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Studies in Conflict & Terrorism

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Reformation of a Terrorist Group:

Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party
a
Krista E. Wiegand
a
Department of Political Science , Georgia Southern University ,
Statesboro, GA, USA
Published online: 23 Jul 2009.

To cite this article: Krista E. Wiegand (2009) Reformation of a Terrorist Group: Hezbollah
as a Lebanese Political Party, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:8, 669-680, DOI:
10.1080/10576100903039320

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 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32:669–680, 2009
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/10576100903039320

Reformation of a Terrorist Group:

Hezbollah as a Lebanese Political Party

KRISTA E. WIEGAND
Department of Political Science
Georgia Southern University
Statesboro, GA, USA
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Despite the classification of Hezbollah as a terrorist group by several states, Hezbollah

is recognized as a legitimate political party within Lebanon. The purpose of this article
is to probe at the reasons why Hezbollah was able to achieve its current status in the
Lebanese government while it still maintains a powerful, well armed military branch that
has used force recently to influence Lebanese politics. An examination of Hezbollah’s life
cycle suggests that two major factors were decisive: 1) Hezbollah’s political leverage
over the majority government, and 2) choices by Hezbollah’s leaders to moderate their
objectives to achieve domestic political goals.

When Westerners think of Hezbollah of Lebanon, what most likely comes to mind are
the suicide bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings of the 1980s, and the years of mili-
tary campaigns in the south of Lebanon against Israel, particularly the war fought in the
summer of 2006. Since its founding in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has had many labels,
some self-imposed, others provided by outsiders: militia, terrorist group, Islamic resistance
organization, social services organization, and political party. Hezbollah has focused its
efforts on one or two roles, and downplayed or ceased other roles altogether, depending on
the political conditions of the time.
Today, Hezbollah devotes most of its efforts to being an active member of the recently
reformed Lebanese government. After 18 months of sit-in protests in downtown Beirut and
a 6-day armed takeover of the capital in May 2008, Hezbollah was successful in winning a
major concession through negotiations with March 14 Alliance, the majority government
alliance. In the negotiations, mediated by Qatar, Hezbollah achieved what it sought as an
opposition party—veto power in the cabinet. Despite the majority government’s desire for
Hezbollah to disarm as a militia, the group was able to gain veto power in the cabinet by
promising not to use armed force within Lebanon to solve internal political problems, but it
did not have to agree to disarm its militia. Hezbollah is not only recognized as a legitimate

Received 15 April 2008; accepted 22 November 2008.

The author thanks participants of the Political Extremism and Democracy Conference at Georgia
State University in June 2008 and the participants of the Southeast Regional Middle East and Islamic
Studies Seminar Fall 2007 conference for helpful comments and suggestions.
Address correspondence to Dr. Krista E. Wiegand, Assistant Professor, Department of Political
Science, Georgia Southern University, P.O. Box 8101, Statesboro, GA, 30460-8101, USA. E-mail:
kwiegand@georgiasouthern.edu

669
 670 K. E. Wiegand

opposition party by the rest of the government, but as an actor that wields enough power to
be respected and taken seriously.
Critics of Hezbollah point to the illegitimate status of the group’s armed militia, as
declared by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559. Yet despite the call to dis-
arm and the classification of Hezbollah as a terrorist group by several states, Hezbollah
is recognized as a legitimate political party within Lebanon, throughout the Arab world,
and even to several Western governments, including the United Kingdom and many other
European states.1 Terrorist groups and political parties often share a common objective—to
engage in political change of some sort, but the major difference is the strategy they use to
achieve their objectives. Terrorist groups pursue violence in order to meet their objectives,
whereas political parties pursue their objectives through peaceful, democratic means. Polit-
ical parties “have been celebrated . . . as indispensable components of a democratic political
order. . . . Terrorist groups by contrast are regarded as organizations whose use of violence
is intended to circumvent or destroy the democratic political process.”2 How was Hezbollah
able to elevate its status as a political party in Lebanon that uses mostly nonviolent political
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strategies, while still maintaining an armed militia, claimed as illegitimate by most? The
purpose of this article is to probe at the reasons why Hezbollah was able to achieve its status
in the Lebanese government despite the continuation of a powerful, well-armed military
branch that has used force recently to influence Lebanese politics.3
This article argues that Hezbollah’s status resulted from two major factors: (1) Hezbol-
lah’s political leverage over the government and (2) choices by Hezbollah’s leaders to
moderate their objectives to achieve domestic political goals. Hezbollah’s transformation
has been unlike that of other terrorist groups that negotiated with powerful governments to
join the political system and disavow violence. Hezbollah was and still is an equally if not
more powerful actor in Lebanese politics, not the government, which provides the group
with political leverage. Hezbollah used its leverage and rational choices to moderate itself
to achieve its domestic political objectives as a legitimate political party in Lebanon.

Hezbollah as a Terrorist Group and Militia

Hezbollah’s founding in 1982 began as part of a general social protest movement of Shia’a
Muslims inspired by Islamist clerics in Lebanon and the success of the Iranian revolution in
1979. The group’s initial identity was as an armed militia actively involved in the Lebanese
civil war fighting against other Lebanese militias and against Israeli occupation of parts of
Lebanon. Hezbollah was officially created as part of a 2 June 1982 meeting of Islamists
and other religious clerics in Lebanon, which resulted in a manifesto of objectives about
the role of Islam in Lebanon and reactions to Israeli military intervention in Lebanon.4
Hezbollah broke off from Amal, another Shia’a militia, and merged with several smaller
Islamic groups. Head clerics in the newly created Hezbollah chose leaders with careful
deliberation and devised plans for mobilizing Shia’a Muslims to join the organization in its
effort toward resistance of Israeli occupation of parts of Lebanon.5 Hezbollah is comprised
of Shia’a Muslims, most of who have felt unrepresented in the political and economic
systems for much of Lebanon’s existence, even though they account for up to 40 percent
of the population in Lebanon.
Since Hezbollah’s beginnings, Iran has been directly involved in the organization’s
strategies and shared Shia’a principles. Hezbollah leaders were greatly inspired by the suc-
cess of the Iranian Revolution and were hopeful for “backing and reinforcement” from the
new Islamic state.6 The relationship between Hezbollah and Iran seemed like a natural fit due
to their shared belief in the jurisdiction of the jurist-theologian—the Ayatollah Khomeini
 Reformation of a Terrorist Group 671

himself, shared Islamic principles, and the same views toward liberation movements and
rejection of Israeli occupation of certain territories. As a result of these shared goals, at
the time of Hezbollah’s founding, the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran commanded the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard to support Lebanon’s resistance against Israel both militarily and
financially, establishing a relationship between Iran and Hezbollah that continues today.
According to U.S. intelligence records of bank transfers, Iran has provided funding for
Hezbollah since the mid-1980s in the amount of approximately $100 million each year and
Hezbollah has regularly sent its soldiers to Iran for “refresher courses” in military training
from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC).7 As a result, Iran has provided training
that has included advanced military training and religious and moral lessons. Hezbollah
officials and Iranian government leaders also regularly talk and meet to discuss their mutual
interests.8 Former Iranian president Hojatoleslam Mohammad Khatami praised Hezbollah
in 2003, claiming that “Hezbollah is the key to Lebanon’s success in fighting occupation,
oppression, and invasions” and Hezbollah leaders have praised Iran for its role in advancing
the cause of Muslims worldwide.9 Iran continues to use Hezbollah as its proxy to have
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greater influence in the region that includes Israel.

As with many political relationships, Hezbollah’s relationship with Syria is not nearly
as direct as its relationship with Iran. Initially, Syria and Hezbollah had no political rela-
tionship, but instead only coordinated on security issues, with President Hafez al-Assad
allowing arms and IRGC troops to travel from Iran via Syria to Lebanon. Hezbollah’s polit-
ical relationship with Syria began in the late 1980s when Hezbollah leaders were concerned
that Syrian troops might ally with Amal, the opposing Shia’a militia in Lebanon. In order
to prevent Syrian support of Amal, Hezbollah leaders met with Syrian representatives to
discuss Syrian support for Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel based on their shared prob-
lems with Israel. Today, Hezbollah is a strong advocate of pro-Syrian policies in Lebanon, a
stance that caused major tensions within the Lebanese government starting in 2005 between
the majority anti-Syrian parties and the pro-Syrian opposition parties Throughout the resis-
tance against the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, Hezbollah officials openly admitted
to having coordinated very closely with Syria.10 Bashar al-Assad has continued his father’s
policy toward Hezbollah’s resistance against Israel, considered to be a legitimate cause.
However, unlike Iran’s support of Hezbollah, Syria’s leverage over Hezbollah has declined
since Syrian withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon in April 2005, making Hezbollah the
stronger player relative to Syria.11
Hezbollah’s objectives have been primarily based on three principles outlined at
the start of the group’s founding—belief in Islam, jurisdiction of the jurist-theologian,
and jihad.12 For Hezbollah, Islam is not only a religious belief, but a code of law and
complete way of life. The implication is that all aspects of life are guided by Islamic
principles. Based on this position and the jurisdiction of the jurist-theologian, the Ay-
atollah in Iran, Hezbollah’s major objectives have been to improve political represen-
tation and economic viability for the Shia’a community of Lebanon, primarily through
social services, to incorporate Islamic principles into the Lebanese political system, to
push for the de-confessionalization of the electoral system and most controversially, to
establish an Islamic state in Lebanon based on the Iranian model, all part of Hezbol-
lah’s embedded goal of da’wa, the mission to spread Islam’s influence in Lebanon.
The last objective has since been changed to Islamic influence in the Lebanese political
system.
The concept of jihad, which means struggle or to strive against an enemy or the negative
aspects of one’s own soul, was best illustrated in its Open Letter of 1985, a “working agenda
defining and expressing the entity called Hizbullah” and “used as a point of entry into the
 672 K. E. Wiegand

Lebanese scene.”13 In the published statement, Hezbollah concluded that, “we have seen
that aggression can be repelled only with the sacrifice of blood, and that freedom is not
given but regained with the sacrifice of both heart and soul.”14 Objectives rooted in jihad
included forcing foreign militaries to withdraw from Lebanon, particularly the American,
French, and Israeli militaries. The Open Letter put the concept of jihad into practice by
stating that “each of us is a combat soldier when the call of jihad demands it and each of
us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his lawful assignment within the
framework of action under the guardianship of the leader jurisprudent.”15
Such “assignments” influenced by jihad included terrorist tactics of targeting Amer-
ican and European civilians in Lebanon throughout the 1980s. Besides the numerous
kidnappings and occasional assassinations of American and European journalists, religious
leaders, academics, and government officials, the best known suspected acts of terrorism
and political violence pursued by Hezbollah include the April 1983 bombing of the U.S.
embassy in Beirut and the October 1983 suicide bombing of the U.S. and French contin-
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gents of the Multinational Force stationed in Lebanon, in which 241 American Marines
were killed. Hezbollah is also suspected of the hijacking of TWA flight 847 in June 1985,
intended to release 766 Lebanese prisoners held in Israel.
Since publishing the Open Letter in 1985, Hezbollah leaders have continued to call
for the destruction of Israel as a Jewish state, viewed as the oppressor of their Palestinian
brothers and occupier of the holy city of Jerusalem, and the creation of a state inclusive of
Palestinians and particularly Muslims. According to Sheikh Atallah Ibrahim of Hezbollah,
head of Hezbollah’s special information unit and official responsible for detainees and
prisoners in Israel, as stated in an interview with the author,

Hezbollah has an ideology—Israel was the enemy and will remain the enemy
always because it is written in the Quran. In the beginning, God talked about
these people, but not that they were to occupy Palestine. They came out of
nowhere into Palestine and stole the land. . . . The only way to negate Israel is
for them to leave Palestine—it’s not good enough until they leave completely.16

Hezbollah’s support of Palestinian terrorist groups is a major reason why Hezbollah offi-
cially remains a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. Department
of State and several U.S. allies including Israel, Canada, Australia, and the United King-
dom. Hezbollah’s designation was cited because “animosity toward the United States has
not abated” and its leaders continue to denounce U.S. policies regarding Israel and the
Palestinians.17 Intelligence shows that Hezbollah has both funded and trained Palestinian
groups in terrorist tactics in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon. Because of the current U.S.
policy that supporters of terrorist groups are terrorists themselves, Hezbollah will continue
to be on the FTO list regardless of its status in Lebanese politics.
Since the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, Hezbollah has focused
mainly on “liberating” the disputed territory of Shebaa Farms, recognized by the United
Nations as Israeli territory, but claimed by the Lebanese government and Hezbollah as
Lebanese territory. Between the summer of 2000 and the summer of 2006, Hezbollah
clashed with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) troops in the disputed Shebaa Farms territory.
The tactics used included use of anti-aircraft missiles against Israeli military aircraft, ground
operations that have directly targeted Israeli soldiers at their bases or during patrol in the
disputed territory, including capturing them as bargaining chips to use in negotiations for
 Reformation of a Terrorist Group 673

the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel, and rocket attacks at Israeli military bases in
northern Israel.
In the 2006 war against Israel, sparked by Hezbollah’s capture of two Israeli soldiers
and the killing of several other Israeli soldiers on 12 July 2006, Hezbollah temporarily
shifted its tactics from attacking Israeli soldiers in Lebanese territory to launching missiles
deep into Israeli territory, killing 43 Israeli civilians. Their justification, retaliation for the
barrage of indiscriminate aerial attacks by the IDF, was not supported by international
humanitarian law and as a result, Hezbollah received harsh criticism from the international
community. At the same time, Israel received even more criticism regarding the deliberate
targeting of civilians in Lebanon, which killed anywhere between a confirmed 510 civilians
and 900 civilians, in addition to the hundreds of Hezbollah fighters killed.18 Since the
cease-fire on 14 August 2006, there have been no rocket attacks by Hezbollah into Israel
and no active combat between Hezbollah forces and the IDF. Negotiations mediated by
Germany resulted in a prisoner exchange between Hezbollah and Israel that took place in
July 2008, including the remains of the two IDF soldiers captured in July 2006.19
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Hezbollah as a Political Party

Despite the stereotype, Hezbollah was not only a terrorist group/militia from the start,
but also a political movement that provided social services. Hezbollah’s political role
began as a provider of social services as a form of da’wa, a mission to extend Shia’a
influence in Lebanon. As early as 1983, Hezbollah created an extensive network of social
services that the Lebanese government was unable to provide, including health services
to the community, water distribution, electricity, and garbage removal.20 Hezbollah “is
arguably the most effective and efficient political organization in the country,” providing
highly efficient levels of social services (hospitals, schools, vocational schools for boys and
girls, cultural centers) unlike any other organization in Lebanon.21 In many cases, Shia’a
are known to turn first to Hezbollah’s services than go to the government for assistance
(welfare, education, and medical needs) because Hezbollah is more efficient overall.
Since the end of the civil war in 1990, Hezbollah has transformed itself to work within
the status quo political system, for the most part using nonviolent political strategies. At
the end of the war, Hezbollah leaders had no choice but to either disband the group as
other militias did and cease to exist, or shift its status to join as a political party in the new
fledgling government. There are numerous terrorist groups that have abandoned an agenda
of political violence, either by transforming into a legitimate political party completely or
by ceasing to exist altogether (Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO], Irish Republican
Army [IRA], National Liberation Front [FLN], Stern Gang, and African National Congress
[ANC]). In the case of Hezbollah, its leaders chose to rein in the political violence, but
still maintain a distinct militia for the resistance movement against the Israeli occupation
of south Lebanon.
At the same time, the group poured parallel energy into broadening its political wing
into a nonviolent political party that would work within the status quo system. Hezbollah
chose to accept the political institutions in place as legitimate and be willing to work
within the government without the use of political violence. In order to do this, Hezbollah
had to engage in what some analysts have labeled Lebanonization, the acceptance of
the multi-religious Lebanese state and the status quo of the state’s political institutions.
By the late 1980s, Hezbollah leaders made a strategic decision to engage in the process
of Lebanonization by becoming involved in the political institutions already in place in
Lebanon and to not use violence to achieve domestic political goals. The decision to join
 674 K. E. Wiegand

the political system was not a default decision, but one that was heavily debated within
Hezbollah. The decision to become involved in the political system and move away from its
use of terrorism was a major step for the group. As a result of the debates, the group chose
to shift its strategy, “as a pragmatic organization, ostensibly ready to abandon commitment
to its ideological concepts or at least to postpone their implementation until far into the
future.”22 Since then, Hezbollah leaders have pursued a more practical political agenda,
while respecting the status quo confessional system, downplaying strong rhetoric, and
providing concessions to the majority government parties.23
In order for Hezbollah to be able to work within the rules of the status quo political
system, it had to first negotiate a deal with the fledgling Syrian-backed Lebanese govern-
ment. To become a legitimate political party, Hezbollah had to be recognized as a legitimate
actor. Therefore, it was necessary for the status quo government to recognize the group’s
right to exist as a political party. Normally, this is done when a government provides a
terrorist group “an opportunity to come in from the cold by providing members of an orga-
nization with amnesty and an opportunity to reconstitute themselves as a peaceful political
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organization.”24 A significant part of this process is direct or implicit bargaining between

the group and the government. Because the group needs acceptance from the government,
often the government uses its powerful bargaining position to extract additional concessions
at this moment as a price of entry into the political field. In the case of Hezbollah, there
was no stable government that used only nonviolence, but a fledgling government made
up of former militias that had turned over their arms. Because Hezbollah ultimately had
more power than the fledgling government made up of other former militias, mostly due to
its backing by Syria, the group did not have to agree to disarm as a concession, like other
terrorist groups/militias usually have to do.
With the exception of not having to disarm, Hezbollah agreed to play by the rules of
the status quo political system, just as all the other political parties did. Leaders learned new
means by which political objectives were sought and other parties had to trust Hezbollah
to pursue non-violent, legitimate means to achieve domestic political goals. Hezbollah
leaders recognized that even though they were well armed and relatively stronger than the
fledgling new government, the group still needed recognition of the organization by the
existing political institutions in Lebanon. The thinking was that recognition of the group
would in fact help make the resistance legitimate as well, so Hezbollah pursued peaceful
negotiations with the ruling parties.25 Despite Hezbollah’s leverage at the time, Hezbollah’s
leaders decided that it was a better approach to negotiate with the ruling parties and provide
some concessions in exchange for recognition as a legitimate party. Ultimately, the strategy
paid off. Rather than using force to achieve domestic political goals like da’wa, Hezbollah
deliberately chose to not use force domestically, even with their fully stocked armed and
well-trained militia in place.
Syria’s strong influence on the postwar Lebanese political system meant that if
Hezbollah were to join the government, it would have to work closely with Damascus.
With Syria’s backing of the military wing of the group, it was not a major step for
Syria to work with the political wing of the group. The Syrian government brokered the
negotiations between Hezbollah and the status quo government by having the two sides
agree to a number of stipulations. The new Lebanese government was still relatively weak
and mostly dependent on Syrian approval. Therefore, if Syria approved the legitimacy of
Hezbollah, then the Lebanese government would too, regardless of whether they wanted
to or not. In the negotiations, Hezbollah agreed to a number of concessions starting with
the forfeiting of aspirations to make Lebanon an Islamic republic ruled by shari’a, like the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Hezbollah also agreed to set aside its radical ideology or at least
 Reformation of a Terrorist Group 675

minimize it so that it could enter the political system, and halt subversive activities against
the Lebanese government. Although it was allowed to maintain a position as an opposition
party, Hezbollah had to agree to be a loyal opposition party.
In exchange for these minor concessions made by Hezbollah, the new government
responded by agreeing to provide protection and promises to Hezbollah that it would be
treated as a legitimate political party if the group followed through on its promises to not
use violence for domestic political objectives. The government also officially endorsed
Hezbollah’s continued resistance against Israeli occupation of south Lebanon, recognizing
it as a national resistance, not just representing Hezbollah’s aspirations. Syrian officials
legitimated Hezbollah’s continued resistance movement against Israel along the border
region of the three states as well, providing much leverage for Hezbollah. Thus, initially
it was both Syria’s increasing political influence in Lebanon and Lebanese government
approval that enabled Hezbollah to continue its resistance movement, while simultaneously
joining the political system as a legitimate political party.
Hezbollah’s first major move as a newly vetted political party was the decision to
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participate in the 1992 parliamentary elections. There was extensive internal debate within
Hezbollah about whether political participation would signal acquiescence, how partici-
pation would affect the resistance movement, and the costs and benefits of participation.
Perhaps of greatest concern was Hezbollah’s ability to continue the armed resistance move-
ment (as a militia) in south Lebanon, while still being able to participate in Lebanese
politics. Hezbollah officials decided that both tasks would be possible and thus began plans
to participate in the first post-war parliamentary elections to be held in 1992. Ten out of
12 members of the delegation assigned to decide the organization’s future voted for par-
ticipation in the Lebanese parliament, deciding that such participation would not serve as
acquiescence, but instead would be a means to reach more people and achieve necessary
changes in Lebanon.26 More importantly, the delegation acknowledged that political par-
ticipation would not conflict with the priority of the resistance movement, as influenced
by the principle of jihad. By participating in the parliament, Hezbollah leaders hoped to
be able to better voice concerns about the resistance movement and gain stronger public
support for the movement.27
Skeptics feared that the organization’s objective to create an Islamic state in Lebanon
was a primary and therefore threatening objective. Hezbollah had enacted shari’a in some
municipalities that have majority Hezbollah control on municipal councils, but since the
early 1990s, there has been no evidence of actual attempts to establish an Islamic state
in Lebanon.28 Rather than attempt to implement an Islamic state, Hezbollah pushed for
electoral reforms based on proportional representation, which would provide the majority
Shia’a Muslims with more voice and influence in the government based on current de-
mographics. Many analysts agree that Hezbollah’s participation in the existing Lebanese
political institutions signals that the group has no actual plan to establish an Islamic state.29
Hezbollah leaders themselves believed that participating in the existing political system
would allow Hezbollah to better present their Islamic point of view and have a more direct
influence on bringing aspects of Islam into legislation.30 Again, just as Hezbollah leaders
had decided to give concessions in the postwar negotiations process, even though they did
not have to do so, they decided a more moderate approach would best work to achieve their
domestic political goals. This was a rational choice to tone down extremist rhetoric and
play by the status quo rules using political institutions rather than force.
In less than 50 days between the announcement of Hezbollah’s intention to participate
in the elections and the actual day of the August 1992 elections, Hezbollah members
successfully mobilized public support by presenting a comprehensive political and social
 676 K. E. Wiegand

program, resulting in a gain of eight seats out of the total 128 seats. One significant factor
for winning seats in the parliament was the creation of a coalition with other religious sects
including both Sunnis and Christians.31 Since then, Hezbollah has participated in the 1996,
2000, and 2005 parliamentary elections and the 1998 and 2004 municipal elections. In the
2000 parliamentary elections, Hezbollah’s share of seats in the Lebanese parliament rose
from 9 to 12. In a coalition with the other dominant Shia’a Muslim group Amal, they won
all 23 seats in southern Lebanon and all 9 seats in the Baalbek-Hermel region, located in
the Bekaa Valley and heavily dominated by Shia’a.32 In the 2005 parliamentary elections,
an alliance between Hezbollah and Amal won control of 35 seats, or 27 percent of the total
seats and in the recent June 2009 elections, the Hezbollah bloc won 57 seats.
For much of the late 1990s and early 2000s, Hezbollah was on decent terms with
other political parties. Despite some skepticism, the majority parties accepted Hezbollah’s
growing position in the government. In the years after the Israeli withdrawal from the south
of Lebanese in 2000, Lebanese officials approved of Hezbollah’s resistance movement
against claimed Israeli occupation of Shebaa Farms, mostly because Hezbollah was better
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equipped than the Lebanese army and more willing to accept casualties. Hezbollah was
not only allowed to pursue guerilla activities in south Lebanon, but it was openly and of-
ficially supported as a legitimate organization pursuing what is perceived by the Lebanese
government as a legitimate resistance to Israeli occupation of Shebaa Farms. As Interna-
tional Relations Head of Hezbollah, Nawwaf al-Musawi, noted in a 2003 interview, it is
the Lebanese government that made the initial claim for Shebaa Farms against Israel. al-
Musawi also pointed out that the government “repeatedly announced the legitimacy of the
right of resistance in working to retrieve that land.”33 From 2000 to early 2005, Hezbollah’s
status became more legitimate, despite its continued control of an armed militia.
Overt government support for Hezbollah came to an abrupt halt after the February
2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. After Syria was accused of
carrying out the assassination, Hezbollah and its allied parties—Amal and the Christian
Free Patriotic Movement—clashed with the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance comprised of
Sunni, Druze, and Christian political parties—Future Movement, Progressive Socialist
Party, Phalange, and Lebanese Forces.34 Hezbollah and other pro-Syrian groups staged a
major demonstration on 8 March in support of Syria. In response, anti-Syrian groups led by
Future Movement led thousands in a protest on 14 March, demanding for the withdrawal of
Syrian forces from Lebanon and an end to Syrian interference in internal Lebanese politics.
By April, the anti-Syrian protests and strong international pressure persuaded Syria to
withdraw its troops from Lebanon. However, Syrian political influence did not cease and
Hezbollah continued to support Syrian influence in Lebanon.
Despite a temporary alliance of the parties in response to the Israeli war in the summer
of 2006, the government continued to split further and further among pro- and anti-Syrian
groups. After the war, the March 14 Alliance, backed by the United States, called for
Hezbollah to disarm its militia and devote itself fully to the political system. Nasrallah
responded to these calls for disarmament by stating that they are “immoral, incorrect and
inappropriate,” that it was “wrong timing on the psychological and moral level particularly
before the cease-fire,” and that disarmament should be discussed secretly and not to satisfy
Israeli demands on Hezbollah’s disarmament.35
By November 2006, in protest to the majority government’s call for an investigation of
Syria’s alleged role in Rafiq Hariri’s assassination, five Shia’a cabinet members, including
those representing Hezbollah, resigned from the cabinet. The party also sponsored and
successfully mobilized pro-Syrian, pro-Hezbollah nonviolent protests in conjunction
with Aoun’s Christian Free Patriotic Movement party. The group was instrumental in
 Reformation of a Terrorist Group 677

organizing a peaceful demonstration in December 2006, mobilizing an estimated 800,000

people who demanded the resignation of anti-Syrian, Western-backed Prime Minister
Fuad Saniora and called for less government corruption and more representation in the
cabinet with an ability to veto decisions such as calls for Hezbollah’s disarmament.
Hezbollah also staged protest encampments in downtown Beirut outside the parliament
building and had parliament members and supporters vote against electing a president on
19 occasions between December 2007 and May 2008. The alliance with Michel Aoun’s
Christian Free Patriotic Movement party helped Hezbollah gain some support across
sectarian lines, but it was political tactics that “provided Hezbollah with the ability to
operate from within the government to disrupt the formation of coherent pro-government
policies. . .”36
In May 2008, Hezbollah shifted its strategy from nonviolent protests and parliamentary
votes to using minor political violence. This was the first time since the end of the civil
war that Hezbollah had used political violence domestically in an attempt to gain political
concessions. Why did Hezbollah turn its guns (literally) against its opponents? First, the
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group’s strategy of nonviolent protests was not gaining them any political ground. When
the government made two moves perceived by Hezbollah to be threatening (the removal
of a pro-Hezbollah manager at the airport and investigations into Hezbollah’s private
communications network), the leaders of Hezbollah retaliated by using limited force.
Since Iran had helped Hezbollah rebuild its military capabilities since the summer 2006
war, the group not only had military leverage that was relatively stronger than the Lebanese
army, but they also had resolve. Hezbollah used the political violence as leverage to compel
the majority government to seriously reconsider the opposition’s political demands. The
crisis, which involved Hezbollah gunmen taking over the capital lasting from May 9–14,
resulting in the deaths of 65 people, ended when Qatar successfully mediated between the
pro- and anti-Syrian groups. The Qatar mediated agreement allows for 16 cabinet members
of the majority parties, 11 members of the opposition parties, and three members chosen
by the president.
To have veto power, one third plus one vote is required, which the opposition parties
have gained. This means that Hezbollah gained the ability to veto any future bills calling
for the disarmament of Hezbollah, a major concession that increased its power in the
government. In exchange, Hezbollah has agreed to not use any armed force to deal with
domestic political problems. This concession may have been a bluff, but the anti-Syrian
majority parties still accepted it as sufficient. Though the majority parties had been calling
for Hezbollah to disarm, the Qatar negotiations did not involve a disarmament deal. Yet
again, Hezbollah demonstrated its ability to gain major influence without having to comply
with calls for disarmament.
The decision to use even some degree of political violence was a major move by
Hezbollah. It is understandable that the majority government wants Hezbollah to disarm. Yet
no moves to push Hezbollah to do so have occurred since the May crisis. Rather, Hezbollah
continues to rebuild its weapons stockpile for its resistance movement against Israel. The
government has little choice about Hezbollah’s continued armament. Hezbollah is stronger,
more effective, and has more resolve than the Lebanese army, and the government knows
this. Whether Hezbollah will use political violence as a coercion strategy within domestic
politics again is hard to predict. Until Hezbollah disarms, the possibility is always there.
In the meantime, the majority government has given Hezbollah the ability to have stronger
influence in the government, with which Hezbollah seems satisfied for now.
Despite many bumps in the road, Hezbollah leaders were successful in becoming a
legitimate political party in Lebanon partly by adapting their organization so that it would
 678 K. E. Wiegand

be able to work within the Lebanese political system. Though Hezbollah continues to
maintain a militia, the political wing evolved into the larger, more significant, and more
influential part of the organization. The result has been a hierarchical leadership system
with an information office, social service divisions, branch offices, active participation
in the parliament and executive cabinet, and alliances with other parties. An observer
of Hezbollah points out that “this hierarchical division of labor (which permits certain
degrees of flexibility) enables the party to move comfortably between the military and the
political apparatus, depending on the circumstances.”37 Hezbollah has become a legitimate,
recognized political party and active member of the status quo political system. A day after
the Lebanese Parliament elected Michel Suleiman as the new president on 25 May 2008,
Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech promising that: “We don’t want to have
control over Lebanon, or to have governance over Lebanon or to impose our ideas over
the people of Lebanon, because we believe Lebanon to be a special and diverse country
that needs collaboration of everyone.”38 Whether Hezbollah, as a full member of the new
national unity government, will be true to its word is still to be determined.
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Conclusion
Hezbollah is a major player in Lebanon and the Middle East. Despite continued reference
to Hezbollah as a terrorist group, the group has also been recognized for more than 16 years
as a legitimate political party in Lebanon. Hezbollah has been in a unique position in that it
is able to act as legitimate political party and provide social services in Lebanon, while still
maintaining an armed militia. Because Hezbollah was not required to disarm as part of the
government negotiations in Qatar in May 2008, it is unlikely that the majority government
will require disarmament anytime soon. As a result of the negotiations, it is very likely that
Hezbollah will not only continue to be a major political party in Lebanon, but its role as a
key opposition party will continue to strengthen its influence on Lebanese politics.
Two major factors were significant for Hezbollah’s shift into a political party and
increased political influence: (1) Hezbollah’s political leverage over the government and
(2) choices by Hezbollah’s leaders to moderate their objectives to achieve domestic political
goals. Not only did Hezbollah leaders deliberately moderate their objectives, rhetoric, and
actions to achieve domestic political goals, but they did so in a unique environment in
which their group had leverage over other parties in the government. These conditions
have allowed Hezbollah to experience a very different trajectory than other terrorist groups
that chose to join political systems. Although there continues to be significant tension
between Hezbollah and the majority political parties, the tension is subdued by Hezbollah’s
continued leverage, preventing the majority parties from stirring up the situation too much.
Hezbollah’s efforts have gained them legitimacy and a relatively strong position in
Lebanon, which has only been enhanced by the 2006 war with Israel and the political crisis
of 2007–2008. A decade and a half after Hezbollah’s strategic decision to become a political
party in Lebanon, it appears that Hezbollah will only continue to become more embedded
in Lebanese politics and maintain a significant amount of public support, regardless of its
continued label as a terrorist organization.

Notes
1. Although the United Kingdom recognizes Hezbollah as a terrorist group, it makes a distinc-
tion between the domestic political organization and the militant wing.
 Reformation of a Terrorist Group 679

2. Leonard Weinberg, “Turning to Terror: The Conditions Under Which Political Parties Turn
to Terrorist Activities,” Comparative Politics 23(4) (July 1991), p. 423.
3. Although it is tempting to debate whether Hezbollah still deserves the designation as a
terrorist group, this article does not seek to address this controversial question. Articles and books
that discuss the status of Hezbollah as a terrorist group include Nazir Hamzeh, “Lebanon’s Hizbullah:
From Islamic Revolution to Parliamentary Accommodation,” Third World Quarterly 14(2) (1993);
Augustus Richard Norton, “Hezbollah: From Radicalism to Pragmatism,” Middle East Policy 4(5)
(January 1998); S. Simon and J. Stevenson, “Declawing the ‘Organization of God’ Toward Normal-
ization in Lebanon,” World Policy Journal (Summer 2001); Joseph Alagha, “Hizbullah’s Gradual
Integration in the Lebanese Public Sphere,” Sharqiyyat 13(1) (2001); A. Saad-Ghorayeb, Hizbullah:
Politics and Religion (London: Pluto Press, 2002); and Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing
Face of Terrorism (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004).
4. Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within (London: Saqi, 2005), p. 20.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 235.
7. “Iran/Lebanon Hostage Payments Reported,” Facts on File World Digest, 23 January
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1992, p. 35 D3; 60 Minutes, “Hezbollah: ‘A-Team Terrorists,’“ CBS News, 18 April 2003.
Some say that Iran has provided Hezbollah with up to $300 million in the past year. See Bill
Samii, “Lebanese and Palestinians Train in Iran,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 16 January
2003.
8. Numerous news stories from Lebanese and Iranian newspapers cite meetings between
Hezbollah officials and Iranian government officials.
9. Bill Samii and Steve Fairbanks, “Iran: Khatami Meets with Hezbollah Leader in Beirut,”
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 May 2003; “Hezbollah Leader Praises Iran for Supporting
Muslims,” IRNA news agency, 28 April 2003.
10. Augustus R. Norton, “Hezbollah and the Israeli Withdrawal From Southern Lebanon,”
Journal of Palestine Studies 30(1) (Autumn 2000), p. 26.
11. See Robert G. Rabil, “Has Hezbollah’s Rise Come at Syria’s Expense?,” Middle East
Quarterly 14(4) (2007) and Emile El-Hokayem, “Hizballah and Syria: Outgrowing the Proxy Re-
lationship,” The Washington Quarterly (Spring 2007) for analysis about Syria’s relationship with
Hezbollah.
12. Qassem, Hizbullah, pp. 21–58.
13. Qassem, Hizbullah, p. 98.
14. Hezbollah Central Information Office, “Nass al-Risala al-Maftuha Allati Wajahaha Hezbol-
lah ila-l-Mustad’afin fi Lubnan wa-l-Alam” (“Open Letter to Dowtrodden in Lebanon and the World”),
al-Safir, 16 February 1985.
15. Ibid.
16. Interview with Sheikh Attalah Ibrahim, Central Information Office of Hezbollah, Haret
Hreik, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 June 2000.
17. Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, “Know Thy Enemy: Hezbollah, ‘Terrorism’ and the
Politics of Perception,” Third World Quarterly 26(1) (2005), p. 175. See “Daily Says Many Hezbollah
Members ‘Social Workers’ Not ‘Terrorists,’” Tehran Times, 9 September 2002 for Hezbollah’s
response to U.S. designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
18. Five hundred and ten deaths were confirmed on the ground by Human Rights Watch. The
900 deaths are estimated by Jane’s Defense Weekly. See Human Rights Watch, Why They Died:
Civilian Casualties in Lebanon During the 2006 War (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007) and
Alon Ben-David, “Israel Introspective After Lebanon Offensive,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, 26 August
2006.
19. Prisoner negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel occurred from September to December
1991, July 1996, June 1998, December 1999, January 2004, and July 2008. See Barry Schweid,
“Hostage Releases Follow Years of Frustrating Diplomacy,” The Associated Press, 4 December
1991; “Hezbollah-Israeli Prisoner-Body Exchange,” Radio Lebanon, 22 July 1996; Hussein Dakroub,
“Prisoners Arrive Home after Israel and Lebanon Swap Bodies,” The Associated Press, 26 June 1998;
 680 K. E. Wiegand

“Five Released Hezbollah Members Welcomed at Beirut Airport,” Radio Lebanon, 30 December
1999; “Israel, Hezbollah Swap Prisoners,” CNN, 29 January 2004.
20. Harik, Hezbollah, pp. 83–85.
21. Augustus R. Norton, Hezbollah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics (New
York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1999), p. 2.
22. Eyal Zisser, “Hezbollah: Between Armed Struggle and Domestic Politics,” in Barry Rubin,
ed., Revolutionaries and Reformers: Contemporary Islamist Movements in the Middle East (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 2003), p. 94.
23. Bilal Y. Saab, “Rethinking Hezbollah’s Disarmament,” Middle East Policy 15(3) (2008), p.
96.
24. Leonard Weinberg and Ami Pedahzur, Political Parties and Terrorist Groups (New York:
Routledge, 2003), p. 62.
25. Qassem, Hizbullah, p. 190.
26. Qassem, Hizbullah.
27. Interview with Sheikh Attalah Ibrahim, Central Information Office of Hezbollah, Haret
Hreik, Beirut, Lebanon, 30 June 2000.
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28. Harb and Leenders, “Know They Enemy,” p. 179.

29. Zisser, “Hezbollah,” p. 95.
30. Qassem, Hizbullah, pp. 187–191.
31. In addition to the eight Shi’ite winners, the coalition also included two Sunni, one Roman
Catholic, and one Maronite Catholic Members of Parliament.
32. S. Simon and J. Stevenson, “Declawing the ‘Organization of God’ Toward Normalization
in Lebanon,” World Policy Journal (Summer 2001), p. 39.
33. Khalid Al-Haruji, “Hezbollah Official Discusses Political Stance, Regional Ties, Others,”
al-Majallah, 17 August 2003.
34. In February 2006, Hezbollah’s Secretary General Nasrallah and Michel Aoun, head of the
Christian Free Patriotic Movement party, signed a Memorandum of Agreement, creating the March
8 Alliance, which encouraged national dialogue with all political parties in Lebanon, supported
consensual democracy, called for electoral law reform emphasizing proportional representation,
encouraged positive relations with Syria and the Palestinians, promoted an improved national defense
system in Lebanon, recognized the right of Lebanese control of Shebaa Farms, and proposed the
return of Lebanese citizens imprisoned in Israel. Full English text of Aoun-Hezbollah agreement, Ya
Libnan, 9 February 2006, available at http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2006/02/full english te.php.
Nasrallah partially justified the capture of the two Israeli soldiers in July 2006 by citing the objective
of releasing Lebanese prisoners in Israel and the Lebanese right to Shebaa Farms in the memorandum.
See al-Jazeera Satellite Television, Interview with Hezbollah Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah by
al-Jazeera Beirut Bureau Chief Ghassan Bin-Jiddu, 20 July 2006.
35. Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, al-Manar Television, 14 August 2006.
36. Imad Salamey and Fred Pearson, “Hizbollah: A Proletarian Party with an Islamic Mani-
festo,” paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, Chicago,
April 2006.
37. Saab, “Rethinking Hezbollah’s Disarmament,” p. 98.
38. “Hezbollah Promises Lebanon Cooperation,” available at CNN.com. 26 May 2008.