In Re: Petition for recognition of Divorce between Takashi and Morana vs discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals

individuals whose rights

Republic/GR No. 227605/ December 05, 2019/Lazaro-Javier, J. are equally protected by the law.

Facts: The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the
equal protection clause. They said that the limitation provided by Article 26 is
Petitioner Morana and Minoru Takahashi got married sometime based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation of
on 24 June 2002 in San Juan, Manila. They then lived in Japan where they the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against
had two (2) children named as follows: Haruna Takhashi and Nanami Filipino spouses who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who
Takahashi. Later, after ten (10) years together, their marriage turned sour. obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated the
According to the petitioner, her husband failed to perform his marital divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction
obligations to her and he also refused to give support to their two (2) between them as regards to the validity of the divorce decree obtained
children. She also alleged that her husband cohabited with another woman. would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.
Because they can no longer amend their relationship, and the petitioner kept
on demanding for financial support, they finally agreed to divorce. Hence this The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the
case. solidarity of the Filipino family but also to defend, among others, the right of
children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and
Issue: other conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if
the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is limited to
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred, in affirming the
only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.
dismissal of the petition for recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
Ruling:
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types
No. A foreign decree of divorce may be recognized in the
of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates
Philippines although it was the Filipino spouse who obtained the same.
the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it
General Rule, the Philippine law does not allow absolute divorce. and leaves the bond in full force.
However, as enshrined in Article 26 of the Family Code, a Filipino married to
The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the
a foreign national is allowed to contract a subsequent marriage if a divorce
Court to believe that the decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The
decree is validly obtained by the alien spouse abroad.
fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce
Republic vs. Manalo/ G.R. No. 221029/2018 must still be proved.

Facts: In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on
Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce.
divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to
Racho vs. Tanaka/ G.R. No. 199515/June 25, 2018/Leonen, J.
cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry
and to be allowed to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo. (Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to
determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, where a
divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes “validly obtained” and
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status should be given to
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
the Filipino spouse. The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino
incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
spouse from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be
capacity to remarry under Philippine law
inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national
Issues: laws from something that a foreign law may allow.)
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse
FACTS:
initiate the divorce instead of the foreign spouse?
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married on April 20, 2001 in Las
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the
Piñas City, Metro Manila. They lived together for nine years in Japan and did
Philippines?
not have any children. Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka
Held: filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She secured a Divorce
Certificate issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama of the Japanese Consulate in
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be the Philippines and had it authenticated by the DFA. She was informed that
taken into consideration. According to Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to
the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid the the Philippines to report the documents for registration and to file the
absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign appropriate case for judicial recognition of divorce.
spouse even though the latter is no longer married to the former. According
to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil
Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does Registry of Manila but was refused since there was no court order
not discriminate as to who should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the recognizing it. When she went to the Department of Foreign Affairs to renew
Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo that her passport, she was likewise told that she needed the proper court order.
the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be She was also informed by the National Statistics Office that her divorce could
initiated by the foreign spouse, the Court will not follow such interpretation only be annotated in the Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order
since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law. capacitating her to remarry.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the She filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of
Court ruled that even if Manalo should be bound by the nationality principle, Capacity to Marry before the RTC but the latter held that failed to prove that
blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied. Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC
but the latter deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse
duly authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce. On from initiating or participating in the divorce proceedings. It would be
March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance, attaching a duly inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own national
authenticated Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce that she laws from something that a foreign law may allow. The question in this case,
obtained in Japan. therefore, is not who among the spouses initiated the proceedings but rather
if the divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent was valid.
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by
agreement becomes effective upon notification, whether oral or written, by Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the
both parties and by two or more witnesses. She contends that the Divorce matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of
Certificate stating “Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan” is sufficient to prove that would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other
she and her husband have divorced by agreement and have already effected interpretation than that the divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is
notification of the divorce. She avers further that under Japanese law, the absolute and completely terminates their marital tie. Even under our laws,
manner of proving a divorce by agreement is by record of its notification and the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties
by the fact of its acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce the legal capacity to remarry.
Certificate. She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since
Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states that a matrimonial relationship is Yasin vs. Shari’a District Court/G.R. No. 94986/February 23, 1995/Bidin, J.
terminated by divorce.
Facts: 
ISSUE:
After the dissolution of her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim
Whether the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is Law of the Philippines, petitioner Yasin filed a petition to resume the use of
sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce was validly obtained by Tanaka maiden name before the Shari'a District Court. The respondent court denied
according to his national law. the petition on the ground that the petition is substantially for change of
name and that compliance with the provisions of Rule 103 Rules of Court on
RULING: change of name is necessary if the position is to be granted. 

Yes. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a Issues: 

foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in the Philippines as long as it was
validly obtained according to the foreign spouse’s national law. The second 1. WON petitioner seek to change her registered name?
paragraph provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained 2. WON in case the marriage ties no longer exist (as in the case of death,
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino divorce, annulment), does women need to seek judicial confirmation of the
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. change in their civil status in order to revert to their maiden name?

Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is Held:

insufficient. In Garcia v. Recio, the court established the principle that before
1. The true and real name of a person is that given to him and entered in the
a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a separate action
civil register. While it is true that under Article 376 of the Civil Code, no
must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of
person can change his name or surname without judicial authority,
foreign laws and foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce
nonetheless, the only name that may be changed is the true and official
decree and the national law of the foreign spouse must be pleaded and
name recorded in the Civil Register. In the instant petition, petitioner does
proved like any other fact before trial courts.
not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution
Certificate issued by Consul Takayama. This Certificate only certified that the of her marriage, by virtue of a decree of divorce granted in accordance with
divorce decree, or the Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce, Muslim law. 
exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. Upon appeal to this Court, however, 2. No. When a woman marries a man, she need not apply and/or seek
petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, judicial authority to use her husband's name by prefixing the word "Mrs."
certifying that the divorce has been accepted. before her husband's full name or by adding her husband's surname to her
maiden first name. The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil Code).
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case
of Divorce is a question of fact that would not ordinarily be within this of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by the Muslim Code, the
Court’s ambit to resolve. The court records, however, are already sufficient widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her
to fully resolve the factual issues. civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as the use of her former
husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. When petitioner
Additionally, the Office of the Solicitor General neither posed any objection married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status.
to the admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce nor Neither was she required to secure judicial authority to use the surname of
argued that the Petition presented questions of fact. In the interest of judicial her husband after the marriage, as no law requires it. The use of the
economy and efficiency, this Court shall resolve this case on its merits. husband's surname during the marriage, after annulment of the marriage
and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce by
case of legal separation.
agreement is not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code.
In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the burden of
The court finds the petition to resume the use of maiden name filed by
this narrow interpretation, which may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section
petitioner before the respondent court a superfluity and unnecessary
14 of our Constitution provides that State recognizes the role of women in
proceeding since the law requires her to do so as her former husband is
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of
already married to another woman after obtaining a decree of divorce from
women and men. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is
her in accordance with Muslim laws. 
irrelevant for courts to determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the
divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued, the divorce becomes “validly Cohabitation, Mutual love, mutual help and support
obtained” and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status
should be given to the Filipino spouse. Garcia vs. Santiago/L-28904/December 29, 1928/Ostrand, J.
Facts: returned to her parent’s home.  Goitia filed a complaint against respondent
for support outside the conjugal home.  It was alleged that respondent
This is an appeal but the plaintiff from a judgment of the Court of demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. 
First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissing the complaint. Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other
than the legal and valid cohabitation.  Since Goitia kept on refusing,
In her complaint the plaintiff alleges that she was married to the
respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her
defendant Isabelo Santiago on 1910, and that from that date they lived
face and different body parts.  The trial court ruled in favor of respondent
together as husband and wife, until continued family dissentions compelled
and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in
her to leave the conjugal dwelling on 1925. plaintiff and Isabelo Santiago
the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her
have been several discussions and quarrels, which culminated in their
separation or divorce from respondent.  Goitia filed motion for review.
separation of February 3, 1925, which separation became necessary in order
to avoid personal violence; that notwithstanding plaintiff's repeated ISSUE:
demands, defendants Isabelo Santiago has continually refused to provide for
her support, and plaintiff could not live in their conjugal dwelling, because of Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her
illicit relations between Alejo Santiago and Prisca Aurelio. outside the conjugal home.

The defendants' answer to the complaint was a general denial. HELD:

Issues: The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is
created merely in the act of marriage.  The law provides that the husband,
WON The court erred in declaring her separation from the who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying
defendant Isabelo Santiago unjustified. her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. 
However, this option given by law is not absolute.  The law will not permit
WON The court erred in not granting the plaintiff the right to
the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the
administer the conjugal property.
wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.  In
Held: the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of
the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim
It clearly appears that the spouses led a rather stormy life support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the
subsequent to the dishonor of the plaintiff's daughter, Prisca, and that conjugal home.
husband, according to the plaintiff's testimony, went so far as to order her to
leave his house and threatened to illtreat her if she returned. It also appears People vs. Edgar Jumawan/G.R. No. 147895/April 21, 2014/ Reyes J. 
that, aside from the quarrels, she had very unpleasant experiences in other
Facts:
respects. Her young daughter was, and still, under her care, and her assertion
that her husband's son was the cause of her daughter's pregnancy is                 On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging
probably not unfounded. It requires no stretch of the imagination to that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of
conclude that to keep the two young people under the same roof with the December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
opportunity to continue their illicit relations would create a very December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing
embarrassing situation for the girl's mother. to have sex with him.

Taking into consideration the facts stated, we do not think that                 KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache
the plaintiffs' separation from the husband in unjustified. Ordinarily, it is not and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did
the fault of one that two quarrel, and in all probability, the plaintiff is not free not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and
from blame, but she was virtually driven out of their home by her husband threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood
and threatened with violence if she should return. Under these up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. The
circumstances, to compel the plaintiff to cohabit with her husband can only accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his
lead to further quarrels and would probably be unfortunate for both parties. desire to copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely
The separation therefore seems necessary. declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling
well. The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK
As to the plaintiff's maintenance allowance it is the evident that
tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully
the sum of P500 monthly is much too large and that an allowance of P50 per
they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.
month is all that ought be granted at present.
                Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely
The fifth assignment of error relates principally to the plaintiff's
fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the control
prayer for an allowance of attorney's fees. Under the circumstances of the
and management of their businesses, and to cover up her extra-marital
case, we do not think that the court below erred in refusing to grant such
affairs.
allowance.
Issue:
The judgment appealed from is therefore modified, and it is
ordered that the defendant, Isabelo Santiago, pay to the plaintiff the sum of                 Whether or not there can be a marital rape.
P50 per month for her maintenance and that such payments be made within
the first ten days of each month. No costs will be allowed. Held:

So Ordered.                 YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property
rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
Goitia vs. Rueda/ G.R. No. 94986/November 02, 1916/ marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

FACTS:                 The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from
non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda,
and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The
respondent, were married on 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San
Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital
Marcelino Manila.  They stayed together for a month before petitioner
rape and non-marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted SEC. 7. Venue. The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall
in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women
consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place
withstand even the slightest scrutiny. The Court declared the marital where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial
exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional. Said Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from the complainant.
prosecution for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains
pertained to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but he will
possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon
be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her. Moreover, all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is settled
relationship with his victim. The Court also ruled against the application of that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, "this
implied consent theory which was raised by the accused. The accused argued authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their
wife unless the contrary is proved. conformity to the fundamental law." The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a
                According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs.
without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her,
and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying  Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, G.R. No. 168852/ September 30, 2008/ Austria-
Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353. Marinez J.

Garcia vs. Drilon/G.R. No. 179267/June 25, 2013/Perlas-Bernabe J. (Applicability of the doctrine of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code to
R.A. 9262 Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004.)
Facts
Facts:
On 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for
herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition (Civil Case No. On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari Go-Tan and Steven Tan were
06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance married. Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and
of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage,
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical petitioner Go-Tan filed a petition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital Protective Order (TPO) against Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of causing verbal, psychological, and economic abuses upon her in violation of
her children and of financial support. Section 5, paragraphs (e) (2) (3) (4), (h) (5) and (i) of Republic Act No. 9262

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Issue:
Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698),
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) Whether or not respondents-spouses, Perfecto and Juanita,
the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included in the petition for the issuance of
the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued a protective order, in accordance with RA 9262.
in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
Held:
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed
Yes, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. While the
the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
provisions of RA 9262 provides that the offender be related to the victim by
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with
marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. In
R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection
Section 47 of RA 9262, it has expressly provided for the suppletory
orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
application of the RPC. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under
in the Resolution dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now the Supreme special laws, such as RA 9262 in which the special law is silent on a particular
Court. matter. 

Issue Pelayo vs. Lauron/G.R. No. L-4089/January 12, 1909/Torres, J.

1. Whether or not the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest Facts:
possible opportunity?
Dr. Arturo Pelayo filed a complaint against Marelo Lauron and
Held Juana Abellana alleging that upon their request, he rendered medical
assistance to their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a
Family Court's jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a child. The just and equitable value of the services rendered by him was P500,
statute. At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special which the defendants refuse to pay without alleging any good reason
courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise therefor.
known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against In their Answer, Marelo and Juana alleged that their daughter-in-
women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court law had died in consequence of the said childbirth, and that when she was
designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one alive, she lived with her husband independently and in a separate house
Family Court in each of several key cities identified. To achieve harmony with without any relation whatever with them, and that, if on the day when she
the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional gave birth she was in the house of the defendants, her stay there was
Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive accidental and due to fortuitous circumstances; therefore, the defendants
jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law: should be absolved of the complaint with costs against the plaintiff.
Issue: 

WON Marelo and Juana obliged to pay petitioner for the medical

assistance rendered to their daughter-in-law?

Held:
No. According to article 1089 of the Civil Code, obligations are
created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and by illicit acts and
omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
Obligations arising from law are not presumed. Those expressly determined
in the code or in special laws, etc., are the only demandable ones.
Obligations arising from contracts have legal force between the contracting
parties and must be fulfilled in accordance with their stipulations. (Arts. 1090
and 1091.) 

The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised

among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of
mutual support. (Arts. 142 and 143.) If every obligation consists in giving,
doing or not doing something (Art. 1088), and spouses were mutually bound
to support each other, there can be no question but that, when either of
them by reason of illness should be in need of medical assistance, the other
was under the unavoidable obligation to furnish the necessary services of a
physician in order that health may be restored, and he or she may be freed
from the sickness by which life is jeopardized. The party bound to furnish
such support was therefore liable for all expenses, including the fees of the
medical expert for his professional services. Consequently, the person bound
to pay the fees due to the plaintiff for the professional services that he
rendered was the husband of the patient.

Within the meaning of the law, the father and mother-in-law are
strangers with respect to the obligation that devolves upon the husband to
provide support, among which is the furnishing of medical assistance to his
wife at the time of her confinement; and, on the other hand, it does not
appear that a contract existed between the defendants and the plaintiff
physician, for which reason it is obvious that the former cannot be compelled
to pay fees which they are under no liability to pay because it does not
appear that they consented to bind themselves.