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d
 Mark Leonard
Page 1

Economics Jonathan Hackenbroich

Page 18

Technology José Ignacio Torreblanca

Page 38

Climate Alex Clark and Susi Dennison

Page 62

People Fiona Adamson and Kelly Greenhill

Page 84

Military Ulrike Franke

Page 106

Health Anthony Dworkin

Page 126

Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev

Culture Page 148
f
 The Power Atlas
by Mark Leonard

The post-cold war era is over. Its end came slowly and then all at once with the
abrupt and chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The heart-rending scene of
desperate Afghan civilians falling off American evacuation planes at Kabul airport
may become an image that marks the conclusion of that US-dominated era. It was
not simply Afghan civilians who were left behind, but also a certain dream of a
liberal international order cemented by economic globalisation and the internet, and
governed by liberal democracy and free-market capitalism. Of course, the shift had
been a long time coming. The debacles that followed the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 had severely dented America’s credibility
as an international guarantor of economic and military security, while the Obama-
Trump years had been defined by a desire to end ‘forever wars’ abroad and concentrate
on domestic issues. And, outside the West, other powers had grown not just in
economic and military might, but also in their determination to chart an independent
course rather than follow the Western playbook. President Joe Biden likes to say that
“America is back.” Well, maybe – but, if it has re-emerged from the populism and
quasi-isolationism of the Trump years, America is a very different country confronting
a changed world.

The contours of this world, and the new patterns of American engagement, have
consequences in every region. Yet it is Europeans who feel the change most
dramatically. For hundreds of years, we have been at the centre of geopolitics – either
as the motors of history or the world’s most important battleground. For decades,
we have been used to looking at global problems through a Western prism, with the
transatlantic alliance as the main unit of analysis for addressing these challenges. And,

1
 since the end of the cold war, we have thought that the core lesson of the European
Union – that interdependence reduces conflict by turning enemies into friends – could
be applied to the rest of the world.

The chaotic end of the post-cold war era has raised profound questions about all
three ideas. The United States has made clear that it is pivoting away from Europe
and the greater Middle East to focus on the Indo-Pacific. That the US did not
consult its European allies about the manner of the Afghanistan withdrawal – while
simultaneously manoeuvring to sign a submarine pact with Australia and the United
Kingdom – demonstrated once again that, while it values the EU’s support on key
issues, it no longer looks at the world through a Western prism. And the fact that
America was doing all this to become more battle-ready for a generational ‘cold war
2.0’ with China showed that the hope of using interdependence to forge a multilateral
world order has given way to decoupling and great power competition. I have sought
to describe the new geopolitical era conceptually in my book The Age of Unpeace. This
atlas is a companion volume that shows through data where power now lies in the
world.

Finding the right map

Many Europeans have been forced to let go of their dreams of moving towards ‘one
world’ governed by economic interdependence and multilateral politics. But they do
not know what will take its place. In recent times, commentators have often written
about the world ‘going back to normal’ and encouraged us to dust off more traditional
geopolitical frameworks to understand international affairs.

At the end of the nineteenth century, two grand theories competed to define the
twentieth-century map of power. The first – best described by American naval
strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan – held that the emerging technologies of massive ships
powered by fossil fuels implied that whoever held command of the seas would control
the world. The second was exemplified by British theorist Halford Mackinder, whose
heartland theory held that, in an age of railroads, power flowed to those in control of
the large landmass and abundant natural resources of Eurasia. These theories implied
different maps of the world and different strategies for prospering in the twentieth
century. The Germans followed Mackinder’s map to eventual ruin; the Americans used
Mahan’s map and prospered. Regardless of one’s destination, it is important to use the
right map.

So, what map of power would explain the modern world? Europeans had hoped that it
would be defined by flows of goods and services rather than geopolitical blocs, and by
the rights of individuals rather than competing states. They tried to build a new world

2
 The Power Atlas

based on pooled sovereignty, mutually beneficial interdependence, and norms that

everyone would eventually accept. But national sovereignty has proven too resilient,
interdependence too double-edged, and norms too contested.

At the same time, the new world is not simply a return to old concepts, a geographical
projection based on either land or sea. On the old map, states were well-defined
entities that shielded themselves from the influence of others. It made sense, therefore,
to map power geographically. In a globalised world, however, interdependence is a
reality in everything from trade, investment, and supply chains to flows of people and
information.

In an era in which states use their interdependence against one another, power is no
longer defined by control of land or oceans, or even the normative influence of “soft
power”. It is now defined by control over flows of people, goods, money, and data, and
via the connections they establish. As states compete to control such connections and
the dependencies they create, these flows cut across overlapping spheres of influence –
shaping the new map of geopolitical power. Only those who see this map clearly will be
able to control the modern world.

The purpose of this atlas is to describe the key terrains of power. The European
Council on Foreign Relations commissioned seven essays that explore these seven
terrains: economics, technology, climate, people, military, health, and culture. By
studying each of the terrains closely, one can see how various states are already trying
to seize what they view as the high ground, as well as what this means for the future
of conflict and relative power. During the cold war, the world was split between free
countries and authoritarian states – a divide that gave the West enormous soft power.
It was not just that many people yearned for the freedoms of liberal democracy,
but also that liberal democracies seemed to be richer and better at solving political
problems than their rivals. And, in the case of the US, they were also more powerful
in every measure. Superficially, the world looks very similar today, with many people
talking about a new cold war between the US (as the ‘leader of the free world’) and
a China that stands alongside other authoritarian powers such as Russia. However,
while the map of global politics might appear to be similar, there has been a dramatic
change in the very nature of power and the ways in which it flows through that map.
Even if our world has not been defined by world wars, it is riven with global conflict,
as each of the terrains of power becomes a battlefield. This liminal condition – neither
a formal war, but certainly not peace – is something that cyber scholars such as Lucas
Kello have theorised very skilfully. But now the same dynamics are spreading to all
facets of globalisation. It is a condition best described by the old Anglo-Saxon word
‘unpeace’.

3
 The seven key terrains of the Power Atlas

The Power Atlas describes the structure of the complicated web of connections and
flows in today’s globalised world. Journalist Thomas Friedman once famously claimed
that globalisation would lead to a flat world. But, in reality, the world is mountainous
and criss-crossed by networks in which some powers are much more central than
others. The nature of the ties that bind them together creates great opportunities for
exercising power and influence.

Each essay in this collection focuses on one of the seven key terrains of the Power
Atlas – describing how it has become a battleground of power, as well as the metrics
of power, vulnerabilities, and ‘weapons’ on this terrain. The essays outline the power
dynamics on each terrain and who has advantages in controlling them. The maps
show that some of the legacy powers – such as the US and Europe – continue to have
certain advantages even as the terrains become more multipolar and subject to a rise
in Chinese influence. Maybe the biggest change to the effects of hard power in the first
six terrains lies in the seventh one: culture. The fact that the world is moving from
universalism and liberalisation to cultural resistance has blunted the advantages of
many of the established powers in the other domains.

Jonathan Hackenbroich describes in his essay on the economics terrain how level
playing field penalties and market access – together with other economic tools
such as export controls, sanctions, and data regulations – have become the main
non-military battlefield of great power politics. He differentiates between offensive
tools governments can use to implement policies that increase their economic
and geopolitical reach, and defensive tools that limit a country’s vulnerability to
offensive economic instruments. However, efforts to build up defensive and offensive
capabilities in the economic realm can have negative repercussions for economic
strength – which the essay describes as the third metric of power on this terrain.
Hackenbroich assesses global powers’ attempts to walk this fine line, highlighting
the disadvantages the EU faces on the economic and finance terrain. The dominance
of the US dollar gives Washington an extraordinary ability to act as the gatekeeper
of the global financial system. Through the use of sanctions, entities lists, and rules
on listing and delisting companies, the US has many opportunities to coerce other
countries into compliance. And, paradoxically, the countries that are most vulnerable
to this pressure are in Europe because they are the most exposed to the American
financial system – and are least used to thinking they need to defend themselves from
America. But this chapter also shows that, in the longer run, China could become an
even more significant player on this terrain. Two-thirds of countries already trade
more with China than America. And differential growth rates mean that the balance of
power will shift. But the biggest changes come from the way that President Xi Jinping
4
 The Power Atlas

is shifting China’s economic model from one based on ‘export-led growth’ to a model
of ‘dual circulation’. Under this system, the goal is to have two parallel economies –
an internal one that is shielded from international pressure, and an external one that
allows China to use others’ dependence on it to increase its international clout. China
is working to achieve these two goals with a raft of new policies such as export controls
and the development of non-dollarised payment systems. Meanwhile, powers such as
Russia and Turkey are increasingly using negative offensive tools but lack the ability
to project power at the global level. The EU – with its large market and single currency
– does have the potential to be a player on this terrain. But the union is held back by
the fact that it places the economic and political realms in different silos, and that it is
reluctant to use its resources as a deterrent to weaponised interdependence.

Nowhere are these limitations clearer than on the technology terrain. José Ignacio
Torreblanca outlines in his essay how today’s battles are about critical digital
infrastructure, critical raw materials, and new industries such as artificial intelligence
(AI), the control of data flows and storage, semiconductors, 5G and mobile equipment,
and quantum technology, as well as the definition of standards for new technologies.
New technologies are used for foreign influence operations, disinformation, and cyber-
attacks. This has led to very low levels of public trust in technology. The great powers
on the technology terrain – China and the US – are once again thinking in terms of
spheres of influence and trying to lure countries into their technological ecosystems.
In 2019 companies headquartered in the US and China accounted for 90 per cent of
the market capitalisation of the 70 largest digital platforms (68 per cent and 22 per
cent respectively), 75 per cent of all patents related to blockchain technologies, 75
per cent of the cloud computing market, and 50 per cent of global spending on the
internet of things. The US continues to have huge advantages on this terrain. The
market capitalisation of American companies means that they can outspend or buy
up any potential competitors in smaller markets. The US also dominates the world
of data centres and the use of bandwidth – giving it the opportunity to mine the
data of other powers both openly and secretly (as Edward Snowden revealed). Once
again, China is emerging as an increasingly important player. It is a hyper-power in
its investment in research and development, as its ‘Made in China 2025’ initiative
strives to transform the country into the dominant player in many of the technologies
of the future, from AI and quantum computing to batteries and smart cities. China
also outranks other nations in online retail sales. Its access to rare earths provides it
with a possible choke-point – one that it has used to advance a geopolitical agenda.
Its leadership in surveillance technology allows it to strengthen the repressive power
of the state, build huge databases for AI, and forge links with other states that want to
use its technologies to control society. The biggest losers in the new world are Africa
and south Asia, which are still relatively offline – although this also makes them less

5
 vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Europeans, in contrast, have only just begun to look at
technology through a geopolitical lens. The EU is wedged between the US and China; it
fails on both fronts – tech sovereignty and competitive edge.

In their essay on the climate terrain, Alex Clark and Susi Dennison explore how
climate change and the transition away from a carbon-fuelled economy are changing
power dynamics in today’s world. A large proportion of remaining oil, gas, and coal
resources will become stranded assets – with potentially devastating consequences
for the main exporters. In the short run, the biggest losers are high-cost producers
such as the US and Canada. But, eventually, even the lowest-cost producers in the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) – such as Saudi Arabia,
Qatar, Iraq, and Kuwait – are likely to see fossil fuel extraction become economically
unviable. At the same time, a range of renewables superpowers is emerging through
quick investment and innovation in the areas of carbon capture and storage, battery
storage, advanced nuclear technologies (China and the US), and green hydrogen and
battery production (the EU and China). The countries and regions with the largest,
lowest-cost solar and wind resources also have clear advantages on this terrain – as do
those in possession of the crucial raw materials needed for the green transition. There
are huge differences between states in their vulnerability to, and capacity to deal with,
the physical effects of climate change and concurrent environmental crises. However,
as the distributional effects of climate policy become clearer, it is likely that there will
be a backlash against Western countries that are seen as cloaking their protectionist
instincts in green rhetoric.

Fiona Adamson and Kelly Greenhill argue in their essay on the people terrain that
“labour migrants, refugees, tourists, students, expatriates, and global elites all emerge
as potential pieces on a strategic chessboard on which states compete for advantage
and influence.” A big population or appeal as a popular destination for migrants,
students, or tourists can be a source of power but can also create dependencies and
vulnerabilities. Adamson and Greenhill differentiate mainly between migration
magnets (such as Gulf countries, the US, and Germany); diaspora powers (such as
China and India); remittances seekers (such as Nepal, Tajikistan, and Ukraine);
and those that commodify migrants by either selling citizenship (such as St Kitts-
Nevis), using their geographical position to block migration outflows (such as Libya),
or acting as ‘warehouses’ of their own or others’ populations (such as Turkey or
Nauru). The authors highlight that the idea to weaponise migration is a surprisingly
common strategy, one that states across the globe have long used to achieve a wide
range of political, military, and economic goals. But, in today’s globalised world, it is
increasingly important to retain the ability to manage cross-border mobility through
effective immigration, entry, and diaspora policies.

6
 The Power Atlas

Ulrike Franke shows how new technologies and shifting alliances are changing the
balance of power on the military terrain. Global military expenditures have risen
continuously over the last two decades, and last year, according to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, reached almost $2 trillion (of which almost 40
per cent is accounted for by a single country, the US). However, hard factors such as
money spent on the military, possession of nuclear weapons, and number of overseas
military bases are of changing significance. This is due to a range of less obvious
factors that determine military power, such as alliances, combat experience, and
readiness to act. Technological developments such as armed drones, cyber, and AI can
shift the military balance – and highlight that not just possession of new technologies
but also strategies for how to use them are determining who has an advantage.
American military capacity is likely to be sustained by high levels of defence spending,
nuclear power, overseas bases, war-fighting and other military experience, and
an independent defence industry. However, several countries are mixing things
up: Russia with its new nuclear posture, Turkey through its use of drones and its
geopolitical promiscuity, and – above all – China, which is becoming a leader in
cyber-power, military satellites, and military tech. The biggest losers in this world are
African countries (some of which are experiencing conflicts and have underdeveloped
militaries) and Middle Eastern states (some of which are also experiencing conflicts,
while others have high military spending but are still behind technologically).

Anthony Dworkin describes how the covid-19 pandemic has turned the health terrain
into a geopolitical battlefield. Governments entered a fierce competition for medical
goods that could help them scale back rates of illness and allow economic activity to
return to normal. Public health became a core indicator of governmental effectiveness
at a time of systemic competition. East Asia, south-east Asia, and Australasia
performed best in containing the impact of the disease; the US and Europe less well.
China dominates the production of personal protective equipment and – together with
India, Europe, and the US – plays a leading role in pharmaceuticals manufacturing.
This creates dependencies that states can weaponise – as one can see during a health
crisis. Before the pandemic, the EU was the world’s largest vaccine producer, closely
followed by India. Now, China is the clear leader – in terms of not only production
but also exports. The geopolitics of vaccines has seen the main powers adopt different
approaches: “industrial strategists” (the US and the UK), “market champion” (the EU),
“licensing giant” (India), “outward-facing authoritarians” (China and Russia), and
“aspiring producers” (Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa). Even though the “outward-
facing authoritarians” were able to use vaccine exports geopolitically in the short
term, the lower efficacy of Chinese vaccines and Russia’s poor record of production
limited their use as soft power tools or as a weapon in the longer term. In contrast,
the “industrial strategists” and the “market champion” produced the most effective

7
 vaccines and, after having vaccinated their own populations, exported and donated
doses – which boosted their perceived health power.

Ultimately, states’ ability to use their power resources has a lot to do with cultural
norms. During the cold war, there was a battle of universalist creeds that won over
elites and publics around the world through their ideas as much as their military and
financial support. In the post-cold war era, there was also a sense that soft power
would shape the world, as many countries seemed to embrace liberal democracy
and free markets. This formed the backdrop to the fourth wave of democratisation
and the expansion of the EU. However, in our essay on the culture terrain and the
future of what Joseph Nye called “soft power”, Ivan Krastev and I show that the
world has entered a decisive new phase. We discuss three trends that shift power
relations on this terrain. The most fundamental change is to a new mood of “cultural
decolonisation” – which replaces the universalism of the cold war and the “end of
history”. We show how the development of successful alternatives to American pop
culture and Hollywood – such as K-pop, Bollywood, and Turkish soap operas – reflects
a deeper trend towards nationalism and efforts to ‘take back control’. This is leading
to a multipolar world of ideas in which any universalist project is likely to provoke a
backlash that is even more powerful than the original force. Powers such as China,
with a mercantilist rather than a missionary outlook, are now better placed to thrive
than those with Enlightenment missions to transform the world, such as Europe and
America. And we argue that few people think that the world is clearly split between
free and non-free countries, with the former performing better than the latter. This
is partly because, in today’s world, the idea of democracy is becoming contested by
leaders such as Viktor Orban and Donald Trump, who challenge the importance of
liberalism. But it is also because it is not clear that democracies are outperforming
their autocratic counterparts at economic growth or responses to covid-19. These two
big trends lead to a third trend, namely a shift from relying on the power of example
as a source of soft power to exploiting the vulnerabilities of other systems. This
situation has further empowered spoiler countries such as Russia and China, which
have become adept at hacking liberal democracies and exploiting the openness of their
systems to undermine them from within.

Together, these seven terrains form a new map of power. They demonstrate that, in the
modern world, power is exercised not by ships passing through contested waters but
by people, goods, money, and data passing through the multiple contested domains of
connectivity. Just understanding these new power dynamics is not enough, however.
One needs to understand the strategies for exercising power on these new terrains.

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 The Power Atlas

The strategies of connectivity warriors

The beauty of maps is that they can mark out the great powers, the territory they
control, and their spheres of influence. The old economic world of globalisation was
crowned by a G7 of advanced economies but, as the Power Atlas shows, the connected
world is dominated by a slightly different group of great powers – each of which has its
own goals, as well as its own strategies for seeking power and glory.

In the new world, a great power can build its influence through its capacity to define
regulations and set standards, its control over financial or energy flows, its ability to
affect or corrupt political processes, or even its capacity to build social media platforms
or set search engine standards – among other connections. Each great power tries
to benefit from the high ground it already controls. But the strategies each adopts
to pursue this power depends in part on the structure of its networks. In The Age
of Unpeace, I have laid out the seven strategies of the most successful connectivity
warriors, which are summarised in Table 1.

Table 1. The seven habits of successful connectivity warriors

1. Centrality The goal is to put yourself into a position where other people need you more
than you need them. Then, you can dictate the terms of the relationship.
Example: Russia blackmailing its energy customers.

2. Gatekeeping The ability to decide who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ of the network. Example: The
US effectively shutting Iran out of the global financial system by threatening
to exclude any banks from using the dollar if they trade with Iranian entities.
Because 90 per cent of foreign exchange trading involves the American
currency, the US has created a choke-point.

3. Data-mining The ability to spy on others because you control the network or cables through
which information flows. Example: Information collection by America’s National
Security Agency.

4. Subversion The goal is to intervene in other countries’ systems and overturn the normal
rules so that they no longer apply. Example: Russia spreading misinformation
about vaccines in the West.

5. Infiltration Rather than influencing a country from the outside, it is often more efficient
to change it from within. This strategy involves encouraging companies to
invest, political parties to develop friendships, or even citizens to emigrate to
that country. Example: President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reaching out to Turkish
minorities in European countries.

6. Rule-making The goal is to set the norms or rules for the whole network. Example: The EU’s
General Data Protection Regulation.

7. Independence-seeking If many powers are trying to weaponise their links with others, the best defence
can be to minimise one’s dependence on them and thereby resist external
manipulation. Example: China trying to become independent in the production
of semiconductors and computer chips.

Source: Mark Leonard, The Age of Unpeace: How Connectivity Causes Conflict, 2021

9
 Every power is trying to take advantage of its centrality to specific parts of the complex
international system to weaponise interdependence and expand its sphere of influence.
And, on the seven terrains discussed above, several archetypes emerge.

Russia has become the ‘disruptor in chief’. In the last few years, its foreign policy has
shaped the behaviour of its neighbours and other powers through tactics including
gas cut-offs, sanctions, the expulsion of workers, cyber-attacks, disinformation
and propaganda campaigns, and attempts to gridlock Western-led international
organisations ranging from the UN Security Council to the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe. In parallel, the country has worked to establish new
organisations to extend its power, such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO), and the Eurasian Economic Union. But because Russia has not
done enough to strengthen and diversify its economy – which relies overwhelmingly
on hydrocarbon exports – its share of the global economy has declined. This will limit
its ability to project power over time.

Turkey is positioning itself as a migration superpower. President Recep Tayyip

Erdogan has regularly used the threat of flows of people to change the balance
of power between Turkey and the EU – demanding that the union remove visa
restrictions on Turks, provide funds to help the country host more than two million
Syrians, and reinvigorate its bid for EU membership. Turkey also uses its power to
influence European foreign policy: in May 2020, Malta – a country that is heavily
affected by migration – vetoed the EU’s allocation of funds to Operation Irini, a naval
mission primarily designed to enforce the UN arms embargo on Libya. As Turkey was
shipping weapons to the Government of National Accord in Libya – and, therefore,
was disproportionately affected by this operation – most analysts saw this Maltese
move as a favour to Turkey.

Saudi Arabia and Iran have used the resources they acquire from energy to turn
themselves into “powers by proxy”. Saudi Arabia draws its geo-economic strength
from the 10m barrels of oil it extracts every day, which make it responsible for one-
fifth of the global oil trade. For decades, the country has converted its hydrocarbons
into geopolitical influence, positioning OPEC as the primary instrument for translating
market power into international economic leverage. Saudi Arabia has been willing to
take short-term economic hits to shape global markets to its advantage (relative to
rivals such as Iran or US shale companies). Moreover, Riyadh has invested billions
of petrodollars to achieve its foreign policy goals – supporting counter-revolutionary
regimes during the Arab uprisings as well as waging a proxy war against Iran across
the Middle East. Iran is the mirror image of Saudi Arabia in its efforts to become
a global champion of Islam, forge links with proxies across the Middle East, and
establish itself as a cyber-power.

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 The Power Atlas

And South Korea has emerged as a surprise cultural power. When the video for pop
song ‘Gangnam Style’ became the most viewed in YouTube’s history, this seemed to be
a quirky anomaly. But, just a few years later, other branches of K-pop have dominated
the music charts, a South Korean film has become the first foreign-language movie
to win the Oscar for ‘best picture’, and South Korean television series ‘Squid Game’
has had the most successful launch ever on Netflix. This reflects not simply the
attractiveness of South Korea’s cultural products as a turn away from Western cultural
hegemony. It may also be the fact that South Korea is unlikely to take over the world –
and is, therefore, unthreatening to other national cultures – that has opened the door
for its singers, film directors, and TV companies to thrive across the globe.

India is a big player on several terrains – as a demographic superpower with a large

diaspora, as a cultural player with a huge film industry, and as a medical superpower
with its enormous capacity to manufacture vaccines. And, in future, the country
could emerge as a decisive force in efforts to set global standards for handling data,
potentially becoming a technological superpower. However, even with its 1.3 billion
people and its reach, India – like all the archetypes mentioned above – is still a niche
player in the Age of Unpeace. The same is true of countries such as Japan, Australia,
and the 54 states of Africa that, by mid-century, will collectively have more residents
than China and India combined.

So far, only three powers – the US, China, and the EU – can set the rules for
global competition across several domains. I have called them the three empires of
connectivity.

The US is emerging as a ‘gatekeeper power’ – one trying to control access to the

global commons. The country remains the world’s sole superpower and can still
project military might with greater ease than any of its rivals. But, recently, the US
has been using the role of the dollar as the world’s reserve currency and its control of
the internet and cutting-edge technologies to develop new instruments for projecting
power. After 9/11 and the American president’s declaration of a global “war on terror”,
officials in the US Treasury started exploring how Washington could leverage the
ubiquity of the dollar and their country’s dominance of the international financial
system to target the financing of terrorism. What started as a war against al-Qaeda
grew to encompass measures against North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and even Russia. The
enormous fines the US authorities imposed on banks accused of breaking sanctions
– such as France’s BNP Paribas – sent shockwaves through global financial markets
and acted as a powerful deterrent to future deals that violated these measures. In the
words of the then director of the CIA Michael Hayden: “this was a twenty-first-century
precision-guided munition”. During this era, US security agencies capitalised on the
fact that so much data runs through American cables and platforms to gather vast
quantities of information.
11
 The next phase of American thinking focused on using these techniques to prepare for
what Biden calls “extreme competition” with China. This approach centres on efforts
to multiply American strength by forging closer relations with democracies across
the globe. The Biden administration wants the US and its democratic allies to create
a bulwark against Chinese coercion, and to counter Chinese companies in markets
in Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, Africa, and other regions (particularly those affected by
China’s Belt and Road Initiative) through offensive policies such as infrastructure and
connectivity partnerships.

China is rapidly challenging American dominance by using investment and

infrastructure. Today, Beijing uses economic statecraft more frequently, more
assertively, and in a more diverse fashion than ever before. The Chinese approach to
international relations focuses as much on the ties that bind different players together
as on the resources of these players. And one of the keys to thinking about power in
the ‘relational’ theories of international affairs that Chinese scholars have developed is
to look at the structure and the nature of the relationships between different countries.
Even though China’s trade and economic power is growing, its most innovative geo-
economic tool is infrastructure – both physical and institutional. Stretching from
Hungary to Indonesia, Beijing’s budget for the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
is $100 billion – as much as the Marshall Plan spent in Europe, in inflation-adjusted
dollars. Most of this finances roads, railways, pipelines, and other infrastructure
across Eurasia, smoothing China’s westward projection of power. Official Chinese
sources claim that this investment will add $2.5 trillion to China’s trade in the next
decade, more than the value of the country’s exports in 2013, when it was the world’s
top exporter. In addition, while Beijing remains an active player within international
institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the
World Bank, it is also promoting and financing parallel structures such as the SCO.

The overall goal of these efforts is greater autonomy, primarily from the US, and to
expand the Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and beyond. China’s ambitions extend
to the virtual world, where it is pushing a cyber-sovereignty agenda and challenging
the US-backed multi-stakeholder and open model of internet governance – aiming
to allow national governments to control data flows and the internet within their
jurisdictions. And the Chinese leadership is strengthening its control over the internet
and technology suppliers. China has the weight to achieve this, given that it is home to
the world’s largest community of netizens: nearly 700 million Chinese citizens now use
the internet regularly, around 600 million of them through mobile devices. By 2018,
China was the world leader in data and technology nationalisation, seeking to develop
technological standards and capacities that were different from global ones.

12
 The Power Atlas

Chinese scholars have identified several areas in which China could soon have control
over choke-points of advanced technology such as high-performance computers,
quantum communications, core chips, and satellite navigation and operating systems.
China has exported surveillance technology to more than 60 countries with dismal
human rights records, including Iran, Myanmar, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. And
the fear is that, in other critical technologies, China will use systems such as its
Blockchain-based Service Network to try to rewire the world and create a parallel
internet subject to Chinese standards.

Many people have characterised the EU as a hapless plaything of these two great
powers – torn between its values-based security alliance with Washington and
its economic dreams of trading with China. But, in recent decades, the union has
emerged as a pole of its own on many of the terrains in this atlas, using its norms
and the accession process to become a rule-making superpower. Because the EU has
the world’s largest single market, most multinational companies depend on access
to the region – which means complying with the union’s standards. The EU has
used this economic power at various times over the years – blocking the merger of
General Electric and Honeywell, forcing Microsoft to unbundle its Explorer browser,
and challenging US agri-business in Africa and other global markets over the use of
genetically modified organisms.

This export of regulations has extended to the political sphere on issues such as
climate change – and, most dramatically, through the EU’s accession process and
neighbourhood policy. These policies condition accession to the EU and access to its
markets on countries’ adoption of the union’s rules and standards. To join the EU,
candidate countries need to integrate more than 80,000 pages of law – governing
everything from gay rights and the death penalty to lawnmower sound emissions
and food safety – into domestic legislation. Moreover, as Anu Bradford argues in The
Brussels Effect, regulatory power is less costly, more durable, more deployable, and
less easily undermined by competitors than traditional foreign policy tools.

Managing and preventing the new wars

Military planners in Beijing and Washington are busy running war games for a
conflict in Taiwan and over various rocks and atolls in the South China Sea and the
East China Sea. A war between China and America that takes on a nuclear dimension
is the scariest scenario one could imagine. And this is not the only part of the world
that could see the use of nuclear weapons. European defence ministries are trying
to understand changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine and technologies that make the
deployment of tactical nuclear weapons more likely, while the world has at various

13
 points been worried about nuclear escalation between India and Pakistan, and
what governments in North Korea or Iran might do once they are emboldened with
functioning nuclear weapons.

In the last decade, conflicts raging in Syria, Yemen, the Sahel, and eastern Ukraine
have killed many civilians and tempted other states to wage war by proxy through their
support for militias in each of these theatres.

But this atlas shows that, even in the absence of catastrophic scenarios, there will
be a huge amount of conflict waged across all the terrains discussed above. As
geopolitics takes over, global supply chains will unravel and the world may plunge
into a recession. Technology wars could lead to the Balkanisation of knowledge and
see the control of critical systems and components become choke-points in geopolitics
– just as the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Hormuz were in earlier eras. As the
world embarks on a dramatic carbon transition, there is a risk that all the elements of
that process will be weaponised. And, as the global population grows and people are
increasingly on the move, migration will continue to be central to our economic health,
our cultural vibrance, and our politics. But it might be in the cultural realm that
geopolitical competition plays out most dramatically. Fake news factories, interference
in elections, and deep fake technology have the potential to sap faith in politics and
exploit the tensions in our already polarised societies.

War is almost always an argument over relative power – states do not go to war unless
they believe they can win. To avoid such misunderstandings, great powers have often
tacitly signalled that they control a certain sphere of influence, usually to warn their
rivals to stay away. War sometimes results from disputes about whether a country
falls within a particular sphere of influence. The Cuban missile crisis, for example,
resulted from the Soviets’ (ultimately successful) effort to draw Cuba into their sphere
of influence.

Despite such dangerous disputes, it was relatively easy to define the Soviet and
Western spheres of influence in an era in which territorial control was the primary
determinant of power. The presence of military bases and technical advisers, and
membership of military alliances, stood out on the power maps of those days. Today,
however, great powers are putting forward very different concepts of their spheres of
influence – ones based on the terrains that are most important to them.

Each great power now disputes not just the border of its sphere of influence but also
what constitutes one. So, America is trying to build a sphere of influence based on
control of information technology, the centrality of the US economy, and military
power; China one based on trade and investment flows, as well as infrastructure

14
 The Power Atlas

projects; Russia one based on energy flows, corrupt business ties, and manipulation
of the information space; and Iran one based on cultural and religious ties to Shia
populations in the Middle East.

States are already constructing defences against these efforts. They are seeking to
address their vulnerabilities by, for example, restricting data and investment flows,
creating their own technology companies, or even developing ‘splinternets’ that
sacrifice connections for greater control over the national information environment.
They are, in essence, fortifying their positions at choke-points on the new map of
power.

As each state promotes its own version of a sphere of influence, it risks interfering in
others’ spheres, possibly without intending to do so. When two countries are reading
different maps of power, they will often fail to understand how the other understands
its sphere of influence. In Ukraine, for example, the EU’s ‘unconscious empire’ – in the
form of an Association Agreement that threatened to remake Ukrainian governance
– butted up against Russian efforts to move Ukraine into its sphere of influence. The
result was a war over which sphere Ukraine belonged to, and the effective division of
the country.

The idea of a European project that will benignly spread universal values clashes with
the way that other powers are thinking about the world. The EU may object to the idea
of spheres of influence, but these powers often see it as playing this game in a similar
fashion to everyone else.

Unless Europeans understand how their actions appear to others, they will stumble
into new conflicts with other great powers in the Balkans, other parts of eastern
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. As increasingly diverse spheres of influence
continue to overlap across the world, such disputes will likely become more common
and more confusing.

All this implies that the starting point of trying to manage global problems and reduce
conflict is to read from the same map. I hope that this atlas can contribute to the
process. By mapping the terrains of power in new ways, we can better understand one
another’s actions and strategies – and that can be the first step towards working out
how to coexist more peacefully. If they do not read from the right maps, our leaders
could literally find themselves lost in our new Age of Unpeace.

15
 Acknowledgments

This Power Atlas came into being out of an intellectual effort, together with Jeremy
Shapiro, to understand the reconfiguration of international relations. This essay
would have been a joint project had he not taken a sabbatical. The text on finding the
new map of power and the historical reflections on Mahan and Mackinder bear his
inimitable imprint. Lucie Haupenthal has been a wonderful intellectual companion
and managed the whole project with great verve through a tough pandemic-affected
period. She showed what an extraordinary person she is with the smartest ideas, a
great humanity towards her colleagues, and a superhuman commitment to seeing the
process through. It would certainly not have happened without her. Anthony Dworkin,
who stepped in to cover Jeremy’s role as research director during his sabbatical,
skilfully led the process of commissioning and editing the essays. Gosia Piaskowska
did an amazing job in collecting, organising, and analysing the data, as well as
preparing the visualisations in this atlas. All of this data may been like a tree falling
in a forest with no one around to hear it without Chris Eichberger. Communicating
data effectively requires creating data visualisations that are well-designed, clear,
and efficient, so they can be easily understood, and Chris worked tirelessly and
professionally to juggle the content and creative ideas from the authors and other
colleagues and gave the project its distinctive look. Rafael Loss supported the project
team in any capacity needed – from data collection to visualisation ideas, to logistics.
Susanne Baumann and Swantje Green helped build a launch strategy around the atlas.
Catherine Baron, Pau Ruiz Guix, Filip Medunic, and Alessandra Thomsen supported
the project with their research.

We thank Michael Schwarz, Anne Duncker, Teresa Spancken, and Stiftung Mercator
for their enduring support for ECFR and Re:shape Global Europe. And we thank the
IWM Institute and the Austrian Ministry of Defence for supporting the work on the
culture chapter.

16
The Power Atlas

17
 Economics
by Jonathan Hackenbroich

Trade policy once seemed so apolitical that EU member states abandoned their powers
in the area and let technocrats in a commission of European experts take decisions
for them. The reason they did so was never just because a common trade policy made
sense in a customs union and a common internal market. It was also because even
powerful countries such as Germany, France, and the United Kingdom could afford
to treat tariff negotiations, rules of origin, or trade standards as technical matters
in the unidirectional quest for ever more open markets. Had they imagined what a
battleground of power this once-technical terrain would become, the European Union
might look very different.

Today, the main battlefield on which great powers compete is not military but
economic. It is one on which, for geopolitical reasons, they attach conditions to access
to their market and use instruments such as tariffs, quotas, and level playing field
penalties, along with tools such as export controls, sanctions, and data regulations.
China, Russia, Turkey, and even the United States – Europe’s close ally – have
punished other countries for their policy choices or tried to prevent them from
making certain choices by pressuring companies to induce behavioural change, and
by securing access to ever more sensitive information through the use and threat of
tariffs, other curbs on trade, ‘popular boycotts’, financial sanctions, export controls,
and forced transfers of sensitive data. China has become a systemic rival of European
states, the US, and other liberal democratic countries across the globe. In March
2021, Beijing sent a strong, direct message to Europe when European companies
such as H&M and Adidas disappeared from Chinese e-commerce platforms and by
manufacturing ‘popular boycotts’ of these firms’ products, an increasingly common
Chinese sanctions tactic. The damage was limited, but the message was clear: China is
now ready to use economic coercion in direct response to European policy choices – to
even moderate EU attempts to adopt stronger policies and close ranks with the US.
President Xi Jinping said as much to German Chancellor Angela Merkel. According
to Chinese state news agency Xinhua, Europe needed “to make [a] correct judgment
independently”, he told her.
19
 But the change in international politics is more profound than any one actor’s
attempts at coercion. A wide array of countries increasingly combine state action
with geopolitics and economics; they use economic tools to enhance their geopolitical
power and geopolitics for economic gain. Their economic weight is increasing relative
to that of the G7, which by 2050 will probably account for just 20 per cent of world
GDP. The economies of the Emerging 7 (E7) – Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, Russia, and Turkey – were 37 per cent of the size of those of the G7 in 1991 (in
purchasing power parity terms) but are now a similar size, and might reach 50 per cent
of the world’s output by 2040. The E7 are different in many ways; not all of them use
economic coercion. But rapid economic growth in these countries – particularly China
– is indicative of the rise of a new model of economic statecraft (see: Map 1).

Many states now put economics at the centre of a grand strategy combining all
instruments of statecraft to enlarge a country’s sphere of influence. Trade deals not
only create economic efficiencies but also tie countries to one another through their
value chains, while allowing for diversification away from the markets of states with
which they have difficult geopolitical relations. Transparent supply chains help states
identify pressure points that they can use against their rivals, but also give others the
same advantage. A government’s economic threats can alter another actor’s behaviour.
Even central bank policies now have significant geopolitical consequences. And the
most successful players combine these tools with measures such as development
cooperation, language schools, military deployments, or disinformation campaigns
– all of which are geared towards gaining strategic leverage over others and securing
one’s own position in the world.

The EU’s most important partners – from the US to the United Kingdom and others
– have started to react to these developments by enhancing their own geo-economic
toolboxes, aiming to strengthen their defences and respond to unfair practices that
they were powerless against. Their adaptation – and the irresponsible and dangerous
use of economic coercion by former US president Donald Trump – contributed to the
emergence of a much more geo-economic era. The change is structural, and the EU
needs to deal with it using its own tools.

There are three basic metrics of power and vulnerability on this terrain: offensive
capabilities, defensive capabilities, and economic strength.

Methodology: The map shows a country ranking based on the OECD’s trend gross domestic product, including long-term
baseline projections (up to 2060), in real terms. The OECD’s forecast is based on an assessment of the economic climate
in individual countries and the world economy, using a combination of model-based analyses and expert judgement. This
indicator is measured in US dollars at constant prices and 2010 purchasing power parities.

Source: OECD (2021). Economic Outlook: Real GDP long-term forecast

20
 The Power Atlas Economics

Europe’s share of global GDP is declining Trending up Map 1

Projected GDP rankings Trending down

2020 2030 2060

China 1 1 China

United States 2 2 India

India 3 3 United States

Japan 4 4 Indonesia

Germany 5 5 Japan

Russia 6 6 Turkey

Indonesia 7 7 Germany

France 8 8 Brazil

Brazil 9 9 United Kingdom

United Kingdom 10 10 Mexico

Italy 11 11 France

Mexico 12 12 Russia

Turkey 13 13 South Korea

South Korea 14 14 Saudi Arabia

Canada 15 15 Canada

Spain 16 16 Australia

Saudi Arabia 17 17 Italy

Australia 18 18 Spain

Poland 19 19 Argentina

Netherlands 20 20 South Africa

Argentina 21 21 Netherlands

Colombia 22 22 Poland

South Africa 23 23 Colombia

Switzerland 24 24 Sweden

Romania 25 25 Belgium

Belgium 26 26 Israel

Singapore 27 27 Switzerland

Sweden 28 28 Chile

Austria 29 29 Ireland

Chile 30 30 Austria
 Offensive capabilities. These include trade agreements, state-owned enterprises
(SOEs), punitive tariffs, boycotts, export controls, and personal and financial
sanctions, among many other measures. Governments can use such tools to actively
pursue policies that increase their economic and geopolitical reach. ‘Positive’ tools of
this kind range from trade agreements to investments and connectivity partnerships.
During the Trump years, when open international trade came under threat from the
EU’s closest partner, the union concluded several trade agreements and advanced
its trading power to hedge against deteriorating transatlantic trade relations. The
EU also enlarged its networks of trade and common standards through closer
partnerships with Japan, Mercosur, and others. China and 14 other Asian countries
moved to reduce US influence by concluding the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership – which, in contrast to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, excluded America.
China’s SOEs are also a positive offensive tool in that they have negative and, at times,
dangerous consequences for Europeans. China increasingly uses SOEs in its strategic
quest to dominate markets and marginalise its Western competitors’ industries and
capabilities. Heavily subsidised SOEs sell products, or instruct companies they have
acquired to sell products, at below production cost – sacrificing short-term economic
success for long-term influence (see: Map 2).

In contrast, the ‘negative’ offensive tools that states use are designed to exert pressure
on other countries and punish them for their conduct (see: Map 3). In 2018 the US
administration imposed a 25 per cent tariff on imported steel and a 10 per cent tariff
on imported aluminium, labelling the EU’s and others’ steel and aluminium exports as
a threat to US national security (a label that remains in place, despite the compromise
America and Europe reached in late October 2021). Since 2018, the administration
has also prohibited Europeans from trading with Iran. In 2020 China curbed 10
per cent of Australian exports as punishment for Australia’s call for independent
investigations into the origins of covid-19. In late 2019 Beijing used the threat of car
tariffs to try to pressure Berlin into accepting a Huawei bid to build Germany’s 5G
infrastructure – a core decision about the country’s future critical infrastructure and
security. In late 2020 President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on Turks to boycott
French-labelled goods after his French counterpart, Emmanuel Macron, announced
new policies to combat extremism. Moscow banned in 2014 the import of a vast
array of EU agricultural products, especially those produced by Poland, in response
to Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine. While these actions were
geopolitically motivated, Russia justified them by pointing to public health concerns.
Russia threatened in May 2021 to ban Czech beer imports after the Czech government
declared that the Russian intelligence services were likely responsible for explosions at
a Czech warehouse in 2014.

22
 The Power Atlas Economics

China leads the Fortune Global 500 Map 2

Chinese growth is led by state-owned enterprises

Number
Number of Fortune
of Fortune GlobalGlobal
500500500 companies
companies by by by country
region 2000 2020
Number of Fortune Global companies region 2000
2000 2020
2020

180 180

160 160

140 140

120 120
100
100
80
80
60
60
40
40
20
20
Japan

France
United States

Canada

South Korea
United Kingdom

Germany

Switzerland

China
Netherlands
Japan

France
United States

Canada

South Korea
United Kingdom

Germany

Switzerland

China
Netherlands

State-owned enterprises among Fortune Global 500

State-owned enterprises among the Fortune Global 500 Chinese Other
State-owned enterprises among Fortune Global 500
2000 18 9

2000 18 9
2020 84 26

2020 84 26
Chinese Other

Chinese Other

Sources: Fortune Global 500 (2020); Bloomberg (2020). The Changing Headquarters Landscape for Fortune Global 500 Companies
23
Map 3

The EU is increasingly threatened by economic coercion

Selected examples

5
2
8
4
3
7

6 1

1. Chinese curb on Australian exports to push 6. Turkish boycott of French-labelled goods following
back against an investigation into the origins of President Emmanuel Macron’s announcement of
covid-19 (2020) policies to combat extremism (2020)
China curbed Australian exports pushing Turkish boycott of French-labelled goods
1
2. against
Chinese COVID-19
threat origins
of car tariffs investigation
to pressure Germany
(2000) Huawei’s 5G infrastructure (2019)
7. 6
Russian threatfollowing Macron’s
to ban Czech
policies
beerannouncement
imports
to combat declaration
extremism (2020)
of
into accepting following Czech government’s of links
China threat of car tariffs to pressure between Russian intelligence services and the
2 vegetables
3. Russian ban oninto
Germany Polish
following
infrastructure
importsHuawei's
accepting of fruit and
5G
EU sanctions over the war in
(2019) 7
Russia threatexplosions
2014 Czech warehouse to ban Czech beer imports
(2021)
following Czech government declaration
Ukraine (2014) 8. of linkage
Reported Chinese betweenofRussian
suspension intelligence
rail freight
Russia ban on Polish imports of fruits and services and the 2014
to Lithuania and block on export permitsCzech warehouse
3
4. US threat vegetables
the
of section
war in
following EU sanctions
301 tariffs
Ukraine (2014)
to preventover
France for Lithuanianexplosions
producers(2021)
in reaction to the
and other European countries from levying taxes announcement that a Taiwanese Representative
China reportedly suspended rail freight to
on digital services (2020)
US threat of section 301 tariffs to prevent 8
Office would open in Lithuania (2020)
Lithuania and halted export permits for
4
5. Chinese France and other
‘popular European
boycott’ countries (such
of EU companies
the country´s producers in reaction to the
announcement that a Taiwanese
from levying taxes on digital services
as Adidas and H&M) following EU sanctions
(2020) Representative Office would open in
on Chinese officials involved in human rights Lithuania (2020)
violations in Xinjiang (2021)
Chinese "popular boycott” of EU
5 companies (such as Adidas and H&M)
following EU sanctions of Chinese
Source: author’s own analysis
24 officials involved in human rights
violations in Xinjiang (2021)
 The Power Atlas Economics

Defensive capabilities. These are designed to limit a country’s vulnerability when

confronted with negative offensive economic instruments. Sometimes, of course, the
best defence is a good offence: agreements that diversify trade relations can reduce
the overexposure of certain sectors, for instance. But the rise of economic coercion in
recent years has prompted many powers, including the EU, to adopt robust defences.
Europe has updated its trade enforcement regulation to allow it to act in trade matters
even if there is no final ruling by the World Trade Organization (due to blockages in
the institution caused by the Trump administration’s refusal to appoint new members
to its appellate body). The EU has also implemented an investment screening
mechanism that allows it to intervene when foreign companies acquire European
firms mainly for geopolitical reasons. The EU is currently updating its competition
policy to impose fines on SOEs or heavily subsidised foreign companies that can act in
unprofitable but strategic ways in the EU market. The US, China, and others have put
in place a vast range of deterrent measures that, when they are subject to economic
coercion, allow them to sanction third-country companies or impose broad and heavy
trade restrictions on the grounds of national security (many explicitly state that they
have this capability; others only hint at it). The US now has an ‘integrated deterrence’
doctrine that uses economic measures as part of its national defence strategy.

Like offensive measures, these defensive capabilities resemble those in other areas
of foreign policy. What would be diplomatic initiatives or even military strikes in
traditional statecraft can now be free trade agreements or sanctions in the economic
sphere (see: Map 4). What are regional security architectures, arms control treaties, or
military deterrents in traditional statecraft can be agreements or instruments designed
to uphold WTO rulings when the global trading system comes under pressure.

Economic strength. This metric is different from the other two. In the military
realm, armament and the strength of weapons systems directly determine the power of
offensive and defensive capabilities; the establishment or use of offensive or defensive
tools does not typically compromise a state’s strength. But it does in economics. Here,
the use of defensive tools (and some offensive tools) often involves state interventions
in economic processes, and can involve protectionism. Protectionism tends to stifle
innovation, limit competitiveness, and render a market unattractive for businesses –
all effects that might result from a state’s efforts to prop up SOEs, implement punitive
tariffs, or develop deterrents or instruments to impose countermeasures.

However, in the geo-economic era, states’ efforts to enhance their economic strength
are the basis of success. Pressuring an economically strong and interconnected
country can be costly for the coercer. This is not least because the coercer will have to
account for the dependencies and asymmetries that the strong country could exploit
in retaliation. This means that European countries and many other states need to walk

25
Map 4

Sanctions
List of sanctions programmes (2021)

US Sanctions EU and US Sanctions

​Counter-narcotics trafficking Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia)
​Cuba Belarus
​Foreign Interference in a United States election Burundi
​Lebanon Cyber-attacks
​Non-proliferation US Sanctions Human
EU & US rights (Magnitsky Sanctions)
Sanctions
​Rough diamond trade controls
Counter Narcotics Trafficking
Cuba
Lebanon
Balkans (Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia)
Belarus
​Transnational criminal organizations
Foreign Interference in a United States Election Myanmar
Burundi (Burma)
Lebanon Cyber-attacks
Chinese military companiesNon-Proliferation Nicaragua
Human rights (Magnitsky Sanctions)
Rough Diamond Trade Controls Lebanon
Ethiopia Transnational Criminal Organizations North Korea
Myanmar (Burma) EU
Nicaragua

1
Chinese Military Companies
Hong Kong Russia
Ethiopia-Related
Russian harmful foreign activities
Hong Kong
North Korea
Syria
Russia
Syria UN
9
Russian Harmful Foreign Activities
Ukraine
12
Ukraine
EU & US & UN Sanctions EU & US Sanctions
EU USandSanctions 15
Venezuela
US and UN Sanctions Cantral African Republic
Balkans (Bosnia &
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
Herzegovina, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia)
Counter Narcotics Trafficking Counter terrorism (inc. Al-Quaida and Taliban)
Central
Cuba African Republic Democratic Republic of Congo Belarus Zimbabwe
EU Sanctions
Foreign Interference in a United Iran
States Election Burundi Chemical weapons
Counter-terrorism (including Iraq al-Qaeda and Cyber-attacks the Taliban) China
Lebanon Guinea
Democratic Republic of Congo
Non-Proliferation
Libya
Mali
EU
Human rights (Magnitsky Sanctions
Haiti Sanctions)
Rough Diamond Trade Controls Lebanon
Iran North Korea Chemical weapons
Tunisia
Transnational Criminal Organizations
Somalia Myanmar (Burma) Turkey EU
IraqChinese Military Companies South Sudan Nicaragua China
United States

Libya
Ethiopia-Related
Hong Kong
Sudan
Yemen
North Korea
Russia
Guinea
EU & UN Sanctions 1 United States
9
MaliRussian Harmful Foreign Activities Syria
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti UN 11
North Korea Tunisia
12
Ukraine
Total number of sanctioned individuals/entities
EU & US & UN Sanctions
15
Venezuela
Somalia
Cantral African Republic UN 966 Zimbabwe Turkey
South Sudan
Counter terrorism (inc. Al-Quaida and
EU
Taliban) United States
Democratic Republic of Congo EU Sanctions 15,618

Sudan
Iran US Chemical weapons 29,116
Yemen
Iraq China EU and UN Sanctions
Libya Guinea
Mali Haiti Guinea-Bissau
North Korea Tunisia
Somalia Turkey
South Sudan United States
Sudan
Yemen EU & UN Sanctions United States
11
Guinea-Bissau

Total number of sanctioned individuals/entities

Total number of sanctioned individuals/entities
UN UN 966

EU EU 15,618

US US 29,116

Methodology: The UN Security Council, DG FISMA, and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) do not maintain a
specific list of sanctioned countries but of sanctions programmes that can vary in scope. Some are broad-based and
geographically oriented (such as those on Cuba and Iran). Others, such as those for counter-terrorism and counter-
narcotics, are “targeted” and focus on specific individuals and entities. These programmes may encompass broad
prohibitions at the country level as well as targeted sanctions.

Sources: U.S. Department of the Treasury (2021). The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC): Sanctions Programs and Country Information; European Commission
(2020). “Consolidated list of persons, groups and entities subject to EU financial sanctions”, Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital
Markets Union; UNSC (2021). United Nations Security Council Consolidated List
 The Power Atlas Economics

a fine line in enhancing their offensive and defensive capabilities, all while avoiding
negative repercussions for their economic strength. China has expanded domestic
demand, fostered innovation, and reduced its reliance on foreign markets, while
still integrating ever more international trade into its supply chains. This strategy
is difficult to implement but has had great success – and has, as discussed, proven
dangerous for others.

These three basic metrics are not, by themselves, sufficient to explain the power
dynamics of geo-economics. States use increasingly advanced forms of economic
coercion to achieve their strategic goals, often attempting to alter a government’s
policies by targeting companies rather than the government directly. These forms of
coercion function through central hubs in economic networks, at which third countries
can exploit foreign firms’ need for access – as analysts Henry Farrell and Abraham
Newman first revealed.

It used to be that Europeans thought of critical infrastructure primarily in terms

of assets such as water or nuclear plants (see: Maps 5 and 6). But, in a globalised
economy characterised by geo-economic competition, an important technology or
centralised point of exchange can also take on the role of critical infrastructure – the
disruption of which is detrimental to a company, an entire sector, or the economy as
a whole. Powerful countries can now make use of critical financial and informational
choke-points. And China and America are in an intensifying race to secure, defend,
and increase their control over these choke-points. When they tell businesses and third
countries to behave in a certain way or else risk exclusion, the EU sometimes calls this
“extraterritorial reach”. But it too often thinks of this in terms of US extraterritorial
sanctions and not as a structural development in how economic coercion functions –
and that China can increasingly exploit.

The Clearing House Interbank Payments System, for example, is responsible for 95
per cent of all US dollar settlement, clearing and settling $1.8 trillion in domestic and
international payments per day. Moreover, 95 per cent of top banks worldwide are
members of the SWIFT messaging system and use it for transactions. Washington
can de facto deny banks and companies access to these choke-points, and can use
the threat of doing so to coerce them to behave in ways that align with US strategic
goals – even against its European allies’ explicit will. The US clearly dominates the
global financial system (see: Map 7). Europeans and many others depend heavily
on American banks’ financial services, particularly investment banks. For example,
the EU depends on US-controlled payment systems, notably Visa and Mastercard.
These types of dependencies give US primary sanctions great reach beyond America’s
borders, and make it significantly more difficult for other states to maintain financial
channels outside US control.

27
Map 5 US companies control most private submarine
communication cables
Submarine communications cables owned by tech giants
Owned by a tech giant (at least partly)

7
6
12
3 12 16
14
16

1
1

2 5

10
15

9
11

17
13
8

1. Bifrost 8. INDIGO-Central 12. JUPITER

Facebook, Keppel T&T, Telin Australia’s Academic and Amazon Web Services,
Research Network, Google, Facebook, NTT, PCCW, PLDT,
2. Curie
Indosat Ooredoo, Singtel SoftBank
Google
Optus, Superloop
3. Dunant 13. Malbec
Google
9. INDIGO-West Facebook, GlobeNet
Australia’s Academic and
4. Echo 14. MAREA
Research Network, Google,
Facebook, Microsoft, Telxius
Facebook, Google Indosat Ooredoo, Singtel,
5. Equiano Superloop, Telstra (including 15. Monet
Belong) Algar Telecom, Angola Cables,
Google
Antel Uruguay, Google
6. Grace Hopper 10. Japan-Guam-Australia
Google South 16. Pacific Light Cable Network
Australia’s Academic and Facebook, Google
7. Havfrue/AEC-2 Research Network, Google, RTI
Aqua Comms, Bulk, Facebook,
17. Tannat
11. Junior Antel Uruguay, Google
Google
Google

Source: TeleGeography (2021). Submarine Cable Map

 The Power Atlas Economics

The Chinese government leads state-sponsored development Map 6

Submarine communications cables owned by governments 

and state-owned enterprises
Chinese (partly)
American
Russian

9
5

6 7
2
1

3
10

1. Asia Africa Europe-1 6. GTMO-PR

China Unicom, Djibouti Telecom, Etisalat UAE, US Government
Hyalroute, Metfone, Mobily, OTEGLOBE, Omantel,
Ooredoo, PCCW, Pakistan Telecommunications 7. Hainan to Hong Kong Express
Company Ltd., Reliance Jio Infocomm, Retelit, China Mobile
TIME dotCom, TeleYemen, Telecom Egypt, VNPT 8. Sakhalin-Kuril Islands Cable
International, Viettel Corporation Rostelecom
2. Asia Direct Cable 9. SeaMeWe-5
China Telecom, China Unicom, National Telecom, Bangladesh Submarine Cable Company
PLDT, Singtel, SoftBank, Tata Communications, Limited, China Mobile, China Telecom, China
Viettel Corporation Unicom, Djibouti Telecom, Myanmar Post and
3. Bay of Bengal Gateway Telecommunication, Ooredoo, Orange, Saudi
AT&T, China Telecom, Dialog Axiata, Etisalat Telecom, Singtel, Sri Lanka Telecom, TeleYemen,
UAE, Omantel, Reliance Jio Infocomm, Telekom Telecom Egypt, Telecom Italia Sparkle, Telekom
Malaysia, Telstra (including Belong), Vodafone Malaysia, Telkom Indonesia, TransWorld, Turk
Telekom International
4. Far East Submarine Cable System
Rostelecom 10. South Atlantic Inter Link
Camtel, China Unicom
5. GTMO-1
US Government

Source: TeleGeography (2021). Submarine Cable Map

Map 7 The US dominates international finance
Investment banking market value by region, $bn (2020)

Mergers and acquisitions Initial public offerings

66 5 5 5
70 880 15 83
1472 206

11
88 769 127

135

56

Equity capital markets Investment banking revenue (in %)

35
25 200 4 2 21
450 53
2
15 361
2

3
12

42
40

Canada
Canada
US
US
Latin America
Latin America
Europe
Europe

Middle East&and
Middle East Africa
Africa

Japan
Japan

Asia (excluding
Asia (ex. Japan) Japan)

Oceania
Oceania

Source: Wall Street Journal (2021). Investment banking scorecard

30
 The Power Atlas Economics

Meanwhile, China has created a digital renminbi that is projected to account for 15
per cent of all Chinese electronic payments by 2031 – and that, in theory, could create
alternatives to the dollar-dominated financial system (even if that currently seems
unlikely). Chinese payment systems are increasing their reach and are becoming an
ever more important choke-point (see: Maps 8 and 9).

Great powers are also racing for control over and access to other choke-points, such as
internet exchange points. And Chinese scholars have identified several areas in which
China could soon have control over choke-points of advanced technology such as high-
performance computers, quantum communications systems, core chips, and satellite
navigation and operating systems.

To gain influence, isolate a country, or make sure another state does not get access to
information or goods, great powers increasingly impose new regulations on companies
– or ‘squeezing laws’. These include obligations, prohibition of compliance with
other countries’ laws, and licensing requirements for a growing number of goods and
services. China’s newly adopted extraterritorial export controls, anti-sanctions law,
and blocking statute are examples of this. If European firms follow obligations they
have in the US or the EU, they may have to ask Beijing’s permission to export certain
goods or services, face punishment, or even give up on doing business in China.

The systemic rivalry between the US and China – particularly Beijing’s approach to
it – is leading democracies and former advocates of free trade to change course. Under
Trump, the US employed methods that accelerated a shift in the international system
towards fierce geo-economic warfare, even using its leverage against its traditional
allies. The new administration in Washington has abandoned this approach to its allies
and is actively rebuilding relations with them, but the fundamental power dynamics of
geo-economic warfare will not change.

31
Map 8

Chinese payment systems are expanding their reach

Countries that support the two biggest Chinese digital payments systems

AliPay
WeChat Pay
Both

Ali Pay

WeChat

Both

32
 The Power Atlas Economics

Sources: Alipay (2021). Acquiring partners [Corporate website]; WeChat Pay (2021). Which countries/regions are supported by WeChat Pay? [Corporate website]
Map 9

China is expanding renminbi swap agreements,

but the US dollar is still dominant
Number and value of swap agreements and transactions

United States

Belgium
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
United Kingdon
Brazil
Mexico

Canada

European Central Bank

Denmark
United Kingdom

Switzerland

Poland
Hungary

Sweden
Estonia

Japan

Singapore
India
Malaysia
Thailand
Korea
Indonesia

Australia

China

South Korea
Parties to an agreement Hong Kong
Belarus
Argentina
Iceland
New Zealand
Uzbekistan
Total number of swap agreements Mongolia
(1994-2017) Kazakhstan
Russia
Pakistan
UAE
10 Turkey
Ukraine
1 Albania
Sri Lanka
Qatar
Nepal
Suriname
South Africa
Chile
Tajikistan
Macau
34
 The Power Atlas Economics

Value of US Fed SWAPs in $m Value of Chinese SWAPs in $m

(2007-2021) (2009-2020) 500,000 50,000

2021

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

Transaction value in $m
500,000
500,000 50,000
50,000

Sources: Council on Foreign Relations (2019). Central Bank Currency SWAPS tracker; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), Assets: Central Bank Liquidity
2021from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SWPT, 28
Swaps: Central Bank Liquidity Swaps: Wednesday Level [SWPT], retrieved
October 2021.; The Hindu Business Line (2020). Bilateral swaps’ role in China’s rising global footprint
 In fact, the Biden administration is not changing the US posture overall or returning
to the liberal globalisation of the 1990s and 2000s. It is merely replacing negative
offensive tools that sometimes culminated in ‘maximum pressure’ policies with
positive offensive tools or ‘extreme competition’. This approach emphasises
investment in US economic strength and efforts to multiply that strength through
close relations with democracies across the globe. The US-EU deal on aluminium and
steel tariffs underscores this point: the Biden administration recognises that it is a
fundamental US interest to find a compromise with Europeans but, fundamentally,
European exports still represent a national security threat from the administration’s
point of view. The Biden administration wants the US and its democratic allies to
create a strong bulwark against third-country coercion, and to counter third-country
offensive policies in markets in Africa and other regions (particularly those affected
by China’s Belt and Road Initiative) through offensive policies such as infrastructure
and connectivity partnerships. But it is not easing trade tensions with Europe out of
a belief that the geo-economic era has ended and the world is returning to a trading
system that is governed by rules that everyone will abide by.

Domestically, Biden passed a $1.9 trillion fiscal stimulus package and is making
investments in infrastructure and human capital on an unprecedented scale – which,
in the long term, could increase the strength of the American economy to a new
level. Some experts have said that this effort could even lift the US economy above its
steady state and revolutionise economics. The US now emphasises positive offensive
measures in the geo-economic competition between great powers, but the Biden
administration has yet to define how it will use its impressive arsenal of economic
coercion instruments, particularly against China, Russia, and other authoritarian
regimes. The administration has upheld Trump-era punitive tariffs on China, but
has not escalated them. It is entirely possible that the administration will revert to
these tools much more towards the end of Biden’s presidential term – either because
a Republican-dominated Congress pushes the administration to be more assertive in
these ways, or because the administration believes that outcompeting China might be
a smart long-term strategy but does not yield the short-term results it needs to prove it
is sufficiently tough on Beijing.

Europe has several disadvantages in the geo-economic era. The EU has the most
globally connected of markets. And both superpowers are interested in access to that
market and in good relations with the EU. But the European Commission was never
conceived of as a mechanism to engage in geo-economic statecraft or implement a
positive offensive strategy (even if it has performed relatively well in some areas of
this). Europe also struggles to build up its economic strength and develop effective
defensive instruments. This is due to its odd institutional structure – which is split

36
 The Power Atlas Economics

between supranational institutions and member states – as well as divisions between

member states and its complex and slow decision-making processes.

On economic strength, Europeans struggle to match the investments and ambitious

reforms the Biden administration is implementing in the US. The NextGenerationEU
recovery plan does not provide the same kind of firepower as its US counterpart
(even if the US has embarked on a great experiment that is not certain to increase
its economic strength efficiently). To change this, Europeans would have to view the
single market as much more of a geo-economic asset. Completing the single market
would make the EU more competitive and reduce its vulnerability to economic
coercion. The same applies to strengthening the euro. Too often, Europeans become
stuck in debates about the technicalities of a capital markets union or a digital single
market.

On defensive instruments, the EU suffers from its exceptional institutional shape. Its
system of foreign direct investment screening is impressive on paper, but it is unclear
whether all member states will implement it with the necessary rigour. For now, the
EU lacks the legal provisions needed to counter many forms of economic coercion.
This is why the EU should establish an anti-coercion trade instrument.

The European Commission will soon propose such an instrument that could make
countermeasures possible. This will require member states to overcome their
understandable hesitation about it – which might be partly a remnant of the easy
globalisation of recent decades – and to simultaneously avoid protectionist policies
that could reduce their economic strength. But, if they strike a careful balance and
establish the instrument, the EU will become a much more capable actor in the geo-
economic era.

37
 Technology
by José Ignacio Torreblanca

Technology shapes geopolitics – by bringing not only progress but also power to those
who command and control it. Technological revolutions ranging from the development
of irrigation to the first industrial revolution and electrification have unleashed deep
economic, social, cultural, and political changes. All these innovations led to deep
power asymmetries and inequalities before they were disseminated across the world.
The digital revolution is no different. By 2019, around 4.1 billion people (57 per cent of
the global population) were connected to the internet. However, as Map 1 shows, most
of these users lived in developed countries, while large swathes of Africa and south
Asia were still offline.

This technological revolution resembles previous ones in its profound local and global
impact. By eroding political parties and traditional media, social media platforms
have a profound impact on democracies’ political representation and communication
structures, increasing polarisation and damaging trust in established political
institutions. Meanwhile, digital technologies provide authoritarian regimes with new
opportunities to monitor and control their citizens – and, at the same time, wage a
hybrid war to influence and interfere in democratic states, aiming to constrain or alter
their foreign policies.
39
Map 1

The tech divide

Technology and Information
Individuals using the internet as
The global south is still offline percentage of total population (2019)
Technology and Information
Individuals using the internet No
as data
The tech divide
Individuals using the internet as 5 percentage of total 100
population (2019)

The global
percentage of is
south stillpopulation
total offline (2019) No data
5 100
No data
5 100

Individuals using the internet as percentage of total population (2019)

Europe
Individuals using the internet as percentage of total population (2019)
80% The Americas
CIS*
70 Europe
80% The Americas
60
CIS*states
Arab
70
50
60 Asia-Pacific
40 Arab states
50
30 Asia-Pacific
Africa
40
20
30 Africa
10
20
0
10
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
0

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
*Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Ukraine.

Source: ITU-D ICT Statistics (2021) International Telecommunication Union

40
*CIS (Member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States) include Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.
Source: ITU-D ICT Statistics (2021) International Telecommunication Union
 The Power Atlas Technology

Great powers have realised that access to new technologies can be critical to their
sovereignty, prompting them to engage in a fierce competition to develop their
technological capabilities. After massively embracing globalisation due to its positive
economic impact, these powers now regard the interdependence associated with it as a
dangerous vulnerability that they need to constrain and, eventually, reduce.

The weaponisation of tech and information interconnectedness has led to fierce

disputes about critical digital infrastructure (such as 5G and submarine cables), raw
materials (such as rare earths), and industries (such as AI or semiconductors), as
well as the control of data flows and storage, and the definition of standards for new
technologies. Countries are erecting digital borders to keep their data away from
others, imposing export controls on critical technologies and scientific talent, and
seeking to create spheres of technological influence with like-minded countries – all in
the hope of increasing their technological power and promulgating their technological
models.

There is also technological competition in the influence operations, disinformation

campaigns, and cyber-attacks that states use to wage hybrid wars against one another.
This has led many states to try to reduce their connectedness, and even to split the
internet and their industrial technological base to reduce their interdependence. While
the technological revolution will continue, it will be shaped by not only a market logic,
economic actors, and multilateral institutions but also governments’ national security
and geopolitical concerns.

Technological power depends above all on economic and technical superiority. As Map
2 shows, the geography of the digital economy centres on two countries: the United
States and China. In 2019 companies headquartered in the US and China accounted
for 90 per cent of the market capitalisation of the 70 largest digital platforms (68 per
cent and 22 per cent respectively), 75 per cent of all patents related to blockchain
technologies, 75 per cent of the cloud computing market, and 50 per cent of global
spending on the internet of things. The size of digital markets and the trade balance
of digital services provide an accurate picture of the market power on which geo-tech
diplomacy is based. As Map 3 shows, the pandemic has boosted e-commerce sales.
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, between
2018 and 2020, online retail sales jumped from $1,060 billion to $1,414 billion in
China, from $520 billion to $792 billion in the US, and from $84 billion to $131 billion
in the United Kingdom.

Market power in some contested fields – such as 5G, semiconductors, rare earths,
quantum computing, and payments systems – is critical. So is control of data flows
and digital services. Cross-border data flows grew by roughly 112 times from 2008 to

41
 Map 2

Technological bipolarity
Geographical distribution of technology companies
Technology and Information

TheMarket
new capitalisation
east-west divide Market capitalization
Market capitalization
in $billion (2018) in billions of dollars (2018)
ompaniesGeographical distribution of technology companies
in billions of dollars (2018)

(2018)America America
America
100 Asia
Asia 100 Asia
Europe
Europe Europe 50
50
Africa
Africa
Africa 10 10

355 377 732 355

376 376
749 785 749
117150 150
207 105
207
4
122 734
Sourc
Europ

Source: UNCTAD (2019). Digital Economy Report 2019. Retrieved from: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/der2019_en.pdf
n.pdf
42

Source: UNCTAD (2019) Digital Economy Report https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/der2019_en.pdf

 The Power Atlas Technology

Online retail sales now drive the economy 2018 Map 3

Total online retail sales in $billion 2020

Canada
28 China
84 131
United Kingdom

520 792 1,060 1,414 South Korea

104

United States

Singapore
3

Australia
23

2020. In 2018 around 330 million people made online purchases from other countries,
each involving the cross-border transmission of data, helping e-commerce hit $26.6
trillion in sales (30 per cent of the world’s GDP). Companies that gain a competitive
advantage by aggregating, analysing, and exploiting data have seized top market
positions across the globe. Data is a source of both economic power and, now, political
power. It drives productivity but also enhances state capacity.

The ownership and control of data flows have become a primary domain of US-
Chinese competition for economic and geopolitical superiority – as demonstrated
by, for example, the two countries’ battle over 5G technology. Access to data and
the capacity to deny others access to it have become key power variables. And a lack
of global governance of data flows creates an acute risk of disputes over them. The
ce: UNCTAD geopolitical importance of data is reflected in increasingly commonplace concepts such
as ‘data borders’, ‘electronic walls’, ‘high-risk vendors’, ‘decoupling’, and ‘data export
pean Council on Foreign Relations © 2021

controls’.

The five key areas in which China and the US are waging a technological cold war,
and which define countries’ capacity to act, are: artificial intelligence (AI), cloud
computing, semiconductors, 5G and mobile equipment, and quantum technology.

Source: UNCTAD (2019). Estimates of Global E-Commerce 2019 and Preliminary Assessment of Covid-19 Impact 2020
43
 In each of these areas, the next decade is likely to see China make significant
breakthroughs that help it catch up with the US, while the European Union fails to
keep pace. Therefore, the US has an interest in slowing down Chinese companies’
growth in these areas. However, China is lagging on semiconductors: while US
factories only produce 7 per cent of the semiconductors, US companies (such as Intel,
Qualcomm, Broadcom, or Texas Instruments) account for 55 per cent of the global
market for this critical technological component, with Chinese and European firms at 5
per cent and 7 per cent respectively (South Korean and Taiwanese companies account
for 21 per cent and 6 per cent respectively). As Map 4 shows, 63 per cent of the world’s
semiconductors are produced in factories located in Taiwan and 18 per cent in South
Korea, both key US allies, while only 6 per cent are produced in China. The fact that
semiconductors are such a choke-point for China explains why the US is seeking to
restrict exports of these critical goods to its Chinese rival and why Taiwan has become
such a key technological battleground.

Connectivity is also a major battlefield. Like 5G, submarine cables and cloud services
are important domains for tech sovereignty and rivalry. Amazon Web Services, Google
Cloud, and Microsoft Azure dominate these markets, but Chinese firm Alibaba Cloud’s
services are catching up. As Map 5 shows, most interregional bandwidth capacity is
found between North America and Asia, and between North America and Europe.
Europe is the largest internet bandwidth user (at 211 kbits/s, versus 130 kbits/s for
the Americas and 102 kbits/s for the Asia-Pacific) but it lacks leading cloud service
providers.

Another potential weakness for Europe is its access to the raw materials essential
for technologies such as batteries, fuel cells, wind energy systems, photovoltaic cells,
traction motors, robotics, drones, 3D printing, and information and communications
systems. As Map 6 shows, China currently produces 58 per cent of all rare earths, and
its reserves are an estimated 37 per cent of the global total. Meanwhile, US production
of rare earths is 16 per cent of the global total, and its reserves are only 1.2 per cent.
This is a major vulnerability for the EU in its quest for technological sovereignty,
given that it currently produces less than 1 per cent of the lithium it needs for the
batteries it uses, less than 1 per cent of the platinum for its fuel cells, 1 per cent of the
raw materials for its wind energy systems, 1 per cent of silicon-based photovoltaic
assemblies, and 2 per cent of the raw materials for its robotics.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, any list of the world’s ten most valuable firms
included oil and gas producers, consumer goods businesses, and banks and insurance
companies. Today, as Map 7 shows, technology companies dominate the list. The
oil and banking companies on which the US built its global industrial supremacy in
the twentieth century have given way to Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Facebook, and

44
 The Power Atlas Technology

The heart of the digital economy Map 4

Concentration of semiconductor production

Foundry revenue (2020)

TowerSemi

Other
Global
HHGrace
Foundries

SMIC
DBHiTek

Taiwan 63%
South Korea 18%
China 6%
Samsung Other 13%

TSMC

PSMC
UMC
VIS

Total Foundry Revenue: $85,124m

The worldwide shift to next-generation telecommunications standards has brought about a replacement demand for
telecommunications and networking devices. This demand will continue to propel the semiconductor industry, resulting in
high capacity utilisation rates across the major foundries.

As certain foundries continue to expand their production capacities, TrendForce expects total foundry revenue to reach a
historical high of $94.6 billion this year, an annual growth rate of 11 per cent.

Source: TrendForce Department of Semiconductor Research (2021). Foundry Revenue Projected to Reach Historical High
Map 5

The Terabit Era

Data centres and interregional data flows

US and
Canada

Number of data centres

per country (2021)

1,800 Latin
America
1

Use of interregional internet bandwidth,

in gigabits per second (2020)

55,000

30,000

15,000
10,000
2,000
<1,000

46
 The Pow
The Power Atlas Technology

Europe

Asia

Middle
East

Africa

Oceania

Source: Data Center Map (2021); TeleGeography Global Internet Map (2021)
Map 6

Mining rare-earth materials

How geography compromises the green tech revolution

N/A 1.25
Greenland

0
1,500,000

N/A 0.7%
Canada

0
830,000

16% 1.2%
United States
38,000
1,500,000

0.5% 17.5%
Brazil
1,000
21,000,000

Global rare-earth
production and reserves (2021)

Mine production in tons

Reserves in tons
Percentage of world total mine production
Percentage of world total reserves
Rare-earth production

48
 The Power Atlas Technology

1% 10%
Russia
2,700
12,000,000

58% 37%
China
140,000
44,000,000

1.2% 5.7% 0.4% 18.3%

India Vietnam
3,000 1,000
0.2% N/A 22,000,000
6,900,000
Burundi
500
0.8% N/A
0 Thailand 12.5% N/A
Myanmar
2,000
N/A 0.7% 30,000
Tanzania 0
0
0
890,000

7% 3.4%
Australia
3.3% N/A
Madagascar 17,000
8,000 4,100,000
0
N/A 0.7%

South Africa
0
790,000

Methodology: Data for metric tons of rare-earth-oxide equivalent content.

Source: U.S. Geological Survey (2021). Mineral commodity summaries 2021: Rare Earths, https://doi.org/10.3133/mcs2021
Map 7

Technology and Information

MastersofofIndustrial
Masters IndustrialRevolution
Revolution
Digitalisisthe
Digital thenew
new
oiloil
Technology and Information

Market value at the end

Market value at the end of the
of a year
given given year inof$billion
in billions US dollar

1,000

200 39.6 13.9

1,000

34.9 13.3
200 39.6 13.9
Oil and gas 22.3 12.4
34.9 13.3
Technology and communications
Oil and gas
Other
Technology and communications 17 11.3
Other
22.3 12.4
15.9 9.8
Oil and gas
17 11.3
1980
Technology and communications
Other

15.9 9.8

1980

237
269 231
228
237
269 302 231
475
228
216
302 229
475 290
236
2000
216

290 229
236
2000

50
 The Power Atlas Technology

2021

1,393
1,558 753

615

2,051 1,920
588

839 641
1,778

Source: Focam.de (2021), The largest companies through the ages https://www.focam.de/downloads/referenzen/012011_pi.pdf; PwC (2021); Global Top 100 companies by
market capitalisation
Map 8

Disinformation on Facebook
How state actors weaponise social networks

Number of influence operations by country of origin

(2017-2020)

No data
2 5 15 25

Countries most frequently targeted

by foreign actors in influence operations,
2017-2020
US 26
Ukraine 11
UK 11
Libya 6 Countrie
Sudan 6
by foreig
52 2017-20
 The Power Atlas Technology

Methodology: Over the past four years, Facebook security teams have identified and removed over 150 networks for
violating their policy on coordinated inauthentic behaviour (CIB). The CIB policy was a major piece of Facebook’s broader

es most frequently targeted

security strategy on influence operations (IO), developed in response to foreign interference by Russian actors in 2016. Since
then, Facebook has investigated and disrupted operations around the world. These public enforcements paint a global
picture of IO.
gn actors in influence operations,
020
Source: Facebook (2021). Threat report: the state of influence operations 2017-2020
 Apple. US tech companies dominate the global market, with Chinese firms in second
place and European ones a distant third. The Mapping China’s Technology Giants
project at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre
has identified and tracked the overseas expansion of 3,800 key Chinese technology
companies, 27 of which it considers to be “tech giants”.

However, market capitalisation, on which the US leads, is not the whole story. In fact,
it hides the fact that China is leading on AI, machine learning, and cyber-capabilities
– as the US military recently recognised. China is now the world’s largest investor
in technology: in 2020 its research and development investment hit a record $378
billion, equivalent to 2.4 per cent of its GDP. This massive investment puts China
on track to becoming the world leader in machine learning, the technology with the
greatest potential to cause significant economic and military disruption.

In the future, geopolitics will be dominated by countries and firms that excel in
artificial intelligence, robotics, the internet of things, autonomous vehicles, 3D
printing, nanotechnology, biotechnology, materials science, energy storage, and
quantum computing. Here, the US has many critical advantages: despite lagging on
5G and AI, it has the market size, the innovation drive, and the financial resources
to challenge China’s leadership in these fields. Meanwhile, China has a well-funded
industrial strategy designed to achieve technological sovereignty, and can draw on
the power of its huge market. The EU lags on both fronts: it does not have either a
market as dynamic as the US one or an industrial strategy that can compensate for
this. As a consequence, the bloc is off the pace in areas such as AI, patents, innovation,
and ‘unicorn companies’ (privately held start-ups valued at $1 billion or more). Still,
Europe has enough assets – such as EU leadership on 5G and other areas – to be a
technological player. The battle is not yet lost.

US companies are dominant in the social networking, information, advertisement,

and communications markets. Facebook and Twitter are globally established, while
their Chinese and Russian counterparts (WeChat and VKontakte respectively) are only
dominant in their local markets. Revealingly, there are no such companies in the EU –
which makes it completely dependent on the services provided by US platforms.

In liberal democracies, where freedom of speech is a key value, the open and
unregulated nature of US social networking platforms creates vulnerabilities to foreign
influence and interference. One can see this in Freedom House’s Election Watch
project, which maps the countries in which social media has been used to compromise
the integrity of elections. A recent report by Facebook found that, between 2017 and
2020, there were 130 coordinated inauthentic behaviour events designed to seed
disinformation in various countries. As Map 8 shows, the report placed Russia and

54
 The Power Atlas Technology

Iran at the top of the list of actors responsible for these operations, and revealed that
the US and Ukraine were the main targets.

As a result, the economic gains brought about by the technological revolution coexist
with very low levels of public trust in technology, especially when it comes to privacy,
data safety, and cyber-crime. As Map 9 shows, concerns about data privacy and
disinformation have led citizens worldwide to show very low trust in social media
networks. In the 27 countries regularly surveyed by the Edelman Trust Barometer,
the social media industry was the least trusted of a sample of 16 key economic

The information crisis Map 9

How people stopped trusting the media

65% Finland

Portugal Kenya
60 Denmark Netherlands
Norway
55 Belgium Brazil Nigeria
Germany Ireland
South Africa
Switzerland
50 Sweden Thailand
Poland
Canada Austria
Trust news overall (2021)

45 Singapore Croatia
Australia
Japan Romania
Malaysia Turkey
40 Italy
Indonesia
Colombia Peru
Hong Kong India
Mexico
UK Czech Republic Spain Argentina Chile
35 South Korea
Greece
Philippines Bulgaria
France
30 Slovakia Hungary
US Taiwan

25

20

15

10

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40%

Trust news in social media (2021)

Methodology: The numbers show the proportion of each country’s population that trust either the media overall or social
media. The question read: “Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements: I think you can trust the
news/news I use/news in social media/news in search most of the time.”

Source: Reuters Institute, University of Oxford (2021). Digital News Report 2021
55
 sectors (from healthcare to energy, education, and retail) while almost two-thirds
of respondents saw traditional media organisations as biased and as doing their job
poorly, reflecting record lows in trust in information sources.

In contrast to often-vulnerable democracies, authoritarian states can restrict particular

individuals’ and organisations’ access to the internet in the territory they control.
China, Iran, and North Korea have almost complete control of the internet, while
Myanmar and Cambodia are trying to gain something similar. Authoritarian states
such as Russia and Saudi Arabia can use advanced digital technologies, such as facial
recognition and AI, to engage in mass surveillance and repression. As Freedom on the
Net reports, countries such as China, North Korea, and Iran block Twitter, Facebook,
and YouTube, and largely monitor all their citizens’ internet traffic.

As great powers seek to enhance their technological strength, they have once
again started thinking in terms of spheres of influence. In a contest resembling the
nineteenth century ‘Great Game’ between Britain and the Russian Empire for influence
over central Asia, they now seek to lure countries into their technological ecosystems.
As Map 10 shows, China has exported surveillance technology to more than 60
countries with dismal human rights records, including Iran, Myanmar, Venezuela,
and Zimbabwe. Thirty-six of those states have signed on to China’s Belt and Road
Initiative, which gives them access to cheap loans to buy ‘authoritarian tech’ from
Chinese companies, particularly Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, and ZTE. And, in other
critical technologies, the fear is that China will use systems such as its Blockchain-
Based Service Network to try to rewire the world and create a parallel internet subject
to Chinese standards.

Liberal democracies also seek to establish digital and other tech alliances. Through
the Clean Network Initiative it set up in 2017, the Trump administration sought to
incentivise its friends and allies to ban or limit Chinese technology companies such as
Huawei, and to adopt so-called “clean” carriers, data stores, apps, clouds, and cables.
The group – which includes EU member states, as well as Australia, Canada, India,
Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Taiwan, and the UK – seeks to offset Chinese
technological power in a manner similar to the cold war strategy of containment. In
the EU, Latin America, and several other places, countries have begun to slowly move
away from Chinese technology and Chinese companies after designating them as ‘risky
vendors’.

In an environment characterised by tech fragmentation, the ‘splinternet’, and

geopolitical competition for spheres of influence, traditional global governance
institutions such as the United Nations and the World Trade Organization cannot
sustain a rules-based order that guarantees equal access to critical technologies. While

56
 The Power Atlas Technology

great powers compete to gain control over regulatory bodies such as the International
Telecommunications Union and the World Intellectual Property Organization, global
governance is also breaking up around smaller institutions, such as the D-10 initiative
– which the US set up in 2014 to push advanced democracies to coordinate on tech
vis-à-vis authoritarian governments – and the G7 Global Partnership on Artificial
Intelligence, which excludes Russia and China. A new brand of tech diplomacy has
emerged, involving a mixture of incentives and disincentives for countries to join great
powers’ technological blocs and spheres of influence.

Achieving power and resilience on this new landscape requires a combination of

defensive and proactive measures, both at home and globally. Defensive measures
range from diversifying suppliers and markets to limiting or securing third countries’
access to home markets, controlling technological exports, keeping and attracting
talent, and combating foreign influence and disinformation operations. As Map 11
shows, China stands out as the leader in digital trade restrictions and the quest for
‘digital independence’. By 2018, China was the world leader in data and technology
nationalisation, seeking to develop technological standards and capacities that were
different from global ones.

Proactive measures include the creation of deep and comprehensive industrial

strategies that involve both state and market actors, and that allow countries to keep
or gain a competitive edge in critical technologies. They also include the formation
of international coalitions of like-minded countries and multilateral institutions
that ensure fair access to technology and provide public goods such as global tech
governance.

While the US and China have fully embraced geo-tech diplomacy, the EU is only
beginning to learn to speak the language of technological power – to paraphrase its
high representative for foreign and security affairs, Josep Borrell. The bloc needs to
not only expand and secure its industrial technological base at home but also work
to enhance its influence by cooperating with the US and many countries in the Indo-
Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. The EU is not doomed to lose this game: like many
other foreign services, Borrell’s office has appointed its own tech ambassador and
engaged in geo-tech diplomacy. The recent completion of the BELLA submarine cable
linking Europe and Latin America, and the recent EU-Japan Connectivity Agreement
to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative, are signs of progress. The EU seems to
increasingly recognise that only those who see technology through a geopolitical lens
will be able to preserve their sovereignty.

57
Map 10

How technology helps dictatorships

China’s role in spreading surveillance technology

Export destinations of the US and

Chinese surveillance technology (2019)

Chinese surveillance technology

US surveillance technology
Both

58
 The Power Atlas Technology

Source: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2019). AI Global Surveillance (AIGS) Index
Map 11
Growing restrictions on digital trade
Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index

Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index (2018)

Minimally restricted Highly restricted

0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

Europe
0.21

China
0.7
US
0.26

US Europe China

The index shows that the US has a In Europe, the two most digitally This index shows that China is the
level of digital restrictiveness that restricted countries are France and most restricted country in digital
is just above the average level of Germany. Both countries have more trade. China applies sweeping
restrictiveness in all countries covered. restrictive digital trade policies than regulatory measures to all aspects
The country that is most open to digital most other developed countries. of digital trade, including trade
trade, with only a few digital trade France is also the only European in digital goods and services,
restrictions, is New Zealand. Iceland, country that is part of the top ten most investment in the information and
Norway, Ireland, and Hong Kong are restricted countries in digital trade communications technology (ICT)
also among the most digitally open worldwide. Romania is the third most sector, and the movement of data and
countries. restricted European country, with a ICT professionals. China is followed by
score significantly lower than France Russia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam.​
and Germany.​

Methodology: The Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index (DTRI) measures how 64 countries restrict digital trade. The DTRI is
based on a wide spectrum of digital trade policies, covering more than 100 categories of policy measures. The index is
based on the Digital Trade Estimates database that the European Center for International Political Economy has developed
and that is freely available for anyone to use. The database and the index are clustered around four larger areas of digital
trade policy, namely: fiscal restrictions and market access; establishment restrictions; restrictions on data; and, finally,
trading restrictions. The DTRI ranges between 0 (completely open) and 1 (virtually closed).

Source: European Centre for International Political Economy (2018). Digital Trade Restrictiveness Index
60
The Power Atlas Technology

61
62
 Climate
by Alex Clark and Susi Dennison

The transition away from a carbon-fuelled economy is now widely accepted as

inevitable. The politics of global resources and supply chains are being reshaped by
an emerging international consensus on the need to reach ‘net zero’ greenhouse-gas
emissions during the second half of the twenty-first century. This race to zero carbon is
driven by a combination of technological progress, declining costs, rising investment,
and policy measures to support the transition.

The fossil fuel industry may still underpin the global economy but, as its strategic
importance and market value decline, so will its political power. A large proportion of
the world’s remaining oil, gas, and coal resources – and the associated downstream
infrastructure that cannot be repurposed – will become stranded assets as green
alternatives and carbon regulation become more popular, with high-cost producers
at particular risk. Similarly, countries with large and relatively new industrial bases
may experience sharp economic adjustments in the medium term unless they can
retrofit their assets to use green energy molecules and electrons, including hydrogen,
ammonia, and biofuels. States that rely on recently built steel furnaces and cement
kilns – such as China, India, and several Middle Eastern nations – are likely to be
among those most affected by these developments.

At the same time, the physical effects of climate change and concurrent environmental
crises will have an especially severe impact on many developing countries, particularly
African states, low-lying Pacific island nations, and those that host biodiverse, fragile
habitats in tropical regions. Habitat and biodiversity loss, land-use changes, a rise in
the sea level, and desertification will all heighten the need for investment in adaptation
and resilience measures. They will also affect the availability, distribution, and
productivity of arable land and coastal fishing waters, and will alter human and animal
migration patterns. In the long term, these changes will affect the distribution of
economic and political power between states, including within supranational bodies.
63
 In this shifting and unpredictable environment, countries increasingly weaponise
climate diplomacy. Global players exercise diplomatic power through the timing and
substance of their announcements of national targets for reducing carbon emissions,
the policy measures accompanying them, and the conditions they place on related
financial aid. For instance, China made a surprise announcement in September 2020
that its carbon dioxide emissions would peak “before 2030” and that it would aim to
achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. This expression of a marked rise in China’s climate
ambition emphasised the country’s sovereignty over its development pathway.

The European Union is wielding its economic power through legislative proposals
under the European Green Deal. The EU may be positioning itself to benefit from
first-mover advantages in key industries of the future by proposing unprecedented
measures to tax carbon-intensive imports at its borders (see: Map 1) – despite the
diplomatic risks of doing so. Ultimately, this move may prove highly beneficial to
societies around the world by accelerating the adoption of sustainable practices. But
its short-term effect is to protect European industries as they improve their ability
to transition away from carbon, and to place the EU’s trade partners in developing
countries under greater pressure to introduce the same carbon pricing measures.

Emissions mitigation and adaptation are closely linked to investment, but states with
deep pockets have long avoided financial commitments to green the economies of
countries with less responsibility for, and greater vulnerability to, climate change.
Despite the need to recover from the pandemic and to mitigate the increasingly
obvious impact of climate change, the G7 has repeatedly failed to meet its target of
providing developing countries with $100 billion per year in climate finance. This
funding target – which is a drop in the ocean relative to developing countries’ overall
investment and adaptation needs, and which is included in the 2009 COP16 climate
accords – is intended to help these states manage the impact of climate change, and to
develop national action plans to counter it.

Given the importance of technology and innovation in adapting many sectors to the
climate challenge, there is another source of power that will play a growing role in
states’ attempts to make the transition to net zero. Access to the labour force and
natural resources necessary to develop green technology, and the ability to exploit and
monetise them, will also shape states’ capacity to strike economic bargains on climate
in the coming decades.

The map of climate and resources power is complex and uncertain – but governments
need to understand it if they are to operate in a world that is compelled to take action
on climate change.

64
 The Power Atlas Climate

Carbon trading Map 1

Emissions embedded in trade

Share of carbon dioxide emissions embedded in trade, measured as emissions
exported or imported as a percentage of domestic production emissions

Net exporter Net importer

No data
-60%
-40%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%

Methodology: Annual net carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions embedded in trade, measured as a percentage of production-
based emissions of CO2. Net CO2 emissions embedded in trade is the net amount of CO2 that is imported or exported
via goods traded with an economy. A positive value denotes a country or region that is a net importer of CO2 emissions; a
negative value indicates that a country is a net exporter.

Source: Ritchie H. and Roser M. (2020). “CO₂ and Greenhouse Gas Emissions”. Published online at OurWorldInData.org. Retrieved from: ‘https://ourworldindata.org/co2-
and-other-greenhouse-gas-emissions’ [Online resource]
 Energy transition
The global energy mix

Today, there is considerable variation in the carbon intensity of countries’ energy

mixes (see: Map 2). The picture is incrementally shifting as they add new – usually
renewable – sources of power and heat, and retire older ones. One critical factor in the
energy mix is demand, which changes as countries experience demographic growth or
decline, and as their economies develop in various sectors – in some cases, with the
explicit goal of transitioning away from carbon use. Energy demand is likely to grow
significantly in some of the largest, most carbon-intensive economies, particularly
those of India, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico, and China (even as it remains
relatively steady in Europe and the US, both of which are decarbonising). At the same
time, these countries will come under pressure to ensure that future additions to their
energy capacity are zero-carbon, secure sufficient access to renewable electricity, and
forgo easily accessible fossil fuel alternatives.

Stranded assets and oil markets

Given the size of some countries’ fossil fuel economies and the speed of their economic
growth, incremental transformation will be insufficient to meet the climate challenge.
They will need to implement ambitious policies if they are to phase out fossil fuels.
Regardless of whether they do so, there may be rapid changes in international demand
for fossil fuels, shifting the balance of power between energy-producing and energy-
importing countries.

Fossil fuel extraction is likely to become economically unviable for the United States,
Canada, and other high-cost oil producers before it does for the lowest-cost OPEC
producers, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, and Kuwait (although those in the
former groups are less economically dependent on energy production; see: Map 3).
Even as oil and gas markets shrink – and as technologies for alternative sources of
power are still coming on line – socio-economic pressure to monetise carbon before
it is too late may lead these and other economies to expand production in the short
term. They could thereby expose themselves to greater stranded-asset risks – in what
is sometimes called the ‘green paradox’. The extent to which this occurs will depend on
whether producer countries are convinced that other global players are serious about
the transition away from carbon, these states’ internal development needs and political
makeup, and the availability of other sources of revenue.

66
 The Power Atlas Climate

Renewables superpowers and rare earths

Green energy is the new gold: the race is on to develop and deploy technologies that
allow for the production and consumption of non-carbon energy. There are high hopes
for success in sectors such as renewable energy, smart grids, and new energy vehicles.
But, in many countries, it will likely be disruptive to replace electricity generation
infrastructure quickly enough to decarbonise.

Technological solutions are emerging in sectors where electrification is challenging

– such as steel, cement, shipping, and aviation – but face a long road to
commercialisation. Some governments have responded to this challenge more quickly
than others, by investing and innovating in, for instance, carbon capture and storage,
battery storage, and advanced nuclear technologies (China and the US), and green
hydrogen and battery production (the EU and China).

Once these and other technologies become commercially viable, states will need
significant natural resources and infrastructure to adopt them. As renewable,
electricity-based fuels displace oil and gas, countries with the largest, lowest-cost solar
and wind resources – and those that produce the rare earth metals used to harvest
them – may be well positioned to strike energy bargains with the world’s large energy
consumers. States and regions with areas of particularly high solar photovoltaic
potential include Chile, Mexico, the US, Morocco, Algeria, Namibia, South Africa,
Botswana, most of the Middle East, China, and Mongolia. Locations with high wind
energy potential include the United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, and Scandinavia, as
well as the coastlines of Canada, the US, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Namibia,
Somalia, Russia, Australia, France, south-eastern China, and New Zealand
(see: Map 4).

Nonetheless, profitably exploiting these resources will require access to rare earths.
These 17 elements are relatively common throughout the Earth’s crust, but many
deposits of them are undeveloped. China, Vietnam, Brazil, Russia, India, and Australia
currently have the largest reserves of rare earths. Reserves of lithium – a metal that,
like cobalt, is essential for battery production – are primarily concentrated in Bolivia
and Argentina, followed by Chile, the US, Australia, and China.

67
Map 2

Greening the world’s electricity

Renewable energy shares and territorial CO2 emissions

Canada
0.6

United States
5.3

Mexico
0.4

Low-carbon share of electricity generation (2019)

No data
20% 40% 60% 80%

Territorial C02 Emissions

in GTC02/year (2019)

Brazil
10
0.5
5

0.5

Methodology: This map shows the total CO2 emissions within a country’s territory in 2019 [GTCO2/year] and the share of
total electricity generation in 2019 from low-carbon sources: renewables, nuclear, and hydro.

68
 The Power Atlas Climate

Russia
1.7

China
10.2

India
2.6

South Africa
0.5

Source: Ritchie H. and Roser M. (2020). “Energy”. Published online at OurWorldInData.org; Friedlingstein P. et al. (2020). The Global Carbon Budget 2020,
Earth System Science Data. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5194/essd-12-3269-2020”
Map 3

Unburnable carbon
Exposure to oil rents and number of coal mines by country

37% 63%

Canada
91

United States 93%

483

Value of oil rents as a percentage share of total GDP (2019) 88%

No data
10% 20% 30% 40% Columbia
88

Share of operating and

proposed coal mines (2021)

Proposed mines
Operating mines

Number of total mines

(proposed and operating)

500
5

Methodology: The map shows the total number of operating coal mines with a capacity of more than 3 million tonnes per
annum, as well as all proposed coal mine projects with a capacity of more than 1 million tonnes per annum, as of 2021.
The percentage share of each, the operating and proposed mines, are shown for the top 15 countries with the largest total
amount of mines in 2021.

70
 The Power Atlas Climate

Russia
649
Germany
165
Poland 48% 52%
145 Mongolia
Turkey
90 Kazakhstan 61
90%
100% 110
85% 36% 64%

26% 74%
21% 79%

China
2,530
41% 59%

India 15% 85%

990
Indonesia
91% 511

47% 53%

37% 63%
Mozambique
66

Australia
South Africa 924
354

Sources: World Bank (2019). Oil rents (% of GDP); Global Energy Monitor (2021). Coal production by country, Global Coal Mine Tracker, June 2021
 Map 4

Resources for the future

Solar and wind potential, and critical mineral reserves
Average practical solar potential per Offshore wind capacity potential in GW
day, long-term in kWh/kWp/day (2020) (2012)

No data 10,000 1,000 100

3 4 5

44 44 9.2 9.2

Rare earth reserves, million tonnes Lithium reserves,

oxide equivalent
44
(2020) million tonnes 9.2
(2020)
44 9.2

22 22 4.7 4.7
21 21

12 12 4.7
22 21 2.1 2.1
1.9 1.9
6.9 6.9 1.5 1.5
22 4.7
21 4.1 4.1 0.8 0.8
1.5 1.5 0.5 0.5
0.91.5 0.81.5 0.80.9 0.8
12 0.3 0.8 0.3
0.3 0.2 0.3
0.1 0.2
0.1 0.1 0.1
2.1 1.9
6.9 1.5
Canada

Canada

Canada

Canada
Argentina Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe

12
Portugal

Portugal
China

China

China

China
Russia

Russia

Chile

Chile
Greenland

Greenland
India

India

Greenland Brazil Tanzania

Tanzania
Brazil

Brazil

Brazil

Brazil
Other

Other
United States

United States

States

States
Vietnam

Vietnam

Australia

Vietnam Australia

Australia

countries

Other countries
Australia
Argentina

Argentina
Canada IndiaSouth Africa

South Africa
Other countries

Other countries

4.1 2.1 1.9 0.8

6.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 0.3
0.9 0.8 0.8
United

United

0.3
4.1 0.8
Other

1.5 1.5 0.5 0.3

Canada

Canada
Australia China

China
TanzaniaRussia

Chile
Greenland

Tanzania

Other
United States

United States
Australia

Australia

Other countries

0.9 0.8 0.8 0.2

South Africa

Other countries

0.3 0.1 0.1

Canada

Zimbabwe

Portugal
China

China
Russia

Chile
India
Brazil

Brazil
Other
United States

United States
Vietnam

Australia

Other countries
Argentina
South Africa

Other countries

Methodology: The solar potential is shown through PVOUT Level 1, which is the power output of a photovoltaic system
(specific yield); in this case, the long-term power output produced by a utility-scale installation of monofacial modules
fixed mounted at an optimum tilt, measured in kWh/kWp/day. This excludes land with identifiable physical obstacles to
utility-scale photovoltaic plants.

Sources: World Bank (2021). Global Photovoltaic Power Potential by Country; Arent, D., Sullivan, P., Heimiller, D., Lopez, A., Eurek, K., Badger, J., Jorgensen, H.E.,
72 Kelly, M., Clarke, L. and Luckow, P., (2012). Improved offshore wind resource assessment in global climate stabilization scenarios (No. NREL/TP-6A20-55049). National
Renewable Energy Lab.(NREL), Golden, CO (United States); US Geological Survey (2021). Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2021
 The Power Atlas Climate

Climate risks
Vulnerable states

The Notre Dame GAIN index ranks countries’ readiness to deal with the impact of
climate change across the economy, governance, and social infrastructure, as well as
their vulnerability according to exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity (see: Map
5). Most of the poorest performers in the index are low-income and lower-middle-
income states in North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, south Asia, south-
east Asia, and the Pacific. The climate-related risks that these countries face involve
extreme weather events, a rise in the sea level, water stress, and crop failures – all of
which can increase mortality rates. These problems could lead to a host of second-
order effects, including human displacement, disease, health system failures, and
chronic socio-political instability. Pacific island states could be submerged by a rise
in the sea level, as could large swathes of low-lying land in south Asia, north America,
and Europe in particular.

Exposed ND-GAIN Index (2019) Map 5

Vulnerability to climate change Most at risk Least at risk

No data
and readiness to adapt
30 40 50 60 70

Methodology: The ND-GAIN Country Index is composed of two key dimensions of adaptation: vulnerability and readiness.
The vulnerability index contains indicators for exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. The readiness index contains
indicators for economic, governance, and social factors. Climate vulnerability and adaptation readiness are based on
compiled indicators. Thirty-six indicators contribute to ND-GAIN’s measure of vulnerability and nine indicators contribute to
its measure of readiness. ND-GAIN score = (readiness score - vulnerability score +1) * 50

Source: University of Notre Dame (2019). ND-GAIN: Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative
73
 Unstable climate

There are many pathways for the global transition to net zero, each of which has
uncertain climate implications. Some pathways risk simply substituting one set of
problems for another, while others risk truly catastrophic outcomes. For instance, if
the global shift away from coal becomes a shift towards gas, rising upstream methane
emissions (see: Map 6) may increase atmospheric warming in the short term.
Furthermore, if heat waves become more widespread and frequent, there will be a
sharp rise in demand for electricity, including that from fossil-powered generators.
This problem, which is particularly acute in countries prone to extreme temperatures,
would also contribute to warming. For example, India is projected to see the greatest
share of increased cooling degree days – at 27 per cent of the global total – followed
by China, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Brazil, and Bangladesh (see: Map 7). Other
countries in the top 30 for such increases are largely in south-east Asia, north America,
Africa, and central America.

A misjudged or delayed transition to net zero would risk crop failures, fishery
collapses, and ocean eutrophication. Similarly, the irreversible destruction of oceanic
and land-based carbon sinks would reduce the Earth’s capacity to absorb atmospheric
carbon and increase both warming and the need to remove greenhouse gas.

Map 6 Carbon’s powerful cousin Annual methane emissions in million

tonnes CO2 equivalent (2021)
Methane emissions by country
No data
10 50 100 500 1000

Source: Global Methane Initiative, GMI (2021). Methane Emissions Data

74
 The Power Atlas Climate

Cooling demand in a warmer world Map 7

Cooling degree days per capita,

2009-2018 average

Annual cooling degree days,

per capita (2009-2018 average)

No data
0 2500 5000

Methodology: Cooling degree days are the sum of daily mean temperatures above 18.3C (65F), calculated across all days in
the calendar year. The annual measure reflects the number of days with hot weather and the intensity of heat on those days.

Source: Biardeau, L.T., Davis, L.W., Gertler, P. et al. (2020) Heat exposure and global air conditioning. Nature Sustainability 3, 25–28. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41893-
019-0441-9 75
 Water stress, agriculture, and food security

Aside from energy, water and food will be the most precious resources in a climate-
stressed world that is home to a growing and increasingly affluent population. In most
projected climate scenarios, those with access to ample supplies of water and food
are likely to have broader developmental and trade options, and to be able to insulate
themselves from the worst human costs of climate change. By 2040, the most acute
water stress will likely be felt in states in the Middle East, south Asia, and central Asia
(see: Map 8), while those least at risk (in part due to lower consumption) are countries
in central and southern Africa, as well as central America. Nations with the largest
arable land areas include the US, India, Russia, China, Brazil, and Canada.

Map 8 A parched planet Baseline water stress (2019)

Ratio of water withdrawals to Low Extremely high
renewable supplies No data
1 2 3 4

Methodology: Baseline water stress measures the ratio of total water withdrawals to available renewable surface and
groundwater supplies. Water withdrawals include domestic, industrial, irrigation, and livestock consumptive and non-
consumptive uses. Available renewable water supplies factor in the impact of upstream consumptive water users and
large dams on downstream water availability. Higher values indicate more competition among users.

Source: World Resources Institute (2019) Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas. https://www.wri.org/aqueduct
76
 The Power Atlas Climate

Financing the transition

A green economy

Exposure to the risks of climate change and the energy transition, particularly for
countries lacking the resource to adapt or diversify respectively, has long been a
major sticking point in international climate negotiations. This is because developed
countries have resisted providing the necessary financial and technological resources
to address these risks. Adaptation and vulnerability will continue to be pivotal
negotiating issues as countries with the least to gain, most to lose, and least capacity
to protect themselves require progressively greater financial and technical support
from wealthy nations – support that may well not be forthcoming in the absence of
incentives to provide it.

Historically, financing of climate change mitigation has dominated international

and domestic, public and private, climate finance flows (usually involving renewable
energy and energy efficiency projects). The amount of funding flowing into adaptation,
particularly in vulnerable countries, is far less, and a fraction of what is needed to
protect against the projected impact of climate change in these countries (see: Map
9). Meanwhile, climate mitigation finance and development aid remain critical to help
poorer countries – which have underdeveloped financial markets and power grids –
create alternatives to carbon-intensive infrastructure in the medium and long term,
and to drive down the costs of technologies for renewable energy generation, and the
financial costs of building and operating them.

Climate-related financial flows are still very small relative to overall investment.
Although global and regional powers may seek to build up spheres of influence by
bolstering their climate finance commitments and establishing green financial hubs,
climate finance will remain largely marginal without a wholesale realignment of
financial markets through regulation. At present, international bargaining over climate
finance is more a question of optics than a genuine transfer of power from developed
to developing countries.

Still, optics matter. And countries that receive aid do not quickly forget where this
support came from when it was needed. The US-led Build Back Better World initiative,
announced after the 2021 G7 meeting, focuses on climate (alongside health, digital
technology, and gender equality). The initiative underlines the West’s determination to
compete with China and other powers in the struggle for control and influence over the
key sources of power and connectivity in a post-carbon world.

77
Map 9

Banking on green growth

Annual climate finance flows by region

United States
and Canada
81 billion

United States
and Canada
99%
81 billion

99%
Latin America
Total climate finance flows $billion and Caribbean
(2017-2018 average) 37 billion

0 250 Transregional
13 billion Latin America
and85%
Caribbean
Mitigation finance
37 billion
Adaption finance 28%
Multiple objectives finance 60%
Transregional
13 billion
85%
28%
60%

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 The Power Atlas Climate

Western Europe
98 billion

Central Asia
and eastern Europe
99% 21 billion

91%

Middle East
and North Africa East Asia and Pacific
15 billion 250 billion

84% South Asia 95%

30 billion

Sub-Saharan Africa
19 billion 83%

30% 57%
Other Oceania
11 billion

100%

Source: Climate Policy Initiative (2019). Global Landscape of Climate Finance 2019
Map 10

Money for nothing?

Fossil fuel subsidies per capita and bank financing
for carbon-intensive fossil assets

Fossil fuel subsidies in $billion New commercial bank financing for high-carbon
(total, 2015-2019) fossil fuels by country of domicile (total, 2016-2020)

$10 billion
125 250 500 1000 2000 4000 Defined amounts below $10 billion

No data

Canada $558.9 billion United Kingdom $312.4 billion

United States $1279.4 billion

France $377.9 billion

Spain $56.3 billion

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 The Power Atlas Climate

Netherlands $52.4 billion

Denmark
$5.8 billion

Germany $88 billion China $593 billion

Italy $45 billion Finland Russia

$9.4 billion
$13 billion

Japan $358 billion

South Korea
$1 billion

Australia $32.4 billion

India $21.4 billion

Methodology: The Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker incorporates estimates of fossil-fuel subsidies (coal, electricity, gas, petroleum)
and other support measures from three international databases: the OECD Inventory of Support Measures for Fossil Fuels, the
IEA Energy Subsidies Database and the IMF Fossil Fuel Subsidies Database.

The Banking on Fossil Fuels Database shows figures for financing where a given bank plays a leading role in a transaction
with a given fossil fuel company, scaled to the fossil-fuel intensity of that company. It includes oil and gas expansion, tar
sands, arctic oil, offshore deep-sea oil, fracking, liquefied natural gas, coal mining, and coal power.

Sources: IISD and OECD (2021). Fossil Fuel Subsidy Tracker; Rainforest Action Network, BankTrack, Indigenous Environmental Network, Oil Change International,
Reclaim Finance, and Sierra Club (2021). Banking on Climate Chaos: Fossil Fuel Finance Report 2021
 Fossil fuel subsidies and investments

Infrastructure that emits large amounts of carbon – or that facilitates market access
for high-carbon fuels and activities – still dominates new investment. This is partly
due to the decisions made by G20 governments, which have provided an estimated $3
trillion in fossil fuel subsidies since they adopted the Paris Agreement, in 2015 (see:
Map 10). If the international consensus on the need for emphatic climate action holds
and technological progress continues on current trends, investment in carbon-emitting
infrastructure should become less economical. But should the political balance shift
or innovation in key areas stall, there could be a low-profile increase in investment
in fossil fuels. China’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which involves more
than 120 countries, is particularly relevant in this respect. While some participants in
the BRI are trying to green investments linked to the initiative, there are significant
administrative and capacity-related obstacles to doing so. Despite the apparent
slowdown in China’s overseas coal investments since the start of the pandemic, there
is a high risk of carbon-intensive investment in BRI infrastructure in sectors such as
gas, transport, mining, and forestry.

Delays to climate action

To compete, thrive, or – in many cases – simply survive in this environment, states

and other international and subnational actors will need to act quickly and astutely.
They will need to understand the new map of climate and resources power that is
being drawn and redrawn before their eyes.

Some countries appear likely to make short-term tactical gains from climate change
in various areas. And their efforts to capitalise on these potentially short-lived
opportunities may cause geopolitical ripples, or even prove to be serious strategic
mistakes, in the coming years. Canada and Russia, for instance, may well see a
significant expansion of fertile, arable areas as permafrost melts (although this is
highly contingent on seasonal climate variability and access to water resources for
irrigation). Similarly, as ice cover recedes in the summer months, shipping costs and
transit times could fall due to the expansion of routes crossing Canadian and Russian
territorial waters through the Arctic Ocean. Given that such developments could lower
the distances required for commercial shipping, it seems likely that they could benefit
European states dependent on the Suez route more than American ones reliant on the
Panama Canal.

Stalling climate action to reap these potential benefits, however, could be very risky
for these countries and catastrophic for others. Accelerating ice and tundra melt in
polar regions could destabilise water supplies, incentivise the permanent conversion

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 The Power Atlas Climate

of forested areas into arable land, drive up methane emissions from livestock, release
vast quantities of trapped methane, and raise the sea level. Therefore, greater access
to arable land would not automatically boost the economies of Arctic countries,
particularly if it was accompanied by geopolitical tension and conflict.

Although there is a great deal of uncertainty about many future dynamics of climate
and resources power, it seems that swimming against the tide of climate action will
not pay off. Given the wholesale transformation of economies and infrastructure states
will have to engage in to meet their environmental targets, climate and resources
power is rapidly becoming inextricable from the more conventional forms of political
and material power explored elsewhere in this atlas. Global climate politics is likely
to undergo rapid shifts as countries try to implement the Paris Agreement. But
leadership in achieving the deal’s goals seems more likely to pay dividends than efforts
to prevent or slow the transition.

83
84
 People
by Fiona Adamson and Kelly Greenhill

Demography is destiny, the saying goes, and the twenty-first century is no different
in this regard. From time immemorial, people have been a bedrock of state power
and capabilities. Population size and growth rates, for instance, place critical limits
on a state’s aggregate power. A large population does not, by itself, make a state a
great power – indeed, overpopulation can be a profound vulnerability – but it is likely
impossible in the modern world to achieve and sustain great power status without one.
Although technology has reduced and even supplanted the need for human labour in
numerous domains, human capital continues to be a critical determinant of a state’s
industrial and military capabilities, and of its prestige and position in the international
system. Therefore, it is unsurprising that all the world’s major powers have sizeable
populations (see: Map 1).

However, while the significance of demography is perennial, the ways in which states
manage their people power has changed. The world is now highly interconnected,
thanks to seismic shifts in recent decades in communications and transport
technologies; the volume and levels of dependencies in global trade; and cultural
dispersion and homogenisation. In this context, managing people is about not just
populations but also cross-border mobility – who crosses borders, and why and when
they do so. The ways in which states manage mobility can have fundamental effects on
their economic, security, and diplomatic interests. Consequently, issues of migration,
border control, and citizenship and other forms of political membership have become
ever more important to states’ political and strategic agendas – in addition to being
issues of social concern.

States have long viewed populations as a source and battleground of power – as

illustrated by histories of imperial expansion, colonial control, and military conquest
– but the terrain on which this has occurred has changed over time. States are less
likely to pursue control over populations through direct military conquest or colonial
expansion than through the strategic management of different forms of mobility. On
this new battleground, the arsenals at states’ disposal can be their immigration, entry,
diaspora, and citizenship policies. And states’ location within the global system of
migration and mobility shapes this dimension of power (see: Map 2). Labour migrants,
refugees, tourists, students, expatriates, and global elites all emerge as potential pieces
on a strategic chessboard on which states compete for advantage and influence.
85
Map 1 The power of people
China and India account for around 36 per cent of the global population
Size of population, by country (2020)
United States Indonesia Pakistan Brazil Nigeria

China 332m 271m 225m 213m 211m

1.41 billion

Bangladesh Egypt Vietnam Congo Turkey Iran

171m 102m 98m 92m 84m 85m

Germany

Thailand
67m
83m
Russia
146m
Rest of the world
2.39 billion
India Mexico
126m

1.38 billion
Japan
125m

Ethiopia
118m

Philippines
110m

Map 2 Quality of nationality index (2018)

The birthright lottery
Very low Very high
Quality of citizenship benefits by country
No data
20 35 50 75

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 The Power Atlas People

People as a source of power and vulnerability

Military competition can push states to mobilise their populations either as manpower
in combat or as labour in defence-related industries. Economic competition can lead
them to use people in other ways: the search for cheap labour creates a market for
migrant workers, often forcing large numbers of people to live without citizenship or
rights in precarious conditions on the margins of societies. At the same time, a global
class of super-elites purchase mobility via citizenship or residence through investment
schemes such as “golden visas” – enabled by states that commodify their legal
instruments of membership and belonging for economic gain.

In this context of human geopolitics, national borders take on new meanings.

Traditionally, borders were viewed by governments as fortified zones designed to
prevent intrusion by foreign enemies. Today, states increasingly expect borders to
perform dual functions – to simultaneously facilitate the types of movement and
mobility that states view as desirable and prevent those that are not. At the most
basic level, states seek to attract cross-border flows that enhance their economic and
political strength, and to prevent cross-border flows perceived to have detrimental
effects on their economic well-being, security, and stability. The enormous
contradictory pressures on states create a “liberal paradox”: states have economic
incentives to be open to free flows of trade, capital, ideas, and people but political
incentives to halt these flows – in many places, increasingly so – through mechanisms
that define who is a citizen and, therefore, who has access to various political rights,
duties, and obligations.

Illiberal states can jettison these political imperatives without undermining the
basis of their political legitimacy. The populations of the Gulf – which, along with
north America and Europe, is a leading destination for migrants (see: Map 3) – are
composed largely of non-citizens. However, liberal states must live with, navigate,
and balance these fundamental tensions. This leads to different types of power and
vulnerabilities for different types of states. Illiberal states may have fewer constraints
on how they manage migration. At the same time, they are less likely to be attractive
destinations for global talent and the wealth it brings. Liberal states may be more
vulnerable to charges of political hypocrisy: their political ideology relies to some
extent on placing restrictions on membership and belonging, but those restrictions
also undermine universalist liberal conceptions of individual rights – including the
right to freely move, cross borders, and travel. States may make unsavoury trade-offs
between ‘rights and numbers’, and may abrogate or instrumentalise their normative
and legal commitments to provide refuge and protection.

Sources: The World Bank (2021). World Development Indicators (Population, total, 2020); Kochenov, D. and Lindebloom, J. (2019). Quality of Nationality Index, Mendeley
Data, V1, doi: 10.17632/53zr7cfyrs.1 87
Map 3

Migration magnets
Leading destinations for international migrants

Migrants as a share of population (2019)

No data
5% 10% 15% 20%

Relative size of net migration flow (2019)

50,000,000

5,000

Methodology: Country colour indicates percentage of total population accounted for by international migrants. Circle size
indicates total number of migrants. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs defines an “international
migrant” as “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence” (Recommendations on Statistics of
International Migration, Revision 1 (1998) para. 32). This definition excludes movements that are due to “recreation, holiday,
visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimages”.

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 The Power Atlas People

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Population Division (2019). International Migrant Stock 2019 (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/
Stock/Rev.2019)
 States also compete for transitory visitors who can be major sources of income, such
as international students and tourists. For instance, international tourism generated
almost $2 trillion in revenue globally in 2019 alone – but this figure declined
precipitously in 2020, following the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic and the
resulting travel restrictions. Therefore, states or entities within them can become
vulnerable if they depend on this revenue as a key source of income, as do some
tourist destinations (see: Map 4), or to balance the books in certain industries, as is
increasingly the case in higher education. The number of foreign students in the US
– over half of whom hail from China and India – has more than doubled since 2000.
(The UK higher education sector is similarly reliant on overseas students, particularly
those from China.) And many universities need to charge high tuition fees to foreign
students to cover their operating costs and offer educational aid to domestic students
in financial need.

Great people powers

States’ position in global and regional systems of migration and mobility can shape
how they wield and exercise power – and what strategies they adopt to gain a
competitive edge. Countries of origin, transit, and destination for migrants possess
different tools to leverage the power of mobility to their advantage. States that are
populous but poor have incentives to export labour and promote emigration, as
do states with population bulges that could contribute to domestic instability. For
example, the share of the population aged 15-29 is around 7 percentage points higher
in the developing world than elsewhere – a disparity that is especially apparent in
parts of the Middle East and Africa. In both sub-Saharan and North Africa, around 40
per cent of the population is under the age of 15, and nearly 70 per cent is under the
age of 30 (see: Map 5). Exporting ‘excess’ people has long been a means of reducing
domestic pressure associated with surplus labour, as well as a means of securing
income from migrant remittances.

At the same time, states that are heavily reliant on remittances – such as Nepal,
Tajikistan, and Ukraine – may be vulnerable to fluctuations or disruptions in monetary
flows tied to shifts in the size of their overseas workforces (see: Map 6). Countries with
large numbers of emigrants, such as India or China, have incentives to wield political
influence via their diasporas, which they can draw upon as instruments of soft power
and public diplomacy – but which may also be seen as a source of security concerns
and vulnerabilities. Wealthy states that have ageing populations and are in need of
labour and talent will seek to attract migrants that fit their economic needs – either
via points-based or highly skilled visa programmes, or temporary-worker or low-
skilled work programmes (see: Map 7). They may also seek ways to keep out irregular

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 The Power Atlas People

migrants whom they categorise as politically, economically, or socially burdensome.

Weaker states can exploit the restrictive migration policies of stronger states by using
their positions as buffer zones or so-called “container states” that can prevent outward
migration flows. In 2016 Turkey – which hosts more refugees than any other country
(see: Map 8) – leveraged European concerns about migration to secure a €6 billion
aid package, a commitment to visa liberalisation, and promises to restart talks on EU
accession. The tiny island of Nauru has used Australia’s interest in offshoring irregular
migrants to secure tens of millions of dollars in payments, including implementing
a visa fee of $1,000 per person per month, payable by the Australian state; in 2013-
2014, the $18m in visa fee income Nauru received amounted to 18 per cent of its GDP.

A state’s relative power and position in the global migration regime will, therefore,
determine the advantages and disadvantages it has in exercising control in this area,
and the mechanisms and policies at its disposal to do so. In the geopolitical pecking
order, economically powerful liberal countries such as the United States and Germany
may gain the greatest advantages by implementing labour-enabling policies that allow
them to act as migration magnets, as Map 3 suggests. Meanwhile, major countries of
origin for migrants such as India or China may mobilise or repress the political power
of their diasporas, and weaker states may commodify migrants by exploiting restrictive
migration policies elsewhere. These weaker states do so by either selling citizenship
(as does St Kitts-Nevis); using their geographic position to block migration outflows
(as does Libya); or, as discussed, acting as ‘warehouses’ of their own or others’
populations, be they labour migrants or asylum seekers. Thus, the advantages and
disadvantages states have in this realm vary across mobility tools and how they are
wielded, aggregate strength, and domestic governance systems.

91
Map 4

Global tourism and travel

The major players

Travel and tourism as a share of GDP (2018) No data

1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9%

Tourism flows

Net outflow
Net inflow

Net flow of arrivals and departures (2019)

150,000,000
2,000,000

Methodology: Country colour indicates direct contribution of tourism to GDP (world average is 5.4 per cent). Circle size
indicates net tourist flows (combined number of arrivals and departures) and circle colours indicate the direction of travel.
Wherever 2019 data was not available for either arrivals or departures, 2018 data was used (which was the case for only 18
countries). Arrivals data measure the flows of international visitors to the country of reference: each arrival corresponds to
one inbound tourism trip. Data are obtained from different sources: administrative records (immigration, traffic counts, and
other possible types of controls), border surveys, or a mix of them. Departures data measure the flows of resident visitors
leaving the country of reference. Data is collected using one of three methods, or a combination of them to determine
the flows of outbound visitors: using an entry/departure card or a specific survey at the border, or observing them from
household surveys because they belong to resident households.

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 The Power Atlas People

Sources: The World Bank (2021) World Development Indicators (World Tourism Organization, Yearbook of Tourism Statistics, Compendium of Tourism Statistics and data
files); World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC) TCdata3060 (2021). Travel and Tourism direct contribution to GDP, retrieved from: https://tcdata360.worldbank.org/
indicators/tot.direct.gdp?country=ALB&indicator=24650&countries=BRA&viz=line_chart&years=1995,2028
Map 5

Africa: A future centre of people power?

The continent’s population growth rates
dwarf those in the rest of the world

Annual population growth rate in per cent (2021)

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0

No data

Methodology: Total population growth rates are calculated on the assumption that rate of growth is constant between
two points in time. The growth rate is computed using the exponential growth formula: r = ln(pn/p0)/n, where r is the
exponential rate of growth, ln() is the natural logarithm, pn is the end period population, p0 is the beginning period
population, and n is the number of years in between. Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which
counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.

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 The Power Atlas People

Source: The World Bank (2021). Population growth (annual percentage).

Map 6a

The global remittance economy

Inflows, outflows, and dependencies

Remittance inflows as a share of GDP (2019)

No data
0 38%

Remittances

Net outflow
Net inflow

Size of net remittance flow in $m (2019)

75,000
1,000

Methodology: Country colour indicates remittance inflows in 2019 as per cent of GDP. Circle colour indicates whether
countries are net receivers or senders. Circle size indicates net value of remittances sent or received (absolute value of
inflow−outflow). GDP data is taken from the IMF World Economic Outlook. All numbers are in current (nominal) US dollars.

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 The Power Atlas People

Source: The World Bank. (2021). Annual Remittances Data, May 2021
Map 6b The global remittance economy
Inflows, outflows, and dependencies

The top five remittance-dependent countries (share of GDP)

Tonga 37.6%

Haiti 37.1%

South Sudan 34.4%

Kyrgyzstan 29.2%

Tajikistan 28.2%

The top five remittance receivers (US$m)

India 75,599

China 53,263

Mexico 37,539

Philippines 34,941

Egypt 26,319

Source: The World Bank. (2021). Annual Remittances Data, May 2021
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 The Power Atlas People

Global labour mobility Map 7

Distribution of migrant workers by region

North Africa 1%

Latin America and the Caribbean 3%

Eastern Asia 4% Northern, southern,

and western Europe
Southern Asia 4% 24%
Central and western Asia 5%

South-east Asia and the Pacific 7% North America

23%
Sub-Saharan Africa 7%

Eastern Europe 8%
Arab states
14%

The International Labour Office estimated in 2017 that there were 164m migrant workers worldwide, which accounted for
70 per cent of all migrants of working age. The centrality of work to migration flows, particularly in the context of the Asia-
Pacific, is clear. Prior to the covid-19 pandemic, there were 10m international migrants in ASEAN countries, almost half of
whom were women. Arab states feature the highest proportion of migrant workers to all workers (40.8 per cent), and host
13.9 per cent of all migrant workers worldwide, most of them hailing from south-east and south Asia. There are other key
migration corridors in the Asia-Pacific region, including to South Korea and Japan. Migrant workers from Pacific island
countries find jobs in seasonal worker programmes in Australia and New Zealand.

Source: International Labour Office (2018). ILO Global Estimates on Migrant Workers; Results and Methodology, 2nd ed. International Labour Office - Geneva
99
Map 8

Top refugee-hosting countries

Refugees: Total numbers and share of population

Total number of refugees

hosted in 2020

2m
1.8m
1.6m
1.4m
1.2m
1m
800k
600k
400k
200k

No data

Refugees as a share of
population in 2020

10%

1%

Methodology: Data for stock population totals at the end of the year. Only includes those designated as “refugees” under
the UNHCR mandate. Refugees are all persons who meet the eligibility criteria under an applicable refugee definition as
provided for in international or regional refugee instruments under the UNHCR mandate, or in national legislation.

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 The Power Atlas People

Source: UNHCR Refugee Population Statistics Database (2020)

 The power dynamics of migration

The evolution of migration into an area of high politics has entailed the growing
employment by states of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage and
exploit cross-border population mobility. In pursuit of various strategic goals, states
increasingly link issues of migration and mobility to other geopolitical interests.

For example, since the mid-2000s, the European Union has distributed ever more
aid to countries that host large numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons,
creating a new basis for alliances and financial assistance. This could create incentives
for states that receive such aid to make inflated claims about the number of refugees
they host. And it has an impact on the strategic value of states to the EU, with
countries such as Niger gaining new significance as key players in the bloc’s external
migration control policy. The International Organization for Migration estimates that
Niger – which is at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index – received an
injection of approximately €100m into its economy in 2015 due to its significance as a
key migration hub and transit state. The country also received approximately €1 billion
in EU development cooperation aid between 2014 and 2020.

In this context, states can strategically use migration as a political weapon. In May
2021, for example, Morocco opened its border with the Spanish city of Ceuta in a bid to
punish and coerce the Spanish government over policy decisions related to its support
for Polisario, an insurgent group locked in a long-term conflict with Rabat. A similar
move by Turkey in February 2020, which aimed to secure NATO support in Syria,
came close to provoking a military confrontation with Greece. More recently, Belarus
opened its borders and reportedly attempted to weaponise migration in retaliation for
EU sanctions on the country. This instrumental use of migration as a policy tool is a
surprisingly common strategy, one that states across the globe have long adopted to
achieve a wide range of political, military, and economic goals.

Unless the backlash against globalisation severely limits global transit, these trends
are likely to continue – and to be shaped by other dimensions of geopolitics, including
competition between states, public health, climate change, and technology. However,
states have significant leeway in leveraging mobility regimes to shift the power
dynamics of the international system. For example, having made a concerted effort
to improve its passport ranking, the United Arab Emirates has boosted its position
on the Arton Capital Passport Index by 161 per cent in the last decade – more than
any other state (see: Map 9). The country did so by undertaking a massive diplomatic
effort, first securing visa-free travel within the Schengen Zone – which significantly
raised the value of UAE passports – and then moving on to the rest of the world.
Conversely, when the United Kingdom decided to end freedom of movement with the

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 The Power Atlas People

EU, the value of UK citizenship dropped by more than 27 per cent in a single year in
the Quality of Nationality Index.

How states can enhance their people power and resilience

Enhancing national power and resilience on this new terrain requires a range of
trade-offs and an eye to the stability of the global system of migration and mobility.
To sustain the openness of the system, which can benefit all states, governments need
to balance competition and cooperation. They should acquire enough autonomy and
capacity to quickly and successfully respond to changes in international conditions –
as the covid-19 pandemic and its fallout have reminded us. At the same time, there is
tremendous potential for states to enhance their people-focused power and resilience
by cooperating on their migration and mobility policies, and by ensuring that those
who migrate have the optimal conditions for integration (see: Map 10). States can
implement these changes in ways that mitigate shocks to the system and benefit all
players. Such strategies would also benefit migrants and refugees themselves – and
ensure that they are not simply treated as pawns in geopolitical games.

It ought to be possible for states to simultaneously enhance their attractiveness as

homes for global talent and investment while avoiding dependence on the resources
that proactive mobility management can bring, or engaging in exploitative practices
that lead to systemic instability and moves towards autarky. Such strategies can have
significant knock-on benefits, especially when they involve inter-state cooperation.
They can be mutually beneficial for states and the people whom they are charged to
protect.

103
Map 9
The world’s most powerful passports
Global passport power rankings

Rankings by country (as of 1 November 2021)

Most powerful

10

15

20

Least powerful

No data

Methodology: The Passport Index is based on countries that issue passports, regardless of whether they enforce
independent visa policies or not are considered as destinations. A three-tier method, based on the Mobility Score and the
Human Development Index among others, is applied to calculate the Global Passport Power Rank.

Source: Passport Index (2021), available at: www.passportindex.org (accessed 1 November 2021)
 The Power Atlas People

Top countries for migrant integration Map 10

Migrant Integration Policy Index

Migrant Integration Policy Index score (2019)

Favourable
80
Slightly favourable
60
Halfway favourable
40
Slightly unfavourable
20
Unfavourable
1
Critically unfavourable

No data

Methodology: The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) measures policies to integrate migrants in different countries
and their opportunities to participate in society. The MIPEX score is based on a set of indicators covering eight policy
areas that has been designed to benchmark current laws and policies against the highest standards. The policy areas
of integration covered by the MIPEX are the following: labour market mobility; family reunification; education; political
participation; permanent residence; access to nationality; anti-discrimination; and health.

Source: Solano, G. and Huddleston, T. (2020). Migration Integration Policy Index 2020
 Military
by Ulrike Franke

Military power is notoriously hard to measure, and yet it is one of the areas of state
power in which measurements are the most prevalent and sought after. Few things are
as crucial to know before a military confrontation as the opponent’s military strength.
For many years, military, or hard, power was widely considered the primary source
of a state’s power. However, towards the end of the cold war, economic power took
over. A prevalent narrative about the ‘end of history’, combined with a decrease in
military confrontations, led to a belief – or hope – that wars would largely be a thing
of the past. This belief was illustrated most clearly by US leaders’ fear in the 1980s
that Japan – a country that had a pacifist constitution and was unable to legally send
military forces abroad – could overtake the United States due to the rapid growth of
the Japanese economy.

But military power is back. Military confrontations, including those between great
powers, have re-entered western Europeans’ collective imagination. Global military
expenditure has risen steadily in the last two decades. And, last year, according to the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, it reached almost $2 trillion. US
military expenditure alone accounted for an estimated 39 per cent of this.
107
 Judging by the data on military expenditure in Map 1, it seems easy to identify the
key military powers of this century. The US outspends its competitors and partners
to a significant degree. China’s military expenditure has rapidly increased in recent
years, and now stands at $193 billion, or 1.3 per cent of GDP. Smaller states such as
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel spend a relatively large share of their GDP on
defence – due to ongoing conflicts, heightened threat perceptions, or a desire to gain
regional influence.

The world’s key military players also tend to be members of one of the most exclusive
global clubs: nuclear-armed states. As of 2021, nine states have nuclear weapons
(Israel has a policy of deliberate ambiguity about its nuclear capabilities). More than
90 per cent of the roughly 13,080 nuclear warheads worldwide belong to the US or
Russia (see: Map 2). Five states – the US, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and
China – are members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT). This means that they have promised to “pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to […] nuclear disarmament”. But the continued existence
of nuclear weapons, despite the NPT and the more recent Treaty on the Prohibition of
Nuclear Weapons, underlines an important element of military power: deterrence, or
the capacity to demonstrate so much capability that a potential adversary is deterred
from attacking. Nuclear weapons are generally understood to be procured to not
be used, as weapons of last resort that have little tactical impact but provide such
deterrence.

In light of Maps 1 and 2, one might assume that the ranking of the world’s military
powers is rather obvious – and, with the exception of China, fundamentally similar to
that of recent decades. However, in the US and other Western countries, alarm bells
have been ringing for a while. For example, the US National Security Commission on
Artificial Intelligence argues that “America is not prepared to defend or compete in the
AI era. This is the tough reality we must face.” Some Western states fear that emerging
technologies could empower new actors, including smaller states or even non-state
actors, to inflict significant costs on established powers. And, even though kinetic
military confrontations might become more common again, the more immediate
concerns are hybrid operations such as cyber-attacks, the weaponisation of migrants,
and disinformation campaigns – all challenges against which tanks, aircraft, or nuclear
weapons are largely useless. Therefore, in the twenty-first century, military strength
will be determined by not just hard power but also a state’s ability to develop and use
new technologies, react quickly to challenges and build resilience against them, and
draw on support from its partners and allies.

108
 The Power Atlas Military

The role of new technology

There have been moments in history when warfare changed because of the
introduction and innovative use of a new military technology. The crossbow and
gunpowder, the tank and nuclear weapons – when militaries first adopted and used
such technologies in novel ways, this sometimes had a fundamental impact on how
they fought wars, organised their forces, and developed strategies. These moments
are called ‘revolutions in military affairs’. And enacting such a revolution before the
opponent does so is the holy grail for militaries around the world.

Today, there are several new technologies that will become significant elements of
military power. Unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, have received a lot of attention
in recent years. Their development, which dates back to the early 2000s, has played
an important role in the ‘war on terror’ fought by Western militaries. More recently,
drones – especially armed drones – have proliferated to the point that they are now
on battlefields around the world. As the use of drones in the 2020 conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh demonstrated, there is a role for
drones beyond asymmetric wars, such as in confrontations between states. While
today’s generation of drones is unlikely to be the decisive factor in a full-blown military
conflict, they can markedly boost the air power of states (or, indeed, non-state actors’
airborne capabilities). Several states, such as Turkey and China, have in the last few
years invested significant resources in the creation of domestic drone industries. As
Map 3 illustrates, many countries now have military drones – a dozen or more of them
armed drones. Differences in drone arsenals can be substantial enough to change
traditional balances of power: Turkey now has an estimated 140 armed drones –
compared to the UK’s ten, France’s 12, and Germany’s none (despite a long-running
debate about whether to lease five armed drones for its air force).

109
Map 1

Who spends the most on military power

Total defence spending as a share of GDP

United States
3.6%

Total defence spending,

in $billion (2021)

600

500

400

200

100

No data

Defence spending as a
percentage of GDP (2021)

10
1

110
 The Power Atlas Military

Germany
France 1.4%
2.2%

Afghanistan
10.6%

China
1.3%

Saudi Arabia
Israel 7.1%
5.2%

Source: IISS (2021). The Military Balance 2021, Routledge

Map 2

The nuclear powers United Kingdom

Number of nuclear warheads 225*

10 warheads

United States
5,550

* In early 2021, the United Kingdom announced an increase in the cap on its nuclear stockpile from 225 to 260 warheads.

At the start of 2021, nine states – the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel,
and North Korea – had approximately 13,080 nuclear weapons, of which 3,825 were deployed with operational forces.
Approximately 2,000 of these are kept in a state of high operational alert.

112
 The Power Atlas Military

France
290

Israel
90 North Korea
40-50

Pakistan
165 China
350
India
156

Russia
6,255
Russia
6,255

Source: SIPRI (2021). SIPRI Yearbook 2021: Armaments, Disarmaments and International Security. Oxford University Press
 Accompanying the rise of drones is a rise in counter-drone systems. As Map 3 shows,
a variety of counter-drone systems are being used, developed, and tested. Broadly
speaking, there are three ways to down a drone – kinetically, electronically, and by
interception. The first involves shooting drones down with bullets, rockets, or similar
munitions. The second – electronic solutions – is currently the most promising.
It requires the capability to jam or interrupt the signal between the drone and its
operator. A more advanced version of this approach is to hack into the drone and take
command of it. Lastly, there are several ways to intercept drones. For instance, one
can use drones to fight other drones, or can down them with the kind of shoulder-
mounted net-throwers that have appeared at several high-level political meetings this
year (though these latter capabilities are more relevant to the civilian context than
the military one). While anti-drone systems do not directly translate into military
power, the inability to defend oneself against drone attacks can have devastating
consequences and create significant vulnerabilities. But, for now, states have not
found any one capability that can counter most drones, let alone all of them. In this
environment, even relatively small and basic drones can pose a significant threat.

Cyber is another area widely expected to upend traditional power balances, with the
proverbial teenager in their bedroom able to hack state institutions. Although such
attacks are possible, most substantial cyber-power still lies with states, specifically
those willing to invest resources in the requisite capabilities. The Belfer National Cyber
Power Index measures 30 countries’ cyber-capabilities. It ranks the top ten cyber-
powers across the seven objectives it measures in the following order: the US, China,
the UK, Russia, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, and Australia.
However, as Map 4 shows, states’ performance varies a great deal across these
indicators. For example, China, France, and even the Netherlands rank above the US
on defensive capabilities, pointing not only to the complexity of such capabilities but
also to how they might empower smaller states instead of the usual suspects.

With regard to space technologies, however, the old dictum of ‘quantity is a quality of
its own’ still largely holds true. Many actors are building up their space capabilities,
which includes satellites and earth-based space commands (see: Map 5). A country
such as Luxembourg may have a satellite, or Peru a space command, but larger, more
established military actors – such as the US, Russia, and China – still dominate this
area through sheer numbers of satellites.

114
 The Power Atlas Military

Military drones Map 3

Countries with a military drone inventory

and counter-drone technology systems

Top ten countries’ stocks of drones (2020) Location of companies developing

counter-drone technologies

412
412
1,050
670 1,050
670

13,710
13,710
591
591
1,209 514
1,209 514

600
600

1,421
1,421
557
557

Top five exporters of unmanned

aerial vehicles (UAVs)
Countries with military drones by number of countries that are believed
to have acquired at least one UAV of any
class from these countries of origin

6060 9595 US
53 US
53
China
35 China
35
2010
2010 2019
2019 Israel
44 Israel
44
11 6
11 6
Austria France
Austria France

Methodology: These figures do not cover drone acquisitions by non-military agencies or entities, most military drones
that existed prior to the 1980s, or military unmanned ground or maritime vehicles. The list of countries with counter-drone
capabilities is based on the combined lists of Bard College (2019) and the UAS Directory (2021). It includes countries where
at least one company is building a counter-drone technology.

Sources: Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College (2020). The Drone Databook, March 2020 Update; Unmanned Airspace/Philip Butterworth-Hayes (2021).
Counter UAS Directory 115
Map 4

Cyber-power
Belfer National Cyber Power Index

National Cyber Power Index 2020

Less powerful More powerful

No data
10 20 30 40

Top 5 ranking by selected component

Offence* Defence**

*Power to destroy or disable an adversary’s infrastructure and capabilities

**Power to strengthen and enhance national cyber defences

Methodology: The Belfer National Cyber Power Index measures 30 countries’ cyber capabilities. The index looks at
countries’ intent to pursue multiple national objectives using cyber means and their capabilities to achieve those objectives.
The Cyber Capability Index is on a scale from 0 to 100 per cent of the capabilities measured, and is based on the ratings of
27 indicators
Europeanwhich
Councilareongrouped
Foreignby the seven
Relations © national
2021 objectives, including surveillance and defence.
116
 The Power Atlas Military

Source: Voo, J., Irfan, H., Jones, S., DeSombre, W., Cassidy, D. and Schwarzenbach, A.. (2020). National Cyber Power Index, September 2020
Map 5

Counter-space capabilities
Space control Space commands
Military satellites and space capabilities Number of satelites

United States 218 Russia 102 China 125

France 10

India 9

Italy 8 Germany 7 Israel 8

United Kingdom 6 Australia 4 Spain 4

Trans-European 3 United Arab Emirates 3 Japan 2

Mexico 2 South Korea 2 Turkey 2

Brazil 1 Canada 1 Chile 1

Colombia 1 Denmark 1 Egypt 1

Iran 1 Luxembourg 1 Qatar 1

South Africa 1 Thailand 1 Sweden 1

North Korea 0 Libya 0 Ukraine 0

Peru 0 Netherlands 0

EU countries (France, Italy, Germany, Spain, trans-European, Denmark, Sweden) have a total of 35 military satellites. The Union
of Concerned Scientists counts a total of 4,084 operational satellites currently in orbit around the Earth, of which 525 are used
for military purposes. The Center for Strategic and International Studies reports only observed capabilities, or those inferred
from specific observations. Its list is non-exhaustive, meaning that, it does not report on US capabilities in most areas.
Sources: Union of Concerned Scientists (2021). UCS Satellite Database; CSIS Counterspace Timeline (2021)
 The Power Atlas Military

Another promising but hard-to-measure area of military technological development

is artificial intelligence (AI), which can enable and support activities in everything
from logistics to autonomous weapons, cyber-warfare, and disinformation. These
capabilities include offensive and defensive front-line and support systems.

Military experts agree that states will increasingly use AI in the military realm, and
that this will have important implications. However, their assessments of what these
implications will be run from maximalist statements that AI may “alter the immutable
nature of war”, or that AI changes “the psychological essence of strategic affairs”,
to less extreme views that focus on more specific and limited changes in weapons
technology.

In recent years, the maximalist reading has taken hold in US circles in particular. The
US National Security Commission on AI argues that the US “will not be able to defend
against AI-enabled threats without ubiquitous AI capabilities and new warfighting
paradigms”.

But it is difficult to make predictions about where AI will have the biggest impact on
military systems and operations. And, for now, reliably measuring a state’s military AI
capabilities is almost an impossible task. Artificial intelligence is still in development
– with companies inventing new approaches, and making important improvements,
to it. Moreover, most of the most ground-breaking work on AI occurs in the civilian
realm.

Most importantly, it is difficult to make predictions about any technology’s impact on

warfare. This is due to the fact that what matters for a military technology’s impact is
not just the technology but how it is used. For a new technology to have a significant
impact, users need to come up with novel ways of using it, along with doctrines for
doing so. For example, tanks were on the battlefield in 1916. But they did not show
their military potential until the second world war, during which the Wehrmacht’s
Blitzkrieg doctrine combined the use of radios with a novel way of deploying tanks as
independent units, allowing Germany to break through French defences in a matter
of days. It is still unclear what new doctrines, organisational changes, and training
regimes will develop in relation to military AI and other emerging technologies – or
what impact they will have.

In addition to such uncertainties, absolute military capabilities are only relevant up

to a point. The kinds of military systems, training, and doctrines that are needed also
depend on the type of military operations they expect to be involved in. An all-out
inter-state war between peer competitors requires different capabilities to a smaller
intervention or an asymmetric conflict.

119
Map 6

Overseas bases
US
UK
Russia
France
China

All bases

120
 The Power Atlas Military

Sources:
On China: United States Department of Defence (2020). Military and Security Development involving the People’s Republic of China
On France: La République Française, Ministère des Armées (2019). Les forces françaises prépositionnées
On Russia: The Polish Institute of International Affairs (2020). Importance of Foreign Military Bases for Russia
On UK: Crown. (n.d.). The British Army, Operations and Deployments
On US: Vine, D. (2021), Lists of U.S. Military Bases Abroad, 1776-2021, American University Digital Research Archive, 2021, https://doi.org/10.17606/7em4-hb13
Map 7

Military deployments abroad

Number of troops on foreign deployments

The average number of troops on foreign deployments by country

between 2017 and 2021

<500 500-2,000 2,000-10,000 10,000-60,000 ≥60,000 No data

Methodology: Units are the average number of military personnel who were deployed in a mission or location for a given
year between 2017 and 2021. Excludes military observers and equipment of deployed units.

Source: IISS (2021). The Military Balance 2021, Routledge

122
 The Power Atlas Military

A particularly difficult-to-measure indirect military capability is proxy forces and

private military actors, which some states rely on for everything from logistical
support for their troops to secret military operations. When the US drew down its
forces in Afghanistan in early 2021, the US Department of Defence confirmed that
more than 18,000 private contractors remained in the country. Russia’s Wagner
Group has become increasingly active in countries ranging from Syria and Ukraine to,
more recently, Mali. Media reports have uncovered China’s fledgling private security
industry. Unfortunately, there is no reliable publicly available data on the number and
impact of these groups. And it is difficult to compare their activities across different
countries: some groups only provide legal and largely non-military services in conflict
zones, while others are de facto paramilitary actors that do states’ dirty work with a
certain level of deniability.

A state’s military capabilities, particularly those for operations beyond its territory,
depend substantially on its capacity to project power. This capacity can come from
platforms such as aircraft carriers, long-range missiles, and over-the-horizon drone
capabilities. But permanent bases in overseas territories or other countries’ territories
can be especially valuable for power projection. Such bases allow states to make
much faster deployments of troops and personnel to nearby crises. As Map 6 shows,
only a handful of countries have overseas bases – but they have a lot of them. France
and the UK have many overseas territories in former colonies, while the US has such
territories and an extensive alliance system that includes several agreements to station
its troops abroad. Elements of the United States’ overseas presence are also remnants
of the post-war order, with Japan and Germany home to the largest American military
installations outside the US mainland. In 2016 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
began constructing its first overseas base, in Djibouti. This small country on the Horn
of Africa is also home to US and French military installations, as well as the first full-
scale overseas base of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces.

While states can benefit from stationing and training troops abroad (see: Map 7),
there is no substitute for real combat experience: one can assume that states that
have deployed troops in combat in recent years would perform better in military
operations than those that have not done so for a long time. For many Western –
especially European – militaries, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were an important
driver of military modernisation. China, in contrast, last fought a war in 1979 – which
might put into question the PLA’s fighting ability. Of course, if a deployment becomes
too extensive, it can be a drain on, rather than a boost to, a military’s war-fighting
capabilities and financial resources (considerations that were part of the reason for the
US withdrawal from Afghanistan earlier this year).

123
 Map 8

World’s largest arms-producing and military services companies

Number of companies in SIPRI Top 100 by country

Total arms sales among SIPRI Number of companies in SIPRI

Top 100 per country, $m Top 100 by country (2018)

40
0 250,000 1

in SIPRI Top 100 by country (2018)

21

Methodology: SIPRI ranks companies according to the value of their arms sales at the end of what SIPRI considers to be
their financial year. While SIPRI formally excludes Chinese arms-producing companies from its list due to lack of data, the
institute estimates that ten Chinese companies would be ranked among the top 100 arms-producing and military services.

Source: SIPRI Fact Sheet (2019). The SIPRI Top 100 arms-producing and military services companies
124
 The Power Atlas Military

A strong, independent defence industry likely helps states adapt to military

developments, be they technological or political. A national defence industry can
allow states to quickly scale up production of military systems, if needed – and to do
so without support from others. Map 8 shows that the US has a significant advantage
here, with a substantial number of the world’s largest arms producers located there.
But France and the UK also punch above their weight in this field, with eight and six
major arms producers located in the two countries respectively.

Yet, while independence can be beneficial to a state’s military capability, support from
others can also be crucial. Alliances, particularly those with mutual defence clauses
such as NATO’s Article 5 or the European Union’s Article 42.7, significantly boost a
state’s military power. This is because that state no longer needs to rely only on its own
military capabilities, as it can receive support from those of its allies.

Therefore, military capability partly consists of an intricate network of hard power,

which one can measure with indicators such as expenditure and numbers of tanks and
military bases. But it also includes softer elements such as alliances, readiness, and
the ability to act. And efforts to assess states’ military capabilities are complicated by
the impact of technological developments, a constant companion to military power. As
many armed forces have learnt the hard way, no measurement can substitute for real
experience.

125
126
 Health
by Anthony Dworkin

The first responsibility of a state is to protect the lives and security of its citizens. The
covid-19 pandemic brought the public health dimension of this commitment to the
forefront of global politics. The virus showed how global interconnectedness through
the rapid movement of people could create extraordinary vulnerability to a highly
infectious disease. As covid-19 eclipsed all other political concerns and countries
engaged in intensifying systemic competition, governments’ approach to public health
became a core indicator of their effectiveness. More significantly, the pandemic made
clear how countries could exploit the production and distribution of medical goods to
gain extraordinary power.

This is true of vaccines above all. The struggle to acquire personal protective
equipment (PPE) in spring 2020 was a harbinger of ruthless international
competition for medical products. But the development of vaccines offered the first
real opportunity to mitigate the threat of covid-19, reduce rates of illness, and allow
economic activity to return to normal. This was the first time in history that all
governments had a vital interest in procuring a new medical product to administer to
every adult in their countries.

With covid-19 almost certain to remain in circulation, and further pandemics likely
to occur in the future, health will keep its place as one of the components of national
security and power. Countries will now take a more strategic view of their capacity to
produce or acquire medical goods. And some will use this capacity as a tool of foreign
policy. During the pandemic, countries have sought to benefit from deliveries of
medical goods to their partners – to strengthen relations, prevent friendly countries
from being at a disadvantage, or gain more direct benefits. In some cases, states have
threatened to withhold medical products to further their strategic goals. Most of all,
though, powerful countries have sought to secure access to vaccines and other goods,
including through restrictions on exports or preferential agreements with suppliers.
127
 Health and national reputation

At a time when geopolitical competition is overlaid with rivalry between different

systemic models, the way that countries have tackled the pandemic has had an impact
on their international credibility and prestige. Several factors have determined how
many cases and deaths have occurred in different countries, making it difficult to
equate success in handling covid-19 with a particular socio-political system (see: Map
4 in the culture essay). Nevertheless, one can observe some patterns and standout
individual cases.

Until now, the regions that have fared worst in per capita deaths have been Latin
America and eastern and south-eastern Europe (see: Map 1). Those that have been
most effective at reducing the impact of the disease are east Asia, south-east Asia,
and Australasia. China has been particularly careful to treat its response to covid-19
as a matter of national reputation, limiting investigations into the origin of the virus
and often suggesting that it may have reached the country from overseas, as well as
trumpeting its success in containing the crisis. But other Asian countries have also
done well: the key lesson appears to be about the benefits not of state control but of
experience from previous epidemics – of preparedness and responsibility. Trust in the
authorities and in medical advice, especially on vaccines, also seems to play a role in
some cases (see: Map 2). Death rates in the United States have been high relative to its
population density – and have continued to rise even since vaccines have been widely
available, due to widespread resistance to taking them. In this way, covid-19 seems to
add credibility to the idea that east Asia is rising in influence and the US is declining.

The fight for medical goods

The production of medical goods is highly concentrated in certain countries – as one

would expect from the fact that, prior to the pandemic, most governments treated
this almost exclusively as a question of market efficiency. The shift to seeing health as
a matter of national security has prompted a rethink, leading some governments to
call for production to be brought home or production lines diversified. The European
Union’s 2020 New Industrial Strategy for Europe states that “access to medical
products and pharmaceuticals is crucial to Europe’s security and autonomy in today’s
world”. In April 2020, then US presidential trade adviser Peter Navarro said: “never
again should we have to depend on the rest of the world for our central medicines and
countermeasures”.

When covid-19 struck, global shortages of PPE meant that some countries were
suddenly without the means to safeguard the lives of their healthcare workers and
citizens more generally. China dominates the global supply of PPE imported by other

128
 The Power Atlas Health

The impact of covid-19 Cumulative covid-19 deaths per million Map 1

inhabitants (as of 22 September 2021)
Total death toll
500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500

Methodology: Limited testing and challenges in the attribution of the cause of death means that the number of confirmed
deaths may not be an accurate count of the actual number of deaths from covid-19.

Source: Airfinity (2021)

advanced economies (see: Map 3). In 2019 the country was the source of 50 per cent
of PPE imported by Europe and 47 per cent of PPE imported by the US – including
67 per cent of masks and respirators imported into Europe and 72 per cent of those
imported into the US. In the early months of the pandemic, with Hubei province
locked down and China desperately seeking PPE for itself, the country’s exports
dropped significantly; some manufacturers with plants there said the government had
requisitioned their output.

As the pandemic spread, other countries imposed export restrictions on PPE,

including first some EU member states and then the EU as a whole. The US also
imposed export restrictions. After China scaled up production and controlled the virus
at home, its PPE exports increased. China used exports and, in particular, donations
of masks and other protective equipment as a way to highlight its benevolence: Beijing
donated PPE both to countries in need and to those it wanted to impress for strategic
purposes, including Ethiopia and Hungary. Recipients of Chinese shipments often
made public displays of gratitude for them; Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vucic,
spoke of China’s “brotherly care for the citizens of Serbia”.
129
 Map 2 Trust in medical authorities
Views on vaccine safety and government health advice (2018)
The trusting ​Trust in the safety of vaccines but not the government’s advice on health​ Sceptics No data

100% Strongly believe

thatStrongly
vaccines
believe
are safe
that vaccines
0% Strongly believe are safe
80
that vaccines
are safe
60
80

40

60

20
Trust medical and
Trust medical
health advice from
and health
40
the government
advice from the
government
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70%

20 Europe South Asia Latin America and the Caribbean

Trust medical
N
​ orth America Central Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
and health
East Asia and the Pacific ​Middle East and North Africa advice from the
government
0 10
Methodology: 20 plot illustrates
The scatter 30the share of respondents
40 50
per country 60 "strongly agree"
who answered 70% to the
question on vaccine safety and those who answered "a lot" to the question on trust in government’s health advice. The
questions read: ‘Do you strongly or somewhat agree, strongly or somewhat disagree or neither agree nor disagree with
the following statement? Vaccines are safe.’ and ‘In general, how much do you trust medical and health advice from the
government in this country? A lot, some, not much, or not at all?’ The categories in the map correspond to the majority
response in each country.

Source: Wellcome (2019). Wellcome Global Monitor 2018

130
al protection equipment
sks, gloves), pharma products,
The Power Atlas Health
anitizer, food and other products

Putting
-19 temporary national
export needs
measures first
(29/10/2021) Map 3

Temporary export measures on medical products during the pandemic

port restrictions/bans (97 countries)
Affected(Argentina,
port liberalisations products include:
India,personal protection equipment (such as masks and gloves),
Myanmar/Burma)
pharmaceuticals products, hand sanitizer, food, and other products.
port restrictions and liberalisations (Jamaica, Mongolia, Zambia)
Covid-19 temporary export measures (29 October 2021)
ne (136 countries)
Export restrictions/bans (97 countries)
Export restrictions and liberalisations (Argentina, India, Myanmar)
arket Access Map (www.macmap.org) based on media reports and offical legislations
Export libralisations (Jamaica, Mongolia, Zambia)
uncil on Foreign Relations © 2021
None (136 countries)

Much of the world’s personal protective equipment comes from China (2019)

World imports of masks World imports of World imports of all personal

and respirators protective garments protective equipment

Much of the world’s personal protective equipment comes from China (2019)
34% 43% 43%
World imports of masks
66%and respirators 57%
World imports of protective garments 57% imports of all PPE
World

34% 43% 43%

66% 57%
Rest of the world China 57%

From the restBown,

Sources: ITC Market Access Map (2021). Retrieved from: www.macmap.org; of the world
C. P. ImportsMedical
(2021). How COVID-19 from Supply
ChinaShortages Led to Extraordinary Trade and
Industrial Policy, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Map 4

US medical dependency
Source of active pharmaceuticals
ingredients used in the US

All drugs
Percentage of API manufacturing facilities for all
drugs used in the US by country or region (2021)

12%
27%
13%

19% 25%
United States
Europe
India
China
Rest of the world
Generic drugs
Canada
Percentage of API manufacturing facilities
for generic drugs used in the US (2021) Latin America

10% 13%

16%
27%

29%

API – an active pharmaceuticals ingredient is the element of a drug that has a medical effect on people’s bodies.
Generic drugs – medications that are not marketed under a brand name but contain the same active ingredients as
branded medications (such as aspirin and paracetamol).

Source: The White House (2021). Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufucturing, and Fostering Broad-Based Growth, 100-Day Reviews under
132 Executive Order 14017
 The Power Atlas Health

The pandemic has also drawn countries’ attention to their potential dependencies in
the procurement of other important medical products. The EU has declared active
pharmaceuticals ingredients (APIs) to be a strategic area, alongside products such as
semiconductors and lithium-ion batteries. China and India have established leading
roles in the manufacture of pharmaceuticals – particularly low-cost generic drugs. In
2015 Europe accounted for 24 per cent of global API production by value. Sixty-six
per cent of global API production occurred in the Asia-Pacific (principally India and
China), 3 per cent in north America, and 7 per cent in the rest of the world. The EU
imported 53 per cent of the APIs it used by volume – almost all from China (45 per
cent), the US, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, and India.

The US is more import-dependent than Europe, with only 27 per cent of the
manufacturers that supply APIs to the US market located within the country as of
2021; by contrast, 25 per cent of these manufacturers are located in the EU, 19 per
cent in India, and 13 per cent in China (see: Map 4). For generic drugs, the share of
EU and US manufacturing is lower: 29 per cent of manufacturing sites are in India,
27 per cent in the EU, 16 per cent in China, and 13 per cent in the US. It is unclear
whether the complex interdependency of pharmaceuticals supply chains will prevent
governments from weaponising them, but wealthy countries are carefully assessing
their vulnerabilities in this area.

Vaccines

In a normal year, 4 billion vaccine doses are produced worldwide. The development
of covid-19 vaccines led to a dramatic increase in vaccine production: it is likely that
around 12 billion doses of covid-19 vaccines alone will be produced in 2021. Global
vaccine production is dominated by a small group of countries – forming what some
scholars have described as a “vaccine club”. A recent study by Bruegel estimates that,
before the pandemic, the EU was the world’s largest vaccine producer, closely followed
by India. China and the US completed the list of major producers, with significant
production also taking place in Indonesia, South Korea, Japan, and Russia. The EU
and the US exported mainly to higher-income countries, while India dominated sales
to lower-income countries – largely of vaccines produced under licence at low cost.
Chinese exports were insignificant.

The advent of covid-19 has radically changed this picture. For covid-19 vaccines, China
has vastly increased its production to become the clear global leader, and the US has
become the second-largest producer, followed by the EU, India, and the United States
(see: Map 5). However, there is a marked difference between the vaccines produced
in each country or region: the US and the EU have produced the only mRNA vaccines

133
Map 5

Vaccine powers
Vaccine production and exports

United States

Total vaccine production and exports

Argentina
(as of 22 September 2021)

10m vaccines exported

10m vaccines retained for domestic use

134
 The Power Atlas Health

European Union

Russia

United Kingdom

Switzerland

South Korea

Thailand
India

China

Source: Airfinity (2021)

 that have been approved for use – which have emerged as the most effective vaccines
against covid-19. The EU and the UK have produced the leading viral vector vaccine,
which is based on research at Oxford University and produced by British-Swedish firm
AstraZeneca, and is cheaper and more easily transportable than mRNA vaccines. The
same technique has been used under contract in India. Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine
is also based on viral vector technology. China has focused on producing inactivated
virus vaccines, including Sinopharm and Sinovac.

In an even more marked change from pre-pandemic patterns, China is now the leader
in vaccine exports, followed by the EU. The US and India have exported a smaller
number of doses, with the state purchasing the bulk of their production.

There is a significant segmentation of export markets by destination. Producers in the

EU have exported a higher proportion of doses to richer countries, while China has
exported more to the developing world (see: Map 6). Global patterns of production,
procurement, and export reflect a strikingly unequal distribution of vaccines, with
Africa and the Middle East particularly disadvantaged (see: Map 7).

The easiest way to understand the geopolitics of vaccine production and distribution
is to compare the different approaches taken by leading powers. One can divide these
approaches into the following five categories.

Industrial strategists: The US and the UK

From the beginning of its vaccine effort, the US has followed an industrial strategy
designed to address all parts of the production process. In Operation Warp Speed,
the US government has invested heavily throughout the vaccine supply chain to
rapidly scale up production, and has intervened in the market to promote cooperation
between companies. The British government did something similar, working closely
with AstraZeneca to develop a production supply chain in the UK for the vaccine
developed in Oxford. Both countries used this strategic approach to procure supplies
for their own populations, becoming global leaders in the early vaccination of their
citizens. The US barely exported any vaccines during the first months of its vaccination
drive, but the success of Operation Warp Speed has allowed it to become the leading
donor of vaccines to the rest of the world in recent months – and it is poised to
distribute many more doses in the next year (see: Map 8).

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The global vaccine market Map 6

Export destinations of covid-19 vaccines

Total number of exports

(as of 22 September 2021)

Low High

United States
European Union
India
Russia
China

Methodology: Cumulative number of vaccine doses

exported per country, and the recipients of these doses.

Source: Airfinity (2021)

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Map 7

The vaccination race

Percentage of population fully vaccinated

30
APRIL

People fully vaccinated as a share No data

of the population (30 April 2021) 10% 20% 30% 40%

Methodology: Number and proportion of people who are fully protected against covid-19 in each, per country over time.
This is calculated by using the number and type of vaccines supplied to each country, the efficacies of these vaccines, the
administration of vaccines in each country, and the delay until protection after administration.

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19
SEPTEMBER

People fully vaccinated as a share No data

of the population (19 September 2021) 20% 40% 60% 80%

Source: Airfinity (2021)

Map 8

Excess vaccine stock 2021

Projected surplus vaccine doses 2022

No data

73,137,000
Canada 306,000
257,975,000 Iceland
1,344,000

352,927,000
United States
1,187,460,000

106,749,000
United Kingdom
384,019,000

Netherlands
4,582,000
Ireland
19,890,000

55,961,000
France
255,448,000

35,436,000
Spain
173,917,000

18,500,000
Chile
42,066,000

6,896,000
Portugal
Countries not shown 36,971,000

10,796,000
Israel
19,165,000

1,602,000
Slovenia
7,762,000

997,000
Cyprus
4,752,000

Methodology: Number of surplus doses available per country by the end of 2021 and 2022 for a given scenario, in this case
after securing necessary doses to vaccinate 100 per cent of the population over 12 years of age and administer booster
vaccine doses to people at high risk (those who are over 60 or have comorbidities).

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4,522,000 4,423,000
Norway Finland
20,665,000 20,795,000

18,967,000
Japan
418,530,000
8,416,000
Sweden
38,483,000

949,000
Estonia
4,524,000

4,664,000 1,443,000
Denmark Latvia
21,936,000 6,901,000 2,392,000
South Korea
83,828,000
13,712,000 2,103,000
Lithuania
64,512,000 10,048,000

54,837,000 29,098,000
Germany Poland
288,971,000 140,989,000

9,497,000 Czech 8,163,000

Belgium Republic 39,523,000
44,009,000

6,656,000 4,150,000
Austria Slovakia
32,690,000 20,078,000

2,152,000 7,293,000
Hungary
Switzerland 35,799,000
17,844,000
15,867,000
Romania
3,149,000 78,075,000
Croatia
15,482,000
5,179,000
Bulgaria
42,819,000 25,453,000
Italy
225,635,000

7,909,000
Greece
38,880,000

11,730,000
Australia
149,345,000

7,570,000
New Zealand
21,515,000

Source: Airfinity (2021)

Map 9

Vaccine donations
Sources and destinations of donated vaccine doses

Total vaccine donations delivered

(as of 23 September 2021)
European Union
651,000
≥100m
50-100m African Union
739,000
European Union
10-50m 651,000
1-10m
African Union
<1m 739,000

Jordan Canada
United States 503,000 1,000,000
Africa
2,469,260
Jordan Canada
United States 503,000 1,000,000
Africa
COVAX Latin 2,469,260
America
110,350,860 and the Caribbean
30,121,360

COVAX Latin America

110,350,860 and the Caribbean
30,121,360
South and east Asia
7,112,000
Tajikistan Georgia
115,000 503,000
South and east Asia
7,112,000
Tajikistan Georgia
115,000 503,000 Sub-Saharan Africa
1,835,700 Middle East
and North Africa
3,320,400
Sub-Saharan Africa
1,835,700 Middle East
COVAX and North Africa
European Union South and east Asia
17,262,100 3,320,400
5,800,300

COVAX
European Union South and east Asia
17,262,100
5,800,300
Eastern Europe
Latin America
and the Caribbean and the Balkans
1,405,900 4,668,330
Methodology: Number of vaccine doses delivered by donor
countries to recipient countries as of 23 September 2021. This Eastern Europe
includes bilateral donations as well as COVAX H1 deliveries.
Latin America
and the Caribbean and the Balkans
Source: Airfinity (2021) 1,405,900 4,668,330
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Kenya
United Kingdom 410,000

COVAX South and east Asia

2,825,040 The Caribbean
4,526,980 Eastern Europe
1,270,000
and the Balkans
China 3,630,000
The Caribbean
478,800
South and
Sub-Saharan Africa
east Asia
8,153,340
24,810,000

Albania Mongolia
50,000 150,000 Middle East Middle East
and North Africa and North Africa
India 225,000 6,842,000

South and east Asia The Caribbean

7,850,000 1,190,000
Sub-Saharan Africa
Oceania 965,000
110,000
Map 10

Vaccine expertise
Countries with tech and fill and finish capacity for major vaccines
Vaccine production capacity per country (2021) Tech capacity Fill and Finish capacity only

Methodology: Type of production occurring in each country for the following vaccines: J&J, Oxford/AstraZeneca, Sinopharm,
Pfizer/BioNTech, Sinovac, Moderna, and Sputnik V. In yellow are the countries that only have fill and finish capacities among
all of those vaccines. In blue are the countries that have either tech or both tech and fill and finish capacities for at least one of
those vaccines.
Tech indicates the production of the vaccine’s active pharmaceuticals ingredient (API) ONLY. Fill and finish indicates the process
of taking the API and other ingredients and putting them into vials and preparing them for transport ONLY. Tech and fill and finish
indicates facilities where BOTH types of production occur.
It should be noted that this information is very rarely provided by any manufacturer, and so confirmation of functions relies on
cross-referencing third-party data. This means that there are facilities that may be listed as one type as this has been confirmed
to perform at least that function, but the secondary role is hypothesised and not confirmed in any capacity. For example, a facility
may have been confirmed to produce the API but not fill and finish, so is listed as “tech”. However, it is possible that fill and finish
also take place here but cannot be listed as such as this is unconfirmed.

Source: Airfinity (2021)

The US has announced that most of its donations will go to the COVAX global
distribution mechanism, but it has also directed vaccine donations to its strategic
partners: the country sent 2.5m vaccine doses to Taiwan in June 2021 and has also
made donations to neighbouring Mexico and Canada (see: Map 9). The US has also
promised to fund vaccine donations to the Indo-Pacific as part of a Quad initiative.
Through its success in building up what President Joe Biden calls an “arsenal” of the
most effective vaccines, the country has established a powerful position to set the
terms of the world’s fight against covid-19 – and to offset the reputational damage it
has suffered as a result of its domestic response to the virus, which has been hampered
by political disputes.
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Market champion: The EU

Unlike the US, the EU initially approached the procurement of covid-19 vaccines
through a traditional arm’s-length process, negotiating contracts with EU-based
pharmaceuticals companies and making a relatively small initial outlay of money
compared to the US and the UK. As a result, these firms fulfilled their contracts with
the EU alongside other contracts, and continued to export doses – primarily to wealthy
countries. However, after production problems led to a shortfall in doses, the EU
launched an export notification procedure and Italy blocked a shipment of vaccines
destined for Australia. In the face of growing public discontent about the slow pace
of vaccine deliveries to Europe, the EU shifted towards a more strategic approach. By
mid-2021, the bloc had vaccinated large parts of its population and begun to donate
doses to third countries. The EU has directed a large part of its donations to its
partners in its region, especially in the Western Balkans, as well as to COVAX.

Outward-facing authoritarians: China and Russia

China has had great success in scaling up its vaccine production. And, because it
contained covid-19 domestically through stringent restrictive measures, the country
has been able to export and donate more than 1 billion vaccine doses (as of late
September 2021). China has emerged as the leading supplier of vaccines to the
developing world, and has used its sales to advertise its sense of responsibility to
address global challenges. The country has also directed exports and donations to
areas of strategic interest, including the Western Balkans, and has taken advantage
of delays in supplies from the EU. China has focused these exports and donations on
its partners in the Belt and Road Initiative. And the country has allegedly threatened
to withhold exports for political purposes: in 2021 Ukraine withdrew its support for
a statement on Xinjiang at the UN Human Rights Council after Beijing reportedly
warned that it could block vaccine exports it had promised to the country.

However, the lower efficacy of Chinese vaccines has undercut China’s diplomatic
success. Latin American countries that relied heavily on Chinese vaccines have
continued to experience significant death tolls even in the latter stages of their
vaccination campaigns. In south-east Asia, countries turned away from Chinese
vaccines and towards Western ones after the former fared poorly against the delta
variant of covid-19.

Russia bet heavily on its vaccine as a tool of international influence, naming the
product after a Soviet-era scientific triumph and promoting its sale around the world.
One Russian official said the country planned to vaccinate 10 per cent of the world’s
population in 2021. But, so far, Russia’s efforts have fallen far short of its promises.
Everywhere from Latin America to south-east Asia, countries that placed orders for
Sputnik V have faced massive delays, undercutting Russia’s soft power campaign.
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 Licensing giant: India

Before the pandemic, India had already established its position as the leading vaccine
producer outside the advanced economies – above all through pharmaceuticals giant
the Serum Institute of India (SII). As a result, India was able to quickly start producing
covid-19 vaccines – particularly the AstraZeneca one – under licence at the SII. By
producing this comparatively cheap and easy-to-transport vaccine at a low cost,
India aimed to be the pharmacy to the world – it was supposed to supply many of the
doses ordered by COVAX. In addition, India began a programme to donate doses to
neighbours such as Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, as part of an effort to
build up its regional influence. However, a devastating surge of covid-19 cases at home
led India to restrict exports, hitting COVAX and leaving space for Chinese vaccines in
the region. Argentina and South Korea are among the other countries with significant
contract manufacturing capacity.

Aspiring producers: Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa

The developing world’s lack of vaccine doses has led to an intense debate about the
best way to increase global production. South Africa is leading efforts to establish
a significant vaccine manufacturing capacity in Africa, a continent that is largely
dependent on imports and donations from elsewhere. South Africa and India are at the
forefront of a campaign to lift intellectual property protections from medical products
related to covid-19. Several firms in South Africa are seeking licensing agreements
from Western manufacturers, while two companies in the country have established an
mRNA technology transfer hub. The EU has promised €1 billion to build up vaccine
manufacturing in Africa. And German firm BioNTech has agreed to manufacture
vaccines at sites in Rwanda and Senegal. So far, however, many vaccine production
locations outside the developed world merely engage in ‘fill and finish’ operations –
processing active ingredients manufactured elsewhere (see: Map 10). This limits the
independent power they bring to their host countries.

With vaccine production increasing and many people in the rich world vaccinated, a
lively debate is under way about how to increase access to vaccines for lower-income
countries. Much attention has been paid to vaccine donations, but global health
advocates have called for companies to set up production sites in developing countries
– or, even better, to transfer technology and expertise to local manufacturers. Such
knowledge transfers would not only help increase vaccine production in the medium
term but would also begin to redress the unequal distribution of power in global
health.

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147
 Culture
by Mark Leonard and Ivan Krastev

At the end of the cold war, the world experienced a unipolar moment. It was not
just that the West had won the global arms race: liberal democracy became the gold
standard, while Western culture, ideas, and values were pre-eminent. But the cultural
dynamics of the 2020s are very different. The world is moving from an imperial era
– in which Western countries saw their ideas and values spread to the most distant
corners of the globe, empowered by the success of the capitalist economic model
and a revolution in communications technology – to one of decolonisation, in which
countries are increasingly trying to ‘take back control’ and consume their own culture
rather than mimic others.

The onset of this new era, marked by the cult of one’s uniqueness, has dramatic
implications for the exercise of power in the world. There are at least three big new
trends for the power of culture: a mood of cultural decolonisation that halts the spread
of Western ideas, a transformation of democracy that challenges liberalism, and a shift
from relying on the power of example to exploiting the vulnerabilities of other systems.
To grasp how these dynamics have created a new balance of cultural power in the
world, it is important to understand where they come from and how the idea of culture
has changed in the last three decades.
149
 The rise and fall of soft power

Just before the end of the cold war, America was captured by a fear of inevitable
decline triggered in part by the rise of Japan. It was in this context that political
scientist Joseph Nye argued that the debate about how to influence others focused
too much on “hard power” – the economic and military muscle of the state – and
not enough on the attractiveness of the ideas and cultures of different societies.
The capacity to attract, which he christened “soft power”, made him sceptical of the
arguments of those who predicted America’s decline. Nye argued that the United
States had hidden reserves of soft power based on its liberal model, which the rest of
the world would want to imitate.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, the idea of soft power seemed to explain
everything. It explained why Soviet communism had collapsed, why democracy had
spread globally, and why the post-cold war world was dominated by the US. There was
a sense that the ‘end of history’ was not only a political phenomenon but a way of life
that encompassed all aspects of one’s being. It was also a missionary era, an ‘age of
conversion’: alongside the advance of liberal democracy and American consumerism,
there was the spread of religions that always had this universal appeal – Christianity
and other faiths trying to disseminate their ideas, Saudi Arabia dispatching its imams
to other countries, and so on (although some would see the spread of Islamism as the
first big indicator of resistance to Western soft power).

But the age of conversion created fear of what the French philosopher René Girard
has called “contagious similarity”. He claimed that the spread of ideas could
generate anxiety in many countries about a “pure and simple disappearance of their
society”. Today, American soft power is not so much a virus that is close to taking
over the world as one that has prompted the emergence of very powerful cultural
antibodies. And, in many countries, these antibodies are much more powerful than the
universalist ideas that were meant to trigger them.

There is now a celebration of cultural resistance in various forms rather than attempts
to mimic the West. Multiple ideologies are doing well – we no longer live in the flat
world of transnational ideologies but rather one characterised by the spread of ideas
that preserve people’s cultural essence. The digital revolution has accelerated all
this by making it easier for diasporas to maintain their national cultures. It has also
allowed a shift from a verbal to a non-verbal culture that is starting to dethrone the
central position of the English language. In the new visual world, one does not need to
speak English to become a global celebrity.

This is leading to a new map of world power that has three important dynamics.

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Cultural decolonisation

Towards the end of the cold war, the spread of American values was widely seen as
being synonymous with freedom. But, today, many in the world regard liberty as
coming from a rejection of universalist values rather than an embrace of them.

This is leading to a new map of world power on which the most important cultural
powers are not the universalists (the flat-worlders) but unique cultures that are hard
to replicate and, therefore, provide novelty without threatening the culture of the
consuming nations. Indian cinema, Turkish television shows, and South Korean pop
music – all things that do not threaten to take over one’s society – have become more
attractive than Hollywood or American pop music.

Bollywood is one example of this. As Map 1 shows, India produces more movies than
any other country in the world. In 2019 India produced 2,446 movies to China’s 1,037
and the United States’ 601. In the 1990s, the US was by far the biggest film producer.
India exports its films to more than 70 countries. Indian cinema has spread to
countries with no direct links with India – such as Nigeria, Egypt, and Peru – because
it allows people to be entertained “without engaging with the heavy ideological load of
‘becoming Western’”, as anthropologist Brian Larkin puts it.

151
Map 1

Film production power

Numbers of films produced in countries with the largest movie industries
South Korea
Italy
Germany
France
United Kingdom
Japan
China
United States
India

Films produced in 1992

by country

127
144 47

425 240

63 192

152
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
 The Power Atlas Culture

Films produced in 2019

by country

502

601 301

2,446 1,037

265
689
187
325

Source: Marché du Film: Focus – World Film Market Trends (1993-2020), “Top 10 markets worldwide by feature film production”, released by the European Audiovisual
Observatory; Historical data on China’s film production prior to 2005 was supplimented from: National Bureau of Statistics of China (2005), Film production quantity (22-8)
Source: Example text goes here et. al. Hon. Christopherous J.J. McEichenburger esq. first of his name, the unshaven, patter of cats, drinker of tea and writer of source
examples. (2099)

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
 A huge domestic market partly explains India’s rise to cultural prominence, but does
not explain that of some of the other new cultural superpowers. One of the most
surprising is South Korea, a country that is increasingly punching above its weight in
the cultural stakes.

In 2020 South Korean movie ‘Parasite’ became the first non-English language film
to win ‘best picture’ at the Oscars. So-called K-dramas have been dubbed into many
indigenous languages such as Guarani and have captured 86 per cent of television
viewership in, for example, Iran. And South Korean video games have become
incredibly popular around the world. But the most surprising South Korean export
is perhaps pop music. K-pop is now a global phenomenon that is challenging the
dominance of American and British music.

In 2012 South Korean pop song ‘Gangnam Style’ had the first video in history to reach
one billion views on YouTube.

In July 2020, K-pop boy band BTS broke the record for most number-one singles on
iTunes worldwide, which had previously been held by Adele. The group’s track ‘Black
Swan’ topped the charts in 104 countries. In 2020, as Map 2 shows, BTS singer V
broke the record again with his song ‘Sweet Night’, which topped the iTunes chart
in 118 countries. The band has also become Guinness World Record holder for most
Twitter ‘engagements’.

Turkish television shows have spread almost as far as South Korean pop. Programmes
such as ‘Magnificent Century’ have come to rival American television in international
popularity, sweeping through the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America. Known as
‘dizi’, Turkish period dramas seem to have “achieved the perfect balance between
secular modernity and middle class conservatism”, according to author Fatima Bhutto.
Since 2002, more than 150 dizi have been sold to over 100 countries, including
Algeria, Morocco, and Bulgaria. It was ‘Magnificent Century’ – which was sold to
89 countries (see: Map 3) – that blazed the way for others to follow. The Turkish
government claims that, by 2023, the Turkish economy will pull in $1 billion from dizi
exports.

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The power of K-pop Map 2

Countries in which ‘Sweet Night’ by BTS’s V topped the iTunes charts

The power of Turkish television series Map 3

Turkey’s exports of ‘Magnificent Century’

Source: Kpopmag.com (21 April 2021), BTS’s V Becomes The First Artist In History With The Most No.1s On iTunes Worldwide For ‘Sweet Night’
Source: Tims&B Productions (2019)
155
 The blurring of democracy and authoritarianism

During the cold war, the world was split between free countries and authoritarian
states – a divide that gave enormous soft power to the West. It was not just that many
people yearned for the freedoms of liberal democracy, but also that liberal democracies
seemed to be richer and better at solving political problems than their rivals. And, in
the case of the US, they were also more powerful in every measure.

Superficially, the world looks very similar today, with many people talking about a
new cold war between the US (as the ‘leader of the free world’) and a China that stands
alongside other authoritarian powers such as Russia. However, although maps of the
politics of the world might be superficially similar, the power of political ideals has
changed dramatically. There are two profound differences between the world today
and that of earlier eras.

The first concerns the performance of democracies. When it comes to the big questions
on the political agenda, there is no longer a clear link in popular perceptions between
regime type and effectiveness.

As Map 4 shows, there does not seem to be a big difference between the success of the
free and non-free countries when it comes to the battle against covid-19. And Map 5
shows that there is a similar dynamic when it comes to economic growth.

Map 4
Methodology: The ‘free’ and ‘non-free’ world classification is based on the global freedom index produced by Freedom
House. The free world includes countries that are classified as “Free” for the year 2020. The non-free world includes
countries that are classified as either “Not free” or only “Partly free” for the year 2020. Raw data on confirmed cases and
deaths for all countries are sourced from the COVID-19 Data Repository by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering
at Johns Hopkins University and maintained by Our World in Data. It is updated daily and includes data on confirmed
cases, deaths, hospitalisations, and testing.

Source: Dong, E., Du, H., and Gardner, L. (2020) An interactive web-based dashboard to track COVID-19 in real time. Lancet Inf Dis. 20(5):533-534. doi: 10.1016/S1473-
3099(20)30120-1; Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2021 edition

Map 5
Methodology: The ‘free’ and ‘non-free’ world classification is based on the global freedom index produced by Freedom House.
The free world includes countries that are classified as “Free” for the year 2020. The non-free world includes countries that are
classified as either “Not free” or only “Partly free” for the year 2020. Raw data on the Real GDP growth in annual percentage
change is sourced from the IMF Datamapper.

Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) (April 2021). The World Economic Outlook (WEO) database; Freedom House (2021), Freedom in the World, 2021 edition

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The free and non-free worlds Cumulative covid-19 deaths (as of 1 June 2021) Map 4

The fight against the pandemic The free world

The non-free world

10
100
1,000
10,000
50,000
100,000
500,000
No data

The free and non-free worlds Real GDP growth Map 5

(Annual percentage change, April 2021)
Economic growth
The free world
The non-free world
-3% 0% 3% 6%

No data
157
Map 6

Europeans’ views of Chinese power

Share of respondents who said that China will be

a stronger power than the US by 2030

No data
48% 79%

Source: ECFR-commissioned data from Datapraxis and YouGov (Survey conducted in November 2020)
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 The Power Atlas Culture

Map 6 shows that many people believe the link between democracy and power is also
breaking. Even in the liberal democracies of western Europe, a majority think that
China will overtake the US to become the most powerful country in the world.

But even more important than the relative performance of democracies and
authoritarian states is a revolution within the idea of democracy. After a long
period where liberal democracy seemed to be spreading, there are now reports of
a democratic recession and a debate about democratic backsliding. According to
Freedom House, the number of liberal democracies grew from around 100 to close to
150 between the 1980s and the mid-2010s. In its latest report, Freedom House talks
about “the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom” and explains that “the
countries experiencing deterioration outnumbered those with improvements by the
largest margin recorded since the negative trend began in 2006”.

Map 7 uses Freedom House data to show how the world is no longer split between
free and non-free countries. Looking at the work of these authors, we think that we
could include a new category, ‘born-again authoritarians’, to describe states that had
a taste of freedom but then moved towards the non-free world. Examples of this are
Hungary, which has been classified as “partly free” since 2018, and Russia, which has
been classified as “not free” since 2004. More recently, India moved from being “free”
to being “partly free” due to a multi-year pattern of discrimination against its Muslim
population and attempts to silence critical voices in the media and civil society.
What comes out of this map is a much more contested idea of what democracy is –
something that makes a simple opposition between the free and non-free worlds very
difficult to use to mobilise political support.

This is not simply because many of the born-again authoritarians still claim
democratic credentials, as is the case in many countries where they have won free,
if not always fair, elections. It is also because – as a recent study conducted by Pew
Research Center demonstrated – the vast majority of American and French voters are
deeply disappointed with their own political systems (as are many others in Europe).
Some are even unconvinced that they still live in a democracy. Map 8 shows that a
surprising number of people around the world think that military rule is a good way of
governing a country. In the US, for example, 20 per cent think along those lines. In the
European Union, Romania has the biggest share (31 per cent) of potential supporters
of military rule.

159
Map 7

Born-again authoritarians

The free world

Countries that are classified as “Free” for the year 2020.

The non-free world

Countries that are classified as either “Not free” or only “Partly free”
for the year 2020, and have never been “Free”.

Born-again authoritarians
Countries that are either “Partly free” for the year 2020 but have
been “Free” at some point since 1980 or that are now “Not free” but
have been “Free” or “Partly free” at some point since 1980.

No data

Methodology: Calculations based on the global freedom index produced by Freedom House for 1980 to 2020
(as the year under review), which is the latest available data published by Freedom House in 2021.

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 The Power Atlas Culture

Source: Freedom House (2021), Freedom in the World, 2021 edition

Map 8

Support for army rule

Share of the population who think that
army rule is very or fairly good (2020)

No data
0% 30% 77%

Methodology: The map shows the share of respondents who think that army rule is very or fairly good. Question asked: I’m
going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country.
For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? “Having
the army rule”. The World Values Survey methodology states that the minimum sample size per country is 1,200 and must
be representative of all people aged 18 and older residing within private households in each country, regardless of their
nationality, citizenship, or language.

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 The Power Atlas Culture

Source: Haerpfer, C., Inglehart, R., Moreno, A., Welzel, C., Kizilova, K., Diez-Medrano J., Lagos, M., Norris, P., Ponarin, E. and Puranen, B. et al. (eds.). (2020). World Values
Survey: Round Seven – Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WVSA Secretariat. doi:10.14281/18241.13
Map 9

The polarised world

The Polarisation of Society indicator (2020)

Serious polarisation
There are serious differences in opinion in society on almost
all key political issues, which result in major clashes of views.

Moderate polarisation
There are differences in opinion in society on many key political
issues, which result in moderate clashes of views.

Medium polarisation
There are noticeable differences in opinion on about half of the
key political issues, resulting in some clashes of views.

Limited polarisation
There are differences in opinion on only a few key political
issues, resulting in few clashes of views.

No polarisation
There are differences in opinion but there is a general
agreement on the direction to take key political issues.

No data

Methodology: The Polarisation of Society indicator, developed by V-Dem in collaboration with the Digital Society Project,
measures the extent to which differences in opinions result in clashes of views on major political issues. This is measured on a
scale of 0 to 4, where 0 indicates serious polarisation on almost all key political issues and 4 indicates virtually no polarisation.

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 The Power Atlas Culture

Source: Coppedge M. et al. (2021). ”V-Dem Dataset v11.1” Varieties of Democracy Project. https://doi.org/10.23696/vdemds21
Map 10

Culture wars
The generation gap in acceptance of homosexuality

Difference between the youngest and the oldest age groups in

their acceptance of homosexuality (percentage points, 2020)

10pp 20pp
No data
Virtually Low High
none

Methodology: The map shows the difference (in percentage points) between the share of those aged 16-24 who are highly
accepting of homosexuality and the share of those over the age of 65 who are highly accepting of homosexuality in each
country. It is based on the World Value Survey ‘homosexuality acceptance’ index, and specifically the following question:
"Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something
in between? Homosexuality".

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 The Power Atlas Culture

Source: Haerpfer, C., Inglehart, R., Moreno, A., Welzel, C., Kizilova, K., Diez-Medrano J., Lagos, M., Norris, P., Ponarin, E. and Puranen, B. et al. (eds.). (2020). World Values
Survey: Round Seven – Country-Pooled Datafile. Madrid, Spain & Vienna, Austria: JD Systems Institute & WVSA Secretariat. doi:10.14281/18241.13
 Weaponising the vulnerabilities of other systems rather than being a city on
a hill

The most dramatic change to the missionary era is that great powers now seem keener
to exploit the weakness of other systems than to strive to become a model themselves.
Authoritarian states such as Russia find it much easier to exploit the weaknesses of
others than to export their own values or political models. They can see how they can
increase their power by dividing others without needing to come up with anything that
is attractive on their own side.

In many advanced democracies, the political centre is eroding, and societies are
becoming polarised into camps that are divided by culture and values. The stark
polarisation of society in many countries with advanced economies has created a lot
of vulnerabilities to external interference. Map 9 shows how divided the world now is,
using the V-Dem indicator of polarisation in society. The indicator is based on ratings
provided by experts and academics in each country, who measure differences of
opinions on major political issues.

The front line in many of these new conflicts is often culture and identity rather than
class. And the issues that are most divisive often relate to sexuality. Map 10 shows a
profound gap between young and old people in different countries. Often, it is when
countries have begun to liberalise their attitudes to these social questions that the
previous majorities begin to feel that they might become ‘strangers in their own lands’
– and to organise politically. The Brexit referendum and the rise of Donald Trump
have both been linked with the idea of these ‘threatened majorities’ fighting back
against cultural liberalisation.

Both the Brexit referendum and the election of Trump were also subject to debates
about foreign interference. And the rise of social media has made it easy for external
powers to change domestic debates. From foreign troll factories to Twitter bots
and Cambridge Analytica, the role of foreign powers in shaping national debates
has become one of the most talked-about topics of the modern era. Map 11 shows
that, between 2014 and 2020, foreign powers attempted to interfere in 33 elections
collectively involving 1.7 billion people. Map 12 indicates that the cumulative effect of
all these trends is a collapse in faith in democracy – making societies more vulnerable
to this kind of external manipulation.

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 The Power Atlas Culture

Election interference Map 11

Cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections

and referendums between 2011 and 2020

Alleged foreign state actor

China
Iran
North Korea
Russia
United Kingdom

Cyber operation
Covert activities carried out via digital infrastructure to gain access to a server or system in order to compromise
its service, identify or introduce vulnerabilities, manipulate information, or perform espionage.

Online information operation

Information operations carried out in the online information environment to covertly distort, confuse, mislead
and manipulate targets through deceptive or inaccurate information.

Source: O´Connor S., Hanson F., Currey E., & Beattie, T. (2020) (2020). Cyber-enabled foreign interference in elections and referendums, The International Cyber Policy
Centre at ASPI 169
Map 12

The declining legitimacy of democratic elections

Share of people who do not trust the electoral process

Share of population that does not have

confidence in the honesty of elections (2020)

No data
20% 40% 60% 80%

Source: Gallup World Poll (2020)

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 The Power Atlas Culture

Conclusion: How the “ethos of decolonisation” could beat

the “missionary ethos”

As the world moves from flat universalism to cultural protectionism, many countries
are more defined by the cultural antibodies that developed in resistance to Western
soft power than the cultural flows that they were responding to. In the new world, the
core divide is not between democracy and authoritarianism but between dependence
and independence. States that want to prosper will need to find a ‘sovereignty-friendly’
idea of soft power.

Many people believe the future will be defined by a clash between the West on one
side and China on the other, in the same pattern as during the cold war. But, in reality,
there is a huge difference between eras – at least so far.

Both the Soviet Union and the US were universalist powers rooted in the tradition of
the Enlightenment. They were missionaries who wanted to remake the world in their
image.

But China’s pitch to the world has been very different. The claim to power of Chinese
culture comes not from the idea that it is a model that should be emulated but rather
that China is creating a harmonious environment in which everyone can preserve their
indigenous identities in the face of American or Western expansionism. In that sense,
Chinese soft power has been a resistance identity rather than a missionary one. And,
in this world of cultural resistance, “merchant powers” will be more effective than
“missionary powers” at finding global followers. Unlike the missionary, the merchant
pretends that she does not want to change or convert you. It is her focus on your self-
interest that will make the merchant more acceptable than the missionary.

Paradoxically, in this new geopolitical polarisation, the biggest threat to Chinese soft
power would be to present it as a model to the world. Upgrading the Chinese Dream
into an alternative to the American Dream would make it less attractive.

171
About the authors

Fiona Adamson is professor of international relations at SOAS, University of London.

Alex Clark is a visiting fellow at ECFR and researcher at the Smith School of Enterprise
and the Environment at the University of Oxford.
Susi Dennison is a senior policy fellow and director of ECFR’s European Power
programme.
Anthony Dworkin is a senior policy fellow at ECFR.
Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow and head of ECFR’s Technology and European
Power initiative.
Kelly Greenhill is the 2020-21 Leverhulme Trust visiting professor at SOAS; her home
faculty institutions are Tufts University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Jonathan Hackenbroich is a policy fellow and head of ECFR’s Task Force for Protecting
Europe from Economic Coercion.
Ivan Krastev is chair of the Centre for Liberal Strategies in Sofia and a permanent
fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna.
Mark Leonard is co-founder and director of the European Council on Foreign
Relations.
José Ignacio Torreblanca is a senior policy fellow and head of ECFR’s Madrid office.

This publication was supported by

The culture essay in this publication was supported by

What does power mean in the modern world?
At the end of the nineteenth century, two grand theories competed
to define the twentieth-century map of power. The first held that
the emerging technologies of massive ships powered by fossil fuels
implied that whoever held command of the seas would control the
world. The second held that, in an age of railroads, power flowed
to those in control of the large landmass and abundant natural
resources of Eurasia. These theories implied different maps of the
world and different strategies for prospering in the twentieth century.
But, in a twenty-first century in which nations are linked by vastly
complex networks, power is no longer defined by control of land or
oceans, or even the normative influence of “soft power”. It is now
defined by control over flows of people, goods, money, and data, and
via the connections they establish. Interdependence has become a
currency of power – and even a weapon. As states compete to control
such connections and the dependencies they create, these flows cut
across overlapping spheres of influence – shaping the new map of
geopolitical power. Only those who see this map clearly will be able to
control the modern world.

Edited by Mark Leonard

With contributions from Fiona Adamson, Alex Clark, Susi Dennison,
Anthony Dworkin, Ulrike Franke, Kelly Greenhill, Jonathan
Hackenbroich, Ivan Krastev, and José Ignacio Torreblanca.