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Art Villarino
[Course title]

REMREV 2 (SPECPRO)
NOTES AND CASE
[Document subtitle]
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A. JURISDICTION- Sections 29 & 33, BP 129, as Amended

Section 33, BP 129. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate,
including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000) or, in
Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs shall be included in
the determination of fi ling fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes of
actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different transactions;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided,That
when, in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
beresolved only to determine the issue of possession; and

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property,
or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does
not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes,
the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (As amended
by RA No. 7691, March 25, 1994.)*

Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original

jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000) or, for civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) except actions for
forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
2|Page

(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the demand or claim exceeds One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000);

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of the estate exceeds
three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such gross
value exceeds four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000);

G.R. No. 122646 March 14, 1997

ADELIA C. MENDOZA vs. HON. ANGELITO C. TEH, Presiding Judge, Branch 87, RTC, Rosario, Batangas

On October 28, 1994, petitioner "for herself and as administratrix of the intestate estate" of her
deceased husband Norberto Mendoza filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas a
complaint for "reconveyance of title (involving parcels of lot in Batangas) and damages with petition for
preliminary injunction" docketed as Civil Case No. R94-009.1 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of said complaint
states:

2. That Adelia C. Mendoza likewise represents her co-plaintiff, the Intestate Estate of the late Norberto
B. Mendoza in her capacity as the surviving wife of the deceased Norberto B. Mendoza who died on
December 29, 1993;

3. That Adelia C. Mendoza should be appointed by this Honorable Court as the judicial administratrix of
her co-plaintiff for purposes of this case;2

Private respondents filed on January 21, 19953 their "answer with motion to dismiss" alleging among
others that the complaint states no cause of action and that petitioner's demand had already been paid.

On February 17, 1995, private respondents filed another pleading entitled "motion to dismiss" invoking,
this time, lack of jurisdiction, lack of cause of action, estoppel, laches and prescription. In support of
their argument of lack of jurisdiction, private respondents contend that a special proceedings case for
appointment of administratrix of an estate cannot be incorporated in the ordinary action for
reconveyance.

In her opposition to the motions, petitioner asserts among others, that the allegation seeking
appointment as administratrix is only an incidental matter which is not even prayed for in the complaint.

Replying to the opposition, private respondents argued that since petitioner's husband resided in
Quezon City at the time of his death, the appointment of the estate administratrix should be filed in the
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RTC of that place in accordance with Section 1 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, it is their
argument that the RTC of Batangas has no jurisdiction over the case.

In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, the RTC of Batangas thru respondent Judge Teh "dismissed without
prejudice" the complaint for lack of jurisdiction "on the ground that the rules governing an ordinary civil
action and a special proceeding are different."

ISSUE:

Whether or not in an action for reconveyance, an allegation seeking appointment as administratrix of an

estate, would oust the RTC of its jurisdiction over the whole case.

RULING: NO

We rule in the negative. First, Section 19 of B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides:

Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein,
where the assessed value of property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). . .

xxx xxx xxx

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate

Likewise, Section 33 of the same law provides that:

Metropolitan Trial Court shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate . . .
(emphasis ours).

The above law is clear. An action for reconveyance, which involves title to property worth millions of
pesos, such as the lots subject of this case, is cognizable by the RTC. Likewise falling within its
jurisdiction are actions "incapable of pecuniary estimation," such as the appointment of an
administratrix for an estate. Even the Rules on venue of estate proceedings (Section 1 of Rule 73)
impliedly recognizes the jurisdiction of the RTC over petitions for granting of letters of administration.

On the other hand, probate proceedings for the settlement of estate are within the ambit of either the
RTC or MTC depending on the net worth of the estate. By arguing that the allegation seeking such
appointment as administratrix ousted the RTC of its jurisdiction, both public and private respondents
confuse jurisdiction with venue. Section 2 of Rule 4 as revised by Circular 13-958 provides that actions
involving title to property shall be tried in the province where the property is located, in this case, —
Batangas. The mere fact that petitioner's deceased husband resides in Quezon City at the time of his
death affects only the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court.
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FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions dated June 14, 1995 and November 14, 1995 of the RTC of Batangas are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to immediately proceed with the disposition of the
case in accordance with this Decision.

[G.R. No. 124320. March 2, 1999.]

HEIRS OF GUIDO YAPTINCHAY V. DEL ROSARIOA

At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Orders dated
October 25, 1995 and February 23, 1996, respectively, of Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus,
Cavite ("RTC").

The facts that matter are, as follows:

Petitioners claim that they are the legal heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the owners-
claimants of Lot No. 1131 with an area of 520,638 and Lot No. 1132 with an area of 36,235 square
meters, more or less situated in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.

On March 17, 1994, petitioners executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of the estate of the deceased
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay.

On August 26, 1994, petitioners discovered that a portion, if not all, of the aforesaid properties were
titled in the name of respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation ("Golden Bay") under
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. ("TCT") 225254 and 225255.

With the discovery of what happened to subject parcels of land, petitioners filed a complaint for
ANNULMENT and/or DECLARATIONS OF NULLITY OF TCT NO. 493363, 493364, 193665, 493366,
493367; and its Derivatives; As Alternative Reconveyance of Realty WITH A PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and/or RESTRAINING ORDER WITH DAMAGES, docketed as RTC BCV-94-127
before Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court in Imus, Cavite.

Upon learning that "Golden Bay" sold portions of the parcels of land in question, petitioners filed with
the "RTC" an Amended Complaint to implead new and additional defendants and to mention the TCTs to
be annulled.

THE RTC dismissed the Amended Complaint.

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Petitioners moved for reconsideration of the Order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The motion was
granted by the RTC in an Order 1 dated July 7, 1995, which further allowed the herein petitioners to file
a Second Amended Complaint, which they promptly did.

On August 12, 1995, the private respondents presented a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action, that plaintiffs did not have a right of action, that they have
not established their status as heirs, that the land being claimed is different from that of the defendants,
and that plaintiffs’ claim was barred by laches. The said Motion to Dismiss was granted by the
respondent court in its Order 4 dated October 25, 1995, holding that petitioners "have not shown any
proof or even a semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the above-
named Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple."

Petitioners interposed a Motion for Reconsideration but to no avail. The same was denied by the RTC in
its Order 6 of February 23, 1996.

Undaunted, petitioners have come before this Court to seek relief from respondent court’s Orders
under attack.

Petitioners contend that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could proceed. It is petitioners
submission that the respondent court should have proceeded with the trial and simultaneously
resolved the issue of heirship in the same case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the
issue of heirship should first be determined before trial of the case could proceed.

RULING: NO

The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a
declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisively clear that
the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here
are seeking the establishment of a status or right.
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We therefore hold that the respondent court did the right thing in dismissing the Second Amended
Complaint, which stated no cause of action.

=====================================================================================

G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,

vs.

LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.

Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 20021
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
1242 which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.

On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.

On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal
Jr., her herein co-petitioner.

On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein
respondent.

On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Waiver of Rights over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2,
1964. In the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m.
parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.
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On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C.
Lazo."

On February 18, 1984, Paz died.

On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.

On February 15, 1988, respondent (Leonila) executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of
Estate of Deceased Person", adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213
in Portugal’s name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 15981314 was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, "Leonila Portugal-
Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."

Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of
the title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July
23, 1996 a complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by
her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.

In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased
Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when
she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.

Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be
declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in
respondent’s name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners’) name, and that actual,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.

After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,17 after giving an account of the testimonies
of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues
defined during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners’
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of
jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.
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The CA affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the case. Hence, this petition on certiorari.

Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay
and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño
shows; that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the
appellate court’s ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs
before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of Adjudication and of the
TCT issued in her name.

RULING:

In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s
estate, executed on February 15, 198835 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second
sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule
that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is
the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special
proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case –
subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners’ status as heirs
could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it
defined during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:

1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
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2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);

3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;

4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.

=====================================================================================

G.R. No. 198680, July 08, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON

v.

GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. “GAUDIOSO E. YPON,

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC),
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of
law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC,
dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, filed a complaint for Cancellation of
Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras
Ricaforte a.k.a. “Gaudioso E. Ypon” (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.

In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June
28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.

Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer
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in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s
collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his
certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his
passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted
by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared
as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had
established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters
of administration, this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’s
compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s
son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted which
consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of
Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011
due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificate of Compliance was issued.

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse
to the Court through the instant petition.

ISSUE:

whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action was proper.

RULING: YES

The petition has no merit.

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As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they
are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently
warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s
lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary
action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of
Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who
are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and
not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be
made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership
and possession of property. This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in
the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It
is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding
inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

[ G.R. No. 232579, September 08, 2020 ]

DR. NIXON L. TREYES

V.

ANTONIO L. LARLAR, REV. FR. EMILIO L. LARLAR, HEDDY L. LARLAR, ET AL.

Under the Civil Code, when the brothers and sisters of a deceased married sister survive with her
widower, the latter shall be entitled by law to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters to
the other half. The Civil Code likewise states that this successional right of the legal heirs is vested in
them from the very moment of the decedent's death.
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Given that successional rights are conferred by the Civil Code, a substantive law, the question to be
resolved here by the Court is whether a prior determination of the status as a legal or compulsory heir
in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an ordinary civil action seeking for the protection
and enforcement of ownership rights given by the law of succession. The Court now definitively settles
this question once and for all.

FACTS:

On May 1, 2008, Rosie Larlar Treyes (Rosie), the wife of petitioner Treyes, passed away. Rosie, who did
not bear any children with petitioner Treyes, died without any will. Rosie also left behind seven siblings,
i.e., the private respondents Antonio, Emilio, Heddy, Rene, Celeste, Judy, and Yvonne.

At the time of her death, Rosie left behind 14 real estate properties,11 situated in various locations in
the Philippines, which she owned together with petitioner Treyes as their conjugal properties (subject
properties).

Subsequently, petitioner Treyes executed two Affidavits of Self- Adjudication dated September 2,
200812 and May 19, 2011.13 The first Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was registered by petitioner Treyes
with the Register of Deeds (RD) of Marikina City on March 24, 2011, while the second Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication was registered with the RD of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental on June 5, 2011. In these
two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, petitioner Treyes transferred the estate of Rosie unto himself,
claiming that he was the sole heir of his deceased spouse, Rosie.

As alleged by the private respondents, they sent a letter dated February 13, 2012 to petitioner Treyes
requesting for a conference to discuss the settlement of the estate of their deceased sister, Rosie. The
private respondents maintain that they never heard from petitioner Treyes regarding their request.
Undaunted, the private respondents again wrote to petitioner Treyes on April 3, 2012, requesting for
the settlement of their sister's estate, but this request fell on deaf ears.

The private respondents then alleged that sometime during the latter part of 2012, they discovered to
their shock and dismay that the TCTs previously registered in the name of their sister and petitioner
Treyes had already been cancelled, except TCT No. M-43623 situated in Tanay, Rizal and TCT No. T-
627723 situated in Cabuyao, Laguna. New titles had been issued in the name of petitioner Treyes on the
basis of the two Affidavits of Self-Adjudication.

Hence, the private respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint dated July 12, 2013 (Complaint) for
annulment of the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication, cancellation of TCTs, reconveyance of ownership and
possession, partition, and damages against petitioner Treyes, the RD of Marikina, the RD of the
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Province of Rizal, and the RD of the City of San Carlos, Negros Occidental. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. RTC-1226.

Petitioner Treyes then filed another Motion to Dismiss dated June 20, 2014 (second Motion to
Dismiss), arguing that the private respondents' Complaint should be dismissed on the following
grounds: (1) improper venue; (2) prescription; and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

In its Resolution26 dated July 15, 2014, the RTC denied for lack of merit petitioner Treyes' second
Motion to Dismiss. Nevertheless, the RTC held that it did not acquire jurisdiction over the Complaint's
third cause of action, i.e., partition:

x x x A perusal of the Complaint shows that the causes of action are 1) the Annulment of the Affidavit of
Self Adjudication; 2) Reconveyance (3) Partition; and 4) Damages. Hence, the Court has jurisdiction over
the first, second and fourth causes of action but no jurisdiction over the third cause of action of Partition
and the said cause of action should be dropped from the case.

In its assailed Decision, the CA denied petitioner Treyes' petition for certiorari. The dispositive portion
of the assailed Decision of the CA reads:

The CA held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Treyes' second
Motion to Dismiss. Since the Complaint primarily seeks to annul petitioner Treyes' Affidavits of Self-
Adjudication, which partakes the nature of an ordinary civil action, the CA found that the RTC had
jurisdiction to hear and decide the private respondents' Complaint. Further, the CA held that since the
case was an ordinary civil action, the proper venue is San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Lastly, the CA
held that the action of the private respondents is not barred by prescription.

Hence, the instant Petition.

ISSUE:

the determination of the status of the legal heirs in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to
an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property instituted by the legal heirs.

RULING:

III. The Necessity of a Prior Determination of Heirship in a Separate Special Proceeding

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The Court now proceeds to discuss the centerpiece of petitioner Treyes' Petition – that the RTC has no
jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the subject matter of the private respondents' Complaint because
the determination of the status of the legal heirs in a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite to an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property instituted by the legal heirs.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in
the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause
of action.

In the instant case, it is readily apparent from the allegations in the Complaint filed by the private
respondents that the action was not instituted for the determination of their status as heirs, as it was
their position that their status as heirs was already established ipso jure without the need of any
judicial confirmation. Instead, what the Complaint alleges is that the private respondents' rights over
the subject properties, by virtue of their being siblings of the deceased, must be enforced by annulling
the Affidavits of Self-Adjudication and ordering the reconveyance of the subject properties.

Hence, as correctly held by the RTC in its Resolution dated July 15, 2014, the RTC has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the Complaint, considering that the law confers upon the RTC jurisdiction over
civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where
the assessed value of the property involved exceeds P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila,
or where the assessed value exceeds P50,000.00 for civil actions in Metro Manila.

=====================================================================================

B. SUBJECT MATTER- SECTION 1, RULE 72

C. APPLICABILITY OF RULES ON CIVIL ACTIONS

D. DISTINCTION FROM CIVIL ACTIONS

BROADWELL HAGANS, Petitioner,

v.

ADOLPH WISLIZENUS, Judge of First Instance of Cebu, ET AL., Respondents.

15 | P a g e

SYLLABUS

2. ACTION; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ACTION AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; DISTINCTION. — There is a

marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding." An action is a formal demand of
one’s right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of
applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be
defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so
provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.

ISSUE: whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized
under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or
executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a
deceased person.

RULING: NO

This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for the writ of certiorari. The facts alleged in
the petition are admitted by a demurrer. The only question presented is, whether or not a judge of the
Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the
purpose of fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the
care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.

The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provisions of Act No. 190 permit him
to appoint assessors in "special proceedings." The petitioner contends that no authority in law exists for
the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.

The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the following: (a) Sections
57-62 of Act No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section 44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d) section
2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.

Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of Manila only. Act
No. 2369 provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases only. Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190
provide for the appointment of assessors in the court of the justice of the peace. Therefore, the only
provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special
proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.
16 | P a g e

Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for assessors to sit
in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that assessors be provided, . . ."

Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action" ? If it is, then, the court is expressly authorized by
said section 154 to appoint assessors. But we find, upon an examination of section 1 of Act No. 190,
which gives us an interpretation of the words used in said Act, that a distinction is made between an
"action" and a "special proceeding." Said section 1 provides that an "action" means an ordinary suit in a
court of justice, while "every other remedy furnished by law is a ’special proceeding.’"

In view of the interpretation given to the words "action" and "special proceeding" by the Legislature
itself, we are driven to the conclusion that there is a distinction between an "action" and a "special
proceeding," and that when the Legislature used the word "action" it did not mean "special
proceeding."cralaw virtua1aw library

There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding." An action is a formal
demand of one’s legal rights in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law.
It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. (People v. County
Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y. ], 398.) The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. (Porter v. Purdy, 29 N. Y., 106,
110; Chapin v. Thompson, 20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required, unless the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally
granted upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction to
actions, may be given: Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians, tutors; contest
of wills; to perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons; application for admission to the bar,
etc., etc. (Bliss on Code Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 1.)

From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in proceedings like the present the judge
of the Court of First Instance is without authority to appoint assessors. Therefore, the demurrer is
hereby overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby granted, and it is hereby ordered and decreed
that the order of the respondent judge appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the
same is hereby annulled and set aside; and, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.

G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001

PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO

17 | P a g e

vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME,
MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S.
MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners Pilar S. Vda De Manalo, et. Al., seeking to
annul the Resolution of the Court of Appeals affirming the Orders of the Regional Trial Court and the
Resolution which denied petitioner' motion for reconsideration.

FACTS:

Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on February 14,
1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely: Purita M.
Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M. Acuin,
Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who are all of
legal age.

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties located in
Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and style Manalo's Machine
Shop with offices at No. 19 Calavite Street, La Loma, Quezon City and at NO. 45 General Tinio Street,
Arty Subdivision, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late
Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda filed a
petition with the respondent Regional Trial Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the estate of
their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo, as
administrator thereof.

On December 15, 1992, the trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing on February
11, 1993 and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said order
upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned therein.

On February 11, 1993, the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring
the whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the
petitioners therein on March 16, 1993. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general
default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita
and Orlando who were granted then (10) days within which to file their opposition to the petition.
18 | P a g e

Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 39851, after the trial court in its Order 10 dated September 15,
1993. In their petition for improperly laid in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626; (2) the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate
proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same
family; and (5) no certification of non-forum shopping was attached to the petition.

Finding the contentions untenable, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari in its
Resolution11 promulgated on September 30, 1996. On May 6, 1997 the motion for reconsideration of
the said resolution was likewise dismissed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the
respondent trial court which denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial
settlement of estate despite the failure of the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts toward a
compromise involving members of the same family have been made prior to the filling of the petition
but that the same have failed.

RULING: NO

Herein petitioners claim that the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil action
involving members of the same family.

Consequently, according to herein petitioners, the same should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section 1(j)
of the Revised Rules of Court which provides that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed on the
ground that a condition precedent for filling the claim has not been complied with, that is, that the
petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts toward
a compromise have been made involving members of the same family prior to the filling of the petition
pursuant to Article 222 14 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The instant petition is not impressed with merit.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in the case at bar, shall
be controlling. A careful srutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estatein SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners' claim that the same is in the
19 | P a g e

nature of an ordinary civil action. The said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a
petition for the settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fat of death of the late Troadio
Manalo on February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City of Manila at the time of his said
death.

The fact of death of the decedent and of his residence within he country are foundation facts upon
which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest.17 The petition is SP.PROC
No. 92-63626 also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a tentative list of
the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In
addition, the relief's prayed for in the said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention of
the petitioners therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their
deceased father, Troadio Manalo

Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 contains certain averments which may be typical
of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners, as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said defect in
the petition and filed their so-called Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial court, is actually
an Answer containing admissions and denials, special and affirmative defenses and compulsory
counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs in an apparent
effort to make out a case of an ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal under Rule 16,
Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.

It is our view that herein petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only in an ordinary civil action.

In addition, the rule has always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a court, as well as the
concomitant nature of an action, is determined by the averments in the complaint and not by the
defenses contained in the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too difficult to have a case either
thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple strategem. So it should be in the instant
petition for settlement of estate.

G.R. No. 133000 October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER

vs.

HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO

20 | P a g e

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any
of the heirs?

FACTS:

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889.
Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo,
Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09
February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889.
Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share
of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was
issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-
Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share
and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only
447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently,
the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with
a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land
area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first
lot to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No.
1860594 was issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife
Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein
private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of
fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of
TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein
private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.
21 | P a g e

In her answer dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of
the latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in
advance, properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against
Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch ruled in favor of the complainant and voided the
sale executed by Graciano in favor of Patricia Natcher.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter
alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate. The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of
estate of a deceased person. XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the
court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on
advancement to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT PROBATE COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION TO
DISTRIBUTE THE STATE.

RULING: NO

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
22 | P a g e

"XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established
rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the
status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are
required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted
generally upon an application or motion."

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as
advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which
concomitantly requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the
person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor
of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of
23 | P a g e

title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover,
under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle
the estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo
determined the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property
owned by the estate of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings
provided (for) by the Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an
ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject
to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an
advance inheritance."

PART TWO: RULES CONFERRING POWER OVER ANOTHER’S PROPERTY

II. SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS
A. Venue and process – Rule 73
1. Which court has jurisdiction
2. Venue in judicial settlement of estate
3. Extent of jurisdiction of probate court
4. Powers and duties of probate court
CASES:
[G.R. NO. 157912 : December 13, 2007]

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER

v.

ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER

24 | P a g e

FACTS:

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for
all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.

In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on October 7, 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission
due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses incurred
and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money
claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a),
Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against
non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was
not filed and served personally.

On January 15, 2003, the RTC issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim
based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied per
Omnibus Order dated April 9, 2003.

Petitioner then filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following questions:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed for failing to pay
the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its failure to contain a
written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and the payment of
docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides
that rules in ordinary actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
25 | P a g e

The Court gave due course to the Petition for Review on Certiorari although directly filed with this Court,
pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.3

The petition is imbued with merit.

However, it must be emphasized that petitioner's contention that rules in ordinary actions are only
supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but
in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil
actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.

This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in
special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said
proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are
inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for
non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate
would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings
such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent
money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification
against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

26 | P a g e

The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings.
The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory
pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition
for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after
granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the
decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their respective
money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to
be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate

With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman Vda. de Macatangay is
squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Rules
of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if said rule is not
complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite action or
resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely
to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of the postal service.
Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever,
resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch opposing
counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for instance, responsive
pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post office that the registered mail
containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may be claimed, unduly
procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay
in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rules requiring
personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court the discretion to
consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and
no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise
of discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins
with the clause "whenever practicable".

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing,
27 | P a g e

the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the
circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied
by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. In
adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject
matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In Musa v. Amor, this Court, on noting the impracticality of personal service, exercised its discretion and
liberally applied Section 11 of Rule 13:

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of pleadings must be done
personally whenever practicable. The court notes that in the present case, personal service would not
be practicable. Considering the distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the
petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have entailed considerable time,
effort and expense. A written explanation why service was not done personally might have been
superfluous. In any case, as the rule is so worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a
violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper as not filed. While it is
true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid
application of Section 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial justice.
(Emphasis and italics supplied)ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ

In the case at bar, the address of respondent's counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner Sonia's
counsel's is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City. Such distance makes
personal service impracticable. As in Musa v. Amor, a written explanation why service was not done
personally "might have been superfluous."

As this Court held in Tan v. Court of Appeals, liberal construction of a rule of procedure has been
allowed where, among other cases, "the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed."11 (Emphasis
supplied)cralawlibrary

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel for respondent
and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City. The lower court should have
taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not
practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals,12
the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally,
may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under Section 11,
Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of substantial justice.
28 | P a g e

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the
benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and
expenses of administration have been paid. The ultimate purpose for the rule on money claims was
further explained in Union Bank of the Phil. v. Santibañez,14 thus:

The filing of a money claim against the decedent's estate in the probate court is mandatory. As we held
in the vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:

x x x This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the
executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to
determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule
is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the
distributees, legatees, or heirs. The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the
claims against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay
off its debts and distribute the residue.15 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written
explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of substantial justice.

G.R. No. 120880 June 5, 1997

FERDINAND R. MARCOS II, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE and HERMINIA D.
DE GUZMAN, respondents.

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari, Government action is once again assailed as precipitate and
unfair, suffering the basic and oftly implored requisites of due process of law. Specifically, the petition
assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31363, where
the said court held:
29 | P a g e

In view of all the foregoing, we rule that the deficiency income tax assessments and estate tax
assessment, are already final and (u)nappealable-and-the subsequent levy of real properties is a tax
remedy resorted to by the government, sanctioned by Section 213 and 218 of the National Internal
Revenue Code. This summary tax remedy is distinct and separate from the other tax remedies (such as
Judicial Civil actions and Criminal actions), and is not affected or precluded by the pendency of any other
tax remedies instituted by the government.

FACTS:

More than seven years since the demise of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos, the matter of the settlement of
his estate, and its dues to the government in estate taxes, are still unresolved, the latter issue being now
before this Court for resolution. Specifically, petitioner Ferdinand R. Marcos II, the eldest son of the
decedent, questions the actuations of the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue in assessing,
and collecting through the summary remedy of Levy on Real Properties, estate and income tax
delinquencies upon the estate and properties of his father, despite the pendency of the proceedings on
probate of the will of the late president, which is docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 10279 in the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch 156.

Petitioner had filed with the respondent Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
an application for writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order on June 28, 1993,
seeking to —

I. Annul and set aside the Notices of Levy on real property dated February 22, 1993 and May 20, 1993,
issued by respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue;

II. Annul and set aside the Notices of Sale dated May 26, 1993;

III. Enjoin the Head Revenue Executive Assistant Director II (Collection Service), from proceeding with
the Auction of the real properties covered by Notices of Sale.

After the parties had pleaded their case, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 2 on November 29,
1994, ruling that the deficiency assessments for estate and income tax made upon the petitioner and
the estate of the deceased President Marcos have already become final and unappealable, and may
thus be enforced by the summary remedy of levying upon the properties of the late President, as was
done by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

Unperturbed, petitioner is now before us assailing the validity of the appellate court's decision, assigning
the following as errors:
30 | P a g e

A. RESPONDENT COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SUMMARY TAX REMEDIES RESORTED
TO BY THE GOVERNMENT ARE NOT AFFECTED AND PRECLUDED BY THE PENDENCY OF THE SPECIAL
PROCEEDING FOR THE ALLOWANCE OF THE LATE PRESIDENT'S ALLEGED WILL. TO THE CONTRARY, THIS
PROBATE PROCEEDING PRECISELY PLACED ALL PROPERTIES WHICH FORM PART OF THE LATE
PRESIDENT'S ESTATE IN CUSTODIA LEGIS OF THE PROBATE COURT TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHER
COURTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

The facts as found by the appellate court are undisputed, and are hereby adopted:

On September 29, 1989, former President Ferdinand Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.

On June 27, 1990, a Special Tax Audit Team was created to conduct investigations and examinations of
the tax liabilities and obligations of the late president, as well as that of his family, associates and
"cronies". Said audit team concluded its investigation with a Memorandum dated July 26, 1991. The
investigation disclosed that the Marcoses failed to file a written notice of the death of the decedent,
an estate tax returns [sic], as well as several income tax returns covering the years 1982 to 1986, — all
in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

Subsequently, criminal charges were filed against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos before the Regional Trial of
Quezon City for violations of Sections 82, 83 and 84 (has penalized under Sections 253 and 254 in
relation to Section 252 — a & b) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue thereby caused the preparation and filing of the Estate Tax
Return for the estate of the late president, the Income Tax Returns of the Spouses Marcos for the years
1985 to 1986, and the Income Tax Returns of petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II for the years
1982 to 1985.

On July 26, 1991, the BIR issued the following: (1) Deficiency estate tax assessment no. FAC-2-89-91-
002464 (against the estate of the late president Ferdinand Marcos in the amount of P23,293,607,638.00
Pesos); (2) Deficiency income tax assessment no. FAC-1-85-91-002452 and Deficiency income tax
assessment no. FAC-1-86-91-002451 (against the Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos in the amounts
of P149,551.70 and P184,009,737.40 representing deficiency income tax for the years 1985 and 1986);
(3) Deficiency income tax assessment nos. FAC-1-82-91-002460 to FAC-1-85-91-002463 (against
petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II in the amounts of P258.70 pesos; P9,386.40 Pesos;
P4,388.30 Pesos; and P6,376.60 Pesos representing his deficiency income taxes for the years 1982 to
1985).
31 | P a g e

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue avers that copies of the deficiency estate and income tax
assessments were all personally and constructively served on August 26, 1991 and September 12,
1991 upon Mrs. Imelda Marcos (through her caretaker Mr. Martinez) at her last known address at No.
204 Ortega St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "D" and "E" of the Petition). Likewise, copies of the deficiency
tax assessments issued against petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II were also personally and
constructively served upon him (through his caretaker) on September 12, 1991, at his last known
address at Don Mariano Marcos St. corner P. Guevarra St., San Juan, M.M. (Annexes "J" and "J-1" of
the Petition). Thereafter, Formal Assessment notices were served on October 20, 1992, upon Mrs.
Marcos c/o petitioner, at his office, House of Representatives, Batasan Pambansa, Quezon City.
Moreover, a notice to Taxpayer inviting Mrs. Marcos (or her duly authorized representative or counsel),
to a conference, was furnished the counsel of Mrs. Marcos, Dean Antonio Coronel — but to no avail.

The deficiency tax assessments were not protested administratively, by Mrs. Marcos and the other heirs
of the late president, within 30 days from service of said assessments.

On February 22, 1993, the BIR Commissioner issued twenty-two notices of levy on real property against
certain parcels of land owned by the Marcoses — to satisfy the alleged estate tax and deficiency income
taxes of Spouses Marcos.

On May 20, 1993, four more Notices of Levy on real property were issued for the purpose of satisfying
the deficiency income taxes.

On May 26, 1993, additional four (4) notices of Levy on real property were again issued. The foregoing
tax remedies were resorted to pursuant to Sections 205 and 213 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC).

In response to a letter dated March 12, 1993 sent by Atty. Loreto Ata (counsel of herein petitioner)
calling the attention of the BIR and requesting that they be duly notified of any action taken by the BIR
affecting the interest of their client Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II, as well as the interest of the late
president — copies of the aforesaid notices were, served on April 7, 1993 and on June 10, 1993, upon
Mrs. Imelda Marcos, the petitioner, and their counsel of record, "De Borja, Medialdea, Ata, Bello,
Guevarra and Serapio Law Office".

Notices of sale at public auction were posted on May 26, 1993, at the lobby of the City Hall of Tacloban
City. The public auction for the sale of the eleven (11) parcels of land took place on July 5, 1993. There
being no bidder, the lots were declared forfeited in favor of the government.
32 | P a g e

On June 25, 1993, petitioner Ferdinand "Bongbong" Marcos II filed the instant petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with prayer for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

It has been repeatedly observed, and not without merit, that the enforcement of tax laws and the
collection of taxes, is of paramount importance for the sustenance of government. Taxes are the
lifeblood of the government and should be collected without unnecessary hindrance. However, such
collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the apparently conflicting interests of the
authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the
common good, may be achieved. 3

ISSUE: Whether or not the pendency of probate proceedings over the estate of the deceased does not
preclude the assessment and collection, through summary remedies, of estate taxes over the same.

RULING: YES.

Taxes assessed against the estate of a deceased person, after administration is opened, need not be
submitted to the committee on claims in the ordinary course of administration. In the exercise of its
control over the administrator, the court may direct the payment of such taxes upon motion showing
that the taxes have been assessed against the estate.

Such liberal treatment of internal revenue taxes in the probate proceedings extends so far, even to
allowing the enforcement of tax obligations against the heirs of the decedent, even after distribution of
the estate's properties.

Claims for taxes, whether assessed before or after the death of the deceased, can be collected from
the heirs even after the distribution of the properties of the decedent. They are exempted from the
application of the statute of non-claims. The heirs shall be liable therefor, in proportion to their share in
the inheritance.

Thus, the Government has two ways of collecting the taxes in question. One, by going after all the heirs
and collecting from each one of them the amount of the tax proportionate to the inheritance received.
Another remedy, pursuant to the lien created by Section 315 of the Tax Code upon all property and
rights to property belong to the taxpayer for unpaid income tax, is by subjecting said property of the
estate which is in the hands of an heir or transferee to the payment of the tax due the estate.
(Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105, September 15, 1967.)
33 | P a g e

From the foregoing, it is discernible that the approval of the court, sitting in probate, or as a
settlement tribunal over the deceased is not a mandatory requirement in the collection of estate
taxes. It cannot therefore be argued that the Tax Bureau erred in proceeding with the levying and sale
of the properties allegedly owned by the late President, on the ground that it was required to seek
first the probate court's sanction. There is nothing in the Tax Code, and in the pertinent remedial laws
that implies the necessity of the probate or estate settlement court's approval of the state's claim for
estate taxes, before the same can be enforced and collected.

On the contrary, under Section 87 of the NIRC, it is the probate or settlement court which is bidden not
to authorize the executor or judicial administrator of the decedent's estate to deliver any distributive
share to any party interested in the estate, unless it is shown a Certification by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue that the estate taxes have been paid. This provision disproves the petitioner's
contention that it is the probate court which approves the assessment and collection of the estate tax.

If there is any issue as to the validity of the BIR's decision to assess the estate taxes, this should have
been pursued through the proper administrative and judicial avenues provided for by law.

G.R. No. 134100. September 29, 2000

PURITA ALIPIO, Petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING,
Respondents.

The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the
collection of a debt which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be
filed in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent Romeo Jaring was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa,
Bataan. The lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990.
34 | P a g e

On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses
Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of
rent was P485,600.00, payable in two installments of P300,000.00 and P185,600.00, with the second
installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the contract.

The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion
thereof, leaving an unpaid balance of P50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply
with their obligation, so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel
spouses for the collection of the said amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan,
Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants
fail to pay the balance.

Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had
passed away on December 1, 1988. She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which
then provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the
defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that
now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the
defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time
of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final
judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner
especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the
sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses
and that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case. The Manuel spouses
failed to file their answer. For this reason, they were declared in default.

On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner and the
Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of P50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the
amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in denying her
motion to dismiss. In its decision4rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal.
It held:
35 | P a g e

The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed when the
defendant dies before final judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply where there are other
defendants against whom the action should be maintained.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, 1998.6 Hence this petition
based on the following assignment of errors:

ISSUE:

whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt which is owed by the
conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the decedent.

RULING: YES

We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for
the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.

Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the sublease contract
binding themselves to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also
that of the Manuels) is one which is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of
the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for

All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and
those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the
partnership.

When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and debts
chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule
73, 2 which states:

Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the
36 | P a g e

debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have
died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay
the amount of P25,300.00, the attorney's fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The
complaint against petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a claim by private respondent
in the proceedings for the settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the
Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of the rent in the amount of P25,300.00.

B. Summary settlement of estates – Rule 74

1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs, when allowed
2. Two-year prescriptive period
3. Affidavit of self-adjudication by sole heir
4. Summary settlement of estates of small value, when allowed
5. Remedies of aggrieved parties after extrajudicial settlement of estate
==========================================================

Cases:
G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 16,
1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 31574 as well as its Resolution dated April 28, 1994 denying petitioner's Motion
37 | P a g e

for Reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 78, in Sp. Proc. No. Q-91-10441 converting petitioner's petition for the issuance of letters
of administration to an action for judicial partition.

FACTS:

Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and
his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.

The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed
Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is the second wife of Avelino
Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.

The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 78, docketed as SP Proc. No. Q-91-10441, a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked
that she be appointed the administrator of the estate.

On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion to convert the
said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed.

RTC appoved the petition.

On March 17, 1993, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated
June 16, 1993.

On July 23, 1993, Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial court, in granting private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the
issuance of letters of administration to an action for judicial partition.

The CA dismissed Ma. Socorro’s petition for certiorari.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner assigns the following errors:

ISSUE:
38 | P a g e

Whether or not THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE LOWER COURT’s Decision granting
private respondents' motion to convert the judicial proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration to an action for judicial partition.

RULING: NO

When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so
named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court,
then the decedent's estate shall be judicially administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator in the order established in Section 6 of Rule 78. The exceptions to this rule are
found in Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 746 which provide:

Sec. 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left no will and no
debts and the heirs are all of age or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. . .

Sec. 2. Summary settlement of estates of small value. — Whenever the gross value of the estate of a
deceased person, whether he died testate or intestate, does not exceed ten thousand pesos, and that
fact if made to appear to the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction of the estate by the petition of an
interested person and upon hearing, which shall be held not less than one (1) month nor more than
three (3) months from the date of the last publication of a notice which shall be published once a week
for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, and after such
other notice to interested persons as the court may direct, the court may proceed summarily, without
the appointment of an executor or administrator, and without delay, to grant, if proper, allowance of
the will, if any there be, to determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate
and to apportion and divide it among them after the payment of such debts of the estate as the court
shall then find to be due; and such persons, in their own right, if they are lawful age and legal capacity,
or by their guardians or trustees legally appointed and qualified, if otherwise, shall thereupon be
entitled to receive and enter into the possession of the portions of the estate so awarded to them
respectively. The court shall make such order as may be just respecting the costs of the proceedings, and
all orders and judgments made or rendered in the course thereof shall be recorded in the office of the
clerk, and the order of partition or award, if it involves real estate, shall be recorded in the proper
register's office.

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the
latter's death. Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, allows heirs to divide the estate among
themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies without leaving
39 | P a g e

pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor
apply for the appointment of an administrator by the court.

We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs and
legatees are all of age."With this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court
should apply.

In a last-ditch effort to justify the need for an administrator, petitioner insists that there is nothing to
partition yet, as the nature and character of the estate have yet to be determined. We find, however,
that a complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since
the estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it ruled that
the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an action
for judicial partition.

Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an action for letters
of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence procedurally
infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in
cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is
possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that
where the more expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority
of them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. The trial court appropriately
converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for judicial partition, upon motion of
the private respondents. No reversible error may be attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found
the trial court's action procedurally in order.

G. R. No. 147468 - April 9, 2003

SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO

vs.

LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, ET AL

The facts are not in dispute.

40 | P a g e

The spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous parcels of land located on Arayat
Street, Mandaluyong, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 57217 and 57218.

On November 13, 1962, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) caused the annotation of an
affidavit of adverse claim on the titles alleging that the spouses have mortgaged the same to it.

Subsequently, GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the owner's duplicates of
titles. When Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed a petition with the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-1359, praying that the owner's duplicates in Roces' possession be declared
null and void and that the Register of Deeds of Pasig be directed to issue new owner's duplicates to
GSIS.

On September 5, 1977, the Court of First Instance issued an order granting the petition. The order
became final and executory, and TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664) were issued in the name of
GSIS.

Cesar Roces died intestate on January 26, 1980.8 He was survived by his widow, Lilia Roces, and their
children: Cesar Roberto Roces, Ana Ines Magdalena Roces Tolentino, Luis Miguel M. Roces, Jose Antonio
Roces and Maria Vida Presentacion Roces, all of whom are the respondents in this case.

On July 22, 1992, Reynaldo L. Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication over the Arayat properties. He alleged that the properties were owned by the spouses
Cesar and Lilia Roces, both of whom died intestate, on September 13, 1987 and June 27, 1989,
respectively; that the properties were acquired during the existence of their marriage; that the
spouses left no heirs except the brother of Lilia Roces, who was his father; that neither of the spouses
left any will nor any debts; and that he was the sole heir of the Roces spouses.

On January 5, 1993, Montinola filed a petition against GSIS with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
docketed as Civil Case No. R-4743, praying for the cancellation of TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218
(11664).10 During the trial, GSIS failed to produce any document evidencing the alleged real estate
mortgage by Roces of the properties. Hence, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of Montinola,
declaring the owner's duplicates of TCT No. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664) as null and void and
ordering the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong to issue new owner's duplicates of the said titles.

GSIS did not appeal the aforesaid judgment; thus, the same became final and executory. Accordingly,
the Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong issued TCT No. 7299 in the name of Montinola in lieu of TCT No.
57218 (11664).12
41 | P a g e

Sometime in July 1993, Montinola executed a deed of absolute sale of the property covered by TCT
No. 7299 in favor of petitioner spouses Eduardo and Josefina Domingo. Thereafter, TCT No. 7673 was
issued in the names of petitioners.

Both TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673 contained the following annotation:

Subject to the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with respect to the inheritance left by
the deceased SPS. CESAR ROCES & LILIA MONTINOLA.

When respondents learned of the sale of the property to petitioners, they filed a complaint against
Montinola and petitioners with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. They argued that the affidavit of self-
adjudication was fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the Roces spouses and it was not
true that Lilia Roces was dead. Therefore, the affidavit of self-adjudication, as well as the deed of
absolute sale, TCT No. 7299, and TCT No. 7673, all covering the subject property, were null and void.15

In their answer, petitioners alleged that they were buyers in good faith and that their action was
barred by estoppel and laches.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

RTC in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendant Reynaldo L. Montinola who is hereby ordered to pay
to the plaintiffs the following sums.

CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, and declared the Affidavit of Adjudication null and
void.

ISSUES:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ANNOTATION IN THE TITLE REGARDING SEC.
4, RULE 74 IS AN ENCUMBRANCE WHICH DISQUALIFIES PETITIONERS FROM BEING INNOCENT
PURCHASERS FOR VALUE;
42 | P a g e

The petition lacks merit.

It is true that one who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go beyond the
same, but only has to rely on the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are
annotated on the title. However, this principle does not apply when the party has actual knowledge of
facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the
purchaser has knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a
reasonably prudent man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation. One who falls
within the exception can neither be denominated an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in
good faith.

As stated above, the titles, namely, TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673, contained annotations which made
reference to the provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, viz:

SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two (2) years after the
settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of either of the first two
sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in
the estate, such heir or such other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the
manner hereinafter provided for the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the
same time of two (2) years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which
have not been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation
payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after
hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and order how much and in what
manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment thereof, and may issue execution, if
circumstances require, against the bond provided in the preceding section or against the real estate
belonging to the deceased, or both.

Such bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other persons
for the full period of two (2) years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers of real estate
that may have been made.24

The foregoing rule clearly covers transfers of real property to any person, as long as the deprived heir or
creditor vindicates his rights within two years from the date of the settlement and distribution of estate.
Contrary to petitioners' contention, the effects of this provision are not limited to the heirs or original
distributees of the estate properties, but shall affect any transferee of the properties.

Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot now avoid the consequences
brought about by the application of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.
43 | P a g e

Petitioner's claim that respondents were guilty of laches and estoppel is likewise untenable. Laches is
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The essential elements of laches are:
(1) conduct on the part of defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
complained of; (2) delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's
conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the
defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or
prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.28

On the other hand, estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.29

In the case at bar, only four months elapsed from the time respondents discovered Montinola's
fraudulent acts, sometime in May 1993, to the time they filed their complaint on September 6, 1993.
This relatively short span of time can hardly be called unreasonable, especially considering that
respondents used this period of time to investigate the transfers of the property.Delay is an
indispensable requisite for a finding of estoppel by laches, but to be barred from bringing suit on
grounds of estoppel and laches, the delay must be lengthy and unreasonable. No unreasonable delay
can be attributed to respondents in this case.

C. Production and probate of will – Rule 75

1. Nature of probate proceeding
2. Who may petition for probate; persons entitled to notice
==========================================================
Cases:
G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II,, Petitioner,

v.

PACITA DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, Respondent.

44 | P a g e

These are petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions of the Thirteenth and the Special Eighth
Divisions of the Court of Appeals which ruled that petitioner has no right to intervene in the settlement
of the estate of Dr. Arturo de Santos. The cases were consolidated considering that they involve the
same parties and some of the issues raised are the same.

The facts which gave rise to these two petitions are as follows:

On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident of Makati City, filed a petition for probate
of his will in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-4223.

In his petition, Dr. De Santos alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will as
sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his
properties with an approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in
the custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips. A copy of the will
was annexed to the petition for probate.

On February 16, 1996, Judge Fernando V. Gorospe, Jr. of RTC-Makati, Branch 61 issued an order
granting the petition and allowing the will.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De Santos died on February 26, 1996.

On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as the only
child of Alicia de Santos (testators sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded
nephew and nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a creditor of the testator.
Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters
of administration in his name.

On November 4, 1996, Judge Abad Santos granted petitioners motion for intervention. Private
respondent moved for a reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. She then filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals which, on February 26, 1997, rendered a decision setting
aside the trial courts order on the ground that petitioner had not shown any right or interest to
intervene in Sp. Proc. No. M-4343.

Hence, these petitions which raise the following issues:

45 | P a g e

3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to
intervene and oppose the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

First. Petitioner contends that the probate proceedings in Branch 61 of RTC-Makati did not terminate
upon the issuance of the order allowing the will of Dr. De Santos. Citing the cases of Santiesteban v.
Santiesteban and Tagle v. Manalo, he argues that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully
distributed to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules
of Court. Consequently, petitioner contends that Branch 65 could not lawfully act upon private
respondents petition for issuance of letters testamentary.

The contention has no merit.

In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining
the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.9cräläwvirtualibräry

Ordinarily, probate proceedings are instituted only after the death of the testator, so much so that, after
approving and allowing the will, the court proceeds to issue letters testamentary and settle the estate of
the testator. The cases cited by petitioner are of such nature. In fact, in most jurisdictions, courts cannot
entertain a petition for probate of the will of a living testator under the principle of ambulatory nature
of wills.

However, Art. 838 of the Civil Code authorizes the filing of a petition for probate of the will filed by the
testator himself. It provides:

Civil Code, Art. 838. No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition the court having jurisdiction for the allowance
of his will. In such case, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court for the allowance of wills after
the testators death shall govern.

The Supreme Court shall formulate such additional Rules of Court as may be necessary for the allowance
of wills on petition of the testator.
46 | P a g e

Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after
his death, shall be conclusive as to its due execution.

Rule 76, 1 likewise provides:

Sec. 1 Who may petition for the allowance of will. - Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will,
or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition
the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or
is lost or destroyed.

The testator himself may, during his lifetime, petition in the court for the allowance of his will.

After a will has been probated during the lifetime of the testator, it does not necessarily mean that he
cannot alter or revoke the same before his death. Should he make a new will, it would also be allowable
on his petition, and if he should die before he has had a chance to present such petition, the ordinary
probate proceeding after the testators death would be in order.11cräläwvirtualibräry

Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for
Branch 61 to do except to issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the
Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the ruling of Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 of RTC-
Makati that -Nex old

Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati having begun the probate proceedings of the estate of
the deceased, it continues and shall continue to exercise said jurisdiction to the exclusion of all others. It
should be noted that probate proceedings do not cease upon the allowance or disallowance of a will but
continues up to such time that the entire estate of the testator had been partitioned and distributed.

The fact that the will was allowed during the lifetime of the testator meant merely that the partition and
distribution of the estate was to be suspended until the latters death. In other words, the petitioner,
instead of filing a new petition for the issuance of letters testamentary, should have simply filed a
manifestation for the same purpose in the probate court.
47 | P a g e

Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. - If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration
granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

Second. Petitioner claims the right to intervene in and oppose the petition for issuance of letters
testamentary filed by private respondent. He argues that, as the nearest next of kin and creditor of the
testator, his interest in the matter is material and direct. In ruling that petitioner has no right to
intervene in the proceedings before Branch 65 of RTC-Makati City, the Court of Appeals held:

The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de
Santos. Neither is he a compulsory heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the
decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy. Since the decedent has left a will
which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can inherit
only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedents estate is, therefore, not direct or
immediate.

His claim to being a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in
his reply to the opposition to his motion to intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by
evidence.

[G.R. No. 169144 : January 26, 2011]

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners, v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.
48 | P a g e

DECISION

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although
it has not been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United
States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California,
she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta's will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate.[1]

On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta's will
should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin
added that, assuming Ruperta's will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for
having been executed under duress and without the testator's full understanding of the consequences
of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Ruperta's foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions
in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their
deposition, which it granted.

On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or
not Ruperta's U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a) admitting to probate Ruperta's last will; (b)
appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor
designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.cralawlibrary
49 | P a g e

Aggrieved by the RTC's order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot
be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the RTC,[5] holding that
the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto's submission of the
authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond.

The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and
allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The
present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and
allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision,
Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

The Issue Presented

Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it
has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

The Court's Ruling: YES

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be
probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim,
ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local
courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been
admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its
laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in
that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid
execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have
not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given
legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
50 | P a g e

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance
of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or
legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death
of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner: (a)the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.[7] The rules do not require
proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Ruperta's will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign
country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent
court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners'
stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present
case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court
provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.cralawlibrary

Besides, petitioners' stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to
go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since
our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved
and allowed by the proper court.

G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005

CYNTHIA C. ALABAN, ET AL

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO H. PROVIDO

51 | P a g e

This is a petition for review of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69221,
dismissing petitioners’ petition for annulment of judgment.

On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, docketed as SP Proc.
No. 00-135, for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado
("decedent"), who died on 26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo. Respondent alleged that he was the heir
of the decedent and the executor of her will.

On 30 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North, Dumangas, Iloilo,
rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of
letters testamentary to respondent.6

More than four (4) months later, or on 4 October 2001, herein petitioners filed a motion for the
reopening of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will
of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, claiming that they are
the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over
the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to
the other heirs.

Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have been probated because: (1) the signature of the
decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed
to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent lacked testamentary capacity to execute and
publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under duress and improper pressure; (5) the
decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of her signature; and (6) she did not
know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will properties which no longer belonged
to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to respondent be withdrawn and the
estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.

On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners’ motion for being unmeritorious.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were deemed notified of the hearing
by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of docket fees is not a ground for the outright
dismissal of the petition. It merely required respondent to pay the deficiency.11 Moreover, the RTC’s
Decision was already final and executory even before petitioners’ filing of the motion to reopen.12

Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction with the CA, seeking
the annulment of the RTC’s Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002. They claimed
that after the death of the decedent, petitioners, together with respondent, held several conferences to
discuss the matter of dividing the estate of the decedent, with respondent agreeing to a one-sixth (1/6)
portion as his share. Petitioners allegedly drafted a compromise agreement to implement the division of
52 | P a g e

the estate. Despite receipt of the agreement, respondent refused to sign and return the same.
Petitioners opined that respondent feigned interest in participating in the compromise agreement so
that they would not suspect his intention to secure the probate of the will.14 They claimed that they
learnt of the probate proceedings only in July of 2001, as a result of which they filed their motion to
reopen the proceedings and admit their opposition to the probate of the will only on 4 October 2001.
They argued that the RTC Decision should be annulled and set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.15

In its Resolution16 promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the petition. It found that
there was no showing that petitioners failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.
Moreover, the CA declared as baseless petitioners’ claim that the proceedings in the RTC was attended
by extrinsic fraud. Neither was there any showing that they availed of this ground in a motion for new
trial or petition for relief from judgment in the RTC, the CA added. Petitioners sought reconsideration of
the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER WAS PARTY TO THE PROBATE
PROCEEDINGS.

RULING: NO

The petition is devoid of merit.

However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties
to the probate proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person
interested in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published
for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as
furnished to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has
been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding
publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the
settlement of the estate of the decedent.
53 | P a g e

Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it.40 Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition
for probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of
hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of
motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a
motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening
of the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been
filed out of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.

xxxxxxx

To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of respondent’s deliberate
omission or concealment of their names, ages and residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his
petition for allowance of the will, they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were
denied their day in court. In addition, they claim that respondent’s offer of a false compromise even
before the filing of the petition prevented them from appearing and opposing the petition for probate.

The Court is not convinced.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator.48 A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the
decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no
legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the
same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is
cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural
convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.

The non-inclusion of petitioners’ names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them
of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as
they were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the
probate court.
54 | P a g e

D. Allowance or disallowance of will – Rules 76 & 77

1. Contents of petition for allowance of will
2. Grounds for disallowing a will
3. Reprobate
a. Requisites before a will proved abroad would be allowed in the
Philippines
4. Effects of probate
==========================================================
G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY

vs.

In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,

FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan disallowing the alleged will and
testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament executed in
Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay. The value of the estate left by the
deceased is more than P50,000.

On 14 May 1934 Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of
Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real and personal properties in the Philippines and a
house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T.
Cruz namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and Jose, Jr. and a
child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.

Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No.
4892) and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio Suntay. After the latter's
death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
55 | P a g e

On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for
the probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines
on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will
after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the insufficiency of the evidence to
establish the loss of the said will.

An appeal was taken from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the evidence
before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and remanded the case to the Court of
First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings (63 Phil., 793).

In spite of the fact that a commission from the probate court was issued on 24 April 1937 for the taking
of the deposition of Go Toh, an attesting witness to the will, on 7 February 1938 the probate court
denied a motion for continuance of the hearing sent by cablegram from China by the surviving widow
and dismissed the petition.

In the meantime the Pacific War supervened. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the
files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese characters executed and
signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the
Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate
proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 (Exhibit
B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931 (Exhibit N).

There is no merit in the contention that the petitioner Silvino Suntay and his mother Maria Natividad
Lim Billian are estopped from asking for the probate of the lost will or of the foreign will because of the
transfer or assignment of their share right, title and interest in the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay to
Jose G. Gutierrez and the spouses Ricardo Gutierrez and Victoria Goño and the subsequent assignment
thereof by the assignees to Francisco Pascual and by the latter to Federico C. Suntay, for the validity and
legality of such assignments cannot be threshed out in this proceedings which is concerned only with
the probate of the will and testament executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or of the foreign
will allegedly executed in Amoy on 4 January 1931 and claimed to have been probated in the municipal
district court of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China.

As to prescription, the dismissal of the petition for probate of the will on 7 February 1938 was no bar to
the filing of this petition on 18 June 1947, or before the expiration of ten years.

As to the lost will, section 6, Rule 77, provides:

No will shall be proved as a lost or destroyed will unless the execution and validity of the same be
established, and the will is proved to have been in existence at the time of the death of the testator,
or is shown to have been fraudulently or accidentally destroyed in the lifetime of the testator without
his knowledge, nor unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible
56 | P a g e

witnesses. When a lost will is proved, the provisions thereof must be distinctly stated and certified by
the judge, under the seal of the court, and the certificate must be filed and recorded as other wills are
filed and recorded.

The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness, Anastacio
Teodoro and Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the
time of the hearing of this alternative petition.

In his deposition Go Toh testifies that he was one of the witnesses to the lost will consisting of twenty-
three sheets signed by Jose B. Suntay at the bottom of the will and each and every page thereof in the
presence of Alberto Barretto, Manuel Lopez and himself and underneath the testator's signature the
attesting witnesses signed and each of them signed the attestation clause and each and every page of
the will in the presence of the testator and of the other witnesses (answers to the 31st, 41st, 42nd, 49th,
50th, 55th and 63rd interrogatories, Exhibit D-1), but did not take part in the drafting thereof (answer to
the 11th interrogatory, Id.); that he knew the contents of the will written in Spanish although he knew
very little of that language (answers to the 22nd and 23rd interrogatories and to X-2 cross-interrogatory,
Id.) and all he knows about the contends of the lost will was revealed to him by Jose B. Suntay at the
time it was executed (answers to the 25th interrogatory and to X-4 and X-8 cross-interrogatories, Id.);
that Jose B. Suntay told him that the contents thereof are the same as those of the draft (Exhibit B)
(answers to the 33rd interrogatory and to X-8 cross-interrogatory, Id.) which he saw in the office of
Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when the will was signed (answers to the 69th, 72nd, and 74th
interrogatories, Id); that Alberto Barretto handed the draft and said to Jose B. Suntay: "You had better
see if you want any correction" (answers to the 81st, 82nd and 83rd interrogatories, Id.); that "after
checking Jose B. Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed"
(answers to the 91st interrogatory, and to X-18 cross-interrogatory, Id.); that Mrs. Suntay had the draft
of the will (Exhibit B) translated into Chinese and he read the translation (answers to the 67th
interrogatory, Id.); that he did not read the will and did not compare it (check it up) with the draft
(Exhibit B) (answers to X-6 and X-20 cross-interrogatories, Id.).

Ana Suntay testifies that sometime in September 1934 in the house of her brother Apolonio Suntay she
learned that her father left a will "because of the arrival of my brother Manuel Suntay, who was bringing
along with him certain document and he told us or he was telling us that it was the will of our father
Jose B. Suntay which was taken from Go Toh. ..." (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948); that she
saw her brother Apolonio Suntay read the document in her presence and of Manuel and learned of the
adjudication made in the will by her father of his estate, to wit: one-third to his children, one-third to
Silvino and his mother and the other third to Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose, Jr. (pp. 526-8,
530-1, 542, t. s. n. Id.); that "after Apolonio read that portion, then he turned over the document to
Manuel, and he went away," (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).

On cross-examination, she testifies that she read the part of the will on adjudication to know what was
the share of each heir (pp. 530, 544, t. s. n., Id.) and on redirect she testifies that she saw the signature
of her father, Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.).
57 | P a g e

Anastacio Teodoro testifies that one day in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948),
before the last postponement of the hearing granted by the Court, Go Toh arrived at his law office in the
De los Reyes Building and left an envelope wrapped in red handkerchief [Exhibit C] (p. 32, t. s. n., hearing
of 13 October 1947); that he checked up the signatures on the envelope Exhibit A with those on the will
placed in the envelope (p. 33, t. s. n., Id.); that the will was exactly the same as the draft Exhibit B (pp.
32, 47, 50, t. s. n., Id.).

If the will was snatched after the delivery thereof by Go Toh to Anastacio Teodoro And returned by the
latter to the former because they could not agree on the amount of fees, the former coming to the
latter's office straight from the boat (p. 315, t. s. n., hearing of 19 January 1948) that brought him to the
Philippines from Amoy, and that delivery took place in November 1934 (p. 273, t. s. n., Id.), then the
testimony of Ana Suntay that she saw and heard her brother Apolonio Suntay read the will sometime in
September 1934 (p. 524, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948), must not be true.

Although Ana Suntay would be a good witness because she was testifying against her own interest, still
the fact remains that she did not read the whole will but only the adjudication (pp. 526-8, 530-1, 542, t.
s. n., Id.) and saw only the signature, of her father and of the witnesses Go Toh, Manuel Lopez and
Alberto Barretto (p. 546, t. s. n., Id.). But her testimony on cross-examination that she read the part of
the will on adjudication is inconsistent with her testimony in chief that after Apolonio had read that part
of the will he turned over or handed the document to Manuel who went away (p. 528, t. s. n., Id.).

If it is true that Go Toh saw the draft Exhibit B in the office of Alberto Barretto in November 1929 when
the will was signed, then the part of his testimony that Alberto Barretto handed the draft to Jose B.
Suntay to whom he said: "You had better see if you want any correction" and that "after checking Jose B.
Suntay put the "Exhibit B" in his pocket and had the original signed and executed" cannot be true, for it
was not the time for correcting the draft of the will, because it must have been corrected before and all
corrections and additions written in lead pencil must have been inserted and copied in the final draft of
the will which was signed on that occasion. The bringing in for the draft (Exhibit B) on that occasion is
just to fit it within the framework of the appellant's theory. At any rate, all of Go Toh's testimony by
deposition on the provisions of the alleged lost will is hearsay, because he came to know or he learned
to them from information given him by Jose B. Suntay and from reading the translation of the draft
(Exhibit B) into Chinese.

Much stress is laid upon the testimony of Federico C. Suntay who testifies that he read the supposed will
or the alleged will of his father and that the share of the surviving widow, according to the will, is two-
thirds of the estate (p. 229, t. s. n., hearing of 24 October 1947). But this witness testified to oppose the
appointment of a co-administrator of the estate, for the reason that he had acquired the interest of the
surviving widow not only in the estate of her deceased husband but also in the conjugal property (pp.
58 | P a g e

148, 205, 228, 229, 231, t. s. n., Id.) Whether he read the original will or just the copy thereof (Exhibit B)
is not clear. For him the important point was that he had acquired all the share, participation and
interest of the surviving widow and of the only child by the second marriage in the estate of his
deceased father. Be that as it may, his testimony that under the will the surviving widow would take
two-thirds of the estate of the late Jose B. Suntay is at variance with Exhibit B and the testimony of
Anastacio Teodoro. According to the latter, the third for strict legitime is for the ten children; the third
for betterment is for Silvino, Apolonio, Concepcion and Jose Jr.; and the third for free disposal is for the
surviving widow and her child Silvino.

Hence, granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay placed in the envelope (Exhibit A)
and that it was in existence at the time of, and not revoked before, his death, still the testimony of
Anastacio Teodoro alone falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of the lost will must
be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean
competent witnesses and those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor
credible witnesses.

On the other hand, Alberto Barretto testifies that in the early part of 1929 he prepared or drew up two
mills for Jose B. Suntay at the latter's request, the rough draft of the first will was in his own
handwriting, given to Manuel Lopez for the final draft or typing and returned to him; that after checking
up the final with the rough draft he tore it and returned the final draft to Manuel Lopez; that this draft
was in favor of all the children and the widow (pp. 392-4, 449, t. s. n., hearing of 21 February 1948); that
two months later Jose B. Suntay and Manuel Lopez called on him and the former asked him to draw up
another will favoring more his wife and child Silvino; that he had the rough draft of the second will typed
(pp. 395, 449 t. s. n., Id.) and gave it to Manuel Lopez (p. 396, t. s. n., Id.); that he did not sign as witness
the second will of Jose B. Suntay copied from the typewritten draft [Exhibit B] (p. 420, t. s. n., Id.); that
the handwritten insertions or additions in lead pencil to Exhibit B are not his (pp. 415-7 435-6, 457, t. s.
n., Id.); that the final draft of the first will made up of four or five pages (p. 400, t. s. n., Id.) was signed
and executed, two or three months after Suntay and Lopez had called on him (pp. 397-8, 403, 449, t. s.
n., Id.) in his office at the Cebu Portland Cement in the China Banking Building on Dasmariñas street by
Jose B. Suntay, Manuel Lopez and a Chinaman who had all come from Hagonoy (p. 398, t. s. n., Id.); that
on that occasion they brought an envelope (Exhibit A) where the following words were written:
"Testamento de Jose B. Suntay" (pp. 399, 404, t. s. n., Id.); that after the signing of the will it was placed
inside the envelope (Exhibit A) together with an inventory of the properties of Jose B. Suntay and the
envelope was sealed by the signatures of the testator and the attesting witnesses (pp. 398, 401, 441,
443, 461, t. s. n., Id.); that he again saw the envelope (Exhibit A) in his house one Saturday in the later
part of August 1934, brought by Go Toh and it was then in perfect condition (pp. 405-6, 411, 440-2, t. s.
n., Id.); that on the following Monday Go Toh went to his law office bringing along with him the
envelope (Exhibit A) in the same condition; that he told Go Toh that he would charge P25,000 as fee for
probating the will (pp. 406, 440-2, Id.); that Go Toh did not leave the envelope (Exhibit A) either in his
house or in his law office (p. 407, t. s. n., Id.); that Go Toh said he wanted to keep it and on no occasion
did Go Toh leave it to him (pp. 409, 410, t. s. n., Id.).
59 | P a g e

The testimony of Go Toh taken and heard by Assistant Fiscal F. B. Albert in connection with the
complaint for estafa filed against Manuel Suntay for the alleged snatching of the envelope (Exhibit A),
corroborates the testimony of Alberto Barretto to the effect that only one will was signed by Jose B.
Suntay at his office in which he (Alberto Barretto), Manuel Lopez and Go Toh took part as attesting
witnesses (p. 15, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). Go Toh testified before the same assistant fiscal that he did not leave
the will in the hands of Anastacio Teodoro (p. 26, t. s. n., Exhibit 6). He said, quoting his own words,
"Because I can not give him this envelope even though the contract (on fees) was signed. I have to bring
that document to court or to anywhere else myself." (p. 27, t. s. n., Exhibit 6).

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point
in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed,
filed, and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2 provides:

When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for
allowance in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an
original will presented for allowance.

Section 3 provides:

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it,
and a certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which
shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the
same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law
of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.

The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General
of the Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are
inadmissible, because apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make
60 | P a g e

the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be
admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness.
Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters.

Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the
purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the
municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will.

In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese
law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of
probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony,
and even if it were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject.

xxxxx

It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or
both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside
in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties
residing in the Philippines (pp. 474, 476, 481, 503-4, t. s. n., hearing of 24 February 1948). The
proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened toe or come up to the
standard of such proceedings in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the
proceedings were held at the back of such interested parties.

It does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view
thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with
the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of
wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of
Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a
will and, therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent
court of this country.

The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

[G.R. No. 169144 : January 26, 2011]

61 | P a g e

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS AND
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,

v.

ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although
it has not been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United
States (U.S.) citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California,
she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left
properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.cralawlibrary

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta's will and for his
appointment as special administrator of her estate.[1] On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners
Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta,
opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta's will should not be probated in the Philippines but in
the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta's will could be
probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without
the testator's full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not
qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Ruperta's foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions
in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their
deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their
memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta's U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a
court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:[2] (a) admitting to probate Ruperta's last will; (b) appointing
respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor
designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.cralawlibrary
62 | P a g e

Aggrieved by the RTC's order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA),[3] arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be
probated for the first time in the Philippines.cralawlibrary

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,[4] affirming the assailed order of the RTC,[5] holding that
the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto's submission of the
authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA
pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of
the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case,
said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad.
Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and
Benjamin came to this Court.cralawlibrary

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be
probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country
where it was executed.

RULING: YES

The Court's Ruling

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be
probated and allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim,
ensures prior compliance with the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local
courts can only allow probate of such wills if the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been
admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been admitted to probate there under its
laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on probate procedure in
that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for the valid
execution of a will.cralawlibrary

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have
not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given
legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad
produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the
place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.
63 | P a g e

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance
of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or
legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death
of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in
his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the
petitioner: (a)the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and
devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the
court, the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the
decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.[7] The rules do not require
proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its
execution.cralawlibrary

In insisting that Ruperta's will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will
before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a
foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a
competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to
petitioners' stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to
the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign
probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

Besides, petitioners' stand is fraught with impractically. If the instituted heirs do not have the means to
go abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since
our law requires that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved
and allowed by the proper court.[8]

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can
take cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta's will and that, in the meantime, it was
designating Ernesto as special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of
the due execution of the will, i.e. the testator's state of mind at the time of the execution and
compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of California. This explains the trial court's
directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta's will and the certified copies of
the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.cralawlibrary
64 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV
83564 dated July 29, 2005.cralawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 176831 January 15, 2010

UY KIAO ENG, Petitioner,

vs.

NIXON LEE, Respondent.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
August 23, 2006 Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 91725 and the
February 23, 2007 Resolution,2 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The relevant facts and proceedings follow.

Alleging that his father passed away on June 22, 1992 in Manila and left a holographic will, which is now
in the custody of petitioner Uy Kiao Eng, his mother, respondent Nixon Lee filed, on May 28, 2001, a
petition for mandamus with damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 01100939, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, to compel petitioner (Uy Kiao Eng) to produce the will so that probate
proceedings for the allowance thereof could be instituted.

Allegedly, respondent had already requested his mother to settle and liquidate the patriarch’s estate
and to deliver to the legal heirs their respective inheritance, but petitioner refused to do so without any
justifiable reason.

In her answer with counterclaim, petitioner traversed the allegations in the complaint and posited that
the same be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action, for lack of cause of action, and for non-
compliance with a condition precedent for the filing thereof.

Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to
his siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil
Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City. Petitioner further contended that respondent
65 | P a g e

should have first exerted earnest efforts to amicably settle the controversy with her before he filed the
suit.

The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondent’s evidence, petitioner
demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic
will. Importantly, she asserted that the pieces of documentary evidence presented, aside from being
hearsay, were all immaterial and irrelevant to the issue involved in the petition—they did not prove or
disprove that she unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoined as
a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, for the court to issue the writ of mandamus.

The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. In its February 4, 2005 Order, however, it granted
the same on petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration of this
latter order was denied on September 20, 2005.8 Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Aggrieved, respondent sought review from the appellate court.

On April 26, 2006, the CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of
mandamus would issue only in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to
afford redress.

Under Rule 76, in an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent could ask
for the presentation or production and for the approval or probate of the holographic will. The CA
further ruled that respondent, in the proceedings before the trial court, failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove that his mother had in her custody the original copy of the will.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF MANDAMUS FOR THE PETITIONER TO PRODUCE
THE WILL IS PROPER

RULING: NO

The Court cannot sustain the CA’s issuance of the writ.

In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved here—
the production of the original holographic will—is in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that
the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a
photocopy of the will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The
Rules of Court, however, does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance
of the will whether the same is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:
66 | P a g e

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will.—Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a
will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the testator,
petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession
or not, or is lost or destroyed.

An adequate remedy is further provided by Rule 75, Sections 2 to 5, for the production of the original
holographic will. Thus—

SEC. 2. Custodian of will to deliver.—The person who has custody of a will shall, within twenty (20)
days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court having jurisdiction, or to
the executor named in the will.

SEC. 3. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust.—A person named as executor in a will shall
within twenty (20) days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within twenty (20) days after he
knows that he is named executor if he obtained such knowledge after the death of the testator,
present such will to the court having jurisdiction, unless the will has reached the court in any other
manner, and shall, within such period, signify to the court in writing his acceptance of the trust or his
refusal to accept it.

SEC. 4. Custodian and executor subject to fine for neglect.—A person who neglects any of the duties
required in the two last preceding sections without excuse satisfactory to the court shall be fined not
exceeding two thousand pesos.

SEC. 5. Person retaining will may be committed.—A person having custody of a will after the death of
the testator who neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same, when ordered so to do, to the
court having jurisdiction, may be committed to prison and there kept until he delivers the will.30

There being a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the production of
the subject will, the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of. Suffice it to state that respondent Lee
lacks a cause of action in his petition. Thus, the Court grants the demurrer.

Rule 77

E. Letters testamentary and of administration – Rules 78 – 85

1. When and to whom letters of administration granted – Rule 78

67 | P a g e

G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.

FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS, Respondents.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in
Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents
Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and
testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos to have been duly
executed in accordance with law, the same is hereby ALLOWED AND ADMITTED TO PROBATE.

Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued in solidum to
Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II, named executors therein.

Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of
Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.

Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons having
an interest in the estate for them to lay their claim against the Estate or forever hold their peace.

SO ORDERED.”
68 | P a g e

On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters testamentary to
respondents.

On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.

On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a
bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took his
oath as named executor of the will on January 30, 1996.

On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-
Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as Special
Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.

On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of
Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.

On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by
petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos

On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of
the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to
respondents.

On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision, dismissing the referred petition for having taken the
wrong mode of appeal, the pertinent portions of which reads:

Consequently, for having taken the wrong mode of appeal, the present petition should be dismissed in
accordance with the same Supreme Court Circular 2-90

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:
69 | P a g e

II.

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENTS IMELDA R.
MARCOS AND FERDINAND R. MARCOS II SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED TO ACT AND SERVE AS
EXECUTORS.

RULING: NO

The petition is without merit.

The courts have always respected the right to which a testator enjoys to determine who is most suitable
to settle his testamentary affairs, and his solemn selection should not lightly be disregarded. After the
admission of a will to probate, the courts will not name a better executor for the testator nor disqualify,
by a judicial veto, the widow or friend or other person selected in the will, except upon strict proof of
the statutory grounds of incompetency. Matter of Leland's Will, 219 N.Y. 387, 393, 114 N.E. 854. x x x29

Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as executors, to wit:

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No person is competent to

serve as executor or administrator who:

xxxx

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to
respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a
number of cases and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with
questionable integrity.
70 | P a g e

The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following findings:

However, except for petitioner Republic’s allegation of want of integrity on the part of Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will and testament,
so as to render them "incompetent" to serve as executors, the Court sees at this time, no evidence on
record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)

Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the
action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an executor or administrator unless
positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty
and discretion to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor. The
sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities
are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable
to or in disregard of the rules of orders of the court.

Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must evaluate the evidence presented or
alleged by petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification. However, after a painstaking review
of the records and evidence on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed no error or gross abuse
of discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation.

Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have
already been reversed by this Court. Her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 was reversed by this
Court in Dans, Jr. v. People. Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17450 was reversed by this
Court in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan.35 Hence, the so-called "convictions" against respondent Imelda
Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.

On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four charges for
violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section 50
(non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC).

It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569,36 the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos
II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the four charges
for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to
pay a fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner, said
decision is still pending appeal.
71 | P a g e

Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to four violations
of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an
executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his conviction is
later on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the "failure to file an income tax
return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude.

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, acting as a probate court in Special Proceeding No.
10279, is hereby ORDERED to issue letters testamentary, in solidum, to Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and
Ferdinand Marcos II.

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.

LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and Resolution regarding
the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

72 | P a g e

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering
that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person
qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In
support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its
findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio
Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further
that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that
petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may
have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-
interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedent’s
properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the
matter.
73 | P a g e

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision, ruling that litis pendencia does not
apply in this case.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules
requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person,
for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered,
could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in
derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS AN INTERESTED PARTY IN THE ESTATE OF ORLANDO.

RULING:

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC
in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol
still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the
marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an
interested party in the estate of Orlando.

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there
is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the
fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
74 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18
October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

2. Order of preference – Rule 78

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, ET AL

vs.

HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON

In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797 promulgated on August 23, 1991, respondent Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioners assailing the orders of the lower court in
Special Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively sustained the appointment of private
respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator of the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.

FACTS:

On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, private respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, a petition for letters of administration alleging,
among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully
capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. Private respondent mentioned eight (8)
of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the decedent.

On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order setting the hearing of the petition on June 29, 1988,
on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted.
75 | P a g e

The court further directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general
circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed despite such
publication of the notice of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing private respondent as
administrator of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. 4

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of the decedent was
published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private respondent,
filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the
decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had
an interest in said estate.

On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and
Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which incident
was set for hearing on January 16, 1989.

On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed
Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration
issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as
the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein
petitioners.

After some exchanges and on order of the court, petitioners filed an "Opposition to the Petition and
Motion," dated May 20, 1989, alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the
petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be
preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse interest
against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and (4) most of the properties of
the decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and should
not be included in the value of the estate sought to be administered by private respondent.

On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners on
the ground that they had not shown any circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in
that (1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a legitimate
daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who was appointed
administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his
appointment inadvisable under these circumstances. The motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated December 22, 1989.
76 | P a g e

In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that under Section 6, Rule 78 of
the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the
appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving
spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over private respondent
who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant. Aida Valencia.

Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed.
As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda
Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate
son.

Thirdly, it is contended that the non-observance or violation per se of the order of preference already
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion in not following the order of preference because the same is not absolute and the choice of
who to appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FOLLOWING THE ORDER OF PREFERENCE TO
WHOM LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION BE GRANTED.

RULING: NO

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or
the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
77 | P a g e

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select. (Emphases ours.)

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of
letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors,
and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of
discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without
any valid and sufficient reason therefor.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same
consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in
the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that
those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on
the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest
interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.

This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference
of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed
to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. Under the law, the widow would
have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her
share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.

On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has
every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who
has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.

Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed
administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days
from the death of her husband, as required under the rules.

It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next
of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration
for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is
not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must
be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration.
78 | P a g e

In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from
appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is
not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening
sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the
permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative,
"may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors."

On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as
administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests,
to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said
judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error . Administrators
have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to
protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific
causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator,
it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be
evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of
the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of
the administrator. In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there
being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of
private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims,
caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise
its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply
therefor within a given time.

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the
estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is
both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that
letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of

kin.

In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there is only one
administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an
executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may
administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both
the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and
which may further be expected from private respondent for the same estate.
79 | P a g e

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been
upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have
different interests represented; (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions
be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased;

(3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to have all
interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the
estate; and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another
competent person associated with him in the office.

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a
co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private
respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to have
the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented,
especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and
illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested
persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and
supervision of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of
the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the
appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special Proceeding No. 88-4458
of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila.

====================================================================================

[G.R. No. 109979. March 11, 1999.]

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,

v.

COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL SEVENTH DIVISION, HON. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Makati, Branch 57 and EDGARDO S. SILVERIO, Respondents.

On October 7, 1987, Beatriz Silverio died without leaving any will in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, she was survived by the legal heirs (husband and 5 children.
80 | P a g e

On November 12, 1990 or more than three (3) years from the death of the deceased, Edgardo Silverio
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with Branch 57, of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City.
On November 28, 1990, he filed an Urgent Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator, alleging
that during her marriage with Ricardo Silverio, the deceased acquired real and personal properties in the
Philippines and outside the country, the character, identity and aggregate value of which are still
undetermined and not known to petitioner except the personal properties estimated to be worth
P1,000,000.00; that during the lifetime of the late Beatriz Silverio, the surviving spouse has not made
any settlement, judicial or extrajudicial, of the properties of the deceased; that their surviving son,
Ricardo Silverio, Jr., has taken control and management of the properties left by the deceased for his
own benefit and advantage; that petitioner, one of the legal heirs of the deceased, is competent and
willing to act as administrator.

On December 17, 1990, respondent Judge Francisco X. Velez of Branch 57, Regional Trial Court, Makati
City, issued the following Order appointing Edgardo Silverio as Special Administrator

On January 24, 1991, Ricardo Silverio, Sr. interposed his Opposition to the Petition for Letters of
Administration.

On October 29, 1991, the respondent judge appointed the private respondent as regular administrator
in an Order stating:

"WHEREFORE, EDGARDO SILVERIO is hereby appointed as regular ADMINISTRATOR of the Intestate

Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio to serve with a P200,000.00 bond. He is hereby required to take
possession and management of all the real and personal estate of the deceased and shall return to this
Court a true inventory and appraisal of all the properties of the deceased which shall come into his
possession and knowledge within three (3) months from date thereof."

On September 23, 1992, Ricardo C. Silverio Sr. filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, Prohibition and/or Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA
GR SP No. 29038, seeking to annul and set aside the orders of the respondent judge

On January 20, 1993, the respondent court dismissed for lack of merit the petition for certiorari,
pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 6 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals, ratiocinating

That there is no showing that said respondent has acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
lack or in excess of jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 11-9146. When respondent filed the said civil case, he
81 | P a g e

had been appointed as special administrator by respondent Judge Velez of Branch 57 of the same court
in Sp. Proc M-2629 . . .

Secondly, petitioner is estopped by laches from questioning the validity of the Order December 17, 1990
appointing private respondent as special administrator considering that he participated in the
subsequent proceedings without assailing said order in due time.

The rule is clear and unequivocal. It does not provide that the surviving spouse takes precedence
exclusive of and over all other heirs of the deceased in the appointment of the administrator . . ."

Lastly, . . . If at all an error is committed by respondent Judge Velez, it is an error of judgment that is
correctable only by appeal.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition for review on certiorari,
contending that:

ISSUE:

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION THAT SECTION 6, RULE 78 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR AN ORDER OF PREFERENCE IN THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATOR.

RULING: NO

Anent the issue concerning the interpretation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, we are
of the view, and so hold, that the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends
on the attendant facts and circumstances. In the case under consideration, the appointment of
Edgardo S. Silverio as administrator is proper.

Although in the case of Intestate Estate of the deceased Geronima Uy Coque. Juan Navas L. Sioca v. Jose
Garcia, 44 Phil 711[1923], this Court held that:
82 | P a g e

"A probate court cannot arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person enjoying such preferential rights is
unsuitable the court may appoint another person."

In the same case, the court disregarded the order of preference ratiocinating, thus:

. . . "The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great extent,
in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not
be interfered with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error."

. . . "Unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.." . .

"The appointment of a special administrator in a probate case lies in the sound discretion of the court,
and he may be removed without reference to section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure." (De Gala v.
Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil 104 [1929])

RULING:

We discern no ground to disregard the finding of the respondent judge and the respondent court on
the competence of the decedent’s son, Edgardo S. Silverio, to act as administrator. His appointment as
special, and later, as the regular administrator is sanctioned by law.

3. Opposition to issuance of letters testamentary; simultaneous filing

of petition for administration – Rule 79

G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 August 4, 2009

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

vs.
83 | P a g e

FERDINAND R. MARCOS II and IMELDA R. MARCOS

The facts of the case are as follows:

On January 11, 1996, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City Branch 156, acting as a probate court, in
Special Proceeding No. 10279, issued an Order granting letters testamentary in solidum to respondents
Ferdinand R. Marcos II and Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos as executors of the last will and
testament of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos.

The dispositive portion of the January 11, 1996 Order reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the Last Will and Testament of Ferdinand Edralin Marcos to have been duly
executed in accordance with law, the same is hereby ALLOWED AND ADMITTED TO PROBATE.

Upon the filing of a bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00, let letters testamentary be issued in solidum to
Imelda Trinidad Romualdez-Marcos AND Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos II, named executors therein.

Pending the filing of said bond and their oath, Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue is hereby authorized to continue her functions as Special Administrator of the Estate of
Ferdinand Edralin Marcos.

Let NOTICE be given to all known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any other persons having
an interest in the estate for them to lay their claim against the Estate or forever hold their peace.

On January 15, 1996, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration in so far as the January 11, 1996 RTC Order granted letters testamentary to
respondents. On the other hand, respondent Imelda Marcos filed her own motion for reconsideration
on the ground that the will is lost and that petitioner has not proven its existence and validity.

On February 5, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Compliance stating that he already filed a
bond in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as directed by the January 11, 1996 RTC Order and that he took his
oath as named executor of the will on January 30, 1996.
84 | P a g e

On March 13, 1996, the RTC issued Letters of Administration to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-
Chato in accordance with an earlier Order dated September 9, 1994, appointing her as Special
Administratrix of the Marcos Estate.

On April 1, 1996, respondent Ferdinand Marcos II filed a Motion to Revoke the Letters of
Administration issued by the RTC to BIR Commissioner Vinzons-Chato.

On April 26, 1996, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion for partial reconsideration filed by
petitioner as well as the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent Imelda Marcos, the penultimate
portion of which reads:

Under the Rules, a decedent’s testamentary privilege must be accorded utmost respect. Guided by this
legal precept, therefore, in resolving the two (2) motions at hand, the Court is constrained to DENY both.

Examining the arguments poised by the movants, the Court observed that these are but a mere rehash
of issues already raised and passed upon by the Court.

On June 6, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Ruled 45 of
the Rules of Court, questioning the aforementioned RTC Orders granting letters testamentary to
respondents.

On March 13, 1997, the CA issued a Decision,11 dismissing the referred petition for having taken the
wrong mode of appeaL

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,13 which was, however denied by the CA in a Resolution14
dated August 27, 1997.

Hence, herein petition, with petitioner raising the following assignment of errors, to wit:

ISSUE:
85 | P a g e

THE PROBATE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT RESPONDENTS IMELDA R.
MARCOS AND FERDINAND R. MARCOS II SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED TO ACT AND SERVE AS
EXECUTORS.

RULING: YES

XXXXX

Section 1(c), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court defines who are incompetent to serve as executors, to wit:

Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No person is competent to

serve as executor or administrator who:

xxxx

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude. (Emphasis Supplied)

In the case at bar, petitioner anchored its opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to
respondents, specifically on the following grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense
involving moral turpitude. Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of
cases and, hence, should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with questionable
integrity.

The RTC, however, in its January 11, 1996 Order, made the following findings:

However, except for petitioner Republic’s allegation of want of integrity on the part of Imelda Trinidad
Romualdez-Marcos and Ferdinand Romualdez Marco II, named executors in the last will and testament,
so as to render them "incompetent" to serve as executors, the Court sees at this time, no evidence on
record, oral or documentary, to substantiate and support the said allegation. (Emphasis Supplied)

Based on the foregoing, this Court stresses that an appellate court is disinclined to interfere with the
action taken by the probate court in the matter of removal of an executor or administrator unless
positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. The Rules of Court gives the lower court the duty
and discretion to determine whether in its opinion an individual is unfit to serve as an executor. The
86 | P a g e

sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by the said court, whose sensibilities
are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable
to or in disregard of the rules of orders of the court.33

Hence, in order to reverse the findings of the RTC, this Court must evaluate the evidence presented or
alleged by petitioner in support of its petition for disqualification. However, after a painstaking review of
the records and evidence on hand, this Court finds that the RTC committed no error or gross abuse of
discretion when it ruled that petitioner failed to substantiate its allegation.

Petitioner conveniently omits to state that the two cases against respondent Imelda Marcos have
already been reversed by this Court. Her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17453 was reversed by this
Court in Dans, Jr. v. People.34 Likewise, her conviction in Criminal Case No. 17450 was reversed by this
Court in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan.35 Hence, the so-called "convictions" against respondent Imelda
Marcos cannot serve as a ground for her disqualification to serve as an executor.

On the other hand, the eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II involve four charges for
violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section 50
(non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (NIRC).

It is a matter of record, that in CA-G.R. CR No. 18569,36 the CA acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos
II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and sustained his conviction for all the four charges
for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to
pay a fine for his failure to file his income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner,37 said
decision is still pending appeal.

Therefore, since respondent Ferdinand Marcos II has appealed his conviction relating to four violations
of Section 45 of the NIRC, the same should not serve as a basis to disqualify him to be appointed as an
executor of the will of his father. More importantly, even assuming arguendo that his conviction is later
on affirmed, the same is still insufficient to disqualify him as the "failure to file an income tax return" is
not a crime involving moral turpitude.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 13, 1997 Decision and August 27, 1997 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43450 are hereby AFFIRMED.

The Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156, acting as a probate court in Special Proceeding No.
10279, is hereby ORDERED to issue letters testamentary, in solidum, to Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and
Ferdinand Marcos
87 | P a g e

==================================================================================

G.R. No. L-23372 June 14, 1967

IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN. CIPRIANO DURAN and MIGUEL DURAN,
petitioners-appellants,

vs.

JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor and appellee.

Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in Guinobatan, Albay. Among his alleged heirs
are Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces.

Subsequent to his death, on June 2, 1962, Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a
public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of
Josefina Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00.

A year later, on June 8, 1963, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition for
intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator.
An ex parte motion to be appointed special administrator was also filed by him.

Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed on August 9, 1963 an opposition, praying for its dismissal
upon the ground that the petitioner is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view of the deed of
transfer and renunciation the estate, in view of afore-stated, attaching a copy of the same; in the
alternative, she asked to be appointed administratrix.

Replying to this, Cipriano alleged, on September 11, 1963, alleged in his opposition to the motion to
dismiss, that Josefina Duran was not the decedent's wife. Anent the deed of assignment, he contended
that the same was procured thru fraud, with gross inadequacy of price and vitiated by lesion.

Still later, another brother of the decedent, Miguel Duran, filed on September 14, 1963, a petition to be
joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina Duran moved to strike out said petition as an improper
attempt to intervene in the case. She also filed a reply to Cipriano's opposition to her motion to dismiss.
In turn, Miguel filed an opposition to Josefina's motion to strike out.
88 | P a g e

Acting on said motions, on June 3, 1964, the Court of First Instance issued an order dismissing the
petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate. Said lack of interest was premised on the deed
of transfer executed by Cipriano, regarding which the court declared itself without power to examine in
said proceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would render it
rescissible or voidable. And with the petition's dismissal, Miguel's petition to be joined as co-petitioner
was deemed without leg to stand on.

Appeal to Us directly, on questions of law, was taken by Cipriano and Miguel Duran.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT CIPRIANO AND MIGUEL DURAN
ARE DISQUALIFIED TO ADMINISTER AND SETTLE THE ESTATE.

RULING: YES

In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was pending.
The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court.
Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the
same does not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is
valid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are
not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only
(Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud,
lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that
purpose.

And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of
assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is left
without that "interest" in the estate required to petite for settlement proceedings.

Anent appellant Miguel Duran, he sought in his petition below to "join petitioner Cipriano Duran as co-
petitioner in the latter's petition . . . and incorporates herein by adoption all the allegations made in said
petition." (Record on Appeal, pp. 45-46). The same, therefore, amounted to a petition to intervene in
the settlement proceedings. As aptly ruled by the court a quo, since there was really no settlement
proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be denied.

Finally, although Josefina Duran prayed to be appointed administratrix, her doing so did not amount to
ratification of the petition for settlement under the ruling in Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, since she
did so merely by way of an alternative prayer, should her motion to dismiss fail. And said motion to
dismiss was properly sustained.
89 | P a g e

Wherefore, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

4. Powers and duties of executors and administrators; restrictions on

the powers – Rules 81, 83-85

G.R. No. L-46249 October 18, 1939

Intestate Estate of Rafael Jocson deceased.

CONCEPTION JOCSON DE HILADO,

vs.

JESUS R. NAVA

On February 8, 1935, the administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the deceased Rafael Jocson,
executed in favor of appellant Jesus R. Nava a contract of lease period of five crop years, over certain
properties of the estate, at a stipulated rental of P1,000 a year. The contract was entered into without
the intervention of the court acting in the intestate proceedings.

On July 23, 1936, appellee herein, Conception Jocson de Hillado, filed a motion in said proceedings,
praying that the administratix be required to explain certain details in the matter of said lease; and in
reply to the answer filed by said administratrix to lease the lands compromised in the contract to the
highest bidder at public auction. Jesus R. Nava, the lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set
aside, it having been issued without jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and he appealed.

The controlling issue here raised is whether or not the lower court has the power to annul, in the
intestate proceedings, a contract of lease executed by the administratrix without its intervention.
Appellant maintains that it has no such power, and that the contract can only be annulled in a separate,
independent proceeding.

ISSUE: whether or not the lower court has the power to annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract
of lease executed by the administratrix without its intervention.

RULING: NO
90 | P a g e

The contract here in question being a mere act of administration, could validy be entered into by the
administratrix within her powers of administration, even without the court's previous authority. And
the court had no power to annul or invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had
no jurisdiction over the person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary to that effect. In
Gamboa vs. Gamboa (G.R. No. 45121), we held:

"We believe that the Lower Court manifestly erred in declaring in these tutela proceedings without
having promoted a separate cause, that the lease in question is null and void due to lack of judicial
approval. Contracts are presumed valid as long as it is not declared that they are not; and this can only
be done through the exercise of an ordinary action in a separate cause, which is that the question must
be determined, because Chapter XXVII of Law No. 190 that speaks of Guardianships does not confer to
resolve it. What was resolved in the cases of Guzman v. Anog and another, 35 Jur. Phil., 66; Alafriz v.
Mina, 28 Jur. Phil., 142; Llacer vs. Muñoz, 12 Jur. Phil., 336; and do against Wislizenus, 42 Jur. fil., 928,
are by their close analogy to the present case, of much and opportune application to it.

In Ferraris vs. Rhodes, G.R. No. 46021, we observed:

It is not disputed that the lease of the perticipation of this testamentary in the Talaban estate in favor of
Mamerto Ferraris made by the administrator is legal, and it is, in fact, since, being the lease an act of
mere sola, to celebrate that contract with Mamerto Ferraris. If this is so, even without considering
whether the Court had no jurisdiction to issue the disputed order, it is clear that, if it had it, abuse of it
to act against the legal effects of the lease validly and legitimately concluded by the administrator with
Mamerto Ferraris, without said lease having been previously declared null and void by the
corresponding procedures.

Order is accordingly reversed, with costs againts appellee.

G.R. No. L-2166 August 30, 1949

ESTRELLA LEDESMA, petitioner,

vs.

EDUARDO ENRIQUEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, respondent.
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This is a case of prohibition instituted by Estrella Ledesma, administratrix in estate proceedings No.
1362 in the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, against Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez, presiding
over the third branch of said court.

The facts which may be gathered from the petition and from the answer and annexes attached thereto
of the respondent, may be briefly stated as follows:

This case No. 1362 aforementioned refers to the testate estate of the deceased Marcelo Ledesma and
involves properties presumably situated in the Province of Occidental Negros. The petitioner Estrella
appears to be one of the heirs of the deceased Marcelo Ledesma. She is now residing in the city.

In February, 1948, Jose Cosgayon y Ledesma, another heir, filed in said case No. 1362 a petition alleging
that the administratrix Estrella is a permanent resident of Manila; that the properties included in the
testate estate are abandoned; that the produce, rentals, and income of the estate are in the hands of
the tenants and the supposed lessees of the properties; that unless a co-administrator is appointed, the
estate and all its assets including its income are liable to be lost to the detriment of the heirs and other
interested to protect his right and those of the heirs, specially his brother and sisters; and that an order
be issued requiring petitioner Estrella to render an accounting of her administration.

Acting upon this petition Judge Francisco Arellano, presiding over the first branch of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, issued an order dated February 16, 1948, denying the petition for
appointment of a co-administrator on the ground that as long as the administration of the properties
of a deceased person is in the hands of an administrator duly qualified and acting as such, it is
improper to appoint another administrator. The order however, states that since it is alleged that the
administratrix Estrella Ledesma had not filed any inventory or annual report of her administration since
she was appointed 25 years ago, and since she resides permanently in Manila and that all these were
prejudicial to the heirs, he cited Estrella Ledesma to appear before the court on March 6, 1948, at 8:30
a. m., and show cause, if any, why she should not be punished for contempt of court in view of the
alleged abandonment of her administration and in not having made the corresponding inventory of
the properties under her administration, including her annual reports.

On March 4, 1948, Estrella sent the following telegram from Manila to the Court of Negros Occidental:

RE ORDER NO. 1362 ORDER JUST RECEIVED PLEASE POSTPONE REARING FOR 30 DAYS INDISPOSED WILL
FILE WRITTEN REPLY.

On the basis of this telegram Judge Francisco Arellano of said court granted the same and he set the
hearing of the incident (la vista de este incidente) for April 3, 1948, at 8:30 a. m., warning the
administratrix that she must appear personally on that date.
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On April 1, 1948, Estrella again sent the following telegram to the same court:

PLEASE GIVE ANOTHER EXTENSION STILL INDISPOSED AND FINANCIALLY DISABLED.

Acting upon this telegram, Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez, the respondent herein, presiding over the third
branch of said court, issued an ordered dated April 3, 1948 which reads as follows:

No encontrando justificada la peticion de la administradora formulada mediante telegrama de fecha 1.0

de Abril de 1948, pidiendo extension de plazo para su comparencia;

Por el presents, se ordena su arresto.

The corresponding warrant of arrest was issued and was served on the petitioner Estrella in Manila on
April 20, 1948.

On April 22, 1948, the petitioner-administratrix through her counsel filed in this Court the present
petition for prohibition alleging that the warrant of arrest issued against her was illegal and unjust
and constituted a grave abuse of discretion and that as a result thereof, she was arrested and
confinement for an indefinite period of time; that her confinement was causing her great prejudice,
annoyance and degradation, and that she had no other adequate remedy nor could she appeal from the
order ordering her arrest. She now asks this Court to set aside the said warrant of arrest; that pending
consideration of her petition "an order be issued to the respondent judge to refrain him from further
execution of said order of arrest and that herein petitioner be released from confinement."

On April 24, 1948, petitioner's counsel filed a petition to permit the herein petitioner to file a bond in
an amount to be fixed by this Court in order that herein petitioner "will have more facilities to comply
with all what the Hon. Court is requiring her to submit," and within a period of 30 days, the herein
petitioner is willing to appear before the said court and submit her account.

On April 30, 1948, this Court by resolution gave due course to the petition for prohibition and required
the respondent to answer the same within 5 days from receipt of a copy of the resolution, at the same
time ordering the provisional release of the petitioner upon her filing a bond in the sum of P200.
Petitioner's counsel as well as the respondent were notified by telegram on the same date of that part
of the resolution regarding the provisional release of the petitioner.

On May 3, 1948, the petitioner filed the corresponding bail bond and she was forthwith released.
93 | P a g e

On May 22, 1948, the answer of the respondent was received. In said answer Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez
claims among other things, that the petitioner never complied with her promise to file a reply, contained
in her telegram of March 4, 1948; that her petition for another extension contained in her second
telegram of April 1, 1948, was not supported either by an oath or a medical certificate; that he
(respondent) regarded the alleged indisposition of the petitioner stated in her two telegrams as ground
for the postponement of her appearance as a mere subterfuge to frustrate the orders of the court and
to place obstacles in the orderly administration of justice, seeking thereby to convert said orders into
mere scraps of paper to the detriment of the dignity of the courts of justice, and that the issuance by the
respondent of the order of arrest was done in a regular manner and in the ordinary exercise of the
inherent powers of courts of justice to enforce their orders and legal processes.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE WARRANT OF ARREST OF PETITIONER WAS
WARRANTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

RULING: YES

After a careful consideration of this case, we are satisfied that the respondent was warranted in issuing
his order of April 3, 1948, ordering the arrest of the petitioner herein. Said order was issued not to
harass the petitioner but to enforce the order of the court requiring her appearance in court to show
cause why she should not be punished for contempt of court for her failure to comply with her duties
as administratrix in the testate proceedings. Said court was perfectly justified in issuing that order for
her appearance if as made to appear before us, since her appointment as administratrix about 25 years
ago, to the prejudice of the heirs and to the detriment of the properties under administration, she had
really abandoned her administration, had come to live permanently in Manila and had not filed any
annual report, not even an inventory of the properties she was supposed to be administering. And, this
requirement for her to appear and render an accounting of her administration was not done by the
court on its own initiative although it could have done so but upon a petition of one of the heirs said to
be prejudiced by petitioner's abandonment of her administration.

No one may be compelled to act as administrator in any proceedings. The petitioner herein was under
no obligation to be administratrix in said proceedings No. 1362. If she found her permanent residence in
Manila incompatible with her duties to administer properties situated in Negros Occidental, she was
perfectly justified in refusing the administration. But as long as she accepted the appointment of
administratrix, qualified as such, and led the court and the heirs to believe that she would perform her
duties as such and protect and serve the interest of said heirs and other interested parties, she was
bound to comply with her duties. If later on she found it difficult of impossible to continue with her
administration, at least she should have filed an inventory of the properties she had administered and
render an accounting of her administration, particularly of the produce, fruits and income of the
properties under administration, and then ask the court that she be relieved of her duties. This, she
apparently had not done. For this reason as already stated, the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental was justified in requiring her to appear.
94 | P a g e

FALLO:

In view of the foregoing, the present petition is hereby denied, without any pronouncement as to costs.
The petitioner is ordered within ten days after notification of this decision, to appear before the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental as she was originally required to do to be dealt with by that court.
Should she fail to do so, that court is authorized to confiscate the bail bond filed by her under authority
of this Court, and take such other measure it may deem just and proper.

G.R. No. L-9686 May 30, 1961

FELICISIMO C. JOSON, administrator-appellee,

vs.

EDUARDO JOSON, ET AL., heirs-appellants.

FACTS:

Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Quezon, Nueva Ecija leaving behind heirs and properties. He
married three times and was survived by nine (9) heirs: two (2) children and grandchildren by his first
wife Eufemia de la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his second wife Pomposa Miguel and his third wife and
surviving widow Dominga M. Joson.

Upon his death, his will was presented to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija by his son
Felicisimo Joson for probate.

In August, 1945, said will having been duly probated, Felicisimo Joson was appointed administrator of
the estate and, accordingly, he filed an inventory of the properties left by the deceased.

On April 15, 1948, the administrator filed his first account for the year 1945-1946. This was ordered by
the court to be examined by the clerk of court but the same has never been approved.

On July 19, 1948, he filed his second account for the year 1946-1947 which was also referred to the clerk
of court for examination. The same has never been also approved by the court.

On November 11, 1948, the administrator filed another account for the year 1947-1948 and, upon
motion of the heirs, he was ordered to file an accounting covering the properties under his
administration.

On September 7, 1954, Eduardo Joson, one of the heirs, filed an opposition to all the accounts filed by
the administrator where he alleged that the administrator diminished the shares of the heirs in the
yearly produce of the properties and had padded his expenses of administration, and on September 29,
95 | P a g e

1954, the same heir filed another motion praying the court to order the administrator to post a bond in
the amount of P50,000.00 For the reason that from the accounts represented by him to be the true
income of the estate from 1947 to 1953 there was a big difference of P132,600.00 which the
administrator should account for to the heirs.

On October 14, 1954, the administrator submitted an amended statement of accounts for the same
years which were objected by two more heirs on the ground that the administrator had reported for the
years 1947-1952 an income short of what was actually received and expenses much bigger than those
actually incurred by him.

In the meantime, or on December 30, 1952, the heirs were able to compromise their differences and
entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition of the entire estate under the provisions of
Section 1, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court which provides for the settlement of the estate without court
intervention. This settlement was contained in two documents executed on the same date wherein they
manifested that they are entering into it because of their desire to put an end to the judicial proceeding
and administration. But, as the court was never informed of this extrajudicial settlement either by the
administrator or by the heirs, it issued on May 19, 1954 an order requiring the administrator to file an
accounting of his administration from 1949 to 1954, which accordingly the administrator complied with
by submitting an amended statement of his accounts as already mentioned above.

However, on November 25, 1954, without said accounts having been heard or approved, the
administrator filed a motion to declare the proceedings closed and terminated and to relieve him of
his duties as such, which motion was amended by him on January 15, 1955. Heir Eduardo Joson filed an
opposition to said motion but, after hearing, the court issued an order declaring the proceedings
terminated and relieving the administrator not only of his duties as such but also of his accounts
notwithstanding the heirs' opposition to said accounts. Hence this appeal:

In granting the motion of the administrator to declare the proceedings closed and terminated and
relieving him of his duties and of his accounts, the trial court made the following pronouncement:

. . . It is claimed by the oppositor that the estate cannot be declared closed and terminated for the
reason that some of the accounts submitted by the administrator for the years 1945 to 1948 have not
been approved. The Court does not find any logic in this contention. The heirs knew on December 30,
1952, when they entered into an extra-judicial settlement of the estate, the existence of those accounts,
but nothing is mentioned in the said extra-judicial settlement regarding the same. They are, therefore,
presumed to have approved these accounts and have their opposition thereto. There is, therefore, no
reason to suspend the closing of this proceeding and make the same depend upon the approval of
these old accounts. To do so would be like making the accessory more important than the principal.
There is no doubt that the report of the administrator of his administration is a mere incident in this
proceeding to wind up the estate of the deceased. If the parties concerned have already entered into an
96 | P a g e

extra-judicial settlement of the estate, the same should put an end to this proceeding. Once this
proceeding is terminated, the incidents thereto must yield, since the only purpose of submitting a report
of the accounts by the administrator is to facilitate the liquidation. The administration of an estate
cannot be an end but only a means of settlement of the estate. It, therefore, becomes unnecessary and
a mere waste of time to call the administrator to account for, or to report on, his administration from
the moment that the heirs have already entered into an extra-judicial settlement. To do so, would
amount to a modification of the extra-judicial settlement which is the law between the parties, which
include the oppositors herein.

ISSUE

(1) Is the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his administration a mere incident which
can be avoided once the estate has been settled?;

(2) Are the proceedings deemed terminated by the mere execution of an extrajudicial partition of the
estate without the necessity of having the accounts of the administrator heard and approved by the
court?; and

(3) Is the administrator ipso facto relieved of his duty of proving his account from the moment said
partition has been executed?

Appellants answer these questions in the negative with the argument that if the contrary is to be upheld
as was done by the trial court the same would be contrary to the express provisions of our rules relative
to the duties of a judicial administrator. Hence, they argue, the trial court committed an error in closing
the estate in disregard of the accounts submitted by the administrator.

RULING:

We find merit in this contention. To begin with, Section 1 of Rule 86 categorically charges an
administrator "with the whole of the estate of the deceased which has come into his possession at the
value of appraisement contained in the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and income of such an
estate; and with the proceeds of so much of the estate as is hold by him, at the price at which sold."

Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the duty to render an account of his administration within
one year from his appointment, unless the court otherwise directs, as well as to render such further
accounts as the court may require until the estate is fully settled. Section 10 likewise provides that
before an account of the administrator is allowed notice shall be given to all persons interested of the
time and place of examining and allowing the same. And finally Section 9 expressly directs that the court
shall examine the administrator upon oath with respect to every matter relating to his account except
when no objection is made to the allowance of the account and its correctness is satisfactorily
established by competent testimony.

It thus appears that the duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere incident of an
administration proceeding which ran be waived or disregarded when the same is terminated, but that
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it is a duty that has to be performed and duly acted upon by the court before the administration is
finally ordered closed and terminated. Here the administrator has submitted his accounts for several
years not only motu proprio but upon requirement of the court, to which accounts the heirs have
seasonably submitted their opposition. And when the administrator moved the court to close the
proceedings and relieve him of his administration and of his accounts, the heirs who objected thereto
objected likewise to the closing of the proceedings invoking their right to be heard but the court ignored
their opposition and granted the motion setting forth as reasons therefor what we quoted in the early
part of this decision. Verily, the trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so it disregarded
the express provisions of our rules relative to the settlement of accounts of a judicial administrator.

The fact that all the heirs of the estate have entered into an extrajudicial settlement and partition in
order to put an end to their differences cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of the objections
of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the administrator not only because to so hold would be a
derogation of the pertinent provisions of our rules but also because there is nothing provided in said
partition that the aforesaid accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned. While the attitude of the
heirs in concluding said extrajudicial settlement is plausible and has contributed to the early settlement
of the estate, the same cannot however be considered as release of the obligation of the administrator
to prove his accounts. This is more so when, according to the oppositors, the administrator has
committed in his accounts a shortage in the amount of P132,600.00 which certainly cannot just be
brushed aside by a mere technicality.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is set aside. The case shall be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings in line with this decision. No costs.

G.R. No. L-29276 May 18, 1978

Testate Estate of the Late Felix J. de Guzman. VICTORINO G. DE GUZMAN, administrator-appellee,

vs.

CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO, ARSENIO DE GUZMAN and HONORATA DE GUZMAN-MENDIOLA,

oppositors-appellants.

This case is about the propriety of allowing as administration expenses certain disbursements made by
the administrator of the testate estate of the late Felix J. de Guzman of Gapan, Nueva Ecija.

The deceased testator was survived by eight children named Victorino, Librada, Severino, Margarita,
Josefina, Honorata, Arsenio and Crispina. His will was duly probated. Letters of administration were
issued to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman, pursuant to the order dated September 17, 1964 of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija in Special Proceeding No. 1431.
98 | P a g e

One of the properties left by the dent was a residential house located in the poblacion. In conformity
with his last will, that house and the lot on which it stands were adjudicated to his eight children, each
being given a one-eighth proindiviso share in the project of partition dated March 19, 1966, which was
signed by the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower court's order of April 14, 1967 but
without prejudice to the final outcome of the accounting.

The administrator submitted four accounting reports for the period from June 16, 1964 to September,
1967. Three heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio de Guzman
interposed objections to the administrator's disbursements in the total sum of P13,610.48, broken down
as follows:

It should be noted that the probate court in its order of August 29, 1966 directed the administrator
"to refrain from spending the assets of the estate for reconstructing and remodeling the house of the
deceased and to stop spending (sic) any asset of the estate without first during authority of the court
to do so" (pp. 26-27, Record on Appeal).

The lower court in its order of April 29, 1968 allowed the d items as legitimate expenses of
administration. From that order, the three oppositors appealed to this Court. Their contention is that
the probate court erred in approving the utilization of the income of the estate (from rice harvests) to
defray those expenditures which allegedly are not allowable under the Rules of Court.

An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's real and personal estate
as long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He is
accountable for the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the interest,
profit, and income thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is sold by him, at the
price at which it was sold (Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE EXPENSES INCURRED BY THE ADMINISTRATOR IS ALLOWED TO BY THE
RULES.

RULING: YES

I. Expenses for the renovation and improvement of the family residence — P10,399.59. — As already
shown above, these expenses consisted of disbursements for the repair of the terrace and interior of the
family home, the renovation of the bathroom, and the construction of a fence. The probate court
allowed those expenses because an administrator has the duty to "maintain in tenantable repair the
99 | P a g e

houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair to
the heirs or devises" when directed to do so by the court (Sec. 2, Rule 84, Rules of Court).

On the other hand, the oppositors-appellants contend that the trial court erred in allowing those
expenses because the same did not come within the category of necessary expenses of administration
which are understood to be the reasonable and necessary expenses of caring for the property and
managing it until the debts are paid and the estate is partitioned and distributed among the heirs
(Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil. 124).

As clarified in the Lizarraga case, administration expenses should be those which are necessary for the
management of the estate, for protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the
production of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and
its management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of the residue among
the persons entitled thereto.

It should be noted that the family residence was partitioned pro-indiviso among the decedent's eight
children. Each one of them was given a one-eighth share in conformity with the testator's will. Five of
the eight co-owners consented to the use of the funds of the estate for repair and improvement of the
family home. It is obvious that the expenses in question were incurred to preserve the family home and
to maintain the family's social standing in the community.

Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of an the co- owners. They were necessary for the
preservation and use of the family residence. As a result of those expenses, the co-owners, including the
three oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort, convenience and security.

We hold that the probate court did not err in approving the use of the income of the estate to defray
those expenses.

II. Expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of the family residence without paying rent —
P1 603.11 — The probate court allowed the income of the estate to be used for those expenses on the
theory that the occupancy of the house by one heir did not deprive the other seven heirs from living in
it. Those expenses consist of the salaries of the house helper, light and water bills, and the cost of gas,
oil floor wax and switch nail

We are of the opinion that those expenses were personal expenses of Librada de Guzman, inuring y to
her benefit. Those expenses, not being reasonable administration expenses incurred by the
administrator, should not be charged against the income of the estate.
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Librada de Guzman, as an heir, is entitled to share in the net income of the estate. She occupied the
house without paying rent. She should use her income for her living expenses while occupying the family
residence.

The trial court erred in approving those expenses in the administrator's accounts. They should be, as
they are hereby, disallowed (See 33 C.J.S 1239-40).

III. Other expenses — P558.20. — Among these expenses is the sum of P100 for stenographic notes
which, as admitted by the administrator on page 24 of his brief, should be disallowed. Another item,
"representation expenses" in the sum of P26.25 (2nd accounting), was not explained. it should likewise
be disallowed.

The probate court erred in allowing as expenses of administration the sum of P268.65 which was
incurred during the celebration of the first death anniversary of the deceased. Those expenses are
disallowed because they have no connection with the care, management and settlement of the
decedent's estate (Nicolas vs. Nicolas 63 Phil 332).

The other expenses, namely, P19.30 for the lawyer's subsistence and P144 as the cost of the gift to the
physician who attended to the testator during his last s are allowable expenses.

IV. Irrigation fee — P1,049.58. —The appellants question the deductibility of that expense on the ground
that it seems to be a duplication of the item of P1,320 as irrigation fee for the same 1966-67 crop-year.

The administrator in his comment filed on February 28, 1978 explained that the item of P1,320
represented the "allotments" for irrigation fees to eight tenants who cultivated the Intan crop, which
allotments were treated as "assumed expenses" deducted as farming expenses from the value of the
net harvests.

The explanation is not quite clear but it was not disputed by the appellants. The fact is that the said sum
of P1,049.58 was paid by the administrator to the Penaranda Irrigation System as shown in Official
Receipt No. 3596378 dated April 28, 1967. It was included in his accounting as part of the farming
expenses. The amount was properly allowed as a legitimate expense of administration.
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WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of April 29, 1968 is affirmed with the modifications that the sum of
(a) P1,603.11 as the living expenses of Librada de Guzman. (b) P100 for stenographic notes, (c) P26.25 as
representation expenses, and (d) P268.65 as expenses for the celebration of the first anniversary of the
decedent's death are disallowed in the administrator's accounts. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-45494 August 31, 1978

BENITO BOLISAY and GENEROSA BUTED BOLISAY

vs.

HON. LEONARDO S. ALCID in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Branch
in Laoag City, and ANGELA BUTED PASCUAL, respondents.

Petition for certiorari to annul the order of respondent judge in Special Proceedings No. 4560-11 dated
July 27, 1976 which in effect ruled that notwithstanding that the subject property is duly titled in the
name of petitioners, the administratrix of the intestate estate involved in said proceedings has the right
to collect the rentals of said property over the objection of the titled owners just because it is included
in the inventory of said estate and there is an ordinary action in the regular court over the ownership
thereof and the estate is one of the parties therein.

Petitioner Generosa Buted Bolisay and private respondent-administratrix Angela Buted Pascual are
sisters, the daughters of the deceased Luciana Abadilla whose intestate estate is being settled. The
subject property is a lot situated in the Barrio of San Jacinto, Laoag City, with an area of 538 square
meters. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-12782, of the Register of Deeds of the City
of Laoag, in the name of petitioners issued on August 20, 1976. As a matter of fact, they already had the
title over it since June 5, 1961, TCT No. (T-7271)-3377. This earlier title was over 549 square meters,
while the latter is for 538 square meters, the explanation being that, as per Entry No. 6220 made on
August 20, 1952 at the back of the title as it originally was in the name of the deceased Luciana Abadilla,
she sold a small portion to Filemon Pascua for P50.00.

With said lost as security by way of mortgage, petitioners secured from the Government Service
Insurance System a loan of P30,000 in June, 1962. Allegedly, with the proceeds of said loan plus their
own funds, they built a 7-door apartment thereon and the same has been declared in their names for
tax purposes since 1970. The mortgage to the GSIS was released upon full payment by them of the loan
on June 24, 1974.
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On the other hand, in August 1975, private respondent Angela Buted and Maria Buted filed an action
for the annulment of the Deed of Sale executed by their deceased mother Luciana in favor of
petitioners, which deed was precisely the basis of the aforementioned titles in the names of said
petitioners The complaint alleged lack of consideration and disputed that petitioners were the ones who
spent for the construction of the 7 door apartment. The case is docketed as Civil Case No. 6135-II of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte.

Pending also before Branch I of the same court is an action of partition, Civil Case No. 2452-I, wherein a
compromise agreement was reached excluding the lot in question from the list of partitionable
properties.

The foregoing notwithstanding, on May 19, 1973, respondent administratrix filed an inventory of the
properties comprising the estate of Luciana and included therein the property here in controversy. Said
inventory was approved without opposition on June 1, 1973.

And on July 16, 1976, she filed a motion to collect rentals from the 7-door apartment in the
accumulated amount of P7,310 in the actual possession of one Alfredo Palanca. Without notice to
either the petitioners, Alfredo Palanca or the tenants, respondent judge granted the motion on July 27,
1976.

On August 11, 1976, petitioners moved for reconsideration of said order. Further, on September 6,
1976, they filed a motion to exclude the said property from the inventory.

On December 9, 1976, both motions were denied, the court reasoning out as follows:

From the record and the pleadings, the following appears: The administratrix filed on May 19, 1973 an
inventory of the properties comprising the estate of the deceased Luciana Abadilla Vda. de Buted which
inventory was approved by the Court in its Order dated June 1, 1973. Its approval was not opposed. The
property now in controversy is listed as Parcel 31 of said inventory. It is a parcel of land containing an
area of 538 square meters. This same parcel of land is also one of several parcels subject matters of an
amended complaint dated on April 2, 1957 in Civil Case No. 2452-1 for partition filed by Domingo Buted,
Maria Buted, Enrique Buted, Angela Buted and Generosa Buted against Juan Buted, Narciso Buted and
Luciana Abadilla the determination of which is pending before Branch I of this Court.

In the answer of Benito Bolisay to the third party complaint filed by Juan Buted against him in said Civil
Case No. 2452-1, Benito Bolisay claims that he bought Parcel 31 from Luciana Abadilla on June 5, 1961.
In Civil Case No. 6135-11 of this Court which is an action for annulment of the alleged sale of Parcel 31
between Luciana Abadilla and Benito Bolisay said Benito Bolisay and his wife Generosa Buted alleged
that as a consequence of said sale, said spouses were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3377. The
record further shows that on June 27, 1962, using this property as a collateral the above-mentioned
spouses were able to obtain a loan of P30,000.00 from the GSIS which proceeds of loan were used to
construct the building now standing on the property.
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In short, Civil Case No. 2452-1 is an action for Partition of several properties including Parcel 31
allegedly owned in common by plaintiffs and defendants therein, the compromise agreement
approved in said case notwithstanding, while Civil Case No. 6135- 11 is an action for Annulment of that
contract of sale allegedly executed by Luciana Abadilla in favor of spouses Benito Bolisay and Generosa
Buted of said Parcel 31.

In a long line of jurisprudence it has been established that the court in its capacity as a probate court
has no jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership of properties included in the
inventory of an estate. This is a matter that must be litigated in a separate action.

In the instant case, the ownership of Parcel 31 with its improvements is an issue not only in Civil Case
No. 2452-I for partition but also in Civil Case No. 6135-11 for annulment of contract of sale. This Court,
therefore, sitting as a probate court, does not have the jurisdiction to decide with finality the question of
ownership of the property in question because the same might as well be determined in Civil Case No.
2452-1 or Civil Case No. 6135-1 I or in both cases. Nor this Court win attempt to pass on the motion for
exclusion provisionally even if it can do so because it is of the opinion that it will only amount to an
exercise in futility.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration filed by Generosa Buted Bolisay on August 11, 1976 of the
order of July 27, 1976 is hereby DENIED. Likewise, the motion of Generosa Buted Bolisay and Benito
Bolisay filed on September 6. 1976 to exclude Parcel 31 from the inventory submitted by the
administratrix in this case and to order said administratrix to desist from collecting the rentals of the
improvements due is also DENIED. (Pages 10-12, Memorandum for Petitioners.)

His Honor's statement of the control jurisprudence is correct. Indeed, the illustrative expression of the
comprehensive ruling on the matter may be found in Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil 353, which reads thus:

It is the duty of every administrator, whether special or regular, imposed by section 668 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, to return to the court within three months after his appointment a true inventory of the
real estate and an the goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased which come into his
possession or knowledge, unless he is residuary legatee and has given the prescribed bond. The court
which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the
corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said
power, it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it
contains all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his
inventory. In compliance with this duty the court has also inherent power to determine what properties,
rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir
104 | P a g e

or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly can the court's attention to the fact
that certain properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the court's duty
to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attendee to or not
and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination
is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties (23 C.J., P. 1163, par. 381).

The lower court, therefore, had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of the heir Teresa Garcia to the
inventory filed by the special administratrix Luisa Garcia, as well as the observations made by the former
as to certain properties and credits, and to determine for purposes of the inventory alone if they should
be included therein or excluded therefrom. As Teresa Garcia withdrew her opposition after evidence
was adduced tending to show whether or not certain properties belonged to the intestate and, hence,
whether they should be included in the inventory, alleging that the lower court had no jurisdiction to do
so, she cannot be heard to complain that the court suspended the trial of her opposition.

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion and so hold that a court which takes cognizance of
testate or intestate proceedings has power and jurisdiction to determine whether or not the
properties included therein or excluded therefrom belong prima facie to the d although such a
determination is not final or ultimate in nature, and without prejudice to the right of the interested
parties, in a proper action, to raise the question bearing on the ownership or existence of the right or
credit.

To the same effect was Santos vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388, where the Court held:

En cuanto a la exclusion del inventario de ciertas propiedades si bien es cierto, como regla general, que
el tribunal, en esas actual ciones, no tiene facultad para decidir questiones sobre titulo de propiedad, ya
hemos declarado, sin embargo que puede hacerlo, de un modo provisional cuando el proposito es
solamente para determiner si deben o no ex del inventario as propiedades en particular.

And the ruling was reiterated in Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501, at p. 503.

Rather, it is His Honor's application of the jurisprudential rule that calls for modification. As We see the
situation before Us, petitioners are not after a final resolution of their claim of ownership by the probate
court. All that they are asking is that a prima facie determination be made on that score as a basis for
their prayer that the property in dispute be excluded from the inventory, prepared and filed by
respondent administratrix. Indeed, We perceive merit in petitioners' contention that in effect His
Honor's order denying the motion for exclusion is somehow inconsistent, since it is in itself a
determination that for the purposes of Special Proceedings No. 4560-II, and accordingly, until the
question of ownership between petitioners and private respondent has been finally determined in
105 | P a g e

appropriate ordinary action, the disputed pro. property must be deemed part of the intestate estate of
Luciana Abadilla, hence the order to allow the administratrix to collect the rentals due therefrom.
Considering that as aforestated the said property is titled under the Torrens System in the names of the
petitioners, it does appear strange, in the light of the probate court's own ruling that it has no
jurisdiction to pass on the issue of ownership, that the same court deemed the same as part of the
estate under administration just because the administratrix, alleges it is still owned by the estate and
has in fact listed it in the inventory submitted by her to the court.

It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of
ownership, for, on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is
endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself,
which, of course, does not include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. In other words, in Our considered view, the mere
inclusion in the inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a
given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of authority to inquire into the propriety of
such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title thereto. To hold otherwise would
render inutile the power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership
recognized in the above-quoted precedents. The correct rule is that the probate court should resolve
the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It does not
even matter than the issue is raised after approval of the inventory because "apparently, it is not
necessary that the inventory and appraisal be approved by the Court." (Francisco on the Rules of Court
Vol., V-B p. 99, citing Siy Chong Keng v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 494)

In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of
strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of
the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the
title.

As regards the respondent court's order allowing the administratrix Angela Buted Pascual to collect the
rentals from the property here in question and ordering Alfredo Palanca to deliver the P7,310.00 of
rentals in his possession to said administratrix, it is evident that with Our holding above that the
property in issue should be excluded from the inventory of the subject estate, said order has no more
legal basis. The probate court's authority extends only over properties listed in the inventory, without
prejudice to any party adversely affected asserting or protecting his rights or interests in a separate
appropriate remedy.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed orders of respondent judge of July 27, 1976 and December 9, 1976
are hereby completely set aside, for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion, without prejudice
106 | P a g e

to the proper determination of the issue of ownership between the parties herein of the property in
dispute in the action filed by respondent-administratrix for the annulment of the Torrens title now in the
names of petitioners. Costs against private respondent.

G.R. No. 118671 January 29, 1996

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, respondents.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994
and the resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.

The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his
only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children
of Edmond Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and
named Edmond Ruiz executor of his estate.

On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was
distributed among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedent's will. For
unbeknown reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
father's holographic will.

On June 29, 1992, four years after the testator's death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz
Montes who filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and
approval of Hilario Ruiz's will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz,Surprisingly,
Edmond opposed the petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.

On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate — the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street,
Valle Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline — was leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
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On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the
rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property. In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56,
representing the balance of the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses
on the estate.

In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00.6

On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the
probate court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters
testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters
testamentary were issued on June 23, 1993.

On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-
Parte Motion for Release of Funds." It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the
Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a "Motion for
Release of Funds to Certain Heirs" and "Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will."
Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria
Angeline and for the distribution of the testator's properties, specifically the Valle Verde property and
the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.

On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioner's motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes' motion in view of petitioner's lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the
rent payments to the decedent's three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to
and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes
upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent
Montes's motion for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner
likewise reiterated his previous motion for release of funds.

On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for
release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over the Valle Verde property had been
renewed for another year.
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Despite petitioner's manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the
funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration
and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible
from their share in the inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors.

Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate court's
order in a decision dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated January 5, 1995.11

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that:

ISSUE:

whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's
debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the
support of the testator's grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to
grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.

On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. — The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a
deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of
the court, such allowance as are provided by law.

Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He
contends that the testator's three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they are not
incapacitated and are no longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the
provision expressly states "children" of the deceased which excludes the latter's grandchildren.

It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the "minor or
incapacitated" children of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testator's death, provides that during the liquidation of the
109 | P a g e

conjugal partnership, the deceased's legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil
status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The
law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist
even beyond the age of majority.

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
decedent's estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to "widow and children" and does not extend
it to the deceased's grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore,
for the appellate court to sustain the probate court's order granting an allowance to the grandchildren
of the testator pending settlement of his estate.

Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties
to private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order
releasing titles to properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is
allowed only under the following conditions:

Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. — Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or

appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such
terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the
controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions
set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17

And Rule 90 provides that:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. — When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses
of administration the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax if any, chargeable to the estate in
accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or
of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice shall assign the residue of the estate
to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is
entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made
or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.
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In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after
all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have
been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond
in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the
court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations.19

In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the
Blue Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first
publication of the notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of "notice" to creditors, not
payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his
estate had not hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that
must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post
a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective
shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the properties of the estate had
not yet been inventoried and appraised.

It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after
admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity21 and settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy
of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has
been authenticated.23

The intrinsic validity of Hilario's holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate
court in his Reply to Montes' Opposition to his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for
reconsideration of the August 26, 1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as his father's will included the estate of his
mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if
there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their distributive shares in
his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases.

Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take
possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator
to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute
and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,"27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
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Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not
willed. — An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts
and expenses for administration.28

When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been
previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the
properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for
the release of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate
court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before
releasing any further money in his favor.

It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the
one-year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents
after renewal of the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.

Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely
inchoate as long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere
trustee of his father's estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the
duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself
and possess all his parents' properties and the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and
appraisal of all real and personal properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the obligations and estate tax, all of
which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and justness.32

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045
affirming the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc.
No. 10259 are affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order granting an allowance to
the testator's grandchildren and ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon
notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.

Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 156842 : December 10, 2004]

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SOTERO A. PUNONGBAYAN, Petitioner,

v.

DANILO G. PUNONGBAYAN, Respondent.

Assailed in this Petition for Review is the Decision dated August 9, 20021 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 630022 which granted the special civil action for certiorari and mandamus filed by herein
respondent, as well as its Resolution dated January 14, 20033 which denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On July 31, 1969, Escolastica Punongbayan-Paguio died intestate leaving behind considerable properties
in Misamis Oriental, Iligan City, and Bulacan. She was survived by her husband, Miguel Paguio; brothers
Nicolas (now deceased) and SOTERO (herein petitioner), sisters Leonila and Leonora (both now
deceased), all surnamed Punongbayan; nephews DANILO (herein respondent), Restituto, Perfecto, and
Alfredo, and nieces Brigida, Lilia, Marilou, Adeluisa, and Grace, who were the children of Escolastica's
brother, Perfecto Punongbayan, Sr., who predeceased her.

Proceedings for the settlement of her estate were initiated in the then Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1053.4 Miguel Paguio was appointed
administrator and later, DANILO, as co-administrator to represent the interests of the Punongbayan
family.

On September 30, 1974, the above-mentioned heirs executed a compromise agreement distributing
among themselves the estate of the decedent consisting of forty-one (41) parcels of land in Misamis
Oriental, Iligan City, and Bulacan. They likewise authorized the administrator to sell five (5) parcels of
land to pay the liabilities of the estate. The intestate court approved the agreement on June 7, 1976.
Intestate proceedings, however, were left dormant from 1976 to 1993.

On August 4, 1994, SOTERO, Leonila and Leonora (both now deceased) moved for the immediate
distribution of the estate in accordance with the Compromise Agreement of 1974. They asked that
DANILO be ordered to deposit the proceeds from the sales of estate properties with the Clerk of Court
and to render an accounting of his administration for the past twenty (20) years.

The intestate court granted the motion in an Order dated February 1, 1995 and directed DANILO to -
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1. Effect the immediate distribution of the Estate in accordance with the Compromise Agreement dated
September 30, 1974 approved by this Honorable Court in its Order of June 7, 1976;

2. Deposit with the Clerk of Court the proceeds of the sale of whatever properties [were] already sold;
andcralawlibrary

3. Render an accounting of his administration of the estate for the last twenty (20) years or from the
time he assumed as administrator up to the present, within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Order.

DANILO assailed the order in a special civil action for certiorari with the CA7 which, however,
dismissed the same.

We affirmed the dismissal in G. R. No. 128928,8 there being no reversible error on the part of the CA.9
After the decision became final and executory, the corresponding writ of execution was issued by the
intestate court on March 30, 1998. The writ was served upon DANILO's wife but not upon DANILO
himself as he was always absent from his residence and place of work whenever the sheriff came to
serve the writ. A warrant of arrest was issued against him. DANILO filed an urgent motion to recall the
warrant which was denied. Consequently, he assailed the order in a Petition for Certioraribefore the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 57754.10

During the pendency of the petition, DANILO was arrested but was later on released from custody by
the CA upon his manifestation that he will comply with the intestate court's writ of execution, copy of
which was served upon him in open court, and that he will attend the next hearing to submit the
certificates of placement of the proceeds from the sales of a substantial portion of the estate under his
administration. Respondent did not appear during said hearing which prompted the CA to recall his
release order and to direct the National Bureau of Investigation to arrest him.

On October 19, 2000, the CA dismissed the petition for utter lack of merit, ruling that DANILO's clear and
contumacious refusal to obey the intestate court's writ of execution for several years should no longer
be countenanced.

Meanwhile, SOTERO moved for his appointment as co-administrator of the estate in June 2000 on the
grounds that DANILO failed to discharge his duties as administrator, to render an accounting of his
administration, and to turn over P25,000,000.00 in proceeds from the sales of a substantial portion of
the estate, as required in the Order dated February 1, 1995. The motion was granted and SOTERO took
his oath as co-administrator of the estate on August 30, 2000.

On September 1, 2000, DANILO filed a "Motion to Order Sotero Punongbayan to Render an

Accounting"12 alleging that SOTERO appropriated five (5) lots of the estate to the exclusion of the other
114 | P a g e

heirs; that two (2) of the five lots were illegally sold to third persons while two (2) others were illegally
transferred in his own name; and, that the fifth lot was leased to a third person without turning over
lease rentals to the estate. DANILO alleged that he encountered difficulties in rendering an accounting
of estate income and properties because of the illegal sales and lease made by SOTERO. Hence,
DANILO alleged that SOTERO should be made to account first for the income derived from such illegal
transfers and lease before he (DANILO) could render the full accounting required by the intestate
court.

The motion was denied in an Order dated September 15, 200013 as well as a subsequent motion for
reconsideration thereof. DANILO again filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the
CA to assail the order.

SOTERO's motion for reconsideration was denied.17 Hence, this Petition for Review .

Respondent raised certain procedural infirmities in his comment which allegedly warrant the outright
dismissal of the petition.18 We find no merit in them, 19 hence, proceed to resolve this petition on the
merits.

ISSUES:

First, whether the intestate court's Order dated September 15, 2000 was a final order which should
have been appealed by respondent, or an interlocutory one which was properly assailed in a Petition
for Certiorari with the CA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

RULING: IT IS JUST AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER THAT MAY BE ASSAILED BY PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65.

A court order is final in character if it puts an end to the particular matter resolved, or settles definitely
the matter therein disposed of, such that no further questions can come before the court except the
execution of the order.20 On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory if it is provisional and
leaves substantial proceeding to be had in connection with its subject.21

In the instant case, the Order dated September 15, 2000, which denied respondent's motion for
petitioner to render an accounting was an interlocutory order. The motion was filed under Section 8,
Rule 85 of the Rules of Court, which provides -

Every executor or administrator shall render an account of his administration within one (1) year from
the time of receiving letters testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs
because of extensions of time for presenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or of
disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as the court may require until the
estate is wholly settled.
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and Sec. 7, Rule 87, of the same Rules, which provides -

The court, on complaint of an executor or administrator, may cite a person entrusted by an executor or
administrator with any part of the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such
person to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, accounts, or other
papers belonging to such estate as came to his possession in trust for such executor or administrator,
and of his proceedings thereon; and if a person so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the
court may punish him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court.

Applying Sec. 8, Rule 85, the intestate court denied the motion on the ground that it was premature
considering that petitioner has been co-administrator for only one (1) day at the time it was filed. With
the denial, petitioner's accountability as co-administrator was in no way settled as it did not preclude or
forestall future accountings by him which, under said Sec. 8, he is obliged to render within one (1) year
from receiving letters of administration, or as required by the court until the estate is settled. Neither an
accounting or an examination of petitioner under Section 7, Rule 87, definitely settle the issue of his
alleged illegal transfers and lease since a proceeding under this section, like that under Sec. 622 of the
same Rule, is merely in the nature of fact-finding inquiries. It is intended to elicit information or
evidence relative to estate properties.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City which has jurisdiction over the administration and
settlement of the estate has limited jurisdiction and is without authority to resolve issues of ownership
with finality especially when third persons are involved. Separate actions should be instituted by the
administrator for the purpose.

In fine, denial of respondent's motion for petitioner to render an accounting is an interlocutory order
not subject to appeal but may be challenged before a superior court through a Petition for
Certiorariunder Rule 65.

FALLO

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated August 9, 2002 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63002, as well as its Resolution dated January 14, 2003, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Order dated September 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
19, in Special Proceedings No. 1053 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

5. Appointment of special administrator – Rule 80

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G.R. No. 166520 March 14, 2008

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO "JAKE" TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS,
Petitioners,

vs.

THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY
ROMUALDO LIM, Respondents.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc
City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003 whereby it
appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate of the late Gerardo Tan.

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will.

On 31 October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with
the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12.

Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a
special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo’s estate until the Petition can be
resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-
in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an
Opposition to private respondents’ Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private
respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the country.
Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or
competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto
administratrix of his estate since his death.
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On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to
Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix, to wit:

b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary account of the Court
all money and or cash at hand or deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the
decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof;

b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane
harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the past or is presently harvesting or about to undertake,
which belong to the estate of the decedent;

b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to submit a financial
report to the Commission as regards the background of the cash at hand or deposited in bank(s), if any,
the expenses incurred in course of her administration and other relevant facts including that of the
proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing
with the court as above-required.3

More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents’ Urgent Ex-parte
Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty.
Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order appointing Romualdo as
special administrator of Gerardo’s Estate, the fallo of which states:

Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby GRANTED.
Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and shall immediately take
possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the
same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his filing of a bond in the amount of
₱50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court.5

Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that
petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of
the deceased.
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On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive Judge,
issued an Order6 denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.1avvphi1

Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the 17
July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilma’s right to be appointed as special administratix.
Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special administrator thereof.

On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners’ Petition. On 6 December
2004, the Court of Appeals similarly denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners,
to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING and
DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special Proceeding No.
4014-0.7

On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning the following
errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS’
PLEA TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHER’S ESTATE.

RULING: NO

Petitioners contend that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since they are
allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are
purportedly Gerardo’s illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it is the
nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of
the decedent’s estate.

Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their attorney-in-fact
to administer Gerardo’s estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo "Jake" Tan (Jake) claim to have lived for a
long time and continue to reside on Gerardo’s estate, while respondents are not even in the Philippines,
having long established residence abroad.
119 | P a g e

Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix of the estate
since Gerardo’s death on 14 October 2000 and is thus "well steeped in the actual management and
operation of the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural landholdings)."12

DISCUSSION:

The appeal is devoid of merit.

The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which
provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment
of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner
Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of
120 | P a g e

Gerardo’s estate. Contrary to petitioners’ bare assertions, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found
that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the
lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.

We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as
regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special
administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally administer
Gerardo’s estate.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78
of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take
over administration of Gerardo’s estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular
administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special
administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in
granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event
that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause.18 The
principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can
pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.19

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of
the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed
special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of
the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner
Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of
Gerardo’s estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardo’s estate had no
income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma’s non-
compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners should have simply filed a
manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the court’s orders.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010

DALISAY E. OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E. OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO,
JR., Petitioners,
121 | P a g e

vs.

RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO, Respondents.

This petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside
the Decision2 dated December 16, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683. The Decision annulled and set aside the Order dated March 13,
20084 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, in Sp. Proc. No. B-3089; while the
Resolution denied the motion for reconsideration of the Decision.

The Antecedents

Petitioners Dalisay E. Ocampo (Dalisay), Vince E. Ocampo (Vince), Melinda Carla E. Ocampo (Melinda),
and Leonardo E. Ocampo, Jr. (Leonardo, Jr.) are the surviving wife and the children of Leonardo Ocampo
(Leonardo), who died on January 23, 2004. Leonardo and his siblings, respondents Renato M. Ocampo
(Renato) and Erlinda M. Ocampo (Erlinda) are the legitimate children and only heirs of the spouses
Vicente and Maxima Ocampo, who died intestate on December 19, 1972 and February 19, 1996,
respectively. Vicente and Maxima left several properties, mostly situated in Biñan, Laguna. Vicente and
Maxima left no will and no debts.

On June 24, 2004, five (5) months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for
intestate proceedings, entitled "In Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and
Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and Leonardo M. Ocampo," in the RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, docketed
as Spec. Proc. No. B-3089.5

The petition alleged that, upon the death of Vicente and Maxima, respondents and their brother
Leonardo jointly controlled, managed, and administered the estate of their parents. Under such
circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of one-third (1/3) of the total income
generated from the properties of the estate. However, when Leonardo died, respondents took
possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion of petitioners.

The petition prayed for the settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and the estate of Leonardo.
It, likewise, prayed for the appointment of an administrator to apportion, divide, and award the two
estates among the lawful heirs of the decedents.

Respondents filed their Opposition and Counter-Petition dated October 7, 2004,6 contending that the
petition was defective as it sought the judicial settlement of two estates in a single proceeding. They
argued that the settlement of the estate of Leonardo was premature, the same being dependent only
upon the determination of his hereditary rights in the settlement of his parents’ estate.
122 | P a g e

In their counter-petition, respondents prayed that they be appointed as special joint administrators of
the estate of Vicente and Maxima.

In an Order dated March 4, 2005,7 the RTC denied respondents’ opposition to the settlement
proceedings but admitted their counter-petition. The trial court also clarified that the judicial settlement
referred only to the properties of Vicente and Maxima.

Through a Motion for Appointment of Joint Special Administrators dated October 11, 2005,
respondents reiterated their prayer for appointment as special joint administrators of the estate, and
to serve as such without posting a bond.

In their Comment dated November 3, 2005,9 petitioners argued that, since April 2002, they had been
deprived of their fair share of the income of the estate, and that the appointment of respondents as
special joint administrators would further cause injustice to them. Thus, they prayed that, in order to
avoid further delay, letters of administration to serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be
issued to respondents and Dalisay.

In another Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator dated December 5, 2005,10 petitioners
nominated the Biñan Rural Bank to serve as special administrator pending resolution of the motion for
the issuance of the letters of administration.

In its June 15, 2006 Order,11 the RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato as special joint administrators of
the estate of the deceased spouses, and required them to post a bond of ₱200,000.00 each.12

Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated August 1, 200613 of the Order, insisting that
Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to be appointed as administrator of the estate, considering that she
even failed to take care of her husband Leonardo when he was paralyzed in 1997. They also contended
that petitioners’ prayer for Dalisay’s appointment as special administrator was already deemed
abandoned upon their nomination of the Biñan Rural Bank to act as special administrator of the estate.

In their Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration,14 respondents asserted their priority in right to
be appointed as administrators being the next of kin of Vicente and Maxima, whereas Dalisay was a
mere daughter-in-law of the decedents and not even a legal heir by right of representation from her late
husband Leonardo.
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In its Order dated February 16, 2007, the RTC revoked the appointment of Dalisay as co-special
administratrix, substituting her with Erlinda. The RTC took into consideration the fact that respondents
were the nearest of kin of Vicente and Maxima. Petitioners did not contest this Order and even
manifested in open court their desire for the speedy settlement of the estate.

On April 23, 2007, or two (2) months after respondents’ appointment as joint special administrators,
petitioners filed a Motion for an Inventory and to Render Account of the Estate, reiterating their
stance that respondents, as joint special administrators, should be directed to submit a true inventory of
the income and assets of the estate.

Respondents then filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators’ Bond18 on May 22, 2007, praying
that they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without the need to file an
administrators’ bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount. They alleged that, since
petitioners manifested in open court that they no longer object to the appointment of respondents as
special co-administrators, it would be to the best interest of all the heirs that the estate be spared from
incurring unnecessary expenses in paying for the bond premiums. They also assured the RTC that they
would faithfully exercise their duties as special administrators under pain of contempt should they
violate any undertaking in the performance of the trust of their office.

On October 15, 2007, or eight (8) months after the February 16, 2007 Order appointing respondents as
special joint administrators, petitioners filed a Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special
Administration and to Proceed to Judicial Partition or Appointment of Regular Administrator.21
Petitioners contended that the special administration was not necessary as the estate is neither vast
nor complex, the properties of the estate being identified and undisputed, and not involved in any
litigation necessitating the representation of special administrators. Petitioners, likewise, contended
that respondents had been resorting to the mode of special administration merely to delay and prolong
their deprivation of what was due them. Petitioners cited an alleged fraudulent sale by respondents of a
real property for ₱2,700,000.00, which the latter represented to petitioners to have been sold only for
₱1,500,000.00, and respondents’ alleged misrepresentation that petitioners owed the estate for the
advances to cover the hospital expenses of Leonardo, but, in fact, were not yet paid.

Respondents filed their Opposition and Comment22 on March 10, 2008, to which, in turn, petitioners
filed their Reply to Opposition/Comment23 on March 17, 2008.

In its Order dated March 13, 2008,24 the RTC granted petitioners’ Motion, revoking and terminating
the appointment of Renato and Erlinda as joint special administrators, on account of their failure to
comply with its Order, particularly the posting of the required bond, and to enter their duties and
responsibilities as special administrators, i.e., the submission of an inventory of the properties and of
an income statement of the estate. The RTC also appointed Melinda as regular administratrix, subject
to the posting of a bond in the amount of ₱200,000.00, and directed her to submit an inventory of the
124 | P a g e

properties and an income statement of the subject estate. The RTC likewise found that judicial partition
may proceed after Melinda had assumed her duties and responsibilities as regular administratrix.

Aggrieved, respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in (a) declaring them to have failed to
enter the office of special administration despite lapse of reasonable time, when in truth they had not
entered the office because they were waiting for the resolution of their motion for exemption from
bond; (b) appointing Melinda as regular administratrix, a mere granddaughter of Vicente and Maxima,
instead of them who, being the surviving children of the deceased spouses, were the next of kin; and (c)
declaring them to have been unsuitable for the trust, despite lack of hearing and evidence against them.

On December 16, 2008, the CA rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition based on the
finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking respondents’ appointment as joint
special administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption from bond, and for
appointing Melinda as regular administratrix without conducting a formal hearing to determine her
competency to assume as such. According to the CA, the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before
respondents could enter their duties and responsibilities as joint special administrators, particularly their
submission of an inventory of the properties of the estate and an income statement thereon.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision. The CA, however, denied it. Hence, this
petition, ascribing to the CA errors of law and grave abuse of discretion for annulling and setting aside
the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008.

Our Ruling

The pertinent provisions relative to the special administration of the decedents’ estate under the Rules
of Court provide—

Sec. 1. Appointment of special administrator. – When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the
court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased
until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator. – Such special administrator shall take possession and
charge of goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the
executor or administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain
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suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other property as the court orders sold. A
special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.

Sec. 1. Bond to be given before issuance of letters; Amount; Conditions. – Before an executor or
administrator enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters testamentary or of administration issue,
he shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned as follows:

(a) To make and return to the court, within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory of all goods,
chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shall come to his possession or knowledge or
to the possession of any other person for him;

(b) To administer according to these rules, and, if an executor, according to the will of the testator, all
goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate which shall at any time come to his possession or to the
possession of any other person for him, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies,
and charges on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed by the court;

(c) To render a true and just account of his administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court;

(d) To perform all orders of the court by him to be performed.31

Sec. 4. Bond of special administrator. – A special administrator before entering upon the duties of his
trust shall give a bond, in such sum as the court directs, conditioned that he will make and return a true
inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his possession
or knowledge, and that he will truly account for such as are received by him when required by the court,
and will deliver the same to the person appointed executor or administrator, or to such other person as
may be authorized to receive them.32

Inasmuch as there was a disagreement as to who should be appointed as administrator of the estate of
Vicente and Maxima, the RTC, acting as a probate court, deemed it wise to appoint joint special
administrators pending the determination of the person or persons to whom letters of administration
may be issued.

The RTC was justified in doing so considering that such disagreement caused undue delay in the
issuance of letters of administration, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court. Initially, the
RTC, on June 15, 2006, appointed Renato and Dalisay as joint special administrators, imposing upon
each of them the obligation to post an administrator’s bond of ₱200,000.00. However, taking into
126 | P a g e

account the arguments of respondents that Dalisay was incompetent and unfit to assume the office of a
special administratrix and that Dalisay, in effect, waived her appointment when petitioners nominated
Biñan Rural Bank as special administrator, the RTC, on February 16, 2007, revoked Dalisay’s
appointment and substituted her with Erlinda.

A special administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control, expected
to work for the best interest of the entire estate, with a view to its smooth administration and speedy
settlement. When appointed, he or she is not regarded as an agent or representative of the parties
suggesting the appointment. The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to
preserve the estate until it can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the
benefit of creditors and heirs, pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.

While the RTC considered that respondents were the nearest of kin to their deceased parents in their
appointment as joint special administrators, this is not a mandatory requirement for the
appointment. It has long been settled that the selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. The probate court
may appoint or remove special administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the
Rules at its discretion, such that the need to first pass upon and resolve the issues of fitness or unfitness
and the application of the order of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78,38 as would be proper in the
case of a regular administrator, do not obtain. As long as the discretion is exercised without grave
abuse, and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles, interference by higher courts is
unwarranted.

The appointment or removalof special administrators, being discretionary, is thus interlocutory and may
be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and obligations of an
administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all judicial orders;
(3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court; and (4) to
make an inventory within three (3) months. More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond
is conditioned on the faithful execution of the administration of the decedent’s estate requiring the
special administrator to (1) make and return a true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and
estate of the deceased which come to his possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as
received by him when required by the court; and (3) deliver the same to the person appointed as
executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as may be authorized to receive them.

Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the
administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the obligations
incumbent upon, him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent, and,
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therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable against the
estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement of the
estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
administration.41

Hence, the RTC revoked respondents’ designation as joint special administrators, especially considering
that respondents never denied that they have been in possession, charge, and actual administration of
the estate of Vicente and Maxima since 2002 up to the present, despite the assumption of Melinda as
regular administratrix.

XXXXXXXXXXXXX

Given these circumstances, this Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it
revoked the appointment of respondents as joint special administrators, the removal being grounded on
reason, equity, justice, and legal principle. Indeed, even if special administrators had already been
appointed, once the probate court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified
in withdrawing the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.48

On the other hand, the Court finds the RTC’s designation of Melinda as regular administratrix
improper and abusive of its discretion.

In the determination of the person to be appointed as regular administrator, the following provisions of
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, state –

Sec. 1. Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators. – No person is competent to serve
as executor or administrator who:

(a) Is a minor;

(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines; and

(c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties of the trust by reason of drunkenness,
improvidence, or want of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an offense involving
moral turpitude.

xxxx
128 | P a g e

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them,
be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to
some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.

Further, on the matter of contest for the issuance of letters of administration, the following provisions of
Rule 79 are pertinent –

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
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But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice thereof. – When a petition for letters of administration is
filed in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for hearing the petition, and
shall cause notice thereof to be given to the known heirs and creditors of the decedent, and to any
other persons believed to have an interest in the estate, in the manner provided in Sections 3 and 4 of
Rule 76.

Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration. – Any interested person may, by filing a written
opposition, contest the petition on the ground of the incompetency of the person for whom letters are
prayed therein, or on the ground of the contestant’s own right to the administration, and may pray that
letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the opposition.

Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. – At the hearing of the petition, it must first be shown that
notice has been given as herein-above required, and thereafter the court shall hear the proofs of the
parties in support of their respective allegations, and if satisfied that the decedent left no will, or that
there is no competent and willing executor, it shall order the issuance of letters of administration to the
party best entitled thereto.1avvphi1

Admittedly, there was no petition for letters of administration with respect to Melinda, as the prayer for
her appointment as co-administrator was embodied in the motion for the termination of the special
administration. Although there was a hearing set for the motion on November 5, 2007, the same was
canceled and reset to February 8, 2008 due to the absence of the parties’ counsels. The February 8,
2008 hearing was again deferred to March 10, 2008 on account of the ongoing renovation of the Hall of
Justice. Despite the resetting, petitioners filed a Manifestation/Motion dated February 29, 2008,49
reiterating their prayer for partition or for the appointment of Melinda as regular administrator and for
the revocation of the special administration. It may be mentioned that, despite the filing by respondents
of their Opposition and Comment to the motion to revoke the special administration, the prayer for the
appointment of Melinda as regular administratrix of the estate was not specifically traversed in the said
pleading. Thus, the capacity, competency, and legality of Melinda’s appointment as such was not
properly objected to by respondents despite being the next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not
threshed out by the RTC acting as a probate court in accordance with the above mentioned Rules.

However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the settlement of the estate of Vicente and
Maxima, with a view to putting an end to the squabbles of the heirs, we take into account the fact that
Melinda, pursuant to the RTC Order dated March 13, 2008, already posted the required bond of
₱200,000.00 on March 26, 2008, by virtue of which, Letters of Administration were issued to her the
following day, and that she filed an Inventory of the Properties of the Estate dated April 15, 2008.50
These acts clearly manifested her intention to serve willingly as administratrix of the decedents’ estate,
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but her appointment should be converted into one of special administration, pending the proceedings
for regular administration. Furthermore, since it appears that the only unpaid obligation is the hospital
bill due from Leonardo’s estate, which is not subject of this case, judicial partition may then proceed
with dispatch.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2008 and the
Resolution dated April 30, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 104683 are AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the Order dated March 13, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Biñan,
Laguna, with respect to the revocation of the special administration in favor of Renato M. Ocampo and
Erlinda M. Ocampo, is REINSTATED. The appointment of Melinda Carla E. Ocampo as regular
administratrix is SET ASIDE. Melinda is designated instead as special administratrix of the estate under
the same administrator’s bond she had posted. The trial court is directed to conduct with dispatch the
proceedings for the appointment of the regular administrator and, thereafter, to proceed with judicial
partition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

6. Grounds for removal of administrator – Rule 80

G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990

BEATRIZ F. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.

HON. ZOILO AGUINALDO, Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati, Metro Manila and
TERESA F. OLBES, respondents.

This is a petition for certiorari which seeks to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the
Order of the respondent Judge, dated 15 January 1985, cancelling the appointment of the petitioner
Beatriz F. Gonzales as a co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021 entitled "In the Matter of the
Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis," Branch 143, RTC, Makati, Metro Manila; and the
Order of 15 May 1985 denying reconsideration of the same.

The facts are:

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Special Proceedings No. 021, pending before the court a quo, is an intestate proceeding involving the
estate of the deceased Doña Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis. Doña Ramona is survived by her four (4)
children who are her only heirs, namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia
Favis-Gomez.

On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private respondent
Teresa Olbes as co-administratices of the estate.

On 11 November 1984, while petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was in the United States accompanying her
ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country, private respondent Teresa Olbes
filed a motion, dated 26 November 1984, to remove Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix, on the
ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and
omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs. Copy of said motion was served upon
petitioner's then counsel of record, Atty. Manuel Castro who, since 2 June 1984, had been suspended by
the Supreme Court from the practice of law throughout the Philippines. 1

After the filing of private respondent's aforesaid motion, respondent Judge Zoilo Aguinaldo issued an
Order dated 4 December 1984 which required Beatriz F. Gonzales and the other parties to file their
opposition, if any, thereto. Only Asterio Favis opposed the removal of Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-
administratrix, as the latter was still in the United States attending to her ailing husband.

In an Order dated 15 January 1985, respondent Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted
to Beatriz F. Gonzales and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona
Gonzales. The Court, in explaining its action, stated:

. . . In appointing them, the court was of the opinion that it would be to the best interest of the estate if
two administrators who are the children of the deceased would jointly administer the same.
Unfortunately, as events have shown, the two administrators have not seen eye to eye with each other
and most of the time they have been at loggerheads with each other to the prejudice of the estate.
Beatriz F. Gonzales has been absent from the country since October, 1984 as she is in the United States
as stated in the motion and opposition of Asterio Favis dated December 11, 1984, and she has not
returned even up to this date so that Teresa F. Olbes has been left alone to administer the estate. Under
these circumstances, and in order that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient
manner, the court believes that there should be now only one administrator of the estate. 2

Petitioner moved to reconsider the Order of 15 January 1985. Her motion was opposed separately by
private respondent Teresa Olbes and another co-heir Cecilia Gomez.
132 | P a g e

In her manifestation and opposition to petitioner's motion for reconsideration, Cecilia Gomez stated
that it would be pointless to re-appoint Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of Teresa Olbes, as the
former would be leaving soon for the United States to attend to unfinished business. Moreover, she
expressed satisfaction with the manner respondent Teresa Olbes had been managing and administering
the estate.

In his Order dated 7 May 1986, a part of which is hereunder quoted, respondent Judge denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

ISSUE OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE OF DISCRETION IN CANCELLING THE
APPOINTMENT OF PETITIONER AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE.

RULING: NO

Petitioner contends before this Court that respondent Judge's Order dated 15 January 1985 should be
nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown by respondents to be
anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82, Rules of Court, which states:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death,
resignation or removal — If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the
estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided
by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the
trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion, may permit him to resign. . . .

While appellate courts are generally disinclined to interfere with the action taken by the probate court
in the matter of removal of an administrator, we find, in the case at bar, sufficient cause to reverse the
order of the probate court removing petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate.

The rule is that if no executor is named in the will, or the named executor or executors are incompetent,
refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, the court must appoint an administrator
of the estate of the deceased who shall act as representative not only of the court appointing him but
also of the heirs and the creditors of the estate. In the exercise of its discretion, the probate court may
appoint one, two or more co-administrators to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all
times to have different interests represented.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration
reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. 8 This is the
same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference
in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that
133 | P a g e

those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or, on the
other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest
interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.9

Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to protection from
removal without just cause. 10 Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court provides the legal and
specific causes authorizing the court to remove an administrator. 11

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There
must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the
removal of the administrator. In making such a determination, the court must exercise good judgment,
guided by law and precedents.

In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the petitioner as co-administratrix on
any of the causes specified in respondent's motion for relief of the petitioner. Neither did it dwell on,
nor determine the validity of the charges brought against petitioner by respondent Olbes. The court
based the removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and
misunderstandings have existed between petitioner and respondent Teresa Olbes which allegedly
have prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that petitioner had been absent from the
country since October 1984, and up to 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order.

Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with harmonious
relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries,
without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and,
perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if
unresolved by the co-administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the
estate and its heirs.

We, like petitioner, find of material importance the fact that the court a quo failed to find hard facts
showing that the conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrixes were unjustly caused
by petitioner, or that petitioner was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented
the management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission
showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of
the estate. Petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales is as interested as respondent Olbes and the other heirs in that
the properties of the estate be duly administered and conserved for the benefit of the heirs; and there is
as yet no ground to believe that she has prejudiced or is out to prejudice said estate to warrant the
probate court into removing petitioner as co-administratrix.
134 | P a g e

Respondent Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix of the estate also on the
ground that she had been absent from the country since October 1984 and had not returned as of 15
January 1985, the date of the questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone to administer the
estate.

In her motion for reconsideration of the Order dated 15 January 1985, petitioner explained to the court
a quo that her absence from the country was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing
husband to the United States for medical treatment. 13 It appears too that petitioner's absence from
the country was known to respondent Olbes, and that the latter and petitioner Gonzales had continually
maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the estate during the
petitioner's absence from the country. 14 As a matter of fact, petitioner, while in the United States, sent
respondent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and
collect the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the
payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the administration. 15

The above facts, we note, show that petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of
the estate nor had she been remiss in the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary
absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate.

Finally, it seems that the court a quo seeks refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other three (3) heirs of
the estate of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the retention or re-
appointment of petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate,
nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration. In re William's
Adm'r., the court held:

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo dated 15 January 1985 removing
petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as co-administratrix in Special Proceedings No. 021, entitled "In the Matter
of the Intestate Estate of Ramona Gonzales Vda. de Favis" and the Order of the same Court dated 15
May 1985 denying reconsideration of said Order, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is
ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of said estate.

SO ORDERED.

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