THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005.]

ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR.,

petitioners, vs. LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.

Isabel P. Portugal in her own behalf and other petitioner.

Felizardo M. Mercado for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

OF A DECEASED PERSON; WHERE SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN
INSTITUTED BUT HAD BEEN FINALLY CLOSED AND TERMINATED, OR IF A
PUTATIVE HEIR HAS LOST THE RIGHT TO HAVE HIMSELF DECLARED IN THE
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AS CO-HEIR AND HE CAN NO LONGER ASK FOR ITS RE-
OPENING, AN ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION CAN BE FILED FOR HIS DECLARATION AS
HEIR IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT THE ANNULMENT OF THE PARTITION,
DISTRIBUTION OR ADJUDICATION OF PROPERTIES BELONGING TO THE
DECEASED. — The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the
adverse parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the
special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are
pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the
circumstances of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among
other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings.
Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself
declared in the special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its
re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir
in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the
deceased.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, respondent,
believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate,
executed on February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under
the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said
rule is an exception to the general rule that when a person dies leaving a
property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in
case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor
therein. Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A
probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of a deceased. It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to
still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
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 which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of
petitioners as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with
the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous
in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case — subject of the present
case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial. In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to
evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J : p

Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail
the September 24, 2002 1 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 124 2 which dismissed, after
trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction. cSEaDA

From the records of the case are gathered the following material
allegations — claims of the parties which they sought to prove by testimonial
and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. 3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. 4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she
named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner. 5

On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli, 6 later baptized as Leonila
Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent. 7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights 8 over the estate of their father,
Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. 9 In the deed,
Portugal's siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155
sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor. 10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of
land in the name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo." 11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.

On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.

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 On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an "Affidavit of Adjudication
by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person" 12 adjudicating to herself the
Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 13 in Portugal's name was
subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813 14 was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr." HSaIDc

Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the
1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her name,
petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint 15
against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by
her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related
whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.

Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent's Affidavit of Adjudication

and the TCT in her name be declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent's name and to issue in its
stead a new one in their (petitioners') name, and that actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees and litigation expenses be awarded to
them.
Following respondent's filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-
Trial Order chronicling, among other things, the issues as follows:
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased
Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?

b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant

Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?

c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course

and can still be contested by plaintiffs.

d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under

the complaint. 16 (Underscoring supplied)

After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001, 17 after giving
an account of the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses and of their
documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined during pre-trial,
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners'
status and right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate
(sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the case, citing Heirs of Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario. 18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to
the case at bar.
xxx xxx xxx
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 In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a
Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic ) and testimonial evidence to
establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act
of having a status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought
to be determined herein. However, the establishment of a status, a
right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special
proceeding (Sec. 3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court ) , not an ordinary
civil action whereby a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a).
The operative term in the former is "to establish", while in the latter, it
is "to enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs of the
decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to
state a cause of action.

The court, not being a probate (sic ) court, is without

jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs' cause to establish their status and right
herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule
3, in relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra). 19 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied).

Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the

trial court's ratio decidendi in dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to
this Court's following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño, 20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole
basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void.
(Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]) However, for
purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but
not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of
marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case . (Niñal, et al. v.
Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence
of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals,
supra) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in 2001)
subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay(in 1999), the
appellate court found Cariño to be inapplicable, however, to the case in this
wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cariño
case was the validity of the two marriages contracted by the
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 deceased SPO4 Santiago Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone of
contention between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan
Nicdao Cariño and Susan Yee C ariño both of whom he married. It is not
disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages
with said two women during his lifetime, and the only question was:
which of these two marriages was validly celebrated? The award of the
death benefits of the deceased Cariño was thus, merely an incident to
the question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other
hand, the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main issue here is
the annulment of title to property . The only undisputed fact in this
case is that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
34292. However, here come two contending parties, — herein
plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee, — both now insisting to
be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. . . . . The status and rights of the
parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet.
. . . . Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or
right must be properly ventilated in an appropriate special proceeding,
not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a
wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the
present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law
prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To
permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship, or the establishment of the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an ordinary
civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that
purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. . . . 21 (Emphasis in the
original, underscoring supplied).

The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002, 22 thus affirmed

the trial court's dismissal of the case. DHTECc

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, 23 faulting the

appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory
complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.

. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel]

Yaptinchay despite the existence of a later and contrary ruling in
Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to
render judgment based on the evidence presented relative to the
issues raised during pre-trial, . . . 24 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Petitioners thus prayed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme
Court that the questioned CA decision be reversed, and a new one
entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant
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 complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by
petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE , should the Honorable Supreme Court find
that the pronouncements in Cariño apply, a decision be entered
remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which
of the two marriages is valid, and the determination of "heirship" and
legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to the determination of
the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.

Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are
likewise prayed for. 25 (Underscoring supplied).

Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which
is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows; that Cariño allows
courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the
case; and that contrary to the appellate court's ruling, they had established
their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have
to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they
can pursue the case for annulment of respondent's Affidavit of Adjudication and
of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, 26 the
therein petitioners executed on March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of
the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-claimants" of
the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that
a portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development Corporation which in turn sold
portions thereof to the therein individual respondents. The therein petitioners
Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents
moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia,
state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted
the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said
Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any proof or even a
semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of
the aforementioned Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the
legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of who are
the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
reconveyance of property. This must take precedence over the action
for reconveyance . . . 27 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).

On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the
petition was an improper recourse, found that the trial court did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v. Rivera
28 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals, 29 this Court held that "the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the
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 petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right."

In the above-cited case of Litam, 30 Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special

proceeding for issuance of letters of administration before the then Court of
First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is the son of Rafael
Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his
therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his
marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted
in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the
decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of
letters of administration to Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the
decedent." The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of administration to,
on Marcosa's request, her nephew Arminio Rivera. HDTSCc

While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported
siblings filed a civil case before the same court, against the estate of Rafael
Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly appointed
guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings
substantially reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties allegedly acquired during
the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some
unresolved incidents in the special proceeding, both were jointly heard by the
trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing it,
declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the
decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.

On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for
determination was whether they are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.

This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia
Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants
Dy Tam et al., found "substantially correct" the trial court's findings of fact and
its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al.
"do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons
named therein as father [and] it does not appear in the said certificates of birth
that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the preparation and filing
thereof"; and that "[t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is]
entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage
between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . .
as children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the lower court
should not have declared, in the decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the
only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil case], it
being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial
[p]roceeding."
In Solivio, 31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was
a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was
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 a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special proceeding, Branch 23 of
said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent's maternal
aunt-half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedent's
paternal aunt-sister of his father, moved to reconsider the court's order
declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she claiming that she
too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness.
Instead of appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case
against Celedonia before the same RTC, for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the RTC,
which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the
appellate court affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed,
among other issues, "whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's
share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were
still pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this Court held that"[i]n the
interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with
[estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court," citing Guilas v. CFI
Judge of Pampanga. 32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that the estate
proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless [therein private respondent-
Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in
said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent. DaECST

I n Guilas 33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted

daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive
father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the testate estate
of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed
that the records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to
annul the project of partition on the ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and
prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two lots
allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in
the testate estate proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among
other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the
parties' agreement to suspend action or resolution on Juanita's motion in the
testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots allotted to her
until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for
trial.

Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it
for trial on the ground that in the amended complaint she, in the meantime,
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 filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the project of
partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was
seeking. She thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order
setting the civil case for hearing that there was no longer a prejudicial question
to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the
actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966,
denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate court's approval of the project of partition and directive that
the records of the case be sent to the archives notwithstanding, this Court held
that the testate estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as
Juanita's share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her.
Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra .); because a judicial partition is
not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an
action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has
not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand
his share through a proper motion in the same probate or
administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not
through an independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or
order of the probate o[r] intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed
of (Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra;
Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic
vs. Agustines , L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461). 34
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court
setting the civil case for hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue
because it "involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse
parties are putative heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings are pending, or
if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated,
however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the
special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then
an ordinary civil action can be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring
about the annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication of a
property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased. SCcHIE

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 In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was
the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on February 15, 1988 35 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74,
Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. 36 Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in
case he did, he failed to name an executor therein. 37

Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A

probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of a deceased.

It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the
intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, 38 to still subject it,
under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be
long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs
is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and
expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in light of the
fact that the parties to the civil case — subject of the present case, could and
had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed
jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no
compelling reason to still subject Portugal's estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners' status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, 39 the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial, which bear
repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P.
Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and
can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the
complaint. 40

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September

24, 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties and render a decision on the above-enumerated
issues defined during the pre-trial. CcADHI

No costs.

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 SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Garcia, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo at 49-56.
2. Records at 212-230.
3. Exh. "3," Folder of Exhibits.
4. Exh. "A," Folder of Exhibits.
5. Exh. "B," Folder of Exhibits.

6. Exh. "4," Folder of Exhibits.

7. Exh. "5," Folder of Exhibits.
8. Exh. "G," Folder of Exhibits.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits.
12. Exh. "E," Folder of Exhibits.

13. Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits

14. Exh. "D," Folder of Exhibits.

15. Records at 1-5.

16. Id. at 78-80.

17. Id. at 212-230.
18. 304 SCRA 18 (1999).

19. Records at 228-230.

20. 351 SCRA 127 (2001).

21. CA Decision, Rollo at 49, 52-54.

22. Id. at 49-56.
23. Id. at 3-46.
24. Id. at 14.
25. Id. at 43-44.
26. Supra, note 18.
27. Id. at 22.
28. 100 Phil. 364 (1956).
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 29. 182 SCRA 119 (1990).

30. Supra, note 28.

31. Supra, note 29.
32. 43 SCRA 111 (1972).

33. Ibid.
34. Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, supra at 117
(1972).

35. Exh. "E," Folder of Exhibits.

36. SEC. 1 Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the
decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors
are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for
the purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration,
divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only
one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. The parties to an
extrajudicial settlement, whether by public instrument or by stipulation in a
pending action for partition, or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate
to himself by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a
condition precedent to the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the
action for partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a
bond with the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the value of
the personal property involved as certified to under oath by the parties
concerned and conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be
filed under section 4 of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left
no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two
(2) years after the death of the decedent.
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding
upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
(Underscoring supplied).
37. HERRERA, REMEDIAL LAW III-A, p. 31 (2005), citing Utulo v. Leona Pasion
Vda. de Garcia, 66 Phil. 302 (1938).
38. Vide Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of [Portugal], supra,
note 12.
39. Vide Pereira v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 154 (1989); Intestate Estate of
Mercado v. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383 (1955).
40. Supra, note 16.

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