Mediation

and Dialogue
Facilitation
in the OSCE
Reference Guide
Mediation
and Dialogue
Facilitation
in the OSCE
Reference Guide
2
 Table of Contents

Introduction 7
Chapter I: Conceptual Framework of Mediation and Dialogue
Facilitation in the OSCE Context 9

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Facilitation in the OSCE Area 27

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Annex I: Examples of OSCE Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation

Engagements 79

4
 Table of Contents

Annex II: List of Acronyms 107

5
6
 Introduction

As the world’s largest regional security organization, the OSCE possess-

es longstanding experience in facilitating political dialogue and engaging
in mediation activities with the aim of preventing, managing or resolving
conflicts. Already in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act participating States com-
mitted themselves to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and to the use of
such means as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial
settlement. The 1992 Helsinki Document further strengthened OSCE struc-
tures and enhanced the OSCE’s role with wide-ranging provisions on early
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and conflict resolution.

Today, mediation is widely recognized as one of the most effective

means for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts both in
terms of costs and results. Faced with the emergence of new conflicts and
the persistence of protracted conflicts, international and regional organi-
zations resolved to strengthen their capabilities for effective mediation and
dialogue facilitation. In this context, it has been recognized that both me-
diation and dialogue facilitation need to be approached as a professional
activity requiring specialized knowledge, expertise, and operational guid-
ance, as well as sustained political, financial and administrative support.

Within the OSCE, informal discussions among participating States

took place between 2009 and 2011 in the framework of the ‘Corfu Pro-
cess’ and the ‘V to V Dialogues’. These led to the adoption of OSCE Min-
isterial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict Cycle (MC.
DEC/3/11), which, inter alia, tasked the OSCE Secretary General to pre-
pare a proposal on how to maximize the continuity, consistency and effec-
tiveness of OSCE engagement in conflict mediation and to strengthen the
role of OSCE mediators. The Decision also called for the development of

7
 Introduction

a systematic mediation-support capacity within the Secretariat’s Conflict

Prevention Centre (CPC), incorporating four elements: 1) training and ca-
pacity-building, 2) knowledge management and operational guidance, 3)
outreach, networking, co-operation and co-ordination, as well as 4) opera-
tional support. This reference guide contributes to enhancing knowledge
management and operational guidance related to OSCE mediation and dia-
logue facilitation activities.

Furthermore, in July 2011 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly

requested in its resolution 65/283 on ‘Strengthening the role of mediation
in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution’ the
development of guidance for more effective mediation, taking into account,
inter alia, lessons learned from past and ongoing mediation processes. Dur-
ing 2011 and 2012 the UN led a broad consultation process on the develop-
ment of the guidance.

The UN Guidance is a reference document which provides advice to

mediators on the design and effective management of mediation processes.
It gives an outline of the logic of mediation and identifies eight fundamen-
tal principles that mediators and their support staff need to consider. The
Guidance makes it clear that each conflict situation needs to be addressed
within its specific context. Regional organizations can contribute to this by
‘translating’ the general UN Guidance into their regional contexts. There-
fore, the purpose of this reference guide is to provide recommendations
surrounding the eight fundamental principles of the UN Guidance as they
pertain to the OSCE context.

8
 Chapter I: Conceptual
Framework of Mediation and
Dialogue Facilitation in the
OSCE Context

1. OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation

The OSCE originated in the détente phase of the early 1970s, when the Con-
ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) was created as a
multilateral mechanism to facilitate dialogue between the East and West.
After the end of the Cold War and with the increasing shift of attention
from inter-state to intra-state conflicts, participating States gave the CSCE
a broad mandate for early warning, conflict prevention, conflict manage-
ment and post-conflict rehabilitation.

In the 1975 Helsinki Final Act participating States agreed to use nego-
tiation, mediation and conciliation for the peaceful settlement of conflicts.
Further key documents were agreed on, which define the mandate, instru-
ments and mechanisms of the OSCE and its structures throughout all phas-
es of conflict. These include: the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe; the
January 1992 Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE Institu-
tions and Structures; the July 1992 Helsinki Document – The Challenges of
Change; the December 1992 Stockholm Ministerial Council Document; the
1999 Istanbul Charter for European Security; the 2002 Ministerial Council
Decision No. 8 on the Role of the OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office; the 2003

9
 Chapter I

Strategy to Address Threats to Security in the Twenty-First Century; the

2010 Astana Commemorative Declaration – Towards a Security Commu-
nity; and the 2011 Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of
the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE’s Capabilities in Early
Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and
Post-Conflict Rehabilitation. These are in line with the UN General As-
sembly’s resolutions A/RES/65/283 (2011), A/RES/66/291 (2012) and A/
RES/68/303 (2014) on strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful
settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution.

Key definitions

Based on the OSCE Mediation-Support Framework (SEC.GAL/110/13),

this reference guide uses the following broad working definitions of media-
tion and dialogue facilitation.

Mediation: Mediation can be defined as a “structured communication pro-

cess, in which an impartial third party works with conflict parties to find
commonly agreeable solutions to their dispute, in a way that satisfies their
interests at stake.” Mediation processes include four main phases: the pre-
paratory phase for agreeing on negotiations (‘talks-about-talks’), mediated
negotiations, agreement, and implementation.

Dialogue facilitation: The key features of dialogue facilitation are the same
as for mediation. However, dialogue facilitation represents a distinct ap-
proach insofar as it is “a more open-ended communication process between
conflict parties in order to foster mutual understanding, recognition, em-
pathy and trust. These can be one-off conversations, or go on over a longer
period of time. Although dialogues can lead to very concrete decisions and
actions, the primary aim is not to reach a specific settlement, but to gain
a better understanding of the different perspectives involved in a conflict.”

Mediation support: Mediation support is defined as the operational capac-

ity to assist dialogue facilitation and mediation activities. This includes “a

10
 Conceptual Framework

number of accompanying measures that aim to strengthen a mediation ef-

fort.” Operational elements of mediation support may include training and
capacity building; knowledge management and operational guidance; out-
reach, networking, co-operation and co-ordination; and operational sup-
port, including process design.

Mediation support also acknowledges that mediation processes are

team efforts and that they require knowledge, expertise, operational guid-
ance, technical capacity and other forms of resources. Therefore, mediation
support provides a range of services to assist the efforts of high level OSCE
mediators and their teams.

Actors and specific instruments,

mechanisms and procedures
The Chairperson-in-Office (CiO) takes the lead in OSCE activities to prevent,
manage and resolve conflicts in the OSCE area. The CiO can, for example,
establish direct contact with conflict parties and facilitate dialogue and ne-
gotiations. In response to a crisis or to support mediation efforts, the CiO
can appoint Personal or Special Representatives or Envoys. The CiO can also
task the OSCE Secretary General or the Director of the CPC to facilitate dia-
logue in a crisis situation, as was done in 2004 during the political crisis in
Ukraine and in 2010 during the crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Some heads of OSCE field operations are involved in dialogue facilita-

tion and mediation in protracted conflicts or in regional and local disputes.
These efforts may also be conducted by field operation staff on behalf of the
head of mission. Heads of missions and field operation staff also support
Personal/Special Representatives/Envoys of the CiO in their mediation ef-
forts.

The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) engages in

quiet and preventive diplomacy by confidentially facilitating dialogue in
cases of tensions involving national minorities. The Office for Democratic

11
 Chapter I

Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), through its Director and staff, can
also facilitate dialogue on issues related to the OSCE’s human dimension.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) is involved in dialogue fa-

cilitation, especially on the parliamentary level, through the PA President,
her/his Special Representatives and working groups on specific conflicts,
regions or critical issues.

OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation actors work in close co-

ordination with each other based on the principle of respect for their spe-
cific mandates.

Some OSCE mechanisms on the peaceful settlement of disputes avail-

able to the CiO for her/his good offices, mediation and conciliation efforts
include the Valletta Mechanism and the Provisions for an OSCE Concilia-
tion Commission and for Directed Conciliation. Thirty three participating
States acceded to the 1992 Convention of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
CSCE, which established a Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, consisting
of a Conciliation Commission and an Arbitral Tribunal to assist in settling
disputes brought before them by signatory states. Other OSCE mechanisms
and procedures that entail some form of third-party dialogue include the
Mechanism for Consultation and Co-operation as Regards Unusual Military
Activities of the Vienna Document and the Stabilizing Measures for Local-
ized Crisis Situations.

There are also other OSCE mechanisms which can be utilized for the
peaceful settlement of crisis/conflict situations even though they do not
specifically mention the role of a third party. For example, the 2001 Minis-
terial Council Decision No. 3 on Fostering the Role of the OSCE as a Forum
for Political Dialogue (MC(9).DEC/3) allows the Permanent Council (PC)
and the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) to provide a platform for
dialogue, with the FSC providing ‘third party’ expert advice on issues of a
politico-military nature.1

12
 Conceptual Framework

Gender

Both women and men can act as agents for change in conflict and peace-
1

making, but the roles, experiences, needs and interests of women and men
(as well as boys and girls) tend to be different.2 Therefore, if mediators and
conflict parties do not adopt a gender perspective, the process and its out-
come will not be sustainable. It is therefore important that mediators em-
brace a gender perspective from the beginning and throughout all phases
of the process.

Including women leaders, gender experts and women organizations

at all levels and in all phases of the mediation process helps to identify the
gender dimension of substantive issues on the agenda and to incorporate
other critical issues that could possibly be ignored. It will also help to take
into account women’s needs, vulnerabilities, capacities, priorities and in-
terests, therefore rendering the process more inclusive and comprehensive.3
As men and women tend to have different negotiation styles, the inclusion
of women also ensures that a broader set of mediation skills is used in the
process. This can significantly increase the efficiency of the process. At the
same time, the thorough collection of data from both men and women
about the conflict’s impact provides for a more differentiated understand-
ing of substantive issues, which can improve the effectiveness of the process.
Addressing conflict-related patterns of gender-based violence in the process
can also foster a more sustainable peace settlement.

However, owing to persisting stereotypes, women remain the larg-

est group of stakeholders regularly excluded from official negotiation

13
 Chapter I

processes.4 UN Security Council resolution 1325 on ‘Women, Peace and

Security’ from October 2000 therefore called for: an increase in the par-
ticipation of women at decision-making levels in conflict resolution and
peace processes, a gender-sensitive approach to peacebuilding, the pro-
tection of women and girls from gender-based violence and the protection
of their rights and needs during and after armed conflict.5 The OSCE has
also acknowledged the need to enhance women’s participation in peace
negotiations and to promote a gender perspective in mediation and dia-
logue facilitation. Ministerial Council Decision No. 14/05 on Women in
Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation
and Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict
Cycle, among others, urge the Organization and participating States to
ensure the increased participation of women in all phases and at all lev-
els in conflict prevention and resolution. In 2013, the OSCE Secretariat
issued a Guidance Note on Enhancing Gender-Responsive Mediation in
support of this effort.

2. Types of OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation

engagements
The comparative strengths of the OSCE in the area of dialogue facilitation
and mediation stem from its broad mandate for early warning, conflict pre-
vention, conflict management and post-conflict rehabilitation as well as its
wide-ranging membership of 57 participating States. The OSCE has a flex-
ible institutional structure and its consensus-based decision-making pro-
cess gives legitimacy to all OSCE actions.

On this basis, the OSCE has been engaged in mediation and dialogue
facilitation activities since the early 1990s, predominantly in South-Eastern
Europe, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Overall, six

14
 Conceptual Framework

types of OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation engagement can be dis-

tinguished, each requiring a different set of skills, processes and resources:

1.

The OSCE’s engagement in conducting official mediation dates back to 1992.

Since then, OSCE mediation efforts have been carried out within institu-
tionalized negotiation frameworks in three different conflicts, which have
evolved over time:

— The five-sided negotiations and, since 2005, the so-called “5+2”

process on the Transdniestrian settlement;
— The Joint Control Commission for the settlement of the Georgian-
Ossetian conflict and since 2008 the Geneva International
Discussions;
— The Minsk Group process in relation to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.

2.
This type of OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation effort relates to the
prevention, management and resolution of various types of crises and con-
flict situations within participating States, including pre- or post-electoral
crises, civil unrest, inter-ethnic and communal violence, or the breakdown
of law and order. Examples include the crises in Albania in 1997, in the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2001, in Ukraine in 2014 and
in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010. The CiO, his/her Personal and Special
Representatives, the Secretary General, the Director of the CPC, heads of
missions and their field operation staff, the HCNM, the ODIHR and the
OSCE PA have all been involved, either directly by facilitating dialogue or
mediating between the conflict parties, or indirectly by supporting national
and local efforts.

3.
The OSCE is also involved in dialogue facilitation between participating

15
 Chapter I

States. For example, in 2009 the HCNM assisted Hungary and Slovakia in
their dialogue in connection with the promulgation of amendments to Slo-
vakia’s State Language Act. Also in 2009, the HCNM assisted Russia and
Ukraine in their dialogue on the educational situation of their kin-minor-
ities.

4. Facilitating dialogue to foster the inclusion of national

minorities in state institutions
-
-

5.

and mediation
The OSCE’s involvement in dialogue facilitation at the local level is main-
ly carried out by OSCE field operations, for example, in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan. Past activities have included the facilitation of inter-communal
dialogue, the facilitation of dialogue between local authorities and minority
communities and capacity building for local mediation and dialogue mech-
anisms. These all have the long-term goal of transforming relationships be-
tween stakeholders, facilitating reconciliation and preventing new conflict.

16
 Conceptual Framework

6.

Heads of missions and field operation staff also facilitate, sometimes with
the support of specialized international NGOs, informal engagements to
build trust between representatives of the conflict parties. The OSCE’s me-
diation efforts in the protracted conflicts have, in the case of Moldova and
Georgia, been complemented by confidence-building measures (CBMs)6.
These measures have been proposed, planned, supported and facilitated by
OSCE field operations together with the co-mediators, observers and do-
nors, and jointly carried out with the conflict parties.

Some OSCE field missions have supported dialogue activities that seek
to include civil society and vulnerable groups in the broader settlement
processes. These processes have aimed at solving problems at the technical
level, for example by developing ideas for the official negotiation process.

3. Mediation and dialogue facilitation in different

phases of the conflict cycle
Mediation and dialogue facilitation are instruments that can be used in all
phases of the OSCE conflict cycle. The role of the mediators and their ap-
proaches and strategies will depend on the specific phase.

Conflict prevention

Conflicts can be most effectively dealt with at an early stage, i.e. before
they escalate into violence and become complex or entrenched. In the early
phase of an emerging conflict, mediation and dialogue facilitation can be ef-
fective, as they are flexible and relatively cost-effective tools that can bridge
the gap between early warning and early action. Preventive diplomacy can
include efforts by high-ranking diplomats or politicians from international

17
 Chapter I

organizations or states – often taking the form of quiet diplomacy and shut-
tle diplomacy – as well as the efforts of non-governmental organizations
and eminent individuals. The earlier preventive efforts are undertaken, the
better the chances for successful prevention.

In 1994, the HCNM engaged in intensive preventive diplomacy efforts in

Ukraine by facilitating dialogue between the Ukrainian central Government
and Crimean authorities, as the latter of which were demanding unification
with Russia. The efforts of the HCNM, supported by the then OSCE Mis-
sion to Ukraine (currently an OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine) led in
1995-1996 to a compromise solution on the autonomy of Crimea.

Conflict management

Once a conflict has escalated into violence, shuttle diplomacy to reduce

tension and ultimately end violence takes place, and ceasefire negotiations
become a priority. Opportunities for talks among conflict parties, where
conflict causes can be addressed, need to be identified during the conflict
management phase. OSCE mediation and dialogue facilitation can use in-
formal efforts to encourage the parties to (re-)start political negotiations;
to build trust between the conflict parties; and to build national and local
ownership, including that of civil society, over the subsequent phase of me-
diated negotiations.

Formal mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts of the then Swedish Chair
of the OSCE’s Minsk Group and the Russian Federation led to the signing
on 12 May 1994 of the ceasefire agreement between the Defence Ministers
of Armenia and Azerbaijan and the commander of the armed formations
of Nagorno-Karabakh. The ceasefire agreement was a result of intensive
shuttle diplomacy and the use of a partially power-based, directive media-
tion approach.

18
 Conceptual Framework

Conflict resolution

Mediation typically begins with extensive pre-negotiations during which

the framework of the negotiations, including the principal agenda, process
and main participants are agreed on. Depending on the context, formal
processes profit from the support of informal efforts. The latter can, for in-
stance, help to restart official negotiations after breakdowns or deadlocks
by building confidence, strengthening relationships and generating ideas for
formal political negotiations. The longer a conflict persists, the more com-
plex the set of issues and actors, and the more numerous the third parties
engaged in mediation and dialogue facilitation tend to become.

The settlement process of the Transdniestrian conflict in Moldova consists

of formal political negotiations in the so-called “5+2” format. The ‘five’ con-
sist of the co-mediators (the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine) and the sides to
the conflict (Moldova and Transdniestria). The ‘two’ consist of the observ-
ers (the European Union (EU) and the United States (US)). The format also
includes joint working groups that bring together the sides in order to build
confidence. This format is accompanied and supported by informal efforts
facilitated by international and national non-governmental organizations
with the political, financial and sometimes operational support of the OSCE
and/or individual participating States.

Post-conflict rehabilitation

During the implementation of agreements, formal mediation efforts may

need to continue to help resolve possible disputes that may arise from the
implementation itself. This is critical so as to avoid a breakdown of the
agreement or a relapse into violent conflict. Informal engagements can also
be used as complementary mechanisms in this phase with a view to ensur-
ing a transition to long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation. Communi-
ties can also be engaged in third-party-supported dialogue processes in or-
der to facilitate the implementation process and to peacefully address any
additional issues that may emerge.

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 Chapter I

Following the large-scale ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in June

2010, a third-party-supported dialogue process was established by the
OSCE to facilitate and assist inter-ethnic dialogue and post-conflict recon-
ciliation between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities. It was designed around
four complementary and interdependent platforms for dialogue: religion,
youth, women, and economic factors. Each platform aimed at bringing to-
gether and building trust between members of the two communities to try
to bridge some of the ethnic divides. The dialogue process was meant as a
short-term intervention to reduce the level of individual and collective ag-
gression between the communities as well as to address needs stemming
from the post-conflict setting.

4. Limits of Mediation and Dialogue Facilitation

Despite their potential to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, mediation

and dialogue facilitation have a number of limitations.

Readiness of the parties to negotiate

Given their voluntary character, the success or failure of mediation and

dialogue facilitation depends foremost on the conflict parties themselves.
They need to be open to a negotiated settlement of the conflict, agree to
third-party mediation, commit to the process, negotiate in good faith and
have the political will to reach and implement agreements. In the absence of
such political will, the possibilities for meaningful mediation and dialogue
facilitation are very limited.

Third parties will need to approach the conflict parties in a consistent

and co-ordinated manner. International and regional organizations may not
be unified in applying the necessary measures to provide conflict parties
with positive and negative incentives to accept mediation. There are also
cases where ‘insider’ mediators or non-governmental groups have fostered
the readiness of the parties to enter into negotiations. If conflict parties are
not ready to engage in mediation, third parties can only try other means to

20
 Conceptual Framework

foster trust between the parties, such as CBMs, while in parallel continu-
ing to offer their services as mediators and trying to convince the parties of
the need to negotiate.

External actors

The lack of unity of purpose to support a mediation process at the region-

al and international levels may limit its success. Competition among the
main international stakeholders as well as unilateral actions by neighbour-
ing states and regional powers might reduce the commitment of conflict
parties to negotiate in good faith and encourage them to play third parties
against each other. For the OSCE, a lack of consensus among participating
States in the Permanent Council limits the potential of mediation engage-
ments. It also significantly limits the amount of financial, human and other
resources required by the OSCE to support the process.

Outcome

Any peace agreement negotiated by the conflict parties with the help of
mediators has to respect relevant international legal obligations, especial-
ly international humanitarian law, international human rights and refugee
law, and international criminal law. Most importantly, mediators cannot
endorse peace agreements that include sweeping amnesties for genocide,
crimes against humanity, war crimes or gross violations of human rights,
including sexual and gender-based violence.7 Therefore, the accepted out-
come of the mediation or dialogue facilitation process may be limited by
these restrictions.

Do no harm

Like any external intervention, international mediation and dialogue fa-

cilitation have consequences. To minimize negative side effects, OSCE

21
 Chapter I

mediators and dialogue facilitators should be guided by the ‘Do No Harm’

principle in the planning, implementation, and evaluation of their activities.
‘Do No Harm’ requires the mediator to avoid conducting the process in a
way that causes harm to the conflict parties, including women and other
stakeholders, or in a way that exacerbates the conflict.

External mediators can do harm in many ways, usually unintentionally

through lack of proper assessment. Experience has shown that a perceived
lack of impartiality, for example through a badly timed engagement with a
weaker conflict party, can exacerbate existing tensions between parties. The
promotion of CBMs that make the status quo more bearable for the parties
can also contribute to the unwillingness of the parties to negotiate a final
settlement. If CBMs are not carried out jointly they risk deepening the di-
vide between the conflict parties.

Unintended negative effects of mediation and dialogue facilitation ef-

forts can be minimized by implementing a conflict sensitive approach ac-
cording to the ‘Do No Harm’ principle. This includes maintaining a thor-
ough and continuous analysis of the conflict and the impact of the OSCE
mediator’s activities, as well as continuously adapting the mediation strat-
egy in accordance with the impact assessment.

5. Professional support to mediation and dialogue

facilitation
International mediators are faced with a multitude of new challenges. They
have to deal with a variety of highly complex substantive issues for which
they require extensive specialized expertise. This requires systematic sup-
port for mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts throughout all phases
of a conflict. Mediators also need to aim for comprehensive settlements
and mobilize international support for their implementation. They need to
respond to the growing demands of civil society and ensure the participa-
tion of underrepresented groups in peace processes. Mediators also have
to ensure respect for international legal norms and principles related to the

22
 Conceptual Framework

protection of human rights and for international criminal justice through-

out the process8.

To help meet these challenges, international and regional organiza-

tions, such as the UN, the EU and the OSCE, have recognized the need to
improve the effectiveness of their mediation efforts. The analysis of past
and ongoing mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts brought these or-
ganizations to very similar conclusions. They all recognized the need to
provide their mediators with expert support, with an emphasis on helping
mediators make peace processes more inclusive, especially with regard to
the participation of women and civil society, and on strengthening national
and local mediation capacities. They all acknowledged the importance of
developing co-operation, co-ordination and partnerships among interna-
tional, regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as with NGOs and
other actors involved in mediation.

To increase the effectiveness of mediation, several organizations cre-

ated specific mediation-support structures. In 2006, the UN Secretary Gen-
eral (UNSG) established a Mediation Support Unit in the Department of
Political Affairs and, in 2008, created a Standby Team of Mediation Experts
deployable within three days in support of UN mediation efforts. In 2009,
the Council of the EU adopted a Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation
and Dialogue Capacities. In 2011, a Mediation Support Team was created
within the European External Action Service.

Within the OSCE, discussions on strengthening the effectiveness of

OSCE mediation efforts were part of the informal consultations held among
participating States between 2009 and 2011 in the framework of the ‘Corfu
Process’ and the ‘V to V Dialogues’. These consultations aimed at strength-
ening OSCE capabilities in conflict prevention, conflict management
and post-conflict rehabilitation. They led to the adoption, in December
2011, of Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on Elements of the Conflict

23
 Chapter I

Cycle (MC.DEC/3/11), the most comprehensive OSCE decision taken on

the conflict cycle since the 1992 Helsinki Document. MC Decision No. 3/11
thus created the basis for maximizing OSCE engagement in mediation and
dialogue facilitation through (1) the designation of a mediation-support fo-
cal point within the CPC; (2) the development of a systematic mediation-
support capacity within the CPC; and (3) the strengthening of the role of
OSCE mediators at all levels.

The OSCE Secretary General subsequently appointed as mediation-

support focal point the CPC’s Operations Service, which assumed the re-
sponsibility to implement activities related to mediation support in close
consultation and co-operation with the CPC’s Policy Support Service and
other executive structures. This includes training and capacity building;
knowledge management and operational guidance; outreach, networking,
co-operation with other mediation actors; and operational support.

24
25
26
 Chapter II: Reference Guide
on Effective Mediation and
Dialogue Facilitation in the
OSCE Area

The references included in this chapter do not provide an exhaustive over-

view of all possible scenarios and challenges or options available to OSCE
mediators and dialogue facilitators. They should, therefore, be applied with
common sense and judgment, according to the specific circumstances in
which a concrete dispute develops and OSCE mediation and dialogue fa-
cilitation efforts are undertaken.

This chapter provides recommendations for OSCE mediators and their

teams on how to tackle each phase of the mediation cycle (pre-negotia-
tion, negotiation and implementation). Highlights from the UN Guidance
for Effective Mediation are used as a reference followed by OSCE specific
ideas on how to put the UN guidance into practice through existing OSCE
mechanism, tools and processes.

27
 1. Preparedness

Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on preparedness:

— Commit resources to respond rapidly and to sustain support for the

mediation process, including deployment of personnel on a continuous ba-
sis for medium- and long-term engagements.

— Select a competent mediator with the experience, skills, knowledge

and cultural sensitivity for the specific conflict situation. The mediator
should be considered objective, impartial and authoritative and be a per-
son of integrity. The mediator needs a level of seniority and gravitas com-
mensurate to the conflict context and must be acceptable to the parties.

— Reinforce the mediator with a team of specialists, particularly experts

in the design of mediation processes, country/regional specialists and legal
advisers, as well as with logistics, administrative and security support. The-
matic experts should be deployed as required.

— Undertake conflict analysis and regular internal assessments of the

process in order to make adjustments to the mediation strategies as needed.

— Provide proper preparation, induction and training to mediators and

their teams. All team members should understand the gender dimension
of their respective areas of expertise.

— Include a balance of men and women on mediation teams. This also

sends a positive signal to the parties with regard to the composition of their
delegations.

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 Reference Guide

Conflict analysis

The first step in preparing for mediation or dialogue facilitation is a sys-

tematic analysis of the conflict. This analysis should be comprehensive and
geared towards helping the mediation team develop a well-informed me-
diation strategy. The aim of an initial analysis is to gain an understanding of
the conflict, in particular, its history and current phase as well as key causes
and actors. In order to gain a comprehensive picture of the conflict, the
sources of information used need to be comprehensive and balanced. It is
particularly important to reach out to women in the analysis phase in order
to ensure that the views of women on all sides of the conflict are included.
The conflict analysis will enable the mediator to decide with whom and on
what level to engage, on which issues to concentrate, how to gain the nec-
essary leverage and how to design the subsequent process.

Conflict analysis, however, has to be a continuous effort throughout

all phases of a mediation process so as to understand the changing dynam-
ics. This allows the mediator to adapt or correct the strategy as necessary,
to identify ‘windows of opportunity’, to foresee possible developments, to
design contingency plans and to quickly react to new developments. The
analysis should be kept strictly confidential to avoid it being leaked and used
against the mediator by intransigent actors.

Actors
Actors comprise the individuals, groups (including sub-groups) and institu-
tions which contribute to conflict and/or are affected by it in a positive or
negative manner. This part of the analysis should focus first on the actors
directly involved in the conflict, i.e. the conflict parties and their stated po-
sitions as well as their interests and underlying needs with regard to the is-
sues at stake (see below). Attention should be paid to the kind of resources
actors can leverage, the actual/potential impact of their actions on the con-
flict setting, the scale of their support and power, their internal structures,
as well as their leadership structures, including groups more willing to ne-
gotiate and intransigent groups. The balance of power within and between

29
 Chapter II

the conflict parties, their relationships, i.e. the level of mistrust, interaction
and communication on different levels, as well as potential overlaps of in-
terests should be analysed.

It is equally important to make sure that the analysis covers the key
actors on all relevant levels. The analysis should not only focus on formal
actors but also take account of civil society actors, business communities,
women’s and youth organizations or faith-based groups which have a stake
in the conflict and could be potential partners or spoilers in the framework
of the mediation process. The analysis should also cover actors that may
not be directly involved in the conflict but have the means to influence the
situation, for instance through specific relations with the conflict parties.
It is therefore highly advisable to take a close look at neighbouring states,
regional and global powers as well as international governmental and non-
governmental organizations. Such examination should include the level and
nature of their interests in the conflict and/or its resolution, the leverage
they may hold on the conflict parties (or some of their factions), and their
own mediation efforts.

Causes and issues

If possible, the analysis should focus on framing the conflict and identifying
the key issues disputed between the conflict parties. In addition, it should
identify the most important structural (root) causes of the conflict, and any
proximate causes that have served or could serve as conflict drivers or ac-
celerators. This is important to ensure a thorough understanding of what
exactly is contested, to trace the history of different issues and to grasp the
significance of specific conflict dynamics. The gender dimension of key is-
sues as well as structural and proximate causes needs to be assessed. The
analysis of conflict causes and issues should also be used to make a closer
examination of possible mitigating factors and issues that could be lever-
aged to bridge divisions between the conflict parties.

An inclusive conflict analysis will always be a mixture of desk research

and fact-finding through personal consultations, discussions, and inter-

30
 Reference Guide

views. To gain a good understanding of the conflict, the analysis should be

based on information from the broadest possible set of interlocutors and a
wide range of reliable sources.

Forming a mediation team

The next step for the mediator is to form a team. The role of the team is to
support the OSCE mediator and ensure that the process is professionally
and effectively implemented. The mediator can also consider appointing
a chief of staff to manage operational issues on the mediator’s behalf. The
OSCE mediation team should minimally include the following expertise:
political analysis and strategy; mediation processes and tactical questions;
inclusivity and gender strategy; administration and logistics; security; and
media relations. Expertise in relevant thematic areas, such as constitutions,
security sector reform, national minorities, power sharing, cultural herit-
age, and natural resources, can be included on a long- or short-term basis
over the course of the process.

It is advisable for the mediator to draw on expertise from the OSCE

structures, including the country-specific expertise provided by experts
from field operations and the regional desks within the CPC’s Policy Sup-
port Service. Participating States may also be approached to second experts
to the team. The Mediation Support Team within the CPC’s Operations
Service is available to support process design and provide specialized the-
matic expertise, upon request. Thematic expertise can also be drawn from
within the HCNM’s office and ODIHR. Due consideration must be given
to gender balance in the mediation team, as well as cultural and linguistic
skills.

The mediator can also request that her/his team be trained and/or
coached upon appointment to ensure that the team becomes fully function-
al as swiftly as possible. Such training and coaching also provides a team-
building function, helping the new team to learn to work together quickly.

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 Chapter II

Choosing a venue

The choice of meeting venue is important to the process. The venue of nego-
tiations should be selected carefully and done in a way that it contributes to
building confidence between the parties. The venue should also facilitate a
setting that is conducive to open discussions and full concentration on sub-
stantive negotiations. Breakout rooms should be available at all times. The
venue must also be a safe place where the security of all participants can be
guaranteed. In the case of intra-state conflicts, if no safe venue can be found
inside the country, negotiations need to be held abroad. The venue of nego-
tiations often also has a significant symbolic meaning for the conflict parties.

The neutrality of the venue can take different forms. Negotiations can
be held in the conflict country, for example, in the offices of an OSCE field
presence or at the embassy of the country holding the Chairmanship. If the
conflict takes place in the territory of two or more countries, negotiations
could rotate between neutral venues in the territories controlled by the
conflict parties.

Low security concerns and the availability of neutral venues in the territo-
ries controlled by the conflict parties have made it possible to rotate meet-
ings in the Transdniestrian settlement process. Meetings at the level of the
political leadership, political representatives and technical experts have
taken place both in the Moldovan capital, Chisinau, and the administrative
centre of Transdniestria, Tiraspol. The meetings in Tiraspol are held in an
office of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and, in Chisinau, the meetings are
held either in the office of the OSCE Mission, the embassies of the Russian
Federation, Ukraine or the US, or in the office of the EU Delegation.

If security or political-symbolic concerns cannot be overcome, other

solutions for a neutral venue need to be identified. These could be neutral
venues in a location considered by all conflict parties as jointly controlled,
in a no-man’s-land between the territories controlled by the conflict par-
ties, or in a venue abroad.

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 Reference Guide

Negotiations within the Joint Constitutional Commission of Moldovan and

Transdniestrian representatives were delayed by several months in 2003
because the conflict parties could not agree on a venue for the talks. The
Moldovan side demanded that meetings take place in the Moldovan Par-
liament in Chisinau as they considered it to be the only legitimate national
legislative organ in Moldova. The Transdniestrian side demanded that the
tradition of rotating meetings between Chisinau and Tiraspol be continued.
A compromise was found when the OSCE Mission to Moldova opened an
OSCE office in Bender for the purpose of holding Joint Constitutional Com-
mission meetings. According to the July 1992 Moscow Agreement, Bender
is a city that is under the joint control of the conflict parties and also serves
as the seat of the Joint Control Commission (JCC), which oversees the Se-
curity Zone between the sides.

After the August 2008 war in Georgia, the security and political-symbol-
ic concerns of the Georgian Government and the South Ossetian de fac-
to authorities made it impossible to hold rotating meetings between the
territories controlled by the conflict parties, as was done in earlier phases
of the settlement process. The meetings of the Incident Prevention and Re-
sponse Mechanism (IPRM) – co-facilitated by the EU Monitoring Mission
to Georgia (EUMM) and the OSCE – were moved to a no-man’s-land at
the village of Ergneti, located between checkpoints of the conflict parties’
territories. At the same time, it was necessary for the meetings of the Ge-
neva International Discussions – co-facilitated by the EU, the UN and the
OSCE – to take place outside of the territory of Georgia, at the UN prem-
ises in Geneva.

Holding negotiations abroad, however, carries the risk that represent-

atives of the conflict parties may lose contact with realities on the ground.
This could result in representatives negotiating exclusively on the basis of
the leadership’s interests. Therefore, negotiations should be taken back to
the conflict country as often as possible to enable parties to report back to
and consult with their constituencies, and thus to undergo a ‘reality check’.

33
 Chapter II

Whether abroad or in the conflict country, the negotiation venue

needs to be accessible to all participants and provide space for meetings,
including confidential side meetings, as well as separate spaces for the con-
flict parties and the mediators. It must also have all necessary security and
office infrastructure and possess functional communication equipment to
enable the conflict parties to quickly report back to their political leader-
ships and receive guidance. Special cultural and religious needs should also
be considered.

Meetings are normally organized by an appointed host. As the ba-

sic functions of mediators include hosting, arranging and support-
ing meetings, they are responsible for identifying and preparing a ven-
ue for the meeting and any related activities. This includes ensuring
the availability of sufficient funding, preparing all logistical elements,
and providing administrative staff, transportation and security. The
host thus plays an important role and provides leverage in the process.

Financial planning
Mediation and dialogue facilitation are relatively cost effective means to
resolve conflicts. However, when considering a mediation role, the OSCE
needs to ensure the availability of sufficient funds before engaging. The me-
diator will have to make a thorough estimation of costs, including the cost
of staff in the mediation team, travel, meeting venues and special events in
the framework of negotiations.

In joint mediation efforts, where several mediators co-operate and all

third parties have the right to convene meetings and organize special events,
the costs of the process can be shared. An international mediator working
alone will need to ensure considerably more funding. Mediators can also
request financial and other support from international third parties, such
as interested participating States.

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 Reference Guide

In all three of its mediation efforts related to protracted conflicts – the

Transdniestrian settlement process, the Geneva International Discussion
and the Minsk Group process –- the OSCE shares the costs with several
co-mediators, co-facilitators, and observers as well as other participants
and sponsors. In the Transdniestrian settlement process, the host of any
negotiation meeting or of any special event usually covers all related costs
with the exception of travel and accommodation for the co-mediators and
co-observers. Other OSCE participating States have funded specific events
in the framework of the settlement process. For example, Germany hosted
and funded several large CBM conferences, which were held to review pro-
gress and problems in the CBM working groups as part of the “5+2” pro-
cess. In another instance, Finland hosted and funded a workshop for par-
ticipants of the Transdniestrian settlement process on European autonomy
regulations.

The mediator will also need to ensure substantial financial, material

and other resources for the parties to implement the agreement. The me-
diator and her/his team may also need to stay engaged and participate in
monitoring. They will need to make a detailed calculation of the costs of
implementation and the resources required. Based on these calculations,
the participating States and organizations can be approached to request
funding.

Within the OSCE, there are several possible ways to fund mediation
and dialogue facilitation efforts, as well as activities undertaken during the
implementation of the agreement. Field operations, OSCE institutions and
units of the Secretariat prepare budgets for anticipated mediation and di-
alogue facilitation efforts during the yearly Unified Budget Process. The
Chairmanship does the same with regard to the Chairmanship Fund, which
is also part of the OSCE’s Unified Budget. However, the government of the
rotating OSCE Chairmanship reserves additional funds in its national state
budget for activities related to its OSCE Chairmanship, which could also
potentially be allocated to mediation activities.

35
 Chapter II

There are three options for field operations, institutions and Secretari-
at units to request and receive additional funding from participating States.
Upon the request of the Secretary General and a decision of the Permanent
Council, additional funding can be provided on an interim basis from the
OSCE Contingency Fund. This funding is for the initial implementation of
a new OSCE activity that has been agreed by the Permanent Council but
cannot exceed 25 per cent of its estimated costs. A subsequent decision on
a Supplementary Budget needs to be taken by the Permanent Council to
cover the remaining costs of the new activity and to replenish the Contin-
gency Fund. Alternatively, a field operation, institution or Secretariat unit
can request a Supplementary Budget immediately, without use of the Con-
tingency Fund. Finally, extra-budgetary funding can be requested directly
from those participating States interested in donating to an extra-budgetary
project that has been developed by an OSCE structure.

In response to the political crisis in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in April 2010, the

OSCE Centre in Bishkek was granted approval by the Permanent Coun-
cil for the use of the OSCE Contingency Fund to immediately implement
a number of emergency support measures. After the crisis in Southern
Kyrgyzstan erupted in June 2010, the Permanent Council approved a Sup-
plementary Budget for further response activities of the Centre in Bishkek,
including funds to strengthen local capacities in early warning, conflict
prevention and conflict resolution, as well as to replenish the Contingen-
cy Fund. When, in November 2010, the Permanent Council approved the
concept of the OSCE Community Security Initiative in Kyrgyzstan (CSI)
as another response to the crisis, the necessary additional funds were se-
cured through extra-budgetary contributions from a number of participat-
ing States which donated financial resources to an extra-budgetary project
developed by the Centre in Bishkek.

36
 2. Consent

Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on consent:

— Understand whose consent is necessary for a viable mediation process

to start. If only some of the conflict parties have agreed to the mediation,
the mediator may need to engage with the consenting parties and gradually
expand the consent base.

— Cultivate consent, in order to create the space for, and a good under-
standing of, mediation. Informal contacts allow parties to test the waters
without committing to a fully-fledged mediation process; this can help ad-
dress possible fears or insecurities.

— Use confidence- building measures at different stages to build trust

between the conflict parties and between the mediator and the parties, as
well as confidence in the mediation process.

— Be consistent, transparent and even-handed in managing the media-

tion process, and respect confidentiality.

— Periodically assess whether the process has sufficient consent and be

prepared for fluxes in consent throughout the mediation, working to bring
the conflict parties back into the process and drawing on the influence of
their backers or other third parties as appropriate.

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 Chapter II

Mandate to mediate

A clear mandate is mandatory for OSCE mediation efforts. All OSCE struc-
tures, institutions and field operations are strictly guided by the respect for
their mandates, which have been formally agreed by participating States
through decisions of OSCE Summits, Ministerial Councils or the Perma-
nent Council. The formal character of these mandates gives clout to media-
tion and dialogue facilitation engagement.

However, OSCE mandates are not formulated so specifically that they

necessarily indicate mediation and/or dialogue facilitation as specific tools
to be used in their implementation. Instead, mandates are phrased in broad
terms and define overall objectives with the aim of providing strategic and
practical guidance. Thus, they are written in a way that avoids reducing the
flexibility to use a broad range of tools for mandate implementation, in-
cluding mediation and/or dialogue facilitation. For example, the mandates
of field operations established to deal with specific conflicts include such
phrasing as: to “facilitate a lasting comprehensive political settlement of the
conflict in all its aspects”9; or to assist “the parties to the conflict in pursuing
negotiations on a lasting political settlement of the conflict”10. The formal
mandates from participating States are then usually reconfirmed in joint
statements, protocols or decisions of the conflict parties, thus ensuring ac-
ceptance of the OSCE as a mediator.

For OSCE mediators to be able to fulfil their mandates, a functional re-

lationship with the host country is of utmost importance. In intra-state con-
flicts, there is an asymmetry between the conflict parties as the government
side is an OSCE participating State able to withdraw consensus on further
OSCE engagement. However, access to and regular contact with non-state
actors involved in intra-state conflicts are basic conditions for successful

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 Reference Guide

OSCE dialogue facilitation efforts. OSCE mediators, therefore, need to act

with the utmost care and sensitivity with regard to the form, frequency and
content of their interaction with non-state conflict parties.

In situations when a newly emerging dispute does not explicitly lie

within the mandate of an existing field operation, relations with the host
country government are a decisive factor in enabling OSCE dialogue fa-
cilitation activities. In some cases, a relationship of trust between the host
country government and a field operation or a specific head of mission has
led participating States to formally accept or informally acquiesce to a dia-
logue facilitation role for a field operation regarding a dispute that was not
explicitly covered by its mandate.

When disputes erupted between the central Government of the Republic of

Moldova and the authorities of the autonomous region of Gagauzia in 1999
and 2000, Moldova accepted the temporary dialogue facilitation role of the
OSCE Mission to Moldova. In December 2000, after intensive shuttle diplo-
macy, the Mission organized a workshop with high-ranking representatives
of the Moldovan Government and Parliament, and the Executive Commit-
tee and People’s Assembly of Gagauzia during which existing disputes were
discussed and possible compromise solutions developed.

Timing of mediation

The ultimate decision as to whether the OSCE can engage in mediation or

dialogue facilitation depends first and foremost on the willingness of the
conflict parties to negotiate and to accept the OSCE as mediator or facili-
tator. The OSCE will have to assess, as part of the conflict analysis, whether
the conflict is ready to be mediated. The mediator can help the conflict
parties recognize that there is a negotiated way out of hostilities and a mu-
tually acceptable solution to their dispute. For mediation to have a chance
to succeed, the leadership of the parties must have enough cohesion and
support for compromise solutions within their own political structures and
populations.

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 Chapter II

To understand whether the parties are ready to negotiate, objective in-

dicators need to be identified. These include increasing political, economic,
financial or human losses or indicative changes in leadership or allies. Fur-
thermore, an assessment needs to be made as to whether the conflict par-
ties perceive a possibility for compromise solutions to their disputes and
feel confident that they have the necessary support within their structures
and constituencies to engage in negotiations.11 If not, an assessment of what
the OSCE could do to increase the readiness of the parties to negotiate is
required.

The mediator can also encourage or initiate CBMs between the conflict
parties. If negotiations on substantive issues are not yet accepted, consulta-
tions on CBMs might be a possible way to explore non-politicized areas of
common interest. In such consultations, the aim is to encourage the parties
to co-operate in a mutually benefitting way. This will result in the improve-
ment of relations and trust between the conflict parties, which is necessary
to advance to negotiations on substance at a later stage.12

The OSCE Mission in Moldova initiated and supported CBMs between the
Moldovan Government and Transdniestrian de facto authorities to over-
come the resistance of the conflict parties to negotiate and to strengthening
mutual trust so as to allow the talks to (re) start. Such measures were used
both before the initial start of settlement negotiations in 1994 and after a
major breakdown of the process in 2006.

If none of these options work, the mediator can identify incentives

with which to encourage the parties to negotiate. Such incentives could in-
clude diplomatic pressure, and legal, economic and financial measures. In
some extreme cases, military measures may be used but only if mandated
by the UN Security Council. There are a few positive incentives the OSCE

40
 Reference Guide

can offer, such as co-operation, advice and expertise. The OSCE can also
make use of the support of its participating States to provide incentives, if
required.

The Economic Rehabilitation Programme in the zone of the Georgian-Os-

setian conflict was initiated by the OSCE to build trust through economic
co-operation and create conditions for the restart of negotiations. It ran for
two years, from 2006 to 2008. The European Commission as well as several
OSCE participating States funded the programme.

In support of the OSCE’s mediation efforts in the Transdniestrian conflict

in Moldova in 2005, the EU deployed the Border Assistance Mission to
Ukraine and Moldova (EUBAM). Its goal was to help provide transparency
on the flow of goods and to fight smuggling over the Transdniestrian sec-
tor of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, which is not under the control of
the Moldovan Government. The possibility to profit from EU asymmetric
trade preferences motivated many Transdniestrian enterprises to legalize
their foreign trade under Moldovan law and thus to reintegrate into the
Moldovan legal and economic space.

Should none these efforts be successful in convincing the conflict par-

ties to agree to negotiations, it is necessary to revert to a ‘policy of position-
ing’. This means the mediator uses every opportunity to remind the conflict
parties of the increasing costs and losses caused by continued conflict, the
advantages of a peaceful settlement, the need to start negotiations and the
existence of feasible, mutually acceptable compromise solutions, as well as
the mediator’s continued readiness and availability.13

The mediator must always analyse the reasons why the parties agree
to negotiate so as to determine their commitment to the process. Parties
may agree to mediation in an attempt to gain time or to receive third party
confirmation of their positions and instrumentalize the mediation efforts

41
 Chapter II

for other aims. If the parties lack real commitment to the process, the suc-
cess of the mediation will be unlikely.

Selecting a mediator

Next, a decision needs to be taken as to whether and, if so, how to en-

gage in mediation or dialogue facilitation. Depending on the nature of the
conflict several roles might be appropriate for the OSCE. These would be
determined based on: an assessment of the OSCE’s comparative advantage;
the credibility and the acceptance of the OSCE as a mediator to the
conflict parties; the political support of participating States; the mandate
of an OSCE institution or field operation; the agreement of a host coun-
try government and key regional powers; and the available financial
resources.

If the above conditions indicate the possibility for a more direct ap-
proach, the OSCE has different options for involvement, and an assess-
ment of the most appropriate option is needed. Options can include: 1)
the involvement of the CiO, 2) the nomination of a CiO Personal/Special
Representative or Envoy to facilitate dialogue or mediate on behalf of the
Chairmanship, 3) the nomination of the Secretary General or the Director
of the CPC to facilitate dialogue or mediate on behalf of the Chairmanship,
4) the involvement of the HCNM or the Director of ODIHR, 5) mediation/
dialogue facilitation by the head of a field operation and mission staff, 6)
the establishment by the Permanent Council of a new field operation whose
head of mission is tasked to mediate 7) dialogue facilitation efforts of the
OSCE PA, or 8) joint mediation efforts with other organizations and/or
participating States.

If direct involvement is not politically feasible, the OSCE and its insti-
tutions or field operations can consider taking on an indirect role in support
of the process. Such roles include: 1) political support to the mediation ef-
forts; 2) technical assistance to the efforts, and 3) financial support.

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 Reference Guide

Due to sensitivities regarding a direct OSCE role following the June 2010
crisis in Southern Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek expanded its
technical assistance and financial support to local mediation teams in the
Osh and Jalal-Abad Provinces and in Osh City. The OSCE support was de-
livered through two experienced local NGOs and in co-operation with lo-
cal authorities, and was designed to help prevent and address inter-ethnic
disputes and resolve tensions with law-enforcement organs.

When an institutional decision has been made to engage in mediation,

a lead mediator will be selected and appointed. The mediator must be ac-
ceptable to the main parties of the conflict. In addition, the mediator should
possess certain qualities and skills in order to be able to mediate successfully.
The mediator should be clear and honest with the conflict parties. The me-
diator should establish a clear framework for the talks including rules and
principles for negotiation. The mediator should also prepare the conflict
parties for a difficult process which may progress slowly and experience
possible setbacks. The mediator should act consistently and predictably, and
communicate accurately. The mediator should also show serious commit-
ment to the process and a fair outcome, and consult parties and stakeholder
groups actively and inclusively.

The OSCE mediator and her/his team should also prepare diligently
for the process and for each meeting with the parties as well as demonstrate
good knowledge of the conflict and the context within which the conflict
is taking place. The mediator should also have sufficient knowledge of the
country and the region. Mediation requires careful, emphatic listening and
taking the interests and needs of all stakeholders equally seriously. Media-
tors should give honest feedback and not only tell the parties what they
want to hear. The mediator should never make false promises. He/she has
to respect confidentiality while being transparent about his/her own ac-
tivity, show respect for cultural differences and demonstrate inter-cultural
competency.

43
 3. Impartiality

Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on impartiality:

— Ensure and seek to demonstrate that the process and the treatment of
the parties are fair and balanced, including through an effective communi-
cations strategy.

— Be transparent with the conflict parties regarding the laws and norms
that guide their involvement.

— Do not accept conditions for support from external parties that would
affect the impartiality of the process.

— Avoid association with punitive measures against conflict parties by

other actors and minimize public criticism of the parties as much as pos-
sible, while maintaining frank exchanges in private.

— Handover to another mediator, or mediating entity, if you feel unable

to maintain a balanced and impartial approach.

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 Reference Guide

Building credibility and managing impartiality

Mediation and dialogue facilitation are voluntary processes and depend on

the consent of the conflict parties. This is why the mediator must build good
relations with all conflict parties and earn their trust. Such efforts will have
to continue throughout all phases of the mediation process. In this regard,
the mediator’s seniority, experience, skills and conduct are decisive.

The credibility of the mediator also depends on the credibility and

reputation of the organization she/he represents and the international and
domestic support he/she can muster for the mediation efforts. For an or-
ganization like the OSCE which has few incentives to offer, impartiality is
the central resource in terms of building and maintaining credibility.

Being impartial, however, does not mean being neutral. The OSCE and
its representatives undertake their efforts on the basis of OSCE principles
and commitments and the norms of international law. Impartiality means
even-handed conduct by the mediator towards the conflict parties.

Impartiality is often difficult to manage. Even when mediators follow

all good standards of conduct, they will inevitably face accusations of bias
and partiality. Such accusations can be part of the conflict parties’ tactics
aiming at scoring points with the public, or at putting pressure on or trying
to discredit the mediator. Mediation requires a high degree of perseverance
as well as self-reflection to differentiate between tactical accusations of bias
and serious concerns about impartiality.

Throughout their mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts in the Transd-

niestrian and Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts, the OSCE Missions to
Moldova and Georgia have been criticized by both sides for allegedly being
biased. The sides have tried to discredit the Missions and to mobilize other
international third parties to intervene as potentially new or additional me-
diators. Such campaigns often materialized when the Missions were pro-
posing specific compromise solutions or draft agreements to the sides. As

45
 Chapter II

the criticism usually came from both involved sides simultaneously, its pur-
pose to discredit the impartial compromise line of the Missions was obvious
and usually understood as such by the international community.

46
 4. Inclusivity

Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on inclusivity:

— Identify the level of inclusivity needed for the mediation to start and
required for a durable peace that addresses the needs of all affected by the
conflict.

— Communicate with any party or actor necessary to address the conflict,

with the knowledge of the other negotiating parties.

— Promote understanding among conflict parties of the value of broader

participation and minimize preconditions for participation in the process.

— Ensure systematic and structured consultation with women’s groups

early in the process to allow for meaningful participation, with specific ef-
forts to include them in the mediation process.

— Encourage conflict parties to include women in their delegations.

— Develop mechanisms to broaden participation in the process, and to

engage and include the different perspectives within civil society and other
stakeholders, throughout the various phases of the peace process.

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 Chapter II

Who gets a seat at the table?

All major stakeholders in a conflict should be included in the mediation pro-

cess. This is because an inclusive process has the best chance to be seen as
legitimate, to address all important substantive issues and to achieve com-
prehensive and sustainable peace agreements. However, the mediator needs
to strike a balance between inclusivity and efficiency. The more inclusive a
process is in terms of participants and issues, the more complex it will get,
and the more difficult the task of co-ordination and ensuring efficiency of
the process will be. Since not everybody can have a seat at the negotiation
table, additional mechanisms need to be put in place to include those not
present in the official talks. Parallel dialogue processes for broader direct
participation can be established.

For the effective settlement of an armed intra-state conflict, parties

with de jure or de facto decision-making power in terms of ending or con-
tinuing conflict need to be at the negotiation table. If a conflict party is ex-
cluded from the process it may have an interest in sabotaging negotiations
or any agreement implemented from the outside. Therefore, if it is not pos-
sible to include all parties in the formal talks – for example, because the
government refuses to sit at one table with non-state actors, a conflict party
is an internationally or nationally proscribed group, or a non-state actor is
unwilling to take part – the mediator needs to find ways to ensure inclu-
sivity in the process, such as through shuttle diplomacy or proximity talks.

In the settlement process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, no direct in-

teraction exists between representatives of Azerbaijan and the de facto au-
thorities of Nagorno-Karabakh. The consultation of the de facto authori-
ties of Nagorno-Karabakh is therefore conducted by the Co-Chairs of the
OSCE’s Minsk Group and the Personal Representative of the CiO as well as
through contacts between the de facto authorities and Armenia.

To foster the legitimacy of the process, civil society also needs to be

included in the negotiation process in a way that ensures that their voices

48
 Reference Guide

are heard and that their needs and interests are addressed in the official ne-
gotiations. This does not necessarily mean having a seat at the table.

The decision as to who to include in the process, as well as when and

how, is ultimately made by the conflict parties. The OSCE mediator should
promote an understanding of the advantages of an inclusive process. The
mediator should ensure an equal number of women and men in the team
and encourage the conflict parties to do the same in their negotiation del-
egations. Respected civil society actors, religious leaders, elders or scholars
could also be included in negotiation delegations. If this is not possible, the
mediator should suggest specific mechanisms that enable regular consul-
tations with civil society. The mediator can also encourage civil society to
organize parallel processes to engage broader society and feed their views
and ideas into the formal process through channels the mediator can help
to create. Similar processes could be initiated with non-decision-making
mid-level officials of and advisers to the conflict parties in order to feed
ideas into the formal negotiations.

In the Transdniestrian settlement process, the CiO, her/his Special Repre-

sentatives and the Head of the OSCE Mission regularly hold formal and in-
formal consultations with Moldovan and Transdniestrian civil society actors
and organizations. In 2012, on the initiative of the Special Representative of
the Irish OSCE Chairmanship, a Civil Society Forum was initiated to inform
and consult with civil society organizations in the settlement process.

The mediator cannot automatically count on a constructive contri-

bution of civil society to the peace process. Some civil society actors hold
hard-line positions, reject the mediator, or, at worst, reject the whole pro-
cess and actively block it.

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Gender and mediation

There are multiple reasons to why OSCE mediation teams must embrace a
gender perspective in the mediation processes they conduct:

The principles of gender equality and women’s empowerment are firmly

grounded in international law and have to be addressed in all legislation,
policies and processes created by international, regional, national and com-
munity stakeholders.

Ensuring the systematic and structured participation of women leaders,

gender experts and women’s organizations helps to identify the gender di-
mensions of substantive issues on the negotiation agenda and this contrib-
utes to creating a truly inclusive conflict settlement or peace process.

Women have or are forced into different roles in crises, conflicts and post-
conflict settings. Enhancing female representation and taking into account
women’s needs, capacities, priorities and interest as well as vulnerabilities in
peace and mediation processes generates a more comprehensive response
that is more likely to create a stable and secure peace.

Adopting a gender perspective is likely to install a broader set of female and

male mediation skills and qualities in conflict settlement and can increase
the efficiency of the overall mediation process.

Thorough information gathering from both men and women about the im-
pact of a crisis or conflict provides for a more balanced set of facts and can
help the mediation process effectively accomplish its goals.

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Including all segments of the population in the mediation and conflict-

settlement process can have a major impact on the sustainability of peace.
This is because the discussion by diverse stakeholders of a breadth of issues
they might otherwise not have discussed can have a crucial influence on the
post-agreement stability and security.

Gender-responsiveness should be taken into account in all phases of a

mediation process. These include: the mediation process design; awareness
raising among stakeholders at the negotiation table; enhancing the repre-
sentation of women throughout the process; ensuring effective relations
with women’s organizations; developing a gender responsive agenda; and
in the drafting and implementation of agreements.

Each of these phases is discussed extensively in the OSCE Guidance

Note on Enhancing Gender-Responsive Mediation. OSCE mediators and
mediation teams should familiarize themselves with the Guidance Note.14

Gender-responsive mediators, assisted by their teams, need to raise

awareness and gather support among parties at the negotiation table in or-
der to ensure that women are included in the negotiations themselves and
that they contribute to the decisions and final outcome of the entire process.
Measures to do so include: acting as a role model by including women and
men in mediation teams and pro-actively enhancing female participation
in negotiation processes; convening separate information sessions where
gender experts explain the tools and benefits of gender awareness; offering
training to build expertise for negotiation delegations or their advisers; and
by using favourable arguments that present gender equality as an issue of
shared interest rather than an outside imposition.

The international legal and policy framework on ‘Women, Peace and

Security’ calls upon stakeholders to address the under-representation of

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women in peace negotiations. Third-party mediators should hold them-

selves accountable and increase the number of female mediators by using
gender parity principles. The mediation team can convey a message of in-
clusiveness to negotiating parties and lead by example. The mediation can
use tools such as affirmative action, quotas, mentoring schemes and the
provision of gender expertise.

To enhance inclusivity and ownership, the mediator can reach out to

women’s organizations at the national and local level. In some cases, con-
sultation mechanisms with women’s organizations within the formal setup
of the mediation can be established. If such formal mechanisms are not
feasible, parallel forums may constitute safe spaces for women to exchange
views as well as discuss and draft their own agenda. However, parallel fo-
rums should be used cautiously so as to avoid running the risk of marginal-
izing the impact of women on the negotiation process.

Mediators play an important role in identifying the gender dimension

of issues on the agenda. These should not only take into account the pro-
tection and security of women in the transition and reconstruction phases,
but also their political and economic empowerment. Virtually every sub-
stantive issue on the negotiation agenda has a gender dimension, which
will affect individuals differently depending on their gendered roles and
responsibilities.

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 5. Ownership

Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on ownership:

— Consult closely with the conflict parties on the design of the media-
tion process.

— Inform civil society and other stakeholders about developments in the

peace process and create opportunities and support for them to engage on
procedure and substance.

— Guide conflict parties and help them generate ideas for discussion, en-
suring they can claim credit for agreements reached.

— Identify which conflict parties may need support to strengthen their

negotiation capacity and facilitate access to capacity-building support.

— Encourage and enable conflict parties to inform and consult with their
constituencies, including the rank and file, during the mediation process.

— Be aware of the specific cultural approaches to negotiation and com-

munication and leverage those approaches to the greatest advantage of the
process.

— Design a communications strategy to manage expectations, in terms

of what, and the speed at which, the process can deliver.

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Local ownership

An OSCE mediator should always make clear that the parties are the de-
cision-makers in the process. Third parties can only play an advisory role,
facilitating discussions and protecting the process from undue influence
from other external actors. The mediator needs to work closely with the
conflict parties on the design of the process, the agenda and the drafting
of agreements, and at the same time ensure opportunities for civil society
and other stakeholders to give their input. The mediator needs to avoid
the impression of imposing solutions. During the implementation phase,
the conflict parties also need to be in the lead with the mediator providing
support. To promote ownership of the process by the broader society, the
mediator should communicate regularly with civil society groups and other
stakeholders and be open to linking the process with parallel processes or-
ganized by civil society.

Conflict parties, civil society groups and other stakeholders may some-
times need to improve their negotiation skills and ability to prepare for me-
diated negotiations. The OSCE mediation team should identify early on if
such capacity-building needs exist.

From 2004 to 2007, the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI), with
funding from individual OSCE participating States and in consultation
with the OSCE Mission to Moldova, carried out a series of capacity-build-
ing activities in support of the Transdniestrian settlement process. ECMI
worked with the team of the Moldovan chief negotiator, but the Transd-
niestrian Side rejected an offer to work with ECMI. ECMI also worked with
Moldovan and Transdniestrian civil society representatives to build their
capacities to better understand and effectively engage in the settlement pro-
cess. ECMI furthermore worked with the Moldovan Parliament and the
People’s Assembly of the autonomous region of Gagauzia to better define
the division of competencies between central and regional authorities and
to improve the functioning of Gagauzia’s autonomy.

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Similar capacity building efforts might be necessary to enable the con-

flict parties, civil society groups and other stakeholders to effectively con-
tribute to the implementation of agreements and to long-term peacebuild-
ing. Local capacities for early warning, conflict prevention and dispute reso-
lution will need continued support. OSCE mediators can work with a range
of experienced specialized agencies, such particular United Nations Funds
and Programs and international or regional NGOs.

In 2007, the OSCE Centre in Bishkek launched a pilot project of local medi-
ator teams in several localities in the Osh Province in Southern Kyrgyzstan.
After the April and June 2010 crises, the Centre expanded this activity with
another 25 local mediation teams to the Jalal-Abad and Chuy Provinces and
in 2011 with another nine. To build the capacities of these teams, mediation
training was provided to their members by specialized international NGOs.

Managing information

Confidentiality is a key requirement for a successful mediation process. It

is critical in the pre-negotiation and early negotiation phases when mutual
trust is typically low or lacking, relations between the parties are tense, po-
sitions uncompromising and the constituencies of the parties mobilized.15
Confidentiality during the process allows the parties to explore options for
potential compromises which their constituencies are not yet ready to ac-
cept and which they, therefore, could not admit to discussing without losing
face and coming under pressure from hardliners.

Working for conflict prevention in the extremely sensitive area of inter-

ethnic relations, the HCNM traditionally engages in quiet preventive
diplomacy involving OSCE participating States and various ethnic com-
munities throughout the OSCE area. The confidentiality of the HCNM’s
dialogue facilitation work enables the parties involved to soften their stanc-
es on disputed issues and find co-operative solutions without losing face.

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 Chapter II

Confidentiality has thus been key in making this OSCE institution a suc-
cessful and unique instrument for early warning and conflict prevention.

Members of the OSCE Mission to Moldova regularly participate in NGO

events to inform civil society on both sides of the Dniester about the
Transdniestrian settlement process. They also support specific events for
Moldovan, Transdniestrian and Gagauz NGOs to provide them with specif-
ic knowledge about early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management
and post-conflict rehabilitation. The Mission has also tried to engage radi-
cal Transdniestrian youth organizations and representatives of hard-line
Moldovan and Transdniestrian NGOs in the process.

Later in the negotiations when parties are getting closer to an agree-

ment, the constituencies of the conflict parties need to be carefully prepared
for possible concessions and compromises. Once an agreement is reached,
the constituencies need to be properly informed about the content and im-
plementation modalities of the agreement. It is important to make them
fully understand its implications and to ensure support for implementa-
tion. This is especially true if the agreement is to be approved by a popular
referendum.

Informing and preparing civil society and the broader public in timely
manner can create additional leverage on the parties to sign an agreement
as the expectations raised by informing and persuading their constituencies
will make a withdrawal more difficult. If the communication on compro-
mises and envisaged agreements comes too late, there might not be enough
time to prepare the constituencies and hardliners might mobilize them to
thwart the agreement in a referendum.

Working with the media

A certain level of communication with the public and the media is necessary
in OSCE mediation processes. It is impossible to run an inclusive process
without the mediator and the parties informing civil society, grassroots ac-

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tors and the broader public about the negotiations. Such communication
can promote an informed understanding of the process, generate internal
and external support, diffuse rumours and conspiracy theories about the
negotiations, and counteract divisive strategies by intransigent actors, prop-
aganda and media campaigns.16

Managing the right balance between confidentiality and public infor-

mation throughout the process is therefore a task the mediator and the con-
flict parties should ideally handle jointly. It is necessary for the mediation
team to include media and communications experts that are in charge of
thoroughly analyzing the information environment in the conflict area and
preparing a media strategy. The mediator should also encourage the conflict
parties to agree on ground rules for confidentiality and dealing with public
information. Drafting joint press releases at the end of negotiation sessions
can help streamline the communication with the media and to build confi-
dence between the parties.

Following the April 2012 round of “5+2” talks, members of the delegations
made statements in the media that did not accurately represent the conclu-
sions of the meeting and thus caused confusion. As a remedy, starting in
July, the mediator organized collective media briefings that took place after
each round of talks. The briefings were broadcast via video link to the OSCE
offices in Chisinau, where local journalists from both sides would gather.
The CiO Special Representative chaired the briefings, flanked by the Head
of the OSCE Mission to Moldova as well as the two chief negotiators, who
jointly presented the conclusions of the meeting. This proved to be highly
useful as it minimized the risk of misinterpretation and rumours, and built
trust between the parties.

Even if such basic rules are agreed, the conflict parties may sometimes
continue to use the media for propaganda purposes, either against each

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other or the mediator. If the specific conflict situation allows, a mediator

and her/his team can look for allies in civil society and the local media and
try to promote freedom of the media, confidence-building and co-operation
between journalists from each Side of the conflict, as well as professional
journalism and conflict-sensitive reporting.

In both the Transdniestrian and the Georgian-South Ossetian conflicts,

many official and private media outlets of the involved conflict parties have
a long record of biased reporting, misinformation and propaganda. The
OSCE, as a co-mediator in the two settlement processes, has worked inten-
sively with journalists from all conflict sides through the OSCE Mission to
Moldova and the (former) Mission to Georgia. The aim of this long-stand-
ing work is to prevent the creation or escalation of tensions through the
spread of rumours and propaganda, to promote accurate reporting on the
settlement process, and to improve the access of the population to reliable
and balanced information. The Missions have continuously promoted the
independence of the media and professional journalism, organized train-
ings for journalists on conflict-sensitive reporting facilitated by interna-
tional and national media NGOs, and brought together journalists from
the different conflict parties for the purpose of co-operation and confidence
building.

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 6. International law and
normative frameworks

Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on international

law and normative frameworks:

— Be briefed and familiar with the applicable international law and nor-
mative frameworks.

— Ensure that the parties understand the demands and limits of applica-
ble conventions and international laws.

— Ensure that communications with the conflict parties and other stake-
holders on legal matters and normative expectations are consistent; this is
particularly important in instances of co-led or joint mediations.

— Explore with the conflict parties and other stakeholders the timing
and sequencing of judicial and non-judicial approaches to address crimes
committed during the conflict.

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Different types of parties

Asymmetries can exist between conflict parties. The parties may have dif-
ferent levels of power, capacities, resources and international recognition.
The OSCE mediator should work towards an agreement with all parties to
the conflict that a formal role in the negotiations may be necessary for the
negotiations to succeed. However, a formal role in the negotiation process
does not imply formal recognition of an entity by the OSCE. It should there-
fore not be confused with the question of international recognition or status.

At the start of the Geneva International Discussions no agreement could

be found on the status of the representatives of South Ossetia and Abkha-
zia at the negotiation table. Both demanded equal status with the negotia-
tion delegation of Georgia and refused to take part in the plenary sessions.
Eventually, following a proposal of the Co-Chairs of the EU, the UN and the
OSCE, it was agreed not to hold any plenary sessions, but to meet in two
separate working groups in which the representatives of all involved sides
take part as individual equal participants.

It is important to allow negotiation participants to make decisions on

behalf of the conflict parties they represent. Any final agreement needs to
be approved, signed and implemented by all conflict parties who partici-
pate in the process, including armed non-state actors. All conflict parties
should enjoy the same rights, obligations and treatment within the peace
process. The mediator should therefore try to ensure even-handed treat-
ment of conflict parties in the negotiations, but promote the recognition
of existing inequalities outside of the negotiation framework in order to
counteract purposefully wrong interpretations.

Although deeply divided over status questions for years, during most of
the Transdniestrian settlement process, the Moldovan and Transdniestrian
sides tacitly agreed to ignore the status question at the negotiation table.
When status questions reappeared after the restart of negotiations in late
2011, the sides eventually agreed, in April 2012, to a proposal of the Head

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of the OSCE Mission and the CiO Special Representative on Principles

and Procedures for the Conduct of Negotiation, including the principle of
equality of participants to the negotiations. The Principles and Procedures,
however, explicitly stated that the principle of equality was “not a precedent
for the settlement, nor a basis for the evaluation by any side of the current
legal status of the sides”.

Should the conflict parties decide to allow civil society representatives,

community leaders or other actors (representatives of the private sector,
religious groups, etc.) to participate in negotiations, their role and respon-
sibilities in the process need to be clarified.

In the Transdniestrian settlement process, the Russian Federation, the

OSCE and Ukraine act as co-mediators. In 2005, the Moldovan side de-
manded the inclusion of the EU and US as additional co-mediators. When
the Transdniestrian side disagreed, the OSCE facilitated a compromise ac-
cording to which the EU and US were invited to act as observers to the pro-
cess. In a special protocol, the rights and obligations of the observers were
specified, which excluded them from convening and chairing sessions, from
signing documents and from decision making.

Managing negative influencers

Some actors may grow nervous as an agreement gets close and they may
want to disturb or block the process. The internal divisions within conflict
parties often deepen towards the end of the process and hard-line factions
may refuse to compromise and break away from moderate forces. To re-
spond appropriately, the OSCE mediator should try to identify such poten-
tial actors during the conflict analysis phase, understand their needs and
interests and closely manage them throughout the process.

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Radical political forces among the Kosovo Serb majority population in the
northern Kosovo17 municipalities refused to participate in the local elec-
tions announced for November 2013 although the Government of Serbia
had called on the Kosovo Serb population to vote. When the OSCE CPC
and the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) facilitated – in the framework of
the EU-led dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina – the specific dialogue
on local elections in northern Kosovo, it became clear that the radical po-
litical forces would not be able to totally obstruct the election process. As a
consequence, after repeated invitations to the radical forces to participate,
elections were organized in the northern municipalities. Eventually, the
radical forces were only able to obstruct elections in three polling centres
where they were later successfully repeated.

The OSCE mediator can use inducement or socialization to positively

engage negative influencers in the process. Inducement refers to positive
measures to address the grievances of intransigent actors with the aim of
making them join the process or fulfil their obligations under an agreement
reached earlier. Such positive measures could include security guarantees
if the intransigent actor acts out of fear, material benefits if the grievance is
due to lack of fairness, or some degree of legitimacy and recognition if the
grievance is related to justice.

Socialization entails establishing a set of norms for acceptable behav-

iour of the parties within the process and for external parties that seek to
join the process. Under this strategy, the OSCE mediator can encourage
adherence to these norms through incentives, while continuously persuad-
ing the parties of the value of the normative behaviour. If neither of the two
strategies seems to yield results, the mediator may also communicate that
the process will be taken forward with or without the intransigent actor to

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make the latter reconsider the advantages of participation, or the mediator

can threaten to withdraw from the process altogether.18

Although exclusion can strengthen the commitment of constructive

actors to the process, the exclusion strategy may also alienate an actor and
turn it into a ‘spoiler’. The OSCE mediator should always be very cautious
when using an exclusion strategy. If direct inclusion is not possible, the me-
diator can engage with intransigent actors directly or indirectly in a sepa-
rate process in order to listen with empathy and try to make them consider
alternatives to their hard-line positions.19

7.

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 8. Coherence, co-ordination
and complementarity

Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on coherence,

co-ordination and complementarity:

— Mediation initiatives with two or more entities should be based on

a coherent mandate from the relevant entities with a single lead mediator.

— Acceptability of the mediating body and their mediator by the conflict

parties and the potential effectiveness of the mediation should be key con-
siderations when deciding leadership in the process.

— Organizational capacity, capability and available resources should be

considered in deciding on the division of labour within the mediation en-
vironment.

— Mediation actors should work together to agree on the degree of trans-

parency and co-ordination mechanisms for information sharing.

— International actors should consider establishing co-ordination mech-

anisms, such as groups of friends or international contact groups, to provide
consistent political and resource support for the mediation effort.

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Co-ordination and co-operation

with other third parties
It is important to recognize that there may have been mediation attempts by
other third parties prior to the appointment of the OSCE mediator. Some
of these may include so-called ‘insider mediators’, trusted individuals from
within the community in crisis. Other organizations may appoint mediators
prior to and after the appointment of an OSCE mediator. It is important to
map them out and reach out to them early on as the involvement of several
mediators in a peace process can be very useful. A single mediator can face
difficulties with an overload of tasks, continuous outreach to a multitude of
stakeholders, and political pressure. In contrast, a well-co-ordinated team
of mediators – each with comparative advantages, specific skills, expertise,
resources and leverage – can divide the labour and provide different incen-
tives and guarantees to conflict parties. Including respected local interme-
diaries with inside knowledge in the process can help the OSCE mediator
manage impartiality, strengthen the commitment of conflict parties, and
increase local ownership and the legitimacy of the process.20

Within the framework of the Transdniestrian settlement process, the OSCE

Mission to Moldova and the co-mediators of the Russian Federation and
Ukraine are closely co-operating with specialized international and joint
Moldovan-Transdniestrian NGOs in carrying out track parallel processes
with civil society, academic experts and community groups that feed into
the formal negotiations. The Mission has also engaged the OSCE PA, of
which the Moldova Team has facilitated several joint events for Moldovan
and Transdniestrian parliamentarians.

However, unco-ordinated or even competing mediation efforts are

widespread. This is especially the case when external mediators are divided
on regional political issues and have a different perception of the causes and

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solutions to a conflict. However, a lack of co-ordination and co-operation

between mediators can also result from personal or inter-organizational
competition for visibility and reputation, as peace-making is a prestigious
activity in which an increasing number of actors are involved. In such cases,
mediators might have good intentions, but the mixed messages they may
send to conflict parties can be problematic.

To avoid competing processes and to achieve synergy, mediators need

to co-operate and co-ordinate their efforts closely. Mediators may choose
to identify a lead mediator to guide and co-ordinate the process in order to
enhance the coherence of their efforts. They can also develop a joint strat-
egy and agree on a division of labour. As part of the joint strategy, the me-
diators should agree on mechanisms for co-ordination and the exchange of
information. A joint communication strategy will further ensure that the
mediators speak with one voice and that any possible internal differences
are kept strictly confidential.

For the Geneva International Discussions dealing with the conflicts in Geor-
gia, the UN, the EU and the OSCE agreed on a joint mediation effort, and
developed a joint strategy during late 2008 and early 2009. Since then, they
have reviewed their strategy and approaches to substantive issues during
regular joint visits to Tbilisi, Tskhinvali and Sukhumi, as well as in separate
Co-Chair meetings before every round of negotiations. During negotiations,
the three Co-Chairs jointly facilitate the two Working Groups on security
and humanitarian issues. At the end of each negotiation round, the three
Co-Chairs hold a joint press conference. The EU and the UN also co-facili-
tate the IPRM in Gali, whereas the EU and the OSCE co-facilitate the IPRM
at Ergneti. Both mechanisms deal with security issues at the administrative
boundary lines and other issues affecting the daily life of the population.

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The three Co-Chairs of the OSCE’s Minsk Group dealing with the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, Russia, France, and the US, pursue a strict line of agreed
communication with the media. After each visit to the region or meeting
with representatives of one or both of the conflict parties, the Co-Chairs
agree and issue a joint statement.

Working with outside actors

Dealing with the external context of a conflict can be a major challenge for
mediators. The OSCE mediation teams should carefully analyze all relevant
external actors, their interests, their relations to the conflict parties, their
leverage and resources, as well as their possible contributions to the pro-
cess. On this basis, a mediator then develops a strategy on how to engage
with them. The mediator can choose to try to mobilize their support and
use their leverage in the process as well as to counteract undue unilateral
external involvement.

Neighbouring states and regional powers usually have strong inter-

ests in the conflict settlement (for example, owing to national security and
protection of kin minorities). Depending on their relations with the con-
flict parties, their leverage and resources can be useful. If they are ready to
support the OSCE mediator, their influence can be leveraged for various
purposes.

It is important for the OSCE mediator and her/his team to recognize

that not all outside actors have a positive influence on the process. In such
cases, outside actors need to be included in the conflict actor mapping, and
required strategies for their management must be drawn up.

Outside actors can be organized under one umbrella, typically called

a ‘group of friends’ in support of the mediation process. Such ‘friends’ can
be states, international governmental or non-governmental organizations
and individuals. Ideally, the members of the group are trusted by the parties
and have a positive influence on them. The members of the group of friends

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are also typically committed to support the process over the long term. The
group can exist on different levels (for example, in the capitals, at the level
of heads of delegations of participating States in Vienna or representation in
the region through the embassies of the group members’ states). It is useful
to keep such groups relatively small so that they are manageable.21

In November 2009, the OSCE Mission to Serbia established an informal

group ‘Friends of South Serbia’ at the level of representatives of OSCE par-
ticipating States’ embassies and offices of international organizations ac-
credited in Belgrade. The aim of this initiative was to mobilize support from
the international community in Serbia for the OSCE Mission’s efforts to
promote social integration and facilitate dialogue between the ethnic Al-
banian population and its political leaders in South Serbia, and the Serbian
central Government authorities. Given the continuing grievances of the
ethnic Albanian population and the lack of government attention, the initia-
tive also aimed at co-ordinating and strengthening the dialogue of the inter-
national community in Belgrade with the Government of Serbia about the
situation in the South of the country, and preventing a reescalation of the
situation into open conflict, as experienced in 2000 to 2001. Since the end
of 2009, the ‘Friends of South Serbia’ has met regularly to discuss and ana-
lyze developments in South Serbia affecting the ethnic Albanian population.
The Friends have organized joint visits, developed joint strategies and co-
ordinated their messages, responses and activities. In several local disputes
and incidents, the voice of the ‘Friends of South Serbia’ has helped to calm
tensions and build support for activities proposed by the OSCE Mission.

Another option for the OSCE mediator to engage outside actors is to

establish a ‘contact group’. Such groups usually include the major powers
interested in the settlement of the conflict in question. At its best, such a
strong group can lend serious leverage to the mediator’s efforts. However,
not all contact groups are successful and can sometimes be counterpro-

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ductive to the mediation process. This is especially true when some of the
contact group members are considered parties to the conflict. Alternatively,
the OSCE mediator can also resort to ad hoc arrangements that allow the
mediator engage selected external actors in support of specific activities at
different stages of the process.

In the Transdniestrian settlement process, the conflict parties selected and

expanded the group of external actors involved by initially agreeing on the
Russian Federation as mediator and later inviting the OSCE and eventually
Ukraine as co-mediators. In 2005, the parties expanded the group by invit-
ing the EU and US as observers to the process. Outside the “5+2” format,
the mediators have not established or encouraged any further group or
mechanism through which other interested external actors could support
the process. At different stages, the co-mediators have received the sup-
port of individual OSCE participating States for specific purposes. The UK,
for example, promoted confidence building measures between civil society,
business and grassroots actors from the conflict sides, whereas Germany
supports the official CBM process within the “5+2” format. Germany has
also supported, through a specialized NGO, capacity building for the offices
of the parties’ chief negotiators aiming at strengthening the analytical and
negotiation skills of their staff.

During and after the June 2010 crisis in Southern Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE
Centre in Bishkek initiated regular (initially daily) donor co-ordination
meetings to exchange information on international assistance and to co-
ordinate its crisis response activities with other international organizations
and states. During these meetings, the Special Representative of the Ka-
zakh OSCE Chairmanship, the Special Representative of the UNSG and
the EU Special Representative for Central Asia (respectively the highest
ranking OSCE, UN and EU officials in Bishkek) informed donors about
their ongoing efforts with Kyrgyz authorities to respond to the crisis and
to facilitate dialogue between local communities, regional authorities and
law enforcement organs with the aim of long-term conflict prevention and
reconciliation.

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The mediator and her/his team will need to invest substantial time in
engaging with and handling other external actors. Whatever group, mecha-
nism or ad hoc arrangement a mediator opts for, the intergroup dynamics
often develop into a complex and time-consuming process. This is especial-
ly true in cases of regional polarization and requires flexibility and resources
on the part of the mediator.

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 9. Quality of
peace agreements

Highlights from the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation on the quality of

peace agreements:

— The agreement should aim to resolve the major issues and grievances
that led to the conflict, either by addressing the root causes directly or by
establishing mechanisms to address them over time through democratic
processes.

— Where a comprehensive settlement appears unattainable, the mediator

should establish with the conflict parties, and through broader consulta-
tions, what is the minimum that needs to be achieved in order to commence
a peaceful approach to dealing with the remaining aspects of the conflict.

— Agreements should be as precise as possible in order to limit the

points of contention that would have to be negotiated during the imple-
mentation phase.

— Agreements should incorporate clear modalities for implementation,

monitoring and dispute resolution to address disagreements that may arise
during implementation.

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 Chapter II

What to include in the agreement?

Mediation and dialogue processes can result in a variety of outputs. Dia-

logue processes do not typically result in a formal agreement. The results of
dialogue processes can range from a joint declaration or jointly-agreed rec-
ommendations for further action, to improved relations among the parties
which can be measured, for example, by the reduction of violent incidents.

A mediated negotiation process may result in a series of small agree-

ments on selected issues, in a declaration on the way forward, or in a com-
prehensive peace agreement, which concludes all of the topics discussed
during the process. Other outputs from the process may include: cease-
fire agreements; procedural agreements on ground rules for the mediation
process; agreements on basic principles for the conflict settlement; various
intermediary technical agreements; and agreements on international guar-
antees and implementation modalities.

It is important to build a shared understanding with the parties of the

expected result of the process. An agreement on the framework of the con-
flict settlement process can build trust and confidence between the parties.
Typically agreed on during the so-called ‘pre-negotiation phase’, possible
topics for such an agreement include: the structure and format of the talks;
overall issue-areas to be addressed; rules for decision making; participation
or guidelines for participation; communication, including confidentiality
and handling of information given to the constituencies and the media;
timeframes; the sequence of the process; and the role of the mediator.22

The parties may also simply agree on the principles for the conflict
settlement process. Such an agreement can include issues, such as: non-
use of force and peaceful settlement of all disputed issues; the protection
of the rights of all citizens; the basis of future power-sharing arrangements;
and basic guarantees. Achieving such pre-negotiation agreements is often a

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 Reference Guide

long and difficult process. Including all such issues into the final settlement
agreement, however, can be an even bigger challenge that can take months
or even years of further negotiation. It is worth investing time in agreeing
on the framework for the settlement process as reaching such a milestone
can also help build trust among the parties and help the OSCE mediator to
take the parties through the subsequent phases.

In November 2007 at the OSCE Ministerial Council Meeting in Madrid,

the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, which mediates in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, presented the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azer-
baijan with a confidential proposal on the basic principles for the settlement
of the conflict (the Madrid Principles) on which the Co-Chairs had been
working with the parties since 2005. These principles included, among oth-
ers: the return to Azerbaijan of territories adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh
held by Armenian forces; a land corridor connecting Nagorno-Karabakh
with Armenia; the return of refugees and IDPs to Nagorno-Karabakh; an
interim status for the region, including guarantees for security and self-
governance; international security guarantees for Nagorno-Karabakh, in-
cluding an international peacekeeping operation; and, in the future, a legally
binding expression of will of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh on the
status of the region. Although the Co-Chairs have continued their work on
the Madrid Principles with the conflict parties since then, no mutually ac-
ceptable version of the document has been agreed.

In the Transdniestrian settlement process, the sides signed in May 1997

in Moscow a ‘Memorandum on the Bases for the Normalization of Rela-
tions between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria’ (the Moscow
Memorandum). In the Memorandum, the sides, inter alia, reconfirmed
that they would: not resort to the threat or use of force; establish between
them state-legal relations; build their relations within a common state;
and that Transdniestria would have the right to participate in the conduct
of the foreign policy of Moldova and maintain its own international eco-
nomic, scientific-technical and cultural contacts. Immediately after the
signing of the Memorandum, the OSCE and its Russian and Ukrainian

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 Chapter II

co-mediators engaged in various attempts to translate the principles of

the Moscow Memorandum into a legally binding settlement agreement.
However, the principles agreed in the Memorandum, especially the term
“common state”, were interpreted by the sides in different ways. As of to-
day, all attempts to translate the Memorandum into a final settlement
document have failed and, as a consequence, the principles agreed in the
Memorandum are frequently put into question.

The OSCE mediator should refrain from rushing towards a settlement.

In more complicated processes, it may be useful for the mediator to suggest
to the parties a series of intermediary or technical agreements as a way to
strengthen their commitment to the process.23

Ideally, a peace agreement should be comprehensive and based on the

views, needs and interests of all conflict stakeholders and sectors of soci-
ety. It should address all key issues relevant to the conflict and be forward
looking. The agreement should recognize and express respect to all relevant
international humanitarian, human rights and refugee laws, as well as rec-
ognized democratic standards and the rule of law.

At the same time, the agreement needs to be realistic and sufficient-

ly precise. Mechanisms for settling any implementation-related disagree-
ments should be agreed upon. Issues related to particular groups, espe-
cially ethnic and linguistic minorities, should be clearly stated. Each topic
in the agreement should be looked at from the perspective of both women
and men and clearly articulate any gender dimensions. This is to avoid that
a seemingly gender-neutral agreement impacts negatively on the equality,
well-being, security and other needs of women and men.

The OSCE mediator has to assess how comprehensive and detailed a

settlement agreement should to be. There is no one-size-fits-all solution.
Some agreements can fail in spite of their comprehensiveness and detail

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 Reference Guide

whereas others might succeed in spite of not being comprehensive and de-
tailed. A simpler agreement can concentrate on a few core issues that can
be successfully settled while establishing mechanisms to address any possi-
ble remaining issues over time through peaceful and democratic processes.

Implementation and monitoring

The signing of a peace agreement marks the beginning of an implementa-

tion phase, during which the agreement has to be put into practice. The
implementation of a peace agreement is often even more challenging than
its negotiation. Problems during the implementation phase may result in
the failure of entire peace process. The effective implementation of a peace
agreement needs good planning, continuous co-ordination, extensive moni-
toring and verification, as well as continued dialogue among the parties.

The most frequent reasons for non-implementation of peace agree-

ments and other agreements signed during a mediation process are a lack
of political will, shortcomings of the agreements, and insufficient capacities
for effective implementation on the side of the conflict parties.

In the framework of the Transdniestrian settlement process, dozens of in-

termediary decisions and agreements have been signed over the last 20
years in different spheres between the sides, most of which have been only
partially or not at all implemented. Both sides usually lacked confidence in
the good-faith implementation of the agreements by their counterpart. At
the same time, a lack of implementation modalities, timelines and guaran-
tees in the agreements further compounded the situation. Both sides also
lacked the political will to implement agreements or the implementation
was blocked on the lower levels. The leaderships of both sides were not will-
ing to overcome these blockages to ensure implementation.

The OSCE mediator needs to start thinking about agreement imple-

mentation already during the negotiation and drafting phase. When dis-
cussing each agenda point, it is necessary to consider the modalities for im-

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 Chapter II

plementation by asking questions, such as: What action would be required

from each of the parties? How can progress be measured? What sanctions
will there be for non-implementation, if any? What timelines are realistic?

To support the parties in implementing the agreement, mechanisms

for its monitoring and verification should be included in the text. Such
mechanisms can take various forms, ranging from national mechanisms
(such as round tables), national commissions and joint committees, to
mixed national-international implementation councils and conciliation
commissions, to purely international mechanisms, like contact groups. In-
ternational third parties can take part in such mechanisms to monitor the
implementation and to facilitate dialogue for the resolution of disputes that
emerge during implementation.

The OSCE Mission to Tajikistan (now OSCE Office in Tajikistan), which

was originally established to promote dialogue between regional and po-
litical forces as well as the respect for human rights, provided assistance to
the Commission on National Reconciliation. The Commission was set up
as an implementation mechanism for the 1997 General Agreement on the
Establishment of Peace and National Accord which ended the civil war in
Tajikistan (1992 to 1997). Together with eight states from the region, the
UN and the then-called Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the
Mission acted as guarantor of several protocols of the General Agreement
dealing with political issues, refugee return and military matters. It also
formed the part of the Contact Group that monitored implementation and
provided expertise, consultations and other good offices. The Mission fa-
cilitated agreement-implementation in the spheres of human rights and the
establishment of democratic, political and legal institutions by providing
advice, expertise, capacity building and other contributions.

The OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje (now OSCE Mission to Skopje) sup-
ported the implementation of the redeployment of police forces to for-
mer crisis areas. This was agreed under the August 2001 Ohrid Frame-
work Agreement, which ended the violent conflict between ethnic Albanian

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 Reference Guide

fighters and state security forces in the former Yugoslav Republic of Mac-
edonia. OSCE Confidence-Building Monitors and Police Advisors, sup-
ported by the EU and NATO, helped to rebuild confidence between local
Albanian communities and law enforcement organs through the on-site
monitoring and verification of incremental police redeployment, by facili-
tating dialogue between local communities and the police, and by mediat-
ing in local disputes. The Mission also trained and assisted the integration
of ethnic Albanian police cadets into the police force and their deployment
to Albanian inhabited areas.

The implementation of an agreement needs broad, substantial and sus-

tainable financial support and expertise. Typically this is beyond what any
single mediating entity can provide on its own. An OSCE mediator will
need to mobilize other international actors as monitors and guarantors for
the peace agreement and get commitments from key donors to fund the
implementation. The early involvement of key donors and the prospect of
their political and financial support for the agreement can be a strong in-
centive for the conflict parties to adhere to the difficult concessions they
have had to make.

The implementation of the agreement, and ultimately the success of

the settlement process, is primarily dependent on the will of the parties and
the broader society, men and women alike. Therefore, the mediator needs
to foster local ownership of the agreement and its implementation. To do
so, she/he must engage the broader society by making the local population
guarantors of the agreement and giving them a stake in its implementation.

77
78
 Annex I: Examples of OSCE
Mediation and Dialogue
Facilitation Engagements

This annex presents examples of mediation and dialogue facilitation engage-

ments in Eastern Europe, South-Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and
Central Asia that have been undertaken by OSCE CiO Personal and Special
Representatives, senior OSCE Secretariat staff, OSCE field operations, the
HCNM, ODIHR, and the OSCE PA. These examples illustrate the variety
of OSCE’s mediation and dialogue facilitation efforts and have been select-
ed to highlight specific challenges, lessons learned and best practices. The
list of examples is not comprehensive and there are many other mediation
and dialogue facilitation efforts that have been carried out by the different
OSCE executive structures.

1. The “5+2” negotiations on the

Transdniestrian conflict
In July 1992, the Presidents of Moldova and the Russian Federation signed
the ‘Agreement on Principles of a Peaceful Settlement of the Armed Con-
flict in the Transdniestrian Region of the Republic of Moldova’ (Moscow
Agreement). In the agreement, a ceasefire was established after four months
of intense armed conflict between Moldovan state authorities and the de
facto authorities of the breakaway Transdniestrian region, which is situat-
ed mainly to the east of the river Dniester/Nistru. Since the signing of the
Moscow Agreement, international mediation efforts have been ongoing to
help the conflict sides achieve a final settlement agreement. Mandated in
February 1993 by the OSCE participating States to facilitate negotiations

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 Annex I

towards a lasting political settlement of the conflict, the OSCE Mission to

Moldova joined the mediation efforts of the Russian Federation in April
1993 and was followed by Ukraine in September 1995.

In October 2005, the so-called “five-sided format” of three interna-

tional co-mediators and the sides to the conflict was extended to include
the EU and the US as observers. The negotiation format was renamed to
“5+2”. Nearly ten years on, a final settlement agreement is still not in sight.
Although there is no imminent threat of an armed re-escalation of the con-
flict, tensions remain high at the political level. This has led to repeated
breakdowns and long, sometimes multi-year, pauses in official negotiations.
These political tensions are also regularly played out in local disputes and
incidents that are considered prone to escalation within the Security Zone.
The Security Zone was established between the sides by the Moscow Agree-
ment and is controlled by a tri-partite Russian-Moldovan-Transdniestrian
Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF).

The OSCE Mission and the rotating CiO Special Representatives have
been the main driving forces in the negotiation process, working in close
co-ordination with the Russian and Ukrainian co-mediators. Since the be-
ginning, the OSCE mediators have taken a long-term approach, using small
steps to bring the sides closer to a settlement agreement. This approach
includes four aspects. Firstly, in order to (re-)build confidence and mutual
trust, the OSCE mediators support a multitude of people-to-people con-
tacts between the populations and between officials on both sides. Secondly,
the OSCE mediators promote the conclusion and implementation of in-
terim agreements between the sides in less-politicized economic, techni-
cal, social, cultural and humanitarian spheres. Since 2008, the Mission and
the CiO Special Representatives have been supporting joint expert work-
ing groups established by the sides in different spheres. The expert work-
ing groups have been tasked to develop CBMs in the form of technical
decisions, agreements and recommendations for pragmatic co-operative
solutions to some of the most pressing problems. The OSCE supports the
working group meetings and, with the help of interested OSCE participating

80
 Examples

States, the organization of CBM conferences to review progress and further

promote the overall CBM process.

Thirdly, the OSCE mediators work jointly with the co-mediators and
the observers at the political level to discuss different aspects of the con-
flict. The OSCE mediators chair and facilitate negotiation sessions in the
“5+2” format, and facilitate and support bilateral meetings between the chief
negotiators from both sides and between the political top leaderships of
the sides. The OSCE mediators also organize events that bring the sides
together with the aim of exchanging views in an informal setting on exist-
ing models for the resolution of political, constitutional, legal and security
issues. This is done in close co-operation with the other co-mediators and
the observers, and with the support of other OSCE structures and inter-
ested OSCE participating States. Additionally, during repeated pauses in
negotiations, the OSCE mediators engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy
between the sides to provide a line of communication and to overcome ob-
stacles towards restarting the talks.

Fourthly, the OSCE Mission observes the situation in the Security

Zone and the work of the JCC, which oversees the Security Zone. In this
context, the Mission regularly engages in investigating and facilitating so-
lutions to local disputes and incidents that occur in or close to the Secu-
rity Zone, thereby reducing tensions that could have a potential for further
escalation. For this purpose, the Mission’s Military Members engage in ad
hoc dialogue facilitation between opposing parties on the ground where
incidents occur. The Mission also promotes the respect for human rights,
as well as democratic processes and the rule of law on both sides of the
Dniester/Nistru to help create political and social conditions conducive to
a conflict settlement.

The OSCE’s mediation efforts in the framework of the “5+2” process

demonstrate how the impartial and intensive multi-year efforts of interna-
tional mediators to facilitate a conflict settlement can be blocked if a con-
flict is not ripe for resolution. In this case, it is due to a fundamental lack

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 Annex I

of trust and confidence between the sides. Although the work of the OSCE
and its co-mediators and observers has led, over the years, to a multitude
of interim agreements and decisions between the sides, most of these have
not been implemented. Some were suspended by one or the other side due
to unrelated disputes.

In the military-security sphere, the implementation of Confidence and

Security Building Measures (CSBMs) has so far not been possible. This is
because the international political polarization that has been growing since
the late 1990’s has been mirrored in the negotiation format. This interna-
tional political polarization as well as weakened unity and co-ordination
among the co-mediators and observers has enabled the sides to engage in
forum shopping. The result is a situation where the sides have managed to
receive sufficient external support to make the status quo bearable and to
avoid having to make the kind of difficult and unpopular compromises that
are required to reach a final settlement.

2. The Ergneti Incident Prevention and

Response Mechanism (IPRM)
Following the August 2008 conflict in Georgia, the Geneva International
Discussions were established to address the consequences of the conflict.
Co-Chaired by the EU, the OSCE and the UN, the Geneva Discussions
bring together representatives of the Government of Georgia, the de facto
authorities of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as the Russian Federa-
tion and the US.

The situation along the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL), which

separates the Tbilisi-administrated territory from territories under the de
facto control of Tskhinvali, remained tense and unstable after the 2008 con-
flict. A significant number of serious shooting incidents, the detention of
people crossing the ABL, as well as scores of missing persons and a difficult
humanitarian situation in the areas adjacent to the ABL further contributed
to a feeling of insecurity among the population.

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 Examples

Within the framework of the Geneva International Discussions, the

sides agreed in February 2009 to establish IPRMs to deal with the situation
along the Georgian-South Ossetian and the Georgian-Abkhaz ABLs. Their
objective was to support peace, stability and security on the ground. The
IPRMs allowed for the establishment of dialogue between the Georgian,
Russian, South Ossetian or Abkhaz police and security structures so as to
improve the security situation. The sides could thus use a direct channel
of communication to identify and address security concerns in a timely
manner, prevent incidents and rebuild mutual trust between the parties in-
volved. The Georgian-South Ossetian IPRM is co-facilitated by the OSCE
and the EUMM, whereas the Georgian-Abkhaz IPRM is co-facilitated by
the EUMM and the UN.

In the original proposal, the IPRMs were to investigate incidents

through joint on-site visits and to ensure the security of vital installations
and infrastructure. However, this could not be accomplished because the de
facto South Ossetian and Abkhaz authorities refused to provide access to
the territory under their control. Instead, in the spring of 2009, an alterna-
tive process was launched through the establishment of monthly meetings.
In the South Ossetian context, these take place near the village of Ergneti
or occasionally near the village of Dvani. In that framework, IPRM partici-
pants regularly discuss the security situation on the ground, the prevention
of incidents, cases of missing persons and issues related to restrictions on
the freedom of movement that are caused by the formalization of the ABL.
The Ergneti IPRM also addresses issues which negatively affect the liveli-
hood of the population living in the areas adjacent to the ABL, including
access to churches and cemeteries. A 24/7 telephone hotline has been estab-
lished for use by IPRM participants, through which issues of urgent concern
can be communicated and response measures agreed.

The CiO Special Representative for the South Caucasus, an advisor

from the Chairmanship, and a representative of the CPC usually represent
the OSCE at the Ergneti IPRM meetings. The Head of the EUMM and sup-
port staff represent the EU. The Georgian and Ossetian Delegations usually

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 Annex I

include representatives of their interior, defence and security bodies. The

South Ossetian side is also joined by a member of the team dealing with the
post-conflict settlement. The Russian Delegation consists of the commander
of Russian forces in South Ossetia and representatives of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs. The IPRM complements the Geneva International Discus-
sions by addressing concrete issues on the ground. Over the five years of its
existence, the Ergneti IPRM has contributed considerably to stabilizing the
security situation at the ABL, re-establishing regular contacts and some ba-
sic mutual trust between the involved sides, and stimulating improvements
in their co-operation on specific issues.

The problems faced by the IPRM during its first year demonstrate the
difficulties that facilitators could face when choosing a venue for meetings.
Questions of security, neutrality and access to territory made it impossi-
ble to meet on a rotating basis on both sides of the ABL. As a solution, the
IPRM now meets in a tent in no-man’s-land between the Georgian and
South Ossetian checkpoints. In addition, the participation of the OSCE,
its status as a co-facilitator and the status of other participants had initially
been disputed by the de facto South Ossetian authorities who demanded a
rotating chairmanship among all involved sides. This underscores the diffi-
culties that could be encountered by facilitators when trying to agree on the
participants and their status. After overcoming these initial problems, the
IPRM has become an increasingly useful forum for the concrete exchange
of information and for co-operation on security and other concerns con-
fronting the Georgian and South Ossetian sides.

The Ergneti IPRM provides a good example of how a closely co-ordi-

nated joint facilitation process between two international third parties can
support a wider political process, such as the Geneva Discussions. Not only
did the joint OSCE-EU dialogue facilitation effort consolidate the credibility
of the OSCE and the EU, it also stimulated a growing sense of ownership
in the IPRM itself among Georgian and South Ossetian authorities. This is
evidenced in the increasing and more pragmatic use by Georgian and Os-
setian representatives of IPRM meetings, which today often hold bilateral,

84
 Examples

informal side meetings to discuss specific issues without international third

party facilitation. The IPRM has thus shown how pragmatic dialogue on the
ground can help sustain a peace process in spite of strong polarization and
a lack of progress on the political level.

3. The Personal Representative of the CiO on the

Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference
In May 1994, the ministers of defence of Armenia, Azerbaijan and the com-
mander of the so-called Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army signed a cease-
fire agreement following more than two years of fighting in and around
Nagorno-Karabakh. The war left between 10,000 and 20,000 people dead,
up to 1.5 million displaced and a significant part of Azerbaijan’s territory
outside its control. 20 years later, shooting incidents cost the lives of about
30 people on both sides of the Line of Contact (LoC) every year. A peace
agreement has yet to be reached and the volatile security situation on the
border and the LoC, the lack of progress in negotiations, and harsh rhet-
oric regularly prompt concerns over a possible re-escalation into armed
conflict.

In 1992, the OSCE participating States requested the CiO to convene

a conference in Minsk as a forum for negotiations on a conflict settlement.
This so-called Minsk Conference was to be prepared by a group of 11 in-
terested participating States, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan, which lat-
er became known as the Minsk Group. The Minsk Conference was sub-
sequently postponed due to an armed escalation of the conflict and has
still, today, never been convened. At the end of 1994, participating States
established a High-Level Planning Group (HLPG) to make recommenda-
tions to the CiO for the establishment of a multinational OSCE peacekeep-
ing operation in the conflict area. They also tasked the CiO with naming
Co-Chairs of the Minsk Conference to ensure a common and agreed ba-
sis for negotiations and to full co-ordinate all mediation and negotiation
activities. In March 1995, the CiO issued a mandate for the Co-Chairs, now
held by France, Russia and the US. Since then, the three Co-Chairs have

85
 Annex I

mediated between Armenia, Azerbaijan and the so-called Republic of

Nagorno-Karabakh. The latter has not been present at the negotiation table
due to status issues raised by Azerbaijan.

During the same year, the CiO nominated a Personal Representative of

the Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk
Conference (PRCiO). In contrast to the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, the PRCiO
does not directly mediate between the conflict parties. He is mandated to
assist the CiO and the Co-Chairs in creating conditions for the deployment
of an OSCE peacekeeping operation and facilitating a lasting conflict settle-
ment. He also assists the conflict parties in developing and implementing
confidence-building, humanitarian and other measures that facilitate the
peace process, in particular by encouraging direct contacts. The PRCiO is
the main point of contact for the conflict parties outside the formal nego-
tiations and facilitating dialogue between negotiation meetings has become
the PRCiO’s most important task. He travels regularly between his Tbili-
si headquarters and Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert/Khankendi. With the
permission and support of the parties, the PRCiO and his team also visit
the LoC and the Armenian-Azerbaijan border. This is the only CSBM in
the military sphere that has been accepted thus far by the conflict parties.

Representatives of the parties meet regularly with the PRCiO to dis-

cuss current issues. In addition to other aspects of his mandate, he delivers
messages from the CiO or the Co-Chairs to the parties and vice versa. Being
present on the ground, participating in the visits of the Co-Chairs and their
meetings with the parties, and facilitating dialogue between such visits and
meetings, the PRCiO has amassed a significant amount of knowledge over
the years. He has thus become a key source of information for the successive
CiOs and Co-Chairs as well as the broader Minsk Group and the conflict
parties. At the request of the conflict parties, all efforts of the PRCiO and
the Co-Chairs are carried out in complete confidentiality.

Although the dialogue-facilitation, mediation-support and confi-

dence-building activities of the PRCiO have been critical in helping to

86
 Examples

maintain contact, sustain dialogue and reduce tensions in times of stalled

negotiations and rising tensions, the sides have been unable to reach a
peace agreement. The process has been taken forward in small steps with
frequent stalemates, setbacks and pauses in negotiations. The rhetoric of
the parties and the security situation at the LoC have often caused concerns
over a possible re-escalation of the conflict. In recent years there has been
some progress in the negotiations over basic principles for a conflict set-
tlement (Madrid Principles) but a decisive breakthrough has not yet been
achieved.

The PRCiO’s dialogue facilitation work demonstrates the important

role that a credible, knowledgeable, impartial and trusted facilitator can
play in an extremely sensitive mediation process. It also shows the cru-
cial nature of confidentiality, which allows the parties to discuss potential
future options even if they are not ready to make significant concessions.
The PRCiO’s experience illustrates that it is possible to maintain important
channels of communication with interlocutors who are otherwise excluded
from formal negotiations.

At the same time, the near total rejection of confidence-building meas-

ures by the parties, with the exception of the PRCiO’s monitoring of the
LoC, has made it impossible to build the necessary basic trust between the
parties and move the process decisively forward. In addition, the complete
confidentiality of the process and, therefore, lack of any communication
about the process, has contributed to mistrust and rumours. This has lim-
ited the parties’ room for manoeuvre, reinforced their hard-line stances and
made it difficult to prepare their constituencies for the necessary conces-
sions that accompany a settlement.

4. OSCE Dialogue Facilitation in South Serbia

In May 2001, the ‘Konculj Agreement’, facilitated by NATO, the US and the
OSCE, ended an 18-month low-intensity conflict between ethnic Albanian
members of the ‘Liberation Army of Preševo, Medvedja and Bujanovac’

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 Annex I

(UCPMB) and Serbian security forces. The conflict affected South Serbia
around the municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja where Al-
banians are a sizeable component of the population. Following the agree-
ment, Serbian authorities launched a development plan (Čović Plan) for
the three municipalities to be administrated by the Government’s Coordi-
nation Body for the Municipalities. Government attention to South Serbia
still remained low.

Major grievances of the ethnic Albanian population towards the Ser-

bian authorities persisted over: under-representation of ethnic Albanians
in state structures; the significant presence of the Serbian Gendarmerie in
the area; the lack of Albanian-language education and use of Albanian (Lat-
in) script; and slow economic development. Relations between the ethnic
Albanian population in South Serbia and the Serbian central Government
authorities remained strained.

As part of the international crisis response in 2001, the then OSCE

Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (now OSCE Mission to Ser-
bia) took the lead in judicial and police reforms. In November 2001, the
Mission established a field office in Bujanovac, which was tasked to facilitate
dialogue between Serbian Government authorities, especially the Coordi-
nation Body, and the ethnic Albanian community in South Serbia.

In November 2012, a major local dispute emerged when the Serbian

Gendarmerie built a memorial for the Interior Ministry casualties of the
2000 to 2001 armed clashes in the village of Lučane, while the ethnic Alba-
nian local authorities erected a memorial for fallen former UCPMB combat-
ants in front of the Preševo town hall. The latter captured the attention of
the Prime Minister and the President of Serbia. The government demand-
ed that the local authorities immediately remove the memorial in Preševo
and warned that failure to do so by a set deadline would result in its forced
removal. The UCPMB veterans threatened armed resistance in the case of
a police intervention. Tensions grew and dialogue between the local eth-
nic Albanian political leaders and the Coordination Body was interrupted.

88
 Examples

Finally, the Coordination Body asked for the OSCE Mission’s assistance in
facilitating the re-opening of communication channels.

In December 2012, the OSCE Mission and its Bujanovac field office
began an intense engagement with local Albanian politicians, UCPMB vet-
erans and government representatives on the memorial issue. An idea was
proposed to move the memorial from in front of the Preševo town hall to a
different location. However, the positions of the parties did not soften and
were further hardened by a high-level government visit to the Gendarmerie
memorial in Lučane. During a meeting facilitated by the Mission’s Bujano-
vac office, the Coordination Body proposed a temporary solution to move
the UCPMB memorial to private land and also to address the issue of the
Lučane Gendarmerie monument.

The proposal seemed to calm tensions. However, the ruling majority

in the Preševo Municipal Council initiated the legalization of the UCPMB
memorial. Efforts by the OSCE Mission to Serbia, individual participating
States and the EU Delegation to maintain open communication channels
led the majority of South Serbia’s ethnic Albanian political leaders to soften
their positions and the Serbian Government to delay action on the deadline.
The Mission was making headway in obtaining agreement from the local
ethnic Albanian political leaders, veterans and families of the fallen UCPMB
fighters to move the memorial, although there was no public commitment.
The following morning, the Serbian Gendarmerie secured the central square
in Preševo and a private construction company removed the memorial.

The removal of the monument prompted peaceful protests by the

ethnic Albanian community and re-escalated tensions. The OSCE Mission,
with the support of participating States and the EU Delegation, called for
restraint on the part of the ethnic Albanian political leaders and encouraged
the government to address long-standing grievances of South Serbia’s eth-
nic Albanian community as a measure to defuse the situation. These efforts
helped to alleviate tensions and restart discussions between the Coordina-
tion Body and the ethnic Albanian community.

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 Annex I

The OSCE Mission facilitated a meeting between the Coordination

Body and South Serbia’s ethnic Albanian political leaders, at which a com-
mon agenda of topics for discussion was agreed. The topics included repre-
sentation of ethnic Albanians in Serbian government structures, economic
development, decentralization of the judiciary, use of language, education,
culture and media, health care and social protection. Later in the year, this
common agenda was adopted by the Government of Serbia, which tasked
the Coordination Body and 13 ministries to engage in discussions on the
modalities to implement it. The First Deputy Prime Minister met with
South Serbia ethnic Albanian leaders, which was followed by two working-
level preparatory meetings between the Coordination Body and Albanian
leaders. The preparatory meetings were facilitated by the OSCE Mission’s
field office in Bujanovac. The Prime Minister met the ethnic Albanian lead-
ers, which was followed by a visit of the Minister of Health to the region to
jumpstart efforts on the first topic selected, health and social care.

The dialogue facilitation efforts of the OSCE Mission to Serbia in the

UCPMB Preševo memorial dispute and in South Serbia demonstrate the
important role of an international facilitator. This is especially true in situ-
ations when the implementation of a peace agreement or long-term meas-
ures related to it have slowed or stalled, and inter-ethnic tensions re-emerge
in local disputes with a potential for renewed conflict escalation. Through
its engagement, continuous since 2001, in facilitating dialogue between the
Government of Serbia and South Serbia’s ethnic Albanian community, the
OSCE Mission was able to reduce tensions as they emerged and revital-
ize a broader dialogue on long-standing grievances. The support received
from individual participating States and the EU Delegation illustrates how
an international facilitator can take advantage of external actors’ leverage
to influence the behaviour of conflict parties.

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 Examples

5. Inter-Communal Dialogue Facilitation

during Local Elections in Srebrenica, Bosnia
and Herzegovina
The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in late 1995
to support the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina) that ended
the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. In order to support the country in building a
multi-ethnic and multi-confessional democratic society, the Mission works
in strengthening democratic political institutions and promotes reconcilia-
tion between the country’s different ethnic groups. It facilitates inter-com-
munal dialogue in most fields of its activities. The Mission is also the only
civilian international organization that maintains a network of field offices
throughout the country. This enables it to work on the regional and local
levels and support institutions and processes to prevent future conflict. The
field office staff members frequently address local disputes involving inter-
ethnic aspects.

One such dispute emerged in Srebrenica in 2012 during preparations

for local elections. Inter-ethnic relations in the municipality of Srebrenica,
situated in the Republika Srpska (RS), have remained tense and fragile since
the war. As a result of the July 1995 massacre of over 8,000 Bosniak inhabit-
ants of Srebrenica by Bosnian Serb armed formations, Srebrenica has also
become a symbol of the wartime suffering of the country’s Bosniak popula-
tion. Srebrenica’s Bosniak population, formerly about two thirds of the mu-
nicipality’s population, represents today only one third of the population.
A special voting procedure during the local elections in Srebrenica in 2008
enabled former residents to vote in Srebrenica irrespective of their current
place of residence. This allowed a Bosniak mayor to be elected despite the
majority of residents now being Serbs.

During preparations for the local elections, Serb political parties re-
jected any special voting procedure for Srebrenica. This was also accepted
by representatives of the international community based in Sarajevo. When

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 Annex I

it was announced that no such procedure would be applied, Bosniak com-

munity leaders, among them the incumbent (acting) mayor of Srebrenica, re-
acted sharply. At the time, the legislation of Bosnia and Herzegovina allowed
citizens to register as permanent residents in any municipality irrespective
of their actual place of residence. Using this, Bosniak community leaders
initiated a strong and emotional campaign under the slogan “I will vote for
Srebrenica” to mobilize former Bosniak residents of Srebrenica to register as
permanent residents in the municipality and to help elect a Bosniak mayor.

The registration campaign put a strain on inter-ethnic relations. It cre-

ated fear among local Serb political parties, candidates and inhabitants of
losing the local elections to Bosniak parties and candidates. Bosniak inhab-
itants were mobilized against what the leaders of the campaign called the
“genocide denial politics” of Serb parties. The leaders of the campaign ac-
cused the local police and the RS Ministry of Interior of actively obstructing
the registration process by bureaucratic means.

The Mission’s Srebrenica field office got involved with the aim of pre-
venting a further escalation of inter-ethnic tensions. Throughout the pre-
elections phase, the Mission and its field office kept an impartial stance on
the registration issue. It maintained close contact with the local police, lead-
ers of the registration campaign, political parties and candidates, commu-
nity leaders, and civil society organizations, and tried to facilitate dialogue
to bridge differences. The field office used its school projects and women
organizations to work across the ethnic divide. To reduce tensions related
to bureaucratic procedures and to build confidence between the local police
and the Bosniak community, the field office also observed the registration
process in a non-intrusive manner, reviewed the complaints of citizens and
encouraged the use of domestic mechanisms to address complaints.

The field office regularly informed the international community based

in Sarajevo about the situation on the ground and briefed its representatives
visiting Srebrenica. The Head of Mission and other senior mission officials
worked with their counterparts in the international community in Sarajevo

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 Examples

to forge a unified position on the dispute in Srebrenica. The Mission’s Banja

Luka field office repeatedly communicated with the RS Ministry of Interior.
The OSCE Mission was eventually the only interlocutor able to close the
existing communication gap between the registration campaign, the local
police and the RS Ministry of Interior.

There were moments when the field office met strong resistance from
the local police, the RS Ministry of Interior and the leaders of the regis-
tration campaign. The local police and the RS Ministry refused to allow
field office staff access to the registration office to monitor the process. The
leaders of the registration campaign criticized the field office for not open-
ly supporting their cause and eventually, towards the end of the election
campaign, cut communication with the Mission. The registration campaign
leaders even started a campaign against the Mission, slandering it for al-
legedly supporting a “genocide denial course”. Nevertheless, the Mission
managed to keep informal contacts with some of the registration campaign
leaders throughout the entire pre-election phase. The campaign against the
Mission was not successful owing to the help of the international commu-
nity, which counteracted the campaign leader’s allegations.

Eventually, most stakeholders accepted the Mission and its field of-
fices as impartial and credible facilitators. The Mission’s dialogue facilita-
tion efforts helped to ameliorate tensions and to de-escalate the dispute
between the Bosniak and the Serb communities in Srebrenica. By August
2012, roughly 2,000 new permanent residents had registered in Srebrenica
without major problems. Finally, the incumbent (acting) Bosniak mayor of
Srebrenica was re-elected. This occurred despite the fact that ethnic Bos-
niak voters were in the minority and the major Serb political parties sup-
ported a single candidate. However, because an independent Serb candidate
received 14 per cent of the vote, the Bosniak candidate was able to secure
sufficient votes to defeat the main Serb candidate.

This experience of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina

and its Srebrenica field office demonstrates the difficulties and criticism a

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 Annex I

facilitator can face when opposing parties resist dialogue facilitation and
feel their cause is not being supported. The example also shows how a fa-
cilitator can overcome such resistance and successfully build credibility by
consistently maintaining an impartial course, implementing confidence-
building measures, working patiently with all stakeholders, and bridging
communication gaps to re-establish dialogue. The importance of a co-or-
dinated and unified position of the international community in support of
a dialogue facilitation process is also underlined, especially if the facilitator
is facing unjustified criticism from the parties. The difficulties faced by the
Srebrenica field office owing to the slander campaign demonstrate the im-
portance for facilitators to develop an effective communication strategy in
order to explain their role to all stakeholders and the broader society.

6. The Mediation Network of

Peace Messengers in Kyrgyzstan
In the aftermath of the April 2010 ousting of President Bakiyev in Kyr-
gyzstan, inter-ethnic violence broke out in June 2010 in the south of the
country – in the cities and provinces of Osh and Jalal-Abad. According to
different estimates, the clashes between local Kyrgyz and Uzbeks left be-
tween 420 and over 2,000 people dead and over 80,000 displaced. There
were allegations that Kyrgyz police, security and military forces were in-
volved in the clashes or did not seriously attempt to quell them. Although
the riots eventually subsided, relations remained tense between local Kyr-
gyz and Uzbek communities and between these communities and the law
enforcement organs. This raised concerns about the potential re-emergence
of inter-ethnic violence. The range of tensions and potential triggers for the
outbreak of new conflicts included a general lack of trust between govern-
ment and civil society, border incidents, and problems between local citi-
zens and mining companies.

The OSCE Centre in Bishkek decided, in 2010, to expand its support

to local mediation efforts that had begun with a pilot project in the Osh
province in 2007. Some of the local mediator teams established under the

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 Examples

initiative had successfully diffused tensions and prevented new violence

in the wake of the June 2010 riots. A public-private Mediation Network of
Peace Messengers (Yntymak Jarchylary) was then established by increasing
the number of local mediator teams to 34 and expanding the area covered
to the Jalal-Abad and Chuy provinces. The main purpose of the peace mes-
senger teams is to provide early warning on potential inter-ethnic and other
conflicts in their localities and to proactively address them through media-
tion and dialogue facilitation. They also work with local law enforcement or-
gans and other government officials to engage in emergency mediation with
local citizens during crisis situations. In addition, they co-operate with the
police advisors of the OSCE’s Community Security Initiative (CSI), which
was deployed in Kyrgyzstan in response to the June 2010 events, and which
aims at promoting dialogue and building trust between local communities
and law enforcement organs.

The Peace Messenger Network project is carried out by three experi-

enced local NGOs in co-operation with the national, provincial, district and
city authorities. Each of the 34 local mediator teams consists of 22 members.
Half of them are government employees and representatives of law enforce-
ment and the other half are from civil society. The members of the teams are
chosen from among eminent and trusted persons within the different com-
munities who already hold influential roles. Many of them are traditional
male elders (aksakals), women leaders, school directors and teachers, and
at least one member of each team is a police officer. In each team, an ethnic,
gender, age and religious balance is ensured.

The teams maintain contact with each other through information

exchange and regular joint events. This enables them to react in a co-or-
dinated manner to local conflict situations. To ensure ownership by na-
tional, regional and local government authorities, the peace messengers’
teams are working in co-ordination with the provincial, district and city
authorities, including the police and security structures. The teams will
become an integrated part of the national system of early warning and
conflict prevention and mitigation in 2015 (in Osh and Jalal-Abad) and

95
 Annex I

2016 (in Chuy). The consistency of the teams is maintained through two
layers of trainings: two selected members from each team participate in
training of trainers’ courses and they subsequently train their teammates
in the communities.

The peace messengers have been successfully involved in facilitating

resolutions to a significant number of local disputes among citizens, be-
tween citizens and local authorities and between citizens and enterprises.
The peace messengers have also successfully intervened in emerging dis-
putes that could have escalated into more significant local conflicts. These
conflicts were related to the allocation of land plots, real estate, the prob-
lems local residents encounter in connection with the operation of min-
ing companies, protests against local government bodies, and other so-
cio-economic issues with an inter-ethnic component. The messengers have
also worked to diffuse rumours that could have triggered public disorder or
inter-communal clashes.

The Mediation Network of Peace Messengers is a successful example

of an indirect international third party role in dialogue facilitation. In this
case, the third party worked to strengthen national and local capacities for
early warning, conflict prevention and conflict resolution in co-operation
with host country authorities and civil society. The Network also demon-
strates how traditional mediation approaches and local eminent persons
with influential roles within their communities can complement interna-
tional mechanisms.

However, despite the Network’ successes, it has proven especially dif-

ficult to build the necessary acceptance and ownership of local mediation
efforts by national, regional and local authorities, and to overcome the mu-
tual mistrust between state authorities and civil society. It has also been dif-
ficult, at times, to combine traditional mediation and dialogue facilitation
approaches with modern, professionalized methods. In addition, traditional
elders and women leaders have occasionally found it difficult to reconcile
their traditional roles as individual mediators with their roles in a mediation

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 Examples

team. The challenges faced by the Network of Peace Messengers demon-

strate that the strengthening of national and local mediation and dialogue
facilitation capacities is a long-term effort that requires sustainable support.

7. HCNM Dialogue Facilitation in the former

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The HCNM has been engaged in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia since 1993, with a particular focus on education policies. One major
issue that the HCNM has been addressing is the widespread separation
of ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian pupils in primary and second-
ary schools along linguistic and, thus also, ethnic lines. This has limited
inter-ethnic interaction and contributed to inter-ethnic tensions. The Au-
gust 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement, which ended armed hostilities be-
tween Albanian militant groups and State security organs, brought stability
but the ethno-linguistic separation in the education system remained. It
continued to be a major challenge to safeguard the rights of national mi-
norities in order to preserve and develop their identities, while at the same
time ensuring constructive interaction and mutual understanding among
all communities.

Upon the request of the authorities, the HCNM has provided recommenda-
tions on integrated education policies and facilitated dialogue between the
key stakeholders towards adopting a policy framework. On the HCNM’s
recommendation, a local expert was appointed to work under HCNM su-
pervision to consult with ethnic Albanian and ethnic Macedonian inter-
locutors in the government. In response, the government appointed ethnic
Macedonian and ethnic Albanian focal points to work with the HCNM ex-
pert to explore suitable formulations for a policy aimed at increasing inte-
gration in the education system.

By working in confidence with the ethnic Macedonian and ethnic Albanian

focal points on a background document, a comprehensive set of measures
was identified. These ranged from extra-curricular activities, Macedonian-

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 Annex I

language acquisition by ethnic Albanian pupils, teacher training and the

role of local self-government in education. The background document was
then consolidated into a Policy Paper on Integrated Education. In October
2009, the Policy Paper was publicly discussed in the presence of the HCNM,
the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister on the Ohrid Framework
Agreement, the Minister of Education and representatives of the interna-
tional community. Although the discussions were open and had local own-
ership, the HCNM’s dialogue facilitation ensured that negotiations over the
text were guided by the principles of integrated education and by interna-
tional human rights standards on education.

Shortly after the public discussions, the Minister of Education introduced

mandatory instruction from first grade in the Macedonian language in all
non-Macedonian language schools effective as of January 2010. This uni-
lateral move by a new representative of one side to the dialogue process
created distrust among some ethnic Albanian interlocutors about the true
aims of the Policy Paper. This situation was compounded by the fact that
the ministerial decision was misrepresented as directly deriving from the
Policy Paper. As a consequence, non-Macedonian communities, especially
the ethnic Albanian community, perceived the document merely as a way
to impose the Macedonian language on ethnic Albanian pupils.

The HCNM had to readjust the dialogue process. The dialogue with the eth-
nic Albanian branch of the government was re-launched so that their con-
cerns could be effectively addressed. The extensive and complex dialogue
process eventually led to the official endorsement of the policy document
‘Strategy for Integrated Education’ in October 2010.

The experience of the HCNM in facilitating dialogue on integrated educa-

tion in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia demonstrates the im-
portance for facilitators to correctly identify the key stakeholders in a dis-
pute. The facilitator also needs to remain flexible and ready to recalibrate
the process as developments unfold, while remaining steadfast on its main
components and comprehensive character. The example further underlines

98
 Examples

the importance of the parties’ ownership and commitment to work in good

faith to find a mutually acceptable solution.

The HCNM’s experience with the Policy Paper in 2010 shows that the
adoption of an agreement, or in this case a strategic policy document,
often needs further engagement by the facilitator through continuous
confidence building. The agreement is only a first step and the underlying
dispute can only be resolved by implementing the agreement. Moreover,
the lack of mutual trust will not automatically disappear with the signing
of the agreement. For a lasting solution to be achieved, the political will
and good faith of the parties are necessary as well as the willingness of
the facilitators to continue their engagement throughout the implemen-
tation process.

8. The Social Partnership Club in Tajikistan

In April 1996, in the midst of the civil war in Tajikistan that left up to
100,000 people dead and more than 1.2 million displaced, the Public Coun-
cil of Tajikistan was established. The Council was founded by the President
of Tajikistan, the Chairperson of the Parliament, and 50 political parties,
national, cultural, artistic and religious associations, as well as civil society
organizations, as an implementation mechanism for the Agreement on So-
cial Accord that had been signed by them a month before. At the time, the
Public Council, which aimed to promote dialogue between the President,
the Government, Parliament, political parties and civil society, did not in-
clude representatives of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) that had fought
the Government in the civil war. After signing the final peace agreement
(General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in
Tajikistan) in June 1997, the Public Council was first extended in 1999 and
later turned into a permanent dialogue forum. It became increasingly inclu-
sive once the main political parties of the former UTO joined the Council
between 2001 and 2002, with a subsequent broadening in participation over
the following ten years. To further strengthen its national dialogue func-
tion, the Public Council established the Social Partnership Club (SPC) in

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 Annex I

June 1999 as a subsidiary body for holding regular roundtables on the most
pressing political, economic and social issues in the country.

In support of the implementation of the General Agreement, the

OSCE Office in Tajikistan (OiT) continues to assist the work of the Public
Council and the SPC. The goal is to promote inclusive dialogue between
public authorities, political parties and civil society on issues of national
significance, including those pertaining to the protection of human rights
and to the democratization of the country. The OiT has continuously and
successfully advocated to enlarge participation in the Public Council so as
to increase its inclusiveness. At the same time, the OiT provides financial
support for the organization of SPC roundtables in the capital Dushanbe
and in the regions of Tajikistan. The OiT actively participates in prepar-
ing the meetings, among others, by proposing a list of topics for discus-
sion to the President, who holds the final decision-making authority on the
agenda. Furthermore, the Mission promotes national dialogue by holding
regular meetings with representatives of the President’s Administration, the
Government, the Public Council Secretariat, regional authorities, political
parties and civil society organizations. The Head, Deputy Head and other
relevant staff members of the OiT also participate in national and regional
meetings of the SPC, give presentations and monitor the discussions. How-
ever, they do not actively moderate the sessions.

Over the last ten years, in the framework of the SPC, the OiT has
facilitated dialogue between the President, the Government, Parliament,
regional authorities, political parties and civil society on a broad range
of issues. These include: elections; religious extremism; the role and
development of civil society; the role of political parties and independent
media; the National Strategy for the improvement of women’s role in society;
human rights and the Ombudsman institution; economic development;
the fight against corruption; labor migration; education reform; e-govern-
ment; ecology and the exploitation of water and energy resources; and
many others.

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 Examples

The OiT’s work with the Public Council and the SPC in Tajikistan is
an example of how the OSCE is helping to facilitate dialogue in a politi-
cally sensitive post-conflict environment by supporting national forums for
dialogue and reconciliation. The support of the OiT has helped make the
Public Council and the agenda of the SPC more representative and inclu-
sive. Through such activities, the OiT has also been able to build a reputa-
tion as a credible facilitator among public authorities, political parties and
civil society.

At the same time, the OiT’s involvement with the Public Council and
the SPC has experienced challenges in facilitating dialogue through a public
body, whose agenda and follow-up is determined by the authorities. Thus,
it has not always been possible to include the most disputed political issues
on the agenda, for example, the outcome of the 2010 parliamentary elec-
tions. In addition, the active and open dialogue of the Public Council and
the SPC have partially developed into more formal meetings with speeches
and presentations. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the dialogue process
has been criticized by some political parties and parts of the civil society,
which argue that although some important topics have been discussed they
have not led to significant improvements. Therefore, the sense of ownership
in and credibility of the Public Council and the SPC is mixed. Whereas own-
ership is relatively strong on the side of government authorities, ownership
and the sense of credibility in the process on the side of civil society and
certain political parties has been weaker, leading some to begin boycotting
national meetings of the Public Council following the 2010 parliamentary
elections. However, the fact that these parties continue to attend regional
SPC meetings indicates that their sense of ownership in the dialogue pro-
cess is not yet fully lost and might be rebuilt.

9. ODIHR/CPSRI Dialogue Facilitation on Roma IDP

Return in Mitrovica/Mitrovicë
Following the end of the Kosovo war in 1999, the Roma mahala of Mitro-
vicë/Mitrovica, situated in the Kosovo Albanian dominated part of the city,

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 Annex I

was burned down by Kosovo Albanians who accused the Roma of collabo-
rating with the Serbs. Of the estimated 8,000 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian
(RAE) residents of the mahala, most fled to Serbia and Montenegro but
about 800 of them found shelter in three IDP camps situated close to a lead
mine in the majority Kosovo Serb north Mitrovica/Mitrovicë. The 800 RAE
IDPs were left to live in the camps for several years, in disastrous living
conditions with high rates of lead poisoning, as their return to the south of
the city could not be agreed with local authorities. The authorities were not
willing to allow a return as most RAE IDPs did not have legal property titles
on the land of the former mahala. The RAE communities insisted on their
right of return but had serious security concerns. The return of the RAE
IDPs became an urgent issue for the international community in Kosovo.

The head of ODIHR’s Contact Point for Roma and Sinti Issues (CPSRI)
engaged in an international awareness-raising campaign on the situation of
RAE IDPs. This included RAEs in Kosovo, in general, and, specifically, the
situation of the RAE communities in the three IDP camps in north Mitrovi-
ca/Mitrovicë. In close co-operation with OMiK and the UN Mission in Ko-
sovo (UNMiK), CPSRI also engaged in intensive dialogue facilitation efforts
to find a solution for the safe return of RAE IDPs to the former mahala. He
shuttled between the RAE communities in the camps in north Mitrovica/
Mitrovicë, the local authorities in the south of the city and the Kosovo Min-
istry for Communities and Return, together with representatives of OMiK
and UNMiK. They attempted for several years to bring the positions of local
authorities in south Mitrovicë/Mitrovica and the RAE communities in the
camps in north Mitrovica/Mitrovicë closer together. They also mobilized
the international donor community to provide funding for the reconstruc-
tion of houses in the former Roma mahala.

A dispute over the reconstruction of houses quickly developed. Due

to the intransigent position of the local authorities in the south of the city,
the work with the Kosovo Ministry for Communities and Return became
the decisive track of the dialogue facilitation effort. Convincing the Minis-
try of the need to find a solution made it possible to eventually soften the

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 Examples

position of local authorities. However, they were only willing to allot 3.5 of
the former 17.5 hectares of land of the former Roma mahala for the recon-
struction of housing. They also limited the offer to those living as IDPs in
north Mitrovica/Mitrovicë and agreed to rebuild individual houses only for
the few former residents that held property titles. For the majority of for-
mer residents without property titles, apartment blocks were proposed to
be built. The international stakeholders eventually supported this solution
due to the urgent need to improve living conditions for the RAE IDP com-
munities. A breakthrough was achieved in April 2005 with the signature of
an agreement between the Mitrovicë/Mitrovica Municipality and the OSCE,
UNMiK and UNHCR on land allocation in the former Roma mahala. How-
ever, some of the RAE community leaders rejected the plan. They insisted
on the reconstruction of all individual houses and mobilized their com-
munities against a return under the conditions offered by the agreement.

The engagement of the ODIHR Adviser on Roma and Sinti Issues be-
came crucial. Together with OMiK and UNMiK, he continued the dialogue
with all stakeholders in spite of continuous opposition from some RAE
community leaders. He himself a Roma from Romania with a long personal
involvement in Roma-rights activities, the ODIHR Adviser had the neces-
sary credibility, inter-cultural experience and skills to nudge the dialogue
process forward. He succeeded in convincing most of the RAE community
leaders to accept the solution offered by the Ministry, the local authorities
and the international donors. In addition, he provided a regional perspec-
tive on the issue and was perceived as an impartial facilitator. In 2006, hous-
ing reconstruction started in the Roma mahala in the south of Mitrovicë/
Mitrovica. The following year the RAE IDPs, including those from the three
camps in the north of the city, returned in two phases. The second phase
of the internationally-funded return project, which had been taken over by
the UN Kosovo Team, was eventually handed over to the Kosovo Ministry
for Communities and Return in 2008.

OMiK and UNMiK continue to monitor the situation surrounding the

Roma mahala. One item in the agreement, the signing of a lease between

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 Annex I

local authorities and the residents of the mahala, is still not fulfilled. This
raises questions about the sustainability of the facilitated solution. ODIHR/
CPRSI has continued to promote international and national dialogue on
sustainable solutions for RAE IDPs and for the integration of RAE com-
munities in Kosovo.

The experience of ODIHR/CPRSI’s joint dialogue facilitation with

OMiK and other international partners in the dispute on the return of RAE
IDPs to the Roma mahala in Mitrovicë/ Mitrovica is mixed. On the one
hand, the case is a good example of the credibility of a mediator based on
his cultural and professional background. It also illustrates the value of con-
tinuous and effective co-operation between international stakeholders. The
case exemplifies the importance of national ownership in the process and
demonstrates that, in dialogue processes, a less than perfect agreement may
be the only feasible solution.

On the other hand, the example shows that mediating a difficult dis-
pute under strong time pressure can potentially undermine the sustain-
ability of the agreement reached. The danger is that if not all parties are
sufficiently included in the process it can lead to a neglect of some of their
interests. If an agreement reached under time pressure does not regulate in
sufficient detail the obligations of the parties and the steps and timeframe
for their actions, there is a risk that one party, in this case the local authori-
ties, might backslide and not fulfil all of their obligations.

10. Dialogue Facilitation of the Parliamentary

Assembly in Moldova
The OSCE PA can set up ad hoc committees that work to increase par-
liamentary attention to specific issues related to the OSCE’s political-mil-
itary, economic-environmental and human dimensions. In January 2000,
after consultations with the political leaderships in Chisinau and Tiraspol,
the PA established such a committee – the Parliamentary Team on Mol-
dova (Moldova Team). Consisting of four to five parliamentarians from

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 Examples

different OSCE participating States, the mandate of this ad hoc committee

was to promote peace, stability and the rule of law in Moldova. This was
to be achieved by affirming the unity of the state and promoting dialogue
between parties and organizations that represented different sections of
the Moldovan population. The settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict is
a particular priority of the Moldova Team, which closely co-operates with
the OSCE Mission to Moldova.

Although Members of the Moldovan Parliament and deputies of the

Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet were involved in early settlement attempts
between 1990 and 1993, their dialogue broke down over the years. The
OSCE opened additional communication channels between the two banks
of the Dniester/Nistru. As any final settlement agreement would have to
pass the Moldovan Parliament and the Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet and
as parliamentarians from Chisinau and Tiraspol have experience from pre-
vious settlement negotiations, the restoration of parliamentary dialogue
was considered an effective means to get the settlement process back on
track. As a result of the first visit of the PA’s Moldova Team, the Moldovan
Parliament and the Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet signed an agreement
on co-operation in March 2000. In the agreement, they consented to ex-
change of information, harmonize the legislation of the two sides, establish
regular channels of communication and contacts, and institute parliamen-
tary control over the course of the negotiation process.

Following the agreement and after intensive shuttle diplomacy, the

PA’s Moldova Team organized three seminars. The events brought together
members of the Moldovan Parliament and deputies of the Transdniestri-
an Supreme Soviet with MPs and other political practitioners from OSCE
participating States. The purpose was to provide the Moldovan and the
Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet with expertise on different models of self-
government, autonomy and federalism. The Moldova Team also prepared
the text of several draft PA resolutions on Moldova and promoted dialogue
on the Transdniestrian settlement process within the PA.

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 Annex I

Overall, the Moldova Team’s activities in this phase helped to revive

the inter-parliamentary dialogue between the two banks of the Dniester/
Nistru and to increase ownership in the settlement process among legisla-
tors on both sides. The three seminars also provided valuable information to
Moldovan and Transdniestrian legislators during a critical period in which
different settlement proposals were prepared at formal and informal levels.
These included the work of the Joint Constitutional Commission in 2003.

The consultations held with the sides by the PA’s Moldova Team fur-
ther strengthened the credibility of the OSCE as a mediator in the settle-
ment process. Following the deterioration of relations between Moldovan
and Transdniestrian authorities in 2004, the dialogue facilitation efforts of
the PA’s Moldova Team became increasingly difficult. The Team continued
to visit Chisinau and Tiraspol regularly so as to encourage the Moldovan
Parliament and the Transdniestrian Supreme Soviet to continue the parlia-
mentary dialogue. The Team also promoted PA resolutions on the settle-
ment process. However, despite continuous attempts, they failed to bring
Moldovan and Transdniestrian legislators back to the table.

This experience of the PA’s Moldova Team shows that parliamentary

dialogue can be a useful tool to create additional communication chan-
nels between conflict parties in times of stalled negotiations. It can also
strengthen the inclusiveness of a mediation process and stimulate a stronger
sense of national ownership in the process. The sharing of expertise through
dialogue can also strengthen the capacity of legislators to play a more ac-
tive role. Informing legislators about the political negotiations and building
capacities for their roles in the settlement process can be a tool with which
to strengthen the credibility of a mediator among political actors and gain
their support for the process. However, when the conflict is dominated by
strong executive powers, the potential of parliamentary dialogue is limited.
In such situations parliamentary dialogue can barely survive without the
consent of the executive leaderships of the conflict parties.

106
Annex II: List of Acronyms

107
Annex II

108
As the world’s largest regional security organization, the OSCE possesses
longstanding experience in facilitating political dialogue and engaging
in mediation activities with the aim of preventing, managing or resolving

guidance for OSCE representatives who are directly involved in designing,

implementing, and evaluating mediation and dialogue facilitation engagements