VALIAO VS.

REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011

Facts:

The Valiao co-heirs and Nemesio Grandea applied for registration of a

parcel of land they claimed to have acquired from their late uncle and have had
possession until unlawfully being dispossessed by Zafra. Zafra, Yusay, and the
Republic opposed the application, claiming that the land had not been declared
alienable and disposable and the applicants had not been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land which was part
of public domain. The Court denied the application, holding that the co-heirs
failed to prove that the land was alienable and disposable and that they had
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of it.

Issue:

Whether or not the subject property is alienable and disposable land of

the public domain?

Ruling:

No, the subject property is not alienable and disposable land of public
domain. Under the regalian doctrine embodied in the Constitution, all lands of
the public domain belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to
have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to
a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. The
burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of public domain is on the person applying for registration, who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable with
incontrovertible evidence. In this case, the petitioners failed to present
evidence that the land in question has been classified as alienable and
disposable land of public domain, that they and their predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation thereof since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Therefore, the decision of CA
is affirmed.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SEGUNDO SIOSON and PASCUALA

BAUTISTA
G.R. No. L-13687, November 29, 1963

Facts:

The spouses Segundo Sioson and Pascuala Bautista filed an application

for registration four (4) parcels of land, which they claimed to be the owners in
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fee simple. The Director of Lands filed an opposition. The trial court rendered a
decision ordering registration of three lands and declined to adjudicate on the
fourth land. The applicants appealed. The Solicitor General filed in CA a
pleading recommending that the registration of Lot No. 4. CA rendered
judgment decreeing the registration of Lot No. 4. After the said order, the
Solicitor General filed a petition for review of the decree of registration and
cancellation of title to a parcel of land. The petition alleges actual and extrinsic
fraud practiced by the respondents, then applicants, by intentional and
deliberate concealment of facts and connivance by and between the herein
respondents and the land inspector. The Court of Appeals rendered an order
denying the petition. The Republic of the Philippines appealed.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition

without affording the opportunity to the petitioner (Republic) to adduce
evidence in its claim of actual and extrinsic fraud on the part of the applicants?

Ruling:

The petition for review is predicated on actual and extrinsic fraud

committed by the respondents, then applicant, and was filed within a year from
the entry of the decree. Without hearing the evidence in support of the
allegation and claim that actual and extrinsic fraud had been committed by the
respondents the Court below denied the petition. This is an error. There being
an allegation of actual and extrinsic fraud the Court should have afforded the
petitioner an opportunity to prove it. Moreover, if it is true that the lot is or
forms part of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river the decree and title
to it in the name of the respondents would not give them any right or title to it.
Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered under the Land
Registration Act. Petition Granted. The order appealed from is set aside.

CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 195026, February 22, 2016

Facts:

Central Mindanao University claims to have been awarded parcels of

land for the purpose of construction of school sites in Bukidnon by President
Garcia as shown by Proclamation No. 476. However, the Republic, through the
Solicitor General, filed a petition for annulment of the decision of the cadastral
court granting the title before the CA, arguing that said parcels of land are
inalienable lands of the public domain. The Court denied this instant petition
and affirmed the decision of the CA due to the failure of CMU to prove, through
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incontrovertible evidence, that land reservations registered in its name are
alienable and disposable lands of public domain. They were not able to
establish the existence of a positive act of the government.

Issue:

Whether the parcels of land are considered alienable and disposable

considering that issuance of PD 476 and the order of the compulsory
registration by the Office of the President?

Ruling:

The lands are still inalienable lands of public domain. To prove land is
alienable, the existences of a positive act of the government, such as
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action etc.
declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established.
Proclamation No. 476 was issued for the reservation of school site for CMU. It
was pursuant to Section 83 of CA 141. And according to the said Act in Section
88: “The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of section 83,
shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or
other disposition until again declared alienable under the provisions of this Act
or by Proclamation of the President.” In the case of Navy Officers' Village
Association, Inc. v. Republic, it was held that parcels of land classified as
reservations for public or quasi -public uses: (1) are non-alienable and non-
disposable in view of Section 88 (in relation with Section 8) of C.A. No. 141,
specifically declaring them as non-alienable and not subject to disposition; and
(2) they remain public domain lands until they are actually disposed of in favor
of private persons. In other words, lands of the public domain classified as
reservations remain to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from
the public or quasi -public use for which they have been reserved, by act of
Congress or by proclamation of the President, or otherwise positively declared
to have been converted to patrimonial property.

NAVY OFFICERS’ VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOVAI) VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 177168, August 03, 2015

Facts:

On 1965, a certain portion of land was declared for “AFP Officer’s Village”
for disposal. A month later, a part of the land was declared to be for the VFP as
a site for rehabilitation. On November 15, 1991, the property was the subject of
a Deed of Sale between the Republic of the Philippines, and petitioner NOVAI.
The deed of sale was subsequently registered and from which TCT No. T-15387
was issued in NOVAI’s name.
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 Republic wants the title cancelled on the ground that, among others, the
land covered by NOVAFs title is part of a military reservation. The RTC ruled in
favor of NOVAI, contending that the land is already Alienable and disposable.
The CA reversed, inalienable land as the petitioner failed to prove the positive
act of the government.

Issue:

Whether or not the land is already A&D and hence, can be registered?

Ruling:

No. It is settled that the land falls under those which are reserved for
public use in CA 141. In a limited sense, parcels of land classified as
reservations for public or quasi-public uses under Section 9 (d) of C.A. No. 141
are still non-alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the
general classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. By specific declaration under Section 88, in relation with
Section 8 and Section 83, these lands classified as reservations are non-
alienable and non-disposable.

From the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property,

lands which are intended for public use or public service such as reservations
for public or quasi-public uses are property of the public dominion and remain
to be so as long as they remain reserved.

Applying to the case at bar, Proclamation No. 478 was issued after
Proclamation No. 461. Hence, while Proclamation No. 461 withdrew a certain
area or parcel of land from the FBMR and made the covered area available for
disposition in favor of the AFPOVAI, Proclamation No. 478 subsequently
withdrew the property from the total disposable portion and reserved it for the
use of the VRMTC.

HEIRS OF AMUNATEGUI VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983

Facts:

There were two petitions for review on certiorari questioning the

decision of the Court of Appeals which declared the disputed property as
forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons, Borre and
Amunategui.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also

filed an opposition to the application for registration of title claiming that the

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land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and part of
the public domain.

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a

portion of Lot No. 885 containing 117,956 square meters was concerned and
prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in his name.

Issue:

Whether or not the lot in question can be subject of registration and

confirmation of title in the name of the private person?

Ruling:

The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the

appellate court's finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain
licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a
license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from
the District Forester that the same could not be done because it was
classified as "public forest”.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped
it of its forest cover. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out
of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into
private ownership. Therefore, the lot in question never ceased to be classified
as forest land of public domain.

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND DELA ROSA

G.R. NO. L-43938, APRIL 15, 1980

Facts:

Jose dela Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on

his own behalf and on behalf of his children. This application was separately
opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. (Benguet) and Atok Big Wedge
Corporation (Atok).

The petitioners claimed that they have acquired the land from their
parents and that they have been in possession of the land ever since. Benguet
and Atok opposed on the ground that they have mineral claims covering the

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property and had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the
land in concept of owner.

The trial court denied the application while the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant but
subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims. In
other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas
over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of
Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Issues:

1. Who has better claim on the land in dispute.

2. Whether or not land can be classified as both agricultural and mineral

at the same time.

Ruling:

1. The Court held that BCI and Atok have vested rights over the land.
The Court found that the mineral claims of both BCI and Atok have been
perfected prior to the approval of the 1935 Constitution. As a legal effect of a
valid mineral claim, it segregates the area from the public domain and confers
to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim. As of 1935, they were
removed from the public domain and had become private properties of BCI and
Atok. Even if the land was included in the Central Cordillera Forest reserve, it
did not impair the rights vested in both mining companies. The claim of the
Dela Rosas was disregarded for weak evidence, and even so, they could not
have acquired the land through prescription since the lad had already been
converted to mineral land.

2. Atok claims of ownership on a portion of lots 15 and all of lots 6-9 is

similar to that of BCI, that a mineral claim covering that the lots had been sold
to them in 1931 and produced evidence such as the construction and tax
payments. BFD objected that the land in dispute was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proc. No. 217. And since it was a forest land, it
cannot be subject to alienation, pursuant to the 1935 and 1973 Constitution.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND REPUBLIC REAL ESTATE CORPORATION

G. R. NO. 103882 NOV. 25, 1998

Facts:

RA No. 1899 which was approved on June 22, 1957 authorized the
reclamation of foreshore lands by chartered cities and municipalities. Invoking

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RA 1899, the Pasay City passed Ordinance No. 121 for the reclamation of 300
hectares of foreshore lands along the seaside in Pasay City. The Ordinance was
amended authorizing Republic Real Estate Corporation (RREC) to reclaim
foreshore lands of Pasay City under certain terms and conditions. Republic of
the Philippines (RP) filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages
questioning subject Agreement between Pasay City and RREC on the grounds
that the subject matter of such Agreement is outside the commerce of man,
that its terms and conditions are violative of RA 1899 and the said Agreement
was executed without any public bidding. It alleged that that what Pasay City
has are submerged or offshore areas outside the commerce of man which could
not be a proper subject matter of the Agreement between Pasay City and RREC
in question as the area affected is within the National Park, known as Manila
Bay Beach Resort, established under Proclamation No. 41, dated July 5, 1954,
pursuant to Act No. 3915, of which area it (Republic) has been in open,
continuous and peaceful possession since time immemorial.

Issue:

Whether or not the Ordinance passed by Pasay City is valid?

Ruling:

The Ordinance is invalid. Foreshore land does not include submerged

areas. Foreshore lands refer to the strip of land that lies between the high and
low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the
tide. The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so
doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If
the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have
provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the
exclusion of submerged areas from the term "foreshore lands". The subject
matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158,
and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the
intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002

Facts:

The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority to disclose all
facts on PEA’s then on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation to reclaim portions of Manila Bay. The petition
further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI
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involving such reclamation. PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to
institute mandamus proceedings to enforce his constitutional right to
information without a showing that PEA refused to perform an affirmative duty
imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has not
shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial review.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has legal standing to compel PEA to comply

with its constitutional duties?

Ruling:

Petition granted. The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayer’s suit
because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
duties. The right of citizens to information on matters of public concern and
the application of a constitutional provision intended to ensure the equitable
distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens are
two constitutional rights involved. The thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA
to disclose publicly information on the sale of government lands worth billions
of pesos. The second issue is to prevent PEA from alienating hundreds of
hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the
nation.

COLLADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 107764, October 4, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner Collado filed with the land registration court an application for
registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 120.0766 hectares
("Lot" for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal,
and covered by Survey Plan Psu- 162620. Attached to the application was the
technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-162620 signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in- Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which
stated, “this survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed." Then petitioner
Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-applicants.
Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as "petitioners"
for brevity).

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 The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the
Municipality of Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions to petitioners’ application.

Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time
immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and in the
concept of owners. The Lot was surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one
of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as March 22, 1902.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have registrable title over the Lot?

Ruling:

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain as well as all
natural resources belong to the State. Watersheds are considered natural
resources which are not susceptible of occupancy, disposition, conveyance or
alienation. The statute of limitations with regard to public land does not
operate against the State.

REPUBLIC VS. SOUTHSIDE HOMEOWNERS’ ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. NO. 156951, September 22, 2006

Facts:

The subject matter of these proceedings for declaration of nullity of title

are parcels of land with a total area of 39.99 hectares, more or less, known as
the JUSMAG housing area in Fort Bonifacio where, military officers, both in the
active and retired services, and their respective families, have been occupying
housing units and facilities originally constructed by the AFP. Private
respondent SHAI is a non-stock corporation organized mostly by wives of AFP
military officers. Records show that SHAI was able to secure from the Registry
of Deeds of the Province of Rizal a title – Transfer Certificate of Title in its name
to the bulk of, if not the entire, JUSMAG area. The Rizal Registry issued TCT
No. 15084 on October 30, 1991on the basis of a notarized Deed of Sale
purportedly executed on the same date by then Director Abelardo G. Palad, Jr.
of the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) in favor of SHAI. The total purchase
price as written in the conveying deed was P11,997, 660.00 or P30.00 per
square meter It appears that in the process of the investigation conducted by
the Department of Justice on reported land scams at the FBMR, a copy of the
aforesaid October 30, 1991deed of sale surfaced and eventually referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination. The results of the
examination undertaken by NBI Document Examiner Eliodoro Constantino
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reveals that the puported signatures in the document are forgeries. On October
16, 1993, then President Fidel V.Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 173
directing the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to institute action towards
the cancellation of TCT No. 15084 and the title acquired by the Navy Officer’s
Village Association (NOVA) over a bigger parcel within the reservation. A month
later, the OSG, in behalf of the petitioner Republic, filed with the RTC of Pasig
City the corresponding nullification and cancellation of title suit against the
private respondent SHAI, purported signature thereon of Palad is a forgery; b)
there are no records with the LMB of (i) the application to purchase and (ii) the
alleged payment of the purchase price; and c) the property in question is
inalienable, being part of a military reservation established under Proclamation
No. 423. On pre-trial the Republic, as plaintiff therein, marked (and later
offered in evidence) the Deed of Sale dated October 30, 1991 as its Exhibit
"A,"and TCT No. 15084 as Exhibit "B." Respondent, then defendant SHAI
adopted Exhibits "A" and “B” as its Exhibits "1" and “2,” respectively. During
the trial, the Republic presented as expert witness NBI Document Examiner
Eliodoro Constantino who testified and asserted that the signature of Palad in
Exhibit “A” is a forgery. For his part, Palad dismissed as forged his signature
appearing in the same document and denied ever signing the same, let alone in
front of a notary public holding office outside of the LMB premises. Pressing
the point, Palad stated that he could not have had signed the conveying deed
involving as it did a reservation area which, apart from its being outside of the
LMB’s jurisdiction, is inalienable in the first place. For its part, then defendant
SHAI presented an opposing expert witness in the person of Police Inspector
Redencion Caimbon who testified that Palad’s signature in Exhibit “A” is
genuine. Mrs. Virginia Santos, then SHAI president, likewise testified, saying
that applications to purchase were signed and then filed with the LMB by one
Engr. Eugenia Balis, followed by the payment in full of the contract price.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the Republic’s complaint as it considered the parcels
covered by the deed in question as no longer part of the FBMR. Therefrom, the
Republic went on appeal to the CA which affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, this petition of the Republic.

Issue:

Was the JUSMAG area, during the period material, alienable or

inalienable, as the case may be, and, therefore, can or cannot be subject of a
lawful private conveyance?

Ruling:

Petitioner Republic, correctly asserts the inalienable character of the

JUSMAG area, the same having not effectively been separated from the military
reservation and declared as alienable and disposable. The President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, may

10
designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as
reservations for the use of the Republic or any of its branches, or for quasi-
public uses or purposes. Such tract or tracts of land thus reserved shall be
non-alienable and shall not be subject to sale or other disposition until again
declared alienable. Consistent with the foregoing postulates, jurisprudence
teaches that a military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open
to private appropriation or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it
is in the meantime reclassified and declared as disposable and alienable public
land. And until a given parcel of land is released from its classification as part
of the military reservation zone and reclassified by law or by presidential
proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a military
reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than
as a military camp or for defense. The same is true in this case. There is no
doubt that the JUSMAG area subject of the questioned October 30, 1991sale
formed part of the FBMR as originally established under Proclamation No. 423.
And while private respondent SHAI would categorically say that the petitioner
Republic had not presented evidence that “subject land is within military
reservation,” and even dared to state that the JUSMAG area is the private
property of the government and therefore removed from the concept of public
domain per se its own evidence themselves belie its posture as their evidence
both the TCT and the Deed of Sale technically described the property as
situated in Jusmag area located at Fort Bonifacio which is now renamed Fort
Mckinley a declared a military reservation. The Republic has, since the filing of
its underlying complaint, invoked Proclamation No. 423. In the process, it has
invariably invited attention to the proclamation’s specific area coverage to prove
the nullity of TCT No. 15084, inasmuch as the title embraced a reserved area
considered inalienable, and hence, beyond the commerce of man. The October
30, 1991 Deed of Sale purportedly executed by Palad, assuming its
authenticity, could not plausibly be the requisite classifying medium converting
the JUSMAG area into a disposable parcel. And private respondent SHAI’s
unyielding stance that would have the Republic in estoppel to question the
transfer to it by the LMB Director of the JUSMAG area is unavailing. It should
have realized that the Republic is not usually estopped by the mistake or error
on the part of its officials or agents. Since the parcels of land in question
allegedly sold to the private respondent are, or at least at the time of the
supposed transaction were, still part of the FBMR, the purported sale is
necessarily void ab initio. Moreover, Article XII, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution forbids private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain, except through lease for a limited period.

REPUBLIC VS. SANTOS

G.R. No. 180027, July 18, 2012

Facts:
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The respondents purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered land previously
owned by one Generosa Asuncion (Generosa), one Teresita Sernal (Teresita)
and by the spouses Jimmy and Imelda Antona, respectively. The respondents
caused the survey and consolidation of the parcels of land into a single lot-"Lot
3"-with a determined total area of nine thousand five hundred seventy-seven
(9,577) square meters. On 12 March 2002, the respondents filed with the RTC
anApplication8 for Original Registration of Lot 3. The respondents allege that
their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous owners of the parcels of land
making up Lot 3, have been in "continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and
adverse" possession of the said parcels "since time immemorial." The
government insists that Lot 3 still forms part of the public domain and, hence,
not subject to private acquisition and registration.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent’s application for registration be granted?

Ruling:

No. Jura Regalia simply mean that the State is the original proprietor of
all lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles. Thus,
pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land, save those
acquired from native title, must be traced from some grant, whether express or
implied, from the State. Absent a clear showing that land had been let into
private ownership through the State’s imprimatur, such land is presumed to
belong to the State. Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as
land belonging to the State. It is basic that those who seek the entry of such
land into the Torrens system of registration must first establish that it has
acquired valid title thereto as against the State, in accordance with law. In this
case, the respondents were not able to satisfy the third requisite, i.e., that the
respondents failed to establish that they or their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in possession and occupation of Lot 3 "since June 12, 1945 or earlier."

REPUBLIC VS. HEIRS OF SIN

G.R. NO. 157485, MARCH 26, 2014

Facts:

Petitioner in this case is the Republic represented by Aklan National

College of Fisheries (ANCF) and Dr. Andrade as Superintendent of ANCF. The
respondents in this case claims that they are the lawful heirs of Sin who was
the owner of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Tambac, New Washington,
Aklan, and more particularly described as follows:

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 A parcel of cocal, nipal and swampy land, located at Barangay Tambac,
New Washington, Aklan, containing an approximate area of FIFTY EIGHT
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIX (58,606) square meters, more or less, as
per survey by Geodetic Engineer Reynaldo L. Lopez. Bounded on the
North by Dumlog Creek; on the East by Adriano Melocoton; on the South
by Mabilo Creek; and on the West by Amado Cayetano and declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Maxima L. Sin (deceased) under Tax
Declaration No. 10701 (1985) with an assessed value of Php1,320.00.

Respondent filed a complaint at RTC of Kalibo, Aklan against ANCF for

the recovery of possession, quieting of title, and declaration of ownership with
damages. Respondent heirs claim that a 41,231-square meter-portion of the
property they inherited had been usurped by ANCF, creating a cloud of doubt
with respect to their ownership over the parcel of land they wish to remove
from the ANCF reservation.

ANCF alleges that the parcel of land being claimed by respondents

was the subject of Proclamation No. 2074 of then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos allocating 24.0551 hectares of land within the area, which included
said portion of private respondents’ alleged property, as civil reservation for
educational purposes of ANCF. The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred
that the subject parcel of land is timberland and therefore not susceptible of
private ownership.

RTC remanded the case to MCTC of New Washington and Batan

Aklan. Respondent presented evidences that they inherited the land from their
mother, who acquired the land through a Deed of Sale. (1945)

In 1988 a portion of land was occupied by ANCF who converted it

into a fishpond. Respondents claim that they were previously in possession of
the land in the concept of an owner. The disputed area was a swampy land
until it was converted into a fishpond by the ANCF. To prove possession,
respondents presented several tax declarations, the earliest of which was in the
year 1945.

MCTC rendered a judgement in favor of the Respondents.

Petitioner through the Solicitor General Appealed to the RTC, who affirmed the
MCTC. A petition for review was filed with the CA who rendered a judgement in
favor of the respondent. Hence this Petition for Review in the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not complies with the requirements of judicial confirmation of

imperfect title?

Ruling:

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 At the outset, it must be noted that respondents have not filed an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the Public Land Act
or the Property Registration Decree. Nevertheless, the courts a quo apparently
treated respondents’ complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and
declaration of ownership as such an application and proceeded to determine if
respondents complied with the requirements therefor.

The Court has thus held that there are two requisites for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:

(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and

occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-
interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from
June 12, 1945; and

(2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all

lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any
asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of
the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been
reclassified as alienable or disposable to a private person by the State, it
remains part of the inalienable public domain.

Accordingly, in the case at bar, the failure of petitioner Republic to show

competent evidence that the subject land was declared a timberland before its
formal classification as such in 1960 does not lead to the presumption that
said land was alienable and disposable prior to said date. On the contrary, the
presumption is that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands.

Therefore, the respondents which have the burden to identify a positive

act of the government, such as an official proclamation, declassifying
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by them and by their
predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential and could never ripen into
ownership. Accordingly, respondents cannot be considered to have private
rights within the purview of Proclamation No. 2074 as to prevent the
application of said proclamation to the subject property.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC.,

represented by RONNIE P. INOCENCIO
G.R. No. 199310, February 19, 2014
14
Facts:

On December 3, 2001, Remman Enterprises, Inc. (respondent), filed an

application with the RTC for judicial confirmation of title over two parcels of
land, Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 situated in Barangay Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. On December 13, 2001, the RTC granted respondent's application for
registration. Thereafter, following the required publication and posting, a
scheduled hearing was set. However, on May 30, 2002, only the Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA) appeared as oppositor. Hence, the RTC issued
an order of general default except LLDA, which was given 15 days to submit its
comment/opposition to the respondent's application for registration.

On June 4, 2002, the LLDA filed its Opposition to the respondent's

application for registration, asserting that the lots are not part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. On the other hand, the Republic of
the Philippines (petitioner), on July 16, 2002, likewise filed its Opposition,
alleging that the respondent failed to prove that it and its predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject parcels of land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Respondent's witnesses showed that the respondent and its

predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the said parcels of land long before June 12, 1945. The
respondent likewise alleged that the subject properties are within the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, as evidenced by the certifications
issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

On the other hand, the LLDA alleged that the respondent's application
for registration should be denied since the subject parcels of land are not part
of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain; it pointed out that
pursuant to Section 41(11) of Republic Act No. 4850(R.A. No. 4850), lands,
surrounding the Laguna de Bay, located at and below the reglementary
elevation of 12.50 meters are public lands which form part of the bed of the
said lake. Engr. Magalonga, testifying for the oppositor LLDA, he found out
that the elevations of Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 are below 12.50 m. That upon
actual area verification of the subject properties on September 25, 2002, Engr.
Magalonga confirmed that the elevations of the subject properties range from
11.33 m to 11.77 m.

The RTC granted the respondent's application for registration of title to

the subject properties. The RTC found that the respondent was able to prove
that the subject properties form part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain and that the elevations of the subject properties are very
much higher than the reglementary elevation of 12.50 m and, thus, not part of
the bed of Laguna Lake.

15
 The RTC likewise found that the respondent was able to prove that it and
its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of the subject properties as early as 1943.

The petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC. The CA likewise pointed out that the respondent was able to present
certifications issued by the DENR, attesting that the subject properties form
part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was not
disputed by the petitioner. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which granted
the application for registration filed by the respondent?

Ruling:

Yes. The CA erred in affirming the RTC Decision which granted the
application for registration filed by the respondent.

Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 provides that applicants for registration of
title must sufficiently establish: first, that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The first requirement was not satisfied in this case. To prove that the
subject property forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, the respondent presented two certifications issued by Calamno,
attesting that Lot Nos. 3068 and 3077 form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. However, the said certifications
presented by the respondent are insufficient to prove that the subject
properties are alienable and disposable.

In this case, no original copy of the certification of land classification

approved by the DENR secretary and duly certified as true copy by the legal
custodian of the records, was presented by the respondent. They only
submitted the survey map and technical description of the land which bears no
information regarding the land's classification.

For the second and third requirements of land registration, the Court
finds that the respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it
and its predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject properties since June
12,1945, or earlier. The testimonies presented to prove that it has been owned
and cultivated by Jaime since 1943 up to the time it was purchased by
16
respondents in 1989 are self-serving as they were unsubstantiated. Cultivation
of land does not immediately mean ownership of such land. Moreover, the tax
declarations presented by the respondents for the subject properties only
reflect payment from 2002, which is contrary to their claim of ownership of
said lots. Wherefore, the instant petition is granted, while the RTC decision
assailed by the CA is reversed and set aside. The application for registration of
Remman Ent. Inc. for the subject lots is denied for lack of merit

LOZADA VS. BRACEWELL

G.R. No. 179155, April 2, 2014

Facts:

On December 10, 1976, petitioner filed an application for registration

and confirmation of title over a parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514,
which was granted on February 23, 1989 by the RTC of Makati City, Branch
134, acting as a land registration court. Consequently, on July 10, 1997, the
LRA issued Decree No. N-217036 in the name of petitioner, who later obtained
OCT No. 0-78 covering the said parcel of land.

On February 6, 1998, within a year from the issuance of the

aforementioned decree, James Bracewell, Jr. (Bracewell) filed a petition for
review of a decree of registration under Section 32 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 1529, otherwise known as the "Property Registration Decree," before the
RTC of Las Piñas City, Branch 275 (Las Piñas City-RTC) claiming that a portion
of Plan PSU-129514, consisting of 3,097 square meters identified as Lot 5 of
Plan PSU-180598 (subject lot) – of which he is the absolute owner and
possessor – is fraudulently included in Decree No. N-217036. He allegedly filed
on September 19, 1963 an application for registration and confirmation of the
subject lot, as well as of Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Plan PSU-180598, situated in
Las Piñas City, which was granted by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58, on
May 3, 1989. He further averred that petitioner deliberately concealed the fact
that he (Bracewell) is one of the adjoining owners, and left him totally ignorant
of the registration proceedings involving the lots covered by Plan PSU-129514.
Instead of impleading him, petitioner listed Bracewell’s grandmother, Maria
Cailles, as an adjoining owner, although she had already died by that time.

In his answer to the foregoing allegations, petitioner called Bracewell a

mere interloper with respect to the subject lot, which the Bureau of Lands had
long declared to be part and parcel of Plan PSU-129514. He argued that his
Plan PSU-129514 was approved way back in 1951 whereas Bracewell’s Plan
PSU-180598 was surveyed only in 1960, and stated that the latter plan, in fact,
contained a footnote that a portion known as Lot 5, i.e., the subject lot, is a
portion of the parcel of land covered by Plan PSU-129514

17
 Finding that petitioner obtained Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78
in bad faith, the Las Piñas City-RTC rendered a Decision on July 31, 2003 in
favor of Bracewell, who had died during the pendency of the case and was
substituted by Eulalia Bracewell and his heirs (respondents). Accordingly, it
directed the LRA to set aside Decree No. N-217036 and OCT No. 0-78. The Las
Piñas City-RTC faulted petitioner for deliberately preventing respondents from
participating and objecting to his application for registration when the
documentary evidence showed that, as early as 1962, Bracewell had been
paying taxes for the subject lot; and that he (Bracewell) was recognized as the
owner thereof in the records of the Bureau of Lands way back in 1965, as well
as in the City Assessor's Office.

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated his case on appeal before the CA, docketed
as CA-G.R. CV No. 81075, arguing mainly that the Las Piñas City-RTC had no
jurisdiction over a petition for review of a decree of registration under Section
32 of PD 1529, which should be filed in the same branch of the court that
rendered the decision and ordered the issuance of the decree.

In a Decision dated May 23, 2007, the appellate court affirmed the
assailed judgment of the RTC, finding that respondents were able to
substantiate their claim of actual fraud in the procurement of Decree No. N-
217036, which is the only ground that may be invoked in a petition for review
of a decree of registration under Section 32 of PD 1529.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, hence, this

petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Las Piñas City-RTC has jurisdiction over the petition
for review of Decree No. N-217036, which was issued as a result of the
judgment rendered by the RTC of Makati City, Branch 134?

Ruling:

Under the “Land Registration Act,” which was the law in force at the time
of the commencement by both parties of their respective registration
proceedings — jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title was
conferred upon the Courts of First Instance (CFIs, now RTCs) of the respective
provinces in which the land sought to be registered is situated.

Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,[39] otherwise known as

“The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” was enacted and took effect on
August 14, 1981, authorizing the creation of RTCs in different judicial regions,
including the RTC of Las Piñas City as part of the National Capital Judicial
Region. As pointed out by the court, the RTC of Las Piñas City was established
“in or about 1994.” Understandably, in February 1998, Bracewell sought the
18
review of the Decree before the Las Piñas City-RTC, considering that the lot
subject of this case is situated in Las Piñas City.

It should be pointed out, however, that with the passage of PD 1529, the
distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited
jurisdiction conferred upon it as a cadastral court was eliminated. RTCs now
have the power to hear and determine all questions, even contentious and
substantial ones, arising from applications for original registration of titles to
lands and petitions filed after such registration.

Section  32.  Review of decree of registration; Innocent purchaser for

value. -The decree of registration shall not be reopened or revised by reason of
absence, minority, or other disability of any person adversely affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments, subject, however,
to the right of any person, including the government and the branches thereof,
deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by such adjudication or
confirmation of title obtained by actual fraud, to file in the proper Court of First
Instance a petition for reopening and review of the decree of registration not
later than one year from and after the date of the entry of such decree of
registration, but in no case shall such petition be entertained by the court
where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired the land or an interest
therein, whose rights may be prejudiced. Whenever the phrase “innocent
purchaser for value” or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Decree, it shall be
deemed to include an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.

Upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree of registration
and the certificate of title issued shall become incontrovertible. Any person
aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other persons responsible for
the fraud.

As such, case law instructs that for “as long as a final decree has not
been entered by the [LRA] and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from
the date of entry of such decree, the title is not finally adjudicated and the
decision in the registration proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.

HERMOSO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 166748, April 24, 2009

Facts:

The case involves parcels of land located at Malhacan, Meycauyan,

Bulacan, identified as Lot No. 3257 owned by Petra Francia and Lot 3415
19
owned by Antonio Francia. The lots comprise an area of 2.5 and 1.5850
hectares, respectively, and forms part of a larger parcel of land with an area of
32.1324 hectares co-owned by Amos, Jr., Benjamin, Cecilia, Petra, Antonio and
Rufo, all surnamed Francia.

Since 1978, petitioner and Miguel Banag (Banag) have been occupying
and cultivating Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 as tenants thereof. They filed a petition
for coverage of the said lots under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27. On July 4,
1995, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order granting the
petition

Respondents filed an omnibus motion for reconsideration and

reinvestigation. On December 9, 1995, the DAR affirmed with modification the
earlier order, and disposed of the case.

In a separate development, petitioner and Banag filed consolidated cases

with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The
cases delved on whether both petitioner and Banag are tenants of respondents
in the subject landholding. On June 3, 1996, the DARAB rendered a Decision
upholding the tenancy relationship of petitioner and Banag with the
respondents.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed before the CA. However, the petition
was denied on technical grounds. A motion for reconsideration was filed, but
the same was likewise denied. The case was eventually elevated to this Court.
The Court denied the petition for lack of verification, and subsequently, also
denied the motion for reconsideration.

Earlier, on January 20, 1997, Banag filed before the DAR, an urgent ex-
parte motion for the issuance of an emancipation patent. The DAR granted the
motion. Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration. They claimed that the
lands involved have been approved for conversion to urban purposes issued by
the DAR Secretary. The conversion order stated that the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27 does not cover the
subject parcels of land.

On March 10, 1998, the DAR issued an Order affirming the order
granting the motion for issuance of emancipation patent in favor of Banag. On
March 30, 1998, respondents filed a notice of appeal and correspondingly filed
their appeal memorandum. On April 21, 2003, the Office of the President
through the Deputy Executive Secretary rendered a Decision denying
respondents’ appeal.

Respondents then filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court. They maintained that P.D. No. 27 does not cover the
subject parcels of land pursuant to the Order of the DAR Secretary
20
reclassifying the lands and declaring the same as suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes.

On October 15, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed Decision.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On January 19, 2005, the

CA rendered the assailed Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Lot Nos. 3257 and 3415 are covered by P.D. No. 27?

Ruling:

No. Section 3, Article XII22 of the Constitution mandates that alienable

lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.

The classification of lands of the public domain is of two types, i.e.,

primary classification and secondary classification. The primary classification
comprises agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
These are lands specifically mentioned in Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution. The same provision of the Constitution, however, also states that
agricultural lands of the public domain may further be classified by law
according to the uses to which they may be devoted. This further classification
of agricultural lands is referred to as secondary classification

The petitioner in the instant case claims that he is entitled to the

issuance of an emancipation patent under P.D. No. 27. The said decree
promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, on October 21, 1972, is
entitled, "DECREEING THE EMANCIPATION OF TENANTS FROM THE
BONDAGE OF THE SOIL TRANSFERRING TO THEM THE OWNERSHIP OF
THE LAND THEY TILL AND PROVIDING THE INSTRUMENTS AND
MECHANISMS THEREFORE". However, the law specifically applied "to tenant-
farmers of private agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn under a
system of share tenancy or lease tenancy, whether classified as landed estate
or not."

For the parcels of land subject of this petition to come within the
coverage of P.D. No. 27, it is necessary to determine whether the land is
agricultural. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 6657 defines agricultural land, as follows:

(c) Agricultural Land refers to the land devoted to agricultural activity as

defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential,
commercial or industrial land.

and Section 3(b) specifies agricultural activity as:

21
 (b) Agriculture, Agriculture Enterprise or Agricultural Activity means
cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including
the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and
practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming
operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

On the basis of these definitions, the subject parcels of land cannot be

considered as within the ambit of P.D. No. 27. This considering that the subject
lots were reclassified by the DAR Secretary as suited for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes way before petitioner filed a
petition for emancipation under P.D. No. 27.

PALANCA VS. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 151312, Aug. 30, 2006

Facts:

The heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, (petitioners herein), filed an application to

bring the pieces of land they allegedly owned under the operation of the Land
Registration Act. They acquired said realties by inheritance from the late Pedro
S. Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said land openly and
continuously in the concept of an owner 39 years before the filing of said
application, and planted on said lands coconut trees, declared the same for
taxation purposes and paid the taxes. Petitioners likewise presented six
witnesses in support of their application. Alfonso Lucero as one of the
witnesses testified that he is a Forester in the Bureau of Forestry before and he
is convinced that the lands in question have already been released before the
war for agricultural purposes in favor of Pedro S. Palanca through which a
certification was issued by his office.

After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision declaring petitioner as

the owners in fee simple of the two parcels of land in question. After almost 23
years, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree of registration and title, and
reversion.

Respondent presented a Land Classification Map showing that the

subject properties were unclassified lands as of that date as well as a
certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office stating that "the islands of Talampulan and Capar Island located in the
municipality of Busuanga, Palawan are within the unclassified public forest."

Issue:
22
 Whether or not the lands in question are alienable lands?

Ruling:

No. CFI as land registration court has no jurisdiction to decree the

registration of the questioned lands since they are not alienable lands,
otherwise, the tile is null and void.

The possession of public (forest) land on the part of the claimant,

however long, cannot convert the same into private property. Possession in
such an event, even if spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into
ownership. It bears stressing that unless and until the land classified as forest
is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title does not apply.

While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified
lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the classification as mineral
or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until released and rendered
open to disposition. When the property is still unclassified, whatever
possession applicants may have had, and however long, still cannot ripen into
private ownership. This is because, pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the State is the source of
any asserted right to ownership in such lands and is charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. Thus, the Court has emphasized the need to
show in registration proceedings that the government, through a positive act,
has declassified inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes.

SEC. OF DENR VS. YAP

G.R. No. 167707, October 8, 2008
Facts:

Proclamation No. 1801 declared Boracay Island as tourist zone and

marine reserve under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority.
PTA Circular No. 3-829 implemented Proclamation No. 1801.

Respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. filed a petition for

declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan. They alleged that Proclamation
No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles
over their occupied lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their
predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or
23
earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and
paid realty taxes on them.

The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,”
which was not available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.

The RTC and CA decided in favor of the respondent-claimants.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent claimants have a right to secure titles over

their occupied portions in Boracay?

Ruling:

No. Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert
Boracay into an agricultural land. Except for lands already covered by existing
titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain prior to
Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest
under PD No. 705. In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order,
administrative action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the
Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the
portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a
government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot
be assumed.

Further, the Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public
domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony, a
doctrine consistently adopted under the 1935,1973, and 1987 Constitutions;
Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never
been expressly and administratively classified under any of the grand divisions
of land.

CRUZ VS. SECRETARY OF DENR

G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000

Facts:

24
 Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations
(IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the
ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2,
Article XII of the Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisions of Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997

(IPRA) contravene the Constitution?

Ruling:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.

Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs
ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with
the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural
resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and
occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large-scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs
by native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective
of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.

25
 REPUBLIC VS. DOLDOL

Facts:

Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in

Opol, Misamis Oriental. On 1963, he filed an application for salt work purposes
for the said area but the Director of Forestry rejected the same. Sometime in
1965, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental passed are solution reserving a
certain lot as a school site. This lot unfortunately included the lot of Doldol.
Sometime in 1970, the Opol High School filed a complaint for
accionpossessoria with the RTC, the court ruled on school’s power. On appeal,
the CA reversed the decision of the court ruling that Doldol was entitled to the
portion he occupied, he having possessed the same for 32years (1959-1991).

Issue:

Whether or not Doldol has the better right to possess the land in dispute?

Ruling:

No. The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the
land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the
conditions set by law are complied with the possessor of the land, by operation
of law, acquires a right to grant, a government grant, without then ecessity of
title/certificate of tile being issued. The evidence presented shows that the land
in dispute is alienable and disposable in accordance with the District Forester’s
Certification. Doldol thus meets the first requirement.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed
land since his occupation of the same started only in 1955, much later than
June 12, 1945. Not having complied with the conditions set forth by law,
Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land or a right to assert a
right superior to the school given that then Pres. Aquino had reserved the lot
for Opol National School. “The privilege occupying public lands with a view of
pre-empting confers no contractual or vested right in the land occupied and the
authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the
public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to divesting by the government

26
of title thereof stands even though this may defeat the imperfect right of settler.
Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement
on them can be acquired” (Solicitor General) In sum, Opol National School has
the better right of possession over the land in dispute.

27