JOSE MARIA COLLEGE

Philippine Japan Friendship Highway, Sasa, Davao City

COLLEGE OF LAW

TITLE ONE: CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY

SECTION ONE: Treason and Espionage

1. Laurel vs. Misa, 77 Phil. 856 - Corbit, Rea Lyza
2. U.S. vs. Lagnayon, 3 Phil 478 - Fajardo, Rosalie
Mae
3. People vs. Adriano, 78 Phil 561 - Carrillo, Zazi Dizz
4. People vs. Agpangan, GR No. L- - Cruz, Dorothy
778 (October 10, 1947) Grace
5. People vs. Escleto, G.R. No. L- - Trajano, Jovelyn
1006 (June 28, 1949)
6. People vs. Perez G.R. No. L-856 - Arangcon, Ladyh
(April 18, 1949) April
7. People vs. Manayao G.R. No. L- - Castillon, Charry
322 (July 28, 1947) Joy
8. People vs. Prieto, 80 Phil 138 - Suaybaguio,
Mervin Jay
9. People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. - Castillon, Jay-ar
L-9529
10 US vs. Bautista, G.R. No. L-2189 - Caoile, Mara
. (November 3, 1906) Aleah
SECTION THREE: Piracy and Mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters
11 People vs. Mendoza, G. R. No. - Codilla, John Rey
. 104461 (February 23, 1996)
12 People vs. Laurente, G.R. No. - Coquilla, Paolo
. 116734 (March 29, 1996)
13 People vs. Lol-lo and Saraw, G.R. - Archua, Ivy
. No. 17958 (February 27, 1922)
14 People vs. Tulin, G.R. No. - Amadora, Jordan
 . 111709 (August 30, 2001)
15 People vs. Timon, G.R. No. - Plana, Gilvee
. 97841-41 (November 12, 1997) Chardyl

1. REA LYZA CORBIT

LAUREL VS. MISA

77 Phil. 856
January 30, 1947

Rea Lyza Corbit

Absolute and permanent allegiance is not suspended

during enemy occupation. Hence, adherence to said enemy
occupant, through giving them aid and comfort, is an act of
treason punishable under Article 114 of the RPC.

FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus and
argued that a Filipino who adhered to the enemy, giving the
latter aid and comfort, during their (Japanese) occupation,
cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason under Article 114
of the RPC because the sovereignty of the Philippines and the
correlative allegiance of Filipinos at the time were suspended.
ISSUE:
Is the allegiance of Filipinos suspended during enemy
occupation?
RULING:
No, the allegiance of Filipinos is not suspended during
enemy occupation.
A citizen or subject owes absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists of fidelity and obedience, to his
government or sovereign. This kind of allegiance should not be
confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance whom a
foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of the territory
wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for
the protection he receives.
This absolute and permanent allegiance of citizens is not
abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation, because the
sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not
transferred thereby to the occupier. Sovereignty itself is not
suspended and subsists during enemy occupation; what may be
suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, the same
being passed temporarily to the occupant. In effect, the
allegiance of the citizens to their legitimate government or
sovereign subsists, hence, there is no such thing as suspended
allegiance as theorized by Laurel.
2. ROSALIE MAE FAJARDO
The United States, complainant-appellee, vs. Dalmacio
Lagnason, defendant-appellant
G.R. 1582. March 28, 1904.

Ponente: Willard, J.

Facts: The defendant, Dalmacio Lagnason was charged under

section 1 of Act No. 292 with the crime of treason. The following
facts appeared from the evidence.

From the time of the occupation of the Province of

Occidental Negros by the American troops, there had existed a
band of men in arms against the Government of the United
States. This band was led by the defendant and was
campaigning through the northern part of the province. In the
southern part was another similar band led by Dionisio Papa.

In the month of September, 1902, the defendant had

placed himself and his forces under the orders of said Dionisio
Papa. His band was constantly armed and kept together, and its
object was to establish an independent government. On October
29, 1902, the defendant with this band made an attack upon
the pueblo of Murcia in said province.

They were however driven off by the force of Constabulary

there stationed. During that night, two inspectors of the
Constabulary arrived with additional forces in search of the
defendant. He was attacked by the Constabulary and the fight
lasted an hour and a half.

The defendant’s band consisted of between seventy and

eighty men. However, he was still captured in the battle and
about twenty of his men were killed. On the side of the
Constabulary, two policemen were killed in the vicinity who
were acting as guides.

The band had arms; five or ten rifles, bolos, daggers, and
one small cannon. The defendant when captured was armed
with a rifle, a revolver, and a bolo. Most of his men wore black
shirts, white pantaloons, and black caps. They carried no
banners, but did carry two large wooden crosses which were
captured, together with the cannon.

Issue: Whether or not the defendant, Dalmacio Lagnason is

guilty of the crime of treason under section 1 of Act No. 292.

Ruling: Yes, it is treason because the act of violence committed

by armed body of men with the purpose of overthrowing the
Government is considered levying of war and levying of war is
considered as treason regardless of the number of men,
whether it was done by ten men or ten thousand.

Meantime, no distinction was made between foreign enemy

and rebel or insurgent so far as act of levying is concerned.
However, in giving aid or comfort to an enemy, it has been said
that the word "enemy" means a foreign enemy and does not
include a rebel.

In the case at bar, the defendant is clearly guilty of

treason and punishable under the section of Act No. 292 as he
engaged in an attempt to overthrow the Government and was
captured after an armed contest. It matters not how vain and
futile his attempt was and how impossible of accomplishment.
The acts performed by him constituted a levying of war.

The judgment is affirmed with a change of the penalty,

however, from death to ten years and a fine of $10,000, money
of the United States, with the costs of this instance against the
defendant.

Notes:
"SECTION 1. Every person, resident in the Philippine
Islands, owing allegiance to the United States, or the
Government of the Philippine Islands, who levies war against
them or adheres to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort
within the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, is guilty of treason,
and, upon conviction, shall suffer death or, at the discretion of
the court, shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than
five years and fined not less than ten thousand dollars."

"SECTION 3. Every person who incites, sets on foot,

assists, or engages in any rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States, or of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, or the laws thereof, or who gives aid or
comfort to anyone so engaging in such rebellion or insurrection,
shall, upon conviction, be imprisoned for not more than ten
years and be fined not more than ten thousand dollars."
3. ZAZI DIZZ CARRILLO
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
APOLINARIO ADRIANO, defendant-appellant.
78 Phil. 561 (June 30, 1947)
“Two-Witness Rule in Treason”
PONENTE: TUASON, J.
FACT/S:
“This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for treason by
the People's Court sentencing the accused to life imprisonment,
Php 10,000 fine, and the costs.”
That between January and April, 1945 or thereabout, during the
occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese Imperial Forces,
in the Province of Nueva Ecija and in the mountains in the
Island of Luzon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused, Apolinario Adriano, who is not
a foreigner, but a Filipino citizen owing allegiance to the United
States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines, in violation of
said allegiance, did then and there willfully, criminally and
treasonably adhere to the Military Forces of Japan in the
Philippines, against which the Philippines and the United States
were then at war, giving the said enemy aid and comfort as a
member of the Makapili, a military organization established and
designed to assist and aid militarily the Japanese Imperial
forces in the Philippines in the said enemy's war efforts and
operations against the United States and the Philippines.
The court below, however, said these acts had not been
established by the testimony of two witnesses, and so regarded
them merely as evidence of adherence to the enemy.
But the court did find established under the two-witness rule, so
we infer, "that the accused and other Makapilis had their
headquarters in the enemy garrison at Gapan, Nueva Ecija; that
the accused was in Makapili military uniform; that he was
armed with rifle; and that he drilled with other Makapilis under
a Japanese instructor; . . . that during the same period, the
accused in Makapili military uniform and with a rifle, performed
duties as sentry at the Japanese garrison and Makapili
headquarters in Gapan, Nueva Ecija;" "that upon the liberation
of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, by the American forces, the accused and
other Makapilis retreated to the mountains with the enemy;"
and that "the accused, rifle in hand, later surrendered to the
Americans."
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the two-witness rule is required in establishing
the guilt of the accused in the crime of treason.
RULING/S:
Yes.
The Philippine law on treason is of Anglo-American origin and so
we have to look for guidance from American sources on its
meaning and scope - judicial interpretation has been placed on
the two-witness principle by American courts.
The two-witness rule required for conviction for treason is that
no person shall be convicted thereof unless on the testimony of
two-witnesses to the same overt act. If the overt act is
separate, two (2) witnesses must also testify to each part of
overt act for conviction.
In the case at bar, the findings of the court are not borne out by
the proof of two witnesses. No two of the prosecution witnesses
testified to a single one of the various acts of treason imputed
by them to the appellant. Those who gave evidence that the
accused took part in raids and seizure of personal property, and
performed sentry duties and military drills, referred to acts
allegedly committed on different dates without any two
witnesses coinciding in any one specified deed. There is only
one item on which the witnesses agree: it is that the defendant
was a Makapili and was seen by them in Makapili uniform
carrying arms. Yet, again, on this point it cannot be said that
one witness is corroborated by another if corroboration means
that two witnesses have seen the accused doing at least one
particular thing, it a routine military chore, or just walking or
eating.
By extension, the lawmakers who introduced that provision into
the Philippine statute books must be understood to have
intended that the law should operate with the same inflexibility
and rigidity as the American forefathers meant.
The judgment is reversed and the appellant acquitted with costs
charged de oficio.

4. DOROTHY GRACE CRUZ

CRUZ, DOROTHY GRACE F.

Criminal Law 2 – Case Digest

People vs Agpangan
79 Phil. 334
October 1947

Case Title : The People of the Philippines, plaintiff and

appellee, vs. NEMESIO L. AGPANGAN, defendant and appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a judgment of the People’s Court.
FACTS
Appellant Agpangan stands accused of treason, committed
between December 1944 and January 1945, in the Province of
Laguna, on only one count alleged in the information as follows:
'That 011 or about December 20, 1944, the accused, a member
of the Ganap, a subversive pro-Japanese organization, joined
the Pampars, a military organization supporting the Imperial
Japanese Army and designed to bear arms against the army of
the United States and the Commonwealth of the Philippines and
the guerrillas in the Philippines; that he was equipped with a
1903 Springfield rifle, caliber 30, and was made to undergo 10
days training, consisting of military drill, manual of arms, and
target practice; and that from or about January 12, 1945 to
March 15, 1945, the said accused was assigned to guard duty
once a week; that he was armed with a rifle with orders to
shoot any of the Filipino prisoners whom he was guarding who
might attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or American
soldier who might approach the Japanese garrison."
The lowere court found him guilty and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs.
Three witnesses testified for the prosecution:
1. Tomas C. Serrano, 46, farmer, resident of Siniloan. He
testified that in December 1944, he saw the accused in the
Japanese garrison in Siniloan. That Agpangan was a
member of Makapili organization; that he was doing guard
duty, with a rifle, with a bayonet at his side; that he was at
the entrance of the garrison and he made all civilians
passing through the entrance bow to him and that to those
who did not bow, were dragged by the arms and brought
to the captain in the garrison. That he served as guard in
a Japanese garrison in Siniloan since November 1944 up to
the time when Serrano was arrested on March 24, 1945.
That he saw the accused “many times” on guard duty in
the garrison; confiscating foodstuff for the support of the
Japanese soldiers. That he was often seen to have been
accompanied by Japanese soldiers and other members of
 the Makapili arresting suspected guerillas and patrolling or
camping in the hideouts of the guerilla forces. Serrano
was arrested on March 25, 1945 by Japanese soldiers and
Makapilis with whom the accused was. The next morning,
Serrano, together with the other 12 prisoners, were
brought to the place where they were to be executed. On
their way, American planes came roaring, so the guards
took cover. Serrano was able to slip away but was one of
the 12 prisoners being executed. When the town was
liberated, Serrano went back to the place of execution and
knew the place of execution when he smelled very bad
odor and recognized the soil which swelled, and knew that
it was the place where his son was buried. Thirty days
after, they requested the municipal authorities to exhume
the bodies. Serrano did not see the accused at the time of
execution but based his knowledge as to the accused being
a Makapili member and he saw him armed, guarding the
Japanese garrison, confiscating foodstuffs and arresting
guerilla suspects in the town. Bienvenido Agapangan, one
of those who were executed by the Japanese, was the son
of the accused. The witness did not know whether the
accused was present during the execution because there
was nobody present; only God had witnessed the killing.
2. Mauricion Adaro, 47, farmer, resident of Siniloan, testified
that in December 1944, he saw the accused in the
Japanese garrison in Siniloan. That the accused was a
mounting guard but cannot remember to what date he saw
him in the garrison since he was used to go out in Siniloan
every time. That the accused was getting food supplies
from civilians and giving them to the Japanese. The
accused and the Japanese companions arrested the son of
Adaro (Custodio) in their own house but Adaro was not
arrested because he was able to hide. He saw the accused
mounting guard in the Japanese garrison “many times,
more than ten times”; and that the garrison was located ‘in
 the school building.’
3. Delfin Redor, 55, mayor of Siniloan since 1937, testified
that appellant has been his barrio lieutenant and that he
belongs to Pampar Makapili and Pampar and Makapili,
which are believed to be the same, from December 1944
to March 1945. He saw the accused in the Makapili
garrison, in the Siniloan plaza. That the accused
sometimes was detailed as guard in front of the garrison
with arms and ammunitions – bayonet; that he saw him
“many times”. Redor abandoned the office of mayor
during the Japanese occupation in March 1944 because he
escaped being wanted by the Japanese for being a guerilla.
But after which, he remained living in the población of
Siniloan and never stopped living in the población. He had
three times seen the accused accompanied by the
Japanese in raiding out población and commandeered
foodstuffs and took them to the garrison for food. The
Japanese garrison was in the Intermediate Building and the
Makapili garrison is in Baybay Academy, about one
kilometer distant. Redor saw the accused in Makapili
garrison but he did not see the accused when he was
arrested by the Japanese four times. Redor did not know of
anybody who had been pointed out by the accused to the
Japanese and was arrested by the same.
ISSUE
Are the testimonies of the witnesses sufficient to prove treason
against the accused?
HELD
The evidence presented by the prosecution in this case does not
offer that degree of proof. None of the several overt acts alleged
in the information has been proved in accordance with the two-
witness rule provided in Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is imputed to appellant, in the first place, that he is a member
of the Ganap, "a subversive pro-Japanese organization," and
"joined the Pampar, a military organization supporting the
Imperial Japanese Army and designed to bear arms against the
Army of the United States and the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and the guerrillas in the Philippines." No witness has
testified that appellant is a member of the Ganap. Only one
witness, Redor, testified that appellant belonged to Pampar, but
he did not testify as to its nature.

The next allegation of the information is that appellant "was

equipped with a 1903 Springfield rifle, caliber 30, and was made
to undergo ten days training, consisting of military drill, manual
of arms, and target practice." No evidence has been presented
in support of this allegation.

The third allegation against appellant is that "from or about

January 12, 1945, to March 15, 1945, the said accused was
assigned to guard duty once a week." The fourth and the last
allegation is that "he was armed with a rifle with orders to shoot
any of the Filipino prisoners whom he was guarding who might
attempt to escape and also any guerrilla or American soldier
who might approach the Japanese garrison." In connection with
these two allegation, the only thing that the prosecution
attempted to prove is that appellant did guard duty and was
armed with a rifle. But the attempt does not meet the test
under the two-witness rule.

The first two witnesses for the prosecution testified that they
had seen the accused doing guard duty in the Japanese garrison
in Siniloan "many times," more than "ten times," but neither of
them has mentioned any specific time, day and hour. They were
able to mention only years and months. These is no way of
concluding that the two witnesses testified about the same
overt act. The "many times" or more than "ten times"
mentioned by them may refer either to two different sets of
moments, not one instant of one set coinciding with any one of
the other, or to only one and identical set of instances or,
although ref erring to two sets, some of the instances are the
same in both. As there is no basis on record upon which we may
determine which, among the two alternatives, is the correct
one, the doubt must be decided by taking the first alternative,
the one compatible with the presumption of innocence stated in
the fundamental law. The case for the prosecution is further
weakened by the fact that its first two witnesses are
contradicted by the third, who testified that appellant did guard
duty "many times," more than "ten times," in the Makapili
garrison, located in the Baybay Academy, one kilometer from
the Intermediate School building, where the Japanese garrison
was located.
To meet the test under the two-witness rule, it is necessary
that, at least, two witnesses should testify as to the
perpetration of the same treasonous overt act, and the
sameness must include not only identity of kind and nature of
the act, but as to the precise one which has actually been
perpetrated. The treasonous overt act of doing guard duty in
the Japanese garrison on one specific date cannot be identified
with the doing of guard duty in the same garrison in a different
date. Both overt acts, although of the same nature and
character, are two distinct and inconfusable acts, independent
of each other, and either one, to serve as a ground for
conviction of an accused for treason, must be proved by two
witnesses. That one witness should testify as to one, and
another as to the other, is not enough. Any number of
witnesses may testify against an accused for treason as to a
long line of successive treasonous overt acts; but
notwithstanding the seriousness of the acts nor their number,
not until two witnesses, at least, shall have testified as to the
perpetration of a single but the same and precise overt act, can
conviction be entertained.
In justice to appellant, the Court feel it necessary to state that
the decision to acquit him is not only based on the reasonable
doubt the Court entertain as to his guilt, because the
prosecution has not satisfied the requirements of the two-
witness rule, but because the Court rather inclined to believe his
testimony to the effect that a guerrilla member, Vicente Auxilio,
was caught by the Japanese in appellant's house, tortured and,
finally, killed. For said reason, appellant was called by the
Japanese, investigated, and then told to do some work in the
garrison, otherwise he would have the same fate that befell
Vicente Auxilio. "To save my life, I accepted the order and
worked there," he testified, adding: "The Japanese, not being
contented with my work, they got my carabao and on March,
1945, they got my son, who was tortured and killed."

This son is the same Bienvenido Agpangan who, according to

the first witness for the prosecution, was executed by the
Japanese with several other victims. We do not believe that
appellant could have adhered to the Japanese, the same who
tortured and killed his own son. The Court does not believe that,
in the absence of proof, he can be such a monster.
The decision of the People’s Court is reversed and accused is
acquitted.
5. JOVELYN TRAJANO

G.R. No. L-1006 June 28, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
FILEMON ESCLETO, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
The appellant, Filemon Escleto, was charged in the former
People's Court with treason on three counts. The record shows
that on or about, March 11, 1944, Japanese patrol composed of
17 men and 1 officer was ambushed and totally liquidated by
guerrillas in barrio Bibito, Lopez, Province of Tayabas, now
Quezon. As a result, some of inhabitants of Bibito and
neighboring barrios, numbering several hundred, were arrested
and others were ordered to report at the poblacion. Among the
latter were Antonio Conducto, a guerrilla and former USAFFE,
and his family. Sinforosa Mortero, 40, testified that on March
18, 1944, at about 5 PM, obedience to the Japanese order, she
and the rest of her family went to the town from barrio
Danlagan. Still in Danlagan, in front of Escleto's house, Escleto
told them to stop and took down their names. With her were
her daughter-in-law, her son Antonio Conducto, and three
grandchildren. After writing their names, Escleto conducted
them to the PC garrison in the poblacion where they were
questioned by some whose name she did not know. This man
asked her if she heard gunshots and she said yes but did not
know where they were. The next day they were allowed to go
home with many others, but her son was not released. Since
then she had not seen him. On cross-examination she said that
when Escleto took down their names her son asked the accused
if anything would happen to him and his family, and Escleto
answered, "Nothing will happen to you because I am to
accompany you in going to town." Her daughter-in-law Patricia
Araya declared that before reaching the town, Escleto stopped
her, her mother-in-law, her husband, her three children, her
brother-in- law and the latter's wife and took down their names;
that after taking their names Escleto and the PC soldier took
them to the PC garrison; that her husband asked Escleto what
woEscleto what would happen to him and his family, and Escleto
said "nothing" and assured Conducto that he and his family
would soon be allowed to go home; that Escleto presented them
to a PC and she heard him tell the latter, "This is Antonio
Conducto who has firearm;" that afterward they were sent
upstairs and she did not know what happened to her husband.

ISSUE
1) Whether Filemon Escleto is guilty of treason
2) Whether Escleto’s making note of persons who went to the
Poblacion is evidence of an overt act of treason
3) Whether Patricia Araya’s testimony is availing as proof of an
overt act of treason

RULING

1) NO. He is acquitted of the crime of treason.

2) NO. The only point of agreement between the 2 witnesses’

testimonies is that the accused took
down the names of Conducto and of the witnesses and came
along with them to the town. This does
not show betrayal of Conducto because he may be merely doing
his duties as lieutenant of the barrio.
Also, it is not necessary to write down Conducto’s name
because Escleto can merely report him
secretly. That there were spies with masks during the
registration and that others were released
further support the theory that Escleto was merely following
orders in ordering them to write their
names.

3) NO. The only damaging evidence is Araya’s testimony that

the accused told a Philippine
Constabulary Soldier that the deceased has a firearm. However,
the testimony was not shown to have been made for a
treasonable purpose nor did it necessarily have that implication.
In addition, this was not corroborated by another witness.

6. LADYH APRIL VILLAREAL

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-856

April 18, 1949

TUASON, J.:

The accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited,

apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women
against their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they
were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of
Colonel Mini, and among such unfortunate victims, were Felina
Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog,
Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos. On the
other hand, the accused successfully satisfied his lust by having
a carnal knowledge on separate occasions to the following
victims, against their will and by threat and intimidation,
namely: Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and
Flaviana Bonalos.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT, THE ACTS OF THE ACCUSED

CONSTITUTES TREASON.

HELD: NO.

As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and

comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to
them as enemies and not merely as individuals and in addition,
be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To
make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to an enemy
as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may
buy personal necessities is to assist him as individual and is not
technically traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him
money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in
waging war against the giver's country enhance his strength
and by same count injures the interest of the government of the
giver. That is treason.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first

assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering" of women
to satisfy the lust of Japanese officers or men or to enliven the
entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though
the women and the entertainment helped to make life more
pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not
guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if
they voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or
organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with
the Japanese did not directly and materially tend to improve
their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State.
The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated
to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the
defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable
effect the defendant's collaboration with the Japanese might
have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible,
and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital ingredient in the
crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be
gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular
case.

But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo,
Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as
principal by direct participation. Without his cooperation in the
manner above stated, these rapes could not have been
committed.

7. CHARRY JOY CASTILLON

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.

PEDRO MANAYAO, appellant

G.R. No. L-322; July 28, 1947

Ponente: Hilado, J.

FACTS:

On January 29, 1945, Japanese soldiers and a number of

Filipinos affiliated with the Makapili, including the appellant,
gathered the residents of barrio Banaban of Angat, Province of
Bulacan. In accordance with their plan, they killed the residents
excluding the children. The appellant alone killed about six
women and would have also killed the children if he had been
allowed to.

The appellant was then convicted with the high crime of treason
with multiple murder in the People’s Court.
In his appeal, his counsel contends that he is a member of the
Armed Forces of Japan and is therefore not subject to the
jurisdiction of the People’s Court. He also contends that the
appellant has already lost his Filipino citizenship thus he is not
amenable to the Philippine law of treason. He invokes the
following provision under Commonwealth Act No. 63:

Section 1: … A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of

the following ways and/or events:…

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the

constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-
one years of age or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service

of a foreign country;…

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant has lost his citizenship by being a

member of Makapili thus making him not guilty of the crime of
treason.

RULING:

No. The appellant did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

His oath as a Makapili member that he will help Japan in its

fight against Americans does not equate to an oath of allegiance
to the support the constitution or laws of Japan. There is also no
evidence that he accepted a commission “in the military, naval,
or air service” of Japan. He was only a member of Makapili, a
group which although organized to render aid to the Japanese
army, was not part of the Japanese army.

Moreover, if his commission of treasonous acts will divest him of

his Philippine citizenship, then his very crime would be the
shield that would protect him from punishment.
8. MERVIN JAY SUAYBAGUIO

People v. Prieto

G.R. No. L-399 | January 29, 1948

Plaintiff : People of the Philippines

Defendant : Eduardo Prieto (alias Eddie Valencia)

Ponente : Tuason, J.

FACTS:

Eduardo Prieto alias Eddie Valencia was prosecuted in the

People's Court for treason on 7 counts. Initially, he pleaded not
guilty to all 7 counts. Later on, he entered a plea of guilty to
counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 but maintained his original plea of not
guilty to counts 4, 5 and 6.

The special prosecutor only presented evidence to count 4 as he

had insufficient evidence to sustain counts 5 and 6. However,
the witnesses presented to give evidence on count 4 had
statements that did not coincide on any single detail.

The lower court found Prieto guilty to all counts except 5 and 6
of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries with
aggravating circumstances. Apparently, the court regarded the
murders and physical injuries charged in the information, not
only as crimes distinct from treason but also as modifying
circumstances. The Solicitor General agreed with the decision
except as to technical designation of the crime. In his opinion,
the offense committed by the appellant is a "complex crime of
treason with homicide."

ISSUE: What is the criminal liability of Eduardo Prieto?

HELD:

The court ruled that Eduardo Prieto is not guilty of treason as

charged in count 4 but guilty of treason as charged in counts
1,2,3 and 7.

Prieto is acquitted in count 4 as the two-witness principle

requirement was not satisfied. The witnesses failed to
corroborate each other not only on the whole overt act but on
any part of it.

Moreover, there is no crime of treason complexed with other

felonies because these are not separate offenses from treason.
When a deed is charged as an element of treason, it becomes
identified with it and cannot be subject of a separate
punishment, or used in combination with treason to increase the
penalty. Murder or physical injuries are charged as overt acts of
treason and cannot be regarded separately under their general
denomination.

The brutality which accompanied the killing and the physical

injuries are taken as aggravating circumstances since it
augmented the sufferings of the offended parties unnecessarily
to the attainment of the criminal objectives. Since there is a
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty, the punishment should
be reclusion perpetua.

9. JAY-AR CASTILLON

PEOPLE VS VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. L-9529 August 30, 1958

FACTS:

Pedro t. Villanueva was convicted and sentenced to death

by the Fifth Division of the defunct People's Court for the crime
treason. He appealed to the Supreme Court. However, even if
the accused did not appeal, the case must still be elevated to
the Supreme Court for automatic review since the penalty
imposed upon him is death penalty. The Supreme Court noticed
that the transcript of stenographic notes taken down before the
People's Court was missing prompting it to remand the case to
the CFI of Iloilo for the retrial of the case.

Villanueva filed a petition with the CFI of Iloilo that he be

allowed to withdraw his appeal so he can avail the benefits of
the Executive Clemency granted to all prisoners convicted of
treason. Because of this, the CFI of Iloilo returned the case to
the Supreme Court for its decision regarding the withdrawal of
the appeal.

The case was once again remanded to the CFI of Iloilo

where it sentence the accused to suffer the capital punishment.
The case was elevated again to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not appelant can withdraw his appeal to the

Supreme Court?

2. Whether or not the pardon given to him can take effect

immediately?

RULING:

1. Yes, the appellant can withdraw his appeal like any

other appellant in an ordinary criminal case before the briefs are
filed. However, his withdrawal seems useless for under the
provisions of Section 9 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court
provides mandatory review by this Tribunal of all decisions or
judgments of the lower courts imposing death penalties. The
SUpreme Court also said that this automatic review of case
where the penalty is death is something which neither the court
nor the accused can waive or evade.

2. No, the pardon given to him cannot take effect

immediately. A pardon can only be granted if there is already a
final judgment. In this case, where the sentence is death
penalty, the Supreme Court has its job of automatic review of
the said case. Therefore, the judgment of the CFI is not yet final
and executory.

10. MARA ALEAH CAOILE

CAOILE, MARA ALEAH M.

CRIMINAL LAW 2

THE UNITED STATES VS FRANCISCO BAUTISTA, ET AL.

G.R. NO. L-2189, November 3, 1906
CARSON, J.

FACTS:

This is an appeal for the judgement of the Court of First

Instance of Manila against the appellants for the crime of
conspiracy to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the
Government of the Unites States in the Philippine Islands and
the Government of the Philippine Islands.
In the year 1903, Prim Ruiz, recognized as the titular head of
Repulica Universal Democratica Filipina together with Artemio
Ricarte as chief of the military forces, organized a junta and a
conspiracy which entered into by a number of Filipinos in
Hongkong.

Artemio Ricarte arrived in Manila through the steamship

Yuensang and organized a plan and conducted multiple
meetings for the perfection of the conspiracy hatched in
Hongkong together with his intimate friend Francisco Bautista, a
resident of the city of Manila.

Another Appellant, Tomas Puzon together with Jose R. Muñoz,

prime leader of the movement,distribute bonds and nominate
and appoint certain officials, including a brigadier-general of the
signal corps of the proposed revolutionary forces.

In his defense, Puzon denied that he being united with the

conspirators, he did not know that Ricarte was in Manila
organizing conspiracy, and he had only accepted the
appointment as a brigadier-general because he did not want his
friend Muñoz to get annoyed of him. At the time Muñoz offered
him the appointment he jokingly accepted the offer.

His defense is contrary to his written when he was first

arrested. In his written statement he said that he is part of new
revolution presided over by Ricarte. He did not deny his
statement but he alleged that he did not know what he was
saying.

It is further contended that his acceptance or possession of an

appointment as an officer of the military forces of the
conspiracy should not be considered as evidence against him

ISSUE:

Whether or not Puzon will be liable as conspirator.

RULLING:

Yes.

The accused appears to be an intelligent man and was for

eighteen years a school-teacher and later a telegraph operator
under the Spanish Government, and during the insurrection he
held a commission as an officer in the signal corps of the
revolutionary army. His confession is clear and intelligible and in
no way supports his pretense that he was so excited as not to
know what he was saying when he made it, and its truth and
accuracy in so far it inculpates him is sustained by other
evidence of record in this case.

The record clearly discloses that the accused actually and

voluntarily accepted the appointment in question and in doing
so assumed all the obligations implied by such acceptance, and
that the charge in this case is that of conspiracy, and the fact
that the accused accepted the appointment is taken into
consideration merely as evidence of his criminal relations with
the conspirators.

Tomas Puzon conviction is affirmed.

11. JOHN REY CODILLA

Case Digest

People v. Mendoza

G.R. No. 104461; February 23, 1996

Panganiban, J.

Facts:
Appellants Romeo Mendoza and Jaime Rejali were charged on
June 17, 1991 before the Regional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro
Manila of the crime of ROBBERY HOLD-UP with HOMICIDE under
P.D. No. 532, Anti-Piracy and Anti Highway Robbery Law of
1974. Both accused pleaded not guilty to the charge upon
arraignment on August 9, 1991.

1. On May 29, 1991, Ma. Grace Zulueta and her sister, Ma.
Ramilyn Zulueta were on their

way home from their grandparents’ house in Sta. Mesa,

Manila.

2. The Zulueta sisters were seated near the rear entrance of the
jeepney with accused

Romeo Mendoza seated beside Grace. It was through

Mendoza that Grace handed over

their fare to the driver as the jeepney passed by the SM

complex.

3. Glory Oropeo, who boarded the same jeepney near the Stop
and Shop Supermarket,

was seated behind the driver. Accused Jaime Rejali was

beside Glory while their

companion named Jack, who was at large then, was seated

across her.

4. When the jeepney reached the dark portion of Aurora Blvd.,

someone announced a

hold-up. Both Mendoza and Rejali had guns while Jack was
armed with a knife. It was
 Rejali who fired his gun.

5. There was a commotion in the jeepney. Perplexed by this

turn of events, the accused

held Ramilyn who started kicking, trying to extricate herself

from their grasp. This

prompted Mendoza to hit her on the head with his gun. He

boxed and kicked her, causing

Ramilyn to fall out of the jeepney into the street where she
rolled.

6. Mendoza then held Grace by her right arm. As she struggled,

Grace shouted, bitawan

mo ako, bitawan mo ako, in an attempt to call the attention

of the drivers of the other

vehicles on the road. One of the accused hit Grace on the

head with a gun causing her

to lose consciousness.

7. From Glory, the accused were able to get the amount of

P30.00. One of them ordered

the driver to proceed to J. Ruiz St. and when they reached

Paterno, the culprits alighted

and made their escape.

8. Ramon Zulueta, father of Grace and Ramilyn, learned about

the incident. He spent

around P19,000.00 for Grace’s hospitalization and around

P15,000.00 for Ramilyn’s

interment.
9. It was Grace who brought about the apprehension of
Mendoza. By fate, she saw

Mendoza selling ice cream on the morning of June 12, 1991.

She saw him again that

same afternoon. When she approached and asked Mendoza,

he could not look her in

the eyes and seemed confused. Certain now that he was one
of the holduppers, Grace

announced to her brother and the other people present that

Mendoza was one of the

holduppers. Mendoza tried to make a run for it, but the

people gave chase and overtook

him.

10. Mendoza was brought to the police station where he was

identified by Grace in a

line-up. Rejali was apprehended that same night by police

operatives.

11. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime in Violation of Presidential Decree No. 532

(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway

Robbery Law of 1974).

12. The appellants, in their appeal, faulted the trial court for
giving credence to the

inconsistent, conflicting and contradictory testimonies of

prosecution witnesses Grace
 Zulueta and Glory Oropeo and for convicting them of the
crime charged despite the

failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond

reasonable doubt.

13. The Supreme Court pointed out that the inconsistencies or

contradictions of the

prosecution witnesses’ statements were minor ones which do

not have any material,

bearing on the culpability of the appellants as they do not in

any way refute their positive

identification by the two eyewitnesses as the perpetrators of

the hold-up.

14. Although not directly raised by the appellants, the Supreme

Court, upon a thorough

scrutiny of the facts, found that there is yet another question

which is of concern to the

bar and the bench: are the facts attendant to this case
constitutive of the crime of highway

robbery with homicide under Pres. Decree No. 532 or of the

felony of robbery with

homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code?

Issue:

Whether or not the case at bar is a crime of highway robbery

with homicide under Pres. Decree No. 532 as rendered by the
Regional Trial Court.
Ruling:

No. The case at bar is not a crime of highway robbery with

homicide under Pres. Decree 532 but a crime of robbery under
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

While there is a proof beyond reasonable doubt to lay culpability

on the appellants for the killing of Ma. Ramilyn Zulueta, the
physical injuries sustained by her sister Grace and the
asportation of Glory Oropeo’s thirty pesos, the Supreme Court
did not agree with the trial court that the crime committed by
appellants is covered by P.D. No. 532. As the trial court said:

“The Court finds all the elements of the offense charged,

namely, intent to gain, unlawful taking of property of another,
(the P30.00 of Glory Oropeo) violence against or intimidation of
any person, on a Philippine Highway and death of Ramilyn
Zulueta and physical injuries upon Ma. Grace Zulueta, (Section
2, par. 3 and Section 3, par. b, Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974, Pres. Decree No. 532) have been duly
proved in the instant case.”

Conviction under P.D. No. 532 requires not only the above
elements mentioned by the trial court. Highway robbery or
brigandage is defined by Section 2 of said decree as follows:

e. Highway Robbery/Brigandage. - The seizure of any person for

ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes or the taking
away of the property of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful
means, committed by any person on any Philippine highway.

In People vs. Puno, the Supreme Court, speaking through the

learned Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, explained the purpose
of brigandage as follows:

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is inter alia, indiscriminate

highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the
crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least
four armed participants. (citing U.S. vs. Feliciano, 3 Phil. 422
[1904]) x x x

x x x Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery

or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws
indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, x x x

The Supreme Court emphasized that to obtain a conviction for

highway robbery, the prosecution should have proven that the
accused, in the instant case, were organized for the purpose of
committing robbery indiscriminately. There, however, was a
total absence of such proof. There was also no evidence of any
previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused - to show
the indiscriminate commission thereof.

It is possible that since Aurora Boulevard is a highway within

the purview of P.D. No 532,
the prosecutors deemed it proper to charge appellants with
violation of said decree. However, in charging a crime under
P.D. No. 532, it is important to consider whether or not the very
purpose for which the law was promulgated has been
transgressed.

The Supreme Court furthered that petty robbery in public

transport vehicles (with or without personal violence and death)
committed against the middle and lower economic classes of
society is as reprehensible as (if not more so than) large-scale
robbery committed against the economically well-heeled.
Nonetheless, the law must be interpreted not only to bring forth
its aim and spirit but also in light of the basic principle that all
doubts are to be resolved liberally in favor of the accused. As
such, appellants may not be held liable under P.D. No. 532 but
only under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

In the interpretation of an information, what controls is not the

designation but the description of the offense charged.
Considering the allegations of the afore-quoted Information,
appellants herein should be liable for the special complex crime
of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, robbery having been duly established beyond reasonable
doubt by the asportation of thirty pesos from Glory Oropeo. It is
immaterial that Ramilyn Zulueta’s death was accidental because
it was produced by reason or on the occasion of the robbery.
The physical injuries inflicted upon Grace Zulueta during the
commission of the crime are absorbed in the crime of robbery
with homicide.

Moreover, conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated

actions of the appellants and their companion of depriving Glory
of her money and injuring both Ramilyn and Grace which
resulted in Ramilyn’s accidental death. Since both appellants
took part in the robbery, they shall be liable for the complex
crime of robbery with homicide in the absence of proof that they
endeavored to prevent the accidental killing of Ramilyn.

Therefore, the SC modified the decision of the RTC and found

the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide and accordingly, each
of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The other portions of the trial court’s decision,
including the monetary awards imposed against them, are
affirmed.

12. PAOLO COQUILLA

PAOLO B. COQUILLA – BL 1.5 A

CRIMINAL LAW 2

ATTY CAMILLE REMORCOZA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA, MELVIN DAGUDOG and RICHARD

DISIPULO, accused.

LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA, accused appellant.

G.R. No. 116734 March 29, 1996

PONENTE: J DAVIDE, JR.,

FACTS;
• On February 14, 1994 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, larry laurente mentioned helping each, conspired
willfully, unlawfully rob Herminiano G. Artana of his earnings
along F. Concepcion St. Brgy. San Joaquin, Pasig, Metro Manila.

• The victim was strangled with a leather belt and hit him
with a blunt instrument causing him to sustain physical injuries
which caused directly caused his death.

• On February 15, 1994, the two co-accused remained at

large, on arraignment, Laurente entered a plea of not guilty. On
trial, there four (4) witnesses namely: (1) Spo1 Crispin Pio,
investigating officer (2) Myra Guinto, eyewitness (3) Felicitas
Matematico, victim’s daughter and (4) Dr. Emmanuel Arañas,
medico-legal officer of PNP Crime laboratory, who performed
autopsy on victim.

• Pio asked the Guinto siblings in law and other bystanders

and no information gained but in conducting cursory
investigation that sustained strangulation marked and wounds
on the face and head, then conducted crime scene search and
found a brown wallet containing an SSS (Social Security
System) ID of Larry Laurente and a leather belt used for
strangling.

• Then Pio made an incident report and requested SS to

secure complete record and a follow up team formed to arrest
him which was on February 15, 1994 then brought him to police
investigation after apprised of constitutional rights, accused
verbally admitted the crime and two (2) witnesses positively
identified him as one of 3 persons they saw coming out from
taxicab

• On cross-examination, Pio clarified certain details

regarding findings he also admitted that although informed the
accused was not represented by counsel and admission was not
reduced in writing.

• Myra Guinto testified that on 14 February 1994, at about

9:15 p.m., she’s selling cigarettes near to the crime scene and
saw people scrambling inside a yellow taxicab at stop position,
then three men left the taxicab then saw boarded a jeepney
towards Pasig, and a fourth man approached and saw the driver
dead and called the police. She identified that Laurente is one of
them,

• Dr. Emmanuel Arañas testified on the autopsy that the

victim caused of death was traumatic injuries of head,
hematoma, contusion neck, subdural and subarachnoidal
hemorrhages.

• Laurente said that on 14th day of February 1994 he was in

Consorcia St. San Joaquin, Pasig with his friends they began
driking at 3:30 pm and wake up until 4 am on his house. On
15th day of February 1994 he lost his wallet in the wooden bed
which contained an SSS ID hen then presumed that those two
individuals took the wallet and then had been a shingle molder
at Winning Enterprises for past three years, with offices in
Taguig Rizal, which he stayed 15th February 1994 from 6:00
am until 8:00 pm

• After returning from work, four (4) policemen waiting for

him and arrested him without warrant, and not uniformed and
then bought him to police station for being a hold-upper.

• On 23 August 1994, the trial court promulgated the

challenged decision which it was found that Laurente is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of highway robbery with homicide
punishable by death unter President Decree No. 532 entitled
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Roberry Law of 1974.

ISSUE:

Whether Laurente is guilty beyond reasonable under P.D.No.

532 or the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Roberry Law of 1974

HELD:
• For the imposition of death penalty, it is impossible as the
only positive identification that Guinto was possessing is the
SSS ID and the alibi raised by the accused was rejected due to
lack of evidence supporting the claim

• Laurente’s contention that Myra did not see the three men
is a scant consideration, as established the place where Myra
saw Laurente was well-lit due to lamp post and the distance as
only two (2) arms-length away and identified him by Myra, it
was given weight as it’s impossible she will falsely testify
because she don’t have ill feelings towards the accused.

• Laurente's next contention that Myra did not actually see

him stab the victim must likewise fail. The accused conspired to
commit a crime is a direct proof that the act of one is the act of
all.

• Laurente's story on the alleged loss of his SSS ID card and

found in taxicab is simply unbelievable. The court found that
statement of Laurente as not constant as claiming he was on
work on February 14, 1994 and suddenly changed that he was
absent and convince that he was with this co-accused had a
drinking session.

• The full accord is that the rule as alibi as the weakest of all
defense as it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove which
will not pevail over positive identification of the accused.

• So, for Proof of the commission of robbery, however, must

be examined more closely. The accused pleads that the
prosecution failed to prove the element of robbery that even a
single evidence was shown by the prosecution the robbery, so it
is not presumed that the main purpose of killing was to rob,
there must be sufficient evidence.

• There is an examination of proof as the victim’s daughter

gave statement thru her affidavit, she was only informed by
someone that her father was robbed, and this will only
constitute the inadmissible hearsay as any knowledge to
robbery

• On SPO1 Pio’s affidavit wherein pointed as the sole piece of

evidence, it was mentioned that belonging of the dead man was
all intact except for the earning.

• The lone measure in which the judge considered is not

sufficient as it was absent and thus failed to show burden of
proof and satisfy quantum of evidence of robbery in this case.
Thus, a conviction of robbery cannot be promulgated in total
absence of an evidence.

• It is settled that to satisfy crime of robbery with homicide,

it is needed that robbery is conclusive so in absence of proof it
will only be simple homicide or murder.

• The Court ruled that the crime committed is homicide

under Article 249 of RPC with a penalty of reclusion temporal
and it will be medium period

RULING:

• WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of Branch 156 of the

Regional Trial Court of Pasig in Criminal Case No. 104785 is
hereby modified as to the nature of the offense committed. As
modified, accused-appellant LARRY LAURENTE Y BEJASA is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as co-principal by direct
participation, of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused-appellant LARRY
LAURENTE Y BEJASA is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten (10) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four
(4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. In all
other respects, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

13. IVY ARCHUA

Ivy L Archua

BL-5A

CASE DIGEST (Criminal Law 2)

G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS LOL-LO and SARAW

GR No. 17958

February 27, 1922

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS OF THE CASE:

On or about June 30, 1920, two Dutch boats left matuta. In one
of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the
other boat on board eleven men, women, and children, likewise
subjects of Holland. At about 7 o'clock in the evening, the
second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in
the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six
vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first
asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, took for themselves
all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally violated
two of the women.

All of the persons on the Dutch boat except the two young
women, were again placed on it and they made holes for the
boat to submerge. the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch
possession. Two of the Moro robbers were Lol-lo, who also
raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women
were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian,

Tawi-Tawi, Sulu and eventually arrested and were charged in
the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
In the defendant’s defense, they claimed that the offense
charge was not within the jurisdication of the Court of First
Instance, nor any court in the Philippines Islands. However, the
trial judge found the two defendants guilty and sentencing each
of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua)

All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is

robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful
authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention
of universal hostility.

Pirates are in law hostes humani generis (enemy of mankind).

Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all
mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any
country where the offender may be found or into which he may
be carried.

The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no

territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all.
Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits,
though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs.
Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)

ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing

with the crime of piracy are still in force.

HELD: Yes, those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the
crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force
in the Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the
Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least
two of the circumstances named in the last cited article as
authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of
piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and
(2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of
saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or
death should be imposed.

In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one

aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, and compensating the
same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction
provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code,
sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three
aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing
other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage
was taken of superior strength, and that means were employed
which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must
also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.

The courts considers the number and importance of the

qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which
cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed.

Capital punishment must be imposed. In accordance with

provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant
Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the defendant and
appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is
sentenced therefore to be hung until dead.

14. JORDAN AMADORA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O.
CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG,
and JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 111709, August 30, 2001
Ponente: MELO, J.
FACTS:

Accused-appellant along with other co-accused boarded M/T

Tabangao which was a cargo vessel owned by PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation. The pirates/ accused
boarded the ship and detained the crew members. The vessel
was directed to go to Singapore where the cargo was unloaded
and sold under the direct supervision of Hiong. After such
events, the vessel was then directed to sail back to Philippines.

Several warrants of arrests were procured against the pirates

for qualified piracy of the violation of PD 532. Accused-appellant
assails the rendered decision as they contend the trial court
erred in allowing them to proceed with the hearing
notwithstanding the fact that they were represented by a non-
lawyer thereby depriving them of the due process enshrined in
the constitution. Accused-appellant along with other co-accused
alleges also the fact that they were subjected to physical
violence; they were not informed of their constitutional rights,
and several other constitutional violations regarding custodial
investigations.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the accused is guilty of Piracy?

2. Whether or not the case be tried under the Philippine Court
although the crime was committed outside the country's
territorial waters?

RULING:

Yes. Piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised
Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law as provided in Article 2(5) of the
Revised Penal Code.

Since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters,

suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure
of "M/T Tabangao and its cargo were committed in Philippine
waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the
pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded,
transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under
accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although
Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack and seizure
of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters,
the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still
deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be
committed in Philippine waters.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment,

provided that piracy must be committed on the high seas by
any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger
thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the
coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include
offenses committed “in Philippine waters.” On the other hand,
under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the
coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including “a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters.” Hence, passenger or not, a member of the
complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the

provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is
no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no
ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret
the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the
coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect the
citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the
law of nations.

As expressed in one of the “whereas” clauses of Presidential

Decree No. 532, piracy is “among the highest forms of
lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries.”
For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and
piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as
separate laws.
15. GILVEE CHARDYL PLANA

Plana, Gilvee Chardyl M

BL1-5A

Criminal Law II

CASE DIGEST

People vs Timon

G.R. Nos. 97841-42. November 12, 1997.

Ponente: Justice Panganiban

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon,

Metro Manila, Br. 72.

FACTS:

At about 12:00 o’clock noon on September 20, 1989, the fishing

boat “M/B Kali” left Navotas, Metro Manila with its owner
Modesto 7 Rodriguez and seven (7) crew members to buy fresh
fish in Palawan The “M/B Kali” had not yet left the territorial
waters of Navotas when it was intercepted by eight (8) armed
pirates, six (6) of them including appellants boarded “M/B Kali”
unnoticed, while the other two stayed behind in their pump
boat.
Once on board, the six (6) pirates herded the owner and crew
members of “M/B Kali” and ordered them to lie face down.
Thereafter, three (3) of the pirates, including appellants Lagaras
and Sampiton, accosted Rodriguez at the “fuente” and ordered
him to take out the money which he had to buy fish worth about
P100,000.00, after he was pointed to by the crew members as
their boss. After divesting Rodriguez of his P100,000.00 cash
and other personal belongings, the pirates fatally shot him.
Whereupon, the pirates left, after warning the crew members of
“M/B Kali” not to move, accompanied by a warning shot.

As soon as the pirates left, the crew members of “M/B Kali”

stood up, and learned that their boss, Modesto Rodriguez, was
fatally shot at the back of his head. They also found out that the
pirates divested their boss of his money and personal
belongings, and took with them the two (2) telescopes used by
the crew members. That same afternoon, the incident was
reported to the Navotas Police Force which immediately sent a
team to conduct a “spot” investigation. When the policeman
arrived at the Navotas Fish Port where “M/B Kali” was moored,
they saw the lifeless body of the victim Modesto Rodriguez with
a gunshot wound at the back of his head. From the crew
members who did not know the identities of the pirates, albeit
could recognize them if they saw them again, the policemen
took down the description of the suspects.

On the basis thereof, the Navotas Police Force continued to

“follow-up” the case until they received information from the
Philippine Coast Guard as to the identities and/or whereabouts
of some of the suspects. Forthwith, the Philippine Coast Guard
and the Navotas Police Force organized a team to effect the
arrest of the suspects. This was executed at about 2:30 o’clock
in the morning of October 4, 1989—resulting in the arrest of the
four (4) appellants, and the confiscation from appellant Timon
of a shotgun which he was allegedly carrying wrapped in a
“maong” jacket at the time of his arrest.

At the Navotas Police Headquarter[s] where the four (4)

suspects were brought, they were positively identified by the
crew members of “M/B Kali” as among those who boarded their
boat, and at gun point forced them to lie face down

RTC finding all accused- appellants guilty beyond reasonable

doubt for the crime of piracy with homicide. All of them are
hereby sentenced to life imprisonment or RECLUSION
PERPETUA. The penalty should have been death, but same has
been abolished.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Timon et al (accused-appellants) are guilty of

the Crime of Piracy with homicide despite the assignment of
errors.

RULING:

Yes. The accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of piracy

with homicide despite the assignment of errors. The Courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test in resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of
suspects.—In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-
of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following
factors, viz: (1) the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness
at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime
and the identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.

Applying this “totality of circumstances” test to the case at bar,

the Court finds the out-of-court identification of appellants
(which is a show-up) admissible and not in any way violative of
their constitutional rights. This is borne out by the following
salient facts. Police Officer Manalo testified that while the crew
was unable to give the names of the suspects, they nonetheless
gave him their assurance that they would be able to identify the
pirates “if they see them again.” In addition, the crew of the
M/B Kali described the appellants to the police. This description,
coupled with information obtained from the Philippine Coast
Guard and police “assets,” all contributed to the identification
and the arrest of accused-appellants.

There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a

proper identification----that appellants were not lined up with
other “suspects” is not a bar to or inconsistent with their proper
identification. We reiterate that “(t)here is no law requiring a
police line-up as essential to a proper identification.
Identification can be made in a room in a police station even if it
were not a police line-up as long as the required proprieties are
observed x x x.” In fine, no irregularity was shown to have
attended the police work which led to the identification of
appellants at the police station. Hence, applying the totality of
circumstances test, we rule that appellants’ out-of-court
identification is admissible; appellants were not “misidentified”
nor their constitutional rights violated.

Even assuming arguendo that the appellants’ out-of-court

identification was defective, their subsequent identification in
court cured any flaw that may have initially attended it. We
emphasize that the “inadmissibility of a police line-up
identification x x x should not necessarily foreclose the
admissibility of an independent in-court identification.” We also
stress that all the accused-appellants were positively identified
by the prosecution eyewitnesses during the trial.

The defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of the
prosecution witnesses to falsely accuse appellants of so serious
a crime as piracy with homicide. Even Appellant Lagaras himself
could not think of any reason for Prosecution Eyewitnesses
Malibiran, Adreser and Nuña to falsely accuse him. In the
absence of evidence or any indicium that the prosecution’s main
witnesses harbored ill motives against the accused, the
presumption is that they were not so moved and that their
testimonies were untainted with bias.

The trial judge’s evaluation of the witness’ credibility deserves

utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.” “The reason for
this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed
their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.

The defense miserably failed to sustain the alibi. More

significantly, it is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by an
eyewitness who had no motive to falsely testify, like the
prosecution’s eyewitnesses in this case. In view of such positive
identification, appellants’ alibi is unavailing and remains weak
and impotent.

Therefore, the appealed Joint Decision convicting Appellants

Victor Timon, Jose Sampiton, Jesus Lagaras and Claro Raya of
the crime of piracy with homicide, imposing on them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordering the payment to the victim’s
heirs of the sum of P100,000.00 representing the amount taken
from the deceased is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
modifications: (1) the civil indemnity is hereby increased to
P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, and (2) the
words “life imprisonment or” in the dispositive portion thereof
and (3) the unproved amount of P70,000.00 awarded for burial
expenses are deleted. Costs against appellants.