Moot Du
Moot Du
Gradually they developed friendship and in September, 2020, they moved-in together in a rented
apartment in the area of Rohini. Since then they were in a live-in relationship. In April, 2022, for a
few months Jyoti was sent to Bangalore for a work assignment by the company. Jyoti was assisting
Mohit the Senior Software Engineer in Bangalore Branch of the company and they both were
working for long hours together. As the project had strict deadlines, Jyoti had to work hard and
Ramesh felt ignored and blamed Jyoti for having fun time with Mohit while he was left alone in
Delhi. After Jyoti came back to Delhi in August, 2022, Ramesh became suspicious about Jyoti for
having an affair with Mohit in Bangalore and also questioned her as to why she was still in contact
with him, when the project was complete. Gradually Jyoti convinced him that she had no other man
in her life and also disconnected herself from Mohit completely. In the first week of October, 2023
Jyoti found out that she was pregnant and she insisted upon getting married, to which Ramesh
initially refused as he wanted to focus on his career but Jyoti convinced him hard and he agreed.
When Jyoti’s parents went to meet Ramesh’s parent, they purported that Jyoti had multiple illicit
relationships and as they were not sure that Ramesh was the father of the expected child, they did
not want him to get married to Jyoti. Jyoti said that if they had doubts Ramesh could take a paternity
DNA test but he clearly refused to do that and said he cannot be forced for the same and was sure
that the child belongs to Mohit or someone else but him. Jyoti was devastated; she lost all the hopes
and decided to terminate the pregnancy, which by then was of the term of 23 weeks. The doctor
refused to abort the baby as per Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (MTP Act). Against this
Jyoti approached the court to grant equal rights to access abortion upto 24 weeks of gestation to all
women, whether married or not and to order Paternity test of Ramesh to uphold her dignity along
with the compensation for all the agony and trauma. MOOT PROBLEM The trial court denied Jyoti,
the right to terminate her pregnancy. Jyoti did not want to carry the pregnancy because of the social
stigma, family pressure, financial constraints, and above all the betrayal from Ramesh. Jyoti’s
request to order Ramesh to go through the DNA test for paternity was also rejected on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. The Trial Court held that the case involves consensual sex between two
consenting adults and Jyoti had given consent for sexual intercourse and it was only after pregnancy
that Ramesh agreed to get married but the sexual intercourse at any stage before that was
consensual without any conclusive proof of promise to get married from the side of Ramesh. The
Trial court called the case ‘a classic case of a love affair gone bitter’ and said DNA test cannot be
ordered as a ‘matter of course’ merely because they are permissible by the court. In appeal the High
Court, clearly reinstated that DNA test is to be ordered only in deserving cases and forcing someone
infringes his right to privacy. Honb’le High court said, “The appellant seems to be confusing, she is
here with conflicting pleas. She cannot seek permission to terminate her pregnancy and for the DNA
test for Paternity at once. Paternity tests are to create affiliation for the child and his rights; it cannot
be used as a mean to build pressure or extract money or for vengeance. Here it is not for the child
but to prove a point. Paternity test would fetch no fruit if the mother is simultaneously seeking the
abortion. The appellant clearly has no consideration for the child and his paternal affiliation but is
more about to prove the allegation on her character to be wrong, which in no possible scenario gives
rise to a ground to order Paternity test.” Further it was held that she did not have the right to
terminate her pregnancy. The court clearly enlisted that only certain categories of women can
terminate their pregnancy beyond 20 weeks and up to 24 weeks and such categories included
married women whose marital status changed because of divorced or death of the husband during
the pregnancy. The court clearly said that the unmarried women, whose pregnancy arose out of a
consensual relationship, was not covered. And hence Jyoti cannot get her pregnancy terminated.
The court explicitly said that giving an option to terminate the pregnancy must in all the cases be the
exception and not the rule. Abortions are “ethically not advisable”. A woman cannot demand an
abortion because the fetus is not the “property of the woman”. With a 24 week pregnancy,
termination is not as casual as the mother wants it to be, it is a feticide, a killing of fetus which
cannot be allowed just under family pressure. Ms. Jyoti is an independent woman who ignored the
social norms and moved in with her lover and decided to get pregnant, just because the affairs did
not turn out to be as planned, she cannot terminate the pregnancy and kill the fetus, which is a living
being, without any of his fault. If such terminations are allowed, we are in turn increase female-
feticides also. The court upholds the decision that this pregnancy should not be terminated.For
medical practioners, denying abortion has no consequence, but if they provide abortion and it does
not fall under the parameters of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, then there is a
criminal liability. Against the High court judgment the appellant has filed the present appeal stating
that Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees right to life with dignity and the right of every woman
to make reproductive choices without undue interference from the State is the core of the idea of
human dignity. Denial to DNA test and deprivation from abortion choice along with the denial of
access to reproductive healthcare or emotional and physical wellbeing injures the dignity of women.
It is also pleaded that the legislature (Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971) intends to
distinguish between married and unmarried women and hence is against the constitutional mandate
of equality. An interpretation given by the Hon’ble HC is limited only to married women, would
render the law discriminatory towards unmarried women and violate their fundamental right to
equality. On this ground the appellant has sought permission to terminate her pregnancy. Issues:
·Whether the classification made under Section 3 of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971
(MTP Act) is unreasonable and violates Article 14? ·Whether denial to DNA test to establish the
parentage of the fetus to uphold the dignity of a woman wherein, she is accused of infidelity,
violates of Article 21 of the Constitution?
...Section 3 of
the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (hereinafter...Termination of Pregnanc
y Act, 1971 clearly indicates that consent is an essential condition
for...Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is important to.... The crucial consideration is
that a woman's right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity should...the constitutionally
protected “right to privacy”. Even though this decision had struck down a...also referred to
as “the MTP Act”) which reads as follows: “3. When...
Show CiteTEXT
...that Section 3 of Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act bestows...Medical Terminatio
n of Pregnancy Act, 1971 (for short,
‘The...Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 sets some limitations
regarding...Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, it also recognizes
and...Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act and the Rules, as well as the Prison
Manual...Article 21 of the Constitution of India...
S ON BEHALF OF HIS MINOR DAUGHTER v. STATE OF GUJARAT
27
COURT NAME: GUJARAT HIGH COURT
DATE: JAN 30, 2018
CITED BY: 0
CORAM: 1
2
Xyz vs. Union Of India And Others
COURT: BOMBAY HIGH COURT
CITED BY: SIDRA MEHBOOB SHAIKH VS. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
35. Proceeding further, the Division Bench observed that pregnancy takes place within the
body of a woman and has profound effects on her health, mental well-being and life. How
she wants to deal with such pregnancy is a decision she alone can make. The right to control
the body, fertility and motherhood should be left to the woman alone. In so far the provision
of section 3(2)(b)(i) is concerned, the Division Bench held that the said provision is an
extension of the human right of a woman which needs to be protected. The right of exercise
of reproductive choice though restricted by the Act, also recognizes and protects her right to
say no to the pregnancy if her mental or physical health is at stake.36. This judgment was
also referred to and discussed at length in the later judgment of this Court in XYZ v. Union
of India (supra). This Court held that the principle of narrow or literal construction cannot be
adopted when it comes to interpretation of section 3(2) and section 5 of the Act. Rather, the
principle of liberal or purposive interpretation is to be adopted. On such interpretation,
Supreme Court has consistently permitted medical termination of pregnancies which had
exceeded the ceiling of 20 weeks where continuance of pregnancy involved grave injury to
the mental health of the pregnant woman or where there was substantial risk that if
the child were born it would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be
seriously handicapped. On the question of compelling state interest, the Division Bench in
paragraph 91 clarified that the issue of compelling state interest can perhaps arise in
a case where circumstances set out in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(2) of the Act do not
exist and yet the pregnant mother seeks medical termination of pregnancy whether within
or beyond the ceiling limit. Division Bench further noted that the Act lays great emphasis on
the grave injury to not just the physical but also to the mental health of the pregnant woman.
The expression ‘grave injury to her mental health’ has to be liberally construed and while so
construing account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonable and
foreseeable environment. Referring to section 3(3) of the Act this Court held that the
expression ‘pregnant woman's actual or reasonable foreseeable environment’ is particularly
relevant when it comes to dealing with cases of women from rural areas or rural
background. Provisions of the Act have to be so construed so as not to impose
any unreasonable or disproportionate burden on pregnant women who on account of
circumstances set out in clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(2)(b) of
the Act seek medical termination of pregnancy even though the ceiling prescribed may
have crossed. This Court held that in exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it can permit
petitioners to undergo medical termination of their pregnancies in contingencies set out in
clauses (i) and (ii) of section 3(2)(b) of the Act even though the length of such pregnancies
may have exceeded 20 weeks in certain circumstances and contingencies certainly include
grave injury to mental health. The grant or refusal of such permission will be governed by
varied factors, including but not restricted to the opinion of the medical board.
,
27. In XYZ v. Union of India, (2019) 3 Bom CR 400, a Division Bench of this Court held
that the provisions of the Act has to be given a purposive interpretation. Division Bench
has opined that for the purposes of section 3(2) of the Act, the expression ‘grave injury to the
mental health’ is used in a liberal sense by the legislature itself. Further, for determining
whether continuance of pregnancy would involve risk of injury to mental health of the
pregnant woman, account may be taken of the pregnant woman's actual or reasonable
foreseeable environment. In fact, the aspect of a pregnant woman's actual or reasonable
foreseeable environment has greater nexus to the aspect of mental health as compared
to physical health. Division Bench proceeded to hold that this legislative liberality when it
comes to expanding the concept of grave injury to mental health cannot evaporate no sooner
the ceiling of 20 weeks prescribed in section 3(2)(b) of the Act is exceeded. If the expression
‘life’ in section 5(1) of the Act is not to be confined to mere physical existence or survival,
then permission will have to be granted under section 5(1) of
the Act for medical termination of pregnancy which may have exceeded 20 weeks if the
continuance of such pregnancy would involve grave injury to the mental health of the
pregnant woman.
3
Suchita Srivastava And Another vs. Chandigarh Administration .
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CITED BY: POOJA GANESH PAWAR
THROUGH HER GUARDIAN GANESH DIGAMBAR
PAWAR VS. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER
"10. Although section 3 of the Act provides the limit of 12 weeks for medically
terminating pregnancy by a medical practitioner and, where the length
of pregnancy exceeds 12 weeks but does not exceed 20 weeks and if, not less than
two medical practitioners are of opinion, formed in good faith, the continuance
of pregnancy would involve a risk to the life of the pregnant woman or grave injury to
her physical or mental health or that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born, it
would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped, it
would be permissible to terminate the pregnancy. It must be noted that section 5 of
the Act is not controlled by the limitation in respect of duration of pregnancy contained in
sections 3 and 4 of the Act. If in the opinion of medical experts, arrived at in good faith,
the termination of pregnancy is immediately necessary to save the life of the
pregnant woman, such a pregnancy can be terminated. It also must be noted that
Explanation 1 to section 3 records that where the pregnancy is alleged by the
pregnant woman to have been caused by rape, the anguish caused by such pregnancy can be
presumed to constitute a grave injury to the mental health of the pregnant woman. Sub-
section (1)(b)(i) of section 3 refers to the risk involved to the pregnant woman which
includes even injury in respect of mental health. There shall not be reason to doubt that
since pregnancy in the instant matter is as a result of offence of rape, it causes a huge
mental trauma and such inference is in consonance with explanation 1 to section 3(1) of
the Act of 1971." 12. Moreover, in the above decision, the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Suchita 11 Srivastava Vs. Chandigarh Administration, 2009(9)
SCC 1, was referred wherein it has been observed that there is no doubt that a
woman's right to make reproductive choices is also a dimension of "personal liberty" as
understood under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is important to recognize that
productive choice can be exercised to procreate as well as to abstain from procreating.
Moreover, in para 19 of the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has observed as under :-
"19. As evident from its literal description, the "Best interests" test requires the Court to
ascertain the course of action which would serve the best interests of the person in question.
In the present setting this means that the Court must undertake a careful inquiry of
the medical opinion on the feasibility of the pregnancy as well as social circumstances
forced by the victim. It is important to note that the Court's decision should be guided by the
interests of the victim alone and not those of other stakeholders such as guardians or society
in general. It is evident that the woman in question will need care and assistance which will
in turn entail some costs. However, that cannot be a ground for denying the exercise of
reproductive rights."
4
Tapasya Umesh Pisal Petitioner vs. Union Of India And Ors. (S)
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CITED BY: XYZ VS. STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
13. In Murugan Nayakkar (supra), the petitioner, who was 13 years of age, was a victim of
alleged rape and sexual abuse. She preferred a writ petition for termination of
her pregnancy. The Medical Board opined that termination of pregnancy at this stage or
delivery at term will both have equal risk to the mother. The Supreme Court held that
considering the age of the petitioner, trauma which she prima facie suffered due
to sexual abuse and the agony she is going through at the present, it would be appropriate to
allow termination of pregnancy. In Tapasya Umesh Pisal v. Union of India (supra), the
victim, who was 24 years old, was seeking permission to undergo medical termination of
the pregnancy, which had progressed to 24 weeks. The Supreme Court held that it is
difficult to refuse the permission to the petitioner to
undergo medical termination of pregnancy as it is certain that if the foetus is allowed to be
born it would have a limited life span with serious handicaps which cannot be avoided. In
Kalpana Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi (supra), the victim had pregnancy of 25
weeks and 5 days, which was permitted to be terminated medically.
,
6
Mrs. A Petitioner vs. Union Of India And Ors. (S)
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CITED BY: ABC VS. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH, THROUGH STATION HOUSE OFFICER
AND ANOTHER
14. Similarly, in the matter of Mrs. A v. Union of India (2018) 14 SCC 75 , AIR 2017 SC
4037, the Supreme Court has granted permission for termination of pregnancy of
a woman, aged 22 years, in her 25 to 26 weeks of pregnancy holding that continuation
of pregnancy can pose severe mental injury to the petitioner and no additional risk to the
petitioner's life is involved if she is allowed to undergo termination of her pregnancy. Their
Lordships held as under:
7
Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse And Another
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CITED BY: XYZ VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
76. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse - (2014) 1 SCC 188, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the need to shape law as per the changing needs of the times and circumstances by observing
that the law regulates relationships between people. It prescribes patterns of behaviour. It
reflects the values of society. The role of the court is to understand the purpose of law in
society and to help the law achieve its purpose. But the law of a society is a living organism.
It is based on a given factual and social reality that is constantly changing. Sometimes change
in law precedes societal change and is even intended to stimulate it. In most cases, however,
a change in law is the result of a change in social reality. Indeed, when social reality changes,
the law must change too. Just as change in social reality is the law of life, responsiveness to
change in social reality is the life of the law. It can be said that the history of law is the
history of adapting the law to society's changing needs. In both constitutional and
statutory interpretation, the court is supposed to exercise discretion in determining the
proper relationship between the subjective and objective purposes of the law.
8
Lata Singh vs. State Of U.P And Another
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CITED BY: DEEPIKA AND ANR. VS. STATE OF U.P. AND ORS.
"7. ... Whatever may be the date of birth of the petitioner, the fact remains that she is at
present more than 18 years of age. As the petitioner is sui juris no fetters can be placed upon
her choice of the person with whom she is to stay, nor can any restriction be imposed
regarding the place where she should stay. The court or the relatives of the petitioner can
also not substitute their opinion or preference for that of the petitioner in such a matter."9. In
the case of Lata Singh v. State of U.P. and another, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 475 : (AIR
2006 SC 2522), the Court has welcomed the inter-caste marriages and has noted that the
caste system is a curse on the nation and once a person becomes major, he or she
can marry whosoever he or she likes, and if parents of such boy or girl do not approve of
such inter-caste marriage, they can simply cut-off social relations with son or daughter, but
they cannot give threats or com mit or instigate acts of violence. In the said case, the
Supreme Court has issued a gen eral direction to the administration/police authorities
throughout the country to see that if any boy or girl, who is a major, undergoes inter-caste or
inter-religion marriage, with a woman or man, who is a major, they should not be harassed
by anyone nor subjected to threats or acts of violence. The relevant part of such judgment is
extracted below:
,
9. In the case of Lata Singh v. State of U.P. and another, reported in (2006) 5 SCC 475 :
(AIR 2006 SC 2522), the Court has welcomed the inter-caste marriages and has noted that
the caste system is a curse on the nation and once a person becomes major, he or she
can marry whosoever he or she likes, and if parents of such boy or girl do not approve of
such inter-caste marriage, they can simply cut-off social relations with son or daughter, but
they cannot give threats or com mit or instigate acts of violence. In the said case, the
Supreme Court has issued a gen eral direction to the administration/police authorities
throughout the country to see that if any boy or girl, who is a major, undergoes inter-caste or
inter-religion marriage, with a woman or man, who is a major, they should not be harassed
by anyone nor subjected to threats or acts of violence. The relevant part of such judgment is
extracted below:
,
In view of the above, we dispose of the writ petition with the observation that in case the
petitioners have any grievance, they may move an application before the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Allahabad for their protection. In case, such an application is
moved before the Senior Superintendent of Police, Allahabad, he may look into the grievance
of the petitioners and do the needful. Needless to say, if the petitioners propose to lodge First
Information Report against any person who is harassing, the same may be registered and
necessary action may be taken in accordance with law as held by the Apex Court in
the case of Lata Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr., AIR 2006 SC 2522.
9
Pt. Parmanand Katara vs. Union Of India And Others
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CITED BY: XYZ VS. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
127. In the aforesaid regard, we refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Parmanand
Katara v. Union of India (1989) 4 SCC 286 where it was held that there can be no second
opinion that preservation of human life is of paramount importance. That is so on account of
the fact that once life is lost, the status quo ante cannot be restored as resurrection is beyond
the capacity of man. Article 21 of the Constitution casts the obligation on the State to
preserve life. The provision as explained by this Court in scores of decisions has emphasised
and reiterated with gradually increasing emphasis, that position.
10
Kanai Lal Sur vs. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan .
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CITED BY: X VS. THE PRINCIPAL
SECRETARY HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE
DEPARTMENT GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
32. The cardinal principle of the construction of statutes is to identify the intention of the
legislature and the true legal meaning of the enactment. The intention of the legislature is
derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the statute, with a view to
understanding the purpose or object of the enactment, the mischief, and its corresponding
remedy that the enactment is designed to actualise. 2016), 1992 Supp (2) SCC 351, (2001) 4
SCC 139 Ordinarily, the language used by the legislature is indicative of legislativ