FLIGHT SAFETY F O U N D AT I O N

Airport Operations
Vol. 21 No. 5 For Everyone Concerned with the Safety of Flight September–October 1995

Adapting Crew Resource Management to the

Air Traffic Control Environment
A U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) report found that directly
adapting crew resource management (CRM) training for flight crews to air traffic
control (ATC) was not advisable because of significant differences in the work
environments of the two groups. The report did, however, recommend that
ATC-specific CRM training be developed based on an analysis of ATC needs
after ways of analyzing the effectiveness of such programs have been established.

Robert L. Koenig
Aviation Writer

Since the late 1970s, cockpit training programs have been analyzed, and appropriate training interventions should be
developed that go beyond individual-pilot instruction to help flight created to meet unique mission and facility needs.”
crews work more closely together as teams. The improved
interaction and more effective use of resources that these In their report, Controller Resource Management — What Can
programs aimed at were originally called “cockpit resource We Learn from Aircrews?, Härtel and Härtel formulated a
management,” but the term was later broadened into “crew model for CRM training for controllers by integrating common
resource management” (CRM), reflecting its additional elements found in the various methods of different CRM
application to cabin and dispatch crew. Now, similar team-training programs.
methods are being developed for air traffic control (ATC) tasks.
The authors also recommended that “systems for rigorously
Two university researchers, supported by a grant from the U.S. and objectively analyzing the effectiveness of the resulting
Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Civil Aeromedical training programs must be established from the outset, so that
Institute (CAMI) in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, U.S., examined training can be continually improved and updated” for ATCSs.
CRM team-training potential for air traffic control specialists
(ATCSs). The first part of the report reviewed the history and theory of
flight crew resource management. The second part analyzed
The researchers — Charmine Härtel of the University of Tulsa the potential for CRM principles to be applied in the ATC realm.
(Oklahoma), and Günther Härtel of Colorado State University
(Colorado, U.S.) — believed that CRM programs for flight In the 1950s, the U.S. military developed team-training programs
crews can offer valuable lessons in developing similar training for flight crews that were precursors of the current CRM training.
for controllers. But the researchers concluded that “direct
adaptation of existing [flight deck CRM] programs to the ATCS Two decades later, following a series of accidents in the Pacific
profession is not advisable.” that were attributed to pilot error, Pan American World Airways
began a program that it called “crew concept training.” Around
Instead, Härtel and Härtel recommended that “the specific the same time, United Airlines and KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
needs of the ATCS profession should be systematically also began training programs to improve cockpit management.
 In 1979, the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration One example is the Cockpit Management Attitudes
(NASA) and the airline industry conducted a workshop on the Questionnaire (CMAQ), developed by Helmreich in 1984.
human factors in aviation safety. That discussion provided the Because some studies indicate that attitudes tend to help predict
impetus for several additional airlines to begin CRM programs, the behavior of crew members, “changes in measured attitudes
which typically consisted of lectures or videotaped presentations. on the CMAQ are assumed to impact behaviors that cause or
are linked to accidents,” the report said.
CRM has been defined in various ways. Helmreich said that it
is “the effective coordination and utilization of all available CMAQ is a self-rating report using 25 items, many of which
resources in the service of the flight.”1 For Helmreich and question whether specific behaviors are appropriate. For
Foushee, it was “the application of human factors in the example, crew members are asked to agree or disagree with
aviation system.”2 The most recent FAA advisory circular on such statements as: “Crewmembers should avoid disagreeing
CRM (1995) called it “one way of addressing the challenge of with others because conflicts create tension and reduce crew
optimizing the human/machine interface and accompanying effectiveness.” One limitation of the approach is that some
interpersonal activities. These activities include team building crew members’ attitudes may not have changed on that
and maintenance, information transfer, problem solving, question, but they can answer correctly because they learned
decision making, maintaining situational awareness and in CRM what the answer should be.
dealing with automated systems.”3
Taking a more objective approach to determining if CRM
Researchers have also tried to analyze what skill dimensions training is effective, some evaluators use the line-oriented flight
are involved in CRM. A summary of four analyses (Table 1) simulation (LOS) checklist to compare the performance of
shows some overlapping categories but also some differences. crews that have undergone CRM with crews that have not had
the training.
Evaluating CRM and its components is extremely complex,
mainly because of the wide scope of most CRM training Taken together, such studies have been interpreted as
programs and the difficulty of measuring the training’s impact. confirmation that CRM training is effective. But Härtel and
Härtel cautioned that “all these studies lacked randomization
The simplest way to judge CRM’s effectiveness would be to or experimental control,” and were therefore not scientifically
measure how successful it has been in helping to prevent conclusive. They suggested that more effort should be made
accidents and incidents that result from ineffective cockpit to evaluate CRM results objectively.
teamwork. But several researchers have found that such
measurements are difficult because accidents are infrequent. Because CRM’s goal is to improve flight safety, it would seem
logical to extend some form of team training to air traffic
The easiest thing about CRM to measure — usually by means controllers.
of a simple questionnaire — is the participant’s reactions to
the training. To measure changes in attitude, researchers use Sherman and Helmreich found that several accidents had been
more complex questionnaires that are designed to measure blamed on air traffic control specialists’ “lack of adequate
attitudes before and after the CRM training. communication and coordination with air crews.”8 And the

Table 1
Comparison of Crew Resource Management (CRM) Dimensions
Prince & Salas, 19894 FAA, 19895 Helmreich & Foushee, 19932 Lauber, 19796, 19877
Situational awareness Situational awareness Situtational awareness
Leadership Interpersonal skills, Leadership, workload Leadership, delegation
team management management and task of tasks and assignment
delegation of responsibilities,
establishment of priorities
Adaptation Use of available resources Use of information
Communication Communication Communication Communication
Mission analysis Team review or Monitoring and
mission analysis cross-checking
Decision making Decision making Problem assessment
Stress management Building and maintaining team Distraction management

Source: U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and authors referenced above

2 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • AIRPORT OPERATIONS • SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1995

 FAA’s 1989 “Profile of Operational Errors in National Airspace To what extent could existing CRM programs developed for
Systems Report” found that “human error was listed as the flight crews be used to help train ATCSs?
primary cause of most operational errors and deviations.”9
After surveying the available research, Härtel and Härtel
But there is a big difference between the cockpit environment concluded that it is “not advisable” to apply CRM programs
and the control-tower environment. The typical airline flight designed primarily for flight crews to ATCSs. However, they
crew consists of the pilot (or captain), the copilot (or first believed a modified CRM approach would be helpful.
officer) and in some cases a flight engineer (or second officer).
Duties are clearly defined for each crew member, with the “As air traffic controllers increase their involvement with
captain having the ultimate responsibility for the flight’s safety. CRM, they can benefit from lessons learned from over 15
years” of flight-deck CRM, the authors wrote.
In the nature and timing of their tasks, flight crews differ from
other types of work teams. Aviators sometimes describe their “Although we believe that CRM can benefit ATC, it should
work as “hours of intense boredom punctuated by moments not be characterized as a panacea. CRM is unlikely to rectify
of sheer terror.” During a normal flight, the flight crew’s problems caused by deficient basic skills training or inadequate
workload is predictable, but uneven. “There is a substantial safety standards,” said the two Härtels. “Moreover, it is
workload near the beginning of the flight, and then again near unlikely that CRM will prove to be cost-effective in every
the end, with very little work in between,” the report observes. ATC work setting and mission.”

Another characteristic of such cockpit teamwork is “the short At Seattle-Tacoma International Airport, Washington, U.S.,
time aircrew teams spend working together.” Hackman and and some other airports, officials already have started
Helmreich10 noted that many airline crews work together for implementing CRM programs for ATCSs.
only about a month. “In contrast,” Härtel and Härtel wrote,
“although the R-side and D-side controllers change about every The Controller Awareness and Resource Training (CART)
hour, in most cases, especially in towers, controllers work as program began in 1988 at Seattle’s Air Route Traffic Control
part of a controller ‘crew’ and tend to work together for a Center (ARTCC) facility. Similar U.S. programs have begun in
relatively long period of time, often years. Many ATCSs can Boston, Massachusetts, Memphis, Tennessee, and some other
get to know each other fairly well. Therefore, team formation is airports. CART’s emphasis is on teamwork, communication and
likely to evolve differently for controllers than for flight crews.” human factors.
[R-side controllers follow flights on radar and maintain contact
with pilots; D-side controllers handle administrative and After the 1991 Controller Resource Management Conference,
computer-entry tasks associated with radar coverage.] participants created the Air Traffic Teamwork Enhancement
(ATTE) steering committee the following year to develop CRM
Controllers also work under a different authority structure than training materials and help other ARTCC facilities to begin their
do flight crews, the report said. Flight crews have a clear own team-training programs.
hierarchy from the captain down through first and second
officers and then cabin crew. “An en route controller crew,” That 1991 conference identified four main CRM issues:11
Härtel and Härtel said, “has a much more lateral or horizontal
authority structure, with one supervisor at the top, and a number Work environment. The current ARTCC work environment
of R-side and D-side controllers below at the same authority tends to promote individuals rather than teams, and is often
levels [as others performing the same function]” (Figure 1). marred by poor communication, attitude problems and negative
reinforcements. “Controllers are thrust into an environment
that requires them to use their energy to survive rather than to
grow and learn,” the conference found.
Simplified Comparison of Flight Crew and
Attitudes. Some ATCSs have attitudes, such as a reluctance
En Route Controller Authority Structure to ask for help, that should be changed. Such attitudes tend to
Supervisor prevent teams from working effectively together.
Captain
R-side R-side R-side Communication. Poor communication at many levels “causes
Controller Controller Controller conflict and disagreement rather than effective relationships,”
First officer
and makes it more difficult for groups to develop common
D-side D-side D-side goals and work as teams.
Second officer Controller Controller Controller
Source: U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Trust. To promote teamwork, steps must be taken to foster
the development of greater trust among controller-team
Figure 1 members, between controllers and pilots, between controllers

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • AIRPORT OPERATIONS • SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1995 3

 and their supervisors and in the system itself. One important should not be treated as an extension or variation of flight
step is to ensure that all team members are fully competent. crews.”

The ATTE steering committee’s goals are to help controllers Nevertheless, Helmreich12 noted that “the same analytic
work better together as teams, to improve their team skills and strategy employed to identify problems [in CRM] is applicable
problem-solving skills, to help them relate better to one another, in the ATC setting.”
and to help them more effectively manage both their personal
and team resources. The first challenge is to identify ATC “teams.” In the en route
setting, a team could be defined as either the pair of D-side
ATTE has sponsored three-day workshops that included both and R-side controllers working a given position; or as the
controllers and their supervisors in sessions conducted by a “crew,” consisting of all controllers who report to the same
facilitator. The workshops, with classes of a dozen to 15 administrative supervisor.
participants, offered sessions in teamwork, communication,
managing stress and handling conflicts. At each workshop’s Each of those definitions has disadvantages. Two controllers
end, participants were asked to evaluate the sessions overall are not always assigned to work on an en route position. And
and then to rate their knowledge or effectiveness in nine areas supervisors and specialists are not fully part of a “team”
(e.g., “awareness of potential resources” and “listening to because they are often not members of the same bargaining
others”), before and after the training. unit. Also, the configuration of ATC teams would differ in en
route, terminal radar control (TRACON) and tower settings.
“The facilitator never lectures” at the ATTE sessions, Härtel
and Härtel reported. “Instead, videotaped presentations, group “The group dynamics in some of these situations may not even
discussions, team presentations, analyses of case studies, team warrant a team approach, as such,” Härtel and Härtel contended.
exercises and activities, and self-assessment questionnaires and “It may be useful to view teams on a continuum ranging from
critiques of videotaped behaviors are used to convey course tightly interacting and interdependent members to loosely
content.” connected individuals who cooperate with each other.”

For example, one team exercise asked five or six participants, The authors noted that “controllers often have to deal with issues
who chose a leader, to use straws and pins to design and build of mature groups, such as how to deal with difficult individual
a tower that was supposed to be tall, stable and appealing. team members, and how to develop trust among team members.”
When the time expired for the tower-design stage, the team
leaders (and their designs) were reassigned to another team. The communications patterns and the dynamics among ATC
teams vary considerably, depending on the mission or work
“This is expected to cause some interesting team and leadership settings. For example, in radar settings other than en route
dynamics,” the authors said. settings, such as approach control, the ATCS “often works more
independently of other team members, except when using an
To help evaluate such CRM training for ATCSs, Sherman and R-side/D-side pair.” In nonradar settings, there is more verbal
Helmreich8 revised the CMAQ questionnaire for use with ATC. communication among all ATCSs.
The new form, called the CRMAQ, asked participants to rate
25 statements involving controller resource management “The question of who the members of an ATCS team should
concepts, on a five-point scale ranging from “disagree be, and what the dynamics of the team are, will require further
strongly” to “agree strongly.” research,” Härtel and Härtel concluded. They also suggested
the likelihood that “more than one type of ATCS team will
After administering the CRMAQ to 390 ATCSs, Sherman and have to be defined.”
Helmreich found “consistent differences between facilities and
between different controller job descriptions. … Due to its The tasks of ATC teams also differ fundamentally from flight
short length, it is not a highly reliable scale.” The two crews’ tasks.
researchers were working on a revision of the CRMAQ to iron
out the problems. Although the flight crew’s prime mission — to operate a
complex aircraft — helps create a singular team focus, the
Adapting CRM to ATCSs may require substantial revision of mission and human factors setting of ATCSs tend to be more
existing CRM programs, or the development of customized complex.
programs, some researchers say.
In 1972, in the infancy of CRM theory, Edwards proposed the
“It is important that the development of ATCRM concepts SHEL model (Figure 2, page 5) for analyzing the setting in
be based on research specifically identifying and addressing which human factors operate in flight crew coordination.13
controller issues,” Härtel and Härtel reported. “The ATCS SHEL is an acronym for Software, Hardware, Environment
profession has its own unique challenges and needs, and and Liveware. In terms of flight crew coordination, software

4 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • AIRPORT OPERATIONS • SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1995

 One way to identify ATCS areas that might benefit from CRM
SHEL Model for Analyzing the
training is to examine the relationship of aircraft accidents
Crew Resource Management (CRM) and incidents to communication patterns within ATC, between
Human Factors Setting* ATC and cockpits, and within cockpits.
S = Software
An analysis of more than 28,000 incident reports to the U.S.
H = Hardware
E = Environment H National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
L = Liveware
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) from 1976 to 1981
determined that more than 70 percent of the reports cited the
S L E “transfer of information” as a problem. Billings and Cheaney15
said that those incident reports focused mainly on “pilot-
controller interactions and controller communications more
L often than on within-cockpit communication.”

*See text for details. Researchers found that the most common reasons cited for such
Source: U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
communications failures were: the person who had the critical
information did not believe it was necessary to transfer it; or
Figure 2
the information was communicated, but incorrectly.
includes operating manuals, operations bulletins, charts and
other information sources, and the concept could be extended Analysis of the ASRS incident reports showed that factors
to include programming of computer-operated flight controls that interfered with such information transfers included
in newer aircraft. Hardware includes “autopilots, autothrottles “frequency saturation, high workload and inadequately
and other advanced avionics.” Environment is the physical presented data.” Also, communication could be hampered
conditions of the cockpit (temperature, noise, lighting, etc.) by behaviors such as “distraction, failure to monitor and
and liveware is “other accessible people in the system.” complacency.”16

One way of analyzing the ATCS’s tasks is to use the SHEL “Findings like these suggest that at least some of the CRM
terminology. If the controller is represented by the center “L,” principles should be useful for ATCS,” Härtel and Härtel said.
then the L-L connection represents all communication and “The ATCS plays a ‘pivotal role’ in the information transfer
information flow between the controller and other persons in or communication structure in today’s aviation system.”
the system, including flight crews, flight management and other
controllers in related sectors. Instead of trying to adapt existing flight-crew CRM training
to controllers, Härtel and Härtel recommended a model for
The L-H connection represents the interface between persons analyzing the special needs of ATCSs and designing a CRM
and machines, which can be considerable for ATCSs. program that focuses on those needs. The program would be
Researchers say the automation of controller functions could developed in six steps:
strongly influence a controller’s cognitive functioning.
Analyzing needs. Conduct a “systematic needs analysis” by
For example, Thackray and Touchstone14 argued that installing examining accident reports, interviewing controllers and
highly automatic air traffic systems could change the role of observing ATC operations, to identify which behaviors by
ATCSs from that of “active planners” to that of a “passive ATCSs contribute to accidents, errors and other problems. The
responder to alternate courses of action presented by the analysis should also identify the controller behaviors that lead
computer.” to efficient, safe operations.

Researchers warn that such advanced automation could lead Analyzing the job. Examine ATCS tasks to identify whether
to problems such as controller complacency, inattentiveness, resources available to ATCSs, including software, hardware
boredom and reduced readiness. and liveware, are being used to the greatest benefit. The
examination of human resources should analyze where teaming
The L-E connection represents the interaction of the controller controllers might be helpful.
and the environment. That environment in the control tower
or at other sites can be uncomfortable, and can influence “It may become evident that some positions are not suitable
controllers’ performance. for teaming at all, and in some cases, it may be difficult to
define who the members of the team should be,” the report
Finally, the S-L link represents any human factors related to said. Analyzing information flow in ATC facilities will help
the system’s nonphysical aspects, including procedures and identify potential teams. If team membership is transient, then
computer programs. Each of those factors introduces possible the concept of teaming may not be helpful unless staffing
sources of human error. policies are modified.

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • AIRPORT OPERATIONS • SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1995 5

 Setting goals. Using the information derived from the needs team skills, get feedback from experts and require refresher
analysis, experts should draw up an inventory of skills or CRM sessions to reinforce those skills, the report said.
dimensions that ATCSs need to function well and avoid making
errors. “A systematic comparison of effective and less effective Awareness. Using videotapes, role-playing sessions or
controllers can shed light on which skills are most important simulations, the new ATCRM program should teach trainees
for effective team operations,” the authors suggested. the basic resource management concepts to help them understand
the importance of human factors in effective team performance.
That inventory should form the basis for training goals.
Practice and feedback. The training program must provide
Identifying training content. Once the CRM goals are set, opportunities for participants to practice CRM skills and
experts should list the specific behaviors and the knowledge, behaviors, and for experts to give them feedback on their
skills and abilities that can be taught and evaluated. The performance, the report said. The practice could come from
definitions of behaviors may vary depending on the controller’s high-fidelity ATC simulations, desktop computer simulations,
position, the specific task layout and the characteristics of the role playing or feedback from actual critical incidents on the
ATC facility. Periodically, experts should validate those job. The following are some examples:
behavior-based definitions to ensure that the CRM training
helps lead to optimum performance and has no negative effects. • Using high-fidelity ATC simulators, which control the
scenarios and ensure that errors do not result in
Evaluating training’s impact. To evaluate the effectiveness dangerous situations.
of the new CRM training for controllers, experts should
develop valid, objective measures of performance. One • Seeking to achieve a reasonable level of realism, at
possible approach might be developing a checklist that would relatively low cost, by combining standard desktop
help give a quantitative score of the presence or absence of computers with custom-designed components such as
specific behaviors in a participant’s performance. Another special keyboards, software and work stations that give
approach would use trained observers to evaluate qualitative realistic positions of controls and monitors.
aspects of performance, such as team coordination, clear
communications and relations with other team members. • Developing role-playing exercises that simulate group
dynamics and pose challenges that require team
“A combination of these two approaches would provide both coordination and resource-management skills. One
objective and subjective criteria for evaluation,” the authors example is the tower-building exercise used by the FAA’s
suggested. Ideally, the evaluation should be used only for ATTE workshop. Another example is United Airlines’
training and program development, keeping participants’ exercise in which one crew member plays a role reacting
ratings confidential. If employers or supervisors want to use to the scripted roles of the other crew members.
assessments of individual or team effectiveness for certification
or a similar job-related purpose, then a separate program should • Using an FAA system to give feedback on actual on-
be developed that “disassociates certification from training. the-job behavior. That system uses FAA tape logs to
reproduce radio transmissions and radar images of
“Attempting to train and certify at once is not only ethically critical incidents, thus allowing controllers to observe
questionable; the potential chilling effect on trainee behaviors how well they handle real situations. A less expensive
can potentially undermine the optimal effectiveness of both option would be videotaping the routine ATC work-
activities,” Härtel and Härtel wrote. station operations.

Updating the program. The curriculum must be evaluated Härtel and Härtel concluded that “trainees are more likely to
continually to refine the training and keep it current, the report have more faith in a real-life situation than a simulation, and
said. “Periodic reassessment of training needs should be included it presents a training mechanism that can be employed on the
whenever there is a significant change in the task design or work job.” They warn, however, that such on-the-job tapings and
environment (e.g., changes in air traffic patterns, automation or evaluations must be treated with confidentiality.
regulations).” Härtel and Härtel also recommended that a formal
group, perhaps composed of experienced instructors, controllers, Continual reinforcement. By setting up regular refresher
managers and education experts, be charged with program sessions, CRM experts can help reinforce the team lessons
redesign. The authors added that a means of evaluating the learned in the regular training.
impact of an ATCRM program must be in place before the
program is implemented, so that curriculum developers will have Depending on the facility, refresher sessions might be
a baseline by which to judge the program’s effectiveness. integrated into other, regular training, or could be held as
separate training sessions. The authors recommended that
A new CRM training program for ATCSs should make participants CRM training be provided as part of other training occasions,
aware of CRM’s importance, give them an opportunity to practice such as for newly hired or recently promoted controllers, or

6 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • AIRPORT OPERATIONS • SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1995

 for transition training when a controller moves to a new post Controller teams might also benefit from external feedback
or to new equipment. from flight crew teams or similar controller teams, the report
said. For example, some current programs encourage
Another way of providing reinforcement would be “mentoring” controllers to accompany flight crews in the cockpit on
programs, such as those in which the FAA has paired occasion, and encourage pilots to observe ATCSs in action.
experienced controllers with relatively inexperienced
controllers. By enabling such pairs to work together for “Facilitating regular, cross-specialty observation among
extended periods, “the level of coordination and cohesiveness controllers on a regular basis could help controllers better
of controller teams can be strengthened,” the authors suggested. understand their areas’ effect on the others,” the authors
concluded. “Unfortunately, there currently is little structure
Yet another reinforcement technique tried in some FAA to exchange feedback and allow flight crews and ATCS teams
facilities is to adapt the Total Quality Management (TQM) to clarify barriers to more effective performance.”♦
approach of “quality control circles.”
Editorial note: This article was adapted from Controller
Special teams of controllers would be formed to accomplish Resource Management — What Can We Learn from Aircrews?
certain segments of work. At some facilities, teams might Report no. DOT/FAA/AM-95/21, July 1995, by Charmine
involve eight to a dozen controllers working under one area Härtel of the University of Tulsa’s Department of Psychology
supervisor; other facilities might try smaller teams. and Günther Härtel of Colorado State University. The 36-page
report includes charts and a bibliography.
“Each team would hold regular meetings, possibly daily or
weekly, where recurrent training and feedback would take
place,” the report said. “Those meetings could include brief References
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incidents or special situations where CRM was or would have 1. Helmreich, R.L. “Theory Underlying CRM Training:
been useful.” Psychological Issues in Flight Crew Performance and Crew
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to the event being evaluated, the report said. Ideally, specially a Workshop Sponsored by NASA Ames Research Center
trained team leaders might conduct short debriefing sessions and the U.S. Air Force Military Airlift Command. U.S.
for their teams after each work shift. National Aeronautics and Space Administration Ames
Research Center Report no. N87-22635 (1987): 15-22.
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But the authors cautioned that such feedback sessions should 4. Prince, C.W.; Salas, E. “Aircrew Performance Coordination
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11. Controller Resource Management (CRM) Conference About the Author

(1991). Overall Findings. Summary of the Meeting.
Washington, D.C., U.S.: U.S. Federal Aviation Administration.
Robert L. Koenig is a Berlin, Germany-based correspondent
12. Helmreich, R.L. “Whither CRM? Future Directions in who specializes in transportation and science issues. He has
Crew Resource Management Training in the Cockpit and written on aviation matters for Science and the Journal of
Elsewhere.” In Proceedings of the Seventh International Commerce. Before his move to Germany, he was a Washington,
Symposium on Aviation Psychology. Columbus, Ohio, D.C., newspaper correspondent for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
U.S.: Ohio State University, 1993. for which he covered transportation issues. He
won the National Press Club’s top award for Washington
13. Hawkins, F.H. In H.W. Orlady (ed.), Human Factors in correspondents in 1994. Koenig has master’s degrees from the
Flight (second edition). Vermont, U.S.: Ashgate Publishing, University of Missouri School of Journalism and from Tulane
1993. University in New Orleans, Louisiana.

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8 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • AIRPORT OPERATIONS • SEPTEMBER–OCTOBER 1995