UNIT 18 FORMATION OF NATION-STATES-2:

GERMANY AND ITALY

Structure

18.1 Introduction
18.2 German Nationalism
18.2.1 Gelman Nat~onalIdea
18.2.2 Political Background
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18.2.3 Economic Background 'C h

k8.2.4 , Nationalism and Democracy

18.2.5 Unificatlon : Revolution from Above
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18.3 Cultural Background of Italian Nationalism

18.3.1 Idea of Nationalism
18.3.2 Italian Language ,J ' r

18.3.3 Wurna11ism I

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18.4 political Background of Italiali Nationifism
1 8 4.1 Modern Italian Politi~alNationalism
18.4.2 Young Italy 1

18.4.3 I'iedmont Satdinla

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18 4 4 The Catholic Church

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18.5 .Economic Background of Italian Natiorrallsm

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18 5.1 North-South Difference 1

18.5.2 State and Economy ,-, , : '1 :

18.6 Process UniAcation -

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18.6.1 Popular Movementc 11 : f t , ) ,

18.6.2 War ancl Unificatlon

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18.8 Answers to Check Your Progress Exercises p.;rafv- .,-. .

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18.0 OBJECTIVES
h ' f h e earlier Units in this block you have read about the growth of ideas of nationalism and
the rise of nation-stares. You have also seen how the nation-states in Britain and France
developed during 16th and 17th centuries. After reading this Unit you shall be able to learn:
the evolution of Germ@ national idea;
the political and economic background of German nationalism;
the political, cultural and economic background of Italian nationalism; and
the role of war and popular mobilizations in the creation of the nation-states.

18.1 INTRODUCTION
As you have read in the previous Unit, in the older states like Britain and France, nationalism
developed within state boundaries shaped by historical circumstances. It was the French
Revolution which created the ideal not only of democracy but of nationalism - the nation
'one and indivisible'. The French emphasized linguistic uniformity within a nation state
although they were willing to integrate within the nation those who acquired French and
accepted other conditions for citizenship and nationality. In the case of the Germans and
Italians, the absence .of political and territorial unity anlong German and Italian speaking Formation of Nation-States-2 :
people led to movements for national unification.The history of German and Italian nationalism Gemany And Italy
is therefore a struggle to unite German and Italian speaking people within a single nation
state.The history of nationalism in these two malor states is a chronicle of the political movement
and cultural background which created a nation state by overcoming domestic discord and
political fragmentation and also by international diplomacy and war. In Germany and Italy. the
unity of the nation state was created by processes of economic and political unification
domestically in the mid 19th century but ultimately based on military victories achieved against
both domestic rivals and international enemies. In fact, in older accounts of the creation of
nation states in mid 19th century Europe the protagonists were Prussia and Piedmont-Sardinia
which forged national unity by skillful diplomacy and warfare on the one hand and pragmatic
handling of popular national sentiments and occasional revolutionary upsurges.

18.2 GERMAN NATIONALISM

Modern German nationalism emerged about the late 18th century under the impetus provided
by the French Revolution and the simplification of the political map of Europe and of the
German states by the destruction of the Holy Roman Empire by Napoleonic armies. While
modem nationalism has been linked to the rise of capitalism and of bourgeois liberalism by
adopting a linguistic or ethnic definition of nations ,the beginnings of nationalism can be
pushed back much further in time.

18.2.1 German National Idea

During the early Middle Ages various Germanic tribes and Celts and Slavs were fused by a
process of conflict and assimilation into the German peopie. From the 9th century onwards, the
tern1 'German' was used to mark off the large tribes in the empire of the Eastern Franks from
the Romance and Slavonic language groups. After 1000 AD, the term German became widely
used and marked the ethno-genesis of the German nation. The historical antecedents of the
German nation can be traced back to the early feudal period. in the second half of the first
rnil1ennium.b the medieval period there is not much evidence of national feeling although
some historians have discerned the development of a feudal nationality under the great
monarchical states. The medieval imperial idea on which the German Empire was founded
was a universal idea and the German colonization and conquests in the East in this period were
governed by religious motives .
The word deutsch was used in the 8th and 9th centuries to refer to the German language. Only
in the 1lth century was the word 'deutsch' used to refer to German speaking groups and their
land. Even the charter of the Teutonic Order, which spearheaded German colonization of the
east and northeast did not reveal any German national consciousness. Even when the German
races felt bound to each other by ties of blood - the Saxons, Franks, Bavarians and Swabians
- they did not have the consciousness of being German.The nationalism of the German
Renaissance literati constructed a new consciousness both older than and superior to that of
Christianity and the Romans based on the manuscript of Tacitus's Germania discovered in
1455. The connection between Lutheranism and the rise of Geiman nationalism was slight
since their struggle was primarily against the Antichrist in Romq and not limited to national
issues. The Protestant translations of the Bible into the-~ermanvernacular led to the growth
of modern German but the growth of German nationalism actually took place with the rise
of German Romanticism. The Renaissance and Reformation in Germany were primarily scholarly
and theological events and so these movements failed to destroy the medieval idea of world
empire or to change politics and society as in the West European countries. German nationalism
when it developed in the 18th century and later based itself on the "natural" fact of comn~unity
and on ties of kinship rather than concepts of contract or citizenship. German nationalism was
based on the imprecise concept of "folk" which was first developed by the German humanists,
Herder and German romanticism leading to an elaboration of the concept of German volk.
German nationalism like that of the Russians became preoccupied with the "soul" or "mission"
of the nation since it was not rooted in social and political reality and constituted "a venture
in education and propaganda rather than in policy shaping and government".
Martin Luther's rejection of the authority of the Pope and translation of the Bible into German
created the basis for a national consciousness. In 1486, the expression, "Holy Roman Empire
of the German Nation was first used, becoming cornmonplace,in the 16th century. The term
'I3& NathpState System German nation was used by Luther, Ulrich von Hutten and the humanists.Although German
romantics and intellectuals developed a primarily ethnic and linguistic definition of nationalism
-based on the concept of the 'cultural nation' (Kulturnation) - the actual process of nation
state formation was determined by complex historical realities which we will deal with later.

18.2.2 Political Background

At the end of the Napoleonic W i s , the political fragmentation of Germany was partially
overcome by the reduction in the number of sovereign German states to thirty-eight from the
three hundred states of the Holy Roman Empire which was abolished . The German Bund
was created in 1815 in order to preserve "the independence and sovereignty of the individual
German states". The Co~~cert of Europe, created after the Congress of Vienna, was a system
designed by the conservative monarchies of Austria, Prussia and Russia to check the spread
of democratic ideas in Europe. The Austrian Chancellor, Prince Metternich, the principal
architect of this policy, actively suppressed democratic ideas and movements and challenges
to royal authority in 1820 and 1830.
The political unification of Germany was difficult to achieve in the 19th century since
the conservative monarchs were hostile to the spread of liberal ideas. Very limited powers
were granted to Ihe representative institutions introduced after 1815 in the German states.
While after 1848 most Gernlan states introduced democratic reforms, in Prussia the pace of
reforms was slower since electoral votes were allocated equally to three groups of
income-tax payers, the divisions being made on the basis of income tax revenue payments.
The wzll-to-do minority which contributed the upper third of income tax revenues thus
controlled one-third of all electoral votes in Prussia's legislative institutions. This
Prussian system of representation remained in force until 1918 and constituted an important
hasis for the perpetuation of a backward political system.
The process of German unification was also effected by war and military prowess. The
largest German state, Prussia, played an active role in this process. The smaller German
states like Hesse-Cassel, Braunschweig and Saxony would have succumbed to the revolutionaries
during the upsurges of 1830-31 but for the timely military assistance of Prussia and Austria.
In 1848-49 once again the milltary suppression of popular movements was accomplished by
Prussia and Austria. Warfare against Denmark brought Schleswig-Holstein into the German
Bund. The defeat of Austria in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 led to the creation of
the North German Confederation. The defeat of France in the Franco-German War of 1870-
71 led LO the creation of the Imperial German government. A national parliament elected
on the basis of adult franchise - the Reichstag - and representatives of the 25 German states
in h e Federal Council or Bundesrat were to shape the policy of Imperial Germany. The
Prussian king hecame the German Emperor with control over the German armed forces and
the Reich Chancellor was also Prussian. However, the Imperial Reich was not a unified stlte
like that of Britain or a centralized state like that of France. In the Federal Council or
Bundesrat the Prussians controlled a plurality but not a majority of votes since
concessions had to he made to Bavaria and Wurttemberg to entice them into the Imperial
Reich. The German Reich had to share resources with the federating states or Lander and
the communes or Gen~einden and its consumption expenditure declined from 46% of total
public consumption in 1875-79 to 36% in 1910-1913. The process of German national
unification was shapd by Pnissian conservatism and militarism but the process of
centralization under Lhe Imperial Reich was affected by local and centrifugal forces.

18.2.3 Economic Background

The relative backwardness of Germany vis-a-vis Britain and the desire to face British
competition played an important role in the development of bourgeois ideology and to a
certain extent, gken the balance, of bourgeois and Junker interests, of the policies of
German states and specially Prussia. Although agriculture continued to be the most
important sector of the economy, significant growth in textiles took place in the 1830s
after the creation of the Customs Union or Zollverein in 1833, followed by industrial
development in Cha 1840s, associated with investment in railways. The railway based growth
was interrupted by harvest failures in 1846-47 and the revolutions of 1848-49. The growth
of heavy industries in the take-off period of German industrialization - during 1850-1873
- was based on coal, iron and railways. There was an economic boom following unification
of Germany the 1870-73 peak growth being followed by crisis and the Great Depression of
 1873-95. During the period 1850-1874 net product grew hy 2.5% per annum, net product Formation of NationStaten-2 :
1 per capita by 1.7% and industrial employmelit hy 1.6%. For the pcriotl 2875-91 the C k m m y and Italy

t corresponding figures were 1.9%, 1.0% and 2.3% per ilnnum.

iI In German and specially Prussian industrialization the railways played a vital rolc. The

1 iron and coal sectors in Prussia could truly take off only in the - 1850s when railway
building drew on domestic iron - and indirectly on doniestic coal instead of on British and
Belgian supplies. A study of the Ruhr coal sector for the early 1870s suggests that the
railways took ahout half of the output of the iron industry while the iron industry took
I about one-third of the coal produced by the Ruhr. Also one-fourth of the railways' freight
i
business was provided by the coal industry. The railways helped to integrate the German
economy and to accelerate economic growth. Unlike the railways of Britain and the United
Slates. tht German railways made a large difference to the level of demand faced by the iron
and coal industries.
Although German industry was stimulated by the Zollverein and the rapid developnient of
railways, industrial progress was not sufficiently strong to influence the process of
German unification. Although investment in Prussia increased by ahout 51 % hetween 1816-
22 and 1840-49, between 1851-60 and 1881-90 it grew by more than 200% in Germany
6
a5 a whole. Although German industrialization is supposed to be based on Friedrich List's
ideas aboui economic protectionism, the period of high tariffs clnerges in 1879: ~nuchafter
I unification. It is during the last decades of the 19th century that protectionism actually increased
r and effected the alliance between iron and rye - between industrialists and large landowners.
The German industrial class was not sufficiently numerous or signilicant in the economy to
play a decisive role in Gcriiian pblitics - he it concenied with unilication or libcrul democracy.
The German bourgeoisie developed rapidly during the 19th century making the transi~ion
from the manufactory system to the factory system of the industrial revolution in the period
I n f the liheral hrcakthr:)ugh hetwcen 1800 and 1830. Owing to poor management and
plohlelns of succcec!inp i n relatively undeveloped and politically divided markets, several
I enterprises went bankrupt in 1800-1830. There was only a limited continuity between the
preindustrial period and industrial revolution in terms of husiness ilistitutions and thcir directors.
Thc rhernric nt economic progress, used by bourgeois gro1111sto demand transport and
industrial clcvelolmcnt became linked to iindustry for the fathcrlandi even betore 1848. In
Prussia public industrial and technical schools after 1820 encouraged industry for national
pc,litic;il reasons. Liberal entrepreneurs li~iketl the issue of i~idustryfor thc fatherland to
expecratio~~s of ljolitical unity heforc 184%.The engi~ieeriligassociat~onsof the 1850s aiid
1860s carried these ideas further. Some of the key decisions uf the industrial revolution in
Germany were in one scosc "poli[.ical decisic~nsof an increasingly sclf-confident, organized,
and forward looki~ip I)ourgeoisieW. Camphausen, Siemens, Hansemann, List and Harkort
were Ger~uanentrepreneurs who believed that lhcy were also part of "a national civilizing
mission".
Other ilccounts have e~nphasizedthe centrality of the role of the state anti of the progressive
bureaucracy which served as a "surrogate hourgeoisie". In the 1850s and 1860s the hureal~cracy
was influential in the southern German states. In mid 19th century, the idea of material and
moral progress held together the various segmknts of- the bourgeoisie-busincss~nen,
officials and professionals. The pace of Gcrman change in the 1850s and 1860s produced
a noisy, self-aggrandizing bourgeoisie which, according to Blackhourn, could he regiudetl as
"a parvenu class within a parvenu nation." Engels said that Britain had a bourgeois bourgeoisie,
a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois working class. Max Wcher suggested that Germany
had a parvenu hourgeoisie, aristocracy and working class. The stridency of the bourgeoisie
was the product of a rapid development of a new order which "heightened parvenu claims
to a particular position within society as a whole." Dahrendorf has argued that Germany
developed into an industrial but not a capitalist society. The presence of a sizable
Mittelstand or internlediate stratum of small producers is evidence of incomplete ~nodernization.
Far more serious from the standpoint of German history was that the Germar: bourgeoisie
could not democratize German society. Even' a silent hourgeois revolution is not a substitute
far a proper, full fledged process of deniocrntization. The German nation state, unlike the
French, was r~otfounded on the basis of liheral democratic ideas and the weak~iecsof'
the German liberal hourgeoisie is largely responsible for this.
T l ~ eNation-State System
 18.2.4 Nationalism and Democracy Forn~ationof ati ion-states-2 :
Germany and Italj
Although the German liberal bourgeoisie desired democratic reforms as well as nahonal
unification after the defeat of the revolution of 1848-49 it had in effect to choose between the ,
two. The educated and property owning liberals realized that they could not achieve
greater bourgeois influence on the state or democratic freedoms by an open confrontati
with. conservative groups in Germany. Besides, the political fragmentation in Germany,
led the small and medium sized German states to rely on Prussian military force to preserve
order and the status quo, made both national unification and democratization difficult to
achieve. The liberals were too weak to confront the Junker (Prussian) landlords and
conservatives and were also too conservative and timd to consider a mass-based bourgeois
revolution. Even a bourgeois revolution was a dim prospect since a considerable working
class had emerged which did not uphold the values of the liheral bourgeoisie.
It was this recognition of their weakness vis-a-vis the old order in Prussia which led the
national liberals to collaborate with Bismarck during the period 1866-1878. This
collaboration was based on the deferment of demands for introduction of parliamentary
democracy in Prussia. In fact the equation of national unification with progress by the
b
lihera1,bourgeoisre was largely because the introduction of democratic reforms was a more
difficult goal to achieve.The defeat of the revolutions of 18-48-49 and the process of unification
by Bismarck's policy of blood and iron no doubt weakened the dexnocratic movement
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in Germany. Germany witnessed a silent bourgeois revolution in the 19th century but the
democratization of political life was certainly far from substantial.

18.2.5 Unification : Revolution from Above

The process of German unification during the 19th century was speeded up by the creation
of a national market, a network of railways and communications and a self-conscious
bourgeoisie. Unification was achieved by an alliance of liberal bourgeoisie with the
landowning class in which war and diplomacy played a vital role.
The ,German .Bund or Confederation of 1815, with all its deficiencies, served as a
preordained and legitimate theatre of operations till 1867 for nationalist forces in Germany.
In 1815 East Prussia and Schleswig were not a part of the German Confederation while
Bohepia and Moravia, predominantly Czech areas, were included. The Czech liberals
refused to take part in the elections to the German Assembly in 1848. The Confederation
was not therefore entirely suitable as a basis for a Greater Germany - inclusive of all
German speaking people - but was a broadly acceptable basis for such a united Germany.
The German National Assembly in 1848 was created on the basis of the most substantial
and widespread upsurge in Germany in the 19th century. Briefly the Frankfurt Parliament
of 1848 indicated the possibility of a democratic and united Germany. The suppression of
the democratic movement delayed the process and altered the character of German nationalism.
If the ~ r h k f u r t liberal parliament had succeeded in its obiectives it could have either
produced "a centralized monarchy or a federal or indivisible republicv. Even in 1849
the National Assembly opted for a Kleindeutsches Reich or Little Germany. However, after
the defeat of the liberals, the subsequent politics of German unification was shaped by the
conservatives in ~ m s s i a nGermany and the dynastic rivalry of Prussia and Austria. This
rivalry of the two major dynastic powers in Germany eventually led to the Austro-Prussian
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state in Central Europe was bound to disturb the relation between the Great Powers add Gas
sp&ially.Mcelj~t@,effect.w'.i&~e@d.bti Wh.1Despite:the;basti1i of!jthe'PrusSim'legfstatae.:
to &tmmdt's imilitang: &pendime: -f& ~Whiclita: ij.refus&drb::@v8npprovsl; :the PR1F;siani%haekz-.i
managed to pursue his goal of Prussian ascendancy and German unification. In 1863 the issue
of German claims over the Duchies of Saleswig-Holstein, an important issue in 1848, were
The Nation-State System revived and once thcsc duchies were taken from Denmark, it was not difficult to pick a quarrel
with Austria over their teliure. In the Austro-Prussian war although the Austrians secured a
victory at Custo~zathey were decisively defeated at Koniggratz. In so far as the creation of
the North German Confederation in 1867 menaced the power or security of France it has been
rightly relnauked that it was France rather than Austria which was defeated at Koniggratz. It
appeared after Bismarck's victory in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866 that the consummation
of German unity would only be possible after a war between France and Germany. Napoleon
111's 'advisors were hostile to the idea of further German unification and Bismarck too looked
forward to a military victory over France to consolidate the German nation-state. By skillfully
exploiting the d~sputeahout the Hohenzollern candidature to the Spanish throne, Bismarck
managed to provoke a war with France which put that country in the wrong even while it
roused the patr~otisniof the German people.
Finally, the war hctween Prussia and Austria played an important role in the process of German
unification. In July 1863 the Austrian Emperor Francis Joseph convened a meeting of all the
German Princes a1 Frankfurt to discuss a scheme for Federal reform, by which the reconstituted
celitral aurhority was to be placed permanently in the hands of Austria and of her allies, the
secondary states. The. Austrian Emperor persuaded the Prussian King to attend since this
congress was the bcst n1e;lns of carrying out the reform of the confederation on conservative
lines and without danger, of a revolution. Although King William had been almost persuaded
to attend, Bismarck threatened to resign if he went to Frankfurt and thereby the Prussian
Minister thwarted the Austrian move to strengthen her position in Germany. Prussia's absence
made the Austrian proposal unworkable. An Austrian proposal for closer union within the
German ~onfcderation~ 011 the lines of her scheme of Federal reform was rejected by the
snlaller Gcrn1:ul states as wcll as puhlic opinion. The smaller states, anxious to preserve their
autonomy and bargaining power, rejected the Austrian proposals just as they had rejected
similar proposals hy Prussia earlier. Liberal opinion rejected the Austrian proposals because
there was no provisioo for a parliament based on a popular franchise. Although Bismarck's
allnouncement in 1863 that he was willing to support a popular assembly based on a direct
franchise was treated with skepticism it indicated Bismarck's attempt to win public approval.
Eventually. the Rcichstag in the North German Confederation was elected on adult franchise.
Bismarck's policy did not have much support in the Prussian House of Representatives, but he
managed to gain his obicctives si~icethe King was willing to accept Bismarck's policies for
reasons of inl.ernal policy. When the Zollverein was renewed in its original form in October
1864 for a twelve ycar period it was because Prussia was closer to the wishes and interests of
the majority opinion in Germany as on the question of Federal reform. Austria's policy of
trying to overthrow the Zollverein hy using the resentment of the south German secondary
states against Prussia's liberal customs policy failed to yield results. Austria's intentions of
joining the tariff union and then using the south German states to adopt a more protectionist
policy did not succeed. Partly this.was because the. north German smaller states,.enclosed by
Prussian territory, could not really benefit hy any such Austrian protectionist policy. Despite
political sy~ilpathieswith Bavaria and Austria Saxony remained within the Zollverein. The
south German secondary states were compelled to accept the Prussian customs policy since
they were unwilling to join a tariff union with Austria without the north German states. Since
their economic interests would not be safeguarded within a tariff union with the Austrian
Empire. and since they colild not.stand alone the small south German states too had to remain
within the Zollverein.
Bismarck's skill. lay in securing a favourable international situation before he waged war with
Austria in 1866. Also considerable statesmanship was involved in the manner of handling the
sniall German states after Prussian victory in 1866 and in the creation of the North German
Confederation in 1867. Hanover, Electorate of Hesse, Nassau were annexed. Secret defensive
and offensive alliances were negotiated with the scuth German states to ensure that all non-
Austrian Germany would be united in case of war. The fear of France no doubt encouraged
the small south German states to attach themselves to Prussia. In the Bundesrath or federal
Council of the North German confederation Prussia could be outvoted by the smaller states A
since it had only 17 out of 43 members. Although the North German confederation created a
united foreign policy and military system the independence of smaller states was accorded due
recognition.
The failure to create a Southern Confederation indicated that the southern states would eventually
join Bismarck's North German Confederation. Although Baden was willing to join there was
resistance in Bavaria and Wurtemberg. The conflict with France in 1870 led to m,ilitary victories Formation of Nation-States-2 :
which in turn led to the creation of the German Empire. The four southern states, Bavaria, Germany and Italy
Wurtemberg, Baden and Hesse joined the German Empire in 1871 after the apvroval by the
~011thGerman Diets. The federal character of German Empire emerged because the Bavarians
wanted concessions in matters connected with the army, foreign affairs, the postal department
an({ railways. Representatives of the four

Check Your Progress 1

I) Discuss in 100 words the political backgroud of German nationalism.

................................................................................................................................................

............................................................................................................................................
2) How the economic processes helped in the unification of Germany?
................................................................................................................................................

3) What role did Bismarck play in the unification of Germany? Give your answer in
100 words.

18.3 CULTURAL BACKGROCTD OF ITALIAN

NATIONALISM
Tlle Austrian Minister, Metternich, had called Italy a "geogray~hicalexpression" in a
conversation with Lord Palmerston in the summer of 1847. Thlxe is no doubt that
Italian nationalism, which emerged in the late 18th century. actual1;j gained wider support
only in the 1830s and 1840s.

18.3.1 Idea of Nationalism

The idea of Italy as an entity, of Italian as a noble and beautiful lanlyage and of the common
cultural roots of the Italian city states and states, however. can be tracizd back to the Renaissallce
period and even earlier.
The ati ion-State systkm Francisco Petrarch (1304-1374) turned to antiquity for inspiration and solace following
the decline of the two great forces of universalism - the Holy Roman Empire and the
Papacy. Though he has been hailed as a patriot, it was a purely litaary patriotism which he
represented. Cola di Rienzo in the 14th century attempted ito unite the whole of Italy under
the hegemony of Rome. Through the revival of ancient patriotism during the Renaissance
certain ideas of nationalisnl began to develop among a small group of literary men. Rienzo's
"proclamations of the sovereignty of the Roman people and of the unity of Italy", and his
support for the common people against the aristocracy, constitute weak anticipations of
ideas of nationalism and democracy. Although Rienzo interpreted the concept populus
Romanus in a sense of Italian nationalism, any "parochial nationalism" was alien to him
and unthinkable to pis age. An incipient nationalism is evident in Rienzo's letter to the
Italian cities of Sepkmber 19, 1347. Neither the elites not the people, however, understood
Rienzo's nationalism.
During the first half of the 16th century, Italy faced an intermittent conflict between French,
Swiss, Spanish and German soldiers for pohtical supremacy on Italian soil. A balance
between five dominant Italian states - Venice, Milan, Florence, Naples and the Papal states
- produced by, mid-15th century - was upset by the Italian wars of 1494-1559. While France
and Spain began to move towards a sense of nationalism, the Italians had a strong sense
of regional or local attachment to Milan, Florence or Genoa; but they could also swing
to the other extreme to become cosmopolitans - men who could look to serving larger and
more pow&ful political units, whatever the language of service. As Lauro Martines says,
"Castiglione's courtier was trained to serve princes, not nations or homelands." The cause
of the failure of the Italians to unite was to be found in social reality - the antagonism
between rulers and ruled, lord and peasant or prince and nobility. This was the reality behind
Machiavelli's obsessive critique of weak government. These Italian Wars effected the
consciousness of the ruling classes.

18.3.2 Italian Language

Around 1500 amid the Italian Wars the question of a suitable literary language assumed
importance. The discussion began with courtiers at Rome and Milan, Urbino and Mantua. This
debate tried to give shape to the whole Italian peninsula," in pursuit of a literary language that
would cut across dialects and give to Italy a unified tongue." The campaign for a unified
literary vernacular started in Italy when it had become the victim of invading armies. From
the outset of this debate Italian was regarded as equal to Latin if not superior when it
came to imaginative literature.
But the debate on language reflected the social divisions in Italy and not merely regional
Ifferences. The insistence on the linguistic cleavage between the ruling class and the common
people and the assunlption that Italy could have one language only for the dominant social
groups reflected a profoundly elitist attitude.

18.3.3 Humanism
In fact the great contributions of Italian humanism also reflected a bias in favour of the
elite. The great Italian humanists "spoke for and to the dominant social groups". The
~ ~ w h i ~ ~ .. ..
ideabs... of. _e.duc,ation,.b ~ l m i t y . . ~ l i t i c a l ~ ~ t d e r . b&w-
be realized only in a s b f j d ,&@,~~i'$tega@ 34@f 2
people - noblemen, princes, prelates, professionals and

those destined to -hqLd~.lp,.d;ngpositions,h,so~j~ty. qll Jmmanists -

- : ypatever rj,r Lthgr
~ I orientation
~
Yddi' d h ih"'...
'made, a Candid
.?:,. ., alliiiid
,.,">A . .$ % h ~ ~ $ . v,.,.,,:,,,.
~ ~ " ? ' $itp$1'"o:f' ~ i&e
) ~ . ?L ~ro:?.!-:~.,~
& ~hi@apl~$
+ :,>& i C:illJ:;/~l.a ,::1 .,
a sense
i r;,-i.:, of.ihe:i@$?ys?bi1~th:sof .6e'u& ?la%:$. g< , i!ntefiecb$~~t~r~YY$l~te
,

expressed c%nt<m*t f&i.'&kd&ltitu& alid'ael?iii2d thkmselves m'iera4p11

I ! ; aT2Td
',;, , ,, ,:\I . very
: '$0 : ap#-\ ip!;i
~ I I ? ;fqquenfly.
. c, ,~i ; : I , ' I .
.pow2, ; p t;ver.tq
.,I
Since the humanists appealed to the rich man's conscience an sought entry in o e '

ruling class. the humanists "saw to it that the critique of wea!.hicent e.[$y
rather than politics." The humanists often made scornful okeddb*is'% bd3th8 orahTR''
ma$sF,, o$ca~qa$y,.iJJ&,Wiqg c@@!s,~i~!?.; 9PJ!:, ~ o @ ~ ~ ~~*llift! R Q I . , w ~ i,;#9aV&Wsri T
The.fl~~emtln~ ,4qwwisi AJ&$i, crltj4z&g&pe, politics W a w 8 i;Qg;! J.rn&@ .~QW$X i):!i
plebeians' were too much involved in it. Even the Renaissance ideal of,L&:ijigq-$ty t 9 f ; ; ' p ~ r J
was linked to the domineering position of urban ruling groups in an age of triumph.
-
42 The development of Italian tk,ought and c~llkregave Italy a classical heritage which made
Italian nationalists less willing to identify with popular culture. As Peter Burke has argued, Fonnation of NationStates-2 :
since a standard literary Italian already existed, the discovery of dialect was divisive. Italian Germany and Italy
nationalism of the 19th century failed to overcome the cultural elitlsm of the Italian humanists
and literary masters.

18.4 POLITICALBACKGROUND OF ITALIAN NATIONALISM

The political process towards unification of Italy was more tortuous and long-drawn. The
initiative for this came from various sources which are outlined below.

18.4.1 Modern Italian Political Nationalism

It was the French Revolution which provided a model for Italian nationalism in the closing
years of the 18th century. The French occupying forces in Lombardy organized an essay
competition on the subject of the best form of free government for Italy. This encouraged
a debate extolling the ancient glories of Italy, admiration for France and its constitution of 1795
and schemes for Italian regeneration and unification. Metchiorre Gioia, who won the essay
competition and became one of Italy's leading economists has been' reharded as "a link
between the native Enlightenment tradition of practical, modernizing reform and the new
Jac~bianpatriotism." As the old state units favoured anachronistic urban privileges it was
necessary to reject While the moderate nationalists proposed a gradual process of unification
beginning with the Cisalpine Republic as "a model of a self-governing Italian state" the
radicals preferred unitarian and revolutionary nationalism.
The kngdom of Italy created by Napoleon helped to foster Italian national sentiment but
it also reduced it to a lcontinental colonyi of France after the Continental System was
introduced in 1806. Military costs and contributions to France absorbed more than half of
an cnlarged budget. The Napoleonic legal codes and prefectural system which was introduced
in Italy helped to define the model of a unified national state. The elite of bureaucrats,
magistrates, legal and financial experts who had emerged during the Enlightenment in Italy
gilined greater prominence under the Napoleonic system. Even the Italian army, based on
conscription and used for Napoleon's'campaigns, revealed a sense of nationalism. It was as a
reaction to French domination and Napoleon's identification with Imperial Rome that Italian
writers chose to reject the Roman heritage.
In Italy poets played a major role in the development of nationalism. It was a humanistic
literary elite which played a role in the diffusion of the Italian language. There was no
powerful state as in France which could promote the national language. The absence of
a vernacular reformation as in Germany confined the Italian language to a tiny elite of
2.5% who commonly used the Italian language even in 1860. Romanticism in Italy influenced
nationalism hut not in the manner of German Romanticism. The major figures of Italian
Romanticism did notreject either the classical tradition or that of theEnlightenment.
Cultural figures like Alfieri and Manzoni played a significant part in the development of
nationalism. The tension between national and local systems of power as well contributed
to the exceptional importance of artists and adventurers likeManzoni, D'Azeglio, Mazzini,
Verdi and Garibaldi in Italian political life.

18.4.2 Young Italy

? ? ~ eAustrians were the dominant power in Italy ' m d the settlement after the dekat of
Napoleon strengthened Austrian control. Metternich's proposal for an Italian Confederatibn,
on the lmes of the German Confederation, was opposed by both Piedmont and the Pope's
advisers. In the period after 1815 the secret societies attracted the supporters of the Italia*'
Jacobin tradition. Members of the Carbonari and other secret societies were not exclusively
concerned with Italian nationalism. Buonarroti and other committed Jacobins even regarded
the unlty of Italy as a stepping stone towards universal social revolution. The Carbonan of
soulbern Italy who enjoyed the greatest public support among the 19th century revolutionary
organizations were more interested in democratizing Naples than in unifylng Italy. In the
re\lolution in Naples the Carbonari demanded a democratic constitution and were inspired by
the Spahish revolution of 1820. While the radical members of the Carbonari in Naples even
considered the export of revolution to the Papal states and Lombardy in Piedmont and
othe puts of Italy, military conspiracies were not very successful. It was the political
exi!es to Britain, after the failure of the revolutions of 1820-21, who produced a liberal trend
differefit from the egalitariall perspective of Buonarroti.
After the failure of the revolulions of 1830-31, specially in Modena and Bologna, Italians
felt increasingly the need to rely on their ow11endeavours and on open methods of agitation.
Giuseppe Mazzini. stxted Young Italy aud rejected the sectarian model of revolutionary
dictatorship and terror. Mazzini was a democratic nationalist who simultaneously rejected
both the elilism of h e moderates and the Jacobin ideal of revolutionary dictatorship. As a
radical Unitarian Mazzini believed that all forms of federalism were mere mechanisms for
perpetuating the dominance of local elites. Mamini's nationalism was not exclusive and he
believed in the eventual emergence of a United States of Europe after all natiolis had
become free. Although he believed in a people's war of national liberation he also believed
in a democratic government based on universal suffrage. Mazzini recognized the importance
of support from the peasantry for his conception of people's war but Italian republicans
were never able to bridge the gap between the towns and the countryside.

18.4.3 Piedmont Sardinia

The process of national unification in Italy was based on the existence of several states
which tried to preserve their autonomy and privileges in the context of Franco-Austrian
rivalry. Piedmont hecame the Italian state which unified Italy. The king, Charles Albert at least
until 1840, evinced no sentin~entsin favour of either liberalism or patriotism. Charles Albert
(1 83 1-1849) was a conservative monarch who had no compunctious about using Austrian
troops to stop revolution in Italy much like the Metternich syslem envisaged. Albert had
territorial claims heyolid the Alps in F r a ~ x eand he refused to join a league of Italian states
when it was proposed hy the king of Naples. In fact Charles Albert's treaty with Austria
was transposed to his predecessor's reign hy court propagandists. In 1547 the Pope proposed
a tariff league as an initial step towards closer agreement among Italian states. The Grand Duke
Leopoldo of Tuscany agreed to accept the tariff league hut Piedmont did not. The Pope's
envoy, Carboli Russi, explained that his master wanted to thwart revolutionaries and supporters
of a unitary Italian republic by recognizing moderate denlands for Italian unity. The Papal
envoy sensed that the Piedmontese king was reluctant to join such a league because he
wanted to expand his state at the cost of the small Austrian dominated duchies of north-
central Italy. In the struggle between Piedmont and Austria for supremacy in Italy the Pope
was offering the mantle of leadership to Piedmont.
Allhough Piedmont was not qulte Ihe powerhouse like Prussia in an economic sense, it was
politically and militarily the inost active participant in the process of Italian revolution.
Cavour, Mazzi~li and Garibaldi have been hailed in solne accounts as the brain, heart and
sword of unification. While Piedmont's policies had been timid before 1849,in the 1850s
the more resolute policies of Count Cavoiu in combination with the popular movements
launched by Mazzini and Garibaldi led to Italian unification. Cavour used his friendship
and alliance with Napoleon 111 to wage successful wars for both the liberation of Italy from
Austria and political unification. The territorial ambitions of Piedmont-Sardinia and the
desire to preservc social stability shaped the attituL u'f the aristocratic Cavour. Unification
was to depend primarily on the regular army and bureaucracy, not papular movements.
The Piedmont-Sardinian attitude towards mass inohilization was based on a policy of
utilizing the masses no1 g~vingthem an indepcnderlt role in the wars of national unification.
Therefore the numher of casua!ties in these wars were few. Only about 3,000 died. in the first
(1845-49) and second wars (1859-60) of iuiiependence. During the Crimean War of 1855
only 1'4 Italians died. The third war of Italian independence claimed a thousand lives on
land and sea. In 1867 the Garibaldini lost 600 lives at Mentana, in September 1870 the Italian
regulars lost 24 lives. Between 1848 and 1870 the ~otalnumher 01 casualties suffered by both
the r e g u l i ~and volunteer fhrccs was 61000 dead and about 20,000 wounded. The attempt
to pacify Uie 1t:llian suuth ilfter unification led to the "eath of far more people than in all
the wars of lihcraliun. Dt.spilc the tremendous significance of these three wars of inderndence
f w w people died 111i111 ill one single day during the Franco-Prussian War of I b l C ) .

The financial costs of the wars of liheration had to be borne by Piedmont Sardinia which
ad\rersely affected the programme of modernization started by Cavour in the 1850s. Piedmont
had to make cor~siderablesacrifices to unify Italy. The compensation was to be found in the
influence which Piedmont wielded in the unitary state which was created in 1861.
18.4.4 The Catholic Church Formstiun of NationStater-2 :
Gernim~yand ltaly
The Catholic Church played an important role in Italian cultural and political life. The
neo-Guelph historians andliterxy figures tried to produce areconciliation between the idea
of nationalism and the Church. The Piedmontese priest Vincenzo Gioberti took up the
issue of an Italian Confederation under the presidency of the Pope. Between 1846 and the
outbreak of the 1848 revolution the possibility of a synthesis hetween the ideas of Gioberti
and Mazzini seemed possible. When Pope Pius IX withdrew support for a national war
against Catholic Austria in April 1848 he lost the support of nationalist opinion in Italy. The
lil~eralCatholic movement, however, helped to reconcile the idea ot'~~ationdiisnl
with Catholicism
despite the hostility of the Pope. Although in 1847 the Pope had been nlorc eager than the
Piedmontese king for a tariff league, he was not willing to use his moral authority to rouse
the masses. Since the allocution of April 1848 had announced that the Pope could not wage
a crusading war against the Austrian oppressor, the possibility of a political league against
Austria seemed an illusion. The Papal Minister in turn argued that the enlargement of Piedmont
and the autonomy of Italy could not be treated as identical matters.
After the revolution in .Rome and the flight of the Pope, the Roman Republic was proclaimed.
The efforts of the Pope to return succeeded in June 1849 with the help of French 2nd
Austrian forces. During the period of Italian unification, the Pope and the Catholic Church
played a conservative role. After losing temporal power, the Pope forbade the faithful to
participate in national politics the full prohibition lasting until 1904. Although hll participation
was not sanctioned until 1919, nominal Catholics voted in elections after the franchise was
widened in 1882. The opposition cf the Church to the secular state - as well as socialism,
anarchism and the labour movement - culminated in the merger of anticlericalism with
support for parliamentary democracy. Christian Democracy and the Popolari emerged as
a political force only after World War I.

18.5 ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF IThLIAN NATIONALISM

The Italian national movement was not based on such a strong industrial bourgeoisie as in the
case of Germany. The level of economic unification in Italy prior to political unification
was also on a lesser scale than in Germany, the Italian customs union being no match for the
German Zollverein. Another serious economic problem was the considerable backwardness
of the Italian south. Some scholars of the Italian economy between the 18th century and mid
19th century have argued that there was no "single, structurally unified Italian economy".
But although Italy went into economic decline in the 17th century Italy was never like
an underdeveloped region of either pre-industrial Europe or any other con!inent.

18.5.1 North-South Difference

In any analysis of Italian economic and poli:ical development, the differznce between
the- more prosperous northern regions of Piedmont and Lornbardy with that of the less
modernized south is always made. The difficulties posed by the regional imbalance in
Italy is of concern to historians of Italian industrialization and nationalism. The problem
of the south is analyzed by those who wish to explain the growth rate. of the Italian
economy and the political problems which these disparities created for the unification
of Italy and the post-unification Italian state. The Italian state did not perpetrate duelism
but it failed to solve the problems it raised. Over time the Italian state became more
interventionist at least f r m - t h e 1880s onwards. According to Trebilcock, "the late political
integration of the Peninsula, and the liberal - autonomist type of politics needed to achieve
it, exerted more influence upon the content of state policies than did the measure of Italy's
industria! ~nderdevelopment."

18.5.2 State and Economy

If the policies of the Italian state after unification are partly to blame for a failed agricultural
revolution and for the widening North-South divide in the sphere of industry too, state policies
produced uneven and limited rewards. As far as industries are concerned both an initial
policy of free trade and a later policy of protectionism and public investment failed to accelerate
economic development. First, the customs tariffs and trade agreements introduced by Cavour
in Piedmont in the 1850s were extended to the united Italian kingdom. The influence of
 The Nation-State System English free trade ideas led to lowering of tariffs with France after the navigation and trade
agreements of 1862 and 1863. It has been argued that free Wade policies were adopted to
+ .
"repay" Britain and France for the political and military help they had given to Italy during
the process of unification. Free trade was also adopted to gain access for Italian exports
in foreign markets and to attract foreign capital and technology. After the publication of the
Industrial Survey of 1870-74 and potests by industrialists led by Alessandro Rossi a new tariff
structure was introduced between 1875-1880. The openly protectionist tariffs introduced in
1887 helped Italian industry but the average level of nominal protection on industrial products
rarely exceeded 21 percent.
The Italian state after unification did try to force the pace of economic development
in order to catch-up with the advanced countries. One of the measures of this is the
level of public spending to GDP which fluctuated between 12% and 14% up until 1880
and rose to about 17%-18% during the years before World War I. Apart from military
and administrative expenditure infrastructural investment in the railways absorbed the
bulk of these public expenditures. Between unification and World War I, three-quarters
of the total spending on public works plus expenditure on railway construction
from the public debt indicated the zeal for railway development. Unlike the USA and
Germany and even France, the industrialization of Italy was not boosted substantially
by the railways. For one, the bulk of the railway materials and rails had to be imported.
Demand from the railways constituted 8% during 1861-95 and 13% during 1896-1913
of the value added in the engineering sector. Even the utilization of the railways was
poor because North and South did not complement each other; because the main Italian
export-silk-weighed very little; and because of the general backwardness of the
country. The railway policy of the Italian state was excessively "forced" in terms of
timing as well as the mode of financing. Though the railways sewed up the Italian boot
they neither integrated the south with the Italian economy nor boosted overall industrial
growth. Although the Risorgimento and the classically reforming bourgeoisie after
unification tried to modernize Italy. the problems of dualism, backwardness and
regional imbalances were difficult to overcome.

18.6 PROCESS OF UNIFICATION

The unification of Italy was accomplished by Piedmont Sardinia led by Cavour in
collaboration with the popular forces led by Mazzini and Garibaldi. Although popular
mobilization played a part in this process the elites tried to control the level of popular
participation. This is what led Gramsci to characterize the Risorgimento and Italian unification
as a form of passive revolution. Though Mazzini believed in a concept of people's war he
was unable to mobilize the peasant masses. It was after the failure of revolutions in 1820-21,
1830-31 and 1848-49 that republican nationalist opinion came around to accepting an
alliance with the more liberal Cavour in order to forge Italian unity. It was the Italian
National Society which frbm 1857 onwards represented this tacit - and often open -
alliance between Cavour and the republican nationalists. It is this rapprochement which
explains how Cavour on the one hand asked Garibaldi to raise a force of volunteers for a war
of liberation and why Garibaldi fought under the banner of 'Italy and Vittorio Emanuele' in
1860 on the other. In fact Garibaldi confided to potential recruits to his volunteer force in
early 1860 that the king, Victor Emanuele and the Piedmontese government had secretly
incited him to lead on expedition against the Neapolitan government.

18.6.1 Popular Movements

All forms of popular agitation and collective violence are not connected with the major
political crises but apparently inon-political" events like food riots, violent strikes,
tax rebellions and collective seizures of land which occurred with unfailing regularity,
in fact clustered around the crisis years. Secret societies such as the Carbonari, Filadelfi
or Young Italy were active in the 1830s and 1840s in fomenting revolutions. There
was a chain of rebellions in Turin, Naples, Palermo and other areas in 1820-21 and
a fresh round of rebellions during 1828-31 which had repercussions for another two
years. The temporarily successful bourgeois revolutions in Sicily, Naples, Venice,
Lombardy, Tuscany and the Papal states involved street fighting, food riots, destruction
of land records and tax offices. While workers and peasants turned against the
 revolutionary regimes of 1848-49 which did not address their dernand for bread or Formation of NationStates-2 :
elnployment in the cities and distribution of land in the countryside the attempt of Germany a d Italy
revolutionary regimes* to reimpose order met with stout, often violent, resistance. The
?middle classes which sought democratic constitutions for themselves were faced with
hostile reactions to their taxation and conscription policies by the urban poor,
workers andapeasants.As in the 1848-49 revolutions in Germany, the revolutionary
coalitions collkpsed with the woqkers, peasants, urban poor and socialists partipg company
frli'm the liberal upper a'nd middle classes.
The revoluticms of 1848-49 were popular evolutions but more municipal than national
,revolutions. The alliance between the Piedmontese monarchy and local aristocracies was
unaffected by these sporadic and uncoordinated rebellions. The real problem was Zhat
the democrats failed to secure the support of tbk countryside Disillusioned with the conduct
of the war and the policies of the monarchist$ Mazzini in mid 1848 rehned to his concept
of people's war, Although Mazzini q d e efforts his ideas could not effect the countryside
and bridge the gulf between town and countryside. Partly this was because the radicals were
not in as close contxt with the peasantry as were the relatively conservative clergy.
Another reason why the peasantry refused to rally behind the republicans was that the
landowners made no concessions to the peasantry ta help forge a patriotic alliance. The 1848-
49 revolutions failed but the heroic defense of the republics - in Rome by Mazzini and
Garibaldi and in Venice by Manin - produced the legends of Italian nationalism and the
Italian left. The scale of the revolutions of 1848 in Italy and the symbolic importance of
the defense of the republics in the long term effected both poiitid refonns in and unification ,
of Italy.
I
18.6.2 War and Unification
Italy did not take long to recover from the milittuy defeats in the battle of Custozza (July
1848) and Novara (March 1849). Cavour joined the Crimean War in 1855 on behalf of
Britain and France to gain their support in his future confrontation with Austria. One of
Cavour's military officers predicted that out of the mud of the Crimea Italy would emerge.
Although Italy did not achieve much it got an opportunity to discuss its problems in an
international forum in 1856. Piedmont also sought ah alliance with France to alter the
political map of Europe which culminated in the agreement between Napoleon I11 and Cavour
at Plombieres in 1858. Within Piedmont Cavour h d consolidated his position by a connubio
or alliance with Urbano Rattazzi of the centre-left in 1852. It was this alliance between the
centre-right and centreleft which enabled Cavour to establish his political career. The connubio
had to be kept alive during 1855 when Cavour seared Rattazzi's unconditional support
for participating in the Crimean war in exchange for support to Rattazzi's Law of Convents
which restricted the privileges of the Catholic Church by suppressing about 300 religious
I
houses
L
and their orders.
lBttHough the republicans were initially distrustful of Cavour and the Piedmontese they
slowly recognized the pivatal importance which p d m p n l would have to play in
Italian unification. Manin broke with Mazzini ',and.'deneun@ sporadic violence. This
'

leader of the Venetian republic of 1848-49 persuaded Pallavicino that Cavour had a vital
role to play in Italian liberation. Even Garibaldi and Mazzini came to recognize this fact
though their perspectives remained different. Cavour met the former Sicilian revolutionary
La Farina in Sept. 1856 secretly and courted the republicans' support in the projected war
against Austria. Many supporters of Mazzini became disillusioned with repeated failures
to rouse the Italian masses.
The Neapolitan Carlo Piscane who planned an uprising to coincide with the spontaneous
revolt of the Leghorn and Genoa peasantry was forced to kill himself at Sapri in 1857 in
order to avoid a worse death at' the hands of the conservative Sanfedisti peasantry who
identified more with the throne and altar than with liberal or radical ideas. The Italian
National Society formed in July 1857 by Pallavicino and La Farina helped to channel the
support of former revolutionaries and republicans to Cavour and Piedmont. Even Garibaldi by
early 1858 "appreciated the need to wait for Turin's signal" and identified with the National
Society.
On the basis of the agreement with Napoleon I11 at Plombieres in 1858 France, came
to the aid of Piedmont in the war with Austria which broke out in 1859. Though Cavour
resigned for a while as prime minister of Piedmont - disappointed with the peace, terms
The ~ a t i ~ n - s t a St y
e sten~ of Villafra~icain 1859 - he advised the commissioners sent to central Italy to remain there
and mobilize public opinion against the restoration of the former rulQs. In August 1859
Cavour coillplewented the people for preventing the return of the rulers and achieving
independence by their own efforts instead of foreign arms. Back as prime minister in 1860
Cavour instructed his agents in central Italy to den~onstrate- to the satisfaction of the
European courts - that the people endorsed the decisions of their assemblies which sought
union with Piedmont. In order to ensure the incorporation of Tuscany, the Duchies and
the Legations into Italy, Cavour agreed to cede Nice and Savoy to the French. The vote in
these ~errilories confirmed what Cavour and Napoleon 11.1 had predetermined. Although
these plebiscites were far from genuine a measure of popular support was generated by
the activity of the Italian National Society which pfayed a key role in these plebiscites.
Between 1857 and 1862 this Society published a national newspaper, drafted volunteers,
orchestrated revolutions in Central Italy and then played a role in the plebiscites. This
society was implicated in Garibaldi's invasion of Naples as well as Cavour's entry into the
Papal States "thus ensuring", says Coppa, "that the kingdom of 1861 would be national
rather than northe~rn."
Although Garibaldi was upset by the handing over of h ~ home. province of Nice to the
French he collaborated with Cavour in the invasion of ~ i c and
~ yNaples. After Garibaldi's
succCss in the southern campaigns Cavour blocked Garibaldi's march on Rome lest his
actions lead to a conflict with Napoleon 111 and create adverse international repercussions.
In order to deal with the Neapolitan arnues which had withdrawn into the fortresses of
Capua and Gaeta in October 1860. Garibaldi had himself urged the Piedmantese king to
march towards the south. It was the tremendous success of Garibaldi's volunteers
which galvanized Cavour into uniting the whole of Italy while earlier he had concentrated
on northern and central Italy. Although some republicans had conceived of a southern
expedition earlier as a way of mobilizing the masses and contesting the position of
C a v o ~ ~and
r the monarchy in the process of unification, this objective could not be
achieved even in 1860. The 1859 annexations in North and Central Italy had been
achieved without much collective violence, but in 1860.the transfer of power in the south
was marked by enormous violence.
The violence in the Italian south emerged before the arrival of Garibaldi in Sicily and
was directed against the Bourbon government and its property and personnel. As
Garibaldi established his control over Sicily the pattern of violence shifted. Garibaldi's
decrees abolishing the macinato and promising land reform had little impact since
he established a de facto alliance with the militia and bourgeoisie of the island. As the
bourgeoisie realigned itself with Garibaldi, the peasants and workers could no longer
expect justice or redress of grievances from him! Therefore "numerous land occupations
and attacks on proprietors rapidly took on the coloration of opposition to Garibaldi
and the national revolution." On the mainland in the south though there had been
no major rural movements against the Bourbons there were numerous protests against
the bourgeois allies of Garibaldi. Peasants demanding the return of usurped common
lands rioted in the southern city of Matera against the new regime. In Basilicata,
disaffected groups disappointed with the new regime rioted against the plebiscite on
unification, attacked the national guard, declxed support for the deposed Bourbon king
and resisted the draft. The groups which were already mobilized against the Bourbon kings
rapidly adopted violent means to resist a new regime which adversely affected their
interests. Therefore thelevels Gf violent conflict in the south were much higher after the
nominal transfer of power than before. It would appear that the Party of Action was
in the pocket of the Piedmontese king in more ways than one. After the creation of the
Italian nation state in 1861 even Garibaldi and Mazzini together with other republicans
were gradually marginalised.
As far as the unification of Italy was concerned, the question of Venetia and Rome
remained. The banker Isaac Pereire probably at the instigation of Napoleon 111 proposed that
Austria sell Venetia to Italy at the end of 1860. As compensation Austria could purchase
Bosnia-Herzegovina from Turkey. La Marmora, the Italian Prime minister, years later offered
to purchase Venice for 100,000,000 lire, but the Austrians refused once again. As the ally
of Prussia in the war against Austria in 1866 Italy's military performance was unimpressive
but Venice was incorporated in Italy after an overwhelming vote in favour of union in a
plebiscite. However, during the war of 1866 not one city had risen in rebellion and few
Venetians had rushed to join the volunteers of Garibaldi. After several failed attempts to
acquire Rome - notably Garibaldi's attempt in 1867 - it was incorporated after a short Fomiotion of Nation-States-2 :
war in September 1870. Italian unification was achieved but the fruits of this achievement Germany and Italy
cilllle almost at the end of the 19th century.
Check Your Progress 2
1) Discuss in 100 words the cultural basis of Italian nationalism.

21 What was the contribution of popular movements in Italian unification'? Answer in

100 words.

18.7 LET US SUM UP

Both Germany and Italy emerged as nation-states in the 19th century. Although the idea of
nationalism in some form or other can be traced back in time in both cases, the actual
development of nation-states took place only in the 19th century. The process of unification
was different in the case of Germany from that of Italy. While in Germany the economic and
political unity was achieved at a much higher level, in Italy the unification was achieved
mainly at the political and cultural levels. The economic unity in Italy was much weaker in
comparison. In Germany, the unity was brought about mainly from above. But in Italy, the
popular mobilizations also played an important role. Apart from these factors, the war, whether
willing or unwilling, provided the impetus which brought the people together and helped in
forging the' respective nations.

18.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISES

Check Your Progress 1
1) See subsection 18.2.2
2) See subsection 18.2.3
3) See subsection 18.2.5
Check Your Progress 2
1) See section 18.3
2) See section 18.6