PHL 372 MODULE 2 Reale, G. (1990). History of ancient philosophy, vol. 2, trans. by John R. Catan, Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press. Sartre, J. P. (1991). Critique of Dialectical Reason Volume 1: Theory of Practical Ensembles, transl. by Alan Sheridan-Smith. London: Verso. Terry Pinkard (trans & ed.). (2018). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit [Phiinomenologie des Geistes] Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolfgang Fritz Haug. (2005). Dialecties. Historical Materialism. hitps://www.researchgate.net Wyss, P. (2014). “Socratic method: aporeia, elenchus and dialectics (Plato: four dialogues, Handout 3 (PDF). open.conted.ox.a.uk. University of Oxford, Department for ContinuingEducation. 3.6 Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercise(s) 1. Marxian dialectics 2. The Socratic ElenchusPHL RESEARCH METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY UNIT 4 THE ANALYTIC METHOD Unit Structure 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Intended Learning Outcomes 4.3. The Analytic Movement in Philosophy 4.3.1 Analysis as a Philosophical Method 4.4 Summary 4.5 References/Further Reading/Web Resources 4.6 Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercise(s) 4.1 Introduction We begin this discussion by welcoming you to a study of analysis as a research method inphilosophy. We would like to state quickly that analysis is better understood within the tradition of philosophy known as analytic philosophy. Analytic philosophy, which is also called linguistic philosophy, refers to a loosely related set of approaches to philosophical problems, dominant in Anglo-American philosophy from the early 20th century, which emphasises the study of language and the logical analysis of concepts. Although most works in analytic philosophy have been done in Great Britain and the United States, significant contributions also have been made in other countries, notably Australia, New Zealand, and the countries of Scandinavia. The unit examines the meaning of analysis as a method in philosophy. The first section traces the history of the analytic movement, as a prelude to the second section where we discuss what analysis as a method of philosophical research is all about. 4.2 Intended Le: rning Outcomes By the end of this unit, you will be able to: * explain the meaning of analysis * trace the history of the analytic movement ‘© list the essential features of analysis as a method of philosophical research. 4.3 The Analytic Movement in Philosophy It is common knowledge that philosophical problems are addressed through argumentations using the best logical resources available for constructing those arguments which lead to conclusions that are mostly impossible to deny without running into contradiction, The analytic movement embodied this tradition. The main founders of the analytic movement were the Cambridge philosophers George Edward Moore iPHL 372 MODULE 2 and Bertrand Russell. The movement was birthed as a result of their reaction against British Idealism, and their rejection of Hegel and Hegelianism. However, both Moore andRussell, especially Russell, were heavily influenced by the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege. and many of analytic philosophy’s leading proponents. such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Camap and the others. Over the course of thetwentieth century, analytic philosophy developed into the dominant philosophical tradition in the English-speaking world, and grew steadily in the non-English-speaking world, ramifying into all areas of philosophy and diversifying in its methodology and ideas. Analytic philosophy is characterised by the goal of clarity, the insistence on explicit argumentation in philosophy, and the demand that any view expressed be exposed to the rigours of critical evaluation and discussion by peers (Urmson 1956). According to Beaney (2013: 19), while it would be wrong to deny that analytic philosophy places emphasis on argumentation, clarity, and rigour, the most that could really be claimed is that analytic philosophy, on the whole, places more emphasis on these virtues than other traditions of philosophy. The chief change in the history of philosophy that brought about the rise ofanalytic tradition was the tum to logical and linguistic analysis as the means to achievethe resolution of perennial problems in philosophy. This tradition was motivated initially by two questions: “What are numbers?” and “What is the basis of mathematical knowledge?” It was Gottlob Frege who led the way in answering these questions (Kenny 2000). Convinced that the highest certainty belongs to elementary, self-evident principlesof logic — without which thought itself might prove impossible — he believed that the sublime certainty of arithmetic and higher mathematics, must be deductively based on logic itself. It was to demonstrate this that he developed modern symbolic logic inhis 1879 Begriffaschrift. The key step after that was to derive arithmetic from logic by (i) specifying a small set of logical truths of the highest certainty to serve as axioms, (ii) defining all arithmetical concepts in terms of purely logical ones, and (iii) producing formal proofs of all arithmetical axioms from these definitions plus the axioms of logic (Kenny 2000). An important strand in the development of the analytic movement goes back to a group of philosophers in early 20th century in Vienna, Austria. Influenced by the phenomenalism of August Comte and the positivism of Emst Mach, members of the Vienna Circle, who were also called the logical positivists, or more accurately speaking the logical empiricists, such as Moritz Schlick, Hans Haha, Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, believed that all scientifically meaningful claims can be stated in an ideal language of mathematics and thought and that all sciences may be unified given such superior observational language (Urmson 1956). 64PHL RESEARCH METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY Another, related line of the origin of the analytic movement goes back to the early linguistic philosophy, which was taken up, among others, by G. E, Moore and Bertrand Russell at Cambridge. Underlying much of this movement/development was a reaction to the prevailing Oxbridge idealism, Russell, having just broken off with Charles Peirce and Vietoria Welby, had rediscovered Gottlob Frege and began promoting the philosopher, who hardly anybody knew at that time. Then, Wittgenstein, who, in his youth, also had anencounter with Frege, but who soon realised that Frege had nothing to offer him, came to Cambridge to study under Russell in the autumn of 1911. According to some, this event marks the year analytic philosophy kicked off (Unmson 1956; Irvine 2021). But it all depends on what we take analytic philosophy to be. Analytic philosophy is not described by a body of propositions nor is it in any sense a school of thought. Michael Dummett, who clearly overstates the influence Frege exerted on Wittgenstein’s formation, hassuggested that “the only route to the analysis of thought goes through the analysis of language” (Dummett 1993, p. 128). It is pertinent to state here that what made logicism, which is integral to the analytic method, feasible was the creation of modem logic, the system of propositional and predicate logic whose use has been a major force in the development of analytic philosophy. It is here that Frege comes into the story and obliges us to acknowledge him as one of the co-founders of analytic philosophy. For it was Frege who created quantificational logic, and although Russell learnt of this logic through Giuseppe Peano (1858- 1932), and adapted Peano’s notation rather than Frege's, there is no doubt that once Russell properly studied Frege’s writings, after completing The Principles of Mathematics in May 1902, he both leat from them and developed his own position in critique of some of Frege’s key ideas (Stevens 2005). Frege was also an influence on Wittgenstein, whose early thinking was prompted by the problems he found in Frege’s and Russell’s work, taking over some of their ideas and assumptions but criticising others. So on this score, too, Frege must be counted as one of the co- founders of analytic philosophy. Moore’s and Russell’s rebellion against British idealism occurred independently of Frege, but both Russell’s subsequent work and Wittgenstein’s thinking were inextricably linked to Frege’s ideas (Stevens 2005; Irvine 2021). Before we go on to look at analysis as a method in philosophy, it is instructive to note that there are different senses in which analysis has been conceived within the analytic tradition. It may be helpful here to point a few of such senses to aid ourunderstanding. Early analytic philosophers’ notion of analysis was focused on conceptualand logical analysis (sometimes referred to as decompositional analysis, as concepts were broken into their constituent parts) with a focus on linguistic 65PHL 372 MODULE 2 concems and the search for meaning. Russell’s understanding of analysis typifies this. In his book on Leibniz, he asserts as an ‘evident’ truth that ‘all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions’ (Russell 1900, p. 8). For Moore, such analysis consists in decomposing propositions into their constituent concepts, and this decompositional conception is also in play in the first chapter of Principia Ethica, where he argues that ‘good’ is indefinable,that is, that what ‘good’ denotes has no parts into which it can be decomposed. From this,it can be stated that there is a clear sense in which Russell’s and Moore’s philosophy is analytic.” That is, at the core of their method is the decompositional analysis of propositions. For Moore, this is conceptual analysis, while Russell understood this withina broader programme of Jogical analysis. Both Moore and Russell agreed that the aim of philosophical analysis is to uncover the fundamental constituents of propositions. This involved the identification, first, of the logical constituents of propositions, that is, the logical constants, but second, more importantly, of the logical propositions themselves, and in particular, of the fundamental propositions or logical principles from which all other logical propositions can be derived (Griffin 1991). The decompositional approach to analysis was later on superseded by ‘quasi- analysis’ that did not concem itself with the methods of decomposition but sought the relationships between concepts that can be used to define or construct things in ways that were thought to aid better understanding. This explicative, or reconstructive approach was described by Rudolf Camap as a rational reconstruction, which he explained as “the task of making more exact a vague or not quite exact concept used in everyday life or in an earlier stage of scientific or logical development, or rather replacing it by a newly constructed, more exact concept” (Carmap 1947, p. 8). The current-day practice in analytic philosophy that focuses on various acts of construction, with its roots. in Carnap’s rational reconstruction, is targeted to find alternative expressions, statements, or paraphrases which need not be exactly synonymous to the analysandum (the object or idea being analysed) but which are nevertheless exact, simple and fruitful for some purpose, and that are intended to serve these purposes equally well, or sufficiently equally well, as the original expressions do To conclude, analysis is a way of seeking to understand any subject matter by becoming aware of the simple elements it is composed of. This is why in the resolution of problems, analysis describes a breakdown of compound or complex issues to their individual units. Although, Hacker presented three different phases in the development of analytic philosophy on the basis of the kind of analysis that was in question in the following way: 66PHL RESEARCH METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY i, Metaphysical analysis which was popular among early Russel and Moore ii, Reductive analysis which was visible in early Wittgenstein, Russell’s logical atomism, and logical positivism ili. Connective or conceptual analysis which was common among ordinary language philosophers (Hans-Johann, 2013: 14). However, the methodological program of analytic philosophy has some distinguishing features such as i, The thinkers of analytic philosophy do not apply all forms of analysis; rather, they primarily apply logical and linguistic analysis ii, ‘They do not think that it is necessary to use other methods that are popular within the framework of continental philosophy. iii, There is also a difference between analytic philosophy and continental philosophywhen it comes to understanding the proper approach to constructing philosophical reflections. iv. Analytic philosophers not only interpret philosophising as a process of constructing theoretical reasoning as rational, logically consistent, and clearly and rigorously argued but also practice it in this way. 4.3.1 Analysis as a Philosophical Method The analytic method in philosophy is a generalised approach to philosophy which was originally associated with the projects of logical analysis. It emphasises a clear, precise approach with particular emphasis being placed on argumentation and evidence, avoidance of ambiguity, and attention to detail. Philosophising, according to Niekerk is, therefore, analytic when it follows a procedural approach that is “defined by a characteristic procedural focus ... understood as prioritising some objects of analysisover others and, in so doing, of picking out certain kinds of question as particularly valuable” (Niekerk 2015:517). In recent times, analytic philosophy has become “not a philosophical program or a set of substantive views, but a sty/e of doing philosophy” (Brogaard & Leiter 2014-15). Analysis meaningfully distinguishes a specific style of doing philosophy that consists of some distinctive characteristics. For instance, it tests propositional claims in ordinary language, and pursues parsimonious explanations. Testing propositional claims imply ensuring the coherence, validity, and truth-apiness of specific claims to explicitly articulate the propositions” justifications andentailment. Consequently, participants in a discourse strive to make their terms clear by way of proper definitions, which entails the formulation of propositions in ‘ordinary language’ to avoid obscurity 67PHL 372 MODULE 2 of terms. By parsimonious explanations, we mean thedepartmentalisation of issues. For example, categorising issues of discourse into ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological, and treating them as distinct concerns to avoid unnecessary multiple explanatory entities (Niekerk 2015:518). To be analytic therefore, isto adopt “a procedural preference for making the justifications and entailments of concepts at issue as clear as possible, making it a goal to be accessible to interlocutors, and favouring parsimonious explanations” (Niekerk 2015:519) The analytic method implies that we separate constituent elements of a given phenomenon into its various components. This is atomising phenomenon for holistic and comprehensive understanding. It entails argumentative clarity and precision through adopting the methodology of formal logic and conceptual clarification or analysis, which is historically tied to the Vienna Circle and the Berlin Circle. These Circles posit very strict principle of verification that excludes metaphysics because it is considered to be cognitively meaningless. However, contemporary understanding of “analytic” transcends this parochial approach of verificationism. Timothy Williamson captures this fact when he avers that “recent decades have seen the growth and flourishing of a boldly speculative metaphysics within the analytic tradition” (Williamson 2014:7). Furthermore, the analyticmethod has to do with, among other things, conceptual clarifications, definitions and explanations. By this, the tradition focuses on the examination of terms, notions and concepts, which are broken down into understandable units of connected ideas. Thus, a very central aspect of the analytic method is explanableness. For. if an experience, phenomenon or condition is not explainable such that it is intersubjectively understood orverifiable or referred to, it does not qualify for intelligibility and rationality. Self-Assessment Exercise 1. The implies that we separate constituent elements of a given phenomenon into its various components. presented three different phases in the development of analytic philosophy on the basis of the kind of analysis LW 4.4 Summary So far, we have seen that analytic philosophers interpret philosophical ideas through a process of constructing theoretical reasoning in a rational, logically consistent, rigorous and clearly argued manner. These very peculiarities of philosophising have enabled analytic philosophy to be the dominant tradition in Western philosophy for quite some time now. The analytic line of thinking is typically attributed with such characteristics as 6RESEARCH METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY striving for an increase in knowledge, clearness of ideas. rigorousness in style, and the cogency of arguments. As a method of research, its aim is to make philosophical problems plain and understandable by examining and clarifying the language used to express them. In this unit, we began by highlighting key stages in the development of the analytic movement. In this regard, we saw that the key figures in the development of analytic philosophy include Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, G.E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein. It was also stated that the development of analytic philosophy was occasioned by the rise of quantificational logic, linguistic analysis and the activities of themembers of the Vienna circle, who developed their principle of meaningfulness in response to idealism. After noting these key developments, we tumed attention to analysis as a method in philosophy. In this vein, we indicated the essential features of the method of analysis to include clarification (decomposition) of concepts and explainableness that ensures inter-subjective understanding, among others. 4.5 References/Further Readings/Web Resources Analytic philosophy. (2021). New World Encyclopedia. Retrieved 09:21, September 4, 2021from https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org’p/index.php?title=Analytic_phil osophyS&oldi d=1054301. Brogaard, Berit and Leiter, Brian. (eds). “Analytical and continental philosophy.” The Philosophical Gourmet Report. (2014 - 15). http:/Awww.philosophicalgourmet.com/analytic.asp. [Accessed 2 September 2021]. Carnap, R. (1947). Meaning and necessity, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Dummett, M. (1993). The seas of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Frege, Gottlob. (1879). Begriffiscrift, trans. by Beaney, Michael (1997), The Frege reader, Oxford: Blackwell. Gri fin, N. (1991). Rusself’s idealist apprenticeship. Oxford: Clarendon. Hacker, P. M. S. (1996). Wittgenstein’s Place in the Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy.Oxford, Blackwell. Hans-Johana Glock. (2013). What is Analytic Philosophy? Journal for the History of AnalyticalPhilosophy Volume 2, Number 2. oPHL 372 MODULE 2 Livine, A. D. (2021). “Bertrand Russell.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2021 ed.), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = Kenny, A. (2000). Frege: An introduction to the founder of modern analytic philosophy, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers. Michael Beaney. (2013). What is Analytic Philosophy? The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy. DOK: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238842.013.0039 Niekerk, van Jason, (2015). “The analytic appeal of African philosophy.” South African Journal ofPhilosophy. 34.4: 516-525. Russell, Bertrand. 1918). Mysticism and Logic, London: Allen & Unwin. Russell, B. (1900). 4 critical exposition of the philosophy of Leibniz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stevens, G. (2005). The Russellian origins of analytical philosophy London and New York:Routledge Unmson, J.0. (1956). Philosophical analysis: its development between the hwo world wars,Oxford: Oxford University Press. Williamson, T. (2014). ‘Knowledge first.’ In M. Steup, J. Turti, and E. Sosa (eds.), Contemporary debates in epistemology (Second Edition). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 4.6 Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercise(s) 1. Analytic method 2. Hacker End of Module Exercises 1. This method of inquiry is based on the philosophical framework embedded in Husser!’s transcendental method with core emphasis on description of the ‘invariant aspects of phenomena asthey appear to conscious awareness. is an act, that if successful, produces understanding. 3 asks Euthyphro to provide a definition of piety. In = the dialectical method of historical study became intertwined with historical materialism, the school of thought exemplified by the works of Marx, Engels.and Vladimir Lenin. 70RESEARCH METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY MODULE 3 FEATURES AND TOOLS OF RESEARCH IN PHILOSOPHY Unit 1 Features: Rigour and Coherence Unit 2 Features: Clarity and Concision Unit 3 Tools: Language Unit 4 Tools: Logie NIT1 FEATURES: RIGOUR AND COHERENCE Unit Structure 1.1 Introduction 1.2 Intended Learning Outcomes 13 Rigour 1.4 Coherence 1.5 Summary 1.6 References/Further Reading/Web Resources 1.7 Possible Answers to Self-Assessment Exercise(s) 1.1 Introduction Welcome to this discussion on the features of a good philosophical research or writing. Before a good work of research can be effectively carried out in philosophy, it is important to be familiar with the features expected of a good research in philosophy, as these are the indices any examiner or independent observer is going to look out for. A good work of research in philosophy needs, among other things, to be clear and precise, rigorous and coherent. And so, this unit focuses its attention on the features of a good research in philosophy. The features of philosophical research and writing are many. According to A. P. Martinich, “Three of the most important ways to make your essay intelligible are to make sure that it is clear, concise, and coherent. Philosophers also strivefor what they call ‘rigour’ (Martinich, 2005: 140). However, for our purposes in this unit, we will discuss Rigour and Coherence as two of the very core features of philosophical research and writing, while the remaining two features of Clarity and Concision or “Conciseness” will be dealt with in the next unit. Our aim here is to make clear the requirements of a standard research in philosophy. This unit treats rigour and coherence as features of research and writing in philosophy. It examines them, considers what they mean in specific terms, and what effect they each have on your research work. a