REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

Reddendo singula singulis is a Latin term which means by referring each to each, by referring
each phrase or expression to its corresponding objects. In simple words it means that when a list
of words has a modifying phrase at the end, the phrase refers only to the last. This rule indicates
that when a sentence contains several antecedents (a thing which logically precedes another) and
several consequents, they may be read in a distributive manner. The words are to be applied to
the subjects to which they appear by context most relatable and to which they are most
applicable. Where a complex sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it
may be the right construction to provide each to each, by reading the provision distributively and
applying each object to its appropriate subject. A similar principle applies to verbs and their
subjects, and to other parts of speech.

When there are general words of description following a record of particular things then the
general words are to be construed in a distributive manner and if the general words will apply to
some things and not to the others, then the general words are to be applied to those things to
which they will and they are not be applied to those things they will not apply. Thus, each
word/phrase or expression is to be referred to its suitable objects.

The best example of reddendo singula singulis is quoted from Wharton’s law Lexicon, “If
anyone shall draw or load any sword or gun, the word draw is applied to sword only and the
word load to gun only, the former verb to former noun and latter to latter, because it is
impossible to load a sword or to draw a gun.

Case Laws: Koteshwar Vittal Kamat vs K Rangappa Baliga, AIR 1969, in the construction of the
Proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution which reads, “Provided that no bill or amendment for
the purpose of clause (b), shall be introduced or moved in the legislature of a state without the
previous sanction of the President”. It was held that the word introduced applies to bill and
moved applies to amendment. The Supreme Court stated that, where a sentence contains several
antecedents and several consequents they are to be read distributively. That is, the words are to
be applied to the subjects to which they appear by context most properly to relate and to which
they are most applicable.

In Bishop v. Deakin, section 59(1) of the Local Government Act 1933 construed reddendo
singula singulis. The said section provided that “A person shall be disqualified for being elected
or being a member of local authority if he has within five years before the day of election or
since his election been convicted of any offence and ordered to be imprisoned for a period of not
less than three months.”In this case Clanson, J., observed that the section provided two
disqualifications: first what is to be disqualification for election to the local body and second;
what is to be disqualification for being a member after election.
 Generalia Specialibus Non Derogant

When there is a special provision specifically dealing with a subject, a general provision
howsoever widely worded must yield to the former. Thus, it is well settled that if a special
provision is made of certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provision. In a
matter of conflict between the general and special provision, the latter must prevail. The
principle states that general words in a Statute should not be held to repeal or rip up a specific
provision upon a particular matter. A general rule though stated in wide terms must be taken to
be not interfering with matters covered by a special provision.

For example: Article 25 (2)(b) and 26 (b) of the Constitution. Article 25. (1) Subject to public
order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled
to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion. 
(2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from
making any law—
       (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which
may be associated with religious practice; 
       (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious
institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.

Article 26. Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any
section thereof shall have the right—
        (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
        (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
        (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
        (d) to administer such property in accordance with law.

It was held that the right of every religious denomination or any Section thereof to manage its
own affairs in matter of religion is subject to a law made by a State providing for social welfare
and reform or throwing open of Hindu religious institution of a public character to all classes and
sections of Hindus. The aforesaid rule of construction was applied by the Supreme Court in
Venkataramana Devaru Vs State of Mysore, AIR 1958. 

Raj Krishna v Vinod (AIR 1954): The question before the court was the conflict between Sec-
33(2) and Sec-123(8) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Sec-33(2) empowers the
Govt servant to nominate or second a candidate seeking election; whereas Sec-123(8) says that a
Govt servant is not entitled to assist a candidate in an election in any manner except casting his
vote. The SC said that these two provisions should be harmoniously interpreted and that Sec-
123(8) must be interpreted as conferring power on a Govt servant of voting as well as proposing
and seconding a candidate, but forbidding him from assisting a candidate in any manner.
UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT (It is better for a thing to have effect than to
make it void)

This is a Latin term meaning that it is better for a thing to have effect than to make it void. It is a
basic rule of Construction that the courts should construe a Statute in such a manner that it may
be made operative rather than inoperative; efficient rather than inefficient. The inherent idea
behind the rule is that an Act or a section of the Act shall never be made void where the words of
the Act or the Act itself may be applied to an extent to make it good. The Judiciary should make
every effort to find out the meaning of the Statute by looking at the substance of the Statute and
not the mere form. Thus, the difficulties in interpretation do not make a clause bad or incapable
of interpretation. Every word in a statute must be given effect to.

The court must construe a Statute in such a way so as to implement the legislative purpose than
to defeat it. The Rule requires the inconsistencies within the Act to be reconciled. If the obvious
intention of the enactment gives rise to difficulties in implementation of an Act, the courts must
do it’s best to resolve it. This is because it is better to validate a thing than invalidate it. The
courts must avoid such construction that will attribute irrationality to the legislature. Thus the
courts must prefer such construction which renders the statutory provisions constitutionally valid
rather than that which makes it void. The intention of the legislature must not be reduced to
futility.

The Rule furthermore adds that an interpretation which makes certain words used in a Statute
useful must be preferred to the one which renders them useless, void and ineffective.

Bhatia International v Bulk Trading S.A (AIR 2002): The SC observed that if a statutory
provision is open to more than one interpretation then the court has to choose that interpretation
which represents the true intention of the legislature. A construction that results to hardship,
serious inconvenience and injustice should be avoided.

Avtar Singh v State of Punjab (AIR 1965): The appellant was convicted for theft of electricity
under Section-39 of the Electricity Act, 1910 and he argued that his conviction should not be
maintained because the process against him had not started as per the directions under Sec-50 of
the Act (proceedings against him was not initiated by someone mentioned herein). The
respondent however argued that the theft of electricity though not a theft within the meaning of
Sec-378 of Indian Penal Code, 1860, it was made a theft under Sec-39 of the Electricity Act.
Hence, the punishment must be imposed. The SC applied the rule ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. It said that since the crime is against the Electricity Act and not against the Indian Penal
Code, the requirement of Sec-50 must have been followed. But, an offence under Sec-39 of
Electricity Act is deemed to be an offence under Sec-378 of Indian Penal Code and hence the
accused must be punished under Sec-379 of the Code. This was SC made the Section effective
rather than making it void.
contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege

This Rule means that the words of a Statute should be normally understood in the sense they
bore when it was passed. However, an enactment which was wrongly interpreted at that time
should be corrected in future. The court should correct the past mistakes and construe the Act
correctly. “Contemporaneous expositions” mean those expositions (series of theories) which
existed or occurred at the same time or period. The Rule ascertains that contemporaneous
exposition is the best and strongest in law. The best exposition of a statute is what it has received
from the contemporary authority. When a statute was passed the persons who were living then or
there may be presumed to know the circumstances under which it was passed. These prevailing
circumstances play a role in correct interpretation sexual harassment of women at workplace:
vishakha case.

This Rule was laid down by Lord Coke while construing ancient Statutes. That meaning of the
Statute was taken into account which had long professional usage at the time when the Statute
was framed even though the popular meaning is different now. In the case of Salkeld v Johnson,
the Court of Exchequer explained the Rule along with many other Rules. It was said that
interpretation of statute must be done primarily by the words of the statute itself and the words
must be read in an ordinary sense. The words will only be modified so far as it is necessary to
avoid injustice, absurdity or repugnance, but no further. It is proper to consider the state of law
which the statute proposes and the court shall look into the mischief that existed at that time
which the court purports to alter and provide a remedy.

N Suresh Nathan and another v Union of India 1992 1 SCC 584:

The question of law that arose in the case was related to service matters. The Act related was
Civil Services Act, Rule 7 and 11. It related to the promotion to the post of assistant engineers in
PWD. It said that the junior engineers possessing degree in civil engineering with 3 years’
service in the grade shall be promoted to the post of assistant engineers. For matters of
promotion, diploma holder junior engineers obtaining degree while in service were not allowed
to count the 3 years experience period before obtaining such degree. The administrative tribunal
gave a judgment against the diploma-holder engineers; but later on the SC reveres such
judgment. The SC said that according to the recruitment rules of the public works department,
Pondicherry in cases of promotion to the post of assistant engineers, 3 years experience period
shall be calculated from the date when the diploma-holder obtained a degree. Thus the tribunal
was not justified in taking a contrary view and unsettling the settled principle.

LIMITATIONS OF THE RULE:

 Useful only in cases of ambiguity.

 Custom/practice is given more value than the act of the parties. Also can’t be used in
cases of broken usages or practices.
 Useful only in ancient Acts. Can’t be used in modern Acts.
STATUTES IN PARI MATERIA

The maxim pari material means upon the same matter or subject. Statutes in pari material means
those relating to the same subject, thing or having a common purpose. The in pari material rule
of statutory construction is that the statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be
read, construed and applied together so that the legislature’s intention can be gathered from the
whole of the enactments. Thus, it is permissible to read the provisions of two Acts together if
they are complementary to each other. While explaining the maxim, Lord Mansfield said that
statutes in pari materia should be taken together as a single system… as if the two laws are only
part of the same provision. It must be remembered that the term “paris” means equal, not merely
similar. For example: If a term has been used without definition in one Act but it has been
defined in another Act which is in pari material with the first Act then the definition used in the
later Act may be applied in the former one.

The doctrine of pari material is important tool for interpretation of statutes that work towards the
same objective. The doctrine helps us to harmonize the aim and subjects of the legislations which
can take colour from each other. The conditions behind the applicability of the Rule are as
follows:-

 It is applicable on Acts which are given a collective title. This way the Parliament
recognizes that the Acts have a single subject matter.
 It is applicable on those Acts which are required to be construed as one.
 It is applicable for those Acts which deal with the same subject matter on same line. If
Acts are in pari material it is assumed that uniformity in language and meaning was
intended.

Cases: In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh v. M.V. Narasimhan, it was held that the Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Indian Penal Code are in pari material to each other. Sec-2 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 has not defined public servant. Here, the Indian Penal
Code would come into play. Thus Sec-2 of the former Act will take into account Sec-21 of
Indian Penal Code which defines “public servant”

In State of Madras v A Vaidyanath Aiyer (1958, SC 61), section 4 of Prevention of Corruption

Act 1947 was held in pari materia with the Indian Evidence Act 1872. The phrase “shall
presume’ of Indian Evidence Act was utilized to construe the meaning of “it shall be presumed”
of section 4 of Prevention of Corruption Act 1947. Both the phrases were given the same
meaning.