THE UNITED STATES, 

plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

G.R. No. L-5272

FACTS:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at “Officers’ quarters, No. 27,” Fort
Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was
employed as a house boy or muchacho. “Officers’ quarters No. 27” as a detached
house situates some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was
occupied solely as an officers’ mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two
servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of
which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which
communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a
heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had
attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair. In the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened on the
porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the
room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o’clock, the defendant, who had received
for the night, was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the
room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, “Who is there?” He heard no answer and
was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the front of
the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder was a
robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. “If you enter the room, I will kill you.”
At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair which had
been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against which
it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the defendant
struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate,
Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately
wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in the
moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in
the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up
Pascual’s wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the
incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was
employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on
friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when
either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with
his identity.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military
hospital, where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by
the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six
years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

ISSUE:

Should the defendant be acquitted by invoking mistake of fact?

HELD:

YES. Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would
be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his
fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a
dangerous thief or “ladron,” as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant’s thrice-
repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in
his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend
himself from such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to
discover his whereabouts and deliver the first blow.

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held
criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which
he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be,
but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this question
we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such circumstances there
is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was
not due to negligence or bad faith.
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake
of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind
necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or
negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, “The guilt of the accused must
depend on the circumstances as they appear to him.” That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is
to be determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might
reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other
wise, upon which he acted.
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the
defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief
that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose
assault he was in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they must have
presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without
malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising his
legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he
would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness
in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his
property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be
reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail
bond exonerated, with the costs of both instance de oficio.
THE UNITED STATES,vs.
AH CHONG,

G.R. No. L-5272 | March 19, 1910

Justice Carson

FACTS:

The defendant Ah Chong worked as a cooked while the deceased Pascual Gilberto who
was a house boy. The two of them shared a room having a door with no permanent
lock. As a means of securing it, a chair was placed against the door. At around 10 in the
evening, Ah Chong who was sleeping was awakened by someone trying to forcefully
open the door. He called twice but there was no response. Fearing that the intruder
might be a thief, Ah Chong took his knife and struck the intruder when it entered the
room. It turned out that the said intruder was his roommate Pascual. Despite his plea of
self-defense, said defendant was found guilty with homicide by the Court of First
Instance.

ISSUE:

Whether the defendant by reason of mistake of facts criminally liable.

RULING:

The Court held that there is no criminal liability when one commits an offense or act due
to ignorance of facts provided that it was not due to negligence or bad faith. Such
ignorance of the fact is sufficient to negative the particular intent which under the law, is
an essential element to the crime of murder charged cancels the presumption of intent
and works for an acquittal. In the case, the defendant struck the fatal blow on the belief
that the intruder was a robber, on which his life and property was in danger. It is clear
that he acted in good faith without negligence and without any criminal intent in
exercising his right to self-defense. There can be no crime, large or small, without an
evil mind. The author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors. It is a principle that the
essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it cannot exist. In other
words, punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it cannot be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or moral sentiment would any people
in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. This
doctrine confirmed by the maxim actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea in which the act
itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so. Thus, the Court held that
the defendant should be acquitted.