Boydell Press

Chapter Title: The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account

Chapter Author(s): Charles D. Stanton

Book Title: Journal of Medieval Military History

Book Subtitle: Volume XI
Book Editor(s): CLIFFORD J. ROGERS, KELLY DeVRIES, JOHN FRANCE
Published by: Boydell & Brewer, Boydell Press. (2013)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7722/j.ctt31njvf.5

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

Boydell & Brewer, Boydell Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Journal of Medieval Military History

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 2

The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account

Charles D. Stanton

On 18 June 1053 in the undulating open country of the Capitanata of northern

Apulia, near an ancient Roman city which no longer exists, one of the most
crucial battles of the Middle Ages was fought. At Civitate, a modest force of
Norman adventurers faced a papal army of Germans, Italians and Lombards,
perhaps twice its size. The outcome of that clash in what is today a sparsely popu-
lated region would profoundly influence the course of Mediterranean history for
centuries to come. It is recorded in more than a score of contemporary sources.
The most comprehensive accounts are provided by the three primary chroniclers
of the Normans in the South: Amatus of Montecassino, Geoffrey Malaterra and,
especially, William of Apulia. Their narratives are largely corroborated by the
Swabian historian Herman of Reichenau, and the various biographers of Pope
Leo IX.1 Yet the details of the event remain mired in myth.

1 Amatus of Montecassino, Storia de Normanni 3. 39, ed. V. de Bartholomaeis, Fonti per la

storia d‘Italia [FSI] (Rome, 1935), pp. 152–54; Annales Beneventani, ed. G. Pertz, MGH SS
3: 173–85, especially anno 1053, pp. 179–80; Annales Casinenses, ed. G. Pertz MGH SS 19:
303–20, especially anno 1053, p. 306; Annales Cavenses, ed. G. Pertz , MGH, SS 3: 185–97,
especially anno 1053/4, p. 189; Annales Romani, ed. G. Pertz, MGH SS 5:468–80, especially
470; Anonymi Barensis chronicon, ed. L. Muratori, Rerum Italicarum Scriptores [RIS] 5
(Milan, 1726),145–56, especially anno 1052, p. 152; Anonymi Historia Sicula a Normannis
ad Petrum Aragonensem, ed. L. Muratori, RIS 8: 745–80, especially pp. 752–53; Bonizo
of Sutri, Liber ad Amicum in Libelli de Lite Imperatorum et Pontificum, ed. E. Dümmler, 3
vols., MGH, 1: 568–620, especially p. 589; Bruno of Segni, Libellus de symoniacis in Libelli
de Lite Imperatorum et Pontificum, ed. E. Sackur, 3 vols. MGH 2: 543–62, especially pp.
550–51; Chronica ignoti monachi S. Mariae de Ferraria, ed. L. Gaudenzi, Società Napolitana
di Storia Patria Monumenti Storici, ser. 1: Cronache (Naples, 1888), p. 14; Chronica Monasterii
Casinensis, 2: 84, ed. H. Hoffmann, MGH SS: 34: 331–33; Chronicon Breve Nortmannicum,
ed. L. Muratori, RIS 5: 278 anno 1053; Chronicon Vulturnense, ed. V. Federici, 3 vols. (Rome,
1925–38), 3: 85–8; Geoffrey Malaterra, De rebus gestis Rogerii Calabriae et Siciliae comitis
et Roberti Guiscardi ducis fratris eius, 1.14, ed. E. Pontieri, RIS, 2nd ed. (Bologna, 1927–28),
5: 15; Herman of Reichenau, Chronicon, ed. G. Pertz, MGH SS 5: 67–133, especially pp.
132–33; Lupus Protospatarius, Annales, ed. G. Pertz, MGH SS, 5: 51–63, especially anno
1053, p. 59; Regesta pontificum Romanorum ab condita ecclesia ad annum post Christum
MCXCVIII, ed. P. Jaffé, S. Loewenfeld, F. Kaltenbrunner and P. Ewald, 10 vols., 2nd ed.
(Leipzig, 1885–88), 4292, 4333; Romuald of Salerno, Romualdi Salernitani Chronicon, ed.
C. Garufi, RIS 7: 181–82; Sigebert of Gembloux, Chronica, ed. D. Bethman, MGH SS 6:
268–374, especially anno 1050 on p. 359; A. Poncelet, ed., “Vie et miracles du pape S. Léon
IX”, Analecta Bollandiana, 25 (1906), 258–97, especially, pp. 285–87; Vita Leonis IX papae,

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
26 Charles D. Stanton

Although much has been written about the engagement, what actually
happened has been obfuscated by legend, poetic license and outright partisan
myth-making. Even Dante Alighieri reserved a few effusive lines of verse in
his renowned La divina commedia to extol the exploits of one the battle’s epic
heroes: “With those who felt the agony of blows by making counterstand to
Robert Guiscard.”2 In the modern era, Sir Edward Gibbon’s account of the
encounter in The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire is rather short and
somewhat impaired by the pretentious prose of the era.3 Many early twen-
tieth-century writers such as Francis Marion Crawford4 and James van Wycke
Osborne5 were inclined toward a more romantic retelling of the tale and, hence,
were guilty of suppositions unwarranted by the sources. More recently, John
Julius Norwich’s highly readable rendition still contains descriptions bordering
on the imaginative.6 While modern scholars like Ferdinand Chalandon,7 Graham
Loud,8 Huguette Taviani-Carozzi9 and Richard Bünemann10 have provided reli-
able reconstructions of the battle, these have been in the course of more general
discussions on the Normans in the South and have consequently been spare
on some specifics of the confrontation. This paper is an effort to sift the facts
from the known primary sources on the subject in order to fashion a plausible
version of events.

Background
The Normans came to southern Italy initially as pilgrims attracted, in part, by
the sanctuary of their favorite saint, the Archangel Michael, on Monte Gargano
in northeastern Apulia. William of Apulia, a court chronicler commissioned by

in Pontificum Romanorum Vitae, ed. J. Watterich, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1862), 1: 127–70, especially
pp. 163–66; “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae,” in Memorie Istoriche della Pontificia
città di Benevento, ed. S. Borgia, 3 vols. (Rome, 1764), 2: 299–343, especially pp. 319–22;
William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 82–266, trans. M. Mathieu (Palermo,
1961), pp. 138–46. This list is by no means exhaustive.
2 Dante Alighieri, La divinia commedia, cantica inferno, ed. Giorgio Petrocchi (Milan, 1966–
67), canto XXVIII, ll. 13–14. “Con quella che sentio di colpi doglie per contastare a Ruberto
Guiscardo …”, trans. Robert and Jean Hollander, Inferno (New York and London, 2000) as
“together with the ones who felt the agony of blows fighting in the fields against Guiscard.”
3 Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 6 vols. (London, 1776–89, 1994
repr.), 5: 616–61.
4 Francis Crawford, The Rulers of the South, 2 vols. (New York, 1900), 1: 171–81.
5 James Osborne, The Greatest Norman Conquest (New York, 1937), pp. 110–38.
6 John Julius Norwich, The Normans in the South, 1016–1130 (London, 1967), pp. 80–96.
7 Ferdinand Chalandon, Histoire de la domination Normande en Italie et en Sicile, 2 vols. (Paris,
1907), 1: 122–42.
8 G. A. Loud, The Age of Robert Guiscard: Southern Italy and the Norman Conquest (Harlow,
2000), pp. 110–20.
9 Huguette Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, Robert Guiscard et la conquête normande en
Italie (Paris, 1996), pp. 192–212.
10 Richard Bünemann, Robert Guiskard 1015–1085, Ein Normanne erobert Süditalien (Cologne,
1997), pp. 20–4.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 27

Guiscard’s son Roger Borsa, describes a chance meeting there in 1016 between
a handful of Norman pilgrims and a Lombard partisan named Melus who
attempted to recruit them for his rebellion against Byzantine rule in the region.11
Amatus, a monk of Montecassino whose Historia Normannorum primarily
extols the deeds of its Norman benefactors (Robert Guiscard and Richard of
Capua), tells of a band of forty such Norman pilgrims who succored the citizens
of Salerno from “Saracen” raiders at about the same time.12 Regardless of the
truth of either tradition, the Normans indeed began migrating into southern Italy
in significant enough numbers at the beginning of the eleventh century to partic-
ipate in Melus’s ill-fated revolt against Constantinople. As a consequence, the
Normans shared Melus’s defeat in 1018 at the hands of the Byzantine catepan
(provincial governor), Basil Boiannes, at Cannae (10 kilometers southwest of
Barletta, also in Apulia)13 – exactly where Hannibal had crushed the Roman
army in 216 B.C.14 Nonetheless, the wealth of the South had been revealed and
Norman knights, influenced to some extent by the dictates of primogeniture,
began flowing into the region in ever-increasing numbers, hiring their swords
out initially to the competing Lombard lords of Campania. One of them, Rainulf
Drengot, won control of Aversa in 1031.15
Soon after, the first of the predatory offspring of Tancred de Hauteville –
William, Drogo and Humphrey – came seeking their fortune. They initially
found employment with Guaimar IV, the Lombard prince of Salerno, who
promptly loaned them out along with three hundred of their Norman compadres
to the renowned Byzantine general, Giorgios Maniakes, for the latter’s ill-fated
invasion of Sicily in 1038.16 In the course of the campaign, the Norman contin-
gent apparently served in the vanguard of the cavalry and William, its nominal
commander, distinguished himself in single combat with the caid (Muslim mili-
tary governor) of Syracuse, earning himself the sobriquet “Iron-Arm.”17 Disgrun-
tled over perceived inequitable treatment by Maniakes, the Normans returned to
the mainland in 1041 and established themselves at Melfi (in the Basilicata).18
They soon launched the inexorable rise of the Hauteville family to prominence

11 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 1. ll. 1–28.

12 Amatus of Montecassino, The History of the Normans, trans. Prescott Dunbar (Woodbridge,
2004), Bk. 1, ch. 17–19, pp. 49–50; Storia de Normanni, 1. 17–19, pp. 21–4; Chronica
Monasterii Casinensis, 2.37, pp. 236–37.
13 Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 2. 37, pp. 239–40; Lupus Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1019,
p. 57; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 1. ll. 91–4, pp. 104–05.
14 Adrian Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army (London, 2003), pp. 40–1.
15 Amatus, History of the Normans, 1. 42, p. 60; Storia de Normanni, 1. 42, pp. 53–4; William of
Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 1. ll. 170–74, pp. 108–09.
16 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 8, p. 66; Storia de Normanni, 2. 8, p. 68; Geoffrey Malaterra,
Deeds of Count Roger of Calabria and Sicily and of his brother Duke Robert Guiscard, 1.7,
trans. Kenneth Wolf (Ann Arbor, MI, 2005), pp. 55–6; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 7, pp.
10–11. Contrary to Amatus, Malaterra indicates that Humphrey had not, as yet, migrated from
Normandy, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 9, p. 58; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 9, p. 12.
17 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 7, p. 56; De rebus gestis Rogerii,1. 7, p. 11.
18 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 15–19, pp. 669–70; Storia de Normanni, 2. 15–19, pp.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
28 Charles D. Stanton

in the region by electing William Iron-Arm as their “count.”19 Under his lead-
ership, the Normans of Melfi prosecuted several successful campaigns against
the Byzantines of Apulia, most notably achieving two resounding victories over
the Catepan Michael Dokeianos in 1041: one in March at the River Olivento
a few kilometers north of Venosa and another in May at Cannae, avenging
the ignominious defeat of 1018.20 During this period the irrepressible Normans
apportioned several of the towns in the region among twelve of the more promi-
nent nobles,21 but William seems to have retained overall authority in Apulia.
When he succumbed to fever around 1045, Amatus says he “was succeeded
by his brother Drogo who was made count of Apulia.”22 At about the same
time, Rainulf of Aversa passed away and was replaced by his brother’s son,
Asclettin, who also died shortly afterwards leaving the county to Rainulf Trin-
canocte, another nephew.23 Within a year, two of the most prominent players in
the Norman conquest of southern Italy arrived from Normandy, Richard Quarrel
and Robert de Hauteville.24 Richard would eventually claim control of the prin-
cipality of Capua, while Robert would ultimately rise to become duke of Apulia.

Portents
As the Normans grew in numbers and confidence, they became more rapacious
and acquisitive. Their increased ravaging of the region quickly drew the enmity
of the local populace which soon sought external intervention. More crucially,
their aggressive actions in Apulia, Campania and Calabria provoked growing
concern among the great powers of the era: the Holy Roman Empire, the Byzan-
tine Empire and the papacy. All three considered southern Italy within their
respective spheres of influence. In Apulia, for instance, Drogo and his brother
Humphrey strove to capture the ancient Byzantine theme (province) town by

73–8; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 8–9, pp. 56–7; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 8–9, pp.
11–12; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 1, ll. 196–245.
19 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 29, p. 76; Storia de Normanni, 2. 29, pp. 93–4; Lupus
Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1042, p. 58.
20 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 21–3, pp. 71–3; Storia de Normanni, 2. 21–3, pp.
79–83; Annales Barenses, anno 1041, pp. 53–4; Anonymi Barensis, anno 1041, p. 149; Lupus
Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1041, p. 58; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 9–10, pp. 57–9;
De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 9–10, pp. 11–12; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard,
1. ll. 254–304, pp. 112–15; John Skylitzes, A Synopsis of Byzantine History 811–1057, trans.
John Wortley (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 400–01.
21 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 31, p. 77; Storia de Normanni, 2. 31, pp. 95–6; William of
Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 1. ll. 232–39, pp. 110–13.
22 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 35, p. 79; Storia de Normanni, 2. 35, p. 101. “Et à lui
succedi son frere, liquel se clamoit Drogo; et fu fait conte de Puille.” Malaterra confirms this,
Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 12, p. 60; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 12, p. 14.
23 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 32, 34 and 39, pp. 79–78, 82; Storia de Normanni, 2. 32,
34 and 39, pp. 97–9, 106.
24 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 44 and 46, pp. 84–5; Storia de Normanni, 2. 44 and 46,
pp. 110–12.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 29

town. Geoffrey Malaterra, a Benedictine monk in the abbey of Saint Agata of

Catania whose primary patron was Roger de Hauteville, recorded the Norman
modus operandi in the province: “For afflicting the Greeks with frequent raids
throughout the surrounding countryside, the Normans tore up the vines and
olive trees and seized the cattle and sheep and the rest of things that they needed,
thus leaving nothing in the vicinity of the Greek fortress.”25 In response, the
Emperor Constantine IX Monomachos appointed as catepan Argyros, son of
Melus, who ironically had devoted his life to freeing the land from Byzantine
bonds, and dispatched him to Apulia to counter the Norman offensive. Daunted
by the martial prowess of the Normans, the Byzantine basileus (sovereign),
according to William of Apulia, first “ordered Argyros to bring them great
sums of money, silver, precious vestments and gold, that the Normans might
be persuaded to leave the frontiers of Italy, hasten across the sea and mightily
enrich themselves in imperial service,”26 but the Normans “replied that they
would not leave Apulia until they had conquered it.”27 The newly appointed
Byzantine catepan then resorted to cobbling together a coalition of anti-Norman
complainants. William of Apulia says, “Argyros sent emissaries to the pope,”
whom he knew to be in receipt of numerous grievances about the depredations
of these northern freebooters.28
The pontiff at that time was Leo IX, hand-picked for the Holy See by his
cousin, the Western Emperor Henry III, who had appointed the previous two
popes as well. It was apparently one of the methods he employed for influ-
encing what he considered to be his southern domains.29 At the Synod of Sutri at
Christmas 1046, the German monarch had deposed, according to Amatus, “three
unlawful popes” (Benedict IX, Sylvester III and Gregory VI) and replaced them
with Suidger, bishop of Bamberg, whose very first act as Pope Clement II was
to crown Henry Holy Roman Emperor.30 On the same Italian expedition, the
newly-minted emperor sought to recruit the Normans as his armed proxies in
the south by confirming Rainulf (II) Trincanocte, nephew of Rainulf I, as lord
of Aversa and Drogo as count of Apulia.31 His tacit intention seems to have been

25 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 10, p. 59; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 10, p. 13. “Nam
crebis incursionibus eos lacessentes, vineta et oliveta eorum extirpabant, armenta et pecora et
caetera, quae ad usum necessaria sunt, nihil extra castra relinquentes, diripiebant.”
26 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 46–50, pp. 134–135. “Traditur Argiroo
portanda pecunia multa, argenti multum pretiosaque vestis et aurum, ut sic Normanni fallantur,
et egredientes finibus Hesperiae, prospere mare transgrediantur.”
27 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 63–4, pp. 134–35. “Et dimissuros loca
se non Apulia dicunt dum conquirantur.”
28 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 70–1, pp. 134–37. “Nuntia mittit
Argirous papae.”
29 I. Robinson, The Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century (Manchester, 2004), p. 5.
30 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 1, p. 87; Storia de Normanni, 3. 1, p. 116. “… injustement
troiz papes ...” Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 2. 77, pp. 320–22; Herman of Reichenau,
Chronicle, in Eleventh-Century Germany, The Swabian Chronicles, trans. I. Robinson
(Manchester, 2008), anno 1046/1047, pp. 79–80; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1046, pp. 126–27.
31 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 2, p. 87; Storia de Normanni, 3. 2, p. 117.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
30 Charles D. Stanton

to empower the Normans to punish recalcitrant principalities such as Benevento

which had rebelled against his authority.32 It was to be a force that could not be
controlled. Nine months after his installation as pope, Clement expired (October
1047) and in December Henry appointed Poppo, bishop of Brixen, to become
Damasus II. He lasted only until the following August when he died. That
December an assembly at Worms controlled by the emperor selected as papal
successor Bruno, bishop of Toul, who later assumed the appellation Leo IX.33
As one of the first great reforming popes, Leo IX had set his sights on the
eradi­cation of simony (the buying and selling of benefices and ecclesiastical
offices),34 but the Norman problem quickly and brutally intervened.
Tales of Norman excesses throughout the region soon began to reach the
pontiff’s ears. The anonymous author of the eleventh-century Vita Leonis IX
papae, probably a Lotharingian monk from the diocese of Toul,35 melodramati-
cally recounts that the pope “was moved by a generous compassion for the
unheard of afflictions of the people of Apulia” who were subject to “the extreme
savagery and fury of the Normans.”36 The havoc wreaked by the Normans was
by no means limited to Apulia. John, abbot of Fécamp, who was reportedly
assaulted and robbed in papal territory, wrote to the pope that the local inhabit-
ants had come to abhor the Normans to such a degree that the latter could hardly
travel the land without being accosted.37 Graham Loud describes the utterly
ruthless methods employed by the Hautevilles in Calabria:
Norman tactics, directed above all at securing the surrender of towns and strongpoints
by destroying the crops and livelihoods of the inhabitants, were especially effective
in a mountainous region where cultivatable land was limited, and thus easily targeted.
Furthermore, vines and the trees which supported them, and the olive and mulberry
trees of southern Calabria, made communities which depended on them especially
vulnerable, since once cut down they would take years to regrow or be replaced from
cuttings.38

The Swabian chronicler, Herman of Reichenau, sums up Norman conduct in

the South:
After very many of them hastened to the fertile land and their strength increased, they
made war on the natives themselves and oppressed them; they usurped for themselves

32 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1047, p. 80; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1046, p. 127.
33 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1047–1049, pp. 83–5; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1047–
1049, pp. 127–28.
34 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 15, p. 91; Storia de Normanni, 3. 15, pp. 128–30; Vita
Leonis IX papae, in Pontificum Romanorum Vitae, 2.4. ed. J. Watterich, 2 vols. (Leipzig, 1862),
1: 154; “The Life of Pope Leo IX”, 2. 10, in Robinson, Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century,
p. 136.
35 Robinson, Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century, pp. 22–4.
36 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 10, p. 163; “The Life of Pope Leo IX”, 2. 20, p. 149. “… ac clementi
condolens affectu inauditae afflictioni Apuliae gentis ... Normannorum saevissimum …”
37 PL, 143, col. 798–99.
38 Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, p. 126.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 31

an unjust dominion; they snatched by force from the lawful heirs their castles, estates,
villages, houses, even their wives, according to their will; they plundered the property
of churches; finally they threw into confusion, as far as their strength enabled them,
all the divine and human laws and indeed they submitted neither to the pope nor to the
emperor, merely paying lip-service to them.39

Amatus indicates that Leo IX first attempted to modify the behavior of the
Normans by appealing to them directly: “Then he went to Melfi to oppose the
acts of the most mighty Normans, and begged them to abandon their cruelty
and injuries to the poor.”40 It appears that this plea fell upon deaf ears, and
the depredations continued unabated. Leo’s Lotharingian biographer called the
Apulian Normans “savage tyrants and ravagers of the territory,”41 an observa-
tion echoed by the Italo-Norman sources. In fact, land considered to be within
the papal patrimony began to be threatened, drawing increased apprehension
from the Apostolic See. The Normans had begun encroaching upon Benevento,
apparently encouraged by Henry III who, according to the Annales Beneventani,
had in 1047 caused Clement II to excommunicate the townspeople for their
refusal to submit to him and had even set fire to the city’s suburbs.42 Herman of
Reichenau says Leo IX excommunicated the Beneventans again in the spring
of 1050 for their continued rebellion against imperial authority.43 The Normans
quite understandably viewed all this as an invitation to ravage the environs at will,
which they did. Subsequently, both Amatus and the Annales Beneventani record
that the citizens of the city expelled their prince (Pandulf III) and dispatched a
delegation to Leo IX in 1051 to seek papal protection.44 Pope Leo journeyed to
Benevento in July and accepted its fealty. In return, he summoned Drogo as the
most prominent leader among the Normans and Guaimar IV as their primary
patron to Benevento and “told them to give orders that the citizens of Benevento
were not to be harmed or troubled.”45 This evidently was to no avail.46

39 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 94; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 132.
“Postea vero pluribus eorum ad uberem terram accurrentibus, viribus adaucti, ipsos indigetes
bello premere, iniustum dominatum invadere, heredibus legitimis castella, praedia, villas,
domos, uxorem etiam quibus libuit vi auferre, res aecclesiarum diripere, postremo divina et
humana omnia, prout viribus plus poterant, iura confundere, nec iam apostolico pontifici, nec
ipsi imperatori, nisi tantum verbotenus cedere.”
40 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 16, p. 91; Storia de Normanni, 3.16, p. 130. “Et puiz s’en
ala à Melfe opponere contre li fait de li fortissime Normant. Et lor proï qu’il se deüissent partir
de la crudelité, et laisser la moleste de li povre.”
41 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 6, p. 158; “The Life of Pope Leo IX”, 2. 14, p. 141. “... saevissimos
tyrannos ac patraie vastatores ...”
42 Annales Beneventani, anno 1047, p. 179. “Heinricus rex, filius Chuonardi, cum papa Clemente
venit supra Beneventum, urbem excommunicavit, suburbium arsit.”
43 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1050, p. 87; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1050, p. 129.
44 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 17, p. 92; Storia de Normanni, 3. 17, pp. 131–32; Annales
Beneventani, anno 1051, p. 179.
45 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 17, p. 92; Storia de Normanni,3. 17, p. 132. “… les
enforma qu’il doient ordener que cil de la cité non soient gravé né afflit.”
46 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 18, p. 92; Storia de Normanni, 3. 18, p. 133.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
32 Charles D. Stanton

The pope may have held some faint hope at this point that Drogo and Guaimar
would successfully rein in their obstreperous cohorts, but events intervened in
rapid succession, precluding that possibility. First, Drogo was assassinated at
Montellaro, near Bovino, on the feast of Saint Lawrence (10 August) in 1051.47
Some, like Ferdinand Chalandon and John Julius Norwich, have surmised that
the Byzantine faction of Argyros was behind the murder,48 but in all probability
the cause was what Malaterra had outlined: enmity among the local Lombard
population for the Normans. “The Lombards of Apulia, always a perfidious
people, secretly conspired to commit an act of treason whereby the Normans
throughout Apulia would be killed on the same day,” claims Malaterra.49 Both
he and Anonymus Vaticanus (probably a chronicler in the court of King Roger
II) identify the killer as a certain Riso, a “compater” (“godfather”),50 meaning
he was likely a Lombard relative since Drogo was married to Gaitelgrima, the
daughter of Guaimar IV of Salerno.51 Indeed, many other Normans met a similar
fate at the same time, doubtless in retribution for wanton Norman ravaging.52
Humphrey soon assumed his brother’s mantle of power and promptly meted
out retaliation.53 “He mercilessly punished all those who took part; some were
mutilated, others were put to the sword, many were hung,” recounts William
of Apulia grimly.54 Such actions must have only exacerbated the contentious
circumstances.

Papal Mobilization
Malaterra reports that envoys were secretly sent to the pope, “inviting him to
come to Apulia with an army.”55 He does not specify who dispatched these
emissaries, but William of Apulia does: the Byzantine catepan Argyros, who

47 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 19, p. 92; Storia de Normanni, 3. 19, p. 133; Annales
Beneventani, anno 1051, p. 179; Lupus Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1051, p. 59; Malaterra,
Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 13, pp. 60–1; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 13, p. 14; William of Apulia,
La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 75–80, pp. 136–37.
48 Chalandon, Histoire de la domination Normande en Italie, 1: 129; Norwich, Normans in the
South, p. 84.
49 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 13, p. 60; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 13, p. 14. “Longobardi
igitur Apulienses, genus semper perfidissimum, traditionem per universam Apuliam silenter
ordinant, ut omnes Normanni una die occiderenter.”
50 Anonymi Historia Sicula, col. 752; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 13, pp. 60–61; De
rebus gestis Rogerii, Bk. 1. 13, pp. 14–15. Lupus Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1051, p. 59,
also uses the term “compatre” (“godfather”) to describe the assassin.
51 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 35, p. 80 and n. 62; Storia de Normanni, 2. 35, p. 102.
52 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 13, p. 61; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 13, p. 15.
53 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 22, p. 92; Storia de Normanni, 3. 22, pp. 136–37; Lupus
Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1051, p. 59; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 13, p. 61; De
rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 13, p. 15.
54 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 288–90, pp. 148–49. “Funesto cunctos
fuerant qui participati consilio punit; hos truncat, perfodit illos, multos suspendit.”
55 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 14, p. 61; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 14, p. 15. “… per
occultos legatos nonum Leonem apostolicum, ut in apuliam cum exercitu veniat, invitant …”

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 33

proposed military action against the Normans.56 They apparently found a recep-
tive audience, because soon afterwards, in the early spring of 1052, Leo was
reported to have petitioned both the German emperor and the king of France
to aid him in effecting “the ruin and dispersal of the Normans.”57 Distracted
by other concerns closer to home, both declined. The papal entourage then
sought to muster a local force for the purpose. Amatus contends that Frederick
of Lorraine, Leo’s chancellor, began a call to arms with the pronouncement:
“Even if I had only a hundred effeminate knights, I would fight against all the
Norman knights.”58 Supposedly, men from Marsia, the March of Ancona, Gaeta
and Valva all responded eagerly, until the recruitment drive was cut short by a
dire warning from the Normans’ foremost sponsor in the region, the prince of
Salerno: “O wretches, you will be meat for these devouring lions, for when you
feel their claws, you will know what force and power are in them.”59 At the same
time, Guaimar IV sent unmistakable word that he “would not consent to the
destruction of the Normans since he had spent much time bringing them [there],
had hired them at great expense, and considered them an inestimable treasure.”60
Not only would the powerful Lombard lord abstain from joining the anti-Norman
league, he would actively oppose it. Predictably, enthusiasm among the Italo-
Lombard volunteers quickly waned and the potential papal army dissipated.61
A few months later, on 3 June 1052, however, the final impediment to papal
military intervention in the South was removed. Guaimar IV of Salerno was
assassinated, a victim of family intrigue: his wife’s four brothers had conspired
with the ringleaders of an Amalfitan revolt. The Normans quickly avenged the
murder and elevated Guaimar’s son, Gisulf II, to prince, but the latter evidently
remained neutral in the coming confrontation with the pope’s minions.62
Leo IX wasted little time. By Christmas 1052, the pope was in Worms at
the emperor’s side, forcefully laying out the case for military action against
the Normans. His entreaties must have been efficacious, because not only did
Henry III cede control of Benevento along with other sites in southern Italy to
the Holy See, Herman of Reichenau reports, “After the pope had made many

56 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 71–4, pp. 136–37.

57 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 23, p. 94; Storia de Normanni, 3. ch. 23, p. 138. “… la
confusion et la dispersion de li Normant.”
58 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 24, p. 94; Storia de Normanni, 3. 24, p. 140. “Se je avisse
cent chevaliers effeminat, je combatteroie contre tuit li chevalier de Normandie.”
59 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 24–5, pp. 94–5; Storia de Normanni, 3. 24–5, pp. 140–41.
“O triste, vous serez viande de li devorator lion, liquel, quant vouz tocheront o alcune moziche,
vous saurez quel force et quel vertu il y a en eauz!”
60 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 25, p. 95; Storia de Normanni, 3. 25, p. 140. “… lo Prince
de Salerne non se vouloit consentir à la destruction de li Normant, car il avoit mis grant temps
à les assembler, et les avoit rachatez de molt monoie, et les tenoit coment pretiouz tresor.”
61 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 25, p. 95; Storia de Normanni, 3. 25, p. 141.
62 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 26–34, pp. 95–8; Storia de Normanni, 3. 26–34, pp.
141–49; Annales Beneventani, anno 1052, p. 179; Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 2. 82,
p. 229; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 75–8, pp. 136–37. See also
Bünemann, Robert Guiskard, p. 20; Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, p. 117.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
34 Charles D. Stanton

complaints about the acts of violence and injuries perpetrated by the Normans,
who held the property of St. Peter by force against his will, the emperor assigned
a military force to help him to expel them from there.”63 The Chronicle of
Montecassino corroborates all of this, but subsequently recounts how Henry’s
counselor, Bishop Gephard of Eichstät, “approached the emperor, vehemently
opposing him in this matter, and he cunningly had the whole army recalled.”64
As a consequence, Pope Leo brought back with him from Germany only a
few hundred Swabian mercenaries which he and his advisors had personally
procured along with what Herman of Reichenau characterized as “shameless
rogues, driven from the fatherland because of their various offenses.”65
The success of the recruiting effort depends on the source. Herman of
Reichenau says “very many Germans” accompanied the pontiff on his journey
south,66 but Amatus puts the number at just 300.67 The Chronicle of Montecassino
attests that 500 were enlisted for the enterprise from friends and relatives.68
William of Apulia, who provides the most detailed account of the engagement,
initially contends that the pope was “supported by innumerable Swabians and
Germans,” but later refines that estimate to “700 Swabians” under the command
of two nobles named Werner and Albert.69 It suffices to say that Leo returned to
Rome in the early spring of 1053 with at least several hundred Teutonic warriors
of varying ability in tow.
According to Herman of Reichenau, among others, Pope Leo remained in
Rome until after Easter when he held a synod, then in May proceeded first to
Montecassino and then on to Benevento, attracting local Lombard nobles to his
cause along the way.70 Troops came from as far away as Fermo and Ancona on
the Adriatic coast as well as Spoleto, the environs of Rome, the principality of
Capua and from Benevento itself. Prominent Lombard leaders included Duke
Atenulf of Gaeta, Count Lando of Aquino, Count Landulf of Teano, Roffred
of Guardia, Roffred of Lusenza and Malfredus of Campomarino along with

63 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 94; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 132.
“Cumque idem papa de Nordmannorum violentiis et iniuriis, qui res sancti Petri se invito
vi tenebant, multa conquestus esset, ad hos etiam ende propulsandos imperator ei auxilia
delegavit.”
64 Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 2. 46, p. 254 and ch. 81, pp. 228–29. “ad imperatorem
accedens, vehementerque super hoc illum redarguens, ut totus exercitus eius reverteretur
dolosus effecit …”
65 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 94; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 132.
“multi etiam scelerati et protervi, diversasque ob noxas patria pulsi.”
66 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 94; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 132.
“plurimi Theutonicorum …”
67 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 37, p. 99; Storia de Normanni, 3. 37, pp. 150–51.
68 Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 2. 81, p. 229.
69 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 83–4, pp. 136–37and ll. 151–53, pp.
140–41. “… Alemannis innumeris et Teutonicis …” “… Guarnerus Teutonicorum Albertusque
duces non adduxere Suevos plus septingentos …”
70 Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 2. 84, pp. 331–32; Chronicon Vulturnense, 3: 85; Herman of
Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, pp. 94–5; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 132.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 35

the brothers Trasmund and Atto (the counts of Chieti) and the Borell family
of the Sangro Valley in the Abruzzi.71 Amatus of Montecassino claims that the
pope made a certain Robert Octomarset the “standard bearer of Civitate and
the battle,”72 but it is not clear what was meant by this, nor is this personage
attested elsewhere.
Popular modern accounts of the battle, like that of Filippo Donvito in the
journal Medieval Warfare, estimate the total number of papal troops at around
six thousand,73 but this is purely conjecture. No contemporary source offers a
precise figure. Amatus says only that “the pope and his knights had hopes of
winning the battle because of their great numbers,”74 while William of Apulia
characterizes the papal army as “a large force of Italians, supported by innu-
merable Swabians and Germans.”75 It has been assumed that the papal forces
were much larger than the numbers the Normans could bring to bear, because of
statements like that of William of Apulia in which he notes the Normans “were
seen as inferior in number and in strength.”76 Although his claim is considered
less credible, Herman of Reichenau even asserts that it was the Normans who
“were far superior in numbers.”77
In a letter to Constantine Monomachos, Leo IX clearly establishes that his
intention was to effect a link up with Argyros: “Supported therefore, by such
forces as the limited time and the present emergency permitted, I decided to
seek conference and counsel of your most faithful man, the glorious duke and
commander Argyros.”78 The Annales Beneventani confirms the plan was to
rendezvous with the catepan in Apulia,79 while the route taken by the pope’s
legions more specifically suggests somewhere in the Capitanata (northern
Apulia). The pope’s anonymous Benevenetan biographer implies that the

71 Chronicon Vulturnense, 3: 86–7; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 149–74,
pp. 140–41.
72 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 39, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 29, p. 153. “gofanonier
de la Cité et de la bataille Robert, loquel se clamoit de Octomarset.”
73 P. Donvito, “The Norman Challenge to the Pope: The Battle of Civitate, June 18, 1053,”
Medieval Warfare, 1 (2011), 27–34, especially 28.
74 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 39, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 39, p. 153. “Et lo Pape
et li chevalier avoient esperance de veinchre pour la multitude de lo pueple.”
75 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 82–4, pp. 136–37. “Advenisse quidem
Latii cum milite multo audierant papam, comitantibus hunc Alemannis Innumeris et Teutonicis
…”
76 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 96–7, pp. 136–37. “esse videbantur …
utpote nec numero populi nec viribus aequi.”
77 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 95; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 132. “illi,
quia numero longe praestabant …”
78 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 10, p. 164; “The Life of Pope Leo IX”, 2. 20, p. 150. “Suffultus ergo
comitatu, qualem temporis brevitas et imminens necessitas permisit, gloriosi ducis et magistri
Argyrii fidelissimi tui colloquium et consilium expetendum censui.”
79 Annales Beneventani, anno 1053, pp. 179–80.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
36 Charles D. Stanton

rallying point was Siponto (less than two kilometers south of modern Manfre-
donia) at the southern base of the Gargano Promontory.80

Norman Mobilization
Meanwhile the Normans cannot have been oblivious to the papal purpose. The
pope’s efforts to recruit allies from among the Italo-Lombards would have
assuredly alerted them. Moreover, they were quite probably aware that Argyros
intended to join forces with the pope against them. Humphrey had assumed
Drogo’s role as count of Apulia and, thus, would have kept a close watch on
the Byzantine catepan, especially after the latter’s attempt to buy them off at
the behest of Eastern Emperor. And, in all likelihood, he had spies in Bari who
could have informed him of the catepan’s plans, for there was a Norman faction
in the city which was, for a time, powerful enough to refuse Argyros entry into
Bari when he first arrived as “dux Italiae” from Constantinople in March 1051.81
In any case, enmity for Argyros ran deep among the Normans. A decade
before, they had elected this son of Melus as their leader, according to Amatus,
but he had defected to the Byzantines at the siege of Trani in July 1042. Peter
Amicus, in particular, bore him ill-will and threatened to kill him.82 This was
probably because Peter had had a vested interest in Trani’s capture: it had been
allotted to him at the apportionment of Apulia by the Normans in the autumn of
1042.83 Chalandon even contends that the Normans defeated Argyros at Taranto
and Crotone in 1052, but this supposition is based upon the Chronicon Breve
Nortmannicum,84 which may be an eighteenth-century forgery, according to
André Jacob and Graham Loud.85 Besides, it would have made little sense for
Argyros to have sought an alliance with the pope only to engage the powerful
Normans alone on the eve of combining forces.
Far more credible is the account rendered by the Anonymi Barensis Chronicon,
an anonymous set of annals from Bari dating from 860 to 1118, which describes
an encounter between Argyros and the Normans at Siponto. It notes that the
catepan sailed to Siponto where Humphrey and Peter Amicus intercepted him
and slaughtered his army of Lombards, after which “the wounded and half-dead

80 “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae,” in Memorie Istoriche della Pontificia città di
Benevento, 2: 318.
81 Lupus Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1051, p. 59.
82 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 28, p. 75; Storia de Normanni, 2. 28, pp. 91–3; Annales
Barenses MGH SS 5: 51–6, especially 56; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 1.
ll. 478–85, pp. 124–25.
83 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 31, p. 77; Storia de Normanni, 2. 31, p. 96.
84 Chalandon, Histoire de la domination Normande en Italie, 1: 134 and note 5; Chronicon Breve
Nortmannicum, anno 1052, p. 278.
85 A. Jacob, “Le Breve Chronicon Nortmannicum: a veritable faux de Pietro Polidori,” Quellen
und forschungen aus Italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 66 (1986), 378–92; Loud, Age
of Robert Guiscard, p. 131 .

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 37

Argyros” fled to Vieste on the tip of the Gargano peninsula.86 The entry is for
1052, the year prior to the battle of Civitate, but the defeat of Leo IX’s army
by the Normans is described immediately afterwards in the same year. The
anonymous Barese chronicler obviously considered the two events as having
occurred one after the other. He simply got the date wrong. If such is the case,
then the logical deduction is that Argyros made the journey from Bari to Siponto
in an effort to make his prearranged rendezvous with Pope Leo IX. He probably
elected to go by ship so as to avoid a premature engagement with the Normans
who dominated the hinterland. Humphrey, who was probably already aware
of the planned pincer strategy, was likely alerted to the movement of Argyros’
fleet by Peter Amicus. Although the latter had not been able to take Trani by
this time, he held the ports of Barletta to the north and Bisceglie to the south.87
Peter’s people would have been able to spot the Barese ships from the shore
as they sailed north, since medieval galleys usually sailed within sight of land
for navigation purposes.88 Thus, he and Humphrey may have been waiting for
Argyros on the beach at Siponto. Such a turn of events would explain why the
catepan never effected his join-up with the papal army and why, in fact, nothing
is heard from Argyros until he is noted leaving Bari for Constantinople in 1055,
never to return.89
By this time Humphrey must certainly have assumed that a confrontation
with papal forces was imminent and that marshaling all available Norman troops
was imperative. Naturally, he summoned his younger brother, Robert,90 whom
Drogo had installed in Calabria, first at Scribla and later at San Marco Argen-
tano.91 It is not known precisely how many troops Robert brought with him,
but there were at least two hundred Norman knights provided to him by Gerard
of Buonalbergo as part of the dowry that came with Gerard’s aunt, Alberada,
Robert’s first wife. According to Amatus, it was also Gerard who gave Robert
the sobriquet “Guiscard”, meaning “the cunning” in Old French, in honor of
his reputation for resourcefulness as leader of a band of brigands when he first
arrived in hardscrabble Calabria.92 In addition, it is probable that a contingent

86 Anonymi Barensis chronicon, anno 1052, p. 152. “Ipse Argiro semivivus exiliit plagatus …”
87 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 29–31, pp. 132–33.
88 C. Stanton, Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean (Woodbridge, 2011), p. 3.
89 Anonymi Barensis chronicon, anno 1055, p. 152; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert
Guiscard, 2. ll. 267–76, pp. 146–47.
90 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 126–28, pp. 138–39.
91 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 7, p. 88; Storia de Normanni, 3. 7, pp. 120–21; Malaterra,
Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 12, p. 60 and 1. 16, pp. 62–3; De rebus gestis Rogerii,1. 12, p. 14
and 1. 16, p. 16.
92 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 10–11, pp. 88–9; Storia de Normanni, 3. 10–11, pp.
122–26. “Guiscard” (“the cunning”) is derived from the Old French word guischart, meaning
“cunning, sly, crafty”. A. Hindley, F. Langley and B. Levy, Old French-English Dictionary
(Cambridge, 2000), p. 355.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
38 Charles D. Stanton

of Slavs, which Robert had recruited into his entourage early on, accompanied
him as light infantry.93
Humphrey also called upon Richard Quarrel, for the latter had recently been
chosen as count of Aversa following the demise of Rainulf (II) Trincanocte.
Competitive enmity had been shared by the two families (Drogo had even
imprisoned Richard briefly prior to the latter’s ascendance to count), but the
survival of all the Normans in southern Italy was now at stake.94 Besides,
Richard possessed a personal interest in the region: his uncle Rainulf had been
allocated Siponto and Monte Gargano by the Apulian Normans in the fall of
1042.95 As successor to Rainulf, he would have inherited that claim in the Capi-
tanata. Richard would not have hesitated to join the fray and the forces that he
had to offer would have been formidable. Aversa, ever since it had been awarded
to Richard’s uncle Rainulf by Guaimar IV of Salerno in 1031,96 had become the
primary base for the Normans of Campania and Campania had been the first
destination of Norman knights migrating from northern France since the begin-
ning of the eleventh century.
Moreover, Humphrey could count several battle-tested veterans within his
own ranks. Many like, the Amicus brothers, Walter and Peter, had fought by his
side in Apulia since the early 1040s when the Normans first seized Melfi and
made it their base in the Basilicata.97 One, Hugh Toutebove,98 prior to the Battle
of Olivento on 17 March 1041, famously struck the horse of a Byzantine emis-
sary “on the neck with his bare fist, knocking it senseless to the ground with a
single blow.”99 The Normans decisively won the subsequent engagement against
numerically superior forces and the two encounters which followed.100 In other
words, the Normans were a battle-hardened bunch, not accustomed to either
surrender or defeat. Many of them had known each other for a long time and
were comfortable fighting in compact cavalry units under the leadership of their

93 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 16, pp. 62–3; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 16, p. 16.
94 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 12, p. 90; Storia de Normanni, 3. 12, pp. 126–27; William
of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 123–25, pp. 138–39.
95 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 30, p. 76; Storia de Normanni, 2. 30, p. 95.
96 Amatus, History of the Normans, 1. 42, p. 60; Storia de Normanni, 1. 42, pp. 53–4; William
of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 1. 170–74, pp. 108–09.
97 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 28, p. 75 and 2. 31, p. 77; Storia de Normanni, 2. 28,
p. 93 and 2. 31, pp. 95–6; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 27–31, pp.
132–33 and ll. 131–32, pp. 138–39.
98 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 131–33, pp. 138–39. See also Taviani-
Carozzi, La terreur du monde, Robert Guiscard, p. 205.
99 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 9, p. 57; De rebus gestis Rogerii,1. 9, p. 12. “quidam
normannus, Ugo, cognomento Tudebusem, equum manu attrectare coepit: et, ut mirabile
aliquid de se sociisque suis, unde terrerentur, Graecis nunciaretur, nudo pugno equum in
cervice percutiens …”
100 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 21–6, pp. 71–4; Storia de Normanni, 2. 21–6, pp. 79–90;
Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 9–10, pp. 57–9; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 9–10, pp.
12–13; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 1. ll. 254–307, pp. 112–15.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 39

respective lords.101 In all, William of Apulia estimates that the three companies of
Normans amounted to “three thousand horsemen and a few infantry.”102 Robert
Bünemann considers even that number too high, pointing to the possibility that
William of Conqueror himself probably had only two thousand cavalry at most
at Hastings.103 Whatever their actual number, chronicle evidence suggests the
Normans were far fewer than the forces arrayed against them.

Armageddon
The Chronicon Vulturnense suggests that the papal army took a somewhat circu-
itous route from Benevento to Apulia. The early twelfth-century chronicle of the
monastery of San Vincenzo al Volturno says it went by way the Biferno Valley,
camping on the river at a place called Sale,104 which Michele Fuiano speculates
may have been in the vicinity of present-day Guardialfiera.105 This means the
pope’s men probably marched northward from Benevento, skirting the Monti
del Matese, to join the Biferno, probably in the neighborhood of Boiano,106
before continuing northeast to the far end of Lago del Liscione. This elliptical
itinerary was doubtless chosen to avoid Norman-controlled territory. The more
direct track went by way of a pass through the Monti della Daunia dominated
by the Norman-held fortress of Bovino, captured by Drogo in 1045.107 Some,
like Ferdinand Chalandon, would include the nearby fortified city of Troia as
a potential obstacle,108 but the inhabitants of that town did not began paying
tribute to the Normans until after Civitate109 and it was not captured by Robert
Guiscard until 1060.110 From Sale, the papal troops probably forded the Biferno
and finally headed east along the Via Traiana-Frentana, an ancient Roman road,
through the area of Larino to cross the River Fortore at the Ponte di Civitate
(Bridge of Civitate). [See Map 1]

101 R. A. Brown, The Normans (Woodbridge, 1984), p. 38; M. Chibnall, The Normans (Oxford,
2000), p. 26.
102 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 137–38, pp. 138–39. “Vix proceres
istos equites ter mille sequuntur, et pauci pedites.”
103 Bünemann, Robert Guiskard, pp. 20–1.
104 Chronicon Vulturnense, 3: 85.
105 M. Fuiano, “La Battaglia di Civitate (1053),” Archivio Storico Pugliese, 2 (1949), 125–33,
especially 126.
106 Bünemann, Robert Guiskard, p. 20.
107 Romuald of Salerno, Romualdi Salernitani Chronicon, p. 179.
108 Chalandon, Histoire de la domination Normande en Italie, 1: 136.
109 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 293–94, p. 148.
110 Amatus, History of the Normans, 4. 3, p. 112 and 5. 6, p. 135; Storia de Normanni, 4. 3,
p. 185 and 5. 6, p. 228; “Chronicon Amalfitanum”, in U. Schwarz, Amalfi im frühen Mittelalter
(9.–11. Jahrundert) (Tübingen, 1978), pp. 211–12; Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 3. 15,
p. 378. The Chronicon Breve Nortmannicum, anno 1048, p 278, does note the capture of Troia
by Humphrey in 1048 but this document has largely been disregarded as an eighteenth-century
forgery (see note 85 above).

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
40 Charles D. Stanton

Map 1.  Routes taken to the battle

About 500 meters south of where the Ponte di Civitate spans the Fortore,
its tributary, the Staina, branches off to the east and parallels the river to the
south. William of Apulia says the papal army camped along the east bank of
the Fortore,111 but Leo’s anonymous Beneventan biographer specifies instead the
Staina.112 Taking the various contemporary descriptions of the looming battle
into account, the latter is more likely. Varying from 500 to 700 meters further
to the east, the modern Strada Statale Adriatica 16 (Italian state road) shadows
the Staina. Most of the fighting seems to have taken place in the relatively level
intervening ground between the Staina and Strada Statale Adriatica 16. The
northern boundary of the battle field was probably the Ponte di Civitate and the
southern border was likely a large farm called Tre Fontane (Three Fountains).
Still further east about 500 meters, opposite the center of the battlefield is a low
hill called today the Coppa Mengoni, gently rising to a height of 222 meters
above mean sea level (about 50 to 100 meters above the surrounding terrain).
Just about a kilometer north of that are the ruins of a fortified wall, believed
to be all that remains of the old cathedral of Civitate. The city was obliterated

111 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 177–78, pp. 140–43.
112 “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae,” 2: 318.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 41

Map 2.  Battle of Civitate

at beginning of the fifteenth century by an earthquake. Under the Romans, it

was known as Teanum Apulum and its significance stemmed from the fact that
it stood at the head of the Via Traiana-Frentana. The catepan Boiannes had it
fortified and renamed in the aftermath of his victory over the Lombards and
Normans at Cannae in 1018.113 Now it would witness one of the most decisive
battles of the medieval Mediterranean. [See Map 2]
Most of the Normans had undoubtedly arrived some time before 17 June
1053 from over the Tavoliere delle Puglie, a thirty-square-kilometer alluvial
plain extending from the Monti della Daunia in the west to the Gargano Prom-
ontory in the east and bordered by the Ofanto River in the south and the Fortore
in the north. Richard of Aversa and his Campanian knights probably came by
way of Bovino while Guiscard must have brought his Calabrians through the
environs of Ascoli Satriano. Those from Melfi and Venosa in the Basilicata
must have made their way up somewhere east of there. Michele Fuiano hypoth-
esizes that the Candelaro River between Siponto and the vicinity of today’s San
Paolo di Civitate, a few kilometers south of the old city of Civitate, would have

113 Fuiano, “La Battaglia di Civitate,” pp. 124–25 and 124, n. 2.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
42 Charles D. Stanton

been another route.114 Accepting the premise that Humphrey had just beaten
Argyros at Siponto, he would likely have brought his Apulians and the Amicus
brothers along this path. The Norman army apparently bivouacked on the other
side of the Coppa Mengoni from the papal army. Both William of Apulia and
Anonymous of Benevento testify that there was a humble hill between the two
encampments which prevented them from seeing one another.115
Hostilities did not commence immediately. Most of the major sources agree
that the Normans initially sought a negotiated resolution to the conflict.116 Their
motivation in doing so was clear. First of all, field commanders rarely risked
all on the vagaries of a single pitched battle unless there was little choice. John
Gillingham provides a persuasive paradigm which contends, “Most campaigns
did not end in battle largely because both commanders were reluctant to risk
battle,” which he regarded as “a desperately chancy business.”117 This philos-
ophy was in keeping with the “General rules of war” of the fourth-century
Roman strategist, Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus who counseled, “It is pref-
erable to subdue an enemy by famine, raids and terror, than in battle where
fortune tends to have more influence than bravery.”118 Gillingham’s school
of thought on medieval battle-seeking has a number of prominent adherents,
including Stephen Morillo and Matthew Strickland.119 Recently, Clifford Rogers
has offered a more balanced perspective by pointing out that a commander may
have viewed a pitched battle as “the quickest and cheapest way” to achieve his
objectives.120 Nonetheless, Humphrey, the titular head of the Norman forces,
was a highly experienced military leader who, given the circumstances at Civi-
tate, would have been unlikely to gamble his limited forces unless he felt he
had no option. The Normans were apparently grossly outnumbered. William
of Apulia forthrightly observes, “Although famous for their deeds of arms, the
Normans were, on seeing so many columns, afraid to resist them.”121 Humphrey
may also have felt that his knights were in no condition for combat. They were

114 Fuiano, “La Battaglia di Civitate,” pp. 127–28.

115 “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae,” 2: 318; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert
Guiscard, 2. ll. 148–49, pp. 140–41.
116 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 39, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 39, pp. 152–54;
Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 95; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 132;
William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 85–92, pp. 136–37.
117 John Gillingham, “Richard I and the Science of War,” in Anglo-Norman Warfare, ed. Matthew
Strickland (Woodbridge, 1992), pp. 194–207, especially pp. 198–99.
118 Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, 3. 26, trans. N. P. Milner (Liverpool, 1993), p. 108;
Flavi Vegeti Renati, Epitoma rei militaris, 3.26, ed. C. Lang (Leipzig, 1885), p. 121. “Aut
inopia aut superventibus aut terrore melius est hostem domare quam proelio, in quo amplius
solet fortuna postestatis habere quam virtus.”
119 Stephen Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings (Woodbridge, 1994), p. 2; Strick-
land, War and Chivalry, p. 59.
120 Clifford J. Rogers, “The Vegetian ‘Science of Warfare’,” Journal of Medieval Military History,
1 (2002), 1–19, especially p. 19.
121 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 85–6, pp. 136–37. “Normanni licet
insignes fulgentibus armis, agminibus tantis visis obstare timentes.”

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 43

starving. Amatus says, “Hunger vexed the Normans, who by the example of
the Apostles took the heads of grain, rubbed them in their hands, and ate the
kernels.”122 Similarly, William of Apulia relates that “the French, who lacked
bread, had dried the green corn over a fire and had eaten the burnt grains.”123
It seems that news of the papal army had emboldened the local Apulian towns
to close their gates to the Normans and refuse them sustenance.124 To make
matters worse, Lupus Protospatarios, a Byzantine civil servant who wrote a set
of annals for the thema of Longobardia (Apulia) from 855 to 1102, records that
a “great famine” plagued Apulia that year.125 Lastly, despite their reputation
for rapaciousness, there seems to have been some reluctance on the part of the
Normans to wage war on the Vicar of Christ.126
Unfortunately, the parlay did not go well. According to William of Apulia,
the Normans “sent envoys who requested a peace treaty and who asked the pope
to benevolently receive their submission” and that “he be willing to be their
lord and they might be his vassals.”127 “And they promised,” adds Amatus, “to
give incense and tribute money each year to the Holy Church, and those lands
which they had conquered by arms they wanted to receive from the hand of the
Vicar of the Church.”128 In order to bolster their plea, they presented the impe-
rial banner by which Henry III had invested Rainulf II with his land in 1047.
All of these entreaties were rudely rebuffed. Frederick of Lorraine, the pope’s
chancellor, “threatened them with death if they did not leave.”129 The leadership
of the German contingent was more demeaning and deprecatory still. According
to William of Apulia, they derided the relatively short stature of the Normans
and forcefully advised the pope to spurn their proposals:
The Germans, notable for their long hair, good looks and height, mocked the Normans,
who seemed small [to them], and disdained the messages of a people whom they
considered their inferiors both in numbers and strength. They surrounded the pope and
arrogantly addressed him, “Command the Normans to leave the land of Italy, to lay
down their arms and return to their native land. If they refuse this, we do not wish to

122 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 40, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 40, p. 154. “La neces-
sité de la fame moleste li Normant, et par lo exemple de li Apostole prenoient li espic de lo
grain et frotoient o la main, et ensi menjoient lo grain.”
123 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 117–18, pp. 138–39. “quos Franci-
genae, quia pane carebant, igni torrebant et vescebantur adustis.”
124 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 119–21, pp. 138–39.
125 Lupus Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1053, p. 59. “magna fames …”
126 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 89–90, pp. 136–37. See also Loud, Age
of Robert Guiscard, p. 117.
127 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 87–92, pp. 136–37. “Legatos mittunt,
qui pacis foedera poscant, quique rogent papam, placidus famulamen eorum suscipiat ... at
quaesitorum cognoscere munus ab ipso: si placet, hunc dominum poscunt sibi seque fideles.”
128 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 39, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 39, p. 153. “… et
prometoient chacun an de donner incense et tribut à la sainte Eclize, et celles terres qu’il ont
veincues par armes voloient recevoir le par la main de lo Vicaire de l”Eglise.”
129 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 39, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 39, p. 154. “les manesa
de mort, et lor propona qu’il doient fugir.”

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
44 Charles D. Stanton

receive their peace overtures nor should you pay any attention to their messages. They
have not yet experienced German swords. If they do not leave willingly they should
be forced to go, and failing that they will perish by the sword!”130

Obviously, if the testimony of the Norman chroniclers can be believed, there

was no sincere attempt on the part of the pope’s entourage to negotiate with
the Normans in good faith. There was no realistic expectation that disinherited
Norman knights would slink chastened back across the Alps to northern France.
And, to be equitable, the Normans had amply demonstrated up to that point
that once the papal coalition disbanded, as it surely would, they would continue
to take whatever their swords would permit regardless of any promises made
under duress. This is why, as per Anonymous of Benevento, the Normans had
made having a free hand against Argyros a condition of their submission.131
The pope’s advisors understood that the only viable option was to destroy the
Norman forces in the field while the papal host retained numerical superiority.
The harshness of the rejection, if true, however, did not serve the interests of
the Holy See. If Leo had thought that Argyros might still join the fray, it would
have made more sense to play for time by attempting to string out the nego-
tiations with some hope of compromise, but, according to Leo’s own words
written subsequent to the battle, he and his entourage had demanded “total
subjection.”132 As it was, they had only succeeded in removing all alternatives
from the Normans and instilling them with a fierce resolve.
Once the emissaries returned to camp, the Norman leadership had little diffi-
culty deciding what to do. In his post-battle letter to Constantine IX Mono-
machos, Pope Leo writes, “Meanwhile, while we were trying to break down
their obstinacy with our salutary warnings and while they [the Normans] were
responding with false promises of total subjection, they launched a sudden
attack against our forces.”133 Of course, they did. The Normans bore the impe-
rial banner of investiture to symbolize their belief that the lands which they had
conquered with their own blood was theirs by right.134 And at this point, they, in

130 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 99–105, pp. 136–37. “Teutonici, quia
caesaries et forma decoros fecerat egregie proceri corporis illos, corpora derident Normanica,
quae breviora esse videbantur, nec eorum nuntia curant, upote nec numero populi nec viribus
aequi. Conveniunt papam verbis animoque superbi: ‘Praecipe Normannis Italas dimittere
terras abiectis armis, patriosque revisere fines. Quod si noluerint, nec foedera pacis ab ipsis
suscipias volumus, nec eorum nuntia cures. Nondum sunt gladios experti Teutonicorum.
Intereant gladiis, aut compellantur abire, invitique solum, quod nolunt sponte, relinquant.’”
(English translation by G. A. Loud at www.leeds.ac.uk/history/weblearning/MedievalHistory-
TextCentre/medievalTexts/html.)
131 “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae,” 2: 318.
132 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 10, p. 164; “The Life of Pope Leo IX” 2. 20, p. 150. “omnem
subiectionem.”
133 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 10, p. 164; “The Life of Pope Leo IX”, 2. 20, p. 150. “Interea
nobis eorum pertinaciam salutari admonitione frangere tentantibus et illis ex adverso omnem
subiectionem ficte pollicentibus, repentino impetu comitatum nostrum aggrediuntur ...”
134 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 39, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 39, p. 154.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 45

effect, had nowhere else to go.135 Moreover, they had been “three days without
bread.”136 If they had waited any longer, they might not have had the strength to
lift lance and shield in their own defense. They may also have felt that Argyros,
though defeated at Siponto, was still a threat to unexpectedly appear in their
rear with a hastily amassed Greco-Lombard army. Another factor in the decision
may have been that “the German people [the most formidable fighting force in
the papal camp] were not seen in great numbers.”137 Besides, as Taviani-Carozzi
points out at some length, it did not help matters much that the emissaries
of these French-speaking warriors were denigrated by German nobles and a
German chancellor at the behest of a German pope.138 But in the end, it was
about survival, plain and simple. In the view of the Normans, it was prevail or
perish. Thus, they would have pursued every possible ploy to even the odds,
including surprise.
So “before the crowing of the cock” on the morning of 18 June 1053,139
William of Apulia reports, the Normans “climbed the hill to inspect the enemy
camp; after which they armed themselves.”140 Richard of Aversa took the right
wing, Humphrey commanded the center and Robert Guiscard was assigned
the left wing and held in reserve.141 Unfortunately, the chroniclers do not say
precisely how the various companies deployed themselves in relation to the
surrounding topography, like the Coppa Mengoni. Logic, however, would
dictate that, since the Normans were initiating the hostilities, they would use the
heights to their best advantage. Once Humphrey and his lieutenants had taken
possession of the hill for the purposes of reconnoitering the enemy camp, it is
doubtful that he would have risked relinquishing it. No competent commander
would willingly cede the high ground to the enemy, therefore Humphrey prob-
ably arranged his company on the crest of the Coppa Mengoni with Richard’s
Campanians formed up on the north slopes to his right. Archaeological and
anecdotal evidence (i.e., where skeletal remains and other artifacts of the battle
were found) convinced Fuiano that the Normans indeed began the battle from
the hill.142 William of Apulia testifies that Humphrey placed Robert and his
Calabrians on his left,143 but, perhaps, not immediately to his left. Humphrey
may have tried to hold them in reserve by hiding them from view behind the

135 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 180–82, pp. 142–43.
136 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. l. 138, pp. 138–39. “Triduo quia panis
egentes …”
137 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. l. 138, pp. 138–39. “Teutonici populi non
copia magna videtur.”
138 Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, Robert Guiscard, pp. 200–01 and 209–10.
139 Poncelet, “Vie et miracles du pape S. Leon IX”, 25, p. 285. “ante pullorum cantus …”
140 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 182–83, pp. 142–43. “Collem
conscendunt, ut castra hostilia spectent. Spectatis castris armantur.”
141 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 40, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 40, p. 155; William of
Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 184–91, pp. 142–43.
142 Fuiano, “La Battaglia di Civitate”, pp. 130–31.
143 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 183–85, pp. 142–43.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
46 Charles D. Stanton

southern slopes of the hill. According to Jim Bradbury, a cavalry detachment

held in reserve for a decisive charge was a common element in Norman battle
plans.144 Bünemann, for one, believes this was the case at Civitate.145 Further-
more, concealing a reserve element was an age-old battle tactic. Hannibal had
used it at Cannae to annihilate a Roman army twice the size of his own in 216
B.C. and Caesar had won a crushing victory over Pompey the Great at Pharsalus
in 48 B.C. with the tactic.146 This would help explain why the papal army failed
to form a wing to counter Guiscard’s. They simply did not see him.
The pope and his commanders must have realized that battle was immi-
nent once they saw the Normans forming up. Amatus reports, “Rainulf and
Renier were chosen to lead the papal forces,”147 but they are neither identified
nor mentioned in any other contemporary source. Bünemann believes, instead,
that Leo IX may have arranged the battle lines himself in the exigency of the
moment.148 After all, his Lotharingian biographer bears witness that as Bruno,
the twenty-three-year old deacon of Toul, he had served as a field commander for
Conrad II, king of the Germans, on a previous expedition to Italy: “In the direc-
tion of this secular warfare he immediately showed himself wise and circum-
spect, as if he had hitherto been engaged solely in affairs of this kind.” The
monk adds, “He took care to assign each man a suitable task and so regulated
their service that everyone, whether nobleman or commoner, need be concerned
only with his own duties.”149 According to both Amatus and Anonymous of
Benevento, he, at the very least, offered his blessing and encouragement prior
to the onslaught.150 Amatus contends that the pope absolved his knights of their
sins and “gave the order to do battle” from the city walls,151 but this seems
unlikely given the location of the city, less than six hundred meters north of the
Norman camp and over a kilometer east of where his own forces were bivou-
acked. More believably, this was done at the Pozzo di San Leo (Well of Saint

144 Jim Bradbury, “Battles in England and Normandy, 1066–1154,” in Strickland, Anglo-Norman
Warfare, pp. 182–93, especially pp. 191–92.
145 Bünemann, Robert Guiskard, p. 21.
146 Goldsworthy, Complete Roman Army, pp. 40–1and 182–83. At Cannae Hannibal hid two corps
of Libyan foot behind his front line which he used to ambush Roman legionaries breaking
through his center and at Pharsalus Caesar employed a fourth line of infantry concealed behind
his right flank to surprise Pompey’s charging cavalry and to roll up the general’s left flank.
147 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 40, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 40, p. 155. “Ranolfe
et Raynier furent eslit principe de ceste part.”
148 Bünemann, Robert Guiskard, pp. 21–2.
149 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1.1. 7, pp. 134–35; “The Life of Pope Leo IX”, 1. 7, p. 108. “In illius
itaque saecularis militiae dispositione sic repente sagax apparuit et providus, quasi huiusmodi
negotiis tantum fuisset hactenus exercitus.” “… quos sic per assignata et congrua unicuique
officia curabat ordinare, ut tantun pro se quique tam nobiles, quam privati debuissent solliciti
esse.”
150 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 40, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 40, p. 154; “Vita et
obitus sancti Leonis noni papae” 2: 319–20.
151 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 40, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 40, p. 154. “lor
commanda de boche qu’il alent combatre.”

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 47

Leo), about four hundred meters north of the Tre Fontane farm and opposite the
south slopes of the Coppa Mengoni.152
The Swabians were deployed on the right wing, facing Humphrey’s Apulians,
while the Italo-Lombards were placed on the left, opposite Richard with his
“hand-picked squadron of knights.”153 It was the Italo-Lombards that the Leo
was most keen to embolden. By all accounts, they were a pusillanimous, motley
lot whose only advantage was numbers. William of Apulia called them “the
dregs of Italy, a most unworthy people” whose “basic instincts were fear, trem-
bling and decadence.”154 Moreover, many were ill-equipped peasants; only the
nobles probably had the benefit of armor and mounts. And none were accus-
tomed to acting in concert, since they had originated from so many different
regions. In a rousing harangue attributed to the pope by Anonymous of Bene-
vento, Leo attempted to hearten them: “Rally, defend the fields, the vines, the
homes, the sons, the wives, defend yourselves! Do I urge you to combat in order
to procure an increase in honor of itself? No, fight only for your country!”155
The pope’s concerns also bespoke a lack of cohesive leadership among the
Italo-Lombards. William of Apulia specifically names the brothers Trasmund
and Atto, the counts of Teate (modern Chieti), and “the sons of the noble Borell
family” of the Sangro Valley, all in the Abruzzi, as leading the Italo-Lombard
contingent, but no one actually seemed to be in charge.156 The untrained rank
and file would have tended to follow the orders of their respective lords regard-
less. The chain of command was diffuse and muddled at best. Thus, while “the
warlike Swabians” on the right flank apparently responded with alacrity to
the orders of their two commanders,157 Werner and Albert, William of Apulia
claims, “The Italians all stood crowded together on the other side [the left flank],
because they did not know how to arrange their troops in proper battle order.”158
Richard of Aversa could not have failed to notice. He charged. Amatus says,
“Count Richard divided the Germans and passed into their midst,” but his
account is implausible in the extreme.159 Richard would have had to cross in

152 M. Fraccacreta, Teatro topografico storico-poetica della Capitanata, 6 vols. (Naples, 1832),
2: 141.
153 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. l. 186, pp. 142–43. “clara chors equitum
…”
154 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 108–11, pp. 138–39. “Spem dabat his
italae fex indignissma gentis …” “his erat innatus pavor et fuga luxuriesque.”
155 “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae” 2: 319–20. “Expergiscimini inquam agros, vineas,
domos, filios, uxores, vos denique ipsos defendite. Nunquid ut alienum cuiuslibet honorem
acquiratis vos pugnare moneo? Absit, pro patria tantum pugnate.”
156 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 164–66, pp. 140–41. “et Burrellina
generosa propagine proles.”
157 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. l. 187, pp. 142–43. “bella Suevos …”
158 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 193–95, pp. 142–43. “Itali simul omnes
conglomerati, parte alia stabant: etenim certamine belli non aptare suas acies recto ordine
norant.”
159 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 40, p. 100; Storia de Normanni, 3. 40, p. 155. “Et lo conte
Richart despart li Todeschi et passe parmi eaux.”

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
48 Charles D. Stanton

front of Humphrey to ensconce himself in the middle of the most formidable

unit in the papal army, leaving the larger Italian wing to crash the Norman right
flank. William of Apulia is far more credible here. He insists Richard headed
straight for the Italians.160 Seeing hundreds of tons of horseflesh ridden by some
of the most skilled horsemen in Europe thundering down the hill might have
unnerved the stoutest of hearts, something which the Italo-Lombards clearly
were not. They immediately broke. “Fear filled them all,” recounts William of
Apulia, “and they turned and fled across hill and dale.”161
The collapse may have even been exacerbated by treachery. The anonymous
contemporary author of “Vie et miracles du pape Leon IX” claims a certain
Count Madelfrid (probably Malfredus of Campomarino in the Molise) betrayed
the papal cause for Norman silver. He had supposedly prearranged in advance
to flee with his people at the first charge of the Norman cavalry.162 Under the
circumstances, such an action, if true, would have almost certainly engen-
dered a general panic and rout among the Italo-Lombards. While the tale is not
corroborated by other sources, it is certainly not beyond the realm of possibility.
Suborning their adversaries with land and largesse was a ploy routinely prac-
ticed by the Normans in the south. Guiscard did it at the culmination of the siege
of Salerno in 1076163 and again to breach the defenses of Durazzo in 1081.164
The Swabians showed themselves to be another matter entirely. They appear
to have been well led, highly disciplined and utterly resolute. Unlike the
Normans who often began their training in the saddle before the age of eight,165
the Swabians “were not versed in horsemanship.”166 Accordingly, they fought on
foot where they could wield their preferred weapon, the sword, to horrific effect.
“These swords were very long and keen,” insists William of Apulia, “and they
were very often capable of cutting someone in two!”167 Although the precise
size and shape of the Swabian weapon of choice is not known, the presumption
from William of Apulia’s obviously exaggerated description is that it must have
been longer and heavier than its Norman counterpart. Whatever they were, they
proved to be a match for Norman lances – at least at the outset.

160 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 196–97, pp. 142–43.
161 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 193–95, pp. 142–43. “tremor arripit
omnes, inque fugam versi perplana, per ardua diffugiunt ...”
162 Mathieu, “Commentaire”, in La Geste de Robert Guiscard, p. 284; “Vie et miracles du pape
S. Leon IX”, 285–87.
163 Amatus, History of the Normans, 8. 24, pp. 194–95; Storia de Normanni, 8. 24, pp. 364–65;
William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 3, ll. 442–45, pp. 188–89.
164 Lupus Protospatarius, Annales, anno 1082, p. 61; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 3. 28,
pp. 158–59; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 3. 28, p. 74–5; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert
Guiscard, 4, ll. 450–504, pp. 229–31.
165 R. H. C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse (London, 1989), p. 19.
166 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, line 154, pp. 140–41. “... equos adeo non
ducere cauta.”
167 Ibid., ll. 158–60, pp. 140–41. “Sunt etenim longi specialiter et peracuti illorum gladii;
percussum a vertice corpus scindere saepe solent...”

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 49

Humphrey opened his assault on the Swabians with a volley of arrows.

The Germans responded in kind; then, both sides charged each other, swords
drawn.168 The carnage must have been appalling. “You could see human bodies
split down the middle, and horse and man laying dead together,” reports
William.169 While William’s description is clearly embellished, it indicates the
fighting was quite fierce. At this point the clash had become a stalemate at best,
in which the Swabians seemed “determined not to yield in any way.”170 Taviani-
Carozzi contends that Humphrey’s corps may even have been driven back,171
but there is nothing in the sources to substantiate this. Besides, the Swabians
would probably have had to advance uphill to do so. In any case, Humphrey
had become so beleaguered that Robert felt compelled to join the fray. He prob-
ably wheeled his wing around the hill clockwise (from the south around the
west side), smashing into the German right (west side) flank. [Refer to Map 2]
William of Apulia extols Guiscard’s actions in overblown language reminiscent
of the Chanson de Roland:
He speared them with his lance, beheaded them with his sword, dealing out fearful
blows with his mighty hands. He fought with each hand, both lance and sword hit
whatever target they were aimed at. He was unhorsed three times, thrice he recovered
his strength and returned more fiercely to the fray. His fury merely increased, as does
that of the lion who roars and furiously attacks those animals less strong than himself,
and if he meets resistance becomes more ferocious and burns with greater anger. He
gives no quarter, he drags off his prey and eats it, scatters what he cannot devour,
bringing death to all. In such a way did Robert continue to bring death to the Swabians
who opposed him. He cut off feet and hands, sliced heads from bodies, ripped into
breasts and chests, and transfixed those whose heads he had cut off. Cutting off the
heads of these huge men he made them the same size as those smaller, proving that the
greatest bravery is not the prerogative of the tall, but often rests with those of shorter
stature. After the battle it was known that none, victor or vanquished, had inflicted
such mighty blows.172

168 Ibid., ll. 210–12, pp. 142–43.

169 Ibid., ll. 214–15, pp. 144–45. “Illic humanum a vertice corpus vidisses et equos hominis cum
corpore caesos.”
170 Ibid., ll. 217–18, pp. 144–45. “nullatenus ullo cedere velle modo …”
171 Taviani-Carozzi, La terreur du monde, Robert Guiscard, p. 207.
172 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 223–43, pp. 144–45. “Et validis
manibus horrendos incutit ictus; pugnat utraque manu, nec lancea cassa, nec ensis cassus
erat, quocumque manum deducere vellet. Ter deiectus equo, ter viribus ipse resumptis, maior
in arma redit; stimulos furor ipse ministrat. Ut leo, cum frendens animalia forte minora acriter
invadit, si quid reperire quod obset coeperit, insanit, magis et mairibus ira accensa stimulat;
nil iam dimittit inultum; hoc trahit, hoc mandit, quod mandi posse negatur dissipat, affligens
pecus exitialiter omne: taliter obstantes diversa caede Suevos caedere non cessat Robertus;
et hos pede truncat, et manibus quosdam; caput huic cum corpore caedit; illius ventrem cum
pectore dissecat, huius transdigit costas abscisco vertice; magna corpora corporibus truncata
minoribus aequat; virtutisque docet palmam non affore tantum corporibus magnis, qua
saepe minora redundant. Nullus in hoc bello, sicut post bella probatum est, victor vel victus
tam magnos edidit ictus.” (English translation by G. A. Loud at www.leeds.ac.uk/history/
weblearning/MedievalHistoryTextCentre/medievalTexts/html.)

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
50 Charles D. Stanton

Still, the stalwart Swabians stood their ground. What ended the deadlock
was Richard. He had managed to rally his knights and return to the battle. In
William’s words, the Italo-Lombards they were chasing had “fled like doves
with a hawk in pursuit, at top speed towards the rocky summits of a moun-
tain peak,”173 but the only nearby mountains of any magnitude were the Monti
della Daunia, some twenty kilometers to the southwest. What probably stopped
predators and prey alike was much closer: the Fortore, no more than a kilometer
from the main mêlée. The river also would have made a convenient rallying
point for Richard to reform his cavalry. Once this was accomplished, he returned
to the battlefield to see his comrades still embroiled in desperate combat with
the Germans. Richard charged.174 The result was catastrophic. The Swabians
must have been nearly spent, when Richard’s knights slammed into their rear.
They had already been engaged for some time with two corps of crack Norman
cavalry, swinging those heavy swords up against hauberks and kite shields borne
by mounted men in mid-June in the middle of the Mediterranean. The Annales
Beneventani says three hundred of the pope’s knights fell,175 but all three of the
main Norman sources are unanimous: few if any of the Swabians survived.176

Aftermath
Leo IX stood helpless on the walls of Civitate as his dream of imposing papal
power on southern Italy disintegrated before his eyes. Both William of Apulia
and Geoffrey Malaterra maintain that the pope sought refuge in the city as
the battle ended.177 Anonymous of Benevento asserts, instead, that he withdrew
to Civitate after the first clash.178 Regardless of how he got there, the chron-
iclers are generally in agreement that the inhabitants forced him out once a
Norman victory became apparent. After all, the city had, at least in the Norman
view, been under Norman suzerainty since 1042 when it was allotted to Walter
Amicus by the other Norman lords at the partition of Melfi.179 The citizens,
rightfully, must have been fearful of retribution at that point. Indeed, Anony-
mous of Benevento, Herman of Reichenau and Malaterra all claim that the
Normans had already begun to besiege the ramparts when Leo was expelled.180
Practicing a bit of hagiographically-inspired story-shaping the Beneventan biog-

173 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 203–4, pp. 142–43. “fugitivo summa
volatu et scopulosa facit celsi iuga quaerere montis...”
174 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 245–50, pp. 144–47.
175 Annales Beneventani, anno 1053, p. 180.
176 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 40, p. 101; Storia de Normanni, 3. 40, p. 156; Malaterra,
Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 14, pp. 61–2; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 14, p. 15; William of
Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 255–56, pp. 146–47.
177 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 14, p. 61; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 14, p. 15; William
of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 258–59, pp. 146–47.
178 “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae,” 2: 320.
179 Amatus, History of the Normans, 2. 31, p. 77; Storia de Normanni, 2. 31, p. 96.
180 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 96; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 133;

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 51

rapher even goes so far as to profess that the Normans had set fire to the hovels
huddled against the outer fortifications “when, by divine intervention, the winds
suddenly changed direction blowing the flames towards the enemy.”181 In the
end, however, the pontiff had no choice but to submit himself to the mercy of
his triumphant adversaries.
Given the circumstances, the reception must have surprised him.182 The
sources are all in accordance in describing the deferential manner with which
he was treated. The Normans greeted the pope with reverence and remorse.183
The testimony of his anonymous Beneventan biographer is representative:
“Some knights prostrated themselves with their whole bodies; others having
put on vestments of silk covered with dust threw themselves abruptly at the
feet of the pope.”184 They begged for his blessing and absolution. He gave it
and afterwards, according to his Lotharingian hagiographer, “strove to obtain
an honorable burial for those who had been slain in his service, interring them
in a neighboring church that had long been in ruins.”185
This last is supported by archaeological evidence. In 1820, about fifty meters
south of the ruins of the cathedral, Monsignore Giovanni Camillo Rossi, the
bishop of San Severo, unearthed a vaulted crypt which contained the bones
of a large number of tall males bearing the marks of horrendous wounds.
Further excavations throughout the area revealed other heaps of ancient human
remains.186 In 1949, Michele Fuiano writes that in the farmer’s fields to the west
of Strada Statale Adriatica 16 and north of the Tre Fontane farm “were recently
exhumed the bones of men and horses, arranged without any order, higgledy-
piggledy.”187 It appears that many of those who had fallen in the battle were
simply buried where they lay.
Once the obsequies for the dead were accomplished, the Normans accom-
panied the pope back to Benevento. By all accounts he was treated with the
veneration due his status. “They escorted him with all his entourage as far as

Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 14, pp. 61–2; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 14, p. 15; “Vita
et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae,” 2: 321.
181 “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae,” 2: 321. “mirum in modum divino nutu furens incen-
dium, velut venti raptum flamine in hostem cursem retorsit.”
182 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 41, p. 101; Storia de Normanni, 3. 41, p. 157.
183 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 41, p. 101; Storia de Normanni, 3. 41, p. 157; Chronica
Monasterii Casinensis, 2. 84, p. 333; Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 96;
Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 133; Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 14, p. 62; De
rebus gestis Rogerii, 1.14, p. 15; “Vie et miracles du pape S. Leon IX,” p. 287; Vita Leonis
IX papae, 1. 2. 11, p. 165; “The Life of Pope Leo IX,” 2. 21, p. 151; “Vita et obitus sancti
Leonis noni papae,” 2: 322; William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2, ll. 262–65,
pp. 146–47.
184 “Vita et obitus sancti Leonis noni papae, ” 2: 322. “Alios militum toto prostratos corpore; alios
vero sericis pulvere fedatis vestibus reppendo ad eius provolvi pedes.”
185 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 11, p. 165; “The Life of Pope Leo IX,” 2. 21, p. 151. “studuit funera
caesorum honorifice procurare, tumulans ea in vincina ecclesia ab antiquo diruta tempore.”
186 Fraccacreta, Teatro topografico storico-poetica della Capitanata, 2: 57–9, 141–44.
187 Fuiano, “La Battaglia di Civitate,” p. 131.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
52 Charles D. Stanton

Benevento,” writes Amatus, “and they continually furnished him wine, bread,
and all the necessities.”188 But he was by no means a free man. The Anonymi
Barensis makes this abundantly clear: “They [the Normans] captured him [the
pope] and took him to Benevento, albeit with honor.”189 Bishop Bonizo of Sutri
substantiates this in no uncertain terms: “They [the Normans] brought the pope
through the midst of the carnage to Benevento, a captive but honorably treated,
as was his due.”190 Bishop Bruno of Segni provides further proof of Leo’s privi-
leged imprisonment in describing his reception by the citizens of Benevento:
“They stood bewildered and watched their coming [the papal entourage] while
they were still at a distance; now the pontiff was drawing near, preceded by
the bishops and clergy, with sad faces and bowed heads.”191 And a hostage Leo
remained, a condition made unmistakable by Herman of Reichenau: “… and
brought back to Benevento, although in an honorable fashion, he [Pope Leo IX]
was detained there for some time and was not permitted to return [to Rome].”192
The Normans held Leo at Benevento from 23 June 1053 until 12 March 1054
in an apparent attempt to extort recognition from him for their conquests in
southern Italy. The pope gamely resisted for nine months because he continued
to hold out hope that either his cousin, the Holy Roman Emperor Henry III, or
the Eastern Emperor, Constantine IX Monomachos, would come to his aid. In
early 1054, he dispatched a papal legation to Constantinople, which included
Cardinal Humbert of Silva Candida, Archbishop Peter of Amalfi and Frederick
of Lorraine, primarily in hopes of staving off the schism brewing between the
Eastern and Western Churches but also in an effort to devise some sort of joint
action against the Normans.193 His letter to the emperor manifestly reveals that
he had not given up the desideratum of ousting the Normans from Italy: “We
ourselves, trusting that divine aid will be with us and that human help will
not fail us, shall not give up our intention of liberating Christendom nor shall
we give any rest in our time, until holy Church, now so much in danger, is at

188 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 41, p. 101; Storia de Normanni, 3. 41, pp. 157–58. “Liquel
menerent, o tout sa gent, jusque à Bonivent; et lui aministroient continuelment pain et vin et
toute choze neccessaire.”
189 Anonymi Barensis chronicon, anno 1052, p. 152. “Compraehenserunt illum, et portaverunt
Benevento, tamen cum honoribus.”
190 Bonizonis episcopi Sutriensis: Liber ad Amicum, in Pontificum Romanorum Vitae, 1: 100–5,
especially 104–5; “Bishop Bonizo of Sutri: ‘To a Friend’”, in Robinson, Papal Reform of
the Eleventh Century, pp. 158–261, especially 5, p. 193. “captumque Papam, sed, ut decuit,
honorifice tractatum, per mediam stragem interfectorum usque Beneventum perduxerunt.”
191 Brunonis episcopi Signiensis: Libellus de symoniacis, in Pontificum Romanorum Vitae, 1:
95–100, especially p. 98; “Bruno of Segni, The Sermon of the Venerable Bishop Bruno
concerning Simoniacs,” in Robinson, Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century, Appendix 2,
pp. 377–90, especially p.384. “Stant attoniti, spectant de longe venientes. Et iam Pontifex
propinquabat, episcopis et clericis tristi vultu et inclinata facie procedentibus.”
192 Herman of Reichenau, Chronicle, anno 1053, p. 96; Chronicon (MGH), anno 1053, p. 133.
“… Beneventum, cum honore tamen, reductus est; ibique tempore aliquanto detentus, nec
redire permissus.”
193 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 9, p. 162; “The Life of Pope Leo IX,” 2. 19, p. 148.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 53

rest.”194 Unfortunately, the embassy came to naught when the Greek Patriarch,
Michael Cerularius, refused to meet with it and Humbert responded by placing
an anathema on him.195
When it became apparent that no aid would be forthcoming, Pope Leo finally
relented. Geoffrey Malaterra provides a notion of what the pontiff may have
reluctantly yielded: “He [Pope Leo] conceded to them [the Normans] all the
land that they had conquered – as well as any they might acquire in the future in
the regions of Calabria and Sicily – as a hereditary fief from St. Peter to be held
by Humphrey and his heirs.”196 While this sounds suspiciously like what Pope
Nicholas II officially conferred on Robert Guiscard, Humphrey’s successor, at
Melfi some six years later, it does find some tenuous support from Orderic
Vitalis who writes that Robert Guiscard received “a grant of Apulia … from
Pope Leo, to hold perpetually and defend against the enemies of St. Peter.”197
Orderic may, however, have merely gotten this from Malaterra with whose work
he was evidently familiar.198 In any case, whatever the pope may have promised,
it must have been satisfactory, because Humphrey not only released him but also
accompanied him as far as Capua.199
The great reformer of the Church arrived in Rome a broken man who passed
away a few days later on 19 April 1054.200 No one picked up the banner of
his cause against the Normans. Constantine IX followed him to the grave in
January 1055 and Henry III likewise in October 1056.201 Nor were Leo’s imme-
diate successors to the Holy See able to take up the struggle. His direct heir
to the throne of Saint Peter was Victor II, the erstwhile Bishop Gebhard of
Eichstät, who had counseled Henry III to withdraw his troops from the service
of his predecessor for fear of becoming embroiled in the affairs of southern
Italy.202 He, in turn, was followed into the Lateran Palace by Stephen IX, the
former Frederick of Lorraine, who had served as Leo’s chancellor during the

194 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 10, pp. 164–65; “The Life of Pope Leo IX,” 2. 20, p. 150. “Nos
quoque divinum adiutorium affore et humanum non defore confidentes, ab hac nostra inten-
tione liberandae christianitatis non deficiemus nec dabimus requiem temporibus nostris, nisi
cum requie sanctae ecclesiae periclitantis.”
195 Vita Leonis IX papae, 1. 2. 9, pp. 162–63; “The Life of Pope Leo IX”, 2. 19, pp. 148–49.
196 Malaterra, Deeds of Count Roger, 1. 14, p. 62; De rebus gestis Rogerii, 1. 14, p. 15. “…
et omnem terram, quam pervaserant et quam ulterius versus Calabriam et Siciliam lucrari
possent, de sancti Petri haereditali feudo sibi et haeredibus suis possidendam concessit circa
annos MLIII.”
197 Orderic Vitalis, The Ecclesiastical History of Orderic Vitalis, ed. and trans. Majorie Chibnall,
6 vols. (Oxford, 1968–1980), 3: 86–9. “a Leone papa dono recepit Apuliam contra aduersarios
sancti Petri perenniter eam defensurus.”
198 Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, 2: 100–1.
199 Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 2. 84, p. 333.
200 De obitu sancti Leonis papae, in Pontificum Romanorum Vitae, 1. p. 176.
201 Loud, Age of Robert Guiscard, p. 120.
202 Amatus, History of the Normans, 3. 47, p. 103; Storia de Normanni, 3. 47, p. 163; Victoris II
vitae, in Pontificum Romanorum Vitae, 1: 177–83, especially pp. 179–80.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
54 Charles D. Stanton

latter’s ill-fated campaign against the Normans.203 Frederick was reportedly

planning another campaign to finish what his patron had started when untimely
illness and death intervened.204 Nicholas II (Gerard of Burgundy), who took
custody of Saint Peter’s keys in the wake of Stephen’s demise, would reverse
papal policy towards the Normans altogether.205 And he would do so on the
counsel of Hildebrand of Sovana, former advisor to Leo IX and the future Pope
Gregory VII, whose primary temporal protector would become none other than
Robert ­Guiscard.206
As a result, the Normans prospered in the Mezzogiorno unhindered. Humphrey
solidified his hold on Apulia. “Victory greatly raised the spirits of the Normans,”
declares William of Apulia. “No Apulian city remained in rebellion against
them.”207 The chronicler goes on to claim Humphrey “subdued many cities.”
“The inhabitants of Troia paid tribute to the count; those of Bari, Trani, Venosa,
Otranto and the city of Acerenza obeyed him.”208 Richard of Aversa returned to
Campania and consolidated his grip on the region, seizing Capua for himself in
June 1058.209 In the meantime, Robert, having burnished his reputation at Civi-
tate, continued his conquest of Calabria at his brother’s behest until the latter’s
death in early 1057, at which time Robert assumed for himself the county of
Apulia.210 Finally, in August 1059 at the Synod of Melfi, Nicholas II, in return
for fealty to the Holy See, invested Robert Guiscard as “Duke of Apulia and
Calabria, and in the future … Sicily.”211 Leo Marsicanus corroborates this in the
Chronicle of Montecassino and adds that the pope also “confirmed the princi-
pality of Capua to Richard.”212 For the next century and a half, the fate of the
papacy and the Normans would be inextricably entwined.

203 Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 3. 9, pp. 369–71.

204 H. E. J. Cowdrey, The Age of Abbot Desiderius: Montecassino, the Papacy, and the Normans
in the Eleventh and Early Twelfth Centuries (Oxford, 1983), p. 111.
205 Bonizonis episcopi Sutriensis: Liber ad Amicum, in Pontificum Romanorum Vitae, 1: 207–9;
“Bishop Bonizo of Sutri,” in Robinson, Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century, 201–3.
206 Bonizonis episcopi Sutriensis: Liber ad Amicum, in Pontificum Romanorum Vitae, 1: 100–3;
“Bishop Bonizo of Sutri,” in Robinson, Papal Reform of the Eleventh Century, pp. 190–91;
Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 3. 12–15, pp. 373–77.
207 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 284–85, pp. 146–47. “Crescit Normannis
animus victoribus ingens, iamque rebellis eis urbs Appula nulla remansit.”
208 William of Apulia, La Geste de Robert Guiscard, 2. ll. 293–96, pp. 148–49. “Multas sibi
subdidit urbes: solvere Troiani comiti coepere tributum; hunc Barini, Tranenses et Venusini,
cives Ydrunti famulantur et urbes Acerunti.”
209 Amatus, History of the Normans, 4. 11, p. 114; Storia de Normanni, 4. 11, p. 190.
210 Amatus, History of the Normans, 4. 2–3, pp. 111–12; Storia de Normanni, 4. 2–3, pp. 181–83.
211 Le Liber Censuum de l’Eglise Romaine, ed. P. Fabre and L. Duchesne, 3 vols, Bibliothèque
des Écoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome 2, Series 6 (Paris, 1889–1952), 1:421–22. “dux
Apulie et Calabrie et utroque subveniente futurus Sicilie…”
212 Chronica Monasterii Casinensis, 3. 15, p. 377. “Hisdem quoque diebus et Richardo princi-
patum Capuanum ... confirmavit.”

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Battle of Civitate: A Plausible Account 55

Repercussions
Thirteen years after the battle of Civitate, Guy of Amiens famously reported
that William the Conqueror had sought to galvanize his knights on the eve
of the battle of Hastings by reminding them that they were “Normans, accus-
tomed to heroic deeds, and to whom the Apulians, Calabrians, and Sicilians
are slaves.”213 Hastings had a profound impact on European history, particu-
larly that of England and northern France, but perhaps the reverberations of
Civitate on the Mediterranean world of the time were comparably great. The
battle destroyed papal aspirations to temporal power on the Italian peninsula
and accelerated the Norman conquest of the South. Within a few years, the
Normans, led by the House of Hauteville, consolidated power on the mainland
and began the invasion of Sicily. Roger, Guiscard’s younger brother, would
eventually complete the capture of the island from its Muslim masters and
establish an aggressive Christian presence in the central Mediterranean on the
eve of the Crusading movement. There is a compelling hypothesis that this,
in turn, engendered western expansion eastward in the form of western Italian
sea power, from Genoa and Pisa, coincident with the Crusades. From that
moment on, Islam and Byzantium would gradually cede dominance on the sea
to the West. The Norman conquest of southern Italy and Sicily had irrevocably
reshaped the geopolitical and economic balance of power in the medieval Medi-
terranean.214 Without their improbable victory at Civitate, it is highly doubtful
that the Normans would have been able to play their transformative role.

213 Guy Bishop of Amiens, Carmen de Hastingaue Proelio, ed. and trans. Frank Barlow (Oxford,
1999), pp. 16–17.“Apulus et Calaber, Siculus quibus incola seruit, Normanni faciles actibus
egregiis.”
214 Stanton, Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, pp. 1–8, 223–24.

This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
This content downloaded from 128.197.26.12 on Mon, 31 Oct 2016 09:37:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms