NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF LAW
Laoag City, Ilocos Norte

ELECTION CASES
FROM 2019 TO 2023

Prepared & Submitted by:

JURIS DOCTOR II
(A.Y. 2022 – 2023)

Professor:

Assoc. Solicitor Mark Dave Camarao

PROFESSOR

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 AYSON JOEY

ANGKLA VS. COMELEC

3
G.R. No. 246816, 15 September 2020
ALBAN VS. COMELEC
4
G.R. No. 243968. March 22, 2022
MARQUEZ VS. COMELEC
7
G.R. No. 258435. June 28, 2022

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 ANGKLA: ANG PARTIDO NG MGA PILIPINONG MARINO, INC.
(ANGKLA), and SERBISYO SA BAYAN PARTY (SBP) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, et al.
G.R. No. 246816, 15 September 2020
FACTS:
ANGKLA: Ang Partido Ng Mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc., (ANGKLA) and Serbisyo sa
Bayan Party (SBP) filed twin Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition and for Intervention,
challenging the constitutionality of Section 11(b), Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) to
the extent that it allows parties with more than two percent (2%) of the votes in the party-
list system to receive additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. ANGKLA
and SBP argued that the provision leads to double-counting of votes and violates the equal
protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the allocation of additional seats to party-lists in proportion to their
total number of votes, as stated in Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that under Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the party-list system must comprise twenty percent (20%) of the total
membership in the House of Representatives, while the qualifications for a seat are left to
the discretion of the legislature. Therefore, the Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, which
outlines the procedure for electing party-lists and allocating seats to them. The features of
R.A. No. 7941 prevent the allocation of seats solely based on absolute proportionality to
prevent any single party from dominating the party-list system and to ensure that 20% of
the seats in the House of Representatives are allocated to party-list representatives.
As per the landmark case of BANAT, Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 should be applied
as follows:
Round 1: (a) Participating parties, organizations, or coalitions are ranked in
descending order based on the votes they receive in the party-list election. (b) Each party
that receives at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system is
guaranteed one seat each.
Round 2, Part 1: (a) The percentage of votes each party, organization, or coalition
receives is multiplied by the remaining seats available after Round 1. All party-list
participants are eligible for this round, regardless of the percentage of votes they received.
(b) Party-list participants receive additional seats based on the product of (a). The integer of
the product corresponds to the party’s share in the remaining available seats. No fractional
seats are awarded. (c) A party-list can receive no more than two (2) additional seats.
Round 2, Part 2: (a) The party-list party, organization or coalition next in rank is
allocated one additional seat each until all available seats are distributed. The BANAT
formula aligns with the wording of Section 11(b) of the law and has stood the test of time.
The Court finds no compelling reason to depart from this formula. Therefore, the allocation
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of additional seats to party-lists in proportion to their total number of votes, as specified in
Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941, is constitutional. 

ANGELO CASTRO DE ALBAN VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC), et la.,
G.R. No. 243968. March 22, 2022
FACTS:
Angelo Castro De Alban (De Alban) filed his CoC for senator in the May 13, 2019 elections as
an independent candidate, indicating that he is a lawyer and a teacher. On October 22, 2018, the
Comelec Law Department motu proprio filed a petition to declare De Alban a nuisance candidate
alleging that he had no bona fide intent to run for public office and that his candidacy will prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate. Moreover, De Alban will not be able to
sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign without clear proof of financial
capacity. On the other hand, De Alban countered that he has a bona fide intention to run for public
office given his government platforms covering education, agriculture, health, and housing
programs. Also, De Alban claimed that he could wage a nationwide campaign because he sustained
a paid website dedicated to his senatorial bid, commissioned social media platforms
like Facebook to advertise him, and secured support statements from various groups. Lastly, De
Alban averred that his frequent domestic and international travels are sufficient proof of his
financial capacity.
On December 6, 2018, the Comelec First Division declared De Alban a nuisance
candidate. The Comelec cited the authorized expenses for an aspiring senator under the law and
ruled that De Alban failed to establish the financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign
especially since he was running as an independent candidate. Aggrieved, De Alban moved for a
reconsideration and argued that financial capacity is not among the qualifications to run for
senator. The law did not set the minimum expenses for a candidate but only a cap or expenditure
limit. On January 28, 2019, the Comelec En Banc denied De Alban's motion and explained that an
election campaign for a national position involves huge expenditures. Yet, De Alban had no strong
and consolidated political machinery to cover these expenses
Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, De Alban filed this Petition for Certiorari ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the Comelec in declaring him a nuisance candidate. First, De Alban claims
that Section 69 of the OEC which authorized the Comelec to motu proprio refuses to give due
course to or cancel the CoC of nuisance candidates does not apply to aspiring senators. This is
because the OEC became effective in 1985 or before the creation of the Senate under the 1987
Constitution. Second, Republic Act (RA) No. 6646 or The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 impliedly
repealed Section 69 of the OEC and barred the Comelec from refusing due course or
cancelling motu proprio of the CoC of a nuisance candidate. Under RA No. 6646, only registered
candidates running for the same position as the nuisance candidates can file a petition under
Section 69 of the OEC. Third, the last phrase in Section 69 of the OEC which reads  "by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to
run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate" is unconstitutional. The provision allegedly violates
the due process clause for lack of comprehensible standards. Also, the phrase infringes the right of
suffrage and the equal protection clause for being subjective and arbitrary.
Lastly, De Alban maintains that Comelec has no legal and factual grounds to declare him a
nuisance candidate solely on the basis of his CoC which did not require him to state his financial

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capability. Corollary, De Alban prays to include his name in the senatorial list of candidates for the
2019 elections. In contrast, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the OEC governs
the elections of all public officers and that it is not incompatible with RA No. 6646. Further, the
OSG invokes the constitutionality of Section 69 of the OEC considering that the guarantee to run
for public office is merely a privilege subject to limitations such as the prohibition on nuisance
candidates. Finally, the OSG points out that the Comelec declared De Alban a nuisance candidate
because of his lack of financial capacity and the absence of political machinery in terms of
organizational support to wage a nationwide campaign
ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in declaring De Alban a nuisance
candidate based on an erroneous interpretation of the law and for lack of supporting substantial
evidence.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court stated that First, De Alban''s profession as a "lawyer teacher" is not
the "circumstance" contemplated in the third instance of Section 69 of the OEC. Notably, De Alban
even exceeds the minimum qualification of being able to read and write required of a
senator. Second, De Alban's chosen profession is not a clear indication of his capability to wage a
nationwide campaign. Third, assuming that the Comelec's inference on De Alban's profession is
valid, the Comelec already has an idea as to the expenses of previous senatorial candidates based
on their submitted Statement of Contributions and Expenditures. Hence, the Comelec could have at
least pegged an amount based on its data from the immediately preceding elections and
approximate acceptable expenses for campaigning. Yet, the Comelec Law Department did not
specify any reasonable amount but expects De Alban to submit proof of the available funds for his
campaign. At any rate, it is already settled that financial capacity is not required to run for public
office because it is equivalent to a property qualification which is inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system and the principle of social justice. In Maquera v. Borra, the Court
struck down a law requiring candidates "to post a surety bond equivalent to the one-year salary or
emoluments of the position to which he is a candidate, which bond shall be forfeited in favor of the
national, provincial, city or municipal government concerned if the candidate, except when the
declared winner, fails to obtain at least 10% of the votes cast for the office to which he has filed his
certificate of candidacy, there being not more than four (4) candidates for the same office.”
Similarly, in Marquez v. Comelec (Marquez), the Court held that "financial capacity to sustain
the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign" cannot be used, by itself, to declare a
candidate nuisance. The Court clarifies that financial capacity cannot be conflated with the bona
fide intention to run. Significantly, the Court in Marquez rejected the Comelec's invocation of
Section 13 of RA 7166 because the law does not even set by rule any financial requirement for the
candidates, to wit: "Section 13 of RA 7166 merely sets the current allowable limit on expenses of
candidates and political parties for election campaign. It does not (whether by intention or
operation) require a financial requirement for those seeking to run for public office, such that failure
to prove capacity to meet the allowable expense limits would constitute ground to declare one a
nuisance candidate."
Fourth, the required contents of De Alban's CoC do not include his financial capacity or the
source of campaign funds. At most, the Comelec Law Department is merely guessing whose
candidacy should be questioned and initiated the action against De Alban without factual bases.
In Marquez, the Court observed that this posture might be considered a violation of the equal
protection clause because the Comelec did not require all senatorial candidates to prove their
financial capacity, viz.: The COMELEC's invocation of Section 13, without making explicit, by rule,
the minimum amount that meets the financial capacity requirement, is constitutionally anathema
because it violates the equal protection rights of Marquez and all of the other candidates it

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disqualified on this ground. Since the COMELEC did not require all candidates for senator to
declare the amount of money they had, and were committed, to fund their campaign (whether
evidenced by bank certification, guarantee or standby-letter of credit, for instance),  one wonders
how the COMELEC chose who to target for disqualification. By its public pronouncements, the
COMELEC disqualified 70 senatorial candidates. Comparing the COMELEC Legal
Department's motu proprio motion to cancel in this case with the one it employed in De Alban v.
COMELEC, et al., it seems the Legal Department employed a cookie-cutter motion, generally
alleging lack of financial capacity in a transparent attempt to shift the burden of proof upon the
candidate, without setting forth by rule the acceptable minimum financial capacity. This process
puts an unfair and impermissible burden upon the candidate. (Emphases supplied.)
Fifth, the Comelec En Banc justified the cancellation of De Alban's CoC because he had no
strong and consolidated political machinery to cover the expenses of the campaign especially since
he is running as an independent candidate. In the same vein, the Court finds that non-membership
in a political party or being unknown nationwide, or the low probability of success do not by
themselves equate to the absence of bona fide intention to run for public office under Section 69 of
the OEC. Membership in a political party is not a requirement to run for senator under the current
electoral framework while non-membership does not prevent a faithful determination of the will of
the electorate. Also, the candidate's degree of success is irrelevant to bona fide intention to run for
public office. A candidate "has no less a right to run when he faces prospects of defeat as when he
expected to win." Neither the candidate's act of participating for the first time in elections be
equated with the absence of good faith. The Court had overruled the Comelec's postulation that
a bona fide intention to run for public office is absent if there is no "tiniest chance to obtain the
favorable indorsement of a substantial portion of the electorate." Again, it appears that the Comelec
Law Department initiated actions only against De Alban and other unknown candidates without a
political party, or those with low chances of winning. The Comelec did not bother to substantiate its
conclusion that De Alban's CoC was filed without bona fide intention to run for public office when it
remarked that "[t]he Commission is not duty-bound to adduce evidence for any party or for [De
Alban] in this case. x x x" Worse, the burden of evidence improperly shifted to De Alban to convince
the Comelec why his CoC should be given due course. To reiterate, the Comelec has the ministerial
duty to receive and acknowledge a duly filed CoC. The candidate's name will be on the ballot unless
the CoC is withdrawn or canceled.
Lastly, the Court perceived that the Comelec required De Alban to establish his "capacity to
wage a nationwide campaign" immediately after his CoC was filed. This premature and dismissive
approach on the part of the Comelec reinforces the lack of factual basis in cancelling the CoC which
merely rests on the erroneous inference that De Alban's supposed weak campaign machinery would
not change even at the start of the campaign period. It would have been different if the action of the
Comelec Law Department against De Alban was initiated during the campaign period to determine
whether he would not promote his candidacy clearly demonstrating the lack of bona fide intention
to run for public office. Quite the contrary, De Alban presented evidence showing his plan to
actively campaign with the use of social media. The records show that De Alban submitted receipts
of payment for his "De Alban for Senator Movement", engagement posts on "Facebook" showing an
initial number of "impressions," and the receipt of payment for the maintenance of his website. On
this score, the Comelec must have been aware of the popularity of social media, the number of
online users nationwide, and how these platforms potentially influence the preferences of registered
voters.
In sum, the Court upholds the constitutionality of Comelec's authority to motu proprio refuse
to give due course to or cancel the CoC of a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the OEC.
However, the Court ascribes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec in cancelling De
Alban's CoC pursuant to an erroneous interpretation of the law and for lack of supporting

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substantial evidence. The Court reminds the Comelec that the candidate's bona fide intention to
run for public office is neither subject to any property qualifications nor dependent upon
membership in a political party, popularity, or degree of success in the elections.

NORMAN CORDERO MARQUEZ, VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 258435. June 28, 2022
FACTS:
In October 2018, petitioner Norman Cordero Marquez filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Senator in the May 13, 2019 national and local elections. He is a resident of
Mountain Province, a real estate broker, and an independent candidate. However, the
COMELEC Law Department filed a petition to declare Marquez a nuisance candidate and
argued that: (1) Marquez was "virtually unknown to the entire country except maybe in the
locality where he resides;" and (2) though a real estate broker, there is no clear proof of
financial capability, " to sustain the financial rigors of a nationwide campaign." Marquez
countered that, among others, he is the co-founder and sole administrator of an animal
advocacy group based in Baguio, and is known in various social media and websites; and
that has been interviewed in television and radio shows; He argued that the COMELEC
should not discount "the potential of those animal lovers, raisers and handlers, and the
existing local and foreign benefactors and donors who are willing and capable to subsidize
the expenses of a social-media-enhanced national campaign."
The COMELEC First Division cancelled Marquez' CoC, citing this Court's ruling in
Martinez vs HRET, that "in elections for national positions, the sheer logistical challenge
posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its
authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or
serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign." The amounts set forth in Section 13 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7166 15 "would at least require [Marquez] to prove that he can mount
a viable nationwide campaign" and "x x x running as an independent further decreases a
candidate's chances with even more limited resources at his disposal." Marquez, then filed
a MR which the COMELEC En Banc denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may use lack of proof of financial capacity to sustain
the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign, by itself, as a ground to declare an
aspirant for senator a nuisance candidate.
RULING:
1. No. The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared Marquez a
nuisance candidate on the ground of lack of proof of his financial capacity to wage a
nationwide campaign. By so doing, the COMELEC has effectively imposed a "property
qualifications are inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system
ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same x
x x" as clearly proscribed in the case of Maquera.
In Maquera, the Court declared RA 4421 as unconstitutional insofar as it required
"all candidates for national, provincial, city and municipal offices" to "post a surety

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 bond equivalent to the one-year salary or emoluments of the position to which he is a
candidate x x x." The Court ruled that the law had the following effects: (1) preventing
or disqualifying candidates from running although they possess the qualifications
prescribed by the Constitution or law because they cannot pay the premium; and (2)
imposing property qualifications in order that a person could run for public office and
that the people could validly vote for him.

2. While Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service," it is equally undisputed
that there is no constitutional right to run for public office. It is, rather, a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. Thus, in Pamatong, the Court explained the
rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification
of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for public office: The
State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational,
objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of
candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the
increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These
practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a
mandated electoral exercise.
At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical
hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not
merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions.

3. Neither can the COMELEC seek succor behind the provisions of Section 13 of RA
7166, which it interpreted as imposing a financial capacity requirement (or proof
thereof) on those seeking to run for national office. Section 13 of RA 7166 merely
sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political parties for
election campaigns. It does not (whether by intention or operation) require a
financial requirement for those seeking to run for public office, such that failure to
prove capacity to meet the allowable expense limits would constitute a ground to
declare one a nuisance candidate.

4. The COMELEC cannot conflate the bona fide intention to run with a financial
capacity requirement. A candidate's financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging
a nationwide campaign does not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to run for
public office. The COMELEC's burden is thus to show a reasonable correlation
between proof of a bona fide intention to run, on the one hand, and proof of financial
capacity to wage a nationwide campaign on the other. Moreover, the Court
acknowledges the COMELEC's legitimate objective in weeding out candidates who
have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office from the electoral process.
However, any measure designed to accomplish the said objective should, however,
not be arbitrary and oppressive and should not contravene the Republican system
ordained in our Constitution. Unfortunately, the COMELEC's preferred standard falls
short of what is constitutionally permissible.
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 CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ

CSC VS. RODRIGUEZ

10
GR No. 248255, 2020-08-27
CROBELLO VS. OMBUDSMAN
11
G.R. No. 232325, APRIL 10, 2019
TALLADO VS. COMELEC
12
G.R. No. 246679, SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
DTI VS. ENRIQUEZ
13
G.R. No. 225301, June 2, 2020
DELA PAZ VS. OCHOA
14
G.R. No. 211559, 211567, 212570, 215634, October 2019
MARQUEZ VS. COMELEC
15
G.R. No. 244274, SEPTMBER 3, 2019
EIZMENDI, JR. VS. FERNANDEZ
16
G.R. No. 215280, November 27, 2019

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CARLET, ESTELLA MARIZ

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION VS. MARILOU T. RODRIGUEZ

GR No. 248255, 2020-08-27
FACTS:
On June 7 and 8, 1988, respondent Marilou T. Rodriguez took the Nursing Licensure
Examination (NLE) in Manila. Thereafter, she returned to her hometown in Mati, Davao Oriental to
take care of her ailing father. Sometime in October 1988, the results of the 1988 NLE were released
and published in a national newspaper of general circulation. Unfortunately, respondent's name
was not on the list of successful examinees.
In any event, she never got to submit to the hospital an updated copy of her license as a
registered nurse. On July 31, 2002, respondent resigned from the hospital.
Thereafter, she worked abroad as: (1) staff nurse in Al Hayat Medical Center Doha, Qatar
from 2008 to 2009; (2) staff nurse in Appolonia Dental Center, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
from 2010 to 2011; and (3) psychosocial nurse at the International Committee on the Red Cross
from 2012 to 2013.
In November 2009, she took the NLE again. This time, the results showed she passed the
examination. Thereafter, she worked abroad again. In 2013, she returned to the country for good.
She then applied and got appointed as nurse at the Office of City Health Officer, Mati, Davao
Oriental.
On December 16, 2014, she received a Show Cause Order from the CSC Regional Office No.
XI why no administrative case should be filed against her in connection with her Personal Data
Sheets dated March 9, 1989, April 19, 1989, April 25, 1991, September 3, 1992, September 16,
1994, and April 24, 2000, where she invariably stated that she passed the 1988 NLE with a rating
of 79.6% and that she was a registered nurse with professional license no. 0158713. Per verification
with PRC-Davao City, however, Regional Director Josephine C. Villegas-Liamzon certified that the
PRC Identification Card with license no. 0158713 actually belonged to a certain "Ella S. Estopo."
Respondent did not comply with the show cause order.
On April 24, 2015, the CSC Regional Office No. XI formally charged respondent with serious
dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and
falsification of official documents.
ISSUES:
Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it cleared respondent of any liability
arising from her submission and use of a spurious NLE rating and PRC Identification Card and
from falsely declaring in her various Personal Data Sheets that she was a registered nurse during
the relevant years in question?
HELD:
A person is considered in good faith not only when he or she has shown an honest intention.
A person who acted in good faith must also be free from knowledge of circumstances which ought to
put him or her on inquiry. Here, respondent's claim of good faith must fail. First. When the results
of the 1988 NLE were published, respondent was fully aware that her name was not on the roster of
successful examinees. But she claimed to have thereafter transacted with a certain Evelyn Sap on
who supposedly informed her that her name was on the "deferred status" list and all she needed to
do was pay the "processing fee" and submit her "lacking documents" to remove her name from the
so called "deferred status" list
Second. After receiving the PRC Identification Card allegedly sent her by Sapon, respondent
did not even take steps to verify its authenticity. During the investigation before the CSC-Regional

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Office No. XI, it was uncovered that per PRC Master list, the PRC Identification Card bearing license
no. 0158713 which respondent claimed as hers actually belonged to one "Ella S. Estopo."
Third, Section 16 of RA 877 as amended by RA 4704 states: SECTION 16. Inhibition against
practice of nursing. — Unless exempt from registration, no person shall practice or offer to practice
nursing in the Philippines as defined in this Act, without holding a valid certificate of registration as
nurse issued by the Board of Examiners for Nurses.
Finally, respondent used the fake 1988 NLE rating of 79.6% and PRC Identification Card to
gain employment at the Davao Oriental Provincial Hospital from 1989 to 2002. She even got
promoted several times because of these fake documents. As consistently held by the Court, in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of or who used a forged certificate of
eligibility is the forger or the one who caused the forgery.
Respondent is guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service  Respondent is
also liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. This administrative offense
refers to an act or acts of a public officer which "tarnished the image and integrity of his or her
public office"
The petition is granted. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 08948-MIN are reversed and set aside, and the Decision dated February 20,2018 and
Resolution dated July 31, 2018 of the Civil Service Commission, reinstated. Respondent is liable for
Serious Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
She is DISMISSED from the service as Nurse II in the Office of City Health Officer, Mati City, Davao
Oriental. Her civil service eligibility is cancelled and her retirement benefits, except accrued leave
credits, are forfeited. She is perpetually disqualified from re-employment in any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including any government-owned or controlled corporations and
from taking the civil service examinations.

DOMINGO CREBELLO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND

TIMOTEO T. CAPOQUIAN JR.
G.R. No. 232325, APRIL 10, 2019
FACTS:
Petitioner Crebello filed a complaint against Mayor Capoquian for nepotism in the
appointment of certain members of the board of Gamay Water District. The appointment of Raquel
was alleged to be nepotic as she is the sister of respondent Capoquian; and the appointment of
Clarita was also alleged to nepotic as she was recommended by her husband, respondent Gomba as
Vice Mayor/Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan. Respondents failed to submit counter-
affidavits and verified position papers. Based on the evidence on record, the Office dismissed the
case on the ground that the re-election of Mayor Capoquian absolved him of administrative liability.
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the doctrine of condonation had been
abandoned on November 10, 2015 as decided in Morales v. Court of Appeals; hence, the doctrine is
not applicable in the case of Capoquian if the decision thereon had been approved by the
Ombudsman on March 31, 2016. The OMB denied the motion and held that the ruling in Morales v.
Court of Appeals became final only on April 12, 2016, the date of the promulgation of the minute
resolution denying with finality its motion for clarification/motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, alleging that the Office of the Ombudsman
thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However,
the CA dismissed the said petition for being the wrong legal remedy.
ISSUE: Was the Ombudsman correct in applying the condonation doctrine motu proprio?
HELD:
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 No. The ruling promulgated in Morales v. Court of Appeals on the abandonment of the
doctrine of condonation had, indeed, become final only on April 12, 2016, and thus the
abandonment should be reckoned from April 12, 2016. Under the circumstances, the decision of
the OMB dated March 31, 2016 absolving respondent Capoquian, Jr. by reason of the application of
the doctrine of condonation might have been justified.
However, the petitioner has assailed the application of the doctrine of condonation precisely
because respondent Capoquian, Jr. had not invoked the doctrine of condonation as a defense. This
omission on his part appears to be confirmed by the records, which indicated that he did not
submit or file his counter-affidavit and verified position paper despite being required to do so.
Worse, the omission to submit or file, according to the petitioner, amounted to his waiver of his
right to controvert the charge of nepotism brought against him.
Condonation is an affirmative fact that must be raised by the respondent in the
administrative proceedings to enable the OMB to fully consider and pass upon the matter. That did
not happen in the case of respondent Capoquian, Jr., whose failure to file or submit his counter-
affidavit and verified position paper despite notice rendered indubitable that he had not at all raised
before the OMB the doctrine of condonation or any other matter as a defense. Clearly, the OMB
acted whimsically in absolving respondent Capoquian, Jr. by virtue of condonation.

GOVERNMOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, NORBERTO B. VILLAMON AND SENANDRO M.
JALGALADO
G.R. No. 246679, SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
FACTS:
The court, in its decision dated September 10, 2019 annulled the resolutions of the
COMELEC First Division and En Banc and dismissed the consolidated petitions for the cancellation
of the herein petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of
Camarines Norte in the 2019 Local elections,
The respondents filed their respective motions for reconsideration assailing the said decision
on the ground that petitioner never lost title to the office of the Governor of Camarines Norte, citing
the case of Aldovino, Jr., et al v. COMELEC wherein it was ruled that the temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, is not an effective
interruption of a terml and that term limitations should be strictly construed.
It must be noted that petitioner Tallado was the Governor of Camarines Norte for three (3)
consecutive terms. While he was serving his 2013-2016 term; the OMB declared him
administratively liable and a penalty of suspension for one year was imposed against him. In 2015,
a second administratively case was filed and resolved against him and the Ombudsman ordered his
dismissal from service made effective on November 8, 2016. The CA reduced the penalty of
dismissal to six 96) months suspension. Petitioner was able to re-assume his post as governor by
virtue of a TRO issued by the CA. The third case filed against him was in connection of hius re-
assumption of office without having fully served his suspension which the OMB resolved against
him and ordered his dismissal. The CA once again reduced the penalty to six months’ suspension/
On October 20, 2018, petitioner took his oath of office as Governor of Camarines Norte.
On October 15, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Governor of Camarines Norte
in the 2019 Local Elections.

Page | 12
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner’s removal by virtue of the OMB’s order of dismissal constitutes valid
interruption of his term sufficient to break the three-term limit rule.
HELD:
Yes. Interruption of terms entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while interruption of
the full continuity of the exercise of the power of the elective position equates to failure to render
service. In the case of Aldovino, it was concluded that the elective officials must have involuntarily
left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur. An
interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to
his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an
office holder’s term when he retains title “failure to serve” cannot be used once the right to office is
lost; without the right to hold office ot to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is
really lost.
In this case, the execution of the OMB’s dismissal in that manner resulted in the petitioner’s loss of
title to the office of Governor. The OMB’s dismissal order is immediately executory and, once
executed, the public officers ceases to have title for the time being. Hence, it should be considered
as an interruption of his term.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the decision directing the dismissal of the petitioner
included no indication of the petitioner being thereby placed under any type of suspension. As
such, he was dismissed for all intent and purposes of the law in the period that he was dismissed
from office even if he had appealed. In that status, he ceased to hold the title to the office in the
fullest sense, the motion for reconsiderations are denied.

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, REPRESENTED BY

ITS SECRETARY, ET AL., VS. DANILO B. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 225301, June 2, 2020, En Banc
DOCTRINE:
The disciplinary jurisdiction of the department secretary over presidential appointees is limited.
As above stated, the power to investigate does not include the power to impose penalty. It has long
been settled that the power to decide on such disciplinary matters and impose penalty upon said
category of officers remains with the appointing authority.
FACTS:
Then DTI Secretary Adrian Cristobal Jr. instructed Consumer Protection Group
Undersecretary Victorino Mario Dimagiba to conduct an investigation on the alleged corrupt
practices in the issuance of importation clearances by an unnamed high ranking officers of the
Department of Trade and Industry. In his memorandum, Usec. Dimagiba reported the unauthorized
issuances of respondents Danilo B. Enriquez, then Fair Trade and Enforcement Bureau Director,
with regard to certain importations.
Sec. Cristobal issued Department Order No. 16-347 creating a Special Investigation
Committee (SIC) mandated to conduct a full investigation of Enriquez. The DO also clothed the SIC
the authority to issue a preventive suspension order among others.

Page | 13
 Enriquez questioned the regularity of the investigation conducted by Usec. Dimagiba and he
also objected to the validity of DO No. 16-34 with regard to the authority of the SIC to conduct
investigation upon him and order preventive suspension against him.
The SIC issued a “Show Cause Memorandum” directing Enriquez to explain why no
administrative charges should be filed against him with regard to Usec. Dimagiba’s findings. In
response, Enriquez maintained his objections to the SIC’s disciplinary authority over him, being a
presidential appointee, holding a career and high level position with Salary Grade 28. Thus, the SIC
found prima facie case against Enriquez and formally charged him with Gross Insubordination,
among others.
ISSUE: Does the Department Secretary have disciplinary jurisdiction over a presidential appointee?
HELD:
Yes. The Administrative Code provided that an investigation may be entrusted to regional
director or similar officials who shall make the necessary report and recommendation to the chief of
Bureau or office or department. It is important to emphasize that the said provision made no
distinction between presidential and non- presidential appointees with regards to the Secretary’s
disciplinary jurisdiction.
The distinction between presidential and non-presidential appointees becomes relevant only
with respect to the Department Secretary’s power to impose penalties and “power to investigate”.
For presidential appointees, the power to impose penalty resides with the Presidential pursuant to
his power to control under the Constitution and the Administrative Code. Likewise the
Ombudsman, under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, was given such power to impose
penalties. While the power to impose penalty remains with the President or the Ombudsman, the
power to investigate, as well as to designate a committee or officer to investigate, and thereafter to
report its findings and make recommendations, may be delegated to and exercised by subordinates
or a special commission or committee specially created for such purpose.
In this case, there is no imposition of penalty, much less or dismissal from the DTI Secretary.
Hence, as Sec. Cristobal merely exercised his power to investigate and designate an officer and/ or
committee to investigate his subordinate pursuant to the Administrative Code, his actions, as well
as the resulting report from such investigation should be validly sustained absent any findings of
irregularity in the conduct thereof.

ERIC F. ACOSTA AND NATHANIEL G. DELA PAZ VS. HON.

PAQUITO N. OCHOA, et.al
G.R. No. 211559, 211567, 212570, 215634, October 2019
FACTS:
Licensed firearm owners Eric F. Acosta and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz filed before the Supreme
Court a Petition for Prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of
a. Sections 4 (g), 10, 26 and 39 9a), of all Republic Act NO. 10591;
b. Sections 4.4 (a), 4.10 (b), 7.3,7.9, 7.11.2 (b), 10.3, 26.3, 26.4 (1) (a) of the 2013 Implementing
Rules and Regulations and;
c. The requirements of signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection in the pro
forma application form for firearm registration.
For violating Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Page | 14
 On the same day, Peaceful Responsible Owners fi Guns Inc. (PROGUN), a registered non-
stock, non-profit corporation that aims to represent the interest of legitimate and licensed gun
owner in the Philippines, filed Its own Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and /or a writ of preliminary injunction,
questioning the requirements for application for a firearm license to waive their right to privacy and
allow the police to enter their dwellings, in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Guns and Ammo Dealers Association of the Philippines (Guns and Ammo Dealers), allegedly
“an umbrella organization of about 50 members who are authorized firearms dealers in the
Philippines”, also filed its Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari. All cases were later consolidated.
In the main, petitioner argue that Republic Act NO. 10591 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations unduly restrict their right to bear arms, their right to property and their right to
privacy. The government, the Philippine National Police, counters they the keeping and bearing of
arms is a mere privilege, not a right. Thus, whoever seeks to obtain a firearm license has to either
accept or decline the government’s term for the use and possession of the firearms.
ISSUES:
1. Does the signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection violated Article
III Section 2 of the Constitution on the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures?
2. Is the requirements of a license to own and operate a firearm a violation of petitioner’s
right to bear arms?
HELD:
1. Yes. The inspection requirements under Republic Act NO. 10951, as interpreted by the
Philippine National Police in the Implementing Rules, cannot be considered a reasonable
search. What constitute a “reasonable search” depends on whether a person has an
“expectation of privacy”, which society regards as reasonable. The presence of this
expectation of privacy and society’s perception of it as reasonable render the State’s intrusion
a “search” within the meaning of Article III, Section 2 and which intrusion thus requires a
search warrant. There is a legitimate almost absolute, expectation of privacy in one’s
residence. Further, signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection would
allegedly be an invalid waiver, as it is not given freely, voluntarily and knowingly by the
applicant who would just sing it, lest the application not be approved.

2. No. The bearing of arms in our jurisdiction was, and still is, a mere statutory privilege,
heavily regulated by the state. None of our constitution ever provided the right to bear arms.
The bearing of arms was considered a mere option, and a citizen then desiring to obtain a
firearms “must do so upon such terms as the Government sees fit to impose”. At present, the
bearing of arms remains a “mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right”.

NORMAN CORDERO MARQUEZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTION

G.R. No. 244274, SEPTMBER 3, 2019
FACTS:
Petitioner Marquez filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of senator. He is a
resident of Mountain Province, a real estate broker and an independent candidate. The COMELEC
Law Department motu proprio filed a petition of declare Marquez a nuisance candidate arguing that
he was virtually unknown to the entire country and that absent clear proof of financial capacity, he
will not be able to sustain th financial rigors of a nationwide campaign.
Page | 15
 He argued that the COMELEC should not discount the potential for vastly untapped sector of
animal lovers, raiser and handlers and the existing local and foreign benefactors and donors who
are willing and capable to subsidize the expenses of a social-media-enhanced national campaign.
The First Division ruled that in elections for national positions, the sheer logistical challenged posed
by nuisance candidates gives compelling reasons for the Commission to exercise its authority to
eliminate nuisance candidate who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to
mount a nationwide campaign.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Marquez a
nuisance candidate for his failure to prove his financial capability to mount a nationwide campaign.
HELD:
Yes. There is a grave abuse of discretion: (1) when an act is done contrary to the constitution,
the law or jurisprudence or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of
malice, ill will or personal bias. Both elements appear to be present in this case.
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared Marquez a nuisance candidate on the
ground of lack of proof of his financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign. By so doing, the
COMELEC has effectively imposed a “property qualification are inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice
underlying the same already and clearly proscribed under the ruling in Maquera.
Section 69, OEC (BP811) provided the grounds by which a candidate may be considered a
nuisance candidate, while Section 1 m Rule 24 of COMELEC Resolution NO. 9523 which governed
the 2019 election is virtually an exact copy of Section 69, OEC. It is allegedly pursuant to these
provisions that the COMELEC declared Marquez a nuisance candidate. A cursory examination of
the text of Section 69 and Section 1. Rule 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 would, however
show that both are silent as to the requirement of proof of financial capacity before an aspirant may
be allowed to run in the national election. There is utterly no textual support for the claim.
The COMELEC cannot conflate the bona fide intention to run with a financial capacity
requiremtns. A candidate’s financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging a nationwide campaign
does not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to run for a public office. The COMELEC’s
burden is thus to show a reasonable correlation between proof of a bona fide intention to run, on
the one hand, and proof of financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign on the other.
It bears reiterating that the Court acknowledged the COMELEC’s legitimate objective in
weeding out candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run office from the electoral
process. Any measure designed to accomplish the said objective should, however, not be arbitrary
and oppressive and should not contravene that Republican system ordained in our Constitution.
Unfortunately, the COMELEC preferred standard falls short of what us constitutionally permissible.

FRANCISCO C. EIZMENDI JR., JOSE S. TAYAG JR. JOAQUIN L.

SAN AGUSTIN ET.AL VS. EODORICO P. FERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 215280, November 27, 2019
FACTS:
On November 28, 2013, Fernandez filed a Complaint for Invalidation of Corporate Acts and Resolutions
with Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the individual petitioners, who allegedly constituted
themselves as new members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of VVCCI, despite lack of quorum during the annual
members' meeting on February 23, 2013.VVCCI is a duly organized non-stock corporation engaged in promoting
sports, recreation a land social activities, and the operation and maintenance of a sports and clubhouse, among
other matters.

Page | 16
 Fernandez asserted that since petitioners were not validly constituted as the new BOD in the place of the
hold-over BOD of VVCCI, they had no legal authority to act as such BOD, to find him guilty and to suspend him. In
an Urgent Motion or Request for Production/Copying of Documents dated January 10, 2014, Fernandez cited Rule
27 of the Rules of Court and requested the VVCCI, as owner and custodian of corporate documents, to produce
them and allow him to copy the following matters in connection with the hearing of his application for issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction:
1. The original of the Stock and Transfer Book and all cancelled Membership Fee Certificates of the VVCCI.
2. The original of the Certificate of Incorporation of VVCCI issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on May 30, 1975.
3. The original of the Directors' Certificate to By-laws dated August 24, 1975 of VVCCI, as filed with the SEC.
4. The original of the By-Laws of VVCCI dated June 30, 1975 as filed with the SEC.
5. The original of the Certificate of Filing of By-Laws of VVCCI issued by the SEC on October 20, 1976, as
received by VVCCI from the SEC.
6. The original of the duly-signed "Resolution Increasing the Corporation's Membership Certificates To Two
Thousand (2000)", adopted and approved by the Board of Directors of VVCCI on June 22, 1979, consisting
of two (2) pages including the signature page, together with any covering minutes, under pain of sanctions
under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC denied the Urgent Motion or Request for Production/Copying of Documents. The trial court ruled that
the case is not an election contest since it was filed way beyond the reglementary period under the Interim Rules of
Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies for election contests to be brought to court, considering that the
only issue that remains to be resolved is with respect to whether due process was observed in suspending
Fernandez. The CA reversed the RTC, and directed the judge to allow presentation of evidence in connection with
the election of the members of the BOD of VVCCI that was conducted during its annual members' meeting on
February 23, 2013.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Fernandez's complaint may be considered as an election contest within the purview
of the Interim Rules
2.  Whether Fernandez may question the authority of the petitioners to act as the BOD of VVCCI
and approve the board resolution suspending his club membership
3. WoN the final resolution in Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Eizmendi, et al., G.R. No. 209120
dated October 14, 2013 bars Fernandez's complaint
HELD:
1. YES. Here, the allegation in Fernandez's complaint for invalidation of corporate acts and resolutions partly
assails the authority of the BOD to suspend his membership on the ground that despite the lack of quorum
at the same February 23, 2013 meeting, the individual petitioners proceeded to have themselves constituted
as the new members of the BOD of VVCCI. His complaint clearly raises an issue on the validity of the
election of the individual petitioners.
Contrary to Fernandez's claim that the case before the lower court does not involve a claim or title to an
elective office in VVCCI, and that his objective is not to unseat the individual petitioners during the term for
which they were allegedly elected, the Court finds that a plain reading of the prayers in his complaint
betrays his cause: b) Invalidating the claims of individual defendants [individual petitioners) Francisco C.
Eizmendi Jr., Jose S. Tayag, Jr., .Joaquin San Agustin,Eduardo Francisco, Edmidio Ramos, Jr., Albert
Blancaflor, Rey Nathaniel lfurung and Manuel Acosta, Jr. to the office of director of VVCCI”
2. NO. To allow Fernandez to indirectly question the validity of the February 23, 2013 election would be a
clear violation of the 15-day reglementary period to file an election contest under the Interim Rules. As aptly
pointed out by the RTC, what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly.
If the Court were to entertain one of the causes of action in Fernandez's complaint, which is partly an
election contest raised beyond the said reglementary period, then the salutary purposes of the said period
under the Interim Rules would be rendered futile; the floodgates to election contests would be opened, to the
detriment of the regime of efficient and stable corporate governance.
Page | 17
 The RTC's action of virtually dismissing the first cause of action in Fernandez's complaint for being an
election contest filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period, is indeed consistent with the following
provisions of the Interim Rules
(a) Section 3, Rule 1, because such act promotes the objective of securing a just, summary, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding; and (b) Section 4, Rule 6, which authorizes the
court to dismiss outright the complaint if the allegations thereof is not sufficient in form and substance. The
RTC's action is, likewise, consistent with the inherent power of courts to amend and control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable
3. YES, on the ground of stare decisis but neither res judicata nor law of the case. Here,res judicata does
not apply because there is no identity of parties, causes of action and reliefs sought between the complaint
subject of Valle Verde and the complaint subject of this case. First, while the defendants in the complaints
subject of Valle Verde [Commercial Case No. 13-190) and of this case [Commercial Case No. 13-202] are the
very same individual petitioners, the plaintiff in the former case is VVCCI, whereas the plaintiff in this case is
Fernandez as plaintiff and proprietary member in good standing of VVCCI. The absence of identity of parties
is underscored in Valle Verde where the Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint because Valle Verde
had no cause of action and was not the real party-in-interest. The Court explained that a corporation does
not have the right to vote and that the reliefs prayed for in the complaint are for the benefit of the
respondents' contenders [like herein respondent Fernandez]. Second, the causes of action of the complaint
subject of Valle Verde is distinct from that subject of this case. In Valle Verde, the cause of action is the
individual petitioners' misrepresentation that they were elected as new members of the BOD and the
Officers of VVCCI for 2013 to 2014, due to the claim that there was no quorum during the February 23,
2013 annual meeting. In this case, the cause of action is the invalidation of corporate acts of VVCCI on the
ground of lack of authority of the individual petitioners, as members of the BOD, to suspend the club
membership of Fernandez, and the lack of due process which attended his suspension. Third, there is also
a stark contrast between the reliefs sought in the complaint subject of Valle Verde and that subject of this
case. In Valle Verde, VVCCI sought to enjoin the individual petitioners from misrepresenting themselves to
be members of the BOD and Officers of the Club. In this case, Fernandez seeks to invalidate the claims of
said individual petitioners to the office of BOD of VVCCI and to nullify the annual members' meeting of
February 23, 2013, as well as the subsequent board meetings conducted by the individual petitioners,
including all resolutions and measures approved thereat relative to his suspension.
The doctrine of the "law of the case" is also inapplicable, because it only applies to the same case involving
the same parties. Valle Verde is separate and distinct from this case in terms of parties, cause of actions
and reliefs sought, despite the fact that both intra-corporate controversies arose from the February 23, 2013
election of the individual petitioners as members of the BOD of VVCCI in an annual meeting which was
supposedly adjourned due to lack of quorum.
 The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere  [stand by the decision and disturb not what is settled]
applies to this case, but only to the extent that Valle Verde held that (1) if the allegations and prayers in the
complaint raise the issues of validation of proxies, and the manner and validity of elections, such as the
nullification of election was unlawfully conducted due to lack of quorum, then such complaint falls under
the definition of election contest under the Interim Rules; and (2)the real parties-in- interest in an election
contest are the contenders, and not the corporation.
The Order issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, on January 28, 2014 in
Commercial Case No. 13-202, insofar as it did not allow any evidence to be presented relating to the
February 23, 2013 elections of the Board of Directors of Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. and the subsequent
resolution of the trial court dated February 3, 2014, are hereby reinstated.

Page | 18
 DIZON, JIRAH VIE GENRE M.

ANGKLA VS. COE

20
G.R. No. 246816, September 15, 2020
ANG NARS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
21
G.R. No. 215746, October 8, 2019
RE: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA
REQUESTING THE GRANT OF RETIREMENT AND OTHER
BENEFITS TO THE LATE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE 23
RENATO C. CORONA
A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021
DE LIMA V. DUTERTE
25
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
LAGMAN V. SENATE PRESIDENT PIMENTEL ET AL.
27
G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018
IN RE: ABELLANA VS. PAREDES
28
G.R. No. 232006 July 10, 2019
CALLEJA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
31
G.R. No. 252578 December 7, 2021
PEOPLE VS. DORIA
32
G.R. No. 227854, October 9, 2019

Page | 19
 LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; PARTY-LIST SYSTEM

ANGKLA V. COE
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.
G.R. No. 246816, September 15, 2020
SUMMARY
Ang Partido ng mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc., (ANGKLA) and Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP)
and Petitioner-in-Intervention Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-PTN) pray that
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) be enjoined from double-counting the votes in
favor of the two-percenters. Instead, the 2% votes counted in the first round should first be
excluded before proceeding to the second round of seatallocation.

DOCTRINE
Just because a party-list was allocated a guaranteed seat and an additional seat
does not mean that its votes were counted twice. It just means that the party-list concerned
surpassed the proportional thresholds prescribed under the law in both rounds of seat allocation.
Similarly, just because a party-list is not awarded a guaranteed seat or an additional does not mean
that its votes were not counted. Failure of a party-list to obtain a seat only means one thing — it
lost the elections.

FACTS:
Petitioners ANGKLA: Ang Partido Ng Mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc., (ANGKLA) and Serbisyo sa
Bayan Party (SBP) and Petitioner-in-Intervention Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa (AKMA-
PTN) essentially assert that the allocation of additional seats in proportion to a party-list's "total
number of votes" results in the double-counting of votes in favor of the two-percenters. For the
same votes which guarantee the two-percenters a seat in the first round of seat allocation are again
considered in the second round. The proviso purportedly violates the equal protection clause,
hence, is unconstitutional.

On May 22, 2019, the National Board of Canvassers (NBOC) promulgated NBOC Resolution
No. 004-19 declaring the winning party-list groups in the.May 13, 2019 elections. Based on the
National Canvass Report No. 8 and adhering to the Court's pronouncement in BANAT, respondent
COMELEC distributed sixty-one (61) congressional seats among the following parties, organizations,
and coalitions taking part in the May 13, 2019 party-list election, viz.:

ISSUE:
Is Section 11(b), RA 7941 allocating additional seats to party-lists in proportion to
their total number of votes unconstitutional?

RULING:
The Court declares as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL Section ll(b), RA 7941 pertaining to the
allocation of additional seats to party-list parties, organizations, or coalitions in proportion to their
respective total number of votes. Consequently, National Board of Canvassers Resolution No. 004-
19 declaring the winning party-list groups in the May 13, 2019 elections is upheld.
Petitioners fail to meet the third requisite for judicial review
The power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of government under Section
1, Article VIII of the Constitution It sets to correct and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch of Government and may therefore be
invoked to nullify actions of the legislative branch which have allegedly infringed the Constitution.

Page | 20
There is no dispute that the first and the second requisites are present in this case:
But the third requisite - - the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity - - is absent here.
Petitioners ANGKLA and SBP had therefore benefited from the BANAT doctrine in the
previous elections. In fact, SBP itself, being among the winning party-list groups in the 2016
elections impleaded as respondent in An Waray v. COMELEC, even defended the application of
the BANAT formula., viz.:

COURT LEGAL RESEARCHER FUNCTIONS

ANG NARS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CARPIO, J.
G.R. No. 215746, October 8, 2019
SUMMARY
On 28 July 2008, Congress approved Joint Resolution No. 4, authorizing the President of the
Philippines “Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and
the Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and For Other
Purposes.” The said Joint Resolution was approved by PGMA on 17 June 2009. Joint Resolution
No. 4 provides for an amendment of existing laws including, among others, RA 9173.

DOCTRINE
Only a bill can become a law. Before a bill can become a law, it must pass three readings on
three separate days, unless the President certifies that its enactment is urgent.
A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact the joint resolution
into a law even if it follows the requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution
for enacting a bill into a law.

NOTES
A joint resolution can be part of the implementation of a law as provided in the law itself. A
joint resolution can also be treated as recommendation to the Executive on how the law can be
implemented. not uncommon to find a proposed piece of legislation, in identical language,
introduced in the Senate as a Senate bill
Justice Caguioa asserts that the Philippine Congress’ concept of joint resolution is equivalent
to the US Senate’s characterization of joint resolution as a piece of legislation that requires the
approval of both chambers and is submitted to the President for possible signature as a law.

FACTS:
On 21 October 2002 PGMA approved RA 9173, the Sec. 32 of which provides that the
minimum base pay of nurses working in the public health institutions shall not be lower than
salary grade 15 prescribed under RA 6758.
On 28 July 2008, Congress approved Joint Resolution No. 4, authorizing the President of the
Philippines “Modify the Compensation and Position Classification System of Civilian Personnel and
the Base Pay Schedule of Military and Uniformed Personnel in the Government, and For Other
Purposes.” The said Joint Resolution was approved by PGMA on 17 June 2009.
Joint Resolution No. 4 provides for an amendment of existing laws including, among others, RA
9173.
On 17 June 2009, PGMA signed EO No. 811 to implement Joint Resolution No. 4 which
provides that entry level Nurse I shall have a salary grade of 11.

ISSUE:
Page | 21
Whether the Joint Resolution No. 4 (Series of 2009) of the Senate and the House of Representatitves
amended Section 32 of the Philippine Nursing Act of 2002 (RA 6758).

RULING:
Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. Before a bill can become a law, it
must pass three readings on three separate days, unless the President certifies that its enactment is
urgent. (Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution).
The purpose for which three readings on separate days are required is two-fold: (1) to inform the
members of Congress of what they must vote on, and (2) to give the members of Congress notice
that a measure is progressing through legislative process, allowing them and others interested in
the measure to prepare their positions on the matter.
The Senate Rules of Procedure enumerate the types of legislation as follows:
Types of Legislation
The types of measures that Congress may consider and act upon (in addition to treaties in the
Senate) include bills and three kinds of resolutions.
They are:
1. Bills - these are general measures, which if passed upon, may become laws. A bill is
prefixed with S., followed by a number assigned the measure based on the order in which it
is introduced. The vast majority of legislative proposals – recommendations dealing with the
economy, increasing penalties for certain crimes, regulation on commerce and trade, etc., are
drafted in the form of bills. They also include budgetary appropriation of the government and
many others. When passed by both chambers in identical form and signed by the President
or repassed by Congress over a presidential veto, they become laws.
2. Joint Resolutions - A joint resolution, like a bill, requires the approval of both houses and
the signature of the President. It has the force and effect of a law if approved. There is no real
difference between a bill and a joint resolution. The latter generally is used when dealing with
a single item or issue, such as a continuing or emergency appropriations bill. Joint
resolutions are also for proposing amendments to the Constitution.

The Senate’s definition of a joint resolution states that it is no different from a bill. However,
under Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, only a bill can be enacted into law after
following certain requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution. A joint resolution is not a
bill, and its passage does not enact the joint resolution into a law even if it follows the requirements
expressly prescribed in the Constitution for enacting a bill into a law.
Section 64 of the Rules of the Senate states that “prior to their final approval, bills and joint
resolutions shall be read at least three times.” However, Section 68 of the Same Rules provides that
“no bill shall be passed by the Senate unless it has passed three (3) readings on separate days xxx.”
There is no express provision in the Rules of the Senate that applies Section 68 to Joint
Resolutions. The approval process under Section 68 only applies to bills and not to joint
resolutions. In short, there is no express language in the Rules of the Senate that a Joint
Resolution must pass three readings on separate days. In contrast, Section 58 of the Rules of
the House of Representatives states that “no bill or joint resolutions shall become law unless it
passes three (3) readings on separate days and printed copies thereof in its final form are
distributed to the Members three (3) days before its passage except when the President certifies to
the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
In any event, neither the Rules of the Senate nor the Rules of the House of Representatives
can amend the Constitution which recognizes that only a bill can become a law. However, a joint
resolution can be part of the implementation of a law as provided in the law itself. A joint
resolution can also be treated as recommendation to the Executive on how the law can be
implemented.
The Position Paper for the Senate of the Philippines states that bills and joint resolutions, for
all practical purposes, are treated alike procedurally. According to the Senate, it is not uncommon
to find a proposed piece of legislation, in identical language, introduced in the Senate as a Senate
bill and in the House as a joint resolution, and vice versa. The Senate added that while at one time
Page | 22
or another, there might have been definite distinctions between the two types of proposed
legislation, they have for all practical purposes been lost.
On the other hand, the House of Representatives asserts that a joint resolution possesses the
force of law if it resembles a bill as to form and procedure for adoption. The house of
Representatives states that the legislative intent to accord to a joint resolution the same effect as a
law should be deemed controlling, notwithstanding the form and style of enactment. In addition, a
joint resolution is treated in the same way as a bill under the Rules of the House of Representatives.
The Rules of the Senate and the Rules of the House of Representatives can change since a
new Congress is not bound to adopt the rules of the previous Congress. In fact, the Senate and the
House of Representatives of every Congress can amend their own Rules of Procedure at any time. In
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, the Court sustained
the OSG that “every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections
are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate
also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it
may deem fit.” Thus, in that case, the Court required the publication of the rules of Procedure of
the Senate Governing the Inquiries in Aid of Legislation for the 14 th Congress.
The same rule applies to the House of Representatives. The House of every Congress must
adopt its own rules at the start of its term. In particular, the House is admittedly not a continuing
body since the terms of all Members of the House end at the same time upon the expiration of every
Congress. Thus, upon the expiration of every Congress, the Rules of Procedure of the House also
expire. That is why Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of the House of Representatives of the 17 th
Congress, adopted on 25 July 2016, provides: “After the oath-taking of the newly-elected
Speaker, the body shall proceed to the adoption of the rules of the immediately preceding
Congress to govern its proceedings until the approval and adoption of the rules of the current
Congress.”
Again, the Constitution provides that only a bill can become a law. When a bill is proposed,
either in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, the public is immediately informed that
there is a proposal being considered which, if it becomes a law, can bind them. It is imperative for
the public to know when a bill is being considered so that they can send their comments, proposals,
or objections to the bill. This is in consonance with the requirement on transparency in public
transactions under Section 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “subjects to
reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.” If a joint resolution is proposed instead of
a bill, the public will not be alerted that there is a proposed legislation, and a law can pass
stealthily without notice to the public.
The veto power of the President applies expressly only to bills, not to joint resolutions. If a
joint resolution is given the effect of, and treated as, a law, Congress will be taking away the veto
power of the President since the Constitution only provides for the President’s veto power over a bill.
In short, Congress can enact a joint resolution into a law that is not subject to the President’s veto
power, a stipulation that clearly violates the Constitution.

LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; POWER OF IMPEACHMENT; EFFECTS

RE: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA

REQUESTING THE GRANT OF RETIREMENT AND OTHER
BENEFITS TO THE LATE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C.
CORONA

Page | 23
 HERNANDO, J.
A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, January 12, 2021
SUMMARY
After a heavily-publicized trial, the Senate declared Chief Justice Corona unfit to hold such a
lofty position and removed him from his office due mainly to his act of non-declaration of his
Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN). The widow of the Chief Justice, Mrs. Corona,
now pleads for judicial benevolence. She prays that she be allowed to reap the retirement benefits
and other gratuities provided under Sections 1 and 3 of Republic Act No. 9946 (RA 9946), and
monthly survivorship pension under Administrative Circular No. 81-2010 (AC 81-2010).

DOCTRINE
Impeachment is a constitutional process that takes place within the political departments of
our government. The House of Representatives accuses and the Senate, sitting as an Impeachment
Court, decides. Public opinion, as well as the facts established by the evidence and the grounds and
processes prescribed by the basic law, steer and weigh heavily in the formulation of its outcome.
Nevertheless, the pervasive realm of the courts that is judicial review is retained as to any act within
the limits of discretion provided by the Constitution.
Impeachment is only preparatory to liability. Since a removal by impeachment does not
explicitly provide for forfeiture as a consequence thereof, as opposed to a criminal conviction
carrying the penalty of perpetual or absolute disqualification, an impeached official, like former
Chief Justice Corona, cannot be deprived of his retirement benefits on the sole ground of his
removal. Such forfeiture could have been imposed upon criminal conviction which, however, was
pre-empted by his death. Viewing it from another angle, a judgment of liability in a separate legal
proceeding is a resolutory condition after a verdict of ouster by impeachment has been rendered, in
that the impeached official retains all the post-employment privileges already earned unless
otherwise declared by the competent tribunals.

ISSUE:
Whether Mrs. Corona should be accorded retirement benefits, other gratuities and survivorship
pension as the spouse of the late CJ Corona despite the latter’s ouster by impeachment.
 
RULING:
Petition is granted
The sole effect of impeachment is the removal from office and disqualification from holding any
public office. Citing cases from the American Jurisprudence (where the law on impeachment in the
country is heavily based on) there is mutual exclusivity of impeachment proceedings and court trial.
Impeachment is not crafted to mete out punishment. It is made to secure the state against
gross political misdemeanors. As such, it does not touch the person or property, but only divests
him of his political capacity. 
No legally actionable liability attaches to the public officer by a mere judgment of
impeachment against him or her, and thus lies the necessity for a separate conviction for charges
that must be properly filed with courts of law.
In terms of hierarchy, judges of the lower courts stand on unequal footing with the Justices
of the Supreme Court. It may certainly be contended that their circumstances do not level with
those of a Supreme Court Justice, much more the Chief Magistrate. However, whether a judge or a
justice, all are members of the Philippine Judiciary who swear foremost fealty to the same
Constitution and oath of public office, both of which demand the highest degree of awareness,
loyalty, and submission regardless of professional ascendancy. It needs emphasizing that the
peculiarities of the present case find no directly-analogous precedent, both in law or in fact, that the
Court may rely on. Thus being the case, the liberalities granted to a judge can be allowed to the
Chief Justice.
Page | 24
 Whether this would be finally addressed by a compelling authority in the proper forum, the
late Chief Justice Corona has already been removed by impeachment. What was done is fait
accompli and now a final, unalterable reality. For the future's worth, it is herein stressed that
the SALN is a tool for public transparency, never a weapon for political vendetta. 
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona is hereby DECLARED entitled to retirement benefits and
other allowances under Republic Act No. 9946 equivalent to a five-year lump sum of the salary and
other allowances he was receiving at the time of his removal by impeachment on May 29, 2012. The
claim of survivorship benefits of Ma. Cristina Roco Corona is hereby GRANTED reckoned from the
lapse of the five-year period on the lump sum. All benefits granted herein are ordered
immediately RELEASED to his widow and beneficiary, Ma. Cristina Roco Corona, subject to usual
clearances.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

DE LIMA V. DUTERTE
BERSAMIN, J.
G.R. No. 227635, October 15, 2019
SUMMARY
Petitioner Senator Leila M. de Lima (Sen. De Lima) seeks to enjoin respondent Rodrigo Roa
Duterte, the incumbent Chief Executive of the Philippines, by petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data, from committing acts allegedly violative of her right to life, liberty and security. Sen.
De Lima traces this personal presidential animosity from the existence of the time of the
investigation of the so-called "Davao Death Squad" and thereby concludes that taking all the public
statements of the President including denunciations of her corruption and immorality.

DOCTRINE
Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the entire tenure of the President.
The immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter of the suit; it applies whether
or not the acts subject matter of the suit are part of his duties and functions as President.

NOTES
The rationale for the grant of immunity as stated in Soliven v. Makasiar is “to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of distraction, considering that
being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,aside from requiring all of the office-
holder's time, also demands undivided attention.” And as expanded in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, it
will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such.
Besides, any litigation, whether big or small, naturally serves as a distraction to a party-
litigant. Even while represented by counsel, a litigant is still responsible for certain facets of the
case, like presenting evidence and disputing claims, and cannot simply leave the course and
conduct of the proceedings entirely to the discretion of his or her chosen counsel.

FACTS:
President Duterte issued a number of public statements against Sen. De Lima, including
denunciations of her corruption and immorality. The statements prompted her to initiate this
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against President Duterte. In her petition, Sen. De
Lima adverted to several public statements that allegedly threatened her right to life, liberty and
security, namely:
a. The August 11, 2016 public statement of President Duterte threatening to destroy Sen. De Lima.
The statement reads: "I know I'm the favorite whipping boy of the NGOs and the human rights
Page | 25
stalwarts. But I have a special ano kaya no. She is a government official. One day soon I will –
bitiwan ko yan in public and I will have to destroy her in public." Incidentally, in the same event,
President Duterte insinuated that with the help of another country, he was keeping surveillance of
her. "Akala nila na hindi rin ako nakikinig sa kanila. So while all the time they were also listening to
what I've done, I've also been busy, and with the help of another country, listening to them;"3
b. The statement uttered in a briefing at the NAIA Terminal 3, Pasay City in August 17, 2016
wherein President Duterte named Sen. De Lima as the government official he referred to earlier and
at the same time accused her of living an immoral life by having a romantic affair with her driver, a
married man, and of being involved in illegal drugs. "There's one crusading lady, whose even herself
led a very immoral life, taking his (sic) driver as her lover... Paramour niya ang driver nya naging
hooked rin sa drugs because of the close association. You know, when you are an immoral, dirty
woman, the driver was married. So you live with the driver, its concubinage."
c. The statements that described her as an immoral woman; that publicized her intimate and
personal life, starting from her new boyfriend to her sexual escapades;7 that told of her being
involved in illegal drugs as well as in activities that included her construction of a house for her
driver/lover with financing from drug-money;8 and
d. The statements that threatened her ("De Lima, you are finished") and demeaned her womanhood
and humanity. "If I were De Lima, ladies and gentlemen, I'll hang myself. Your life has been, hindi
lang life, the innermost of your core as a female is being serialized everyday. Dapat kang magresign.
You resign.11 and "De Lima better hang yourself ... Hindi ka na nahiya sa sarili mo. Any other
woman would have slashed her throat. You? Baka akala mo artista ka. Mga artistang xrated
paglabas sa, pagkatapos ng shooting, nakangiti ...". De Lim prays to the SC to grant a Writ of
Habeas Data –
a. Enjoining the President and any of his representatives, agents, assigns, officers, or
employees from collecting information about petitioner's private life outside the realm of
legitimate public concern;
b. Disclosing to her (De Lima) the name of the foreign country who, according to her, "helped
him" listen in on petitioner, the manner and means by which he listened in on petitioner, and
the sources of his information or where the data about petitioner's private life and alleged
private affairs came from;
c. Ordering the deletion, destruction or rectification of such data or information; and
d. Enjoining the President from making public statements that (i) malign her as a woman and
degrade her dignity as a human being; (ii) sexually discriminate against her; (iii) describe or
publicize her alleged sexual conduct; (iv) constitute psychological violence against her; and (v)
otherwise violate her rights or are contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy,
and/or public interest; and Sen. De Lima maintains that presidential immunity is not
applicable because President Duterte's attacks against her are not part of his official duties
and functions.

ISSUE:
May the incumbent Chief Executive be haled to court even for the limited purpose under the Rules
on the Writ of Habeas Data?

RULING:
No. The petition is dismissed. Presidential immunity in this jurisdiction attaches during the
entire tenure of the President. The immunity makes no distinction with regard to the subject matter
of the suit; it applies whether or not the acts subject matter of the suit are part of his duties and
functions as President. The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from
suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance of
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention. It will degrade the dignity
of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while

Page | 26
serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. The SC dismissed the petition for the writ of habeas data on the ground that respondent
Rodrigo Roa Duterte as the incumbent President of the Philippines is immune from suit during his
incumbency.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT;

ARTICLE VII, SECTION 18 OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION;LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; RIGHT TO
PROMULGATE ITS OWN RULES TO GOVERN ITS
PROCEEDINGS

LAGMAN V. SENATE PRESIDENT PIMENTEL ET AL.

TIJAM, J.
G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018

SUMMARY
President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not
exceeding sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute Group and
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Three separate petitions were filed before the Supreme Court, challenging
the sufficiency of the factual basis of Proclamation No. 216.

DOCTRINE
The 1987 Constitution grants the Congress the power to shorten or extend the President's
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. While the
number of times that the Congress is allowed to approve an extension of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is not specified, Section 18, Article VII is
clear that the only limitations to the exercise of the congressional authority to extend such
proclamation or suspension are that the extension should be upon the President's initiative; that it
should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public
safety; and that it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the
petition of any citizen. Moreover, Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of
the proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority to decide on
its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be "for a period to be
determined by the Congress."
No less than the Constitution, under Section 16 of Article VI, grants the Congress the right to
promulgate its own rules to govern its proceedings. This constitutionally- vested authority is
recognized as a grant of full discretionary authority to each House of Congress in the formulation,
adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the exercise of this power is generally exempt
from judicial supervision and interference, except on a clear showing of such arbitrary and
improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process. In other words, the Court
cannot review the rules promulgated by Congress in the absence of any constitutional violation.

FACTS:
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the effectivity of
Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22, 2017, the Congress adopted
Resolution of Both Houses No. 2, extending Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017. In a
letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) Chief of Staff, General Rey Leonardo Guerrero (General Guerrero), recommended the further

Page | 27
extension of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018.

ISSUE:
Whether the President and the Congress had sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No.
216.

RULING:
Supreme Court reiterated the case of Lagman v. Medialdea. The Court sustained the
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 216, holding that the President had probable cause to believe
that actual rebellion exists and public safety required the Proclamation. The Court held: A review of
the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the President, in issuing Proclamation
No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion exists. The President's
conclusion, that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the
removal from the allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the
deprivation of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his burden of
proof. After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable cause for a valid
declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. x x x In this
case, the reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension indicate that the
rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No. 216, continues to exist and its "remnants"
have been resolute in establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the
recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up, consolidation of forces
and continued attacks. In recommending the one-year extension of Proclamation No. 216 to the
President, AFP General Guerrero cited, among others, the continued armed resistance of the
DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. As to public safety, the rising number of these rebel groups,
their training in and predilection to terrorism, and their resoluteness in wresting control of
Mindanao from the government, pose a serious danger to Mindanao. In a short period after the
Marawi crisis was put under control, said rebel groups have managed to increase their number by
400, almost the same strength as the group that initially stormed Marawi. Their current number is
now more than half the 1,010 rebels in Marawi which had taken the AFP five months to neutralize.
To wait until a new battleground is chosen by these rebel groups before we consider them a
significant threat to public safety is neither sound nor prudent.

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND

COMPETENT COUNSEL

IN RE: ABELLANA V. PAREDES

CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 232006 July 10, 2019
SUMMARY
Michael Labrador Abellana (Abellana) was charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Art.
II of R.A. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. By virtue of a search warrant,
the police officers searched the house of Abellana and found shabu in the pocket of the latter’s
hanged pants together with the instruments or equipment fit or intended for smoking, consuming,
administering, ingesting or introducing any dangerous drug into the body.

DOCTRINE
Broadly speaking, the writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any
person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion for the issuance
Page | 28
of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement
or placed under some form of illegal restraint. Concomitantly, if a person's liberty is restrained by
some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot be used to directly
assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly acquired
jurisdiction, was not ousted of this jurisdiction through some irregularity in the course of the
proceedings.
However, jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also be availed of
as a post-conviction remedy when, as a consequence sentence as to circumstance of a judicial
proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as such excess.
A client is bound by his counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistake in handling a case. To
allow a client to disown his counsel's conduct would render the proceedings indefinite, tentative,
and subject to reopening by the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that when the detention complained of finds its origin in what
has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably
narrowed. Whatever situation the petitioner invokes from the exceptional circumstances listed
above, the threshold remains high. Mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional right is not
enough. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.

NOTES
Sec. 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SECTION 6. Promulgation of judgment. — xxxxxxx If the judgment is for conviction and the
failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available
in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of
court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to
avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Sections 11 and 12, Article II of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. After police, by issue of a search
warrant, found the hanged pants of the accused in the window. There was no other male person in
the house. They found in the said front pocket of the accused a big transparent plastic pack of
white crystalline substance believed to be shabu as well as other shabu paraphernalia. The RTC
promulgated its Decision finding accused MICHAEL L. ABELLANA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of violation of Section 11, Art. II, RA 9165. Petitioner filed a Motion for New Trial or
Reconsideration. He alleged that his rights as an accused had been prejudiced by some
irregularities committed during trial. Specifically, he claimed that he had been deprived of his right
to due process because he had not been properly notified ever since Atty. Albura became his new
counsel and that in total, Atty. Albura received only two notices involving the case, which included
the Notice of Promulgation of Judgment. Petitioner also discussed the merits of his case, claiming
that there were errors of fact in the RTC Decision. The RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest against
petitioner. At the time of the issuance of the RTC, petitioner was still at large. On February 10,
2010, petitioner was finally arrested at his residence. Petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus before the Court. He claims that a petition for the issuance of the writ of
habeas corpus may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy in such cases when a person is
deprived of his Constitutional rights during the court proceedings. Specifically, he claims that he
has been deprived of his rights to due process and to competent counsel.

ISSUE:

Page | 29
Whether the petition for the writ of habeas corpus should be granted.

RULING:
The petition should be denied. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus is a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. It secures to a prisoner the right to have
the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice and to have it ascertained
whether he is held under lawful authority. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. Thus, the most basic criterion
for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his
freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. Concomitantly, if a person's
liberty is restrained by some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. The writ cannot
be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or tribunal which, having duly
acquired jurisdiction, was not ousted of this jurisdiction through some irregularity in the course of
the proceedings. However, jurisprudence has recognized that the writ of habeas corpus may also be
availed of as a postconviction remedy when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the
following exceptional circumstances is attendant: 1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the restraint of a person; 2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
or 3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. 59 Here,
petitioner is invoking the first circumstance. Mere allegation of a violation of one's constitutional
right is not enough. The violation of constitutional right must be sufficient to void the entire
proceedings. This, petitioner failed to show.

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE

CUICO V. PEOPLE
CAGUOIA, J.
G.R. No. 232293, December 9, 2020

SUMMARY
Evelyn Cuico allegedly violated Sec 12 of RA 9165 or Dangerous Drugs wherein she was
allegedly have in her possession, 23 disposable syringe and 3 ampoules of Nubain or Nalbuphine
Hydrichloride. PO3 Tiempo along with other police officer were conducting "foot patrol" in Barang
Kamagayan, Cebu City where they saw a group of men coming out from a small shanty made of
light materials. PO3 Teimpo, who was standing near the open door shanty, saw that Cucio injecting
nubain and found in her possession, the said paraphernalia which they seized.

DOCTRINE
The presumption of innocence of the accused remains until the judgment of conviction
becomes final and executory. Even if a judgment of conviction exists, as long as the same remains
pending appeal, the accused is still presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, in People v. Mingming, the Court outlined what the prosecution must do to
hurdle the presumption and secure a conviction:
First, the accused enjoys the constitutional presumption of innocence until final conviction;
conviction requires no less than evidence sufficient to arrive at a moral certainty of guilt, not only
with respect to the existence of a crime, but, more importantly, of the identity of the accused as the
author of the crime.
Second, the prosecution's case must rise and fall on its own merits and cannot draw its
strength from the weakness of the defense.

Page | 30
FACTS:
PO3 Edmund Tiempo, with his team, conducted a foot patrol in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu
City, in connection with the report of rampant illegal activities in said area. When they were in the
Barangay, they saw a group of men coming out from a small hut. PO3 Tiempo saw Evelyn Cuico
inside the shanty holding a disposable syringe used for injecting nubain. During the trial, the
Regional Trial Court explained that it was convicting Cuico for there was no reason to doubt the
identities of the syringes and empty ampoules of Nalbuphine Hydrochloride presented by the
prosecution. The RTC further opined that the failure of the police officers to subject the seized items
to forensic examination was not a bar to Cuico's conviction. The RTC thus convicted Cuico.
Aggrieved, she filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of
Cuico.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in affirming the conviction of Cuico.

RULING:
Yes. The prosecution was unable to prove Cuico's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Article III,
Section 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that every accused is presumed innocent unless
his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. This presumption in favor of the accused remains until
the judgment of conviction becomes final and executory. Until a promulgation of final conviction is
made, this constitutional mandate prevails. Hence, even if a judgment of conviction exists, as long
as the same remains pending appeal, the accused is still presumed to be innocent until his guilt is
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS, FREE

SPEECH AND EXPRESSION, TO BE INFORMED OF THE
NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION, AND NON-
DETENTION SOLELY BY REASON OF POLITICAL BELIEFS

CALLEJA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

CARANDANG, J.
G.R. No. 252578 December 7, 2021
SUMMARY
Petitioners primarily assail the validity of Sections 4 to 12 of the Anti-Terror Act due to their
perceived facial vagueness and overbreadth that purportedly repress protected speech. It is argued
further that the unconstitutionality of the definition of terrorism and its variants will leave it with
"nothing to sustain its existence."

DOCTRINE
Under the vagueness doctrine, a law is constitutionally defective when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct
to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. Closely related to the vagueness doctrine is
the overbreadth doctrine, under which a law may be struck down as unconstitutional if it achieves
a governmental purpose by means that are unnecessarily broad and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. In Philippine jurisprudence, originally, it had special application only to free-
speech cases under non- penal laws.

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FACTS:
Before the enactment of RA No. 11479, the Philippine Congress passed RA No. 9372 or the
Human Security Act of 2007 (HAS). However, despite its passage the prevalence of terrorism in the
country not only persisted but also escalated. On June 18, 2012, the R.A. No. 10168 or the
“Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012 was signed into law. As with the
HSA, R.A. No. 10168 did little to curb incidences of terrorism in the Philippines. Thus, on July 03,
2020, President Rodrigo Duterte signed R.A. No. 11479 otherwise known the Anti-Terorism Act
(ATA). The petitioner filed a suit that said Republic Act is unconstitutional.

ISSUE:
Whether the petition assailing the constitutionality of RA 11479 has legal standing and would merit
a judicial review.

RULING:
No. The petition assailing the constitutionality of RA 11479 has no legal standing and would
not merit a judicial review. When the issue of the constitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is
the established doctrine that the court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis
mota of the case. Hence, the petition was dismissed outright absent actual controversy and legal
standing.

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO PRESUMPTION OF

INNOCENCE

PEOPLE V. DORIA
CAGUIOA, J.
G.R. No. 227854, October 9, 2019

SUMMARY
Perez, was arrested for alleged violation of RA 9165, for illegal sale and possession of illegal
drugs. During the trial, the prosecution did not show proof of compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165. Perez argued that since he is the accused he has the presumption of
innocence, and furthermore he cannot be found guilty of violation of RA 9165 specially considering
compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 has not been proven by the prosecution.

DOCTRINE
Undoubtedly, the spread of illegal drugs must be quelled. Our Constitution declares that the
maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of
the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Nevertheless, by sacrificing the sacred and indelible right to due process for the sheer sake of
convenience and expediency, the very maintenance of peace and order sought after is rendered
wholly nugatory. By thrashing basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the proliferation of
illegal
drugs, instead of protecting the general welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is viciously
assaulted. In other words, when the Constitution is disregarded, the war on illegal drugs becomes a
self-defeating and self-destructive enterprise. A battle waged against illegal drugs that tramples on
the rights of the people, is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the people.

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 In an alleged violation of RA 9165, the Prosecution has the burden to prove the compliance
provided for by Section 21, RA 9165 the applicable law at the time of the commission of the alleged
crimes, particularly the prosecution must prove
a. the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or
confiscation; and
b. the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of:
1. the accused or his/her representative or counsel,
2. an elected public official,
3. a representative from the media, and
4. a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
If the prosecution failed to prove the compliance with such requirements, and it also failed to
provide a justifiable reason for failure to comply, the accused must be acquitted as failure to comply
with Section 21, of RA 9165, is already proof that the accused is innocent and not proven guilty.

NOTES
If the buy-bust occurred on or after August 7, 2014, RA 10640 has taken effect thus in such
case, the witness required are only (1) an elected public official, and (2) a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media, who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof.

FACTS:
Doria and Gaddao were arrested in a buy-bust operation for allegedly violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act. Gaddao was arrested without a warrant after her being identified by Doria as
his associate.

ISSUE:
Whether there is a valid warrantless arrest of Gaddao

RULING:
NO. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113
must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers
making the arrest. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust
operation to give ground for her arrest. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding
of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to
justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced on her.

BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AGAINST

UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

ACOSTA V. OCHOA
JUSTICE, J.
G.R. No. 211559, October 15, 2019

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SUMMARY
After the enactment of RA 10591 and the effectivity of the IRR, the Philippine National Police
(PNP) centralized all firearms licensing applications and renewals at its headquarters at Camp
Crame, Quezon City. The pro forma application form for firearm registration contained a paragraph
on the "Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection". Licensed firearm owners Eric F. Acosta
(Acosta), and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz (Dela Paz), petitioners, filed a Petition for Prohibition assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions, including the requirement of signing the Consent of
Voluntary Presentation for Inspection in the pro forma application form for firearm registration, for
violating Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

DOCTRINE
There is no constitutional right to bear arms. Neither is the ownership or possession of a
firearm a property right. Persons intending to use a firearm can only either accept or decline the
government's terms for its use. The grant of license, however, is without prejudice to the
inviolability of the home. The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures
remains paramount, and the government, in the guise of regulation, cannot conduct inspections of
applicants for firearm licenses unless armed with a search warrant.

FACTS:
This Court resolves the consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 10591, or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation
Act, and their corresponding provisions in the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations for
allegedly violating petitioners' right to bear arms, right to property, and right to privacy. On March
25, 2014, licensed firearm owners Eric F. Acosta (Acosta) and Nathaniel G. Dela Paz (Dela Paz) filed
before this Court a Petition for Prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the following provisions
of law and acts: (a) Sections 4(g), 10, 26, and 39 (a), all of Republic Act No. 10591; (b) Sections 4.4.
(a), 4.10(b), 7.3, 7.9, 7.11.2(b), 7.12(b), 10.3, 26.3, 26.4, and 39(1)(a) of the 2013 Implementing
Rules and Regulations; and (c) The requirement of signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for
Inspection in the pro forma application form for firearm registration, for violating Article III, Section
2 of the Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUES:
Whether the Chief of the Philippine National Police added penal provisions in the
Implementing Rules and Regulations, thereby invalidly exercising a power exclusively vested in
Congress.

RULING:
As an exception to the non-delegation of legislative power, Congress has historically
delegated to the chief of the police force the power to approve or disapprove applications for license
to possess or deal with firearms. Under Republic Act No. 6975, or the Department of the Interior
and Local Government Act of 1990, the authority to issue licenses for the possession of firearms
and explosives is now exclusively granted to the Philippine National Police. Pertinently, the power to
make laws-the legislative power-is vested in Congress. The rule which forbids the delegation of
legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. Ond of its
exception permits the legislative body to delegate its licensing power and such licensing power
includes the power to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.

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 DOMINGO, PRINCESS

HALILI VS. COMELEC

36
G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019
TALLADO VS. COMELEC
38
G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019
ROSARIO, ET AL. VS. COMELEC
41
G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020
MARCOS, JR. VS. ROBREDO
44
PET Case No. 005, November 17, 2020

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CHRISTIAN C. HALILI VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 231643, January 15, 2019
MARINO P. MORALES VS. PYRA LUCAS AND THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS
G. R. No. 231657, January 15, 2019

FACTS:
Marino P. Morales was elected and serves as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat,
Pampanga from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2010. He was elected again as mayor during the 2010
elections. During his second term, in 2012, Congress passed Republic Act No. 10164 converting the
Municipality of Mabalacat into a component city and a plebiscite was held. In the 2013 elections, he
ran again and was elected as mayor of the new Mabalacat City. On Dec. 8, 2015, he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the 2016 elections for the position of mayor of Mabalacat City.
On January 4, 2016, Pyra Lucas, another candidate for the position of mayor of Mabalacat
City, filed a Petition for Cancellation of the COC and/or Disqualification of Morales for the Mayoral
Position of Mabalacat City. Lucas alleged that Morales was already disqualified to run for mayor
since he was elected and had served three consecutive terms prior to the 2016 elections. Lucas also
alleged that the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City did not interrupt
Morales' service for the full term for which the latter was elected.
Morales countered that the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City
interrupted his term. According to him, his term as mayor of Mabalacat City is not a continuation of
his term as mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat. He also averred that since he was already
assumed the office, disputes as to his COC became moot and the proper remedy is to file a quo
warranto proceeding.
During the 2016 elections, Morales was proclaimed as the elected city mayor. Crisostomo
Garbo got the second-highest number of votes for the position of city mayor. Christian C. Halili was
proclaimed as the elected city vice mayor.
ISSUE:
1. Was Morales disqualified from running as city mayor of Mabalacat City in the 2016
elections?
2. Was Morales' second term interrupted by the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat
into a component city?
3. Was Morales' declaration in his COC that he is eligible for the position of City Mayor a
material misrepresentation?
4. Will the rule of succession under Sec. 44, LGC, apply?
5. Was the remedy resorted to by Lucas proper?
RULING:
1. Yes, Morales was disqualified from running as city mayor of Mabalacat City in the 2016 elections
because it violates the three-term limit rule. The three-term limit rule, embodied in Sec. 8 of the
1987 Constitution and reflected in Sec. 43 of the Local Government Code, provides that the no local
elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. According
to Lonzanida vs. COMELEC (1999), there are two conditions which must concur for the application
of the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of this rule, namely: 1) that the official
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concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and 2)
that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In this case, Morales even admitted that he has
been elected and has served as mayor of Mabalacat for three consecutive terms, ranging from 2007-
2016. Thus, the three- term limit rule disqualifies him from running for the same position for the
fourth consecutive term.
2. No, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute as an interruption of the
incumbent officials' continuity of service. In Latasa vs. COMELEC (2003), in order to be held as an
interruption of service, the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official
steps down from the office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the
territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit. In that case, the Court reasoned that
such change does fall under the definition of an interruption because: 1) the territory of the local
government unit remained unchanged, 2) the inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
the elective official for three consecutive terms, and over whom the official held power and
authority, and 3) the elective official never ceased from acting and discharging his duties and
responsibilities despite the conversion of the municipality into a city. Thus, absent any showing
that these factors were present in this case, Morales' second term cannot be considered as
interrupted by the conversion of the Municipality of Mabalacat into a component city.
3. Yes, his certification under oath in his COC that he is eligible for the position of city mayor for
Mabalacat City in the 2016 elections constitutes as a material misrepresentation. In Aratea vs.
COMELEC (2012), the Court held that election to and service of the same local elective position for
three consecutive terms renders a candidate ineligible from running for the same position in the
succeeding elections. In this case, Morales misrepresented his eligibility because he knew fully well
that he had been elected, and had served, as mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for three consecutive
terms, yet, he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding term.
4. No, the rule of succession will not apply. In Aratea vs. COMELEC (2012), the Court ruled that a
violation of the three-term limit rule is an ineligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to
elective office and the misrepresentation of such is a ground to grant the petition to deny due
course to or cancel a COC. A person whose COC has been denied due court and/or cancelled under
Sec. 78 is deemed to not have been a candidate at all, because his COC is considered void ab initio
and thus cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes. Because of this,
Morales cannot be considered as the first-placer in the elections and all his votes should be
considered as stray votes. In that case, the person legally entitled to the vacant position would be
the candidate who garnered the next highest number of votes among those eligible. In this case,
Garbo is legally entitled to the position of mayor, having garnered the highest number of votes
among the eligible candidates.
5. Yes, the remedy resorted to by Lucas was proper. In Velasco vs. COMELEC (2008), the Court
ruled that COMELEC's jurisdiction to deny due court to and cancel a COC continues even after the
election and the proclamation of the winner if the same was not resolved before Election Day. Also,
in Fermin vs. COMELEC (2008), the Court likened a proceeding under Sec. 78, OEC to a quo
warranto proceeding under Sec. 253, OEC, since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of
a candidate. The only distinction is that Sec. 78 is filed before the proclamation while a petition for
quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.

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 GOVERNOR EDGARDO A. TALLADO VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 246679, September 10, 2019

FACTS:
The petitioner was duly elected as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte in the 2010,
2013 and 2016 elections. He fully served his 2010-2013 and 2013-2016 terms. It is the turn of
events in respect of the petitioner’s 2016-2019 term that has spawned the controversy under
review. It appears that on January 28, 2013, one Edgardo Gonzales filed in the OMB an
administrative complaint charging the petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression or grave abuse
of authority. While the case was pending, the petitioner won as Governor in the 2013 elections.
On October 2, 2015, while he was serving his 2013-2016 term, the OMB found and declared
him administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of suspension for one year which
suspension was immediately implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG). The petitioner timely appealed the suspension to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review. Acting on the petitioner’s appeal, the CA promulgated its decision reducing the imposed
penalty of suspension from one year to six months. He immediately re-assumed his position after
the lapse of six months, and his re-assumption later became the subject of the third OMB case.
On November 4, 2015, several persons initiated the second OMB case against the petitioner.
In the decision dated April 18, 2016 and approved by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales
on September 13, 2016, the OMB held the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
oppression/abuse of authority and ordered his dismissal from the service. Although the petitioner
appealed to the CA, the DILG implemented the OMB decision on November 8, 2016 by ordering the
petitioner to vacate his position as Governor. On the same date, the DILG issued another
memorandum addressed to then Vice Governor Jonah Pedro G. Pimentel (Pimentel) directing him to
assume as Governor of Camarines Norte.
On December 12, 2016, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the DILG from
implementing or continuously implementing the decision of the OMB. Thus, the petitioner was able
to re-assume his post as Governor. The third OMB case concerned the petitioner’s re- assumption
of the office of the Governor after the CA had initially reduced the penalty imposed in the first OMB
case to suspension for six months. The complainant thereat initiated another complaint on the
basis that the petitioner had violated the first OMB decision by re-assuming office without having
fully served his suspension.
On January 11, 2018, the OMB rendered another decision finding the petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct, and ordering his dismissal from the service. On September 26, 2018, the CA
ruled on the petitioner’s appeal by modifying the penalty of dismissal to six months suspension.
On October 29, 2018, the DILG issued its memorandum directing the implementation of the
decision of the CA, and the reinstatement of the petitioner as Governor if he had already served the
six-month suspension. On October 30, 2018, the petitioner took his oath of office as Governor of
Camarines Norte.
In the meanwhile, on October 15, 2018, the petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Governor of Camarines Norte for the May 2019 elections. This prompted respondents Norberto
B. Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgalado to file their separate petitions with the COMELEC praying
for the denial of due course to and/or for the cancellation of the petitioner’s COC, which petitions
were consolidated and predicated on the application of the three-term limit rule.

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 In its March 29, 2019 resolution, the COMELEC First Division granted the petitions and
ordered the cancellation of the petitioner’s COC. The COMELEC First Division concluded that the
petitioner had fully served three consecutive terms considering that his suspension and dismissals
from the service were not interruptions of his term because he had not thereby lost title to the
office; that the OMB’s decisions ordering his dismissals were not yet final; and that there had been
no permanent vacancy and no succession in accordance with Section 44 of the LGC.
In the resolution promulgated on May 9, 2019, the COMELEC en Banc, with Commissioner
Parreño maintaining his dissent, denied the petitioner’s verified motion for reconsideration and
affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC First Division. Undeterred, the petitioner lodged the petition for
certiorari with the Court. On May 10, 2019, the Court issued a status quo ante order requiring the
parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the COMELEC En Banc
resolution. The petitioner eventually garnered the highest number of votes for the position of
Governor of Camarines Norte in the May 13, 2019 elections. On May 16, 2019, the petitioner was
proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of Camarines Norte.
The petitioner contends that his third term as Governor of Camarines Norte was involuntarily
interrupted when the Ombudsman’s dismissal orders were implemented, thereby preventing the
application of the three-term limit rule.
The OSG, as tribune of the people, submits that the implementation of the Ombudsman’s
decisions on the petitioner’s removal from office must be considered as term interruption because
he thereby ceased to exercise the functions and prerogatives of the office; and that he must be
deemed not to have fully served his third term as Governor considering that he involuntarily lost his
title to the office.
On its part, the COMELEC contends that the three-term limit rule must be strictly construed
in order to avoid attempts to circumvent and evade the.application of the same; that under Section
7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB’s Rules), the petitioner’s
exoneration from the charge of grave misconduct rendered the “dismissal” nothing more than a
mere preventive suspension, which was not the term interruption that effectively precluded the
application of the three-term limit rule; that the dismissal and its resultant legal effects must not be
recognized in view of the reduction of the penalty from dismissal to suspension; that because the
petitioner’s position as Governor was never permanently vacant, he was able to re-assume the office
and functions of Governor, thus warranting the conclusion that the vacancy was only temporary.
ISSUE: Whether or not a penalty of dismissal imposed on an elective official by the Ombudsman
which was later reduced to suspension by the CA constitutes to interruption of the term of office
thereby circumventing the three-term limit rule as provided by the Constitution.
RULING:
Yes. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution embodies the three- term limit rule, viz.:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
For the application of the disqualification under the three-term limit rule, therefore, two
conditions must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive
terms to the same local government post; and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive
terms.

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 The first requisite for the application of the three-term limit rule is present inasmuch as the
petitioner was elected as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, specifically in
the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. But the second requisite was not satisfied because his
intervening dismissals from the service truly prevented him from fully serving the third consecutive
term.
Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while interruption of the full
continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position equates to failure to render service.
In this regard, Aldovino v. COMELEC is instructive, as follows:
From all the above, we conclude that the “interruption” of a term exempting an elective
official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to
office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short,
for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and
its strint intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective official’s continuous stay in office
to no more than three consecutive terms, using “voluntary renunciation” as an example and
standard of what does not constitute an interruption.
Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an
effective interruption of service within a term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand,
temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve
the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the function of his office for a reason provided by
law.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to
hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs
during an office holder’s term when he retains title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for
reasons established by law. Of course, the “failure to serve” cannot be used once the right to office
is lost; without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is
really lost.
The COMELEC relies on the OMB’s Rules to support its view that the execution of the orders
of dismissal against the petitioner did not create a permanent, but only a temporary, vacancy.
A review reveals that the OMB’s Rules did not justify the COMELEC’s reliance.
The OMB’s Rules, promulgated in Administrative Order No. 07, Series of 1990, as amended
by Administrative Order No. 17, Series of 2003, stated in Section 7 of its Rule III as follows:
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision.- Where the respondent is absolved of the
charge, and in case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand,
suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall
be final, executory and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court
of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule
43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension
or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
That the second paragraph of Section 7 of Rule III of the OMB’s Rules, supra, characterizes
the penalty of suspension or dismissal meanwhile enforced as a preventive suspension should the
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public officer later win his or her appeal of the OMB’s decision is absurd and illogical as to the
penalty of dismissal. The characterization also lacks legal and factual support. In his case, the
petitioner was twice fully divested of his powers and responsibilities as Governor by the DILG
immediately transferring the discharge of the office of Governor and the exercise of the functions
and powers thereof to another person, Vice Governor Pimentel. The latter forthwith took his oath of
office as Governor and unconditionally assumed and discharged such office. Without doubt, the
execution of the OMB’s dismissals in that manner resulted in the petitioner’s loss of title to the
office of Governor.
Neither did the non-finality of the decisions render any less the petitioner’s loss of his title to
the office. It would be unwarranted to differentiate the dismissals enforced against him from the
dismissal based on and pursuant to a decision that was already final. Both dismissals would
produce the same effect – the ouster of the official from his title to the office.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the decisions directing the dismissal of the petitioner
included no indication of the petitioner being thereby placed under any type of suspension. In fact,
the decisions did not state any conditions whatsoever. As such, he was dismissed for all intents and
purposes of the law in the periods that he was dismissed from office even if he had appealed. In that
status, he ceased to hold the title to the office in the fullest sense.
The COMELEC considered developments in the petitioner’s appeals in holding that the
DILG’s execution of the decisions did not result into the loss of title to the office. This holding was
grounded on two matters, namely: (1) the non-finality of the decisions under the OMB’s Rules; and
(2) the fact that the petitioner was able to re-assume his seat as Governor.
The holding of the COMELEC was unjustified because it thereby disregarded the fact that the
DILG had fully implemented the decisions of dismissal. The full implementation immediately carried
legal repercussions that no developments in relation to the petitioner’s appeals could change or
undo. Among others, the petitioner effectively lost his title to the office by the DILG’s act of directing
Pimentel to take his oath of office as Governor, and by the latter then assuming and discharging the
office and functions of such office.
The provision of the OMB’s Rules allowing the petitioner to re–assume on the basis of the
interim being considered as a period of preventive suspension after his appeals resulted in the
imposition of lesser penalties did not alter the reality that he had actually been ousted from office.
In other words, there was still an interruption of the term of office. As aptly put in Latasa v.
COMELEC, the interruption, to be considered as interruption of the term, “contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.”
Conformably with said ruling, the period during which the petitioner was not serving as Governor
should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because he had then ceased to exercise
power or authority over the people of the province. Indeed, it was Pimentel who then held title to the
office and exercised the functions thereof. As such, the petitioner did not fully serve his entire third
term even if his re- assumption to office subsequently occurred.

CYNTHIA S. DEL ROSARIO, ET AL. VS. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020

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FACTS:
The provinces of Palawan del Norte, Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur are appealing
Republic Act No. 11259, alleging that it contradicts their charters. On April 5, 2019, the proposal
was signed into law, and it will take effect on May 20, 2019. In fact, said petitioners, a qualified
voters of Puerto Princesa, have not participated in the elections for provincial officials of Palawan.
According to petitioners, this constituted a violation of the political right of the people of Palawan to
participate in public consultations on matters affecting their interest.
Respondents Provincial Treasurer and Provincial Government of Palawan counter that the
assailed statute was developed in coordination with the various offices of the provincial government,
as well as the municipal mayors and Sangguniang Panlalawigan members of Palawan. They also
claim that petitioner Cynthia del Rosario was even present during one of the deliberations of the
House of Representatives on the matter.
Respondents Commission on Elections and the Department of Budget and Management
argue that the passage of the statute did not disregard the right to participate in public
consultations on matters of the public interest, for the creation of the proposed provinces still needs
the approval of the electorate of Palawan.
Sections 51 and 54 of the assailed law provide:
SEC. 51 Plebiscite
Regardless of whether or not the amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be
charged against the appropriations of the present Province of Palawan.
SEC. 54 Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa
Regardless of whether or not the Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa, as a highly urbanized city,
will not be eligible to vote in the plebiscite or for candidates for provincial elective positions.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the reduction of validity by the court of appeal assailed law provide is proper?-YES
Whether or not until a city has been turned into a highly urbanized city (HUC), are the voters of a
city that used to be a component city of a province able to vote in a referendum for the partition of
that province? – YES

RULING:
The petition claims that RA No. 11259 has three flaws that render it unconstitutional: firstly,
it infringes the people's right to participate in public activities by enacting it into law. Second,
contrary to Article X, Section 10 of the Constitution, it does not allow the voters of the City of Puerto
Princesa to vote in a scheduled ballot; and third, it provides for a significant change in the
distribution of proceeds from the development and use of national wealth between the three new
provinces and the cities directly under the central government, as well as the existing bays.
Respondents Commission on Elections and the Department of Budget and Management
argue that the passage of the statute did not disregard the right to participate in public
consultations on matters of the public interest, for the creation of the proposed provinces still needs
the approval of the electorate of Palawan.
Sections 51 and 54 of the assailed law provide
SEC. 51 Plebiscite
Page | 42
Regardless of whether or not the amount necessary for the conduct of the plebiscite shall be
charged against the appropriations of the present Province of Palawan.
SEC. 52. Commencement of Corporate Existence
The provinces of Palawan del Norte, Palawan Oriental, and Palawan del Sur shall commence
its corporate existence upon the election and qualification of its provincial governor,
provincial vice governor and majority of the members of the sangguniang panlalawigan. The
election of the provincial officials of the newly created provinces shall be held on the second
Monday of May in the year 2022.
SEC. 54 Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa.
Regardless of whether or not the Residents of the City of Puerto Princesa, as a highly
urbanized city, will not be eligible to vote in the plebiscite or for candidates for provincial
elective positions.
Sections 51, 54, 58, 59, and 60 of the law can be considered to be in full force and effect, as
these provisions pertain to matters preparatory to the conduct of the plebiscite for the creation of
the three proposed provinces. These are the very provisions sought to be implemented by
respondents as they prepare for the conduct of the plebiscite this coming May. It is therefore
premature for this Court to make any declaration on the unconstitutionality of the law in toto, when
most of the provisions of the law have yet to take effect.
The Court agrees with the submissions of the respondents on the matter. Petitioners' long
but vacuous citation of various constitutional provisions and treaty instruments does not persuade.
The records of the case reveal that the proposed division of Palawan, as reflected in the assailed
statute, was in fact made in consultation with the people of Palawan, through their elected
representatives: the municipal mayors, municipal councilors, and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, as reflected in the transcripts of the consultative meeting, Sangguniang Panlalawigan
meetings, and resolutions from the municipal councils of Palawan.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite
for the validity of a statute. Article XIII, Section 16, as cited by petitioners, is a protection against
any action which serves to abridge the right of people's organizations to "effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making."
The foregoing disquisitions make it abundantly clear that Puerto Princesa has become a
distinct political entity independent and autonomous from the province of Palawan, by virtue of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city in 2007. Hence, it can no longer be considered a "political
unit directly affected" by the proposed division of Palawan into three provinces; and perforce, the
qualified voters of the city of Puerto Princesa, including herein petitioners Cynthia S. Del Rosario,
Federico N. Virgo, Jr., Renato V. Baladad, Beatriz A. Dioso, and Corazon Manalon Davila were
properly excluded from the coverage of the plebiscite scheduled by RA No. 11259. The petition must
therefore be dismissed.

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FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., VS. MARIA LEONOR G. ROBREDO
PET Case No. 005, November 17, 2020

FACTS:
Protestant Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr. is before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(Tribunal) challenging the election and proclamation of incumbent Vice President Maria Leonor
“Leni Daang Matuwid” G. Robredo) in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections. Robredo
garnered 14,418,817 votes while Marcos came at a close second with 14,155,344 votes. P.E.T. Case
No. 005 is the first and only election protest before the Tribunal in which the recount and revision
process of the pilot provinces were successfully concluded and the protest itself resolved on the
merits.
This Resolution does not yet resolve the entire case but is merely preliminary and
interlocutory in nature. It is designed to hear the parties fully on the various legal issues relating to
their controversy.
In consideration of these purposes, the Tribunal, with Marcos’s agreement, categorized his
causes of action into the following:
First Cause of Action - Annulment of Proclamation
The proclamation of protestee Robredo as the duly elected Vice President is null and void
because the COCs generated by the CCS are not authentic, and may not be used as basis to
determine the number of votes that the candidates for VICE PRESIDENT received.
Second Cause of Action – Revision and Recount
Revision and recount of the paper ballots and/or the ballot images as well as an
examination,verification, and analysis of the voter’s receipts, election returns, audit logs,
transmission logs, the lists of voters, particularly the EDCVL, and VRRs,the books of voters and
other pertinent election documents and/or paraphernalia used in the elections, as well as the
automated election equipment and record~ such as the VCMs, CCS units, SD cards (main and
backup), and the other data storage devices containing electronic data and ballot images in ALL of
the 36,465 protested clustered precincts pursuant to Rules 38 to 45 of the 2010 PET Rules; and
Third Cause of Action – Annulment of Elections
Annulment of election results for the position of Vice President in the provinces of
Maguindanao,Lanao de/ Sur and Basilan, on the ground of terrorism; intimidation and harassment
of voters as well as pre-shading of ballots in all of the 2,756 protested clustered precincts that
functioned in the aforesaid areas.
The Tribunal issued a Preliminary Conference Order setting forth the parties’ respective
admissions and stipulations, the issues for the Tribunal’s resolution, and the parties’ proposed
witnesses. The Preliminary Conference Order also indicated Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros
Oriental as Marcos’s designated pilot provinces pursuant to Rule 65 of the 2010 PET Rules. The
revision of ballots was to begin with these three (3) provinces, which shall serve as “test cases” by
which the Tribunal will determine whether to proceed with the revision of ballots of the remaining
contested clustered precincts.
The Tribunal partially granted the retrieval of the ballot boxes and other election documents,
and the decryption of ballot images, only for the pilot provinces of Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros
Oriental. It also deferred action on the technical examination of the signature of voters in Lanao del
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Sur, Maguindanao, and Basilan, following Rule 65 of the 20 l 0 PET Rules. Rule 65 pertains to the
initial determination of the grounds for the protest. Rule 65 grants the protestant the opportunity to
designate three (3) provinces that best exemplify the frauds or irregularities raised in his or her
Protest. These provinces constitute the “test cases” by which the Tribunal will determine whether it
would proceed with the protest. The full effect of Rule 65, however, is yet to be determined by the
Tribunal based on the required submission of Memoranda mentioned in this Resolution.
In relation to the decryption and printing of ballot images, the Tribunal directed the
COMELEC to inform the Tribunal of its recommended procedures, logistics, schedule, and cost of
the decryption and printing of the ballot images for the pilot provinces of Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and
Negros Oriental. In compliance thereto, the COMELEC, submitted its Manifestation/Compliance
with Motion, attaching thereto Resolution No. 10155 on the Guidelines to Decrypt Ballot Images
and other related resolutions, the Order of Payment, and Summary of Supplies.
Marcos paid the COMELEC the costs and expenses for the conduct of the decryption and
printing of ballot images, election returns and audit logs for all the protested clustered precincts of
the pilot provinces. As scheduled, the decryption and printing of the ballot images for the three (3)
pilot provinces commenced on October 23, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. Representatives from protestant,
protestee and the Tribunal, together with representatives from the COMELEC-ERSD, stood as
witnesses in the authentication of the printed ballot images.
Robredo filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to be Allowed to Secure Soft Copies of the Ballot
Images and Other Reports from the Decrypted Secured Digital Cards, praying that she be allowed to
secure soft copies of the ballot images and other reports from the decrypted SD cards, in lieu of the
printed images. The Tribunal granted.
The Tribunal allowed Marcos to secure only photocopies or soft copies of the decrypted ballot
images, election returns, and other reports for all the protested clustered precincts of the pilot
provinces, subject to the payment of incidental costs. The Tribunal held that for the purpose of the
conduct of the revision proceedings, the custody of the official, printed, and authenticated copies of
the decrypted ballot images, election returns, and audit logs from the protested clustered precincts
of the said pilot provinces shall remain with the Tribunal.
The Tribunal resolved to create an exploratory mission/retrieval team composed of nine (9)
officials and personnel of the Tribunal to facilitate such retrieval of ballot boxes and election
documents from the three (3) pilot protested provinces. The exploratory mission entailed
coordinating with concerned officials from COMELEC, the local government units and the Philippine
National Police, the PhilPost, and finding suitable transportation procedures and storage places to
assure the most efficient, expeditious, and safest way to retrieve and transport the ballot boxes.
The Tribunal approved the use of the SC gymnasium for revision and the parking space of
the SC-Court of Appeals Multi-Purpose Building as storage for the ballot boxes and other election
documents.
Start of the Revision Proceedings
The main purpose of the revision proceeding is to conduct a physical recount of the ballots
and provide the parties with an opportunity to register their objections and claims thereon, the
validity of which will later be ruled upon by the Tribunal during the appreciation stage. For the
present case, the revision process was undertaken by fifty (50) RCs constituted by the Tribunal,
each composed of a Head Revisor, and one representative of the protestant and one representative
of the protestee (Party Revisors). Revision Supervisors, who were lawyers, were designated by the
respective offices of the Chairman and Members of the Tribunal to directly oversee the revision
process. 169 Each revision day, two (2) Members of the Tribunal were required to assign lawyers

Page | 45
from their offices who had previously undergone the necessary training to act as Revision
Supervisors.
The Incident Reports prepared by the Revision Supervisors involving alleged tampered ballots
and irregularities on the external condition of the ballot boxes, glaringly different BEI signatures on
the ballots, excess ballots, and damaged and wet ballots were referred for appropriate action by the
Tribunal to the panel of Commissioners who will examine the ballots subject of the Incident Reports
vis-a-vis the relevant election documents.
The City and Municipal Treasurers and the BEI were required to explain the irregularities
found on the ballots, ballot boxes, and other election paraphernalia. The revision of ballots for the
pilot protested precincts commenced on April 2, 2018 and was concluded on February 4, 2019.
Paper ballots and decrypted ballot images were revised in a total of 5,415 clustered precincts. Three
(3) clustered precincts were left unrevised as the paper ballots contained in their ballot boxes were
wet, damaged and unreadable, and at the same time, COMELEC failed to provide the Tribunal with
their respective decrypted ballot images.
The Tribunal directed the parties to strictly observe the sub Judice rule. However, despite
these directives, the parties and their counsel continued to disclose sensitive information on the
Protest, as shown in several news reports. The Tribunal, directed the parties to show cause and
explain why they should not be cited in contempt. Each denied having violated the sub Judice rule.
It found out that the parties violated the sub Judice rule, which restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice.
Accordingly, the Tribunal imposed the penalty of fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00)
on both parties, and were sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.
As to the threshold, Rule 43(1) of the 2010 PET Rules provides that during segregation of
ballots in the revision process, a 50% threshold is to be applied in determining a valid vote:
(1) xxx. However, marks or shades which are less than 50% of the oval shall not be considered as
valid votes. Any issue as to whether a certain mark or shade is within the threshold shall be
determined by feeding the ballot on the PCOS machine, and not by human determination.
On the other hand, the Revisor’ s Guide provides that any issue on whether a mark or shade
is within the threshold must be resolved by the assigned Revision Supervisor.
As to what must be used in its revision of ballots, the Tribunal noted that the purpose of the
revision process is simply to recount the votes of the parties. This is implemented by mimicking how
the VCMs read and counted the votes during the elections. Hence, in the segregation of ballots, the
Tribunal held that its Head Revisors must be guided by the number of votes indicated in the
Election Returns. The election return is a document in electronic and printed form directly
produced by the VCM showing the date, province, municipality, and precinct in which the election
was held, and the votes in figures for each candidate in a clustered precinct where the said VCM
was utilized.
Marcos filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S.
Caguioa on the ground of evident bias and manifest partiality in favor of Robredo due to his close
ties with former President Benigno Simeon C.Aquino, a classmate of Justice Caguioa and had
previously appointed him as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, Secretary of Justice, and eventually,
as Associate Justice of the SC. Marcos asserted that former President Aquino and his family bore a
grudge against Marcos and had handpicked Robredo as the Liberal Party’s candidate for Vice
President in the 2016 National and Local Elections.

Page | 46
Appreciation of Ballots
After the revision had concluded, the revised ballots were then appreciated. During this
process, the Tribunal validates and verifies the physical count of the ballots during the revision
stage and rules on the parties’ respective claims and objections thereon.The Ballot Appreciation
Guidelines were used in the appreciation of the ballots, specifically in determining the validity of the
ballots and whether they contained valid votes. The cardinal objective of ballot appreciation was to
discover and give effect to the intent of the voter.
The Tribunal proceeded with the appreciation of the ballots following the Ballot Appreciation
Guidelines and taking into consideration the objections and claims of the parties. The Tribunal
ruled on the objections and claims of the parties, and to determine the validity of each ballot and
vote, regardless of whether the parties registered an objection or claim.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the protest is sufficient in form and substance.
2. Whether a threshold to be applied is 50% or 25%.
3. Whether Justice Caguioa should be inhibited

RULING:
1. Yes. In its previous ruling in Roxas v. Binay, the Tribunal emphasized that in determining
the sufficiency of the allegations of an election protest, what is merely required is a statement of the
ultimate facts forming the basis of the Protest. Based on this yardstick, the Tribunal found the
allegations in the Protest sufficient to apprise Robredo of the issues that she had to meet, and to
inform this Tribunal of the ballot boxes that had to be collected.
2. The Tribunal ruled that it did not have any basis to impose the 25% threshold as even the
RMA Report – the document presented by Robredo to support her claim – indicates the impossibility
of using such threshold. Moreover, the Tribunal held that the mention of a threshold in the
Revisor’s Guide is in reference to the 50% threshold in the 2010 PET Rules. Hence, the Tribunal
retained the 50% threshold under the 2010 PET Rules as the basis of the HRs in determining a
valid vote.
The Tribunal clarified that, prior to the Motion for Reconsideration of Robredo, it was never
furnished a copy of COMELEC Resolution No. 16- 0600 which appeared to be the only official act of
the COMELEC that referred to a 25% threshold. Before the filing of these pleadings, the Tribunal
was merely furnished a copy of the RMA Guide which was not an official act or issuance by the
COMELEC en bane and could not have constituted a sufficient basis to amend the rules of the
Tribunal. The Tribunal likewise emphasized that the parties were apprised of the 50% threshold
under the 2010 PET Rules before the start of the revision proceedings, but neither of them brought
COMELEC Resolution No. 16-0600 to the Tribunal’s attention. In any case, the Tribunal declared
that from the submissions of the parties and the COMELEC, what was adopted during the 2016
National and Local Elections was a range of 20% to 25% shading threshold.
3. No.The Tribunal unanimously denied Marcos’s Motion to Inhibit in its Resolution 196 dated
August 28, 2018 for utter lack of merit, ruling that the grounds cited by Marcos did not fall under
any of the grounds for inhibition under Section 1, 197 Rule 8 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court. Citing Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Spouses Dy, the Tribunal held that the
mere imputation of bias or partiality was not sufficient ground for inhibition, especially when the
charges against Justice Caguioa were without basis and not supported by any evidence. The
Tribunal further held that an opinion piece in a news website and an unauthenticated video
circulating on social media websites were not credible and admissible supporting evidence, and that
these were not even worthy of cognizance.
Page | 47
The Tribunal also found that Justice Caguioa had shown impartiality and that the proceedings in
the Protest had moved forward with utmost dispatch despite the numerous pleadings filed and
incidents brought up by both parties and the COMELEC, as well as the logistical and administrative
concerns in relation to the Protest. The Tribunal also emphasized that all of its decisions were
arrived at through a majority vote of all the members of the Court sitting en bane as the Tribunal,
and not decided by the Member-in- Charge alone.
Thus, based on the final tally after revision and appreciation of the votes in the pilot provinces,
protestee Robredo maintained, as in fact she increased, her lead with 14,436,337 votes over
protestant Marcos who obtained 14,157,771 votes. Before the Tribunal proceeds to make a ruling
on the effects of the results of the revision and appreciation of the votes for the pilot provinces on
the Protestant’s Second Cause of Action the Parties will be required to submit their position stating
their factual and legal basis and to the Third Cause of Action.

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 FELIPE, JEMARD

DE ALBAN VS. COMELEC

50
G.R. No. 243968. March 22, 2022
ECHAVE-VILLAMOR VS. COMELEC
51
G.R. No. 250370, October 5, 2022
AES WATCH, ET.AL. VS SET AND COMELEC
51
G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020
PEÑAS VS. COMELEC
53
UDK-16915, FEBRUARY 15, 2022
CABIGAO VS. COMELEC
55
G.R. No. 247806. November 09, 2021

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 ANGELO CASTRO DE ALBAN VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 243968. March 22, 2022
FACTS:
Angelo Castro De Alban (De Alban) filed his CoC for senator in the May 13, 2019 elections as
an independent candidate, indicating that he is a lawyer and a teacher. On October 22, 2018, the
Comelec Law Department motu proprio filed a petition to declare De Alban a nuisance candidate
alleging that he had no bona fide intent to run for public office and that his candidacy will prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.2 Moreover, De Alban will not be able to
sustain the financial rigors of waging a nationwide campaign without clear proof of financial
capacity. On the other hand, De Alban countered that he has a bona fide intention to run for public
office given his government platforms covering education, agriculture, health, and housing
programs. Also, De Alban claimed that he could wage a nationwide campaign because he sustained
a paid website dedicated to his senatorial bid, commissioned social media platforms like Facebook
to advertise him, and secured support statements from various groups. Lastly, De Alban averred
that his frequent domestic and international travels are sufficient proof of his financial capacity.
On December 6, 2018, the Comelec First Division declared De Alban a nuisance candidate
The Comelec cited the authorized expenses for an aspiring senator under the law6 and ruled that
De Alban failed to establish the financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign especially since
he was running as an independent candidate. Aggrieved, De Alban moved for a reconsideration and
argued that financial capacity is not among the qualifications to run for senator. The law did not set
the minimum expenses for a candidate but only a cap or expenditure limit.8 On January 28, 2019,
the Comelec En Banc denied De Alban's motion and explained that an election campaign for a
national position involves huge expenditures. Yet, De Alban had no strong and consolidated
political machinery to cover these expenses.
Unsuccessful at a reconsideration, De Alban filed this Petition ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the Comelec in declaring him a nuisance candidate. De Alban maintains that Comelec
has no legal and factual grounds to declare him a nuisance candidate solely on the basis of his CoC
which did not require him to state his financial capability. Corollary, De Alban prays to include his
name in the senatorial list of candidates for the 2019 elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC has authority to refuse or cancel COCs of nuisance
candidates.
RULING:
YES. Admittedly, the OEC took effect under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which
presented a unicameral legislative branch composed of members of the Batasan Pambansa.
However, this factual milieu does not automatically render the OEC inoperative after the 1987
Constitution shifted to a bicameral legislature consisting of the members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. A different approach will only result in the absurd and illogical
distinction between members of the legislative department. To stress, Section 2 of the OEC
categorically states that it "shall govern all elections of public officers and, to the extent appropriate,
all referenda and plebiscites."
To be sure, Section 2 of RA No. 6646 is explicit that the OEC shall govern the elections under
the 1987 Constitution. Taken together, the OEC remains the fundamental law on elections despite
the passage of the 1987 Constitution and the enactment of subsequent statutes. Hence, contrary to
De Alban's theory, the OEC applies to elections of all public officers including senatorial candidates.

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 MAYOR ROVELYN ECHAVE VILLAMOR VS. COMELEC
GR 250370, OCTOBER 5, 2022

FACTS:
Villamor garnered 5,879 votes as against Viernes’ 1,534 votes. She was proclaimed mayor of
Lagangilang town on May 14, 2019. Viernes had asked the Comelec to cancel Villamor’s COC on the
ground of alleged false material representation as he claimed that she is a naturalized American
citizen.
In her defense, Villamor told the Comelec that while she was a naturalized American citizen,
she had duly complied with all the requirements for the reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.
The Comelec’s second division granted Viernes’ petition. The ruling was affirmed by the
Comelec en banc, hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
cancellation of Villamor’s COC over alleged misrepresentation.
RULING: The poll body committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the cancellation of
Villamor’s COC over alleged misrepresentation, without any prior determination of whether or not
she had intended to deceive or mislead the electorate.
The Court pointed out that a false representation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code should consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.”
Here, the Court found that the absence of the COMELEC’s determination of Villamor’s intent
to deceive or mislead the electorate constitutes grave abuse of discretion consistent with case law.

AES WATCH, ET.AL. VS SET AND COMELEC

G.R. No. 246332. December 09, 2020

FACTS:
In 1997, Republic Act (RA) No. 84362 authorized the COMELEC to adopt an automated
election system (AES) using appropriate technology for voting and electronic devices to count votes
and canvass or consolidate results. In 2007, RA No. 93693 amended the provisions of RA No. 8436
allowing the COMELEC to use a paper-based or a direct recording electronic election system as it
may deem appropriate and practical. The changes also provided the minimum system capabilities,
and required the authentication of electronically transmitted election results.6 Accordingly, the
COMELEC implemented a paper-based AES technology and utilized optical mark reader machines
in the 2010,2013,2016, and 2019 National Elections. Specifically, the COMELEC used the Precinct
Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines in 2010, and 2013, and the Vote-Counting Machines (VCM) in
2016 and 2019.7 In these national elections, the members of the electoral board8 are assigned with
an iButton security key and a personal identification number (PIN), which they must use in
initiating the voting machines to accept the paper ballots and in closing them to print and transmit
elections results.
Yet, several groups and individuals questioned the AES implementation and the use of voting
machines. In Capalla v. COMELEC,11 the petitioners raised concerns about the alleged absence of
Page | 51
digital signatures on the 2010 election results. The Court held that the PCOS machines could
produce digitally signed transmissions. In Bagumbayan-VNP Movement, Inc. v. COMELEC, the
petitioner sought to compel the COMELEC to enable the VCM's voter verification feature in the 2016
National Elections by printing the voter's receipts, which would allow voters to verify whether their
votes are registered. The petitioner added that the COMELEC's position that the voter's receipts are
not essential in a paper-based AES, which utilized paper ballots, is non-compliant with the
minimum system capabilities under the law.
On May 2, 2019, United Filipino Consumers & Commuters, Froilan M. Dollente, and Teofilo
Parilla intervened in the case. They supported AES¬WATCH, et al., and urged the COMELEC to
submit a complete list of the Media Access Control (MAC) and Internet Protocol (IP) addresses in the
2019 National Elections. On May 10, 2019, Bagumbayan-VNP Movement Inc. likewise intervened. It
adopted the AES-WATCH, et al.'s arguments and added that the prohibition against capturing
devices inside the polling place would make it difficult for poll watchers to record any irregularity
and for voters to object on the VVPAT discrepancies due to limited time to verify their votes.
On May 22, 2019, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), averred that the
conclusion of the 2019 National Elections mooted the petition. Alternatively, the OSG claimed that
AES-WATCH, et al. have no legal standing to file the petition for lack of material interest and that
mandamus will not lie because COMELEC had yet to respond to the letter/request on their queries.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC may be compelled by mandamus to act on the petitions.
RULING:
Here, AES-WATCH, et al. assail the constitutionality of the prohibition on poll watchers from
taking photographs of the proceedings during the elections as well as the COMELEC's compliance
with the Bagumbayan ruling. However, they did not allege any material injury or claim that they are
poll watchers, registered voters, candidates, members of a political party, or members of an
accredited citizens group in the 2019 National Elections. Nevertheless, we deem it proper to relax
the requirement of legal standing given AES-WATCH, et al.'s allegation that they are filing the
petition as citizens.37 Moreover, they raised questions relating to the importance of having credible
and informed elections such as the AES' minimum system capability and the VVPAT requirement.
Similarly, we grant Bagumbayan¬VNP Movement Inc.'s intervention because it has a material
interest in the case as a political party which tends to suffer injury if its poll watchers cannot
exercise their rights and duties under the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, it has candidates in the
2019 National Elections and will be affected if there is non-compliance with the VVPAT requirement.
On the other hand, United Filipino Consumers & Commuters, Froilan Dollente, and Teofilo
Parilla failed to establish that they have the requisite personal and substantial interest. They did
not sustain any direct injury or is in danger of suffering any damages from the assailed COMELEC
actions. They were silent in what capacity they are seeking for intervention. They claimed that the
issues are of "transcendental importance," but failed to allege any interest in the outcome of the
case. Hence, their motion to intervene must be denied.
Mandamus will not lie to control the judgment of an independent constitutional body over
matters which the law gives it the authority to decide absent grave abuse of discretion.
Mandamus is a command requiring the performance of a specific duty resulting from the
party's official station to whom the writ is directed or from the operation of law. It is available when
a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully
excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office. The remedy lies to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty. It can only direct the tribunal, body, or official to act, but not in a
particular way. It cannot direct the exercise of judgment unless there is grave abuse of discretion.
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 A ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise
of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. It is one as to which nothing
is left to the discretion of the person who must perform the act. On the other hand, a discretionary
act refers to the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and one's idea of what is right
and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or favor. As applied to public
functionaries, it means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain
circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the
judgment or conscience of others. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him a
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, it is discretionary and not ministerial.
The following requirements must be present to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus,
to wit: (1) the petitioner has a clear and unmistakable legal right to the act demanded; (2) it is the
duty of the respondent to perform the act because it is required by law; (3) the respondent
unlawfully neglects the duty enjoined by law or unlawfully excludes the petitioner from the use or
enjoyment of the right or office; (4) the act to be performed is ministerial; and (5) there is no plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. These requirements are wanting in this
case. The assailed COMELEC actions involve the exercise of judgment. Moreover, there was no
grave abuse of discretion.
Foremost, the COMELEC is vested with the constitutional power and function to "[e]nforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election." Among its powers is
the promulgation of rules and regulations of election laws. It exercises discretion on how certain
aspects of elections are implemented. This is explicit in the following provisions of RA No. 8436, as
amended, by RA No. 9369.
Here, the petitioners and intervenors failed to show that the COMELEC unjustifiably neglects
the performance of a duty enjoined by law. They maintain that the COMELEC did not adhere to the
Bagumbayan ruling on the matter of VVPAT requirement. As a solution, they propose the
"camerambola" method. However, a comparison of the dispositive portion of the Bagumbayan case
and the COMELEC guidelines in the 2019 National Elections reveals the futility of their theory. As
held in the Bagumbayan, the VVPAT requirement is substantially complied with when the voter's
receipt is printed, and the voter can physically verify his or her vote.

JOSEPH ROBLE PEÑAS VS. COMELEC

UDK-16915, FEBRUARY 15, 2022

FACTS:
On November 28, 2009, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for Mayor of Digos City,
Davao Del Sur for the 2010 National and Local Elections (NLE). He ran under the banner of the
Nationalist People's Coalition (NPC). For the 2010 NLE, Digos City had a total of 93,801 registered
voters.
On June 7, 2010, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8944,6 petitioner filed with
respondent COMELEC his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE)7 where he
declared his total election campaign expenditures.
By Letter dated October 1, 2014, respondent's Campaign Finance Unit informed petitioner
that under Section 139 of RA 7166, a candidate who belongs to a political party is only allowed to
spend three pesos (P3.00) for every registered voter in the constituency where he or she seeks to be

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elected. Hence, petitioner was allowed to spend up to P281,403.00 only for his election campaign.
By spending P600,000.00 for his election campaign, as reported in his SOCE, petitioner clearly
exceeded the expenditure limit allowed by law. Petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the
letter to submit his written explanation why no charges should be filed against him for election
overspending.
On October 29, 2014, petitioner submitted an Affidavit of Correction/Explanation to the
COMELEC Law Department. He explained that he failed in good faith to specify the breakdown of
his expenses in his SOCE. Because he was overwhelmed with emotions for having won in the
mayoralty elections in his city, he failed to thoroughly review the SOCE which his secretary
prepared. Petitioner clarified that of his reported P600,000.00 total campaign expenditures,
P112,924.10 was spent for the printing of sample ballots and P245,000.00, for lawyer's fees. These
items, he claimed, should not have been included in the computation of expenses incurred by a
candidate conformably with Section 811 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8944 for the May 10, 2010
NLE, and Section 3, Rule 412 of COMELEC Resolution No. 947613 for the 2013 NLE. Had these
amounts been deducted from the P600,000.00 expenditure he earlier reported, his expenses would
have only totaled P241,574.01 for his election campaign, well within the expenditure limit
prescribed by law.
On November 6, 2014, the COMELEC Campaign Finance Unit filed a formal complaint
against petitioner for alleged violation of Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the OEC, as
amended by RA 7166, for election overspending.
The expenses for the printing of sample ballots and payment for the legal services of Atty.
Diones were NPC political party expenses and not his own personal expenditure as mayoralty
candidate, thus, should have been excluded from the computation of his expenditures during the
2010 campaign period. This is in accordance with Section 102(i) and (k) of the OEC16 which
categorically state that the expenses for engagement of legal services and printing of sample ballots,
respectively, are excluded from the computation of campaign expenses. The exclusion of these items
would bring his total campaign expenditure to P241,574.01 only, well within the allowed
expenditure limit of P281,403.00 for Digos City.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in finding probable cause to indict him for overspending for his campaign during the
2010 NLE.
RULING:
The COMELEC, through its authorized legal officers, has the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigations of ail election offenses and to prosecute them.33 This power emanates
from Article IX, Section 2, Paragraph 6 of the 1987 Constitution which empowers the COMELEC to
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including acts or
omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices."
As with ordinary criminal cases, the COMELEC is tasked with finding probable cause
whenever it conducts preliminary investigation of election-related offenses. It. is settled though that
the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the sound discretion of
the COMELEC. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a
clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
A court or tribunal can only be considered as having acted with grave abuse of discretion
when its act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction." The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
Page | 54
reason of passion and hostility." From the foregoing definition, it is clear that the special civil action
of certiorari can only strike an act down for having been done with grave abuse of discretion if the
petitioner could manifestly show that such act was patent and gross.
Here, the Court finds that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it recommended the filing of an Information against petitioner
despite the inordinate and oppressive delay which attended the conduct of preliminary
investigation.

VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T. CABIGAO VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 247806. November 09, 2021

FACTS:
Petitioners Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, Yen Makabenta, Mary Wendy A. Duran, Manolito
Coronado, Socorro Maricel Namia Nepomuceno, Jef Nalus Aquino, Antonio Santos, and Cesar
Evangelista contend that many Senators and Members of the Congress circumvented these
provisions by running for office after taking a hiatus or rest period once they maxed out the term
limits.
They submit a list of members of the Senate and House of Representatives who have served
more than two terms and three terms, respectively. The interruption in the continuity of their
service allowed them to run for more than two or three terms.
Petitioners assert that respondent Commission on Elections failed to enforce these provisions
when it allowed senators and members of the House of Representatives to run for the same office
after exceeding the two- and three-term limits. They conclude that respondent tolerated this scheme
by allowing the elective officials to run for reelection. Thus, petitioners filed this Petition for
Mandamus before this Court, citing the Commission on Elections' ministerial duty under Article IX-
C, Section 2(1) of the Constitution to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall."
Petitioners argue that senators and members of the House of Representatives should not be
permitted to run for office after maxing out the term limit. They assert that the Constitution does
not allow termed out officials to run for office again after having respite or "hiatus." The
Constitution does not permit a third and fourth term for Senators and Representatives, respectively.
Further, petitioners aver that the regulatory purpose of Article VI, Sections 4 and 7 is to
"guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service" as provided in Article II, Section 26 of
the Constitution. Allowing termed out officials to seek reelection denies public service opportunity
from other equally deserving candidates, who are marginalized by their lack of campaign resources
to parallel those of their termed out rivals. Moreover, petitioners posit that Sections 4 and 7 should
be narrowly and restrictively construed because they limit the grant of power.
Ultimately, petitioners pray that this Court order the respondent "to deny giving due course
to the certificates of candidacy of termed out senators, members of the House of Representatives
and local elective officials" beginning in the upcoming elections in May 2022 and in the future
elections. Moreover, petitioners ask that the election of the termed out legislators who are presently
serving their term be declared unconstitutional.
Petitioners further reiterate that they possess the legal standing for being citizens. They aver
that the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that they are citizens and
there is no need to show any special and specific interest in the case.
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 Moreover, petitioners add that reelection after maxing out the term limit may be treated as a
patent and apparent defect appearing on the face of the certificate of candidacy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article VI, Sections 4 and 7 preclude a third and fourth term for senators
and members of the House of Representative.
RULING:
While this Court interpreted the provisions by looking into the deliberations of the drafters, a
verba legis interpretation will not alter the meaning of the disputed provisions.
Clearly, the prohibition and term limit refers to consecutive terms. While the provisions do
not textually provide the terms "hibernation, hiatus, or rest period," the usage of the word
"consecutive" indicates that the term limit and prohibition only applies to reelection for an
immediately subsequent term. The interpretation of petitioners is an extra-textual reading of the
Constitution.
What the Constitution clearly prohibits is the reelection for more than two or three
consecutive terms of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives. In all, respondent did
not unlawfully neglect its duty in giving due course to the elective officials' certificates of candidacy
in the past elections; neither will this Court decide on certificates that are yet to be filed.

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 LLACUNA, MELROSE
MARQUEZ VS COMELEC
GR 244274, SEPTEMBER 3, 2019
58
HALILI VS. COMELEC
59
GR 231643, January 15, 2019
TALLADO VS COMELEC
60
GR 246679, SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
ANGKLA AND SBP VS COMELEC
62
GR 246816, SEPTEMBER 20, 2020
MARCOS VS ROBREDO
63
PET Case 005, February 16, 2021
NOGRALES VS COMELEC
67
GR 246328, SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
DEL ROSARIO VS COMELEC
69
GR 247610, MARCH 10, 2020
VILLEGAS VS COMELEC
70
GR 257453, AUGUST 9, 2022
HRET VS PANGA-VEGA
71
GR 228236, JANUARY 27, 2021
ZAPANTA VS COMELEC 73
GR 233016, MARCH 5, 2019
AMAD VS COMELEC 74
GR 258448, JULY 05, 2022
BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT VS COMELEC 76
GR 206719, APRIL 10, 2019
LIBERAL PARTY VS COMELEC 77
GR 247545, JULY 26, 2022
TOLENTINO VS SET AND COMELEC 79
GR 248005, MAY 11, 2021
SUBRABAS VS ABAS AND CASINGAL 80
GR 253103, OCTOBER 6, 2020

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 MARQUEZ VS COMELEC
GR 244274, SEPTEMBER 3, 2019
TOPIC: NUISANCE CANDIDATE
FACTS:
On October 15, 2018, petitioner Norman Cordero Marquez filed his Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of senator in the May 13, 2019 national and local elections. He is a resident of
Mountain Province, a real estate broker, and an independent candidate.
On October 22, 2018, the COMELEC Law Department, motu proprio, filed a petition to
declare Marquez a nuisance candidate. The Law Department argued that: (1) Marquez was "virtually
unknown to the entire country except maybe in the locality where he resides”; and (2) though a real
estate broker, he, absent clear proof of financial capability, "will not be able to sustain the financial
rigors of a nationwide campaign."
Marquez countered COMELEC’s grounds. The COMELEC First Division on December 6,
2018, cancelled Marquez' CoC, citing jurisprudence that, "[i]n elections for national positions, the
sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for COMELEC to
exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or
serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Marquez filed a motion for reconsideration
which the COMELEC En Banc denied on January 23, 2019. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC may use lack of proof of financial capacity to sustain a
nationwide campaign, by itself, as a ground to declare an aspirant for senator a nuisance candidate.
RULING:
NO. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Marquez a nuisance
candidate on the ground of failure to prove financial capacity to sustain the financial rigors of
waging a nationwide campaign.
Citing Maquera v. Borra, the Court ruled that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not
be made to depend upon the wealth of the candidate. We held that the State cannot require
candidacy for a public office to be conditioned on the ability to file a surety bond equivalent to the
one-year salary of the position sought. This is a constitutionally impermissible property
qualification. Maquera 's rationale applies with equal cogency in this case. The COMELEC cannot
condition a person's privilege to be voted upon as senator on his or her financial capacity to wage a
nationwide campaign. Quite obviously, the financial capacity requirement is a property
requirement.
Nuisance candidates, as an evil to be remedied, do not justify the adoption of measures that
would bar poor candidates from running for office. Republic Act 4421 in fact enables rich
candidates, whether nuisance or not, to present themselves for election. Consequently, it cannot be
sustained as a valid regulation of elections to secure the expression of the popular will.
The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared Marquez a nuisance candidate on the
ground of lack of proof of his financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign.

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 HALILI VS. COMELEC
GR 231643, January 15, 2019

TOPIC: THREE TERM LIMIT RULE

FACTS:
Petitioner Marino P. Morales was elected and served as Mayor of the Municipality of
Mabalacat, Pampanga from 1 July 2007 to 30 June 2010. He was elected again as mayor during the
2010 elections. On 15 May 2012, or during Morales' second term, Congress passed Republic Act No.
(RA) 10164, converting the Municipality of Mabalacat into a component city. Thereafter a plebiscite
was held. In the 2013 elections, Morales ran again and was elected as mayor of the new Mabalacat
City. On 8 December 2015, Morales filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2016 elections for the
position of mayor of Mabalacat City, as substitute candidate for Wilfredo Feliciano of Aksyon
Demokratiko Party.
On 4 January 2016, respondent Pyra Lucas (Lucas), also a candidate for the position of
mayor of Mabalacat City, filed a Petition for Cancellation of the COC and/or Disqualification of
Morales for the Mayoral Position of Mabalacat City, before the COMELEC. Lucas alleged that
Morales was disqualified to run for mayor, since he was elected and had served three consecutive
terms prior to the 2016 elections. Lucas also alleged that the conversion of the Municipality of
Mabalacat into Mabalacat City did not interrupt Morales' service for the full term for which he was
elected.
On 10 May 2016, following the canvass of all election returns, the City Board of Canvassers
of Mabalacat City proclaimed Morales as elected city mayor, and petitioner as elected city vice
mayor. On 20 May 2016, respondent Crisostomo Garbo (Garbo), another candidate for the position
of mayor of Mabalacat City, filed a Motion for Leave To Intervene and To Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention alleging that he was interested in the outcome of the case, since he obtained the
second highest number of votes and he should be proclaimed as mayor of Mabalacat City should
Morales' COC be cancelled.
On 28 June 2016, Halili also filed a Verified Motion for Leave to Intervene (as Respondent)
and Admit Attached Answer-in-Intervention alleging that, as incumbent vice mayor of Mabalacat
City, he should be proclaimed as mayor of Mabalacat City should Morales' COC be cancelled
pursuant to the rule on succession under Section 44 of RA 7160, or the Local Government Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Morales violated the three term limit rule.
RULING:
YES. The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
There are two conditions which must concur for the application of the disqualification of a
candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In the present case, Morales admits that he has been elected and has served as mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for three consecutive terms: (1) 2007-2010; (2) 2010-2013; and (3) 2013-
2016. However, Morales insists that his second term as mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat was
interrupted by the conversion of the municipality into a component city. Morales claims that

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Mabalacat City is an entirely different political unit from the Municipality of Mabalacat, having an
increased territory, income and population.
In Latasa vs COMELEC, it was already held that the conversion of a municipality into a city
does not constitute an interruption of the incumbent official's continuity of service.
Applying our ruling in Latasa, the provisions of RA 10164 mean that the delineation of the
metes and bounds of Mabalacat City did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by the Municipality of Mabalacat. Consequently, the inhabitants are the same group of
voters who elected Morales to be their mayor for three consecutive terms, and over whom he held
power and authority as their mayor. Accordingly, Morales never ceased from acting and discharging
his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Mabalacat, despite the conversion of the
Municipality of Mabalacat into Mabalacat City.
In view of these, Morales has indeed, served three full terms, and thereby, can no longer run
for the same position.

TALLADO VS COMELEC
GR 246679, SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

TOPIC: INVOLUNTRAY INTERRUPTION OF SERVICE; THREE TERM LIMIT RULE

FACTS:
The petitioner was duly elected as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte in the 2010,
2013 and 2016 elections. He fully served his 2010-2013 and 2013-2016 terms. It is the turn of
events in respect of the petitioner’s 2016-2019 term that has spawned the controversy under
review.
It appears that on January 28, 2013, one Edgardo Gonzales filed in the OMB an
administrative complaint charging the petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression, or grave abuse
of authority. While the case was pending, the petitioner won as Governor in the 2013 elections.
On October 2, 2015, while he was serving his 2013-2016 term, the OMB found and declared
him administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of suspension for one year which
suspension was immediately implemented by the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG).
The petitioner timely appealed the suspension to the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for
review. Acting on the petitioner’s appeal, the CA promulgated its decision reducing the imposed
penalty of suspension from one year to six months. He immediately re-assumed his position after
the lapse of six months, and his re-assumption later became the subject of the third OMB case.
On November 4, 2015, several persons initiated the second OMB case against the petitioner.
In the decision dated April 18, 2016 and approved by then Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales
on September 13, 2016, the OMB held the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and
oppression/abuse of authority and ordered his dismissal from the service.
Although the petitioner appealed to the CA, the DILG implemented the OMB decision on
November 8, 2016 by ordering the petitioner to vacate his position as Governor. On the same date,
the DILG issued another memorandum addressed to then Vice Governor Jonah Pedro G. Pimentel
(Pimentel) directing him to assume as Governor of Camarines Norte.

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 On December 12, 2016, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the DILG from
implementing or continuously implementing the decision of the OMB. Thus, the petitioner was able
to re-assume his post as Governor.
The third OMB case concerned the petitioner’s re- assumption of the office of the Governor
after the CA had initially reduced the penalty imposed in the first OMB case to suspension for six
months. The complainant thereat initiated another complaint on the basis that the petitioner had
violated the first OMB decision by re-assuming office without having fully served his suspension.
On January 11, 2018, the OMB rendered another decision finding the petitioner guilty of
grave misconduct, and ordering his dismissal from the service. On September 26, 2018, the CA
ruled on the petitioner’s appeal by modifying the penalty of dismissal to six months suspension.
On October 29, 2018, the DILG issued its memorandum directing the implementation of the
decision of the CA, and the reinstatement of the petitioner as Governor if he had already served the
six-month suspension. On October 30, 2018, the petitioner took his oath of office as Governor of
Camarines Norte.
In the meanwhile, on October 15, 2018, the petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
for Governor of Camarines Norte for the May 2019 elections. This prompted respondents Norberto
B. Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgalado to file their separate petitions with the COMELEC praying
for the denial of due course to and/or for the cancellation of the petitioner’s COC, which petitions
were consolidated and predicated on the application of the three-term limit rule.
ISSUE: Whether or not a penalty of dismissal imposed on an elective official by the Ombudsman
which was later reduced to suspension by the CA constitutes to interruption of the term of office
thereby circumventing the three-term limit rule as provided by the Constitution.
RULING:
YES. Section 8, Article X, of the Constitution embodies the three- term limit rule. For the
application of the disqualification under the three-term limit rule, therefore, two conditions must
concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the
same local government post; and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.
The first requisite for the application of the three-term limit rule is present inasmuch as the
petitioner was elected as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, specifically in
the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. But the second requisite was not satisfied because his
intervening dismissals from the service truly prevented him from fully serving the third consecutive
term.
Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while interruption of the full
continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position equates to failure to render service.
In this regard, Aldovino v. COMELEC is instructive, as follows: the “interruption” of a term
exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a
length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective
interruption of service within a term. On the other hand, temporary inability, or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective
interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective
break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the
function of his office for a reason provided by law.

Page | 61
 The COMELEC relies on the OMB’s Rules to support its view that the execution of the orders
of dismissal against the petitioner did not create a permanent, but only a temporary, vacancy.
Moreover, the decisions directing the dismissal of the petitioner included no indication of the
petitioner being thereby placed under any type of suspension. In fact, the decisions did not state
any conditions whatsoever. As such, he was dismissed for all intents and purposes of the law in the
periods that he was dismissed from office even if he had appealed. In that status, he ceased to hold
the title to the office in the fullest sense.
The COMELEC considered developments in the petitioner’s appeals in holding that the
DILG’s execution of the decisions did not result into the loss of title to the office. This holding was
grounded on two matters, namely: (1) the non-finality of the decisions under the OMB’s Rules; and
(2) the fact that the petitioner was able to re-assume his seat as Governor.
The holding of the COMELEC was unjustified because it thereby disregarded the fact that the
DILG had fully implemented the decisions of dismissal. The full implementation immediately carried
legal repercussions that no developments in relation to the petitioner’s appeals could change or
undo. Among others, the petitioner effectively lost his title to the office by the DILG’s act of directing
Pimentel to take his oath of office as Governor, and by the latter then assuming and discharging the
office and functions of such office.
The provision of the OMB’s Rules allowing the petitioner to re–assume based on the interim
being considered as a period of preventive suspension after his appeals resulted in the imposition of
lesser penalties did not alter the reality that he had been ousted from office. In other words, there
was still an interruption of the term of office. As aptly put in Latasa v. COMELEC, the interruption,
to be considered as interruption of the term, “contemplates a rest period during which the local
elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.”
Conformably with said ruling, the period during which the petitioner was not serving as
Governor should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because he had then ceased
to exercise power or authority over the people of the province. Indeed, it was Pimentel who then held
title to the office and exercised the functions thereof. As such, the petitioner did not fully serve his
entire third term even if his re- assumption to office subsequently occurred.

ANGKLA AND SBP VS COMELEC

GR 246816, SEPTEMBER 20, 2020
TOPIC: PARTY LIST SYSTEM
FACTS:
In these twin Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition, and for Intervention, ANGKLA: Ang
Partido Ng Mga Pilipinong Marino, Inc., (ANGKLA) and Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP) assail the
constitutionality of Section 11(b), Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) insofar as it provides that
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes cast for the party-list system shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
They assert that the allocation of additional seats in proportion to a partylist’s "total number
of votes" results in the double-counting of votes in favor of the two-percenters. The same votes
which guarantee the two-percenters a seat in the first round of seat allocation are again considered
in the second round. The proviso purportedly violates the equal protection clause, hence, is
unconstitutional.

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ISSUE: Whether or not Section 11(b), R.A. No. 7941 allocating additional seats to party-lists in
portion to their total number of votes unconstitutional.
RULING:
NO. Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the party-list system
shall compose twenty percent (20%) of the total membership in the House of Representatives. But
the matter on how party-lists should qualify for a seat is left to the wisdom of the legislature.
Pursuant to this constitutional directive, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941, setting forth the
parameters for electing party-lists and the manner of allocating seats to them. The features of R.A.
No. 7941 preclude the allocation of seats based solely on absolute proportionality: (a) To bar any
single party-list party, organization, or coalition from dominating the party-list system; and (b) To
ensure maximization of the allotment of 20% of seats in the House of Representatives to party-list
representatives.
As finally settled in the landmark case of BANAT, Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is to be
applied, thus: Round 1: (a) The participating parties, organizations or coalitions shall be ranked
from highest to lowest based on the number of votes they each garnered in the party-list election.
(b) Each of those receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to and guaranteed one seat each. Rationale: The statute references a two-percent
(2%) threshold. The one-seat guarantee based on this arithmetical computation gives substance to
this threshold. Round 2, Part 1: (a) The percentage of votes garnered by each of the parties,
organizations, and coalitions is multiplied by the remaining available seats after Round 1.
All party-list participants shall participate in this round regardless of the percentage of votes
they garnered. The party-list participants shall be entitled to additional seats based on the product
arrived at in (a). The whole integer of the product corresponds to a party's share in the remaining
available seats. Fractional seats shall not be awarded. Rationale: This formula gives flesh to the
proportionality rule in relation to the total number of votes obtained by each of the participating
party, organization, or coalition. (c) A party-list shall be awarded no more than two (2) additional
seats. Rationale: The three-seat cap in the statute is to be observed. Round 2, Part 2: (a) The party-
list party, organization, or coalition next in rank shall be allocated one additional seat each until all
available seats are completely distributed. Rationale: This algorithm endeavors to complete the 20%
composition for party-list representation in the House of Representatives.
The BANAT formula mirrors the textual progression of Section 11(b) of the law. The formula
withstood the test of time and the Court is offered no cogent reason to depart therefrom.

MARCOS VS ROBREDO
PET Case 005, February 16, 2021
TOPIC: ELECTION PROTEST; ANNULMENT/FAILURE OF ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Protestant Ferdinand “Bongbong” R. Marcos, Jr. is before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(Tribunal) challenging the election and proclamation of incumbent Vice President Maria Leonor
“Leni Daang Matuwid” G. Robredo) in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections. Robredo
garnered 14,418,817 votes while Marcos came at a close second with 14,155,344 votes. P.E.T. Case
No. 005 is the first and only election protest before the Tribunal in which the recount and revision

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process of the pilot provinces were successfully concluded and the protest itself resolved on the
merits.
This Resolution does not yet resolve the entire case but is merely preliminary and interlocutory in
nature. It is designed to hear the parties fully on the various legal issues relating to their
controversy.
In consideration of these purposes, the Tribunal, with Marcos’s agreement, categorized his causes
of action into the following:

First Cause of Action -Annulment of Proclamation

The proclamation of protestee Robredo as the duly elected Vice President is null and void because
the COCs generated by the CCS are not authentic, and may not be used as basis to determine the
number of votes that the candidates for VICE PRESIDENT received.

Second Cause of Action – Revision and Recount

Revision and recount of the paper ballots and/or the ballot images as well as an examination,
verification, and analysis of the voter’s receipts, election returns, audit logs, transmission logs, the
lists of voters, particularly the EDCVL, and VRRs,the books of voters and other pertinent election
documents and/or paraphernalia used in the elections, as well as the automated election
equipment and record~ such as the VCMs, CCS units, SD cards (main and backup), and the other
data storage devices containing electronic data and ballot images in ALL of the 36,465 protested
clustered precincts pursuant to Rules 38 to 45 of the 2010 PET Rules; and

Third Cause of Action – Annulment of Elections

Annulment of election results for the position of Vice President in the provinces of Maguindanao,
Lanao de/ Sur and Basilan, on the ground of terrorism; intimidation and harassment of voters as
well as pre-shading of ballots in all of the 2,756 protested clustered precincts that functioned in the
aforesaid areas.

The Tribunal issued a Preliminary Conference Order setting forth the parties’ respective admissions
and stipulations, the issues for the Tribunal’s resolution, and the parties’ proposed witnesses. The
Preliminary Conference Order also indicated Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros Oriental as Marcos’s
designated pilot provinces pursuant to Rule 65 of the 2010 PET Rules. The revision of ballots was to
begin with these three (3) provinces, which shall serve as “test cases” by which the Tribunal will
determine whether to proceed with the revision of ballots of the remaining contested clustered
precincts.

The Tribunal partially granted the retrieval of the ballot boxes and other election documents, and
the decryption of ballot images, only for the pilot provinces of Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and Negros
Oriental. It also deferred action on the technical examination of the signature of voters in Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, and Basilan, following Rule 65 of the 20 l 0 PET Rules. Rule 65 pertains to the
initial determination of the grounds for the protest. Rule 65 grants the protestant the opportunity to
designate three (3) provinces that best exemplify the frauds or irregularities raised in his or her
Protest. These provinces constitute the “test cases” by which the Tribunal will determine whether it

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would proceed with the protest. The full effect of Rule 65, however, is yet to be determined by the
Tribunal based on the required submission of Memoranda mentioned in this Resolution.

In relation to the decryption and printing of ballot images, the Tribunal directed the
COMELEC to inform the Tribunal of its recommended procedures, logistics, schedule, and cost of
the decryption and printing of the ballot images for the pilot provinces of Camarines Sur, Iloilo, and
Negros Oriental. In compliance thereto, the COMELEC, submitted its Manifestation/Compliance
with Motion, attaching thereto Resolution No. 10155 on the Guidelines to Decrypt Ballot Images
and other related resolutions, the Order of Payment, and Summary of Supplies.
Marcos paid the COMELEC the costs and expenses for the conduct of the decryption and
printing of ballot images, election returns and audit logs for all the protested clustered precincts of
the pilot provinces. As scheduled, the decryption and printing of the ballot images for the three (3)
pilot provinces commenced on October 23, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. Representatives from protestant,
protestee and the Tribunal, together with representatives from the COMELEC-ERSD, stood as
witnesses in the authentication of the printed ballot images.
Robredo filed an Urgent Ex-pa rte Motion to be Allowed to Secure Soft Copies of the Ballot
Images and Other Reports from the Decrypted Secured Digital Cards, praying that she be allowed to
secure soft copies of the ballot images and other reports from the decrypted SD cards, in lieu of the
printed images. The Tribunal granted.
The Tribunal allowed Marcos to secure only photocopies or soft copies of the decrypted ballot
images, election returns, and other reports for all the protested clustered precincts of the pilot
provinces, subject to the payment of incidental costs. The Tribunal held that for the purpose of the
conduct of the revision proceedings, the custody of the official, printed, and authenticated copies of
the decrypted ballot images, election returns, and audit logs from the protested clustered precincts
of the said pilot provinces shall remain with the Tribunal.
The Tribunal resolved to create an exploratory mission/retrieval team composed of nine (9)
officials and personnel of the Tribunal to facilitate such retrieval of ballot boxes and election
documents from the three (3) pilot protested provinces. The exploratory mission entailed
coordinating with concerned officials from COMELEC, the local government units and the Philippine
National Police, the PhilPost, and finding suitable transportation procedures and storage places to
assure the most efficient, expeditious, and safest way to retrieve and transport the ballot boxes.
The Tribunal approved the use of the SC gymnasium for revision and the parking space of
the SC-Court of Appeals Multi-Purpose Building as storage for the ballot boxes and other election
documents.
Start of the Revision Proceedings
The main purpose of the revision proceeding is to conduct a physical recount of the ballots
and provide the parties with an opportunity to register their objections and claims thereon, the
validity of which will later be ruled upon by the Tribunal during the appreciation stage. For the
present case, the revision process was undertaken by fifty (50) RCs constituted by the Tribunal,
each composed of an Head Revisor, and one representative of the protestant and one representative
of the protestee (Party Revisors). Revision Supervisors, who were lawyers, were designated by the
respective offices of the Chairman and Members of the Tribunal to directly oversee the revision
process. 169 Each revision day, two (2) Members of the Tribunal were required to assign lawyers
from their offices who had previously undergone the necessary training to act as Revision
Supervisors.

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 The Incident Reports prepared by the Revision Supervisors involving alleged tampered ballots
and irregularities on the external condition of the ballot boxes, glaringly different BEI signatures on
the ballots, excess ballots, and damaged and wet ballots were referred for appropriate action by the
Tribunal to the panel of Commissioners who will examine the ballots subject of the Incident Reports
vis-a-vis the relevant election documents.
The City and Municipal Treasurers and the BEI were required to explain the irregularities
found on the ballots, ballot boxes, and other election paraphernalia. The revision of ballots for the
pilot protested precincts commenced on April 2, 2018 and was concluded on February 4, 2019.
Paper ballots and decrypted ballot images were revised in a total of 5,415 clustered precincts. Three
(3) clustered precincts were left unrevised as the paper ballots contained in their ballot boxes were
wet, damaged and unreadable, and at the same time, COMELEC failed to provide the Tribunal with
their respective decrypted ballot images.
The Tribunal directed the parties to strictly observe the sub Judice rule. However, despite
these directives, the parties and their counsel continued to disclose sensitive information on the
Protest, as shown in several news reports. The Tribunal, directed the parties to show cause and
explain why they should not be cited in contempt. Each denied having violated the sub Judice rule.
It found out that the parties violated the sub Judice rule, which restricts comments and disclosures
pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice.
Accordingly, the Tribunal imposed the penalty of fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos (PS0,000.00)
on both parties, and were sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt
with more severely.
As to the threshold, Rule 43(1) of the 2010 PET Rules provides that during segregation of
ballots in the revision process, a 50% threshold is to be applied in determining a valid vote.
Marcos filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Inhibit Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S.
Caguioa on the ground of evident bias and manifest partiality in favor of Robredo due to his close
ties with former President Benigno Simeon C.Aquino, a classmate of Justice Caguioa and had
previously appointed him as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, Secretary of Justice, and eventually,
as Associate Justice of the SC. Marcos asserted that former President Aquino and his family bore a
grudge against Marcos and had handpicked Robredo as the Liberal Party’s candidate for Vice
President in the 2016 National and Local Elections.
Appreciation of Ballots
After the revision had concluded, the revised ballots were then appreciated. During this
process, the Tribunal validates and verifies the physical count of the ballots during the revision
stage and rules on the parties’ respective claims and objections thereon.The Ballot Appreciation
Guidelines were used in the appreciation of the ballots, specifically in determining the validity of the
ballots and whether they contained valid votes. The cardinal objective of ballot appreciation was to
discover and give effect to the intent of the voter.
The Tribunal proceeded with the appreciation of the ballots following the Ballot Appreciation
Guidelines and taking into consideration the objections and claims of the parties. The Tribunal
ruled on the objections and claims of the parties, and to determine the validity of each ballot and
vote, regardless of whether the parties registered an objection or claim.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the protest is sufficient in form and substance;
Whether a threshold to be applied is 50% or 25%.

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RULING:
Yes. In its previous ruling in Roxas v. Binay, the Tribunal emphasized that in determining
the sufficiency of the allegations of an election protest, what is merely required is a statement of the
ultimate facts forming the basis of the Protest. Based on this yardstick, the Tribunal found the
allegations in the Protest sufficient to apprise Robredo of the issues that she had to meet, and to
inform this Tribunal of the ballot boxes that had to be collected.
The Tribunal ruled that it did not have any basis to impose the 25% threshold as even the
RMA Report – the document presented by Robredo to support her claim – indicates the impossibility
of using such threshold. Moreover, the Tribunal held that the mention of a threshold in the
Revisor’s Guide is in reference to the 50% threshold in the 2010 PET Rules. Hence, the Tribunal
retained the 50% threshold under the 2010 PET Rules as the basis of the HRs in determining a
valid vote.
The Tribunal clarified that, prior to the Motion for Reconsideration of Robredo, it was never
furnished a copy of COMELEC Resolution No. 16- 0600 which appeared to be the only official act of
the COMELEC that referred to a 25% threshold. Before the filing of these pleadings, the Tribunal
was merely furnished a copy of the RMA Guide which was not an official act or issuance by the
COMELEC en bane and could not have constituted a sufficient basis to amend the rules of the
Tribunal. The Tribunal likewise emphasized that the parties were apprised of the 50% threshold
under the 2010 PET Rules before the start of the revision proceedings, but neither of them brought
COMELEC Resolution No. 16-0600 to the Tribunal’s attention. In any case, the Tribunal declared
that from the submissions of the parties and the COMELEC, what was adopted during the 2016
National and Local Elections was a range of 20% to 25% shading threshold.

NOGRALES VS COMELEC
GR 246328, SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

TOPIC: POWERS OF THE COMELEC

FACTS:
On March 11, 2019, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte signed into law Republic Act No. (R.A.)
11243.3 Under R.A. 11243, the 1st District was reapportioned, thereby creating the lone legislative
district of General Santos City. Under Section 1 of the said law, the creation of the lone legislative
district of General Santos City was "to commence in the next national and local elections after the
effectivity of this Act." Consequently, R.A. 11243 took effect on April 4, 2019 - just over a month
before the 2019 general elections.
The same law directed the incumbent Representatives of First and Second Legislative
Districts of South Cotabato to continue representing their respective districts "until new
representatives shall have been elected and qualified."4 Thereafter, COMELEC was mandated to
issue the necessary rules and regulations to implement R.A. 11243.5
Petitioners contest the validity of the assailed Resolution for violating R.A. 7166.7 Under R.A.
7166, the elections for elective members of the House of Representatives shall be on the second
Monday of May, every three years.8 While they admitted that special elections may be held,
petitioners claim that none of the exceptional circumstances are present to warrant the same.9
Petitioners also averred that scheduling the first regular election "within six (6) months from
May 13, 2019"10 violated R.A. 11243. R.A. 11243 intended the reapportionment to commence in
the next national and local elections after the effectivity of the said Act, or on the second Monday of
Page | 67
May 2022 - not May 13, 2019. According to petitioners, the legislators were well aware that the
election period for the 2019 general elections have already begun at the time R.A. 11243 was
passed. Furthermore, petitioners doubted the feasibility of conducting a special election within six
months from May 13, 2019.11
Petitioners also questioned COMELEC's directive to consider votes for the 1st District as
stray votes in the 2019 general elections. They claim that if the same were implemented, there
would be no representatives for the 1st District from July 1, 2019 until the time elections for such
position are held. On the other hand, to allow the 1st District's incumbent representative to
continue in a holdover capacity "would be extending his term of office for another three years
without being elected by the people."12
Lastly, petitioners sought for the issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order in order to "restor[e]
the right of the people to vote for their representative for the 1st District in the upcoming May 13,
2019 elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the elections for the representative of the 1st District of South Cotabato
must be upheld.
RULING:
YES. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The 1987 Constitution is clear: Elections for Congress should be held on the 2nd Monday of
May unless otherwise provided by law. The term "unless otherwise provided by law" contemplates
two situations (1) when the law specifically states when the elections should be held on a date other
than the second Monday of May; and (2) when the law delegates the setting of the date of the
elections to COMELEC.
Section 1 of R.A. 11243 categorically states that the reapportionment of the 1st District shall
"commence in the next national and local elections after the effectivity of this Act." R.A. 11243 did
not specifically provide for a different date. Neither did it delegate unto COMELEC the setting of a
different date.
We need not discuss COMELEC's powers under Section 5 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
issue lies in ascertaining when Congress intended R.A. No. 11243 to be implemented.ℒαwρhi ৷ The
law was passed with the view of implementing the reapportionment of the First Legislative District
of the Province of South Cotabato at the most feasible and practicable time, i.e., during the next
elections on the second Monday of May 2022. Congress could not have intended to enforce R.A.
11243 during the 2019 general elections as the election period had already begun when R.A. 11243
was enacted. To require implementation last May 13, 2019 would lead COMELEC to act
precipitously.
Also, if We were to follow COMELEC's interpretation, an incongruity would result as the
winning candidate in COMELEC's special elections would serve a term less than that provided for in
Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Similar to Section 8, the only exception is when
another term is "otherwise provided by law." Again, R.A. 11243 did not provide for a term less than
three years, as provided in the 1987 Constitution.
The elections for the First Legislative District of the Province of South Cotabato scheduled on
May 13, 2019 should not have been suspended, and the candidate obtaining the most number of
votes for the said position must be proclaimed. Consequently, the holdover provision under Section
2 of R.A. 11243 would be inapplicable since there would already be a newly elected and qualified
Representative.

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 DEL ROSARIO VS COMELEC
GR 247610, MARCH 10, 2020

TOPIC: PLEBISCITE
FACTS:
The present petition for prohibition assails the constitutionality and validity of Republic Act
(RA) No. 11259, entitled "Charter of the Provinces of Palawan del Norte, Palawan Oriental, and
Palawan del Sur." The bill originated from House Bill Nos. 7413 and 8055, which was initiated in
the 17th Congress by the representatives of the three legislative districts of the province of Palawan.
The bill was signed into law on April 5, 20193 and published in the Official Gazette on May 20,
2019.4
The district representatives who were duly elected and qualified in the election immediately
preceding the May 2022 national and local elections of the present First Legislative District, Second
Legislative District, and Third Legislative District shall continue to represent their respective
districts until the representatives for the newly created legislative districts for the three (3) provinces
and the highly urbanized City of Puerto Princesa shall have been elected and qualified.
Petitioners Cynthia S. Del Rosario, Federico N. Virgo, Jr., Renato V. Baladad, Beatriz A.
Dioso, and Corazon Manalon Davila are all residents of various barangays in Puerto Princesa City;
while the other petitioners are residents of three municipalities in Palawan. Loreta N. Alsa is a
resident of Sagpangan, Aborlan; petitioner Hiya I. Hassan is a resident of Panitian, Sofronio
Espanola; and petitioner John Vincent C. Colili is a resident of Amas, Brooke's Point. Claiming
standing as taxpayers and registered voters of Puerto Princesa City and of Palawan, they ask this
Court to declare RA No. 11259 unconstitutional and invalid. Consequently, they also seek the
issuance of a writ of prohibition against the conduct of the May 11, 20205 plebiscite provided for in
Sections 51 and 54 of RA No. 11259, without the participation of the electorate of Puerto Princesa
City, as well as the disbursement of funds relative thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the people to take part in a plebiscite was violated.
RULING:
NO. The records of the case reveal that the proposed division of Palawan, as reflected in the
assailed statute, was in fact made in consultation with the people of Palawan, through their elected
representatives: the municipal mayors, municipal councilors, and the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, as reflected in the transcripts of the consultative meeting, Sangguniang Panlalawigan
meetings, and resolutions from the municipal councils of Palawan.
Furthermore, the Constitution does not establish prior public consultation as a prerequisite
for the validity of a statute.
This Court sustains the contention of the Solicitor General that the assailed statute does not
run afoul of the constitutional policy on public consultation because its effectivity is still subject to
the supreme mode of public consultation: the ballot. Petitioners must be reminded that ours is a
republican state, where the people are heard primarily through their· elected representatives.20
Sovereignty resides in the people, but is primarily manifested through their elected representatives.
In the case at bar, the duly elected representatives of the people of Palawan at every level:
municipal, provincial, and national, have registered their support and consent to the proposed
division of their province.

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 VILLEGAS VS COMELEC
GR 257453, AUGUST 9, 2022
TOPIC: CANCELLATION OF COC
FACTS:
On 17 October 2018, petitioner filed her CoC as Member of Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
Lone District of Biñan, Laguna, for the 13 May 2019 National and Local Elections (NLE).
On 22 October 2018, respondent Lim filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner
before the COMELEC. Respondent Lim claimed that petitioner acquired United States (US)
citizenship and sought election to public office without making a personal and sworn renunciation
of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Respondent Lim likewise alleged that petitioner's application for and use of a US passport negated
her claim that she was a Filipino citizen at the time she filed her CoC.
On 3 December 2018, petitioner filed her answers to the foregoing petitions, claiming that: (1)
she did not commit any material representation in her CoC since there was no deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible; (2) she is a
dual citizen and she is not precluded from seeking an elective position; (3) dual allegiance is unlike
dual citizenship, and it is the former that is proscribed by law; (4) since there is no voluntary or
positive act on her part in acquiring her US citizenship, she being born in the US, the provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act
of 2003 (R.A. 9225), is not applicable to her; (5) possession of an American passport of a dual
citizen is not a basis for disqualification; and (6) the COMELEC cannot, as yet, decide on her
qualifications since it is an issue that is undecided or undetermined by the proper authority.
The COMELEC First Division found that petitioner was born on 25 June 1991 in Makati City
to a father who is a Filipino citizen, and a mother who is an American citizen. It was likewise found
that, prior to 2012, petitioner acquired American citizenship as evidenced by the Consular Report of
Birth Abroad of a Citizen of the United States of America (CRBA), and obtained her US passport. In
addition, petitioner ran and won as Barangay Kagawad of Barangay San Vicente, Biñan City,
Laguna in the 2013 Barangay Elections, and as Member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the
same city in the 2016 NLE. As previously stated, she filed her CoC as member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Biñan City, Laguna in connection with the 2019 May NLE. Further, the COMELEC
First Division found that, from the time her US passport was issued in 2010 up to 2018, petitioner
used her US passport to travel to and from the US and the Philippines, and vice versa.
In relation to the foregoing factual findings, the COMELEC First Division concluded that
petitioner is a dual citizen, having been born to a Filipino father, and with the CRBA strongly
indicating that she is likewise a US citizen. The COMELEC First Division's resolution noted that
under Section 2705(2), Title 22 of the United States Code, a CRBA issued by a consular office shall
have the same force and effect as proof of US citizenship as certificates of naturalization or of
citizenship issued by the Attorney General or a court having naturalization jurisdiction. The
resolution likewise noted the lack of evidence to show that petitioner renounced any of her
citizenships, and thus, she was a dual citizen at the time of the filing of her CoC for the 2019 May
NLE.
According to the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner's failure to comply with the requirements of
R.A. 9225 rendered her ineligible to run for elective office and, thus, she committed material
misrepresentations in her CoC when she stated therein that she was eligible to run for election.

Page | 70
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction holding that, under R.A. No. 9225, she is required to comply with the
twin requirements of taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and renouncing
her US citizenship.
RULING:
As was made clear in De Guzman v. COMELEC, R.A. 9225 covers two categories of
individuals, thus:
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
1) natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country: and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the
effectivity of the law, become citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are deemed to
have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
R.A. 9225 particularly applies to natural-born Filipinos who lost their Filipino citizenship
through the process of naturalization. Essentially, both classes of individuals mentioned in R.A.
9225 refer to those who have undergone the process of naturalization.
Thus, the coverage of R.A. 9225 includes only those natural-born Filipinos who acquired
foreign citizenship through the process of naturalization. Similarly, the provisions of R.A. 9225 on
the required oath of allegiance under Section 3, and the personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship under its Section 5(2) apply only to dual citizens by naturalization and
not to dual citizens by birth.
Records show that petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she filed her CoC for the May
2019 NLE, being both a US citizen and a natural born Filipino. The pivotal issue however is whether
petitioner acquired her US citizenship—and therefore her status as a dual citizen—by birth or
through naturalization. If by birth, petitioner need not renounce her US citizenship or pledge
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to qualify as a candidate for public office as required by
Sections 3 and 5(2) of R.A. 9225. Otherwise, if her dual citizenship proceeded from naturalization,
petitioner must perform the twin requirement or renunciation and the taking of an oath under R.A.
9225.

HRET VS PANGA-VEGA
GR 228236, JANUARY 27, 2021

TOPIC: HRET JURISDICTION

FACTS:
On February 2, 2011, Atty. Daisy B. Panga-Vega (Panga-Vega), then Secretary of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), requested authority to avail of the 15 days of special
leave benefit under Republic Act (RA) No. 9710, otherwise known as the Magna Carta of Women,"
on February 7-11, 14-18, and 21-25, 2011, but not to exceed two months, to undergo
hysterectomy.
On February 3, 2011, the HRET approved Panga-Vega's request for special leave for a period
not exceeding two months starting February 7, 2011.5 On February 7, 2011, she underwent total
hysterectomy.
On March 7, 2011, after a month of availing of the special leave, Panga¬ Vega informed the
HRET Chairperson that she was reassuming her duties and functions. She also presented a medical
Page | 71
certificate dated March 5, 2011, stating that there was "no contraindication to resume light to
moderate activities." On March 9, 2011, she explained that the earlier medical certificate did not
necessarily indicate her fitness to report for work. Thus, she presented another medical
certificate10 of even date stating that she was already "fit to work" after her physical examination
on March 6, 2011.
On March 10, 2011, the HRET directed Panga-Vega to consume her 2-month special leave
given her need for prolonged rest following her hysterectomy, and in view of a pending investigation
on her alleged alteration or tampering one minutes of the meeting that could subject her to more
stress. On March 14, 2011, she sought reconsideration of this HRET Reso1ution. On March 24,
2011, the HRET denied reconsideration reiterating her need to rest, and also, pointing out the
confusion and doubts regarding her true medical condition as caused by her medical certificates.
On April 13, 2011, Panga-Vega filed an appeal with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) assailing
the March 10, 2011 and March 24, 2011 HRET Resolutions.
On October 9, 2012, the CSC issued a Decision granting the appeal of Panga-Vega. It ruled
that she only needed to present a medical certificate attesting her physical fitness to return to work
and need not exhaust the full leave she applied for under RA No. 9710.It was further held that
applying the rules on maternity leave, she is entitled to both the commuted money value of the
unexpired portion of the special leave and her salary for actual services rendered effective the day
she reported back for work. On November 23, 2012, the HRET sought reconsideration, but the CSC
denied this in its Resolution dated February 12, 2013.
On March 19, 2013, the HRET filed a Petition for Review assailing the foregoing Decision and
Resolution of the CSC with the CA. On April 29, 2016, the CA dismissed the petition. Adopting the
CSC's findings, it ruled Panga-Vega may opt not to consume the full leave she applied for upon her
submission of the medical certificate. It also held that nothing in RA No. 9710 precludes the
suppletory application of the rules on maternity leave to the special leave benefit under RA No.
9710. The HRET sought reconsideration, but the CA denied this in its Resolution dated November
8, 2016. Hence, this petition.
The HRET argues that the CSC should not have applied suppletorily the rules on maternity
leave to the special leave benefit under RA No. 9710. It also contends that Panga-Vega did not
sufficiently comply with the "CSC Guidelines on the Availment of the Special Leave Benefits for
Women Under RA No. 9710" (CSC Guidelines), warranting her return to work.
Panga-Vega counters that the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of the HRET was not authorized
to file the instant petition. She further claims that the suppletory application of the rules on
maternity leave to the special leave benefit is more in accord with the thrust and intent of RA No.
9710. As to her compliance with the CSC Guidelines, she maintains that her medical certificate and
her attending physician's subsequent clarifications sufficiently showed her fitness to return to work.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET has the authority to initiate cases to the Court.
RULING:
The HRET was created by virtue of Section (Sec.) 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which provides that the House of Representatives shall have its own Electoral
Tribunal that shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of its Members. As a recognized instrumentality of the Government, the Court, in a
catena of cases, exercised over it its expanded judicial power to include the determination of
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Meanwhile, the OSG was constituted as the law office of the Government and shall discharge
duties requiring the services of a lawyer as such. It shall represent the Government of the
Page | 72
Philippines, its agencies, instrumentalities, and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. It is tasked to represent the Government
and its officers in the Court, the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special
proceedings in which the Government, or any officer thereof, in his official capacity is a party,
among others.
The OSG, however, may be excused from representing the Government, its agencies, and
instrumentalities when there is an express authorization by the OSG, naming therein the legal
officers who are being deputized in cases involving their respective offices, subject to its supervision
and control, or when the OSG takes a position different from that of the agency it is duty bound to
represent.
A perusal of the records shows that there was no express authorization by the OSG naming
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of the HRET as its deputized legal officers in filing this petition.
There was also no proof, let alone an allegation, that the OSG took a position different from the
HRET in this case. Instead of providing a plausible justification why the OSG did not represent it,
the HRET simply reasoned that the instant petition should be given course in the interest of a
speedy determination of issues. It even posited that the defect in its filing of the instant petition may
be cured upon a subsequent filing by the OSG of a manifestation and motion ratifying and adopting
it, but there had been no such manifestation and motion in this case. These facts necessarily evince
that HRET lacked the legal capacity to initiate this case, and the HRET gave no compelling reason
for the Court to disregard this finding.

ZAPANTA VS COMELEC
GR 233016, MARCH 5, 2019

TOPIC: APPRECIATION OF BALLOTS

FACTS:
For the May 9, 2016 national and local elections, Reynaldo, Alfred, and petitioner-intervenor
Edilberto U. Lagasca each filed a Certificate of Candidacy for city councilor of the Second District of
Antipolo City, Rizal. The Second District of Antipolo City is entitled to eight (8) seats in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Alfred and Lagasca filed their Certificates of Candidacy on October 16, 2015. Alfred, a
nominee of political party Aksyon Demokratiko, was then an incumbent city councilor of the Second
District of Antipolo City. Reynaldo, a member and nominee of Lakas-CMD, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on December 10, 2015 to replace another candidate, Rolando Z. Zonio.
On December 14, 2015, Alfred filed before the Commission a Verified Petition To Deny Due
Course and/or To Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Reynaldo S. Zapanta as Nuisance Candidate
(Nuisance Petition). He alleged that Reynaldo indicated the name "Alfred" both as his nickname in
his Certificate of Candidacy and as his name in the official ballots. He claimed that Reynaldo never
identified himself as "Alfred." To prove his allegations, Alfred attached a printed copy of Reynaldo's
social media accounts, which showed that Reynaldo was using the name "Rey Zapanta." Alfred also
attached screenshots of public conversations from the same social media accounts, where different
people pertained to the account holder as "Rey."

Alfred averred that Reynaldo's use of the name "Alfred" was "designed to mislead the voters"
to steal the votes intended for him. He contended that Reynaldo "has no [bona fide] intention to run
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for the office [and only aims to] cause confusion among the voters of Antipolo City and thus prevent
the faithful determination of the true will of the electorate of Antipolo City." He prayed that
Reynaldo be declared as a nuisance candidate and that Reynaldo's Certificate of Candidacy be
canceled. He further prayed that Reynaldo's name be excluded in the official ballots and, should his
Petition be decided after the elections, that the votes Reynaldo would have received be counted in
his favor.
Reynaldo emphasized that he was nominated as councilor by Lakas-CMD. His membership
in a political party, he said, established that he has a bona fide intention to run. Further, he had
expertise and experience in both the private and public sectors to serve its constituents.
Finally, Reynaldo claimed that, come election day, there would be no confusion since his and
Alfred's entries in the official ballots were different: Reynaldo's name would be "ZAPANTA ALFRED
LAKAS," while Alfred's would be "ZAPANTA ALFRED J."
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ordered that the votes cast for petitioner be credited to the votes cast
for private respondent Alfred J. Zapanta.
RULING:
After a perusal of the case records, this Court holds that petitioner was not able to
sufficiently show that voters can clearly identify that his chosen nickname pertains only to him. The
affidavits he presented are not enough to show that he had been using the name "Alfred" or that he
is publicly known by that name.
Moreover, despite being given an opportunity to counter private respondent's allegations,
petitioner failed to deny that he had no campaign materials using the name "Alfred Zapanta," or
present evidence to the contrary. He merely banked on his membership in a political party to
support his claim that he had a bona fide intention to run for office. Association to a political party
per se does not necessarily equate to a candidate's bona fide intent; instead, he or she must show
that he or she is serious in running for office. This, petitioner failed to demonstrate.
Additionally, private respondent is more recognized by his constituents as "Alfred Zapanta,"
being an incumbent city councilor who was running for another term.
This Court further holds that public respondent's order of adding petitioner's votes to private
respondent's votes is not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. However, its ruling on this issue
must be set aside.
There is grave abuse of discretion when a constitutional organ such as the Senate Electoral
Tribunal or the Commission on Elections, makes manifestly gross errors in its factual inferences
such that critical pieces of evidence, which have been nevertheless properly introduced by a party,
or admitted, or which were the subject of stipulation, are ignored or not accounted for.
A glaring misinterpretation of the constitutional text or of statutory provisions, as well as a
misreading or misapplication of the current state of jurisprudence, is also considered grave abuse of
discretion. The arbitrariness consists in the disregard of the current state of our law.
Public respondent explained that it based its ruling on Dela Cruz, where this Court held that
the votes for the nuisance candidate should be added to the votes for the bona fide candidate.
Despite involving a single-slot office, where only one (1) candidate can win for the position, public
respondent applied Dela Cruz as it was the prevailing doctrine when it decided on this case. More,
there were then no rules or jurisprudence dealing with the votes of a nuisance candidate in a multi-
slot office.

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 This Court finds that public respondent did not exercise its judgment in an arbitrary,
capricious, or whimsical manner when it ordered adding the votes cast for petitioner to the votes
cast for private respondent. On the contrary, it merely applied "the current state of our law."

AMAD VS COMELEC
GR 258448, JULY 05, 2022

TOPIC: NUISANCE CANDIDATE

FACTS:
On October 7, 2021, Amad filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Vice President for the
May 9, 2022 National and Local Elections (NLE). Thereafter, the COMELEC filed a Petition dated
October 11, 2021 entitled "In Re: Motu Proprio Petition to Declare Wilson Caritero Amad as
Nuisance Candidate," docketed as SPA No. 21-057 (DC)(MP) (the Nuisance Petition).
In the Nuisance Petition, the COMELEC averred, among others, that: (1) Amad does not
appear to have a genuine intention to run for public office; (2) he does not have a nationwide
network of supporters; (3) he is not personally capable of persuading a substantial number of voters
from different parts of the country; and (4) he is not virtually known to the entire country except
possibly in the locality where he resides. The COMELEC likewise made much of the fact that in
Amad's COC, he stated that he was running as an independent candidate with no political party to
support him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Amad is a nuisance candidate.
RULING:
NO. The Court finds that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Amad's motion for reconsideration and declaring him as a nuisance candidate. Again, the
COMELEC granted the Nuisance Petition based on the following grounds: first, it appears that
Amad's support is only limited to areas within Northern Mindanao; second, it appears that Amad
failed to prove that he possesses an established network nationwide and a strong political
machinery; and third, Amad failed to prove that: (1) he has a bona fide intention to run for Vice
President, and (2) his popularity in the South coupled with the capitalization of the use of social
media will be enough to launch and sustain a nationwide campaign.
Relevantly, as pointed out by Amad in the instant petition, the Constitution only prescribes
age, citizenship, voting and residence qualifications to be able to run for Vice President. Clearly,
being known throughout the Philippines and having an established network nationwide are not
qualifications for Vice President. In fact, the lack thereof are not even grounds to be declared as a
nuisance candidate in accordance with the Omnibus Election Code.
Here, the records are bereft of any evidence to clearly establish that Amad's filing of his COC
was intended to put the election process in mockery or to cause confusion among the voters.
Moreover, the COMELEC's allegation that Amad is only known within Northern Mindanao also does
not establish that he has no bona fide intention to run for Vice President.
Thus, it is manifestly clear that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when,
without any factual or legal basis, it denied Amad's motion for reconsideration, and declared him a
nuisance candidate.

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 BAGUMBAYAN-VNP MOVEMENT VS COMELEC
GR 206719, APRIL 10, 2019

TOPIC: COMELEC JURISDICTION; ELECTION PROCESS

FACTS:
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436, otherwise known as the Election
Modernization Act of 1997, which authorized the COMELEC to adopt an automated election system
(AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of the
national and local elections.7
On January 23, 2007, R.A. No. 9369 was signed into law, amending among others certain
provisions of R.A. No. 8436, pertinently Section 10.
To facilitate the review process as mandated by the law, the COMELEC promulgated Minute
Resolution No. 10-01388 on February 10, 2010, adopting the guidelines recommended by the
COMELEC Advisory Council and the Technical Evaluation Council (TEC). This resolution set the
guidelines for the conduct of the source code review, and was done a month before the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections.
Years later, this time for the 2013 National and Local elections, the TEC submitted to the
COMELEC on February 12, 20139 the former's resolution on the certification of the validity of AES
for the 2013 elections. As required by Section 9 of R.A. No. 9369, SLI Global Solutions (SLI),
certified and categorically stated that "the AES, including its hardware and software components,
are operating properly, securely, and accurately, in accordance with the provisions of the Act,"10
and that the same could be used by the voters, board of election inspectors (BEI), local and national
boards of canvassers, as well as the COMELEC in the aforementioned elections.
On March 1, 2013,11 the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9651, the guidelines
promulgated by COMELEC in order to fulfill its mandate to make the source code available.
According to Resolution No. 9651, several requirements12 must be submitted by interested parties
before they may be allowed to partake in the source code review.
Subsequently, on March 14, 2013, COMELEC likewise promulgated Resolution No. 9657,
which stated that to afford the COMELEC enough time to evaluate the request for source code
review, and the credentials of the reviewer, there is a need to set a deadline within which the
request, together with the credentials of its reviewer, should be filed, and where to file the same.
Resolution No. 9657 resolved that the request for the conduct of the source code review by the
political parties and interested groups, together with the credentials of the reviewer, shall be filed no
later than April 1, 2013.13
As a result of the aforementioned issuances, several parties, Parti do Demokratiko Pilipino-
Lakas Bayan, Pwersa ng Masang Pilipino, the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting and
the Liberal Party, in separate letters to the COMELEC, requested for participation in the source
code review.14 From April 10 to 24, 2013, these parties conducted the source code review for the
Consolidated Canvassing System and Elections Management System, but not for the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) source code, as the same had not yet been released due to negotiations
between the COMELEC, Dominion Voting Systems (Dominion), and Smartmatic TIM (Smartmatic)
over an issue involving a disagreement with the latter two institutions.
This disagreement started on September 6, 2012,15 when Smartmatic filed an action with
the Court of Chancery in the State of Delaware in the United States against Dominion, to which the
latter filed a counterclaim. According to COMELEC, this termination birthed two (2) consequences:

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first, Smartmatic lost its access to the program systems of Dominion, which signified that any
counting error committed in the following elections could not be corrected; and second, Smartmatic
failed to deliver to the COMELEC the source code, pursuant to Section 14 of R.A. No. 8436, a failure
that meant the said source code would not be reviewable by any party or candidate participating in
the 2013 elections.
The foregoing caused a delay in the availability of the source code, and thus, it was only on
May 5, 2013 when a representative from SLI arrived in the Philippines with a copy of the PCOS
source code that was subjected to the trusted build.16
On May 3, 2013, ten (10) days before the start of the elections, the petitioners filed the
instant Petition for Mandamus (With Extremely Urgent Prayer to Set Petition for Oral Arguments), to
compel COMELEC to obtain the source code and to make the same available for review of the
petitioners and other similarly situated parties. The Court, thus, set the case for oral arguments on
May 8, 2013.
During the oral arguments, Chairman Brillantes manifested before the Court that first, the
COMELEC had already acquired the PCOS source code, and second, that the same will be deposited
in escrow at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), thus making it available for review,17 subject to
compliance with certain requirements.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed the instant petition, reiterated in a Memorandum dated May
28, 2013 praying that the COMELEC obtain the source code and immediately make a complete copy
of the source code available for the review of the petitioners and other similarly situated parties.
Likewise, the petitioners prayed that the Court enjoins the COMELEC by way of a Temporary
Restraining Order from removing the PCOS machine used for the May 13, 2013 National and Local
Elections from the latter1 s respective precincts, schoolhouses, or present whereabouts and
transferring them to the COMELEC's own or maintained storage facilities and/or opening up or,
otherwise, tampering with the components, contents, and software encoded into the said machines.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the Writ of Mandamus to compel COMELEC to
open up the source code review for the elections immediately for the review of the petitioners and
other similarly situated parties.
RULING:
NO. As this Resolution No. 10423 now governs the conduct of the upcoming elections, and
any automated election from here on out unless it, itself, is superseded by another, the cause of
action of the petitioners has ceased to exist.
Despite its aforementioned misgivings about the conduct of the COMELEC at the time the
consolidated petition was filed, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to this important development in
the case's factual milieu, the issuance of the new Resolution No. 10423. Thus, as to the source code
review, with a mention that the COMELEC should be more circumspect when it comes to its rule-
making power, the Court rules that the claims of the petitioners are moot and academic.

LIBERAL PARTY VS COMELEC

GR 247545, JULY 26, 2022
TOPIC: COMELEC JURISDICTION; PARTY LIST SYSTEM
FACTS:
On March 25, 2019, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 10514 titled "Rules
and Regulations Governing the Filing of Accreditation for the Purpose of Determining the Dominant

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Majority Party, Dominant Minority Party, Ten (10) Major National Parties and Two (2) Major Local
Parties in Connection with the May 13, 2019 National and Local Elections."4 Resolution No. 10514
was issued in accordance with Section 26 of Republic Act No. 7166,5 as amended.
On April 10, 2019, the Liberal Party filed with the Commission on Elections its Petition for
Accreditation as the Dominant Minority Party, docketed as SPP (DM) No. 19-018.8 On May 8, 2019,
the Commission on Elections En Banc issued Resolution No. 105389 declaring Partido Demokratiko
Pilipino - Lakas ng Bayan as the Dominant Majority Party, the Nacionalista Party as the Dominant
Minority Paiiy, and .the Liberal Party as among the eight Major Political Parties for the 2019
national and local elections.
In a May 7, 2019 Memorandum 12 attached to the Resolution, Commissioner Luie Tito F.
Guia (Commissioner Guia) expressed his serious reservation with the determination of the
dominant minority party. He argued that the position that the dominant minority party should
come from the minority, "a party that belongs to those that stand in opposite to the majority" in
accordance with Section 274 of the Omnibus Election Code. Commissioner Ma. Rowena Amelia V.
Guanzon concurred with Commissioner Guia's position. On July 1, 2019, the Liberal Party filed
before this Court a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing Resolution No. 10538.
Meanwhile, respondent Nacionalista Party also argues that the Petition for Certiorari had
been rendered moot by the May 2019 national and local elections. 27 It also claims that the
Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it found that respondent
Nacionalista Party was the dominant minority party, and that petitioner was only a major political
party for the May 2019 national and local elections. It points out that since 1992, respondent
Commission on Elections had used accreditation criteria which did not require that the dominant
minority be an opposing party to the majority party.
ISSUE: Whether or not Liberal Party is entitled to privileged participation in the election.
RULING:
In election law, accreditation "relates to the privileged participation that our election laws
grant to qualified registered parties."3° For the 2019 national and local elections, Resolution No.
10538 declares the political parties accredited as the dominant majority party, dominant minority
party, and the 10 national political parties. The parties thus designated are entitled to certain
privileges relevant to the conduct of the elections.
The process of accreditation of the dominant majority and minority parties, and national
political parties is a process that begins anew with every electoral cycle. The purpose for which the
parties were accredited in Resolution No. 10538 had already been fulfilled long before the Petition
for Certiorari was ij even filed. Any action this Court may take regarding Resolution No. 10538 will
not produce any legal effect. Even if this Court find for petitioner and revoke respondent
Nacionalista Party's accreditation in its favor, this Court cannot take back the election returns
already distributed and permit it the electoral watchers to which it is entitled. Even petitioner
implicitly admits that the conclusion of the 2019 national and local elections essentially rendered
its prayer for annulment of Resolution No. 10538 moot.
Here, the May 13, 2019 elections for which the contested accreditation was made had already
been over for more than a month before petitioner filed its Petition for Certiorari. There is no longer
any adverse legal interests to speak of, or any specific relief that petitioner may obtain contingent to
privileges pursuant to Resolution No. 10538.
Further, a review of petitioner's arguments shows that it does not actually contest Resolution No.
10538. While it alleges that respondent Nacionalista Pmiy should not have been declared the
dominant minority party for the 2019 national and local elections, it does not do so based on the
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point allocations or computations made in Resolution No. 10538. Instead, what petitioner assails is
the inclusion of certain criteria and alleged exclusion of others to determine which political party is
the dominant minority party.

TOLENTINO VS SET AND COMELEC

GR 248005, MAY 11, 2021
TOPIC: COMELEC JURISDICTION
FACTS:
During the May 9, 2016, National, Local and Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) Elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) utilized a total of Ninety-Two
Thousand Five Hundred Nine (92,509) Vote Counting Machines (VCMs) and their respective
components and other paraphernalia. These election machines and equipment were procured by
the COMELEC from Smartmatic-TIM under an Automated Election System (AES) contracts, which
were in the nature of a lease with option to purchase (OTP).
On June 20, 2016, petitioner filed an election protest against Senator Leila M. De Lima,
pertaining to the official results of the senatorial elections.
In a letter dated July 22, 2016, the COMELEC sought clarification on the coverage of the
protection order under Resolution No. 16-01.
In response, the SET issued Resolution No. 16-067 dated August 15, 2016, modifying the
protection order and excluded therefrom the hardware and suppletory components of the VCMs and
Consolidated Canvassing System (CCS) laptops used during the elections, which do not contain any
election data. Moreover, pursuant to Section 6.9 of the AES Contracts, the SET Executive
Committee required the COMELEC to provide the amount to be paid by petitioner as retention costs
of the VCMs and the CCS laptops pertaining to the latter's protest.
Thereafter, the SET issued Resolution No. 16-158 dated November 9, 2016 requiring
petitioner to manifest to the Tribunal his intended course of action with respect to the retained
equipment related to his election protest. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a
Manifestation9 dated November 18, 2016 requesting that forty-five (45) VCMs and six (6) CCS
laptops be retained by the COMELEC. Subsequently, he filed a Motion10 dated November 18, 2016,
praying that an additional One Hundred Six (106) VCMs and their SD cards and other materials
contained therein, be safeguarded and preserved by the COMELEC.
On October 3, 2018, petitioner filed a Motion for the Return of Payments,16 asserting that
the payments made by him in the total amount of P3,315,785.36 should be returned because
despite paying the purchase price of these election machines and equipment, he never enjoyed
ownership rights over the same. He had no opportunity to possess them as these machines and
equipment remained in the custody of the COMELEC. He cannot even access them without
permission from the COMELEC.
Petitioner further contended that the purchase of the said machines and equipment was in
furtherance of his election protest. Since free access to, use and enjoyment of the same, were
denied, if not limited, forensic examinations of the hardware could not be done. Considering that
these machines and equipment were not utilized and would no longer be of use in his election
protest, the complete payment made by him did not bear its purpose.
ISSUE: Whether or not SET committed grave abuse of discretion when it passed upon the issue on
the validity and constitutionality of Section 6.9 of the AES Contracts.

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RULING:
YES. The SET has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue on the validity and constitutionality
of Section 6.9 of the AES Contracts. The constitutional mandate and jurisdiction of the SET is
expressly articulated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
A cursory reading of the foregoing unmistakably would show that the SET has no express,
inherent or implied power to declare void or unconstitutional Section 6.9 of the AES Contracts,
which requires the protestant to shoulder the retention costs. The authority of the SET is limited to
matters affecting the validity of the protestant's title. While it may be true that the SET has the
power to control its proceedings, such power cannot, by any means, be construed as including the
power to interpret much less invalidate a contract between third parties. Thus, any issue
concerning the contract between the COMELEC and Smartmatic-TIM is beyond the jurisdiction and
constitutional mandate of the SET. To rule otherwise is to overstretch if not to go astray from the
interpretation of the SET's constitutional grant of jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of the Senate, as laid down in
Javier.

SUBRABAS VS ABAS AND CASINGAL

GR 253103, OCTOBER 6, 2020

TOPIC: ELECTION PROTEST

FACTS:
Epifania Calayca (Calayca) was a mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of CJarin, ·
Ivfisamis Occidental under the political party Pilipinong Dugong · Dakiiang Samahan* (PDDS)
during the 2019 synchronized election .Three (3) days prior to the election, Calayca filed a case
before the COMELEC against mayoralty candidates Navarro and Villa and their party-mates under
the Nationalist Party (NP) and PDP-Laban Party, respectively, for vote-buying and vote-selling.
After the election, Navarro and Gloria Fe D. Roa won as Mayor and Vice Mayor, respectively,
while seven (7) NP candidates and one (1) independent candidate won the eight (8) Sanggunian
Bayan seats. Acting on the complaint, COMELEC Law Department Director Maria Norina S.
Tangaro-Casingal, on July 29, 2019, transmitted Calayca's complaint to Atty. Renato A. Magbutay,
Regional Election Director of Region X, Cagayan De Oro City for preliminary investigation.
In tum, the latter forwarded the complaint to Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Milber G.
Alinas (Atty. Alinas). Under Order dated July 22, 2019, Atty. Alinas directed Calayca to submit the
affidavits of his witnesses and additional copies of the complaint with its attachment considering
the number of respondents impleaded therein. Calayca complied. On August 14, 2019, Navarro
and, the elected municipal officials of the Municipality of Clarin filed their joint affidavit. They
denied engaging · in vote-buying/vote-selling, imputed political harassment complainant, and
sought the dismissal of the case for lack of merit. In September and November 2019, Calayca twice
moved to resolve with dispatch the complaint, sans any hearing as his party mates feared for their
lives. Meanwhile, sometime in October 2019, Navarro was slain in Cebu. Between December 2019
and February 2020, Calayca sent various requests for the Regional COMELEC office to conduct a
hearing prior to resolving the complaint. He also charged the COMELEC regional officials before the
Ombudsman with alleged inaction on his complaint. 8 On June 4, 2020; Calayca executed an
affidavit designating Subrabas to substitute him as complainant in the complaint due to health
reasons. Subrabas was Calayca's running mate in the 2019 Election.9 On June 11, 2020,

Page | 80
COMELEC Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Alinas replied to Calayca's complaint against him
and other COMELEC's officials for abuse authority and dereliction of duty.
He explained that COMELEC's role in his complaint for vote-buying and vote-selling was
merely to conduct a preliminary investigation. His recommendation on the complaint had already
been submitted to the COMELEC Law Department in February 2020 for transmittal to the
COMELEC En Banc which shall determine whether to file the case with the regular court.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC can be compelled by mandamus to immediately resolve the
complaint for election offense against the named officials based on the evidence she had submitted.
RULING:
NO. Mandamus lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty when refused, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. An act is considered ministerial if "an officer or
tribunal perfom1s in the context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard
for the exercise of his or its own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done."
In contrast, an act is considered discretionary "[i]f the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed." The writ will lie if the
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station. The writ of mandamus, however,
will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do, or to give to the
applicant anything to which he-is not entitled by law.
In the prosecution of election cases, the COMELEC 's duty is to conduct preliminary
investigation to determine whether or not there is ground to file an Information to the court.
Petitioner who has a pending election complaint before it now asks the Court to direct COMELEC to
immediately resolve it. For sure, the Court cannot, by mandamus, direct COMELEC on how to
conduct its investigation of an election offense. It is within its exclusive authority at first instance to
determine whether or not there is basis in filing the complaint with the trial court. This is a matter
of discretion and not just a ministerial duty, hence, beyond the· ambit of mandamus·.

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 LLAMAS, JOCELYN

BAÑAS-NOGRALES, ET AL. VS. COMELEC

83
G.R. No. 246328, September 10, 2019
GURO VS. COMELEC
84
G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021
PENSON VS. COMELEC
87
G.R. No. 233016, March 05, 2019
BUENAFE VS. COMELEC
88
G.R. No. 260374. June 28, 2022

Page | 82
 VICE MAYOR SHIRLYN L. BAÑAS-NOGRALES, ET AL. V.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 246328, September 10, 2019
FACTS:
On March 11, 2019, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte signed into law Republic Act No. (R.A.)
11243. Under R.A. 11243, the 1st District was reapportioned, thereby creating the lone legislative
district of General Santos City. Under Section 1 of the said law, the creation of the lone legislative
district of General Santos City was "to commence in the next national and local elections after the
effectivity of this Act." Consequently, R.A. 11243 took effect on April 4, 2019 - just over a month
before the 2019 general elections.
The same law directed the incumbent Representatives of First and Second Legislative
Districts of South Cotabato to continue representing their respective districts "until new
representatives shall have been elected and qualified." Thereafter, COMELEC was mandated to
issue the necessary rules and regulations to implement R.A. 11243. COMELEC then issued
resolution suspending the election of Representatives for the First Legislative District, including
General Santos City, in the Province of South Cotabato, scheduled on May 13, 2019 and if there are
votes, it will consider as stray votes.
Petitioners contest the validity of the assailed Resolution for violating R.A. 7166.7 Under R.A.
7166, the elections for elective members of the House of Representatives shall be on the second
Monday of May, every three years. While they admitted that special elections may be held,
petitioners claim that none of the exceptional circumstances are present to warrant the same.
Petitioners also averred that scheduling the first regular election "within six (6) months from
May 13, 2019"10 violated R.A. 11243. R.A. 11243 intended the reapportionment to commence in
the next national and local elections after the effectivity of the said Act, or on the second Monday of
May 2022 - not May 13, 2019. According to petitioners, the legislators were well aware that the
election period for the 2019 general elections have already begun at the time R.A. 11243 was
passed. Furthermore, petitioners doubted the feasibility of conducting a special election within six
months from May 13, 2019.
Petitioners also questioned COMELEC's directive to consider votes for the 1st District as
stray votes in the 2019 general elections. They claim that if the same were implemented, there
would be no representatives for the 1st District from July 1, 2019 until the time elections for such
position are held. On the other hand, to allow the 1st District's incumbent representative to
continue in a holdover capacity "would be extending his term of office for another three years
without being elected by the people."
Lastly, petitioners sought for the issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order in order to "restore the
right of the people to vote for their representative for the 1st District] in [the] upcoming May 13,
2019 Mid-term Elections.
Without issuing a Status Quo Ante Order, this Court ordered COMELEC to file its comment
on the petition in a Resolution14 dated May 3, 2019.
The scheduled elections ensued on May 13, 2019. Inevitably, votes were cast for the
representative of the 1st District. Out of the 284,35115 votes cast, 194,929 votes (68.55%) were for
Shirlyn L. Bañas-Nograles (Bañas-Nograles). However, following Section 3 of the assailed
Resolution, all the votes for the 1st District's representative were considered stray. Thus, Bañas-
Nograles was not proclaimed as the 1st District's representative-elect.

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ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC Resolution is valid.
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. The 1987 Constitution is clear: Elections for Congress should be
held on the 2nd Monday of May unless otherwise provided by law. The term "unless otherwise
provided by law" contemplates two situations (1) when the law specifically states when the elections
should be held on a date other than the second Monday of May; and (2) when the law delegates the
setting of the date of the elections to COMELEC.
Section 1 of R.A. 11243 categorically states that the reapportionment of the 1st District shall
"commence in the next national and local elections after the effectivity of this Act." R.A. 11243 did
not specifically provide for a different date. Neither did it delegate unto COMELEC the setting of a
different date.
We need not discuss COMELEC's powers under Section 5 of the Omnibus Election Code. The
issue lies in ascertaining when Congress intended R.A. No. 11243 to be implemented. The law was
passed with the view of implementing the reapportionment of the First Legislative District of the
Province of South Cotabato at the most feasible and practicable time, i.e., during the next elections
on the second Monday of May 2022. Congress could not have intended to enforce R.A. 11243
during the 2019 general elections as the election period had already begun when R.A. 11243 was
enacted. To require implementation last May 13, 2019 would lead COMELEC to act precipitously.
The elections for the First Legislative District of the Province of South Cotabato scheduled on
May 13, 2019 should not have been suspended, and the candidate obtaining the most number of
votes for the said position must be proclaimed. Consequently, the holdover provision under Section
2 of R.A. 11243 would be inapplicable since there would already be a newly elected and qualified
Representative.

SARIPODEN ARIMAN GURO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

AND SOMERADO MALOMALO GURO
G.R. No. 234345, June 22, 2021

FACTS:
On October 16, 2015, private respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Municipal Mayor of Lumbaca-Unayan, Lanao del Sur in connection with the then forthcoming May
2016 NLE, indicating therein under oath that he is a registered voter of Barangay Poblacion
Dilausan, Lumbaca-Unayan, Lanao Del Sur and that he is eligible to run for the office he seeks to
be elected to.
Petitioner, who was the erstwhile municipal mayor of Lumbaca-Unayan, running for re-
election, challenged private respondent's candidacy via a Petition for Disqualification on April 29,
2016. He alleged that based on the posted certified voters' list, private respondent is not a registered
voter of the municipality; hence, not qualified to be a candidate for the contested position.
On June 13, 2016, private respondent filed his Verified Answer (With Special and Affirmative
Defenses), denying the material allegations in the petition and arguing that the same had been
rendered moot and academic by the COMELEC's resolution approving the recommendation of
Director Teopisto R. Elnas, Jr. of the Election and Barangay Affairs Department (EBAD), for
inclusion of respondent's name in the supplemental list of voters. He likewise averred that he was

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able to cast his vote on Election Day, and that he won and was proclaimed as the Mayor of
Lumbaca-Unayan in the May 2016 NLE.
The COMELEC First Division rendered the first assailed order dismissing the petition on the
ground that petitioner filed the same beyond the prescriptive period of twenty-five (25) days for filing
a Petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). In denying his verified motion for
reconsideration of the order of the First Division, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed said order and
found that the petition was filed way beyond the reglementary period. Accordingly, it found it
unnecessary to tackle the other substantive issues raised by petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for technical grounds.
HELD:
As correctly held by the COMELEC, since the petition is anchored on the alleged ineligibility
of private respondent, the same is in the nature of a petition to deny due course or to cancel the
latter's COC which falls under Section 78 of the OEC. Where the disqualification is based on age,
residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, the reglementary period provided by law
should be applied strictly. On the ground that the candidate allegedly misrepresented himself as
being a registered voter, there is no reason to depart from settled jurisprudence and the
reglementary period of 25 days provided by law should likewise be strictly applied to such a
disqualification.

RICARDO L. PENSON, HANS CHRISTIAN M. SEÑERES, RIZALITO

L. DAVID, AND BALDOMERO C. FALCONE VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS CONSTITUTED AS THE NATIONAL BOARD OF
CANVASSERS FOR SENATORS AND COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 211636, September 28, 2021

FACTS:
On December 2, 1997, the Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8436 or the "Election
Modernization Act of 1997" in line with the State's policy to ensure a free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
and credible elections.
One of the innovations introduced in R.A. No. 8436 is the concept of Automated Election
System (AES) or a system which uses appropriate technology for voting and electronic devices to
count votes and canvass/consolidate results.6
Pertinently, Section 67 of R.A. No. 8436 has authorized the COMELEC to utilize an AES for
the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results in the national and
local elections
Section 23 thereof further provides for the composition of the NBOC for Senators, which shall
be comprised of the Chairman and Members of the COMELEC sitting en banc.
On January 23, 2007, R.A. No. 8346 was amended by R.A. No. 9369 or the "Automation
Law." Among the provisions introduced by the amending law is a change in the mandate of the
COMELEC, now sitting as the NBOC for both Senators and Party-List Representatives, which shall

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proclaim the winning candidates for both positions after consolidating the certificate of canvass
electronically transmitted.9
Unlike in R.A. No. 8436, the AES in R.A. No. 9369 can either be paper-based10 or direct
recording election system11 depending on COMELEC's determination.
In compliance therewith, on May 10, 2013, the COMELEC as NBOC (COMELEC-NBOC)
randomly selected the cities/municipalities which will be subjected to RMA through the use of
Automated Random Selection Program (ARSP). After two (2) days, the COMELEC-NBOC selected the
priority and contingency clustered precincts. A total of 234 clustered precincts, which correspond to
one precinct per legislative district was randomly selected in each province and city.
On May 13, 2013, the national and local elections were held.
Pursuant to R.A. No. 9369, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 9595 providing the
guidelines on the conduct of RMA by the Random Manual Audit Team (RMAT) for the positions of
Senator, Member of the House of Representatives, and Mayor.
After the May 13, 2013 national and local elections, the COMELEC-NBOC proceeded to canvass the
results by consolidating the electronically transmitted certificates of canvass.
True to the intent and spirit of R.A. No. 9369, is to have a fast and accurate result that is
reflective of the genuine will of the people, the COMELEC-NBOC issued the first assailed
Resolution14 No. 004-13 dated May 18, 2013, which initially proclaimed the senatorial candidates
who garnered the most number of votes during the May 13, 2013 elections.
On March 31, 2014, petitioners filed the instant petition seeking to nullify the
aforementioned NBOC Resolutions and Senatorial Canvass Report No. 17 due to grave abuse of
discretion committed by COMELEC-NBOC.
Procedurally, the OSG asserts that the Court has no jurisdiction over the issues presented by
petitioners as the same fall within the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET), which is
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of
the Senate under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
On October 10, 2014, Volunteer Against Crime and Corruption, represented by Martin Dino
filed a Petition-in-Intervention, which is a substantial reiteration of the main issues advanced by
petitioners in their petition for certiorari. As additional arguments, petitioners-intervenors claim that
the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC-NBOC should be nullified in view of the latter's failure to
comply with Section 12 of R.A. No. 9369, which requires that the source code of the PCOS
machines be made available and open to any interested parties for review to ensure that no
malicious instructions are contained therein and that no other utility, software or programs are
embedded to introduce any extrinsic data.
As the allegations in the petition-in-intervention are essentially the same as those in the
petition for certiorari, the OSG reiterated its earlier submissions in its Comment to the petition-in-
intervention.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC-NBOC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing NBOC Resolution No. 004-13 dated May 18, 2013, NBOC
Resolution No. 0010-13 and Senatorial Canvass Report No. 17 both dated June 5, 2013, which
proclaimed the 12 winning candidates as duly elected Senators of the Republic of the Philippines
during the 2013 national and local elections.

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HELD:
The petition is bereft of merit. Prefatorily, it is basic that certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy
narrow in scope and inflexible in character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop. It
offers only a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep an inferior tribunal within its
jurisdiction. It can be invoked only for an error of jurisdiction, that is, one where the act complained
of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack, or in excess, of jurisdiction. This
remedy essentially serves as a check on acts, either of excess or passivity, that constitute grave
abuse of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Further, being an extraordinary remedy,
a writ of certiorari may only be availed of when there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper even if
the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal, not the Supreme Court, which has the exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all matters relating to the alleged irregularities in the canvassing
of election returns and nullity of the proclamation of the 12 winning senatorial candidates.
To delve on these matters would be to usurp on the clear, complete, and categorical authority
bestowed upon the SET as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the Senate. As succinctly held in Barbers, any pursuit by the
Court to assume jurisdiction would be tantamount to an encroachment of the constitutional
functions of the SET.

REYNALDO S. ZAPANTA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND

ALFRED J. ZAPANTA; EDILBERTO U. LAGASCA
G.R. No. 233016, March 05, 2019

FACTS:
For this Court's resolution is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Motion to Admit
Petition for Intervention with Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. The Petition prays that the May 8, 2016 and August 8, 20173 Resolutions of
the Commission on Elections (the Commission) be reversed and set aside, and that a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the execution of the
assailed Resolutions. The Commission declared Reynaldo S. Zapanta (Reynaldo) as a nuisance
candidate and ordered that the votes he received be added to the votes received by Alfred J. Zapanta
(Alfred). For the May 9, 2016 national and local elections, Reynaldo, Alfred, and petitioner-
intervenor Edilberto U. Lagasca (Lagasca) each filed a Certificate of Candidacy for city councilor of
the Second District of Antipolo City, Rizal.6 The Second District of Antipolo City is entitled to eight
(8) seats in the Sangguniang Panlungsod.7 Alfred and Lagasca filed their Certificates of Candidacy
on October 16, 2015. Alfred, a nominee of political party Aksyon Demokratiko, was then an
incumbent city councilor of the Second District of Antipolo City.8 Reynaldo, a member and nominee
of Lakas-CMD, filed his Certificate of Candidacy on December 10, 2015 to replace another
candidate, Rolando Z. Zonio. On December 14, 2015, Alfred filed before the Commission a Verified
Petition To Deny Due Course and/or To Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Reynaldo S. Zapanta as
Nuisance Candidate (Nuisance Petition). He alleged that Reynaldo indicated the name "Alfred" both
as his nickname in his Certificate of Candidacy and as his name in the official ballots. He claimed
that Reynaldo never identified himself as "Alfred."13 To prove his allegations, Alfred attached a
printed copy of Reynaldo's social media accounts, which showed that Reynaldo was using the name

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"Rey Zapanta." Alfred also attached screenshots of public conversations from the same social media
accounts, where different people pertained to the account holder as "Rey." Alfred averred that
Reynaldo's use of the name "Alfred" was "designed to mislead the voters" to steal the votes intended
for him. He contended that Reynaldo "has no [bona fide] intention to run for the office [and only
aims to] cause confusion among the voters of Antipolo City and thus prevent the faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate of Antipolo City." He prayed that Reynaldo be
declared as a nuisance candidate and that Reynaldo's Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. He
further prayed that Reynaldo's name be excluded in the official ballots and, should his Petition be
decided after the elections, that the votes Reynaldo would have received be counted in his favor.
COMELEC granted the petition of Alfred and declared Reynaldo as nuisance. Reynaldo
moved for reconsideration with the En Banc but the same was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ordered that the votes cast for petitioner be credited to the votes cast
for private respondent Alfred J. Zapanta
HELD:
The petition is partly meritorious. This Court finds that public respondent did not exercise its
judgment in an arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical manner when it ordered adding the votes cast for
petitioner to the votes cast for private respondent. On the contrary, it merely applied "the current
state of our law." With the recent promulgation of Santos, this Court clarified how the votes of
nuisance candidates in a multi-slot office should be treated:
In a multi-slot office, such as membership of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, a registered voter
may vote for more than one candidate. Hence, it is possible that the legitimate candidate and
nuisance candidate, having similar names, may both receive votes in one ballot. The Court agrees
with the OSG that in that scenario, the vote cast for the nuisance candidate should no longer be
credited to the legitimate candidate; otherwise, the latter shall receive two votes from one voter.
Therefore, in a multi-slot office, the COMELEC must not merely apply a simple mathematical formula
of adding the votes of the nuisance candidate to the legitimate candidate with the similar name. To
apply such simple arithmetic might lead to the double counting of votes because there may be ballots
containing votes for both nuisance and legitimate candidates.
The Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes for petitioner alone should be counted in
favor of private respondent; if there are votes for both petitioner and private respondent in the same
ballot, then only one (1) vote should be counted in the latter's favor. This will not only discourage
nuisance candidates, but will also prevent the disenfranchisement of voters.

G.R. No. 260374. June 28, 2022

FR. CHRISTIAN B. BUENAFE, FIDES M. LIM, MA. EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, CELIA LAGMAN
SEVILLA, ROLAND C. VIBAL, AND JOSEPHINE LASCANO, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 260426
BONIFACIO PARABUAC ILAGAN, SATURNINO CUNANAN OCAMPO, MARIA CAROLINA
PAGADUAN ARAULLO, TRINIDAD GERILLA REPUNO, JOANNA KINTANAR CARIÑO, ELISA
TITA PEREZ LUBI, LIZA LARGOZA MAZA, DANILO MALLARI DELA FUENTE, CARMENCITA
MENDOZA FLORENTINO, DOROTEO CUBACUB ABAYA, JR., ERLINDA NABLE SENTURIAS, SR.
ARABELLA CAMMAGAY BALINGAO, SR. CHERRY M. IBARDOLAZA, CSSJB, SR. SUSAN
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SANTOS ESMILE, SFIC, HOMAR RUBERT ROCA DISTAJO, POLYNNE ESPINEDA DIRA, JAMES
CARWYN CANDILA, AND JONAS ANGELO LOPENA ABADILLA, PETITIONERS, VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, FERDINAND ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, JR., THE SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT, THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
This is a consolidated case of Petition for Certiorari assailing the resolution of the COMELEC
En banc in a petition filed by Fr. Christian Buenafe et.al and Bonifacio Parabuac Ilagan to cancel
the COC of respondent Marcos Jr. under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, Article IX of Batas
Pambansa Blg. (BP) 881, or the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and Petition for Disqualification
under Section 12, Article I of the OEC, respectively. They claim that respondent Marcos, Jr. made
false material representations under oath when he filed his COC for President in the 2022 National
Elections with the COMELEC in reference to his conviction by Court of Appeals involving his
criminal case of non-filing of income tax return. The dispositive portion of the decision is as follows:
The CA ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. ACQUITTING the accused-appellant of the charges for violation of Section 50 of the NIRC for
non-payment of deficiency taxes for the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
02-29216, Q-92-29215, Q-92-29214, and Q-91-24390; and FINDING him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 45 of the NIRC for failure to file income tax returns for
the taxable years 1982 to 1985 in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-91-24391, Q-92-29212, Q-92-29213,
and Q-92-29217;
2. Ordering the appellant to pay to the BIR the deficiency income taxes with interest at the legal
rate until fully paid;
3. Ordering the appellant to pay a fine of ₱2,000.00 for each charge in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
92-29213, Q-92-29212 and Q-29217 for failure to file income tax returns for the years 1982,
1983, and 1984; and the fine of ₱30,000.00 in Criminal Case No. Q-91-24391 for failure to file
income tax return for 1985, with surcharges.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent Marcos, Jr. intended to appeal the CA Decision before this Court. However, he
later filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw his Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review. We granted his motion to withdraw in a Resolution dated 08 August 2001. Our Entry of
Judgment was made on 31 August 2001. The CA made an Entry of Judgment on 10 November
1997.
Petitioners in sum argued before the COMELEC that respondent Marcos, Jr. committed false
material representation when he stated in his COC that he is eligible to run for President.36 They
maintained that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s prior conviction carries with it the accessory penalty of
perpetual disqualification from holding any public office, to vote, and to participate in any election.
The COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent Marcos, Jr.'s material representations
are not false, i.e., that he is eligible for the position of President and that he is not perpetually
disqualified from public office.52 It underscored that the CA Decision did not mete out the penalty
of perpetual disqualification from holding public office.53 It also found, as a matter of judicial
notice, that respondent Marcos, Jr. ceased to be a public officer when he and his family were forced
to leave the Philippines on 25 February 1986.54 The penalty of perpetual disqualification from
public office under Section 286 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1994, which amended Section 286(c)
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of the 1977 NIRC, thus cannot apply to respondent Marcos, Jr. since he was already a private
individual when he failed to file his 1985 income tax return.55 The COMELEC Second Division also
concluded that respondent Marcos, Jr. had no intention to deceive the electorate about his
qualifications for public office.
The COMELEC Second Division reiterated this Court's declaration in Republic v. Ferdinand
Marcos II and Imelda R. Marcos57 that failure to file an income tax return is not a crime involving
moral turpitude.58 Moreover, failure to file income tax returns is not tax evasion.
In a Resolution dated 10 May 2022, the COMELEC En Banc denied petitioners Buenafe, et
al.'s Motion for Partial Reconsideration and affirmed the Resolution dated 17 January 2022 of the
COMELEC Second Division. It held that the Motion for Partial Reconsideration failed to raise new
matters or issues that warrant the reversal of the questioned Resolution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Supreme Court still has jurisdiction to rule upon the eligibility of [respondent
Marcos, Jr.].
2. Whether the [COMELEC] committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling that [respondent
Marcos, Jr.] did not commit any material misrepresentation in his COC.
HELD:
The consolidated petitions are DISMISSED. The Court holds that respondent Marcos, Jr. is
qualified to run for President, and that his COC is valid.
This Court, in all the cases involving controversies over the candidacies or election of the President
or Vice-President, has always asserted its jurisdiction to decide the cases brought before it under
the authority vested upon it by the Constitution. We take the same stance here and decide on the
issues raised in the present Petitions.
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the present petitions
A case is moot when a supervening event has terminated the legal issue between the parties,
such that this Court is left with nothing to resolve. It can no longer grant any relief or enforce any
right, and anything it says on the matter will have no practical use or value.156 This is not the
scenario We have here.
The issues raised in both the Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions – whether respondent Marcos, Jr.
is guilty of material misrepresentation of his eligibility and whether he suffers any of the grounds for
disqualification – are not rendered moot by his receipt of the highest number of votes or by his
subsequent proclamation. The petitions raise fundamental questions as to whether respondent
Marcos, Jr. is qualified to be a candidate for President. These are actual and justiciable
controversies that the Court must resolve in the exercise of its judicial power. We cannot stress
enough that the qualification of the candidate is not waived by his or her subsequent election to the
office. A candidate may obtain 99% of the votes cast, but if he or she is found to possess any of the
grounds for disqualification, our laws prohibit such candidate from occupying public office.
The last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "[t]he
Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests, relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate rules for the
purpose."
Applying the ruling in Reyes to the present petitions, this Court, sitting En Banc, can only
take cognizance of an election contest if the following requisites concur: (a) a petition is filed before
it; and (b) the petition is filed against a Presidential or Vice-Presidential candidate who has been
validly proclaimed, properly taken his or her oath, and assumed office.
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 These conditions are not present here. The Buenafe and Ilagan Petitions are filed under Rule
65 assailing the Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc. While respondent Marcos, Jr. has been
proclaimed as the Presidential candidate with the highest number of obtained votes, he has yet to
take his oath and assume office. As Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez astutely pointed out, the
term of office begins at noon on the 30th day of June following the election. Hence, as long as the
petitions remain with this Court before 30 June 2022, this Court has jurisdiction to resolve them.
2. The COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to deny due course to or to cancel
respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC.
The COMELEC En Banc further noted that "despite the finding that the Petition may be
summarily dismissed for noncompliance with the requirements under the law, the Commission
(Second Division) relaxed compliance with technical rules and proceeded to discuss the merits of
the case."273 Given that, there is no need to belabor the procedural correctness of petitioners
Buenafe, et al.'s submissions before the COMELEC. Whether petitioners Buenafe, et al. raised
arguments more appropriate for a petition for disqualification274 is now irrelevant to this Court's
resolution of the present petitions.
Moreover, the Court has ruled that, even without a petition under Section 78 of the OEC,
"the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from
the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction."275 Thus, even procedural defects in petitioners Buenafe at al.'s COMELEC
petition will not save respondent Marcos, Jr.'s COC from scrutiny.
In passing upon the merits of these petitions, We are mindful that the scope of Our review in
a petition for certiorari is limited. Pursuant to Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Rules of Court,
petitioners Buenafe, et al. must show that the COMELEC acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.276
Grave abuse of discretion generally refers to a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."277 Thus, mere abuse of discretion is not enough.278 The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an "evasion of a positive duty or to
a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."279
Unless it is firmly established that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion, We would
not interfere with its decision.280 Findings of fact of the COMELEC, when supported by substantial
evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable.281
We find no grave abuse of discretion in this case. The COMELEC's ruling is amply supported
by law, jurisprudence, and the evidence on record.
Notably, not every false representation warrants the denial of due course to or cancellation of
a COC. It must be shown that the false representation pertained to material information and was
made with an "intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for public office."282
Thus, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not, in and of itself, justify the
cancellation of his or her COC. The requisites of materiality and intent must be present.
Respondent Marcos, Jr.'s representations that are subject of the Petitions are material
When respondent Marcos, Jr. declared that he has not been convicted of an offense that
carries with it the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold office, he made a material
representation regarding his eligibility to run for and hold elective office. This representation, if
proved false, would fall within the ambit of Section 78 of the OEC.

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 Similarly, respondent Marcos, Jr. made a material representation when he signed and
subscribed to his COC, which states that, "I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to."291 In
Aratea v. COMELEC292 (Aratea), the Court emphasized that disqualification to run for office is an
ineligibility.
The next question is whether such material representation is false.
We agree with petitioners Ilagan, et al. that Section 286 clearly provides for the imposition of
disqualification from public office as a penalty upon public officials or employees found guilty of
violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC, as amended by PD 1994. It is, however, not disputed that
the fallo of the CA Decision adjudging respondent Marcos, Jr.'s guilt for non-filing of the required
income tax return makes absolutely no mention of said penalty.
The offense of non-filing of income tax returns does not conceivably implicate any private
interests, much less those pertaining to petitioners Ilagan, et al. As in malversation of public funds
or property, tax evasion, or violations of RA 3019, the government is the offended party that
sustained actual and direct injury as a result of the commission of the offense in question and the
one entitled to the civil liabilities, if any, of the accused.339 On this score alone, petitioner Ilagan, et
al.'s contentions should be rejected.
As correctly pointed out by respondent Marcos, Jr., while Section 286(c) specifies that the
revocation or cancellation of a certified public accountant's certificate is automatic upon
conviction, the same is not true with respect to the imposition of the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office. If indeed the legislative intent is such that a public officer or
employee found guilty of violating the provisions of the 1977 NIRC is automatically perpetually
disqualified from holding public office, then the law could have so easily stated. It, however, did not
do so.
In dubiis reus est absolvendus — all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused. This
Court thus holds that, unless explicitly provided for in the fallo, the penalty of
disqualification from public office under Section 286(c) is not deemed automatically imposed
on a public officer or employee found to have violated the provisions of the 1977 NIRC. We
find this interpretation to be more in keeping with the intention of the legislators, as well as being
more favorable to the accused.
This Decision was never intended to validate the 31,629,783 who expressed their faith on
respondent Marcos, Jr. Instead, this Decision aims to confirm the eligibility and qualifications of
respondent Marcos, Jr. for the highest position of the land. After much scrutiny, We come to the
conclusion that our laws do not support the position taken by petitioners Buenafe, et al., who
declared that respondent Marcos, Jr. made false material representations as to his eligibility, nor
the assertions of petitioners Ilagan, et al., who put doubt on respondent Marcos, Jr.'s qualifications
by alleging that he is perpetually disqualified from running from public office and convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude.

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 OASAN, FREDELYN

AGUILAR VS. BENLOT

94
G.R. No. 232806, January 21, 2019
ZAPANTA VS. COMELEC
94
G.R. No. 233016, March 5, 2019
MARQUEZ VS. COMELEC
96
G.R. No. 244274, September 3, 2019

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 AGUILAR v. BENLOT
G.R. No. 232806, January 21, 2019

FACTS:
Petitioner was elected and served as Punong Barangay for 3 consecutive terms. On the 2010
elections, he ran for Barangay Kagawad and was ranked 3 rd. The persons elected as Punong
Barangay, 1st ranked and 2nd ranked Kagawads resigned after taking their oaths. Hence, petitioner
assumed the office of the Punong Barangay.
Defendant, claiming that the resignation of the Punong Barangay, 1 st ranked and 2nd ranked
Kagawads was a ruse for the petitioner to circumvent the three-term limit rule, filed a complaint for
violation of RA 6713 against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three-term limit rule was violated.
HELD:
YES. Petitioner violated the three-term limit.
The Supreme Court ruled that assumption of office by operation of law should not be
counted for purposes of the three-term limit rule based on the fact that running for an elective
position presupposes voluntariness. To be counted as service for a full term for purposes of
determining term limits, the elective official must have also been elected to the same position for the
same number of times. Assumption of office by operation of law is generally involuntary because the
elective official ran for a position different from that which he was subsequently called to serve.
Granting that the petitioner was able to serve a fourth term as Punong Barangay, not by virtue of
election, but by succession, the willful act of conspiring to circumvent our laws indicate
voluntariness. It is as if petitioner had run for the position of Punong Barangay, instead of
Barangay Kagawad.

Although the three-term limit was violated, the petitioner was not held administratively liable
by virtue of the condonation doctrine.

ZAPANTA v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 233016, March 5, 2019

FACTS:
For the May 9, 2016 national and local elections, Reynaldo, Alfred, and petitioner-intervenor
Edilberto U. Lagasca each filed a Certificate of Candidacy for city councilor of the Second District of
Antipolo City, Rizal. The Second District of Antipolo City is entitled to eight seats in
the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
On December 14, 2015, Alfred filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny due course
and/or to cancel certificate of candidacy of Reynaldo S. Zapanta as Nuisance Candidate.  He alleged
that Reynaldo indicated the name "Alfred" both as his nickname in his Certificate of Candidacy and
as his name in the official ballots. He claimed that Reynaldo never identified himself as
"Alfred." Alfred also averred that Reynaldo’s use of the name “Alfred” was designed to mislead the
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voters to steal the votes intended for him, and that Reynaldo has no bona fide intention to run for
the office.
In its May 8, 2016 Resolution, the COMELEC 2 nd Division granted Alfred’s petition, holding
that Reynaldo’s name, as it would be indicated in the ballots, was “confusingly similar” to Alfred’s
name. In this case it is noteworthy that petitioner is an incumbent Member of the City Council of
Antipolo, as such, it seems that he is known to the City as only Alfred Zapanta.
On June 1, 2016, Reynaldo moved for the reconsideration of the May 8, 2016 Resolution of
the Commission's Second Division. He argued that his name's likeness with Alfred's "does not
necessarily make him a nuisance candidate." He maintained that it was Alfred who should present
evidence to prove that his candidacy was not made in good faith, and that the Commission erred in
placing the burden of proving his nickname's authenticity on him. He argued that confusion based
on similar names could not arise in an automated election, and reiterated that his evidence proved
that he had always been known as "ALFRED.
Meanwhile, the national and local elections took place on May 9, 2016. The COMELEC En
Banc declared in its August 8, 2017 Resolution denying Reynaldo’s motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit, final and executory. It also issued a Writ of Execution on August 31, 2017, directing
the Special City Board of Canvassers, among others, to amend/correct the official certificate of
canvass by crediting the votes counted for respondent Reynaldo in favor of petitioner Alfred
Zapanta.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not COMELEC, in declaring Reynaldo Zapanta as a nuisance candidate,
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it ordered that the votes cast for Reynaldo be credited to the votes cast
for Alfred Zapanta.
HELD:
1. The petition is partly meritorious.
In Martinez III v. HRET, the Court thoroughly discussed the reasons why nuisance candidates
are abhorred:
A nuisance candidate is defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no
bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole
purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that the ballots
with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of
them.
After the perusal of case records, the Court holds that Reynaldo was not able to sufficiently
show that voters can clearly identify that his chosen nickname pertains only to him. The affidavits
he presented are not enough to show that he had been using the name “Alfred” or that he is
publicly known by that name.
Moreover, despite being given the opportunity to counter Alfred’s allegations, Reynaldo failed
to deny that he had no campaign materials using the name “Alfred Zapanta” or present evidence to
the contrary. He merely banked on his membership in a political party to support his claim that he
had a bona fide intention to run for office. Association to a political party per se does not necessarily
equate to a candidate’s bona fide intent; instead, he or she must show that he or she is serious in
running for office. This, Reynaldo failed to demonstrate.

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 2. The Court holds that the COMELEC’s order of adding Reynaldo’s votes to Alfred’s votes is not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. However, its ruling on this issue must be set aside.
The Court finds that COMELEC did not exercise its judgment in an arbitrary, capricious or
whimsical manner when it ordered adding the votes cast for Reynaldo to the votes cast for Alfred.
On the contrary it merely applied “the current state of our law”.
In the recent promulgation of Santos v. Comelec, the Court clarified how the votes of nuisance
candidates in a multi-slot office should be treated.
In a multi-slot office, such as membership of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, a registered voter
may vote for more than one candidate. Hence, it is possible that the legitimate candidate and
nuisance candidate, having similar names, may both receive votes in one ballot. The Court agrees
with the OSG that in that scenario, the vote cast for the nuisance candidate should no longer be
credited to the legitimate candidate; otherwise, the latter shall receive two votes from one voter.
Thus, to ascertain that the votes for the nuisance candidate is accurately credited in favor of
the legitimate candidate with the similar name, the COMELEC must also inspect the ballots. In
those ballots that contain both votes for nuisance and legitimate candidate, only one count of vote
must be credited to the legitimate candidate.
Here, the Santos doctrine must be applied: the votes for Reynaldo alone should be counted in
favor of Alfred; if there are votes for both of them in the same ballot, then only one vote should be
counted in Alfred’s favor. This will not only discourage nuisance candidates, but will also prevent
the disenfranchisement of voters.

MARQUEZ v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 244274, September 3, 2019

FACTS:
Petitioner Marquez filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of senator. He is a
resident of Mountain Province, a real estate broker, and an independent candidate.
The COMELEC Law Department motu proprio filed a petition to declare Marquez a nuisance
candidate, arguing that he was virtually unknown to the entire country and that absent clear proof
of financial capacity, he will not be able to sustain the financial rigors of a nationwide campaign.
He argued that the COMELEC should not discount the potential for vastly untapped sector of
animal lovers, raisers and handlers, and the existing local and foreign benefactors and donors who
are willing and capable to subsidize the expenses of a social- media-enhanced national campaign.
The First Division ruled that in elections for national positions, the sheer logistical challenge
posed by nuisance candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority
to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no financial capacity or serious intention to
mount a nationwide campaign.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Marquez a
nuisance candidate for his failure to prove his financial capacity to mount a nationwide campaign.
HELD:
YES. There is grave abuse of discretion: (1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of
malice, ill will or personal bias. Both elements appear to be present in this case.
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 The COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it declared Marquez a nuisance candidate
on the ground of lack of proof of his financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign. By doing so,
the COMELEC has effectively imposed a property qualification inconsistent with the nature and
essence of the Republican system ordained in our Constitution and the principle of social justice
underlying the same.
The COMELEC cannot conflate the bona fide intention to run with a financial capacity
requirement. A candidate’s financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging a nationwide campaign
does not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to run for public office. The COMELEC’s burden
is thus to show a reasonable correlation between proof of a bona fide intention to run, on the one
hand, and proof of financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign on the other.
It bears reiterating that the Court acknowledges the COMELEC’s legitimate objective in
weeding out candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office from the
electoral process. Any measure designed to accomplish the said objective should, however, not be
arbitrary and oppressive and should not contravene the Republican system ordained in our
Constitution. Unfortunately, the COMELEC’s preferred standard falls short of what is
constitutionally permissible.

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