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 [2022] 2 PIR [3] 41

1
Chong Jia Ming
v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
5
Sessions Court, Johor Bahru – Writ of Summons
No. JA-A53KJ-830-11/2020
Sazlina Safie scj

[3] Quantum – Lower limb – 1 cm muscle wasting – Anterior cruciate ligament

10
laxity – Decreased range of movement – Higher risk of developing osteoarthritis –
Lateral collateral ligament tear – Open fracture proximal 3rd of left tibia and
fibula – Posterior cruciate ligament laxity of left knee – Residual pain – Extensive
scarring

15
Date of accident
July 8, 2019

Date of grounds of judgment

August 8, 2022

Judgment received
20
August 8, 2022

Brief description of plaintiff’s injuries

1. Open fracture proximal 3rd of the left tibia and fibula
Disabilities
25
1. 1 cm muscle wasting in the left leg
2. Anterior cruciate ligament laxity of the left knee
3. Decreased range of movement of the left leg
4. Extensive scarring
5. Higher risk of developing osteoarthritis of the left knee joint
30 6. Lateral collateral ligament tear of the left knee
7. Posterior cruciate ligament laxity of the left knee
8. Residual pain in the left leg

Plaintiff’s age
(a) As at date of accident : NA
35
(b) As at date of hearing : NA
Plaintiff’s occupation
(a) As at date of accident : Storekeeper & technician
(b) As at date of hearing : Repair & service
40
42 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

Plaintiff’s earnings 1
(a) As at date of accident : RM1,313.43
(b) As at date of hearing : RM1,313.43
Liability
100% against the defendants
5
Award (Based on 100% liability)
1. General damages
(a) 1 cm muscle wasting and decreased range of
movement of the left leg – RM 5,000.00
(b) Anterior cruciate ligament laxity, posterior
10
cruciate ligament laxity and lateral collateral
ligament tear of the left knee, and higher
risk of developing osteoarthritis of the left
knee joint (Note: The plaintiff as a result
suffers from knee instability) – RM30,000.00
(c) Extensive scarring – RM10,000.00 15
(d) Open fracture proximal 3rd of the left tibia
and fibula (healed) (Note: The plaintiff as a
result suffers from residual pain) – RM30,000.00

2. Special damages 20
(a) Actual loss of earning (pre-trial)
(RM1,173.43 × 2 months) – RM 2,346.86
(b) Cost of future surgery
(ligament reconstruction of the knee) – RM50,000.00
(c) Follow up treatment at KPJ Bandar
25
Dato Onn – RM 7,111.10
(d) JPJ search (agreed) – RM 10.00
(e) Medical expenses – RM19,049.24
(f) Medical expenses at Hospital Penawar – RM 2,392.30
(g) Medical report from Hospital Penawar
(agreed) – RM 100.00 30
(h) Pain and suffering during future surgery – RM 7,000.00
(i) Physiotherapy (1/3 × RM110.00 per session
x 4 times a month × 3 months) – RM 466.00
(j) Travelling expenses incurred by the plaintiff
for follow up treatment (RM50.00 × 6 times) – RM 300.00 35
(k) Travelling expenses incurred by the
plaintiff’s family whilst visiting the plaintiff
at the hospital (RM50.00 × 4) – RM 200.00
Note
1. An appeal was lodged by the plaintiff at the High Court, Johor Bahru in 40
Civil Appeal No. 12B-33-07/22 against the Sessions Court’s finding on
quantum.
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 43

1 2. An appeal was also lodged by the defendants at the High Court,

Johor Bahru in Civil Appeal No. 12B-33-07/22 against the Sessions
Court’s finding on liability.
3. Both appeals are pending determination.

Interest
5
(a) 2.5% per annum on special damages from date of accident until date of
judgment.
(b) 5% per annum on general damages from date of service of writ of
summons until date of judgment.
(c) 5% per annum on total judgment sum from date of judgment until date of
10 full settlement.

Case(s) referred to by the court

Chu Kim Sing & Anor v Abd Razak b Amin [1999] 4 AMR 4198; [1999] 4 CLJ 448
Chuah Beng Kong & Satu Lagi lwn Zizah Othman & Satu Lagi [2019] 1 LNS 2351
15 Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd [1948] AC 549
Hassnar b MP Ebrahim @ Asaiar v Sulaiman b Pong & 6 Ors [2017] 6 AMR 821;
[2018] 1 MLJ 346
Krishnan a/l Perumal & Anor v Yang Cheng Choy & Anor [2010] AMEJ 0652;
[2010] 1 LNS 436
20
Mohd Nizam b A Rahman v A Hamid b A Kamar [2016] 2 PIR [51]
Mohd Shahrul b Md Yusof v Subramaniam a/l Nadeson [2015] 1 PIR [54]
Muhammad Al Rifa’ie b Samsudin (seorang budak mendakwa melalui bapa yang sah
dan sahabat wakilnya, Samsudin b Mohamad Haris) v S Arikrishnan a/l
Samynathan & Anor [2012] 1 PIR [65]
Ng Chul Sia v Maimon bt Ali [1983] 1 MLJ 110; [1982] 1 LNS 95
25 Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v Aidi Abdullah [1985] 1 MLJ 30
Teo Tio Khiang & Anor v Ooi Eng Teong [1986] 1 LNS 63
Teoh Weng You & Anor v Tan Hee Joo [2017] 9 MLJ 721
Woo Yew Chee v Yong Yong Hoo [1978] 1 LNS 240

Legislation referred to by the court

30
Civil Law Act 1956, s 28A(1)
Employment Act 1955
Road Traffic Rules 1959, rule 7(2)

Other references
35
Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards

Solicitors

Saralathevi Murthy (Teo & Assoc) for plaintiff

40 Nik Mohd Hasrul Nik Hamdan (TJ Goh & Co) for defendants
44 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

Sazlina Safie scj 1

Latar belakang kes

Terdapat dua notis rayuan difailkan dalam tindakan ini:

[1] Lampiran 31 – Notis rayuan oleh perayu/plaintif atas keputusan 5
hakim Sesyen pada Julai 6, 2022 atas isu kuantum sahaja.

[2] Lampiran 34 – Notis rayuan oleh perayu/defendan atas keputusan

hakim Sesyen pada Julai 6, 2022 atas isu liabiliti sahaja.

Oleh demikian, alasan penghakiman ini adalah untuk keseluruhan isu 10

liabiliti dan juga kuantum bagi keputusan yang telah diberikan pada Julai 6,
2022 tersebut.

A. Liabiliti
[3] Mahkamah telah memutuskan tindakan ini selepas bicara penuh 15
dengan kehadiran saksi-saksi memberi keterangan di mahkamah.
[4] Setelah meneliti ikatan pliding, keterangan saksi-saksi, eksibit-eksibit,
hujahan dan otoriti kedua-dua pihak, atas imbangan kebarangkalian,
mahkamah membenarkan tuntutan plaintif dengan kos. Defendan-
defendan cuai 100% dalam kemalangan ini. 20

[5] Dalam tindakan ini, pihak plaintif dan defendan telah memanggil
saksi-saksi seperti berikut:

SP1 – Sarjan Veeran a/l Krishnan (pegawai penyiasat)

SP2 – Chong Jia Ming (plaintif) 25

SP3 – Jeep Hing Tai (wakil majikan)

SP4 – Doktor Darhaysyam Al Jefri bin Mohamed Muslim
(ortopedik consultant di KPJ)
SP5 – Santosh Kumar Prasad (orthotist)
30
SD1 – Defendan Abdul Khalik bin Yusof (defendan pertama)
[6] Plaintif secara ringkas dalam pernyataan tuntutan memplidkan
seperti berikut:
Pada 8/7/2019 lebih kurang jam 8:45 pagi, Plaintif yang menunggang motorsikal
35
nombor pendaftaran JFJ8505 dari rumah di Taman Megah Ria menuju ke tempat
kerja di Permas Jaya (iaitu dari bawah ke atas Rajah Kasar Kunci Kemalangan
Trafik Report Seri Alam 08170/19) dan apabila sampai berhampiran lampu
isyarat Jalan Kota yang dikawal oleh lampu isyarat menunjukkan warna hijau,
motorsikal Plaintif meneruskan perjalanan lalu telah terlibat dalam satu
kemalangan jalanraya dengan sebuah motorlori nombor pendaftaran JSJ 6302 40
yang dipandu oleh Defendan Pertama yang sedang dalam perjalanan dari arah
yang sama dan disebelah kiri motorsikal Plaintif lalu membelok masuk ke
simpang di sebelah kanan motorsikal Plaintif secara tiba-tiba.
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 45

1 [7] Defendan-defendan dalam pembelaan memplidkan bahawa mereka

mengakui wujudnya satu kemalangan antara motorlori defendan dan
motorsikal plaintif tetapi ia adalah disebabkan kecuaian plaintif sendiri.

[8] Mahkamah membuat dapatan berdasarkan keterangan lisan,

keterangan senyap dan eksibit-eksibit yang telah dikemukakan. Beban
5
pembuktian adalah di pihak plaintif atas imbangan kebarangkalian.

[9] Mahkamah merujuk kes Ng Chul Sia v Maimon bt Ali [1983] 1 MLJ 110;
[1982] 1 LNS 95 di mana ia dinyatakan bahawa:
In an action for negligence the onus of proving the allegation of negligence rests
10 on the person who makes it unless there are disclosed facts which raise a
presumption in favor of the plaintiff. The plaintiff must show affirmatively that
there has been a breach of a specific or general duty by the defendant and this
resulted in the damage to the plaintiff. If he fails to prove this the action must fail.
When an accidental harm is done it is not for the doer to excuse himself by proving
that the accident was inevitable and that there was no negligence on his part. It is
15
for the person who suffers the harm to prove affirmatively that the accidental
harm was due to the negligence of the other person.

Keterangan pegawai penyiasat (SP1)

[10] Mahkamah merujuk kepada keterangan pegawai penyiasat ("SP1"),
20
beliau menyatakan sampai di tempat kemalangan jam 1.30 tengahari pada
hari sama kejadian, cuaca baik, ada lampu isyarat di tempat kejadian, lampu
isyarat berfungsi tetapi ia tidak dilakar dalam rajah kasar kunci, tidak ada
tunjuk serpihan kaca kesan kemalangan dalam rajah kasar kunci dan SP1
ada ambil rakaman percakapan kedua-dua pihak.
25
[11] Rajah kasar kunci ditandakan sebagai eks P2, SP1 ada ambil gambar
kemalangan tetapi gambar rosak dan pengesahan dari pihak balai ditanda
sebagai P1.
[12] Daripada keterangan SP1 juga, beliau ada memeriksa kerosakan
30 kedua-dua kenderaan iaitu motorsikal rosak di bahagian hadapan – cover set,
rim dan handle manakala motorlori rosak di bahagian lampu isyarat depan
kanan.

[13] Bagi arah perjalanan motorsikal pula, SP1 maklumkan plaintif/

motorsikal berada di lorong A3-A4 menghala ke simpang kanan manakala
35 motorlori berada di lorong A2-A3 hendak membuat pusingan U menghala
ke Pasir Gudang. Tempat kejadian adalah dibenarkan untuk membuat
pusingan U. Arah perjalanan kedua-dua kenderaan ini diperolehi daripada
rakaman percakapan kedua-dua pihak.

[14] Motorlori yang disiasat oleh SP1 adalah lori lebih kurang 3 tan dan
40
tidak besar dengan enam tayar. Sekiranya motorlori ada di mana-mana
46 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

lorong, berdasarkan kelebaran lorong di situ, motorsikal masih muat untuk 1

berada di lorong yang sama. Semasa disoal balas oleh peguamcara
defendan, SP1 tidak setuju motorlori tersebut adalah sebuah kenderaan yang
panjang.

[15] Hasil siasatan SP1, beliau memutuskan untuk mengeluarkan saman

5
kepada pemandu motorlori JSJ 6302 iaitu Abdul Khalik bin Yusof dan
keputusan kes ditandakan sebagai eks P3. Alasan SP1 saman defendan
pertama adalah kerana menggunakan lorong yang salah. SP1 menjelaskan,
sekiranya motorlori ingin membuat pusingan U atau membelok ke kanan, ia
perlu guna lorong A3-A4.
10
[16] Peguam defendan ada mencabar keterangan SP1 berhubung arah
perjalanan kedua-dua pihak dan lorong yang sepatutnya digunakan. SP1
bersetuju dengan cadangan pihak defendan bahawa jika plaintif ingin
bergerak terus, lorong yang sepatutnya digunakan adalah lorong A1-A2-A3
dan jika hendak belok ke kanan, baru guna A3-A4.
15
[17] Ketika pemeriksaan semula oleh peguamcara plaintif, SP1 telah
menjelaskan semula bahawa hasil rakaman percakapan kedua-dua pihak,
SP1 setuju motorsikal menggunakan laluan yang betul iaitu berada di lorong
A3-A4 untuk membelok sedangkan motorlori mengaku ingin buat pusingan
U ke arah Pasir Gudang dan menggunakan lorong A2-A3. Hasil siasatan 20
berbeza daripada laporan polis defendan dan motorsikal hendak belok ke
kanan dan jika ingin belok ke kanan, lorong yang perlu digunakan adalah
A3-A4 dan plaintif menggunakan lorong yang betul untuk membelok. Hasil
siasatan SP1 secara keseluruhannya adalah bahawa motorlori telah
menggunakan lorong yang salah dan oleh itu saman dikeluarkan.
25
Keterangan plaintif (SP2)
[18] SP2 memberi keterangan bahawa motorlori di lorong tengah telah
melanggar motorsikal beliau di bahagian kiri. SP2 telah menandakan
tandaan "L" sebagai lorong yang beliau gunakan (lorong A3-A4), tandaan
"M" sebagai lorong yang digunakan oleh motorlori (lorong A2-A3) dan 30
tandaan "X" sebagai tempat kemalangan (lorong A3-A4).

[19] SP2 ada membuat laporan polis lebih kurang 17 hari selepas
kemalangan dan ia ditandakan sebagai eks P4. SP2 lewat membuat laporan
polis kerana cedera dan dimasukkan ke hospital dan ini tidak dicabar oleh
35
pihak defendan.

[20] Dalam laporan polis beliau (P4), SP2 melaporkan seperti berikut
"… saya menunggang motorsikal No. JFJ 8505 … dari Taman Megah Ria
menuju ke tempat kerja di Permas Jaya, teruskan perjalanan di lorong kanan,
40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 47

1 apabila sampai di trafik light Jalan Kota, tiba-tiba sebuah motorlori No. JSJ
yang memandu di lorong tengah membuat pusingan U lalu melanggar
motorsikal yang saya tunggang …".

[21] SP2 beri keterangan bahawa motorlori tidak memberikan apa-apa

isyarat sebelum membuat pusingan U dan semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh
5
peguamcara defendan, SP2 masih nyatakan bahawa beliau nampak
motorlori tidak keluarkan signal.
[22] Ketika kejadian, SP2 menunggang dengan kelajuan 20 km/j dan
semasa pertembungan, beliau tidak sempat membrek atau mengelak.
10
[23] SP2 juga mengaku beliau ada dipanggil oleh pegawai penyiasat untuk
rakam percakapan selepas membuat laporan polis.
[24] Semasa dicadangkan oleh peguamcara defendan bahawa SP2 tidak
sepatutnya guna lorong A3-A4 kerana ingin pergi lurus/terus, SP2 tidak
15
bersetuju dengan cadangan tersebut.

Keterangan defendan pertama (SD1)

[25] Dalam pemeriksaan utama, SD1 memberi keterangan bahawa pada
hari kejadian, beliau memandu motorlori JSJ 6302 dari Pandan hendak ke
20
Jalan Kota. Apabila sampai di persimpangan Jalan Kota/Mersawa 16, beliau
meneruskan perjalanan dengan membelok ke simpang kanan. Secara
tiba-tiba motorsikal yang berada di kanan beliau telah melanggar motorlori.
[26] SD1 ada membuat laporan polis dan ia ditandakan sebagai eks D14.
Dalam laporan polis SD1 yang dibuat satu jam selepas kemalangan, SD1
25 melaporkan seperti berikut "… saya memandu motorlori No. JSJ 6302 jenis
Nissan UD dari Pandan hendak ke Jalan Kota, apabila sampai di
persimpangan Jalan Kota/Mersawa 16, saya meneruskan perjalanan dengan
membelok ke simpang sebelah kanan saya, tiba-tiba sebuah motorsikal
nombor tidak pasti yang berada di sebelah kanan saya telah terlanggar
motorlori saya …".
30
[27] SD1 memberi keterangan dan menjelaskan di mahkamah bahawa
pada hari kejadian, beliau berhenti di muka simpang bahagian kanan sekali,
lampu merah, setelah lampu bertukar hijau, beliau membelok ke kanan dan
bukan membuat pusingan U. Ini kerana tidak ada signboard yang benarkan
35 beliau membuat pusingan U.

[28] Apabila peguamcara defendan merujuk SD1 ke rajah kasar kunci (P2)
dan meminta SD1 tunjukkan simpang kanan sekali yang dimaksudkan SD1,
beliau menunjukkan tempat "arrow" ke kanan (A3-A4).

40
48 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

[29] Apabila disoal oleh peguamcara defendan sendiri, apakah 1

arah/tujuan perjalanan SD1, beliau menjelaskan bahawa beliau ingin ke
arah Pasir Gudang iaitu arah bawah rajah kasar kunci (P2) tetapi
memandangkan di kawasan tersebut tiada papan tanda untuk pusingan U,
beliau perlu mencari alternatif lain untuk pusing.
5
[30] SD1 nyatakan ukuran motorlori beliau adalah 23-24 kaki. Semasa
kejadian ada muatan dalam lima paket simen. SD1 juga katakan bahawa
motorsikal datang dari bahagian belakang motorlori arah kanan.
[31] Semasa pemeriksaan balas oleh peguamcara plaintif, SD1 mengaku
bahawa beliau ingin ke Pasir Gudang dan SD1 bersetuju bagi lori atau 10
kenderaan besar untuk membelok atau membuat pusingan U, beliau tidak
boleh ke kanan sangat dan perlu ke kiri dulu untuk ambil ruang.

[32] Kemudian, ketika disoal balas juga, SD1 setuju beliau berada di lorong
A2-A3 sebab perlu beri ruang (space). SD1 juga setuju harus berhati-hati dan
oleh kerana motorsikal sudah berada di laluan A3-A4, hak utama laluan 15
adalah hak motorsikal.

[33] SD1 mengaku ada dikenakan saman tetapi beliau tidak bayar kerana
tidak bersalah. Semasa pemeriksaan balas, SD1 mengaku polis saman beliau
kerana menggunakan lorong yang salah dan SD1 juga mengaku sebenarnya
beliau tidak membayar saman kerana tiada duit. 20

Kerosakan kenderaan

[34] Hasil siasatan SP1, motorsikal rosak di bahagian hadapan – cover set,
rim dan handle manakala motorlori rosak di bahagian lampu isyarat depan
kanan. 25

[35] Walaupun tiada gambar kerosakan dirakamkan, kerosakan yang

dinyatakan oleh SP1 adalah sama dan konsisten dengan keterangan SD1
yang motorlori rosak signal depan kanan dan lampu depan. Kerosakan
motorlori SD1 juga ada dinyatakan dalam laporan polis SD1 (D14).
30
[36] SP2 juga ada nyatakan kerosakan motorsikal beliau dalam laporan
polis iaitu rosak bahagian depan, cover set, rim, handle dan lain-lain kerosakan
yang belum dipastikan.

Dapatan mahkamah
35
[37] Setelah meneliti kesemua keterangan dan bukti yang ada, atas
imbangan kebarangkalian, mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa pihak
plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya dan kecuaian adalah
sepenuhnya di pihak defendan-defendan.
40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 49

1 [38] Dari segi kelajuan kedua-dua kenderaan, mahkamah dapati ia bukan

isu memandangkan SP2 mengaku menunggang dengan kelajuan 20 km/j
dan tidak ada apa-apa bukti berhubung kelajuan motorlori. Mahkamah
mendapati bahawa ini adalah kerana kedua-dua pihak telah berhenti di
lampu isyarat dan apabila lampu isyarat bertukar hijau, masing-masing
5 memulakan semula perjalanan.

[39] Dari segi arah perjalanan dan kedudukan kenderaan, mahkamah

mendapati bahawa adalah jelas motorsikal plaintif berada di lorong kanan
(A3-A4) dan bukan di belakang motorlori. Manakala motorlori pula, berada
di lorong tengah (A2-A3). Ini konsisten dengan keterangan plaintif (SP2)
10 sendiri dan juga SP1 yang menyiasat kejadian.

[40] Fakta ini berbeza dengan keterangan SD1. Semasa pemeriksaan

utama, beliau dengan tegas menyatakan beliau di lorong kanan padahal
kemudiannya mengaku beliau perlu berada di lorong kiri (iaitu ke tengah
sedikit – mahkamah dapati keterangan yang ada mengesahkan motorlori di
15 A2-A3) untuk ambil ruang bagi membuat pusingan U atau masuk ke
simpang kanan.
[41] Dalam masa yang sama, SD1 akui motorsikal berada di kanan
motorlori (dan bukan di belakang motorlori). Oleh itu, keterangan SP1, SP2
20
dan SD1 adalah selari. Motorsikal plaintif bukan datang dari arah belakang
motorlori. Ini juga konsisten dengan kandungan laporan polis SD1
"… tiba-tiba sebuah motorsikal nombor tidak pasti yang berada di sebelah
kanan saya telah terlanggar motorlori saya …".
[42] Apakah tujuan asal kedua-dua pihak sebenarnya? Defendan
25 mencadangkan bahawa SP2 ingin bergerak terus dan sepatutnya berada
antara lorong A1-A2-A3 dan tidak sepatutnya berada di A3-A4. Walaupun
dalam pernyataan tuntutan plaintif menyatakan "… motorsikal Plaintif
meneruskan perjalanan …" ia terbukti terus untuk belok ke kanan.
Ini konsisten dengan keterangan SP1, SP2 dan laporan polis plaintif (P4). Ia
juga menunjukkan arah yang betul kerana SP1 sendiri sahkan dalam rajah
30
kasar kunci yang dilukis, beliau tidak lukis lampu isyarat dan hanya fokus
kepada lorong-lorong yang ada di tempat kejadian.
[43] Berhubung arah perjalanan SD1 pula, SD1 memberi keterangan yang
berubah-ubah dan tidak konsisten. Dalam satu keterangan, SD1 katakan
35 beliau ingin ke Pasir Gudang iaitu ke arah bawah rajah kasar kunci tetapi
memandangkan tiada papan tanda untuk membuat pusingan U, beliau
perlu menggunakan jalan alternatif iaitu masuk ke simpang kanan dan pergi
semula ke arah bawah.

[44] Keterangan ini bercanggah dengan keterangan SP1 di mana SP1

40 sahkan tempat kejadian adalah dibenarkan untuk membuat pusingan U.
50 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

[45] Tambahan pula, SD1 dalam keterangan seterusnya mengaku apabila 1

disoal balas, beliau berada di lorong tengah A2-A3 kerana perlu ambil ruang
(space) untuk membelok memandangkan SD1 memandu lori besar.

[46] Peguam defendan ada mencabar keterangan SP1 memandangkan

terdapat percanggahan bahawa motorlori mendakwa dia membelok ke
5
kanan manakala plaintif mendakwa motorlori membuat pusingan U.
SP1 setuju ia adalah satu tindakan yang berbeza.
[47] Pada dapatan mahkamah, isu sama ada SD1 ingin membelok ke kanan
atau membuat pusingan U, SD1 masih harus berada di lorong paling kanan
iaitu di A3-A4 sebagaimana dinyatakan oleh SP1 dan dipersetuju SD1 10
sendiri apabila dicadangkan fakta ini.
[48] Tambahan pula, dalam keterangan SD1, jika sekiranya beliau bertegas
beliau perlu berada di lorong tengah sedikit untuk mengambil ruang apabila
memandu sebuah lori yang besar, beliau seharusnya lebih berhati-hati dan
mengambil tindakan sewajarnya apabila sebuah kenderaan kecil seperti 15
motorsikal plaintif berada di bahagian kanan beliau. Kehadiran motorsikal
SP2 adalah dalam pengetahuan SD1.

[49] SD1 juga akui hak keutamaan adalah bagi motorsikal plaintif. Dalam
keadaan demikian, SD1 gagal berhati-hati dan tidak ada dalam mana-mana
keterangan menyatakan beliau ada menyalakan lampu signal ke kanan bagi 20
memberi amaran kepada kenderaan lain tujuan beliau berada di lorong
A2-A3 untuk bergerak ke simpang kanan/membuat pusingan U. Fakta
mengenai lampu signal tiada dalam D14 yang dibuat satu jam selepas
kemalangan. Jika benar fakta ini sangat penting dan akan dinyatakan dalam
laporan polis. 25

[50] Keterangan SD1 bahawa beliau perlu ambil ruang untuk membelok
yang mana mahkamah dapati sememangnya SD1 memandu di lorong
A2-A3 adalah satu tindakan yang salah. Oleh itu, keputusan SP1
mengeluarkan saman terhadap SD1 atas alasan menggunakan lorong yang
salah adalah tepat. Ini adalah penting kerana, lorong A2-A3 adalah khas 30
untuk kenderaan yang ingin meneruskan perjalanan ke atas/terus di
rajah kasar kunci dan bukan untuk kenderaan membelok atau membuat
pusingan U.

[51] Tindakan SD1 berada di lorong yang salah akan menimbulkan satu
35
keadaan tidak terduga terutama bagi kenderaan yang berada di lorong
kanan termasuk kenderaan yang berada di belakang motorlori SD1.

[52] Dengan keadaan jalan raya yang sudah jelas diperuntukkan untuk
tujuan tertentu sebagaimana jalan raya di tempat kejadian yang dikawal oleh
40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 51

1 lampu isyarat, diletakkan anak panah untuk satu lorong membelok ke kiri,
dua lorong untuk jalan terus dan satu lorong untuk membelok ke kanan,
pengguna jalan raya harus patuh dan akur dengan lorong yang telah
disediakan.

[53] Tambahan pula, SD1 memandu kenderaan yang lebih besar

5
berbanding kenderaan lain di jalan raya harus lebih berhati-hati. Mahkamah
merujuk kes Chuah Beng Kong & Satu Lagi lwn Zizah Othman & Satu Lagi [2019]
1 LNS 2351:
[13] Perayu/Plaintif juga berhujah bahawa suami Responden/Defendan Pertama
yang memandu motorlori mempunyai tugas berhati-hati (duty of care) yang lebih
10
besar terhadap pengguna lain di jalan raya berbanding Perayu/Plaintif Kedua
yang memandu motorkar. Di dalam kes Mariam binti Ahad v. Ernesto A Gacad &
Anor [1984] 1 LNS 149; [1986] 1 MLJ 266; Mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa:-

"It is obvious that somebody in charge of vehicle of such size on road with
limited width, is under a duty to maintain a very high degree of care in his
15
driving. It is not for the driver of a vehicle of this size to enter a portion of
road where there is a Centre line, knowing that his vehicle is bound to extend
beyond the Centre line unless he is satisfied that there is no danger of collision
with an oncoming vehicle. Unfortunately, in this instance, I find that that is
what the 1st defendant did."
20
[14] Perayu/Plaintif berhujah bahawa suami Responden/Defendan Pertama
sewajarnya membawa motorlori di lorong sebelah kiri pada setiap masa kecuali
untuk memotong dengan merujuk perenggan 3 Kod Lebuhraya dan keputusan
Mahkamah di dalam kes Thanalakshmi Muchan v. Ong Koi Soi [2009] 10 CLJ 735.
Namun tindakan suami Responden/Defendan Pertama yang memandu
25
kenderaan besar seperti motorlori di tengah lorong sudah pasti akan
mengundang risiko dan menghalang pengguna lain untuk melalui jalan yang
sama.

[54] Walaupun dalam kes ini YA hakim Mahkamah Tinggi memutuskan

perayu/plaintif tidak berjaya membuktikan liabiliti atas suami
30 responden/defendan pertama dan menolak rayuan perayu/plaintif serta
mengekalkan keputusan hakim di peringkat bicara, hujahan pihak perayu
dalam kes tersebut adalah prinsip yang terpakai mengikut undang-undang.

[55] Peguamcara defendan sendiri juga ada mencadangkan kepada SP1

"Ada kemungkinan motorsikal ditunggang di bahagian blind spot
35 motorlori?" SP1 tidak setuju dengan cadangan tersebut. Mahkamah juga
membuat dapatan bahawa, fakta ini konsisten apabila motorsikal diakui
oleh SD1 berada di sebelah kanan motorlori. Ini menunjukkan motorlori
sedar akan kehadiran motorsikal plaintif.

[56] Mahkamah memutuskan dalam keadaan ini, SD1 gagal mengambil

40
tindakan berhati-hati sedangkan ia adalah satu judicial notice bahawa
52 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

kenderaan besar/berat mempunyai had penglihatan (blind spot) dan lebih 1

perlu memberikan perhatian ketika pemanduan kepada pengguna-
pengguna jalan yang lain.

[57] Mahkamah merujuk kes Grant v Sun Shipping Co [1948] AC 549:

A prudent man will guard against the possible negligence of others when 5
experience shows such negligence to be common.

[58] Ini kerana pertembungan/kemalangan melibatkan kenderaan

besar/berat dengan kenderaan lebih kecil seperti motorsikal/motorlori,
motortrailer/kereta adalah lebih kerap berlaku akibat apa yang dinamakan
10
"blind spot" kenderaan besar. Oleh itu, walaupun tanggungjawab untuk
berhati-hati di jalan raya adalah tanggungjawab semua pihak, kenderaan
besar harus mengambil berat perkara ini.

[59] Mahkamah merujuk juga kepada kes Krishnan Perumal & Anor v
Yang Cheng Choy & Anor [2010] AMEJ 0652; [2010] 1 LNS 436, CA, Putrajaya, 15
Low Hop Bing; Syed Ahmad Helmy; Mohamed Apandi Ali:
[11] Having said that, we are of the view that the learned trial judge should not
have brushed aside her earlier "judicial notice" of the tendency of vehicles taking
a right bend to encroach onto the path on the other side of the road. A fortiori,
when such judicial notice was taken to be common knowledge by the Federal 20
Court in the case of Chew Soo Lan v. Ludhiana Transport Syndicate & Anor [1976] 1
LNS 11; [1976] 2 MLJ 205. Furthermore, it has been observed by the
Supreme Court in the case of Ahmad Nordin bin Hj Maslan & Anor v. Eng Ngak Hua
& Ors [1985] 1 LNS 49; [1985] 2 MLJ 431, that "the trend of cases may show that in
cases of road accident involving lorries and smaller vehicles, generally the driver
of a bigger and heavier vehicle should bear a bigger portion of the blame than his 25
counterpart in the smaller vehicle. In the present appeal, the plaintiff was riding
a motorcycle and the first defendant was driving a much heavier vehicle namely
a motorbus."

[60] Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa versi plaintif adalah lebih

munasabah dan berkemungkinan (probable). Defendan pada masa material, 30
ingin membuat pusingan U dan tanpa mempedulikan kenderaan kecil
plaintif yang beliau tahu berada di sebelah kanan motorlori ketika itu.

[61] Oleh kerana ingin membuat pusingan U, SD1 perlu mengambil ruang
disebabkan kenderaan besar serta panjang, ruang yang dikatakan adalah di
lorong A2-A3 ditambah pula dengan pengakuan semasa pemeriksaan 35
semula di mana SD1 menyatakan "Ya, saya setuju saya disaman sebab guna
lorong salah, ya saya keluar sedikit dari line/space untuk belok, saya tidak
tahu kenapa polis saman saya, mungkin salah makan lorong sikit."

[62] Mahkamah juga menilai keterangan SP1 iaitu sama ada ingin
40
membuat pusingan U atau membelok ke kanan, SP1 masih sahkan motorlori
perlu berada di lorong A3-A4.
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 53

1 [63] Jika dirujuk peruntukan undang-undang iaitu peraturan 7(2)

Road Traffic Rules 1959 ia memperuntukkan "Every driver shall, when turning
to the right, keep as close as may be to the right hand side of the road from which he is
making the turn and of the road which he is entering."

[64] Sama ada untuk membelok atau membuat pusingan U, pengguna

5
jalan raya perlu menggunakan lorong sepatutnya iaitu lebih ke arah tujuan
membelok/membuat pusingan U tersebut.
[65] Tandaan "X" yang dibuat oleh SP2 adalah di laluan sah plaintif dan ini
tidak dicabar oleh pihak defendan. Ia juga konsisten dengan kerosakan
10
kedua-dua kenderaan yang mana bahagian signal kanan hadapan motorlori
yang kena dengan bahagian depan motorsikal plaintif. Ini menunjukkan
motorlori di lorong A2-A3 sedang dalam keadaan membelok manakala SP2
di sebelah kanan ingin jalan terus dan juga membelok ke simpang kanan.
[66] Dalam semua masa material, SP2 telah menunggang dengan betul di
15 lorong A3-A4 bagi tujuan membelok ke simpang kanan dan kemalangan
berlaku di lorong sah SP2. Oleh itu, SP2 telah mengambil tindakan yang
betul dan munasabah dalam pemanduan beliau.

[67] Mahkamah merujuk kepada kes Chu Kim Sing & Anor v Abd Razak
Amin [1999] 4 AMR 4198; [1999] 4 CLJ 448, HC Malaya, Johor Bahru,
20 Abdul Malik Ishak J:
[4] The respondent had taken ordinary care of himself when he rode the
motorcycle on that stretch of the road. He had acted as a reasonable man when he
rode the motorcycle for his own safety and, consequently, the respondent did not
contribute to the accident and was entitled to be compensated in full by the
25 appellant.

[5] Having pleaded guilty to the offence of careless and inconsiderate driving, the
appellant must now be barred from raising the defence of contributory
negligence.

30 [68] Dalam kes Woo Yew Chee v Yong Yong Hoo [1978] 1 LNS 240, FC,
Kuala Lumpur, mahkamah memutuskan:
In a civil case one needs only circumstances raising a more probable inference in
favour of what is alleged. An inference from an actual fact that is proved is just as
much part of the evidence as the fact itself. Where direct proof is not available it is
35 enough if the circumstances appearing in evidence give rise to a reasonable and
definite inference; they must do more than give rise to conflicting inferences of
equal degree of probability so that the choice between them is a mere matter of
conjecture see Richard Evans & Co. Ltd. v. Astley [1911] AC 674, 687. By more
probable is meant no more than that upon a balance of probabilities such an
inference might reasonably be considered to have some greater degree of
40 likelihood. It is to be noted that once the right principle has been applied the
appellate Court has said over and over again that this type of case becomes a
matter of fact for the learned trial Judge.
54 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

[69] Mahkamah juga merujuk kepada kes yang sama fakta dengan 1
kejadian kemalangan di sini iaitu kes Teo Tio Khiang & Anor v Ooi Eng Teong
[1986] 1 LNS 63, HC, Singapore, Lai Kew Chai J:
On a balance of probabilities and having heard and seen the witnesses, I accept the
first plaintiff's version as to how the accident occurred. I find that the defendant
had overtaken the plaintiffs and attempted to turn into the sliproad thereby 5
incommoding the first plaintiff by his change of direction. He admitted he had
seen the plaintiffs and yet he made the left turn causing the accident. The pick-up
was slanted towards the sliproad, as was confirmed by the sketch plan and the
evidence of the son of the defendant. The defendant was accused by the Traffic
Police of having turned left and cutting across the path of the first plaintiff. He
10
compounded the offence by paying $50 and explained that he had done so on the
advice of his insurance company. I did not find his explanation acceptable.

[70] Dalam kes ini, pihak defendan berhujah bahawa plaintif wajar
dipertanggungjawab kecuaian sebanyak 70% dalam kemalangan ini dan
kemalangan berlaku akibat kecuaian plaintif sendiri. 15

[71] Plaintif mengaku bahawa kemalangan berlaku selepas dua hari beliau
mendapat lesen memandu. Oleh demikian, defendan berhujah bahawa
plaintif masih belum cekap dan berpengalaman dan gagal mempraktikkan
corak pemanduan berhemat.
20
[72] Dalam isu ini, mahkamah tidak nafikan isu baru mendapat lesen tapi
kemalangan berlaku bukan disebabkan kurang pengalaman, lesen baru
diterima atau faktor ketidakcekapan pemanduan SP2. SP2 berada di lorong
yang betul dan seperti dinyatakan sebelum ini, tindakan SD1 yang tidak
dapat dijangka adalah penyebab dan punca kemalangan. Jika SD1 berada di
laluan yang betul dan memberi amaran awal (signal), ia mungkin boleh 25
dielakkan.

[73] Keadaan kes ini berbeza dengan kes Teoh Weng You & Anor v Tan Hee Joo
[2017] 9 MLJ 721 yang dirujuk oleh defendan. Dalam kes tersebut, ada
keterangan bahawa defendan pertama iaitu pemandu motorlori ada
30
memberikan isyarat untuk membelok ke kanan dan ia diterima oleh
mahkamah. Dalam kes ini, tiada bukti SD1 ada memberi isyarat apatah lagi
SD1 berada di lorong yang salah.
[74] Secara kesimpulannya, mahkamah ini telah menimbang segala aspek
dan sudut sama ada keterangan lisan serta keterangan senyap dan membuat 35
dapatan bahawa kecuaian adalah sepenuhnya di pihak defendan-defendan
tanpa apa-apa sumbangcuai di pihak plaintif.
[75] Oleh demikian, plaintif telah berjaya membuktikan tuntutannya
terhadap defendan-defendan atas imbangan kebarangkalian dan oleh itu
tuntutan plaintif dibenarkan. 40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 55

1 B. Kuantum

Atas dasar 100%, defendan-defendan hendaklah membayar kepada plaintif

kuantum bagi gantirugi seperti berikut:
Gantirugi khas
5
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
1 Physiotherapy RM466.00
10
Dibenarkan 1/3 × RM110.00 (setiap sesi – empat
kali sebulan × tiga bulan = RM1,400.00)
= RM466.00
Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM2,800.00.
15 Defendan berhujah RM440.00.
Mahkamah membenarkan RM466.00.
Alasan mahkamah:
[1] Dalam laporan perubatan dan juga
20
keterangan SP4 di mahkamah, SP4 mengesyorkan
plaintif menjalani rawatan physioterapi.
[2] Defendan tidak memfailkan apa-apa laporan
perubatan atau mencabar keperluan bagi sesi
physioterapi ke atas plaintif.
25 [3] Plaintif memohon jumlah RM2,800.00
berdasarkan cadangan SP4 iaitu RM110.00 sekali
rawatan dan selama 3-4 bulan. Defendan
mencadangkan hanya 1/3 dibenarkan.
[4] Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah 1/3
30
daripada kos tetapi kiraan adalah berdasarkan
1/3 × RM110.00 (setiap sesi – empat kali sebulan ×
tiga bulan = RM1,400.00) = RM466.00.
2 Ligament reconstruction RM50,000.00

35 Dibenarkan RM50,000.00 (kos pembedahan)

Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM300,000.00.
Defendan tidak berhujah atas isu ini.

40
56 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM50,000.00.
Alasan mahkamah: 5

[1] SP4 yang merawat plaintif menyatakan dalam

laporan perubatan bahawa "He may require
ligament reconstruction of his knee if his instability
persist."
10
[2] Walaupun plaintif berhujah terdapat tiga
"ligament injuries" – PCL, ACL dan LCL (rujuk
alasan di gantirugi am) dan kos untuk membaiki
satu ligament adalah antara
RM50,000.00-RM100,000.00.
15
[3] Oleh sebab itu, plaintif menuntut jumlah
RM300,000.00 untuk tiga pembedahan
(RM100,000.00 × three ligaments).
[4] Mahkamah tidak sependapat dengan pihak
plaintif. Ini berdasarkan keterangan SP4, tidak 20
dinyatakan bahawa setiap satu ligament
hendaklah dibuat pembedahan yang
berlainan/berasingan.
[5] Tambahan pula, sebagaimana dinyatakan oleh
SP4, pembedahan ini perlu jika ia melibatkan 25
masalah "persistent pain and instability."
[6] Defendan juga ada mencadangkan kepada
SP4 "Would operation be an option? Yes. What is the
operation called? Ligament reconstruction."
30
[7] Oleh demikian, pembedahan adalah satu cara
yang disyorkan dan tidak dicabar jika sekiranya
plaintif perlukan dan masih mengalami kesan
jangka panjang pada masa akan datang.
[8] Sebagaimana mahkamah menyatakan di 35
bawah kecederaan "left knee" masalah yang timbul
hanyalah "pain and instability". Tiada masalah lain.
Jadi, untuk mengatasi masalah ini, yang mungkin
jika masih berterusan di masa akan datang,
pembedahan adalah disarankan. 40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 57

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
[9] Tidak ada keterangan SP4 menyatakan setiap
5 ligament di bahagian yang sama tersebut perlu
dibuat pembedahan berasingan.
[10] Pada dapatan mahkamah, punca adalah satu
dan solusinya adalah satu.
[11] Kos yang dicadangkan oleh SP4 adalah
10 antara RM50,000.00-RM100,000.00. Pendekatan
yang boleh diambil mahkamah adalah
membenarkan hanya 1/3 daripada kos
pembedahan atau boleh dicadangkan
pembedahan di hospital kerajaan.
15
[12] Namun dalam kes memandangkan SP4
merawat plaintif dan plaintif ada dirujuk ke KPJ,
kos pembedahan di KPJ yang dicadangkan
sebanyak RM50,000.00 dibenarkan dan
munasabah.
20
[13] Jika sekalipun, secara alternatif jika tiga
pembedahan berasingan perlu dilakukan
(mahkamah ini tidak sependapat dan ia tidak
dibuktikan), prinsip hanya 1/3 daripada kos
pembedahan di hospital swasta harus dibenarkan.
25
[14] Ini bermakna jika kiraan 1/3 × RM50,000.00,
jumlah bagi satu pembedahan adalah
RM16,666.66 dan untuk tiga pembedahan, jumlah
adalah RM49,999.99 iaitu jumlah yang sama yang
30
diawardkan oleh mahkamah sepertimana di atas.
[15] Walau bagaimanapun, mahkamah masih
berpegang bahawa hanya satu pembedahan perlu
dan kos RM50,000.00 pembedahan di hospital
swasta diberikan bagi membolehkan plaintif
35 mendapatkan pembedahan segera jika betul-betul
diperlukan bagi mengatasi masalah kaki beliau
seperti disarankan oleh pakar perubatan.

40
58 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
3 Pain & suffering for future surgery RM7,000.00
Plaintif berhujah RM21,000.00. 5
Defendan tidak berhujah.
Mahkamah membenarkan RM7,000.00.
Alasan mahkamah:
[1] Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM21,000.00 iaitu 10
jumlah RM7,000.00 bagi satu pembedahan.
Plaintif berhujah perlu tiga pembedahan
dijalankan pada masa akan datang.
[2] Plaintif merujuk kepada kes Mohd Nizam bin
A Rahman v A Hamid bin A Kamar [2016] 2 PIR [51] 15
yang membenarkan RM35,000.00 bagi "pain and
suffering during five future surgeries" (RM7,000.00
× 5).
[3] Mahkamah mengulangi semula alasan di atas
dan menyatakan bahawa plaintif hanya perlu 20

menjalani satu pembedahan jika perlu pada masa

hadapan.
[4] Oleh demikian, jumlah RM7,000.00 adalah
munasabah bagi satu award "pain and suffering for
25
future injury" terhadap plaintif.
4 Knee brace DITOLAK
Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM141,900.00.
Defendan berhujah ditolak.
30
Mahkamah memutuskan tuntutan ini ditolak.
Alasan mahkamah:
[1] Menurut ikatan pliding plaintif, di perenggan
10 pernyataan tuntutan – butir-butir gantirugi
khas, item ini tidak pernah diplidkan. 35

[2] Jika secara alternatif, mahkamah atas

menerima tuntutan bagi gantirugi ini dihujahkan,
mahkamah ini tidak dapat membenarkan
gantirugi tersebut.
40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 59

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
[3] Ini kerana, pada masa keterangan SP2 di
5 mahkamah, beliau telah kembali bekerja tetapi
dengan bidang tugas yang berbeza dan sehingga
kini (kemalangan pada Julai 8, 2019 hingga Julai 6,
2022), plaintif tidak pernah memakai apa-apa alat
bantuan atau kasut khas untuk bergerak/berjalan.
10
Plaintif tidak pernah guna apa-apa alat bantuan
orthotic.
[4] Mahkamah merujuk laporan SP4 – cadangkan
pembedahan ligament reconstruction, kos
pembedahan dan kesakitan pada masa akan
15 datang telah dibenarkan oleh mahkamah.
[5] SP4 sendiri mencadangkan pembedahan "if his
instability persist" tetapi semasa disoal balas di
mahkamah, SP4 memberi keterangan "knee brace is
better option."
20
[6] Mahkamah merujuk juga keterangan SP5,
"Knee brace to delay OA and stability."
[7] Pada peringkat ini, mahkamah membuat
dapatan bahawa memandangkan SP4 adalah
doktor pakar yang merawat plaintif manakala SP5
25
bukanlah seorang pakar perubatan, cadangan dan
saranan daripada pakar perubatan iaitu SP4 lebih
wajar dan patuh diambilkira.
[8] Oleh sebab itu, mahkamah telah
30
membenarkan kos bagi pembedahan membaiki
ligament jika isu "instability" masih berterusan
pada masa akan datang.
[9] Isu stability telah ditangani melalui
pembedahan. Osteoarthritis yang dinyatakan oleh
35 SP5 juga telah diberi gantirugi dalam gantirugi am
(jika sekiranya wujud kelak).

40
60 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
[10] Pada akhirnya, ia bergantung kepada plaintif
sendiri yang mana plaintif apabila mempunyai 5
masalah berhubung kecederaan kaki kirinya pada
masa akan datang, plaintif akan merujuk semula
kepada pakar perubatan beliau iaitu SP4 dan
bukan kepada SP5 yang tiada kepakaran di
bahagian perubatan. 10
[11] Persamaan antara keterangan SP4 dan
cadangan/pendapat SP5 adalah masalah
instability. Harus diingat, SP5 bukan pegawai yang
menjalankan rawatan terhadap plaintif.
[12] Mengikut pakar perubatan, instability boleh 15
dirawat melalui pembedahan. Walaupun semasa
disoal balas di mahkamah, SP4 memberi
keterangan "knee brace is better option" sebagai
pakar perubatan, semestinya rawatan
komprehensive dengan pemeriksaan lengkap 20
akan disarankan. Better option tidak bermaksud
wajib atau sangat-sangat disarankan.
[13] Dalam hujahan pihak defendan, mereka
berhujah berkenaan penerimaan keterangan SP5
serta keesahan laporan orthosis yang disediakan 25
SP5. Dalam isu ini, cukup mahkamah nyatakan
bahawa laporan orthotics oleh SP5 telah
ditandakan sebagai eks P17 dengan kehadiran SP5
memberi keterangan di mahkamah.
30
[14] Walaupun begitu, mahkamah tidak bersetuju
untuk membenarkan tuntutan bagi "knee brace" ini
berdasarkan apa yang dinyatakan di atas
terutama tempoh tiga tahun sudah berlalu dan
plaintif tidak pernah menggunakan bantuan knee
brace tetapi telah boleh kembali bekerja (walupun 35
dengan tugasan yang berbeza).
[15] Tambahan pula, mahkamah telah
mempertimbangkan untuk plaintif menjalani
pembedahan masa hadapan sebagaimana
40
disarankan oleh doktor pakar plaintif sendiri jika
ia perlu pada masa akan datang.
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 61

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
[16] Di samping itu, keilatan plaintif hanya
5 berkait masalah "instability" sedangkan
keterangan SP5 yang tidak disokong oleh
mana-mana bukti terkini oleh kes-kes sebelum ini
bahawa penggunaan "knee brace" boleh "delay
osteoarthritis." Osteoarthritis juga bukanlah sesuatu
10
yang pasti cuma dinyatakan kemungkinan
plaintif mendapat osteoarthritis adalah lebih
berkemungkinan dibanding dengan orang normal.
[17] Jika dirujuk laporan orthotic SP5 di P17,
penggunaan "knee brace" hanya untuk manfaat
15 yang terhad "The following orthotic management is
recommended for patient Chong Jia Ming to increase
the stability, reduced the pain on left knee, delay the
process of traumatic Osteoarthritic changes in left knee,
control the ligament instability and improve the
20
stability during walking, reduced pain over the left
lower limb."
[18] Apa yang dinyatakan adalah sama seperti
tujuan pembedahan "knee ligament reconstruction"
yang dicadangkan SP4.
25 [19] Jika dilihat masalah yang diadu oleh plaintif
kepada SP5 di ms 23 P17, plaintif masih tidak
dapat squatting, walking up and down on stairs, back
pain, stand and walk for longer duration dan lain-lain.
Jadi apakah keistimewaan dan kelebihan
30 menggunakan "knee brace" kepada plaintif yang
pada masa akan datang jika telah pergi ke
pembedahan membetulkan ligament?
[20] Harus diingat, cadangan dan quotation
plaintif dan jumlah RM141,900.00 adalah untuk
35 seumur hidup plaintif.
[21] Tambahan pula, jika ia dibenarkan, ia akan
menjadi award berganda (duplicity) dengan kos
pembedahan yang telah dibenarkan. Unjust
enrichment telah dibenarkan jika mahkamah
40
membenarkan tuntutan ini.
[22] Oleh demikian, tuntutan ini ditolak.
62 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
5 Bil perubatan RM19,049.24
Dibenarkan kos penuh 5
(Defendan tidak merayu atas kuantum)
6 Kos penjagaan DITOLAK
Plaintif menuntut RM4,800.00 untuk empat
bulan jagaan ibu plaintif.
10
Defendan tidak berhujah.
Mahkamah menolak tuntutan ini.
Alasan mahkamah:
[1] Tuntutan ini tidak diplidkan dalam pliding di 15
bawah tuntutan gantirugi khas item 10(a-s).
[2] Jika sekalipun mahkamah atas ingin
menimbang tuntutan ini, kos penjagaan adalah
oleh ibu plaintif sendiri. Tidak ada keterangan
kenapa jumlah RM1,200.00 wajar diberikan 20
kepada ibu plaintif.
[3] Adakah wajar mengambilkira kos mengupah
seorang pembantu rumah dan "open market value"
untuk penjagaan seorang ibu yang juga suri
rumah yang tidak bekerja atau perlu mengambil 25
cuti bagi menjaga seorang anak yang tidak
mampu uruskan diri atas dasar kasih sayang ibu
dan anak?
[4] Apakah tempoh empat bulan yang
dinyatakan? Kesemua ini tidak dibuktikan oleh 30
plaintif dan juga tidak diplidkan dalam
pernyataan tuntutan. Ini adalah satu pemikiran
semula (afterthought) dan sebagai satu gantirugi
khas, ia haruslah diplidkan dan dibuktikan
dengan ketat. 35

40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 63

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
7 Aggravated damages DITOLAK
5 Plaintif menuntut jumlah RM300,000.00.
Defendan tidak berhujah.
Mahkamah menolak tuntutan ini.
[1] Walaupun plaintif berhujah bahawa tuntutan
10
bagi "Aggravated damages" tidak perlu diplidkan,
mengikut kes Hassnar bin MP Ebrahim @ Asaiar v
Sulaiman bin Pong & 6 Ors [2017] 6 AMR 821; [2018]
1 MLJ 346, mahkamah ini harus berhati-hati ketika
membenarkan award di bawah gantirugi ini.
15 [2] Plaintif perlu menunjukkan ada sebab-sebab
khas dan istimewa kenapa mahkamah perlu
memberikan award ini. Adakah hanya kerana
defendan tidak ingin mengakui liabiliti (admission
of liability) atau memberikan tawaran
20
penyelesaian bagi kes yang mana plaintif
berpendapat ini adalah satu "clear cut case"?
[3] Jika ia adalah satu "clear cut case", kes ini tidak
akan sampai ke peringkat perbicaraan dengan
saksi, keputusan dan rayuan sebagaimana
25 sekarang.
[4] Setiap kes harus dipertimbangkan dari segi
undang-undang sewajarnya.
[5] Mahkamah tidak bersetuju dengan prinsip
yang dinyatakan oleh plaintif bahawa apabila
30 mahkamah membenarkan gantirugi "Aggravated
damages" yang tinggi, ia akan "set satu precedent di
Mahkamah ini dan akan banyak kes pada masa
depan akan diselesaikan dengan lebih cepat."
[6] Itu bukanlah satu tugas "judicial exercise"
35
mahkamah untuk menekan pihak-pihak terutama
defendan untuk memberikan tawaran dan
membantu mahkamah menyelasaikan kes.
[7] Jika sesuatu kes jelas (clear cut), ia pasti akan
40
diselesaikan walaupun tanpa "set precedent"
sebegini. Mahkamah menghormati prinsip setiap
kes adalah berbeza dan ada kekuatan/kelemahan
sendiri.
64 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
8 Kehilangan pendapatan RM2,346.86
(a) Actual loss of earning (pre-trial) – tiga bulan (90 5
hari MC dibayar). Plaintif diberi lima bulan
MC. Dibenarkan RM1,173.43 sebulan × dua
bulan = RM2,346.86
(b) Loss of earning capacity = DITOLAK
Actual loss of earning (pre-trial) 10

Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM5,867.15.

Defendan berhujah ditolak.
Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM2,346.86.
Alasan mahkamah: 15

[1] Untuk kehilangan pendapatan, plaintif mengemukakan eks P9 (carian

SSM syarikat), P10 (surat kuasa dari majikan kepada SP3 memberi
keterangan di mahkamah), P11 (surat pengesahan kerja), P12 (surat
majikan), P13 (slip gaji) dan sijil cuti sakit (dipersetujui).
20
[2] SP2 memberi keterangan beliau bekerja sebagai storekeeper dan
technician di OFT Pancing Sdn Bhd. Keterangan ini disahkan oleh wakil
majikan iaitu SP3.
[3] Gaji SP2 adalah RM1,313.43 sebulan dan beliau ada dibayar gaji basic
semasa cuti sakit. 25
[4] Sijil cuti sakit yang dikemukakan adalah selama 5½ bulan dan selepas
tamat cuti sakit, SP2 telah kembali bekerja di tempat yang sama tetapi
memberi keterangan bidang tugas adalah berbeza dan lebih ringan.
[5] Menurut SP3, gaji dibayar semasa MC pada kadar gaji pokok adalah
mengikut Employment Act. 30

[6] Bagi tuntutan ini, multiplier kehilangan pendapatan SP2 adalah lima
bulan.
[7] Bagi multiplicand, SP2 berhujah pendapatan adalah RM1,313.43 sebulan.
SP2 bekerja 20 hari sebulan (lima hari dalam seminggu) dan living expenses 35
adalah RM20.00 (petrol/tambang perjalanan) dan RM6.00 (makan
tengahari). Oleh demikian, living expenses yang perlu ditolak adalah
RM140.00 sebulan = RM1,173.43.
[8] Oleh demikian, kehilangan pendapatan sebenar SP2 adalah
RM1,173.43 × lima bulan = RM5,867.15. 40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 65

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK

[9] Plaintif berhujah jumlah kehilangan pendapatan ini tidak boleh ditolak
5 dengan gaji basic selama 3.5 bulan yang telah dibayar oleh majikan plaintif.
Ini kerana ia adalah peruntukkan undang-undang di bawah Civil Law Act
1956 iaitu "gratuity/any sum which has been or will be paid under any written
law".
[10] Defendan pula dalam hujahan mereka berhujah bahawa jumlah ini
10 harus ditolak kerana plaintif telah dibayar sepanjang MC. Oleh itu, plaintif
tidak mengalami apa-apa kehilangan pendapatan akibat kemalangan.
[11] Mahkamah membenarkan kehilangan pendapatan sebenar pada
multiplicand RM1,173.43 sebulan seperti kiraan plaintif tetapi hanya untuk
dua bulan = RM2,346.86.
15
[12] Ini kerana, plaintif mendapat MC selama lima bulan dan untuk
tempoh tiga bulan, kehilangan pendapatan beliau telah dibayar oleh
majikan di bawah Employment Act. Oleh itu, bagi tempoh tiga bulan ini,
plaintif telah menerima gaji sebagaimana keadaan asal jika beliau bekerja.
20
Mahkamah mengambilkira bahawa, jika plaintif keluar bekerja (dan tidak
terlibat dengan kemalangan, plaintif akan membawa pulang jumlah gaji
sama (basic) disebabkan perlu mengeluarkan belanja minyak dan makan).
[13] Dari slip-slip gaji (P13), SP2 hanya menerima OT pada bulan Jun 2019
manakala bulan-bulan lain tiada OT dan gaji basic adalah RM1,300.00
25 sahaja. Oleh itu, tiada apa-apa kehilangan pendapatan bagi tiga bulan MC
yang dibayar oleh majikan di bawah Employment Act.
[14] Mahkamah hanya membenarkan kehilangan pendapatan bagi dua
bulan lagi baki cuti sakit yang tidak dibayar oleh majikan. Mahkamah
membuat dapatan bahawa benar terdapat peruntukan di bawah s 28A(1)
30 Civil Law Act 1956 seperti yang dinyatakan oleh plaintif.
[15] Walau bagaimanapun, seperti yang mahkamah nyatakan tadi,
mahkamah telah mengambilkira kehilangan yang dialami oleh plaintif
yang mana sebahagiannya telah dibayar oleh majikan dan sebahagian lain
telah dipampas oleh mahkamah. Oleh itu, adalah adil dan tiada berlaku
35 "Unjust enrichment" bagi tuntutan ini dan plaintif telah dikembalikan
keadaan asal sebagaimana jika kemalangan ini tidak berlaku ke atas
dirinya.

40
66 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
Loss of earning capacity
Plaintif berhujah RM126,089.28. 5

Defendan berhujah ditolak.

Mahkamah menolak tuntutan ini.
Alasan mahkamah:
[1] Plaintif berhujah jumlah ini diperolehi dengan kiraan gaji bulanan 10

plaintif sebanyak RM1,313.43 sebulan tetapi mencadangkan jumlah 50%

daripada gaji tersebut sebagai multiplicand dan untuk multiplier,
memandangkan umur plaintif semasa kemalangan adalah 21 tahun,
kiraan adalah 16 tahun = RM656.71 × 12 bulan × 16 tahun = RM126,089.28.
15
[2] Alasan plaintif adalah SP2 tidak boleh melakukan kerja seperti dulu.
Ini diperolehi daripada keterangan SP2 dan juga SP4 yang menasihat SP2
untuk tidak bekerja semula sebagai storekeeper dan mencari kerja ringan
yang tidak perlu berdiri lama dan mengangkat berat.
[3] Defendan berhujah tuntutan ini perlu ditolak kerana SP2 telah kembali
20
bekerja ditempat lama dengan gaji yang sama seperti sebelum
kemalangan. SP2 tidak mengalami sebarang risiko kehilangan kerja atau
risiko mendapat gaji yang lebih rendah akibat kecederaannya.
[4] Mahkamah merujuk kes Ngooi Ku Siong & Anor v Aidi Abdullah [1985] 1
MLJ 30 yang diputuskan oleh Mahkamah Persetukutan yang mana 25
membezakan "Loss of future earnings and loss of earning capacity".
There is also a difference between loss of future earnings and loss of earning
capacity although both items are under general damages. Future loss of earnings
or loss of prospective earnings are awarded for real assessable loss ie, loss that is
capable of assessment at the date of the trial. It must be proved by evidence and 30
not by mere speculation. In the absence of such evidence if the Court is satisfied
that the plaintiff has suffered a loss of earning capacity, he will be awarded a
sum as part of the general damages for his disability suffered as a result of the
injuries sustained, instead of compensation for loss of future earnings. It arises
where there is a residual risk that the plaintiff might be thrown out of work
altogether at some future date. The risk must be real and not speculative or 35
fanciful. Any loss of money is relevant, whether the money is properly described
as "earnings" or not, provided that the money is more than a "mere possible
contingency." Thus loss of possible contract as opposed to loss of probable
contract is not recoverable. (See Kemp and Kemp on the Quantum of Damages,
4th Edn. Vol. 1, on pp. 122 and 123). Generally both items need not be specifically
40
pleaded as in the case of special damages but averred in general terms in the
pleadings.
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 67

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
[5] Mahkamah mengambil pendekatan daripada kes ini yang mana
5 YA hakim Mahkamah Persekutuan jelas memberi garis panduan
bagaimana menentukan kehilangan "earning capacity". YA hakim
menekankan risiko kehilangan kerja/pendapatan pada masa hadapan
mestilah "Real and not speculative or fanciful."
[6] Mahkamah meneliti keterangan SP3 yang mengesahkan SP2 sudah
10 tidak boleh buat kerja berat seperti dulu. Tiada apa-apa keterangan
bahawa syarikat akan memberhentikan SP2, mengurangkan gaji SP2,
masalah atau rungutan dengan hasil kerja SP2 selepas kemalangan atau
prospek pekerjaan SP2 di syarikat akan terjejas. Tambahan pula, SP3
hanyalah wakil syarikat yang mengesahkan selepas kemalangan SP2
15 sudah kembali semula bekerja di syarikat tetapi dipindahkan ke unit
"repair and service" dengan gaji yang sama seperti sebelum kemalangan.
[7] Mahkamah juga menilai keterangan SP2 sendiri bahawa beliau
mengesahkan beliau tiada kemahiran di bidang lain dan tidak tahu apa
kerja yang sesuai dengannya. Peringkat pendidikan tertinggi SP2 adalah
20 gagal Tingkatan 5.
[8] Mahkamah merujuk surat pengesahan kerja daripada majikan SP2
(P11) yang mengesahkan bahawa SP2 telah bekerja sejak Disember 10,
2018. Selepas MC tamat, SP2 kembali bekerja di tempat yang sama. Ini
kerana, kemahiran SP2 pada dapatan mahkamah adalah di tempat di mana
25 beliau bekerja sekarang.
[9] Pihak plaintif berhujah bahawa cadangan SP4 "he is better suited for
lighter task or desk job". Dengan pendidikan yang ada dan pertimbangan
pihak majikan, SP2 telah kembali bekerja di tempat sama dengan "lighter
task." Hujahan pihak plaintif bahawa surat pengesahan majikan di P12
30
yang mana SP2 telah diberikan kerja ringan sahaja menunjukkan
kemerosotan dalam prestasi kerja adalah tidak benar. Tiada keterangan
tentang kemerosotan kerja.
[10] Tambahan pula, majikan telah terima beliau bekerja semula di tempat
sama walaupun diberi kerja yang berbeza. SP2 telah kembali bekerja pada
35
November 7, 2019 dan sehingga tarikh perbicaraan, SP2 masih kekal di
tempat tersebut dengan menerima gaji yang sama tanpa apa-apa
pengurangan.
[11] Keterangan SP2 bahawa beliau takut suatu hari nanti majikan akan
40
memberhentikan beliau dari kerja kerana banyak perkara yang beliau
tidak dapat lakukan adalah andaian SP2 semata yang tidak disokong oleh
mana-mana bukti.
68 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
[12] SP3 iaitu majikan juga tidak pernah memberi keterangan bahawa ada
kemungkinan SP2 akan diberhentikan atau kerja SP2 merosot dari masa ke 5
semasa. Ini dapat dilihat bahawa tempoh November 7, 2019 sehingga
Julai 6, 2022 sudah dua tahun lebih dan gaji dibayar tapa apa-apa
pengurangan sehingga kini.
[13] Oleh demikian, berbalik kepada prinsip dalam kes Ngooi Ku Siong
yang dirujuk sendiri oleh pihak plaintif, mahkamah tidak dapat bersetuju 10
dengan hujahan pihak plaintif dan memutuskan bahawa tuntutan ini
ditolak.

9 Kos perbelanjaan dan pengangkutan keluarga RM200.00

ke hospital untuk empat hari dibenarkan RM50.00 15
× 4 = RM200.00
10 Kos rawatan perubatan di Hospital Penawar – RM2,392.30
dibenarkan
11 Kos rawatan susulan di KPJ Bandar Dato Onn – RM7,111.10
dibenarkan 20

12 Perbelanjaan bagi rawatan susulan sebanyak RM300.00

enam kali (ikut kad rawatan) – dibenarkan
RM50.00 × enam = RM300.00
13 Kos untuk crutches DITOLAK
25
Plaintif menuntut RM70.00. Mahkamah menolak
kerana tiada keterangan atau resit dikemukakan.
14 Kos wheelchair DITOLAK
Plaintif menuntut RM700.00. Mahkamah menolak
kerana tiada keterangan atau resit dikemukakan. 30

15 Kos laporan perubatan Hospital Penawar – RM100.00

dipersetujui
16 Kos laporan pakar dari Gleneagles Hospital DITOLAK
plaintif menuntut RM1,354.00. Mahkamah
35
menolak kerana tiada keterangan atau resit
dikemukakan.
17 Bayaran carian SSM plaintif menuntut RM15.30. DITOLAK
Mahkamah menolak kerana tiada keterangan atau
resit dikemukakan.
40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 69

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
18 Gambar polis, laporan polis dan rajah kasar kunci DITOLAK
plaintif menuntut RM16.00. Mahkamah menolak
5
kerana tiada keterangan atau resit dikemukakan.
19 Carian JPJ dipersetujui RM10.00
JUMLAH RM88,975.50

10 Gantirugi am

BIL PERKARA JUMLAH

DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
15 1 Open fracture proximal 3rd left tibia and fibula RM30,000.00
Plaintif berhujah untuk jumlah RM50,000.00
Defendan berhujah untuk jumlah RM50,000.00
bercantum dengan award kecederaan "Grade 1
20
posterior cruciate ligament (PCL) injury of left knee."
Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM30,000.00
bagi kecederaan ini bersama dengan item No. 2
iaitu kecederaan bagi "Residual pain on the left leg".
Alasan mahkamah:
25
[1] Mahkamah bergantung kepada laporan-
laporan perubatan dan laporan pakar yang
dirujuk di mahkamah.
[2] Bagi kecederaan ini, tiada kependekkan
30
tulang dilaporkan dan ia telah bercantum dan
sembuh.
[3] Bagi "Residual pain on the left leg", plaintif
berhujah ia adalah satu keadaan kesakitan lain
yang perlu diberikan award berasingan. Award
35 yang dipohon adalah RM10,000.00.
[4] Defendan sebaliknya berhujah, item
kecederaan ini perlu disatukan dengan "Grade 1
posterior cruciate ligament (PCL) injury of left knee."

40
70 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
[5] Mahkamah membuat dapatan bahawa,
kecederaan "left tibia and fibula" boleh disatukan 5
dengan "Residual pain on the left leg" kerana ia
adalah keilatan dan kesan/residue kecederaan di
kaki kiri plaintif.
[6] Dalam kes ini, defendan tidak berhujah untuk
gantirugi "Residual pain on the left leg" dan fokus 10
kepada kecederaan di bahagian kaki kiri plaintif
sahaja.
[7] Mahkamah memutuskan dua kecederaan ini
boleh disatukan dan diberikan award secara
global. 15

[8] Berbeza dengan kecederaan di "Grade 1

posterior cruciate ligament (PCL) injury of left
knee" – mahkamah membezakan dan memberikan
award khusus untuk kecederaan dan keilatan di
20
bahagian "knee" seperti item 3, 4 dan 5 di bawah
dan mengklasifikasikan tiga item ini di bawah
satu award.
[9] Bagi award "Open fracture proximal 3rd left tibia
and fibula" – Revised Compendium of Personal Injury
25
Awards mencadangkan jumlah antara
RM21,500.00-RM42,000.00.
[10] Dalam laporan perubatan SP4 di ms 3
ikatan F, SP4 sahkan pada tarikh terakhir
consultation beliau dengan plaintif iaitu pada 30
Mac 28, 2021, dinyatakan "During his last
appointment his left tibia and fibula fracture has
united."
[11] Oleh demikian, mahkamah memutuskan
bagi tuntutan ini (dan item No. 2), jumlah 35
RM30,000.00 adalah munasabah dan berpatutan.
2 Residual pain on the left leg

40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 71

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
3 Left knee posterior cruciate ligament laxity (PCL) RM30,000.00
5 Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM30,000.00. Defendan
berhujah ia disatukan dengan item No. 1.
Mahkamah mencantumkan dengan item 4 dan 5
di bawah sebagai satu gantirugi dan
membenarkan jumlah RM30,000.00
10 4 Left knee anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) and
lateral collateral ligament (LCL) tear
Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM60,000.00.
5 Higher risk of developing osteoarthritis (OA) of
the left knee joint
15
Plaintif berhujah jumlah RM30,000.00.
Alasan mahkamah (bagi item 3, 4 dan 5)
[1] Kecederaan yang dinyatakan di item 3, 4 dan 5 adalah terbabit dengan
kecederaan di satu tempat iaitu "left knee".
20 [2] Daripada laporan perubatan dan laporan pakar, adalah disahkan
terdapat PCL, ACL dan LCL.
[3] Mengikut penjelasan doktor, PCL menyebabkan plaintif mengalami
"knee instability".

25 [4] Mengikut laporan radiology dari Hospital KPJ Dato’ Onn, "MRI is done
after the plate in the left leg is removed. MRI is most accurate in detecting knee
ligament injury. ACL and LCL is injured at the same time with the PCL but could
not be detected due to reason MRI could not be done at that time".
[5] Daripada laporan doktor pakar ini, mahkamah membuat dapatan
30 bahawa terma PCL, ACL dan LCL mungkin nampak berbeza di sini tetapi
ia adalah di satu tempat yang sama dan memberikan kesan yang sama.
Yang membezakan hanyalah "posterior cruciate, anterior cruciate dan lateral
collateral".
[6] Ini boleh dirujuk melalui keterangan SP4 iaitu pada ms 3 ikatan
35 defendan iaitu laporan perubatan plaintif sebelum MRI – dinyatakan
"Mild laxity of posterior cruciate ligament of the left knee." Manakala di ms 3
ikatan F, SP4 nyatakan "He had laxity of PCL dan PLC of the left knee. He
may require ligament reconstruction of his knee if instability persist."

40
72 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
[7] Kesan kecederaan di bahagian "left knee" tersebut boleh dilihat juga
melalui laporan radiologi di ms 19 ikatan E di mana dalam "Finding & 5
Impression" dinyatakan "Partial tear of left posterior cruciate, anterior cruciate
and lateral collateral ligaments". SP4 menerangkan bahawa "Partial tear"
bermaksud "Not full tear." MRI ini hanya dibuat di bahagian "EXAM: MRI
LEFT KNEE".
[8] Walaupun dinyatakan sebagai PCL, ACL dan LCL tiga perkara yang 10
berbeza, masalah dan kesan kecederaan di "left knee" tersebut kepada
plaintif hanyalah satu sebagaimana saranan doktor iaitu "Instability".
[9] SP4 juga ada memberi keterangan bahawa "MRI has limitation in
classifying or determining the severity of the ligament injury. Management of knee
ligament injury should be based on good history, physical examination, 15
comprehensive imaging results and intraoperative findings."
[10] Plaintif nyatakan kesan kecederaan di keseluruhan kaki kirinya
(termasuk fracture tibia dan fibula) serta "knee" adalah beliau tidak boleh
berdiri lama, tidak boleh angkat berat, tidak boleh cangkung, tidak boleh
20
berjalan jauh, tidak boleh berlari/bersukan dan hanya buat kerja ringan.
Semasa memberi keterangan, SP2 telah kembali bekerja di tempat yang
sama cuma dengan tugas yang berlainan.
[11] Mahkamah merujuk Revised Compendium of Personal Injury Awards,
award in dikategorikan sebagai "Knee ligament (anterior/posterior cruciate)"
25
antara RM18,000.00-RM30,000.00.
[12] Bagi "Higher risk of developing Osteoarthritis (OA) of the left knee joint"
mahkamah merujuk kepada keteragan SP4 di ms 27 "He sustained left PCL
injury with left knee joint grade 1 laxity. The risk to develop osteoarthritis left knee
comparable to healthy general population." Keterangan ini tidak disangkal oleh 30
pihak defendan.
[13] Plaintif merujuk kepada kes Mohd Shahrul bin Md Yusof v Subramaniam
a/l Nadeson [2015] 1 PIR [54] yang membenarkan jumlah RM20,000.00 dan
mahkamah memutuskan bahawa, bagi keseluruhan kecederaan di
bahagian "left knee" di item 3, 4 dan 5 ini, jumlah RM30,000.00 adalah adil, 35
munasabah dan berpatutan.

40
 Chong Jia Ming v
Abdul Khalik bin Yusof & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [3] Sazlina Safie scj 73

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
6 Extensive scarring RM10,000.00
5 Plaintif berhujah RM30,000.00.
Defendan berhujah RM10,000.00.
Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM10,000.00.
Alasan mahkamah:
10 [1] Jika dilihat laporan perubatan, parut-parut
plaintif adalah di sekitar left leg, left knee, right knee,
left shoulder dan right elbow.
[2] Parut-parut berkenaan diakui adalah parut
kekal tetapi ia bukanlah parut yang mencacatkan
15 atau jagged/operation scar. Ia juga di bahagian
terlindung dan kurang dari 10 cm (kecuali di "left
leg").
[3] Mengikut Revised Compendium of Personal Injury
Awards, jumlah yang diberikan antara
20 RM8,500.00-RM16,000.00 dan jumlah yang
dihujahkan oleh plaintif sangat tinggi.
[4] Walaupun Revised Compendium of Personal
Injury Awards hanyalah digunakan sebagai
rujukan, tetapi kes yang dirujuk oleh plaintif iaitu
25
Muhammad Al Rifa’ie bin Samsudin (Seorang Budak
Mendakwa Melalui Bapa Yang Sah dan Sahabat
Wakilnya, Samsudin bin Mohamad Haris) v
S Arikrishnan a/l Samynathan & Anor [2012] 1 PIR
[65] perlu dibezakan.
30
[5] Kes tersebut melibatkan kanak-kanak dan
parut yang berbeza. Oleh demikian, bagi tuntutan
ini, mahkamah membenarkan jumlah
RM10,000.00 sebagai adil dan munasabah.
35

40
74 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [3]

1
BIL PERKARA JUMLAH
DIBENARKAN
/DITOLAK
7 Muscle wasting and decreased range of movement RM5,000.00
of the left leg
5
Plaintif berhujah RM10,000.00.
Defendan berhujah RM3,000.00.
Mahkamah membenarkan jumlah RM5,000.00.
Alasan mahkamah: 10
[1] Kecederaan muscle wasting ada dinyatakan
dalam laporan perubatan. "Wasting of the left leg"
adalah pada 1 cm dan ia adalah pada tahap
minima.
[2] Namun begitu, mengambilkira ia adalah 15
daripada kesan kecederaan yang dialami, jumlah
RM5,000.00 adalah munasabah dan mengikut
garis panduan Revised Compendium of Personal
Injury Awards, award kebiasaan bagi kecederaan
ini adalah antara RM3,000.00-RM5,000.00. 20

[3] Oleh demikian, jumlah yang diawardkan oleh

mahkamah adalah adil dan berpatutan.
JUMLAH RM75,000.00

25
C. Faedah

1. Faedah atas gantirugi khas ialah 2.5% setahun dari tarikh

kemalangan ke tarikh penghakiman.

2. Faedah ke atas gantirugi am ialah 5% setahun dari tarikh 30

penyampaian writ saman hingga penghakiman.

3. Faedah ke atas jumlah penghakiman ialah 5% setahun dari tarikh

penghakiman sehingga pembayaran jumlah penuh penghakiman.

D. Kos seperti dalam skala 35

40
S/N fgCUqtPTeUCrNW7ns9lbHw
**Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal
 [2022] 2 PIR [38] 397

1
Helmi bin Abdullah
v
Mohammad Mustafar Kamal bin Adnan & Anor
5
High Court, Klang – Civil Appeal No. BL-12B-3-01/2021
Norliza Othman JC

July 2, 2021

10
Appeal from Sessions Court, Klang –
Civil Suit No. BL-53KJ-484-10/2019 as reported in [2022] 2 PIR [44]

[38] Quantum – Abrasion and laceration – Laceration over tongue and lip –
Arthritis – Osteoarthritis – Head – Dental trauma – Lower limb – Closed fracture
15 of left tibial plateau – Grade 3 laxity of lateral collateral ligament – Grade 3 laxity of
posterior cruciate ligament – Non-union of posterior cruciate ligament avulsion
fracture – Paralysis – Complete paralysis of left common peroneal nerve with
permanent foot drop – Muscle wasting – Scars

The Sessions Court had in this instance found the appellant ("the plaintiff")
20 20% liable and the respondents ("the defendants") 80% liable for the loss and
damages suffered by the plaintiff pursuant to a motorvehicle accident
involving the plaintiff’s motorcycle and the defendants’ four-wheel drive
that was stationary. The Sessions Court judge ("the SCJ") had found that
although the defendants’ four-wheel drive had stopped on the plaintiff’s
25 rightful way, the plaintiff could have avoided colliding into the stationary
four-wheel drive had he maintained a safe distance. The SCJ had also
awarded damages accordingly.
The plaintiff has lodged the instant appeal against the whole of the decision
of the SCJ.
30
Held, dismissing the appeal; SCJ’s order maintained
1. The SCJ was correct in holding that the plaintiff was 20% contributorily
negligent because although the plaintiff was on his rightful way, he still
has a duty to be careful of the surrounding road conditions including
35 being aware of any other vehicles or objects on the road. The plaintiff
cannot contend that because he is on his rightful way, the duty to ensure
that he is in a safe condition when riding his motorcycle rests with those
who are on his route. The plaintiff's duty to ensure safety when riding his
motorcycle is in line with the defendant's duty when driving his
40 four-wheel drive. However, in the instant case, the division of liability
between them is different where 80% of the liability is imposed on the
defendants due to the act of stopping the vehicle on the road suddenly
without any indicators.
398 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [38]

2. The quantum of damages awarded by the SCJ is reasonable and fair, 1

which ought to be maintained and does not warrant appellate
intervention.

Case(s) referred to by the court

Fletcher v Autocar and Transporters Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 726 5

Mohamad Azhar b Yussoh v Mohamad Hairul Alhafiz b Zan Imi & Anor [2018] 2
PIR [39]
Mohamad Fairus b Mohd Bakri v Saiful Bahri b Hamzah & Anor [2018] 1 PIR [5]
Muhammad Saiful Suffian b Zulkafli v Mohamed Razif b Hashim & Anor [2020] 2
PIR [17] 10
Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324
Tabarani b Mohd Arsad & Anor v Chan Tenn Yeu [1999] 2 AMR 1884; [1999] 3 CLJ
188
UMW Toyota Motor Sdn Bhd & Anor v Allan Chong Teck Khin & Anor [2021]
AMEJ 0129; [2021] 5 CLJ 193
Wong Li Fatt William (an infant) v Haidawati bt Bolhen & Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497 15

Legislation referred to by the court

Road Traffic Rules 1959, rule 10

Other references 20

Compendium of Personal Injury Awards (Revised 2018)

Solicitors
Sharon Christina (Othman Hashim & Co) for appellant
25
Rajeswari Shanmugarajah and Malathi Katuri (Rajes & Assoc) for respondents

Judgment received: July 6, 2021

Norliza Othman JC
30
[1] Ini adalah rayuan oleh perayu ("plaintif") atas keseluruhan keputusan
hakim Mahkamah Sesyen selepas perbicaraan penuh yang diberikan pada
Disember 22, 2020.
A. Latar belakang
35
[2] Pada Ogos 16, 2018, plaintif menunggang motorsikal No. BLC 1848
dari Kg Pendamar menghala ke Kampung Johan Setia. Apabila sampai di
Jalan Pendamar di mana plaintif sedang bergerak terus; tiba-tiba sebuah
motorkar iaitu pacuan empat roda No. BPJ 5895 berada di atas jalan dalam
keadaan gelap tanpa apa-apa tanda amaran atau isyarat; plaintif tidak
sempat mengelak maka berlaku kemalangan dengan motorkar pacuan 40
empat roda itu.
 Helmi bin Abdullah v
Mohammad Mustafar Kamal bin Adnan & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [38] Norliza Othman JC 399

1 [3] Plaintif mendakwa kemalangan adalah disebabkan oleh kecuaian atau

separa disumbang oleh defendan 1 sebagai pengkhidmat, ejen dan/atau
orang yang memandu motorkar No. BPJ 5985 dengan keizinan defendan 2.
Akibat dari itu, plaintif mengalami kecederaan.

[4] Plaintif mengemukakan tiga orang saksi:

5
(i) SP1 – Sarjan Balasingam a/l Velanali (Penolong Pegawai Penyiasat);
(ii) SP2 – Plaintif;

(iii) SP3 – Amierah binti Mohd Merin @ Mohd Tamrin (Kerani di

10 Syarikat RC Reka Sdn Bhd – majikan plaintif).

[5] Defendan-defendan pula mengemukakan defendan 1 seorang sahaja.

B. Isu-isu untuk dipertimbangkan dalam rayuan ini

15
[6] Mahkamah telah meneliti memorandum yang difailkan oleh
perayu/defendan-defendan dan boleh dirumuskan isu-isu yang
ditimbulkan oleh perayu/defendan-defendan adalah hakim Mahkamah
Sesyen telah khilaf dari segi undang-undang dan fakta dalam memutuskan
bahawa perayu/defendan-defendan adalah 80% cuai dalam kemalangan ini
tanpa mengambil kira segala bukti dan keterangan yang dikemukakan
20 termasuklah siasatan dari penolong pegawai penyiasat, kerosakan yang
dialami oleh kedua-dua motorkar dan motorsikal.

C. Dapatan mahkamah
[7] Mahkamah Tinggi yang menjalankan kuasa rayuan untuk mendengar
25 dan memutuskan rayuan dari mahkamah rendah tidak akan mengganggu
dapatan hakim yang mendengar kes terutamanya yang melibatkan
saksi-saksi kerana hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dan/atau majistret berada
dalam kedudukan lebih baik untuk menilai keterangan yang diberi oleh
saksi-saksi selain dapat melihat pada "demeanour" saksi-saksi.
30
[8] Fungsi mahkamah yang mendengar rayuan dari mahkamah rendah
dibincangkan di dalam keputusan Mahkamah Rayuan prinsip untuk
mahkamah ini menjalankan kuasa rayuannya khususnya untuk mencelah
dapatan hakim yang membicarakan kes diperjelaskan di dalam keputusan
Mahkamah Rayuan iaitu UMW Motor Sdn Bhd & Anor v Allan Chong Teck Khin
35 [2021] AMEJ 0129; [2021] 5 CLJ 193:
Principles of Appellate Intervention

[28] Foremost on our minds are the two tests, namely, "plainly wrong test" and
"insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence" test for appellate interference in
40 subordinate court’s findings. In respect of the two tests, the Court of Appeal held
400 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [38]

as follows in Lee Eng Chin & Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 19; [2003] 2 1
MLJ 97 at pp. 90 to 99:

(2) Generally, an appellate court will not intervene unless the trial court was
shown to be plainly wrong in arriving at its decision or where there had
been no or insufficient judicial appreciation of evidence. Judicial
appreciation of evidence meant that a judge who was required to 5
adjudicate upon a dispute must arrive at his decision on an issue of fact by
assessing, weighing and, for good reasons, either accepting or rejecting the
whole or any part of the evidence placed before him. He must, when
deciding whether to accept or to reject the evidence of a witness, test it
against relevant criteria. Thus he must take into account the presence or
absence of any motive that a witness may have in giving evidence. Where 10
contemporaneous documents existed, he must test the oral evidence of a
witness against these. He must also test the evidence of a particular
witness against this. He must also test the evidence of a witness against the
probabilities of the case. The principle central to appellate interference is
that a decision arrived by a trial court without judicial appreciation of the
evidence may be set aside on appeal. 15

[29] The Court of Appeal has reiterated in Ong Chiou & Anor v Keller (M) Sdn Bhd
& Ors & anor appeal [2019] 1 LNS 26; [2019] 3 MLRA 322 at pp 329 that:

(25) We are mindful of the limited role of the appellate court in relations to the
findings of court made by the court of first instance. The general principle 20
is that the conclusion of a trial judge is a finding of fact on the oral evidence
based on the demeanour and credibility of the finding ought not to be
disturbed unless the appellate court is convinced that it is plainly wrong.
It would not be sufficient to warrant an appellate court interference merely
because the appellate court entertains doubt whether such finding is right.
(see: Lee Ing Ching Ors v Gan Yook Chin & Anor [2003] 2 CLJ 19, [2003] 1 25
MLRA 95. Gan Yook Chin & Anor v Lee Ing Chin Ors [2004] 4 CLJ 309, [2004] 2
MLRA 1).

[9] Dalam konteks rayuan plaintif, mahkamah mendapati hakim Sesyen

yang bijaksana telah meneliti dan memberi pertimbangan yang wajar pada
rajah kasar dan kunci, nota keterangan sebelum memutuskan 30
defendan-defendan bertanggungan sebanyak 80% dan plaintif 20% atas
kemalangan tersebut.

D. Isu liabiliti

[10] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen di dalam alasan penghakimannya 35

menyatakan bahawa hasil siasatan yang dibuat oleh pegawai penyiasat
didapati plaintif telah gagal mengawal motorsikalnya hingga menyebabkan
kemalangan itu dan satu saman telah dikeluarkan terhadap plaintif di
bawah kaedah 10 LN 166/59.
40
[11] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen di dalam penghakimannya menyatakan
walaupun mahkamah bersetuju bahawa kawasan kemalangan adalah laluan
sah plaintif namun mahkamah berpendapat bahawa plaintif tidak
menjarakkan motorsikalnya dalam jarak yang sepatutnya dengan motorkar
 Helmi bin Abdullah v
Mohammad Mustafar Kamal bin Adnan & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [38] Norliza Othman JC 401

1 pacuan empat roda defendan-defendan sehingga tidak dapat mengawal

motorsikalnya sehingga melanggar motorkar pacuan empat roda
defendan-defendan.

[12] Mahkamah Sesyen juga menyatakan seandainya plaintif berada

dalam jarak yang sepatutnya dari motorkar pacuan empat roda
5
defendan-defendan maka beliau boleh mengelak apabila melihat motorkar
defendan-defendan berhenti di atas jalan laluan plaintif dan kemalangan itu
tidak akan berlaku.
[13] Oleh itu, dapatan hakim Mahkamah Sesyen bahawa plaintif turut
10
menyumbang 20% atas kemalangan tersebut adalah betul kerana walaupun
beliau berada di atas laluannya yang sah, namun masih mempunyai
kewajipan untuk berhati-hati dengan keadaan jalan sekeliling termasuk
apa-apa kenderaan atau objek lain yang berada di atas jalan. Plaintif tidak
boleh menyatakan oleh kerana beliau berada di laluan yang sah, maka
kewajipan untuk memastikan beliau berada di dalam keadaan yang selamat
15 ketika menunggang motorsikal adalah terletak pada mereka yang turut
berada di laluannya. Tugas plaintif untuk memastikan keadaan selamat
ketika menunggang motorsikal adalah seiring dengan tugas defendan ketika
memandu motorkar pacuan empat roda beliau; kecuali pembahagian
liabiliti antara mereka adalah berbeza di mana 80% liabiliti dikenakan ke atas
20 defendan-defendan kerana tindakan memberhentikan kenderaan di atas
jalan secara tiba-tiba tanpa sebarang signal dan/atau isyarat (seperti dapatan
hakim Mahkamah Sesyen) adalah satu tindakan yang merbahaya pada
kenderaan yang mengekori di belakang.
E. Isu award gantirugi am dan khas
25
[14] Mahkamah Sesyen dalam memberikan award kepada plaintif untuk
kecederaan yang beliau alami dan gantirugi khas yang dituntut telah
merujuk kepada beberapa otoriti (lihat Fletcher v Autocar and Transporters Ltd
[1968] 1 All ER 726; Wong Li Fatt William (an infant) v Haidawati binti Bolhen &
Anor [1994] 2 MLJ 497; Tabarani Mohd Arsad & Anor v Chan Tenn Yeu [1999] 2
30
AMR 1884; [1999] 3 CLJ 188; di mana prinsip-prinsip berkaitan award
gantirugi di dalam otoriti-otoriti yang dirujuk adalah konsep gantirugi itu
adalah untuk memberi pampasan kepada pihak yang mengalami kerugian
atau kesakitan kepada keadaan sewaktu mereka belum mengalami kerugian
dan kesakitan tersebut.
35
F. Kuantum (berdasarkan liabiliti 100%)
[15] Mahkamah ini sekali lagi tidak akan mengganggu award atas
kuantum yang diberi untuk kecederaan dan kesakitan yang dialami plaintif
sekiranya mahkamah mendapati hakim yang telah menjalankan
40 perbicaraan dan mendengar keterangan saksi-saksi mendapati kuantum
yang diawardkan itu adalah munasabah, tidak menindas dan selaras dengan
kuantum yang dibenarkan untuk kecederaan dan kesakitan yang plaintif
alami.
402 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [38]

(i) Closed fracture left tibial plateau 1

[16] Plaintif telah menuntut sejumlah RM30,000.00 dengan merujuk

kepada laporan pakar. Defendan telah menggabungkan tawaran kecederaan
"closed fracture left tibial plateau with peroneal nerve injury (foot drop) with
posterior cruciate ligament and lateral collateral ligament injury" dengan
5
menawarkan RM52,000.00 setelah menolak "overlapping" 25% dari
RM30,000.00 di mana peguam defendan berhujah bahawa kesemua
kecederaan tersebut adalah berkait rapat dan terjadi pada hanya satu kaki
sahaja. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan hakim Mahkamah Sesyen
bahawa jumlah ini adalah munasabah, adil dan tidak menindas plaintif.
10
(ii) (a) Grade 3 laxity of posterior cruciate ligament
(b) Grade 3 laxity of lateral collateral ligament
(c) Non-union of CPL avulsion fracture

[17] Plaintif menuntut sejumlah RM30,000.00 untuk kecederaan ini;

namun Mahkamah Sesyen mengawardkan sejumlah RM55,000.00 15

sebagaimana award di perenggan (i) dengan mengambil kira semua

kecederaan ini adalah berkait rapat dan berhubungan antara satu sama lain.
Mahkamah ini berpendapat jumlah yang diawardkan oleh Mahkamah
Sesyen adalah munasabah dan adil kerana kecederaan yang dialami oleh
plaintif ini adalah berkait dan berhubungan. Oleh itu jumlah award 20
RM55,000.00 ini adalah dikekalkan.

(iii) Complete paralysis of the left common peroneal nerve permanent foot
drop
[18] Plaintif menuntut sejumlah RM15,000.00 dan defendan-defendan 25
menawarkan RM55,000.00 sebagaimana alasan-alasan yang dinyatakan di
perenggan (i) dan (ii) dan Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengaward RM55,000.00.
Mahkamah ini mendapati jumlah ini adalah munasabah, adil dan tidak
menindas plaintif dan dikekalkan.
(iv) Osteoarthritis 30

[19] Plaintif menuntut sebanyak RM5,000.00 dengan merujuk kepada

laporan pakar dan Compendium of Personal Injury Awards Revised as at July 6,
2018.
[20] Defendan menghujahkan bahawa laporan pakar menunjukkan 35
plaintif hanya berkemungkinan untuk mendapat osteoarthritis dan
berdasarkan hujahan ini, hakim Mahkamah Sesyen mengawardkan
RM3,000.00. Mahkamah ini memutuskan jumlah ini adalah munasabah dan
adil setelah mengambilkira laporan pakar bahawa osteoarthritis adalah
kemungkinan akan terjadi pada plaintif. 40
 Helmi bin Abdullah v
Mohammad Mustafar Kamal bin Adnan & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [38] Norliza Othman JC 403

1 (v) Muscle wasting

[21] Plaintif telah menuntut sejumlah RM10,000.00 berdasarkan laporan

pakar dan otoriti-otoriti. Defendan-defendan menawarkan RM2,500.00
berdasarkan laporan pakar defendan yang melaporkan 3 sm di paha dan
2 sm di kaki. Laporan pakar plaintif pula melaporkan muscle wasting adalah
5
4.5 sm di paha dan 2 sm di kaki. Mahkamah Sesyen menerima hujahan
defendan yang merujuk kepada laporan pakar terkini atas plaintif
berkenaan "muscle wasting" iaitu dari UMSC (University Malaya Specialist
Centre) bertarikh November 25, 2019 (rekod rayuan ms 181-184) yang
mengesahkan bahawa "muscle wasting"; yang dialami plaintif adalah 3 sm di
10 paha dan 2 sm di kaki.

[22] Mahkamah Sesyen telah merujuk kepada kes Muhammad Saiful Suffian
bin Zulkafli v Mohamed Razif bin Hashim & Anor [2020] 2 PIR [17] di mana
award yang diberi adalah sebanyak RM3,000.00 bagi "muscle wasting" 2.5 sm
di betis kanan (right calf) dan 6 sm di paha kanan (right thigh). Ukuran "muscle
15 wasting" yang dialami adalah melebihi dari yang dialami oleh plaintif di
dalam kes ini. Oleh itu, Mahkamah Sesyen mengawardkan sejumlah
RM2,500.00 sebagai jumlah yang munasabah, adil kepada plaintif.
Mahkamah ini juga bersetuju dengan jumlah yang diawardkan oleh
Mahkamah Sesyen dan ia seharusnya dikekalkan.
20
(vi) Dental trauma

[23] Plaintif menuntut sejumlah RM6,000.00 dengan menghujahkan

bahawa dua batang gigi plaintif perlu dicabut dan sebatang lagi dirawat
dengan "crowning" di Hospital Tengku Ampuan Rahimah, Klang.
25
[24] Defendan-defendan menghujahkan jumlah award yang setimpal
adalah RM3,000.00 dengan merujuk kepada kes Mohamad Fairus bin
Mohd Bakri v Saiful Bahri bin Hamzah & Anor [2018] 1 PIR [5] di mana
mahkamah membenarkan award sebanyak RM3,000.00 untuk "dental trauma
with upper teeth loss". Jumlah ini juga yang diawardkan oleh Mahkamah
30 Sesyen kepada plaintif kerana ianya melibatkan lebih dari satu gigi dan
bukan merujuk kepada sebatang gigi.

[25] Mahkamah ini juga sependapat dengan hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dan
memutuskan jumlah ini harus dikekalkan kerana ianya munasabah, adil dan
tidak menindas plaintif.
35
(vii) Scars

[26] Plaintif telah menuntut sejumlah RM10,000.00 dengan merujuk

laporan pakar dan otoriti-otoriti. Defendan menawarkan RM4,000.00
dengan merujuk kepada laporan pakar defendan kerana ianya merujuk
40
kepada keadaan plaintif terkini.

[27] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sejumlah RM4,000.00

kepada plaintif. Laporan pakar yang disediakan oleh Prof Dr Viviek Ajit
404 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [38]

Singh dari UMSC menyatakan bahawa terdapat parut iaitu "10 cm surgical 1
scar over medial left upper tibia and 4 cm surgical scar over the left shin". Di dalam
laporan yang sama juga; pakar menyatakan "The scars are not hypertrophic or
keloid, therefore scar revision is not necessary". Oleh itu, jumlah RM4,000.00 yang
diawardkan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen adalah munasabah dan adil dan harus
dikekalkan. 5

(viii) Laceration tongue and lip

[28] Plaintif menuntut sejumlah RM8,000.00. Defendan menawarkan
RM3,000.00 serta berhujah bahawa semua "soft tissue injury" adalah pada
bahagian muka sahaja. 10

[29] Mahkamah Sesyen telah mengawardkan sejumlah RM4,000.00

dengan merujuk kepada kes Mohamad Azhar bin Yussoh v Mohamad Hairul
Alhafiz bin Zan Imi & Anor [2018] 2 PIR [39] di mana mahkamah
mengawardkan sejumlah RM3,000.00 untuk "multiple lacerations over the face,
lips and ear". Mahkamah ini berpendapat jumlah RM4,000.00 yang 15
diawardkan oleh Mahkamah Sesyen adalah munasabah, adil dan tidak
menindas plaintif dan seharusnya dikekalkan.

G. Gantirugi khas

[30] Undang-undang berkaitan beban pembuktian untuk gantirugi khas 20

adalah jelas iaitu ianya mesti dibuktikan secara terperinci dan bukan sekadar
meletakkan jumlah kerugian yang dialami dan menyerahkan kepada
mahkamah untuk meletakkan jumlah yang dirasai sesuai dan patut (rujuk
Ong Ah Long v Dr S Underwood [1983] 2 MLJ 324).

(i) Kos perjalanan keluarga plaintif dan kos perjalanan rawatan susulan 25

[31] Plaintif menuntut RM40.00 × 11 kali perjalanan dan ianya berjumlah

RM440.00. Plaintif juga menuntut sejumlah RM35.00 × 12 kali perjalanan
dengan keseluruhan berjumlah RM420.00.
[32] Ini adalah jumlah untuk perjalanan ulang alik keluarga plaintif 30
sewaktu plaintif dirawat di Hospital Tengku Ampuan Rahimah ("HTAR")
selama 11 hari dan juga kos perjalanan untuk mendapatkan rawatan susulan
di HTAR.

[33] Mahkamah Sesyen telah menggabungkan tuntutan kos perjalanan

35
keluarga plaintif bersama dengan kos perjalanan rawatan susulan
membenarkan RM100.00 dan ia adalah munasabah dan adil atas plaintif.
Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan award yang diberikan ini.

(ii) Pakaian/kasut/telefon bimbit/jam tangan dan wang tunai

40
[34] Untuk tuntutan gantirugi atas kerosakan barang-barang peribadi
milik plaintif, Mahkamah Sesyen mengawardkan sejumlah RM50.00 atas
alasan kerosakan atas barang-barang peribadi milik plaintif tidak dapat
 Helmi bin Abdullah v
Mohammad Mustafar Kamal bin Adnan & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [38] Norliza Othman JC 405

1 dielakkan kerana plaintif jatuh dari motorsikal sewaktu kemalangan. Jumlah

ini juga mahkamah berpendapat ianya adalah wajar dan munasabah.

(iii) Laporan perubatan pakar dan dokumen-dokumen yang berkaitan

dengan tuntutan plaintif
5 [35] Jumlah yang dituntut untuk plaintif mendapatkan dokumen-
dokumen ini adalah munasabah dan mahkamah telah membenarkannya.
(iv) Rawatan di Hospital Tengku Ampuan Rahimah, Klang

[36] Plaintif menuntut sejumlah RM80.00 untuk kos rawatan. Mahkamah

10 berpendapat kos ini adalah munasabah dan wajar diberikan kepada plaintif.

(v) Pembedahan dan kos rawatan pada masa hadapan

[37] Plaintif telah memohon sebanyak RM8,600.00 dengan merujuk

kepada laporan pakar dan otoriti-otoriti. Defendan-defendan pula
15 menawarkan RM1,000.00 untuk mengeluarkan implant dan RM100.00 untuk
fisioterapi dan doktor pakar defendan mengatakan bahawa
prosedur-prosedur ini boleh dijalankan di hospital kerajaan.

[38] Mahkamah Sesyen telah membenarkan award sebanyak RM1,600.00

iaitu RM1,000.00 untuk mengeluarkan implan dan RM600.00 untuk kos
20 fisioterapi kerana rawatan-rawatan ini boleh dilakukan di hospital kerajaan.
Pada waktu material plaintif sedang menjalani rawatan susulan di hospital
kerajaan.
[39] Mahkamah ini mendapati award yang diberi adalah munasabah dan
adil kerana award yang diberi membolehkan plaintif meneruskan
25
prosedur-prosedur rawatannya di hospital kerajaan.

(vi) Kos penjagaan plaintif

[40] Plaintif menuntut kos penjagaan sebanyak RM6,000.00. Selepas

plaintif keluar dari hospital beliau dijaga oleh ahli keluarganya dengan
30
penjagaan adalah sebanyak RM500.00 sebulan. Plaintif telah bercuti sakit
hampir 12 bulan iaitu dari Ogos 16, 2018 sehingga Ogos 5, 2019. Plaintif
memerlukan bantuan keluarga untuk membawanya mendapatkan rawatan
ke hospital selain bergerak ke mana-mana.

35 [41] Mahkamah Sesyen tidak membenarkan tuntutan ini kerana plaintif

gagal membuktikan bahawa kos sebanyak RM500.00 sebulan diperlukan
untuk menjaga plaintif.

[42] Mahkamah bersetuju dengan dapatan hakim Mahkamah Sesyen

kerana kos penjagaan yang bagaimana dimaksudkan oleh plaintif. Plaintif
40 tinggal dengan keluarganya dan adakah mereka digaji untuk menjaga
beliau. Oleh itu kos penjagaan plaintif adalah tidak dibenarkan.
406 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [38]

(vii) Kehilangan pendapatan sebenar 1

[43] Plaintif menuntut sejumlah RM207,000.00 (RM1,500.00 × 11½ bulan).

Plaintif menghujahkan beliau adalah pekerja am dengan gaji RM1,500.00
sebulan dan ianya disokong oleh SP3 iaitu wakil majikan plaintif iaitu RC
Reka Sdn Bhd.
5
[44] Defendan-defendan menghujahkan pekerjaan sebenar plaintif tidak
dapat disahkan kerana saksi-saksi memberikan versi yang berbeza; doktor
pakar (defendan) mengatakan plaintif adalah seorang despatch, doktor
pakar (plaintif) mengatakan plaintif adalah pekerja pembinaan dan
SP3 – mengatakan bahawa plaintif adalah pekerja am. Apakah pekerjaan 10
sebenar plaintif sewaktu kemalangan: ianya tidak dapat disahkan kerana
majikan sebenar plaintif tidak hadir memberi keterangan. Di dalam alasan
penghakiman, hakim Mahkamah Sesyen menyatakan bahawa SP3 tidak
membawa sebarang rekod butiran pekerjaan plaintif ketika kemalangan.
Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen menyatakan tidak dapat dibuktikan bahawa
pada ketika kemalangan plaintif adalah bekerja dengan memperolehi 15

pendapatan sebanyak RM1,500.00 sebulan.

[45] Ketika pemeriksaan balas SP3, beliau telah ditanya berkenaan slip gaji
(ID6 dan ID7). SP3 telah sahkan beliau membuatnya tetapi tandatangan tidak
pasti. Seorang yang bernama En Mazlan telah mengarahkan beliau membuat 20
slip gaji tersebut (En Mazlan tidak dipanggil sebagai saksi).

[46] Mahkamah boleh mengambil "judicial notice" bahawa plaintif bekerja

untuk menampung keperluan hariannya tetapi apa yang perlu dibuktikan
adalah pada masa kemalangan beliau adalah bekerja dan sepanjang waktu
kemalangan itu beliau telah tidak bekerja dan gaji yang diperolehi adalah 25
RM1,500.00. Mahkamah Sesyen tidak dapat menerima kesahihan slip gaji
plaintif kerana ianya tidak dibuktikan dengan sempurna apabila majikan
plaintif yang bertanggungjawab untuk meletakkan gaji plaintif sebagai
RM1,500.00 sebulan tidak hadir. Mahkamah ini bersetuju dengan dapatan
hakim Mahkamah Sesyen untuk menolak tuntutan kehilangan pendapatan.
30
(viii) Prosthesis

[47] Plaintif menuntut sejumlah RM73,040.00 dengan merujuk kepada

kiraan untuk keseluruhan perbelanjaan Supralite AFO dan knee brace.
[48] Defendan menghujahkan doktor pakar (plaintif) mencadangkan "knee 35
brace for the gross laxity of the left knee" manakala doktor pakar (defendan)
mencadangkan untuk "ankle foot orthosis".

[49] Hakim Mahkamah Sesyen menyatakan di dalam alasan

penghakimannya bahawa laporan doktor pakar defendan adalah lebih
40
terkini berbanding laporan pakar plaintif untuk menjelaskan perkembangan
kecederaan yang dialami plaintif. Hasil penelitian mahkamah pada
kedua-dua laporan pakar yang disediakan, tidak dinyatakan secara spesifik
 Helmi bin Abdullah v
Mohammad Mustafar Kamal bin Adnan & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [38] Norliza Othman JC 407

1 untuk cadangan "custom made special shoe with right custom made total contact
insole"; maka tiada keperluan untuk mengawardkan jumlah yang dituntut
oleh plaintif.

H. Kesimpulan
5 [50] Mahkamah ini mendapati hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dalam mencapai
kepada keputusannya dari segi liability, award untuk gantirugi am dan khas
telah meneliti dan mengambil kira keterangan lisan saksi-saksi, keterangan
dokumen dan hujahan pihak-pihak. Mahkamah tidak melihat terdapatnya
apa-apa kekhilafan baik dari segi fakta dan undang-undang dalam
10
memutuskan tuntutan plaintif. Oleh itu, mahkamah mengekalkan
keputusan hakim Mahkamah Sesyen dan menolak rayuan plaintif.

15

20

25

30

35

40
S/N fgCUqtPTeUCrNW7ns9lbHw
**Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal
292 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

A
Iftikar Ahmed Khan (as the executor of the estate for Sardar
Mohd Roshan Khan, deceased) v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd
(previously known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
B

FEDERAL COURT (PUTRAJAYA) — CIVIL APPEAL NO 02(f )-10 OF

2011(W)
RAUS SHARIF CHIEF JUSTICE, SURIYADI, ZAINUN ALI, ABU
SAMAH NORDIN AND RAMLY ALI FCJJ C
6 NOVEMBER 2017

Civil Procedure — Pleadings — Issues not pleaded — Writ of action filed for
declarations and refund of fixed deposit receipt (‘FDR’) — Claim based on D
negligence — Whether bank at liberty to uplift FDR without consent — Whether
there was cause of action — Whether bank liable for breach of contract
— Whether breach of contract stated in pleadings — Whether parties bound by
pleadings — Whether decision based on issue not raised in pleadings liable to be set
aside E

The appellant was, prior to his death, the sole proprietor of a firm known as
Omar Khayam Enterprise (‘OKE’). His son (‘PW2’), was substituted as a party
to this appeal. OKE was given various banking facilities by the respondent
amounting to RM15m. The appellant had authorised PW2 to sign all cheques F
on behalf of OKE in respect of OKE’s account (‘the account’). The respondent
granted OKE an additional overdraft of RM300,000 (‘the OD’). Subsequently,
the appellant applied to the respondent to transfer the banking facilities
enjoyed by OKE to Omar Khayam Enterprise Sdn Bhd (‘the company’). A
fresh joint and several guarantee for RM15,300,000 was duly executed by the G
appellant and PW2. The parties to the memorandum of deposit remain
unchanged. The shareholders of the company, namely, PW2 and Rajah Sultan,
sold their shares to one Sallim and two others, for RM550,000. The appellant
later discovered that Sallim had, without his knowledge, used the company’s
cheque to withdraw RM300,000 from the company’s OD account to purchase H
a cashier’s order in the name of the appellant. Sallim then gave the cashier’s
order to the appellant as part payment of the purchase price of the shares. As a
result of Sallim’s action, the overdraft facilities of RM300,000 given to the
company was fully utilised for an unauthorised purpose, unknown to the
appellant. The company’s cheque was signed by Sallim alone and this was in I
breach of the directors’ resolution which required that the company’s cheques
must be signed by two signatories, namely Sallim and PW2. The appellant filed
a writ of action against the respondent for certain declarations and for the
refund of the fixed deposit receipt (‘FDR’), alleging that the respondent had
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 293

A negligently and without his consent, uplifted his FDR. The High Court
dismissed the appellant’s claim based on negligence, holding that the appellant
had no cause of action in tort against the respondent as the overdraft was given
to the company and not to the appellant. The High Court, however, found that
the respondent was liable for breach of contract and accordingly granted the
B declaration that the respondent was not entitled to uplift the FDR without the
appellant’s consent and ordered the respondent to refund the FDR. Aggrieved,
the respondent appealed to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal allowed
the respondent’s appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court on the
sole ground that the appellant had abandoned his claim based on the tort of
C
negligence. The Court of Appeal held that the appellant’s cause of action was
not based on a breach of contract but on the tort of negligence and the parties
were bound by their pleadings. The appellant thus appealed against the said
decision and was granted leave to appeal to this court on the following
D questions of law: (a) when evidence was led without objections at trial, could an
appellate court reverse the decision of the High Court on the sole ground that
the cause of action in negligence had been abandoned; and (b) was the plaintiff
entitled to declarations of rights as pleaded.

E Held, dismissing appeal with costs:

(1) The appellant’s cause of action was based on negligence and not on a
breach of contract. There was no clear averment that the appellant’s case
was based on contract and that the respondent had, in breach of the
contract, uplifted the FDR without the appellant’s consent. Not a single
F word of ‘contract’, let alone the breach of it, was stated in the pleadings.
Parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to adduce facts
and issues which they have not pleaded. A decision based on an issue
which was not raised by the parties in their pleadings was liable to be set
aside (see paras 25–27).
G
(2) There was no evidence that the respondent had breached any term of the
memorandum of deposit when it uplifted the FDR without the
appellant’s consent. The appellant’s claim against the respondent was for
the refund of his FDR which was uplifted to settle the outstanding
H amount in the overdraft account. The monies in the overdraft account
were fully utilised due to the respondent’s alleged negligence in
honouring the cheque presented by Sallim without it being
countersigned by PW2. It was patently clear that the claim was not based
on a breach of contract (see para 39).
I (3) The appellant could not plead ignorance and conveniently say that he did
not know the terms of the agreement which he signed. Clause 6 of the
memorandum of deposit expressly states that the respondent was at
liberty, at any time, to withdraw the deposit and to apply the proceeds
thereof in or towards the discharge of the appellant’s account without
294 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

reference to him. The finding of the trial judge that the respondent was in A
breach of the contract in uplifting the FDR without the appellant’s
consent was contrary to cl 6 of the memorandum of deposit. It was also
against the weight of evidence. The memorandum of deposit was signed
by the appellant together with his son. The respondent had, before
uplifting the FDR, written to the son for approval to uplift the FDR and B
the son consented to it in writing (see paras 42–43).
(4) The first question in this appeal was framed on the supposition that
‘evidence is led without objections at trial.’ In truth, there was no
evidence adduced without objections to support the appellant’s C
contention that the respondent was in breach of the contract, namely, the
memorandum of deposit by uplifting the FDR without the appellant’s
consent. The respondent was clearly at liberty to uplift the FDR without
the consent of the appellant by virtue of cl 6 of the memorandum of
deposit. Thus, this court found that it was not necessary to answer the D
first question posed. In view of that, it was also not necessary to answer
the second question. The Court of Appeal did not err in reversing the
decision of the High Court on the sole ground that the cause of action in
negligence had been abandoned (see paras 44–45).
E
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Sebelum kematiannya, perayu adalah pemilik tunggal sebuah firma, Omar
Khayam Enterprise (‘OKE’). Anak lelakinya (‘PW2’) telah diganti sebagai
pihak dalam rayuan ini. OKE diberi pelbagai kemudahan perbankan oleh
responden berjumlah RM15 juta. Perayu telah memberi kuasa kepada PW2 F
untuk menandatangani semua cek bagi pihak OKE berkenaan akaun OKE
(‘akaun’). Responden memberi OKE overdraf tambahan RM300,000 (‘OT’).
Kemudiannya, perayu memohon kepada responden untuk memindah milik
kemudahan perbankan yang dinikmati OKE kepada Omar Khayam
Enterprises Sdn Bhd (‘syarikat’). Satu jaminan baharu dan bersama berjumlah G
RM15,300,000 dimeterai oleh perayu dan PW2. Pihak-pihak dalam
memorandum deposit kekal dan tidak berubah. Syarikat tidak diganti sebagai
pihak dalam memorandum deposit sebagai ganti perayu dan PW2. Seterusnya,
pemegang-pemegang saham syarikat, iaitu PW2 dan seorang bernama Rajah
Sultan menjual saham mereka kepada seorang bernama Sallim dan dua orang H
lagi untuk RM550,000. Perayu kemudiannya mendapati bahawa Sallim telah,
tanpa pengetahuannya, menggunakan cek syarikat untuk mengeluarkan wang
sebanyak RM300,000 daripada akaun OT syarikat untuk membeli perintah
juruwang bawah nama perayu. Sallim telah memberikan perintah juruwang
kepada perayu sebagai sebahagian bayaran harga belian saham-saham. Akibat I
tindakan Sallim, kemudahan overdraf RM300,000 yang diberikan kepada
syarikat digunakan sepenuhnya untuk tujuan yang tidak dibenarkan, tanpa
pengetahuan perayu. Cek syarikat ditandatangani oleh Sallim sahaja dan ini
melanggar resolusi pengarah yang menetapkan agar cek-cek syarikat
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 295

A ditandatangani oleh dua penandatangan, iaitu Sallim dan PW2. Perayu

memfailkan tindakan writ terhadap responden untuk beberapa pengisytiharan
dan untuk bayaran balik resit tetap deposit (‘FDR’), dengan dakwaan bahawa
responden telah cuai dan tanpa kebenarannya mengeluarkan FDR.
Mahkamah Tinggi menolak rayuan perayu berdasarkan kecuaian, dengan
B memutuskan bahawa perayu tidak mempunyai kausa tindakan dalam tort
terhadap responden kerana overdraf telah diberikan kepada syarikat dan bukan
perayu. Mahkamah Tinggi, walau bagaimanapun, mendapati bahawa
responden bertanggungjawab atas pelanggaran kontrak dan membenarkan
pengisytiharan bahawa responden tidak mempunyai hak mengeluarkan FDR
C
tanpa kebenaran perayu dan memerintahkan responden membayar balik
FDR. Terkilan, responden merayu ke Mahkamah Rayuan. Mahkamah Rayuan
membenarkan rayuan responden dan mengetepikan penghakiman Mahkamah
Tinggi atas alasan perayu telah meninggalkan tuntutannya berdasarkan tort
D cuai. Mahkamah Rayuan mendapati kausa tindakan perayu bukan
berdasarkan pelanggaran kontrak tetapi tort cuai dan pihak-pihak terikat
dengan pliding mereka. Perayu dengan itu merayu terhadap keputusan
tersebut dan memberi kebenaran merayu ke mahkamah ini atas persoalan
undang-undang: (a) di mana keterangan dikemukakan tanpa bantahan semasa
E perbicaraan, bolehkah Mahkamah Rayuan mengakas keputusan Mahkamah
Tinggi atas alasan tunggal bahawa kausa tindakan berdasarkan kecuaian telah
diabaikan; dan (b) sama ada plaintif berhak atas pengisytiharan hak seperti
yang diplidkan.

F Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dengan kos:

(1) Kausa tindakan perayu berdasarkan kecuaian dan bukan pelanggaran
kontrak. Tiada penjelasan yang jelas bahawa kes perayu berdasarkan
kontrak dan bahawa responden telah, dalam melanggar kontrak,
mengeluarkan FDR tanpa kebenaran perayu. Tiada perkataan ‘kontrak’,
G atau pelanggarannya, dinyatakan dalam pliding. Pihak-pihak terikat
dengan pliding dan tidak dibenarkan mengemukakan fakta dan isu yang
tidak diplidkan oleh mereka. Keputusan berdasarkan isu yang tidak
dibangkitkan oleh pihak-pihak dalam pliding mereka boleh diketepikan
(lihat perenggan 25–27).
H
(2) Tiada keterangan bahawa responden telah melanggar apa-apa terma
memorandum deposit apabila responden mengeluarkan FDR tanpa
kebenaran perayu. Tuntutan perayu terhadap responden untuk bayaran
balik FDRnya yang telah dikeluarkan untuk menyelesaikan jumlah
I tertunggak dalam akaun overdraf. Wang dalam akaun overdraf telah
digunakan akibat kecuaian responden menunaikan cek yang diberi oleh
Sallim tanpa tandatangan PW2. Amat jelas tuntutan bukan berdasarkan
pelanggaran kontrak (lihat perenggan 39).
(3) Perayu tidak boleh memplidkan kejahilan dan menyatakan dia tidak tahu
296 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

tentang terma-terma perjanjian yang ditandatanganinya. Klausa 6 A

memorandum deposit jelas menyatakan responden bebas, pada bila-bila
masa, untuk mengeluarkan deposit dan menggunakan hasilnya untuk
pelaksanaan akaun perayu tanpa rujukan kepadanya. Dapatan hakim
bicara bahawa responden melanggar kontrak dengan mengeluarkan
FDR tanpa kebenaran perayu bertentangan dengan klausa 6 B
memorandum deposit. Ini juga bertentangan dengan keterangan yang
dikemukakan. Memorandum deposit ditandatangani oleh perayu
bersama-sama dengan anaknya. Responden telah, sebelum
mengeluarkan FDR, meminta kelulusan anaknya untuk mengeluarkan
C
FDR dan anak perayu telah membenarkannya secara bertulis (lihat
perenggan 42–43).
(4) Soalan pertama dalam rayuan ini dibentuk atas anggapan bahawa
‘keterangan dikemukakan tanpa bantahan semasa perbicaraan’.
Sebenarnya, tiada keterangan dikemukakan tanpa bantahan untuk D
menyokong hujahan perayu bahawa responden telah melanggar kontrak,
iaitu, memorandum deposit dengan mengeluarkan FDR tanpa
kebenaran perayu. Responden mempunyai kebebasan mengeluarkan
FDR tanpa kebenaran perayu menurut klausa 6 memorandum deposit.
Oleh itu, mahkamah ini memutuskan tidak perlu untuk menjawab E
soalan pertama yang diajukan. Dengan itu, tiada keperluan juga untuk
menjawab soalan kedua. Mahkamah Rayuan tidak terkhilaf apabila
mengakas keputusan Mahkamah Tinggi atas alasan tunggal bahawa
kausa tindakan cuai telah diabaikan (lihat perenggan 44–45).]
F
Notes
For cases on issues not pleaded, see 2(4) Mallal’s Digest (5th Ed, 2017 Reissue)
paras 7548–7568.
G
Cases referred to
Albion Hotel (Freshwater) Ltd v Maia E Silva & Anor [2002] IRLR 200 (refd)
Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian Merchant Bank Bhd
[1995] 3 MLJ 331, FC (refd)
Dato’ Hamzah bin Abdul Majid v Omega Securities Sdn Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ H
725; [2015] 9 CLJ 677, FC (refd)
Hadmor Productions Ltd and others v Hamilton and others [1982] 2 WLR 322,
HL (refd)
Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 213;
[1995] 2 CLJ 900, CA (refd) I
Lee Ah Chor v Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 428; [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 239,
SC (refd)
Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ
465, FC (refd)
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 297

A Perniagaan Kinabalu (S) Sdn Bhd v Sua Ah Yoke & Ham Jon See [2002] MLJU
601, HC (refd)
Philipps v Philipps (1878) 4 QBD 127, CA (refd)
Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha
Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995] 1 MLJ 308, CA (refd)
B Rosita bte Baharom (an infant) v Sabedin bin Salleh [1993] 1 MLJ 393, SC
(refd)
Samuel Naik Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 1, FC (refd)
State Government of Perak v Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490, SC (refd)
Superintendent of Lands and Surveys (4th Div) & Anor v Hamit bin Matusin &
C Ors [1994] 3 MLJ 185; [1994] 3 CLJ 567, SC (refd)
The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157, FC (refd)
The County Council of Hereford and Worcester v Neale [1986] ICR 471, CA
(refd)
Veronica Lee Ha Ling & Ors v Maxisegar Sdn Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 141; [2009]
D 6 CLJ 232, FC (refd)
Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye [1990] 2 MLJ 152, SC (refd)

Legislation referred to
Land Code (Cap 81)
E Rules of the High Court 1980 O 15 r 16, O 18 r 7(1), (2)

Appeal from: Civil Appeal No W-02–722 of 2007 (Court of Appeal,

Putrajaya)

F Bastian Pius Vendargon (Gene Anand Vendargon with him) (YS Woo & Proctor)
for the appellant.
Ben Chan (Mah-Kamariah & Philip Koh) for the respondent.

Abu Samah Nordin FCJ (delivering judgment of the court):

G
[1] This is an appeal by the appellant, Sadar Mohd Roshan Khan (the
plaintiff in the High Court) against the decision of the Court of Appeal which
had set aside the judgment of the Kuala Lumpur High Court given in his
favour. He had since passed away. On 18 March 2013, his son Raja Iftikar
H Ahmad Khan was substituted as a party to this appeal.

[2] The High Court had allowed the appellant’s claims for a declaration that
Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (the respondent) was not entitled to uplift his fixed
deposit receipt No 049675 (‘FDR’) which was pledged to the respondent as
I security for an overdraft facility of RM300,000, without his consent and
accordingly ordered the respondent to refund the FDR to him with interest at
8%pa from 18 March 1993 until realisation. The High Court found that the
respondent was in breach of contract by uplifting the FDR without the
appellant’s consent. The Court of Appeal however allowed the respondent’s
298 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court on the ground that the A
appellant’s cause of action was for the tort of negligence, which it had
abandoned and not for breach of contract.

[3] On 27 January 2011 the appellant was granted leave to appeal to this
court against the decision of the Court of Appeal on the following questions of B
law:
(a) when evidence is led without objections at trial, can an appellate court
reverse the decision of the High Court on the sole ground that the cause
of action in negligence has been abandoned? and C
(b) is a plaintiff entitled to declarations of rights as pleaded?

BACKGROUND FACTS
D
[4] The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
(a) Sadar Mohd Roshan Khan (‘PW1’) was, prior to his death, the sole
proprietor of a firm known as Omar Khayam Enterprise (‘OKE’);
(b) on 18 March 2013 his son, Raja Iftikar Ahmad Khan (‘PW2’) was E
substituted as a party to this appeal;
(c) OKE was given various banking facilities by the respondent amounting
to about RM15m as at August 1990;
(d) on 13 April 1990 the appellant informed the respondent that he had F
authorised PW2 to sign all cheques on behalf of OKE in respect of
OKE’s account No 1102052687 (‘the account’);
(e) by another letter dated 16 April 1990 the appellant informed the
respondent that he had authorised PW2, to operate the account and to G
do all things necessary to protect the respondent’s interest. The letter
further states that the appellant:
agree to be responsible for due repayment of money due to you on the
account or otherwise and purported to have been incurred on my/our behalf
or on behalf of my/our firm by the authorised person whether such liabilities H
have been or shall be incurred in usual course of business or not and
notwithstanding any default, omission, negligence or fraud on the part of the
authorised person.

(f) on 22 December 1990 the respondent granted OKE an additional I

overdraft of RM300,000 (‘the OD’);
(g) the OD was secured by the FDR of RM200,000 vide FDR No 049675
dated 15 January 1991; and a personal guarantee of PW2;
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 299

A (h) the terms and conditions of the FDR are contained in the memorandum
of deposit dated 15 January 1991 which was executed by PW1 and PW2
in favour of the respondent. Paragraph 6 of the memorandum of deposit
states:
B You are at liberty at any time to withdraw the deposit made under the said
Deposit Receipt No 049675 or any Fixed Deposit from time to time
substituted for or replacing the same and to apply the proceeds thereof in or
towards the discharge of my/our accounts without reference to one/us. And a
statement signed by anyone of your officer as the amount for the time being
owing on my/our account shall be final and conclusive evidence against
C
me/us for all purposes.

(i) on 31 January 1991 the appellant applied to the respondent to transfer

the banking facilities enjoyed by OKE to Omar Khayam Enterprises
Sdn Bhd (‘the company’), which the respondent agreed, subject to the
D conditions that:
(i) a fresh joint and several guarantee for RM15,300,000, to be
executed by Mr Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan and Mr Raja Iftikar
Ahmad Khan; and
E (ii) all facilities together with liabilities will be transferred from Omar
Khayam Enterprise to Omar Khayam Enterprises Sdn Bhd; and
(j) a fresh joint and several guarantee for RM15,300,000 was duly executed
by the appellant and PW2. The parties to the memorandum of deposit
F dated 15 January 1991 however remain unchanged. The company,
Omar Khayam Enterprises Sdn Bhd, was not substituted as a party to
the memorandum of deposit in place of the appellant and PW2.

[5] On 15 May 1991, the shareholders of the company, namely, PW2 and
G Rajah Sultan sold their shares to one Sallim bin Mohamed (‘Sallim’) and two
others for RM550,000. PW2 was then the majority shareholder, holding
715,001 shares of the company. Rajah Sultan held only 1 share in the company.
A deposit of RM100,000 was paid upon execution of the sale and purchase
agreement.
H
[6] The balance of RM450,000 was to be paid by 15 July 1991. Sallim paid
the appellant another sum of RM300,000 by way of a cashiers order dated
26 July 1991. The cashiers order was not paid to PW2 as he was actually
holding the shares in trust for the appellant.
I
[7] The balance of RM150,000 was not paid as Sallim was arrested in
Singapore on fraud charges and imprisoned for six years. Sallim’s solicitors later
told PW2 that nothing could be done as her fees and disbursement had not
been paid by Sallim.
300 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

[8] The appellant later discovered that Sallim had, without his knowledge, A
used the company’s cheque to withdraw RM300,000 from the company’s OD
account to purchase a cashiers order in the name of the appellant. Sallim then
gave the cashiers order to the appellant as part payment of the purchase price of
the shares. As a result of Sallim’s action, the overdraft facilities of RM300,000
given to the company was fully utilised for an unauthorised purpose, unknown B
to the appellant. The company’s cheque was signed by Sallim alone. This was in
breach of the directors resolution dated 25 July 1991 which required that the
company’s cheques must be signed by two signatories, namely Sallim and
PW2.
C
[9] On 4 March 1999 the appellant filed a writ of action against the
respondent for certain declarations and for the refund of the FDR, alleging that
the respondent had negligently and without his consent uplifted his FDR. The
appellant named PW2 as the second defendant, alleging that PW2 had D
consented to the uplifting of the FDR without his authorisation. The appellant
later withdrew the suit against PW2, leaving the respondent as the sole
defendant.

[10] The appellant sought the following reliefs against the respondent: E
(a) an order and declaration that the respondent should have obtained the
consent from the appellant before uplifting the said FDR No 049675;
(b) an order and declaration that the respondent was negligent in
honouring Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd cheque No 531000 dated F
26 July 1991 when the same had not been countersigned by his son and
accordingly the respondent was not entitled to uplift the said deposit
receipt No 049675 against the said overdraft facility of RM300,000;
(c) an order and declaration that the respondent refund to the appellant the G
sum of RM231,155.60 with interest at 8%pa from 18 March 1993 to
date of judgment and realisation; and
(d) costs.
H
[11] It is to be noted that in prayer (b), the appellant, quite surprisingly, is
not asking the respondent to refund the sum of RM300,000 withdrawn from
the overdraft account due to the respondent’s negligence in honouring the said
cheque without being countersigned by PW2. Instead, the appellant sought a
declaration that the respondent was not entitled to uplift the FDR and for an I
order that the respondent refund the FDR.
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 301

A THE HIGH COURT

[12] The High Court dismissed the appellant’s claim based on negligence,
holding that the appellant has no cause of action in tort against the respondent
as the overdraft was given to the company and not to the appellant. This is what
B the learned trial judge said:
When the cash cheque of RM300,000 was negligently and wrongfully honoured by
the first defendant on 26 July 1991 then only the company was entitled to sue the
first defendant for negligence and for the recovery of the said sum of RM300,000.
The plaintiff has no cause of action in tort against the first defendant as the OD was
C
given to the company and not to the plaintiff.

[13] The High Court however found that the respondent was liable for
breach of contract and accordingly granted the declaration that the respondent
D was not entitled to uplift the FDR without the appellant’s consent and ordered
the respondent to refund the FDR. The High Court held that the appellant has
a cause of action for breach of contract and that the cause of action on contract
arose when the respondent uplifted his FDR without his consent and in breach
of the terms of the memorandum of deposit. The High Court held that the
E memorandum of deposit was between the appellant and the respondent and
not between the company and the respondent. The High Court pointed out
that the respondent failed to request the appellant to execute a fresh
memorandum of deposit when the banking facilities were transferred to the
company. This is how the learned trial judge justified his finding against the
F respondent for breach of contract:
Although the plaintiff has pleaded negligence on the part of the first defendant in
honouring the cheque for RM300,000 the plaintiff ’s cause of action is for breach of
contract and the cause of action only arose when the first defendant uplifted the FD
and set it off against the OD of RM300,000 given to the company. Since no monies
G had been utilised by the company the first defendant was not entitled under the
terms of the memorandum of deposit to uplift the FD. The act of uplifting the FD
on 15 April 1993 was a breach of contract by the first defendant.

[14] At pp 41–42 of his judgment the learned trial judge further explained:
H At p 41:
The memorandum of deposit was a contract by which the plaintiff agreed that if
any monies were owing by OKE the first defendant was at liberty to withdraw
the FD and apply it to settle sums owing by OKE. In breach of contract the first
defendant uplifted the FD on 15 March 1993 and set off same against the OD
I of the company.
At p 42:
Since the FD belonged to PW1 the consent of PW1 should have been obtained
and not that of PW2. The FD did not belong to PW2 or the company. Even if
302 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

PW2 had agreed to the upliftment of the FD it was not within his power to do A
so. The plaintiff ’s consent was never obtained.

[15] The respondent, being aggrieved by the decision of the High Court,
appealed to the Court of Appeal. The principal ground of appeal was that the
B
learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in holding that the appellant’s cause
of action was for breach of contract (which was not pleaded) whereas the
appellant’s pleaded cause of action was based on the tort of negligence.

THE COURT OF APPEAL

C

[16] The Court of Appeal allowed the respondent’s appeal and set aside the
judgment of the High Court on the sole ground that the appellant had
abandoned his claim based on the tort of negligence. The Court of Appeal held
that the appellant’s cause of action was not based on a breach of contract but on D
the tort of negligence. The parties were bound by their pleadings.

[17] Learned counsel for the appellant however urged the Court of Appeal to
enter a declaratory judgment for the appellant pursuant to O 15 r 16 of the
Rules of the High Court 1980, based on a breach of contract, contending that E
the Court of Appeal could still make a declaratory order in the absence of such
pleading. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the appellant’s
cause of action was for the tort of negligence and not for breach of contract. As
the appellant’s counsel had conceded in his written submission before the High
Court that the appellant has no cause of action in the tort of negligence, which F
was the appellant’s pleaded case, the appeal by the respondent should therefore
be allowed. The Court of Appeal agreed with the respondent that the
appellant’s cause of action was based on negligence as can be seen from
paras 11, 12, 16 and 18 of the appellant’s statement of claim and that the G
appellant had abandoned his claim based on negligence. At para 23 of its
judgment, the Court of Appeal said:
The omnipotent words ‘negligently’, ‘negligence’ and ‘negligent’ appear in the
aforesaid paragraphs of the plaintiff ’s statement of claim. It is as clear as crystal that
the plaintiff ’s statement of claim is an illustration of a classic case based on the tort H
of negligence, and not based on a breach of contract. The expression ‘breach of
contract’ had never appeared at all, to say the least, it is non-existent’.

THE FEDERAL COURT

I
[18] There are two questions of law for our determination, namely:
(a) when evidence is led without objections at trial, can an appellate court
reverse of decision of the court on the sole ground that the cause of
action in negligence has been abandoned? and
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 303

A (b) is a plaintiff entitled to declaration of rights as pleaded?

[19] Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant’s pleaded
case against the respondent was based on negligence as well as breach of
contract.
B
Negligence:
(a) it was contended before us that the Court of Appeal erred in setting aside
the judgment of the High Court on the sole ground that the appellant
had abandoned his action based on the tort of negligence as this was not
C raised in the memorandum of appeal nor submitted upon. The court, in
an adversarial system of justice should never decide a case on a point or
issue not raised or submitted upon by counsel unless they have been
given an opportunity to address that point first: see Hock Hua Bank
(Sabah) Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin & Ors [1995] 2 MLJ 213; [1995] 2 CLJ
D 900, Hadmor Productions Ltd and others v Hamilton and others [1982] 2
WLR 322, Albion Hotel (Freshwater) Ltd v Maia E Silva & Anor [2002]
IRLR 200, The County Council of Hereford and Worcester v Neale [1986]
ICR 471; and
E (b) this is disputed by learned counsel for the respondent who pointed out
to us that the respondent’s memorandum of appeal against the decision
of the High Court stated clearly that the learned judge erred in law and
in fact in allowing the appellant’s claim based on a breach of contract
(which was not pleaded) whereas his pleaded case was based on
F negligence.

[20] We find that the contention by learned counsel for the appellant is
without merit for the following reasons. Firstly, the respondent’s memorandum
of appeal against the decision of the High Court expressly stated that the
G learned trial judge erred in allowing the appellant’s claim based on a breach of
contract when his pleaded case against the respondent was based on negligence.
Secondly, the claim that the appellant was denied the opportunity of being
heard is unfounded as it was the appellant himself who abandoned his cause of
action based on negligence. Thirdly, the appellant did not appeal against the
H trial judge’s ruling that the appellant has no cause of action in negligence.
BREACH OF CONTRACT

[21] The next thing to consider is whether the appellant’s pleaded case is also
I based on a breach of contract. Order 18 r 7(1) and (2) of the Rules of the High
Court 1980 lays down the basic rules of pleading:
(a) subject to the provisions of this rule and rules 10, 11 and 12 every pleading
must contain, and contain only a statement in a summary form of the
material fact on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defence, as
304 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

the case may be, but not the evidence by which these facts are to be proved, A
and the statement must be as brief as the nature of the case admits.
(b) without prejudice to paragraph (1) the effect of any document or the
purpose of any conversation referred to in the pleading must if material, be
briefly stated, and the precise words of the document or conversations
shall not be stated, except in so far as those words are themselves material. B

[22] The function of pleading is to give fair notice of the case which has to be
met: Rosita bte Baharom (an infant) v Sabedin bin Salleh [1993] 1 MLJ 393,
Perniagaan Kinabalu (S) Sdn Bhd v Sua Ah Yoke & Ham Jon See [2002] MLJU C
601. This is to prevent the opposing party from being taken by surprise by
evidence which departs from pleaded material facts, for such evidence if
allowed, will prejudice and embarrass or mislead the opposing party: see
Superintendent of Lands and Surveys (4th Div) & Anor v Hamit bin Matusin &
Ors [1994] 3 MLJ 185; [1994] 3 CLJ 567; Raja Abdul Malek Muzaffar Shah D
bin Raja Shahruzzaman v Setiausaha Suruhanjaya Pasukan Polis & Ors [1995]
1 MLJ 308. A good pleading should contain a statement of: (1) facts, not law,
(2) material facts only, (3) facts, not evidence, and (4) facts stated in a summary
form: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed, Reissue), para 13.
E
[23] What are material facts? All facts which must be proved in order to
establish the ground of claim or defence are material: Philipps v Philipps (1878)
4 QBD 127 at pp 133–134. Parties are bound by their pleadings. This is a rule
which will be strictly enforced by the court. Thus, where a party’s case in based
on a contract and the other party to the contract is in breach of it, these material F
facts must be pleaded.

[24] Halsbury’s Law of England, at para 26 illustrates how a case based on

contract should be pleaded:
G
In pleading a contract it must be stated whether it is express or implied. The
pleading should state the date of the alleged agreement and the names of all the
parties to it. If the contract is express, it must be shown whether the contract is oral
or in writing, and if the contract or any part of it is in writing, the document or
documents must be identified. If the contract is not under seal, the consideration
should be stated. If any contract or any relationship is to be implied from a series of H
letters or conversations, or otherwise from a number of circumstances, the effect of
the letters or conversations, or reference generally to the circumstances should be
pleaded briefly, but not set out in detail. If the person pleading desire to rely in the
alternative upon more contracts or relationships than one, each contract or
relationship which is to be implied may be stated in the alternative. I

[25] We agree with the Court of Appeal that the appellant’s cause of action
was based on negligence and not on a breach of contract. We have looked at the
averments in the appellant’s statement of claim. We are unable to find any clear
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 305

A averment that the appellant’s case was based on contract and that the
respondent had, in breach of the contract, uplifted the FDR without the
appellant’s consent. The appellant’s cause of action based on negligence is
clearly stated in paras 11 and 12 of the statement of claim:
11. Notwithstanding the above stated instructions, the 1st Defendant negligently
B
allowed the said Sallim Bin Mohamad to cash a cheque No 53100 dated 26.7.1991
belonging to the said Limited Company for RM300,000 without the signature of
the Second Defendant. As a consequence the said Overdraft Facility was completely
utilised.

C 12. Despite the 1st Defendant’s above negligence, the 1st Defendant then wrote to
the 2nd Defendant stating that the 1st Defendant intended to uplift the said FDR
which at that point of time amounted to RM231,393.00 in order to reduce the said
Overdraft Facility of RM300,000.00.

D [26] Not a single word of ‘contract’, let alone the breach of it, is stated in the
pleading. The appellant blamed his son (the second defendant) and sued him
for unlawfully authorising the respondent to uplift the FDR. He later
withdrew the suit against the son, leaving the respondent as the sole defendant
in the suit.
E
[27] It is settled law that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not
allowed to adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded: Samuel Naik
Siang Ting v Public Bank Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 1, State Government of Perak v
Muniandy [1986] 1 MLJ 490, Veronica Lee Ha Ling & Ors v Maxisegar Sdn
F Bhd [2011] 2 MLJ 141; [2009] 6 CLJ 232. In Lee Ah Chor v Southern Bank
Bhd [1991] 1 MLJ 428; [1991] 1 CLJ Rep 239 it was held that where a vital
issue was not raised in the pleadings, it could not be allowed to be granted and
to succeed on appeal. A decision based on an issue which was not raised by the
parties in their pleadings is liable to be set aside: Yew Wan Leong v Lai Kok Chye
G [1990] 2 MLJ 152. In The Chartered Bank v Yong Chan [1974] 1 MLJ 157 the
Federal Court set aside the judgment of the trial judge as it was decided on an
issue not raised on the pleadings. In that case the trial judge erred in concluding
that the pleadings included a claim for breach of contract as well as a claim for
libel.
H
[28] Learned counsel for the appellant could not pinpoint to us that breach
of contract was also the appellant’s pleaded case against the respondent. He
candidly admitted in his written submission that the appellant’s ‘plea of breach
of contract lacked elegance’. Thus the appeal before us is not directly based on
I the ground that the Court of Appeal erred in disregarding the appellant’s
pleaded case based on a breach of contract as that is bound to fail.

[29] The appellant’s contention is that evidence of contract between the

appellant and the respondent and the breach of it by the latter had been led at
306 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

trial without objections and as such the court is duty bound to consider the said A
evidence. The opposing party is deemed to have waived the requirement that
the material facts relating to the contract must be pleaded. In such
circumstance there was no element of surprise and prejudice. Learned counsel
for the appellant relied on Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd v Arab-Malaysian
Merchant Bank Bhd [1995] 3 MLJ 331, Perniagaan Kinabalu (S) Sdn Bhd v B
Sua Ah Yoke & Ham Jon See [2002] MLJU 601, Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd
v Chang Ching Chuen & Ors [1998] 1 MLJ 465 in support of his contention.

[30] In Boustead Trading (1985) Sdn Bhd’s case the Federal Court at p 342
C
ruled that:
Thirdly, where there is no pleaded case of estoppel, but there is let in, without any
objection, a body of evidence to support the plea, and argument is directed upon the
point, it is the bounden duty of a court to consider the evidence and the submissions
and came to a decision on the issue. It is no answer, in such circumstances, to say D
that the point was not pleaded.

[31] In Pekan Nenas Industries Sdn Bhd’s case the plaintiffs ie Chang Ching
Chuen & Ors (the respondents in the appeal before the Federal Court) brought
an action in the High Court against the defendants, seeking, inter alia, a E
declaration that the sale of the lands to the purchaser, namely Pekan Nenas
Industries Sdn Bhd was null and void. The plaintiffs obtained an injunction to
prohibit the sale. The purchaser was allowed to intervene merely for the
purpose of setting aside the injunction. The purchaser was not made a party to
the suit between the plaintiffs and the defendants. At the trial, the purchaser F
through its chairman gave evidence without objection that the purchaser was a
bona fide purchaser without notice. The High Court allowed the plaintiff ’s
claim and set aside the sale but it ruled against the purchaser holding that the
purchaser/intervenor was not a bona fide purchaser. The Court of Appeal
affirmed the decision of the High Court. The defendants did not appeal. But G
the purchaser appealed to the Federal Court. The respondents contended that
the purchaser/intervenor was never a party to the proceedings in the High
Court and that the evidence on behalf of the purchaser was not supported by
the pleadings. The Federal Court, in response to the contention that the matter
was not pleaded, at p 503 said: H
No objection was taken to evidence being led on behalf of the intervenor/purchaser
and the case was argued both in the High Court and on appeal to the Court of
Appeal, as though the intervenor/purchaser was a co-defendant which had filed a
pleading and it was on this basis that the case was heard and determined.
I
[32] Learned counsel for the appellant further stressed the point that
evidence given at the trial could, in appropriate circumstance, overcome defects
in the pleadings where the net result of such evidence is to prevent the other
side from being taken by surprise. One exception to the rule that evidence
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 307

A given at trial without objection could overcome defects of pleading is when

such evidence represents a radical departure from the pleadings, and it is not
just a variation, modification or development of what has been alleged in the
pleading in question: see Perniagaan Kinabalu (S) Sdn Bhd’s case.

B [33] Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the law on the
question posed by the appellant is settled and had been adequately answered by
this court in Superintendent of Lands and Surveys (4th Div) & Anor v Hamit bin
Matusin & Ors [1994] 3 MLJ 185; [1994] 3 CLJ 567. In that case the
respondents (plaintiffs) claimed that they have acquired native customary
C
rights over certain lands by virtue of Sarawak’s Land Code. They sought an
injunction to restrain the appellants (defendants) from building on their land.
The defendants in their defence denied that the appellants had acquired native
customary rights over the said land. This defence was just a mere denial without
further particulars as to any reason for such mere denial. But at the trial,
D
evidence was given and admitted without objection as to why they denied the
respondents claim that they had acquired native customary rights over the said
land. One of the reasons was that the land were within a river bank reserve on
which no one can claim any title thereon by virtue of Sarawak’s Land Code.
The other reason was that the land belonged to Sarawak Shell Oil Ltd.
E
[34] It was only in the final submission after the conclusion of all evidence
that an objection was raised by the respondents for the first time that such
defence were not pleaded. One of the issues which the Supreme Court in that
F case had to decide was this:
Whether by allowing the appellants to adduce the evidence without any objection
until such a late stage and not objecting to the evidence as and when the evidence
emerged, the respondent were deemed to have waived the impropriety of admitting
such evidence.
G
[35] The Supreme Court at p 190 (MLJ); p 567 (CLJ) said:
Generally, in civil cases only, both parties can validate any mode of adducing
evidence by consent, express or inferred, even when such mode is irregular, for any
irregularity is deemed to be waived by such consent. Technical rules of evidence can
H be to a limited extent, even dispensed with by a court without such consent also,
please see Baerlein v Chartered Mercantile Bank [1895] Ch D 488; similarly with
technical rules of procedure. Therefore when such evidence represents a departure
from pleading, it should be objected to as when and where it is adduced, and it will
be too late when it only objected to later on, as in the final submission at the close
of evidence as in the instant appeal. In these circumstances, the party facing such
I
evidence at variance from pleading, by failing to object cannot be said to be taken by
surprise, prejudiced, misled or embarrassed. Otherwise, the other side of the coin
would be, in the event of such objection raised at the stage of final submission being
accepted by the court, that the party adducing such evidence may face the great risk
of being denied leave to amend his pleading in question at that stage.
308 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

Such evidence when given without any objection by the opposing party will further A
have the effect of curing the absence of such plea in the relevant pleading, in other
words, the effect of overcoming such defect in such pleading. As was stated by
Federal Court in Ang Koon Kau & Anor v Lau Piang Ngong [1984] 2 MLJ 277 (FC)
at p 278:
Evidence given at the trial can therefore in appropriate circumstance overcome B
defect in the pleadings where the net result of such evidence is to prevent the
other side from being taken by surprise.
There is however, at least one important exception to such curing of defect of
pleading by evidence departing from such pleading without objection then and C
there to such evidence.
The exception is when such evidence represents a radical departure from the
pleading, and is not just a variation, modification or development of what has been
alleged in the pleading in question, please wee Waghorn v George Wimpey & Co Ltd
[1969] 1 WLR 1764, which was approved by Ang Koon Kau & Anor v Lau Piang D
Ngong and John Stein & Co Ltd v O’Hanlon [1965] AC 890.

[36] The cases cited by both counsel to us clearly show that the law on the
first question posed by the appellant is settled. It is this. In a case where the
matter or material facts are not pleaded but evidence is led without objections E
at trial, the court is duty bound to consider such evidence although it may be
a departure from the pleading. It has the effect of curing defect in the pleading.
In such a case the opposite party is not taken by surprise, prejudiced,
embarrassed or misled. The exception is where the evidence represents a radical
departure from the pleading and is not just a variation, modification or F
development of what has been alleged in the pleading. Dato’ Hamzah bin Abdul
Majid v Omega Securities Sdn Bhd [2015] 6 MLJ 725; [2015] 9 CLJ 677 is an
illustration of a case where there was a radical departure from the pleading. In
that case, loan, which was not a pleaded defence but evidence of it was adduced
without objection was rejected as a defence as it was a radical departure from G
pleading, not just a variation, modification or development of what had been
alleged in the pleading.

[37] The next question is whether there was evidence led without objections
at trial, as contended by learned counsel for the appellant, that the respondent H
was in breach of contract by uplifting the FDR without the consent of the
appellant. This is a question of fact which can only be determined by looking
at the evidence.

[38] Learned counsel for the appellant did not pinpoint to us where, in the I
records of appeal that the appellant had led evidence, without objections that
the respondent was in breach of contract by uplifting the FDR without his
consent. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that there was no such
evidence. PW1 or PW2 did not in their evidence allege that the respondent had
 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (previously
known as Perwira Habib Bank Malaysia Bhd)
[2018] 2 MLJ (Abu Samah Nordin FCJ) 309

A acted in breach of the terms of the memorandum of deposit when it uplifted

the FDR without the appellant’s consent.

[39] The appellant’s case against the respondent was based on his own
evidence (PW1) and his son’s evidence (PW2). We have read PW1’s and PW2’s
B witnesses statements and their oral testimony before the High Court. We are
unable to find any evidence from them alleging that the respondent had
breached any term of the memorandum of deposit when it uplifted the FDR
without the appellant’s consent. The appellant’s claim against the respondent is
C
for the refund of his FDR which was uplifted to settle the outstanding amount
in the overdraft account. The monies in the overdraft account were fully
utilised due to the respondent’s alleged negligence in honouring the cheque
presented by Sallim without it being countersigned by PW2. The appellant
explained the nature of his claim in his witness statement as follows:
D Q40. So what is your claim today?
A. I want the 1st Defendant to refund the monies uplifted on 15.4.1993 amounting
to RM233,155.60 and repay the same with interest.
Q41. Why?
E A. Because what the 1st Defendant did was unlawful in that:
(a) They should not have allowed Sallim to draw on the Overdraft Account of
the company; and
(b) They were negligent.
F
It is patently clear that the claim is not based on a breach of contract.

[40] It was contended that no fresh memorandum of deposit was executed

when the banking facilities were transferred from OKE to the company.
G Therefore the FDR was never pledged as a security for the overdraft facility of
RM300,000 which was transferred to the company. But this is contrary to the
appellant’s own testimony. He admitted, during cross-examination that the
memorandum of deposit was also transferred to Omar Khayam Enterprises
Sdn Bhd.
H
[41] This is what the appellant said in cross-examination:
Q: So this is the Memorandum of deposit which you gave for the overdraft facility
of RM300,000 is this correct?
I A: Yes
Q: Was this Memorandum of Deposit also transferred to Omar Khayam Enterprise
Sdn Bhd?
A: Yes
310 Malayan Law Journal [2018] 2 MLJ

Q: Do you know that one of the terms of this Memorandum of Deposit is that the A
bank is at liberty to withdraw from the fixed deposit receipt without reference to you
or Raja Iftikar or Omar Khayam Enterprise?
A: No
Q: But you sign this agreement?
B
A: Yes.

[42] The appellant cannot plead ignorance and conveniently said that he did
not know the terms of the agreement which he signed. Clause 6 of the
memorandum of deposit expressly states that the respondent is at liberty at any C
time to withdraw the deposit and to apply the proceeds thereof in or towards
the discharge of the appellant’s account without reference to him.

[43] The finding of the learned trial judge that the respondent was in breach
D
of the contract in uplifting the fixed deposit receipt without the appellant’s
consent was contrary to the cl 6 of the memorandum of deposit. It is also
against the weight of evidence. The appellant himself admitted that the
memorandum of deposit was also transferred to the company. It must be noted
that the memorandum of deposit was signed by the appellant together with his E
son. The respondent had, before uplifting the FDR, written to the son for
approval to uplift the FDR and the son consented to it in writing. The
respondent’s letter to the appellant approving the transfer of the banking
facilities from OKE to the company was subject to the condition that, ‘All
facilities together with liabilities will be transferred from Omar Khayam F
Enterprise to Omar Khayam Enterprises Sdn Bhd’.

[44] We agree with the contention of learned counsel for the respondent that
the first question was framed on the supposition that ‘evidence is led without
objections at trial’. In truth we find that there was no evidence adduced without G
objections to support the appellant’s contention that the respondent was in
breach of the contract, namely, the memorandum of deposit by uplifting the
FDR without the appellant’s consent. The respondent is clearly at liberty to
uplift the FDR without the consent of the appellant by virtue of cl 6 of the
H
memorandum of deposit.

[45] For the abovesaid reasons, we do not find it necessary to answer the first
question posed to us. In view of our decision with respect to the first question
we also do not find it necessary to answer the second question. In our judgment I
the Court of Appeal did not err in reversing the decision of the High Court on
the sole ground that the cause of action in negligence has been abandoned.

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Reported by Afiq Mohamad Noor

S/N fgCUqtPTeUCrNW7ns9lbHw
**Note : Serial number will be used to verify the originality of this document via eFILING portal
 [2022] 2 PIR [49] 493

1
Jamal bin Abd Karal
v
Rekha binti Nustari
(suing on her behalf as a widow and on behalf of
5
three (3) children as dependants to Faizal bin
Muhamad, deceased) & Anor

High Court, Tawau – Civil Appeal No. TWU-12B-1/2-2021

10
Lim Hock Leng J
August 19, 2021

Appeal from Sessions Court, Tawau –

15
Summons Case No. TWU-A53KJ-7/5-2019 (SC) as reported in [2022] 2 PIR [57]

[49] Quantum – Abrasion and laceration – Laceration over right ear pinna –
Head – Nose and eyes bleed – Psychological and emotional trauma – Right cranial
nerve III palsy – Right craniotomy wound – Right eye periorbital haematoma –
Right eye refractive error (blurring of eye) – Right parietal bone depressed fracture
20 extending to frontal bone – Retrograde amnesia – Surgical scars over head –
Underlying temporoparietal extradural and subdural haemorrhage over right
parietal bone (moderate traumatic head injury with intracranial haemorrhage) –
Lower limb – Closed fracture distal 1∕3 of left tibia and fibula – Grade IIIA open
comminuted fracture midshaft of right tibia – Puncture wounds over anterior shin
25
The Sessions Court had in this instance found the appellant ("the defendant")
wholly liable for the death of the first respondent’s ("the first plaintiff")
husband and the injuries to the second respondent ("the second plaintiff")
pursuant to a motorvehicle accident. The Sessions Court judge ("the SCJ")
had awarded damages accordingly and the defendant has hence filed the
30 instant appeal only as regards the SCJ’s finding on quantum.

Award (Based on 100% liability)

(First plaintiff)
1. General damages
(a) Bereavement – RM 10,000.00
35 (b) Loss of dependency (RM1,050.00
× 12 months × 12 years) – RM151,200.00

2. Special damages
(a) Cost of transportation – RM 500.00
40 (b) Funeral expenses – RM 5,000.00
494 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [49]

(Second plaintiff) 1
1. General damages
(a) Closed fracture distal 1∕3 of the left tibia and
fibula – RM30,000.00
(b) Cost of cranioplasty – RM20,000.00
(c) Cost of future surgery – RM10,000.00 5
(d) Grade IIIA open comminuted fracture
midshaft of the right tibia – RM30,000.00
(e) Laceration over the right ear pinna – RM 3,000.00
(f) Loss of earnings (RM1,000.00 × 14 months) – RM14,000.00
(g) Nose and eyes bleed – RM 2,000.00
10
(h) Pain and suffering during future surgery – RM 5,000.00
(i) Partial loss of earnings (RM500.00
× 112 months) – RM56,000.00
(j) Psychological and emotional trauma – RM30,000.00
(k) Puncture wounds over the anterior shin – RM 5,000.00
(l) Retrograde amnesia – RM 2,000.00 15
(m) Right cranial nerve III palsy and right eye
refractive error (blurring of eye) – RM40,000.00
(n) Right craniotomy wound – RM 6,000.00
(o) Right eye periorbital haematoma – RM 8,000.00
(p) Right parietal bone depressed fracture
20
extending to the frontal bone – RM25,000.00
(q) Surgical scars over the head – RM 5,000.00
(r) Underlying temporoparietal extradural and
subdural haemorrhage over the right
parietal bone (moderate traumatic head
injury with intracranial haemorrhage) – RM50,000.00 25

2. Special damages
(a) Cost of documents – RM 500.00
(b) Hospital bills – RM 188.00
(c) Nursing care – RM 4,800.00 30
(d) Transportation cost – RM 500.00

Held, allowing the appeal in part with no order as to costs

1. As regards the first plaintiff
(a) The award for loss of dependency is reduced from RM151,200.00 35
(RM1,050.00 (security guard + part time carpenter) × 12 months ×
12 years) to RM64,800.00 (RM600.00 (security guard) – RM150.00 ×
12 months × 12 years);
(b) The award for funeral expenses in the sum of RM5,000.00 is
maintained; and
40
(c) The award for transportation costs in the sum of RM500.00 is set aside
as the first plaintiff had abandoned it through her counsel.
 Jamal bin Abd Karal v
Rekha binti Nustari & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [49] Lim Hock Leng J 495

1 2. As regards the second plaintiff

(a) The award for right parietal bone depressed fracture extending to the
frontal bone in the sum of RM25,000.00 is set aside on the ground of
overcompensation;
(b) The awards for right craniotomy wound in the sum of RM6,000.00;
5 surgical scars over the head in the sum of RM5,000.00; retrograde
amnesia in the sum of RM2,000.00; puncture wounds over the
anterior shin in the sum of RM5,000.00; right cranial nerve III palsy
and right eye refractive error (blurring of eye) in the sum of
RM 40,000.00; pain and suffering during future surgery in the sum of
RM5,000.00; psychological and emotional trauma in the sum of
10
RM30,000.00; and nose and eyes bleed in the sum of RM2,000.00 are
set aside as they were not pleaded;
(c) The award for right eye periorbital haematoma in the sum of
RM8,000.00 is reduced to RM4,000.00 as the second plaintiff had
pleaded for a sum of RM6,000.00 and pursuant to the Revised
15 Compendium of Personal Injury Awards (2018) the appropriate range for
haematoma around one eye is RM3,000.00 to RM4,000.00;
(d) The award for cost of cranioplasty in the sum of RM20,000.00 is
reduced to RM10,000.00 on the ground of overcompensation;
(e) The award for cost of future surgery in the sum of RM10,000.00 is set
20
aside as no evidence was adduced as to any other future operation;
(f) The award for nursing care by the second plaintiff’s wife in the sum of
RM4,800.00 is maintained;
(g) The awards for pre-trial loss of earnings in the sum of RM14,000.00
(RM1,000.00 × 14 months) and partial loss of earnings in the sum of
RM56,000.00 (RM500.00 × 112 months) are set aside due to
25 contradictory or at least inconsistent findings of fact; and
(h) No interest is awarded for loss of dependency for the first plaintiff on
account of the deceased’s occupation as a security guard and no
interest is awarded for cranioplasty for the second plaintiff.

Case(s) referred to by the court

30
Abdul Ghani Hamid v Abdul Nasir Abdul Jabbar & Anor [1995] 4 CLJ 317
Abdul Hadi b Abd Rozak v Mohamad Asyraf b Mat Radzi [2018] 2 PIR [23]
Ahmad Daman Huri b Hussein v Koo Chin Yau [1990] 3 MLJ 53
Ang Yee Cheng & Anor v Ang Siang Hock (seorang yang tidak berkeupayaan dan
35 mendakwa melalui Koh Beng Guek, wakil litigasinya) [2016] 2 PIR [46]; [2016] 9
MLJ 238
British Transport Commission v Gourley [1956] AC 185
Chan Yung Sheng v Zakaria Awang [2019] 5 CLJ 549
Iftikar Ahmed Khan (sebagai wakil bagi harta pusaka Sardar Mohd Roshan Khan) (si
mati) v Perwira Affin Bank Bhd (dahulunya dikenali sebagai Perwira Habib Bank
40
Malaysia Bhd) [2017] 8 AMR 517; [2018] 1 CLJ 415
Khaliah bte Abbas v Pesaka Capital Corp Sdn Bhd [1997] 1 MLJ 376
Liong Thoo v Sawiyah & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 286
496 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [49]

Mahmod b Kailan v Goh Seng Choon & Anor [1976] 1 LNS 68 1

Murtadza b Mohamed Hassan v Chong Swee Pian [1980] 1 MLJ 216
Sang ak Abui (suing through his wife and next friend, Mis ak Ji'iam) v Jenuang ak
Nirau & Anor [2016] 2 PIR [25]; [2016] 1 LNS 925
Seah Yit Chen v Singapore Bas Services Ltd & Anor [1990] 4 MLRH 605
Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak & Ors (and Other Cases) [1996] 2 CLJ 5
1068

Legislation referred to by the court

Civil Law Act 1956, s 7(3)(iv)(a)
10
Other references

Compendium of Personal Injury Awards (Revised 2018)

Solicitors

Catherine Chau Siew Ping (Catherine Chau & Assoc) for appellant 15
Justinus B Bahrum (Justinus Bahrum, Taidin & Dominic) for repondents

Judgment received: August 26, 2021

Lim Hock Leng J

20
The appeal

[1] Following a trial, the learned Sessions Court judge ("the SCJ") found
the defendant/appellant who was driving a Honda Civic car wholly liable in
negligence in a road traffic accident on May 31, 2017, which resulted in the
death of one Faizal bin Muhamad ("the deceased") who was riding a Honda 25
motorcycle along Jalan Kalabakan, Tawau, and injuries to one Rosli bin
Salleh who was the pillion passenger.

[2] An action was brought by the widow suing as the first plaintiff
("first respondent"), suing on her own behalf as a widow and on behalf of her
30
three children as dependants of the deceased, and by the pillion passenger as
the second plaintiff ("second respondent").
[3] The appellant was aggrieved by the damages awarded by the SCJ to
each of the respondents. Hence the appeal against the quantum of damages
which now lies before this court. The appellant is not appealing against the 35
finding of liability. There was no cross-appeal.
[4] The principles applicable to an appeal against quantum was laid down
by the Federal Court in Mahmod bin Kailan v Goh Seng Choon & Anor [1976] 1
LNS 68:
40
The principle upon which we can interfere with the award has been stated by
Lord Wright in Davies v. Powell Duffryn Associated Collieries Ltd [1942] AC 601, 616,
617 as follows: Where the award is that of the judge alone, the appeal is by way of
 Jamal bin Abd Karal v
Rekha binti Nustari & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [49] Lim Hock Leng J 497

1 rehearing on damages as on all other issues, but as there is generally so much

room for individual choice so that the assessment of damages is more like an
exercise of discretion than an ordinary act of decision, the appellate court is
particularly slow to reverse the trial judge on a question of the amount of
damages. It is difficult to lay down any precise rule which will cover all cases, but
a good general guide is given by Greer LJ in Flint v. Lovell. In effect the court,
5 before it interferes with an award of damages, should be satisfied that the judge
has acted on a wrong principle of law, or has misapprehended the facts, or has for
these other reasons made a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage suffered. It
is not enough that there is a balance of opinion or preference. The scale must go
down heavily against the figure attacked if the appellate court is to interfere,
whether on the ground of excess or insufficiency.
10
As against the first respondent
[5] The appellant appeals against the awards of the SCJ in favour of the
first respondent for:
15 (i) RM151,200.00 as damages for loss of support/dependency;

(ii) RM5,000.00 for funeral expenses; and

(iii) RM500.00 transportation.

20 [6] In awarding loss of dependency, the SCJ premised it on the deceased’s

occupation as a part-time carpenter earning RM800.00 per month, and as a
security guard earning RM600.00 per month. He deducted 25% as living
expenses, resulting in a nett sum of RM1,050.00 (RM12,600.00 per year) ×
12 years = RM151,200.00.
25 [7] Learned counsel for the respondents cited a litany of authorities which
hold that an appellate court should be slow to interfere with a trial court’s
findings. I am mindful of the well-entrenched principle but in view of the
SCJ’s observations on the deceased’s job as a carpenter and the evidence
available, I will have to disallow that part of the claim based on the
30
deceased’s occupation as a carpenter.
[8] In fact the SCJ observed that "the court is not too clear of the actual income
of the Deceased because of quite insufficient evidence pleaded," there was
insufficient evidence of the deceased’s actual income, the testimony of the
first respondent (the deceased’s wife) "is quite insufficient". In spite of his
35 doubts, the SCJ "believe(d) that the deceased might be a part time carpenter and the
salary exactly is not known so therefore the court uses its own discretion in
assessment and rule that the deceased could have probably earn about RM800/- per
month".
[9] To hold that the deceased was earning RM800.00 per month is
40 speculative and plainly wrong in the face of all the uncertainty expressed by
the SCJ himself, when the only purported evidence of his earnings as a
carpenter is in the form of three cash bills which were not in running order
498 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [49]

and were all issued in May 2017, and no independent witness (such as a 1
customer or the penghulu of the deceased’s village) came forth to testify on
his earnings. Further, as pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant, the
SCJ vacillated between saying that the deceased earned RM800.00 per
month, and the deceased and the second respondent (who were said to be
working together) jointly earned that amount per month. Furthermore, the 5
contents of the bills appear to be unclear and the possibility that the bills were
for a one-off job cannot be discounted since they were all issued in the space
of one month only and there were no other bills. These bills could not be
considered to be part of a regular income stream. The customer was said to
have left for Indonesia but no details of his name or the nature of the work
10
was provided. See PWS6, Q&A 21. The deceased could not be said to have
been receiving earnings by his labour prior to his death, pursuant to
s 7(3)(iv)(a) of the Civil Law Act 1956.

[10] By contrast, PW7, one Jainuddin bin Ambolaut, testified that he had
been the treasurer of the Koperasi Peneroka Felda Umas 02 Tawau for 15
10 years and referred to the documentary payment for the deceased’s salary
from March to May 2017. PW7 testified that "Faizal bin Muhammad bekerja
sebagai pengawal keselamatan menjaga stesen minyak pada waktu malam," and
"gaji Faizal bin Muhammad ialah RM600.00 sebulan". See PWS6, Q&A 6-7. It was
argued for the appellant that: (i) the documentary records were questionable
as no one else had copies, and (ii) there was no contract of employment and 20
the position was probationary, not permanent. The first respondent however
gave direct evidence of her receipt of payment direct from PW7, which the
SCJ – having the audio-visual advantage of observing the witnesses –
accepted. As for the appellant’s contention that the deceased only held a
probationary position, the short answer to it may be found in the decision of 25
the Court of Appeal in Khaliah bte Abbas v Pesaka Capital Corp Sdn Bhd [1997] 1
MLJ 376:
Although the word "probation" or "probationary" was not found in the definition
of workman in s 2 of the Act, the word "apprentice" was mentioned in the section
and an apprentice would normally be a probationer … Consequently, an 30
employee on probation would enjoy the same rights as a permanent or confirmed
employee and, therefore, his or her services could not be terminated without just
cause or excuse …

[11] In brief, that part of the order which allowed for loss of dependency
based on the deceased’s purported earnings as a carpenter is set aside, while 35
the loss of dependency based on the deceased’s salary as a security guard at
the petrol station is maintained subject to a deduction of 25% for personal
expenses: RM600.00 – RM150.00 per month = RM450.00 × 12 months ×
12 years = RM64,800.00.
40
[12] The award of RM5,000.00 for funeral expenses is maintained. The SCJ
allowed RM5,000.00 "even though there is no receipt but this is a reasonable
amount for a Muslim funeral expenses". In Takong Tabari v Government of Sarawak
 Jamal bin Abd Karal v
Rekha binti Nustari & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [49] Lim Hock Leng J 499

1 & Ors (and Other Cases) [1996] 2 CLJ 1068, RM3,000.00 was allowed though
receipts were not produced.

[13] Taking into account inflation, RM5,000.00 is not a sum so out of the
way that a reasonable judge similarly circumstanced would not have ordered
it. In Abdul Ghani Hamid v Abdul Nasir Abdul Jabbar & Anor [1995] 4 CLJ 317, it
5
was held that changes in the value of money must be taken into account.
See also Chan Yung Sheng v Zakaria Awang [2019] 5 CLJ 549.
[14] The unexpected and traumatic nature of a fatal road accident is such
that the dependants cannot be expected to meticulously keep every receipt or
10
maintain records of the costs. I would agree with learned counsel for the first
respondent that the focus of any wife, like PW8/the first respondent, at a
time of grief or shock, would be to arrange for the funeral of the deceased
spouse instead of keeping an eye on receipts.
[15] In Takong (supra), Malanjum J (as he then was) held:
15
For the funeral expenses no evidence was adduced as to the exact sum spent.

However, this Court should be allowed to consider a figure as it could not be

denied that expenses would have been incurred. (see: Pang Ah Chee v. Cheng Kwee
Seng [1985] CLJ 236; [1985] 1 MLJ 153). Hence, the sum of RM3,000 as submitted by
the learned Counsel for the plaintiff is not excessive and I allow it.
20

[16] As for the award of RM500.00 transportation costs, it has to be set aside
as the first respondent had abandoned it through her counsel.

As against the second respondent

25 [17] For the second respondent, the SCJ granted a multitude of awards, out
of which the appellant appealed against nine of them.

[18] The first of the complaints is that the original description of an injury
described as "right parietal bone depressed fracture extending to frontal and
30
parietal bone with underlying temporo-parietal extradural and subdural
haemorrhage" was split into two parts which resulted in two awards:

(a) right parietal bone depressed fracture extending to frontal and

parietal bone (RM25,000.00); and

(b) Underlying temporo-parietal extradural and subdural haemorrhage

35
over right parietal bone (moderate traumatic brain injury with
intracranial haemorrhage) (RM50,000.00).

[19] The appellant submits that the head injury assessed as a whole merits
an award of RM50,000.00 only, and the additional award of RM25,000.00 for
40 what was in truth part of the claim for the head injury as a whole ought to be
500 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [49]

set aside. The following passage in Seah Yit Chen v Singapore Bas Services Ltd & 1
Anor [1990] 4 MLRH 605 at 607, was cited:
... where injuries sustained are related to same part or function of body there
should be only one award, but if injuries are to different parts of body and affect
different functions then it is appropriate to make separate award for each head of
damage ... 5

[20] I would think that it is not so much whether two separate claims are
made for one injury (the appellant argues that the injuries – the fracture and
haemorrhage are in the same area, whereby one injury leads to another); but
rather the real issue is what is the proper aggregate quantum.
10
[21] On a reading of the grounds of judgment, I would agree that the
Sessions Court had intended to and did award RM50,000.00 for the whole
head injury, and the RM25,000.00 award for the haemorrhage ought to be set
aside else it would result in over-compensation. The relevant part of the
grounds is reproduced: 15

Underlying temporo-parietal extradural and subdural hemorrhage over the right

parietal bone (Moderate traumatic head injury with intracranial hemorrhage).
On this point I have considered the case authorities submitted by both the plaintiff
and the defendant counsel. The case authorities submitted by the plaintiff’s
counsel which is Micheal a/l Vincent v Mohanraj a/l Sandran & Anor [Sessions Court, 20
Shah Alam] [October, 2015] in which RM100,000/- was awarded is not applicable
to our present case today. To put it in brief the second plaintiff in our case today
does not suffer similar serious head injuries. In fact the second plaintiff was able to
work as a lorry driver, a job that requires him to be alert. It means that the impact
of the accident on the second plaintiff are not as serious as the one in the
Shah Alam Sessions Court case. I allow the award of RM50,000/-. 25

[22] The second point the appellant makes is that the Sessions Court
awarded RM6,000.00 for a right craniotomy wound, RM5,000.00 for surgical
scars over the head, and RM2,000.00 for retrograde amnesia when these were
not pleaded. As held by Lord Goddard in British Transport Commission v
Gourley [1956] AC 185 at 205: 30

In an action for personal injuries the damages are always divided into two main
parts. First, there is what is referred to as special damage which has to be specifically
pleaded and proved. Secondly, there is general damages which the law implies and
which is not specifically pleaded. (Emphasis added.)
35
[23] Likewise, in Sang anak Abui v Jenuang anak Nirau & Anor [2016] 2 PIR
[25]; [2016] 1 LNS 925, Justice Ismail Brahim held that "the court could only
make an award on the respective head of injuries pleaded in the statement of claim
upon proof of the injuries either by way of written report or oral testimony of the
witnesses". (Emphasis added.) As was observed by Abu Samah Nordin FCJ in 40
 Jamal bin Abd Karal v
Rekha binti Nustari & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [49] Lim Hock Leng J 501

1 Iftikar Ahmed Khan v Perwira Affin Bank Berhad [2017] 8 AMR 517; [2018] 1 CLJ
415:
It is settled law that parties are bound by their pleadings and are not allowed to
adduce facts and issues which they have not pleaded: Samuel Naik Siang Ting v.
Public Bank Bhd [2015] 8 CLJ 944; [2015] 6 MLJ 1, State Government of Perak v.
5 Muniandy [1985] 1 LNS 117; [1986] 1 MLJ 490, Veronica Lee Ha Ling & Ors v.
Maxisegar Sdn Bhd [2009] 6 CLJ 232. In Lee Ah Chor v. Southern Bank Bhd [1991] 1 CLJ
667; [1991] 1 CLJ (Rep) 239 it was held that where a vital issue was not raised in the
pleadings, it could not be allowed to be granted and to succeed on appeal.
A decision based on an issue which was not raised by the parties in their pleadings
is liable to be set aside: Yew Wan Leong v. Lai Kok Chye [1990] 1 CLJ 1113; [1990] 1 CLJ
10 (Rep) 330; [1990] 2 MLJ 152. In The Chartered Bank v. Yong Chan [1974] 1 LNS 178;
[1974] 1 MLJ 157 the Federal Court set aside the judgment of the trial judge as it
was decided on an issue not raised on the pleadings. In that case, the trial judge
erred in concluding that the pleadings included a claim for breach of contract as
well as a claim for libel.
15
[24] As such, those awards as well as the Sessions Court’s awards of
RM5,000.00 (puncture wounds over shin, the third point of appeal), and
RM40,000.00 (right cranial nerve III palsy and right eye refractive error, the
fifth point of appeal) have to be set aside.

20
[25] The claims of RM5,000.00 for pain and suffering during future surgery;
(b) RM30,000.00 for psychological and emotional trauma; and (c) RM2,000.00
for nose and eye bleeds – were also not pleaded, and the awards (sixth point
of appeal) are to be set aside. While it is true the second plaintiff prayed for
general damages for pain or suffering (prayer (b)), the future surgery and
details were not. Additionally, the assumption of pain and suffering in a
25 future surgery is speculative in the absence of cogent evidence.
[26] The omissions in the statement of claim/claims not pleaded would
otherwise cause grave injustice to the appellant/defendant who would be
deprived of the opportunity to plead his defence and to marshal rebuttal
evidence.
30
[27] In any case, aside from the cardinal point on pleading, no evidence was
led at the trial on the alleged nose and eye bleeds, pain and suffering, and
especially on psychological and emotional trauma in respect of which
RM30,000.00 was given under this head of claim.
35
[28] In respect of the fourth point upon which the appellant rested his
appeal, the Sessions Court had awarded the sum of RM8,000.00 for the
second respondent’s right eye periorbital haematoma, although the second
respondent had asked for RM6,000.00 which is still well in excess of the usual
range of RM3,000.00 to RM4,000.00 for what is commonly known as a black
40 eye or a bruise to the face around the eye (not the eye itself).

[29] Learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that he had
asked for RM6,000.00 and it was for the SCJ to vary it. He also submitted that
502 Personal Injury Reports [2022] 2 PIR [49]

he had asked for RM8,000.00 for a right eye roof orbital wall fracture which 1
was rejected.

[30] I do not think there is any merit in those submissions. If at all there was
evidence to support the claim for RM8,000.00 for the purported fracture and
it was justified, the second plaintiff could have but did not file a cross-appeal.
5
Further, the rejection of a larger or different claim does not mean that the
court ought to compensate by awarding an excess for another injury.
[31] For the appellant, reference was made to the Revised Compendium of
Personal Injury Awards (2018) by which a range of RM3,000.00 to RM4,000.00
is considered appropriate for haematoma around one eye. Reference was 10
also made to Abdul Hadi bin Abd Rozak v Mohamad Asyraf bin Mat Radzi
[2018] 2 PIR [23] where RM4,000.00 was awarded for an eye haematoma.

[32] In line with the Federal Court’s decision in Mahmod bin Kailan (supra),
where there is an erroneous application of the law or excessive damages, the
impugned order can be set aside. The award of RM8,000.00 is thus set aside 15
and substituted with an award of RM4,000.00 for the right eye periorbital
haematoma.

[33] The first to sixth grounds of appeal in respect of the quantum of

damages awarded to the second respondent having been dealt with, I now
turn to the seventh: the second respondent sought RM10,000.00 for a 20
cranioplasty operation but the Sessions Court awarded RM20,000.00, thus
over-compensating the second respondent. The award is set aside and
substituted with an award of RM10,000.00. On top of that, the Sessions Court
had awarded RM10,000.00 when no evidence was adduced as to any other
future operation. That award is thus set aside in its entirety. 25

[34] The eighth ground concerns the award of RM4,800.00 for nursing care
by the second respondent’s wife – comprising RM800.00 monthly over a
period of six months. Here, there is no reason to interfere with the SCJ’s
award as PW5, Dr Pulivendhan, the consultant neurosurgeon, testified as to
the need for nursing care for the first six months – see ROA, p 77, lines 30
1162-1165 for, although he had initially said the second respondent "does not
need nursing care", the material time appears to be at the time of the trial.
There is no need for a contract or a formal arrangement, or receipts,
considering the authorities cited for the second respondent: Liong Thoo v
Sawiyah & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 286; Ang Yee Cheng & Anor v Ang Siang Hock 35
(person under disability suing through Koh Beng Guek, litigation representative)
[2016] 2 PIR [46]; [2016] 9 MLJ 238; and Ahmad Daman Huri bin Hussein v Koo
Chin Yau [1990] 3 MLJ 53.

[35] As for the ninth point raised by the appellant specifically in respect of
the second respondent, it was contended that the Sessions Court had erred in 40
law and in fact in awarding the second respondent pre-trial loss of earnings
in the sum of RM14,000.00; and (b) partial loss of future earnings in the sum
of RM56,000.00.
 Jamal bin Abd Karal v
Rekha binti Nustari & Anor
[2022] 2 PIR [49] Lim Hock Leng J 503

1 [36] While the second plaintiff testified that he was working as a carpenter
for the past two years prior to the accident with an average monthly income
of about RM2,600.00 with a lot of customers, there was no documentary
evidence (be it in the form of photographs or tax returns or receipts) save for
the three cash bills in the month of the accident, which the first respondent
5 relied on to establish the deceased’s income as a carpenter with the second
respondent. These purported bills are rejected for the same reasons. These
bills are questionable as there gaps in the sequence of the numbers, the nature
of the work was unknown and the customer who was said to have gone back
to Indonesia was not identified. Although the second respondent claimed to
have a lot of customers, not a single one was produced although the
10
respondents were able to call 10 witnesses to testify for them, including four
doctors and two policemen.
[37] This court had earlier referred to the SCJ’s doubts over the first
respondent’s occupation as a part-time carpenter. As for the second
15
respondent, the SCJ held:
On the second plaintiff I rule that his claim of being a carpentry (sic) is also unsupported
by evidence. No cogent evidence or even evidence on the balance of probabilities is adduced
to this effect. However based on the invoices receipt on the bulian (sic) trees, I rule
that he could have done carpentry work but his income is not fixed. He could only
be earning an average of RM1,000/- per mon (sic) I also rule that his income from
20
carpentry will be likely and probably around RM1,000/- per month as this job was
not a fixed income job. The RM1,000/- here is assessed taken into an average
orders that he and the deceased might have received. (Emphasis added.)

[38] The contradictory (or at least inconsistent) findings of fact require the
25 award of loss of earnings to be set aside, and it is hereby wholly set aside.
[39] As for the appellant’s contention that no interest ought to be awarded
on damages for loss of support/dependency and the costs of the future
operations since the respective respondents had not been kept out of the
money but would be receiving them in advance – see Murtadza bin Mohamed
30 Hassan v Chong Swee Pian [1980] 1 MLJ 216 – this court agrees that there ought
not to be interest on the loss of dependency damages awarded to the first
respondent on account of the deceased’s occupation as a security guard, and
no interest on the sum of RM10,000.00 awarded for the cranioplasty
operation for the second respondent. Interest on the other awards is
35
otherwise to run at the rate of 5% per annum for the period as decreed by the
SCJ.

[40] The appeal is allowed to the extent as set out above. No order is made
as to costs for the appeal as the appellant has only partially succeeded. An
order of costs representing 10% of the respective judgment sum for each of
40 the respondents (as revised) would be appropriate, more so as the trial
involved 11 witnesses and was over an extended period of time.