GH104 - CRIMINAL LAW COURSEWORK ESSAY

Alliyah Zoobi – 27/02/18

Mr. Kofi Bonnie has been arrested for the murder of his friend, Kwasi Sim.
Given the circumstances in which the death of Kwasi Sim occurred, as well as the
events leading up to it, it is paramount to bring forth the discussion on Mr.
Bonnie’s liability. In order to thoroughly do so, certain issues concerning the
areas of murder, provocation and unlawful harm that arise from this particular
case would have to be analyzed and duly considered. They are as follows:
1) Whether or not Kofi Bonnie’s act of striking a blow to Kwasi Sim’s head
amounts to murder?
2) Whether or not a plea of provocation can successfully reduce Kofi’s
conviction?
3) Whether or not Kofi’s act of throwing a punch at JD was done in the
consciousness that it was likely to cause death?

To begin with, it is important to understand the interpretation and

fundamental elements of murder as defined by the Law in order to methodically
address the first issue at hand. According to the Criminal Offences Act (Act 29),
murder is defined as one’s act of intentionally causing the death of another
person by any unlawful harm. By this definition, the two underlying elements of
murder are intent and unlawful harm.
First, section 11 (1) of Act 29 describes intent as: “Where a person does an
act for the purpose of causing or contributing to cause an event, that person
intends to cause that event, within the meaning of this Act, although in fact, or in
the belief of that person or both in fact and also in belief, the act is unlikely to
cause or to contribute to cause the event.”
Establishing intent would be placing moral blameworthiness alongside the
act of causing unlawful harm, meaning a presumption that a person intends the
probable results of his or her act. However, in situations where the mens rea and
actus reus occur separately, section 11 (5) of Act 29 provides a transfer of intent.
In an attempt to cause harm, a person’s plan may fall through and may cause
suffering to a completely different person instead. Section 11 (5) reads: “If a
person does an act with intent to assault, kill, or cause any other event to a
particular person, and his act happens to take effect, whether completely or
incompletely, against a different person, he shall be liable to be tried and
punished as if his intent had been directed against that different person; […]”. In
Ametewee v The State, the appellant, intending to assassinate the President,
missed and killed the President’s bodyguard instead. It was held that a person
who fires at another with the intent to kill, but accidentally kills a third person
who was not the intended target, intends to kill said third party. In the case being
argued before the court, section 11 (5) would be applied and intent would be
transferred, therefore, it is invalid to argue that Kofi Bonnie never intended to
hurt his friend Kwasi Sim, for he still intended to hurt JD.
In addition to intent, unlawful harm also needs to be proven in order to
convict murder. Section 69 of Act 29 explains that a person who causes harm to
another person is one who intentionally and unlawfully does so. Kofi Bonnie’s act
of striking a blow to Kwasi Sim’s head was unjustifiable by law and therefore
unlawful. Additionally, in a case where unlawful harm causes death, it is
important to note the rule implied by section 64 (B), that every person must take
their victim as they find them. The section reads: “It is immaterial that the harm
would not have caused the person’s death but for the infancy, old age, disease,
intoxication, or any other state of body or mind of that person at the time when
the harm was caused”. In Twum v The Republic, it was held inconsequential that
the deceased had an edema found in his lungs making the violence used on him
by the appellant an even greater one than intended. The appeal was quashed and
the appellant was convicted of manslaughter. This establishes the fact that Kofi
Bonnie cannot successfully argue that he is not liable for the harm he caused
because he was unaware of the tumor existing in Kwasi Sim’s head, and
therefore could not have known that causing such harm to his friend could have
led to his demise.
It is for the reasons stated above that we can discern the key elements to
the criminal offense of murder found in the case of The Republic v Kwasi Sim and
acknowledge the fact that there was indeed an intent to commit unlawful harm.

Having established the fact that the case in contention before the court is
indeed a murder case, it would also be essential to appreciate the possibility
given by the Law to reduce the conviction from an intentional murder to
manslaughter. This is what the second issue in this particular case addresses.
Section 52 (b) states that in the circumstance where a person was provoked or
lost self-control which caused him or her to commit unlawful harm, that person
would not be convicted on the grounds of murder, but rather on the grounds of
manslaughter.
According to section 53 (c), an act of adultery committed in the view or
presence of the wife or husband may amount to extreme provocation causing
death. This lawful provision leaves room for human error and allows for an
understanding that a reasonable person in special or unforeseen circumstances
could very well lose control and act unreasonably. However this provision is only
applicable if the wife or husband witnesses the act of adultery. In Agyeman v The
Republic, the appellant killed a man who he suspected his wife was committing
adultery with. However, he never witnessed the act himself and his intent to kill
was nor justifiable by mere suspicions nor justifiable by him apparently hearing
his wife in the deceased’s room. The appeal was therefore quashed and he was
convicted of murder. In a similar fashion, this provision would not apply for Kofi
Bonnie’s case. It would be futile to attempt to plead provocation because Kofi
Bonnie never actually witnessed his wife committing adultery with JD. There is
no doubt that he was provoked by the sight of his wife flirting with another man,
however, he was never extremely provoked in the eyes of the law. Mere
flirtations do not amount to enough reason to temporarily lose control under
section 53 (c).
Furthermore, section 54 makes the precise and explicit overview of
circumstances where a plea of provocation cannot avail to certain persons in
certain situations. Even if there is clear evidence of extreme provocation, the
criminal offence shall not be reduced if there was a period of time that elapsed
between the instance of provocation and the act that caused the harm. This
exclusion was made on account that a reasonable person would not hold on to
the temporary insanity caused by extreme provocation and would therefore no
longer feel the need to cause harm after a certain period of time has progressed.
Extreme provocation is hence only an available plea if the act that it causes is
immediate or instant. This provision is clearly illustrated in the case of
Koranteng v The Republic, where the appellant only took action twenty-four
hours after the provocation was offered and as a result the appeal was quashed
and he was convicted of murder. Kofi Bonnie too would accordingly not be able
to successfully make this plea because he waited until the following day to pick a
fight with JD. In the eyes of the law, his judgment would have therefore returned,
excluding him from making this defense.
The preceding reasons allow for the determination that to plead
provocation would forfeit a chance of reducing the verdict to manslaughter, as
Kofi Bonnie does not fill the criteria for a successful appeal.

As has previously been mentioned, Ghanaian Law allows for

circumstances of exceptions, and our third and final issue will address Kofi
Bonnie’s intent, in a different light and under a different microscope. Having
established that Kofi Bonnie did indeed intend to cause harm and should
undeniably be held liable for Kwasi Sim’s death, it is still of significance to cross-
examine whether his act was done in the consciousness that it was likely to cause
death.
Section 11(3) cites: “A person who does an act of a kind or in a manner
that, if reasonable caution and observation had been used, it would appear to
that person that the act would probably cause or contribute to cause an event, or,
that there would be great risk of the act causing or contributing to cause an
event, intends for the purposes of this section, to cause that event until it is
shown that that person believed that the act would probably not cause or
contribute to cause the event, or that there was not an intention to cause or
contribute to it”. In the case of Odupong v The Republic, the appellant shot and
killed his wife while they were wrestling over a loaded gun. It was held that the
appellant intended to kill his wife because the loaded weapon used was a lethal
one, one that he loaded himself, and that the consequence was foreseeable. The
appellant acted without reasonable caution and accordingly, under section 11
(3), the appeal was quashed. Similarly, in the case of The Republic v Adekura, the
appellant blindly fired a deadly weapon at a moving car at dawn when visibility
was poor. He killed a passenger in the car and the court held him guilty for
murder under the same provision’s authority, because he too did not use his
deadly weapon with reasonable caution and observation.
However, unlike in the previous cases where deadly weapons were used
and no reasonable cautions were made, in the case of Sene v The Republic, Sene
engaged in a fistfight with the deceased who later died. The appeal for a lesser
conviction was granted and the court held that “in order to fasten a person with
responsibility for murder for fighting with his fists, it must be shown that he
realized that death was the probable consequence of his act when he undertook
to engage in it.” Sene could not have imagined that a mere fistfight would result
in the death of the deceased. Based on the authority provided from this case, it is
clear that Kofi Bonnie could not have foreseen the possibility that throwing just
one punch could result in death and therefore he too deserves a lesser
conviction. The defense asks that the jury consider whether when they speak of
Kofi Bonnie’s intent, they consider that it wasn’t an intention to kill but merely
an intention to fight.
 In conclusion, Kofi Bonnie may be liable for intending to cause unlawful
harm resulting in death, however he could appeal for a substitution from the
charge of murder to manslaughter. Notwithstanding the fact that he cannot
successfully plead provocation, he could still appeal on the basis that he honestly
and obviously did not believe his actions would result in death. The defense
would hope that the Court certainly and undoubtedly make their final verdict in
consideration of the points, provisions and legal precedents explained
previously.

Bibliography/References
Ametewee v The State [1964] GLR 551, SC
Twum v The Republic [1967] GLR 724, CA
Agyeman v The Republic [1995-1996] 1 GLR 118
Koranteng v The Republic [1968] CC 151
Sene v The Republic [1977] 2 GLR 434, CA
Republic v Adekura [1984-1986] 2GLR 345, CA
Mensa-Bonsu, The Annotated Criminal Offences Act Of Ghana (5th Edition, Black
Mask Ltd 2008)
Mensa-Bonsu, The General Part of Criminal Law, A Ghanaian Casebook Volumes 1
& 2 (Black Mask Ltd. 2001)