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Xerox University Microfilms

300 North Zeeb Road
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75-9007

WHITE, Robert Gale, 1941-

LANGUAGE AND POLITICS: THE POLITICAL
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THOUGHT OF NOAM CHOMSKY.

Indiana University, Ph.D., 1974

P o litical Science, general
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Xerox University Microfilms , Ann Arbor, M ichigan 48106

@ 1975

ROBERT GALE WHITE

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

 LANGUAGE AND POLITICS:

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF NOAH CHOMSKY

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Robert G. White
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Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School

in p a r tia l fu lfillm e n t o f the requirements fo r
the degree Doctor o f Philosophy in the
Department of P o litic a l Science
Indiana U niversity
August, 197^
Accepted by the Facii ty of the Graduate School, Department of
Political Science, Indiana University, in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.

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Doctoral Committees
Alfred Diamant
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Alan Rifctor, Ph.D.
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Milton Fisk, Ph.D

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1

II. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORT

OF TRANSFORMATIONAL THEORY.............................................................13

Transformational Theory
The Philosophical Import o f Transformational Theory
The Psychological Import o f Transformational Theory
Assessment

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III. THE POLITICAL IMPORT OF TRANSFORMATIONALTHEORY ........................ 59

P o litic s IE
The Study of P o litic s
Is Chomsky a P o litic a l Theorist?

IV. CONCLUSION 102

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 1

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose o f th is d is s e rta tio n is to draw a tte n tio n to the

p o lit ic a l thought o f lin g u is t Noam Chomsky. There are three reasons

fo r doing so. F ir s t , his lin g u is tic theory o f transformational

generative grammar provides support fo r a r a tio n a lis t epistemology

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and fo r ratio n alism 's underlying conception o f human nature as ac tiv e

and c re a tiv e . Secondly, th is conception o f human nature can be seen

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as elaborating and strengthening the p o litic a l tra d itio n of lib e rta ria n

socialism by providing a w e l1-developed psychological foundation for

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it. T h ird ly , in re la tin g language, mind and p o lit ic s , Chomsky provides

an in teresting illu s tr a tio n of the re la tio n between epistemology and

p o litic a l theory.
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I t Is esp ecially appropriate th at a tte n tio n be drawn to

Chomsky's p o lit ic a l thought in lig h t of the current re-appraisal of

lib e ra lis m , and the revival of in te re s t in anarchism. This re-appraisal

o f lib e ra lis m is sparked in part by recognition of the deficiency

and s u p e r fic ia lity o f lib e ra lis m 's sense o f community. S im ila rly , the

revival o f in te re s t in anarchism results in part from the recognition

that embodied in anarchist thought is a deeper sense o f community. This

deeper anarchist community is based on reciprocal consciousness,: or

consciousness o f others. Reciprocal consciousness, in turn, is based

on and develops from consciousness o f s e lf. The e m p iric is t epistemo­

logy underlying lib eralism is d e fic ie n t precisely because i t allows

 2

fo r no concept o f self-consciousness. Chomsky's contribution lies

in providing an a lte r n a tiv e , r a tio n a lis t epistemology containing a

strong, e x p lic it conception o f self-consciousness, thus providing the

p o s s ib ility fo r developing reciprocal consciousness and the deeper

sense o f community.

In addition to his contribution to the psychological founda­

tions of anarchism, Chomsky helps to c la r if y some of the confusion

surrounding the philosophical foundation of the study o f p o litic s .

The dominant orthodoxy o f behavioral ism in p o litic a l science rests on

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both an e m p iric is t epistemology and an instrum entalist in terp re ta tio n

o f science. Chomsky extends the post-behavioral c ritiq u e o f behav­

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io ra l Ism, and in doing so he helps c la r if y some o f the epistemological

confusion in p o litic a l science.

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The idea that the study o f language provides insight into man's

p o lit ic a l l i f e is by no means novel. Since the very beginning of

Western p o lit ic a l thought, language has been regarded as a s a lie n t

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c h a ra c te ris tic of the human species, serving to set i t apart from the

rest of the animal kingdom, and in tim ately connected with our very

capacity to have a p o litic a l l i f e . A ris to tle was among the f i r s t to

note the importance o f language as a distinguishing feature of human­

kind: " . . . the power o f speech is intended to set forth the

expedient and inexpedient, and likew ise the ju s t and unjust; and the

association o f liv in g beings who have th is sense makes a fam ily and a

s ta te ." ! Descartes noted the lin e that language capacity seemed to

draw between man and the rest of the animal kingdom, and also that

language served to communicate thoughts. " I t is a very remarkable

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f a c t ,” he said, " th a t there are none so depraved and stupid, without

even excepting id io ts , that they cannot arrange d iffe r e n t words

together, forming o f them a statement by which they make known th e ir

thoughts." Man alone among the creatures o f nature possesses this

p e c u lia rity of perceiving good and e v i l , o f declaring what is ju s t

and unjust, and of expressing these thoughts through language.

Chomsky developed transformational theory in order to account

fo r the c h a ra c te ris tic a lly crea tiv e use o f language. This creative

aspect o f language, Chomsky believes, is the central fa c t th a t any

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theory o f language must confront. According to Chomsky, "Most o f our

lin g u is tic experience both as speakers and hearers is w ith new sen­
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tences; once we have mastered a language, the class o f sentences with

which we can operate flu e n tly and without d i f f i c u lt y or h e s ita tio n

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is so vast th a t fo r a ll p ra c tic al purposes (and, obviously, fo r a ll

th eo retical purposes), we may regard i t as in f in it e ." A theory of

language, then, must explain an in f in it e range o f a c tiv ity by a f in it e

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language capacity. Of a ll the facts that a theory of language must

account f o r , the most s a lie n t is th at every day people express and

understand sentences th at are t o t a lly new to them.

Chomsky conceives o f lin g u is tic s as the study o f both the

sounds o f language and the thoughts which they express. Convinced

th at the main problem of that d is c ip lin e was to explain the c reative

use o f language, Chomsky developed the theory o f transform ational

generative grammar. While there is l i t t l e doubt that the s p e c ific

form o f transformational grammar w ill be revised as research proceeds—

Chomsky him self acknowledges th is — the general o u tlin e has been deter­
mined. One of its central and most controversial tenets is that

there are In variant properties o f language, sp ecies-sp ecific fo r Homo

sapiens. which are therefore transm itted b io lo g ic a lly from generation

to generation.

The p a ra lle l th at Descartes observed between the sounds that

compose a sentence and the thought which the sentence expresses is

one o f the differences between modern s tru c tu ra l lin g u is tic s and post-

Chomskyan lin g u is tic s . Chomsky considers both the thoughts and the

sounds to be the subject m atter o f lin g u is tic s , w hile the s tru c tu ra l­

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ists in s is t that the proper subject o f lin g u is tic s is only the u t t e r -

ances and not the thoughts th a t un derlie them.

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Like any area o f knowledge and b e lie f, Chomsky says, "Language

results from the in terp lay o f i n i t i a l l y given structures o f mind,

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maturationa! processes, and in te ra c tio n with the environment."'* At

the outset o f the in vestig ation o f language, there is no a p rio ri

reason fo r expecting or not expecting to find in varian t properties o f

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language. This Is so ip s p ite o f the fa c t th at " i n i t i a l l y given

structures o f mind" and the "m aturational processes" may be quite

re s tric te d .

Suppose, however, th a t in va ria n t properties o f language are

discovered. Is i t not p lau sible to hypothesize that these in variant

properties are somehow innate to the mind? The hypothesis may be

proven fa ls e , but there is no reason to suppose that i t w ill be true

or fa ls e on any a p r io r i grounds. C ertain ly i t is as plau sible as

the hypothesis that in varian t properties in the song o f a p a rtic u la r

species o f birds are innate. I f the hypothesis is accepted as

 5

p la u s ib le , then what kind o f In varian t properties o f language does

Chomsky claim to have discovered?

Given the somewhat e so teric character o f transformational

generative grammar, and the general u n fa m illa rlty o f p o lit ic a l

s c ie n tis ts with lin g u is tic theory, something more extensive than the

usual introductory remarks is In order here. According to Chomsky,

a grammar is a description of language in terms o f a set o f rules

which re la te sound and meaning. These grammatical rules seem to con­

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form to abstract p rin cip le s or to e x h ib it in varian t p rop erties. These

p rin cip le s or properties underlie the grammar o f every language and

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lead lin g u is ts to the postulation that they are innate to the mind.

Perhaps an example w i ll make th is point more c le a r.

Consider the sentence, "The dog in the corner is hungry." It

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can be transformed into the question, " Is the dog in the corner hun­

gry?" by moving the " is " to the front o f the sentence. Most flu e n t
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speakers o f English are oblivious to the ru le , which is to move the

occurrence o f " is " follow ing the subject noun phrase to the fro n t of

the sentence. Because the ru le e n ta ils an operation which requires the

id e n tific a tio n o f the subject noun phrase, Chomsky c a lls i t a

"structure-dependent op eration ." I t is not merely the order o f words

in the sentence that is important fo r the operation o f the ru le , but

th e ir s tru c tu re , or th e ir relatio n sh ip to each other. I f i t were not

fo r th is la t t e r fa c t, then an a lte rn a tiv e kind o f rule could be

suggested, v iz . . one th at would not depend on the structure o f the

sentence. Although simpler and more e f f ic ie n t because i t would not be

necessary to id e n tify the structure to which the ru le applies, such a

“ structure-Independent” ru le never occurs among the rules o f grammar.

This Is a simple example, but i t illu s tr a te s the point: the kinds o f

rules which make up the grammar are in variab ly structure-dependent

in operation.

A transform ational description o f language poses the question

o f why c h ild re n , on the basis of l i t t l e evidence, and th at o f a very

degenerate nature, invariably u t i l i z e the structure-dependent operating

p rin c ip le in constructing grammatical ru le s , rather than a simpler and

more e f f ic ie n t (structure-independent) p rin c ip le . The answer, Chomsky

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says, is because "the idea o f structure-dependent operations is part

o f the innate schematism applied by the mind to the data o f experience."^

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This is what he means by an in varian t property o f language, or an innate

p rin c ip le o f mind. Such in variant properties are referred to sometimes

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as prin cip les o f universal grammar, or as formal lin g u is tic universals.

When a c h ild learns a language, he re lie s on experience to

provide him w ith the data fo r learning the grammar, but he re lie s also
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on his innate mental schematism, which d ictates that only certain

kinds o f rules are acceptable. There are other properties o f language

which are in varian t in the same sense. " I t is reasonable to suppose,"

according to Chomsky, " th a t they are 'a p r io r i' fo r the organism,

in th at they d e fin e, fo r him, what counts as a human language, and

they determine the general character o f his acquired knowledge of

language."^

Language, o f course, is only one area o f knowledge. What about

other areas o f knowledge? Are they also based on some innate schema­

tism o f the mind? Chomsky maintains that th is is an open question.

However, he c le a rly thinks that the acq u isitio n o f language is sug-

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gestive o f how other systems o f knowledge might be acquired. And

th is seems plau sible considering how rich are our systems o f knowledge,

and on how l i t t l e experience they re s t.

The aspect o f Chomsky's work that p o lit ic a l s c ie n tis ts are

most lik e ly fa m ilia r with is not his lin g u is tic theory but his radical

p o lit ic a l polemics, especially his condemnation o f the Indochina war

and his c ritiq u e o f the lib e ra l ideology im p lic it in much o f behavioral

p o litic a l science. An underlying assumption of th is essay is that

Chomsky's lin g u is tic theory can be shown to have p o lit ic a l ram ifica­

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tio n s . I t is often asserted that there is a connection between

Chomsky's transform ational lin g u is tic theory and his lib e rta ria n
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s o c ia lis t p o lit ic s . Robert S k lar, fo r example, asserts th at "Chomsky

him self live s not in two worlds but in one." He continues, saying
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that "Chomsky's p o litic s and his lin g u is tic s have always been more

closely integrated than his colleagues in e ith e r f ie ld have ever

suspected; and i f the lin g u is tic s revolution succeeds, i t cannot f a il

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8
to have its Impact on p o litic s as w e ll." S im ila rly , a reviewer of

Chomsky's most recent c o lle ctio n o f essays, For Reasons of S ta te .

suggests th a t, "One o f the in terestin g things about £ i t / is th at

i t suggests relationships between his scholarly work and his social

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and p o litic a l statements." But i f a connection between lin g u is tic s

and p o litic s is often suggested, i t is ra re ly explicated by Chomsky

or anyone else; i t has fo r the most part remained submerged.

The question o f a relatio n sh ip arises because, for Chomsky, both

areas o f inquiry share a common conception o f human nature. Moreover,

s im ila r concepts, such as "freedom," "spontaneity," " c r e a t iv it y ," and

"Inno vatio n ," crop up repeatedly in both theories. According to

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Chomsky, th is commonality o f concepts does not Indicate any logical

connection. He in sists th a t the s im ila r ity o f concepts in both

theories Is “ a c c id e n ta l." He says, “The way these concepts a ris e in the

study o f language and the theses they sustain are appropriate or

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inappropriate, true or fa ls e , q u ite independently o f p o lit ic s ."

Regarding lib e rta r ia n socialism , Chomsky in sis ts th at i t “ is ju s t if ie d

qu ite apart from anything th at may happen in lin g u is tic s . So in that

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sense they are lo g ic a liv independent."

However, although there is no logical connection, Chomsky holds

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th at there is a t least a “ tenuous connection." This tenuous connection

can be illu s tr a te d by posing the question o f what kind o f social and

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p o lit ic a l organization “would p erm it," in Chomsky's words, "the fre e s t

and fu lle s t development o f the in d iv id u a l, o f each in d iv id u a l's

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p o te n tia litie s in whatever d ire c tio n they might take, th at would permit

him to be f u lly human in the sense o f having the greatest possible

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scope fo r his freedom and in itia tiv e ? " For Chomsky the answer is
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lib e rta ria n socialism .

More re ce n tly, he has expressed th is "tenuous connection" in

th is way:

Social action must be animated by a vision o f a future society,

and by e x p lic it judgments o f value concerning the character o f
th is fu tu re society . . . . These judgments must derive from
some concept o f the nature o f man, and one may seek empirical
foundations by in vestigating man's nature . . . . ’ ’

in the follow ing pages the argument is advanced that th is "tenuous

connection" can be found in the concept of consciousness. The passive,

re fle x iv e theory o f mind underlying empiricism provides no basis for

consciousness o f s e lf and oth er. Without consciousness o f o th e r, there

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is no basis fo r community. And community is a crucial aspect of

Chomsky's lib e rta r ia n s o c ia lis t visio n o f future society.

By drawing a connection between language and p o litic s based on

consciousness and community, i t becomes easier to understand the

anarchist themes in Chomsky's p o lit ic s , since community is a chief

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value fo r anarchists. The anarchist sense o f community is one that

pervades everyday l i f e . Thus, Chomsky's community d iffe rs from the

lib e ra l community o f im partial c itiz e n s in the public forum. And, as

R. P. Wolff, points o u t, one o f the c h ie f d e ficien cies of lib e ra l

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theory is it s weak conception o f community. "The severest c ritic is m s

o f lib e ra l s o ciety, both from the l e f t and from the rig h t, focus on
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the absence of community in even the most e f f ic ie n t and a fflu e n t

lib e ra l c a p ita lis t s ta te .

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In sum, the p rin cip a l sign ificance o f Chomsky's theory of lan­

guage is th a t he uses the description o f language in terms o f tran s fo r­

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mational generative grammar as evidence fo r a ra tio n a lis t theory of

mind as a c tiv e and c re a tiv e . I t is , then, the p o litic a l ram ifications

o f rationalism th at are o f major importance fo r p o litic a l science.

These ram ifications are o f p a rtic u la r in te re s t because of the d is tin c t

realism th a t pervades Chomsky's radical p o lit ic s , and that serves to

set i t apart from the romanticism permeating much of contemporary

radical thought.

This realism is most evident in his recognition th a t there may

be perimeters to possible change, lim its imposed by "the biolo gical

c h a rac te ris tic s th at determine the nature of the human organism ."^

This aspect o f his realism is most c le a rly expressed in the notion o f

constrained c r e a tiv ity . C re a tiv ity involves fre e action w ith in a

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system o f ru le s , although I t Is not narrowly determined by these

rules or by external s tim u li. But Chomsky's realism extends beyond

his conception o f human nature. I t Is re fle c te d In his recognition of

the relevance o f technology fo r extending democracy, and in his recog­

n itio n o f the p o s s ib ilitie s fo r radical change in in d u s tria lize d

society.

This essay is divided into three p a rts . Chapter Two begins with

a b r ie f sketch o f the nature and development o f transformational

generative grammar, and then goes on to consider its philosophical

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and psychological importance. The philosophical import o f transforma­

tio n a l theory lie s in the debate between rationalism and empiricism,

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where Chomsky's lin g u is tic research provides evidence fo r the r a tio n a lis t

p o s itio n . The psychological import lie s in the strength transformational

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theory provides fo r the conception o f human nature as ac tiv e and c re a tiv e .

Chapter Three attempts to draw together the disparate elements o f a

coherent p o lit ic a l theory in the lib e rta r ia n s o c ia lis t tr a d itio n . The

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assessment o f Chomsky as a r e a lis t regarding the p o s s ib ility o f p o l i t i ­

cal change is developed, and i t is shown to be related to his r e a lis t

in te rp re ta tio n o f science. The importance o f realism , in the la t t e r

sense, fo r the study o f p o litic s is discussed, and i t is pointed out

how th is may c la r if y some o f the confusion in the recent controversy

in the d is c ip lin e over behavioral ism and post-behavioralism . The

fourth and concluding chapter considers the wider ram ifications of

Chomsky's lin g u is tic s , focusing on the re la tio n s h ip of epistemology,

p o lit ic s , and the study o f p o litic s .

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Notes

^ A ris to tle , P o litic s , Book I . , Ch. 2, trans. by B. Jowett,

ed. by Louise R. Loomis, in A ris to tle ; On Man in the Universe
(Rosiyn, N.Y.: W alter J. Black, 1943), p. 250.

2Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method. Part V, The Philosophical

Works o f Descartes, tran s. by E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, V ol. I
(New Y o rk: Dover, 1955), P- 116.

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^Chomsky, Current Issues in L in g u is tic Theory (The Hague:
Mouton, 1964), p. 7»

^For a discussion o f stru c tu ra l lin g u is tic s , see John Lyons,

Noam Chomsky (New York; V ik in g Press, 1970), ch. 3 , and the d iscu ssio n
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and references in the fo llo w in g c h a p te r.

^Chomsky, Problems o f Knowledge and Freedom (New Y ork: Pantheon,

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1971), p. 23.

6 I b id . . p. 28 .

7 1b id . . p. 31.
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Robert S k lar, ''Chomsky's Revolution in L in g u is tic s ," N ation.

September 9, 1968, p. 213.

^Richard Todd, "Review o f For Reasons o f S ta te ." A tla n tic ,

J u ly , 1973, p. 97-

^ "L in g u is tic s and P o litic s : Interview with Noam Chomsky,"

New L e ft Review. S e p t./O c t., 1969, p. 31.

11 Ib id .

l 2 lb ld .

l^Chomsky, For Reasons o f State (New York: Vintage Books, 1973),

p. 404.

l^A la n R it t e r , "Some A n a rc h is t C ritic is m s o f Democracy," unpub-

1ished paper.
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p. W o lff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon

Press, 1968), p. I 83.

'^ •L in g u is tic s and P o litic s : Interview with Noam Chomsky,11

p. 33.

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CHAPTER I I

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPORT

OF TRANSFORMATIONAL THEORY

The purpose o f th is chapter is to consider the philosophical

and psychological import o f transformational theory, thus providing

a foundation fo r examining in the following chapter the p o lit ic a l

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import o f Chomsky's lin g u is tic work. Because i t would be awkward

and perhaps confusing to consider the philosophical and psycholog­

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ical import o f transform ational theory without a t le a s t b r ie fly

explicatin g or illu s tr a tin g the theory, the f i r s t section o f th is

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chapter is a b r ie f discussion o f Chomsky's contribution to lin g u is ­

tic s . This discussion o f transformational theory is not intended to

be a f u l l account o f the revolution Chomsky has wrought in lin g u is ­

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tic s . Rather, the in ten t here is more modest, to convey the general

thrust and d ire c tio n o f Chomsky's work by illu s tr a tin g c e rta in

aspects o f transform ational theory th at a ris e in considering the

theory's philosophical and psychological Import. These aspects

include the d is tin c tio n s between competence and performance, between

deep stru ctu re and surface s tru c tu re , and the notion o f an innate

universal grammar.

Following th is discussion is a consideration o f the philosophi­

cal and psychological ram ifications o f transformational theory. The

s ig n ific a n t philosophical ram ification lie s in the argument between

rationalism and empiricism. Chomsky thinks that his lin g u is tic

theory provides evidence for the r a tio n a lis t p o sitio n . The s ig n if i­

cant psychological ra m ificatio n is in the conception o f human nature

underlying transformational theory. Chomsky believes th a t the human

mind is structured and th a t i t in teracts a c tiv e ly and c re a tiv e ly with

the world. The p o lit ic a l sign ificance of transform ational theory is

that Chomsky's r a tio n a lis t conception o f human nature informs, or is

a t the root o f , his p o lit ic a l theory. The p o lit ic a l im plications o f

these competing r a tio n a lis t and e m p iric is t conceptions o f human nature

li e in th e ir relationsh ip to the concepts o f consciousness and com­

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munity. The chapter concludes with a c r it ic a l assessment of the

philosophical and psychological aspects o f transform ational theory.

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A. Transformational Theory
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The s tru c tu ra l lin g u is tic s paradigm, against which Chomsky

reb elled , provides a good s ta rtin g point fo r discussing transforma­

tio nal theory. For Chomsky, the contrast between stru c tu ra l lin g u is ­
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tic s and transform ational lin g u is tic s illum inates the wide" c o n flic t

between empiricism and ratio n alism , since s tru c tu ra l lin g u is tic s ,

lik e behavioral p o lit ic a l science, rests on an e x p lic it ly e m p iric is t

epistemology.

Before Chomsky published his seminal work, Syntactic Structures.

In 1957* the goal o f lin g u is tic s was to describe languages, to d is ­

cover th e ir grammars, and to formulate rules or procedures for the

discovery o f such grammars. * Rigorous procedures were established

fo r describing languages, and lin g u is tic s was considered as "a sort

o f c la s s ific a to ry science." 2 There are two lik e ly reasons for

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th is s ta te o f a f f a ir s . F ir s t , American lin g u is tic s a t the beginning

o f th is century was influenced strongly by the imperative to describe

American Indian languages, many o f which were on the verge o f dying.

Linguists f e l t th a t these languages must be described to preserve

them fo r future study, and th a t the most lo g ic a l way o f preserving

them, by maintaining a community o f native speakers, was impossible.

Since the population o f n a tiv e speakers was rapidly shrinking, i t

was possible that many Indian languages might become e x tin c t.

A second important influence In s tru c tu ra l lin g u is tic s was

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the desire to make the study o f language in to a science, to place

the d is c ip lin e o f lin g u is tic s on a s c ie n t if ic footing. In th is regard,

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Leonard Bloomfield was probably the most in flu e n tia l lin g u is t. Bloom­

f ie ld understood the term science to mean, among other things, that

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there was no need to postulate unobservable or " m e n ta lis tid 1 concepts

in accounting fo r language. L in g u is tic behavior could and should be

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explained in terms o f the organism's response to e x te rn a l, observable

s tim u li. Bloomfield e x p lic it ly adopted the p rim itiv e stimulus-response

theory re flected in the work o f J.B. Watson and his follow ers in

psychology. Together with implanting an abhorrence o f mental Ism in

the d is c ip lin e , Bloomfield attempted to estab lish lin g u is tic s on a

firm e m p iric is t foundation in the Lockean tr a d itio n . Thus, Chomsky

claims to have overthrown not only the s tru c tu ra l lin g u is tic paradigm,

but its underlying e m p iric is t epistemology as w e ll.

Structural lin g u is ts did not deny that the normal, everyday

use o f language revealed an astounding c r e a t iv ity , but they paid

l i t t l e a tten tio n to this important f a c t. The task o f the lin g u is t

was to transcribe a sample o f a language (the corpus) from a n ative

speaker, then by analysis to discover its grammar, and f in a lly to

devise procedures to f a c ili t a t e the discovery o f grammars of other

languages. How a person learned a language was accounted for on the

basis o f properly reinforced responses to external s tim u li.

However, accounting fo r the c re a tiv e aspect o f language use

was an anomaly in stru ctu ral lin g u is tic s . Chomsky's i n i t i a l c o n tri­

bution to lin g u is tic theory was to stress that a language, as dis­

tin c t from its corpus, consisted o f an in f in it e set o f unbounded

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sentences and that language use was innovative and appropriate as

a given occasion demanded. 3 Chomsky stressed th at a grammar must

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be a grammar o f the language, not a grammar o f the corpus. Moreover,

according to Chomsky, a grammar must be capable o f accounting fo r

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c e rta in cases o f ambiguity, a matter we w ill return to in a moment.

Chomsky's d is tin c tio n between language competence and language

performance is fundamental to transform ational theory. Language

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performance is the normal, everyday, c r e a t i v e use o f language.

Underlying th is normal c reative use o f language is the speaker's

language competence, his knowledge o f the language. To know a

language, according to Chomsky, is to know the rules th a t allow

one to construct and to understand any o f the in f in it e set o f sen­

tences in his language. To know a language is to know its grammar,

which pairs sound and meaning over an in f in it e range. Chomsky

imputes knowledge o f a language, th a t is , o f grammar, to every

native speaker of the language. In other words, Chomsky re lie s on

the in tu itiv e judgment o f the native speaker to determine whether or

not a sentence is grammatical or well-form ed. The task o f the

lin g u is t Is to specify precisely the rules employed in generating

or constructing sentences in the language. Thus, language competence

is the complete description o f a language in terms o f the grammatical

rules which govern sentence formation. I t is what one knows when one

knows a language, and i t is distinguished from language performance,

or language use. ^

Another fundamental aspect o f transform ational theory is

the d is tin c tio n between the surface stru ctu re o f a sentence and its

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corresponding deep structure.^ E a r lie r i t was noted th a t stru c tu ra l

lin g u is tic s could not adequately account fo r certain cases o f ambigu­

ous sentences. Consider the sentence, " I lik e her cooking.,( I t is

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ambiguous because i t has several meanings. I t might mean, " I lik e

what she cooks," o r, " I lik e i t th a t someone is cooking her," and

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so fo rth . Each o f these d iffe r e n t meanings o r In terp retatio n s is

based on a d iffe r e n t deep s tru c tu re . Each o f these d iffe re n t deep

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structures has been transformed in to the same surface s tru c tu re ,

thus creating the ambiguity. By analyzing the ambiguous surface

stru ctu res, the ambiguity is resolved.

Another example is a sentence th at Chomsky borrowed from

the seventeenth-century Port Royal grammarians: "A wise man is

honest." I t provides a simple illu s tr a tio n o f the functioning

o f transformational ru les. According to Chomsky, the deep structure

o f th is sentence r e a lly consists o f two d iffe r e n t sentences, "A man

Is honest," and, "A man is wise,11 which are combined in three steps

by the application o f c e rta in transform ational rules. Represented

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as a tre e diagram, a form o f notation common In transform ational

theory, the deep stru ctu re looks lik e th is :

NP ■VP

man is honest

man

The f i r s t transformation replaces the lowest noun phrase

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"mart1 w ith "whtf' y ie ld in g , "A man who is wise is honest." A second

transformation deletes the "who is ," resu ltin g in , "A man wise is

honest." A th ird transformation inverts "man" and "w ise," giving

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the surface s tru c tu re , "A wise man is honest."

The deep s tru ctu res, or base phrase markers as Chomsky

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c a lls them, are generated by a set o f rules called phrase structure

j ru les. The deep structures are then converted into surface structures
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by transform ational rules. Chomsky's claim is th a t such rules can

be precisely specified fo r every language in the world, though th is

task is very fa r from complete.

The in terestin g aspect o f transform ational theory is that these

rules conform to c e rta in complex and qu ite abstract p rin cip le s th at

are not a t a ll obvious and which have no functional explanation.

Chomsky has variously characterized these p rin cip le s as lin g u is tic

u n iversals, universal grammar, or simply as in varian t properties o f

language.

One such p rin c ip le or in varian t property is s tru c tu re -

dependence. For example, to form a question o f the sentence, "The dog

in the corner is hungry," a transform ational rule specifies that the

verb following the subject noun phrase moves to the fro n t o f the sen­

tence. In th is example, the verb "Is " follow ing the subject noun

phrase "the dog In the corner" moves to the fr o n t, y ie ld in g , " Is the

dog In the corner hungry?" According to Chomsky, In order fo r the rule

to apply, i t Is necessary that the subject noun phrase be id e n tifie d .

Thus, to apply the rule requires the id e n tific a tio n o f a p a rtic u la r

stru ctu re In the sentence. In other words, the application o f the ru le

depends not on the order o f the words in the sentence but on th e ir

relationsh ip to each o th e r, i . e . , on the sentence stru ctu re. Chomsky

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maintains th at i t would be simpler and more e f f ic ie n t to imagine rules

whose operation would not be structure-dependent, but that such

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structure-independent rules never occur among the rules o f grammar,

whether in English or any other language. Thus, Chomsky in sists that

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structure-dependence is a universal p rin c ip le o f grammar on the basis

o f which grammatical rules are constructed. ^

Chomsky specifies a v a rie ty o f such p rin cip le s and then asks,

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how are we to account fo r them? More s p e c ific a lly , why is i t that a

c h ild when learning its native language constructs grammatical rules

only on the basis of these principles? The answer, Chomsky says, in

what is probably his most controversial claim , is th a t these p rin cip le s

are innate to the mind. Every member o f the species is born w ith

these p rin c ip le s . They are transmitted g e n e tic a lly from generation

to generation ju s t as other species c h a ra c te ris tic s , such as having

two arms or two eyes, are transm itted. Chomsky believes that th is

claim accounts fo r the fa c t th at children on the basis o f l i t t l e data,

in a r e la tiv e ly short period o f time and w ith l i t t l e or no formal

in stru c tio n , are able to construct the grammar o f th e ir language.