Ruano, Mary Jannyn E.

September 17, 2022

1W
Asynchronous Activity #2

Roberto Domingo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818
September 19, 1993
Romero, J.

Facts: Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition for the “Declaration of Nullity of Marriage” against
petitioner Roberto Domingo alleging among others that: they were married on November 26, 1976;
unknown to her, Roberto had a previous marriage with one Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which
marriage is valid and still existing; she came top know of the prior marriage only sometime in 1983 when
Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; and that she discovered that he was cohabiting another woman.

Roberto Domingo filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. He
argued that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man with another woman is illegal;
and void and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage. The marriage
being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore superfluous and
unnecessary. The trial court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit, explaining
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity.

A motion for reconsideration was filed. Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special
civil action for certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court contracted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.

Issue/s: Whether a judicial decree necessary to establish the invalidity of a void, bigamous marriage.

Ruling: Yes. The Family Code settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgement declaring the previous marriage void. The requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his
or her marriage is void, remarries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of her first marriage,
the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.

Renato Castillo v. Lea De Leon-Castillo

G.R. No. 189607
April 18, 2016
Sereno, CJ.

Facts: On May 25, 1972, Lea De Leon-Castillo, herein respondent married Benjamin Bautista. On
January 6, 1979, Lea married herein petitioner Renato Castillo. On 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to
his subsisting marriage with Benjamin. Lea opposed the petition and contended that her marriage with
Benjamin was null and void as they did not secure a marriage license. Lea filed an action to declare her
first marriage with Benjamin void. The RTC granted such action. Meanwhile, Lea filed a demurrer to
evidence claiming that Renato’s proof was insufficient to prove bigamy. On the other hand, Renato
contends that the bleated judicial declaration of nullity did not erase the fact that she entered into marriage
with him when her first marriage was subsisting.

The RTC declared the second marriage null and void ab initio. Benjamin moved for motion for
reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties is concerned, but this was denied. Upon
appeal, the CA reversed the decision and upheld the second marriage. The CA noticed that Lea’s marriage
were celebrated in 1972 and 1979 which is prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. Thus, the
applicable law should be the Civil Code which does not dictate that a judicial decree is necessary in order
to establish the nullity of the second marriage.

Issue: Whether the second marriage is valid.

Ruling: YES. The second marriage is valid. The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be
determined in accordance with the law in effect at the time of its celebration. In the case at bar, the law in
force at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. Hence, the Court must resolve this
using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages. Particularly, Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 and
those on voidable marriages are Articles 83, 85 and 86. The Civil Code differentiates void and voidable
marriages: “in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is necessary”, while in a
voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree. The first marriage was void for lack of license and
consent. Thus, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before she could contract a second
marriage. There was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. The Court
concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her marriage
to Benjamin because of the absence of a marriage license.

Brenda Marcos v. Wilson Marcos

G.R. No. 136490
October 19, 2000
Panganiban, J.

Facts: Respondent Wilson Marcos and petitioner Brenda Marcos first met in 1980 when both were
assigned at the Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of
Pres. Marcos. They got married on September 6, 1982. After leaving the military, Wilson engaged in
different business ventures that did not prosper. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment,
they would often have violent quarrels. He would beat Brenda and even force her to have sex with him
despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was
so severe on the way he chastised them. By 1992, the two were already living separately. In the case study
conducted by Social Worker, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them.
Brenda submitted herself for psychological evaluation, while Wilson, on the other hand, did not.

The court find the respondent to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations
mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards petitioner
and their children. The CA reversed the RTC decision holding that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented because respondent was not subjected to
psychological or psychiatric evaluation.

Issue: Whether psychological incapacity of a respondent in a petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation.

Ruling: NO. Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence presented does not
show such incapacity. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Although the Court is sufficiently convinced that the respondent failed
to provide material support to the family and may have restored to physical abuse and abandonment, the
totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. Verily the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and
was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material; and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his
alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage.
Equally important, there is evidence showing that his condition is incurable.

Noel Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127358
March 31, 2005
Azcuna, J.

Facts: These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by
petitioner Noel Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife, Isabel Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filer her answer, petitioner with
leave of court, amended his petition by statin that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated
to comply with essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer
denying the allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.

Issue: Whether the petitioner is psychologically incapacitated, such as being willful warrants the award of
moral damages.

Ruling: NO. The petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated. It is contradictory to characterized acts
as a product of psychologically incapacity, and hence beyond control of the party because of an innate
inability, while at the same time considering the same set acts as willful. By declaring the petitioner as
psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same facts was negated.
For the same reason since psychological incapacity means that one is truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that one assumes and discharge as a consequence of marriage. It removes the basis for the
contention that the petitioner purposely deceived the private respondent. If the private respondent was
deceived, it was not due to willful act on the part of the petitioner. Since the grant of moral damages was
not proper, it follows that the grant of exemplary damages cannot stand since the Civil Code provides that
exemplary damages are imposed to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Nicolas Matudan v. Republic

G.R. No. 203284
November 14, 2016
Del Castillo, J.

Facts: Nicolas Matudan filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Marilyn Matudan
when the latter left to work abroad and never heard of again. Nicolas alleged that Marilyn was
psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife, and a mother; that based on expert
evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy Tayag, Marilyn’s psychological incapacity is grave,
permanent and incurable.

Issue: Whether Marily Matudan is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under
Art 36 of the Family Code.
Ruling: NO. Marilyn Matudan is not psychologically incapacitated. Psychologically incapacitated must
be characterized by a) gravity, b) juridical antecedence, and c) incurability. The incapacity mut be grave
and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage although overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were, otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. Petitioner harped on the abandonment of
respondent. He even admitted that this is the only reason why he wants their marriage dissolved.
Abandonment of spouse however is not psychological incapacity. For psychological incapacity however
to be appreciated, the same must be serious, grave, and so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness
of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. Petitioner’s evidence
consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag. The
supposed evaluation of Marilyn’s psychological condition was based solely on petitioner’s account, since
Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.

Comparison and Contrast of Tan-Andal v. Andal (G.R. No. 196359) & Republic v. Molina (G.R. No.
108763)

Republic v. Molina:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the
decision
(3) Incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage
(6) Essential marital obligations must be those embraced in Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code
as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 25 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of
the Philippines.
(8) Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state

Tan-Andal v. Andal:

According to the Supreme Court:

(1) The term “psychological incapacity” is not exclusively confined and should not be equated to
mental illness or serious personality disorders rather it refers to an anomaly or incongruity in
one’s physical makeup.
(2) It is not a medical legal concept but a personal condition that prevents a spouse to preform marital
obligations in relation to a specific person that may exist at the time of the marriage but may have
revealed through behavior and it need not to be mental or personality disorder.
(3) As to gravity, it must be shown that the incapacity is caused genuinely serious psychic cause
(4) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage even if
such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
(5) Essential are not limited to those between spouses
(6) Incurable, not in the medical, but in the legal sense.
The third Molina guideline was modified in Andal, that psychological incapacity must be incurable, not in
the medical, but in the legal sense. Psychological incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a
specific partner, and contemplates a situation where the couple’s respective personality structures are so
incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable
breakdown of the marriage.