SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 230170, June 06, 2018 ]

MA. SUGAR M. MERCADO AND SPOUSES REYNALDO AND
YOLANDA MERCADO, MERCADO, VS. HON.JOEL SOCRATES S.
LOPENA [PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 33, QUEZON CITY], HON. JOHN BOOMSRI S. RODOLFO
[PRESIDING JUDGE, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38,
QUEZON CITY], HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY [PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 90, QUEZON CITY], HON.
ROBERTO P. BUENAVENTURA [PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 86, QUEZON CITY], HON. JOSE L.
BAUTISTA, JR. [PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 107, QUEZON CITY], HON. VITALIANO AGUIRRE II (IN HIS
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE), BON. DONALD LEE (IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY), KRISTOFER JAY I. GO, PETER
AND ESTHER GO, KENNETH ROUE I. GO, CASEY LIM JIMENEZ,
CRISTINA PALILEO, AND RUEL BALINO, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J:
This is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Petition),
invoking the power of the Court "to promulgate rules concerning protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, to declare the cases filed by Go against Mercado as Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation (SLAPP) and therefore contrary to the Constitution, public policy
and international law and x x x repugnant to fundamental equality before the law of women and
men and the spirit and the intent of Republic Act [No.] 9262."[1]

Mercado Ma. Sugar M. Mercado (Mercado) is joined herein by her parents, co-Mercado
spouses Reynaldo and Yolanda Mercado (collectively, Mercado).

Go Kristofer Jay I. Go (Go) is the husband of Mercado Mercado. The other Go herein are
spouses Peter and Esther Go (parents of respondent Go), Kenneth Roue Go, Casey Lim
Jimenez, Cristina Palileo, and Ruel Balino (relatives and friends of respondent Go) (collectively,
Go). Likewise impleaded herein are public respondent judges and prosecutors presiding over
various cases filed against Mercado (collectively, public respondents).

Factual Antecedents

The root of this controversy is a domestic dispute between estranged spouses Mercado
Mercado and Go Go. Such dispute eventually led to the filing of numerous suits by both parties
against each other, as summarized below.
 Cases filed by Go against Mercado

Sometime in October 2015, respondent Go filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus with
Custody of their children, which was docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-08943. The case
was raffled to and is still pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
86, which is presided by herein public respondent Judge Roberto P. Buenaventura.[2]

Within the period of September 2015 to November 2015, Go also filed the following cases
against Mercado:
1. People v. Sugar Mercado and Yolanda Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-06371-
CR) for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610[3];

2. People v. Yolanda Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-06372-CR) for violation of

R.A. No. 7610;

3. Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado-Go (NPS XV-INV-15J-11698) for Libel;

4. Kristofer Go v. Yolanda Mercado (NPS-XV-INV-15J-11699) for Libel;

5. People v. Sugar Mercado (Crim. Case No. R-QZN-16-5596-98-CR) for Physical

Injuries, Oral Defamation, Slander by Deed, and Unjust Vexation; and

6. People v. Yolanda and Reynaldo Mercado (Crim. Case No. 16-09066-69) for Unjust
Vexation, Unlawful Arrest, Slight Physical Injuries, Grave Coercion.

All the cases were still pending at the time the Petition was filed, except for NPS XV-INV-
151-11698, which was dismissed by the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Quezon City in a
Resolution dated November 23, 2016.[4]

In addition to the foregoing, beginning February 2016, Go initiated the following cases:
1. Kristofer Go and Christina Palileo v. Yolanda Mercado (QCOCP-NOS-INV-16A-
01033) for Grave Threats;

2. Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado (NPS-XV-02-INV-16C-00840) for violation of R.A. No.

10175[5];

3. Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado (Civil Case No. R-QZN-16-02517-CV) for Indirect

Contempt; and

4. Kristofer Go v. Sugar Mercado (Civil Case No. R-QZN-16-07881-CV) for Indirect

Contempt.

Of the above cases, NPS-XV-02-INV-16C-00840 was dismissed for lack of probable cause.[6]

Cases filed by Mercado against Go

On the other hand, on November 5, 2015, Mercado Mercado filed an Urgent Petition for
Issuance of Temporary and/or Permanent Protection Order (TPO/PPO), docketed as Civil
Case No. R-QZN-15-10201 (the PPO Case).[7] The case was also raffled to Branch 86 of the
RTC of Quezon City.[8] Therein, Mercado Mercado complained of several acts of
respondent Go allegedly constituting domestic violence.

At the same time, Mercado Mercado also filed a criminal complaint for violation of R.A. No.
9262[9] against respondent Go and his parents, respondent spouses Peter and Esther Go, which
was eventually dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

On February 19, 2016, the RTC in the PPO case granted the petition and forthwith issued
a PPO in favor of Mercado Mercado.[10] The Order granting the PPO was appealed by
respondent Go to the Court of Appeals (CA) and was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 106476.[11] In
a Decision dated March 3, 2017, the CA denied respondent Go's appeal.[12] The CA's
Decision was then elevated to the Court via Rule 45 which was denied appeal
by certiorari in G.R. No. 232206 (Kristofer Jay I. Go v. AAA), which was denied through a
Resolution dated October 2, 2017 for failure to show any reversible error on the part of the CA.
[13]

Mercado Mercado also filed several other cases against Go, as follows:
1. Sugar Mercado v. Kristofer Jay Go (R-QZN-16-05478-CV) for Indirect Contempt;

2. Sugar Mercado v. Krystle Anne I. Go-Cantillo (OCP NPS-INV-16H-09264) for

violation of R.A. No. 10175;

3. Ma. Sugar Mercado v. Kristofer Hay Go, Peter and Esther Go (NPS-XV-03-INV-15K-
12139) for violation of R.A. No. 9262; and

4. Ma. Sugar Mercado v. Kristoffer Jay Go, Peter and Esther Go (NPS-XV-INV-16C-
00802 OCP) for violation of R.A. No. 9262.

The last two cases for violation of R.A. No. 9262 were eventually dismissed by the OCP of
Quezon City for lack of probable cause.[14]

Hence, the instant Petition.

Mercado aver that the cases filed by Go against them (the subject cases) are forms of
SLAPP intended to harass, intimidate, and silence them.[15] Mercado claim that the subject
cases are false and baseless complaints that were filed to emotionally, psychologically,
and financially drain them and ultimately to pressure them to give up custody of
Mercado's minor children. Mercado also argue that the filing of the subject cases falls
within the definition of "abuse" and "violence against women" under R.A. No. 9262. In this
regard, Mercado claim that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the subject cases even though Mercado
Mercado is a "judicially declared victim of domestic violence" and in whose favor a PPO has
been issued.[16]

Mercado thus pray that the Court declare the subject cases as SLAPP and for the Court
to issue a TRO/Writ of Preliminary Injunction directing public respondents to desist from
conducting further hearings on the subject cases and for the immediate dismissal of the
same. Mercado also seek the amendment of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence
Against Women and Children) to include provisions against SLAPP.
Comment of Go

On September 14, 2017, Go filed their Comment to the Petition.

Go allege that the Petition does not satisfy the procedural requisites of judicial review
and that the Mercado’s are guilty of forum-shopping. They likewise claim that the filing of
the subject cases against Mercado was not a violation of the PPO as some of the cases
were filed prior to the issuance of the PPO on February 19, 2016. Nonetheless, there was no
pronouncement in the PPO that the filing of said cases was a violation thereof. Go further allege
that the subject cases had factual and legal bases and that the enforcement of a right or
seeking redress through judicial processes does not constitute violence against women.
Thus, Go argue that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondents as
they were merely performing their official functions.

Comment of Public Respondents

On November 9, 2017, public respondents Vitaliano Aguirre II, in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, and Donald Lee, in his capacity as Chief of the Prosecutor's Office, Quezon City, filed
their Comment through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Public respondents stress several procedural infirmities in the Petition, namely: (i) that
the requisites for judicial review are not present in this case; (ii) that the filing of the
Petition is premature because there are other plain, speedy, and adequate remedies
available to Mercado; and (iii) that there was also a failure to observe the hierarchy of
courts.

With respect to the substantive issue, public respondents further aver that they did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the subject cases as the same cannot be
considered as SLAPPs because such rule applies specifically to environmental cases
only. Hence, the relief being sought by Mercado lacks legal or procedural basis.

Issues

As gathered from the submissions of the parties, the principal issue for the Court's resolution is
whether public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the subject cases.

Discussion

The Petition is dismissed.

The Petition is procedurally infirm; availability of plain, speedy, and adequate remedies; failure
to state material dates

At the outset, the Court finds the filing of the instant Petition premature. For a petition
for certiorari or prohibition to prosper, the Rules require that there be no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law.[17] Here, the cases before the
public respondents are still pending. Thus, there still exists in law a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy for Mercado which is to participate in said cases and await the
judgment of the RTC. And, if the RTC renders an unfavorable judgment against Mercado,
they may appeal the cases to the CA. Meanwhile, as to the complaints filed before the OCP
of Quezon City, the same may be elevated via petition for review before the Secretary of Justice
and thereafter to the Office of the President; if the prosecutor's finding of probable cause is
ultimately upheld, the case may then proceed to trial.

In the same vein, Mercado is also entitled to the appropriate relief under R.A. No. 9262 in case
of a violation of the PPO dated February 19, 2016 issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-15-10201.
Under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9262, a violation of any provision of a PPO shall constitute
Contempt of Court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules:
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. -

xxxx

Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under this Act shall constitute contempt of
court punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to any other criminal or
civil action that the offended party may file for any of the acts committed.[18]
The Court is a court of last resort. This policy must be strictly observed so as not to unduly
burden the Court with cases that may be resolved by the lower courts vested with concurrent
jurisdiction. The Court's original jurisdiction may only be invoked when serious and important
reasons exist that necessitate the same.

Furthermore, the Petition is dismissible for failure to include a statement of material

dates in violation of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 3 of Rule 46. Rule
46 provides that the following material dates must be stated in a petition
for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the judgment or final
order or resolution was received, (b) the date when a motion for new trial or for
reconsideration was filed, and (c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was
received.[19] The same provision states that the Mercado's failure to comply with said
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.[20]

The purpose of this requirement is to determine whether the petition was filed within the proper
reglementary period. A petition for certiorari or prohibition must be filed not later than sixty (60)
days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution sought to be assailed. [21]

Here, out of the ten (10) subject cases, not once did Mercado allege any material date in
compliance with Rule 56, much less cite a specific order or ruling of the court or agency which
they are questioning. Consequently, there is no way for the Court to determine the timeliness of
the Petition because Mercado failed to include the required statement, nor did they attempt to
satisfactorily explain their failure to do so.

Parenthetically, on the issue of the rule on hierarchy of courts, the Court finds the direct
filing with the Court unwarranted under the circumstances. Generally, a direct invocation of
the Court's original jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons therefor.[22] Thus, in Rama v. Moises,[23] the Court recognized
the following exceptions to the strict application of the rule on hierarchy of courts:
x x x (a) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time; (b) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance;
(c) cases of first impression; (d) when the constitutional issues raised are best decided
by this Court; (e) when the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored; x x x.
[24]
(Emphasis supplied)
Notwithstanding the foregoing, while the Court notes that the Petition presents, at the
very least, a case of first impression, novelty alone cannot cure the inherent defects of
the Petition.

Those who seek relief from the Court must comply with its rules. Procedural rules are in place
for the orderly administration of justice. Litigation may not be a mere contest of technicalities,
but this does not excuse strict compliance with the Rules of Court.[25] The Court will only relax
the application of the rules for the most compelling and exceptional reasons, none of which are
existent in this case. Based on the foregoing, the Petition should therefore be dismissed.

The Court's rule-making power cannot be invoked through a Rule 65 petition

Mercado invoke the power of the Court to promulgate rules of procedure, presumably to extend
the relief of SLAPP to those cases filed against victims of domestic violence in the context of
R.A. No. 9262.

Foremost, the rule-making power of the Court in matters of pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts is vested by Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.[26] Hence, being plenary in
nature, the Court cannot be called upon by a private citizen to exercise such power in a
particular manner, especially through the vehicle of a petition for certiorari or prohibition, which
is intended for an entirely different purpose.

Moreover, as discussed above, a petition filed under Rule 65 is directed against any
tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions that has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Relief in such a petition merely takes the
form of correcting any error of jurisdiction committed by the tribunal or officer. Here,
Mercado would want the Court to accommodate her cause of action by granting a
collateral relief that is not comprehended under the provisions of Rule 65 - or any of the
Rules, for that matter - which is to extend the concept of SLAPP to cases of violence
against women and their children.

Prescinding therefrom, the Court finds no occasion under the circumstances to allow
such a relief.

The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable to cases of domestic violence against women and
children under R.A. No. 9262

The concept of SLAPP was first introduced to this jurisdiction under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC).[28] As defined therein, a SLAPP refers to
an action whether civil, criminal or administrative, brought against any person,
institution or any government agency or local government unit or its officials and
employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue pressure or stifle any legal
recourse that such person, institution or government agency has taken or may take in
the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of
environmental rights.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
In application, the allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have
been filed merely as a harassment suit against environmental actions:
RULE 6

Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation

xxxx

SECTION 2. SLAPP as a Defense; How Alleged. - In a SLAPP filed against a person involved in
the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment, or assertion of
environmental rights, the defendant may file an answer interposing as a defense that the
case is a SLAPP and shall be supported by documents, affidavits, papers and other evidence;
and, by way of counterclaim, pray for damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

The court shall direct the plaintiff or adverse party to file an opposition showing the suit is not a
SLAPP, attaching evidence in support thereof, within a non-extendible period of five (5) days
from receipt of notice that an answer has been filed.

The defense of a SLAPP shall be set for hearing by the court after issuance of the order
to file an opposition within fifteen (15) days from filing of the comment or the lapse of the
period.[30] (Emphases supplied)

RULE 19

Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation in Criminal Cases

SECTION 1. Motion to Dismiss. - Upon the filing of an information in court and before
arraignment, the accused may file a motion to dismiss on the ground that the criminal
action is a SLAPP.

SECTION 2. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the defense of a SLAPP shall be summary in
nature. The parties must submit all the available evidence in support of their respective
positions. The party seeking the dismissal of the case must prove by substantial evidence
that his acts for the enforcement of environmental law is a legitimate action for the
protection, preservation and rehabilitation of the environment. The party filing the action
assailed as a SLAPP shall prove by preponderance of evidence that the action is not a SLAPP.
[31]
(Emphases supplied)
Transposed to this case, the Court finds no occasion to apply the foregoing rules as the
Petition has no relation at all to "the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of
the environment or assertion of environmental rights."[32] R.A. No. 9262, which involves
cases of violence against women and their children, is not among those laws included
under the scope of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC:
SECTION 2. Scope. - These Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal and special
civil actions before the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts involving enforcement or
violations of environmental and other related laws, rules and regulations such as but not
limited to the following:
(a) Act No. 3572, Prohibition Against Cutting of Tindalo, Akli, and Malave Trees;

(b) P.D. No. 705, Revised Forestry Code;

(c) P.D. No. 856, Sanitation Code;

(d) P.D. No. 979, Marine Pollution Decree;

(e) P.D. No. 1067, Water Code;

(f) P.D. No. 1151, Philippine Environmental Policy of 1977;

(g) P.D. No. 1433, Plant Quarantine Law of 1978;

(h) P.D. No. 1586, Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement System Including Other
Environmental Management Related Measures and for Other Purposes;

(i) R.A. No. 3571, Prohibition Against the Cutting, Destroying or Injuring of Planted or Growing Trees,
Flowering Plants and Shrubs or Plants of Scenic Value along Public Roads, in Plazas, Parks, School
Premises or in any Other Public Ground;

(j) R.A. No. 4850, Laguna Lake Development Authority Act;

(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous Waste Act;

(l) R.A. No. 7076, People's Small-Scale Mining Act;

(m)R.A. No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System Act including all laws, decrees, orders,
proclamations and issuances establishing protected areas;

(n) R.A. No. 7611, Strategic Environmental Plan for Palawan Act;
(o) R.A. No. 7942, Philippine Mining Act;

(p) R.A. No. 8371, Indigenous Peoples Rights Act;

(q) R.A. No. 8550, Philippine Fisheries Code;

(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;

(s) R.A. No. 9003, Ecological Solid Waste Management Act;

(t) R.A. No. 9072, National Caves and Cave Resource Management Act;

(u) R.A. No. 9147, Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act;

(v) R.A. No. 9175, Chainsaw Act;

(w) R.A. No. 9275, Clean Water Act;

(x) R.A. No. 9483, Oil Spill Compensation Act of 2007; and

(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, The Public Land Act; R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law of 1988; R.A. No. 7160, Local Government Code of 1991; R.A. No. 7161, Tax Laws Incorporated
in the Revised Forestry Code and Other Environmental Laws (Amending the NIRC); R.A. No. 7308,
Seed Industry Development Act of 1992; R.A. No. 7900, High-Value Crops Development Act; R.A.
No. 8048, Coconut Preservation Act; R.A. No. 8435, Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act of
1997; R.A. No. 9522, The Philippine Archipelagic Baselines Law; R.A. No. 9593, Renewable Energy
Act of 2008; R.A. No. 9637, Philippine Biofuels Act; and other existing laws that relate to the
conservation, development, preservation, protection and utilization of the environment and
natural resources.[33] (Emphases supplied)
SLAPP, as a defense, is a mere privilege borne out of procedural rules; accordingly, it
may only be exercised in the manner and within the scope prescribed by the Court as a
rule-making body.[34] Here, Mercado cannot, under the guise of substantial justice, rely on
a remedy that is simply not available to them. In fact, by invoking the Court's rule-making
power in their Petition, Mercado have admitted that the instant action has no basis under any of
the rules promulgated by the Court. The Court takes this occasion to remind Mercado that rules
of procedure are not a "one-size fits-all" tool that may be invoked in any and all instances at the
whim of the litigant as this would be anathema to the orderly administration of justice.

Further on this matter, it is highly improper for Mercado to invoke SLAPP as a defense in
an original action before a separate forum considering that the above rules clearly
mandate that such a defense can only be invoked in the same action and consequently,
before the same court. Here, Mercado essentially initiated an omnibus motion before the
Court to dismiss all cases pending elsewhere. Such maneuver is patently repugnant to
established procedure and thus cannot be sanctioned by the Court.

Needless to state, the dismissal of the Petition does not mean denial of redress to the Mercado.
As already discussed above, there are still available and adequate remedies within the
framework of the law and applicable rules.

The public respondents did not commit grave abuse of discretion; writs of certiorari and
prohibition are not available remedies to Mercado

The writs of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 are extraordinary remedies that may be
availed of when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[35] The term grave abuse of discretion connotes capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[36]

Based on the foregoing standards, the Court finds that Mercado herein utterly failed to establish
their entitlement to a corrective writ of certiorari or prohibition.

It bears stressing that a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition seeks solely to
correct errors of jurisdiction and not merely errors of judgment made in the exercise of
jurisdiction.[37] In this case, Mercado failed to demonstrate that the subject cases fell outside of
the respective jurisdictions of public respondents; there was no showing that the subject matters
of the said cases were not properly cognizable by the offices of public respondents. Instead,
Mercado merely argue that public respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in the
taking of cognizance of the subject cases despite the issuance of the PPO in favor of Mercado
Mercado.[38] This is serious error.

While the PPO indeed enjoins Go from committing acts amounting to physical, psychological,
and emotional abuse, and from harassing, annoying, contacting, or communicating with
Mercado Mercado, such directive can hardly be construed to extend to public respondents in
their act of dispensing the functions of their office. There is absolutely nothing that precludes
public respondents from exercising their respective jurisdictions over the complaints or
cases filed before them; anything less would be tantamount to an abdication of their
public offices.

Further, neither does the issuance of the PPO prevent Go from seeking redress from the courts
for any alleged offense committed by Mercado against them. The PPO granted in favor of
Mercado Mercado does not and cannot insulate her from prosecution for acts committed in
violation of the law, even if the action is initiated by Go. Granted, the PPO is a directive
addressed to Go; however, the latter is still entitled to redress and be granted the reliefs he
sought so long as they were based on legitimate grounds.

All told, as correctly submitted by both private and public respondents in their respective
Comments, in taking cognizance of the subject cases, public respondents were merely fulfilling
their respective duties in the administration of justice. This, the Court finds, does not amount to
abuse of discretion, much less a grave one. Hence, the dismissal of the Petition must follow.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Peralta, Perlas-Bernabe, and Reyes, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Twelve states as well as various cities and organizations sought to require the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate greenhouse gases like
carbon dioxide under its authority to regulate pollutants. The lawsuit was
based on Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act, a provision that requires the
EPA Administrator to set emission standards for air pollutants from motor
vehicles that the Administrator judges to play a role in pollution that could be
reasonably expected to endanger public health or welfare.

Responding to that mandate, the EPA had decided that it lacked authority to
regulate greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide for climate change purposes.
Even if it did have that authority, it felt that it was unnecessary to set
greenhouse gas emissions standards for vehicles. The case combined the
substantive issue of whether the agency had decided correctly on these issues with
the procedural question of whether the states, cities, and organizations even had
standing to bring such a claim. The concrete injury that they alleged was the
loss of coastline to rising sea levels in global warming.
Attorneys

 James Milkey (plaintiffs)

Opinions

Majority

 John Paul Stevens (Author)

 Anthony M. Kennedy
 David H. Souter
 Ruth Bader Ginsburg
 Stephen G. Breyer

After finding that the states had standing for these types of environmental claims,
Stevens wrote that the Clean Air Act does provide sufficient statutory authority for
the agency to regulate greenhouse gases. Stevens pointed out that the law provides
a sweeping definition of what constitutes a pollutant, and greenhouse gases like
carbon dioxide clearly fit inside that definition. He sent the case back to the agency
for a reconsideration of its decision. While its current reasoning for not regulating
greenhouse gases was insufficient, it would have the chance to find another
reasonable basis for that policy.

Dissent
  John G. Roberts, Jr. (Author)
 Antonin Scalia
 Clarence Thomas
 Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

Arguing that the states lacked standing, Roberts felt that the loss of land to rising
sea levels in coastal areas was not a sufficiently concrete injury. He also found that
there was a lack of scientific evidence to support the notion that EPA regulations
would have a meaningful impact in controlling global warming. This meant that
there was not a causal nexus between the actions of the EPA and the harm to the
states. Roberts pointed out that much of the impetus behind global warming comes
from foreign nations that have no environmental regulations.

Dissent

 Antonin Scalia (Author)

 John G. Roberts, Jr.
 Clarence Thomas
 Samuel A. Alito, Jr.

Picking up where Roberts left off, Scalia agreed that the plaintiffs lacked standing
but proceeded to address the merits of the case as though they did. He found that
the statute did not deny the agency the authority to defer its decision on
regulations in the area until a later date. He also agreed with Roberts that the
scientific evidence supporting the claims of the states was too speculative to take
seriously. Scalia argued that the majority had abandoned the principle of deference
to agency decision-making that was articulated in Chevron v. Natural Resources
Defense Council (1984).

Case Commentary
When it reconsidered the matter, the EPA reversed its decision and found that
regulating greenhouse gases had a reasonable connection to protecting public
health and welfare. It stated that greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide had played
a key role in global warming. Challenges by states that opposed more aggressive
agency regulations did not survive review by the D.C. Circuit.

SYLLABUS
OCTOBER TERM, 2006
MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

MASSACHUSETTS et al. v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

No. 05–1120. Argued November 29, 2006—Decided April 2, 2007

Based on respected scientific opinion that a well-documented rise in global

temperatures and attendant climatological and environmental changes have
resulted from a significant increase in the atmospheric concentration of
“greenhouse gases,” a group of private organizations petitioned the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to begin regulating the emissions of
four such gases, including carbon dioxide, under §202(a)(1) of the Clean Air
Act, which requires that the EPA “shall by regulation prescribe … standards
applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class … of new motor
vehicles … which in [the EPA Administrator’s] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to,
air pollution … reasonably … anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” 42
U. S. C. §7521(a)(1). The Act defines “air pollutant” to include “any air pollution agent
… , including any physical, chemical … substance … emitted into … the ambient air.”
§7602(g). EPA ultimately denied the petition, reasoning that (1) the Act does
not authorize it to issue mandatory regulations to address global climate
change, and (2) even if it had the authority to set greenhouse gas emission
standards, it would have been unwise to do so at that time because a causal
link between greenhouse gases and the increase in global surface air
temperatures was not unequivocally established. The agency further
characterized any EPA regulation of motor-vehicle emissions as a piecemeal
approach to climate change that would conflict with the President’s
comprehensive approach involving additional support for technological
innovation, the creation of nonregulatory programs to encourage voluntary
private-sector reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, and further research
on climate change, and might hamper the President’s ability to persuade key
developing nations to reduce emissions.
 Petitioners, now joined by intervenor Massachusetts and other state and local
governments, sought review in the D. C. Circuit. Although each of the three
judges on the panel wrote separately, two of them agreed that the EPA
Administrator properly exercised his discretion in denying the rulemaking
petition. One judge concluded that the Administrator’s exercise of “judgment” as to
whether a pollutant could “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare,” §7521(a)(1), could be based on scientific uncertainty as well as other
factors, including the concern that unilateral U. S. regulation of motor-vehicle
emissions could weaken efforts to reduce other countries’ greenhouse gas
emissions. The second judge opined that petitioners had failed to demonstrate the
particularized injury to them that is necessary to establish standing under Article III,
but accepted the contrary view as the law of the case and joined the judgment on
the merits as the closest to that which he preferred. The court therefore denied
review.

Held:

1. Petitioners have standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of their rulemaking petition.
Pp. 12–23.

(a) This case suffers from none of the defects that would preclude it from being
a justiciable Article III “Controvers[y].” See, e.g., Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1.
Moreover, the proper construction of a congressional statute is an eminently
suitable question for federal-court resolution, and Congress has authorized
precisely this type of challenge to EPA action, see 42 U. S. C. §7607(b)(1).
Contrary to EPA’s argument, standing doctrine presents no insuperable
jurisdictional obstacle here. To demonstrate standing, a litigant must show
that it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual
or imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that a
favorable decision will likely redress that injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561. However, a litigant to whom Congress has
“accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests,” id., at 573, n. 7
—here, the right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld, §7607(b)(1)
—“can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy,” ibid. Only one petitioner needs to have
standing to authorize review. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U. S. 47, 52, n. 2. Massachusetts has a special position and interest
here. It is a sovereign State and not, as in Lujan, a private individual, and it actually
owns a great deal of the territory alleged to be affected. The sovereign
prerogatives to force reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, to negotiate
emissions treaties with developing countries, and (in some circumstances) to
exercise the police power to reduce motor-vehicle emissions are now lodged
in the Federal Government. Because congress has ordered EPA to protect
Massachusetts (among others) by prescribing applicable standards, §7521(a)
(1), and has given Massachusetts a concomitant procedural right to challenge
the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious, §7607(b)(1),
petitioners’ submissions as they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most
demanding standards of the adversarial process. EPA’s steadfast refusal to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts
that is both “actual” and “imminent,” Lujan, 504 U. S., at 560, and there is a
“substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested” will prompt EPA to
take steps to reduce that risk, Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study
Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 79. Pp. 12–17.

(b) The harms associated with climate change are serious and well
recognized. The Government’s own objective assessment of the relevant
science and a strong consensus among qualified experts indicate that global
warming threatens, inter alia, a precipitate rise in sea levels, severe and
irreversible changes to natural ecosystems, a significant reduction in winter
snowpack with direct and important economic consequences, and increases
in the spread of disease and the ferocity of weather events. That these
changes are widely shared does not minimize Massachusetts’ interest in the
outcome of this litigation. See Federal Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U. S. 11, 24.
According to petitioners’ uncontested affidavits, global sea levels rose between 10
and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming and have
already begun to swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land. Remediation costs alone,
moreover, could reach hundreds of millions of dollars. Pp. 17–19.

(c) Given EPA’s failure to dispute the existence of a causal connection

between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming, its refusal
to regulate such emissions, at a minimum, “contributes” to Massachusetts’
injuries. EPA overstates its case in arguing that its decision not to regulate
contributes so insignificantly to petitioners’ injuries that it cannot be haled into
federal court, and that there is no realistic possibility that the relief sought would
mitigate global climate change and remedy petitioners’ injuries, especially since
predicted increases in emissions from China, India, and other developing nations
will likely offset any marginal domestic decrease EPA regulation could bring about.
Agencies, like legislatures, do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell
swoop, see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U. S. 483, 489, but instead
whittle away over time, refining their approach as circumstances change and they
develop a more nuanced understanding of how best to proceed, cf. SEC v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U. S. 194, 202–203. That a first step might be tentative does not by itself
negate federal-court jurisdiction. And reducing domestic automobile emissions is
hardly tentative. Leaving aside the other greenhouse gases, the record indicates
that the U. S. transportation sector emits an enormous quantity of carbon dioxide
into the atmosphere. Pp. 20–21.

(d) While regulating motor-vehicle emissions may not by

itself reverse global warming, it does not follow that the Court lacks
jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take steps
to slow or reduce it. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U. S. 228, 243, n. 15. Because of the
enormous potential consequences, the fact that a remedy’s effectiveness
might be delayed during the (relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-
vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially irrelevant. Nor is it
dispositive that developing countries are poised to substantially increase
greenhouse gas emissions: A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the
pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere. The
Court attaches considerable significance to EPA’s espoused belief that global
climate change must be addressed. Pp. 21–23.

2. The scope of the Court’s review of the merits of the statutory issues is narrow.
Although an agency’s refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is not ordinarily
subject to judicial review, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U. S. 821, there are key differences
between nonenforcement and denials of rulemaking petitions that are, as in the
present circumstances, expressly authorized. EPA concluded alternatively in its
petition denial that it lacked authority under §7521(a)(1) to regulate new vehicle
emissions because carbon dioxide is not an “air pollutant” under §7602, and that,
even if it possessed authority, it would decline to exercise it because regulation
would conflict with other administration priorities. Because the Act expressly
permits review of such an action, §7607(b)(1), this Court “may reverse [it if it finds it
to be] arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law,” §7607(d)(9). Pp. 24–25.

3. Because greenhouse gases fit well within the Act’s capacious definition of “air
pollutant,” EPA has statutory authority to regulate emission of such gases from new
motor vehicles. That definition—which includes “any air pollution agent … ,
including any physical, chemical, … substance … emitted into … the ambient air … ,”
§7602(g) (emphasis added)—embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.
Moreover, carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are undoubtedly “physical
[and] chemical … substance[s].” Ibid. EPA’s reliance on postenactment congressional
actions and deliberations it views as tantamount to a command to refrain from
regulating greenhouse gas emissions is unavailing. Even if postenactment
legislative history could shed light on the meaning of an otherwise-unambiguous
statute, EPA identifies nothing suggesting that Congress meant to curtail EPA’s
power to treat greenhouse gases as air pollutants. The Court has no difficulty
reconciling Congress’ various efforts to promote interagency collaboration and
research to better understand climate change with the agency’s pre-existing
mandate to regulate “any air pollutant” that may endanger the public
welfare. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 133, distinguished.
Also unpersuasive is EPA’s argument that its regulation of motor-vehicle carbon
dioxide emissions would require it to tighten mileage standards, a job (according to
EPA) that Congress has assigned to the Department of Transportation. The fact that
DOT’s mandate to promote energy efficiency by setting mileage standards may
overlap with EPA’s environmental responsibilities in no way licenses EPA to shirk its
duty to protect the public “health” and “welfare,” §7521(a)(1). Pp. 25–30.

4. EPA’s alternative basis for its decision—that even if it has statutory authority to
regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this time—rests on
reasoning divorced from the statutory text. While the statute conditions EPA action
on its formation of a “judgment,” that judgment must relate to whether an air
pollutant “cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” §7601(a)(1). Under the Act’s clear
terms, EPA can avoid promulgating regulations only if it determines that
greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some
reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether they do. It has refused to do so, offering instead a laundry list of
reasons not to regulate, including the existence of voluntary Executive Branch
programs providing a response to global warming and impairment of the
President’s ability to negotiate with developing nations to reduce emissions. These
policy judgments have nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions
contribute to climate change and do not amount to a reasoned justification for
declining to form a scientific judgment. Nor can EPA avoid its statutory obligation by
noting the uncertainty surrounding various features of climate change and
concluding that it would therefore be better not to regulate at this time. If the
scientific uncertainty is so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned
judgment, it must say so. The statutory question is whether sufficient information
exists for it to make an endangerment finding. Instead, EPA rejected the rulemaking
petition based on impermissible considerations. Its action was therefore “arbitrary,
capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” §7607(d)(9). On remand, EPA
must ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute. Pp. 30–32.

415 F. 3d 50, reversed and remanded.

Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined.

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