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 CAPRi Working Paper No. 87 June 2008

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFAR COMMONS IN

ETHIOPIA
State Coercion, Diversification, and Property Rights Change among
Pastoralists

Bekele Hundie, Ethiopian Civil Service College

Martina Padmanabhan, Humboldt University of Berlin

The CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi) is an initiative of the
15 centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR). The initiative
promotes comparative research on the role of property rights and collective action institutions in
shaping the efficiency, sustainability, and equity of natural resource systems. CAPRi’s Secretariat is
hosted within the Environment and Production Technology Division (EPDT) of the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
CAPRi Working Papers contain preliminary material and research results. They are circulated prior to a
full peer review to stimulate discussion and critical comment. It is expected that most working papers
will eventually be published in some other form and that their content may also be revised
(http://dx.doi.org/10.2499/CAPRiWP87).
Copyright © June 2008. International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of
this material may be reproduced for personal and not–for–profit use without the express written
permission of but with acknowledgment to IFPRI. To reproduce the material contained herein for profit
or commercial use requires express written permission. To obtain permission to reprint, contact the
IFPRI Communications Division at ifpri–copyright@cgiar.org.
CGIAR Systemwide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi)
C/– International Food Policy Research Institute, 2033 K Street NW, Washington, DC 20006–1002 USA
T +1 202.862.5600 • F +1 202.467.4439 • www.capri.cgiar.org

1
ABSTRACT

The major economic activity for pastoralists is animal husbandry. The harsh
environment in which herders raise their livestock requires constant mobility to
regulate resource utilization via a common property regime. In contrast to the
mobile way of life characterizing pastoralism, agriculture as a sedentary activity is
only marginally present in the lowlands of the Afar regional state in Ethiopia.
Nevertheless, this study reveals a situation where the traditional land–use
arrangements in Afar are being transformed due to the introduction of farming. In
the past, the Imperial and the Socialist governments introduced large–scale
agriculture in a coercive manner, thereby instigating massive resistance from the
pastoralists. Currently, the recurrence of drought in the study areas has facilitated
the subdivision of the communal land on a voluntary basis for the purpose of
farming. Qualitative and quantitative analysis highlight the drivers, both coercive
and non–coercive, of the transformation of traditional property rights of Afar
pastoralists.

Keywords: traditional property rights, pastoralists, introduction of farming,

common property, drought

2
Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................... 4
2. Theoretical Perspectives on Property Right Changes, Diversification and
Collective Action ........................................................................................... 6
3. Study Sites and Methods ......................................................................... 8
4. Traditional Institutional Arrangements ..................................................... 10
5. Coercive Ways of Property Rights Change: The State Subverting the
Commons.. ................................................................................................ 11
6. Non–coercive ways of property rights changes: Voluntary adoption of
farming.... ................................................................................................. 15
7. Summary and policy implications ............................................................ 24
References ................................................................................................ 28

3
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AFAR COMMONS IN
ETHIOPIA

State Coercion, Diversification, and Property Rights Change among

Pastoralists

Bekele Hundie and Martina Padmanabhan1

1. INTRODUCTION

Change in natural environmental conditions has constantly influenced pastoral

livelihoods in the Afar region of Ethiopia, though uncertainty in ecological conditions
and insecurity of property rights has increased only relatively recently (Scoones,
1995, McCarthy et al., 1999). As a result of these changes, the reliable flow of life–
sustaining goods and services previously wrought from the area's erratic rangeland
ecosystems is diminishing, putting pastoral livelihoods at great risk (Gadamu,
1994). The adaptation of these pastoralists is not confined to a simple human–land
relationship in an isolated setting, but is rather influenced by demographic change,
agricultural expansion, attempts to incorporate them into the national economy,
and insecurity arising from conflicts and border instability (Davies and Bennett,
2007). Due to the widespread nature of droughts (Berkele, 2002) and ethnic
conflicts (Hagmann, 2005) in several areas of Ethiopia, livestock mobility between
alternative water and grazing areas has also been severely constrained
(Padmanabhan, forthcoming), weakening livestock and causing a significant
increase in livestock mortality. The cumulative effect of these factors has led to the
weakening of traditional authority, degradation of natural resources, and growing
vulnerability of different pastoral groups to ecological and economic stress, often
resulting in poverty (Unruh, 2005; Rettberg, 2006).
In this situation, livestock herders increasingly pursue non–pastoral income
strategies to meet consumption needs and prepare against shocks such as drought
(Little et al., 2001). Property right changes having to do with the evolving
relationship between pastoralists and agriculture are at the center of this analysis,
which looks into two cases related to agricultural production systems and Afar
pastoralists. One case portrays the conflictive transformation of the traditional land
use arrangements of Afar pastoralists, which came about due to the coercive
intervention of the state in implementing projects associated with commercial
farming, while the other shows the more or less collective adaptation to farming, as
induced by recurrent droughts in the presence of small–scale and supportive state
intervention. Indeed, the two cases show that pastoralism is under pressure arising
from both policy–related and natural challenges.

1
Corresponding author: martina.padmanabhan@agrar.hu–berlin.de
*This research was funded by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development,
Germany.

4
 Ethiopia’s national poverty reduction program recognizes that there is a
rising threat to pastoral livelihoods as a result of biased policies and environmental
change. The changes in economic policy that came about following political changes
in 1991 gave development priority to neglected regions and groups, like pastoral
and agro–pastoral group in the lowlands. Consequently, the present constitution
recognizes pastoral land as specified in Article 40 and shows the step–wise
constitutional and legal recognition of a common property regime for rangeland
resources. Nevertheless, the government is still facilitating the gradual conversion
of pastoralists into more sedentary livelihoods, reflected in the majority of its
strategies for change (UN OCHA–PCI, 2007).
Historically, Ethiopian pastoralists have been the most marginalized groups in
the policy arena (Helland, 2002; Yemane, 2003). During the Imperial regime (1930
to 1974), pastoralists were considered to be aimless wanderers who led a primitive
way of life (Abdulahi, 2004; Getachew, 2001); moreover, they were considered to
have been using natural resources wastefully (Gebre, 2001). Hence, during this
time the main ambition of government officials, who were entirely from peasant or
urban backgrounds, was to convert these ‘primitive’ societies into sedentary
farmers who would utilize resources more efficiently. Different government policies
emphasized that efficient resource utilization was possible if the vast and
‘inefficiently used’ resources in pastoral areas came under the control of the state,
legitimizing government intervention (ibid).
This modernist discourse, viewing pastoralism as a stage for gradual
development towards agro–pastoralism and finally sedentary agriculture, had been
the basis for most policy formulation under the socialist regime (1974 to 1991) until
the nineties, and still causes great grievance and irritation in the public policy
debates on pastoralists today. Chatty (2007) stresses the simultaneity of
pastoralists’ cultural persistence and resistance to sedentarization and farming,
while also compromising and adjusting to modernization efforts and a globalizing
world. Modernist thinking, characterized by a linear development path, has
influenced the pastoral situation in the past through forced diversification, while
today we observe voluntary farming activities.
On the one hand, with its increasing involvement in land–use politics since
the 1960s, the state as a powerful external force has inflicted severe changes upon
the property right regimes that govern pastoralist life. The influence of the state–
farms established in the Awash valley on dry–season pastures has forced the
institutional arrangements of the commons into diversification. On the other hand,
the current endeavors of development intervention to promote farming are opening
up other opportunities.
In this chapter, we discuss two cases of pastoralist involvement in agriculture
and investigate the challenges and opportunities of this transition. We focus on the
drivers of crop production from a dual perspective: first, as an outcome of state
coercion and, second, as a voluntary response to natural calamities. One case
portrays the conflictive transformation of the traditional land use arrangements of
Afar pastoralists, which came about due to the coercive intervention of the state in
implementing projects associated with commercial farming, while the other shows
the more or less collective action to adapt farming, as induced by recurrent
droughts in the presence of small–scale and supportive state intervention. Property
right changes are at the center of this analysis of diversification. As we will

5
demonstrate, there is considerable difference within pastoral communities in
motivations for diversification, predominantly along lines of wealth and gender. In
addition, the question of whether this recent option of small–scale farming is taken
up by pastoralists depends on factors such as per capita livestock assets, suitability
of the land for farming in general, access to wage employment as an alternative
income source, and external support in regards to farming activities. The
contradictory impact of these processes on property rights and collective action
regarding poverty is also to be discussed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly
discusses the theory of transformation of property rights; the next section places
the study at hand in the wider theoretical debate on property right changes. Section
3 describes the study sites and methods; Section 4 describes the current
institutional arrangements of Afar pastoralists; Sections 5 and 6 discuss the
transformation of the traditional land use arrangements of Afar due to coercive
state intervention and natural challenges, respectively. The final section
summarizes the main findings and provides policy suggestions.

2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY RIGHT CHANGES,

DIVERSIFICATION AND COLLECTIVE ACTION

The notion of property rights refers to a “bundle” of rights that individuals or groups
have on a certain material or intellectual resource (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992;
Alchian and Demsetz, 1973). Bromley (1991) defines these bundles of rights as
including the right to derive benefits from the resource, the right to exclude others,
the right to manage the resource, and the right to transfer the resource to others
through various arrangements, backed up and enforced by the collective. Rights
may be time–bounded or intermittent. Right holders are claimants over a resource
− including individuals, communities, or legal entities − who may enjoy all rights in
a bundle or be limited to only some of them. In most cases, conflicts take place
among different individuals or communities regarding who should have command
over a resource, how to use it, when to use it, and so on (Mwangi, 2005). There are
a great number of cases in which different people or communities bear overlapping
claims over resources, such as in the case of the riverine pastures of Afar. In
pastoral areas, grazing land is a common–pool resource to which a great number of
herders have de facto rights (Kirk, 1999; Swallow and Bromley, 1995). For a
detailed discussion of the linkage between land rights and access to water, see
Beyene and Korf (2008).
While rights imply the access of right holders to benefit streams, they do not
guarantee the realization of benefits. All members of a clan in Afar hold rights to
the common rangeland that belongs to their clan, but have different capabilities to
utilize it. Households with little livestock have less means with which to actually
access the resources. Ribot and Peluso sharpen this distinction by providing a
broader framework for property right analysis. The basic idea underlying their
framework is the distinction between property and access. Accordingly, ‘access is
about all possible means by which a person is able to benefit from things’, while
‘property generally evokes some kind of socially acknowledged and supported
claims or rights’ (2003:155). With this re–conceptualization, they show how

6
capability differences arising from access to different resources influence the
quantity and quality of benefits that can be generated from them.
Studies in diversification strategies (such as Holtzman, 1996; Kituyi, 1990;
Little, 1992; Zaal and Dietz, 1999) show that distinct change and diversification is
still discussed as a two–sided coin, which may either allow herders to better cope
with high levels of risk or may exaggerate their problems. Cultivation is a major
avenue of diversification and is seen by some as a viable risk management strategy
(Campbell, 1984; Smith, 1998), while others view it as an unsustainable or even
destructive option that accentuates the risks pastoralists face (Hogg, 1988; Little et
al., 2007). Fratkin (1991) and Nathan et al. (1996) show the potentially negative
ecological and social effects of pastoral sedentarization and diversification. Yet, for
Holtzmann (1996), diversification is seen as a cyclical rather than a linear process,
whereby herders combine different income strategies at different points in their
life–cycle. Equally, income diversification strategies such as farming among
pastoralists do not necessarily lead to a diminished interest in livestock investments
and production (Little et al., 2001).
One driving factor of property rights changes is diversification through the
adoption of non–pastoral livelihood strategies. Berhanu et al. (2007) describes for
the Borana pastoralists in southern Ethiopia the importance of human capital
investment and related support services for improving the pastoralist capacity to
manage risk through a diversified income portfolio. The increasing privatization of
rangelands for crop production and private grazing along this diversification is
explained by Kamara et al. (2004): certain national policies have resulted in
conflicts of authority between traditional and formal systems, creating an avenue
for spontaneous enclosures, associated conflicts and decreasing human welfare.
Lesorogol (2005) finds that in Kenya households’ gains from privatization depend
on the particular ways of how the process of land tenure change and the pattern of
diversification were integrated into the pastoral livelihood. In this case local level
norms reinforced the value of land ownership for residents, thus preserving the
pastoral way of life.
Collective action is a central feature structuring the utilization of rangelands
by herders. In this paper, two different applications of collective action are
examined. On the one hand, collective ownership and differentiated use patterns in
herd management are the precondition for pastoralist’s existence in marginal
environment. On the other hand, the mobile people react to changes in property
rights by venturing into crop production as a mean of livelihood diversification. If
collective action is the voluntary action taken by a group to achieve a common
interest (Meinzen–Dick and Di Gregorio, 2004), herding as well as commonly
adopted agriculture are aiming at improving the welfare of the members. Collective
action and cooperation may also exist at various levels within an institutional
framework (Schmid, 2004; Ostrom, 1990) for purposes such as defense and attack
or peaceful exchanges (Hundie, 2008). Institutions create stable expectations
among people (Knight, 1992), and, hence, well–functioning institutions facilitate
cooperation (Schmid, 2004). In some societies, the rules that govern human
behavior are more formalized than in others. In such cases, institutions are built
intentionally to reduce the incentives for non–cooperation vis–à–vis cooperation
(Olson, 1965). In other societies, informal social relationships and the institutions
embedded in those relationships shape behavior and the decisions of actors to

7
cooperate or not (Grant, 2001). State coercion and diversification into agriculture
are met with collective strategies and result in the transformation of the commons
in Afar.

3. STUDY SITES AND METHODS

The Afar region extends from central to northeastern Ethiopia, following the East
African Rift Valley. The study districts – namely Amibara, Awash–Fentale and
Semu–Robi–Gele’alo – are found in the southern part of the Afar region (Figure 1).
Amibara and Awash–Fentale are located in the middle Awash valley, within the Rift
Valley, whereas Semu–Robi is found across the lowland–highland interface, towards
the western border of the Rift Valley. All study areas are characterized by a semi–
arid climate, with average annual temperatures ranging from 21 to 38 °C, the
lowest temperatures being between December and February, and the highest
between April and June. The average annual rainfall is about 697 mm, coming
primarily in two rainy seasons, namely karma (July to September) and gilel (March
to April).

Figure 1: Location of Afar Region and Study Districts

Source: Afar Region Administration (2005)

8
 The dominant source of livelihoods in the study areas is pastoralism, with
limited levels of crop cultivation and other activities (Table 1). Afar pastoralists
raise mixed species of primary livestock, including camels and cattle, and keep
supplementary herds of goats and sheep, usually for commercial purposes. They
manage their livestock under an extensive mobile system, with natural pasturage
being the main source of livestock feed.

Table 1: Background of the three study sites

Location Amibara Awash Fentale Semu Robi
Household economy Pastoralism, farming Pastoralism, farming Pastoralism, farming
(recently begun) (recently begun)
Ethnic and clan groups Afar clans: Sidhabura, Afar clans: Afar clan: Sidhabura
Rakbadermella Rakbadermella, Mafay,
Non–Afars: Amhara, Ayraso
Oromo and others
Kebeles studied Ambash, Qurqura Doho, Dudub Harihamo, Daleti
No. of households 60 60 60
interviewed
Location Southern part of Afar Southern part of Afar Southwest part of Afar
region (in the middle region (in the middle region (across the
Awash valley) Awash valley) lowland–highland
interface)

To investigate both historical and recent changes in the traditional property

rights of Afar pastoralists, we pursued primary and secondary data sources and
employed various procedures for data collection. Section five is based mainly on
secondary data, including several unpublished documents accessed from the Middle
Awash Agricultural Development Enterprise (MAADE), the Melka Werer Agricultural
Research Center, and the Afar Region Administration. The information obtained
from these and other documents was augmented with data generated through key
informant interviews and discussions with groups of pastoralists.
Section 6 is based mainly on the data collected from 180 pastoral households
dwelling in six purposively selected sites namely: Ambash and Qurqura in Amibara
district, Doho and Dudub in Awash–Fentale district, and Harihamo and Daleti in
Semu–Robi district (Table 1). A two–stage procedure was used to select the sample
households. First, using lists of household heads in each site (generated for the
purposes of this study), with the help of the local elders pastoral households were
stratified into three groups: poor, medium income, and better–off. Thereafter, ten
households were selected from each stratum using systematic random sampling
technique. In most cases, household heads (usually male) were interviewed,
though in a few cases responses were taken from an adult family member who was
not the head. A group of trained enumerators conducted the interviews with

9
individual sample households, guided by a structured questionnaire prepared for
this purpose.
The overall data collection process encompassed two phases. The first phase
(December 2004 to May 2005) involved several tasks, including implementation of
the household survey, collection of secondary data, and collection of detailed
qualitative data though group and key–informant interviews. The second phase
(October 2006) was organized for a short period in order to strengthen the
evidence gathered from the first phase by reviewing secondary sources and
conducting expert interviews.

4. TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

The clan is the lowest and de facto unit of traditional administration in Afar,
although there are also smaller social units, such as the dahla or sub–clan. As
Getachew notes, each clan comprises “a group of people related to each other by
decent, living within shared territory and sharing common rituals and political
leadership” (2001:54). Each clan has a well–established gerontocracy, whereby
decision–making power regarding land and other natural resources resides within
the clan council, consisting of the clan leader, elders, the feima,2 and local wise
men.
Each clan manages its resources collectively, based on customary principles.
Accordingly, herd management follows rotational grazing patterns. When rainfall is
normal for successive seasons, clan members are instructed not to use reserved
pasture areas. These areas are made accessible to the members only after other
areas have been exhaustively used. Although each clan member has an inalienable
use right over the resources, intra–clan customary laws (or operational rules)
regulate these use rights.
The traditional institutions of the Afar allow two types of resource users. The
first category includes clan members who use the rangeland permanently. They are
primary right–holders (waamo) who not only have the right to use the resources on
the rangeland but also to exclude others and to transfer to their heirs. The second
type of resource users comprises groups of neighboring pastoralists whose
demands for pastoral resources go beyond their own endowments, particularly
during drought years. These groups are secondary right–holders. They can be
termed “right–holders” because they have frequent access to clan resources that is
generally recognized and accepted by clan members and traditional leaders.
However, certain obligations are operational on secondary right–holders in order to
obtain access to the resources. Ex ante negotiation is required with waamo right–
holders, the success of which depends upon the relationship between the two
groups and resource conditions. If they are allowed access, secondary right–holders
are required to honor the customary rules of the host group. For instance, they
should refrain from actions such as cutting trees, allowing other herders to use the
resources, and rushing their livestock into reserved areas.

2
Feima is a rule–enforcing authority in Afar traditional administration. It consists of a principal
leader (feima–abba), a deputy leader (erenna–abba), and ordinary members.

10
5. COERCIVE WAYS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS CHANGE: THE STATE
SUBVERTING THE COMMONS

Triggers and Processes of Coercive Change

The intervention of the state in Afar was very limited prior to the 1960s. Farming
was limited to the lower Awash flood–fed plains, where some pastoralists in the
Asahimarra section of Afar had been practicing mixed crop–livestock farming for
generations (Getachew, 2001). However, following the 1960s state interventions in
these areas have increased, mainly for two reasons. First, the Afar plains –
specifically areas in the middle Awash valley – were found to have great potential
for wide–scale irrigated farming. The most attractive feature of these areas was
their suitability for cotton production, which was critically important for expanding
the country’s textile industries: a primary focus of the first and the second five–
year national development plans (IGE, 1957; 1962). Second, pastoralism was not
accepted as a livelihood strategy within the reigning national political mindset of the
time. Rather, pastoralism was considered to be a primitive and nonviable way of life
− to be avoided rather than preserved (Abdulahi, 2004; Getachew, 2001). Thus,
the intention of the policy makers was to change this mobile mode of life towards
sedentary farming. However, the pastoralists neither participated in the decision–
making process nor were they convinced about the goal of change.
In 1962, the Awash Valley Authority (AVA) was established by decree as an
agent of institutional change. AVA was responsible for undertaking several
activities, such as the founding and management of state farms, coordination and
financing of pastoral settlements and other schemes, and monitoring the overall
transformation process, for which some 70,000 ha of dry–season rangeland was
targeted (Getachew, 2001). AVA had direct military and financial support from the
government to implement the planned changes, using its military power, for
example, to threaten the pastoralists. The Middle Awash Agricultural Development
Enterprise (MAADE) began operations on the expropriated rangeland with the main
objective of satisfying the demand of domestic textile industries for cotton. Initially,
it had an operating area of 300 ha, which was increased to 13,116 ha in 1985. In
addition to MAADE, several pastoral development schemes were implemented with
directives coming from AVA. These included collective settlement farms and
irrigated pastures.3 The costs to cultivate the settlement farms were covered by the
state while the pastoralists contributed nothing except their labor. The output of the
settlement farms was distributed among registered households.
The implementation of the state–driven projects resulted in a mixture of
property rights in the area. Firstly, by using its coercive power the state became
the de facto owner of part of the land over which the pastoralists had had
inalienable rights for generations. Secondly, the introduction of the collective

3
The irrigated pasture scheme was envisaged to plant a variety of improved grass seeds through
the participation of the settler pastoralists, so that the latter would appreciate the improved
techniques and thereafter manage the irrigated pasture independently. However, this did not take
place, and the irrigated pastureland served the dairy farm that had been established to fulfill the milk
consumption of the staff of the state farms.

11
settlement farms brought a new variant of common property, apart from the
traditional communal ownership of the rangeland. Indeed, the non–riverine parts of
the area remained under the control of the pastoralists and were entirely allocated
for livestock grazing, whereas traditional rights were nullified by order from the
state in the riverine sites. This implies that the intervention of the state created a
“legal dualism”: claims over the riverine sites were governed and protected by
statutory laws, whereas the non–riverine sites remained outside of direct state
protection and legitimacy.
Because the state, by the power vested in it, redefined the land use rules
without consulting the pastoralists, the process of change was not smooth, with the
pastoralists resisting every action of the state. Indeed, throughout the 1980s and
1990s Afar pastoralists put great pressure on the administration of the state farms.
4
The pastoralists expressed their dissatisfaction with and opposition to the
implementation of the commercial farm schemes mainly by damaging mature crops
in the field, a typical example being the recurrent damage caused by local people
on banana plantations, which eventually forced the state farms to abandon banana
production. Initially, the state farms allocated compensatory funds to be paid to
clan leaders and elders in the form of employment benefits which would, it was
hoped, ameliorate the dissatisfied pastoralists. This reward system did not put an
end to the grievances, however, as the power of the pastoralists emanate from
their great number, which was increasing over time.
In the course of time, the relative power of the two actors has changed in
favor of the pastoralists. At the beginning, AVA had the power of mobilizing
resources to constrain the choices of the pastoralists and was capable of controlling
their actions. However, it couldn’t maintain this power to continuously influence the
choices and actions of its counterparts. This is partly attributable to the decline of
attention paid by the government towards state farms after 1989. Especially after
the economic reform of 1991, the stake of the state in business ventures
dramatically declined. As a result, AVA did not receive enough financial, political,
and other support from the government to maintain its power. In addition, the shift
in the national political structure towards ethnic–based federalism and the
concomitant establishment of the Afar National Regional State re–calibrated the
power balance in favor of the pastoralists.
These changes had effects on the existing property rights and land use
arrangements. With the efforts of the Afar regional government and the decision of
the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, MAADE handed over a significant part of
its land, including irrigation infrastructure and facilities, to the Afar5 in 1993. This,
in turn, resulted in the existence of two distinct forms of property relations,
consequently increasing the number of actors involved. First, the pastoralists
subdivided part of the returned farmland and started private farming in
collaboration with highlanders, implying the individualization of the traditional
communal rangeland. Second, the pastoralists leased–out part of the returned land

4
The resistance was also supported by Afar Liberation Front (ALF), which declared armed struggle
against the government on June 3, 1975, following the dramatic expansion of the commercial farms
by the military government. (http://www.arhotabba.com/alf.html).
5
The state farms handed over about 6547 ha, with the entire irrigation infrastructure intact
(MAADE, unpublished document, 2005).

12
to local investors, whereby the latter annually transfer cash payments to the
pastoralists,6 implying the introduction of a lease contract regime into the area.
In general, this sub–section shows that the state is the major source of
property right changes in the middle Awash valley of Afar region. Empirical
evidence from other areas in East Africa also confirms the significant role of the
state with regard to property rights changes in pastoral areas. In some East African
countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, the intervention of the state in forming
modern ranches subverted traditional property rights arrangements and the
existing ways of life (Fratkin, 1997; Mwangi, 2005; Rutten, 1992; Muhereza, 2001;
Helland, 1977). Similarly, the pro–conservation policies of many East African
governments resulted in the transfer of large areas of rangelands from pastoralists
to the state (Fratkin, 1997; Markakis, 2004; Lane, 1998; Kisamba–Mugerwa,
2001), as did the pro–farming policies that facilitated the rapid expansion of large–
scale commercial farms in pastoral areas of these countries (Rutten, 1992;
Lesorogol, 2005; Shazali and Ahmed, 1999; Fratkin, 1997). None of these state–led
transformations of traditional common property regimes were characterized by
peaceful interaction between the state and the local people, and all took coercive
lines.

Impacts of coercive change on the livelihoods of pastoralists

Direct intervention of the state has, step by step, changed the traditional property
regime of the pastoralists and brought about new forms of land use arrangements
that have direct implications for their livelihoods. Four distinct forms of land use
arrangements have been implemented since the initial interventions of the state:
state farms, settlement farms, individual small farms, and private large–scale
farms. These new variants of property rights have one main feature in common:
they are all related to the production of crops. However, each of them is unique in
terms of the types of actors interacting with pastoralists and the impacts on rights
and capabilities of pastoralists to secure livelihoods that they entail. The existence
of state farms implies de facto state ownership as well as the nullification of
customary rights, which pastoralists had had over land for generations. Indeed, the
contemporary rights that pastoralists have over this portion of the former commons
have been limited to use rights over crop residues, and only with the consent of
officials from the state farms. On the other hand, the expropriation of large tracts
of dry season rangeland, without compensation, has resulted in the reduction of the
capability of pastoralists to secure livelihoods through the traditional means of
livestock production. In this respect, the present vulnerability of Afar pastoralists to
recurrent droughts is at least partly associated with such expropriatory measures of
the state (Sen, 1981; Getachew, 2001; Yemane, 2003).
The settlement farms, established for compensatory reasons, reflect a kind of
interaction between the state and the pastoralists. In this case, the new resources

6
As realized from group discussions, investors pay 30 percent of their annual profit to pastoralists
in the form of rent. In addition to financial payments to the pastoralists, the investors have promised
to improve local infrastructure, including schools, watering trenches, and health stations. However,
the pastoralists complain that none of the investors have honored their word regarding infrastructural
development.

13
necessary to produce crops were entirely supplied by the state. The existing
irrigation infrastructure and the road networks were built by the state through a
large outlay. Similarly, farm machinery and facilities were purchased by the state.
The technical personnel and the management staff had also been installed through
the efforts of the state. While these resources defined capabilities to exercise rights
within the parameters of the new land use system, pastoralists already had well–
recognized rights to the benefit streams from the land. In other words, they had
the rights7 as well as the capabilities to generate benefits from the settlement
farms. However, the state was not “benevolent” forever, but rather stopped its
support in the mid–1980s. The termination of state support and the concomitant
transfer of all machinery and facilities to the state farms have debilitated the
capability of the pastoralists to extract benefits from their land, although their
rights to the land have remained intact. Lacking the knowledge and physical
resources needed for farming, the pastoralists have not been able to continue crop
production on the former settlement farms, despite their rights to do so. As a
result, the entire settlement farm has been out of production and is covered, at
present, by an inedible exotic weed (Prosopis juliflora). In fact, this part of the
former rangeland is neither cultivated nor is it efficiently used for livestock
production, which has direct implications for the livelihoods of the pastoralists.
The return of the confiscated land in 1993 was an important action that
reduced the influence of the state on the traditional lands of the pastoralists.
Actually, the pastoralists were free to decide on what to do with the returned land.
Accordingly, the land was partly allocated to clan members and was partly leased
out to local investors. In regard to individual parcels of land, the Afar have
established partnerships with agriculturalists from the highlands. Individual
landowners have the right to choose their partners, define and redefine the land
use contracts, and terminate contracts if required. In the lease arrangements, the
new partners of the pastoralists are local investors. Under this form of contract, the
pastoralists collectively earn 30 percent of the investors’ profits in return for the use
of their land, which they distribute among themselves based on predefined criteria.
They have formed a standing committee, including an accountant, to monitor all
transactions of the investors. The committee has been entrusted to defend the
rights of its principals and, hence, to take action when errors or other problems
arise.
While the current situation shows the restoration of the rights of the
pastoralists over their traditional land, capability limitations are apparent in terms
of maximally exploiting the new venture. First, pastoralists have poor knowledge of
farming techniques and lack resources (such as farm implements) necessary to
cultivate crops. As a result, the highlanders are responsible for all farm operations
in return of larger shares of the net farm proceeds (up to 70 percent), whereas the
contributions and earnings of the pastoralists are minimal. Actually, the share of
the highlanders reflects the costs to be paid by the pastoralists due to their limited
capabilities to produce crops on their own. Second, the capacity of the committee
to actually carry out their responsibilities concerning the lease arrangements is

7
In fact, pastoralists were restricted to using the land consistent with formal regulations for the
area. For instance, they couldn’t use it as rangeland.

14
questionable. The members have no accounting knowledge, and some of them do
not even know how to read and write. Hence, everything is done based on trust,
implying the possibility that the pastoralists could be cheated if the investors desire
to do so. Again, this implies the weak position of the pastoralists under such
arrangements.
It is also worthwhile to pinpoint the distributional effects of the changes in
property rights that have taken place. Traditional property rights allowed multitudes
of users to share a resource system in accordance with certain predefined rules.
Under the traditional arrangements, all clan members had equal rights to grazing
resources and, hence, could extract benefits, provided that they had livestock.
However, equality in rights to the communal heritage has not been ensured
following the state–induced changes of property rights. During the initial period of
the transformation, elites and their allies abandoned the customary rules and
facilitated their own entitlement to the benefits from the settlement farms. Others
used their physical fitness and connections with project leaders to secure their own
benefits, while those households lacking such resources were denied access to them
(Getachew, 2001). The procedures following the subdivision of the newly returned
land has also not been immune to discrimination. Contrary to the traditional land
law, about 31 percent of the sample households were left out of consideration
during the subdivision. A closer look at the assets of the sample pastoralists chosen
for this study shows that those who have not been benefiting from the subdivided
land are poorer (average 0.89 TLU of per capita livestock asset) as compared to
those who have been benefiting (2.91TLU). This inequity and mistreatment is even
more visible with regard to the women. Female–headed households were neither
considered when the returned land was distributed among clan members nor have
they been beneficiaries from the leased–out land because of tradition–based
criteria: women are de facto minors in Afar customary laws.8

6. NON–COERCIVE WAYS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS CHANGES: VOLUNTARY

ADOPTION OF FARMING

Triggers of voluntary change

Afar pastoralists in the study areas have been highly threatened not only by the
coercive actions of the state, but also by recurrent droughts. Two major droughts
have hit the areas since the mid–1990s, and short dry spells are common as well.
The prevalence of drought has adversely affected the pastoral economy in two
ways. First, it has reduced the total livestock assets and productive capacities of the
area, thereby increasing mortality and morbidity rates. Sanford and Habtu (2000,
cited in Mesfin 2003:44) have estimated that a 5 to 15 percent reduction in
livestock assets occurred in Afar due to the drought of 1999–2000. In fact, this

8
Women have no ownership rights to land as well as other resources, including livestock. They
hold conditional rights and, thus, are only entitled to benefit streams via their husbands. When a
woman’s husband dies, all jointly owned assets, including livestock, are transferred to her husband’s
family, and the widow loses control rights over ‘her’ former resources. As a small compensation, she
can indeed maintain control over the livestock given to her as presents by her husband during their
marriage.

15
estimation corresponds to the best–case scenario. Under the worst–case scenario,
livestock loss has been estimated to range from 15 to 45 percent. Emergency
assessment reports of various development organizations and relief agencies
indicate that the prolonged drought of 20022003 had even more serious
consequences for the Afar pastoralists (FEWS NET, 2002; UN–EUE, 2002a; UN–
EUE, 2002b).
Second, the successive droughts have re–calibrated the terms of trade
against the pastoralists. Although no systematic records have been found yet,
assessment reports of aid agencies indicate a sharp decline of livestock prices
during the droughts. A UN assessment mission in the area indicated that
pastoralists faced more than 50 percent reduction in livestock prices following the
drought of 1999–2000 (UN–EUE, 2000). Similarly, livestock prices fell by 50 to 60
percent due to the drought of 2002, while maize prices simultaneously rose by
about 235 percent (Davies and Bennett, 2007). The adverse effects of the droughts
on the terms of trade were compounded by other factors, such as export
restrictions imposed by Saudi Arabia in September 2000 following a Rift Valley
fever outbreak and insecurity around the northern border of the Afar region in the
aftermath of the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998.
These livestock losses coupled with the deteriorating terms of trade against
pastoralists worsened food insecurity in the study areas, with the degree of food
insecurity reaching its climax in 2002–2003 due to the intensified drought. A
serious famine hit the area, during which a large number of pastoralists had
nothing to eat. On 12 July 2002, the Disaster Prevention and Preparedness
Commission issued a Special Alert that publicized the deterioration of food security
in several parts of the country, particularly in the Afar region and the neighboring
East Shewa zone of Oromia. According to the Special Alert, 448,500 people in the
Afar region needed emergency aid, out of which 45.3 percent were located in Zone
3 (constituting Amibara and Awash–Fentale) and Zone 5 (constituting Semu–Robi).
The deterioration of food security in pastoral areas in general and Afar in
particular necessitated an intensified intervention of external agents (governmental
and non–governmental organizations, NGOs) into pastoral livelihoods. While the
most immediate external intervention was provision of food aid to save human
lives, a number of programs and projects financed by the government and NGOs,
such as FAO, Farm–Africa, CARE–Ethiopia, and Oxfam GB, were designed to
improve the livelihoods of pastoralists. One intervention was focused on designing
projects and programs to facilitate the expansion of crop cultivation in these areas.
Both traditional authorities and external agents were important facilitators of
collective action to begin farming. In this respect, external agents (local
government and NGOs) sponsored meetings at the kebele level. While there exist
no formal records of the number of local meetings in the study sites, the average
number of meetings reported by the sample households ranges between 7.2 (for
Dudub site) and 18.6 (for Daleti site) for the year preceding the survey. During the
meetings, the external agents explained their vision and commitment toward
improving the livelihoods of pastoralists, mainly through programs focused on
farming. The interventions of the external actors were even more direct in three of
the study sites, namely Harihamo, Daleti, and Doho. In Harihamo and Daleti, the
government directly supported collective activities in relation to farming through its
food security program. Assistance included provision of farm tools, covering initial

16
costs of farm operations (such as costs of tractor for tillage), provision of oxen, and
other logistic and advisory support. At the Doho site, support was mainly provided
by an FAO livestock recovery project office at Awash–Fentale, which provided
financial support for initial development of irrigation infrastructure and farm inputs,
mainly seeds. Moreover, district level experts on agriculture were responsible for
providing advisory support to the “agro–pastoralists.”
Similarly, the role of traditional authorities was substantial. Specifically,
activities such as mobilizing clan members for meetings, organizing and supervising
all activities such as bush clearing and land leveling, and imposing sanctions on free
riders required the active participation of the feima members. Traditional sanctions
were to be applied, including asset penalties, like slaughtering the breeding cows of
free riders, and corporal punishment, such as beating free riders in public to shame
them.
The pastoralists were required to be involved in all activities to prepare the
communal land for cultivation, following which it was allocated to the participants.
The preparatory activities were done intermittently for about 4 months in Semu–
Robi and for 2 months in Awash–Fentale. For Amibara, the exact duration is not
clear, but, according to sample respondents, it ranged between 30 and 180 days.
The overall participation rates across districts in these cooperative activities were
39.1 percent (n=70) with 13.3 percent (n=8) in Amibara, 23.3 percent (n=14) in
Awash–Fentale, and 81.4 percent (n=48) in Semu–Robi.

Analytical model and variables

Section 6.1 indicates that farming is an enterprise that has been induced because of
natural shock to the area. Understanding the movement of pastoralists towards
farming entails comparison between the situation under farming and pastoralism.
Thus, assuming that individuals make decisions by comparing their expected
utilities associated with the two enterprises, this binary choice can be modeled
following the utility function approach. Let Ui1 and Ui0 be the utilities of individual
i associated with farming and pastoralism, respectively. We expected that
community members would be heterogeneous in terms of the level of utilities
generated from farming. We also expected that community members would vary in
terms of the level of utilities they generate from pastoralism. Thus, Ui1 and Ui0 can
be formulated as a function of other variables such that
U i1 = α i1 + β i1 X i + ε i1 and
U i 0 = α i 0 + β i 0 X i + ε i 0 , where α and β are parameter estimates and X is a vector of
exogenous variables that cause heterogeneity among community members. As a
U − U i 0 > 0 , and
utility maximizer, individual i decides in favor of farming if i1
otherwise if
U i1 − U i 0 < 0 .9 Accordingly, participation in collective activities to start

farming reveals that i 0

ε − ε i1 < (α i1 − α i 0 ) + (β i1 − β i 0 )X i . If we replace ε i 0 − ε i1 by ε i ,

9
There could be indecision if U i1 − U i 0 = 0 , but this happens with zero probability if U i1 − U i 0 is a
continuous random variable.

17
α i1 − α i 0 by α i and (β i1 − β i 0 )X i by β i X i for brevity, then the probability that
individual i will participate in collective action to start farming can be specified
as:
P(C = 1) = P(ε < α + β X
i i i )
i 1 . If a normal distribution function is assumed for i, ε
then the model turns out to be a probit model (Amemiya, 1981). Alternatively, if a
logistic distribution is assumed, the model becomes the logit one (ibid). The two
alternative models produce similar outputs, except in rare cases when the data
concentrates around the tails of the distributions (Amemya, 1981; Greene, 2000).
Here, the logit model is used since it lends itself to easier interpretation.
Table 2 shows the description of the independent variables considered for
logistic regression analysis and their hypothesized signs. The dependent variable
takes on a value of 1 if a pastoralist participated in collective action to start
farming, and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables had been tested for their
importance by using descriptive statistics before they were subjected to regression
analysis. The results show that participants are significantly different from non–
participants with respect to all but one variable.10

10
The exception was EDUCATE.

18
Table 2: Description of variables and working hypothesis
Variable Description Mean of Xj or Hypothesis

code (Xj) Percent of Xj = 1

AGEHH Age of household head in years 40.1 –

EDUCATE A dummy variable which takes on 1 if 25.7 +/–

the household head is literate; and 0

otherwise

ACTIVLB The number of household members 4.9 +

within the age range between 10 and 60

years11

SUITAGR A dummy variable which takes on 1 if 66.5 +

the area is either suitable for rain–fed

agriculture or can be irrigated given

existing water resources and capacity to

irrigate; and 0 otherwise.

PERCPLS Per capita livestock holding of household 3.1 –

(TLU)

EMPOPP A dummy variable which takes on 1 if 10.6 –

the household generates income from

wage employment; and 0 otherwise.

SUPPORT A dummy variable which takes on 1 if 49.7 +

external agents provided direct support12

before and during collective activities;

and 0 otherwise.

Source: Own survey data

11
Classification was made based on local information.
12
External support includes financial, material, and advisory services. Moreover, the role of
external agents in organizing local meetings has been taken into account to define the variable.

19
Regression results and discussion

The outputs of the regression are shown in Table 3. The signs of the coefficients in
the regression are all in agreement with prior expectations. The chi–square statistic
is significant, implying that the explanatory variables (taken together) are
important in explaining the variability in the dependent variable (cooperation to
start farming). The model was able to correctly predict 86 percent of the cases vis–
à–vis participation in collective activities. Since the standard coefficients in the
logistic regression equation are not directly interpretable, the marginal effects of
explanatory variables were computed by using an additional algorithm in the
LIMDEP statistical software version 7.

Table 3: Determinants of Cooperation among Pastoralists to Start Farming

Coefficients SE Marginal Effects

Constant –3.6695** 1.2439 –0.6348

AGE –0.0143 0.01523 –0.0024

EDUCATE 0.5477 0.5483 0.0947

ACTIVLAB 0.0561 0.0776 0.0097

SUITAGR 3.8085** 1.1561 0.6588

PERCPLS –0.1681** 0.0623 –0.0291

EMPOPP –2.0585* 0.8831 –0.3561

SUPPORT 1.5636** 0.6195 0.2705

Chi–square 108.7822**

Log likelihood function –65.39940

Percent of correct prediction 86

Number of cases 179

Source: Own survey data

* and ** significant at 5% and 1% levels, respectively

Four variables are important for explaining cooperation of pastoralists in collective

activities geared towards the decision to start farming: suitability of the area for
agriculture, per capita livestock holding of a household, access to wage
employment, and external support. Each of them will be discussed in some detail in
the following.
The proxy variable for suitability for farming (SUITAGR) is positively related
to the level of cooperation. This variable is supposed to capture the variability
among the study sites with respect to their potential for crop cultivation. In this
respect, the study areas were classified into two groups, based on the perceptions

20
of the pastoralists. Ambash, Doho, Harihamo, and Daleti were classified as potential
sites for agriculture, either because of the presence of irrigation infrastructure
(Ambash and Doho) or because of better rainfall distribution (Harihamo and Daleti).
On the contrary, Qurqura and Dudub were classified as non–potential areas. The
heterogeneity of the study sites with respect to their potential for agriculture
implies the existence of spatial variation regarding the costs of running a new
enterprise (i.e. crop production). In areas where shifting to farming is easier, either
because of better rainfall or the possibility of irrigation, mobilizing people for
collective action is easier because people anticipate that they would incur relatively
low costs in order to realize benefits that would be reasonably higher than the
alternative engagements. The regression results indicate that the probability of
cooperation in collectively organized action to start farming increases by about 66
percent in areas where people perceive the possible benefits of farming. The
perceptions of the pastoralists on the potential of their localities vis–à–vis farming
influence their decisions because expectations about the benefits of cooperation
arise from individual perceptions.
The second influential factor is the level of wealth of pastoral households, as
implied by per capita livestock ownership (PERCPLS). The expectation was that
households with low livestock assets would have a relatively high incentive to go
into cultivation as compared to their better–off counterparts for the simple reason
that livestock are not dependable sources of livelihood for the former. This
expectation holds true, as confirmed by the regression analysis results. More
specifically, the probability that a household will cooperate in farm–preparing
activities increases by about 2.9 percent for each total livestock unit (TLU13)
reduction in per capita livestock holding, implying that households with lower
livestock assets are more likely to cooperate. In this regard, the variation among
the pastoral households can be explained from a number of different perspectives.
First, the possible differences in labor demands between those with low livestock
assets (< 4.5 TLU14) − hereafter considered as “poor households” − and those with
larger livestock assets (> 4.5 TLU) − hereafter considered as “better–off
households” − can be associated with differences in cooperative behavior between
the two groups. Actually, the better–off households own significantly larger
quantities of livestock (67.3 TLU) than poor households (11.2 TLU), whereas, in
terms of active labor force potential, the former are in a slightly lower position (4.4
persons) as compared to the latter (5.0 persons). Given the fact that those with
larger livestock assets require more labor to properly manage their animals, the
output reveals that labor is scarcer among households with better livestock assets.
Thus, it can be deduced from the results that the introduction of crop production
into the existing system would lead to greater pressure on better–off households in
regards to labor allocation. When competition occurs between crop cultivation and
livestock husbandry, it is less likely that better–off pastoralists would prefer to shift
their labor to the “imported” enterprise (i.e. crop cultivation).

13
TLU refers to Tropical Livestock Unit. 1 Camel = 1 TLU; 1 cattle = 0.7 TLU; 1 donkey = 0.5 TLU;
1 sheep = 0.1 TLU (ILCA 1992).
14
In this region, 4.5 TLU per capita (or about 5 cows) is the minimum threshold level to sustain
family members without requiring additional income from other sources (McPeak and Barrett, 2001).

21
 Second, the decisions of the pastoralists concerning farming activities reflect
their ways of reacting to natural hazards, mainly drought. Pastoralists exercise
several traditional portfolio management techniques to mitigate risk. Livestock
accumulation is one way to mitigate risk (Herren, 1991; McPeak and Barrett,
2001). McPeak (2005) shows that a larger herd size pre–crisis implies a larger herd
post–crisis. Diversification of livestock ownership is another ex ante risk
management strategy, in which pastoralists adjust the composition of their
livestock in a direction that could minimize asset loss due to disaster. Pastoral
households also spread their livestock spatially throughout their personal networks
to reduce risk.
While these ex ante risk management strategies (although not exhaustive)
may exist in many pastoral areas, the poor and better–off households do not have
equal capability to exercise them. The poor appear to have lower capability to
exercise any of the indicated options, simply because livestock are large
investments to them. In this regard, the poor occupy lower positions, not only in
terms of total amount of livestock, but also in terms of the diversity of these assets.
A comparison made between the two groups vis–à–vis diversification (within
pastoralism) shows that better–off households keep more livestock types (3.6
species) than poor ones do (3.3 species). Moreover, better–off households own
more camels (about 30 head) than poor households (about 3 head), which shows
that the former are in a better position to withstand recurrent droughts.15 Keeping
livestock at different locations across personal networks seems to be a rational way
of mitigating risks, especially those arising from localized, not region–wide shocks.
This strategy is also less likely to be feasible for poor households, because there is
not enough livestock to distribute spatially.
Differences in ex–ante risk management strategies and capabilities between
the poor and the better–off also affect their ex–post risk management strategies
and capabilities to cope. In this respect, better–off households possess better
resources to meet basic needs without resorting to other occupations, whereas poor
households need to find opportunities outside of pastoralism to sustain their
families. Therefore, the differences in cooperative behavior observed between the
poor and better–off pastoralists with regard to farming are also attributable to their
differences with respect to ex–post risk management strategies.
Third, the difference observed between the two groups with regard to
cooperative preparations to start farming can also be seen from the perspective of
property rights. Common property regimes allow multitudes of users to share a
resource system in accordance with certain predefined rules (Ostrom, 1990; 1992).
Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean that all rights–holders derive equal benefits from
the resource system. Rather, benefits are a function of rights and capabilities of
individual actors to utilize a resource system (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). A pastoralist
who has limited financial ability to purchase additional stock obviously derives less
benefit from the communal pasturage than his livestock–rich neighbor, given that
the rate of livestock ownership is below the optimum. In other words, the former

15
Camels are best suited to arid areas like Afar. In times of water scarcity, they can endure
without water for more than two weeks, while cattle need water at least once in three days. Moreover,
camels feed on the foliage of trees and bushes, which are better in resisting drought than the grasses
on which cattle are dependent.

22
exploits only a small portion of his rights as compared to the latter although, in
principle, he has the right to derive as much benefit as his neighbor. Indeed, not
only rights but also capabilities determine the actual benefit structure among a
group of people. This is particularly apparent in common–pool resources, especially
with this case in rangelands, where there is de facto open access for all group
members.
Capability differences among right holders to realize benefits from a
communal resource system may result in differences in their reactions to new
challenges or opportunities that may affect benefit streams. For the near–stockless
Afar households, the incentive to cooperate in farming activities would be high,
because in such a way they can better exercise their rights over the resource
system. The current literature indicates that traditionally pastoral communities do
provide opportunities for poor members with a little or no livestock to make grazing
contracts with better–off community members or outsiders so that they can build
their own herds (Ngaido, 1999). However, our evidence shows that, with regard to
contractual arrangements, there is no special institutional treatment for poor
households, implying that their only feasible available option for exercising rights is
to take up crop production, provided that entry is made possible for them.
Pastoral areas are generally marginal as far as intensive crop production goes.
Consequently, livestock production appears to be the best and, in some areas, the
only option under the existing technologies (Ahmed et al., 2002). However, as a
result of challenges (mainly drought) which have caused rapid deterioration of
pastoral livelihoods, these days pastoralists usually seek out alternative means of
survival, at least on temporary basis. Since opportunities are lacking in most
pastoral areas, resorting to agriculture is the main option that pastoralists pursue.
Indeed, a growing trend toward crop cultivation is now observable in many pastoral
areas of Ethiopia in general and Afar in particular (Yemane, 2003). In areas where
alternatives are available, it is expected that pastoralists will make choices from the
“bundle” of non–pastoral activities to sustain themselves, at least until the
conditions for their main occupation improve. In such situations, alternative
activities compete for pastoralists’ resources, and, hence, the decision to cooperate
in farming activities is a matter of evaluating the existing opportunities from the
perspective of each pastoral household, differentiated as they are in terms of
existing assets and capabilities. In this vein, our results indicate that wage
employment opportunities (EMPOPP) tend to have a negative influence on the
decision to cooperate in farming activities. The probability of opting for cooperation
declines by about 36 percent if a household earns income from wage employment.
State farms are a major source of wage employment for pastoralists in the
study areas, particularly in some locations of middle Awash valley. Although Afars
are recruited only for lower level positions, those who get the chance do not
hesitate to join state farms. All in all, about 11 percent of the sample pastoralists
were employed in commercial farms. There are reasons why pastoralists prefer
employment in state farms to farming by themselves. First, they can generate a
more stable (and perhaps higher) income by being wage laborers, whereas farming
is a risky business. Second, in most cases, pastoralists are employed as guards to

23
protect crops (mainly cotton) from livestock,16 which is less tiresome than farm
work and is preferable to pastoralists, who are quite used to tending animals.
Finally, support from external actors (SUPPORT) has been found to be positively
and significantly related to participation in collective action to start farming. The
probability that a household will participate in collective action increases at the
mean level by 27.1 percent in the presence of external support. There are two
possible explanations for this result. First, participation of external actors in
organizing meetings facilitates discussions and information exchange among
pastoralists. Some pastoralists may not participate because they are completely
unaware of the intervention. Some others may be ambivalent because of
incomplete information with regard to the intended activities. Thus, the existence of
external support increases the likelihood of participation of those households that
either unwittingly or due to ambivalence fail to cooperate, thereby improving their
awareness regarding what has been intended for their locality, the costs and
benefits of cooperation and non–cooperation, the commitment of external
supporters, the reactions of other members of the community, and the “rules of the
game.”17
Second, financial and material support provided by external actors could
increase the likelihood of participation. Such support, which augments the capacity
of households to invest in the new venture, can particularly increase the
participation of the poor, who may otherwise refrain from participation due to
financial and material limitations. The positive effect of this variable is not,
however, exclusively associated with poor households. Even the participation of
better–off households can be enhanced in the presence of financial and material
support as a result of possible reductions in costs of participation vis–à–vis the
anticipated benefits. Moreover, better–off households may become persuaded to
have their “share” from the resources externally injected into the system.

7. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Traditional communal landholding has been prevalent in Afar, accommodating the

interests of different user groups for many generations. This is attributable to the
ecological conditions of Afar which entail the use of pastoral resources scattered
over a wide area of land to produce livestock. However, this traditional land use
system is changing because of pressures from both governmental policy and
natural events. This study has examined both political and natural forces that have
induced the transformation of the traditional land use arrangements in selected

16
Information obtained from MAADE indicates that there is great pressure coming from the
surrounding areas to feed livestock on cotton stocks. While cotton harvesting normally comprises
three rounds, pastoralists have been rushing their animals into the cotton fields immediately after
first–round picking. In order to reduce this pressure from the local herders, guards are recruited from
members of different clans. This is done to use social capital as a means of mitigating the problem.
Quite large amount of money is allocated by MAADE to mitigate the problem. For instance, a total of
294,335 Birr (~USD 34,000) was allocated in 2004–2005 for this purpose (personal communication
with MAADE administrative officer).
17
There is also a possibility that external agents may romanticize the outcomes of forthcoming
cooperative efforts to persuade those who have not yet decided to join them.

24
areas of Afar. State intervention, which has been imposed mainly since the early
1960s, brought about detrimental effects on the livelihoods of pastoralists. First,
through employment of coercive ways, the state expropriated large areas of dry–
season rangeland, resulting in the exacerbation of feed scarcity in the area.
Second, the state had been enforcing the transformation of pastoralism into
sedentary farming without taking into account pastoral households’ capacities to
produce crops. More specifically, the development schemes initiated and financed
by the state couldn’t enhance the capabilities of pastoral households in a way that
would enable them to derive full benefits from their land. Being devoid of public
participation, these schemes paradoxically fostered a dependency syndrome among
pastoralists, which remained even after their termination. Third, state intervention
created a window of opportunity for some pastoralists, while others such as women
and the poor were deprived of obtaining benefits from the new arrangements.
When faced with challenges, pastoral households employ coping strategies
which may involve different ways of using the available resources, even looking
beyond pastoralism. The situation of recurrent drought, which was intensified in
2002 and 2003, has imposed difficulties on pastoral livelihoods in Afar. On the one
hand, the emergence of this natural challenge triggered the intervention of external
actors to facilitate cooperation among pastoralists, providing a catalyst for the
motivation of the pastoralists to take up farming. On the other hand, this natural
challenge has increased the expectations of people that they will be able generate
greater levels of utility by participating in such collective efforts, given the existence
of external assistance. The expectations, whether realized or not, have produced
cooperative decisions towards engaging in organized activities. However, individual
households are heterogeneous in their capability to withstand the natural challenge.
In case studied, our results show that poor households are more interested in
farming and, hence, promote the transformation process. Whether this demand on
the part of the poor could lead to permanent individualization of the previously
communal land remains to be seen.
Overall, the study indicates that communal land ownership, which forms the
basis for pastoralism, is under pressure as a result of state intervention and natural
challenges, as also depicted by several other studies in pastoral areas (Blench,
2001; Markakis, 2004; Ensminger and Rutten, 1991; Helland, 2002). Though the
same collective property rights might be shared, the individual capability of the
right holder to utilize the resource varies to a great extent. This explains why the
diversification into agriculture with the means of external intervention is more
attractive to poor households with less livestock. Nevertheless, the transformation
of the property rights regime is an effect of coercive and voluntary collective action.
With regard to the present study, the following two points are worthy of policy
attention:

1. Averting possible continuation of state coercion: The coercive expropriation

of pastoral land has been slowed down since 1991, and Afar pastoralists have
regained some of the lost rights over their traditional land. However, the
current national policies are not immune from anti–pastoral ethos. For
instance, the 2005 national land use proclamation declares the possibility
that communal rural land holdings will be converted to private holdings if the
government finds such transformation necessary (Article 5 No. 3). There is

25
 also a clear plan to expand the existing irrigated land in the Awash basin
(about 66 percent in Afar region) from 68,800 hectares to 151,400 hectares
(Flintan and Tamirat, 2002). The implementation of such a plan would be
impossible without evicting pastoralists, and the costs of eviction are usually
underestimated. Moreover, it is usually assumed that simply providing
financial compensation would be sufficient for those who lose their land.
However, for pastoralists who do not have enough skills to engage in other
occupations, providing financial compensation without further assistance is
akin to facilitating their movement towards destitution. The failure of past
‘compensation’ schemes in Afar (as discussed in this paper) indicates that
investment expansion through compensation schemes may not lead to a
situation in which all stakeholders benefit. Current experiences in non–
pastoral areas of the country also show that undervaluation of land, large
variance between what investors pay and what evictees receive in
compensation, and ultimate failure of evictees to start new livelihoods are
critical problems associated with the expansion of investments in rural areas
of Ethiopia (Bekure et al., 2006). These problems are attributable to the lack
of effective institutions and appropriate governance structures, including (1)
lack of clear guidelines on land valuation; (2) marginalization of landholders
in the process of land transfers; and (3) a weak organizational setup to
administer the transformation process. Indeed, such experiences provide
good lessons that should be taken seriously in the national and regional
policy arena before promoting investments in rural areas of Afar.

2. Harmonizing policy emphasis with the potentials of pastoral areas: The

transformation of property rights due to natural challenges has had
important implications for the livelihoods of pastoralists. In this regard, this
paper has shown that the poor households (in terms of livestock assets) are
more interested in farming as compared to the better–off ones. The decisions
of pastoralists towards the commencement of farming activities could reflect
their reactions towards recurring natural hazards: farming is considered as
being a post–shock source of livelihood by those households that cannot call
upon their pastoral assets in seasons following a drought period.
Despite this fact, two points can be made about the potential of farming in the
study areas in general. First, efforts to produce food crops under rain–fed
conditions may not provide any substantial remedy to the decline of food security
when drought occurs; during a prolonged spell it presumably will not. This is
because crops are also biological products (like livestock) and, hence, can be
negatively affected by drought. Livestock appear to be even somewhat more
tolerant of drought conditions than crops, since they are mobile. The existence of
mobile pastoralism in dry regions of the world also implies the relative viability of
livestock production as compared to rain–fed agriculture in these regions. Second,
although crops can be produced using irrigation in some ecological niches (for
example, nearby major rivers); an irrigation–based production system is less
appealing in many parts of Afar, given the scarcity of water. Consequently,
livestock production appears to be the best, and in some areas the only, option
under the existing technologies. The relatively low participation level of better–off
pastoralists in collective action to start farming also implies that crop production is

26
not a substitute for, but rather is a subsidiary to, livestock production in such dry
areas. Therefore, instead of overrating the sustainability and impact of farming on
poverty reduction, it would be worthwhile to focus on livestock production (i.e. the
core enterprise in pastoral areas). In this regard, improving key services, such as
the livestock–market information system, veterinary and financial services;
investing in infrastructure (roads and other facilities); and enhancing feed
management are key to turning the silent transformation of the commons into a
viable development path for the Afar. Livestock remains to be the best, if not the
only, sustainable livelihood option under these ecological conditions. This implies
the need for policies to introduce some form of drought insurance system,
especially if cultivation remains transitory and generally not viable. The current
investigations and experiments into livestock insurance schemes such as in
northern Kenya (Orindi et al., 2007) are a promising new institutional mechanism
to enable pastoralists to restock after drought and in order to save the value
represented by male surplus animals in pastoral systems.
The two cases of collective action in herding and farming are reactions to
changing property rights. Diversification is an outcome of induced change, while the
consequences of farming plots remain to be seen in the long run. Collective action
plays a central role in managing the commons in Afar, as it also is an entry point in
disassembling the join holdings as in the case of farming.

27
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LIST OF CAPRi WORKING PAPERS

01 Property Rights, Collective Action and Technologies for Natural Resource Management: A
Conceptual Framework, by Anna Knox, Ruth Meinzen–Dick, and Peter Hazell, October 1998.
02 Assessing the Relationships between Property Rights and Technology Adoption in Smallholder
Agriculture: A Review of Issues and Empirical Methods, by Frank Place and Brent Swallow, April
2000.
03 Impact of Land Tenure and Socioeconomic Factors on Mountain Terrace Maintenance in Yemen,
by A. Aw–Hassan, M. Alsanabani and A. Bamatraf, July 2000.
04 Land Tenurial Systems and the Adoption of a Mucuna Planted Fallow in the Derived Savannas of
West Africa, by Victor M. Manyong and Victorin A. Houndékon, July 2000.
05 Collective Action in Space: Assessing How Collective Action Varies Across an African Landscape,
by Brent M. Swallow, Justine Wangila, Woudyalew Mulatu, Onyango Okello, and Nancy
McCarthy, July 2000.
06 Land Tenure and the Adoption of Agricultural Technology in Haiti, by Glenn R. Smucker, T.
Anderson White, and Michael Bannister, October 2000.
07 Collective Action in Ant Control, by Helle Munk Ravnborg, Ana Milena de la Cruz, María Del Pilar
Guerrero, and Olaf Westermann, October 2000.
08 CAPRi Technical Workshop on Watershed Management Institutions: A Summary Paper, by Anna
Knox and Subodh Gupta, October 2000.
09 The Role of Tenure in the Management of Trees at the Community Level: Theoretical and
Empirical Analyses from Uganda and Malawi, by Frank Place and Keijiro Otsuka November 2000.
10 Collective Action and the Intensification of Cattle–Feeding Techniques a Village Case Study in
Kenya‘s Coast Province, by Kimberly Swallow, November 2000.
11 Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Natural Resource Management: Exchange
of Knowledge and Implications for Policy, by Anna Knox and Ruth Meinzen–Dick, January 2001.
12 Land Dispute Resolution in Mozambique: Evidence and Institutions of Agroforestry Technology
Adoption, by John Unruh, January 2001.
13 Between Market Failure, Policy Failure, and .Community Failure.: Property Rights, Crop–
Livestock Conflicts and the Adoption of Sustainable Land Use Practices in the Dry Area of Sri
Lanka, by Regina Birner and Hasantha Gunaweera, March 2001.
14 Land Inheritance and Schooling in Matrilineal Societies: Evidence from Sumatra, by Agnes
Quisumbing and Keijuro Otsuka, May 2001.
15 Tribes, State, and Technology Adoption in Arid Land Management, Syria, by Rae, J, Arab, G.,
Nordblom, T., Jani, K., and Gintzburger, G., June 2001.
16 The Effects of Scales, Flows, and Filters on Property Rights and Collective Action in Watershed
Management, by Brent M. Swallow, Dennis P. Garrity, and Meine van Noordwijk, July 2001.
17 Evaluating Watershed Management Projects, by John Kerr and Kimberly Chung, August 2001.
18 Rethinking Rehabilitation: Socio–Ecology of Tanks and Water Harvesting in Rajasthan, North–
West India, by Tushaar Shah and K.V.Raju, September 2001.
19 User Participation in Watershed Management and Research, by Nancy Johnson, Helle Munk
Ravnborg, Olaf Westermann, and Kirsten Probst, September 2001.
20 Collective Action for Water Harvesting Irrigation in the Lerman–Chapala Basin, Mexico, by
Christopher A. Scott and Paul Silva–Ochoa, October 2001.
21 Land Redistribution, Tenure Insecurity, and Intensity of Production: A Study of Farm Households
in Southern Ethiopia, by Stein Holden and Hailu Yohannes, October 2001.

33
22 Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights, by Ruth Meinzen–Dick and Rajendra Pradhan,
January 2002.
23 International Conference on Policy and Institutional Options for the Management of Rangelands
in Dry Areas, by Tidiane Ngaido, Nancy McCarthy, and Monica Di Gregorio, January 2002.
24 Climatic Variablity and Cooperation in Rangeland Management: A Case Study From Niger, by
Nancy McCarthy and Jean–Paul Vanderlinden, September 2002.
25 Assessing the Factors Underlying the Differences in Group Performance: Methodological Issues
and Empirical Findings from the Highlands of Central Kenya, by Frank Place, Gatarwa Kariuki,
Justine Wangila, Patti Kristjanson, Adolf Makauki, and Jessica Ndubi, November 2002.
26 The Importance of Social Capital in Colombian Rural Agro–Enterprises, by Nancy Johnson, Ruth
Suarez, and Mark Lundy, November 2002.
27 Cooperation, Collective Action and Natural Resources Management in Burkina Faso: A
Methodological Note, by Nancy McCarthy, Céline Dutilly–Diané, and Boureima Drabo, December
2002.
28 Understanding, Measuring and Utilizing Social Capital: Clarifying Concepts and Presenting a Field
Application from India, by Anirudh Krishna, January 2003.
29 In Pursuit Of Comparable Concepts and Data, about Collective Action, by Amy Poteete And Elinor
Ostrom, March 2003.
30 Methods of Consensus Building for Community Based Fisheries Management in Bangladesh and
the Mekong Delta, by Parvin Sultana and Paul Thompson, May 2003.
31 Formal and Informal Systems in Support of Farmer Management of Agrobiodiversity: Some
Policy Challenges to Consolidate Lessons Learned, by Marie Byström, March 2004.
32 What Do People Bring Into the Game: Experiments in the Field About Cooperation in the
Commons, by Juan–Camilo Cárdenas and Elinor Ostrom, June 2004.
33 Methods for Studying Collective Action in Rural Development, by Ruth Meinzen–Dick, Monica Di
Gregorio, and Nancy McCarthy, July 2004.
34 The Relationship between Collective Action and Intensification of Livestock Production: The Case
of Northeastern Burkina Faso, by Nancy McCarthy, August 2004.
35 The Transformation of Property Rights in Kenya‘s Maasailand: Triggers and Motivations by
Esther Mwangi, January 2005.
36 Farmers‘ Rights and Protection of Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, by Stephen B. Brush,
January 2005.
37 Between Conservationism, Eco–Populism and Developmentalism – Discourses in Biodiversity
Policy in Thailand and Indonesia, by Heidi Wittmer and Regina Birner, January 2005.
38 Collective Action for the Conservation of On–Farm Genetic Diversity in a Center of Crop
Diversity: An Assessment of the Role of Traditional Farmers‘ Networks, by Lone B. Badstue,
Mauricio R. Bellon, Julien Berthaud, Alejandro Ramírez, Dagoberto Flores, Xóchitl Juárez, and
Fabiola Ramírez, May 2005.
39 Institutional Innovations Towards Gender Equity in Agrobiodiversity Management: Collective
Action in Kerala, South India,, by Martina Aruna Padmanabhan, June 2005.
40 The Voracious Appetites of Public versus Private Property: A View of Intellectual Property and
Biodiversity from Legal Pluralism, by Melanie G. Wiber, July 2005.
41 Who Knows, Who Cares? Determinants of Enactment, Awareness and Compliance with
Community Natural Resource Management Bylaws in Uganda, by Ephraim Nkonya, John Pender,
Edward Kato, Samuel Mugarura, and James Muwonge, August 2005.
42 Localizing Demand and Supply of Environmental Services: Interactions with Property Rights,
Collective Action and the Welfare of the Poor, by Brent Swallow, Ruth Meinzen–Dick, and Meine
von Noordjwik, September 2005.

34
43 Initiatives for Rural Development through Collective Action: The Case of Household Participation
in Group Activities in the Highlands of Central Kenya, By Gatarwa Kariuki and Frank Place,
September 2005.
44 Are There Customary Rights to Plants? An Inquiry among the Baganda (Uganda), with Special
Attention to Gender, by Patricia L. Howard and Gorettie Nabanoga, October 2005.
45 On Protecting Farmers‘ New Varieties: New Approaches to Rights on Collective Innovations in
Plant Genetic Resources by Rene Salazar, Niels P. Louwaars, and Bert Visser, January 2006.
46 Subdividing the Commons: The Politics of Property Rights Transformation in Kenya‘s Maasailand,
by Esther Mwangi, January 2006.
47 Biting the Bullet: How to Secure Access to Drylands Resources for Multiple Users, by Esther
Mwangi and Stephan Dohrn, January 2006.
48 Property Rights and the Management of Animal Genetic Resources, by Simon Anderson and
Roberta Centonze, February 2006.
49 From the Conservation of Genetic Diversity to the Promotion of Quality Foodstuff: Can the
French Model of =Appellation d‘Origine Contrôlée‘ be Exported? by Valérie Boisvert, April 006.
50 Facilitating Collective Action and Enhancing Local Knowledge: A Herbal Medicine Case Study in
Talaandig Communities, Philippines, by Herlina Hartanto and Cecil Valmores, April 2006.
51 Water, Women and Local Social Organization in the Western Kenya Highlands, by Elizabeth
Were, Brent Swallow, and Jessica Roy, July 2006.
52 The Many Meanings of Collective Action: Lessons on Enhancing Gender Inclusion and Equity in
Watershed Management, by Laura German, Hailemichael Taye, Sarah Charamila, Tesema
Tolera, and Joseph Tanui, July 2006.
53 Decentralization and Environmental Conservation: Gender Effects from Participation in Joint
Forest Management, by Arun Agrawal, Gautam Yadama, Raul Andrade, and Ajoy Bhattacharya,
July 2006.
54 Improving the Effectiveness of Collective Action: Sharing Experiences from Community Forestry
in Nepal, by Krishna P. Achyara and Popular Gentle, July 2006.
55 Groups, Networks, and Social Capital in the Philippine Communities, by Marie Godquin and
Agnes R. Quisumbing, October 2006.
56 Collective Action in Plant Genetic Resources Management: Gendered Rules of Reputation, Trust
and Reciprocity in Kerala, India, by Martina Aruna Padmanabhan, October 2006.
57 Gender and Local Floodplain Management Institutions––A case study from Bangladesh, by
Parvin Sultana and Paul Thompson, October 2006.
58 Gender Differences in Mobilization for Collective Action: Case Studies of Villages in Northern
Nigeria, by Saratu Abdulwahid, October 2006.
59 Gender, Social Capital and Information Exchange in Rural Uganda, by Enid Katungi, Svetlana
Edmeades, and Melinda Smale, October 2006.
60 Rural Institutions and Producer Organizations in Imperfect Markets: Experiences from Producer
Marketing Groups in Semi–Arid Eastern Kenya, by Bekele Shiferaw, Gideon Obare and Geoffrey
Muricho, November 2006.
61 Women‘s Collective Action and Sustainable Water Management: Case of SEWA‘s Water
Campaign in Gujarat, India, by Smita Mishra Panda, October 2006.
62 Could Payments for Environmental Services Improve Rangeland Management inCentral Asia,
West Asia and North Africa? by Celine Dutilly–Diane, Nancy McCarthy, Francis Turkelboom,
Adriana Bruggeman, James Tiedemann, Kenneth Street and Gianluca Serra, January 2007.
63 Empowerment through Technology: Gender Dimensions of Social Capital Build–Up in
Maharashtra, India, by Ravula Padmaja and Cynthia Bantilan, February 2007.

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64 Gender and Collective Action: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis, by Lauren Pandolfelli, Ruth
Meinzen–Dick, and Stephan Dohrn, May 2007.
65 Gender, Wealth, and Participation in Community Groups in Meru Central District, Kenya, by
Kristin E. Davis and Martha Negash, May 2007.
66 Beyond Group Ranch Subdivision: Collective Action for Livestock Mobility, Ecological Viability,
and Livelihoods, by Shauna BurnSilver and Esther Mwangi, June 2007.
67 Farmer Organization, Collective Action and Market Access in Meso–America, by Jon Hellin, Mark
Lundy, and Madelon Meijer, October 2007.
68 Collective Action for Innovation and Small Farmer Market Access: The Papa Andina Experience,
by André Devaux, Claudio Velasco, Gastón López, Thomas Bernet, Miguel Ordinola, Hernán Pico,
Graham Thiele, and Douglas Horton, October 2007.
69 Collective Action and Marketing of Underutilized Plant Species: The Case of Minor Millets in Kolli
Hills, Tamil Nadu, India, by Guillaume P. Gruère, Latha Nagarajan, and E.D.I. Oliver King, M.S.
Swaminathan Research Foundation, October 2007.
70 The Role of Public–Private Partnerships and Collective Action in Ensuring Smallholder
Participation in High Value Fruit and Vegetable Supply Chains, by Clare Narrod, Devesh Roy,
Julius Okello, Belem Avendaño, and Karl Rich, October 2007.
71 Collective Action for Small–Scale Producers of Agricultural Biodiversity Products, by Froukje
Kruijssen, Menno Keizer, and Alessandra Giuliani, October, 2007.
72 Farmer Groups Enterprises and the Marketing of Staple Food Commodities in Africa, by Jonathan
Coulter, October 2007.
73 Linking Collective Action to Non– Timber Forest Product Market for Improved Local Livelihoods:
Challenges and Opportunities, by Heru Komarudin, Yuliana L. Siagian, and Ngakan Putu Oka,
December, 2007.
74 Collective Action Initiatives to Improve Marketing Performance: Lessons from Farmer Groups in
Tanzania, by James Barham and Clarence Chitemi, March 2008.
75 Sustaining Linkages to High Value Markets through Collective Action In Uganda: The Case of the
Nyabyumba Potato Farmers, by Elly Kaganzi, Shaun Ferris, James Barham, Annet Abenakyo,
Pascal Sanginga, and Jemimah Njuki, March 2008.
76 Fluctuating Fortunes of a Collective Enterprise: The Case of the Agroforestry Tree Seeds
Association of Lantapan (ATSAL) in the Philippines, by Delia Catacutan, Manuel Bertomeu,
Lyndon Arbes, Caroline Duque, and Novie Butra, May 2008.
77 Making Market Information Services Work Better for the Poor in Uganda, by Shaun Ferris,
Patrick Engoru, and Elly Kaganzi, May 2008.
78 Implications of Bulk Water Transfer on Local Water Management Institutions: A Case Study of
the Melamchi Water Supply Project in Nepal, by Dhruba Pant, Madhusudan Bhattarai and
Govinda Basnet, May 2008.
79 Bridging, Linking and Bonding Social Capital in Collective Action: The Case of Kalahan Forest
Reserve in the Philippines, by Ganga Ram Dahal and Krishna Prasad Adhikari, May 2008.
80 Decentralization, Pro-poor Land Policies, and Democratic Governance, by Ruth Meinzen-Dick,
Monica Di Gregorio, and Stephan Dohrn, June 2008.
81 Property Rights, Collective Action, and Poverty: The Role of Institutions for Poverty Reduction,
by Monica Di Gregorio, Konrad Hagedorn, Michael Kirk, Benedikt Korf, Nancy McCarthy, Ruth
Meinzen-Dick, and Brent Swallow, June 2008.
82 Collective Action and Property Rights for Poverty Reduction: A Review of Methods and
Approaches, by Esther Mwangi and Helen Markelova, June 2008.
83 Collective action and vulnerability: Burial societies in rural Ethiopia, by Stefan Dercon, John
Hoddinott, Pramila Krishnan, and Tassew Woldehanna, June 2008.

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84 Collective Action and Vulnerability: Local and Migrant Networks in Bukidnon, Philippines, by
Agnes Quisumbing, Scott McNiven, and Marie Godquin, June 2008.
85 Community Watershed Management in Semi-Arid India: The State of Collective Action and its
Effects on Natural Resources and Rural Livelihoods, by Bekele Shiferaw, Tewodros Kebede, and
V. Ratna Reddy, June 2008.
86 Enabling Equitable Collective Action & Policy Change for Poverty Reduction and Improved
Natural Resource Management in the Eastern African Highlands, by Laura German, Waga
Mazengia, Wilberforce Tirwomwe, Shenkut Ayele, Joseph Tanui, Simon Nyangas, Leulseged
Begashaw, Hailemichael Taye, Zenebe Admassu, Mesfin Tsegaye, Francis Alinyo, Ashenafi
Mekonnen, Kassahun Aberra, Awadh Chemangei, William Cheptegei, Tessema Tolera, Zewude
Jote, and Kiflu Bedane, June 2008.

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