HE ROLE of US Special Forces aviation is

T often a shady one, and was seldom more

so t h a n d u r i n g t h e 1980s a n d 1990s.
Transparency has never been a hallmark of
military policy - many missions are classified
either as 'black' (plausibly deniable) or 'grey 1
(deniable, if not plausibly), only the 'white'
missions being openly a c k n o w l e d g e d . As a
result, S p e c i a l Forces are o f t e n involved in
m i s s i o n s t h a t o f f i c i a l l y d o not e x i s t , and
information is therefore understandably vague.
Indeed, it is a defining factor that only failed
'black' or ' g r e y ' missions are known about
widely, as covert operations are only successful
if they remain secret. The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of
operations other than open w a r f a r e , w h i c h
o c c u r r e d under the Reagan administration,
further confuses the picture. For these reasons,
as well as space constraints, this article will be
limited in remit to those operations which have
From the Vietnam era, HH-53B/Cs and CH-53Cs, the surviving US Air Force H-53s, were upgraded
shaped the role, capabilities and activities of the as MH-53J Enhanced Pave Low Ills from 1987. This configuration introduced improved T64
US Special Forces establishment, and only those powerplants and better avionics and communications, and was the long-range special operations
where the integrity of the information presented helicopter for the US Air Force during DESERT STORM. KEY-ALAN WARNES

30 October 2002
 strike. Accordingly, they started mapping out a
l o n g - r a n g e and i n t r i c a t e r e s c u e i n v o l v i n g
meticulous, but excessively complex, planning.
An Army rescue team would be covertly flown
into Iran in a combination of US Marine Corps
RH-53 helicopters and 8th SOS C-130s. The C-
130s would transport the assault troops into a
desert staging area inside Iran, code-named
Desert One, from friendly bases in Oman. From
the forward operating base in Iran, the mission
would continue by refuelled RH-53 to the final
staging area, some 50 miles (80km) from the
final target - Tehran - from where they would
await the second day of operations.
On day two, the Army team would make its way
to the US embassy in Tehran in trucks, guided by
CIA agents already in the country. The team
would then s t o r m the embassy, rescue the
hostages and move them to a nearby football
stadium, from where the extraction of the entire
force and the hostages would begin.
From there, the party would fly by RH-53 to
Manzariyeh Air Base, about 40 miles (64km)
southeast of Tehran, which would already have
been seized by Rangers flown in by MC-130s.
Meanwhile, AC-130H Spectre gunships were to
provide close air support to cover the lengthy
deployment. The mission would end with the
removal of all personnel from Manzariyeh by C-
141 Starlifter Special Operations transports.
That at least was the plan. However, the reality
quickly diverged from the intent. Despite a
p r e v i o u s visit to the landing site by USAF
Combat Controllers and the successful use of
remote-controlled landing lights to guide the
aircraft in, two of the USMC RH-53s were forced
by poor w e a t h e r to turn back, l e a v i n g the
mission with only six of the original eight
helicopters. The rest of the mission, the flight
from the stadium to Manzariyeh, required a
minimum of six helicopters. Upon arrival at
Desert One, where all the 8th SOS' C-130s had
arrived safely, a hydraulic failure was identified
on one of the R H - 5 3 s , l e a v i n g o n l y f i v e
operational helicopters. The mission was over
before it had begun, and the operation was
a b o r t e d . W h a t happened next was tragic.
According to reports, as one of the RH-53s lifted
off, its pilot, blinded by the dust cloud from the
rotor downwash, collided with one of the C-130s
preparing to depart. The ensuing fireball
engulfed both aircraft. Eight men and a great
can be guaranteed. However, it must be many illusions died that morning. The plan
considered that, in this case, the acknowledged relied on too many successful contingencies, and
'truth' is only half the story. was too elaborate to adapt to a changing tactical
s i t u a t i o n . T h i s w a s e x a c e r b a t e d by the
EAGLE CLAW command of the mission being split between all
One of the first of the major Special Forces (SF) four US military s e r v i c e s : the USAF was in
missions to be undertaken subsequent to the control of the fixed wing element, the Army led
Vietnam War was Operation EAGLE CLAW, the 1980 the storming party, and the USMC ran the RH-
attempt to rescue 66 US hostages seized by the 53s, which f l e w initially from the US Navy-
new Iranian Islamic Government. The Iranian commanded carrier, USS Nimitz. The result was
a u t h o r i t i e s had h i j a c k e d the US e m b a s s y too many chiefs and too few Indians. Something
compound in an attempt to exert leverage on clearly needed to change.
the US to return the exiled former monarch, Prior to the ill-fated Operation EAGLE CLAW, the
Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The mission, US Army's special operations aviation assets
hamstrung by almost farcical planning, ended in were already in the throes of reorganisation
the deaths of eight US hostages, five from the following the end of the Vietnam War and the
8th Special Operations Sguadron (SOS) and a A burnt-out C-130 Hercules at Desert One in associated reduction in the size of the US
further three from the US Marine Corps (USMC). Iran. Over-complex and possibly over- military establishment. The failure at Desert
Planning for the operation had been a long and ambitious, EAGLE CLAW resulted in the deaths of One a d d e d f u r t h e r i m p e t u s t o t h a t
eight US military personnel. The soul-
tortuous process. After considering a lightning- reorganisation, and the need for a dedicated US
searching that followed the failed attempt to
fast mission involving the insertion of SF teams rescue the hostages in Tehran sowed the seeds Army Special Forces aviation capability was self-
by parachute, the planners had realised there for the present United States special evident. The 160th Special Operations Aviation
was no infrastructure or support for a quick operations aviation communities. Regiment (Airborne), also known as 160th SOAR

www.airforcesmonthly.com 31
or Task Force 160, grew out of Task Force 158,
which was first called to the colours in 1978-9
and destined to fulfil the US Army's Special
Forces aviation requirement. Initially comprised
of elements of the 101st Airborne Division and
staff from the 229th Aviation Battalion, Task
Force 160 w a s o f f i c i a l l y d e s i g n a t e d 160th
A v i a t i o n B a t t a l i o n in 1981. The unit a l s o
achieved its initial operational readiness in 1981
(when it g a i n e d the soubriquet 'The Night
S t a l k e r s ' ) and c o n d u c t e d its f i r s t c o m b a t
missions during Operation URGENT FURY, the US
invasion of Grenada in 1983, where it deployed
MH-6E 'Little Birds' and UH-60A Blackhawks. From a large special operations force in the Vietnam War, the US Army had to reinvent this
capability for itself in the decade following the fall of Saigon. Special forces aviation assets were
Another of the early missions conducted by the
built up using a two -pronged approach, with a 'quick' minimum modification being undertaken of
newly-formed TF 160 was the covert retrieval of several types of helicopter until a dedicated special forces version could be developed. For the
an Mi-24 Hind a t t a c k helicopter, probably a Chinook, the US Army modified a number of CH-47Ds as CH-47D SOA (Special Operations Aircraft)
Libyan example, retrieved at short notice in before investing in MH-47Ds, which featured improvements such as air-to air refuelling. A total of
June 1988. The operation, code-named MOUNT 12 MH-47Ds were produced. TED CARLSON/FOTODYNAMICS
HOPE in, (the title implies two earlier, failed
missions, although no details are available)
occurred in central Africa, most likely Chad,
where Libyan Mi-24s were engaged in combat.
After a speedy and long-range deployment, two
MH-47s flew 950 miles (1,530km) at night and in
adverse weather to extract and return the Hind
to US i n t e l l i g e n c e , w h e r e it b e g a n a long
programme of tests and evaluations designed to
assess its capabilities.
The Night Stalkers were also active during the
Iran-Iraq War in Operations PRIME CHANCE and
E A R N E S T WILL. Both t h e s e o p e r a t i o n s w e r e
initiated in the late 1980s, with the ostensible
aim of providing protection for civilian vessels
transiting the Persian Gulf. The Night Stalkers
operated against Iranian f a s t patrol v e s s e l s
attacking Iraqi - as well as Saudi Arabian and
other Gulf States' - oil and shipping routes.
(Iran targeted Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf From the MH-47D, the MH-47E was developed as a dedicated special forces aircraft, capable of
States' vessels in revenge for their bank-rolling surviving a five-hour mission 300nm into enemy-held territory. Its most noticeable difference from
of Iraq in its war against Iran.) the MH-47D is the larger fuselage fuel bladders. Unlike the MH-47D, the 'Es refuelling probe is not
For these operations, TF 160 and the US Navy detachable. The first flight was conducted on June 1,1990. BOEING
S E A L s ( S e a , A i r Land) (as w e l l a s highly- liberation of Panama. MH/AH-6s, UH/MH-60s also by the 'joint' nature of US special forces
c l a s s i f i e d C I A - r u n ' S e a s p r a y ' ' b l a c k ' units)
and MH-47Ds were deployed in support of the planning, which allowed the efficient use of
conducted operations against hostile Iranian o p e r a t i o n , f l y i n g u n i v e r s a l l y a t night. USAF, USN and Army assets within one unified
shipping. TF 160 aircrews operated to within Spearheading the use of darkness was not the command. However, the intense fighting in
30ft (9m) of the surface of the sea, often at only capability to be pioneered by TF 160, and u r b a n a r e a s h i g h l i g h t e d one of the most
night, and pioneered the use of helicopter night JUST CAUSE saw the f i r s t o p e r a t i o n a l use of enduring problems for any close support of
vision goggles and FLIRs. Operating from US helicopter in-flight refuelling, with three hastily- forward forces, that of target discrimination.
Navy ships in the Persian Gulf, MH-60As and equipped MH-47Ds deploying without a break Two fratricide incidents occurred, one when a
MH/AH-6s conducted armed reconnaissance from the continental US to Panama. Operation helicopter misidentified US forces, leading to the
missions in support of Navy operations in the JUST CAUSE led to the deployment of elements of deaths of two soldiers, and another when an AC-
t r o u b l e d w a t e r s o f the P e r s i a n G u l f . O n
the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 160th SOAR. Although 130 injured a number of soldiers engaged in
September 27, 1987, a joint MH/AH-6 package operations in Panama City illustrated many of c o m b a t with e l e m e n t s of the Panamanian
engaged the minelayer Iran Ajr and FLIR images the key strengths of Special Forces aviation and Defence Force. TF 160 finished the conflict with
obtained during the operation were used to the US overwhelmingly attained all its strategic the distinction of providing the transport (MH-
justify further operations to safeguard objectives, the operation validated the principles 47D) for M a n u e l Noriega's f i n a l f l i g h t into
international shipping routes through the Straits of rapid, precise and overwhelming force. captivity.
of Hormuz. TF 160 was relieved of this mission Meticulous planning, complemented by
in July 1988, when US Army Task Force 118, adaptable, fast and fluent command and control, The 'Night Stalkers' return to the Persian Gulf
flying OH-58Ds, assumed the role. was a critical f a c t o r in its success, and was From 1990-1991, the Regiment was involved in
largely due to the streamlining in operational Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, with
Panama command which was facilitated both by the at least four MH-47s and eight MH-60s in the
The Night Stalkers were also called upon to Joint Task Force command structure, which region. Its primary role was to provide transport
spearhead Operation JUST CAUSE, the 1989 pared away many of the tiers of command, and for the reconnaissance and strike Special Forces,
ORGANISATION OF 160TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRBORNE REGIMENT and to support the full spectrum of Special
Forces missions.
Unit Tasking Fielded Aircraft
1st Battalion, 160th SOAR (1/160), Classified ('black') operations supporting 18 AH-6H/J, 18 MH-6H/J, 20 MH-60K, 15 The 1st Battalion 160 SOAR was deployed to the
Based at Fort Campbell, Kentucky Delta Force, SEAL Team Six and others MH-60L (around 50% as 'AH-60L'). Persian Gulf in support of operation DESERT STORM
2nd Battalion 160th SOAR(2/160) 'Black' and 'white' (unclassified) operations 24 MH-47D in October 1990. Its task remains classified, but
based at Fort Campbell was directed at missions against the Iraqi regime.
3rd Battalion 160th SOAR (3/160) 'White' ops, Primarily supports the 75th 20 MH-60L (around 50% as 'AH-60L') Although details remain scarce, hundreds of low-
Based at Hunter Army Air Field Ranger Regiment (Airborne). 8 MH-47D level penetrations of Iraqi airspace were carried
4th Battalion 160th SOAR (4/160) Support Unit out and one MH-60L, along with its crew of four,
based at Fort Campbell was lost in a fierce sandstorm.

32 October 2002
 The 2nd Battalion deployed eight MH-47s,
leaving sufficient to cover contingency ops in the
CONUS (Continental United States). The 3rd
Battalion deployed four MH-47s and eight MH-
60s: the unit was based at King Khalid Military
City, Saudi A r a b i a . In December 1990 and
January 1991, it received improved HIRS (Hover
IR Suppression system) to provide improved
protection from IR missiles. The units also
received 5.56mm mini-guns, internal fuel tanks
and other p r o t e c t i o n and n a v i g a t i o n
improvements. TF 160 supported the 101st
Airborne Division and provided combat search
and rescue (CSAR) assets, initially from King
Khalid Military City, though later it forward
deployed to Rafha, as the threat level diminished.
Despite gaining the CSAR task in addition to
the more traditional Special Forces mission, the
only CSAR mission performed by TF 160 during
the Persian Gulf War was the rescue of a downed
F-16 pilot, Capt Scott T h o m a s . A f t e r his
While the 'regular' US Army was quietly passing on its OH-6A Cayuses to the National Guard and Army
wingman witnessed the successful ejection of Reserve, the Night Stalkers were operating new versions of the diminutive Hughes design as the 'Little
Capt Thomas and established radio contact, the Bird'. A multitude of different designations have been assigned to versions of the design operated by
pilot was located to an area 60 miles (96km) special forces, including T-tail and NOTAR variants (the latter not entering widespread service).
inside hostile airspace. Despite mechanical MH-6C 68-17249 is one of a handful of the variant still used for SOA training. TED CARLSON/FOTODYNAMICS
problems, and poor visibility (notwithstanding team. Flying as close to the sand as it dared, campaign against Iraq, conducting strikes against
NVGs and one radar illumination by Iraqi SAMs) and grateful for the newly-installed mini-guns, high value targets, known as Direct Action (DA)
the rescue was successful. the MH-60 arrived over the stranded team in m i s s i o n s . The f i r s t s t r i k e o f the w a r w a s
The 3rd Battalion also performed in support of mid-afternoon. Embarking the three-man SF conducted with the use of AFSOC MH-53 Pave
the SR mission, the most dramatic incident team, the Blackhawk sped towards the Forward Low III helicopters as navigation ships, which
being the extraction of one compromised SF Operating Base (FOB) at Rafha. Once on the successfully shepherded AH-64As in a vital pair
team. The day before the launch of Operation ground, it was discovered that the helicopter of strikes against Iraqi early-warning radar sites
DESERT STORM ( F e b r u a r y 23, 1991), v i l l a g e r s had been hit by ground fire several times and located near the Saudi-Iraq border. The MH-53s
discovered a Special Forces team located 185 was badly damaged. The SF team had a lucky led the strike package of AH-64s to a point some
miles (298km) inside Irag. As dawn broke, escape and owed their lives to the s k i l l and 6 miles (10km) from the radar sites, just prior to
increasing numbers of militia and v i l l a g e r s bravery of one Night Stalker aircrew. the start of hostilities. Lacking an embedded
b e s i e g e d the SF t e a m and an e m e r g e n c y GPS navigation suite and operating at night, the
e x t r a c t i o n was hurriedly planned. A g a i n , AFSOC in the Gulf AH-64s were reliant on the navigation suite
mechanical problems occurred and the usual Air Force Special Operations assets were also deployed on the specialist Pave Lows, but the
two-ship formation of MH-60s was not available, extensively deployed during the Gulf conflict. Hellfire missile proved its worth and both sites
so a lone Black Hawk was sent to save the From the outset, Air Force Special Operations w e r e d e s t r o y e d , c l e a r i n g a path for the
increasingly precarious e x i s t e n c e of the SF Command (AFSOC) was at the forefront of the subsequent waves of fixed-wing strike aircraft.

The US Air Force's AC-130 fleet was active in several campaigns throughout the period detailed in the narrative. This example, featuring the observer's
bubble which was not fitted to all the gunships, is seen forward-deployed to a European airfield in mid-1993 as part of the NATO/Western European Union
Adriatic embargo enforcement (Operation SHARP GUARD/DENY FLIGHT), part of the response to the deepening crisis in the former Yugoslavia. NATO

www.airforcesmonthly.com 33
 the ensuing 18-hour battle that the US suffered
its losses. Over 1,000 Somalis were estimated to
h a v e died d u r i n g the e n g a g e m e n t - more
accurate figures do not exist. Following the
failure of the mission, the force posture (intent
of the military organisation) moved to the self-
protection of the force and its reinforcements.
These included four AC-130H Spectre gunships
of 16th SOS which were deployed to the region
in June 1993, where they successfully provided
close air support during the final days of the US
intervention in December 1993. However, one
was lost when it crashed on March 15,1994, off
the K e n y a n c o a s t , k i l l i n g e i g h t of t h e 14
personnel aboard.
Although the operation and its mistakes have
been documented in more detail elsewhere,
several of the most i m p o r t a n t errors bear
restating. The critical failure lay in mission
An MH-47E comes into land alongside a an MH-60K on the deck of a US warship in April 1995. The planning and in the style and culture in which
nature of special operations roles means that the crews of the helicopters of the 160th SOAR must the mission was enacted. Understandably, the
be proficient in operations from warships. BOEING US troops that entered Somalia arrived with a
Several other USAF Special Forces aircraft also lines by USAF and TF 160 assets to collect p e r s p e c t i v e better suited to combat than
flew Direct Action missions. MC-130E Combat geological data to ascertain the suitability of humanitarian assistance. Less justifiably, the
Talons supported the initial breaching operation terrain for airborne and armoured forces. The commanders for the mission failed to collect
of Iraqi minefields and entrenched positions in airborne assault c a r r i e d out by X V I I I Corps sufficient information about the situation on the
southern Kuwait, using the BLU-82 'Daisy Cutter' remains the l a r g e s t heli-borne operation in ground. Human intelligence was notable solely
15,000lb (6,804kg) fuel-air explosive bombs. military history. XVIII Corps, comprising 82nd by its absence. There was an assumption that
Five such missions dropped eleven BLU-82 and 101st (Air Assault) Airborne Divisions, plus Somalia as a country possessed nothing in the
against minefields, forward-deployed Iraqi forces the French 6th Light Division (supported by HOT way of civil society because of the absence of
and command and control positions. Although carrying Gazelle helicopters), was tasked to cut effective government, and a failure to appreciate
the BLU-82 proved i n e f f e c t i v e a g a i n s t the Iraqi lines of communication along Highway 8 that the powerful elements that did exist within
minefields which were its intended targets, the between Kuwait City and Baghdad, thereby the country needed to be incorporated in, rather
size of the blast from the huge bomb contributed isolating Iraqi units in Kuwait. It would then than excluded from, the humanitarian assistance
greatly to the psychological intimidation of the engage the theatre reserve, the Republican effort.
Iraqi army (or at least to those units which saw Guard in the area. In short, the move, designed A s s o c i a t e d with these m i s t a k e s was the
the bomb used), and many Iraqi prisoners-of-war to screen the left flank of the armoured effort to assumption that the local population (derisively
cited the BLU-82 as the main reason for their take Kuwait, closely resembled a typical Special referred to as 'Slims' due to years of horrific
surrender. The US credits the use of the BLU-82 Forces mission in all but scale. The 1st Brigade, d r o u g h t ) w e r e i n c a p a b l e o f c o h e r e n t , co-
with the d e f e c t i o n of v i r t u a l l y the entire 101st Air Assault employed some 60 UH-60As ordinated operations against US forces. The
command staff of one Iraqi battalion. and 30 CH-47Ds, with AH-1s and AH-64s in intervention force failed to appreciate that the
AC-130 S p e c t r e gunships were also active support. The advance by 3rd Brigade, 101st Somali militias had far more combat experience
during the conflict, marking a departure from the remains the deepest assault in military history, than the US troops deployed in opposition to
u s u a l l y r e l a t i v e l y benign t h r e a t l e v e l s covering 175 miles (282km) from its marshalling them, or that many of the militia leaders had
encountered by these somewhat sluggish point on the I r a q - S a u d i border to occupy received formal military training in Italy or the
aircraft. Eight AC-130A/Hs were deployed to King blocking positions on the south bank of the then Soviet Union.
Fahd International Airport in Saudi Arabia, the Euphrates river, near the town of An-Nasiriyah. These problems w e r e e x a c e r b a t e d by the
gunships being drawn from the 16th Special Following the ejection of the Iraqi Army from assortment of f o r c e s deployed to UNOSOM
Operations Squadron (SOS), 191st SOS (both 1st Kuwait, operations in the region continued with (United Nations Operations in Somalia), which
SOW units) and, distinct from other Special elements of TF 160 deployed in support of was composed of contingents drawn from across
Operations assets, were attached to the Air Force Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in Turkey and the globe. Differences in language, doctrine and
command structure (CENTAF) and not to Special northern Iraq. o p e r a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s c o n s t r a i n e d the
Forces command (SOCCENT). They therefore O p e r a t i o n R E S T O R E HOPE, t h e f a i l e d U S c o m m a n d and c o n t r o l e f f o r t considerably.
became part of the overall air campaign and intervention in Somalia, followed in 1993, and Furthermore, some c o m m a n d e r s of non-US
were not specifically tasked to Special Forces ended in disaster for the US Special Forces c o n t i n g e n t s a c c u s e d the U S f o r c e s o f a n
missions. One AC-130 was lost to hostile fire community. Two MH-60Ls were lost to hostile arrogant and overbearing manner which further
when it lingered over the battle at al-Khafji until fire, others were damaged, 17 US troops were complicated the coalition warfare at which the
after dawn. Exposed by the morning light, the left dead and 77 others injured. Although the American troops had excelled only two years
AC-130 fell victim to a MANPADS missile. operation has been covered in great detail previously. Media reports suggest that Pakistani
Special Forces aviation was also crucial in elsewhere, the consequences for the US Special t r o o p s d e p l o y e d t o U N O S O M enjoyed
providing the traditional SF mission of insertion Forces community were far-reaching and a few c o n s i d e r a b l y more c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s with
and extraction of forces in hostile areas. Special brief lessons g l e a n e d f r o m them can be S o m a l i s , due in part to their closer
R e c o n n a i s s a n c e (SR) missions sought to repeated here. understanding of the situation in that country.
a s c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s on the ground, Iraqi Special Forces became involved in Operation O p e r a t i o n s f o l l o w e d in Haiti during 1994
capabilities, whereabouts and activities, or in R E S T O R E HOPE in A u g u s t 1993, s u p p o r t i n g ( R E S T O R E D E M O C R A C Y ) a n d t h e B a l k a n s (JOINT
gathering information on terrain conditions in elements of US 10th Mountain Division which ENDEAVOUR) during the remainder of the 1990s,
support of other operations. SOCCENT admitted were already engaged in the deteriorating and the Special Forces remained at the sharp
to c o n d u c t i n g 12 SR o p e r a t i o n s during the mission. Following an increase in tension which edge of US foreign policy. In the concluding
conflict, inserting Army SF teams to provide real led to a series of confrontations between the UN instalment of this article, we shall bring the
time strategic reconnaissance for prolonged intervention force in Somalia (UNOSOM) and story up to date and consider the evolving
periods. One team is reported as spending 60 locals, TF 160 and 400 US Army Rangers were tactics of the Special Forces and their role in the
hours in the field. sent to Mogadishu. On October 3 and 4, a group 'War on Terror', as well as looking at the new
SR missions were performed in support of the of 100 Rangers and Delta Force personnel badly fleets of a i r c r a f t which are intended to
airborne assault by US XVIII Airborne Corps, and botched a mission to capture a hostile militia p e r p e t u a t e and e x t e n d the ' s p e c i a l '
Special Forces were deposited far behind enemy leader, Mohammed Farrah Aideed. It was during elements of the US military.

34 October 2002