Contemporary Debates in Pakistan Affairs 16 the fore; including the progressive poet Falz Ahmed Faiz who tried to encourage a progressive ang cultural rich and diverse understanding of Pakistan's ideology. Unfortunately, his ideas did not floursn within the recesses of the average Pakistani, who had been born and bred in a soll that was increasingly taking on a dogmatic and exclusionary shade of Islam as encouraged by General Yahya. Under Yahya the nascent state of Pakistan delayed in handing over power to Mujib-ur-Rehman’s Awami party ang made the mistake of labelling Mujib’s rhetoric as ‘anti-Pakistan’. Continuing from a mode of thinking that viewed any alternative narrative or any non-Punjabi, non-Sunni, non-landed class view to be seen as a threat to Pakistan’s sovereignty, Bhutto's PPP majority and the military together castigated East Pakistan, fashioned themselves as custodians of Pakistan’s ideology and thereby fomented exclusionary feelings and resentment. Resultantly, the-already fragile state was ripped apart and divorced from its significant other; the ramifications of which we continue to feel to this date. This splinter necessitated the need for a strengthening of Pakistan's ideology by those at the helm of power; resultantly Pakistan Studies was added in the national curriculum for the first time by Bhutto in 1972. This manual of sorts socialized the impressionable generation into Islamic teachings and an imposed notion of what it meant to be a Pakistani Muslim; curtailing room for critical analysis and the consideration of alternative ethnic- linguistic viewpoints. To chart out a step-by-step trajectory of how Pakistan's ideology was moulded since the time of Bhutto is futile; harsh socio-economic conditions, excessive dependence on foreign states, sectarianism, intolerance and illiteracy have all amalgamated together to provide a firm foundation for the brewing of an ideology that does not allow room for manoeuvring. We oft pigeonhole General Zia as being the root of all evil as far as terrorism, sectarianism and religious violence is-concerned, but it is imperative to remain cognisant of that fact that Zia’s policies and rhetoric were not a breakthrough or newly introduced concepts; they were a continuum of an ideology that had been adopted and encouraged ever since the demise of Jinnah. However, Jinnah’s vision of Pakistan need’not remain an enticingly elusive mirage — always distantly visible yet. never within reach, for it can be made a tangible reality if the ideological foundations of this country can be bounded strongly together through the ties of ethnic and religious pluralism. The carving of an alternative ideology — one that is more inclusive and tolerant and not monopolised by an elite oligarchy composed of the military or the mosque or certain political fiefdoms can only take place if Pakistan, as a state and as a nation, embarks on a journey of socio- economic and psychological revamping, It is imperative to first reduce our thirst and our hunger, to shake off biases embedded in our minds and our hearts through seeking knowledge and to realize that Pakistan is strong nation. She cannot be uprooted if her ideology becomes more receptive and egalitarian owas diferent ethnicities, languages, sects and religions nor does she need to be hijacked by a handful of people and be protected only by them. We still have a chance of. nourishing this soil and jiding it the caref oe ul sustenance it needs to flourish into Jinnah’s Pakistan ~ the question is, are we willing t0?15 Contemporary Debates in Pakistan Affairs Winged ie ae eee ects Urdu language, hostility towards India and Islam. Islam was viewe uld withstand the potent i tram fst Pakistan, whieh now compote the majorly eine prouy, aed ao protection seins ay attempt to sabotage Pakistan's integrity. The ruling Muslim League members soon formed 9 bond between the mosque and the military, and quelled democratic recognition of ethnic or cultural pluralism, in order to safeguard their own bourgeoise landed-class interests and subvert any chances of the Bengalis metamorphosing into the main ruling group (Jalal, 2014). Ergo, shortly after partion, Islam became synonymous with Pakistan, and asserted itself through the lens of resisting ‘Hindu India’ and as a means of forging ties with Islamic countries in order to help bolster Pakistan’s economic woes and pa for its soaring defence needs. A corollary of the birth of ‘Islamic Pakistan’s ideology was that it provided an impetus to religious leaders to become the self-styled custodians of Islam, and the spokespersons of the poor and disenfranchised communities. The ink was hardly dry on the parchment of the Lahore Resolution when Pakistan was formally invited into the hallowed chambers of an Islamic ideological state ‘on March 1949; with the promulgation of the Objectives Resolution. Incorporating Maulana Maududi's doctrine of Political Islam, this resolution was adopted by Liaquat Ali Khan and spelled out the principles upon which a future constitution was to be carved out. The deed had been done; there was no turning back now — Pakistan has-been permanently painted as an Islamic ideological state. What can be ascertained thus far is that the amalgamation of the quintessential Pakistani identity with Islam paved the way for the civilian bureaucracy, military establishment, religious leaders, Punjabi landed political bourgeoise and the intelligence apparatus to become the self-appointed and natural heirs to thenew country. Foreign, defence and economic relations have all been viewed and maneuverer through the prism of Islam, Relations with India have remained inflexible, the Sunni majority has continued to assert its dominance, the disenfranchised sentiments of Bengalis have seeped into those of Pashtuns and Balochis, centre-province relations remain splintered due to the dominance exerted by Punjab, the military's shadow continues to hover over the executive, legislative and judicial branches, who in turn remain in a tussle, thereby slowly undermining the separation of powers doctrine upon which Pakistan’s constitution is embedded (Devji, 2013). Every component of this three-pronged ideology imperceptibly impacted each other in a symbiotic fashion; Pakistan was declared a bastion of Islam because India posed an existential threat to Islam, and Pakistan needed the support, of the Americans in order to confront the Indians whilst convincing the US that its strategic location would act as a barrier against the evil of communism (Devji, 2013). Resultantly, claims for the realization of ethnic rights, regional autonomy or political inclusion were never taken seriously and always viewed as a threat at splintering the fragile state’s ego; groups making such claims were castigated as anti-state, anti- nationalism and simply unpatriotic. The Pakistani ideology became an expansive, all-encompassing concept sprung forth from the impetus provided by Islamic underpinnings leading to the coining of the term ‘Nazriah-e-Pakistan’ by Professor Khurshid Ahmed in 15. Interestingly, such a term was never used by the founders of Pakistan during their speeches in 1947. Khurshid was a proponent of Jamat Islami, which rose to the front in opposition to President Ayub, who tried to fashion a more progressive and liberal understanding of Islam and tried Jalism and secularism to istan’s i re progressive. When Jamat Islami declared social be the attests of on tre on th the PPP was incentivized to come to be the antithesis of an Islamic, and therefore Pakistani, ideology,emporary Debates in Pakistan Affairs 14 Understanding the Ideology of Pakistan Shanza Foig Conti pakistan’s ideology can be likened to a river whose tributaries meander through every facet of the society's soil and colours the mindset and weltanschauung of every socio-economic strata. If one were to foray through the annals of Pakistan's history, it will become increasingly apparent that many have tried to alter the course of the river’s tributaries to suit their own vested interests. It is imperative to remain cognisant of how this country’s ideology sprung about, the different factors that have moulded it and where it lies today. It is only with a clear socio-historical understanding that one can develop an understanding of the critical need to revisit Pakistan’s ideology with a more inclusive, tolerant and less dogmatic mindset. The ideological underpinnings of Pakistan started brewing under the colonial rule, when socially constructed and largely Westernized notions of nationalism and the nation-state were transplanted onto the Indian community. These concepts, when transposed onto a community that had hitherto been bounded together by the soil on which they were raised, allowed fissures to start developing amongst the community. These cracks bifurcated the Indians along communal and ethnic lines; linguistic, religious and ethnic divisions started to become more prominent and were encouraged by the British raj under their dogma of ‘divide and rule’ (Haqqani, 2014). Jinnah, along with his cherrypicked leaders composing the Muslim League, became bastions of Muslim independence and the need to carve out a separate sphere for the Muslims, and other religious minorities, of India. The religious frenzy that accompanied the communal underpinnings of Pakistan and India’s bloody parturition allowed Islam to carve an indelible niche for itself soon after the demise of Jinnah. Plucked and nurtured by senior Muslim League members, such as Liaquat Ali Khan, Islam was soon seen as a unifying force between the ethnic, linguistic, communal and sectarian divisions that started to manifest themselves after the creation of Pakistan. The leaders of Muslim League did not know how to tackle these new divisions that had started to rear their faces; prior to partition, all Muslims had been clumped together in opposition with the Hindus. However, it was only after partition that ethnic and provincial fissures between Pashtuns, Bengalis, Punjabis, Balochis, Sindhis etc (Haqqani, 2014). began to ferment. Liaquat Ali Khan himself was not a ‘son of the soil’ so to speak; he himself was a mohojir and did not hold a communal political backing within the newly created Pakistan. Resultantly, Islam was brandished as the proverbial glue that would unite the variegated differences between the new citizens of Pakistan and view each other as brethren within the umbrella of Islam. Did Jinnah envisage for Islam to adopt such a central gravitational role within the P administrative framework of Pakistan? One glance at his 11" August 1947 speech would It Qn conclude towards a resounding no. Scholars such as Ayesha Jalal have waxed eloquent about Jinnah wanting to create a nation that would provide a safe space to anyone wishing to not live under a nate where concepts such as human rights, religious freedom, rule of law etc (Jalal, 1994). would e unrecognized. Thus, eveh though Jinnah never enunciated Pakistan as an ideological state pri : partition, his successors delineated a Pakistani ideology shortly after independence. This ideology W litical and jead one to