Tac attack

July 1987

·.. -.
·.: ..
 Angle of Attack

W e are coming down to the wire and hope-

fully will award the training contract for
the Combat Oriented Mishap Prevention Analy-
periods for us to be on our toes.
This will enable the smart leaders from the
front-line supervisor right on up to the com-
sis System (COMPAS) before August. This is a mander to develop awareness programs that will
major first step in improving our methods and reduce the potential for a loss. You know the
approach to mishap prevention. I'm convinced type of programs I mean-remember the ones
this systems approach will enable us to continue you normally have after a mishap occurs in your
to reduce our overall mishap rates in all areas. unit? What's the awareness like then? It's way
The kickoff is scheduled for a one- year test run up, isn't it, and chances of you having another
at three TAC units. "Okay," you say. "If you're so mishap at that particular time are way down,
convinced, why not teach the system to everyone aren't they?
right now, rather than at only three of our This is exactly what we want to be able to do
bases?'' Well, the reason is simple. We want to do and achieve before the mishap. And we can. We
it right. Although the system has been very suc- just have to remember that awareness is the key
cessful in other organizations, it isn't yet in TAC to mishap prevention. If we are aware of the in-
language. That's important, and one of our major creased levels in risk that occur, we can reduce
goals during the trial year is to convert the ex- mishap potential through awareness programs.
isting terms into ones that are meaningful to us. We may not be able to reduce a risk. For exam-
This system is designed to work for the front line ple, if we go to combat, that's a risk we have to
worker as well as top level leaders. Therefore, we accept. But the key is to be aware of the in-
first need to get the language into everyday creased risk and the specific dangers involved in
terms that are meaningful to all and relate di- having to operate in a combat environment. We
rectly to the way we do our business. need to identify the increased risk on the ground
For example, COMPAS wouldn't be worth as well as in the air. That's identifying mishap
much to us if it was only workable during peace- potential. Once we identify it and make everyone
time. What happens when the balloon goes up? If aware of those increased risks and dangers, we're
everything relates to how we do a peacetime mis- creating a mishap prevention program.
sion, how do we use it when we go to war? Well, That's what it's all about, friends. Reducing
the first two words in COMPAS say it best- our mishap potential to its lowest level, and
combat oriented. And it is. It can help us prevent when we do ... we save lives and resources. If
oversights and omissions during combat as well that's not the best angle of attack, I don't know
as peacetime, thereby helping to reduce our mis- what is. What's yours?
hap potential. That's the meaning of the second
two words in COMPAS-mishap prevention.
By learning to use COMPAS analysis tech-
niques, we stay in an active rather than a reac-
tive mode. It helps us identify and plan for high
G~r/LJ~
levels of risk. It won't tell us precisely when the EDSEL J. DE VILLE, Colonel, USAF
next mishap will happen, but it will help identify Chief of Safety
 TAC ATTACK
DEPARTMENT OF THE MR FORCE

features
4 Interview with a Double Ace: No matter what the reason, you're not
feeling 100% and you know it. What are
Colonel Vermont Garrison (USAF, you going to do?
Ret.)
He became an ace the first time with the
25 Director of Aerospace Safety
Fourth Fighter Group over Europe by
Special Achievement Award
388th Tactical Fighter Wing
claiming 7.33 aerial victories. Later over
Korea, he became an ace again with a 26 SOFing (Or How To Avoid Gray
total of 10 MiG kills. Col. Vermont Gar- Hairs At 30)
rison shares his thoughts and experiences The Supervisor of Flying fills a vital role
on flying and fighting. in TAC's daily flying operations. How can
12 Weapon Words: K Factors and you do your best when it's your turn?
Combat Aircraft Parking 30 F-4 Situational Emergency
A look at some of the things that can be Procedure Training
done to avoid an explosives mishap. fepartments

16 Where Is Your Article?

We need your inputs. Here's how you can
get published in TAC ATTACK.
18 Let COMPAS Be Your Guide
epa
11 TAC Tips
n
Putting COMPAS to work.
12 Weapons Words
22 Self-Medication: There're No 15, 25 Safety Awards
"Pluses" To It 29 Fleagle Salutes

TACRP 127-1

TAC Attack is not directive in nature. Recommendations are intended to comply with existing directives. Opinions ex-
pressed are those of the authors and not necessarily the positions of TAC or USAF. Mishap information does not identify the
persons, places, or units involved and may not be construed as incriminating under Article 31 of the UCMJ. Photos and art-
work are representative and not necessarily of the people or equipment involved.
Contributions are encouraged, as are comments and criticism. We reserve the right to edit all manuscripts for readability
and good taste. Write the Editor, TAC Attack, HQ TAC/SEP, Langley AFB, VA 23665-5001; or call AUTOVON 574-3658.
Distribution F(X) is controlled by TAC/SEP through the PDO, based on a ratio of 1 copy per 10 persons assigned. DOD
units other than USAF have no fixed ratio; requests will be considered individually.
Subscriptions for readers outside DOD are available from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402. All correspondence on subscription service should be directed to the superintendent, not to
TAC/SEP. Volume 27 Number 07
 COL VERMONT GARRISON,
(USAF, RETIRED)

Wing, in
Vermont Gar- Fighter Interceptor Gar-
Bio: Colonel Korea. Flying the F-86,MiG
rison, from Mt. Victory, rison brought his first
flying with 21st and be-
Kentucky, began down on February
in 1941 came an ace for the second
the Royal Air Force the on June
and later transferredGroup,
to
flying
time with two victories
scored
EDWARD C. Fourth Fighter Squad-
5th. By July, he had
Korean
ALDRIDGE, JR. with the 336th Fighter four more kills for a
SECRETARY OF ron out of Debden, England.
gained his War total of 10.
THE AIR FORCE Flying the P-47, he
De- Col Garrison's flying career
in-
first air-to-air victories in totaled nearly 8000 hours,
GEN ROBERT D. RUSS cember 1943 and January cluding nearly all the Century
the
COMMANDER 1944. He then converted to
considered to be series aircraft, as well as to
P-51s and was but, on F-4 and B-57 in addition
a possible leading ace, those he flew during Worldserved as
March 3rd, after claiming War II and Korea. He
another victory which raised commander of the 405th sta-
to 7 ,
his total for the war Fighter Wing when it wasand
Garrison was downed by tioned at Clark Air the
Base
and became a pris- commander of 8th Tac-
ground fire of the vice
oner for the remainder tical Fighter Wing. Idaho
COL "COUPE" DE VILL war. U.S Col Garrison lives in the
returned to the
CHIEF OF SAFETY Garrison the war and remains active with
and active flying after Air Force Association.
MAJ DON RIGHTMYER reassigned to
In 1953, he was
EDITOR his old unit, now the
4th

STAN HARDISON
ART EDITOR
TAC ATTACK: Colonel Gar- ing up against, what the other
SSGT DENNIS WALLACE rison, how do you think a fellow has and how to beat
STAFF ARTIST fighter pilot can best prepare him. I guess the best thing is to
himself to fly and fight? be able to fly your equipment
to the feathered edge of its
GARRISON: Well, the obvious capability.
thing is to know your equip-
ment to start with. Train as TAC ATTACK: Without going
TAC Attack (ISSN 0494-3880) is much as possible in what that over that edge.
published monthly by HQ TAC/SEP, equipment is supposed to do. If
Langley AFB, VA. POSTMASTER: you're supposed to be air-to-air,
Send address changes to TAC GARRISON: Yes. That's right.
Attack, TAC/SEP, Langley AFB, VA air-to-ground or both, learn Because you may have to.
23665-5001. Second-class postage how to do your mission as well Those were my primary
paid at Hampton, Virginia, and ad- as possible. If you can, know a goals-to know my equipment,
ditional mailing offices. little bit about what you're go- know the mission that we were
4
July 1987
 interview with a double ace

Maj Don Rightmyer

Editor, TAC ATTACK

tasked to do and and then

know how to do it to the best of
my ability.

TAC ATTACK: Your record

shows that you were successful
in doing that.

GARRISON: You hope you are

better than the other guy. As-
suming you are pretty well
equal in equipment, if you are
better than him, then you may
beat him. At least you hope
you will. In World War II and
Korea, the equipment was pret-
ty even in performance. Some-
times one side had a little edge,
sometimes the other side had
it. You can get a lot of argu-
ments about Korea-the
MiG-15 and F-86 Sabrejet. For
my money, I would take the
Sabrejet. Overall, it was a bet-
ter airplane-more dependable
and a better gun platform. I
sure think our pilots were bet-
ter. That was what made the
difference. They had a lot more
MiGs than we had F-86s, but
they were short on good
leadership.
That's important-good lead-

TAC ATTACK 5
 interview with an ace

RVIEW WITH AN ACE

ership. The people that are go- key. Getting your eyes on the deal because the pilots were
ing to follow you, that you target is vital. supposed to already have that.
command, must have con- A lot of fighter groups ran a
fidence in you. I think a lot of GARRISON: Certainly and it "Clobber College" (for want of a
good fighter pilots will do well will be in the future as well . better name) to break in the
whether they have a good new guys, give them a flight or
leader or not. That's been prov- TAC ATTACK: It's been said two and show them what you
en. But more of them will do that no one has figured a new could. In Korea, we had a rule
better under good leadership. way to crash airplanes. What that you had to take them up
sort of mistakes did you see and show them where the front
TAC ATTACK: You started guys making in World War II lines were for obvious reasons.
out as a wingman and eventu- and Korea that led either to an But, no, we didn't send a new
ally became a flight leader. airplane crash or a loss in an pilot into combat right off on
When you went out on amission, air-to-air engagement? the first flight he made over
what did you try to instill in there. We took him up and
your wingmen? What sort of GARRISON: I saw what I tried him out. We'd say "This is
things would you attempt to thought was lack of skill caus- the way we want you to fly. "
teach them so that they could ing landing accidents some- Obviously he was going to be a
eventually become flight lead- times. Even though, in theory, wingman if he was a young
ers as well? they'd had good training, they kid. We broke him in as best
still made mistakes. we could. Unfortunately, you
GARRISON: Well, how to In combat, I occasionally saw might not do as much as you
offer each other mutual pro- foolhardy aggressiveness lead wanted to because of pressing
tection and to keep a "swivel" to mistakes. Now, aggressive-
neck. Times have changed a ness is absolutely necessary. A
little bit. There's a lot of elec- fighter pilot in air-to-air com-
tronic gear today that's going bat certainly isn't going to be
to tell you who's out there, but successful without it. But stu-
the things that were going to pidity is another thing. Don't
tell you that in those days were allow yourself to get in front of
your eyeballs. Sometimes you somebody and leave him sitting
might have radar telling you back there where he can shoot
they're coming up; but when you while you're trying to shoot
you get close in to the fight, somebody else.
well, it's your eyeballs. Look
around and know how to look, TAC ATTACK: During World
too. You have to remember War II, Korea and Vietnam,
that that was all gun firing. did you ever do any training
sorties as such or was every
TAC ATTACK: I understand. sortie totally committed to
As you say, you didn't have as combat?
many electronic means of de-
tecting the enemy as we do to- GARRISON: We were able to
day but visual contact is still do a little training. Not a great

6
needs for the aircraft. that maintained your aircraft? nearly all cases was
outstanding.
TAC ATTACK: Did you fly GARRISON: Outstanding. I
the same airplane every day don't think you could ever go TAC ATTACK: You men-
during World War II and Korea back totally to that but I know tioned some thoughts on how a
or did you switch airplanes on that they are doing more of pilot can best prepare himself.
different days? that now. You buy a whole lot. What gave you the decisive ad-
You get a feel for the airplane vantage over your adversary
GARRISON: I flew ninety and your crew chief. It's the during your air-to-air victories?
percent of my missions in crew chiefs airplane and the
World War II and Korea in armorer's, too. My crew chief GARRISON: This is going to
what I called "my air- and armorer in Korea asked if sound a little like self-
plane"-the same airplane. they could have their names on aggrandizement. I had good
You didn't fly it on every mis- one side with my name on the eyes for one thing. I could
sion. If your airplane was other. It was all right with me. shoot. And I thought I was a
broken, then you flew another They said, "Every kill that this pretty fair pilot. I thought I
one. But if my airplane was airplane gets, we're going to could make the airplane do
ready to go, then I almost al- put it under our names over about anything that anybody
ways flew it. here. The ones that you get, else could make it do.
you can put on the other side."
TAC ATTACK: What sort of I thought that was great. TAC ATTACK: No matter
relationship did you have with From my own experience, the how good our eyes are, there is
your crew chief and the people crew chief-pilot relationship in a lot that you can do with the
way you use them. As you said,
knowing how to look and keep-
ing your head on a swivel is
important. If you have the best
eyes in the world but don't use
them effectively, they won't do
you much good. Some of your
ability obviously came as a re-
sult of the practice and experi-
ence you had.

GARRISON: Well, I was al-

ways interested in that and did
lots of shooting. I don't know
how good I was. I won several
gunnery awards. I led the first
worldwide weapons meet. Of
course, I did a lot of shooting.
Before going to Korea, I had
just spent a couple of years at
Nellis. That was our business.

7
 i nterview with an ace

RVIEW WITH AN ACE

TAC ATTACK: So you were a motivate them right. It seemed depend on my wingman or my
weapons instructor there at to me that among fighter pi- element lead to do all the look-
Nellis? lots, some people were just ing back there. You shouldn't.
automatically motivated. Give Do your own looking.
GARRISON: Part of the time. them the guidance and experi- Everybody should be looking
I was a squadron commander ence they need and hope they around at all times.
most of the time; of course, listen. If they respect you, they In Korea, I had a wingman
you're in the same business. will. Go through the training that shot an aircraft down
We trained for both air-to-air that you need to to keep them when I switched places with
and air-to-ground- strafe, dive up on that feathered edge all him. We were flying pretty
bombing and just air-to-air the time. high over there-45 to 50,000
dogfighting. feet some of the time. You just
TAC ATTACK: How do you .don't horse an airplane aroun"d
TAC ATTACK: You obvi- feel a squadron commander up there, especially with those
ously had a few hours of expe- goes about getting the respect airplanes, because you're just
rience· under your belt from of his people? about hanging there. When we
your World War II experience got attacked, he was in the best
and postwar flying before you GARRISON: I think being position for the kill, so I said,
arrived in Korea. honest is very important. If "Go." My wingmen knew that
your people don't trust you to and it helped morale, too.
GARRISON: Not so much in be honest about things, they're
World War II, compared to Ko- not going to respect you very
rea. But, going to Korea I had much. Let them know that you TAC ATTACK: What were
quite a few hours. Nobody had have their welfare and their some of the qualities that you
very much flying going into training under consideration at mosf admired about the in-
World War II. I thought they all times. Everybody likes to structor pilots or flight leaders
were all kids. I was a little get promoted but don't give you served under in your early
older than everybody else. We your people the feeling that days? How did they help you
had 21-year old majors, you're just using them as a learn to become a better pilot?
colonels that had to be accom- stepping stone to further your
panied by their mothers into own career. GARRISON: In combat,
the bar and things like that. having a leader who knew
TAC ATTACK: What is your what he was doing-what he
TAC ATTACK: You had the view of the role of the flight was about. We had some good
opportunity on several occa- leader and the wingman? ones in every outfit.
sions to serve in leadership Experience, assuming you
positions. What did you con- GARRISON: In my view, two have everything else, has a lot
sider to be your greatest chal- people fighting together are to do with it. I followed a guy
lenges as a leader of fighter about 10 times as strong as one named Don Blakeslee, our
pilots? alone. I always figured I was group commander. He probably
going to see the enemy. Of had more fighter experience
GARRISON: I don't know if course, you hope your wingman than anybody else in Europe,
motivating them is the right does as well. Fortunately, I maybe in the entire Army Air
word or not. Some people can looked around myself. I didn't Forces. He knew what he was

8 July 1987
about. We also had guys like engaged in combat? your mind on what you're
Jim Goodson, Willard Millikan, about. What are you there
and several others. When you GARRISON: There are all for-to kill that target. It
got into a hassle and needed a kinds of combat. Are you going doesn't do much good to go in
little assistance, you never to hit a target on the ground? and peck at it a little bit, lose
heard those guys say, "I'm If it is an important target (and some people, not get it and
short on fuel." They were there; it ought to be or they shouldn't have to go back after it again
they would come if they pos- be sending you against it), then the next day.
sibly could. You get to know go in to kill the target. Take
and appreciate those kind of advantage of all the equipment TAC ATTACK: Aircraft today
people. you've got if you're going to be are more complex than when
shot at (and you will be today you first started flying but all
TAC ATTACK: What do you with surface-to-air missiles and flying requires some sort of
think is the most important that kind of stum. Take all the preparation. How did you pre-
thing to remember when you're training you can get. Keep pare for missions?

TAC ATTACK 9
 interview with an ace

TAC ATTACK: How impor- that we're going to train as

GARRISON: Obviously you tant is flight discipline? we'll fight. I don't really be-
want to be as well briefed as lieve that but I think you
possible on what you're sup- GARRISON: Well, air dis- should come as close to it as
posed to be doing: where you're cipline is very important. Dis- you can.
going in, how you're going to cipline means many things to When you talk about break-
egress, how you're going to get people. Discipline used so that ing airplanes today that cost
out if somebody gets hit. you give no flexibility at all is millions of dollars with no re-
Know as much about the whole bad in my opinion. I've known placements for them, you have
situation as you possibly can. quite a few fighter squadron to think of these things. We
If it's a dive bomb mission, commanders to do that. But, had lots of accidents way back
know where the flak or discipline means many things. but airplanes didn't cost as
surface-to-air missiles are I didn't do that-just say "you much. Could we have done a
located if you can, how best have to stay back there and better job in safety? The an-
to get in and out. If somebody that's the only place you can swer is yes. We certainly could
gets hurt, how best to get him go." Circumstances change and have done a better job. I don't
out, if possible. All of those you have to be flexible to re- think we did as good a job as
things. spond to that. the Air Force does today.
We briefed pretty thoroughly Normally if the wingman Maybe that's because of the
over in Southeast Asia, going saw the enemy and I didn't time and era, I don't know. I
up into the Hanoi area. Some- (which was seldom) I said, think safety as a rule has gen-
times we made a long day of it. "You tell me and I'll let you go erally improved over the years.
Well, we briefed thoroughly and I'll be covering you." But I A lot of us, including me,
everywhere, of course some never worried much about it didn't put as much emphasis on
things didn't require much because I figured I was going to safety as we should have.
briefing. You already knew see the enemy before they did I don't think you can put too
what it was all about. If you anyway-and I did. Discipline much emphasis on safety as
were going up on the Yalu is very important. But, I don't long as you don't let what
River in Korea to hunt for like to use the term discipline you're doing get in the way of
MiGs, there wasn't much to it. to mean you've got to march in the training that needs to be
You wanted to know what the lock step all the time. Fighter done. In some cases, you'll
weather was going to be or if pilots aren't very good for that probably have to do a little bit
there was any possibility of anyway. of that.
weather. We, of course, always
tried to get high if we possibly TAC ATTACK: What are your TAC ATTACK: So, as you've
could. They say altitude above views on flying and safety? said before, the important point
you and runway behind you are How do we achieve that? is to remember what you're
the two most worthless things about?
in the world. In those days you GARRISON: I don't have an
couldn't get to 45,000 feet by answer for it. I know that GARRISON: Sure, if you're
lighting the burners and zap- safety is an absolute must. If going to be successful in what
ping up there real quick , so we you want to have perfect you're doing, you're going to
tried to use the weather to our safety, then you wouldn't fly have to keep your wits about
advantage and plan ahead. the airplanes. They like to say you. ->-
10 July 1987
 INTERESTING ITEMS,
MISHAPS WITH MORALS,

tac tips
FOR THE TAC AIRCREWMAN

Instant reactions - tination with wrinkled clothes was bad enough;

just add analysis having to wear flight boots with your civvies was
ridiculous. But those days are over. Now we go

W hat's the first thing you do in the simu-

lator when the Master Caution light comes
on? That's easy-look at the telelight panel, see
cross-country with travel pods, and you can just
about bring the whole closet. But it's still pos-
sible to show up missing a few articles.
which lights are shining at you, and do what it One pilot asked the transient alert crew chief
takes to make them go out, right? Not so fast. to fasten the door on his aircraft's travel pod
This system of problem solving usually works OK while he did his preflight walk-around inspection
in the simulator, but it may breed bad habit pat- of the rest of the aircraft. After the crew chief
terns for airborne emergencies. It lacks a few closed the door, he was called away to help move
basic life-preserving steps like maintain aircraft and connect the power unit to the aircraft. In a
control (knock off whatever you're doing and fly classic case of habit pattern interruption, both
the jet) and analyze the situation .. . Sometimes the pilot and the crew chief forgot to return to
instant reaction is not warranted or welcomed. the travel pod and secure the door.
What's the worst t hing t hat could make a The aircraft took off normally, and no one no-
bunch of lights come on? How about a flameout? ticed anything was wrong for about 15 minu tes.
A pilot flying a two-engine fighter noticed the Then the wingman noticed the travel pod door
left generator, left oil pressure and left hydraulic was open and a red streamer was flapping in the
system lights during his pull-up for a closed pat- breeze. After a turn back to the base they had
tern. In the base turn, he reset control aug- departed, the streamer was no longer around.
mentation switches and troubleshot his hydraulic Neither was the downlock for the main landing
system, but never took a second to check the left gear that the streamer was attached to.
engine's rpm or temperature gauges. Guess what Since we also carry the aircraft's 780 gear
lights come on when your left engine flames out (which includes several heavy metal objects) in
the travel pod, it's more than a matter of wrin-
When your Master Caution light brightens u p kled or missing clothes.
your cockpit, take a glance at the tachs on your Don't forget your shoes or your belt. And don't
way to or from the telelight panel. You might forget to check the travel pod door.
discover an immediate need to employ single-
engine procedures instead of coping with a per-
ceived multiple emergency.

What's worse than

wrinkled clothes
' ' And don't forget to pack your shoes and a
belt." Remember those words from UPT
when you were getting ready for your first over-
night cross-country mission? Showing up at des-

TAC ATTACK
 weapons words

K Factors and combat

aircraft parking
MSgt Denis Jones
TAC Weapons Safety

I 'm sure everyone has seen the movie, "How

To Stage a Disaster." You know, the Air
Force training film where Bien Hoa AB , Viet-
nam, essentially blew up. This disaster was
caused in part by parking explosives loaded air-
craft too close to one another. Every person I
have talked to recently thinks that this disaster
couldn't happen again. Don't believe it-it could.
Let's start with a scenario to show how this
could happen if explosive safety rules are ignored
or at least set aside for a short period of time. A
wing starts a Phase I Self-Initiated Operational
Readiness Inspection, a three-day exercise where
one AMU will load all mission capable aircraft
with their primary munitions. The aircraft, F-4s,
are parked as specified by AFM 86-2, Standard
Facility Requirements, (Figure 1) which is
roughly the wing span plus ten feet. This manual
does not address explosives loaded aircraft park- figure 1.
ing. This is left to AFR 127-100.
AFR 127-100, Explosive Safety Standards, de- Alright, alright, I know I just lost you when I
scribes combat loaded aircraft as above ground started with the "K" factor stuff. K factors are
magazines. That means they require K-11 sep- constants which have been determined through
aration between each other and K-18 separation testing or mathematical formulae to provide a
from related facilities. certain amount of protection from blast (over-

12 July 1987
pressure) which is produced by an explosion. The will be 126 feet. That means that this wing's air-
larger the K factor, the greater the amount of craft must be separated by 126 feet (measured
protection provided. Some resources require between the explosives of one aircraft and the
greater protection than others; for example, explosives of the next aircraft). This equates to a
buildings with people assigned inside require protection factor of K-11. Now, how close can we
greater protection (K40/50) than munitions stor- park the aircraft to related facilities like squad-
age igloos (K1.25). General K factors are already ron operations? We know the required protection
computed for you in AFR 127-100, table 5-1 (Fig- factor is K-18 from table 5-1 and that the NEW
ure 2) and all you need to know is what type of is 1152. Find the NEW under the weight line and
facilities you are measuring for separation. Since follow it over to the column K-18 and the dis-
we are discussing
combat aircraft all
11,
we need to know is
that the distance BLE 5-1. Quantity - Distance Separation Criteria:
between explosives
HAZARD CLASS/DIVISION CL AS IA0 tf 1.1
loaded aircraft
requires K-11 and
COLUMN - T2 J
3 I 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
FROM: - EARTH ABOVE ABOVE OPER- OPER- COMBAT
from related facilities TO: POTENTIAL COVERED
EXPLOSION IGLOO
GROUND
MAGA-
GROUND
MAGA-
BARR-
ICADED
ATING
LOCA-
ATING
LOCA-
ACFT
PARK-
1
requires K-18. SITE (PES) FRONT FRONT
ZINE ZINE MODULE TION TION ING
EXPOSED UNBARR- BARR- UNBARR- BARR. AREA
OK, OK, these K SITE (ES) SIDE REAR UNBARR- BARR-
LADED ICADED LADED ICADED LADED LADED
(EXPLOSNES)
factors still don't 39 39 2 2 3 38 46 3 46
relate to distance. EARTH
COVERED
K125 K1.25 1(235 K2.75 K4 K4 K1.25 1(4 K4 K4
SIDE
This is why the IGLOO 1
14 14 14 14 14
writers of AFR 127- K1.25 K1.25 K2 1(2 1(4 K4 1(1.25 K4 1(4 1(4
100 provided table REAR

5-2 (Figure 3), but 14 14 14

FRONT
you need to know BARR-
1(2.75 K2 1(11 K6 1(11 K6 1(6 1(11 1(6 K11

what the Net 3 ICADED

14
39 7
xplosives Weight FRONT K2'75 K2 K6 K6 K6 1(6 K6 1(6 1(6 K6
(NEW) is for the UNBARR
AGED
munitions on the
aircraft. For this, you
go to TO 11A-1-46
to look up the stock
number and find the
NEW for that item. RELATED
Now that I've FAC 36t

explained what the

K factor is and where
to look up the NEW
for a specific item, figure 2.
let's fit them together. Our wing with F-4s
starts their three-day exercise and loads 6 tance is 210 feet. Do you have it?
MK-82s on all their FMC aircraft and we know AFM 86-2 separation for F-4s is 48 feet (from
that the aircraft will require K-11 separation. centerline to centerline). As you can see, that's a
K-11 separation is figured by finding the total little bit short of K-11 separation (126 ft). Using
NEW of the explosives loaded on each aircraft. A K-11 separation, we should only load every
single MK-82 has a NEW of 192 lbs of explosive fourth aircraft spot and leave the parking spots
so take 6 times 192 which will result in 1152 between empty.
NEW of 1.1 explosives on each aircraft. Now go Here are some other things which should be
to table 5-2 (Figure 3). Find the line of weights considered: Are more munitions located at less
where 1152 falls, follow it over to the K-11 than K-11 distance from the aircraft? If so, you
column and read the number, which in this case should add the NEW of those munitions into the
TAC ATTACK 13
 K Factors and combat aircraft parking

CTORS AND COMBAT

RAFT PARKING

formula. Are there any non-related facilities in repaired locally. While this is bad enough, if the
the area such as the fire department, wing head- same mishap happened while the aircraft were
quarters or the control tower? If so, they must be parked at 48 feet as specified by AFM 86-2, the
located at greater distances. closest aircraft would experience 120 psi over-
Earlier I stated that K factors equate to pro- pressure and the explosion would propagate to a
tection from overpressure caused by an explosion. point where K-11 distances exist. Remember
Overpressure, if great enough, can cause immedi- that the greater the explosives weight, the more
ate propagation of explosions from one aircraft to distance will be required to meet the K-11 sep-
the next. To protect explosives from propagation, aration criteria. The probabilities are that the
they must be separated by K-11 distance. While entire row of explosives-loaded aircraft parked at
K-11 protects from propagation, it provides little 40 feet would be destroyed.
protection from explosive communication caused To make this mishap more severe, during an
by fire or fragments. However, if our aircraft exercise more personnel are on the parking ramp.
were parked at 126 feet and a mishap occurred, All of these personnel would not have a chance to
the overpressure which would be experienced by evacuate to the 2000 foot criteria. Personnel pro-
the closest aircraft to the explosion would be 7.8 tection for a NEW of 1152 lbs requires K-18 dis-
psi. The overpressure would totally disable these tance (210 feet) and at this distance they would
aircraft, buckling the bulkheads and panels. The experience 3.5 psi overpressure. We could expect
next aircraft would be 252 feet from the mishap 10 percent ear damage at this distance. Even at
and would experience 2.8 psi, requiring major 2000 feet, 2% of the personnel in the open could
depot repair. The remaining aircraft would suffer be killed by hazardous fragments.
damage by fragments and could be repaired by The bottom line is that our resources require
local specialists. This is assuming that no ex- protection. The more protection required, the
plosive communication by fire or fragments oc- larger the K factor and the greater the separa-
curred. By parking our aircraft at K-11 distance, tion. These are weapons of war designed to kill
we will lose two aircraft completely and another and destroy the enemy. If the weapons are mis-
two aircraft until the depot level repairs are handled or improperly positioned, you become the
made. The remaining damaged aircraft could be victim.

TABLE 5-2. Quantity - Distance Separation Distances.

NET EXPLOSIVE WEIGHT

(POUNDS)
DISTANCE FROM POTENTIAL EXPLOSION SITE TO EXPOSED SITE (FOR GIVEN KFACTOR)
(FEET)
I"
NOT CUBE ROOT K1.1 K1.25 K2 K2.5 K2.75 K3 K4 K4.5 K5 K6 K7 1(8 1(9 1(11 1(18
OVER- OF UPPER
OVER HAS IL IM IL
LIMIT IM IM IM IM IM POL IM 1M HAS IM
0 1 1.00 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 5 5 6 7 8 9 11 18
1 2 1.26 2 2 3 4 ' 4 4 5 6 6 8 9 10 12 14 23

1,000 1,500 11.45 13 14 23 28 31 34 46 52 57 69 80 92 105 126 210

1,500 2,000 12.60 14 16 25 32 34 38 50 57 63 76 88 100 115 139 230
2,000 3,000 14.42 16 18 29 36 40 43 58 65 72 86 100 115 130 158 260
3,000 4,000 15.87 17 20 32 40 44 48 63 71 79 95 110 125 145 175 290

figure 3.
 W hile performing
normal duties
during aircraft re-
their area with a serious fuel
leak; of which the aircrew was
unaware. Both sergeants imme-
Recognizing the severity of the
problem, SSgt Novak felt that
he could stop the leak even
covery, MSgt Tedford diately notified individuals though fuel continued to
and SSgt Novak with radios to declare an emer- stream out of the aircraft.
spotted, from gency while they proceeded to Unable to lower door 22 due

T he 363d
Tactical
Fighter Wing's
separate loca-
tions, an
RF-4 taxi-
flag down the pilot who stopped
the aircraft. Once the aircraft
was stopped, they communi-
to the high performance center-
line tank, SSgt Novak lowered
doors 28 L/R, reached inside
Vehicle Operations cated the need for an immedi- and found a leaking drain
Branch has demonst- ate engine shutdown. valve. His technical expertise
rated its dedication to MSgt Tedford coordinated the and intimate knowledge of the
safety by providing Shaw emergency response while SSgt aircraft allowed him to close
AFB with an accident-free Novak identified the location of the valve by feel which stopped
environment in vehicle oper- the fuel leak as the door 22 the leak.
ations for 180 consecutive days. area. This area is located in The alertness of MSgt Ted-
This branch is responsible for front of the auxiliary air ford and SSgt Novak to aircraft
providing a 120 vehicle fleet 24 doors and a catastrophic operating outside their im-
hours a day, 7 days a week in engine bay fire could mediate work area and their
support of 9AF, USCENTAF, easily have been positive actions to remedy a se-
the 363 TFW and the 507 have caused by leaking rious safety deficiency have
TAIRCW. Over 25,000 passen- earned' fuel being blown earned them the TAC Out-
gers and 7 million pounds of them the back into the standing Achievement in
cargo were safely moved more TAC Out- engine bay by Safety Award.
than 400,000 miles to myriad standing prevailing
locations-an unprecedented Achievement 25-knot
safety record for a vehicle op- in Safety Award.
erations branch of this size.
The success of the 363d's Ve-
hicle Operations Branch is due
to a conscious effort to
thoroughly train new operators
OUTSTANDING
on all aspects of each vehicle.
The branch has also strategi-
ACHIEVEMENT
cally placed a tote board in the
operations compound dis-
playing the number of accident-
IN SAFETY
free days accumulated. This
visibility provides incentive for
their drivers to practice
AWARD
good safety habits. Vehicle Operations
The men and Branch , 363d
women ofthe Transportation
363d Transport- Squadron
ation Squadron's 67 AGS,
Vehicle 67TRW
363d Tactical
Fighter Wing
ence, their pro- Shaw AFB, SC
fessionalism and
extraordinary ·
safety record MSgt David B. Tedford

TAC ATTACK
WHERE IS YOUR AI

T ake a second and look at

our masthead on page 4
where our magazine's staff is
we're looking for it. We can use
your "There I Was" accounts of
personal experiences where you
ficient manner? Tell us how
you go about maintaining air-
craft, launching sorties, loading
listed every month. You'll no- or someone you know learned a ordnance, repairing avionics
tice that there are no staff valuable (and sometimes pain- and all the other factors vital
writers assigned to us here at ful) lesson from which the rest to accomplishing our mission.
TAC ATTACK. That's because of us can benefit. But, we're not For you fighter jocks (pilot,
most of our writers are located just looking for the "bad news" WSO, EWO or whatever) we
out there in the field-those of type of experiences. Have you need your thoughts on how and
you who read the magazine. ever found yourself in a situa- where we can fly tactically
We rely on you to help us put tion that was rapidly going smarter (and safer as a result).
the magazine together on a downhill and you were able to Don't assume that what you're
monthly basis. We need your prevent a potential mishap by doing right is common knowl-
inputs to make TAC ATTACK breaking the chain of events? edge to everyone else in the
relevant, timely and interest- Tell us about it. Your personal command. There are a lot of
ing for you, your daily needs experiences put real flesh and good ideas being used on a
and your co-workers through- bone details around the princi- daily basis that will serve as a
out the TAC workplace; ples of working and flying good reminder for some of us
whether it's the flightline, the safely that we talk about each and as new insights for others.
cockpit, the avionics shop or month. No one in TAC should feel
the office. For example, we need to hear left out from our "unofficial"
I know a lot of you have from you maintenance types staff of writers. I wouldn't even
thought about writing an arti- about how you operate in and attempt to list all the career
cle for us, but just never around the flightline on a daily fields that are a part of the
seemed to get around to it. Let basis in all kinds of readiness T AC team. If you haven't found
me encourage you to take the conditions and weather. What an article in the magazine that
time now to put your thoughts standards of excellence do you hits your area of concern, it
and experiences down on paper operate by that prevent you may be because you haven't
so we can share them with from having some of the kinds written an article for us.
everyone else in TAC. You'll be of mishaps we write about in Finally, if what you've been
glad you did and we certainly "Chock Talk"? How do you re- waiting for is a personal in-
will as well. late to all the other activities vitation, here it is:
What kinds of articles are we around the ramp that get the
looking for? You name it and mission done in a safe and ef-
 TICLE?
for
name), (an article to
written forward
Dear (Your you looking
Why haven't We're your experiences, in an
TAC ATTACK)?
Take together
from you. put them all
hearing
insights
and
us is up to
your for us. it to but we'll
article format for sending is fine
The double-spaced
you. Typed, aboutin your
take handwritten.questions
also got any be interested We'll give
If you'veor not we'd 574-3658.and make
whether at Autovon all
call us friendly reception to make
ideas,
article
a
to use your efforts
your attempt for us
every something
of us smarter.and write to hear from you.
Sit down waiting
We're
today.
Sincerely

The Editor
ATTACK
TAC
 Let Compas be your guide

UR GUIDE

Maj Harold T. Gonzales

721'FTS
MacDill AFB, Florida

I t was the fourth day of a

sortie surge week. The
0-dark-thirty brief was at 0300.
target information from GCI
and at 22 NM called "Judy."
The mishap pilot began a vis-
fatally injured. He had tried to
intercept a train north of the
range.
Three sorties of predawn inter- ual conversion on the target. How often have you been out
cept missions followed by two He descended to 14,000 MSL, there in the dark, flying this
daylight missions. Triple briefs the bottom of his altitude same scenario? Do you ever re-
had been standard all week block, reported "Lost visual" to lax once you see the target and
and the duty day was 12 hours GCI and requested "Bogey fly a visual conversion at the
to the second. Takeoff was at dope." GCI responded "210 de- end of a night intercept? How
0500; sunrise was not until grees at 3 NM." The mishap pi- numb are you after being on
0709. The mishap pilot was lot responded "Say again." GCI the morning schedule for 4
number 2 in a 2-ship. He per- repeated "210 degrees and 3 days? I know, that's the nature
formed a radar trail departure NM." The mishap pilot called of the fighter business. You get
to the working area and acted "Skip it" then "Tally ho." The up early, grab a cup of coffee,
as target for lead's 3 intercepts. mishap pilot began to fly his brief and fly. You are not real
The flight then switched roles post-attack maneuver with vis- sharp, but you can hack it.
with number 2 assuming the ual reference to the target. No Disorientation-you get it, but
fighter role. further transmissions were you can plow through. Cer-
The mishap pilot began his heard from the mishap pilot. tainly, anyone who has flown
intercept with the target at The aircraft impacted the fighters can relate to this mis-
18,000 feet MSL. He received ground and the pilot was hap. Is it just the nature of the

18 July 1987
business? Do we just think of tigation does it for them. The mission briefing was
this as the cost of doing busi- Using COMPAS, let's take adequate, but rushed because
ness or can we prevent this apart the scenario described of the requirement to brief 3
type of mishap? Using the TAC above. The key to remember is missions. It was the fourth day
COMPAS system, let's look at that many people and super- of the surge, so much of the
this mishap in greater detail. visors had identified one or two "motherhood" items were stan-
Let's see how many indications of the indications of trouble, dard. Nothing much was said
there were that this pilot but the mishap still happened. about night procedures or pos-
should not have been flying TAC COMPAS allows us to put sible disorientation.
this sortie at this time. these independent observations The range was totally dark.
First, you are probably ask- into a framework from which a There was no moon and very
ing, "What is the TAC COM- decision could have been made. few ground lights. Though
PAS system?" COMPAS stands The pilot was an experienced there were a few scattered
for Combat Oriented Mishap fighter pilot with over 1000 clouds, it was night VMC. The
Prevention Analysis System. fighter hours. He had an excel- area however, was a "great
Simply put, COMPAS uses a lent record as an instructor pi- black hole."
logic tree (you know, like those lot in a 2-seat fighter; however, The aircraft had no low-
charts in the Dash One that try he had just transitioned into a altitude warning system or
to make pilots handle emer- new single-seat fighter. At the radar altimeter. The location of
gencies like a computer) to time of the mishap, he had less the radar/electro-optical (REO)
provide a framework for taking than 20 hours at his new base display caused reflection prob-
a step-by-step look at a prob- and was still in Mission Qual- lems on the canopy. Though
lem. These analytical trees are ification Training. the HUD gave copious amounts
tools in understanding a mis- The new aircraft, apart from of information, it was not easy
hap sequence, not just as an being a single-seat fighter , had to remain spatially oriented
independent event, but as a several innovations. The HUD with reference only to the
failure of a total system. When was a new tool for the mishap HUD.
this type of approach is used, pilot and the large bubble can- The wing had been involved
normally many more contribut- opy and instrument locations in the normal routine of 3-go
ing factors that led to the mis- were different. The aircraft days. The normal duty day,
hap are discovered. The impli- didn't have the "feel" nor the when they weren't flying a
cation is that such in-depth in- aural warning of the old one. surge schedule, was 12 hours.
vestigation should lead to
better recommendations to
keep these mishaps from
recurring.
On the positive side, COM-
PAS's best application is to
identify problems with a sys-
tem before they result in mis-
haps. Two of the areas COM-
PAS evaluates are change
(what you or your people are
doing different from normal
and what the impact is) and
system performance review
(what the UEI does , without
the pain of a re-visit in 90
days). Bottom line, COMPAS is
a road map that allows an
organization to take a mean- ·
ingfullook at itself and its op-
erations before a mishap inves-

TAC ATTACK 19
 Let compas be your guide

COMPAS BE
GUIDE
Maintenance was attempting to "Can do anything" mentality pilot averaged 4.8 hours sleep
support a 22 UTE and the prevailing. per night during the surge. Be-
normal flying day was a The mishap pilot was also cause of the briefing time, he
14/12/10. subjected to several stresses in was attempting to sleep during
The wing surge was designed his personal life. He had re- his normal awake time and fly
to support all four squadrons' ported into his new squadron during his normal sleep cycle.
participation. Because of in- 36 days before the mishap. He The result was chronic and
sufficient daylight, the decision had flown 15 times in those 36 cumulative fatigue. His plate
was made for morning players days, 9 of which had been dur- was full, but his ego would not
to fly 1 night and 2 day gos. ing the last 3 days. He was ea- allow him to call "Knock it off."
Afternoon flyers flew 1 day and ger to finish MQT and become All these factors added up to
1 night sortie. This exercise a flight lead again. He had a Class A mishap, a destroyed
was to prepare the wing for an moved into base housing 8 days aircraft and the loss of a highly
ORI expected in the near prior to the mishap. Though skilled pilot.
future. still trying to get settled, the We in the TAF have gotten
To fill the surge schedule, pilot asked to fly in the surge smarter. The 3-go day has been
the squadron needed every pi- in order to get the flying time. reduced to a normal 2-go day.
lot available, including MQT. During his off-duty time, the ORI surge rates have been re-
Squadron supervision had to pilot was mission planning at duced from 100 sorties per day
cover a 20-hour period from home and trying to unpack and 24-hour tasking to a more
first briefing to last landing. In since his wife was unable to lift realistic 74 sorties per day and
addition, with winter approach- heavy objects due to an ad- 18-hour tasking. Flight com-
ing, the squadrons were trying vanced pregnancy. The mishap manders have become more in-
to bank sorties. There was a

20 July 1987
volved with their people and tion, which might have pre- bed at 1800 and wake up at
are now deeply involved in vented this mishap. Here is the 0200? Were the wife and kids
programming. Briefing guides true potential of the TAC quiet? If so, your risk factor is
stress night procedures, and COMPAS system. But, let's be very low and you should volun-
there has been an increased realistic. TAC COMPAS is not teer to fly all the morning gos.
emphasis on spatial misorienta- going to stop all mishaps, but But, if you are normal, your
tion and disorientation. Avi- perhaps it will reduce the price warning lights should be on
onics innovations such as we must pay to learn from our and flashing. As a supervisor,
CARA and line-in-the-sky are mistakes. COMPAS will allow understand your people are at
providing the pilot with alti- us to gain the maximum risk. Watch them close. You
tude warning. Perhaps any one knowledge from every mishap might just cut them out of a
of these innovations would and prevent many others from sortie, but save their life.
have prevented this mishap. happening. Finally, when you are plan-
Unfortunately, all of these But, have we totally pre- ning for deployments or local
changes were not the result of vented the possibility of this flying at strange and exotic
mishap investigation board particular type of mishap from times, remember this article.
recommendations from this one happening again, even with Ask your flight doc what the
incident. Without the TAC this COMPAS analysis? How limits of the human body are.
COMPAS system to guide in- about each pilot's individual Ask your safety office to use
vestigations, it has taken the responsibility to see the signs TAC COMPAS and tell you
recommendations of over 30 of impending trouble? When where the threat lies. You
mishap boards to bring the was the last time you got a wouldn't fly a combat sortie
TAF to the present configura- 0300 brief time? Did you get to without an Intell brief, would
you? The same logic applies. ->-

TAC ATTACK 21
 II
• I
self-medication:

events of the day to come.

The morning was to be
routine-morning stand-up in
the command section, routine
flight physicals with no one
scheduled who required waiver
paperwork, and, finally, the
shop survey with the environ-
mental health technicians.
The afternoon would be
somewhat less than routine. He
remembered the mishap board
briefing scheduled for 1400.
That accident had not only re-
sulted in the wing losing a
seasoned fighter pilot and his
jet, but the flight surgeon had
also lost a close personal friend.
He couldn't shake the feeling
in the pit of his stomach that
signaled the frustration and
anger he felt at each mishap
briefing.
He had provided the required
information to the board. He
had also assisted the board's
Brigadier General Robert A. Buethe flight surgeon with the unique
TAC Command Surgeon medical support she had re-
quested, yet he'd kept his dis-
tance as not to interfere in the

I t was a bright, beautiful day

in early March with the ris-
ing sun providing the first
day to look forward to; to feel
good about. As the chief flight
surgeon made the short walk
investigation involving a good
friend. The findings on the
cause of the mishap just had to
warmth to herald the promise from the parking lot to his of- be an inopportune key system
of the coming spring. It was a fice, he thought about the failure. Slim had been a good

22 July 1987
 THERE'RE NO "PLUSES" TO IT
pilot, an IP, a squadron opera- lent physical health-with one eine cabinet there was only one
tions officer. He'd led a mod- exception. A routine drug Alka-Seltzer box and it was a
erate life style, had a great screen, performed on all acci- box of Alka-Seltzer Plus.
family with few problems and dent victims, revealed thera-
was in perfect health. Good jets peutic levels of a strong decon- ng: The mishap pilot
flown by good pilots just didn't gestant, a strong antihistamine ad self-medicated with a
impact the ground on CAS mis- and aspirin in the pilot's blood powerful antihistamine and
sions without some sort of sig- and tissues. decongestant which in addi-
nificant system failure. There were no prescriptions tion to aspirin were at thera-
Later in the day, the mishap ordered in the pilot's medical eutic levels in his blood
briefing proceeded through the record for antihistamines, de- ream and tissues at the
established protocol. There congestants, or, for that matter, time of the accident. (Caustill
were no identifiable aircraft medication of any type. He
system or mechanical failures. hadn't even been seen in the Causal? Taking an extremely
Through a reconstruction of the flight surgeon's office since his common over-the-counter, non-
flight profile, the board had de- last physical, some eight prescription medication isn't
termined that the mishap air- months prior to the mishap. safe? The chief flight surgeon
craft had performed a non- The source of the medication knew the answer and the
standard reversal of flight was puzzling. reason for the feeling in the pit
course at low altitude and, al- Slim's wife had reported to of his stomach. It was found in
though there was sufficient al- the mishap board flight sur- his (and almost every other
titude to perform the maneu- geon that her husband had physician's) office in a bright
ver, a perfectly functioning air- complained of a minor "sinus- red book entitled Physician's
craft had simply been flown type" headache and had taken Desk Reference for Nonprescrip-
into the ground. There was no a couple of Alka-Seltzer tablets tion Drugs. Under the caution
attempt to eject. about three hours prior to his section of the listing for Alka-
The flight surgeon again felt final flight. In the squadron, Seltzer Plus were the words:
a sick feeling in the pit of his Slim had appeared to be his "Product may cause drowsiness:
stomach. What had gone usual jovial self to his squadron use caution if operating heavy
wrong? Something must have mates when he reported for the machinery or driving a ve-
happened to or distracted his mission brief. hicle." Surely piloting a mod-
friend to cause him to lose his The wing commander inter- ern high performance jet quali-
spatial orientation. The au- rupted the briefer and, turning fies as "driving a vehicle" in
topsy findings noted by the to his Chief Flight Surgeon, spades! Once again self-medica-
board and the medicine cabinet commented, "Surely, Doc, a tion had contributed to the loss
in the pilot's home provided a couple of Alka-Seltzers couldn't of a life and an aircraft.
possible answer. explain this finding." Unfortu- The mishap briefing over, the
There were no medical condi- nately, they did. chief flight surgeon left wing
tions found at autopsy such as After the autopsy laboratory headquarters. As he walked
heart disease, stroke or other values were reported to the back to his office, he again no-
vascular problems which could board flight surgeon, she re- ticed the pleasant March
have caused a sudden and com- turned to the pilot's home and weather. It was indeed a beau-
plete incapacitation. In fact, asked to see the box from tiful day! The bright sun felt
the autopsy confirmed the which Slim had taken his warm on his face. "I've got to
flight surgeon's clinical impres- Alka-Seltzer. Her suspicions do it again," he thought. "Once
sion that the pilot was in excel- were confirmed. In the medi- again I've got to brief our crew
TAC ATTACK 23
 self-medication

-MEDICATION

force on the dangers of self- You can also be assured that

medication. Why don't they their pharmacologic effect on
hear me?" He knew that until you as an aviator is just as
he'd delivered his message, the dangerous as it was when they
tightness in the pit of his stom- required a prescription.
ach would be constant. Medications marketed and
I'm sure each of you has compounded for use by children
heard at least one presentation also pose a significant danger
on the subject of self-medica- to the aviator. Some crew mem-
tion and the dangers of flying bers, under the impression that
aircraft of any type "under the they can take a dose of pedi-
influence", etc. I'm sure you've atric medication with impunity,
also noticed that this magazine use this category of medica-
as well as all the other tions for the mild symptoms of
MAJCOM safety magazines colds or similar disorders.
have published at least one ar- Wrong! They contain the same
ticle on the subject within the drugs with the same pharma-
past year to 18 months. cologic effect as adult prepara-
Why all the interest? Quite tions, with the same side ef-
simply because self-medication fects and use warnings.
in aircrews continues to be a What medications can a flyer
problem. One could argue that take without the approval of
in Slim's case, he probably his friendly flight surgeon?
thought he was only taking as- How about simple aspirin, Ty-
pirin in the form of Alka- lenol, medicated shampoo and
Seltzer. Yet, he had ingested athlete's food preparations? Yet
two drugs which a few years even these drugs can cause side
ago would have required a pre- effects which won't mix well
scription. It wasn't the Alka- with aviation. Many of us have
Seltzer that ruined Slim's day, often discussed what type of re-
it was the "Plus." strictions for use would have
Over the past 10 to 15 years been placed on aspirin by the
there has been a gradual but Federal Drug Administration if
definite relaxation in the re- it were invented today. I sus-
quirement for prescriptions for pect it might well have re-
certain classes of drugs. They quired a prescription.
generally fall into the cate- The point of this whole piece
gories of decongestants, anti- is quite simple: drugs and the
histamines, diet aids and anal- aviator don't mix. Just because
gesics for pain. You can find a product is sold over the
them quite easily in the Base counter without a prescription
Exchange in brightly colored doesn't make it safe. Self-medi-
packages labeled "Plus", cation of any type is dumb. In
"Extra-Strength", "New", Slim's case, it was dumb as
"Long Acting" or "Improved." dirt! ~

24 July 1987
TAC--------------
CREW CHIEF
SAFETY AWARD
S gt Eric Ziegler is dedicated
to flight line ground safety
as well as the safety of his sec-
areas and maintenance re-
quirements of each available
aircraft. This training con-
tion and the transient aircraft tinues until each person is fa-
they service. His section miliar with the different types
handles over 600 aircraft each of aircraft that land at Luke.
month, including a variety of The success of this program is
aircraft from all branches of illustrated by the record of
DOD as well as numerous civil- accident-free service to thou-
ian aircraft. The vast experi- sands of transient aircraft. The
ence and knowledge which Sgt transient alert section has also
Ziegler has acquired on a vari- received numerous "excellent"
ety of aircraft have contributed and "zero defects" ratings from
immensely to his training of the squadron, wing and air
fellow transient maintenance division.
personnel and their out- A specific example of Sgt
standing safety record. Ziegler's thoroughness and
Sgt Ziegler begins his safety safety consciousness occurred
training program by giving Sgt Eric D. Ziegler
recently during a quick-turn
Transient Alert Section
each newly assigned crew chief thruflight inspection on a tran-
405 EMS, 405 TTW
a complete briefing covering all sient F-15. During the inspec-
Luke AFB, AZ
danger areas of the flight line tion, Sgt Ziegler noticed appar-
and the common hazards on ent damage to the first row of
most aircraft. This initial train- compressor blades on one en-
ing is further augmented as gine. On closer examination, he ther damage to the engine and
dissimilar aircraft show up at found that the damage ex- possible loss of the aircraft.
the base. Sgt Ziegler takes all tended to several rows of the Sgt Ziegler's dedication to
available on-duty crew chiefs compressor and an engine excellence and continual safety
and, through one-on-one train- change was performed. Sgt awareness have earned him the
ing, points out the danger Ziegler's actions prevented fur- T AC Crew Chief Safety Award.

THE DIRECTOR OF AEROSPACE SAFm

SPECIAL ACHIEVEMENT AWARD

T he Director of Aerospace
Safety Special Achieve-
ment Award is presented each
contributions or achievements.
The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing,
Hill AFB, Utah, has been
year to persons and or organi- selected as recipient of the
zations for outstanding safety award for 1986.
 SOFing

(OR HOW TO AVOID GRAY HAIRS AT 30)

Major John Bookhardt the snowy sky. You turn to prepared, knowledgeable and
TAC Flight Safety your coffee, prop your feet up ready for actions and decisions.
on the desk and settle back.
"Mayday. Mayday." The call Preparation
on guard is tense, loud and In the above scenario, you
causes immediate and tur- had minimum time to get to

I t's 0530 in the morning. Still

dark and bitter cold outside.
A light snow is dusting the
bulent action as the tower per-
sonnel and you leap for the
microphones. You grab the fly-
the tower before the first
scheduled launch. If you had
looked at the schedule on the
ramp. The gusting wind causes ing schedule-the first three way up, the "TED-exercise"
occasional swirls of snow to lines say: "TED-exercise." should have stood out like a
partially obscure nearby ob- You hear an emergency locator sore thumb. A quick call to the
jects. You're in the squadron beacon. Who's in the jets? command post should have
for an early morning sortie Where are they? What's hap- provided the needed informa-
when the duty supervisor grabs pened? You're torn between tion. If the aircraft were ready
you and tells you that the two thoughts: "What do I do for takeoff, a decision to hold
scheduled SOF is sick. You now?" and "Why me?" them for several minutes would
must be in the tower in 10 Does this scenario sound fa- have been appropriate while
minutes. miliar? If it does, you might you got the needed info. The
Nine minutes and 45 seconds want to seriously consider sell- key here is flexibility, an-
later, you're gasping for breath, ing insurance or shoes rather ticipation of events and the
but in place in the tower. The than being in the fighter busi- courage to make a tough call;
first three-ship is already in ness. What went wrong here? all of which fall under the
position on the runway. Your How could this have been general term of preparation.
first thought is coffee and a avoided? The answer to these Normally, if everything goes
little relaxation now that questions is simply this: the perfectly, you arrive at a
you're in place. The roar of the SOF may not be able to di- reasonable time before the first
burners passes as each jet in rectly prevent a crash or mis- sortie of the day and accom-
turn lifts off and disappears in hap, but he can be thoroughly plish the needed items:

26 July 1987
 your judgment and capability
(1) Study the schedule: so your decisions must be based
on cold, hard facts. Study the
a. Players? books beforehand and keep up
b. Experience? with all the changes. Many
c. Weather Category? wings have a read file avail-
d. Ranges/exercises? able in the tower to include
e. Bomb load (live)? wing guidance, temporary pro-
cedures and recent changes-
(2) Check the field facilities/condition at Base Ops: read it!
a. Airfield Construction? Decision Ability
b. ILS out? How does one develop this?
c. TACAN maintenance? Some guys seem to come by it
d. Inbound heavy weight aircraft? naturally, others have to learn
e. PAR? it. The key point here is that
your wing supervisors (DO/
squadron commander) selected
(3) Weather: you based on your capabilities.
a. Local-ask to see the satellite pictures. Take confidence in that fact.
b. Ranges/M0As? Remember that the first two
c. Any cross-country sorties? Departure factors we discussed, prepara-
base/en route weather? tion and knowledge, make deci-
sion ability much easier. Re-
d. Alternate? (backup, just in case?) member also that you're in
charge-think logically and
(4) Ramp check: then act. Double check as soon
a. SOF vehicle-gas, radio check? as you have the time-use the
b. Taxi and runway approach lights / VASIs? SOF emergency action
c. Snow-Are the snow removal crews checklist.
Brief your tower personnel
working on it? on what you expect of them.
d. FOD? Know and understand their
e. Construction? duties and responsibilities. A
good working relationship with
the ATC folks can be the basis
Knowledge for a smooth running organiza-
The biggest problem after these The SOF, by definition, tion. As AFR 60-2, TAC Sup 1
necessary checks are accom- should be the most knowledge- says, "A cooperative, teamwork
plished is the fact that things able individual available and approach is a must." Work
very seldom go perfectly. Be- one of the most experienced. through the tower personnel for
cause of this you must be men- But since we all have to start radio calls and directives in all
tally prepared for the million somewhere, experience in the cases except where time critical
and one things that might go jet comes first, and experience emergencies dictate the im-
wrong. By anticipating prob- as a SOF follows at a some- mediate use of the radio by the
lems, you're in the right state what slower rate. In any case, SOF. For all normal activity,
or frame of mind to handle any you've got to know the books the watch supervisor in the
problem. In short, have a plan. cold. Many people will rely on tower is the person to talk to.

TAC ATTACK 27
 Fing

Keeping "THE MAN" DeploymentJExercises Unusual Situations

Informed Very often during de- Every once in a while, you're
As a SOF, you are in the di- ployments and exercises away going to be faced with an un-
rect wing chain of command. from the home drome, a non- usual situation; i.e., one that is
But you have a prime duty and SOF certified aircrew member not covered in the checklist or
that is to keep the DO (or his will serve as a flight manual or for which there exists no pre-
designated representative) in- checklist reader and advisor to viously established guidance.
formed. As the T AC Sup em- the designated SOF (who may Earlier in this article I men-
phasizes, the first step (and last not be familiar with your air- tioned that flexibility is a nec-
step) of each checklist begins craft or operation). It is easy essary component of SOFing. It
with "Notify DCO." That's be- sometimes to approach this includes problems caused by
cause you, as the SOF, work duty in a less than totally seri- exercises, schedule changes, in-
directly for him and are an ex- ous manner. Since we in TAC experienced aircrew members
tension of his eyes and ears. spend about 20% of our time in and coping with rapidly chang-
The relationship is clear. The a deployed status, this means ing nasty weather, low ceilings/
DO at all times retains respon- that this additional duty can thunderstorms or cold winters
sibility for all unit flying oper- comprise as much as one-fifth with lots of snow and ice on the
ations. The SOF assists the DO of the total SOF duty per- ramp and runways. In these
in exercising that responsibility formed. If you find yourself cases, get out of bed earlier in
and is delegated the authority volunteered for this duty, ap- the mornings and get to work
to make decisions as necessary proach it with the same respect early enough to get the ramp/
but particularly where time is and professionalism that you runways cleared and/or decide
critical. use while flying the jet. Stay on alternates or, if necessary,
near the phone or in a desig- weather holds. Unfortunately,
nated location-and be ready. it also includes the worst pos-
sible case: an aircraft crash.
Nothing you can do will fully
SOFing prepare you for this, but the
things I've already mentioned
can certainly help. As a SOF
who has faced this situation
while on duty, I can only say
that keeping a cool head and a
firm control on the events as
they unfold and keeping the
wing supervisors and/or the
command post informed is
paramount. Pray it doesn't
happen, but if it does, you can
mean the difference between a
smooth efficient operation or a
total disaster. It's up to you.
Check 6-but plan ahead.__::;:-

28 July 1987
 ploy and fall from an F -4 air- continued to monitor the F-16
craft on takeoff. He immedi- dv.ring the final turn and, as
ately contacted the expediter the aircraft rolled out on final
who contacted the maintenance approximately 300 feet above
operations center who notified the ground in a gear-up con-
the control tower. The tower in- figuration , A1C Piano fired a
formed the aircrew to prepare flare. The flare alerted the pilot
for a no-chute landing. That's to his landing configuration
exactly how the system is de- and the pilot safely executed a
signed to work-but it takes go-around. A1C Piano's alert-
motivated people like Airman ness and timely actions pre-
Williams whose quick action vented a gear-up mishap.
eoobled the aircrew to take the

I FLEAGLE proper precautions on landing

and prevent possible damage to
the aircraft.
Captain Gregory S. Sparks,
62 TRTS, 67 TRW, Bergstrom
AFB, TX, is an outstanding ad-
SALUTES Sgt John Wolfe, 435 AMU, 479
'ITW, Holloman AFB, NM,
ditional duty flight safety offi-
cer (ADFSO) whose efforts
have directly contributed to his
A1C Steven K. Deney, 56 prepared his aircraft for a func- squadron's mishap-free record.
CRS, 56 'ITW, MacDill AFB, tional check flight (FCF) after He conducts monthly flight
Fla., was performing a routine work was done to correct a safety meetings in a manner
teardown of the F-16 main flight control problem. After which draws both students and
landing gear retractor when he engine start, Sgt Wolfe in- instructors into the discussion.
discovered the spring retainer formed the pilot that the num- The inbriefing which he cre-
nut cracked in several places. ber one engine didn't sound ated for newly arrived students
The significance of this find is right. The pilot's cockpit in- exposes them to the com-
that the nut was not listed as struments indicated normal. mander's flying safety philos-
an area to be inspected in the Engine shop personnel were ophy as well as safety admin-
technical data inspection guide. called to investigate and de- istrative procedures.
A1C Deney promptly informed termined that the aircraft had Capt Sparks designed and
his supervisor and submitted a a malfunctioning engine gear implemented a computer pro-
materiel deficiency report and box. The flight was aborted. gram for conducting and re-
a technical data change to add Had Sgt Wolfe not detected the cording spot inspections. The
this item to the inspection malfunction, the FCF pilot inspection areas and items are
guide. A1C Deney's keen ob- would likely have found him- combined by topic on each
servation prevented a serious self in an emergency situation sheet and serve as excellent
landing gear system mal- after takeoff. This is where ex- tools for performing trend
function, and his actions will perience and being responsible analysis. The program also
help eliminate the problem in pays big diyidends. tracks follow-up items and was
the future. adopted as a model for wing-
A1C Anthony Piano, 72 TFTS, wide implementation.
While standing on his air- 56 'ITW, MacDill AFB, Fla. , Capt Sparks' enthusiasm as
craft, performing crew chief was serving as the runway op- the ADFSO has shown positive
duties, A1C Sandy L. erations monitor when he saw results. His thoroughness in
Williams, 336 AMU, 4 AGS, 4 an F-16 approach the down- managing the squadron flying
TFW, Seymour Johnson AFB, wind perch position without safety program has paved the
NC, noticed the drag chute de- lowering the landing gear. He way for a mishap-free record.

TAC A'ITACK 29
N.."\.\\\.\\\X"\\XXN.
16/22 area fire.
One of the most important
things to do is to quickly run
the controlled bailout checklist.
Things to think about: tighten
all belts and straps (hopefully
F-4 Emergency Situation training your seat kit straps aren't
loose so you can "check 6"),
stow loose equipment (like the
$49.95 massive checklist holder/
EME NC ITUATION TRAINING tape recorder on your
leg) and run your seat down to
Major Vandy Vandenberg good place to have a fire (as if where the face curtain doesn't
TAC Flight Safety any place is), since under door prevent you from getting your
16 is the LOX system, aft head all the way back (seat full
SITUATION: It's Day 2 of Red emergency canopy jettison bot- down is a good technique). Let
Flag 88-X and your F-4E is in tle, and massive wire bundles, the world know what you're go-
the third two-ship of a massive while door 22 shelters the ing to do, crew coordinate and
gorilla heading west from Stu- heart of the fuel system, utility perform a dual-sequenced ejec-
dent Gap. While approaching a hydraulic reservoir, bleed air tion when the situation
turn point at 300', the pitter ducts and the pneumatic com- dictates.
says, "Check Master Caution pressor. No matter how or The WSO must be ready to
Light." You start a climb and where a fire starts, if it spreads use the "Canopy Fails to
check the telelight panel. to the LOX, hydraulic or fuel Separate" procedures in
"Oxygen Low" is staring at systems, you're sitting in a jet case his canopy jettison bot-
you. The WSO then calmly in- that probably isn't going to tle has been breached. This
forms you that smoke is coming make it and you need to plan will involve some fancy hand -
up around his seat. accordingly. Other considera- work, but assuming the regular
Yo!. .what's your plan?
. tions are loss of utility hydrau- pneumatics system is oper-
OPTION 1: Pull the oxygen lics, spurious flight control in- ating, you probably won't have
gauge circuit breaker in the puts and other unpredictable to go past the second step:
rear cockpit, since the thing malfunctions as the fire "Normal canopy control
has obviously shorted out. spreads. handle-open."
OPTION 2: Eject. After all, Now that you're alerted to There are a couple of things
since there's no oxygen, you the problem, you can continue in the works to help us with a
can't breath. to run the checklist. What's a door 16/22 fire. The first is a
OPTION 3: Continue to climb safe altitude? Your choice, but fire detection (and possibly
away from the ground, call I'm going to use 5000' as a suppression) system to warn us
"Knock-it-off", and inform your minimum. Going 100% and of the problem; OO -ALC is cur-
leader/wingman that you have Emergency probably isn't going rently evaluating this proposal.
a possible bleed air duct to do much for you in this situ- The second is the addition of a
failure/fuselage fire. ation, since the LOX system is redundant aft canopy emer-
DISCUSSION: Option 3 is the probably out of there. Also, the gency jettison bottle, to be
correct choice, though option 2 new WARNING in the Dash placed in the rear cockpit. At
may follow shortly thereafter. One says that the bailout bottle this point, it looks like late
The most important thing to do can't supply enough pressure 1988 before this modification
is step 1 of the checklist: "At for normal breathing unless the starts. We hope to expedite
tain and maintain safe ejection CRU-60/P supply hose is dis- starts of both modifications, but
altitude." connected, allowing fumes into meanwhile, crews have to be
Since January 1986, there the mask. Talk about a rock able to analyze a fire in the
have been three documented and a hard place! No wonder the door 16/22 area and carry out
cases of inflight fire in the door Dash One recommends early the appropriate emergency
16/22 fuselage area. That's not a ejection with a confirmed door procedures.
 TIC TALLY
TAC ANG AFR
Thru May Thru May Thru May
MAY 1987 1986
MAY 1987 1986
MAY 1987 1986

CLASS A MISHAPS 0 5 7ir 0 3 2 3

AIRCREW FATALITIES 0 6 6 0 3 3 4
TOTAL EJECTIONS 0 4 1 0 2 1 1

SUCCESSFUL EJECTIONS 0 4 0 2 0 0

TAC'S TOP 5 thru MAY 1987

1st AF I 9th AF L 12th AF

ANG I AFR DRU's

c ass A m h ree months class A mishap-free months

2 1, USAFTAWC
28 AD
USAFTFWC

CLASS A MISHAP COMPARISON RATE

(CUM. RATE BASED ON ACCIDENTS PER 100,000 HOURS FLYING TIME)

2.7 2.2
TAC 1987 3.5 2.0 1.6

A 1987 0.0 0.0 4.4 3.2 2.6

NG
6.0
A 1987 23.1 12.7 8.1 14.2

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1986-1987 625-031/07