Circuit Court for Talbot County
Case No. C-20-CR-17-000169
UNREPORTED
IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 342
September Term, 2018
______________________________________
SHONTELLE GOLDSBOROUGH
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
______________________________________
Meredith,
Reed,
Zarnoch, Robert A.
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Zarnoch, J.
______________________________________
Filed: January 29, 2019
*This is an unreported opinion and therefore may not be cited either as precedent or as
persuasive authority in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any
other Maryland court. Md. Rule 1-104.
—Unreported Opinion—
A Talbot County jury convicted appellant Shontelle Goldsborough
(“Goldsborough”) of theft and conspiracy after $2,790 in checks were written from her
closed bank account. Finding sufficient evidence to convict her of both charges, we
affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The essential facts are not in dispute.1 In December 2015, Goldsborough opened a
bank account with SunTrust Bank in Easton.2 Soon after, in January 2016, SunTrust
closed the account after the account accrued a negative balance.3 Nevertheless, in the
later months of 2016, seven checks subsequently written from Goldsborough’s closed
account were deposited into accounts maintained by Kierney Nichols and Tyrell Phillips
1
Goldsborough does not contest the facts, but rather that the facts fail to show the
requisite intent. For instance, at trial, during closing argument defense counsel argued, “I
want you to look at the same evidence and say if possible that Ms. Goldsborough had her
checks stolen by somebody she knew, [and] that person wrote checks on her account.”
2
After opening the account on December 17, 2015 with no deposit, Goldsborough
made a cash deposit of $170 on December 24. Later on the 24th, at a different location,
there was a $160 withdrawal. The SunTrust branch manager testified that opening the
account with no deposit on the 17th would allow time for a debit card to be received in
the mail by the 24th.
3
The State entered into evidence Goldsborough’s bank statement from SunTrust for
the period between December 17, 2015 and January 19, 2016, which stated, among other
information, that the checking account was “***CLOSED***”. When examining the
statement during defense counsel’s motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge
observed, “I think it’s tough for anyone to discern from [the statement] that this account
has been closed.” However, the trial judge also noted that the statement said the account
was closed, and the trial judge ultimately accepted that the statement provided prima
facie evidence that Goldsborough knew the account was closed. Though Goldsborough
was charged with theft under § 7-104 of the Criminal Law Article, when making this
finding, the trial judge also pointed to § 8-104 (the Bad Check Statute), which states that
an individual is presumed to know whether he or she has sufficient funds in an account.
—Unreported Opinion—
at Shore United Bank in Easton. This was possible because Shore United offers
immediate access to funds when a check is deposited (i.e., there is no required waiting
period to withdraw money after depositing a check to make sure that it clears).
Accordingly, despite Goldsborough’s account being closed, funds were capable of being
withdrawn upon depositing the checks from her account. In all, seven checks totaling
$2,790 from Goldsborough’s account were deposited into Nichols and Phillips’s accounts
(four checks totaling $1,401 into Nichols’s account; three checks totaling $1,389 into
Phillips’s account).
Shore United eventually became aware that the funds were being withdrawn in
this manner. The bank then discovered that various combinations of questionable checks
from (1) Goldsborough, (2) Tasheka Gibson, and (3) Shakira Williams were going into
the accounts of (1) Nichols, (2) Phillips, and (3) Travel Hayman. To link this web of
activity as connected—as more than mere miscellany—the State introduced video
footage from the bank’s ATM that showed Goldsborough withdrawing funds from
Hayman’s account during this period when the checks were being written.
After a one-day trial in January 2018, the jury convicted Goldsborough of theft
between $1,000 and $10,000, and conspiracy to commit theft between $1,000 and
$10,000.4 At a subsequent sentencing, the court sentenced Goldsborough to three years
4
Goldsborough was charged in July 2017 for the scheme occurring on or between
October 19, 2016 and December 14, 2016. We note that, effective October 1, 2017, the
relevant figures specified in § 7-104(g)(1)’s penalty range are now “at least $1,500 but
less than $25,000.” 2016 Laws of Md., ch. 515.
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—Unreported Opinion—
for theft, suspended in its entirety, with three years of supervised probation.5 The court
merged the conspiracy count to the theft.6 Goldsborough timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Goldsborough argues that the evidence was insufficient to support convictions for
both theft and conspiracy. She argues that, as described above, the State only proved that
checks from her account were presented to the bank, not that there was any conspiracy
between the six individuals named above, nor criminal intent on her part.
In reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence, we ask “whether after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Grimm v.
State, 447 Md. 482, 494-95 (2016) (quoting Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630, 656-57 (2011)).
In doing so, we give due regard to the trial court’s factual findings and do not “re-weigh”
the evidence. Spencer v. State, 422 Md. 422, 434 (2011). Deferring “to any possible
reasonable inferences [that] the trier of fact could have drawn from the . . . evidence,”
Grimm, 447 Md. at 495 (quoting Jones v. State, 440 Md. 450, 455 (2014)), appellate
courts “need not decide whether the jury could have drawn other inferences from the
evidence, refused to draw inferences, or whether we would have drawn different
inferences from the evidence.” Grimm, 447 Md. at 495 (quoting State v. Mayers, 417 Md.
5
The court also ordered restitution of $2,790.
6
Though not raised by the parties, we note that “a conspiracy to commit a crime is
entirely separate from the substantive crime.” Savage v. State, 226 Md. App. 166, 174
(2015).
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—Unreported Opinion—
449, 466 (2010)). “In short, the question is not whether we might have reached a different
conclusion from that of the trial court, but whether the trial court had before it sufficient
evidence upon which it could fairly be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
defendant’s guilt of the offense charged,” Spencer, 422 Md. at 434 (quoting Dixon v.
State, 302 Md. 447, 455 (1985)) (Internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).
To convict Goldsborough of theft, the State had to prove that she willfully or
knowingly obtained control over someone else’s property. Md. Code (2002, 2012 Repl.
Vol., 2018 Supp.), Criminal Law Article (“Crim. Law”), § 7-104. For the purposes of the
theft statute, “[p]roperty can be ‘obtained[]’ . . . even when it is transferred to a third
party.” State v. Coleman, 423 Md. 666, 673 (2011). Next, proving conspiracy “requires a
showing of ‘an unlawful agreement,’ which is ‘a combination of two or more persons to
accomplish some unlawful purpose[.]’” Bordley v. State, 205 Md. App. 692, 723 (2012)
(quoting Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71, 75 (1988)). “The agreement need not be formal or
spoken, provided there is a meeting of the minds reflecting a unity of purpose or design.”
Id. Nor is direct proof of such an agreement required. “[A] conspiracy may be shown by
circumstantial evidence, from which a common design may be inferred[.]” Bordley, 205
Md. App. at 723 (quoting Mitchell v. State, 363 Md. 130, 145 (2001) (Internal quotation
marks omitted).
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the jury could have
reasonably inferred that Goldsborough was guilty of both theft and conspiracy. As the
state elicited at trial, various combinations of checks were deposited into three bank
-4-
—Unreported Opinion—
accounts from Goldsborough and two other individuals’ frozen accounts. The value of
the checks deposited from Goldsborough’s closed account totaled $2,790. See Crim. Law
§ 7-103(f) (“When theft is committed in violation of this part under one scheme or
continuing course of conduct . . . the value of the property or services may be
aggregated”). As the trial court noted, the jury could also infer that Goldsborough’s
actions were knowing in light of the January 2016 statement from SunTrust that showed
her account was “***CLOSED***”. Additionally, video evidence showed Goldsborough
withdrawing money from Hayman’s account during the relevant time period when the
questionable checks were being deposited into the three accounts. As such, the jury could
reasonably infer that the actions were not merely miscellaneous transactions, but rather
tied together into one conspiracy to write the checks, and to take advantage of Shore
United’s policy allowing immediate access to funds without having to wait for a check to
clear. The law makes no distinction between direct or circumstantial evidence, and no
greater degree of certainty is required of circumstantial evidence than of direct evidence.
From the evidence described above, the jury could find the essential elements of theft and
conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR TALBOT COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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