BAGGAY, HAROLD L.
JD II-B
Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 102858. July 28, 1997
FACTS:
On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529. However, during the pendency of his petition, applicant died.
Hence, his heirs—Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary Ann, all surnamed
Abistado— represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who was appointed their
guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.
The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed the petition
“for want of jurisdiction.” However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and peaceful
possession of the subject land since 1938.
Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which, as
earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the registration
of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. The subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA Resolution dated November 19, 1991.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed “grave abuse of discretion” in
holding that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case No. 86 need
not be published in a newspaper of general circulation
RULING:
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner.
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication
of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows: “Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing,
publication, etc.—The court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue
an order setting the date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order. The public shall
be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1)
publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be
deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official
Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied
with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official
Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed
in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested
parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring
properties, and may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-
encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the consequences of default
orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in
as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements
for publication, mailing and posting.
Republic vs. Guinto-Aldana
G.R. No. 175578. August 11, 2010
FACTS:
On April 3, 2002, respondents Zenaida Guinto-Aldana4 (Zenaida), Ma. Aurora
Guinto-Comiso, Ma. Luisa GuintoDionisio, Alfredo Guinto, Jr., Pacita R.
Guinto, Ernesto R. Guinto, Natividad R. Guinto and Alberto R. Guinto, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 199 an
Application for Registration of Title5 over two pieces of land in Talango,
Pamplona Uno, Las Piñas City.
Respondents professed themselves to be co-owners of these lots, having
acquired them by succession from their predecessors Sergio Guinto (Sergio)
and Lucia Rivera-Guinto (Lucia)—Zenaida’s parents—who, in turn, had
acquired the property under a 1969 document denominated as “Kasulatan sa
Pag-hahati ng Lupa na Labas sa Hukuman na may Pagpaparaya at Bilihan.”
Under this document, Sergio and Lucia Guinto acquired for a consideration the
respective shares on the property of Pastor Guinto, Dionisio Guinto, Potenciana
Guinto and Marcelina Bernardo who, together with Luisa, had derived the
same from Romulado Guinto.8 Respondents also alleged that until the time of
the application, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual,
open, peaceful, adverse, exclusive and continuous possession of these lots in
the concept of owner and that they had consistently declared the property in
their name for purposes of real estate taxation.
The trial court found the application to be sufficient in form and substance;
hence, it gave due course thereto and ordered compliance with the publication
and notification requirements of the law. Opposing the application, petitioner,
through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City, advanced that the
lots sought to be registered were inalienable lands of the public domain; that
neither respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in prior
possession thereof; and that the muniment of title and the tax declaration
submitted to the court did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
bona fide acquisition or of prior possession in the concept of owner.
Zenaida’s claim of prior, open, exclusive and continuous possession of the land
was corroborated by Josefina Luna (Josefina), one of the adjoining lot owners.
At the close of Josefina’s testimony, respondents formally offered their exhibits
without the oppositor placing any objection thereto. Aggrieved, respondents
appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on March 30, 2006, issued the
assailed Decision reversing the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, it filed the instant petition which attributes
error to the Court of Appeals in reversing the trial court’s July 10, 2003
decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondents and their predecessors-in interest have been in
open, continuous, adverse, public and exclusive possession of Lot Nos. 4 and 5
for 30 years.
RULING:
Proceeding from this fundamental principle, we find that indeed respondents
have been in possession and occupation of Lot Nos. 4 and 5 under a bona fide
claim of ownership for the duration required by law. This conclusion is
primarily factual. From the records, it is clear that respondents’ possession
through their predecessor-in-interest dates back to as early as 1937. In that
year, the subject property had already been declared for taxation by Zenaida’s
father, Sergio, jointly with a certain Toribia Miranda (Toribia). Yet, it also can
be safely possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
Indeed, that respondents herein have been in possession of the land in the
concept of owner—open, continuous, peaceful and without interference and
opposition from the government or from any private individual—itself makes
their right thereto unquestionably settled and, hence, deserving of protection
under the law.
Republic vs. Sogod Development Corporation
G.R. No. 175760. February 17, 2016
FACTS:
On December 9, 1999, Sogod filed an application for registration and
confirmation of land title over Lot No. 2533, Cad. 827-D with an area of 23,896
square meters and situated in Brgy. Tabunok, Municipality of Sogod, Province
of Cebu.7 The case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 016- SO.
Sogod claimed that it purchased the land “from Catalina Rivera per deed of
absolute sale dated October 28, 1996.” It also averred that “by itself and
through its predecessors-in-interest, it had been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of [the land] since June
12, 1945.”10 On February 11, 2000, the Office of the Solicitor General moved
to dismiss the Petition on the ground that Sogod was disqualified from applying
for original registration of title to alienable lands pursuant to Article XII,
Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution. The trial court issued an Order dated June
15, 2000 pronouncing a “general default against all persons except against the
Solicitor General[.]” On September 19, 2000, the Regional Executive Director of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VII, Banilad,
Mandaue City filed an Opposition on the ground that the land was previously
forest land and “was certified and released as alienable and disposable only on
January 17, 1986.” Thus, it could not be registered without violating Section
48, paragraph (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 6940.
Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Sogod also presented witnesses
Celedonio Campos, Jr., Bonifacia Sugarol, and Ranito Quadra to prove its
ownership and possession of the land. According to their testimonies, the land
“was originally in the possession of Ignacia Rivera, the mother of Catalina.”
“Catalina inherited this land from her mother.” On October 28, 1996, Catalina
sold the land to Sogod. “A tax clearance dated July 30, 1999 was issued by the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer, certifying that all taxes over the land covered
by Tax Declaration No. 043-6156 had been paid.” “Thereafter, Tax Declaration
No. 11096 A was issued in the name of Sogod.”
On May 10, 2001, the trial court rendered the Decision granting the
application. The Office of the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals. According to the Office of the Solicitor General, the trial court erred in
allowing the titling of Lot No. 2533.
On August 25, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the
Decision of the 6th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod,
Cebu.33 It ruled that Sogod was able to prove that “it and its predecessors-in-
interest had been in possession of Lot No. 2533 since June 12, 1945 or earlier
and the land sought to be registered is an agricultural land.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
property in the manner and length of time required by law
RULING:
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that respondent applicant had
sufficiently proved its and its predecessors-in-interest’s continuous possession
of the land tracing back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Possession since 1945 was
established through testimonies of respondents’ witnesses, the unbroken chain
of tax declarations in the name of Catalina Rivera, the person from whom
respondent bought the property in 1996, and a certification from the municipal
treasurer that all previous taxes had been paid. Tax declarations or realty tax
payments constitute at least proof that the holder has a sincere and honest
claim of title over the property. Moreover, witness Bonifacia Sugarol, the owner
of the adjoining land, stated that the land was owned by Ignacia Rivera and
inherited by Catalina; and the land was planted with corn and had many
tenants.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, respondent was able to present in evidence the
tax declaration for 1945. What were not presented were tax declarations before
1945 because as testified by a representative from the Office of the Municipal
Assessor of Sogod, all its records before the war were destroyed.
Republic vs. Heirs of the Late Leopoldo de Grano
G.R. No. 193358. September 16, 2020
FACTS:
LRC No. TG-394 is an amended application filed in September 17, 1991 with
the RTC by respondents Heirs of the Late Leopoldo de Grano (respondents) for
registration under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 of Lot 7467, Cad. 355-D,
Tagaytay Cadastre. They alleged that Lot 7467 is alienable and disposable
public land; that their family has been in possession and ownership thereof for
more than 30 years, as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 019-0163; and that
there is no third person having an interest in the property. During the hearing,
tenants on the property testified that they have been farming it for
respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner Republic)
opposed the application on the ground that the property is part of the public
domain and there is no evidence that it has been declared alienable and
disposable. Moreover, there is no evidence of possession by respondents, as
“only three (3) hectares are covered by tax declarations” in their name.
Respondents failed to prove bona fide acquisition of the property, for even the
alleged Spanish title of their predecessors was not registered within six months
from February 16, 1976, as required by Presidential Decree No. 892.
Another oppositor, petitioner Violeta Sevilla (petitioner Sevilla), argued that as
early as 1987 the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
acquired primary jurisdiction over Lot 7467 when it entertained her
Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (IV-4) 290 over the property as well as
several opposing claims, including respondents. In its view, respondents “have
more than sufficiently established by clear and convincing evidence that their
predecessor-in-interest occupied and possessed the land from as far back as
1894” and that respondents continuously occupied and possessed the property
by paying taxes thereon up to 1994 and farming the same through their
tenants.
Only petitioner Sevilla filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
DENR had exercised primary jurisdiction over the property, to the exclusion of
the RTC, and resolved the status of the property in an Order of the DENR
Regional Director dated July 16, 1991 and Order of the DENR Secretary dated
February 2, 1993 (DENR’s Orders).
The CA amended its decision and modified the RTC’s order.
In its motion for reconsideration from the CA’s amended decision, petitioner
Republic pointed out that the DENR Certification relied upon by the CA refers
to the status of the property as of 1997, or six years after respondents filed
their application. Hence, it does not satisfy the evidentiary requirement of the
law. CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner Republic due to its
failure to attach the registry receipt to the affidavit of service. Petitioner
Sevilla’s partial motion for reconsideration was also denied.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA gravely and palpably erred in ruling that respondents have
registrable right over the subject property at the time of the filing of their
application for registration.
RULING:
The prevailing rule is that to establish the alienable and disposable character
of the land the following evidence must be presented with the application: (1) a
certification by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) or Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO);
and (2) a copy of the original land classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records.
It is notable that respondents invoke the finding in the foregoing administrative
decisions that Lot 7467 is alienable and disposable public land, and yet they
argue that the DENR and OP have no jurisdiction over the said lot and that
these administrative decisions do not bar their application for judicial
confirmation of title to the remaining portion. In effect, respondents question
the jurisdiction of DENR and OP but invoke the latter’s findings. This will not
do. It is either respondents recognize the jurisdiction of the DENR and OP and
avail of the latter’s administrative findings as evidence of the classification of
Lot 7467, or they do not. The findings are only as good as the authority with
which they were rendered. To sum up, the CA erred in relying upon the DENR
NAMRIA certification as it is not authoritative evidence of the alienable and
disposable classification of Lot 7467 as of September 17, 1991, when the
application for registration was filed. The DENR’s Orders and OP’s Resolution
are authoritative evidence of said status but they are beyond the reach of
respondents.
Republic vs. Sese
G.R. No. 185092. June 4, 2014
FACTS:
Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese
(respondents) filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land
over a parcel of land with an area of 10,792 square meters, situated in
Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described as Lot 11247, Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan
No. AP-03-004226. Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired,
through a donation inter vivos from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro
(Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their
predecessors-ininterest, had been in possession of the subject property; and
that the property was not within a reservation.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that:
“This survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20
LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is
outside any civil or military reservation.” The said plan was approved by the
DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando,
Pampanga, on December 3, 1998. Finding the application sufficient in form
and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10, 2002, setting the
case for hearing with the corresponding publication.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon)
testified on their claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted
their formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered were admitted by
the MTC in the Order, dated July 10, 2003, without objection from the public
prosecutor. The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision, ordering the registration of
the subject property in the name of respondents.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed
as C.A.-GR. CV No. 81439. In its brief, the OSG presented the following
assignment of errors: a) only alienable lands of the public domain occupied and
possessed in concept of owner for a period of at least thirty (30) years is
entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents failed to prove specific acts
of possession.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the judgment of
the MTC ordering the registration of the subject property in the name of
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether respondents are entitled to the registration of land title under Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, or pursuant to Section 14(2) of the
same statute
RULING:
The court finds the petition meritorious. In this regard, respondents likewise
failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal, the earliest that
respondents and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and
occupation of the subject land was only in the year 1950, when their mother,
Resurreccion, acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950
by virtue of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession of the subject property
commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date
expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their
application for registration of land title was legally infirm
