An Economic and Political Consequences of Open Remittance

Policy: A Critical Literature Review

Abdul Razak Nasution

Universitas Pembangunan Panca Budi
Medan, North Sumatera, Indonesia
abdulrazaknasution@pancabudi.ac.id

ABSTRACT
In this paper discussed of migration crises in recent decades, scholars have begun to study the effects
of international mobility of labours for receiving countries, largely debating whether migrants bring
positive or negative economic consequences and whether migrants possess non-material. More than 75
percent of these flows were directed towards low- and middle- income countries. India, China and
Mexico were the largest recipient countries, gaining USD 78.6, 67.4, and 35.7 billion, respectively. In
terms of GDP, Tonga, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan were the most beneficiaries of financial
remittance inflows as it accounts for 35.2, 33.6, and 31 percent of their GDP, respectively. With
positive economic trends on remittance-sending countries forecasted, the Bank predicted financial
remittance flows to low- and middle- income countries would reach USD 550 billion in 2019,
becoming their largest source of external financings 1 for the first time in more than three decades. It is
also important to note that actual financial remittance flows are believed to be even larger than the
amount estimated by the Bank as remittance flow is assumed to be underreported because migrants
may also use informal channels to send remittances.
Keywords: Migration Crises, Globalitation, economic

INTRODUCTION.
Academic literatures on globalization did traditionally overlook the international
mobility of labour, focusing more on the international mobility of goods, services, and
financial capital (Freeman, 2006). Provoked by a series of migration crises in recent decades,
scholars have begun to study the effects of international mobility of labours for receiving
countries, largely debating whether migrants bring positive or negative economic
consequences and whether migrants possess non-material (e.g. cultural) threats (Hanson,
2009; Orrenius & Zavodny, 2012; Foner, 2012; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). While these
literatures presented an important academic development on the study of migration, this
initially left the effects of migration on sending countries largely unnoticed.
Roughly since the beginning of this decade, considerable academic attentions have
been given to study the effects of migration for sending countries. Devesh Kapur and John
McHale, for example, argue there are four channels 2 – prospect, absence, diaspora and return
– on how outmigration may have economic and political effects for its home countries (Kapur
& McHale, 2012; Kapur, 2014). Despite these four suggested channels, most academic works
remain concentrated on the diaspora channel, examining the economic and political effects of
emigrants to their countries of origin.
1
According to the report, financial remittance inflows would be more than foreign direct investment (FDI),
portfolio debt and equity flows, and official development assistance (ODA) in 2019.
2
Kapur and McHale (2012) define each channel clearly. The prospect channel captures how the prospect of
migration affects current behaviour of citizens, while the absence channel focuses on the effects that migration
has on those left behind in the countries of origin. Whereas the diaspora channel represents the influences of
those who are living abroad, the return channel captures the impacts of migrants who have returned to their
home countries.
 As the emigrants remain living in the host countries, the intermediary variables of
their influences are financial remittances, which are a sum of money migrants transfer back
home, and social remittances which are ideas, norms and knowledge that migrants transmit
back home through cross-border communication (Levitt, 1998). Scholars have separately
studied its impacts on a number of variables, such as on economic condition, economic
policy, formal political behaviour, non-electoral political behaviour and political attitude.
However, many of these works found contradictory findings. Yet, very few have attempted to
compare and contrast these works to provide a complete picture of the economic and political
effects of financial and social remittance inflows.
In light of this, this essay aims to provide a brief map of economic and political
consequences of financial remittances for countries that receive it by critically reviewing
academic literatures regarding the issue. In doing so, it will also advance its own arguments.
Due to space limitations, this paper would not be able to discuss the economic and political
effects of social remittances. As almost a decade of growing academic literatures on this
matter has been passed, this paper serves an important purpose – to step back and reflect on
how far we have gained valuable insights concerning the subject.
This paper would be divided into four sections. The first section will briefly discuss
the key features and recent developments of financial remittance flows. It will be followed
with a section examining its economic effects, while the third section will explore its political
impacts. In the final section, this paper will conclude by arguing that financial remittances
have positive economic but mixed political consequences.

METHOD
2.1. Financial Remittances
Financial remittances have become prominent capital inflows for many countries.
According to a recent World Bank’s report, global financial remittance flows reached USD
689 billion in 2018, a 10.3 percent growth from previous year (World Bank, 2019). More than
75 percent of these flows were directed towards low- and middle- income countries. India,
China and Mexico were the largest recipient countries, gaining USD 78.6, 67.4, and 35.7
billion, respectively. In terms of GDP, Tonga, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan were the most
beneficiaries of financial remittance inflows as it accounts for 35.2, 33.6, and 31 percent of
their GDP, respectively. With positive economic trends on remittance-sending countries
forecasted, the Bank predicted financial remittance flows to low- and middle- income
countries would reach USD 550 billion in 2019, becoming their largest source of external
financings3 for the first time in more than three decades. It is also important to note that actual
financial remittance flows are believed to be even larger than the amount estimated by the
Bank as remittance flow is assumed to be underreported because migrants may also use
informal channels to send remittances.
Financial remittances also have three special features, making it distinct from other
external financings. First, unlike FDI and portfolio flows, financial remittances are
‘unrequited’ transfers because they do not result in claims on assets, debt service obligations
or any other contractual obligations (Mosley & Singer, 2015). Therefore, they could not be
withdrawn and, thus, have no risks of capital flight. Second, unlike ODA, financial
remittances did not accrue to governments but directly to households. Therefore, while it
3
According to the report, financial remittance inflows would be more than foreign direct investment (FDI),
portfolio debt and equity flows, and official development assistance (ODA) in 2019.
affects households directly, it only has indirect macro effects. Third, panel data from World
Bank (2019) found that financial remittance flows are stable and even countercyclical, rising
when the recipient economy suffers from economic crisis, political instability or natural
disaster as migrants send more funds during hard times to help their families and friends.

2.2. Economic Effects of Financial Remittances

Although financial remittances are private flows of money from migrants to their
relatives, which neither directly taxed nor directed to specific uses by states, scholars found it
positively contributes to the economy of the states (World Bank, 2006; Chami, et al., 2008).
Even if we considered counterfactual effects, assuming migrants had not leave and continue
to work in their home countries, analyses across countries worldwide found financial
remittance inflows significantly increase household income, increase household social
investments (e.g. higher spending in education and healthcare) and reduce poverty (Ratha,
2007; Ratha, Mohapatra, & Plaza, 2008; Adida & Girod, 2010). As it increases household
consumption as well, such inflows are also found to have positive economic effects for
governments as it increases and stabilizes government tax revenue through value-added tax
collected (Abdih, Baragas, Chami, & Ebeke, 2010; Ebeke, 2010; Ebeke, 2014). Because
governments collect more taxes, total government expenditures also raise, stimulating the
economy further (Singer, 2012). Thus, financial remittances intuitively contribute positively
to economic growth, although researchers found this is scientifically hard to prove due to the
difficulty of establishing counterfactual findings and controlling counter-causality (Yang,
2011).
Arguably, the only negative impact of financial remittance on economic conditions
that has been found by scholars is the so-called ‘Dutch disease’ (Mosley & Singer, 2015).
Like other foreign capital inflows, scholars argue that financial remittance inflows cause an
appreciation of the receiving countries’ currency. Building upon Jeffry Frieden’s classic
economic model, this will reduce the countries’ export competitiveness as the prices of
domestic products would be relatively increased (Frieden, 1991). As these flows are stable,
this effect cannot be neutralized by governments’ foreign exchange reserves as intervening
the market for a long time would be costly.
However, the overall effect of Dutch disease on the economy is not necessarily
negative. Indeed, one of the central arguments of Frieden’s paper is that high level of
exchange rate has distributional consequences (Frieden, 1991). High level of exchange rate
disadvantages export-oriented industries (as domestic products would be more expensive and
less competitive in foreign markets) and disadvantages import-competing industries as well
(because foreign products would be cheaper and more competitive in the domestic market).
However, high level of exchange rate is beneficial for local investors engaged in international
markets and producers of non-tradeable goods – as both have relatively higher value of capital
under high exchange rate. Therefore, the net effect of the Dutch disease on an economy
depends largely on the overall structure of the economy itself – whether it is fundamentally
driven by domestic producers or by domestic consumption. In other words, it is possible that
the appreciation of a currency actually improves its overall economy.
Although research on the effects of financial remittance inflows on government
policies have flourished, such as on dual citizenship policy, exchange rate regime is the only
economic policy that have been studied (Singer, 2010; Leblang, 2017). Singer (2010) argues
financial remittance inflows lead to the adoption of fixed exchange rate regime. He argues
that financial remittance inflows reduce the need to have domestic monetary autonomy as it
flows countercyclically and protects governments from domestic economic volatility.
Therefore, building on Mundell-Fleming trilemma 4, Singer argues that remittance inflows
increase the likelihood that policy makers adopt fixed exchange rate regime.
Despite governments lose the power to use interest rates as an instrument in
maintaining domestic economic conditions, the adoption of fixed exchange rate regime does
not necessarily have negative impacts on its economy. Frieden (1991) found distributional
consequences of exchange rate flexibility. Fixed exchange rate regime disadvantages import-
competing producers and producers of non-tradable goods as their markets are predominantly
domestic – benefitted if the governments use interest rate as an instrument to stimulate
domestic economic activity. However, fixed exchange rate regime is preferred by export-
oriented producers and local investors with substantial commercial interests abroad as both
prefer a stable exchange rate to reduce foreign exchange risk. Therefore, the net effect of the
adoption of fixed exchange rate regime on an economy depends largely on the overall
structure of the economy itself.
In short, financial remittance inflows have positive impacts on economic conditions of
remittance-receiving countries. Among others, it increases household income and
consumption, reduces poverty, improves households’ social investments, expands government
tax revenue and enhances government expenditure. Therefore, intuitively, financial remittance
contributes positively to overall economic growth.
Furthermore, although financial remittance inflows may harm some parts of the
receiving-country economy, due to high and stable exchange rate, it also gives benefits to
other groups of the economy. In other words, it has distributional consequences but does not
necessarily mean it negatively affects the overall economy. All considered, financial
remittance inflows have positive economic impacts for remittance-receiving countries.

RESULT
3.1. Political Impacts of Financial Remittances
Most literatures on the political impacts of financial remittances look at political
behaviour and political regimes as dependent variables. To be more specific, these literatures
inquire how financial remittances affect voting behaviour and non-electoral political
behaviour of remittance recipients (or citizens in high migration areas), as well as how it
affects the likelihood of democratization and the quality of government institutions. As some
literature found contradictory findings, this section would compare these findings and put
forward its own arguments.
First, financial remittance negatively affects voting turnout in remittance-receiving
countries. Goodman and Hiskey (2008) found that towns with higher emigration rates in
Mexico participate less in elections. Although they recognised that it is partly caused by
political brain drain (those who left are those most likely to participate), they also found, due
to financial remittances, those who left behind in high migration municipalities will rely more
on their networks abroad to satisfy their basic needs and become increasingly disengaged
4
Fleming (1962) and Mundell (1963) argue that, in any given time, a country can only choose two out of three
options – high capital mobility, domestic monetary policy autonomy and fixed exchange rate. As high capital
mobility is the main feature of today’s economic order, countries must give up either fixed exchange rate or
domestic monetary policy autonomy. Policy makers have important trade-offs, choosing fixed exchange rate to
avoid uncertainty in international economic relations or choosing domestic monetary policy autonomy to retain
the ability to adjust interest rates in reaction to domestic economic downturns.
from their formal political system. Similarly, Bravo (2008) also found that financial
remittance results in an increased detachment of remittance recipients from electoral
participation. Conducting his study in Mexico as well, Germano (2013) explains why
remittance recipients participated less in elections, arguing because they have fewer economic
grievances than neighbours who do not receive such inflows. Germano’s findings are further
confirmed by Ahmed (2017) who found in 18 Latin American countries remittance recipients
are more likely to have positive assessment of the national economy than non-recipients. In
other words, as economic voter theory predicts, remittance recipients have less economic
demands to governments and see less reasons to participate in elections.

3.2. Financial Remittance Inflows Positively Affect Non-Electoral Political Behaviour.

In the same study as above, Goodman and Hiskey (2008) found that individuals in
high migration regions tend to be more active in community organizations than their
counterparts in low migration towns. Similar finding is also found in Burundi where
remittance-receiving households are more civically engaged than non-receiving households,
participating and financially contributing more in religious and other social organisations
(Fransen, 2015). Even if these organizations may not have clear connections to politics, active
participation in non-political community organizations is an important feature of well-
managed political system (Perez-Armendariz & Crow, 2010).

3.3. An Impact Of Financial Remittance On The Likelihood Of Democratization Is

Widely Debated.
Some scholars argue that financial remittance inflows prolong autocratic regimes. As
financial remittances increase income levels of recepients, Doyle (2015) argue such inflows
will reduce their demands for social expenditure programs whose primary aim is to protect
low-income individuals from poverty. With lower public desires for social welfare programs,
he argues that governments will eventually reduce its expenditures on social benefits.
As governments reduce expenditures on social programs, they divert their budget in
favour of patronage goods (Ahmed, 2012). His argument is based on the assumption that
governments must supply welfare goods to the masses and targeted transfers in the form of
patronage to stay in power, although the distribution of each type of goods supplied by
governments varies. As Doyle suggests that financial remittances have substitution effect to
welfare goods, Ahmed argues that such inflows enable governments to spend more for
targeted transfers. His arguments corroborated with other research which found that increased
financial remittance inflows correlate with an increase in the shares of funds diverted by
governments for its own purposes or that of its favoured constituents (Abdih, Chami, Dagher,
& Montiel, 2012). With welfare goods substituted by financial remittances and patronage
goods increased, Ahmed argues that remittance inflows reduce the likelihood that
governments would be ousted from power, hindering democratization in autocracies.
Nevertheless, their underlying argument is based on the substitution effect of financial
remittances to social programs (i.e. welfare goods). None of them, however, explain
adequately why remittance recipients do not want to continue to benefit from social welfare
transfers as additions to its received remittances. Doyle, the only one who provide relevant
explanation on the matter, argues that because social programs are funded through taxation,
remittance recipients do not demand for expanded social programs as it would increase taxes
imposed to them. His argument works well to explain why remittance-recipients do not
demand for greater social programs but does little to elaborate why they do not want to
continue enjoying their current social transfers – by definition, current social benefits do not
require additional taxes collected. Even if they found empirical evidences of their
assumptions, it is likely a result of counter-causality as governments who diverted funds for
patronage goods experience higher emigration and higher financial remittance inflows.
Therefore, as the substitution effect of financial remittances is theoretically problematic, their
further arguments become less convincing.
Indeed, there are scholars who argue that financial remittance inflows increase the
likelihood of government turnover and democratization. Using data from Mexican municipal
elections in 2000-2002, Pfutze (2012) found that emigration significantly increases the
probability of an opposition party to win in a municipal election for the first time against the
then-ruling party the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). He argues this happened
because financial remittances increase household incomes, making the necessary clientelistic
transfers paid in exchange for political support would unambiguously need to increase as
well. As a result, the government who previously relied on clientelistic networks to garner
votes will face budget constraints, weakening their ties and eventually increasing the
likelihood of their failures in the elections. This is also amplified as financial remittance
inflows usually increase in election years and larger if the upcoming elections appear to be
more contested (O'Mahony, 2013).
At face value, the finding appears to be contradictory with the first argument of this
section which found financial remittance inflows reduce voting participation in remittance-
receiving countries. However, increasing the likelihood of an opposition party to remove the
ruling party from power does not necessarily require voters to vote for the opposition. As
scholars have argued, this happened merely because the turnout for the formerly dominant
party significantly decreased (Pfutze, 2014).
Extending these arguments further, scholars argue financial remittances, not only
increase the likelihood of government turnover, but also increase the likelihood of
democratization as it erodes the political support for autocratic incumbents (Escriba-Folch,
Meseguer, & Wright, 2015). Using similar logic as above, financial remittances undermine
the capacity of autocratic regimes to mobilize electoral support. They found empirical
evidence supporting this argument from panel data on 137 autocratic regimes from 1975 to
2009. However, some authoritarian regimes do not allow political parties to challenge the
regime by competing for power in regular elections. Therefore, scholars initially assume that
the democratizing effect of financial remittance only exist in electoral authoritarians –
autocratic regimes who regularly hold elections but was typically uncompetitive.
Nevertheless, scholars found that financial remittances may directly fund opposition
political groups, regardless whether the system allows the opposition groups to participate in
elections (Burgress, 2014; Escriba-Folch, Meseguer, & Wright, 2015). With increased
resources available to political opposition groups, financial remittances do increase political
protests in non-democracies as these groups can mobilize masses (Escriba-Folch, Meseguer,
& Wright, 2018). Moreover, survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa also indicates that
remittance-recipients are more likely to participate in political protests than non-recipients
(Dionne, Inman, & Montinola, 2014). This is not because opposition groups have more
resources but because remittance-recipients themselves have personal resources to do so.
Through these two mechanisms, financial remittance inflows escalate collective anti-regime
actions.
 Table 1. Summarize Financial Remittances.
Financial Remittance Economic Consequences Political Consequences
Inflows
Positive Effects  Increase household income,  Increase non-electoral
consumption and social political behavior
investment  Promote
 Reduce poverty democratization
 Increase government tax  Strengthen government
revenue and spending institutions
 Contribute to economic
growth
Negative Impacts N/A  Decrease electoral
(Although high and stable exchange participation
rates have distributional
consequences)

While protest constitutes standard politics in democracies, it may destabilize

dictatorships and result in regime transition (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Rivera &
Gleditsch, 2013). In fact, popular uprisings are the second most common way, after electoral
defeat, that precipitated the downfall of numerous autocracies in recent decades (Geddes,
Wright, & Frantz, 2014). Hence, financial remittances promote democratization through two
channels – reducing electoral supports for autocratic incumbents and increasing anti-regime
political protests. Through these two channels, we thus argue that financial remittance
increases the likelihood of democratization, both in electoral authoritarians and in other
autocratic regimes which do not regularly host any elections.
Fourth, financial remittance increases the quality of government institutions. Tyburski
(2012) argues that financial remittance inflows elevate good governance as it promotes
government accountability and other governance reforms. Using data from Mexico in 2001–
2007, his study found empirical evidence as corruption trended downward in states receiving
larger financial remittances. However, in his more recent paper, Tyburski (2014) argues that
such impact can only be observed in democracies, where remittance-recipients have relatively
more political power. Similar argument is also advanced by other scholars who argue that
regime type determines governments behaviour (Easton & Montinola, 2017). However, as we
have argued above that financial remittances increase democratization, it consequently means
such inflows elevate the quality of government institutions. Put differently, financial
remittances democratize authoritarian regimes first then turns the newly-democratic countries
into well-governed democracies with strong institutions.
In sum, financial remittance inflows increase non-electoral political behaviour,
heighten the likelihood of democratization and improve the quality of government
institutions. However, it reduces electoral participation. Therefore, this paper argues that
financial remittances have mixed political consequences.

CONCLUSION
Initially neglected, academic attentions on economic and political consequences of
migration for sending-countries have begun to flourish since the beginning of this decade.
Most of these literatures largely concentrated to study how emigrants – those who remain
living abroad – affect its home countries through financial remittances. This essay aims to
provide a complete picture of the matter by critically compare findings of these literatures
and, in doing so, advance its own arguments. Financial remittances positively contribute to
the economy of remittance-receiving countries through numerous variables and do not have
any overall negative effects. On the other hand, while it has many positive political impacts,
such inflows reduce electoral participation. Therefore, this paper concludes that financial
remittances inflows have positive economic outcomes but mixed political consequences.

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