1. HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

vs SECRETARY MICHAEL
DEFENSOR Citation : G.R. No. 163980 August 3, 2006 Ponente : TINGA, J.:

Facts :
A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized
the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center
(NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over
440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11,
1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of
the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and
authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide
residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion
excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former
President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing
the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families
who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing
program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A.
No. 9207. Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a
homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its
president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity
and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing
the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise
known as the "National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of
2003."

Issue : Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee
was not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared
null and void for being arbitrary, capricious and whimsical.

Held: Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and

quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation
that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and
separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative
remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of
the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative
power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the
Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the
theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is
not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what
is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the
administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular
courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the
exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and
the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence
does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.

2. REPUBLIC VS DRUGMAKER’S LAB (GR NO. 190837 MARCH 5, 2014)

Facts: The FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the “Food, Drug
and Cosmetics Act” primarily in order to establish safety or efficacy standards and
quality measure of foods, drugs and devices and cosmetics products. On March 15,
1989, the Department of Health, thru then Secretary Alfredo RA Bengzon issued AO 67
s. 1989, entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical
products. Among others, it required drug manufacturers to register certain drug and
medicine products with FDA before they may release the same to the market for sale. In
this relation, a satisfactory bioavailability/bioequivalence (BA/BE) test is needed for a
manufacturer to secure a CPR for these products. However, the implementation of the
BA/BE testing requirement was put on hold because there was no local facility capable
of conducting the same. The issuance of circulars no. 1 s. of 1997 resumed the FDA’s
implementation of the BA/BE testing requirement with the establishment of BA/BE
testing facilities in the country. Thereafter, the FDA issued circular no. 8 s. of 1997
which provided additional implementation details concerning the BA/BE testing
requirement on drug products.

Issue: Whether or not the circular issued by FDA are valid.

Held: Yes. Administrative agencies may exercise quasi-legislative or rule-making power

only if there exist a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so
promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statutes and must not involve
discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the
execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with the
doctrine of separation of powers and as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of
legislative powers.

3. Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298; G.R. No.
101279, August 6, 1992

Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to
establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same.
The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers.
Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing
guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers
to HK and the accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino
domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of
employment contracts of domestic workers for HK.

Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.

Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA
through an administrative order and circular is valid.

Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict
and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative
issuance discloses that the same fall within the administrative and police powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the respondents.

4. G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995

Landbank of the Philippines vs Court of Appeals, Pedro Yap, Heirs of Emiliano

Santiago, Agricultural Management and Development Corp.

Facts:

Yap and Santiago are landowners whose landholdings were acquired by the DAR,
subjecting it for transfer to qualified CARP beneficiaries. Aggrieved by the
compensation valuation of DAR and LBP, respondents filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with a preliminary mandatory injunction. The case was referred to CA for
proper determination and disposition.

Respondents argued that DAR and LBP committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
without jurisdiction when they opened trusts accounts in lieu of the depositing in cash or
bonds, before the lands was taken and the titles are cancelled. Respondents claim that
before the taking of the property, the compensation must be deposited in cash or bonds.

DAR, maintained that the certificate of deposit was a substantial compliance with the
rule on taking and compensation. LBP confirms that the certificate of deposit expresses
"reserved/deposited".

CA ruled in favor of Yap and Santiago. DAR filed a petition. DAR, maintain that the
word "deposit" referred merely to the act of depositing and in no way excluded the
opening of a trust account as form of deposit.

Issue: Whether the opening of trust account tantamount to deposit.

Ruling:

Contention of DAR is untenable. Section 16 of RA 6657 provides: (e) Upon receipt by

the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR
of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds
to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines.

It is very explicit that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds, there is no
ambiguity.

5. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. vs. CAG.R. No. 116356 June 29, 1998

Facts: Respondent elevated a complaint against petitioner for unpaid fees for pilotage
service rendered. Despite repeated demands, petitioner failed to pay and prays be
directed to pay with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint and other such
other relief. The petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the EO 1088 upon which
respondent based its claims. Petitioner insists that it should pay pilotage fees in
accordance with and on the basis of the memorandum circulars issued by the PPA, the
administrative body vested under PD 857.The trial court directed the petitioner to pay
respondent on sum of unpaid pilotage fees, legal rate of interest, attorney's fees and
costs. The trial court added that the factual antecedents of the controversy are simple;
the petitioner insists on paying the fees prescribed under PPA circulars because EO
1088 sets a higher rate, petitioner then assailed its constitutionality. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. Hence, the petition.

Issue: WON EO 1088 is valid

Ruling: Yes. EO 1088 provides for adjusted pilotage service rates without withdrawing
the power of the PPA to impose, prescribe, increase or decrease rates, charges or fees.
The reason is because EO 1088 is not meant simply to fix new pilotage rates. Its
legislative purpose is the "rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the
imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all
Philippine ports.

6. Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to
legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need
stronger barriers against further erosion.

Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized identification

reference system requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the
president of the republic of the Philippines is, therefore, an unconstitutional usurpation
of the legislative powers of the congress of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue: WON the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the
Philippines is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of
the Republic of the Philippines?

Ruling: Yes, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the
Philippines is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of
the Republic of the Philippines.

In this case, A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of
privacy interest against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc.
Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that
Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are
entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent
source of power to make laws.

Hence, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the Philippines
is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the
Republic of the Philippines.

7. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. PHILIP MORRIS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING,

GR No. 202943, 2015-03-25

Facts: On November 19, 2008, PMPMI, through the advertising agency PCN Promopro,
Inc. (PCN), by virtue of Article 116[4] of Republic Act No. (RA) 7394[5] or the
"Consumer Act of the Philippines," applied for a sales promotion permit before... the
BFAD, now the FDA, for its Gear Up Promotional Activity (Gear Up Promo).[6] The
application included the mechanics for the promotional activity, as well as relevant
materials and fees.
on November 28, 2008, PMPMI, through another advertising agency, Arc Worldwide
Philippines Co. (AWPC), filed another application for a sales promotional permit, this
time for its Golden Stick Promotional Activity (Golden Stick Promo) which the BFAD,
however,... refused outright, pursuant to a directive of the BFAD Director that all permit
applications for promotional activities of tobacco companies will no longer be accepted.
Despite inquiries, the BFAD merely advised AWPC to await the formal written notice
regarding its... application.

Eventually, in a letter[11] dated January 5, 2009, the BFAD... denied PMPMI's Gear Up
Promo application in accordance with the instructions of the Undersecretary of Health
for Standards and Regulations, directing that as of July 1, 2008, "all promotions,
advertisements and/or sponsorships of tobacco products are already prohibited," based
on the provisions of RA 9211[12] or the "Tobacco Regulation Act of 2003."

Issues: whether or not the CA erred in finding that the authority of the DOH, through the
BFAD, to regulate tobacco sales promotions under Article 116 in relation to Article 109
of RA 7394 had already been impliedly repealed by RA 9211, which... created the IAC-
Tobacco and granted upon it the exclusive authority to administer and implement the
provisions thereof;... whether or not the CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion
upon the DOH when the latter held that RA 9211 has also completely prohibited...
tobacco promotions as of July 1, 2008.

Ruling: PMPMI elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari and mandamus,
[22] docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 109493, ascribing grave abuse of discretion upon the
DOH in refusing to grant its sales promotional permit... applications, maintaining, inter
alia, that RA 9211 still allows promotion activities notwithstanding the phase-out of
advertising and sponsorship activities after July 1, 2008.

The Court agrees with the CA.

In fine, the Court agrees with the CA that it is the IAC-Tobacco and not the DOH which
has the primary jurisdiction to regulate sales promotion activities as explained in the
foregoing discussion. As such, the DOH's ruling, including its construction of RA 9211
(i.e.,... that it completely banned tobacco advertisements, promotions, and
sponsorships, as promotion is inherent in both advertising and sponsorship), are
declared null and void, which, as a necessary consequence, precludes the Court from
further delving on the... same. As it stands, the present applications filed by PMPMI are
thus remanded to the IAC-Tobacco for its appropriate action. Notably, in the proper
exercise of its rule-making authority, nothing precludes the IAC-Tobacco from
designating any of its pilot agencies to perform its multifarious functions under RA
9211.
8. SM LAND VS BCDA

FACTS

BCDA “Bases Conversion and Development Authority” opened for disposition and
development its Bonifacio South Property pursuant to RA 7227 “Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992”

SM Land Inc submitted to the BCDA unsolicited proposals for the development of the lot

BCDA then entered into negotiations witn SM Land until BCDA finally accepted the
terms of the final unsolicited proposal

Thereafter, their agreement was reduced into writing through the issuance of the
Certification of Successful Negotiations in 2010

It was agreed that BCDA accepted SM Land’s unsolicited proposal and declared SMLI
eligible to enter into the proposed Joint Venture activity.

It also “agreed to subject SM Land’s Original Proposal to Competitive Challenge

pursuant to NEDA Joint Venture Guidelines, which competitive challenge process shall
be immediately implemented following the Terms of Reference.

Moreover, said Certification provides that the BCDA shall commence the activities for
the solicitation for comparative proposals. Years later however, the BCDA through the
issuance of Supplemental Notice No. 5 terminated the competitive challenge for the
selection of BCDA’s joint venture partner for the development of a portion of Fort
Bonifacio.

SMLI, argued that BCDA’s unilateral termination of the competitive challenge is a

violation of SMLI’s rights as an original proponent and constitutes abandonment of
BCDA’s contractual obligations. BCDA, on the other hand, responded that it is
justifiable since NEDA JV Guidelines is a mere guideline and not a law, and that the
Government has a right to terminate the competitive challenge when the terms are
disadvantageous to public interest.

ISSUE

Whether BCDA and SM land have a contract that would bestow upon the latter the right
to demand that its unsolicited proposal be subjected to a competitive challenge

HELD

There exists a valid agreement between SMLI and BCDA

Article 1305 of the New Civil Code defines a contract as “a meeting of minds between
two persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or
to render some service.” It is a “juridical convention manifested in legal form, by virtue of
which one or more persons bind themselves in favor of another or others, or
reciprocally, to the fulfilment of a prestation to give, to do, or not to do.” The succeeding
Article 1318 of the Code lays down the essential requisites of a valid contract, to wit:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract; and

(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

In the case at bar, there is, between BCDA and SMLI, a perfected contract––a source of
rights and reciprocal obligations on the part of both parties. Consequently, a breach
thereof may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party.

9. LBP vs Yap

GR 118712 October 6, 1995

FACTS: 1. Respondent Pedro Yap alleged that his 2 transfer certificates of titles were
cancelled by the Register of Deeds of Leyte and were transferred in the names of
farmer beneficiaries without notice to Yap and without complying with the requirement of
Sec 16 of RA 6657 to deposit the compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in an
accessible bank

2. Respondent Heirs of Emiliano Santiago alleged that they are the owners of a parcel
of land. Without their notice, the Landbank required and the beneficiaries executed
Actual tillers of Deed of undertaking to pay rentals to the Landbank for the use of their
farm lots.

3. Respondent AMADCOR alleged that a summary admin proceeding to determine

compensation of the property was conducted by the DARAB without notice to the la
landowner. They all argued that Admin Order 9 series of 1990 (enacted by DAR) was
issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion because it permits the
opening of trust accounts by the Landbank. They also alleged that DAR and Landbank
merely earmarked, deposited in trust or reserved the compensation in their names as
landowners despite a clear mandate that before taking possession of property, the
compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds as stated in RA 6657.

ISSUES/ RULING:

1. WON respondents are entitled as a matter of right to immediate and provisional

release of the amounts deposited in trust it has filed for just compensation Yes. Sec
16(e) of RA 6657 explicitly states that a deposit must be made only in cash or in LBP
bonds. DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power to enact rules and regulations
when it issued Admin Circular 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because RA 6657
is very specific that deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds.

2. WON respondents are entitled to withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in their
behalf pending the final reso of the cases involving the final valuation of their properties
Yes. To withhold the right of the landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for their properties simply because they
rejected the DAR’s valuation and notwithstanding that they have already been deprived
of the possession and use of such properties is an oppressive exercise of eminent
domain. A landowner who is deprived of the use and possession of his property should
be fairly and immediately compensated.

10. Lokin Jr. vs Commission on Elections

GR No. 179431-32

Facts: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized groups
duly registered under the partylist system of representation that manifested their
intention to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local elections.
Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, CIBAC, through its President
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of 5 nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of
qualifying votes. The nominees in order that their names appeared in the certificate of
nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: 1.) Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva; 2.) herein
petitioner Luis K. Lokin Jr.; 3.) Cinchora C. Cruz-Gonzales; 4.) Sherwin Tugma; and 5.)
Emil L. Galang. The nominees certificate of acceptance were attached to the certificate
of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees was later published in two
newspaper of general circulation. Prior to elections, however, CIBAC still through
Villanueva filed a certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of
nominees dated May 7, 2007, hereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugma and
Galang and substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees.

Issue: Whether or not the substitution is valid.

Held: No. The legislative power of the government is vested exclusively in accordance
with the doctrine of separation of power. As a general rule, the legislative cannot
surrender pr abdicate its legislative power for doing so will be unconstitutional. Although
the power to make laws cannot be delegated by the legislative to any other authority, a
power that is not legislative in character may be delegated.

11. GMA NETWORK, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014

FACTS: The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged
unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the
broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political parties for national
election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive
regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the
people’s right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of
their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections

Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per
station” airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior
COMELEC approval for candidates’ television and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime
limits violates freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD: YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates
and political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted
reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits – leveling the playing field –
does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the
absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

12. ROMULO, MABANTA, BUENAVENTURA, SAYOC & DE LOS ANGELES,

petitioner, vs. HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, respondent. G.R. No.
131082 June 19, 2000

Facts: Petitioner was exempted from the Pag-Ibig Fund coverage by respondent HDMF
for the whole of 1995 due to a superior retirement plan. The HDMF Board of Trustees,
issued Board Resolution No. 1011, Series of 1995, amending the Rules and
Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7742. The petitioner filed an application for Waiver
of Suspension of Fund Coverage and attached a letter challenging the validity of the
1995 Amendments. The petitioner’s application was denied on the ground that there
should be a clear use of “and/or” and that the Rules are valid. Petitioner filed a petition
before the Court assailing the 1995 and 1996 Amendments to the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA No. 7742 for being contrary to law.

Issue: Whether or not the HDMF Board exceeded its rule-making power

Held: Yes. The HDMF Board has rule-making power as provided in Section 51 of R.A.
No 7742 and Section 13 of P.D. No 1752. However, the rules and regulations must be
within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative
agency. It is regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law. The Board
of Trustees required that employers should have both provident/retirement and housing
benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Fund, it
effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. When the Board abolished the
exemptions, it rendered the amendments invalid. Thus, the petition is granted. The
disapproval by the HDMF of the application of the petitioner for waiver or suspension of
Fund coverage is SET ASIDE, and the HDMF is hereby directed to refund to petitioner
all sums of money it collected from the latter.

13. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL,

represented by ALFREDO A. DY, Respondent

G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010

FACT:

The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No.
99-75 unconstitutional, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly use
aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out
of aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as
unconstitutional for being violative of substantial due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as well as for restraining competitive free trade and
commerce.

ISSUE(S):

Whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 -

(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and

(b) restrained free trade and competition.

RULING:
The equal protection clause means that “no person or class of persons shall be
deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.” The guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on a reasonable
classification. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of
individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.

Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were
based on a reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or
trade but the integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA
7832. Traders like Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct
manufacturers/processors especially in the light of their failure to negate the rationale
behind the distinction.

14. Rodolfo S. De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit GR 109023 Aug. 12, 1998

FACTS:
Petitioners are employees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Prior to
July 1, 1989, they were receiving honoraria as designated members of the LWUA Board
Secretariat and the Pre-Qualification, Bids and Awards Committee. Republic Act No.
6758 entitled “An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification
System in the Government and For Other Purposes”, took effect. Section 12 of said law
provides for the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into
standardized salary rates. Certain additional compensations, however, were exempted
from consolidation. Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate
Compensation Circular No. 10 (DBM-CCC No. 10), discontinuing without qualification
effective November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic
salary. Pursuant to the aforesaid Law and Circular, respondent Leonardo Jamoralin, as
corporate auditor, disallowed on post audit, the payment of honoraria to the herein
petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the COA, questioning the validity and enforceability
of DBM-CCC No. 10 but were denied. Hence the instant petition.

CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONER:

DBM-CCC No. 10 is inconsistent with the provisions of Rep. Act 6758 (the law it is
supposed to implement) and, therefore, void. And it is without force and effect because
it was not published in the Official Gazette.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT:

DBM-CCC No. 10 need not be published for it is merely an interpretative regulation of a
law already published.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DBM-CCC No. 10 is legally effective despite its lack of publication in the
Official Gazette.

RULING:
No. Following the doctrine enunciated in Tanada, publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines is required since DBM-CCC No. 10
is in the nature of an administrative circular the purpose of which is to enforce or
implement an existing law. Stated differently, to be effective and enforceable, DBM-
CCC No. 10 must go through the requisite publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

15. PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL TRADING CORPORATION v. COA

G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999
Facts:

● On October 19, 1988, the PITC Board of Directors approved a Car Plan
Program for qualified PITC officers.
o Under such car plan program, an eligible officer is entitled to purchase a
vehicle, 50% of the value of which shall be shouldered by PITC while the
remaining 50% will be shouldered by the officer through salary deduction
over a period of 5 years.
o Maximum value of the vehicle to be purchased ranges from P200,000.00
to P350,000.00, depending on the position of the officer in the corporation.
o PITC will also reimburse the officer concerned 50% of the annual car
registration, insurance premiums and costs of registration of the chattel
mortgage over the car for a period of 5 years from the date the vehicle
was purchased.
o The terms and conditions of the car plan are embodied in a `Car Loan
Agreement'.
o The purpose of the plan is to provide financial assistance to qualified
employees in purchasing their own transportation facilities in the
performance of their work, for representation, and personal use.
o The plan is envisioned to facilitate greater mobility during official trips
especially within Metro Manila or the employee's principal place of
assignment, without having to rely on PITC vehicles, taxis or cars for hire.
● On July 1, 1989, RA No. 6758, entitled "An Act Prescribing a Revised
Compensation and Position Classification System in the Government and For
Other Purposes", took effect.
o Section 12 of said law provides for the consolidation of allowances and
additional compensation into standardized salary rates save for certain
additional compensation such as representation and transportation
allowances which were exempted from consolidation into the standardized
rate.
 o Section 12 likewise provides that other additional compensation being
received by incumbents as of July 1, 1989 not integrated into the
standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.
● To implement RA 6758, DBM issued Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10
(DBM-CCC No. 10). Paragraph 5.6 of DBM-CCC No. 10 discontinued effective
November 1, 1989, all allowances and fringe benefits granted on top of basic
salary, not otherwise enumerated under paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5 thereof.

COA Audit

● On post audit, the payment/reimbursement of the 50% of the yearly car

registration and insurance premiums and 50% of the costs of registration of the
chattel mortgage over the car made after November 1, 1989 was disallowed by
the resident COA auditor.
● The disallowance was made on the ground that the subject car plan benefits
were not one of the fringe benefits or form of compensation allowed to be
continued after said date under the DBM-CCC No. 10.
● PITC appealed the decision of the resident COA auditor but to no avail.

● PITC’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by COA.

Issues:
WON the legislature intended to revoke existing benefits being received by incumbent
government employees as of July 1, 1989 (including PITC’s car plan benefits) when RA
6758 was passed. – NO
Ruling:
NO. In Philippine Ports Authority v. COA, the Court confirmed the legislative intent to
protect incumbents who are receiving salaries and/or allowances over and above those
authorized by RA 6758 to continue to receive the same even after RA 6758 took effect.
In reserving the benefit to incumbents, the legislature has manifested its intent to
gradually phase out this privilege without upsetting the policy of non-diminution of pay
and consistent with the rule that laws should only be applied prospectively in the spirit of
fairness and justice.

In the case at bar, petitioner correctly pointed out that there was no intention on the part
of the legislature to revoke existing benefits being enjoyed by incumbents of
government positions at the time of the passage of RA 6758 by virtue of Sections 12
and 17 thereof. There is no dispute that the PITC officials who availed of the subject car
plan benefits were incumbents of their positions as of July 1, 1989.
Thus, it was legal and proper for them to continue enjoying said benefits within the five-
year period from date of purchase of the vehicle allowed by their Car Loan Agreements
with PITC.

16. Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298; G.R. No.
101279, August 6, 1992
Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private
employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to
establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same.

The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers.
Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing
guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers
to HK and the accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino
domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of
employment contracts of domestic workers for HK.

Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in
excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.

Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA
through an administrative order and circular is valid.

Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict
and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative
issuance discloses that the same fall within the administrative and police powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the respondents.

17. People Vs Maceren 79 SCRA 450, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977
Facts: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No.
84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The
municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit
electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same.
On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid.
Held: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner
of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old
Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body
intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what
acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the
imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.

Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards
authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of
administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict
with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making
power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate.

18. HON. RENATO C. CORONA VS UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF

THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 111953 December 12, 1997

Facts:

Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92) provides that all appointments to
harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one
year from date of effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority
after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance.

PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 whose avowed policy
was to instill effective discipline and thereby afford better protection to the port users
through the improvement of pilotage services.

On Aug 12, 1992, respondent, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO
No. 04-92 before the Dept of Transportation and Communication.

On December 23, 1992, the Office of the President (OP) issued an order directing the PPA to hold
abeyance the implementation of the said administrative order. PPA countered that the said order was
issued in the exercise of its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6,
Article I of P.D. 857.

On March 17, 1993, the OP, through Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona,
dismissed the appeal and lifted the restraining order issued. He concluded that the said
order applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and purposes, was not an act of
Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing P.D. 857, mandating it to
control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots in any port district.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages before the Regional Trial Court.

Issue: WON Administrative Order No.04-92 is constitutional

Held: NO

The Court is convinced that PPA No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of
respondents’ right against deprivation of property without due process law. The
Supreme Court said that in order to fall within the aegis of the provision, two conditions
must concur, namely, that there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done
without proper observance of due process.

Neither does that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity
of the administrative order. As general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirement of procedural due process, are essential only when administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an Administrative body needs to
comply with the requirement of notice and hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right. It is
readily apparent that the said administrative order unduly restricts the right of harbour pilots to enjoy
their profession before their right of harbor pilots to enjoy their respective profession before their
compulsory retirement.

19. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. COURT

OF TAX APPEALS and FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION. G.R. No. 119761. August 29,
1996]

FACTS:
Fortune Tobacco Corporation is engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes.
On various dates, the Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate certificates of
trademark registration over "Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes.

The CIR initially classified 'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were listed in
the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to foreign companies. However, Fortune changed the
names of 'Hope' to Hope Luxury' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby removing the said brands
from the foreign brand category. Fortune also submitted proof the BIR that 'Champion' was an original
register and therefore a local brand. Ad Valorem taxes were imposed on these brands.

RA 7654 was passed in it was provided that 55% ad valorem tax will be imposed on local brands
carrying a foreign name. Two days before the effectivity of RA 7654, the BIR issued Revenue
Memorandum Circular No. 37-93, in which Fortune was to be imposed 55% ad valorem tax on the
three brands classifying them as local brands carrying a foreign name.

Fortune filed a petition with the CTA which was granted finding the RMC as defective. The CIR filed a
motion for reconsideration with the CTA which was denied, then to the CA, an appeal, which was also
denied.

ISSUE: Whether the RMC was valid.

RULING: NO. The RMC was made to place the three brands as locally made cigarettes bearing
foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654. Specifically, the new law would have
its amendatory provisions applied to locally manufactured cigarettes which at the time of its effectivity
were not so classified as bearing foreign brands. Prior to the issuance of the RMC, the brands were
subjected to 45% ad valorem tax. In so doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law but it legislated
under its quasi-legislative authority. The due observance of the requirements of notice, of hearing, and
of publication should not have been then ignored.

The Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a valid and
effective administrative issuance.

20. Case Digest: Ernesto M. Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.
18 July 1991 G.R. No. 96266

FACTS:
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private respondents oil companies filed
with the ERB their respective applications on oil price increases. ERB then issued an order granting a
provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to
nullify said increase.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be subject to presidential review.

HELD:
Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board
from ordering a provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to make it permanent
or to reduce or increase it further or to deny the application. The provisional increase is akin to a
temporary restraining order, which are given ex-parte.

The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that “the ERB is not averse to the idea of a
presidential review of its decision,” except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. The
Court suggested that it will be under the scope of the legislative to allow the presidential review of the
decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still “ an administrative body
under the Office of the President whose decisions should be appealed to the President under the
established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,” especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all Filipinos.
21. Guevara v. COMELEC

G.R. No. L-12596 | July 31, 1958

FACTS:

Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt for having published in the newspaper an article which tended to interfere
with and influence the COMELEC awarding the contracts for the manufacture and
supply of ballot boxes; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring into
disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function of this Commission and
its Chairman.

Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to punish as contempt the publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as
neither in the Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so
punish the same.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to conduct contempt
proceedings against Guevara in connection with the publication of an article.

HELD:

Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted in controversy

between several dealers that however merely refers to a ministerial duty, which the
Commission has performed in its administrative capacity. It only discharged a ministerial
duty; it did not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise
the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is inherently
judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: “The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts, and,
consequently, in the administration of justice”. We are therefore persuaded to conclude
that the Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit petitioner to
contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him because of the publication of the
article mentioned in the charge under consideration.

22.

23. PO1 LEONITO ACUZAR vs APRONIANO JOROLAN and HON. EDUARDO A.

APRESA, PEOPLES LAW ENFORCEMENT BOARD (PLEB) Chairman, New
Corella, Davao del Nort G.R. No. 177878 April 7, 2010 Villarama, Jr. J.
FACTS:

Respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed an Administrative Case against petitioner before

the Peoples Law Enforcement Board(PLEB) charging the latter of Grave Misconduct for
allegedly having an illicit relationship with respondents minor daughter. On May 11,
2000, respondent also instituted a criminal case against petitioner before the MTC of
New Corella for Violation of Child Abuse Act.

Petitioner denied the accusations and attached the affidavit of complainants daughter,
Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship with the petitioner or having
kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person. Petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings before the PLEB pending resolution of the criminal case filed
before the regular court. The PLEB found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
punishable with dismissal.

Petitioner’s Claim:

Petitioner alleged that the subject decision was issued without giving him an opportunity
to be heard. He likewise averred that the respondent Board acted without jurisdiction in
proceeding with the case without the petitioner having been first convicted in the
criminal case before the regular court. Petitioner pointed out that under the PLEB Rules
of Procedure, prior conviction was required before the Board may act on the
administrative case considering that the charge was actually for violation of law,
although denominated as one (1) for grave misconduct. Petitioner filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order.

Petitioner was ordered dismissed from the PNP. The trial court annulled the decision of
PLEB. The respondent elevated the case to the CA where the decision of the RTC was
reversed.

ISSUE:

1. WON PLEB has jurisdiction over the case

2. WON CA erred in ruling that petitioners resort to certiorari was not warranted as the
remedy of appeal from the decision of the PLEB was available to him.

HELD:

1. YES. Violation of law presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense
penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. The settled
rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other.
In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative
proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may
proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative
disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring members of the PNP, has
jurisdiction over the case.

2. NO. It is apparent from the foregoing provision that the remedy of appeal from the
decision of the PLEB to the Regional Appellate Board was available to petitioner. Since
appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The existence and
availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil
action of certiorari. The Principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he
should have availed of the means of administrative processes afforded to him. If a
remedy is available within the administrative machinery of the administrative agency,
then this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts. This
is to enable such body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the
court.

24. Ute Paterok vs. Bureau of Customs

FACTS:

In March 1986, petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two containers, one
with used household goods and the other two used automobiles (one Bourgetti and one
Mercedes Benz). The first container and the Bourgetti car were released by the BOC,
but not the Mercedes Benz, which remained in custody of the Bureau.

Petitioner then received a notice of hearing, informing him that seizure proceedings
were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz. While this case was pending,
petitioner received a letter from the District Collector of Customs, informing her that a
decision ordering the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been rendered.

Petitioner did not know that the same Mercedes Benz was subject to two different
forfeiture proceedings. He only found out later that the Notice of Hearing for the
forfeiture proceedings before the District Collector was posted on the bulletin board of
the BOC, at Port Area, Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the posting on the bulletin board of the public respondent was sufficient
compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due process
Whether or not seizure and forfeiture was proper in the instant case

HELD:

The Court held that there was no sufficient compliance with requirement of notice and
hearing under the due process clause. But notwithstanding the procedural infirmity, the
Court ruled that the petition cannot be granted.

The seizure and forfeiture proceedings was based on a violation of B.P. 73, specifically
a law that promotes energy conservation and prohibits the importation, manufacture or
assembling of gasoline-powered passenger motor cars with engine displacement of
over 2,800 cubic centimeters.

The Mercedes Benz subject of this case has an engine displacement of over 2,800
cubic centimeters, which clearly falls within the prohibited importation and as such, is
liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents.

25.MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO

BLANCAFLOR / G.R. No. 157581 / December 1, 2004 / QUISUMBING, J.:

Facts:

Petitioner MIAA is a government-owned and controlled corporation created by

Executive Order No. 778. It owns, operates, and managesNAIA. Petitioners properties,
facilities, and services are available for public use subject to such fees, charges, and
rates as may be fixed in accordance with law. Herein respondents are the users,
lessees and occupants of petitioners properties, facilities, and services.

The schedule of aggregate dues collectible for the use of petitioners properties,
facilities, and services are divided into: (1) aeronautical fees; (2) rentals; (3) business
concessions; (4) other airport fees and charges; and (5) utilities.

On May 19, 1997, petitioner issued Resolution No. 97-51announcing an increase in the
rentals of its terminal buildings, VIP lounge, other airport buildings and land, as well as
check-in and concessions counters. Business concessions, particularly concessionaire
privilege fees, were also increased.

On April 2, 1998, petitioner passed Resolution No. 98-30adopting twenty percent (20%)
of the increase recommended by Punongbayan and Araullo, to take effect immediately
on June 1, 1998. Thus, petitioner issued the corresponding Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1998 to reflect the new schedule of fees, charges, and rates.
On February 5, 1999, petitioner issued Resolution No. 99-11, which further increased
the other airport fees and charges, specifically for parking and porterage services, and
the rentals for hangars. Accordingly, petitioner amended Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1998.

Respondents requested that the implementation of the new fees, charges, and rates be
deferred due to lack of prior notice and hearing.The request was denied. Petitioner
likewise refused to renew the identification cards of respondents personnel, and vehicle
stickers to prevent entry to the premises.

Issue:

Whether MIAA is authorize to increase its fees, charges, and rates?

Ruling: NO. Under the original Charter of the MIAA, petitioner was given blanket
authority to adjust its fees, charges, and rates. However, E.O. No. 903 limited such
authority to a mere recommendatory power. Hence, petitioner’s Charter itself, as
amended, directly vests the power to determine revision of fees, charges, and rates in
the “ministry head” and even requires approval of the Cabinet. Worth noting, its Charter
established MIAA as an attached agency of the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications (now Department of Transportation and Communications). Hence, the
“ministry head” who has the power to determine the revision of fees, charges, and rates
of the MIAA is now the DOTC Secretary. Clearly, petitioner has no authority to increase
its fees, charges, or rates as the power to do so is vested solely in the DOTC Secretary,
although petitioner’s prerogative to recommend possible increases thereon is of course
recognized. As an attached agency of the DOTC, the MIAA is governed by the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Administrative Code specifically requires notice and
public hearing in the fixing of rates.

26. NICOLAS VS. DESIERTO G.R. No. 154668, DEC. 16, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner Nicolas was the Commissioner of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau. He was administratively before the Ombudsman for allegedly releasing an
apprehended cargo based on spurious documents. The Graft Investigation Officer found
him guilty of gross neglect of duty which was duly approved by the Ombudsman. The
motion for reconsideration was denied, and thus he appealed to the CA. The CA upheld
the decision. Petitioner went further to the SC arguing that the CA erred in affirming the
decision despite of lack of substantial evidence to support his conviction of gross
neglect of duty.
ISSUE:

What is the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings?

HELD:

The quantum of proof necessary to prove a charge in an administrative case is

substantial evidence, which is defined as relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Such quantum was not met here.
Even though petitioner had not adduced evidence on his behalf, the facts on record
show that his act or omission does not constitute gross neglect of duty.

27. HAYDEE C. CASIMIRO,vs. FILIPINO T. TANDOG

G.R. No. 146137. June 08, 2005

FACTS:

On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a

report[2] based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in the office
of petitioner Casimero. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax
Declarations No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one
in the name of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380
and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in
favor of petitioner’s brother-in-law Marcelo Molina.

Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No.

13[3] dated 06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for
thirty (30) days. Three (3) days later, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No.
15, directing petitioner to answer the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,
[4] petitioner denied the alleged irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation
of the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her
assumption to office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax declarations in
favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed by
Antipas San Sebastian in Molina’s favor.

On 23 October 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17,[5] respondent Mayor extended
petitioner’s preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days effective 24 October 1996
to give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities.

On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 18[6] was issued by respondent Mayor
directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Noraida San Sebastian
Cesar and Teodulo Matillano.
Noraida San Sebastian Cesar[7] alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376
covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a certain
Marcelo Molina, petitioner’s brother-in-law, without the necessary documents. Noraida
Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the
land covered by the said Tax Declarations.

In response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a letter[9] dated 29

October 1996, stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida San Sebastian
Cesar, she had already explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996.

Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the

matter. After a series of hearings, the committee, on 22 November 1996, submitted its
report[10] recommending petitioner’s separation from service, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

Evaluating the facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor
Haydee Casimero is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the
prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon who are making possible the
payments of her salary and other allowances. Consequently, we are unanimously
recommending her separation from service.

Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor issued Administrative Order

No. 1[11] dated 25 November 1996 dismissing petitioner.

ISSUE: whether or not petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process
when she was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose,
Romblon.

HELD:

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.

In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely,
that there is deprivation of life, liberty and property and such deprivation is done without
proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process, however, a
distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance.

The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice
and a real opportunity to be heard.[18] In administrative proceedings, such as in the
case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
“To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process

28. RIMANDO A. GANNAPAO versus CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION (CSC)

May 31, 2011G.R. No. 180141

FACTS:

Ricardo Barien, et al., stockholders and board members of United Workers Transport
Corp. (UWTC), filed a verified complaint before the PNP Inspectorate Division at Camp
Crame, charging petitioner Gannapao with Grave Misconduct and Moonlighting with
Urgent Prayer for Preventive Suspension and Disarming.

Barien, et al. alleged that the buses regularly driven by them and other
stockholders/drivers/workers were confiscated by a “task force” composed of former
drivers, conductors and mechanics led by petitioner. Armed with deadly weapons such
as guns and knives, petitioner and his group intimidated and harassed the regular bus
drivers and conductors, and took over the buses.

Subsequently, a summary hearing on the complaint was conducted by the Office of the
Legal Service, PNP National Headquarters. A subpoena was issued then to petitioner
requiring him to appear at the hearing before the Office of the Legal Service in Camp
Crame

Petitioner was then found guilty of the charge of serious irregularities in the performance
of duties and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) months suspension from the
police service without pay.

Aggrieved, petitioner brought his case to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) which denied his appeal. Displeased by the decision, petitioner
appealed to the CSC but the latter modified his penalty of three months suspension to
dismissal from the service. Petitioner thus filed with the CA a Petition for Review with an
Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction. The CA issued a TRO on September 4, 2002 and a writ of preliminary
injunction on January 14, 2003. Subsequently, the CA affirmed the assailed resolution
of the CSC and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was denied administrative due process before the
Office of the Legal Service of Philippine National Police.
RULING: No.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of the
principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice
but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the
opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.

As records bear out, petitioner was adequately apprised of the charges filed against him
and he submitted his answer to the complaint while the case was still under a pre-
charge investigation. When the Office of the Legal Service conducted a summary
hearing on the complaint, petitioner was again duly notified of the proceedings and was
given an opportunity to explain his side.

Having been given a reasonable opportunity to answer the complaint against him,
petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of due process.

29. G.R. No. 191877 June 18, 2013 PAGCOR vs. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ

FACTS: Ariel R. Marquez and Ireneo M. Vedillo were both employed as dealers in the
game of Craps at the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) at the
Casino Filipino Heritage.

They were administratively charged with conspiring with Cheng in defrauding PAGCOR
of an undetermined amount of money and were required to submit a written
explanation. Marquez admitted that he was aware of several erroneous calls made by
Verdillo on the dice throws, but he still paid out winnings to Cheng. Meanwhile, Verdillo
also submitted a written explanation, denying the accusations against him. They were
invited by the Branch Management Panel (BMP) to a hearing to explain their side of the
controversy.

The BMP’s recommendation was adopted by the Adjudication Committee and its
findings were then forwarded to PAGCOR’s Board of Directors for final approval. Senior
Managing Head of the Human Resource and Development Department later sent a
Memorandum to Marquez and Verdillo informing them that the Board had approved the
Adjudication Committee’s recommendation to dismiss them from the service due to
"Dishonesty, Grave violation of company rules and regulations, Conduct prejudicial to
the best interest of the company, and Loss of trust and confidence" for conspiring with a
co-dealer and a customer in defrauding the house on numerous occasions.

CSC dismissed respondents’ appeal for lack of merit. Respondent-appellants are guilty
of the administrative offenses of Serious Dishonesty, Violation of Office Rules and
Regulations and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and imposes the
penalty of dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties of forfeiture of
retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government
service, bar from taking civil service examinations in the future and cancellation of civil
service eligibilities.

Not satisfied, Marquez filed a petition for review with the CA arguing that he was not
accorded his right to due process and that there was no substantial evidence to support
a finding of his guilt in the administrative charge.

CA rendered a decision in his favour. The CA held that there is no administrative charge
of conspiracy under the Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It
found Marquez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay credible and ruled that there was no dishonesty
on his part, much less a conspiracy with Verdillo and Cheng to defraud PAGCOR. The
CA observed that the fact that as stated in his sworn statement, Marquez called
Verdillo’s attention to his erroneous call only on the second time that Verdillo made an
erroneous call, cannot be interpreted that he was dishonest or engaged in a conspiracy.
Rather, it shows that he was negligent in the performance of his duties.

Meanwhile, Verdillo filed with the CA a separate petition for review. He argued that
PAGCOR’s Decision was not supported by the evidence on record. He also averred that
he was denied due process of law.

The CA, however, denied Verdillo’s petition. CA found that Verdillo did not judiciously
perform all the acts expected of him as a dealer-stickman and all acts necessary to
protect PAGCOR’s interest. The CA found that there exists substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that Verdillo is guilty of the offense of violation of office rules and
regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The CA also
concluded that the circumstances present in the case supply more than reasonable
grounds to believe that Verdillo conspired with Marquez and Cheng to defraud
PAGCOR.

PAGCOR filed before this Court a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the CA
erred in finding that the notice of charges against Marquez was not in accordance with
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases. It contends that the designation of the
offense in an administrative case is not controlling and one may be found guilty of
another offense if it is based on the same facts subject of the original designation.

ISSUE: Whether PAGCOR failed to comply with the requirement of administrative due
process since Marquez was not duly apprised of the proper charges which led to his
dismissal.

HELD: Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." A

finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is
supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the acts stated in
the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We
find that Marquez and Verdillo failed to present any cogent reason for the Court to
deviate from the rule that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held
to be binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the
record of the case.

All told, we find that there was substantial evidence for the charges against Marquez
and Verdillo, warranting their dismissal from service.

30. https://www.scribd.com/document/499268332/Case-Digest-1

31. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS), Petitioner, v. RODOLFO

ZALDARRIAGA, Respondent.

FACTS:

Zaldarriaga was the Municipal Treasurer of the Municipality of Lemery, Iloilo. November
16, 1998, the COA conducted an audit examination of the accountabilities of
respondents cash and accounts covering the period 1997 to 1998. Based on the audit
conducted, the COA auditors prepared a report showing a deficiency of 4.7 million
pesos. Respondent was asked to restitute the deficiency but he failed to do so.
Subsequenlty, COA filed a Letter-Complaint. respondent contested the findings of the
COA auditors alleging that it was inaccurate, incorrect, and devoid of merit. Meanwhile,
the Office of the Provincial Treasurer also conducted its own investigation. Its findings
did not indicate any shortage but, instead, pointed out that had the mayor, treasurer,
and accountant observed COA Rules and Regulations in the proper disbursement of
funds, the irregularity would not have been committed. Respondent then sought for the
dismissal of the complaint filed against him on the ground that the latest COA report
dated May 25, 2000 indicated that there was no shortage. However, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered a decision dismissing respondent from government service for
dishonesty. The CA reversed the decision of the latter hence the said petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Did the COA findings that respondent failed to account for the shortage and his
unjustified release of cash advances constitute sufficient basis for his dismissal?

HELD:

In administrative cases, the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual

administratively liable is substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not
necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but such kind
of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct
of their affairs. The evidence upon which respondents administrative liability would be
anchored lacked that degree of certainty required in administrative cases, because the
two separate audits conducted by the Commission on Audit yielded conflicting results.
Evidence of shortage in respondents cash and accounts, as alleged in the first audit
report, is imperative to hold him liable. In this case, the evidence against respondent
could not be relied upon, because the second audit report, which was favorable to him,
necessarily puts into question the reliability of the initial audit findings. Whether the zero
balance as appearing in the second audit report was correct or inadvertently indicated,
the credibility and accuracy of the two audit reports were already tarnished. Even in
administrative cases, a degree of moral certainty is necessary to support a finding of
liability. DENIED

32.

33. ATTY. JANET D. NACIONvs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, MA. GRACIA PULIDO-

TAN, JUANITO ESPINO AND HEIDI MENDOZA

Facts:

Petitioner was administratively charged by Commission on Audit (COA) for grave

misconduct. She was assigned by COA in Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewage
System (MWSS). During the petitioner’s assignment in MWSS from 2001 to 2003, she
availed of the MWSS Multi-Purpose Loan Program, such as car loan, housing loan, and
received benefits and bonuses from the latter.
Petitioner avers that she availed of the housing and car loan in an honest belief that she
could avail of the benefits in the absence of any prohibition thereon, considering that
COA Resolution that prohibited COA personnel from availing of all forms of loan,
monetary benefits from agencies under their jurisdiction was issued only on 2004. She
denied receiving any allowances and bonuses and argued that the documents
submitted to establish the same are not conclusive evidence that she indeed received
the money. COA cited violation of Sec. 18 of RA 6758 prohibiting COA personnel from
receiving salaries, bonuses, allowances or other emoluments from government entity,
local government unit, GOCCs and government financial institution, except the
compensation directly paid by COA. She was give one-year suspension as penalty,
finding in her favor mitigating circumstances her waiver of the formal investigation and
admission of availment of MWSS Housing and Car Loans.

Issue:

Did the Commission on Audit committed grave abuse of discretion in finding Nacion
guilty of grave misconduct and violation of reason able office rules and regulations?

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that Nacion’s availment of the housing and car programs
was undisputed.

34.

35. PEÑALOSA vs. VILLANUEVA G.R. No. 75305 (177 SCRA 478)

Facts: On November 29,1984, in NLRC-NCR Case No. 2517-84 entitled ‘Philippine

Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU-RMC Chapter) and its Members v. Riverside
Mills Corporation, et al.”, Labor Arbiter Manuel Caday awarded separation pay, wage
and/or living allowance increases and 13th month pay to the individual complainants
who comprise some of the respondents in this case. Labor Arbiter likewise awarded
separation pay, vacation and sick leave pay and unpaid increases in the basic wage
and allowances to the other private respondents herein in NLRC Case No. NCR-7-
2577-84 entitled ‘Michael Peñalosa, Jose Garcia and Apolinar Ray, et al. v. Riverside
Mills Corporation, et al., and Samahang Diwang Manggagawa sa RMC-FFW Chapter,
et al. v. Riverside Mills Corporation (RMC).’ On March 29,1985, after the judgment had
become final and executory, Dogelio issued a writ of execution. The Deputy Sheriff,
however, failed to collect the amount so he levied upon personal and real properties of
RMC. On April 25, 1985, a notice of levy on execution of certain real properties was
annotated on the certificate of title filed with the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro
Manila, where all the said properties are situated. Meanwhile in the other development
which led to this case, petitioner DBP obtained a writ of possession on June 7, 1985
from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig of all the properties of RMC after having
extra-judicially foreclosed the same at public auction earlier in 1983. DBP subsequently
leased the said properties to Egret Trading and Manufacturing Corporation, Rosario
Textile Mills and General Textile Mills.

On October 31, 1985, Dogelio issued an order recognizing and declaring the
respondents’ first preference as regards wages and other benefits due them over and
above all earlier encumbrances on the aforesaid properties/assets of said company,
particularly those being asserted by respondent Development Bank of the Philippines.
The petitioner appealed the order of Dogelio to the NLRC. The latter in turn, set aside
the order and remanded the case to public respondent Labor Arbiter Santos for further
proceedings.

Issue: Whether the disputed property did not belong to the judgment debtor could be
validly levied upon by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment?

Held: No, the disputed property did not belong to the judgment debtor, it could not be
validly levied upon by the sheriff for the satisfaction of the judgment therein.
Consequently, the SC rejected the objections raised by herein petitioners to the
jurisdiction of the RTC to issue the questioned writs of preliminary injunction. The rule is
settled that even if a writ of execution is issued by a co-equal court, and we place the
National Labor Relations Commission in the same category for purposes of this case,
respondent judge could validly issue the temporary restraining order and, later, the writs
of preliminary injunction on the basis of DBP’s claim of ownership over the properties
levied upon. Under Sec. 17 of Rule 39 a third person who claims property levied upon
on execution may vindicate such claim by action. Obviously, a judgment rendered in his
favor, declaring him to be the owner of the property, would not constitute interference
with the powers or processes of the court which rendered the judgment to enforce which
the execution was levied. If that be so-and it is so because the property being that of a
stranger is not subject to levy-then an interlocutory order, such as injunction, upon a
claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the claimant, cannot be considered as
such interference either.

36. ARANETA vs. GATMAITAN G.R. Nos. L-8895 and L-9191, April 30, 1957 (101
Phil 328)

Facts: Sometime in 1950, trawl operators from Malabon, Navotas and other places
migrated to this region most of them settling at Sabang, Calabanga, Camarines Sur, for
the purpose of using this particular method of fishing in said bay. On account of the
belief of sustenance fishermen that the operation of this kind of gear caused the
depletion of the marine resources of that area, there arose a general clamor among the
majority of the inhabitants of coastal towns to prohibit the operation of trawls in San
Miguel Bay. In response to these pleas, the President issued Executive Order
prohibiting the use of trawls in San Miguel Bay.

A group of Otter trawl operators took the matter to the court by filing a complaint for
injunction and/or declaratory relief with preliminary injunction with the Court of First
Instance praying that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Fisheries from enforcing said
executive order; to declare the same null and void, and for such other relief as may be
just and equitable in the premises. The CFI declared the Executive Order invalid; the
injunction prayed for is ordered to issue;

Issue: Whether the EO Executive Orders are valid and does not encroach the authority
of the Legislature in the said Prohibition.

Held: Yes, EO Executive Orders are valid for having been issued by authority of the
Constitution, the Revised Administrative Code and the Fisheries Act. The opinion of the
SC that with or without said Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl
fishing from all Philippine waters come, under the law, within the powers of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who in compliance with his duties may
even cause the criminal prosecution of those who in violation of his instructions,
regulations or orders are caught fishing with trawls in the Philippine waters.

37. Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs The Deputy Executive Secretary, et al. 190
SCRA 673 / GR No. 79538, 18 October 1990, J. Cortes

FACTS: In 1986, at the start of President Corazon Aquino’s administration, petitioner

sent letters to the Office of the President and to the Ministry of Natural Resources
(MNR) seeking the reinstatement of its timber license agreement (TLA No. 87), which
was cancelled in August 1983 along with nine other concessions, during the Marcos
administration. It alleged that after the its TLA was cancelled without being given the
opportunity to be heard, its logging area was re-awarded to other logging
concessionaires without a formal award or license, as these entities were controlled or
owned by relatives or cronies of deposed President Marcos. The Ministry ruled that a
timber license was not a contract within the due process clause of the Constitution, but
only a privilege which could be withdrawn whenever public interest or welfare so
demands, and that petitioner was not discriminated against in view of the fact that it was
among ten concessionaires whose licenses were revoked in 1983. It also emphasized
the fact that there was currently a total log ban being imposed on the subject areas.
After the logging ban was lifted, petitioner appealed to the Office of the President, but
the petition was denied on the ground that the appeal was prematurely filed, the matter
not having been terminated in the MNR. Hence, petitioner filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to overturn administrative orders issued by their
predecessors.

RULING: The refusal of public respondents to reverse final and executory administrative
orders does not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. It is an established doctrine in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders
of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. These decisions and orders
are as conclusive upon the rights of the affected parties as though the same had been
rendered by a court of general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the
reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction Petitioner did not avail of its remedies under the law for attacking
the validity of these administrative actions until after 1986.

38.

39. G.R. No. 131442 July 10, 2003 Bangus Fry Fisherfolk VS Lanzanas

FACTS: Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe ("RED Principe") of Region IV,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR"), issued an Environmental
Clearance Certificate ("ECC") in favor of respondent National Power Corporation
("NAPOCOR"). The ECC authorized NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring
facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo, Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental
Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a
mangrove area and breeding ground for bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone. The mooring
facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCOR's power barge, which,
due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, required
relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4 megawatts power barge would
provide the main source of power for the entire province of Oriental Mindoro pending
the construction of a land-based power plant in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for
the mooring facility was valid for two years counted from its date of issuance or until 30
June 1999. Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto
Galera, sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. Petitioners filed a complaint with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of the ECC and for the
issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Petitioners
opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust administrative
remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1605, 8 Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160, and the
provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37 ("DAO 96-37") on the
documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed that the implementation of
the ECC was in patent violation of its terms. TC dismissed complaint.

ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint for lack of
cause action and lack of jurisdiction.

HELD: Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought. A perusal of the allegations in the
complaint shows that petitioners' principal cause of action is the alleged illegality of the
issuance of the ECC.

40. BERNARDO vs. ABALOS G.R. No. 137266. December 5, 2001. Sandoval-
Gutierrez, J.

FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of Mandaluyong City and his
son, Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a candidate for city mayor of the same city for the May
1998 elections. Petitioners herein interposed that respondents conducted an all-
expense-free affair at a resort in Quezon Province for the Mandaluyong City public
school teachers, registered voters of the said city and who are members of the Board of
Election Inspectors therein. The said affair was alleged to be staged as a political
campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political jingle was played all throughout and his
shirts being worn by some participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr. also made an offer and a
promise then to increase the allowances of the teachers. In this regard, petitioners filed
a criminal complaint with the COMELEC against Abalos Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote-
buying, further alleging that they conspired with their co-respondents in violating the
Omnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the recommendation of the Director of the Law
Department of the COMELEC, the COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the petition before the Supreme Court must be given due course
without the petitioners first submitting a motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC.

HELD: NO. The Court ruled that a petition for certiorari can only be resorted to if there is
no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In
the instant case, it was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC is the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse that petitioners can avail
of as it was intended to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed
to it. As the petitioners then did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the
COMELEC level, it was held that their instant petition is certainly premature.
Significantly, they have not also raised any plausible reason for their direct recourse to
the Supreme Court. As such, the instant petition was ruled to fail.

41. UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORP. (CORN DIVISION) vs. LAGUNA LAKE

DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY G.R. No. 191427, May 30, 2011

FACTS: Petitoner, Universal Robina Corp. is engaged in, among other things, the
manufacture of animal feeds. Respondent, Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
through its Pollution Control Division – Monitoring and Enforcement Section, after
conducting on March 14, 2000 a laboratory analysis of petitioner’s corn oil refinery
plant’s wastewater, found that it failed to comply with government standards provided
under Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative
Orders (DAOs) Nos. 34 and 35, series of 1990. On May 30, 200, LLDA issued an Ex-
Parte Order requiring petitioner to explain why no order should be issued for the
cessation of its operations due to its discharge of pollutive effluents into the Pasig River
and why it was operating without a clearance/permit from the LLDA. Despite
subsequent compliance monitoring and inspections conducted by the LLDA, petitioner’s
wastewater failed to conform to the parameters set by the aforementioned DAOs and
only in 2007 that URC’s upgraded wastewater treatment facility was completed, which
petitioners plant finally complied with government standards. Petitioner soon requested
for a reduction of penalties to cover only a period of 560 days. However, after
conducting hearings, LLDA found that URC was found to be discharging pollutive
wastewater in two periods: from March 14, 2000 – November 3, 2003 and from March
15, 2006 – April 17, 2007. LLDA issued its Order to Pay penalties for a total of 1,247
days amounting to PHP 1,247,000.00. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was
denied by the LLDA and reiterated its order to pay the aforestated penalties. Hence, a
petition for certiorari was filed before the Court of Appeals, attributing to LLDA grave
abuse of discretion in disregarding its documentary evidence, and maintaining that the
lack of any plain, speedy or adequate remedy from the enforcement of LLDA’s order
justified such recourse as an exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative
remedies prior to judicial action.

ISSUE: Whether or not LLDA erred in not crediting petitioner for undertaking remedial
measures to rehabilitate its wastewater treatment facility.

RULING: No, the petition must fail. Without belaboring petitioner’s assertions, it must be
underscored that the protection of the environment, including bodies of water, is no less
urgent or vital than the pressing concerns of private enterprises, big or small. Everyone
must do their share to conserve the national patrimony’s meager resources for the
benefit of not only this generation, but of those to follow. The length of time alone it took
petitioner to upgrade its WTF (from 2003 to 2007), a move arrived at only under threat
of continuing sanctions, militates against any genuine concern for the well-being of the
country’s waterways.

42. National Irrigation Administration vs. Enciso G.R. No. 142571, May 5, 2006

FACTS: In 1984, NIA commenced widening of the Binahaan river in Brgy. Cansamada,
Dagami, Leyte. The project wasdivided into small sections costing ₱ 50,000 each to
escape public bidding. Pre-bidding was done by NIA todetermine the lowest bid, which
would serve as the cost of the project. Contractors were assigned sections to

work without formal contracts. When a contractor’s works is complete the NIA will check
it and if satisfied, the latter will prepare contracts so that the collector can collect
payment. Enciso worked as one of the contractorsunder the name LCE Construction.
His first billing was paid by NIA. However, his second and final billing of ₱ 259,154.01
was denied on ground that work done on the right side of the river was not
accomplished. Enciso filedfor collection of sum of money with damages and attorney’s
fees with the RTC of Makati City. Petitioner and co-defendants motion to dismiss on
grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative agencies and lack of cause ofaction was
denied by the court a quo. RTC ruled in favour of herein respondent and ordered NIA to
pay thedemand sum plus 12% interest per annum until fully paid.Both parties appealed
to the CA, petitioner averring RTC erred in denying its Motion to Dismiss.
Respondentclaimed RTC erred in failing to hold petitioners co-defendants liable for
damages and NIA solely liable based onwork done in 1985. CA found no reversible
errors and affirmed said rulings.

ISSUE: (1) Did CA err in dismissing Motion to Dismiss for non-exhaustion of

administrative remedies?

(2) Is the NIA liable to Enciso for the latter’s work on the formers project?

RULING:(1)Yes, CA should have focused solely on respondent’s failure to EAR by not

appealing to the COA. NIA, beinga gov’t. entity disbursing public funds is subject to
jurisdiction of COA for any claim for collection of sum ofmoney, especially where no
written contract is done. PD 1445, Sec. 26 vests said power to the COA. Indeed,COA
may not be compelled to release funds to respondent without a written contract.
However, DEAR isdisregarded were: (1) violations of due process will be committed; (2)
issues involved are purely legalquestions; (3) the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (4)estoppel on part of administrative agency;
(5) irreparable injury; (6) respondent is a department secretary; (7)unreasonable; (8)
amounts to nullification of a claim; (9) subject matter is private land in land proceedings;
(10) rules does not provide plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (11) circumstances
indicating injury of judicial intervention.

(2) Petitioners payment to respondent’s claim may be addressed in a proper case

before the COA. Petition granted

43. UST v Sanchez G.R. No. 165569 July 29, 2010

Facts: A Complaint for Damages filed by respondent Danes B. Sanchez (respondent)

against the University of Santo Tomas (UST) and its Board of Directors, the Dean and
the Assistant Dean of the UST College of Nursing, and the University Registrar for their
alleged unjustified refusal to release the respondent’s Transcript of Records (ToR).

Instead of filing an Answer, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss where they claimed that
they refused to release respondent’s ToR because he was not a registered student,
since he had not been enrolled in the university for the last three semesters. After the
parties filed their responsive pleadings, petitioners filed a Supplement to their Motion to
Dismiss, alleging that respondent sought administrative recourse before the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) through a letter-complaint dated January 21,
2003. Thus, petitioners claimed that the CHED had primary jurisdiction to resolve
matters pertaining to school controversies, and the filing of the instant case was
premature.

Issue: WON Rule on Primary Jurisdiction applies in this case

Held: NO. The rule on primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency
exercises quasi-judicial or adjudicatory functions. Thus, an essential requisite for this
doctrine to apply is the actual existence of quasi-judicial power. However, petitioners
have not shown that the CHED possesses any such power to “investigate facts or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions.
Indeed, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7722 otherwise known as the Higher Education
Act of 1994, certainly does not contain any express grant to the CHED of judicial or
quasi-judicial power.

44.

45.
46. EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC vs PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION (POEA)

Facts: Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in
an accident in Tokyo, Japan, March 15, 1985. His widow sued for damages under
Executive Order No. 797 and Memorandum Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner,
as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was cognizable not by the POEA but
by the Social Security System and should have been filed against the State Insurance
Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position
papers of the parties ruled in favor of the complainant. The award consisted of
P180,000.00 as death benefits and P12,000.00 for burial expenses. The petitioner
immediately came to this Court, prompting the Solicitor General to move for dismissal
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Issue: Whether or not POEA is duly delegated to promulgate its own regulations.

Ruling: The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration was created under

Executive Order No. 797, promulgated on May 1, 1982, to promote and monitor the
overseas employment of Filipinos and to protect their rights. It replaced the National
Seamen Board created earlier under Article 20 of the Labor Code in 1974. Under
Section 4(a) of the said executive order, the POEA is vested with "original and exclusive
jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims, involving employee-employer
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino contract
workers, including seamen." Memorandum Circular No. 2 is an administrative
regulation. The model contract prescribed thereby has been applied in a significant
number of the cases without challenge by the employer. The power of the POEA (and
before it the National Seamen Board) in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as
there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority.
That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of
overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices."

47.

48.

49. G.R. No. 170512 October 5, 2011

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO T. REYES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Jaime Acero filed a complaint against Antonio Reyes and Angelito Peñaloza who
were officials/employees of the LTO District Office in Mambajao, Camiguin. In his
affidavit, Acero alleged that he was made to pay an additional assessment of P500.00
in order to get a reconsideration when he failed the examination for his application of
driver’s license.

Peñaloza filed his counter-affidavit denying the allegation and implicating Reyes
as the mastermind behind the illegal exactions from applicants who fail the examination.
He also submitted in evidence the affidavit of Rey Amper, a former employee of LTO, to
support his allegations. Meanwhile, Reyes, in his counter-affidavit denied the accusation
claiming that Acero’s complaint was a mere fabrication and that it was Peñaloza who
pocketed the P500.00.

A preliminary conference was set on July 11, 2001. However, neither of the
accused appeared and the case was deemed submitted for decision. On July 23, 2001,
counsel for Peñaloza informed the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao that he was
waiving his right to a formal investigation and was willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the evidence on record. Peñaloza also submitted the
additional affidavit of one of their witnesses, Rickie Valdehueza. Valdehueza was also
an applicant who failed the examination, but whose test results were adjusted upon
payment of a fee.

On September 24, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao found Reyes

guilty of grave misconduct and Peñaloza of simple misconduct. After Reyes’ Motion for
Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary Conference was denied,
he filed a Petition for Review with the CA.

The CA granted the petition and reversed the judgment of the Ombudsman. It found
that the Ombudsman erred in its appreciation of the evidence presented. Likewise, it
noted that Reyes claimed that he was not furnished any copy of Peñaloza’s counter-
affidavit.

Hence the instant petition for certiorari, averring that the CA erred in not giving weight to
its findings of fact and substituting its own judgment for that of petitioner’s.

ISSUE: Whether respondent’s right to due process was violated

HELD: Yes. The SC found that Reyes’ right to due process was violated when he was
not furnished a copy of the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza before
petitioner rendered its September 2001 Decision.

50. ESTELITO V. REMOLONA vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. 137473

August 2, 2001

FACTS:

Estelito Remolona is the Postmaster of Infanta, Quezon while his wife Nery is a teacher
in Kiborosa Elementary School. On January 3, 1991, Francisco America, the District
Supervisor of Infanta inquired about Nery’s Civil Service eligibility who purportedly got a
rating of 81.25%. Mr. America also disclosed that he received information that Nery was
campaigning for a fee of 8,000 pesos per examinee for a passing mark in the board
examination for teachers. It was eventually revealed that Nery Remolona’s name did not
appear in the passing and failing examinees and that the exam no. 061285 as indicated
in her report of rating belonged to a certain Marlou Madelo who got a rating of
65%.Estelito Remolona in his written statement of facts said that he met a certain Atty.
Salupadin in a bus, who offered to help his wife obtain eligibility for a fee of 3,000
pesos. Mr. America however, informed Nery that there was no vacancy when she
presented her rating report, so Estelito went to Lucena to complain that America asked
for money in exchange for the appointment of his wife, and that from 1986-1988,
America was able to receive 6 checks at 2,600pesos each plus bonus of Nery
Remolona. Remolona admitted that he was responsible for the fake eligibility and that
his wife had no knowledge thereof. On recommendation of Regional Director Amilhasan
of the Civil Service, the CSC found the spouses guilty of dishonesty and imposed a
penalty of dismissal and all its accessory penalties. On Motion for Reconsideration, only
Nery was exonerated and reinstated. On appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for review and denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service
for an offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance
of his official duty.

HELD:
Yes. The private life of an employee cannot be segregated from his public life.
Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee to continue in
office and the discipline and morale of the service. It cannot be denied that dishonesty is
considered a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section
23, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292. And the
rule is that dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the
course of the performance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is
that if a government officer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave
misconduct, even if said defects of character are not connected with his office, they
affect his right to continue in office. The Government cannot tolerate in its service a
dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well, because by reason
of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of
dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government
other than the office where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and
possesses a certain influence and power which renders the victims of his grave
misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed and prepared to resist and to
counteract his evil acts and actuations. Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.