Azarcon vs Sandiganbayan : 116033 :

February 26, 1997 : J. Panganiban :

Third Division
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 116033. February 26, 1997]

ALFREDO L. AZARCON, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and JOSE C.
BATAUSA, respondents.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Petitioner Azarcon here was a contractor who engaged the services of the sub-contractor Jaime Ancla.
The trucks of Ancla were left in the premises of Azarcon. Now, Ancla was delinquent taxpayer; he was
unable to pay his tax liability in the amount of PhP80,000.00. A Warrant of Distraint of Personal
Property (A CIVIL REMEDY FOR COLLECTION OF TAXES) was then issued by the BIR to
Azarcon, commanding him to distraint the Isuzu Dumptruck of Ancla, and to remit the same to BIR.

However, Ancla severed his operations with Azarcon and surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from
Azarcon’s custody. The Regional Director of BIR filed a complaint before the Fiscal (a deputized
Tanodbayan Prosecutor) against Azarcon and Ancla.

In the Sandiganbayan, they were charged with Malversation of Public Funds (under Art. 217 of RPC,
in relation of Art. 222).

INFORMATION:

That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of Surigao del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Alfredo L. Azarcon, a private individual
but who, in his capacity as depository/administrator of property seized or deposited by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, having voluntarily offered himself to act as custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck
(sic) with Motor No. E120-22958, Chasis No. SPZU 50-1772440, and number CXL-6 and was
authorized to be such under the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, has become a responsible
and accountable officer and said motor vehicle having been seized from Jaime C. Ancla in
satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum of EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY
ONE PESOS and 59/100 (P80,831.59) became a public property and the value thereof as public
fund, with grave abuse of confidence and conspiring and confederating with said Jaime C. Ancla,
likewise, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, (sic) unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate, misapply and convert to his personal use and benefit the aforementioned motor
 vehicle or the value thereof in the aforestated amount, by then and there allowing accused Jaime C.
Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with the
authority, consent and knowledge of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Butuan City, to the damage
and prejudice of the government in the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Consider this:

Under P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 (23 March 1983) which was the law at the time of
the commencement of the action (12 January 1990), the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over private
individuals only when the complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within its
jurisdiction.

The Information here does not charge Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a
public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. The Information
presupposes Azarcon as a public officer.

The contention was that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly owned by
Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro
forma receipt for it, effectively designated petitioner a depositary and, hence, a public officer.

RULING

The Court ruled that Azarcon was not a public officer as contemplated under Article 203 of the
RPC.

Article 203 of the RPC does not apply here.

Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by
the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be
deemed authorized by popular election. Azarcon’s designation by the BIR as a custodian of
distrained property hardly qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by competent
authority. The basis of the designation was Article 206 of the NIRC (Constructive Distraint of the
Property of A Taxpayer) The provision authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by
requiring any person in possession of a property distrained, to preserve the same.

There is, however, no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason
of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be
stretched to include the power to appoint him as a public officer.

Art. 222 of the RPC does not apply, too.

According to the prosecution, Article 222 defines the individuals covered by the term officers under
Article 217, and since Azarcon became a depository of the truck seized by the BIR he also became a
public officer.

Article 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions. -- The provisions of this chapter
shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have charge of any insular,
provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to any administrator or depository of
funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public authority, even if such property
belongs to a private individual.

QUESTION: Why is this provision inapplicable?

The Court said that Article 222 refers to a private individual who has in his charge any of the public
funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of
Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a
private individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.

 What is the lacking element? Azarcon did not malverse the property.

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the Azarcon did not cease to be a private individual
when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished dump truck. Therefore, when the information
charged him and Jaime Ancla before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property,
the prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any public officer being similarly
charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy
and therefore all the proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent
Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.

FULL TEXT

Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over a private individual who is

charged with malversation of public funds as a principal after the said
individual had been designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a
custodian of distrained property?Did such accused become a public officer and
therefore subject to the graft courts jurisdiction as a consequence of such
designation by the BIR?

These are the main questions in the instant petition for review of respondent
Sandiganbayans Decision[1] in Criminal Case No. 14260 promulgated on
March 8, 1994, convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds and
property, and Resolution[2] dated June 20, 1994, denying his motion for new
trial or reconsideration thereof.

The Facts
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business,
hauling dirt and ore.[3] His services were contracted by the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) at its concession in Mangagoy,
Surigao del Sur.Occasionally, he engaged the services of sub-contractors like
Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at the formers premises.[4] From this set
of circumstances arose the present controversy.

x x x It appears that on May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal

Property was issued by the Main Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) addressed to the Regional Director (Jose Batausa) or his authorized
representative of Revenue Region 10, Butuan City commanding the latter to
distraint the goods, chattels or effects and other personal property of Jaime
Ancla, a sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and, a delinquent taxpayer. The
Warrant of Garnishment was issued to accused Alfredo Azarcon ordering him
to transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the property in his
possession owned by taxpayer Ancla. The Warrant of Garnishment was
received by accused Azarcon on June 17, 1985.[5]

Petitioner Azarcon, in signing the Receipt for Goods, Articles, and Things
Seized Under Authority of the National Internal Revenue, assumed the
undertakings specified in the receipt the contents of which are reproduced as
follows:

(I), the undersigned, hereby acknowledge to have received from Amadeo V.

San Diego, an Internal Revenue Officer, Bureau of Internal Revenue of the
Philippines, the following described goods, articles, and things:

Kind of property --- Isuzu dump truck

Motor number --- E120-229598
Chassis No. --- SPZU50-1772440
Number of CXL --- 6
Color --- Blue
Owned By --- Mr. Jaime Ancla

the same having been this day seized and left in (my) possession pending
investigation by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized
representative. (I) further promise that (I) will faithfully keep, preserve, and,
to the best of (my) ability, protect said goods, articles, and things seized from
defacement, demarcation, leakage, loss, or destruction in any manner; that (I)
will neither alter nor remove, nor permit others to alter or remove or dispose
of the same in any manner without the express authority of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue; and that (I) will produce and deliver all of said goods,
articles, and things upon the order of any court of the Philippines, or upon
demand of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or any authorized officer or
agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.[6]

Subsequently, Alfredo Azarcon wrote a letter dated November 21, 1985 to the
BIRs Regional Director for Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City stating that

x x x while I have made representations to retain possession of the property

and signed a receipt of the same, it appears now that Mr. Jaime Ancla intends
to cease his operations with us. This is evidenced by the fact that sometime in
August, 1985 he surreptitiously withdrew his equipment from my custody. x x
x In this connection, may I therefore formally inform you that it is my desire
to immediately relinquish whatever responsibilities I have over the above-
mentioned property by virtue of the receipt I have signed. This cancellation
shall take effect immediately. x x x .[7]

Incidentally, the petitioner reported the taking of the truck to the security
manager of PICOP, Mr. Delfin Panelo, and requested him to prevent this truck
from being taken out of the PICOP concession. By the time the order to bar the
trucks exit was given, however, it was too late.[8]

Regional Director Batausa responded in a letter dated May 27, 1986, to wit:

An analysis of the documents executed by you reveals that while you are (sic)
in possession of the dump truck owned by JAIME ANCLA, you voluntarily
assumed the liabilities of safekeeping and preserving the unit in behalf of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. This is clearly indicated in the provisions of the
Warrant of Garnishment which you have signed, obliged and committed to
surrender and transfer to this office. Your failure therefore, to observe said
provisions does not relieve you of your responsibility.[9]

Thereafter, the Sandiganbayan found that

On 11 June 1986, Mrs. Marilyn T. Calo, Revenue Document Processor of

Revenue Region 10 B, Butuan City, sent a progress report to the Chief of the
Collection Branch of the surreptitious taking of the dump truck and that Ancla
was renting out the truck to a certain contractor by the name of Oscar Cueva at
PICOP (Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, the same company
which engaged petitioners earth moving services), Mangagoy, Surigao del
Sur. She also suggested that if the report were true, a warrant of garnishment
be reissued against Mr. Cueva for whatever amount of rental is due from Ancla
until such time as the latters tax liabilities shall be deemed satisfied. x x x
However, instead of doing so, Director Batausa filed a letter-complaint against
the (herein Petitioner) and Ancla on 22 January 1988, or after more than one
year had elapsed from the time of Mrs. Calos report.[10]

Provincial Fiscal Pretextato Montenegro forwarded the records of the

complaint x x x to the Office of the Tanodbayan on May 18, 1988. He was
deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor and granted authority to conduct
preliminary investigation on August 22, 1988, in a letter by Special Prosecutor
Raul Gonzales approved by Ombudsman (Tanodbayan) Conrado Vasquez.[11]

Along with his co-accused Jaime Ancla, petitioner Azarcon was charged before
the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of public funds or property
under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in
the following Information[12]filed on January 12, 1990, by Special
Prosecution Officer Victor Pascual:

That on or about June 17, 1985, in the Municipality of Bislig, Province of

Surigao del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Alfredo L. Azarcon, a private individual but who, in his
capacity as depository/administrator of property seized or deposited by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, having voluntarily offered himself to act as
custodian of one Isuzu Dumptruck (sic) with Motor No. E120-
22958, Chasis No. SPZU 50-1772440, and number CXL-6 and was authorized
to be such under the authority of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, has become
a responsible and accountable officer and said motor vehicle having been
seized from Jaime C. Ancla in satisfaction of his tax liability in the total sum of
EIGHTY THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY ONE PESOS and 59/100
(P80,831.59) became a public property and the value thereof as public fund,
with grave abuse of confidence and conspiring and confederating with said
Jaime C. Ancla, likewise, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, (sic)
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his
personal use and benefit the aforementioned motor vehicle or the value
thereof in the aforestated amount, by then and there allowing accused Jaime
C. Ancla to remove, retrieve, withdraw and tow away the said Isuzu
Dumptruck (sic) with the authority, consent and knowledge of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, Butuan City, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the amount of P80,831.59 in a form of unsatisfied tax liability.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
The petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation before the Sandiganbayan on
May 14, 1991, alleging that: (1) the petitioner never appeared in the
preliminary investigation; and (2) the petitioner was not a public officer,
hence a doubt exists as to why he was being charged with malversation under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.[13] The Sandiganbayan granted the
motion for reinvestigation on May 22, 1991.[14] After the reinvestigation,
Special Prosecution Officer Roger Berbano, Sr., recommended the withdrawal
of the information[15] but was overruled by the Ombudsman.[16]

A motion to dismiss was filed by petitioner on March 25, 1992 on the ground
that the Sandiganbayan did not have jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner since he was not a public officer.[17] On May 18, 1992, the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion.[18]

When the prosecution finished presenting its evidence, the petitioner then
filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence which was denied on
November 16, 1992, for being without merit.[19] The petitioner then
commenced and finished presenting his evidence on February 15, 1993.

The Respondent Courts Decision

On March 8, 1994, respondent Sandiganbayan[20] rendered a Decision,

[21] the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Alfredo Azarcon y Leva GUILTY

beyond reasonable doubt as principal of Malversation of Public Funds defined
and penalized under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal
Code and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in view of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court hereby sentences
the accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in its maximum period to
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of Reclusion Temporal. To indemnify the Bureau of Internal Revenue the
amount of P80,831.59; to pay a fine in the same amount without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; to suffer special perpetual
disqualification; and, to pay the costs.

Considering that accused Jaime Ancla has not yet been brought within the
jurisdiction of this Court up to this date, let this case be archived as against
him without prejudice to its revival in the event of his arrest or voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of this Court.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through new counsel,[22] filed a motion for new trial or

reconsideration on March 23, 1994, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan
in its Resolution[23]dated December 2, 1994.

Hence, this petition.

The Issues

The petitioner submits the following reasons for the reversal of the
Sandiganbayans assailed Decision and Resolution:

I. The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over crimes committed solely
by private individuals.

II. In any event, even assuming arguendo that the appointment of a private
individual as a custodian or a depositary of distrained property is sufficient to
convert such individual into a public officer, the petitioner cannot still be
considered a public officer because:

[A]

There is no provision in the National Internal Revenue Code which authorizes

the Bureau of Internal Revenue to constitute private individuals as
depositaries of distrained properties.

[B]

His appointment as a depositary was not by virtue of a direct provision of law,

or by election or by appointment by a competent authority.

III. No proof was presented during trial to prove that the distrained vehicle
was actually owned by the accused Jaime Ancla; consequently, the
governments right to the subject property has not been established.

IV. The procedure provided for in the National Internal Revenue Code
concerning the disposition of distrained property was not followed by the
B.I.R., hence the distraint of personal property belonging to Jaime C. Ancla
and found allegedly to be in the possession of the petitioner is therefore
invalid.
V. The B.I.R. has only itself to blame for not promptly selling the distrained
property of accused Jaime C. Ancla in order to realize the amount of back
taxes owed by Jaime C. Ancla to the Bureau.[24]

In fine, the fundamental issue is whether the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction

over the subject matter of the controversy. Corollary to this is the question of
whether petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being
designated by the Bureau of Internal Revenue as a depositary of distrained
property.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

It is hornbook doctrine that in order (to) ascertain whether a court has

jurisdiction or not, the provisions of the law should be inquired into.
[25] Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court must appear clearly from the
statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be presumed or implied.
[26] And for this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of a court is
determined by the law at the time of commencement of the action.[27]

In this case, the action was instituted with the filing of this information on
January 12, 1990; hence, the applicable statutory provisions are those of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, but prior to their
amendment by R.A. No. 7975 on May 16, 1995. At that time, Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606 provided that:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in

relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes,
where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED,
HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxxxxxxxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or

accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with
said public officers and employees.

x x x x x x x x x.

The foregoing provisions unequivocally specify the only instances when the
Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction over a private individual, i.e. when the
complaint charges the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime
within its jurisdiction.

Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual?

The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal,

accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be proven a public
officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime
charged. Article 203 of the RPC determines who are public officers:

Who are public officers. -- For the purpose of applying the provisions of this
and the preceding titles of the book, any person who, by direct provision of the
law, popular election, popular election or appointment by competent
authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or
in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.

Thus,

(to) be a public officer, one must be --

(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or

Performing in said Government or any of its branches public duties as
an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class; and

(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to
perform public duties must be --

a. by direct provision of the law, or

b. by popular election, or

c. by appointment by competent authority.[28]

Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck
constructively distrained by the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity
constituting public functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized by
popular election. The next logical query is whether petitioners designation by
the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by
direct provision of law, or by competent authority.[29] We answer in the
negative.

The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint
over the truck allegedly owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring the petitioner
Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign a pro forma receipt for
it, effectively designated petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs.
Rastrollo,[30] a public officer.[31] This is based on the theory that

(t)he power to designate a private person who has actual possession of a

distrained property as a depository of distrained property is necessarily
implied in the BIRs power to place the property of a delinquent tax payer (sic)
in distraint as provided for under Sections 206, 207 and 208 (formerly
Sections 303, 304 and 305) of the National Internal Revenue Code, (NIRC) x x
x.[32]

We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before
us simply because the facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to
those obtaining here. While the cited case involved a judicial deposit of the
proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of the debtor, the case at
bench dealt with the BIRs administrative act of effecting constructive distraint
over alleged property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property
which was received by petitioner Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly
within the scope of that courts jurisdiction and judicial power to constitute the
judicial deposit and give the depositary a character equivalent to that of a
public official.[33] However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority
to require petitioner Azarcon to sign a receipt for the distrained truck, the
NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.

It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited

government, that its branches and administrative agencies exercise only that
power delegated to them as defined either in the Constitution or in legislation
or in both.[34] Thus, although the appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, x x x[35] the quantum of powers possessed by an
administrative agency forming part of the executive branch will still be limited
to that conferred expressly or by necessary or fair implication in its enabling
act. Hence, (a)n administrative officer, it has been held, has only such powers
as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof.[36] Corollarily, implied powers are those which are necessarily
included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It
cannot extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental
thereto.[37] For to so extend the statutory grant of power would be an
encroachment on powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution.
[38] It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed out by the prosecution,
authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring any person to
preserve a distrained property, thus:

xxxxxxxxx

The constructive distraint of personal property shall be effected by requiring

the taxpayer or any person having possession or control of such property to
sign a receipt covering the property distrained and obligate himself to preserve
the same intact and unaltered and not to dispose of the same in any manner
whatever without the express authority of the Commissioner.

xxxxxxxxx

However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public

officer by reason of such requirement. The BIRs power authorizing a private
individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. The prosecution argues that Article 222 of the
Revised Penal Code x x x defines the individuals covered by the term officers
under Article 217[39] x x x of the same Code.[40] And accordingly, since
Azarcon became a depository of the truck seized by the BIR he also became a
public officer who can be prosecuted under Article 217 x x x.[41]

The Court is not persuaded. Article 222 of the RPC reads:

Officers included in the preceding provisions. -- The provisions of this
chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity whatever, have
charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property
and to any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized or
deposited by public authority, even if such property belongs to a private
individual.

Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a

statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is
applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to
only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or
would lead to an injustice.[42] This is particularly observed in the
interpretation of penal statutes which must be construed with such strictness
as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant x x x.[43] The language of
the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any
of the public funds or property enumerated therein and commits any of the
acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the RPC,
should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public
officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private
individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.

After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds petitioner
Alfredo Azarcon and his co-accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals
erroneously charged before and convicted by Respondent Sandiganbayan
which had no jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayans taking cognizance
of this case is of no moment since (j)urisdiction cannot be conferred by x x x
erroneous belief of the court that it had jurisdiction.[44] As aptly and correctly
stated by the petitioner in his memorandum:

From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the petitioner did not cease to
be a private individual when he agreed to act as depositary of the garnished
dump truck.Therefore, when the information charged him and Jaime Ancla
before the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public funds or property, the
prosecution was in fact charging two private individuals without any
public officer being similarly charged as a co-conspirator. Consequently, the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the controversy and therefore all the
proceedings taken below as well as the Decision rendered by Respondent
Sandiganbayan, are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.[45]

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution and Decision of the

Sandiganbayan are hereby SET ASIDE and declared NULL and VOID for lack
of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.