V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS
INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.[38]

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262,
we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition
(CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if
not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court,
it will not be considered on appeal.[39] Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.[40]

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City,
petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is “inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality.”[41]

We disagree.

Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional
Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts
have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children.[42] In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of
the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.[43] To
achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional
Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant.
(Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as
a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special
proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. [44] It is settled that
RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,[45] “this authority being embraced in
the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.”[46] The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all RTCs.[47] We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA[48] that, “[p]lainly the
Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior
courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

x x x

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the
RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an
answer.[49] Thus:

SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he
himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and
third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party.[50] A cross- claim, on the other hand, is any claim
by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.[51] Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim
that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim. [52] As
pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause
of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore,
it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio unius
est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of
private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of which is
being attacked[53] by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause
for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.[54] Be that as it may, Section 25
of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among
others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may
issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits;
and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent
possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis
supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary,
Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11- SC provides that if a temporary protection order issued is due to
expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until
final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order
as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running
afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may
have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an
injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a
petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial
court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the
TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered
the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,[55] with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,[56] should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.[57] In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,[58] the Supreme Court of the United
States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate
and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are
unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for
his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized
and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only
to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits
of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect
women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat
the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again,
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view
of private respondent's plea in her Comment[59] to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge
to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse,
which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough
basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.[60]

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,[61] which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada),
had originally proposed what she called a “synthesized measure” [62] – an amalgamation of two
measures, namely, the “Anti-Domestic Violence Act” and the “Anti- Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act”[63] – providing protection to “all family members, leaving no one in isolation” but at
the same time giving special attention to women as the “usual victims” of violence and
abuse,[64] nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure.
We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have
expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence apart
from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they
fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the
bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a relationship. We would
like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves “WIIR” Women
in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men
are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family, prescribing
penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-
in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.[65]

x x x x

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

x x x x

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and
not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we would
be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to
file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If
we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their
spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.

I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the
men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this representation.
Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how empowered
the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the
macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.

x x x x

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the
family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the family
other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the intended
victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some
relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always the helpless
victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more
or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for
one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that
they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also
recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the
basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in our
society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and wife
and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical
input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and
other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the pe