Study Material for Democracy

Lesson from History by Will Durant (Book)

Voltaire and Rousseau were the heralds of this change; they popularized those invaluable
shibboleths, liberte and egalite, to the music of which the middle class marched to political
supremacy. Originally liberty meant freedom from feudal tyranny and tolls; originally equality
meant the admission of the middle classes, along with the aristocracy and the clergy, to the honors
and spoils of government; originally one suspects, fraternity meant the open access of bankers and
merchants, butchers and bakers and candlestick makers, to aristocratic and episcopal salons. It was
not supposed that these splendid words would be so misunderstood as to embrace all male adults,
much less all women; mere wives and workingmen would understand that no reference to them
was intended. Rousseau, father of democratic theory, wished to exclude all women, and all
propertyless persons, from political power, and did not include them in the term ‘people’. Under
the constitution adopted by the French Revolutionary Assembly, three-fifths of all adult males
were excused from participating in the franchise. Under the laws of various states in our own
republic a property qualification was attached to the franchise until the days of Andrew Jackson.
By its origin, then, and still in its current development, democracy means the rule of the middle
class, government by the second best.
The last contributory cause of our democratic failure is the popularity of ignorance. ‘The
imbecility of men’, said Emerson, “is always inviting the importance of power”. The intelligence
tests confirmed the opinion of those who had watched the elections of the preceding twenty years.
The theory of democracy had presumed that man was a rational animal; no doubt someone had
seen this in a book of logic. But man is an emotional animal, occasionally rational; and through
his feelings he can be deceived to his heart’s content. It may be true, as Lincoln pretended to
believe, that “you can’t fool all the people all the time”; but you can fool enough of them to rule a
large country. It has been computed that the supply of fools, on this planet, is replenished at the
rate of two hundred every minute; which is a bad omen for democracy.
Apparently it is not democracy alone that is a failure; it is ourselves. We forgot to make
ourselves intelligent when we made ourselves sovereign. We thought there was power in numbers,
and we found only mediocrity. The larger the number of voters, the more ordinary must be the
man or the qualities that will appeal to them. We do not demand greatness or foresight in our
elected officials, but only bare-toothed oratory and something this side of starvation. According to
Bacon, “the ancient politicians said of democracies that ‘the people were like the sea, and the
orators like the wind’.” Indeed, we do not much care who govern us; we hardly realize that we are
being governed, just as formerly we thought we paid no taxes because we paid them through the
landlord or the tariff.
Voltaire preferred monarchy to democracy, on the ground that in a monarchy it was only
necessary to educate one man; in a democracy you must educate millions, and the grave-digger
gets them all before you can educate ten percent of them. We hardly realize what pranks the birth
rate plays with our theories and our arguments. The minority acquire education, and have small
families; the majority have no time for education, and have large families; nearly all of each
generation are brought up in homes where the income is too small to provide for the luxury of
knowledge. Hence the perennial futility of political liberalism; the propaganda of intelligence
cannot keep pace with the propagation of the ignorant. And hence the weakness of Protestantism;
a religion, like a nation, is saved not by the wars it wins, but by the children it breeds.

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The Improbable Future of Democracy in Pakistan by S Akbar Zaidi (Research Paper)
While there have been failures of democracy in Pakistan, of the state, and of governance, and
despite the dominance of the military in Pakistan’s state and society, there has also been a
noticeable failure of Pakistan’s civil society. Social groups and institutions located outside of
government and not working purely for profit in the private sector; groups of academics,
intellectuals and journalists; political groups and parties; non-governmental organisations and
community and neighbourhood organisations; and other groups which in some way are perceived
to be of a liberal bent, working to change/improve society, with some notion of justice, all tend to
constitute what is commonly called ‘civil society’.
While there have been failures of democracy in Pakistan, of the state, and of governance, and
despite the dominance of the military in Pakistan’s state and society, there has also been a
noticeable failure of Pakistan’s civil society. Social groups and institutions located outside of
government and not working purely for profit in the private sector; groups of academics,
intellectuals and journalists; political groups and parties; non-governmental organisations and
community and neighborhood organisations; and other groups which in some way are perceived
to be of a liberal bent, working to change/improve society, with some notion of justice, all tend to
constitute what is commonly called ‘civil society’.
In Pakistan, the tendency has been to restrict the notion of civil society to NGOs and other groups,
because they are seen to be working for change. Advocacy NGOs and groups, often criticising
government and ostensibly working for democracy, have been active components of civil society,
as have writers and intellectuals. Yet, when these same groups have become apologists for
government, particularly military rule, and have joined and become partners in military
governments, their credentials to be part of ‘civil’ society have to be questioned. In fact one would
argue, that once civil society actors join the ‘other side’, they are no longer part of civil society.
One major reason why the military tends to dominate state, society and politics in Pakistan, is
because of the failure of civil society in Pakistan. Like other social actors in Pakistan, members of
civil society are eager to be co-opted and ‘serve’ military governments, as has most recently been
seen after General Musharraf’s coup in 1999. Like technocrats, who perhaps make no qualms of
their distaste and distrust of democrats, civil society groups and actors, many of whom have at
least joined the chorus in favour of democracy in the past, also eagerly embraced General
Musharraf and his government and endorsed the military coup in 1999. Important, well-respected
and articulate members of Pakistan’s civil society became ministers in the Musharraf government
and justified their support for military government at the cost of democracy, by arguing that a
liberal and efficient non-elected, undemocratic, authoritarian government, was preferable to an
illiberal, inefficient and increasingly authoritarian democracy. For these actors, democracy as it
was practiced in Pakistan, had failed and was secondary, and what mattered was not a
civilian/military distinction, but apparently, liberal values emanating from the person of one
General, were preferable to illiberal policies being pursued by elected representatives. Pakistan’s
civil society has had a key role in strengthening and supporting military government in Pakistan
at the cost of democracy. Members of the intelligentsia and academics in Pakistan, have done no
better and have had no qualms in supporting military rule in preference to Pakistani style
disfunctioning democracy. Unlike many other countries, in Pakistan, civil society actors13 and
groups have been collaborationists, not confrontationalists, working with military governments,
not against them.

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Making of Pakistan by Khurshid Kamal Aziz (Book)
This is not a flight of fancy. The argument presented here is that nationalism, like so many
other human experiences, is a state of mind. We know that we are a nation; therefore, we are a
nation. It is not logic; it is intuition. It is not dialectics, it is instinct. It is not a thought process
approved by the laws of reasoning. It is a conviction born of insight. It is a vision, an awareness,
which comes to us in the flash of a moment. That is what makes it irresistible. People die for their
faith; they rarely die in defence of reason.
What are the articles of this strange faith which has made and remade modern history,
which has drawn lines across maps upon its own responsibility, which has killed millions in
national wars, and which has also made millions free? A study of modern nationalism points to
thirteen conditions or beliefs which seem to make up its creed.
The first and the most pre-eminent is the common group feeling which inspires the
members of a nation. 'We all belong to one nation' expresses this sentiment. The second, flowing
from the first, is the love for fellow nationals. This certainly does not mean that, say, every
Pakistani loves or likes every other Pakistani; but it does mean that in a foreign country Pakistanis
will tend to get together, or, on a personal level, in a quarrel with a Pakistani and a foreigner, other
Pakistanis will normally side with their compatriot. The third, which is a consequence of the first
two, is common hostility to other like groups. Before 1947 the Muslims of India, who considered
themselves a nation, looked with hostility upon the Hindus and the Sikhs. This hostility is in
proportion to the threat which one national group poses to the existence of the other. This feeling
is inevitable in a country or geographical area occupied by more than one nation, particularly if
one national group feels that its existence is denied or opposed or threatened or even criticized by
the other, for example, in the pre-1947 Imperial India or in the pre-1919 Ottoman Empire.
The fourth is a common territory possessed or coveted by a nation. Once the emotion of
nationalism has been aroused, territory is the first and an indispensable step towards the
establishment of a State. In India the Muslims claimed the Muslim-majority provinces as their
homeland. The Jews have similarly claimed and won Israel as their historical and national home.
The fifth is the existence of a common sovereign government or the desire for it. This is the second
step after a territory has been mentally demarcated and the claim to it staked. Sovereignty, or
politically speaking independence, is usually the final goal of all nationalist movements. Freedom
is the open sesame which has been invoked by all colonial peoples struggling to be their own
masters. The sixth is the existence of common moral, social or economic institutions or ideas.
Medieval history provides some examples of nationalism (though this word was then not used to
describe the movement) based on the Christian religion. In our age nationalism has had such
formidable inspirations as Communism, National Socialism and Fascism. On a less powerful scale
radicalism and reformism have been the ingredients of many nationalist movements.
The seventh is the possession of some common cultural characteristics, such as language,
customs, manners, literature, art, music and folk-lore. If a person shares these with others and
wants to go on sharing them he is a member of that nation. Culture, in its broader sense, is the most
lasting foundation of nationalism. The eighth is common religion. In the secularism of the
twentieth century religion has lost much of its force, yet it has produced the two most controversial
nation-states of the post-war period-Pakistan and Israel. The ninth is common history or common
origin. Whether this history is real or invented is pointless so long as the members of a nation
believe in it and look upon certain common historical figures as national heroes. Similarly, though
modern science rejects both the theory and the purity of races, the feeling of common racial origin
may lead to solidarity of sorts, as the modern Arab movements and the idea of pan-Africanism
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illustrate. The tenth is a common character shared by the national group. Geography, history,
religion and culture combine to mould the contours of national character.
The eleventh is a common pride in national achievements and a common sorrow in national
tragedies. Traditionally this pride attached to feats of arms and this sorrow to military reverses.
But in our technological age, scientific competition, economic rivalry and even educational
jealousy are largely replacing the race for armaments. The twelfth is simple devotion to the nation.
'My country, right or wrong' is one expression, an extreme one perhaps, of this feeling. The last is
the hope that the nation will one day be great, or, if it is already that, the greatest in the world. This
aspiration may work in many directions, depending on the nation's mood and background:
territorial expansion, military power, scientific advance or, in rare cases, academic glory.
The order in which these conditions have been given reflects the nature and composition
of nationalism. Each of the four preceding paragraphs describes one stage in its evolution. The
first enumerates the three feelings (oneness, love for fellow nationals, and hostility to other groups)
which make up the emotional basis of nationalism. The second mentions the three factors
(territory, sovereignty, and social ideas) which form its political and social apparatus. The third
lists the four beliefs (culture, religion, history, and character) which constitute its spiritual
equipment. The fourth portrays the sentiment of nationalism on three time-levels: pride in
historical achievements relates to the past, devotion to the national cause concerns the present, the
wish to achieve greatness is a hope of the future.
Nationalism can be a sentiment, or a policy, or a myth, or a dogma, or a doctrine. It is a
sentiment when it is the love of a common soil, race, language or culture. It is a policy when it is
a desire for independence, security or prestige. It is a myth when it is a mystical devotion to a
vague social whole, the nation, which is more than the sum of its parts. It is a dogma when it is a
belief that the nation is an end in itself and that the individual lives exclusively for the nation. It is
a doctrine when a nation considers itself dominant among other nations or aggressively strives to
be supreme among them (the German Ntionalismus).
These are different aspects of nationalism, not its definitions. As a description each of them
is narrow, inadequate and misleading. As an aspect each represents one facet and concentrates
attention on it. Every nationalism is sui generis and takes on its character and shape from its context
and environment. Each is a mixture of all these ingredients-but never in equal proportions. It is a
compound of all these in varying combinations. One nationalism will emphasize the element of
dogma, another that of sentiment, still another that of policy. The same nationalism may appear
sometimes to underline its doctrinal foundation and sometimes to over-accentuate its mythical
content. However, it is unwise to underestimate or ignore the role of myths in nationalism. They
are liable to obsess the minds of their creators and thus to become not true but real. And a real
myth is a sword which few know how to sheath.
Ideal Democracy
At a minimum, an ideal democracy would have the following features: effective
participation - Before a policy is adopted or rejected, members of the dēmos have the opportunity
to make their views about the policy known to other members; equality in voting - Members of
the dēmos have the opportunity to vote for or against the policy, and all votes are counted as equal;
informed electorate - Members of the dēmos have the opportunity, within a reasonable amount
of time, to learn about the policy and about possible alternative policies and their likely
consequences; citizen control of the agenda - The dēmos, and only the dēmos, decides what
matters are placed on the decision-making agenda and how they are placed there. Thus, the

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democratic process is “open” in the sense that the dēmos can change the policies of the association
at any time; inclusion - Each and every member of the dēmos is entitled to participate in the
association in the ways just described; fundamental rights - Each of the necessary features of
ideal democracy prescribes a right that is itself a necessary feature of ideal democracy: thus every
member of the dēmos has a right to communicate with others, a right to have his voted counted
equally with the votes of others, a right to gather information, a right to participate on an equal
footing with other members, and a right, with other members, to exercise control of the agenda.
Democracy, therefore, consists of more than just political processes; it is also necessarily a system
of fundamental rights.
In modern representative democracies, the features of ideal democracy, to the extent that
they exist, are realized through a variety of political institutions. These institutions, which are
broadly similar in different countries despite significant differences in constitutional structure,
were entirely new in human history at the time of their first appearance in Europe and the United
States in the 18th century. Among the most important of them is naturally
the institution of representation itself, through which all major government decisions and policies
are made by popularly elected officials, who are accountable to the electorate for their actions.
Other important institutions include: Free, fair, and frequent elections - Citizens may participate
in such elections both as voters and as candidates (though age and residence restrictions may be
imposed); freedom of expression - Citizens may express themselves publicly on a broad range of
politically relevant subjects without fear of punishment; independent sources of
information (There exist sources of political information that are not under the control of the
government or any single group and whose right to publish or otherwise disseminate information
is protected by law; moreover, all citizens are entitled to seek out and use such sources of
information.); freedom of association - Citizens have the right to form and to participate in
independent political organizations, including parties and interest groups. Institutions like these
developed in Europe and the United States in various political and historical circumstances, and
the impulses that fostered them were not always themselves democratic. Yet, as they developed,
it became increasingly apparent that they were necessary for achieving a satisfactory level of
democracy in any political association as large as a nation-state. The relation between these
institutions and the features of ideal democracy that are realized through them can be summarized
as follows. In an association as large as a nation-state, representation is necessary for effective
participation and for citizen control of the agenda; free, fair, and frequent elections are necessary
for effective participation and for equality in voting; and freedom of expression, independent
sources of information, and freedom of association are each necessary for effective participation,
an informed electorate, and citizen control of the agenda.
Why should “the people” rule? Is democracy really superior to any other form of
government? Although a full exploration of this issue is beyond the scope of this article, history—
particularly 20th-century history— demonstrates that democracy uniquely possesses a number of
features that most people, whatever their basic political beliefs, would consider desirable: (1)
democracy helps to prevent rule by cruel and vicious autocrats; (2) modern
representative democracies do not fight wars with one another; (3) countries with democratic
governments tend to be more prosperous than countries with nondemocratic governments; and (4)
democracy tends to foster human development—as measured by health, education, personal
income, and other indicators—more fully than other forms of government do. Other features of
democracy also would be considered desirable by most people, though some would regard them
as less important than features 1 through 4 above: (5) democracy helps people to protect their

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fundamental interests; (6) democracy guarantees its citizens fundamental rights that
nondemocratic systems do not, and cannot, grant; and (7) democracy ensures its citizens a broader
range of personal freedoms than other forms of government do. Finally, there are some features of
democracy that some people—the critics of democracy—would not consider desirable at all,
though most people, upon reflection, would regard them as at least worthwhile: (8) only democracy
provides people with a maximum opportunity to live under laws of their own choosing; (9) only
democracy provides people with a maximum opportunity to take moral responsibility for their
choices and decisions about government policies; and (10) only in a democracy can there be a
relatively high level of political equality.
These advantages notwithstanding, there have been critics of democracy since ancient
times. Perhaps the most enduring of their charges is that most people are incapable of participating
in government in a meaningful or competent way because they lack the necessary
knowledge, intelligence, wisdom, experience, or character. Thus Plato, as noted above, argued that
the best government would be an aristocracy of “philosopher-kings” whose
rigorous intellectual and moral training would make them uniquely qualified to rule. The view that
the people as a whole are incapable of governing themselves has been espoused not only by kings
and aristocratic rulers but also by political theorists (Plato foremost among them), religious leaders,
and other authorities. The view was prevalent in one form or another throughout the world during
most of recorded history until the early 20th century, and since then it has been most
often invoked by opponents of democracy in Europe and elsewhere to justify various forms
of dictatorship and one-party rule. No doubt there will be critics of democracy for as long as
democratic governments exist. The extent of their success in winning adherents and promoting the
creation of nondemocratic regimes will depend on how well democratic governments meet the
new challenges and crises that are all but certain to occur.
Ethnic and Cultural Nationalism:
Does nationalism embrace two, quite distinct traditions? Does nationalism have a ‘good’ face and
a ‘bad’ face? The idea that there are, in effect, ‘two nationalisms’ is usually based on the belief
that nationalism has contrasting civic and ethnic forms. What is often called civic nationalism is
fashioned primarily out of shared political allegiances and political values. The nation is thus an
‘association of citizens’. Civic nationalism has been defended on the grounds that it is open and
voluntaristic: membership of the nation is based on choice and self-definition, not on any
predetermined ethnic or historical identity. It is a form of nationalism that is consistent with
toleration and liberal values generally, being forward-looking and compatible with a substantial
degree of cultural and ethnic diversity. Critics, however, have questioned whether civic
nationalism is meaningful (Kymlicka 1999). Most citizens, even in a ‘civic’ or ‘political’ nation,
derive their nationality from birth, not choice. Moreover, divorced from the bonds of ethnicity,
language and history, political allegiances and civic values may simply be incapable of generating
the sense of belonging and rootedness that gives nationalism its power. By contrast, ethnic
nationalism is squarely rooted in ethnic unity and a deep sense of cultural belonging. This form of
nationalism is often criticized for having a closed or fixed character: it is difficult, and perhaps
impossible, for non-citizens to become members of the nation. Nationalism therefore acquires a
homogenizing character, breeding a fear or suspicion of foreigners and strengthening the idea of
cultural distinctiveness, often interwoven with a belief in national greatness. Ethnic nationalism is
thus irrational and tends to be tribalistic, even bloodthirsty. On the other hand, its capacity to
generate a closed and fixed sense of political belonging may also be a virtue of ethnic nationalism.

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‘Ethnic’ or ‘cultural’ nations tend to be characterized by high levels of social solidarity and a strong
sense of collective purpose.
The Improbable Future of Democracy in Pakistan by S Akbar Zaidi
The core argument of this paper on the future of democracy in Pakistan, is that since the social
groups and classes who have the most to gain from establishing democratic institutions in the
country, in order to access the state and its actors, already have access to the state and to the nexus
of power, they do not have the need for messy democracy, participation and accountability. We
argue, that Pakistan’s15 social structure is one where the urban and rural middle classes are already
part of the nexus of power in Pakistan, and so they have all the benefits which accrue to groups
which would thrive for such access through whatever means, including the recourse to popular
participation and democracy.
There have been two attempts at real democratisation in Pakistan, at precisely those junctures
where the democratising forces had much to gain from capturing a share in the state’s power. In
the late 1960s, as we show above, capitalist development created new classes and new
contradictions in the urban and rural structures of society. These new emerging social classes had
not been part of the older political settlement. The movement for democracy under Bhutto at the
end of the 1960s, took place (and successfully) precisely because the middle class vanguard of the
democratic revolution was not part of the nexus of power of the state. The second moment came
about under General Zia ul Haq, when women and liberal sections of society were active in the
movement to oust the military dictatorship since they had been excluded from access to the state
and its resources and power, to the extent that they felt it necessary to raise the democratic flag.
As long as the state – even a military state – allows multiple groups and classes access to the nexus
of power, particularly to those groups which can be mobilised and vocal, a movement for
democracy in Pakistan seems improbable.
One of the wild cards in the political and social scene at the moment, is the Islamic movement.
Ironically at the moment, the Islamic parties seem to be playing a pro-democratic (and in a sense,
an anti-imperialist) role since they have taken it upon themselves to confront the Musharraf
government, both on account of its domestic non-democratic agenda, and on account of its pro-
US policies. However, as we argue earlier, the Islamic parties are in Parliament largely because of
the particular conditions and specific circumstances which existed at the time of the 2002 elections
– the US role in the region and Musharraf’s support for it, the exile of the three main political
leaders, etc. This electoral presence of the Islamic parties should not be seen as a manifestation of
the desire by Pakistanis for an Islamic theocratic state; these parties have been resoundingly routed
in elections in the past. And while there is a noticeable drift towards conservatism and even
towards appropriating Islamic symbols and following rituals, this need not translate into the
electoral triumph of Islamic parties. Leaders from these parties have been part of the oddest of
alliances in the past with mainstream parties as well as with the military; these groups are just the
same as other actors on the Pakistani political scene. It must also be emphasised, that Islam is very
much part of the cultural and social milieu of Pakistan and Pakistan will not move towards
becoming a secularised state for years to come, if ever. Yet, Islam is neither a problem nor a
constraint towards any move towards a possible democracy; it has only been used as an excuse to
abort democracy, an excuse which has been swept away every time there has been space created
for people to register their genuine opinions. Our argument in this paper has been that it is largely
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structural factors, and a politics of opportunism – to which the Islamic parties are also a party --
that hinders democracy. Islam has never been the problem.
This paper has also been arguing about the dominance of an urban Pakistan, one that is
increasingly non-rural, non-agricultural, and certainly not ‘feudal’. One, where social, economic,
political and cultural trends and development are urban rather than rural. We have also argued that
Pakistan is now dominated by urban middle class factions and social groups, and has an urban,
modern, feel to it. Urbanization has laid the ‘bases for the realignment for social organisations and
the redefinition of social relations as well as cultural norms’. Yet, while this demographic, cultural
and social account is real, it has not brought about a progressive political movement which is
modern or democratic. Unlike other countries where the rising urban middle classes have struggled
for collective social emancipation and for democracy, Pakistan’s middle classes have preferred to
become partners of authoritarian and military governments. These groups have not been a ‘natural’
ally for democrats and have displayed opportunistic (though perhaps, rational) behaviour,
compromising at each historical juncture. Moreover, the experience that Pakistani citizens have
had with democracy during the 1990s, a democracy which was controlled and manipulated by the
military, has found few enthusiasts for the idea and practice of democracy in Pakistan.
Perhaps it would be no exaggeration to state, that based on experience and example from recent
years, there is no substantial real and concerted constituency in Pakistan for democracy, and people
in general, and the urban middle classes in particular, are largely interested in fulfilling their
narrow economistic goals and interests, as well as those related to the acquisition of power through
whatever means possible. Or, as we also argue, perhaps these classes have partly captured the state
and find representation more manageable through alliances and jore-tore, rather than through the
cumbersome and less certain path of participation. Whichever way one looks at it, with regard to
their antagonistic disposition towards democracy, Pakistan’s urban middle classes reflect trends
which seem to be against the norm found in other countries and also across time, and are perhaps
unique to Pakistan. While there will always be a politics in Pakistan – of the politicians, of the
military, of the mullahs and of the16 common man – there is no reason to expect that there will
necessarily be any move towards a democracy. Amartya Sen’s ‘Argumentative Indian’, in the
context of Pakistan, is a political actor, probably an authoritarian one, but certainly not a
democratic one.
Democracy by Mazhar ul Haq
Democracy is a complex term with various meanings. It can be conceived as a political
system, an ethical idea or a social condition. We can describe a State, a government or a society,
an institution, an idea or an ideal as democratic. Here we shall deal with democracy as a political
system or institution and as an ideal.
The word ‘democracy’ is derived from two Greek words, “demos” which means ‘the
people’ and “kratos” which means ‘the rule’. So originally and really, democracy means the rule
of the people. As a form of government, it means the rule of the many, and as a form of
representative government, it means the rule of the majority. It is variously defined by the various
writers. Aristotle, who disliked democracy, defined it as the rule of the mob, and condemned it.
Seeley defined it as “a government in which everyone has a share.” Dicey defines it as a form of
government in which “the governing body is a comparatively large function of the entire nation.”
Bryce says, “The word democracy has been used ever since the time of Herodotus to denote that

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form of government in which the ruling power of a State is largely vested, not in any particular
class or classes but in the members of the community as a whole.” He further adds that the ruling
power in the community belongs to the majority, which is the only way of determining the will of
the community. Abraham Lincoln said that Democracy is the government of the people, by the
people and for the people. Gettell defines it as “that form of government in which the mass of the
population possesses the right to share in the exercise of sovereign power.”
Modern democracy is a product of three historical developments, viz., English
partiamentary system, the great French Revolution of 1789 with its slogans of “sovereignty of the
people”, and the liberty, equality and fraternity, and the Industrial Revolution which began first in
England and then spread over to Europe during the nineteenth century. In other words, modern
indirect form of democracy came into being during the nineteenth century and spread almost over
the whole world during the twentieth century. However, after the World War II, it became so
popular and horrific a term many a dictatorship styled itself as democratic. The result is, as a
UNESCO report says, that “for the first time in the history of the world practical politicians and
the political theorists agree in stressing the democratic element in the institutions they defend and
in the theories they advocate.” This misuse of the term “democracy” has led Bertrand de Jonvenel
to say that “discussion about democracy is intellectually worthless because we do not know what
we are talking about”. But this means that we should carefully analyse this concept rather to despair
of defining it.
Democracy may stand both for an ideal and a reality. The reason is that democratic
institutions, values, attitudes, habits, beliefs and practices are not uniformly found in the States
which claim to be democratic. Consequently, we may divide democracies into three types: (i) full
democracies which possess all democratic institutions, values, practices, etc; e.g. USA., U.K.,
Sweden, etc; (ii) semi-democracies, which are mixtures of democratic and autocratic institutions
and ways of government, e.g., Yugoslavia, India, Thailand, etc; and (iii) pseudo-democracies,
which are democracies only in name but not in fact; they are really dictatorships masquerading or
styled as democracies ; examples of too many to mention here, e.g. Ayyubi dictatorship in
Pakistan, or the so called People’s Democracies in Eastern Europe, including Stalinist Russia, etc.
The criteria which distinguish a democracy from a non-democratic state are the following
democratic institutions, values and practices: opposition and competitive parties, free press,
majority rule with respect for the rights of the minorities; constitutional government, providing
opportunities for alternative government; fundamental rights; maximization of equality; free and
fair elections; responsible political and governmental leadership; absence of social, economic,
cultural or regional distinctions on the basis of caste, clan, creed, sex, nationality, colour or
religion. A democracy which lacks these criteria partially or wholly may be classified as semi or
pseudo-democracy respectively. In other words, what makes a state democratic is not the
government for the people but the government of the people, on the basis of the criteria mentioned
above.
Democracy in Pakistan” by Hasan Askari Rizvi
The major features of the Pakistani polity show serious problems of democracy. At times,
democracy and participatory governance are either totally non-existent or their quality is poor.
Institutional Imbalance:
Pakistan inherited institutional imbalance at the time of independence in August 1947. The state
apparatus, i.e. the bureaucracy, the military and the intelligence services, was more organized and
developed than the political and democratic institutions. Further, the first Interim Constitution,
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1947, also strengthened bureaucracy and authoritarian governance. This imbalance was reinforced
by two inter-related trends in the political domain.
First, the process of political decay and degeneration was set in motion soon after independence.
The Muslim League that led the independence movement, lacked sufficient organization and
capacity for state and nation building. A good number of Muslim League leaders had feudal or
semi-feudal background, and were motivated by personal or power ambition rather than building
the party as a viable organization capable of standing on its own feet. Other political parties also
suffered from similar problems of internal disharmony and conflict, indiscipline and a lack of
direction. As a consequence, they were unable to offer a viable alternative to the Muslim League
and failed to articulate and aggregate interests within a participatory national political framework.
They also failed to create viable political institutions or processes capable of pursuing meaningful
socio-economic policies.
Second, the bureaucracy and the military maintained their professional disposition marked by
hierarchy, discipline, and esprit de corps. The serious administrative problems in the early years
of independence led the civilian government to seek the support of the military and the
bureaucracy. Pakistan’s security problems with India, especially the first Kashmir war, also helped
to strengthen the military’s position in the polity. All Pakistani civilian governments supported a
strong defence posture and allocated a substantial portion of the national budget to defence and
security. The military’s position in the polity received additional boost with Pakistan’s
participation in the U.S. sponsored military alliances in the mid-1950s. This facilitated weapon
transfers to Pakistan and its military obtained training by Americans in Pakistan and the U.S. which
increased the military’s efficiency and strike power. Thus, the degeneration of the political
machinery was in sharp contrast to the increasing efficiency, discipline, and confidence of the
military.
These developments accentuated institutional imbalance and worked to the disadvantage of the
civilian leaders. The weak and fragmented political forces found it difficult to sustain themselves
without the support and cooperation of the bureaucracy and the military. This enabled the
bureaucracy and the military to enhance their role in policy making and management and they
began to dominate politics. In October 1958, the military swept aside the fragile political
institutions and established its direct rule, with the bureaucracy as the junior partner.
These developments accentuated institutional imbalance and worked to the disadvantage of the
civilian leaders. The weak and fragmented political forces found it difficult to sustain themselves
without the support and cooperation of the bureaucracy and the military. This enabled the
bureaucracy and the military to enhance their role in policy making and management and they
began to dominate politics. In October 1958, the military swept aside the fragile political
institutions and established its direct rule, with the bureaucracy as the junior partner.
Political Consensus-building:
The democratic process cannot become functional without a minimum consensus on the
operational norms of the polity. The minimum consensus is the beginning point. As the political
process functions over time and it offers opportunities for sharing power and political
advancement, it evokes more support from among different sections of the society and the polity.
The scope of consensus widens when more groups and individuals enter the political mainstream
through the democratic norms as set out in the constitution and law. This makes the political
institutions and processes viable.

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The Pakistani polity has been unable to fully develop a consensus on the operational political
norms. Whatever understanding developed among the competing interests at one point of time was
allowed to fitter away with the passage of time because of the non-accommodating disposition of
the competing interests and an open defiance of constitutionalism and norms of democracy.
Therefore, all constitutions turned controversial with the passage of time because they were
violated by the power wielders.
Pakistan functioned without a constitution for years under martial law imposed by the Army Chief
which made him the repository of all authority and power in the country. If constitution can be
easily set aside or subordinated to the will of the military ruler, the tradition of constitutionalism
and participatory governance cannot develop. The civilian rulers also amended the constitution in
a partisan manner by employing parliamentary majority, and disregarded the need of building
consensus.
A low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor tradition of open debate on important national issues
has hindered the growth of a broadly shared consensus on the framework for political action. The
dominant elite often endeavoured to develop selective consensus by excluding those disagreeing
with them. It is not merely the dominant elite who suppress dissent, several civil society groups
manifest intolerance and use violence against those who question their views.
A low level of tolerance of dissent and a poor tradition of open debate on important national issues
has hindered the growth of a broadly shared consensus on the framework for political action. The
dominant elite often endeavoured to develop selective consensus by excluding those disagreeing
with them. It is not merely the dominant elite who suppress dissent, several civil society groups
manifest intolerance and use violence against those who question their views.
Political Parties and Leadership:
Political harmony and democratic evolution is facilitated primarily by political parties and leaders.
These are important instruments of interest articulation and aggregation and serve as vehicles of
political mobilization. In Pakistan, political parties have traditionally been weak and unable to
perform their main function in an effective and meaningful manner.
The role of the political parties has suffered due to, inter alia, periodic restrictions on political
activities under military rule, infrequent elections, weak organizational structure and poor
discipline among the members, absence of attractive socio-economic pogrammes, and a paucity of
financial resources. Political parties also suffer from factionalism based on personality, region and
ideology.
The Muslim League that led the independence movement failed to transform itself from a national
movement to a national party. It suffered from organizational incoherence, ideological confusion
and a crisis of leadership. The parties that emerged in the post-independence period could not
present a better alternative. They suffered from the weaknesses that ailed the Muslim League.
Consequently, the political parties could not work for political consensus building and political
stability and continuity.
Most Pakistani political parties lack resources and trained human-power to undertake dispassionate
and scientific study of the socio-political and economic problems. The emphasis is on rhetoric and
sloganeering which may be useful for mobilization purposes but it cannot be a substitute to serious,
scientific and analytical study of the societal problems. The level of debate in the two houses of
the parliament and provincial assemblies is low and these elected bodies often face the shortage of

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quorum which shows the non-seriousness of the political parties and their members in the elected
houses in dealing with the national issues and problems. Quite often the ministers and
parliamentary secretaries are not available in the house to respond to the issues raised by the
members.
The political parties or their coalitions that exercised power since the mid-1950s were either floated
by the establishment (the military and top bureaucracy and the intelligence agencies) or these
enjoyed its blessings. The coalition building at the national level in pre-1958 period and especially
the setting up of the Republican Party in 1956, provides ample evidence of the role of the
establishment in party politics. Generals Ayub Khan patronized a faction of the Muslim League
which was turned into the ruling party in 1962-63. General Zia-ul-Haq pursued a similar strategy.
He co-opted a faction of the Muslim League which ruled with his blessings after he restored
civilian and constitutional rule in 1985. General Pervez Musharraf9 has done the same by co-
opting a faction of the Muslim League and installed governments under its leadership at the federal
level and in Sindh, Balochistan and the Punjab in November-December 2002.
The only exception to this rule of state sponsorship of the ruling parties is the Awami League (pre-
1971) and the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) which did not owe their origin and rise to political
eminence to the establishment. The Awami League won the 1970 general elections despite the
strong opposition of the military government. So did the Pakistan People Party (PPP) which won
majorities in the 1970s in the Punjab and Sindh. In 1971, the Awami League was pushed out of
Pakistan. The military transferred power to the PPP after it lost the war to India in December 1971.
The PPP continues to face the distrust of the establishment.
The political parties formed electoral alliances and political coalitions. These have generally been
ephemeral in nature because of differences in their political orientations and limited experience of
working together. Furthermore, each party suffers from internal incoherence which undermines its
role in a coalition. Political parties have been relatively more successful as a movement for
pursuing a limited agenda like the overthrow of a sitting government, than as a political party
because this requires a viable organization and a broadly shared long term political agenda.
Islam and Politics:
A predominant majority of Pakistanis agree that the Pakistani political system must have some
relationship with Islam. However, there are strong differences on the precise nature of relationship
between Islam and the polity. There is a lack consensus on the institutions and processes to be set
up under the rubric of Islamic state. Most conservative and orthodox elements want to establish a
puritanical Islamic state with an emphasis on the punitive, regulative and extractive role of the
Islamic state. Others emphasize the egalitarian norms of Islam and underline the principles of
equality, socioeconomic justice and the modern notions of the state, civil and political rights and
participatory governance. To them, Islam is a source of guidance and provides the ethical
foundations of the polity rather than offering a specific political structure or a legal code for the
modern times. Another debate pertains to the political disposition of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the
founder of Pakistan: Did he advocate an ideological Islamic state or a secular system with no links
with Islam or a modern democratic state that viewed Islam as one of the sources of law and ethics?
Still another issue is how far the Two-nation theory is relevant to the post-independence period for
shaping political choices? Was Pakistan created as a Muslim state or an Islamic state?

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General Zia-ul-Haq tilted the political balance in favour of the orthodox and conservative
interpretation of the Islamic polity in order to win over the conservative and orthodox religious
groups. He made several administrative and legal changes reflecting the puritanical Islamic
principles as advocated by the orthodox and conservative groups. This increased religious and
cultural intolerance and religious extremism in Pakistan. The official circles and the religious
groups engaged in massive propaganda against the notion of participatory governance,
constitutionalism, and the rule of law, equal citizenship and civil and political rights as western
implants in Pakistan.
The post-Zia civilian governments were too weak to undo the Islamic laws made by the military
regime of Zia-ul-Haq. General Musharraf talks of enlightened moderation as the organizing
principle for the Pakistani political system but he too did not revise the Islamic laws and
punishments introduced by General Zia-ul-Haq. He is constrained by the need of the support of
the Muttahida-i-Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), a conglomerate of 6 Islamic conservative parties, for
staying in power. The rise of Islamic orthodoxy has also increased Islamic-sectarian violence
which poses a major threat to the fabric of the Pakistani society.
The inconclusive debate on Islam’s relationship with the Pakistani state and the political system
adversely affects the prospects of democracy. Most conservative and orthodox Islamic groups
reject democracy as a western system or support it to the extent of using the electoral process to
attain power and then implement their notion of Islamic system. As long as there is a lack of
consensus on the precise relationship between Islam and the Pakistan’s constitutional, legal and
political system, democratic institutions and processes would not fully develop and become
sustainable.
Military Rule and Constitutional and Political Engineering:
The repeated assumption of power by the military and its desire to shape the Pakistani polity in
accordance with its political preferences has also undermined the steady growth and sustainability
of democratic institutions and processes. The military rulers either abolished the constitution or
suspended it to acquire supreme legislative and administrative powers. This disrupted the
development of civilian institutions and processes and made it impossible for them to develop
strong roots in the polity. After every ten years or so, the military returned the country to square
one, promising to introduce a system designed to respond to the needs and aspiration of the people
and reflected the operational political realities of the country.
While establishing the post military rule political order the military regimes did not pursue a non-
partisan approach. The overriding consideration with the military rulers was to ensure their stay in
power and the continuity of the policies introduced during the period of direct military rule. They
engaged in constitutional engineering either by introducing a new constitution (Ayub Khan in
1962)) or by making drastic changes in the existing constitutional system to protect the interests
of the military regime. Zia-ulHaq and Pervez Musharraf introduced far reaching changes in the
1973 constitution in 1985 and 2002 respectively to sustain their centrality to the political process
and to ensure that no political party could unilaterally alter the policy measures adopted by the
military regime.
Constitutional engineering was coupled with the co-option of the political elite that was willing to
play politics in accordance with the rules determined by the military rulers and supported their
continued stay in power. Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf resorted to co-option of a
section of the political elite. Their co-option strategy focused on some faction of the Muslim
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League. The strategy of co-option pre-supposed the exclusion of those who openly challenged the
military-initiated political arrangements. This strategy was adopted by the above named military
rulers for replacing direct military rule with new political arrangements based on sharing of power
between the top brass of the military and the co-opted political leadership. Another strategy
adopted by the Pakistani military rulers was the holding of carefully managed general elections to
ensure that the co-opted leaders performed better than their adversaries.
The political institutions and processes created by the military regime reflected the military ethos
of hierarchy, discipline and management and were often based on a narrow and selective
consensus. These institutions and processes could not develop an autonomous political profile and
remained closely associated with the generals. That was the major reason that they often faltered
in responding to the demands for political participation and socio-economic justice. The quality of
democracy was poor in the post-military rule political arrangements.
Historical Development of Democracy in Pakistan
Pakistan, like India, adopted the Government of India Act, 1935 with some changes to meet the
requirements of an independent state as the Interim Constitution, 1947. It provided for a
parliamentary system of government, although the governor general enjoyed special powers and
the federal government exercised some overriding powers over provinces. Pakistan’s early rulers
did not pay much attention to democratization of the political system because their major concern
was how to ensure the survival of the state in view of internal and external challenges. The fear of
the collapse of the state reinforced authoritarian governance and political management.
Pakistan faced serious administrative and management problems caused by the partition process
These included the division of civil and military assets of the British Indian government between
India and Pakistan, communal riots and the movement of population to and from Pakistan, and the
troubled relations with India, including the first war on Kashmir, 1947-48. Pakistan had to set up
a federal government in Karachi and a provincial government in Dhaka at a time when it lacked
experienced civil servants and military officers.
While Pakistan was coping with initial administrative and humanitarian problems, Mohammad Ali
Jinnah, the father of the nation, died in September 1948, thirteen months after the establishment
of Pakistan. This set in motion the political trends that undermined the already weak political
institutions and fragmented the political process. Most of post-Jinnah political leaders had regional
and local stature and did not have a nationwide appeal which regionalized and localized politics.
This made it difficult for the political parties and leaders to pursue a coherent approach towards
the problems and issues of the early years. They were unable to develop consensus on the
operational norms of the polity and took 8 ½ years to frame a constitution which did not enjoy the
unqualified support of all the major parties, leaders and regions. By the time the constitution was
introduced (March 23, 1956) a strong tradition of violation of parliamentary norms was
established, the political parties were divided and the assembly was unable to assert its primacy.
The effective power had shifted to the Governor General/President.
The acute administrative problems, degeneration of the political parties and the inability of the
political leaders to command widespread political support enabled the governor general to amass
power. He manipulated the divided political forces and decided about the making or unmaking of
governments. Given the bureaucratic background of Governor Generals (Ghulam Muhammad
(1951-55) and a combined military and civilian-bureaucratic background of Governor
General/President Iskander Mirza (1955-1958); they could rely on the top bureaucracy and the

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military for support. This contributed to the rise of the bureaucratic-military elite in Pakistani
politics which further undermined the prospects of democracy.
By 1954-55, the top brass of the military (mainly the Army) emerged as the key policy makers
along with the bureaucracy. They made major input to policy making on foreign policy, security
issues and domestic affairs. By October 1958, the Army Chief, General Muhammad Ayub Khan,
overthrew the tottering civilian government with the full support of President Iskander Mirza. The
latter was knocked out of power by the generals within 20 days of the military take-over. Since
then the top brass of the military have either ruled the country directly or influenced governance
and policy management from the background.
The first military ruler, Ayub Khan, ruled the country under martial law from October 1958 to
June 1962, when he introduced a presidential constitution. Though direct military rule came to an
end but the 1962 Constitution attempted to give a legal and constitutional cover to Ayub’s
centralized and authoritarian rule which did not allow the growth of autonomous civilian
institutions and processes, although the state media projected his rule as the beginning of a new
era of participatory governance. His government’s political management and economic policies
accentuated economic disparities among the people and the regions and caused much political and
social alienation in parts of Pakistan, especially in what was then East Pakistan.
Ayub Khan was replaced by another general, Yahya Khan, in March 1969, who abrogated Ayub’s
1962 Constitution and imposed martial law in the country. This was another troubled period in
Pakistan’s politics. The military government was unable to cope with the demands from East
Pakistan for socioeconomic equity and political participation. The military resorted to an extremely
brutal military action in East Pakistan (March 25, 1971 onwards) and engaged in a war with India
(November-December 1971). Pakistan’s military debacle at the hands of India led to the break up
of the original Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh as an independent state. Such a major
military and political setback forced General Yahya Khan to quit and handover power on
December 20, 1971 to a civilian leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whose Pakistan People’s Party had the
largest number of the National Assembly seats in what was left of Pakistan, i.e. the present
Pakistan.
Z.A. Bhutto asserted civilian primacy over the military during his rule (December 20, 1971 to July
5, 1977) against the backdrop of the serious damage to the military’s reputation in the wake of the
military debacle of 1971. Initially, he retired several senior officers and changed the military’s
command structure. However, his ability to assert his primacy over the military eroded when he
began to cultivate the military’s support to pursue his strident policy towards India and employed
authoritarian methods to deal with the domestic opposition. When the opposition launched anti-
Bhutto agitation on the pretext that the government had rigged the 1977 general elections, the
military led General Zia-ul-Haq, Chief of the Army Staff, had no problem in dislodging Bhutto
and assuming power on July 5, 1977. The opposition parties welcomed the military take over
because it removed Bhutto from power.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s martial law from July 1977 to December 1985 was the longest period of
direct military rule in Pakistan. He sought political support for his rule by vowing the orthodox
and conservative Islamic groups and tilted the state policies heavily in their favour. His rule was
helped by his government’s partnership with the West, especially the United States, for reinforcing
Afghan-Islamic resistance to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. As a frontline state
for the U.S. policy to dislodge the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, General Zia’s government
obtained international financial and diplomatic support which contributed to sustaining his military
rule. His policies promoted religious extremism and militancy, undermining the prospects of social
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and cultural pluralism and participatory institutions and processes. These trends continued after he
civilianized his military rule in 1985 by introducing far reaching changes in the 1973 Constitution
and co-opting a section of the political elite to ensure his continued centrality to governance and
political management.
In the post Zia period (1988-99) the elected civilian governments functioned but the top
commanders closely monitored the performance of these governments and made their views on
political and security matters known to them. The generals were prepared to stay on the sidelines
provided their professional and corporate interests were not threatened by the civilian leaders.
Therefore, governance for Benazir Bhutto (December 1988-August 1990, October 1993-
November 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (November 1990-July 1993, February 1997-October 1999)
was a delicate balancing act between the civilian government and the top brass of the military. The
scope for autonomous political action by the civilian leaders depended on their ability to maintain
cordial interaction with the top military commanders.
The military returned to power on October 12, 1999 after dislodging the civilian government of
Nawaz Sharif. There were two significant changes in the disposition of the senior military
commanders during the fourth phase of direct military rule. First, the military was no longer willing
to stay on the sidelines and viewed itself as critical to internal stability and continuity. It advocated
a direct and constitutional role for the top brass. Second, the military expanded its nonprofessional
role to such an extent that it could not give a free hand to the civilian political leaders.
The military has spread out in government and semi-government institutions and pursues wide
ranging commercial and business activities, especially in the fields of industry, transport, health
care, education, and real estate development. It seeks assignments from the federal and provincial
governments for civil construction projects. Given the military’s expanded interests and its
involvement in governance, its role in Pakistan can be described as hegemonic.
Pakistan Political Parties by Mariam Mufti, Sahar Shafat & Niloufer Siddique (Book)
Pakistan’s electoral system has gone through many manifestations over the years since its
independence. Elections have been held through an electoral college structure comprising
members of local bodies; through nonparty means, only at the provincial level; and on the one
person-one vote basis of today. It should not therefore be surprising that parties in Pakistan have
sought to keep up with these changes, adjusting their tactics and policies in order to achieve the
greatest electoral success. For example, nonparty local elections introduced under General Zia-ul-
Haq disadvantaged the popular PPP by privileging local-and patronage-politics over national
politics.
Given these circumstances, how can we categorize political parties in Pakistan and across which
cleavages and platforms?
Mainstream Parties
From 1988 until approximately 2013, two political parties-the PPP and the PML-N-dominated
political competition in Pakistan. Moe recently, the PTI, which received the largest number of
votes in 2018, has proved to be a viable third-party option. Together, these parties can be thought
of as the primary “mainstream” parties in Pakistan’s political system, distinct from those parties
that appeal primarily to one ethnic group or region or those that are avowedly Islamist in nature.
All three of these parties have in common a weak organizational structure and an overreliance on
local notables or elites in lieu of party workers. While the PML-N and the PTI are considered right-
of-center, particularly in comparison to the left-leaning PPP, this ideological positioning has not
prevented electoral candidates and party members from switching across the three parties.
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The PML-N inherited its legacy from the All India Muslim League, whose struggle led to the
establishment of a separate homeland for Muslims in 1947. But, as Saeed Shafqat writes in chapter
1, rather than seeking to institutionalize a democratic party system with itself at the helm, the
PMLN was initially vulnerable to factionalism and co-optation by the military. Indeed, the PML-
N, led by former prime minister Man Nawaz Sharif, is made up of politicians who began their
careers during General Ziz-ul-Haq’s tenure. However, since General Musharraf’s 1999 military
coup, and notably again in 2018, the party has found itself on the receiving end of the military’s
interventions. Shafqat argues that the PML-N’s formation and development over the years and the
personal rise of Nawaz Sharif is a story of the changing dynamics of civil-military relations in
Pakistan more broadly.
The PPP has much in common with the PML-N, even while it remains its erstwhile enemy. In
chapter 2 Philip E. Jones explains how the party has been shaped by political events dominated by
a powerful military-bureaucratic establishment. Jones describes that evolution of the PPP
following the historic 1970 election, when it successfully campaigned to win a landslide victory
on the populist mantra of roti, kapra, aur makaan (food, clothing, and shelter) and its heavy reliance
on the Bhutto family and the land-owning elite to its current electoral decline. Jones argues that
the PPP’s decline is due to the personalistic leadership of the Bhutto family, which compromised
its organizational ability in order to counter the challenges posed by the military establishment.
Although the PTI was founded in 1996 by cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, it did not
register its presence in Pakistan’s electoral politics until 2011. Khan is a controversial figure who
attracts vitriol and adulation in equal measure. He has been referred to simultaneously as a rebel,
a Taliban sympathizer, and a Jewish agent. In 2013 the PTI formed the government in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province (KP) but continued its oppositional politics centered on accusations that
the elections had been rigged and the governing PML-N was corrupt, before winning in the center
in 2018. In chapter 3 Tabinda M.Khan examines whether the PTI truly marks a departure from the
norm of patronage-driven and elite-run political parties or if it is a continuation of traditional
Pakistani politics. As a former member of the PTI herself, Khan offers a unique perspective as
both an insider and an outsider-a perspective that she acknowledges and engages with critically.
Ethnic/Regional Parties
An ethnic party has been defined as one that “derives its support overwhelmingly from an
identifiable ethnic group (or clusters of ethnic groups) and serves that interests of that group”
(Horowitz 1985, 291), as “a party that overtly represents itself as a champion of the cause of one
particular ethnic category… and makes such a representation central to its strategy of mobilizing
voters” (Chandra 2004, 3), and “as an organization authorized to complete in elections, the
majority of whose leaders and members identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic
group, and whose electoral platform includes among its central demands programs of an ethnic or
cultural nature” (Van Cott 2005, 3). A party may be classified as an ethnic party at one point in
time but may not always remain an ethnic party. Indeed, parties may make ethnic appeals in some
locations but not in others.
According to these definitions, the MQM and the ANP are ethnic parties. They have been relevant
both as coalition partners of mainstream parties and have held important roles in provincial
governments. Even though their electoral fortunes have waxed and waned, they have largely
preserved their electoral support bases, rooted in distinctive ethnic groups.
The MQM, a Karachi-based political party, has represented the interests of the Muhajir ethnic
group since the early 1980s. The party’s strong organizational structure has attracted the attention

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of many scholars (Verkaaik 2004; N. Khan 2010; Gayer 2014; N.Siddiqui 2017). Two features in
particular made the MQM unique not only by Pakistani standards but by those of the developing
world more broadly: the outsize role of Altaf Hussain, the party’s London-based founder, and its
city-wide organizational structure. In recent months- culminating in its disastrous showing in the
2018 elections-the party has faced significant challenges, with splinter groups forming and Hussain
facing legal troubles in the United Kingdom. In chapter 4 Tahir Naqvi nests his contemporary
analysis of the party within a historical overview of its cultural party may face organizational
challenges in the near term, the demand for a Muhajir political formation will continue to exist in
some form.
Little has been written about the Pashtun nationalist ANP in Pakistan, despite the party being an
important actor in the politics of KP. In addition to representing Pashtun interests, the ANP is also
essentially a leftist party that traces its origins to Bacha Khan’s party, the Khudai Khidmatgar
(Servants of God), in the 1930s. In chapter 5 on the party and the leftist movement more broadly,
Anushay Malik examines the ANP as a secular, left-leaning organization that has not experienced
consistent electoral success. She explains that the ANP has traditionally banked on its Pashtun
voter base to win elections in Pakistan’s First Past the Post system, both provincially and
nationally. But tying their regional interests with leftist political ideals has made the ANP the target
of state repression, which in turn has inhibited the party’s organizational capacity to mobilize
electoral support outside the Pashtun belt. Its ineffective governance of KP province from 2008 to
2013 further led to the party being sidelined by PTI’s rise in subsequent elections.
A number of ethnic political parties also exist in Balochistan province. Among these are four
Baloch parties-the Jamhoori Wattan Party (JWP), the National party (NP), the Baloch Natioanl
Party-Awami (BNP-A), and the Baloch National Party-Mengal (BNP-M)-as well as a Pashtun
nationalist party, the Pukhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP). The Baloch parties have had a
turbulent history of splits and mergers instigated by both tribal family politics among the Bugtis,
Mengals, Bizenjos, and Marris and differences over how to negotiate with the central government.
Although the parties have been united in their pursuit of Baloch nationalism, they have disagreed
on the strategies used to achieve it. The JWP vociferously championed the goal of attaining control
over natural resources but, unlike other parties, has not extended this claim to self-determination
for the Baloch. After party leader Nawab Akbar Bugti’s death, caused by a military operation in
2006, the party split into two factions, one led by Bugti’s brother and the other by his grandson,
with the latter leading an anti-government insurgency.
In contrast, the NP-born out of a merger of the left-leaning Pakistan National Party and the
Balochistan National Movement-is self-styled as a “moderate, middle-of-the-road” political party
(Waseem and Mufti 2012, 58) that aims to achieve provincial autonomy through the democratic
process under the leadership of the Bizenjos. The BNP-M also traces its origins to the Balochistan
National Movement. It was originally conceived as a party that would unity the disparate Baloch
parties and uphold a progressive agenda against the domination of the sardars (tribal chiefs). It
experienced short-lived electoral success in 1997 but also failed to achieve its stated goals due to
the centralized leadership of Sardar Attaullah Mengal and his son, Sardar Akhtar Mengal. The
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), led by the Marri tribe, strives for Baloch self-determination at all
costs and engages in violence against the Pakistani state. Finally, in keeping with the dizzying
array of splits and mergers in Baloch politics, defectors from the PML-N and Pakistan Muslim
League –Quaid (PML-Q)-closely aligned with the Center-formed the Balochistan Awami Party
(BAP) in an effort to boost their election prospect. The BAP subsequently joined the PTI-led
coalition government in 2018.
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Islamist Parties
A number of Islamist parties, which range in their commitment to the democratic system and in
their sectarian affiliations, have played a key, albeit supporting, role in Pakistan’s political system.
Scholars have argued that the power of Islamist parties primarily stems from their ability to bring
people out onto the street to protest and lobby for specific policies (Butt 2016). This is no doubt
true. Protests have helped advance Islamist agendas on issues central to Pakistan’s national and
religious identity as well as on matters related to foreign policy. For example, since 1953
protestors have demanded, and state authorities have largely acceded to, a steady erosion of
Ahmadi rights, including adding a 1974 constitutional provision that Ahmadis are non-Muslim
(S.Saeed 2007).
Notwithstanding their key lobbying role, however, Islamist parties have also played an important
role in electoral politics. During the 2002-8 period under Musharraf, a coalition of religious parties
that called themselves the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) was elected into power in KP (White
2008). The coalition consisted of six parties belonging to various subsects of Sunni Islam,
including the two largest parties: Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (Fazlur Rehman
faction). After the 2013 elections, the PTI also formed a coalition with the Jamaat-e-Islami in KP,
which involved giving the religious party control over three provincial ministries. The 2018
elections also saw a large number of electoral candidates fielded by two new religious contenders:
the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan Party (TLP) and the Milli Muslim League (MML). Despite only
officially forming in November 2017, the Barelvi TLP in particular surprised analysts and
observers by receiving the fifth-highest vote total in the country.
Such sectarian parties affiliated with violent movements or those that incite hatred and intolerance
are becoming increasingly important as electoral alternatives and as crucial allies of mainstream
political parties (N. Siddiqui 2017). This troubling trend is indicative of two related phenomena.
First, it suggests that the nature of the local elite is changing and weakly organized parties that
once relied on the area’s largest feudal landlord for gathering votes must now turn to this religious-
and often violent-local power broker. Second, the nature of Islamist parties itself is evolving, away
from mainstream religious parties that have ultimately chosen to abide by the democratic process
to actors who serve to challenge it even while contesting elections. In chapter 6 Johann Chacko
examines the range of parties that fall under the Islamic category, assessing both their role in
government as coalition partners and their influence as outside pressure groups. Chacko asks us to
pay particular attention to the largest networks of which these parties are part, arguing that their
behavior is influenced by both electoral and nonelectoral considerations.
Pakistan: Fifty Years of Nationhood by Shahid Javed Burki (Book)
Widespread and pervasive corruption and poor-quality governance had become major
issues by the time Pakistan celebrated its fiftieth birthday. The preceding analysis points to a
number of conclusions about Pakistan’s experience in these areas and what Pakistani rulers need
to do to regain the confidence of those they govern. Although some serious efforts were made to
structure a new system of accountability, the manner in which they were deployed created the
impression of an intent to hurt opponents, not to build effective institutions. In this context it is
appropriate to highlight eight conclusions.
First, corruption attracts enough public attention in developing countries to bring down
governments. This has certainly happened in Pakistan where the fall of at least five administrations
in the last thirty years could be attributed to the public’s unhappiness with issues pertaining to
governance and corruption. The military coups d’etat against President Ayub Khan in Mrach 1969
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and against Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in July 1977 were provoked in part by a widespread
perception of poor governance. Corruption was explicitly cited as the reason for the dismissal of
the governments headed by Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto (August 1990), Nawaz Sharif (April
1993), and Benazir Bhutto (November 1996).
Second, even though governments have been brought down by a strong perception of
corruption, a government fall did not necessarily bring improvement to the situation. Although
time series on the incidence of corruption or perception about corruption are not available, few
would argue that corruption in Pakistan reached a new peak in 1996. This perception was
highlighted by the index published in the summer of 1996 by the Berlin-based organization
Transparency International ranking Pakistan as the second most corrupt country in the world. The
TI index for 1997, released along with its annual report in the summer of that year, suggests some
improvement in the case of Pakistan. The country was now viewed as the fifth most corrupt in the
world. This slight improvement in the perception of the people contacted by TI may have resulted
from the attention devoted to corruption since the publication of the TI report in the summer of
1996.
Third, there is a high level of tolerance in the country for corruption. This is because of
well-established cultural norms in which transactions between individuals are governed by mostly
custom and tradition – riwaj – rather than by rules and regulations. These norms have been in place
for a long time; in fact, they were strengthened by the actions of a series of administrations that
have governed Pakistan – the grant of industrial licenses by the government of Ayub Khan; the
distribution of route permits to road transporters by the West Pakistan administrations of Governor
Nawab of Kalabagh; the grant of urban land plots, in particular in Islamabad, by President Zia ul-
Haq; and the use of public sector banks to provide loans to the friends of the regime by all
administrations since the country achieved independence. All are examples of this kind of
behaviour.
Fourth, even though the public has displayed a great deal of tolerance for corruption and
poor governance, they appear to identify a threshold that those who govern and rule must not cross.
The threshold is, of course, not rigorously defined. But when it was crossed, governments were
changed, either by military action or by presidential decree. The governments that took office,
replacing those disgraced by charges of corruption, felt obliged to take ameliorative action. The
actions taken were generally of an ad hoc character. No effort was ever made to introduce structural
changes into the culture that supported corrupt behaviour in the first place. The most recent
examples of this approach are the promulgation of the Ehtesab Ordinance of the caretaker
administration that held office from November 1996 to February 1997 and the establishment of
the Ehtesab cell in the prime minister’s secretariat by Mian Nawaz Sharif.
Pakistan Beyond the ‘Crisis State’ by Maleeha Lodhi (Book)
Ever since returning to live in Pakistan several months ago, I’ve been struck by the
pervasive negativity of views here about our country. Whether in conversation, on television, or
in the newspaper, what I hear and read often tends to boil down to the same message: our country
is going down the drain. But I’m not convinced that it is. I don’t dispute for a second that these are
hard times. Thousands of us died last year in terrorist attacks. Hundreds of thousands were
displaced by military operations. Most of us don’t have access to decent schools. Inflation is
squeezing our poor and middle class. Millions are, if not starving, hungry. Even those who can
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afford electricity don’t have it half the day. Yet, despite this desperate suffering, Pakistan is also
something o a miracle. It’s worth pointing this out, because incessant pessimism robs us of an
important resource: hope.
First, we are a vast nation. We are the sixth most populous country in the world. One in
every forty human beings is Pakistani. There are more people aged fourteen and younger in
Pakistan than there are in America. A nation is its people, and in our people we have a huge, and
significantly untapped, sea of potential. Second, we are spectacularly diverse. I have travelled to
all six of world’s inhabited continents, and I have seen few countries whose diversity comes close
to matching ours. Linguistically, we are home to many major languages. Punjabi is spoken in
Pakistan by more people than the entire population of France; Pashto by more than the population
of Saudi Arabia; Sindhi by more than Australia; Seraiki by more than Netherlands; Urdu by more
than Cuba and Balochli by more than Singapore.
Pakistani diversity is not limited to language. Religiously we are overwhelming Muslim,
but still we have more non-Muslims than there are people either in Toronto or Miami. We have
more Shi’as than any country besides Iran. Even our majority Sunnis include followers of Barelvi,
Deobandi and few other numerous schools, as well as, in all likelihood, many millions who have
no idea what school they belong to and don’t really care. Culturally too, we are diverse. We have
transvestite talk-show hosts, advocates for ‘eunuch rights’, burqa-wearers, turbaned men with
beards, outstanding fast bowlers, mediocre opening batsmen, tribal chieftains, bhang drinking
farmers, semi-nomadic shepherds and at least one champion female sprinter. We have communist
Mazdoor Kissan Party and we have Porsche dealerships. We are nobody’s stereotype.
Diversity is an enormous advantage. Not only is there brilliance in potential in differences,
a wealth of experience and ideas, but also lack of our sameness forces us to accommodate each
other, to find ways to coexist. This brings me to our third great asset. ‘Tolerance’ seems a strange
word to apply to a country where woman are still buried alive and teenagers have started detonating
themselves in busy shopping districts. Yet these acts shock us because they are aberrations, not
the norm. Pakistan is characterized not by the outliers among its citizens who are willing to kill
those unlike themselves, but by the millions of us who reject every opportunity to do so. Our
different linguistic, religious, and cultural groups mostly live side by side in relative peace. It
usually takes state intervention (whether by our own state, our allies or our enemies) to get us to
kill one another, and even then, those who do so are a tiny minority.
The ability to hold our noses and put up with fellow citizens we don’t much like it is surely
a modern Pakistani characteristic. It could be the result of geography and history, of millennia of
invading, being invaded, and dealing with aftermath. Europe learned the value of peace from
World Wars One and Two. Maybe we learned our lesson from the violence of partition or 1971.
Call it pragmatism or cosmopolitanism or whatever you want, but I think most Pakistanis have it.
I will call it coexistence-ism, and it is a blessing.
Over the past sixty or so years, with many disastrous missteps along the way, our vastness,
diversity and coexistence-ism have forced us to develop our fourth great asset: the many related
components of our democracy. Between India and Europe, there is no country with combination
of diversity and democracy that comes close to us. Other than Turkey, the rest are dictatorships,
monarchies, apartheid states or under foreign occupation.
We, on the other hand, are evolving a system that allows our population to decide how they
will be ruled. Many of our politicians may be corrupt and venal, they are a part of a lively and
contested multiparty democracy. Many in our media may be immature or serving vested interests,

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but collectively they engage in a no-holds-barred debate that exposes, criticizes, entertains and
informs-and through television they have given our country, for the first time in its history, a
genuine public space. Our judges may have a rather unusual understanding of the correct
relationship between legislature and judiciary, but they are undoubtedly expanding the rule of law-
--and hence the power of the average citizen-in a land where it has been almost absent.
As I see it, the Pakistan project is a messy search for ways to improve the lives of 220
million very different citizens. False nationalism will not work: we are too diverse to believe it.
That is why our dictatorships inevitably end. Theocracy will not work: we are too diverse to agree
on the interpretation of religious laws. That is why the Taliban will not win. Can democracy
deliver? In some ways it already is. The National Finance Commission (NFC) award and,
hopefully, the Eighteenth Amendment, are powerful moves towards devolution of power to the
provinces. Too much centralization has been stifling in a country as diverse as Pakistan. That is
about to change. The pressure of democracy seems likely to go further, moving power below the
provinces to regions and districts. Cities like Karachi and Lahore have shown that good local
governance is possible in Pakistan. That lesson can now start to spread.
Similarly, democracy is pushing us to raise revenue. Our taxes amount to a mere 10 percent
of GDP. After spending upon defence and interest on our debt, we are left with precious little for
schools, hospitals, roads, electricity, water and social support. We and especially our rich, must
pay more. American economic aid amounts to less than $9 per Pakistani per year. That isn’t much,
the secret is: we shouldn’t need it; new taxes, whether at VAT or in some other form, could give
us far more.
Our assemblies, powerful media and independent judiciary collectively contain within
them both pressure to raise taxes and mechanisms to see that taxes actually get paid. This is new
for Pakistan. Our number one war shouldn’t be a War on Terrorism or a cold war with India or a
war against fishing for all the outside off-stump(although all of those matter): it should be a war
on free riders, on a people taking advantage of what Pakistan offers without paying fair share in
taxes to our society. Luckily this war looks like it is ready to escalate, and not a moment too soon.
I have no idea if things will work out for the best. The pessimists may be right. But it seems
mistaken to write Pakistan off. We have reasons for optimism too.
Questions of identity
Recently I’ve heard it said that the insurmountable problems with Pakistan is that we don’t
have a national identity. America has a national identity. Even India has national identity. So why
don’t we? My own view is that national identity is overrated. I say this is not just as man who
chose to move back to Pakistan after many years abroad, who wore a green wig to last year’s T20
World Cup final at Lords, and who experienced undeniable pleasure at the fact that his first child
was born on 14 August. I am a Pakistani, no doubt about it.
At least, I am a Pakistani to me. But if the test of being a Pakistani is that I am by definition
an anti-Indian, then I am fail. I don’t like Pakistan losing to India team in cricket. I dislike the
Indian government’s position on Kashmir. And I deeply dislike Indian leaders’ talk about
launching air strikes against Pakistan. Am I fundamentally anti-Indian, though? No, if it were up
to me, I would have both countries compromise on our dispute, end our dangerous military
standoff, and institute visa-free travel.
Similarly, if the test is being a Pakistani is that I would like our country to look more like
what Zia-ul-Haq had in mind—in other words, a country where you could happily live your life
according to any interpretation of Islam—then I fail again. I don’t want my government imposing
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its view of religion on me. There is a reason why differences between Shi’as and Sunnis exist, and
why differences between Barelvis and Deobandis exist. The reason these differences exist is that
Muslims disagree. So I support the idea that Pakistan should be a place where Muslims are free to
practice their religion according to their own conscience, and where religious minorities are free
to do the same.
But let’s say I was different. Let’s say I have India to the core. In Canada there are aging
Sikh supporters of Khalistan who probably hate India to the core. Does hating India made me
somehow Canadian? Or let’s say that I liked Zia’s particular vision of Islam. May there are people
in Saudi Arabia who like it too. So am I really Saudi? My point is that neither being virulently
anti-Indian nor having a rigid, government sponsored interpretation of religion necessarily makes
someone Pakistani.
What does make someone Pakistani then? In its simplest terms: being from here. If you are
from Pakistan, then you are a Pakistani. I recognise that this definition of national identity, which
takes at its starting point people at geography rather than abstract ideology, may seem pretty
useless. But I don’t think it is useless at all, for three reasons. First, being able to define Pakistanis
simply as people from Pakistan should come as relief. Before 1947, there was no Pakistan. For
some decades after, it looked we might be overrun by a hostile India. Yet we’re still here. We’re
sixty-three years old. We lived about a human lifetime. We don’t need to conjure ourselves into
existence through struggles and bloodshed and political will because we already exist. We are not
a dream; we are reality. We are not some weird idea for a country, we are a country. We’re normal.
At last. And part of being normal is we don’t have to justify to anyone else why there should be a
Pakistan. There is a Pakistan. Let’s move on.
Second, if we think about our national identity in this way we can stop clinging to
oppressive ideologies to really hold our ethnically diverse country together. We should not be at
much risk of splitting apart. Take each of our provinces in turn. The Hazara minority issue aside,
the Pathans of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are unlikely to want to join up with their brethren in
Afghanistan for the simple reason that life Afghanistan is much worse than it is in Pakistan. Sindh
and Balochistan, their names notwithstanding, are multi-ethnic provinces that would themselves
face ethnic divisions should they attempt to build independent states on the basis of ethnicity. The
same is true of Punjab, which is landlocked besides. Of course, oppressing ethnic groups could
drive them out of our federation, but provided we treat each other fairly, our reason to remain
together are more powerful.
Third, if we can accept that we’re real people in real place, and that we are one country
because we actually chose to be (instead of a sandcastle in desperate need of wave-resistant
ideology), then we can focus on what really matters: understanding who our country is for. In a
democracy, the answer is clear: our country is for us. It exist to allow many of us as possible to
live better lives. At the moment, a few of us are living like kings. But most of us are living on
weekly wages worth not much more than a kilo of pine nuts. When you’re paid pine nuts, so to
speak, you have every right to demand that things improve.
The stories countries tell themselves about their national identities are always partly
fictional. Among millions of people, in any country, there will be differences. National identities
are ways of denying those differences. After its civil war between north and south, America re-
forged its national identity in conflict against Native Americans, Germany, Japan, and Soviet
Union. Now its conflicts is with a few thousands terrorists. But the latter is hardly an adversary
powerful enough to unite a nation of 300 million people. Cracks in America’s national identity are
re-emerging, with more uncompromising partnership and political groupings that appear in many
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ways to be descended from those of the old North and South of a century and a half ago, even if
now the terms used are Red and Blue.
In India too, some sections of the society seem determined to forge a national identity as
an upcoming superpower. It is perhaps no accidents that has been accompanied by the rise of an
anti-Muslim political parties and a backlash of Maoist tribal rebellions. The official Indian national
identity appears to be growing more distant from one that can encompass all of its people. Pakistan
has been making the same mistake, but we stop. The problem with Pakistan is not our national
identity. The problem is that we have allowed ourselves to be distracted and bogged down in the
same national identity for too long. I am Pakistani. Surely that should be enough.
Pakistan’s secret
And here’s the great secret about Pakistan: we are not as poor as we like to think. Over the
years I’ve travelled a fair bit around our country. I’ve have ridden on the back of motorbike in
Gawadar, walked down streets in Karachi, explored bazaars in Peshawar. I’ve hiked Skardu, fished
(unsuccessfully) in Naran, sat down to meal in a village Multan. I’m not expert, but I believe what
my eyes tell, me and there’s no doubt about it. Times are incredibly tough. For most Pakistanis,
meat is a luxury. Drinking water is contaminated with urine, faeces or industrial chemicals. School
is a building that exists only on paper or otherwise employs a teacher who is barely literate.
Electricity is intermittent as to be almost a force of nature, like rain or a breeze.
The budget reveals that the Pakistani government plans to generate RS. 1.5tr in taxes this
year. With an estimated population of 170 million people, this equals approximately RS. 9,000
each per year; a little over RS. 700 per month per person. This is not enough. Yes, we got money
from other sources. We borrow, and sell off state assets, and ask for aid from anyone willing to
give it to us. But still, what we can raise ourselves in taxes accounts for most of what our
government can spend. And when our goal is enough power plants and teaching training and low-
income support and (since we seem intent on buying them) F-16s for the world’s sixth most
populous country, RS 700, the equivalent of a large Pizza Hut pizza in taxes for each of us every
month doesn’t go very far.
Why is Pakistan not delivering what we hope for? Because of the dictatorships, or India,
or the Americans? Perhaps, but these days a large part of the reason is this: we citizens aren’t
paying enough for Pakistan to flourish. On my travel around our country I haven’t just seen
malnourished children and exhausted farmers and hardworking forty-year-old women who look
like they’re eighty. I’ve also seen huge ancestral land-holdings and giant textile factories and
Mobilink offices with lines of customers stretching out the door. I’ve seen shopkeepers turn up to
buy Honda Civics with cash. I’ve seen armies of private security guards, fleets of private electricity
generators. I’ve seen more handwritten non-official receipts than can I possibly count.
Many of our rich have tens of millions of dollars in assets. And our middle class numbers
tens of millions of people. The resources of our country are enormous. We’ve just made a
collective decision not to use them. We play only about 10 per cent of our GDP in taxes. (Our
GDP is our total economy, what all of us together earn in a year.) Meanwhile, Sri Lanka pay 15
per cent of their GDP in taxes, India pay 17 per cent, Turks pay 24 per cent, Americans pay 28 per
cent and Swedes pay a fat of 50 per cent. We Pakistanis pay a pittance in comparison. That is a
fabulous news, because it can change. Raising taxes doesn’t depend upon foreign policy, getting a
wink from Uncle Sam or a nod from king so-and-so. It doesn’t require a breakthrough in
technology or a year of good rain. It’s under our control.

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 What would happen, for example, if we raised tax revenues by a fifth: from 10 per cent of
GDP to 12 per cent? Well, that would give us RS. 300 billion a year. We could use that to rent a
million classrooms for RS.10, 000 per month, give jobs as teachers to a million graduates for RS.
15,000 per month, and ensure that every single child in our country received a decent education.
By raising taxes to level of Sri Lanka, 15 per cent of GDP, we would generate additional revenue
equal to twice our official defence budget. Match India at 17 per cent of GDP and additional money
would equal a staggering twenty-fifth times our current education, health and housing budget
combined.
So, if you are a progressive who wants the state to do more to help a poor, you should
support more taxes. If you are an industrialist who wants to see that Taliban recruits are
rehabilitated and retrained, you should support more taxes. If you are a professional who wants
electricity and better police, you should support more taxes. If you are an anti- American who
wants to stop taking US aid, you should more taxes. If you are a diehard militarist who wants to
buy lots of F-16s, you should support more taxes.
The only people who shouldn’t support more taxes are those who think that the situation
in Pakistan right now is already too good. Taxes are big hope for Pakistan. It isn’t complicated.
Anyone who says we can’t solve our problems or afford to give our people a decent standard of
living isn’t telling the truth. We can’t afford it. We’ve just chosen not to.
This is where our democracy can make a difference. We have elected our representatives.
Horribly imperfect as they are, they represent us. And because they represent us, they the right to
ask us to act in our shared self-interest, to contribute more to the collective pot that is Pakistan. It
seems they are starting to do so. And perhaps rampant inflation and a dozen hours of load-shedding
a day are making even many formerly comfortable and tax-averse citizens more amenable to
change.
But what about corruption? Yes, there’s no doubt that much of officialdom is corrupt. But
aren’t we, the citizens? Every time we accept a fake receipt, or fail to declare any income, we are
stealing from our country in precisely the same way our politicians and bureaucrats are. Our thefts
are as taxpayers might be comparatively small, but that is because taxes are so low in our country
to begin with. At the moment, we feed off each other. As we citizens start to display more probity
in tax, we’re likely to demand more probity in how our money is spent, and our strengthening
courts and media are likely to help us to get it. The tax revolution is not going to happen overnight.
It will take time. But there is a good reason to hope it is coming, and to slowly shift the weight of
our votes, our accounts and our attitudes to support the right side. A brighter future awaits us if
we, as Pakistani citizens, are willing to pay for it.
Politics and Government by Macionis
The sociologist Max Weber (1978, orig. 1921) claimed that every society is based on
power, which he defined as the ability to achieve desired ends despite resistance from others. The
use of power is the business of government, a formal organization that directs the political life of
a society. Governments demand compliance on the part of a population; yet Weber noted that most
governments do not openly threaten their people. Most of the time, people respect, or at least
accept, their society’s political system.
No government, Weber explained, is likely to keep its power for long if compliance comes
only from the threat of brute force. Even the most brutal dictator must wonder if there can ever be
enough police to watch everyone—and who would watch the police? Every government, therefore,
tries to make itself seem legitimate in the eyes of the people. This fact brings us to Weber’s concept
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of authority, power that people perceive as legitimate rather than coercive. How do governments
transform raw power into more stable authority? Weber pointed to three ways: traditional
authority, rational-legal authority, and charismatic authority.
Preindustrial societies, said Weber, rely on traditional authority, power legitimized by
respect for long-established cultural patterns. Woven into a population’s collective memory,
traditional authority means that people accept a system, usually one of hereditary leadership,
simply because it has always been that way. Chinese emperors in centuries past were legitimized
by tradition, as were aristocratic rulers in medieval Europe. The power of tradition can be so strong
that, for better or worse, people typically come to view traditional rulers as almost godlike.
Traditional authority declines as societies industrialize. Hannah Arendt (1963) pointed out that
traditional authority remains strong only as long as everyone shares the same beliefs and way of
life. Modern scientific thinking, the specialization demanded by industrial production, and the
social changes and cultural diversity resulting from immigration all combine to weaken tradition.
Therefore, a U.S. president would never claim to rule “by the grace of God,” as many rulers in the
ancient world did. Even so, some upper-class families with names like Bush, Kennedy, Roosevelt,
and Rockefeller are so well established in our country’s political life that their members may enter
the political arena with some measure of traditional authority (Baltzell, 1964). Around the world,
there are still hereditary rulers who claim a traditional right to rule. But this claim is increasingly
out of step with modern society. Some traditional rulers persist by relinquishing most of their
power (as in the United Kingdom) or at the other extreme by keeping their people cut off from the
world and in a state of total subjugation (as in North Korea).
Weber defined rational-legal authority (sometimes called bureaucratic authority) as power
legitimized by legally enacted rules and regulations. Rational-legal authority is power legitimized
in the operation of lawful government. Weber viewed bureaucracy as the type of organization that
dominates in rational-thinking, modern societies. The same rational worldview that promotes
bureaucracy also erodes traditional customs and practices. Instead of looking to the past, members
of today’s high-income societies seek justice through the operation of a political system that
follows formally enacted rules of law. Rationally enacted rules also guide the use of power in
everyday life. The authority of deans and classroom teachers, for example, rests on the offices they
hold in bureaucratic colleges and universities. The police, too, depend on rational-legal authority.
In contrast to traditional authority, rational-legal authority comes not from family background but
from a position in government organization. A traditional monarch rules for life, but a modern
president or prime minister accepts and gives up power according to law, which shows that
presidential authority lies in the office, not in the person.
Finally, Weber claimed that power can turn into authority through charisma. Charismatic
authority is power legitimized by extraordinary personal abilities that inspire devotion and
obedience. Unlike traditional and rational-legal authority, charismatic authority depends less on a
person’s ancestry or office and more on personality. Charismatic leaders have surfaced throughout
history, using their personal skills to turn an audience into followers. Often they make their own
rules and challenge the status quo. Examples of charismatic leaders can be as different as Jesus of
Nazareth and Adolf Hitler. The fact that they and others, such as India’s liberator, Mahatma
Gandhi, and the U.S. civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr., succeeded in transforming the
society around them certainly shows the power of charisma. And it probably explains why
charismatics are highly controversial and why few of them die of old age. Because charismatic
authority flows from a single individual, the leader’s death creates a crisis. Survival of a
charismatic movement, Weber explained, requires the routinization of charisma, the
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transformation of charismatic authority into some combination of traditional and bureaucratic
authority. After the death of Jesus, for example, followers institutionalized his teachings in a
church, built on tradition and bureaucracy. Routinized in this way, the Roman Catholic Church
has lasted for 2,000 years.
Monarchy (with Latin and Greek roots meaning “one ruler”) is a political system in which
a single family rules from generation to generation. Monarchy is commonly found in the ancient
agrarian societies; the Bible, for example, tells of great kings such as David and Solomon. In the
world today, twenty-six nations have royal families; some trace their ancestry back for centuries.
In Weber’s terms, then, monarchy is legitimized by tradition. During the Middle Ages, absolute
monarchs in much of the world claimed a monopoly of power based on divine right. Today, claims
of divine right are rare, although monarchs in a number of nations—including Saudi Arabia and
Oman—still exercise almost absolute control over their people. With industrialization, however,
monarchs gradually pass from the scene in favor of elected officials. All the European nations with
royal families today are constitutional monarchies, meaning that their monarchs are little more
than symbolic heads of state; actual governing is the responsibility of elected officials, led by a
prime minister and guided by a constitution. In these nations, nobility formally reigns, but elected
officials actually rule.
The historical trend in the modern world has been toward democracy, a political system
that gives power to the people as a whole. More accurately, because it would be impossible for all
citizens to act as leaders, we have devised a system of representative democracy that puts authority
in the hands of leaders chosen by the people in elections. Most high-income countries of the world,
including those that still have royal families, claim to be democratic. Industrialization and
democratic government go together because both require a literate populace. Also, with
industrialization, the legitimization of power in a tradition-based monarchy gives way to rational-
legal authority. Thus democracy and rational-legal authority go together, just like monarchy and
traditional authority.
Retooling Institutions by Dr Ishrat Husain
Chronic political instability and frequent changes in political regimes have also caused
disastrous consequences for economic governance, During the 1990s the changes were too many
and too chaotic. Invariably, the incoming governments abruptly abandoned, discontinued or
slowed down the implementation of the policies, projects and pro-grams inherited from their
predecessors. As institutions take a long time to nurture, the implementation of projects is spread
over a multiyear period and the impact of policies is felt with considerable time-lag, premature
abandonment caused more damage than good. Starting all over again and before the benefits
started accruing, the government was either overthrown or had to step down before completing its
tenure. The incoming government began the cycle again with a fresh set. The majority of the
populace never witnessed any benefits while unending costs were incurred by every successive
regime.
The situation is quite the opposite in India as aptly summed up by Arun Shourie: In India,
there is a consensus in practice so that whenever a group is in office, wherever it is in office, it
attempts to do the same sorts of things. But when it is in opposition, where it is in opposition, it
strains to block the same measures. We have the Communists in West Bengal garnering credit for
implementing reforms in the State that they are blocking at the Centre.
What is the effect of this unending cycle of politically motivated economic governance on
the majority of the population? A sense of deprivation and denial of basic economic rights creates

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feelings of cynicism, negativism and frustration. The credibility of governments in power-any
government-is completely eroded. Distrust of 'government' becomes so widespread and credibility
of government' so low that unfounded and unsubstantiated rumors, mudslinging and suspicion
about their motives assume a momentum of their own. In the last six to seven years the media,
taking advantage of this widespread lack of government credibility have taken over the role of an
opposition party and thus accentuated feelings of negativism.
Democracy in Pakistan by Hassan Askari
A conflict between the professed democratic values and the operational realities of
authoritarianism and non-sustainable civilian institutions and processes is the main feature of
Pakistani political experience. The redeeming feature of this conflict is that despite the long spells
of authoritarian and military rule, the theoretical commitment to democracy and participatory
governance has persisted in Pakistan. None of the two political trends has been able to overwhelm
each other. If democracy could not function on a continuous basis, the authoritarian and military
rule did not get accepted as a normal or legitimate political system. This engenders the hope that
the over all commitment to democracy would continue to persist as one of the most cherished
norms in the polity and a governance system that falters on democracy would not be able to
cultivate voluntary popular support.
The failure to institutionalize participatory governance has caused much alienation at the
popular level. A good number of people feel that they are irrelevant to power management at the
federal and provincial levels. The rulers are so engrossed in their power game that they are not
bothered about the interest and welfare of the common people. Such a perception of low political
efficacy is reflected in the declining voting percentage in the general elections. A good number of
voters maintain that their vote does not matter much in the selection of the rulers. Invariably they
express negative views about the rulers as well as those opposing them. Despite all this, the people
have not given up on democracy. While talking about their ‘helplessness’ with reference to
changing the rulers, they continue to subscribe to the norms of democracy and participatory
governance and emphasize the accountability of the rulers. They are therefore vulnerable to
mobilization for realization of these norms and values.
The political system of Pakistan is characterized by intermittent breakdown of constitution
and political order, weak and non-viable political institutions and processes, rapid expansion of
the role of the military bureaucratic elite, military rule and military dominated civilian
governments, and authoritarian and narrow-based power management. Pakistan’s political history
can be divided into different phases with reference to the dominant style of governance and
political management.

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