“If South Korean resentment of America’s military presence is less clear-cut
than many would suggest, so, too, are the policy differences supposedly divid-
ing American and South Korean leaders.”
America and South Korea:
The Ambivalent Alliance?
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VICTOR D. CHA
T
he alliance between South Korea and the American views spotlighted how the distinction
United States remains one of the most suc- between the United States as security guarantor and
cessful political-military relationships forged as a spoiler of inter-Korean reconciliation had been
in the cold war era. What started as the quintessen- muddled at best, destroyed at worst.
tial “realist” alliance—formed between two parties The alliance appeared to unravel even further
that knew little about one another and had nothing with the decision this year by the US to pull back its
in common except a common threat—has devel- troops from their tripwire deterrent position along
oped into a prosperous and militarily robust rela- the demilitarized zone. South Koreans viewed this
tionship between two market democracies that plan both as American preparation for a possible
stands as a model of cold war success. preemptive attack on the North (pulling US forces
No relationship is without its problems. Yet, for out of harm’s way) and as malicious “punishment”
nearly 50 years after the alliance was formed, Amer- for anti-American demonstrations in South Korea
ica’s role in inter-Korean relations remained rela- at the end of 2002.
tively uncontroversial: the United States guaranteed Fortunately, the situation is not so simple or so
deterrence against a North Korean attack. Equally bleak as it might appear. America’s role on the
indisputable was US–South Korean unity on a pol- peninsula, both as co-container of North Korea and
icy of diplomatic isolation of and non-dialogue with as impediment to reconciliation, has always been
the North. nuanced. For most of the alliance’s history, the US
Recently, this basic American function of “co- posture has encompassed not only containment of
container” has been called into question. The US the communist North, but also restraint of Amer-
role in inter-Korean relations is now contested, the ica’s South Korean ally.
spectrum of views ranging from supporters of the As for the alleged sea change in South Korean
cold war template to dissenters who see America as attitudes toward the United States, a close analysis
fundamentally an obstacle to improving inter- shows more evidence of ambivalence than aversion,
Korean relations. and there is cause to believe that the recent
The contested nature of the US role became evi- groundswell of anti-Americanism will not prove as
dent after the June 2000 summit between North permanent as popularly predicted. In the end, the
and South Korea. While the meeting marked a forces of democracy, geostrategy, and market pros-
detente that relaxed tensions on the peninsula, it perity appear to support a continuing, significant,
did not deter President George W. Bush from des- and constructive rather than obstructive role for the
ignating North Korea as part of an “axis of evil” United States on the Korean peninsula.
after September 11. The election in 2002 of a South
Korean president with a history of avowedly anti- AMERICA AS CO-CONTAINER
America’s co-container role coincided with the
cold war, when North-South tensions were at their
VICTOR D. CHA is an associate professor of government at height. Brief periods saw some warming of inter-
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and co-
author, with David Kang, of the forthcoming Nuclear North Korean relations—a July 1972 North-South joint
Korea (New York: Columbia University Press). communiqué, for example, and exchanges in 1984
279
280 • CURRENT HISTORY • September 2003
and 1985—but these were short-lived and did not actions. This concern was evident in pointed mes-
alter the predominant relationship, which was sages that the Lyndon Johnson administration con-
adversarial. The South Koreans had virtually no veyed in 1968, on one occasion dispatching personal
interest in improving relations with the North. envoy Cyrus Vance to tell President Park that the
Because of this, America’s role in inter-Korean rela- United States would not tolerate any South Korean
tions was by definition limited to supporting its military retaliation for the failed North Korean assas-
ally’s position. sination attempt on Park at the Blue House that year.
On the rare occasion that Washington probed the American archival records reveal the extent to
possibility of a thaw on the peninsula, South Korea’s which this preoccupation with restraining South
reaction was swift and negative, highlighting acute Korea was interwoven with arguments that the
fears of allied abandonment in Seoul. During the United States should retain operational command
Nixon administration, Seoul objected when the authority within the alliance. The traditional ratio-
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United States hinted that it might lift travel restric- nale for America’s holding command authority over
tions on North Korea. In July 1972, Foreign Minis- US and South Korean forces was to enhance defensive
ter Kim Yong-sik filed strong protests against a US war-fighting efficiency. But operational control also
official’s use of the formal designation DPRK—the allowed the United States to keep a leash on its ally.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea—when Standing policy dictated that any unilateral military
referring to the North. Seoul harshly criticized these actions by the South would prompt a severe response
actions as departures from past practice and the first by Washington, including immediate cessation of
steps toward American recognition of the regime. economic and military aid and even the use of Amer-
Buttressing America’s crystal-clear containment ican forces to impose martial law. According to
role during the cold war was an implicit social con- records of White House deliberations in the late
tract between the allies: the United States would 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower went so far
provide the stability and security that enabled Kore- as to suggest that the United States would covertly
ans to prosper economically beyond their wildest support new leadership, forcibly remove Syngman
expectations. South Koreans in turn would allow Rhee, or even threaten to abrogate the alliance.
the United States to maintain a military presence in Admittedly, US concerns about a South Korean
Korea (on terms favorable to the United States) and preemptive attack have abated considerably over
to project power in the region. the years, especially since democratization began in
Even as it fulfilled this explicit function of co- South Korea in 1987 and the United States trans-
container against the North, the United States also ferred peacetime command authority to the South
played an implicit and less well-known role dur- in 1994. The point remains, however, that the US
ing the cold war: containing its own ally’s ambi- role in inter-Korean relations during the cold war
tions on the peninsula. The governments of both featured, explicitly or implicitly, containment of
Syngman Rhee (1948–1960) and Park Chung Hee both North and South Korea.
(1961–1979) were never shy about their desire for
unification, and these ambitions raised serious AMERICA AS SPOILER
concerns within the US government about entrap- The recent and more controversial role played by
ment in a second Korean conflict. the United States on the peninsula, at least in pop-
In the early cold war years, South Korea’s desires ular perception, is as an “impeder” of improved
for “unification by force” (pukch’in t’ongil or songong North-South relations. A radical ideological fringe
t’ongil ) were illustrated in stories about Syngman in South Korea has harbored this view for some
Rhee deliberately trying to sabotage the 1953 time, but now it is playing a role in mainstream
armistice negotiations because he wanted to prose- public opinion in the South.
cute the Korean War to its end with American sup- Perceptions of America as an impeder became
port. Park Chung Hee also sought to retaliate salient in 2000 and gained force after January 2001
militarily in response to North Korean provoca- with the confluence of two critical developments:
tions, such as the failed commando raid on South the South’s unprecedented engagement with the
Korea’s presidential Blue House in 1968. North, and a change in the military relationship
Not wanting to enflame a second conflagration in between the United States and its ally.
Asia while the war in Vietnam raged, the United President Kim Dae Jung’s “sunshine policy,”
States became hypersensitive to the threat of entan- based on the principle of unconditional engagement
glement in a new conflict by overzealous allied with the North, facilitated the June 2000 summit
America and South Korea • 281
meeting, which at the time far exceeded anyone’s worry is the danger of nuclear and missile prolifer-
expectations. The summit’s joint declaration, along ation (post-cold war) and the threat to homeland
with family reunions, joint infrastructure projects, security (post-September 11) posed by the North.
and ministerial meetings, propelled North–South The allies share an interest in preventing a second
relations forward by leaps and bounds. All of this North Korean invasion, of course. But with the
was a far cry from previous South Korean adminis- effective deterrence of this contingency, gaps in the
trations’ fixation on containment of the North. Not their views on proliferation have become clearer.
only did the South eschew any pretense of making South Koreans question America’s hard-line pol-
engagement conditional, it also denied any need for icy toward the North because the sunshine policy, in
dialogue channels to go through Seoul alone. The their view, reduces the primary threat posed to the
sunshine policy had no objection to world engage- South by diminishing the possibility of another con-
ment with the reclusive regime. ventional invasion, even if it fails to appease US wor-
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However, Kim’s policy did have the unintended ries about longer-range threats still posed by the
consequence of fostering nationwide perceptions of North. This decoupling of America’s nonprolifera-
America as an obstacle to better relations with the tion interests from South Korea’s security concerns
North. In his first meeting with George W. Bush in feeds the view that the United States has been
March 2001, Kim tried to lecture the newly inaugu- unduly spoiling the inter-Korean party since the
rated president on the wisdom of the sunshine pol- June 2000 summit.
icy, but the lecture apparently did not go well.
President Bush called a “time-out” on President Bill AMERICA AS PERMANENT IMPEDIMENT?
Clinton’s previous engagement with the North and Is the perception that America is an obstacle to
his administration undertook a critical policy review. North-South reconciliation now a permanent fixture
A US statement in June 2001 included an uncondi- of Korean public opinion? A snapshot of the politi-
tional offer to meet with the North Koreans. But cal scene at the end of 2002 and the beginning of
North Korea said it was not interested in meeting 2003 might lead one to believe so. Political maver-
because of America’s high-handed attitude. Of ick and former labor activist lawyer Roh Moo-hyun
course, Bush’s January 2002 “axis of evil” speech was elected president in December 2002 on a clear
reduced chances for dialogue even further. wave of anti-Americanism. His campaign rhetoric,
What emerged from the sunshine policy was a highly critical of Bush’s “axis of evil” designation of
dual dynamic that put the United States in an unen- North Korea, appeared to resonate with a broad-
viable catch-22. The policy’s initial successes cre- based constituency in South Korea. Perhaps for the
ated the impression among many South Koreans first time in the South’s political history, it appeared
that America’s overbearing military footprint on the to many, particularly young Koreans, that the Amer-
peninsula was no longer necessary. Indeed, during icans were more threatening to their country than
the summer of 2000, in the aftermath of the sum- the communist threat from across the demilitarized
mit, demonstrations occurred at US military facili- zone. December 2002 polls showed that more South
ties to protest the American presence. For its part, Koreans harbored negative images of the United
the South Korean government ordered a toning States than of North Korea.
down of celebrations marking the fiftieth anniver- A Gallop Korea survey taken a fortnight after
sary of the Korean War; Seoul did not want to risk Roh’s election painted a picture of a changing
its new detente with the North by invoking memo- demographic in which a younger post-Korean War
ries of America’s role as wartime savior. When the generation informed with a less grateful, more crit-
sunshine policy failed to elicit a reciprocal summit ical view of the United States had risen to political
or other confidence-building measures from the significance. While 26 percent of middle-age South
North, the popular response was to look for scape- Koreans held negative images of the United States,
goats. The US presence and Bush’s bellicose state- an astounding 76 percent of young people in their
ments represented convenient targets. twenties and 67 percent of those in their thirties
Also contributing to the view of America as an responded in a similar fashion. Moreover, 51 per-
impediment to reconciliation is a new dynamic in cent of South Koreans polled believed that North
the military alliance: in effect, a decoupling of secu- Korea’s nuclear intransigence was the result of the
rity interests. US and South Korean security inter- Bush administration’s hard-line policy. Only 25 per-
ests have never been identical. While the South’s cent attributed the problem to North Korean
top concern has been peninsular defense, America’s actions and intentions.
282 • CURRENT HISTORY • September 2003
On New Year’s Eve 2002, 23,000 Koreans gath- What is most interesting, however, is that the
ered in the vicinity of the American embassy in public anger and demonstrations at the end of 2002
Seoul for a candlelight demonstration protesting the were soon followed by counterdemonstrations by
Bush administration’s policies and alleged US mili- other South Korean NGOs expressing support for the
tary abuses. On February 8, 2003, a 60 Minutes CBS US presence in Korea and calling for continuation of
television segment caught a group of young Kore- the long-standing alliance. These demonstrations,
ans self-righteously responding to a loaded ques- organized by Korean War veterans and religious
tion that President Bush was scarier to them than groups and numbering in the tens of thousands,
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. sought to make clear that the protests seen by the
Perceptions of America as spoiler grew worse world at the end of 2002 did not represent all of
after the March 2003 announcement that the Korean public opinion, and that a silent majority of
United States would pull back its troops from the Koreans still strongly supported the United States.
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DMZ to rear positions on the peninsula. Anger at the The counterdemonstrations suggest that anti-
United States, in some people’s minds, turned to Americanism is more contested and less one-dimen-
genuine fear that America might be pulling forces sional than it might seem. The reality in South Korea
out of range of North Korean artillery in order to is that one can strongly support America and its pres-
press forward with a preemptive attack. ence in Korea despite disagreeing with its policy
toward North Korea. Likewise, one can oppose
NOT YET inequities and perceived abuses in US–Korean rela-
A deeper and more nuanced analysis would look tions while still supporting the alliance. Civic group
at longer-term trends beyond the heat of the leaders who organized the pro-US demonstrations in
2002 presidential election campaign and would December 2002 noted exactly this point. Indeed, polls
find less irreversible anti- at the height of anti-Amer-
Americanism than poll ican sentiment in Decem-
results and popular impres- ber still showed a clear
sions suggest.
Is the perception that America is an obstacle to majority of respondents
If the perception of North-South reconciliation now a permanent (55 percent) supporting a
America as the impeder in fixture of Korean public opinion? US troop presence.
North-South relations is Wellesley College poli-
to prove a permanent fact tical scientist Katherine
of life, one would expect to observe two continuing Moon helpfully distinguishes between banmi anti-
trends. At the “street” or general public level, which Americanism and bimi anti-Americanism. The for-
presumably embodies the attitudes of the post- mer term refers to a deeper, ideological aversion to
Korean War generation, dissatisfaction with the US US hegemony. Had this been the prevailing opinion
military presence would be unconditional and grow- in Korea, then the US role as “impeder” would be
ing. At the elite level, a widening gap in policy toward permanent. The latter terms refers less to an ideo-
North Korea between Washington and Seoul would logical opposition to the United States and more to
be evident as President Roh pursues engagement in a critical, yet supportive view. Arguably, not only is
defiance of the Bush administration’s harder line. this latter view less severe, it is actually healthy for
Neither of these trends is indisputably evident. the alliance.
First, at the street level, there is an undeniable Bimi anti-Americanism can be seen as a product
groundswell of dissatisfaction with the US military of South Korea’s development and democratization.
presence, expressed through the burning of flags It reflects the emergence of a young, affluent, edu-
and effigies of Bush and demonstrations in down- cated generation that views quality-of-life issues
town Seoul. The proximate event fueling this move- such as the environment, labor, and the rule of law
ment was the acquittal, by a US military jury, of two as critical to the national agenda. This generation’s
servicemen for the accidental vehicular death of views will naturally tend to bump up against some
two South Korean schoolgirls in November 2002. of the more anachronistic aspects of a cold war
Popular outrage over this outcome, fueled by the alliance that puts a major foreign military presence
heat of presidential campaign rhetoric, turned one in the heart of the host nation’s capital. Much like
dimension of the election into a choice between the the experience in Japan and Germany during the
“pro-American” Lee Hoi-chang and the “anti-Amer- 1960s, South Korean complaints in this sense rep-
ican” Roh Moo-hyun. resent growing pains within the alliance as the
America and South Korea • 283
junior partner matures and not a permanent fissure nent role for the United States as impeder of penin-
in the relationship. sular reconciliation would suggest greater gaps
The backpedaling in the South Korean viewpoint between the Roh government’s policies toward
on US troops, evident particularly since March 2003, North Korea and those of the Bush administration.
offers another lesson about the supposed depth of Campaign rhetoric certainly gave the impression
anti-Americanism. A number of prominent Ameri- that the gaps would be wide. Yet, since Roh has
can conservatives filled the commentary pages of taken office, these gaps have closed with a distinct
major newspapers with columns criticizing the moderating of the Roh government’s attitudes
South Koreans as ungrateful allies and calling for toward both the United States and North Korea.
the pullout of US troops after the anti-American For his foreign policy advisers, the new South
demonstrations at the end of 2002. This was fol- Korean president chose experience over ideology.
lowed, in early March 2003, by reports that Defense He also chose experts with substantial understand-
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Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was considering ing of and interaction with the United States. Just
“adjustments” in the US deployment in South Korea after the December elections, Roh lectured anti-
as part of a movement within the Defense and State American civic groups to moderate their behavior.
Department bureaucracies to undertake a serious He has publicly supported the US war in Iraq and,
review of America’s presence on the peninsula. in a controversial decision, agreed this spring to dis-
If the United States were viewed as a permanent patch to Iraq a contingent of noncombatant forces.
impediment to inter-Korean relations, the popular More to the point, Roh acknowledged that “US
response would be somewhat welcoming of these troops are necessary at the present for peace and
steps. Instead, South Koreans from all walks of life stability on the Korean peninsula and will be in the
expressed vehement opposition to talk of US with- future as well.” And in an extraordinary public
drawal. In an unusual public plea, Prime Minister admission, Roh admitted during his first summit
Koh Kun, on behalf of the new Roh government, trip to the United States that his decision to sign a
asked Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on March 6 declaration in his past activist days calling for the
that the United States not remove forces from removal of American forces from the peninsula was
South Korea. a “mistake.”
Meanwhile, fears that the announced troop rede- After North Korea tested cruise missiles three
ployment might signal preparation for an attack on times in February and March 2003, Roh criticized
the North subsided after the initial shock. US offi- the tests and called the prospect of a nuclear North
cials assured that the first phase of force rebalanc- Korea unacceptable. Despite explicit pledges to
ing entailed repositioning rather than withdrawing maintain a primary role for the South Koreans in
troops, in which case they would still be vulnerable “mediating” talks between the North and the
to North Korean counterattack. A repositioning of United States, Roh not only acceded to North
some 17,000 US soldiers away from the DMZ would Korean demands that Seoul be excluded from the
still leave thousands of American expatriates, not US–North Korea–China talks in Beijing, held April
to mention millions of South Koreans, acutely vul- 23–24, 2003, but also defended the format by say-
nerable to North Korean artillery. ing that substance was more important than form.
President Roh, who had called during his cam-
paign for a more equal relationship with the United FORCES OF CONTINUITY
States and pointedly asked top military officials The Roh government is still new, and events
whether they had prepared for self-reliant defense, could change rapidly. US–South Korea relations
now called for an end to anti-US vigils in Seoul. As have yet to be fully tested by the North Korea
Doug Struck noted in a March 14, 2003, Washing- nuclear crisis. Still, it is clear that since December
ton Post story, “The anti-American demonstrations 2002, expectations of strains in US–South Korea
here have suddenly gone poof. US soldiers are walk- relations have been replaced by a new confidence
ing the streets of Seoul again without looking over in the relationship. Why has the moderation in
their shoulders. The official line from the South Roh’s position been so marked, and contrary to
Korean government is: Yankees stay here.” what many experts had predicted? A variety of
If South Korean resentment of America’s military explanations offer themselves, including the dif-
presence is less clear-cut than many would suggest, ference between campaign promises and presiden-
so, too, are the policy differences supposedly divid- tial decisions, and the tendency of new leaders to
ing American and South Korean leaders. A perma- discover that policies they have criticized are the
284 • CURRENT HISTORY • September 2003
way they are for a reason. Three longer-term fac- Korean economy. Roh’s desire to continue his coun-
tors also deserve consideration. try’s slow but steady recovery from the financial cri-
First, and perhaps most important: South Korea sis of 1997–1998 is perhaps his most important
is now a vibrant democracy. Roh Moo-hyun, as domestic objective, and South Korea has made seri-
chief executive, is required to carry out policies that ous efforts to implement economic reforms. Yet
represent the majority of the country rather than a North Korean agitations have undermined much of
narrow local constituency. This dynamic is com- the international confidence in these efforts. The
mon to most liberal democracies and resonates with North Korean missile tests carried out earlier this
recent Korean political history. Many were deeply year saw sovereign credit outlook downgrades by
concerned when Kim Dae Jung took office in 1998 Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, along with a stock
that his past views would lead to extremely difficult market slide and a drop in investment from the
relations with the United States. But Kim made United States.
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appointments across the political aisle, moved The economics alone of the North Korean threat
toward the center, and ended his term in office as would suggest, then, that gaps between US and
perhaps the most pro-American president in South South Korean policies may narrow. Seoul and
Korea’s political history. Similarly Roh, although a Washington may not share identical interests with
political maverick, is not immune to the democratic regard to North Korean weapons proliferation, but
system’s moderating impulses. Public regard for the they still could care about the same thing for dif-
sunshine policy has diminished, meanwhile, in ferent reasons.
light of recent revelations about side payments the
Kim government made to North Korea in exchange WHO IS TO BLAME?
for its participation in the 2000 summit. Roh’s term of office under the Korean constitu-
Second, while political leaders change in South tion will last five years, but his immediate tenure is
Korea, geography does not. South Korea remains a one year before the next general elections in 2004.
relatively smaller nation in a region of great powers And the primary issue for voters is how to continue
contending for influence on the peninsula. Histori- the slow but steady economic recovery since the
cally, Koreans have contended with this geostrate- 1997 financial crisis. If North Korea continues to
gic environment with one of two grand strategies. act in ways that hurt growth and international
One has been a policy of isolation or neutrality investor confidence in South Korea, then surely
(hence, the “hermit kingdom”), trying to withdraw there is a limit to which the South Korean public
from the region’s power politics. This proved rela- and elite can continue to blame America, rather
tively unsuccessful (and arguably is still practiced than North Korea, for their problems.
in North Korea today). The other strategy has been Although these imperatives could push South
to ally with one of the great powers. This approach Korea in the direction of appeasing the North to
was fairly effective with regard to China before the avert further destabilizing actions, the opposite
twentieth century. It was clearly successful in the appears to be taking place. During Roh’s May 2003
postwar era, turning the South into the most visit to the United States, he acknowledged that he
vibrant liberal democracy in Asia and the third- was not naive about North Korea’s record of ignor-
largest economy in the region and the eleventh- ing agreements, noting that he did not “trust North
largest in the world. A powerful geostrategic logic Korea that much.”
pushes South Koreans to continue placing their bets While a strengthened alliance is not the assured
on a relationship with the great power in the region direction in which US–South Korean relations will
that is most distant and that shares their political go, it is likely that Washington’s and Seoul’s per-
and economic values—that is, the United States. spectives on North Korea will grow closer. Indeed,
Third, Roh’s moderation is intimately tied to eco- the first year of the Roh presidency offers confirm-
nomic development imperatives, particularly regard- ing evidence. All of this lends credence to the view
ing policies toward North Korea. At the beginning that America’s perceived role as impeder between
of 2003, it was clear that the crisis over North Korea the two Koreas may prove less abiding than many
was having a vastly negative effect on the South of the younger generation are prone to believe. ■
