Marriage and why divorce is not allowed in the Phils.

Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 Feb. 2009

ARTICLE 36 OF FAMILY CODE

FACTS:
On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te a freshman in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. They developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. On March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused but
Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They left Manila and went to Cebu that month. Edwards money lasted for
only a month and they could not find a job. On April 1996, they returned to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was away, Rowena threathened him that she would
commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to
get married. The couple continued to stay at Rowena’s uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisoner and
was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. After a month, Edward escaped from the house and stayed with his
parents. His family then hid him from Rowena. On June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena and told her that
they should live with his parents but she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. On January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of
the latters psychological incapacity. On July 30, 2001, the trial court rendered the marriage of the parties null and
void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner
failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of
the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of
the Family Code. Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on
certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is
no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
Yes. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Edward’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
 Tilar vs. Republic, G.R. No. 214529, 12 July 2017

FACTS:
Jerrysus L. Tilar filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of his
wife’s (Elizabeth) psychological incapacity based on Article 36 of the Family Code. Elizabeth failed to file her
Answer despite being served with summons. The RTC then required the Public Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation whether collusion existed. In his Manifestation and Compliance, the Public Prosecutor certified as to
the absence of collusion between the parties. Trial, thereafter, ensued with Jerrysus and his witness testifying. The
RTC issued its assailed Decision dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Jerrysus filed a petition for review
directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the courts have jurisdiction to rule on the validity of marriage pursuant to the provision of the
Family Code.

RULING: YES. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The State is mandated to protect marriage, being the
foundation of the family, which in turn is the foundation of the nation. As marriage is a lifetime commitment which
the parties cannot just dissolve at whim, the Family Code has provided for the grounds for the termination of
marriage. These grounds may be invoked and proved in a petition for annulment of voidable marriage or in a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which can be decided upon only by the court exercising jurisdiction
over the matter. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 provides: Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction: (15) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations; Hence, a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, which Jerrysus filed before the RTC falls within its exclusive
jurisdiction; thus, the RTC erred in dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Bolos vs. Bolos, G.R. No. 186400, 20 Oct. 2010

FACTS:
 On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity o
f her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Art. 36 of the Family Code, docketed as
JDRC No. 6211.
 On January 16, 2007, judgment was rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69
(RTC) declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T.
BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological i
ncapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code wit
h all the legal consequences provided by law.
 Respondent then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeki
ng to annul the orders of the RTC on January 16, 2007 declaring as final and executory
 On December 10, 2008, the Court of Appeals in an original action for certiorari under rule 65 enti
tled “Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos” reversedthe January
16, 2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
 The appellate court in its decision stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as
a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. 02-11-10-SC (Rule On Declaration Of Absolute Nullity Of Void
Mariages And Annulment Of Voidable Marriages) is not applicablein this case since the marriage
of Cynthia and Danila was solemnized before the Family Code took effect.
 Moreover, the appellate court relied on its ruling in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinacelli stating that
“coverage of A.M. 02-11-10-SC extends only to those marriages entered into during the effecti
vity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988”.
 Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seekin
g a review of the December 10, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling because the phrase “under the Family Code” in A.M. 02-11-
10-SC pertains to the word “petitions” rather than to the word “marriages”

RULING:
The Court of Appeals ruled that the categorical language in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is explicit in its scope.

RATIONALE:
In Section 1 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, it reads that:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and ann
ulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Phillipines.
The categorical language being used clearly states that the coverage of this Rule extends only to those marriages e
ntered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which became effective on August 3, 1988. The Court therefor
e cannot apply merit to the petitioner’s interpretation stating that “petitions” is being categorized in the phrase “u
nder the Family Code” when the Rule took effectivity.
Furthermore, the Court clarified that a cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free
from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation, only application. It must therefor
e be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation in what is known as “plain-meaning rul
e” or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or “speech is the index of intention”. Additionall
y, there is also the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a status there should be no depa
rture.”

Peregrina vs. Avenido, G.R No. 173540, 22 Jan 2014

This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been validly married to the same man,
now deceased.

Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that Tecla is the lawful wife of the deceased
Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).

Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol in rites
officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. While the a marriage certificate was recorded with the local civil
registrar, the records of the LCR were destroyed during World War II. Tecla and Eustaquio begot four children, but
Eustaquio left his family in 1954.

In 1979, Tecla learned that Eustaquio got married to another woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage
she claims must be declared null and void for being bigamous. In support of her claim, Tecla presented
eyewitnesses to the ceremony, the birth certificate of their children and certificates to the fact that the marriage
certificate/records were destroyed.

Peregrina, on the other hand averred that she is the legal surviving spouse of Eustaquio who died on 22 September
1989, their marriage having been celebrated on 30 March 1979 and showed the marriage contract between her
and Eustaquio.

RTC ruled in favor of Peregrina. It relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to Eustaquio.
Without such certificate, RTC considered as useless the certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon
over the lack of records.

The CA, on appeal, ruled in favor of Tecla. It held there was a presumption of lawful marriage between Tecla and
Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband and wife and begot four children. Such presumption,
supported by documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the RTC, and testimonial
evidence created sufficient proof of the fact of marriage. The CA found that its appreciation of the evidence
presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Between Tecla and Peregrina, who was the legal wife of Eustaquio?

RULING: TECLA
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole
and exclusive evidence of marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the
marriage between his parents.

It is an error on the part of the RTC to rule that without the marriage certificate, no other proof can be accepted.

The execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who
saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated
the execution thereof.

In this case, due execution was established by the eyewitness testimonies and of Tecla herself as a party to the
event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony of the officiating priest. Since the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–testimonial and
documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage.

Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves
out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law.

Legal Capacity
Silverio vs. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, 22 October 2007

TES SILVERIO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (CASE DIGEST)

G.R. No. 174689
October 22, 2007
TOPIC: Change of Name, Sex Change
FACTS:
Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to
female in his birth certificate in the RTC of Manila, for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male
transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The RTC ruled in his favour, saying that it is in
consonance with the principle of justice and equality.
The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the CA, alleging that there is no law allowing change
of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a change in the “name” and “sex” entries in birth certificates are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.
RULING:
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name
is ridiculous, tainted with dishonour, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the
change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name
does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground
of sex reassignment. The petition was denied.

RP vs. Cagandahan, G.R No. 166676, 12 Sept 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN (CASE DIGEST)

G.R. No. 166676
September 12, 2008
TOPIC: Change of Name, Change of Sex, Changes in Birth Certificate, Intersex

FACTS:
Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC. She alleged that she was
born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) – a
condition where persons afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from
Jennifer to Jeff.

Respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
respondent’s condition is known as CAH. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondent’s uterus is
not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified
that respondent’s condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made
up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted respondent’s petition.

Hence, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The OSG contends, among others, that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in granting the petition on the ground of her medical condition.

RULING:
No.
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.

Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. It is one of the many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. An organism
with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.

In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations, which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing
the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in
his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.
It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with
what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have
undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold
of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health.
Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence
of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondent’s position and his
personal judgment of being a male.

We respect respondent’s congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male.

As for respondent’s change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of
right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow. The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine
name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his
preferred gender, we find merit in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of
the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

The Republic’s petition is denied.

 Falcis vs. Civil Registrar, GR No. 217910, 3 Sept 2019
Falcis III vs Civil Registrar General
G.R. No. 217910 September 3, 2019
J. Leonen

Facts: On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. His Petition sought to “declare article 1 and 2 of the
Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.”

Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing Magallona v. Executive Secretary, Araullo v. Executive
Secretary, and the separate opinion of now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice Brion) in
Araullo. Again citing Associate Justice Brion’s separate opinion, he claims that this Court should follow a “‘fresh’
approach to this Court’s judicial power” and find that his Petition pertains to a constitutional case attended by
grave abuse of discretion. He also asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2, was a
prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, and that the issues he raised were of such transcendental
importance as to warrant the setting aside of procedural niceties.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the mere passage of the Family Code creates an actual case or controversy reviewable by this
Court;
2. Whether or not the self-identification of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member of the LGBTQI+
community gives him standing to challenge the Family Code;
3. Whether or not the Petition-in-Intervention cures the procedural defects of the Petition;
4. Whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is warranted;
5. Whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the right to life and
liberty;

Held:
1. No. Parties coming to court must show that the assailed act had a direct adverse effect on them.
In Lozano v. Nograles:
An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of “ripeness”. In the United States, courts are
centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness:
first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding
court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an
action has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step in.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
2. No. Legal standing or locus standi is the “right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”
To possess legal standing, parties must show “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have]
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.” The
requirement of direct injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of
the controversy and, in effect, assures “that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”

The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed actual case and controversy are both “built on the
principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch
of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.” In addition, economic reasons justify the rule.
Thus:
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional
issues is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient
judicial service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits
and suitors is for them to unduly overburden their
dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly
confronts our judiciary today.

Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
interest being “material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case[,] [ not
just] mere curiosity about the question involved.” Whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have “a
present substantial interest,” not a “mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
interest.” Those who bring the suit must possess their own right to the relief sought. (Citations omitted)

Petitioner’s supposed “personal stake in the outcome of this case” is not the direct injury contemplated by
jurisprudence as that which would endow him with standing. Mere assertions of a “law’s normative impact”;
“impairment” of his “ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships”; as well as
injury to his “plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country”; or influence over his
“decision to stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country” cannot be recognized by this as sufficient interest.
Petitioner’s desire “to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships” and “to settle down and
have a companion for life in his beloved country” does not constitute legally demandable rights that require
judicial enforcement. This Court will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted
inability to find a partner.

Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to him. His
assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the imputed cause, the existence of the
Family Code. His fixation on how the Family Code is the definitive cause of his inability to find a partner is
plainly non sequitur.

Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury. Petitioner fails to show how the Family Code is the
proximate cause of his alleged deprivations. His mere allegation that this injury comes from “the law’s normative
impact” is insufficient to establish the connection between the Family Code and his alleged injury.

3. No. Intervention requires: (1) a movant’s legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) a showing that
the intervention will not delay the proceedings; and (3) a claim by the intervenor that is incapable of being
properly decided in a separate proceeding. Here, while petitioners-intervenors have legal interest in the issues,
their claims are more adequately decided in a separate proceeding, seeking relief independently from the Petition.

The Petition-in-Intervention suffers from confusion as to its real purpose. A discerning reading of it reveals that the
ultimate remedy to what petitioners-intervenors have averred is a directive that marriage licenses be issued to
them. Yet, it does not actually ask for this: its prayer does not seek this, and it does not identify itself as a petition
for mandamus ( or an action for mandatory injunction). Rather, it couches itself as a petition of the same nature
and seeking the same relief as the original Petition. It takes pains to make itself appear inextricable from the
original Petition, at the expense of specifying what would make it viable.

4. No. Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the doctrine of

hierarchy of courts. In cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to constitutional rights
warrant a direct resort to this Court. This was clarified in Gios-Samar. There, this Court emphasized that
transcendental importance-originally cited to relax rules on legal standing and not as an exception to the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts-applies only to cases with purely legal issues. We explained that the decisive factor in
whether this Court should permit the invocation of transcendental importance is not merely the presence of
“special and important reasons[,]” but the nature of the question presented by the parties. This Court declared
that there must be no disputed facts, and the issues raised should only be questions of law:
[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the
legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling
reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must first be brought
before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.

5. Yes. Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn state
recognition is better left to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that may arise:

Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal rules.
Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent “legalness” of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot
be secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself
must create the “thing” to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative
obligation on the state to establish this legal framework. (Emphasis supplied)

In truth, the question before this Court is a matter of what marriage seeks to acknowledge. Not all intimate
relationships are the same and, therefore, fit into the rights and duties afforded by our laws to marital
relationships.

For this Court to instantly sanction same-sex marriage inevitably confines a class of persons to the rather restrictive
nature of our current marriage laws. The most injurious thing we can do at this point is to constrain the
relationships of those persons who did not even take part or join in this Petition to what our laws may forbiddingly
define as the norm. Ironically, to do so would engender the opposite of loving freely, which petitioner himself
consistently raised:

The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it
is shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each
commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and
defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.

In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It is that
which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not
by social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring. (Emphasis supplied)

Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more inclusive and egalitarian
arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Many identities comprise the LGBTQI+ community. Prematurely
adjudicating issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It may unwittingly diminish
the LGBTQI+ community’s capacity to create a strong movement that ensures lasting recognition, as well as public
understanding, of SOGIESC.

The evolution of the social concept of family reveals that heteronormativity in marriage is not a static
anthropological fact. The perceived complementarity of the sexes is problematized by the changing roles
undertaken by men and women, especially under the present economic conditions.

To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the sexes is to
perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold.

It renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile couples,
families formed by couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family
organizations. Furthermore, it reinforces certain gender stereotypes within the family.
Presumption in favor of Marriage

Syed Abbas vs. Abbas, G.R No. 183896, 30 Jan 2013

Civil Law │ Persons and Family Relations │ Marriages │ Void Ab Initio
A marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license. Here, the marriage between Syed
and Gloria without the requisite marriage license should be declared null and void.

FACTS:
Syed Azhar Abbas, a Pakistani, decided to stay in the Philippines two (2) years after meeting Gloria Goo
Abbas, a Filipina. While Syed was staying at the house of Gloria’s mother in Manila, Gloria’s mother arrived with
two (2) men. Syed underwent a “ceremony” as a requirement for his stay in the Philippines. They signed a
document, which Syed learned later on was a “marriage certificate”. Upon investigation, Syed discovered that the
marriage license was procured in Carmona, Cavite, where neither Syed nor Gloria resided. Likewise, the marriage
license was issued under a different name, and that no marriage license was ever issued for Syed and Gloria per
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between Syed and Gloria should be declared void ab initio based on the lack
of marriage license.

RULING:
Yes. As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or
the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1)
Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before
the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites
shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect
the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those
solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
A marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a marriage license. Here, the marriage between
Syed and Gloria without the requisite marriage license should be declared null and void. A certification issued by
the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license. The certification likewise enjoys the presumption of regularity, and such presumption may only
be rebutted upon proof of the claimant that no diligent search was made or that the certification did not
categorically state that no such marriage license was made or found. In this case, not only did Gloria fail to explain
why she procured a marriage license in Carmona, Cavite, where neither party resides. There is also proof that
diligent search was made by the Municipal Civil Registrar to find Syed and Gloria’s marriage license since they were
able to trace the marriage license written at the marriage certificate, albeit registered in another couple’s names.
 Alcantara vs. Alcantara, GR No. 167746 28 Aug 2007
Alcantara vs Alcantara
G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Restituto M. Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to
the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a
person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain priest. They got married on the same day. They
went through another marriage ceremony in a church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was
likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
lives. In her Answer, Rosita asserted the validity of their marriage and maintained that there was a marriage license
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She alleged that
Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children and that Restituto only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. After hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. The CA affirmed the decision.
Restituto appealed. He submitted that at the precise time that his marriage with the Rosita was
celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt
with a “fixer” who arranged everything for them.

He and Rosita did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license
from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the Rosita was a resident of the place.

The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that “Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario” but their marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

ISSUE:
Was the marriage between petitioner and respondent void ab initio?

HELD:
No. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab
initio. To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage
contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect
was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita
Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. This certification enjoys
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done
in the regular conduct of official business. Hence, petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to
impugn the validity of his marriage.
Issuance of a marriage license despite the fact that the fact that neither of the parties are residents of the
city or municipality which issued the same is a mere irregularity that does not affect the validity of the
marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
As to the discrepancy in the marriage license number, the court held that it is not impossible to assume
that the same is a mere a typographical error. It does not detract from the conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
 Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, petitioner cannot pretend
that he was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the
requisite marriage license. Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise,
knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed
to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his
taste or suited to his lifestyle
Who can solemnize marriage

Keuppers vs. Murcia, AM No. MTJ-15-1860, 3 April 2018

Facts:
According to the complainant, respondent Judge solemnized the marriage on May 19, 2008 in the
premises of the DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City; that the staff of the DLS Travel and Tours later on handed to
the couple the copy of the marriage certificate for their signatures... respondent professed no knowledge of how
the complainant had processed and secured the documents pertinent to her marriage; denied personally knowing
her and the persons she had supposedly approached to help her fast-track the marriage; insisted that he had met
her only at the time of the solemnization of the marriage, and that the solemnization of the marriage had been
assigned to him; asserted that the documents necessary for a valid marriage were already duly prepared; and
claimed that he was entitled to the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties
The respondent also denied receiving any amount for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and
her husband; and pointed out that he had not been aware as the solemnizing officer if any of the documents
submitted by her was spurious. He recalled that she had freely and voluntarily signed the certificate of marriage;
and that it was the same document that had been filed in the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Davao City. He
declared that the marriage certificate itself stated the place of the solemnization of the marriage; and that he did
not alter, modify or amend the entries therein. there is no pretense that either complainant or her fiancé Peter
Keuppers was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the
contracting parties to respondent that the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or a place other than his
sala. What in fact appears on record that respondent took pity on the couple and risked sanctions to attend to the
urgency of solemnizing the marriage of complainant and Peter Keuppers.
The undersigned Investigating Officer believes that taking pity on the Keuppers couple is not enough reason for
respondent to risk possible sanctions that may be imposed upon him for not observing the applicable laws under
the circumstances. It is his sworn duty to conscientiously uphold the law at all times despite the inconvenience that
it may cause to others.

Issues:
Was respondent Judge liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service?

Ruling:
We hold and find respondent Judge guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service for solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband outside his territorial jurisdiction,
and in the office premises of the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.
Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and not elsewhere, which emphasizes that the place of
the solemnization of the marriage by a judge like him should only be in his office or courtroom. Indeed, the limiting
phrase highlighted the nature and status of the marriage of the complainant and her husband as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman," and as "the foundation of the family and an inviolable
social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to
stipulation."[7] The only exceptions to the limitation are when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of
death of one or both of the complainant and her husband, or in a remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the
Family Code,[8] or where both of the complainant and her husband had requested him as the solemnizing officer
in writing to solemnize the marriage at a house or place designated by them in their sworn statement to that
effect.
 Mercado vs. Omelio, AM No. RTJ-10-2233

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 August 30, 2017

Ms. Florita Palma and Ms. Filipina Mercado, Complainants, vs.
Judge George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao City et. al, Respondents.
Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS:
A certain Mercado sent an electronic mail to pio@supremecourt.gov.ph alleging a "marriage scam" in
Davao City by Judge George E. Omelio. Another email was from Palma with the same allegation against Judge
Ormelio and his wife, Clerk of Court Ma. Florida C. Omelio.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dispatched an investigating team to Davao City.
A careful scrutiny of the documents establishes the following facts:
1. Both respondents Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio solemnized the marriage of Julius Regor M.
Echevarria and Khristine Marie D. Duo. But it is respondent Judge Murcia whose name and signature
appear in the Certificate of Marriage while there are only pictures to show that respondent Judge
George E. Omelio also married the couple. xxx
2. Per Certificate of Marriage, respondent Judge Murcia officiated the marriage in MTCC, Island Garden
City of Samal, Davao del Norte on February 28, 2008 at 5:30 P.M.

3. Respondent Judge Omelio re-enacted the marriage of Regor and Khristine Marie, in the residence of the
Echevarrias, x x x in Monte Maria Village, Catalunan Grande, Davao City, on February 29, 2008 at around
6:00 o'clock in the evening. x x x
Based on the above facts, it cannot be ascertained if respondent Judge Murcia and his
Clerk of Court, Ma. Florida C. Omelio falsified the Certificate of Marriage. x x x
With regard to respondent Judge Omelio, he could not be held liable for falsification since he did not
have any participation at all in the execution of the Certificate of Marriage. His re-enactment of the marriage did
not include the act of preparation of the Certificate of Marriage. Without that public document, it is also difficult
to render a finding on whether or not respondent Judge Omelio may be held liable for performing an illegal
marriage ceremony which is punished under Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code.
The act of Judge Omelio in conducting what essentially was a sham wedding is, by all accounts, against
public law and public policy. In so conducting a bogus wedding before the public, Judge Omelio had trifled with
marriage, an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family whose nature, consequences and
incidents are governed by law x x x. As a jurist, Judge Omelio ought to know that a judge's power to solemnize
marriage is to be exercised in accordance with law. This includes the appearance before him in his chambers by
the contracting parties x x x where they x x x declare personally that they take each other as husband and wife x
x x. While he has undoubtedly the authority to solemnize marriages, he had clearly overstepped the bounds of
that authority by administering a fraudulent wedding ceremony; x x x He should have declined the importunings
of the groom's parents to conduct a "reenactment" of the wedding x x x.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judges should be held liable for their acts. (YES)

HELD:
Records show that Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio both violated AO 125- 2007.
Although both judges were clothed with authority to solemnize marriages, in this instance however, they
overstepped the bounds of their authority.
As correctly found by the OCA, Judge Murcia affixed his signature in the Marriage Contract of Julius and
Khristine Without actually solemnizing their marriage. Judge Murcia's claim that the contracting parties
personally appeared before him was belied by the groom himself, Julius. When confronted by the
investigating team from OCA, Julius denied knowing or appearing before Judge Murcia; moreover, he asserted
that he was not married in the sala of Judge Murcia in the Island Garden City of Samal, but at their residence in
 Davao City. Julius also narrated that it was Judge Omelio, and not Judge Murcia, who acted as the solemnizing
officer. Julius even presented pictures which were taken during the wedding at their residence showing Judge
Omelio as the solemnizing officer.
On the other hand, Judge Omelio's contention that he merely re-enacted the wedding ceremony of
Julius and Khristine upon the request of the groom's parents was similarly debunked by Julius' admission that it
was actually Judge Omelio who solemnized his marriage with Khristine on February 28, 2008 at their residence
in Davao City. Besides, his defense of reenactment would not justify his infraction. Interestingly, although Judge
Omelio acknowledged said "marriage" as a sham, he insisted that it was not contrary to law as the same was
conducted only for picture-taking purposes because they were not able to do so in the sala of Judge Murcia. As a
duly-authorized solemnizing officer, Judge Omelio is expected to know that marriage should not be trifled with,
and its sanctity and inviolability should never be undermined, especially by such a lame ground as picture-taking.
Worse, although he was supposedly merely doing a re-enactment, Judge Omelio claimed to have allowed
additional witnesses/godparents to affix Murcia. Finally, all the guests were deceived into believing that Judge
Omelio was solemnizing a real marriage and not just a mere re-enactment.
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of marriage.

DISPOSITION:
ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against respondent Clerk of Court Florida C. Omelio, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte, is DISMISSED. Respondent Judge George E. Omelio,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City, Davao del
Sur, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in the amount of ₱40,000.00 to be
deducted from the money value of his accrued leave credits. Respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct
and FINED in the amount of ₱40,000.00.

Article 26
Republic vs. Manalo, GR No. 221029, 24 April 2018
Republic v. Manalo
G.R. No. 221029
April 24, 2018

Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce in
Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now wants to
cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed to reuse her
maiden surname, Manalo.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code,

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law

Issues:
1. Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, can the Filipino spouse initiate the divorce instead of the
foreign spouse?
2. Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
Ruling:
1. Yes. The Court ruled that in interpreting the law, the intent should be taken into consideration. According to
Justice Alicia Sempio-Dy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, the aim of the amendment is to avoid
the absurd situation of having the Filipino deemed still married to a foreign spouse even though the latter is no
longer married to the former. According to the Supreme Court, the wording of Article 26, paragraph 2 of the
Family Code requires only that there be a valid divorce obtained abroad and does not discriminate as to who
should file the divorce, i.e., whether it is the Filipino spouse or the foreign spouse. Also, even if assuming arguendo
that the provision should be interpreted that the divorce proceeding should be initiated by the foreign spouse, the
Court will not follow such interpretation since doing so would be contrary to the legislative intent of the law.

In the issue of the application of Article 15 of the Civil Code in this case, the Court ruled that even if Manalo should
be bound by the nationality principle, blind adherence to it should not be allowed if it will cause unjust
discrimination and oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by the law.

The Court also ruled that Article 26 of the Family Code is in violation of the equal protection clause. They said that
the limitation provided by Article 26 is based on a superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. The violation
of the equal protection clause in this case is shown by the discrimination against Filipino spouses who initiated a
foreign divorce proceeding and Filipinos who obtained a divorce decree because the foreign spouse had initiated
the divorce proceedings. Their circumstances are alike, and making a distinction between them as regards to the
validity of the divorce decree obtained would give one undue favor and unjustly discriminate against the other.

The Court also said that it is the State’s duty not only to strengthen the solidarity of the Filipino family but also to
defend, among others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect abuse, cruelty, and other
conditions prejudicial to their development. The State cannot do this if the application of paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code is limited to only those foreign divorces initiated by the foreign spouse.

2. The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.

It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute divorce or a
vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it
and leaves the bond in full force.

The presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the decree is valid or
constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must still be proven. Therefore, the Japanese law on divorce must
still be proved.

In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence
as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

Fujiki vs. Marinay, 712 Phil 524

Fujiki vs. Marinay
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013

EXECUTIVESUMMARY:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay
met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
abuse from Maekara. Fujiki and Marinay were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” The RTC ruled that the petition was in “gross
violation” of the provisions of A.M. 02-10-11 pertaining to the venue and the party who may file the petition. The
RTC took the view that only “the husband or the wife,” in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition
to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. The Supreme Court ruled that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country. Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court held that Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason, he
has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara
in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki
could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay
met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and
Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and
Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the
ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” The RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition. The RTC ruled that the petition was in “gross violation” of the provisions of A.M. 02-10-11 pertaining to
venue and the party who may file the petition. The RTC took the view that only “the husband or the wife,” in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. The RTC
resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether the husband of the first marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the second
marriage between his wife and her second husband – YES

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties
is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules
of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of Court.

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the
trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, the service
of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the
trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is “to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.” The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount
to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada, this Court explained that “[i]f every judgment of a
foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation.”

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute
their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of
another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.

Section 48 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person
creates a “presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent
title.” Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., “want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies
the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
states.

Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the
extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have
a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtains a
divorce decree abroad. There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy AND (3) Whether
the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family
Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his
marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of
law the moment he contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported “in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family” and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
 Medina vs. Koike, GR No. 215723 27 July 2016
Medina vs. Koike
G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla, a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike, a Japanese national, were
married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed
for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. Doreen filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. The RTC denied Doreen’s petition, ruling that
in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in
accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The Supreme Court ruled that
considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of
pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re-evaluation of the evidence
presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the
ambit of a Rule 45 petition for review. Nonetheless, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to
determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

FACTS:
Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla, a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national,
were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City, Philippines. Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was
born on January 23, 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007. On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki,
pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for divorce before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They
were divorced on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate and the same was duly recorded in the Official
Family Register of Michiyuki Koike. Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of
Marriage on file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. The RTC denied Doreen’s petition,
ruling that in an action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code, the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce must be
proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or
official records of Japan, she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the
existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the “The Civil Code of Japan 2000” and “The Civil Code of
Japan 2009,” presented were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24
and 25 of the said Rules, adding too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found
therein and its effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a qualified
expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of the laws of Japan, particularly
those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to
Section 46, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was
presented and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign judgments and law.
Doreen’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce – REFERRED TO THE
CA
RULING AND DOCTRINE:
Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both
the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any other fact. Considering
that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well as the existence of pertinent laws of
Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls for a re evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC,
the issue raised in the instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition
for review. Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. Nonetheless, despite the procedural
restrictions on Rule 45 appeals, the Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of
the Rules of Court. In the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case was referred to the Court
of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent
factual issues.

Arreza vs. Toyo, GR No. 213198, 1 July 2019

Arreza vs. Toyo
G.R. No. 213198, July 1, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were married in
Quezon City. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement. It was later recorded
in Tetsushi’s family register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu. On May 24, 2012, Genevieve
filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity
to remarry. The Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment denying Genevieve’s Petition. It decreed that while the
pieces of evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement was accepted by the local
government of Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan’s law. The Supreme Court ruled that the
rule in actions involving the recognition of foreign divorce judgment is that it is indispensable that the petition
prove not only the foreign judgment but also the alien spouse’s national law. In this case, the documents petitioner
submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with the demands of Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25. However,
the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation are insufficient to prove Japan’s law on divorce. These
documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the
Department of Foreign Affairs. Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official
publication exempted from the requirement of authentication. Neither can the English translation be considered
as a learned treatise. However, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case was referred
to the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:
On April 1, 1991, Genevieve, a Filipino citizen, and Tetsushi Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were married in
Quezon City. They bore a child whom they named Keiichi Toyo. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a
Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received on February 4,
2011. It was later recorded in Tetsushi’s family register as certified by the Mayor of Toyonaka City, Osaka Fu. On
May 24, 2012, Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and declaration of capacity to remarry. The Regional Trial Court rendered a Judgment denying Genevieve’s
Petition. It decreed that while the pieces of evidence presented by Genevieve proved that their divorce agreement
was accepted by the local government of Japan, she nevertheless failed to prove the copy of Japan’s law. The
Regional Trial Court noted that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation submitted by
Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the
Department of Foreign Affairs. Aggrieved, Genevieve filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied in the
Regional Trial Court’s June 11, 2014 Resolution. Thus, Genevieve filed before this Court the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in denying the petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and
declaration of capacity to remarry filed by petitioner – NO, but the case was referred to CA for petitioner to have
an opportunity to prove the foreign law

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

When a Filipino and an alien get married, and the alien spouse later acquires a valid divorce abroad, the Filipino
spouse shall have the capacity to remarry provided that the divorce obtained by the foreign spouse enables him or
her to remarry. Nonetheless, settled is the rule that in actions involving the recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment, it is indispensable that the petitioner prove not only the foreign judgment granting the divorce, but also
the alien spouse’s national law. This rule is rooted in the fundamental theory that Philippine courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Both the foreign divorce decree and the foreign spouse’s national
law, purported to be official acts of a sovereign authority, can be established by complying with the mandate of
Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court.

Here, the documents petitioner submitted to prove the divorce decree have complied with the demands of Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25. However, the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation are insufficient to
prove Japan’s law on divorce. These documents were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the
Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Petitioner argues that the English translation of the Japan Civil Code is an official publication having been published
under the authorization of the Ministry of Justice and, therefore, is considered a self-authenticating document.
Petitioner is mistaken. The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc., a
private company in Japan engaged in publishing English translation of Japanese laws, which came to be known as
the EHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations are “not advertised as a source of official translations of
Japanese laws;” Rather, it is in the KANPŌ or the Official Gazette where all official laws and regulations are
published, albeit in Japanese. Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official
publication exempted from the requirement of authentication. Neither can the English translation be considered
as a learned treatise.

The Regional Trial Court did not take judicial notice of the translator’s and advisors’ qualifications. Nor was an
expert witness presented to testify on this matter. The only evidence of the translator’s and advisors’ credentials is
the inside cover page of the English translation of the Civil Code of Japan. Hence, the Regional Trial Court was
correct in not considering the English translation as a learned treatise. Finally, settled is the rule that, generally,
this Court only entertains questions of law in a Rule 45 petition. Questions of fact, like the existence of Japan’s law
on divorce, are not within this Court’s ambit to resolve. Nonetheless, in Medina v. Koike, this Court ruled that while
the Petition raised questions of fact, “substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the [Court of
Appeals] for further appropriate proceedings.” Thus, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
the case was referred to the Court of Appeals.

Dacasin vs. Dacasin, 625 Phil 494

Facts:
Petitioner Herald Dacasin, American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin, Filipino were married in
Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, who was born on September 21, 1995.

On June 1999, Sharon sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit,
Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois court dissolved the marriage of the two and awarded the respondent sole custody
of Stephanie. It also retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
 On January 28, 2002, both the petitioner and respondent executed a contract for joint custody over
Stephanie in Manila. Later, on 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole
custody over Stephanie contrary to their agreement. Sharon sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among
others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.

On March 1, 2005, the trial court sustained the respondent's motion and dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois
court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the “nationality rule” prevailing
in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code
prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction.
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by
respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of
respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioner's suit and enforce the
Agreement on the joint custody of the parties' child.

Held: Yes. Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court,
statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary
estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child
custody, belongs to this species of actions.
Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court. Indeed, the trial court’s refusal to entertain
petitioner’s suit was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois court’s divorce
decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was “jurisdiction x
x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.”
Petitioner’s suit seeks the enforcement not of the “various provisions” of the divorce decree but of the post-
divorce Agreement on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois court’s so-called
“retained jurisdiction.”

Van Dorn vs. Romillo, 223 Phil 357

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of
the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the Philippines. They
begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the parties were divorced in
Nevada, United States, in 1982 and the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to render an
accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.

Issue:
Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the
Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
Held:
As to Richard Upton, the divorce is binding on him as an American Citizen. Owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. The divorce is likewise valid as to the petitioner.
As such, pursuant to his national law, private respondent Richard Upton is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue Alice Van Dorn to exercise control over conjugal assets. He was bound by the
Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he did not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.

Nullada vs. Civil Registrar of Manila, GR NO. 224548, 23 January 2019

Nullada vs. Civil Registrar

G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Marlyn and Akira got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of Marriage that was issued
by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later
decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. As
she sought recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines, Marlyn filed with the RTC the Petition for
registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. For the trial court, the fact that
Marlyn also agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code. The Supreme Court ruled that applying the same legal considerations and
considering the similar factual milieu that attended in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC’s
decision. However, under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the decree should come with
adequate proof. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to resolve such failure,
a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws of Japan on divorce
is allowed.

FACTS:
On July 29, 1997, Marlyn and Akira got married in Katsushika-Ku, Tokyo, Japan, as evidenced by a Report of
Marriage that was issued by the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan. The document was registered with both the
Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics Office, Civil Registry Division. The union
of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito. Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour
and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce
decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines. Marlyn and Akira’s
acceptance of the notification of divorce by agreement was supported by an Acceptance Certificate that was
issued by the Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan, an English translation of which forms part of the records. As she
sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the Philippines, Marlyn filed with the RTC the Petition for registration
and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court. The RTC rendered its Decision denying the petition. For the trial court, the fact that Marlyn also
agreed to the divorce and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse had
validly obtained a divorce. Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial
court via an Order dated April 26, 2016. This prompted Marlyn to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a divorce was mutually agreed upon by the spouses is enforceable in the Philippines – YES

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

The facts in Manalo are similar to the circumstances in this case. Applying the same legal considerations and
considering the similar factual milieu that attended in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC’s
decision that refused to recognize the divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner
spouse in Japan solely on the ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by the spouses. The Court finds no
reason to deviate from its recent disposition on the issue, as made in Manalo. The dismissal of Marlyn’s petition
based on the trial court’s interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code is erroneous in light of the Court’s
disposition in Manalo. The fact that the divorce was by the mutual agreement of Marlyn and Akira was not
sufficient ground to reject the decree in this jurisdiction.
While Marlyn and Akira’s divorce decree was not disputed by the OSG, a recognition of the divorce, however,
could not extend as a matter of course. Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the decree
should come with adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce must then be
sufficiently proved. Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The records only include a photocopy of
excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely stamped LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of
Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on
proof of Japan’s law on divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to
resolve such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the laws
of Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court.

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna, GR No. 171914, 23 July 2014

Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Atty. Luna was married to Eugenia Zaballero-Luna with whom he begot seven children. However, he obtained a
divorce decree of his marriage with Eugenia from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of
the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the
same date, Atty. Luna contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad. Thereafter, Atty. Luna and Soledad
returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987. Atty. Luna died, leaving behind
properties such as the (1) 25/100 share in a condominium unit and (2) law books found in the law office. These
properties became the subject of a complaint filed by Soledad as she contended that the she should be declared as
co-owner of such to the extent of 3/4 pro-indiviso share consisting of her 1/2 share in the said properties plus her
1/2 share in the net estate of Atty. Luna which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament.
The trial court rendered its decision declaring that the share in the condominium unit was acquired by Atty. Juan
through his sole industry and thus plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the said
property. However, she was declared to be the owner of the books found in the condominium unit. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna did not terminate his prior marriage, thus, it
adjudged nothing to the respondent and gave all the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from his first marriage.
The Supreme Court ruled that conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of
his death on July 12, 1997. As such, the marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad is void-bigamous and their
property relations would be governed by the rules on co-ownership. However, Soledad was not able to prove his
contributions to the acquisition of the subject properties. Moreover, given the subsistence of the first marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal
funds and effort remained. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna. Petitioner,
the second wife of Atty. Luna, by virtue of the invalidity of the divorce between Atty. Luna and his first wife is thus
entitled to no share.

FACTS:
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo,
Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna, whom he initially married in a civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of
Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San
Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In Atty. Luna’s marriage to Eugenia, they begot seven (7) children,
namely: Regina Maria L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio Macario
Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, Atty. Luna and
Eugenia eventually agreed to live apart from each other whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property. On January 12, 1977, Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with Eugenia from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the Court of First
Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, Atty.
Luna contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad. Thereafter, Atty. Luna and Soledad returned to the
Philippines and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko
(LUPSICON) where Atty. Luna was the managing partner. On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through Atty. Luna
purchased the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project at Gamboa St., Makati City. Sometime in 1992,
LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned by the partners; the parties stipulated that the
interest of Atty. Luna over the condominium unit would be 25/100 shares. Atty. Luna thereafter established and
headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and used a portion of the office condominium unit as their
office. The said law firm lasted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997. After the death of Atty. Juan, his share
in the condominium unit including the law books, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by
Gregorio Z. Luna, Atty. Luna’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
A complaint was filed by Soledad against the heirs of Atty. Luna with the RTC of Makati City on September
10, 1999 alleging that the subject properties (the share in the condominium unit and the law books) were acquired
during the existence of the marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad through their joint efforts that since they had
no children, Soledad became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of Atty. Luna to the extent of 3/4 pro-
indiviso share consisting of her 1/2 share in the said properties plus her 1/2 share in the net estate of Atty. Luna
which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and that the heirs of Atty. Luna through
Gregorio Z. Luna excluded Soledad from her share in the subject properties.
The trial court rendered its decision declaring that the share in the condominium unit was acquired by Atty. Juan
through his sole industry and thus plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the said
property. However, she was declared to be the owner of the books found in the condominium unit. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the divorce decree obtained by Atty. Luna did not terminate his prior marriage, thus it
adjudged nothing to the respondent and gave all the properties to the heirs of Atty. Luna from his first marriage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the 25/100 pro indiviso share in the condominium unit and the law books of the deceased
husband is part of his conjugal property with his second wife, petitioner herein – NO.

RULING AND DOCTRINE:

The first marriage between Atty. Luna. and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted
the nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed this
case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenia having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality
rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a special contract of
permanent union between a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-
recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital
union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded
only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as this public policy
on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given
legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement prior to their
marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their
property relations. The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per se dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still
required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code.
The approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic was insufficient in
dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia. The approval
took place only as an incident of the action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the
justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for divorce.
With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine
law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their
marriage.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership. In
such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carries the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish co-
ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
acquisition of property. However, as found by the CA, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did
not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence, did not serve
the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the
presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should
then be justly concluded that the properties in litis legally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains as of the
time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indiviso share of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the law books pertained to the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
 Marriage License
Ninal vs. Bayadog, GR No. 133778 14 march 2000

Niñal v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, Mar. 14, 2000

FACTS:
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito
resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They executed an affidavit dated December
11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, thus, they are exempted
from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their father’s death,
petitioners, children of Pepito in the first marriage, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case was filed under
the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights.
Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among
the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: W/N the marriage was valid

HELD:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage should be a period of legal union. Pepito and Teodulfa’s marriage was still subsisting 5 years prior to
Pepito and Norma’s marriage. 2nd marriage is void ab initio. Note: However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution
of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

Santiago vs. People, GR No. 200233, 15 July 2015

Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH
GR 200233
July 15, 2015

Facts:
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were served an
information for Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that Nicaonor was still married to Estela when he entered into
the 2nd marriage; he was able to escape while petitioner pleaded ‘not guilty’ relying on the fact that when she
married him, she thought he was single. She soon averred that their marriage was void due to lack of marriage
license, wherein she should not then be charged with bigamy. 11 years after inception if criminal case, Estela
Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she had met petitioner and introduced herself
as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and stated that she met Estela only after she had already married
Nicanor.

Issue: W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.

W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid
Held:
Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of
the following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they
openly showed their disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his
true civil status (3) Estela, who was the more credible witness, compared to petitioner who had various
inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two occasions that the
former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archilla, knowledge of the second wife of the fact of her spouse’s
existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission of Bigamy, which makes her
responsible as an accomplice. She is not co-accused. She is guilty of Bigamy as an accomplice thereby sentenced to
6m arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.

Republic vs. Dayot, GR No. 175581, 28 March 2008

FACTS:
On November 24, 1986, Jose and Felisa were married in Pasay City through the execution of a sworn
affidavit attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity and that being unmarried, they had lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. Then Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual
on August 31, 1990. On June 3, 1993 Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Then on July 7, 1993, Jose filed
a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Biñan,
Laguna. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between
the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for
at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. The RTC rendered a Decision
dismissing the complaint for the ground that the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated
between Jose and Felisa was valid. Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals
the Court of Appeals did not accept Jose assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a
marriage license. Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for
the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 34 of the New Civil Code were not
fully attendant in the case at bar he cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been living
together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the
affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Jose and Felisa is void ab initio?

RULING:
Yes, it is void ab initio (void from the beginning) for lacking the requirements of valid marriage in which
the sworn affidavit that Felisa executed is merely a scrap of paper because they started living together five months
before the celebration of their marriage. That according to the five-year common-law cohabitation period under
Article 34 “No license shall be necessary for the marriage for a man and a woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediments to marry each other… “ it means that a
five years period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had
it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the marriage,
characterized by exclusivity, meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years and continuity
that is unbroken.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be
used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an
Amended Decision that the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson is void ab initio.
 Void and Voidable Marriages
Enrico vs. Heirs of Medinaceli GR No. 173614, 28 Sept 2007

ENRICO VS. MEDINACELI

G.R. NO. 173614, SEPTEMBER 28, 2007
Doctrine:
Nial Case A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil marriage celebrated during the effectivity of the
Code. Family Code.
Coverage: Coverage:
ü Marriages celebrated during effectivity of Civil Code ü Marriages celebrated on and after March 15, 2003
(this rule being prospective)
ü How about marriages celebrated during the
effectivity of the Civil Code but the action was
commenced only after the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC?

Does not cover: Cases already commenced before

March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is
within the coverage of the Family Code. (Which law
governs this then?)
Petitioner: a person who must be the party who A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the wife.
suit. Ex. heirs

FACTS:
· Respondents, heirs of Spouses Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli filed an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico.
· Complaint alleged that Eulogio and Trinidad were married on 14 June 1962 and begot seven children, herein
respondents, namely: Eduardo, Evelyn, Vilma, Mary Jane, Haizel, Michelle and Joseph Lloyd. On 1 May
2004, Trinidad died. On 26 August 2004, Eulogio married petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan.
Six months later, or on 10 February 2005, Eulogio passed away.

In impugning petitioners marriage to Eulogio, respondents averred that the same was entered into without the
requisite marriage license. They argued that Article 34 of the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman
who have been living together for at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage
license, was not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio because they could not have lived together under the
circumstances required by said provision.

Petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband and wife under one roof for 21 years openly
and publicly; hence, they were exempted from the requirement of a marriage license. As an affirmative defense,
she sought the dismissal of the action on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file
an action for declaration of nullity of marriage.

· RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action, citing Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC
promulgated by the Supreme Court which took effect on March 15, 2003 provides in Section 2, par. (a) that a
petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of a Void Marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
· Respondents filed a MR.
· RTC reinstated the complaint on the ratiocination that the assailed Order ignored the ruling in Nial v.
Bayadog, which was on the authority for holding that the heirs of a deceased spouse have the standing to assail a
void marriage even after the death of the latter. It held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-20-SC, which provides
that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife,
applies only where both parties to a void marriage are still living.

ISSUE: Which applies in the case at bar: the case law as embodied in Nial, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as specified in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC?

HELD:
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because it is the law that governs petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage
celebrated during the effectivity of the Family Code. The marriage of petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on 26
August 2004.

While it is true that Nial allowed therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their father, we cannot, however, apply its ruling for the reason
that the impugned marriage therein was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code. The Court
in Nial recognized that the applicable law to determine the validity of the two marriages involved therein is the
Civil Code, which was the law in effect at the time of their celebration. What we have before us belongs to a
different milieu, i.e., the marriage sought to be declared void was entered into during the effectivity of the Family
Code. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioners marriage to Eulogio was celebrated in 2004.

The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988. A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC took effect on 15 March 2003. Thus, contrary to the opinion of the RTC, there is no need to reconcile the
provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC with the ruling in Nial, because they vary in scope and application. As has been
emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective in
its application.

Hence, in resolving the issue before us, we resort to Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which provides:
Section 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. (a) Who may file. A petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

Rationale: Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of
the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor, and hence
can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution.
 Republic vs. Olaybar, GR NO. 189538, 10 Feb 2014
Facts:

Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract... the assailed Order
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of
the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she
was already married to a certain
Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace
of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she
did not appear before the solemnizing... officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge
Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because
she was then in Makati working as a medical... distributor in Hansao Pharma.
she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was
working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House.
her name was... used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport.
Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who
confirmed that... the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged
wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.
a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was... forged.
RTC granted petition
RTC rendered the assailed Decision
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no
clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio

Issues:
whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the... marriage may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Ruling:
We deny the petition.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry.
The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects... the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial... errors in a civil registry
may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved
by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.

An appropriate adversary suit or... proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and... considered.
as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the... appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one
who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In... other words, she claims that no such marriage was
entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune.
She... then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she
was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary... evidence clearly established that the
only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare... the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

Principles:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to
be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects... the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is
deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial... errors in a civil
registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.

Mallion vs. Alcantara, GR No. 141528, 31 Oct 2006

Facts:
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his
marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No.
209... the RTC denied the petition in a decision[2] dated November 11, 1997... upon the finding that petitioner
"failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking."
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition[5]
for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with
respondent was null and... void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage license.

Issues:
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the invalidity of a marriage due to the
absence of an essential requisite prescribed by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding
where the marriage is being impugned on the ground... of a party's psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code?

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid
celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had... been solemnized and celebrated in accordance
with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now
deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of... marriage license is barred by the decision dated November 11,
1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
Principles:
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. I
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence and is founded upon the
following precepts of common law, namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2)... the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed
twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the... preservation of the
public tranquility and happiness
On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of judgment" or
otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues actually and... directly resolved in a
former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2)
it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order
on the... merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter,
and of causes of action
If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the
first case is a bar to the subsequent action

Kho vs. Republic, GR No. 187462, 1 June 2016

FACTS
Petitioner Raquel Kho (Raquel) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage to Respondent Veronica Kho (Veronica) on the ground that their marriage was solemnized
without the requisite marriage license. According to Raquel, his parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon to
arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers required for the marriage of Raquel and Veronica. The couple
thereafter exchanged vows. Nevertheless, Raquel alleges that he never went to the Local Civil Registrar (MCR) to
apply for a marriage license and had not seen any documents in connection thereto. Thus, their marriage is void ab
initio. Raquel presented as evidence a Certification from the LCR that there is neither record nor copy of the
marriage license issued to Raquel and Veronica. Veronica opposed Raquel’s allegations by claiming that their
marriage was celebrated with a marriage license, though she cannot present any evidence to support her claim.
The RTC rendered its decision granting the petition, finding Raquel to have sufficiently established the absence of
the requisite marriage license when his marriage to Veronica took place. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA)
reversed the RTC’s decision, holding that there is a presumption a marriage license was issued in the absence of
any indication in the marriage certificate on the contrary.

ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for nullity of marriage must be granted.

RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the Civil Code, which is the applicable law in the present case,
provides that a marriage license is one of the requisites to be complied with in order for a marriage to be validly
solemnized, except for some instances of marriages of exceptional character. Now, for a marriage to be considered
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that its absence must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage was
issued to the parties.
In the present case, aside from the fact that Veronica failed to adduce any evidence to show that there
was a valid marriage license at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Raquel was able to present a
Certification issued by the LCR attesting that neither a record nor a copy of any marriage license was ever issued in
favor of Raquel and Veronica. Thus, on the basis of such certification, the presumed validity of the marriage of
Raquel and Veronica has been overcome and it becomes the burden of Veronica to prove that their marriage is
valid as it is she who alleges such validity.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

The Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC is
REINSTATED.

Salgado vs. Anso, GR No. 204494, 27 July 2016

SALGADO V. ANSON
G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016
Doctrine: MARRIAGE EXEMPTED FROM LICENSE REQUIREMENT

FACTS:
Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses Salgado) seeking the
annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the
Deceased Severina De Asis.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson. They were married
in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their
daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina’s daughter from a previous relationship.
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties, because there was no marriage
settlement between him and Severina, the above- listed properties pertain to their conjugal partnership. But
without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale transferring the
properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties. When Severina died
Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis adjudicating
herself as Severina’s sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and
of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina.
The Spouses in defense raised the nullity of the marriage which took effect prior the effectively of the family code
for lack of marriage license.
RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage license?

RULING:
No. The marriage is not of an exceptional character A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and
Severina reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage
license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as
the reason therefor.
The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document,
the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina’s marriage contract are prima facie proof that at the time of
their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of
an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the
regulations, rites, or practices of any church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the
requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall merely be considered as a purely religious
ceremony.
The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which
was solemnized civilly. In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken
merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required
issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be
applicable, it is sine qua non that:
(1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance with law (civil
marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.
Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the
civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 – the only date of marriage appearing on the records.
Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and
this was not solemnized pursuant to any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by
the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin
requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties and a ratifying religious
ceremony, were not complied with.
There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license is
required for Luis and Severina’s marriage to be valid.

Buenaventura vs. Buenaventura, GR No. 127358, 31 march 2005

NOEL BUENAVENTURA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ISABEL LUCIA SINGH BUENAVENTURA
G.R. No. 127358 31 March 2005
Azcuna, J.

FACTS:
This case was instituted by Petitioner Noel Buenaventura where he stated that he and his wife, Isabel
Lucia Singh Buenaventura, were both psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The lower court found that petitioner was merely under heavy parental pressure to marry, and deceived
Private Respondent Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable to relate to his wife, as a husband, and their
son, Javy, as a father. Moreso, he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he’d
rather choose to leave his family than reconcile with his wife.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not, based on the findings of the lower court, the marriage between Buenaventura and Singh
may be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, due to the psychological incapacity of the
petitioner.
Whether or not the award of moral damages to the aggrieved spouse is proper in such cases.

RULING:
Yes. The Court of Appeals and the trial court considered the acts of the petitioner after the marriage as
proof of his psychological incapacity, and therefore a product of his incapacity or inability to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. Psychological incapacity has been defined, as no less than a mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Based on the above definition of psychological incapacity, by declaring the petitioner as psychologically
incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of
moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence
that it was done deliberately and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet wilfully
concealed the same.

Chi Ming tsoi vs. CA, GR No. 119190, 16 Jan 1997

Facts:

Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi married on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral Intramuros Manila. After
the celebration thereof and wedding reception, the newlyweds proceeded to the house of husband-defendant’s
mother. Contrary to her expectations, instead of consummating their marriage, husband-defendant just went to
bed, slept on one side, then turned his back and went to sleep. The newlyweds failed to consummate their
marriage even on the succeeding nights. The couple slept together in the same room and on the same bed for
almost ten (10) months but there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She claims that she did not
even see her husband’s private parts nor did he see hers.

On January 20, 1989, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufamio Macalalag,
urologist at the Chinese General Hospital. The results of said physical examination showed that she is healthy,
normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband’s examination was kept confidential. Medications were only
prescribed for her husband but the same was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her, but for her
husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he failed to do so.

Frustrated, the wife filed a case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in order to annul their marriage.

Husband-defendant does not want his marriage annulled since he loves her wife very much, he has no
defect on his part, and there is still chance of reconciliation. However, husband-defendant claims that if their
marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. The husband-
defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was
no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that every time he
wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private
parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once
but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. In another physical
examination by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., which was submitted in a Medical Report, results showed that there is no
evidence of impotency of husband-defendant
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed such
decision and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity.
Whether or not there is a necessity to determine who between the couple are psychologically
incapacitated.

Held:
1. Yes, the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity. The Court provides that one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end
of marriage.” Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In this case, the Court ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the
above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The Court further quoted, “If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the
causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse
is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.”
 While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the “spontaneous, mutual affection
between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298).
Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in
marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.”
2. No, there is no necessity to determine who between the couple are psychologically incapacitated. In
this case, neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other, however, the fact remains that there has never been
coitus between them. The Court held that since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either
party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes
immaterial.
Herein Petitioner alleged that it was his wife who refused to have coitus with him, that the same may not be
psychological but merely a physical disorder. The Court found such defenses unmeritorious. The Court held that
there was nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife
could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor’s Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency
and he is capable of erection. Since it is petitioner’s claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
As stated by the respondent court:
“…if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court
and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal
expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband’s inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the
Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate
testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.”
Hence, in view of the foregoing, the petition is denied.

Article 36

Republic vs. Mola Cruz, GR No.236629, 23 July 2018

Nature of the Case: This is an appeal by certiorari filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) asking the
Court to reverse and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the (CA) which affirmed the Decision and Order of
the (RTC) declaring the marriage of Liberato P. Mola Cruz (respondent) and Liezl S. Conag (Liezl) void ab initio.

Facts:
Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code against his wife Liezl. They were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City. Later on they both went to
Japan for work and it was when respondent noticed changes in Liezl. She began going out of the house without
respondent’s permission and started giving respondent the cold treatment. Liezl also started getting angry at
respondent for no reason. The couple later returned to the Philippines after Liezl was released from detention due
to overstaying in Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed to respondent her romantic affair with a Japanese man.
Despite the confession, Liezl did not end the illicit relationship, which caused respondent such stress that he was
hospitalized. Respondent would give Liezl a chance but found out that Liezl already cohabited with her lover. The
RTC relied on the psychological report and testimony of expert witness, Dr. Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) a clinical
psychologist. Based on the evaluation and assessment procedure she followed, Dr. Tudla found that Liezl was
afflicted by histrionic personality disorder, a pervasive pattern of behavior characterized by excessive emotionality
and attention seeking. A histrionic so afflicted tends to be perceived by others as selfish, egotistical and unreliable;
seeking immediate gratification; over-reactive to even minor provocations; suggestible; and lacking in analytical
ability.

Issue: WON Liezl’s psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations was sufficiently established by
the totality of evidence presented by respondent.

Ruling:
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te predicated, “as aptly stated by Justice Dante 0. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity
under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be
judged, not 0111 the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts.
And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.”
To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the
evidence must sufficiently prove that the respondent spouse’s psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and
existing prior to the time of the marriage.27 The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be
incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.28 “There must
be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person – an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to the marriage – which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity. “ The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent and continued well
into adulthood. It fully appreciated Liezl’s psychological evaluation that revealed her unconsciousness of her
disorder. The courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts o f Liezl as actual manifestations o f her histrionic
personality disorder. A person with such a disorder was characterized as selfish and egotistical, and demands
immediate gratification. These traits were especially reflected in Liezl’s highly unusual acts of allowing her
Japanese boyfriend to stay in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed with his Japanese boyfriend and
introducing her husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat of desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and
lack of regard for the sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot be expected from a married person who
reasonably understand the principle and responsibilities of marriage.

Santos vs. CA, GR No.112019, 4 Jan 1995

FACTS:
Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia in Iloilo City. On
September 20 1986, Leouel and Julia exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court and followed by a church
wedding. The newly married couple lived with Julia’s parents. On July 18, 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy
named Leouel Santos, Jr. But as the day passed by, the couple went on quarrelling over a number of things. On
May 18, 1988, Julia went to the United States of America to work as a nurse even if Leouel convinced her not to go.
On January 01, 1989, Julia called up Leouel and promised him to return home upon her contract expire on July
1989. But Julia broke her promise. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a
training program under the AFP from April to August 1990, he desperately tried to find the whereabouts of Julia
but he failed. Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental a complaint for “Voiding of marriage
Under Article 36 of the Family Code. On May 31, 1991, respondent Julia through his counsel, opposed the
allegations and claimed that it was Leoeul who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent. On November 06,
1991, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Leouel appealed to the CA, but it affirmed the
decision of the trial court. The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-
91, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit. Leouel argues that the ommission
of Julia to return home and not communicating with him for more than 5 years clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

ISSUE:
Whether or not psychological incapacity is attendant to the case at bar.

HELD:
No. Julia’s failure to return to her husband and communication with him do not constitute psychological
incapacity. .
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with,
existing precepts in our law on marriage. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to
live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This
psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Although Leouel was aggrieved, the petition was dismissed because the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife
is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented.

Republic vs. Molina, GR No. 108763, 13 Feb 1997

FACTS:
Roridel O. Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. The petition alleged
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and irresponsibility” as a husband and a father
since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money and that he
depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances,
resulting in frequent quarrels between them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not “opposing and conflicting personalities” is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

RULING:
NO.
In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt
that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an
incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
some marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconciliable differences” and “conflicting personalities” in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities
and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some
psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each
other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability.

Azcueta vs. Republic 606 Phil 177

Facts:
Marietta Azcueta (Marietta) filed a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage to Rodolfo
Azcueta (Rodolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Marietta averred that Rodolfo was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Marietta complained that despite her
encouragement, Rodolfo never bothered to look for a job and always depended on his mother for financial
assistance and for his decisions. It was Rodolfo’s mother who found them a room near the Azcueta home and paid
the monthly rental. Rodolfo also pretended to have found work and gave Marietta money which actually came
from Rodolfo’s mother. When Marietta confronted him, Rodolfo cried like a child and told her his parents could
support their needs. They had sex only once a month which Marietta never enjoyed. When they discussed this,
Rodolfo told Marietta that sex was sacred and should not be enjoyed or abused. Rodolfo also told her he was not
ready for a child. When Marietta asked Rodolfo if they could move to another place, he did not agree and she was
forced to leave and see if he would follow her. He did not.
Rodolfo’s first cousin, who at one time lived with Rodolfo’s family, corroborated Marietta’s testimony that Rodolfo
was not gainfully employed and relied on the allowance given by his mother who also paid the rentals for the room
the couple lived in. The psychiatrist who examined Marietta testified that she found the latter to be mature,
independent, focused, responsible, had a direction and ambition in life, and was not psychologically incapacitated
to perform the duties and responsibilities of marriage. Based on information gathered from Marietta, the same
psychiatrist found Rodolfo to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder characterized by loss of self-
confidence, constant self-doubt, inability to make his own decisions and dependency on other people. The
psychiatrist explained that the root cause of the disorder was a cross-identification with Rodolfo’s mother who was
the dominant figure in the family considering that Rodolfo’s father, a seaman, wasalways out of the house. She
added that the problem began during the early stages of Rodolfo’s life but manifested only after his marriage. She
stated that the problem was severe, because he would not be able take on the responsibilities of a spouse, and
incurable, because it began in early development and had been deeply ingrained in his personality. She,
thus,concluded that Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties and responsibilities.

Rodolfo failed to appear and file an answer despite service of summons on him. The City Prosecutor found no
collusion between the parties. Based on the evidence presented by Marietta, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
declared the marriage void ab initio.

The Solicitor General appealed the RTC’s decision, arguing that the psychiatric report was based solely on the
information given by Marietta, and there was no showing that the alleged psychological disorder was present at
the start of the marriage or that it was grave, permanent and incurable.The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC’s
decision. Marietta, thus, brought the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not Rodolfo is psychologically incapacitated to justify a declaration that his marriage to
Marrieta is void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Held:
Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital duties because of his Dependent
Personality Disorder. His marriage to Marietta was declared void ab initio.
Marietta sufficiently discharged her burden to prove her husband’s psychological incapacity. As held in Marcos vs.
Marcos [397 Phil. 840 (2000)], there is no requirement that the respondent spouse should be personally examined
by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. What matters is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. Marietta’s testimony was corroborated in material points by Rodolfo’s close
relative, and supported by the psychiatrist’s testimony linking the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the
trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the
trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate
their candor or lack thereof. Since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of Marietta’s factual premises, there is
no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by her expert witness.
The root cause of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was alleged in the petition, medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by testimony of an expert witness with more than 40 years experience in the field of psychology
and psychological incapacity, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision. As held in Te vs. Te (G.R. No.
161793, 13 February 2009), “(b)y the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden
of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”
Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity was also established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of marriage. Witnesses were united in testifying that from the start of the marriage, Rodolfo’s
irresponsibility, overdependence on his mother and abnormal sexual reticence were already evident. These
manifestations of Rodolfo’s Dependent Personality Disorder must have existed even prior to the marriage being
rooted in his early development and a by-product of his upbringing and family life.

Furthermore, Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity had been shown to be grave so as to render him unable to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. The Court of Appeals’ opinion that Rodolfo’s requests for financial assistance
from his mother might have been due to embarrassment for failing to contribute to the family coffers and that his
motive for not wanting a child was a “responsible” realization since he was unemployed, were dismissed by the
High Court for being speculative and unsupported by evidence. The Supreme Court likewise disagreed with the
Court of Appeals’ finding that Rodolfo’s irresponsibility and overdependence on his mother could be attributed to
immaturity, noting that at the time of his marriage, Rodolfo was almost 29 years old. Also, the expert testimony
identified a grave clinical or medical cause
for Rodolfo’s abnormal behavior – Dependent Personality Disorder.

A person afflicted with Dependent Personality Disorder cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living
together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday
decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his importantdecisions (such as where to
live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own,
volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or
helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. (Te vs. Te, supra)

One who is unable to support himself, much less a wife; one who cannot independently make decisions regarding
even the most basic matters that spouses face every day; and one who cannot contribute to the material, physical
and emotional well-being of his spouse, is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the marital obligations
within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code.

This is not to say, however, that anyone diagnosed with Dependent Personality Disorder is automatically deemed
psychologically incapacitated to perform his/her marital obligations. The court must evaluate the facts, as guided
by expert opinion, and carefully examine the type of disorder and the gravity thereof before declaring the nullity of
a marriage under Article 36.

Finally, it has been established that Rodolfo’s condition is incurable, having been deeply
ingrained in his system since his early years.

Halili vs. Halili 607 Phil 1

FACTS:
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying petitioners
petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition sought to set aside the January
26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.
Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M. Santos-Halili
null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.
He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they never lived
together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting constantly a year
later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other women. Immediately
thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was
only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not fake.
Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and
self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held
that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly affected his capacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the marriage null and void.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It
was denied.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs decision
and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.
Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to respondent
ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed that the evidence he
presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to sustain the findings and
conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of complying with the essential
obligations of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not, psychological incapacity of the petitioner is a sufficient ground for the nullity of marriage.
Whether or not decision of the Regional Trial Court should be reinstated.

HELD: Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a ground for the
declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.
In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as:
a personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals usually
lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by others
comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for overprotection.
In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident in the
fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioners
mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon
learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already existent
at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent
From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity that
effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is declared null and void
The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is REINSTATED.

Aurelio vs. Aurelio, 665 Phil 693

AURELIO V. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367, [June 06, 2011]
Petitioner: DANILO A. AURELIO
Respondent: VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO

FACTS:
Danilo A. Aurelio and Vida Ma. Corazon Aurelio were married on 23 March 1988. They were gifted with
two sons: Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel.
Four years after their marriage, on 9 May 2002, the wife with the RTC of Quezon a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage. In the petition it was alleged that both the petitioner and respondent were suffering from
psychological incapacity in the performance of the essential marital obligations. The wife stated that this state was
present even before and during the time of the marriage ceremony. Putting forward Article 36 of the Family Code,
she prays that their marriage be declared null and void.
On the side of the husband, psychological incapacity manifested by lack of financial support from him as
well as his lack of drive for his wife. He also was consistently jealous and distrust his wide. His moods were very
hostile and he constantly refused to assist in the maintenance of the family. Moreover, on the side of the wife, her
moods changed quickly – from feeling very high in spirits to instantly switching to despair all depending on her day-
to-day experiences. She was emotionally immature that she gets really upset if she cannot get what she wants.
With all these said, their marriage broke down and they both were incapacitated to accept and fulfill the essential
obligations of a marital life.
However, on 8 November 2002, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the said petition of the wife. He argues
that the petition did not state a cause of action and that it did not meet the standards set by the Court for the
implementation of Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC denied the petition and the CA affirmed it. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allegations in the wife’s petition are sufficient to declare their marriage null and void
based on psychological incapacity? – YES.

HELD:
The petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage observed the requirements in Republic v. CA or
better known as the Molina Doctrine. The root cause of psychological incapacity, juridical antecedence and
incurability were all alleged in the petition.
The petition included the family backgrounds of both spouses and was seen as the root causes of their
psychological incapacity. An expert also affirmed the same as the root causes. Moreover, the illnesses of both
spouses were also of such grave nature to the point that their was a disability for them to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The respondent suffers from Histrionic Personality Disorver with Narcissistic Features,
while the petitioner suffered from Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder. These disorders are alleged to be grave
and incurable. And lastly, the failure to comply with the essential marital obligations under Article 68 of the Family
Code that states “the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support,” were all alleged in the petition. Hence, their marriage must be declared null
and void.

ADDITIONAL NOTES: The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving
psychological incapacity:
(1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
a. medically or clinically identified
b. alleged in the complaint
c. sufficiently proven by experts
d. clearly explained in the decision
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage;
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision;
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
 Ngo te vs. Ong, GR No. 161793, 13 Feb 2009
FACTS:
On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te a freshman in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. They developed a certain degree of
closeness towards each other. On March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he refused but
Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They left Manila and went to Cebu that month. Edwards money lasted for
only a month and they could not find a job. On April 1996, they returned to Manila. Rowena proceeded to her
uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was away, Rowena threathened him that she would
commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to a court to
get married. The couple continued to stay at Rowena’s uncles place where Edward was treated like a prisoner and
was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. After a month, Edward escaped from the house and stayed with his
parents. His family then hid him from Rowena. On June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena and told her that
they should live with his parents but she said that it was better for them to live separate lives. On January 18, 2000,
Edward filed a petition before the RTC of Quezon City, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of
the latters psychological incapacity. On July 30, 2001, the trial court rendered the marriage of the parties null and
void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that petitioner
failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not personally examine
respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. In sum, the evidence adduced fell short of
the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of
the Family Code. Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner filed before the SC the instant petition for review on
certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the marriage void, not only because of respondent’s
psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’ psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is
no requirement for the psychologist to personally examine respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:
Yes. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Edward’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the
evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage that
they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
 Kalaw vs. Fernandez, GR No. 166357, 14 Jan 2015
FACTS:
Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973, maintained a
relationship and eventually married in Hong Kong and subsequently had four children. Shortly after the birth of
their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano who gave birth to a son.
In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living
with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.
In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his
marriage with Malyn in a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver.
The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children whenever any of them got sick. Also, in
accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends.
Tyrone brought the two elder children, Rio and Ria to the US. After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines
and chose to live with Malyn.
Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyns family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two
younger children, Miggy and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on
weekends because of alleged weekend plans with their father.
Nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed
that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their
children during their co-habitation
Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy,
S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyns psychological incapacity.
Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyns behavior her sexual infidelity,
habitual mahjong playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD).
The trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital
obligations under the Family Code.
The CA reversed the trial courts ruling because it is not supported by the facts on record.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity.

RULING:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial courts Decision
for lack of legal and factual basis.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which
provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic
marital obligations. The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must prove that
the incapacitated party, based on his or her actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that
completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging the essential obligations of the marital state.
The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and must be incurable.
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He
presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent
which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioners experts heavily relied on petitioners allegations of respondents
constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their
children. Petitioners experts opined that respondents alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment
of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in
the form of NPD.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of
NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the
evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not
totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties.
The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusion of
psychological incapacity.

Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage/Presumptive Death

Lasanas vs. People, GR No. 159031, 23 June 2014
Lasanas vs People GR 15903 (2014)

FACTS: On February 16, 1968, Judge Salazar of the MTC Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas
and Socorro Patingo without the benefit of a marriage license. The records show that Lasanas and Patingo had not
executed any affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and
Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious ceremony before Fr. Tamayo at the San Jose Church in Iloilo
City. They submitted no marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.7 Both ceremonies were
evidenced by the corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because of
irreconcilable differences. On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a
religious ceremony. Their marriage certificate reflected the civil status of the accused as single. On July 26, 1996,
the accused filed a complaint for annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro. The complaint alleged that
Socorro had employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in securing his consent to their marriage.

ISSUE: W/N Lasans committed bigamy

RULING:
YES. This Court concedes that the marriage between accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation. The ratificatory
religious wedding ceremony could not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the church wedding be
treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a valid marriage should be
present. One of these requisites is a valid marriage license except in those instances when this requirement may be
excused. There having been no marriage license nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided
over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid marriage in itself.

But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner should have first secured a judicial declaration of the nullity
of his void marriage to private complainant Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but
after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban. Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
 Vitangcol vs. People, GR No. 207406, 13 Jan 2016
Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016

FACTS:
That on or about December 4, 1994, in Manila, the accused, being then legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and
without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
contract a second or subsequent marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the
legal requisites for its validity with the said accused NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and
at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to the said GINA M. GAERLAN.
Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros.
They have 3 children. After some time, Alice “began hearing rumors that
Norberto was previously married to another woman. She eventually discovered that Norberto was previously
married to a certain Gina on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the NSO. Alice
subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.
On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987. “After
much prodding by their friends and relatives, they decided to get married in 1994.”Before finalizing their marriage
plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a “fake marriage” with his college girlfriend, GIna.
Nevertheless, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were married on
December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their
household workers that Alice was having an affair with a married man. He was able to confirm the affair after
hearing Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour.
Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer
also warned Alice of the possible criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour.
Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint for bigamy
against Norberto.
RTC convicted Norberto of bigamy. On appeal, the CA sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified
the penalty imposed. Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the petition.
Norberto presented as evidence a Certificate from the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite which states that the Office
has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with no
proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish
the legality of his first marriage

ISSUE:
W/N the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to
Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him
from the bigamy charge.

HELD:
NO. The Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It
does not categorically state that Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist. Moreover, petitioner admitted the
authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina.The marriage
contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first
marriage.This “should be given greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any
record of the marriage[.]”
The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its
presentation, the cause of action in the case, and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to
the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a doctrine that a certification that a
marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was
issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of
those words. That the license now cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.
A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage
licenses may be conveniently lost due to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest
when the benefit is to evade prosecution.
In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and
voluntarily signed and attested to by the parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first
marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered into on December 4, 1994. Within a
span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial declaration
of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage
as spurious was presented. In other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered
untrue by his own actuations.
This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect.
The prosecution has to prove that despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless
contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage contract with proof of its authenticity
and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage
exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil
registrar that the marriage license cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such
marriage license was issued.
The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract.There is no evidence to show
that the number series of that license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no
proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the document in question still exists in the custody of the
civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital documents. This
would have shown whether there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have
contributed to the proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.
This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions to the
civil registrar for the purposes sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion that there is no marriage license.
At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the context just
discussed can lead to the conclusion that he in good faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This
presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor does it mean that the marriage license
was issued.
However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly executed by
petitioner and his first spouse as well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the
civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by a public officer should
likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.
 Castillo vs. Castillo, GR No. 189607, 18 April 2016
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent
G.R. No. 189607

FACTS:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). On 28 May 2001, Renato filed
before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void
due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage
to Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefore and neither of them was a member
of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground
that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's
marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato
bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a
judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. Lastly, RTC also said that
even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and
second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial
decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

ISSUE: Whether or not judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

RULING: No, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the
invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as
this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to
strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

Valdez vs. Republic, GR No. 180863, 8 Sept 2009

Valdez vs. Republic
GR No. 180863, September 8, 2009

FACTS:
Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named Nancy. They argued
constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In March 1972, the latter left their
house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to go back to her parent’s home. 3 years
have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975 when he showed up and they agreed to separate
and executed a document to that effect. It was the last time they saw each other and had never heard of ever
since. Believing that Sofio was already dead, petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application
for naturalization in US was denied because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007,
petitioner filed a petition seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of presumptive death
of Sofio.

HELD:
The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil Code governs during
1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed. Thus, petitioner was
capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
 Matias vs. Republic, GR No. 230751, 25 APRIL 2018
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AUTHOR: Reyes, Brixton
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
TOPIC: Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
PONENTE: J. Velasco
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
 Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
 Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already established by law. There is no
need to file such petition under said provisions before the court.
FACTS:
1. Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of the Philippine Constabulary
and assigned in Araya, Pampanga. They were married on January 7, 1968.
2. On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in order to serve his duties. He
was never seen or heard from again and has never made contact with any of his or Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner
constantly sought updates from the Philippine Constabulary regarding the whereabouts of her husband to no avail.
3. After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D. 1638 from the Philippine
Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. One of its requirements is a judicial declaration of presumptive death.
4. RTC: Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under Art. 41 of the Family Code.
5. CA: Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41only allows such declaration in cases of remarriage which Petitioner did not seek.

ISSUE(S): Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.

HELD: No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a viable suit.
RATIO:
 Article 41 of the FC involves that presumption of death established therein is only applicable for the purpose of
contracting a valid subsequent marriage.
 The RTC erred in considering said petition because it was not filed for the purpose of remarriage under the FC but
Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be presumed dead for
the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened
Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard of
for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.
 Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare
a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court
could decide. The presumption in the said articles is already established by law. In short, the petition is not authorized
by law.
 It is unnecessary for Petitioner to file for judicial declaration of presumptive death to claim death benefits from the
PVAO or the AFP. What is only required is evidence of the claimant that the concerned soldier had been missing for a
number of years and or under the circumstance prescribed under Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.
 Republic vs. Catubag, GR No. 210580, 18 April 2018
Republic of the Phils. Vs. Ludyson C. Catubag
G.R. NO. 210580; APRIL 18, 2018
PETITIONER/S: Republic of the Philippines RESPONDENT/S: Ludyson Catubag

EMERGENCY RECIT: Private Respondent’s wife left the family home. After 6 years, Respondent filed a petition to
have his wife declared presumptively dead. The RTC granted it, but the Petitioner challenged it, filing a Petition
under Rule 65 with the CA, The CA dismissed it, ruling that the recourse was improper as the Petitioner should
have filed a MR with the RTC before elevating the case to the CA. The SC ruled that the recourse was proper, and
that there was no well-founded belief that the wife was dead due to the failure of Respondent to prove that he
exerted diligent efforts in searching for the absentee spouse.

DOCTRINE: In cases of summary proceedings, a decision of the trial court can be elevated to the CA via Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65.

FACTS:
Private Respondent Ludyson and Shanaviv were cohabiting with each other as husband and wife, and had 2
children together.
Ludyson and Shanaviv eventually married in 2003. The marriage was solemnized by a Municipal Judge in Rizal,
Cagayan.
Sometime in 2006, while Ludyson was working abroad, Shanaviv left their house and never returned (Ludyson’s
relatives took care of the children).
Ludyson flew back home and proceeded to look for his wife. He inquired with close friends and relatives and even
travelled as far as Bicol, where he wife was born and raised, but to no avail. He also searched various hospitals and
funeral parlors, also to no avail.
Ludyson subsequently sought the help of Bombo Radyo to broadcast the fact of his wife’s disappearance.
In 2012, Ludyson filed a petition with the RTC to have his wife declared presumptively dead.
The RTC granted the petition.
Petitioner, through the office of the SolGen, elevated the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
contending that Ludyson failed to establish a well-founded belief that his wife was already dead.
The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that Petitioner should have filed a MR with the RTC. The Petitioner filed a MR
but the CA denied the same.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner’s resort to an appeal to the CA under Rule 65 is proper.
Whether the Private Respondent has complied with the requisites of a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Art. 41 of the Family Code.

HELD:
1. YES. The nature of the proceeding determines the appropriate remedy or remedies available. Under
Art. 41 of the Family Code, a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding. Art 253 of the
same Code likewise characterizes proceedings under Art. 41 as summary proceedings.
As a consequence of this summary nature, parties cannot seek reconsideration, nor appeal decision in
summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code because these judgments are immediately final and
executory by express mandate of law.
However, parties may challenge the decision in such proceedings through a petition for certiorari to
question grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. As previously held by the Court in Republic vs.
Sareňogon, Jr., in a summary proceeding for the declaration for presumptive death, if a party is aggrieved by the
decision of the RTC, then a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 should be filed with the CA. any subsequent
decision by the CA may be elevated to the SC via Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
 2. NO. There are 4 requisites under Art. 41 that must be complied with for the declaration of presumptive
death to prosper:
The absent spouse has been missing for 4 consecutive years, or 2 if such spouse was in danger of death
when the disappearance occurred;
The present spouse wants to remarry;
The present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
The present spouse files for a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.

In this case, Ludyson has complied with the 1st, 2nd, and 4th requisites, nut has not satisfied the 3rd requisite as
he has not established a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead. Such belief must result from diligent efforts
to locate the absent spouse. Ludyson failed to establish his allegations. He did not present the friends and family
he claims to have made inquiries to. While he did have a certification from Bombo Radyo’s manager, he did not
seek help from government agencies like the police or NBI. Ludyson’s assertion, uncorroborated by evidence, falls
short of the diligence required to engender a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead.

Republic vs. Quinonez, GR No. 237412, 2 Jan 2020

Art. 41 Presumptive Death

Facts:
Remar A. Quinonez and his wife Lovelyn met when he was in college. They got married on August 16,
1997 at the Saint Vincent de Paul Parish in Mangagoy, Bislig City.To support his family, Remar started
working as a security guard at the National Food Authority Warehouse in October 1997, although later on, he
transferred to Cebu City for an opportunity to earn a bigger salary. In 2001, Lovelyn asked her husband's
permission to go on a three-month vacation in Manila. Despite Remar's reluctance, he agreed to his wife's
request. During the first three months, Lovelyn constantly communicated with Remar through cell phone. It was
also at this time that Remar resigned from his work in Cebu City and transferred to Surigao City.Remar informed
Lovelyn that as soon as she arrive[d] from Manila, they would be living together in Surigao City [with] their two
children. Thereafter, the calls and text messages tapered off until the communication between the spouses
ceased altogether.At first, Remar thought that his wife just lost her cellphone, so he inquired about her from
their relatives in Bislig City. Someone informed him that his wife was then already cohabiting with another man
and would no longer be coming back out of shame. After almost ten (10) years of trying to know about the
whereabouts of his wife from their relatives proved futile Remar filed a Petition for Declaration of Presumptive
Death before the RTC. RTC favor with Renmar. The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA seeking to annul the RTC Judgment. The Republic argued that Remar failed to establish
that he "exerted proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain Lovelyn's whereabouts". The
Republic of the Philippines has filed a petition for certiorari challenging the RTC's Judgment in the case of
Lovelyn Uriarte Quiñonez, whose body has never been found.

Issue:
WON the CA erred when it found sufficient legal basis to uphold the declaration of Lovelyn's
presumptive death.

Ruling:
Yes. Article 41 of the Family Code provides the requirements for a declaration of presumptive death. For
the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Article 41 of the Family Code,
imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief' that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
The allegations in Remar's Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death suggest that he is aware of the true
cause of Lovelyn 's disappearance. The petition of respondent Remar A. Quinonez to have his wife, Lovelyn
Uriarte Quiñonez declared presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage is DENIED.
 Article 45 and 46

Engle vs. Doe, GR No. L-23317 7 Aug 1925

In civil actions the burden of proof rests upon him who alleges insanity to establish that fact by a
preponderance of the evidence, but where insanity is once proved to exist, the burden of proof is then
shifted to him who asserts that the act was done while the person was sane.
JOHNS, J.:
LEGAL DOCTRINE: Annulment of marriage; burden of proof
FACTS:
 On October 18, 1922, Floyd Engle became an inmate of St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila with Dr.
N. M. Saleeby as his physician. It appears from the hospital records that at the time of his admission his
disease was defined as: "Insanity, Delusional & Melancholic & Amebic lnfection & Tertiary Syphilis"
 He remained in the hospital under the care of Doctor Saleeby until sometime in March, 1923, when he
was taken to Baguio, and upon his return to Manila in June, he left for the United States. The marriage
ceremony between Engle and the defendant was performed in the hospital on December 7, 1922.
 December 20, 1922, a petition for the appointment of a guardian for him, alleging insanity, was filed in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, and on December 29, 1922, H. C. Powers was appointed guardian
of his person and J. V. House guardian of his property.
 After the marriage Engle and the defendant never lived together as husband and wife, and on the
following day the defendant left Manila and went back to Tacloban, Leyte, which was Engle's former
residence, and made an effort to obtain possession of all of his business and property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not at the time of the marriage Engle was of sound mind and mentally capable of
entering into a marriage contract.

HELD/RULING:
 No. It will be noted that he was admitted to the hospital October 18, 1922, and the nature of his
disease at the time of his admission was described in the hospital records as: "Insanity, Delusional &
Melancholic & Amebic Infection & Tertiary Syphilis" and that his alleged marriage to the defendant
took place on December 7, 1922, fifty days after that time. That during all of the time that Engle was in
the hospital, he was under the personal charge of Doctor Saleeby, who was his only physician.
 The record is conclusive that Doctor Saleeby was a fair and impartial witness, and that he had no
interest whatever in the result of this suit, and that he was in daily attendance upon Engle from the
time that he entered until he left the hospital, covering a period of about five months. His testimony is
materially strengthened and corroborated by the evidence of J. V. House, H. C. Powers, and E.
Womack, who were lifelong personal and intimate friends of Engle. Opposed to this is the evidence
of the defendant and the Reverend H. J. Parker, who performed the marriage ceremony.
 Under section 10, General Orders No. 68, a marriage may be annulled where it appears that either
party was of unsound mind at the time of the marriage, or that either party at the time is physically
incapable of entering into the marriage state when such incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable. Where general insanity is once shown to exist, it is presumed to continue, and if a recovery
or lucid interval is alleged to have occurred, the burden of proving that allegation is on the person
making it.
 Where it is shown that insanity once existed, and it is sought to prove that a subsequent act was done
in a lucid interval, sanity must be shown to exist at the very time of the act in question, and it is not
sufficient to show a lucid interval before and after the day of the act. In construing the evidence as to
the insanity of a person, much weight should be given to his physician who is learned and experienced
in his profession, and who for a long time was in daily attendance upon him as his physician.
 Almelor vs. Almelor, GR No. 179620, 26 Aug 2008
FACTS:
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married on
January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an anesthesiologist
and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in Las
Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this
was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of
their frequent fights as a couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection
Manuel has for his mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She
caught him in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found
several pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the lips.
The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida
took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their children. Dr.
Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove Leonida’s claim. She testified that she
conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview
with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is
marked by antecedence; it existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that
the true cause of Leonida’s hostility against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage,
not on the ground of Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by reason of
Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.

HELD:
Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per se.
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a homosexual and that
he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of
Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s
peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was
nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from
Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been vitiated by such.

Alcazar vs. Alcazar, GR No. 174451, 13 ocotber 2009

Facts:
Petition for Review
Complaint... was filed by petitioner... alleged... hat she was married to responden... by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan...
at the... latter's residence After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, the hometown of respondent's parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent
did not live with petitioner at the latter's abode Tondo, Manila... respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop... respondent did not communicate with petitioner
by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a
year and a half... a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines...
surprised why she was not... advised... respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home... to
petitioner instead, respondent proceeded to his parents' house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon... learning...
petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of
respondent's whereabouts. petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed... that
respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival... from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines,
he never contacted her... petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to... paragraph 5, Article 45
of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between
petitioner and respondent. Respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder... making him
psychologically incapacitated to... properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a
married man. The RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner's Complaint for annulment of her marriage... he
Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the
moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity... on his part. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration Petitioner filed an appeal with
the Court of Appeal... he Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision

Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.

Ruling:
it appears that petitioner was actually seeking the... declaration of nullity of her marriage to... respondent based
on the latter's psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint... before the RTC to her former counsel's mistake or
gross ignorance
But even said reason cannot save petitioner's Complaint from dismissal.
Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life

Principles:
must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of marriage
based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be incurable;
Article 45(5) of the Family Code... lack of power to copulate.
Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act
of sexual intercourse.
No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with petitioner.
Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their
wedding and... before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondent's
part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner's marriage to respondent
 Collusion
Lim-Lua vs. Lua, GR No. 175279-80, 5 June 2013

Subject Matter: Provisional orders; AM No. 02-11-12 SC

Summary:
Susan filed a petition against her husband, Danilo, for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer for
support pendente lite. RTC granted P250k monthly support in addition to P1.75million support in arrear. The
CA however reduced the monthly support to P115k. Based on Danilo’s understanding of the CA decision,
Danilo issued a check only in the amount of P162k in favor of Susana. He explained that the said amount is the
difference between the support in arrear and amount advanced by Danilo to Susana and his children. On
certitorari, the CA ruled that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses incurred by
respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel
expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to
the benefit not only of the two children. Nonetheless, the SC did not agree with CA because any amount to be
credited as monthly support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.
Note that there is no controversy as to the reasonableness and sufficiency of monthly support as both parties
did not appeal the reduced monthly support of P115k which was determined after due hearing, submission of
documentary evidence, and Susan’s testimony.

Doctrines:
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for annulment of
voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or
upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support
pendente liteprior to the rendition of judgment or final order.
Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case before it can
settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application.
It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
Parties:
Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua
Respondent Danilo Y. Lua

Facts:
Susan filed a petition against Danilo for a declaration of nullity of marriage with a prayer for support pendente
lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per month. Citing respondent’s huge earnings
from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
After due hearing, RTC granted support pendent lite of 250,000.00. Citing Art. 203 of the Family Code, RTC stated
that support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of
judicial demand. A total of P1,750,000.00 should be paid by Danilo to Susan (i.e P250k x 7 months that elapsed
from time of filing of complaint until hearing of support pendente lite), and P250,000.00 for every month.
Danilo filed an MR which was denied.
Danilo filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA.
CA, finding that RTC gravely abuse its discretion, reduced monthly support pendente lite to P115,000.00.
Neither of the parties appealed CA’s decision.
In a Compliance, Danilo issued a check in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to Susan. Danilo explained that, as
decreed in the CA decision, he deducted the advances given by him to Susan and his children in the sum of
P2,482,348.16 (with attached photocopies of receipts/billings) from the total amount of support in arrears
amounting to P2,645,000.00.
RTC issued a writ of execution as it did not agree with Danilo’s interpretation of the CA decision.
However, respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, hence petitioner filed in
the a Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages in the CA. On the other hand, Danilo filed a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 against the RTC judge.
CA ruled in favor of Danilo. CA ordered the deduction of the amount of a total of PhP3,428,813.80 from the
current total support in arrears (larger amount to be deducted from support in arrears; because two expensive
cars bought by respondent for his children plus their maintenance cost, plus travel and grocery expenses were
included in the deduction). It held that the trial court should not have completely disregarded the expenses
incurred by respondent consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees,
travel expenses, and the credit card purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which certainly inured to
the benefit not only of the two children, but their mother as well.

Issue/s:
1. WON certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total
support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children . (YES –only those necessary for sustenance
and household expenses.)

Argument:
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of the
two cars and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the
sustenance of the family or in keeping them alive.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the subject deductions would result in unjust
enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice.
Ratio:
YES– Necessary for sustenance and household expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted
from the total support in arrears owing to petitioner and her children
Substantive law
 As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family relationship
is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the needs of the recipient. Such support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
Remedial law
 Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or for
annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the
court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or designated
custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order.
 Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case
before it can settle an application for this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind
and amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the application.
 It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record.
o In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for petitioner and her two children was
determined after due hearing and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although
the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is clear that the monthly support
pendente lite of P115,000.00 ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of
petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers and house helpers, and other
household expenses.
o There is no controversy as to the sufficiency and reasonableness of monthly support pendente
lite as it was not appealed by either party.
o The dispute concerns the deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
What deductions should be made?
 The CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by Danilo to be credited against the
accrued support pendente lite.
  Any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly support should only cover those
incurred for sustenance and household expenses
o As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was
intended primarily for food, household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house
helpers, and also petitioner’s scoliosis therapy sessions.
o Hence, the value of two expensive cars bought by Danilo for his children plus their maintenance
cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli, purchases through credit card of items other than
groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the
judgment awarding support pendente lite.
o The ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the accrued monthly support completely
ignores the unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-being, was given due
regard by the trial and appellate courts.

Wherefore, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 01154 and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for Contempt of Court with Damages filed
by Susan Lim Lua against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua’s Petition for Certioraridocketed as SP. CA G.R. No. 01315.
Consequently, the assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB29346 entitled “Susan Lim
Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php 648,102.29from the support pendente
litein arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two (2) children;

ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of his monthly support of PhP115,000.00
pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him subject to the
deduction aforementioned.

iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this judgment. SO ORDERED.”

Legal Separation

Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz, 22 SCRA 333

Dela Cruz vs. Dela Cruz
GR 19565, January 30, 1968

FACTS:
Estrella, the plaintiff, and Severino, the defendant were married in Bacolod and begotten 6 children.
During their coverture, they acquired several parcels of land and were engage in various businesses. The plaintiff
filed an action against her husband for the separation of their properties. She further alleged that her husband
aside from abandoning her, also mismanaged their conjugal properties. On the other hand, Severino contended
that he had always visited the conjugal home and had provided support for the family despite his frequent
absences when he was in Manila to supervise the expansion of their business. Since 1955, he had not slept in the
conjugal dwelling instead stayed in his office at Texboard Factory although he paid short visits in the conjugal
home, which was affirmed by Estrella. The latter suspected that her husband had a mistress named Nenita
Hernandez, hence, the urgency of the separation of property for the fear that her husband might squander and
dispose the conjugal assets in favor of the concubine.

ISSUE:
 WON there has been abandonment on the part of the husband and WON there has been an abused of his
authority as administrator of the conjugal partnership.

HELD:
The husband has never desisted in the fulfillment of his marital obligations and support of the family. To
be legally declared as to have abandoned the conjugal home, one must have willfully and with intention of not
coming back and perpetual separation. There must be real abandonment and not mere separation. In fact, the
husband never failed to give monthly financial support as admitted by the wife. This negates the intention of
coming home to the conjugal abode. The plaintiff even testified that the husband “paid short visits” implying more
than one visit. Likewise, as testified by the manager of one of their businesses, the wife has been drawing a
monthly allowance of P1,000-1,500 that was given personally by the defendant or the witness himself.
SC held that lower court erred in holding that mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of
the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the business constitutes abuse of administration. In
order for abuse to exist, there must be a willful and utter disregard of the interest of the partnership evidenced by
a repetition of deliberate acts or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

Partosa Jo vs. CA, 216 SCRA 692

G.R. No. 82606
December 18, 1992

Facts:
Jose Jo is a Chinese national, and Prima Partosa is his legal wife. Jose Jo admitted that he had cohabited with three
other women and fathered 15 children. The two agreed that Prima would temporarily leave their conjugal home in
Dumaguete City to stay with her parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and for Jose to visit and support
her. They never agreed to separate permanently. In 1942, Prima went back to Dumaguete, but she was not
accepted by her husband.
In 1980, Prima filed a petition for judicial separation of conjugal property as well as for support. The trial court
judge rendered the decision granting Prima a monthly support of Php500, Php40,000 for the construction of a
house where she may live separately, Php19,200 by way of support in-arrears, and Php3,000 for attorney’s fees.
However, the complaint for judicial separation of conjugal property was dismissed for lack of a cause for action and
on the ground that separation by agreement was not covered by Article 178 of the Civil Code.
Jose contended that the decision of the trial court could no longer be reviewed by the Court of Appeals because it
has long since become final and executory. Prima, on the other hand, argued that a disposition of that case was
made in the penultimate paragraph of the decision. It reads:
“It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all properties in question are considered properties of Jose Jo, the defendant
in this case, subject to separation of property under Article 178, third paragraph of the Civil Code, which is subject
of separate proceedings as enunciated herein.”
Prima believed this to be the dispositive portion of the case.

Issues:
1. Can the appellate court still rule on the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision?
2. Is Prima Partosa-Jo entitled to a judicial separation of conjugal property?

Ruling:
1. Yes. The Supreme Court held that the drafting of the decision was not exactly careful. Although the petitioner’s
counsel should have taken immediate steps in rectifying the ruling, a mere technical defect is not insuperable. It
has been ruled that where there is an ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion of the
decision, the Court may clarify such an ambiguity by an amendment even after the judgment has become final.
2. Yes. The petitioner, Prima Partosa-Jo, invoked Article 178 (3) of the Civil Code, which reads
Article 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval, shall not affect the
conjugal partnership except that
****
(3) If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one year, she may petition the court for a
receivership, or administration by her of the conjugal partnership property or separation of property.
Article 178 of the Civil Code had been superseded by Article 128 of the Family Code at the time of the decision by
the Supreme Court. As was ruled in Ramirez v. CA, “an appellate court, in reviewing a judgment on appeal, will
dispose of a question according to the law prevailing at the time of such disposition, and not according to the law
prevailing at the time of rendition of the appealed judgment.”
Article 128 of the Family Code reads:
If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for judicial separation of property, or for authority to be
the sole administrator of the conjugal partnership property, subject to such precautionary conditions as the court
may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
As early as 1942, Jose had already rejected his wife and refused to give financial support to her. This falls squarely
under Article 135 of the Family Code, which provides that if at the time of the petition, the spouses had been
separated for at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable, it should be considered sufficient cause for
judicial separation of property.

Petitioner Prima Partosa-Jo’s petition for judicial separation of property is granted.

People vs. Schneckenburger, 73 Phil 413

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.

NATURE OF ACTION: Appeal on Accused’s Conviction of Concubinage

FACTS:
May 15, 1926: accused Rodolfo married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena. After 7 years (due to
incompatibility of characters) they agreed to live separately from each other. May 25, 1935: they executed
document—agreement, which states that “Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del
otro por el resto de su vida y se comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni intervenir ni
mezclarse bajo ningun concepto en la vida publica o privada de los mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de los
otorgantes en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.” June 15, 1935: accused w/o
leaving the Philippines secured a divorce decree from civil court of Juarez, Bravos District of Chihuahua Mexico
May 11, 1936: he contracted another marriage with co-accused Julia Medel before the justice of the peace
of Malabon because of the nullity of the divorce decree, complainant herein instituted two actions against
the accused, one for bigamy and another for concubinage charge for bigamy culminated in the conviction of
accused; Meanwhile, before the trial for the charge of concubinage commenced, accused interposed the plea of
double jeopardy and the case was initially dismissed; upon appeal, the CA held the dismissal before trial to be
premature and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on
the merits
TC: accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence

ISSUE:
Whether the accused should be acquitted of concubinage in view of the agreement executed by Rodolfo and
Elena upon their separation

HELD:
Yes. The agreement constituted a consent given by Elena to Rodolfo, hence, Rodolfo should be
acquitted. Judgment is reversed.
No double jeopardy - the defense of bigamy for which he was convicted and that of
concubinage for which he stood trial in the court are two distinct offenses in the law BIGAMY: celebration of
second marriage while the first is still existing; offense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the
instance of the state
 CONCUBINAGE: mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife; offense against chastity
and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party
Upon the other hand, the accused should have been acquitted of the crime of concubinagethe document
executed by and between the accused and the complainant in which they agreed , while illegal for the purpose
for which it was executed , constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the
meaning of Art. 344 of the RPC
by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other Previously, the court held
that the consent which bars the offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of
adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given
expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed. However, in this case, the Court sees this to
be a narrow view.
As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been
intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical
difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the
offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court
and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong
Prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended aprty from prosecuting the offense
An agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and
manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense
Article 344 of the RPC provides:
The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are
both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders

Bugayong vs. Ginez, 100 Phil 616

Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to Leonila Ginez in 1949 at
Asingan, Pangasinan. In July 1951, Benjamin began receiving letters informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his
wife. In August 1952, Benjamin went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife whom he met in the house of one Mrs.
Malalang, Leonila's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of Pedro,
Benjamin's cousin, where they stayed and lived for 1 night and 1 day as husband and wife. The next day they
passed the night in their house as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin tried to verify from his wife the
truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of answering his query,
merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity imputed on her.
Benjamin then filed a case for legal separation. Leonila filed an answer vehemently denying the averments
of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After Benjamin testified, Leonila's counsel moved for the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of condonation.

Issue:
Does Benjamin's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him,
amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts?

Held:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A detailed examination
of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part of the husband for the
supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendant-wife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the
infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the
plaintiff. The act of the latter in persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to
be brought to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day and one
night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house likewise as husband and wife — all
these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than that a reconciliation between them was effected and that
there was a condonation of the wife by the husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of
the acts of infidelity amounting to adultery. It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the
different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse after discovery of the
offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especially as against the husband'. In the lights of the facts testified to
by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted, and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable
conclusion is that there is condonation.

Almecen vs. Baltazar, L-10028, 23 May 1958

[ G. R. No. L- 10028, May 23, 1958 ] NAME OF THE CASE
:
HIPOLITA ALMACEN, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TEODORO N. BALTAZAR, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT. D
ECISION
ENDENCIA, J.:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY :
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila ordering the defendant-
appellant to pay plaintiff-appellee a monthly support of P50.00 beginning with the month of August, 1955.
Despite the meagre amount involved in the case, it was brought to this Court on appeal because the appellant
only raised questions of law.

STATEMENT OF FACTS :
The facts of the case as found by the lower court are as follows: that plaintiff and defendant were legally married
on March 24, 1923; that in 1937, plaintiff committed adultery with one named Jose Navarro, a cousin of
defendant; that prior to the infidelity of the wife, the defendant himself has not been loyal to her, he having
been once confined at the hospital suffering from venereal disease; that the defendant separated from the
plaintiff after the latter's infidelity and while estranged from her he lived maritally with another woman by the
name of Lourdes Alvarez; that after their separation there has been a reconciliation between them or at least a
condonation by defendant of the acts committed by the wife as shown by the fact that he has been sending her
money for her support; that husband and wife were in pari delicto and, therefore, defendant is bound to support
the plaintiff because he has likewise been unfaithful to her.

ISSUES :
Whether or not the lower court erred:
1. in not taking plaintiff's adulterous act of infidelity as defense against her claim for support and in not
exempting him from the obligation to give such support; and
2. in finding that the evidence on record was sufficient to establish a condonation of plaintiff's
adulterous act and reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant.

ANSWER as to issue nr. 1 :

Yes, we agree with the lower court's ruling that defendant is still bound to support his wife.

REASONING:
As to the first assignment of error, we find that by the provisions of Art. 303 of the new Civil Code, the obligation
to support shall cease "when the recipient has committed some act which gives rise to disinheritance;" that under
Art. 921 (k) of the same Code, a spouse may be disinherited when she has given cause for legal separation," and
under Art. 97, one of the causes for legal separation is "adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on the
part of the husband", as defined in the Penal Code.
And plaintiff and defendant were both guilty of infidelity and before the filing of the action they had a
reconciliation or, at least, defendant had pardoned plaintiff's unfaithfulness, for which reason we may apply Art.
922 of the aforesaid Code which provides that "a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the
offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit, aid renders ineffectual any disinheritance that may
have been made;" secondly, the law on support (Title IX, Book I, Arts. 290-304, Civil Code) contains no provision
squarely applicable to the present case in which both parties had committed infidelity, neither is there any
provision to the effect that when both spouses committed marital offenses against one another, one can no
longer ask support from the other; thirdly, there is the general principle that when two persons acted in bad
faith, they should be considered as having acted in good faith, which principle may be applied to the instant
 case to the effect that plaintiff and defendant being in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim the adultery of the
former as defense to evade the obligation to give her support.

ANSWER to issue nr. 2 : As to the second assignment of error, we find it also groundless, for the lower court
declared that there has been a condonation by the defendant of the acts committed by the wife because of the
latter's testimony and documentary evidence submitted, which show that the defendant had given money to
the plaintiff on several occasions through third persons and, in our opinion, such evidence is really sufficient to
show condonation or reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant, for had there been no condonation of
plaintiff's infidelity and no reconciliation between her and defendant, the latter would not certainly have given
any amount of money for her support.

REASONING :
The act of giving money to an erring wife and the fact proven in the case that no action was taken against her
before the courts of justice are sufficient to establish forgiveness amounting to condonation, for "condonation is
the forgiveness of one of the married parties of an offense which he knows the other has committed against the
other." (Words & Phrases 8A, pp. 19-20} At any rate, pardon or condonation does not require sexual intercourse
and it may be express or implied.

HOLDING :
"Wherefore, finding no errors in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against the
defendant.

Ong vs. Ong, GR No. 153206, 23 Oct 2006

PONENTE: Austria-Martinez

FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong were married on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3 children. On March 21,
1996, Lucita filed a complaint for legal separation under Art 55 (1) of FC on grounds of physical violence, threats,
intimidation and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner. RTC granted appeal for legal separation. CA upheld RTC’s
decision when herein petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The highlight was on December 14, 1995
when the respondent asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their son, back from Bacolod which turned into a violent
quarrel with the petitioner hitting the respondent on the head, left cheek, eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately
pointing a gun at respondent’s head asking her to leave the conjugal house.

ISSUES:
Whether or not CA erred in upholding the RTC’s decision granting legal separation to Lucita when she herself has
given ground for legal separation when abandoned her family.

HELD:
No, It is true that a decree of legal separation should not be granted when both parties have given ground for legal
separation (Art 56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment referred to in the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year. Also, it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct
which does not constitute the abandonment contemplated in the said provision. The petition was denied for lack
of merit.
 Araneta vs. Concepcion, 99 Phil 709
Araneta vs. Hon. Concepcion Case Digest
Facts:
Luis Araneta filed an action for legal separation on the ground of adultery against his wife Emma. After the issues
were joined, Emma filed an omnibus petition, supported by her Affidavit, to secure custody of their three minor
children, a monthly support for herself and said children, the return of her passport, to enjoin Luis from ordering
his hirelings from harassing and molesting her. Luis opposed the petition, denying the misconduct imputed to him
and alleging that Emma had abandoned the children. He prayed that the parties be required to submit their
respective evidence.

Judge Concepcion resolved the omnibus petition, granting the custody of the children to Emma and a monthly
allowance of P2,300 for support for her and the children, P300 for a house and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Upon
refusal of the judge to reconsider the order, Luis filed a petition for certiorari against said order and for mandamus
to compel the respondent judge to require the parties to submit evidence before deciding the omnibus petition.

The main reason given by the judge, for refusing Luis’ request that evidence be allowed to be introduced on the
issues, is the prohibition contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows:

“ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the
filing of the petition.” (now Art 58, Family Code)

Issue:
Does the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from the filing
of the petition preclude the court from acting on an omnibus petition for support and custody?

Held:
It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein is evidently intended as a cooling off period to make
possible a reconciliation between the spouses. The recital of their grievances against each other in court may only
fan their already inflamed passions against one another, and the lawmaker has imposed the period to give them
opportunity for dispassionate reflection. But this practical expedient, necessary to carry out legislative policy, does
not have the effect of overriding other provisions such as the determination of the custody of the children and
alimony and support pendente lite according to the circumstances. (Article 105, Civil Code, now Art. 49, Family
Code.) The law expressly enjoins that these should be determined by the court according to the circumstances. If
these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to actual facts, rank injustice may be caused.

The rule is that all the provisions of the law even if apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and given
effect by reconciling them if necessary.

“The practical inquiry in litigation is usually to determine what a particular provision, clause or word means. To
answer it one must proceed as he would with any other composition — construe it with reference to the leading
idea or purpose of the whole instrument. A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is
animated by one general purpose and intend. Consequently, each part of section should be construed in
connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Thus it is not proper to confine
interpretation to the one section to be construed.” (Southerland, Statutory Construction section 4703, pp. 336-
337.)

Thus the determination of the custody and alimony should be given effect and force provided it does not go to the
extent of violating the policy of the cooling off period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the separation,
like the actual custody of the children, the means conducive to their welfare and convenience during the pendency
of the case, these should be allowed that the court may determine which is best for their custody.

The writ prayed for is hereby issued and the Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to proceed
on the question of custody and support pendente lite in accordance with this opinion. The court’s order fixing the
alimony and requiring payment is reversed. Without costs.

Laperal vs. Republic, GR No. L-18008, 30 Oct 1962

Laperal vs. Republic GR No. 18008, October 30, 1962 6 SCRA 357
October 24, 2016

FACTS:
The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.
However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with
Enrique. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to
resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground
that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code. She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give
rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of
the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.

HELD:
In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.
The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances
was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate
that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence,
there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.