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Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping - Conflict Resolution Through State-

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Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping – Conflict
Resolution through State-Building and
Democracy Promotion in Haiti

Julia Leininger *

“Constitution is paper, a bayonet is iron.”

(Haitian saying)

“You cannot have a one-year solution to a ten-year problem.”

(Participant of the IPA Seminar “Lessons Learned: Peace-building in
Haiti”, 23-24 January 2002)

* The author would like to thank Claudia Zilla, Markus Rau, Pamela Jawad,
and Markus Böckenförde for their valuable and sound advice on this arti-
cle.

A. von Bogdandy and R. Wolfrum, (eds.),

Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 10, 2006, p. 465-530.
© 2006 Koninklijke Brill N.V. Printed in The Netherlands.
466 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

I. Introduction
II. Peace-Keeping through State-Building and Democracy Promotion
1. State-Building, Democracy Promotion and Conflict Resolution
a. State-Building and Conflict Resolution
b. Democracy Promotion and Conflict Resolution
c. An Integrated View on State-Building and Democracy Promotion
2. Foundations for the Promotion of Democracy in International Law
a. Searching for Evidence: A Right to Democracy?
b. Examining the Regional Level: The Democracy Clause of the OAS
c. Defining Threat to Peace: Breakdown of Democracy
III. The Haitian Case: Peace-Keeping through State-Building and Democracy
Promotion
1. State and Democracy in Haiti
a. Historical Overview: Legacies of the Past
b. Development of the State and Democracy in Haiti
2. Roots, Evolution and Surfacing of the Haitian Conflict
a. 1991: Overthrow of the First Haitian Democratic Government
b. 1994-2004: The Slow, but Predictable Return to Conflict
c. 2004: Ousting of President Aristide’s Government
3. On the Ground: UN Peace-Keeping Approaches in Haiti
a. UNMIH (1993-1996): A Narrow View on an Ample Problem
aa. Deployment
bb. Mandate
cc. Composition and Implementation
dd. Humanitarian Aid
ee. State-Building and Democracy Promotion
ff. Fulfillment of Mandate
b. UNSMIH, UNTMIH, and MIPONUH (1996-2000): A Drop in the
Ocean
c. Excursion – MICIVIH (1993-2000): Searching for a Role, though Suc-
cessful
d. MINUSTAH (since 2004): A Comprehensive Venture
aa. Deployment
bb. Mandate
cc. Composition and Implementation
dd. State-Building and Democracy Promotion
ee. Fulfillment of the Mandate
e. Lessons Learned: UNMIH and MINUSTAH in Comparative Per-
spective
aa. Deployment
bb. Mandate and Design
cc. Form
dd. Composition and Implementation
ee. State-Building
ff. Democracy Promotion
gg. Cooperation
IV. Conclusions
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 467

I. Introduction

UN peace-keeping has been subject to major changes since the end of

the Cold War. A new, more comprehensive, concept of security, “hu-
man security” has emerged. With it the international community has
widened its recognition of factors which may constitute a threat to
peace. According to this view, internal state conflicts and other domes-
tic situations, – in addition to the traditional recognition of inter-state
conflicts – may cause a threat to peace. For instance, civil war, major
diseases, natural disasters and poverty may be considered a threat to
peace.1 The United Nations is making efforts to adapt its organization
to these challenges. It recently established a Peace-building Commis-
sion which will marshal resources at the disposal of the international
community to advise and propose strategies for post-conflict recovery,
reconstruction, institution building and sustainable development, in
countries emerging from conflict.
UN peace-keeping has been in a state of continuous reform
throughout the past decade. Peace-keeping missions evolved from
purely military missions to so-called “integrated” missions, which have
a new make-up and objective. Thus, peace-keeping now comprises mili-
tary and civilian components,2 and with respect to the latter, state-
building and democracy promotion increasingly became instruments to
build peace.
Haiti in particular seems to be a playground for the outlined evolu-
tion of peace-keeping missions. In no other country has the UN made
so many different efforts to keep peace. Throughout the 1990s five UN
peace-keeping missions were deployed to Haiti. In practice the man-
dates of these missions gradually evolved. They were slowly adapted to
the Haitian context and also influenced the evolvement of a general
peace-keeping design as described above. In this respect state-building
and democracy promotion are two instruments, which were widely
used in UN peace-keeping in Haiti because they were assumed to be
adequate means to build peace. Finally, democracy played an excep-

1 B. Fassbender, UN Reform and Collective Security. The Report of the UN

High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of December 2004
and the Recommendations of the UN Secretary-General from March 2005,
Global Issue Papers 17 April 2005, 15-16, available at: <www.boell.de/
en/04_thema/3642.html>.
2 For further explanation of the development of peace-keeping see under II.
1. in this article.
468 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

tional role in UN peace-keeping in Haiti because in 1994 the UN Secu-

rity Council, for the first time, authorized coercive measures to restore
democracy in a Member State.3 Consequently, a discussion came into
being, whether a right to democracy in international law exists and
could be derived from the Haitian case. By focusing on the issue of a
right to democracy, one crucial aspect has been widely underexposed,
i.e. the relation between democracy and the threat to peace. The latter is
the necessary precondition for the authorization for the use of force by
the UN Security Council. Therefore, a rupture with democracy must
constitute a threat to peace, if coercive measures need to be taken in or-
der to promote democracy.
In spite of the qualitatively and quantitatively wide-ranging efforts
undertaken in Haiti, the conflict there remains unsolved and democracy
is far from consolidated. That is why this article tries to trace why the
effects of UN peace-keeping have been limited at best. Since democracy
– in terms of its relevance for UN Security Council mandating as well
as its use as a peace-building instrument – played a crucial role in the
Haitian case, special attention will be drawn to it. Against this back-
ground two aspects are of major interest: first – did the rupture with
democracy in Haiti constitute a threat to peace and does the Haitian
case build a precedent for the emergence or indeed, existence, of a right
to democracy? Second – since the restoration of democracy was the
starting point of the first UN peace-keeping mission in Haiti, one must
ask, whether state-building and democracy promotion were adequate
means to build sustainable peace.
The article is divided into two main parts. In the first, a conceptional
framework is given to examine the relation between peace-keeping,
state-building and democracy promotion. Furthermore, the relevance
the Haitian case has with regard to a possible right to democracy in in-
ternational law will be discussed. The second part gives the empirical
foundation for the examination of the evolution and outcome of UN
peace-keeping in Haiti. By using state-building and democracy promo-
tion as instruments to build peace in Haiti, the UN assumed that a
functioning state, a consolidated democracy and the conflict as such
were inter-related with each other. Therefore, the description of UN
peace-keeping is preceded by the assessment of the Haitian state, de-
mocracy and conflict. The final part of the article will deal with an
comparative evaluation of UN peace-keeping in Haiti.

3 D. Malone, Decision-Making in the UN Security Council. The Case of

Haiti, 1990-1997, 1998, 1.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 469

II. Peace-Keeping through State-Building and

Democracy Promotion

According to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter all members shall refrain

in their international relations “from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state ...”. This
principle is subject to two exceptions, namely the right to self-defense
pursuant to Article 51 UN Charter and the right of the UN Security
Council to impose coercive measures in order to maintain peace, ac-
cording to Arts 39 and 42 of the UN Charter.4 Against this background
UN peace-keeping was created in order to assist states to maintain
peace. In doing so the UN Security Council, by respecting the principle
of sovereign equality pursuant to Article 2 (1) UN Charter, avoided in-
tervention in internal state conflicts. Hence, peace-keeping was origi-
nally designed to support the cessation of hostile inter-state conflicts.
However, already throughout the conflict in the Congo in the chaotic
aftermath of independence in 1960, the devastating civil war with all its
consequences was classified by the Security Council as a threat to the
peace. But only throughout the 1990s the UN Security Council was in-
creasingly willing to intervene in internal conflicts of states and in com-
plex humanitarian situations, in as much as they constituted a threat to
peace.5
Consequently in its early days UN peace-keeping encompassed pri-
marily military components to support the resolution of inter-state
conflicts, although, support for the solution of internal conflicts, often
characterized by inter-communal strife, crises of democracy, fighting
marked by the struggle to control national resources and wealth,6 de-
manded a new type of peace-keeping operation. Faced with these chal-
lenges of internal conflicts, the UN started to provide technical and
humanitarian assistance, civil administrative support, and support with
civilian functions, in particular police functions. In short, contemporary

4 The “enemy clause” of Article 107 UN Charter constitutes, indeed, a fur-

ther exception, but it has lost its significance over time and is not applied
anymore.
5 J. Cockayne/ D. Malone, “United Nations Peace Operations Then and
Now”, in: H. Langholtz et al. (eds), International Peacekeeping: The Year-
book of International Peace Operations 9 (2004), 1 et seq. (8); C.E. Philipp,
“Somalia-A Very Special Case”, in: R. Wolfrum/ A. von Bogdandy, Max
Planck UNYB 9 (2005), 518 et seq. (527).
6 Cockayne/ Malone, see note 5, 9.
470 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

UN peace-keeping has changed in terms of its objectives and structure.

Referring to its structure, a twofold composition of missions emerged,
so-called “integrated missions”7 which comprise military and civilian
components.8 With regard to their objectives, peace-keeping missions
now pursue a multi-disciplinary approach which also integrates peace-
building. The latter covers to a lesser extent military options, but rather
aims at fostering socio-economic and political structures which, in turn,
are presumed to strengthen peace and to avoid a relapse into conflict.9
One could say that UN peace-keeping has become more “political”.10
In this context state-building and democracy promotion evolved as in-
struments of UN peace-keeping.11 Given this evolution, it is a moot
point whether these instruments are adequate means to support conflict
resolution and to build sustainable peace.

1. State-Building, Democracy Promotion and Conflict

Resolution

a. State-Building and Conflict Resolution

“Stateness” can be a necessary requirement for the absence or preven-

tion of a violent conflict within a society. As defined by Max Weber, a
state requires the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force.”12
Additionally following Jellinek’s concept of the state, this physical force

7 Although this twofold composition of UN peace-keeping missions sug-

gests a constant homogeneous structure of missions, in fact peace-keeping
missions vary especially with regard to their form and mandate.
8 W. Kühne, “Peace Support Operations: How to Make them Succeed”, In-
ternationale Politik und Gesellschaft 4 (1999), 358 et seq. (359-360). Fur-
thermore, the development of peace-keeping missions was highly influ-
enced by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s reflections, out-
lined in An Agenda for Peace Doc. A/47/277-S/24111 of 17 June 1992.
9 A. Cutillo, International Assistance to Countries Emerging from Conflict: A
Review of Fifteen Years of Interventions and the Future of Peacebuilding,
Policy Paper of the International Peace Academy, February 2006, 1, avail-
able at: <http://www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Publications.htm>.
10 E.M. Cousens et al., Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile
Societies, 2001.
11 Though the category “post-conflict” is widely accepted, its interpretation
differs from case to case.
12 M. Weber, Soziologische Grundbegriffe, 1984, 91.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 471

must be exercised in a determined territory for the protection of the

people living on it. In this spirit, the core function of a state consists in
guaranteeing (physical) security to its citizens. Very often, internal vio-
lent conflicts correlate with a weak state because no or very poor state
capacities, e.g. police forces, are available in order to prevent violent
conflicts.13
Additionally, a broader understanding of the “state” includes the de-
liverance of public goods to a state’s people (economic and social secu-
rity).14 In states which are not capable of providing and distributing eq-
uitably public benefits to their people, social conflicts are more likely to
arise.15 Generally it must be assumed that a lack of economic and social
security might constitute a cause of conflict, while a lack of physical se-
curity complicates dealing with such conflicts.
Against this background state-building became a means of peace-
building. Indeed, the outlined concepts of the “state” enjoy widespread
acceptance, but they result in varying understandings of state-
building.16 This must be considered further due to the concepts’ gener-
ally high relevance for political practice, i.e., peace-keeping measures.
First, the great variety of state-building concepts is caused by di-
verse comprehensions of state failure. The more broadly a concept of
“state” is defined, the more factors must be considered when determin-
ing state failure. In consequence, how and to what extent state-building
is implemented by specific states or organizations depends on the per-
ception or, ideally, an analysis of the status quo on the ground by inter-
vening actors. Therefore, state-building may cover a wide range of
measures, e.g. police training or support of administrative functions.
Second, diverse intervening actors make use of different terms when
alluding to state-building due to their specific historical provenance.
This becomes apparent in the inconsistent use of the terms “state-
building” and “nation-building”.17 They are very often compounded

13 S. Chesterman et al., Making States Work. From State Failure to State-

Building, 2004, 16.
14 A. Bogdandy et al., “State-Building, Nation-Building, and Constitutional
Politics in Post-Conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarifications and an Ap-
praisal of Different Approaches”, Max Planck UNYB, see note 5, 580 et
seq. (583-584).
15 Chesterman, see note 13, 2.
16 M. Ottaway, “Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States”, Develop-
ment and Change 33 (2002), 1001 et seq.
17 Bogdandy et al., see note 14, 591.
472 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

and used synonymously.18 Here, the concepts of state-building and na-

tion-building are distinguished, referring to different objectives: “State-
building refers to the organization and physical infrastructure of a state
whereas nation-building means to form the human beings living in a
particular territory into a population sustaining a particular state-the
nation.”19
Finally, state-building’s relevance for peace building depends on the
form and causes of the specific conflict. Therefore, whether a conflict
can be effectively addressed by state-building measures depends on its
very specific characteristics and must be decided on a case-to-case basis.

b. Democracy Promotion and Conflict Resolution

State-building per definitionem does not imply a specific determined

form of government. By contrast democracy promotion is a strategy or
instrument utilized to establish one specific type of government, which
is commonly described as the “government of the people, by the people,
for the people”(emphasis added).20 Hence, in democratic systems sover-
eignty emanates from a people, generally through free and fair elections.
In a substantive sense democracy also includes social justice because it
is presumed that democracy (re)distributes resources and creates wel-
fare accessible to all citizens of a state.
Democracy is presumed not to be vulnerable to internal violent con-
flicts. This is principally based on the assumption that democracy in
terms of its procedural dimension is a form of governance to resolve so-
cietal conflicts in a peaceful manner.21 Therefore, democracy promotion

18 E.g. for a synonymous use see J. Dobbin et al., The UN’s Role in Nation-
Building, from the Congo to Iraq, 2005. S. Chesterman, You, the People:
The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, 2005
attributes nation-building merely to post-conflict situations. In turn, F. Fu-
kuyama, State-building, Governance and World Order in the 21st Century,
2004, makes an analytical distinction, but states its synonymous use in poli-
tics.
19 R. Wolfrum, “International Administration in Post-Conflict Situations by
the United Nations and Other International Actors”, Max Planck UNYB,
see note 5, 649 et seq. (653).
20 Well-known citation of A. Lincoln, from the U.S.-American civil war in
1863. For a systematic research on democracy see exemplarily Democracy,
1998 and D. Held, Models of Democracy, 2nd edition, 1996.
21 M.M. Brown, “Democratic Governance: Towards a Framework for Sus-
tainable Peace”, Global Governance 9 (2003), 142 et seq.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 473

is increasingly regarded as one possible means to create and maintain

peace in post-conflict situations.22
Indeed, this assumption can be assured in the long-run because it re-
fers to already consolidated democracies. But it must be questioned in
the short-run. Democratization processes are characterized by their de-
stabilizing effect because thereby power within the society is redistrib-
uted and new structures and institutions are created in order to organ-
ize this very power. However, “traditional” power holders or privileged
groups are often not willing to pass on power and consequently oppose
democratization. Additionally, the creation of new institutions also
causes an unsettled environment vulnerable to crisis. Thus, stability is at
stake and descent into conflict is feasible.23 Against this background it is
obvious that external actors, like the United Nations, are only success-
ful if their democratization policies are agreed with the respective inter-
nal actors and widely accepted within a particular society.
Generally there are two ways to promote democracy. First, democ-
racy can be promoted through positive measures. They primarily in-
clude technical assistance which can be directly addressed to the core of
democratization, that is its institutions and governance (e.g. electoral as-
sistance, support of parliaments, etc.) or which support democracy in
an indirect way by strengthening its output capacity (e.g. economic pol-
icy programs or creation of basic services).24 Second, democracy pro-
motion can appear through negative measures. They are implemented
through political or economic conditionality, sanctions or the use of
force. Coercive measures often aim at protecting democracy, e.g. in the
case of a rupture with the democratic order in a specific state.25
Regarding its legal basis, democracy promotion is generally based
upon a consensus of the intervening actor and intervened state, nor-
mally a bi- or multilateral agreement.26 In contrast it is ambiguous if a
rupture with a democratic order constitutes a threat to peace which al-
lows the legal use of coercive means in order to promote or protect de-

22 Ch. Kumar/ S. Lodge et al., Sustainable Peace Through Democratization:

The Experiences of Haiti and Guatemala, IPA Policy Paper, March 2002, 6.
23 Brown, see note 21.
24 Direct measures to promote democracy refer to the enforcement of democ-
ratic institutions and procedures as well as the participation of civil society.
Indirect measures focus on the output of the political system.
25 For a further distinction between democracy promotion and democracy
protection see below.
26 This also applies to state-building.
474 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

mocracy.27 Finally, whether democracy promotion is an effective in-

strument in order to build peace, or institutions for peaceful conflict
resolution in society, depends on the willingness of internal actors to
(re)distribute power and reform institutions as well as governance
structures. Since democratization affects enrooted institutional and
governance structures, a long-term commitment of external actors is in-
dispensable.

c. An Integrated View on State-Building and Democracy Promotion

Theoretically the existence of a functioning, sovereign state is consid-

ered to be one precondition for the establishment of democracy.28
Hence, a sequence between state-building and the establishment of de-
mocracy is widely assumed. Although a minimum of state structures is
required, sequencing of state-building and democratization is limited in
practice due to a de facto concomitance of differing political, societal
and economic developments in transition processes.29 Given these cir-
cumstances, it is impractical to pursue a linear, narrow procedure,
which would automatically lead to stable state structures in a first step
and to democracy in a second step.30 The simultaneity between both
dimensions of transition lies in the objective, state-building, itself: a
form of a state is normally (re)designed at the very beginning of the
transition process. This also implies the form of governance reigning
within it, often determined in the constitution-building process. Due to
the interdependence between both processes, external efforts to support
state-building often cannot be distinguished from democracy promo-
tion and vice versa.31 Notwithstanding, external actors, especially the
United Nations, frequently “label” their civilian measures as “state-
building”, although these also include aspects of democracy promotion.

27 For a discussion of this issue see under II. 2. of this article.

28 J.J. Linz/ A. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Consolidation: Southern
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, 1996, 17.
29 The term “transition” is here used in a twofold way. On the one hand it re-
fers to the process from conflict to resolution of a conflict. On the other
hand in the context of democracy promotion it relates to the change of a
political regime.
30 T. Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, Journal of Democracy
13 (2002), 5 et seq. (7).
31 L. Zanotti, “Taming Chaos: A Foucauldian View of UN Peacekeeping,
Democracy and Normalization”, International Peacekeeping 13 (2006), 150
et seq. (151).
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 475

This derives from two circumstances. Indeed, democracy has been

the only widely accepted form of government since the end of the Cold
War.32 But it is often perceived as “the Western model” of government
which should be imposed on indigenous forms of government in devel-
oping countries.33 Therefore democracy promotion is often opposed by
political elites and populations in transition countries. Further, the right
to self-determination pursuant to Article 1 (2) UN Charter forbids in-
terference in internal matters of states. Since the form of its government
is at the core of the internal matters of each state, states often remain
sceptical or even reluctant to democracy promotion. Nevertheless,
throughout the 1990s, the commitment of the United Nations to sup-
port democracy was much strengthened.34
Finally, bringing together the triangle of conflict, state, and democ-
racy, it can be assumed that the construction of a democracy, indeed,
requires a minimum of state structures.35 But state-building and democ-
racy promotion might be planned and even implemented in parallel.
For instance, this becomes obvious in the case of holding democratic
elections: holding elections – an activity more and more supported by
peace-keeping missions36 – requires a state infrastructure and a stable
and secure environment on election day. Hence, administrative entities
are implemented while democratic rules are developed. And, state-
building and democracy promotion, indeed, may be necessary, but are
not sufficient means to build internal peace. Whether they can be ade-
quate and successful means to keep and build peace greatly depends on
the specific characteristics and causes of a particular conflict. Therefore
only a case-to-case analysis – here below undertaken for the case of

32 J. Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organiza-

tions and Democratization”, International Organization 56 (2002), 515 et
seq. (515).
33 G. Crawford, “Promoting Democracy from Without – Learning from
Within”, Democratization 11 (2003), 77 et seq. (80).
34 For an overview compare: R. Rich/ E. Newman, “Introduction: Approach-
ing Democratization Policy”, in: E. Newman/ R. Rich (eds), The UN Role
in Promoting Democracy, between Ideals and Reality, 2004, 3 et seq.
35 P. Burnell, “Democracy Assistance: The State of the Discourse”, in: id.,
Democracy Assistance, International Co-operation for Democratization,
2000, 4 et seq. (12) and Linz/ Stepan, see note 28.
36 K. Kumar, “International Assistance for Post-Conflict Elections”, in:
Burnell, see note 35, 191 et seq. (191-192). The elections in July 2006 in the
Congo form a good example in this respect.
476 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

Haiti – allows an evaluation of the peace-building capacity of democ-

racy promotion and state-building.

2. Foundations for the Promotion of Democracy in

International Law

In general, democracy promotion consists of technical and financial as-

sistance which is undertaken in agreement with the respective state and
thus is beyond any dispute.37 In contrast, democracy promotion that
uses coercive measures such as military intervention causes and has
caused arguments.38
Democracy – as a form of government – is assigned to be an essen-
tial internal matter of a state. Therefore democracy promotion which
uses coercive means by the United Nations is assumed to be critical due
to its interceding nature into the internal matters of a state. Generally,
military interventions must be legalized through a mandate of the UN
Security Council, which is only granted if a threat to peace predomi-
nates.
In this context, Haiti sometimes was interpreted as a precedent for a
universal right for “democratic interventions”,39 that is military inter-
ventions mandated to promote democracy. In 1994 the UN Security
Council in its Resolution 940 legalized the military, US-led intervention
into Haiti in order to restore democracy in that country.40 It resulted in
the partly successful attempt to restore the first democratically elected
Government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide after its military overthrow in
1991.
Resolution 940 was one of the factors which generated a wide-
ranging debate throughout the 1990s as to whether a right to democ-

37 T.M. Franck, “The Democratic Entitlement”, University of Richmond Law

Review 29 (1994-1995), 1 et seq. (34).
38 Although coercive measures pursuant to Chapter VII UN Charter vary,
e.g. economic sanctions, use of force, in this section reference is only made
to military measures due to their significance in the case of Haiti. Other co-
ercive measures which are widely used and were also applied in Haiti will
be addressed below.
39 R. Falk, “The Haiti Intervention: A Dangerous World Order Precedent for
the United Nations”, Harv. Int.l L. J. 36 (1995), 341 et seq. (345).
40 S/RES/940 (1994) of 31 July 1994.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 477

racy is emerging and thus constitutes a principle of international law.41

By focusing on this material aspect of international law, scholars fo-
cused the mandate of Resolution 940 and asked whether supporting
democracy can be a legal and legitimate part of a UN Security Council
mandate. In doing so they neglected to ask if, and if yes, under which
conditions the lack of democracy constitutes a threat to peace and is
therefore a sufficient reason to intervene into a states’ domestic affairs
pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Evidence shall be given as to whether a right to democracy is emerg-
ing in international law or does already exist. Second, a closer look into
the international legal frameworks in the Americas especially of the
OAS, shall give further insight on the specific Haitian case. Third, UN
Security Council Resolution 940 will be examined with regard to the
causes and content of the threat to peace emerging from the Haitian
case.

a. Searching for Evidence: A Right to Democracy?

In 1992 Thomas Franck opened the scientific discussion on ‘democratic

entitlement’, arguing that an individual right to democracy is emerging
in international law.42 Since then a wide-ranging debate has been unfold
on this subject in academia and politics. Therewith five aspects have
been continuously stressed:
(1) Democracy and Self-determination. As Franck puts it, self-
determination is the ‘grandfather’ of democracy.43 During the 1960s, the
UN translated self-determination pursuant to Article 1 (2) UN Charter
into a synonym of de-colonization. Therefrom self-determination aims
at the sovereignty of a state vis-à-vis other states, that is at “external”
sovereignty. In turn, sovereignty vis-à-vis other states is nurtured by
“internal” self-determination which is the right of a people to determine
independently its political and social future. Nevertheless, the practice
of the United Nations during the period of de-colonization indicates
that the organization was already involved in the political affairs of the

41 Literature see below in section a. of this Chapter.

42 T.M. Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, AJIL 86
(1992), 46 et seq.
43 Franck, see note 37, 34.
478 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

newly emerged Member States.44 Against this background many schol-

ars deduce a legal norm from Article 1 (2) UN Charter which could le-
gitimize democracy promotion through coercive measures or, even fur-
ther, a right to democracy.45 The former is based on the assumption that
a people living under a non-democratic rule which expresses its inde-
pendent and free will to democracy can be legally supported by inter-
vening actors in order to establish a democratic order within the af-
fected state. The latter goes further and assumes that an individual right
to democracy can be granted on the basis of Article 1 (2) UN Charter.46
Whereas self-determination was interpreted as a legal basis of coer-
cive “democratic interventions” in order to support a people, it can be
as well interpreted in the exact opposite way. Therefore it also “… in-
cludes the right of a people to freely and without external interference
decide upon its political future and the economic system it will imple-
ment.”47 In addition referring to the practical side of the issue, no crite-
ria exist which suggest that a people’s demand for democracy would le-
galize a coercive intervention. Taking also into account the principle of
non-intervention pursuant to Article 2 (7) UN Charter and that the
form of government, in this case democracy, constitutes a core compo-
nent of internal state matters, no universal right to democracy for a
people can be assumed yet.
(2) Democracy as a Human Right. Assumptions concerning an indi-
vidual right to democracy are based on articles 1 and 25 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Article 1
(2) UN Charter. Article 1 of the ICCPR states that “all peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cul-
tural development.” Following a systematic interpretation, defenders of
the human rights-approach to democracy argue that the word “freely”
indicates the reference to an individual right of self-determination due
to the emphasis on individual rights of freedom granted in the

44 T. Farer, “The Promotion of Democracy: International Law and Norms”,

in: E. Newman/ R. Rich (eds), The UN Role in Promoting Democracy, be-
tween Ideals and Reality, 2004, 32 et seq. (33).
45 See note 42, as well as J. Wouters et al., “Democracy and International
Law”, NYIL 34 (2003), 137 et seq. (154-156) and J. Crawford, “Democracy
and the Body of International Law”, in: G.H. Fox/ B.R. Roth (eds), De-
mocratic Governance and International Law, 2000, 91 et seq. (101).
46 Franck, see note 37, 9. On this particular aspect see the next paragraph.
47 Wolfrum, see note 19, 679.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 479

ICCPR.48 In addition article 25 of the ICCPR, directly referring to in-

dividuals, highlights political rights, which are interlinked with democ-
racy: every citizen has the right “(a) To take part in the conduct of pub-
lic affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote
and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by univer-
sal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing
the free expression of the will of the electors.”
Although participation and free elections are core elements of de-
mocracy no universal, individual right to democracy can be deduced
from the text of the ICCPR due to its insufficient definition of elec-
tions. Article 25 of the ICCPR does not include the aspect of “competi-
tion” which is fundamental to a democratic order. This is also backed
by a historic perspective: adopted in 1966 and entered into force in 1976
the ICCPR was supported and ratified by states, e.g. the USSR, which
indeed held elections at this time, but on an affirmatory rather than
competitive basis. It is very probable that these states would not have
ratified a treaty obliging them to competitive elections. Nevertheless it
must be considered that state practice has probably changed since then,
especially since the end of the Cold War, and this suggests a rather pro-
democratic electoral practice.
Although, no universal right to democracy can be traced in interna-
tional law an increasing political-practical commitment to democracy of
the international community of states can be stated. The latter gives rise
to the assumption that the evolution of an international right to democ-
racy cannot be excluded. In addition recent evolutions in terms of de-
mocratic norms on the regional level back this assumption.
(3) Democracy in Regional Organizations.49 In the Western world
democracy was broadly included into Western international law.
Mainly it was introduced as a condition for membership in regional or-
ganizations such as the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),50
the Council of Europe,51 the European Union (EU),52 and the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS).53 Emanating from these provisions,

48 Franck, see note 37, 12-15.

49 This issue will be further elaborated by examining the OAS in the follow-
ing section of this article.
50 Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 4 April 1949.
51 Article 3 of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Council of Europe of 5
May 1949.
52 Article 6 (1) of the Treaty of Amsterdam of 2 October 1997.
53 Article 2 of the Charter of the OAS of 30 April 1948.
480 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

policies of democracy promotion were evolved and implemented in

Member States. The European Union’s Cotonou Agreement of 2000
and the former Agreements of Lomé I-IV (1975-2000) with African,
Caribbean and Pacific States (ACP states) also comprises democracy as
one condition for development aid vis-à-vis third states.54 As will be
shown below the legal provisions of the OAS go even further by pro-
viding a right to democracy on the regional level.
Although these regional, mostly legally binding, commitments to
democracy give further evidence of an emerging norm of democracy in
international law, no universal validity can be claimed. Since democracy
has its historic roots in the “Western world” it is widely perceived as a
typical Western model of government, especially in developing, Arabian
and Asian countries. No evidence can be given that a universal right to
democracy already exists in international law. But there are further in-
dications that the international community of states is increasing its po-
litical commitment to democracy, which, in turn, might foster the for-
mation of a right to democracy in international law.
(4) Democracy and the Practice of International Assistance in Elec-
tions.55 Since the end of the Cold War in 1989 the United Nations has
played a crucial role in providing technical assistance and monitoring
electoral processes.56 Although electoral assistance became one of the
core functions of the United Nations in the field of political assistance,
up to the present no universal standards have been adopted in order to
provide a common understanding of democratic elections. Indeed, in
1992 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on guidelines for elec-
toral observation.57 Instead of comprehending common guidelines, it
states only that electoral assistance would be offered on a “case-by-
case” basis. Apart from some other single documents,58 no further ad-

54 Article 9 of the Cotonou Agreement of 23 June 2000.

55 The term electoral assistance is here used in a broad sense, comprising as-
sistance of the organization and conduct, verification, coordination, techni-
cal assistance, follow-up and report as well as training of national observ-
ers.
56 C.C. Joyner, “The United Nations and Democracy”, Global Governance 5
(1999), 333 et seq. (342-349).
57 A/RES/47/138 of 18 December 1992.
58 See Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters, Venice Commission in
July 2002 or International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assis-
tance (IDEA), International Electoral Standards, Guidelines for Reviewing
the Legal Framework of Elections, 2004.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 481

vances have been made in this respect. But a closer look at the practice
of the United Nations as well as that of the regional organizations
shows that generally one specific type of election is supported: this is
the support of free and fair elections which are based on competition
between political parties – that is to say democratic elections.59
In conclusion, continuous electoral assistance has been widely ac-
cepted and constantly made use of by Member States of the United Na-
tions. Thus it can be assumed that its continuous practice reflects a
growing acceptance of democratic principles in the community of
states. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that electoral assis-
tance is always based on an invitation by the affected state. That is to
say that Member States act positively in order to receive and provide
electoral assistance.60 Thus, evidence of a rising commitment to democ-
racy within the international community of states can be given.
(5) Democracy on the Political Agenda. In addition to the assessment
made for electoral assistance, democracy became an increasingly impor-
tant topic on the international political agenda. For instance, in June
1988 a series of International Conferences of New and Restored De-
mocracies started in Manila.61 The conferences encouraged states, inter-
national organizations and civil society representatives to attempt to
concentrate democratic values and elaborate common strategies to
promote democracy.62 This intergovernmental process which enjoys
strong support from the United Nations led to the adoption of various
General Assembly resolutions referring to democracy which inter alia
asked the Secretary-General to report on the actions taken by the
United Nations to promote democracy.63 One outcome was, amongst
others, the Agenda for Democratization of Secretary-General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali. On the one hand he defines democracy promotion as a

59 R. Ludwig, “The UN’s Electoral Assistance: Challenges, Accomplish-

ments, Prospects”, in: E. Newman/ R. Rich (eds), The UN Role in Promot-
ing Democracy, between Ideals and Reality, 2004, 169 et seq. (177-179).
60 For an overview of state practice in order to assist national elections see
Joyner, see note 56, 344, Table 1. Joyner also provides the legal sources re-
flecting the opinio iuris of UN Member States.
61 Further conferences were held in Manila (1988), Managua (1994), Bucha-
rest (1997), Cotonou (2000) and Ulaanbaatar (2003 and a follow-up confer-
ence in 2006). The next one will be in Qatar, November 2006.
62 Joyner, see note 56, 335.
63 A/RES/49/30 of 7 December 1994; A/RES/50/133 of 20 December 1995;
A/RES/51/31 of 6 December 1996; and A/RES/52/18 of 21 November
1997.
482 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

core task of the organization in order to maintain world peace. On the

other hand he argues that “It is not for the United Nations to offer a
model of democratization or democracy or to promote democracy in a
specific case … [because there is] … no one model of democratization
or democracy suitable for all societies …”.64 Since then UN Member
States increasingly backed the importance of democracy as a precondi-
tion for peace and development. In their Millennium Declaration of
2000 they agreed to implement the principles and practices of democ-
racy.65 Finally, they confirmed this primarily rhetorical affirmation by
creating the United Nations Democracy Fund in July 2005.66
To conclude, throughout the 1990s the international community of
states clearly increased its commitment to democracy on a political-
rhetorical level and affirmed the importance of democracy for peace and
development. Although this evolution could contribute step-by-step to
the formation of an international norm of democracy, the final step in
this direction has not yet been taken.
To sum up, there does not exist a universal, legally binding right to
democracy in international law which can generally legitimize military
interventions to establish or defend democracy within a state. But tak-
ing into account the above described evolutions with regard to democ-
racy in international law on the one hand and the practice of the UN
Security Council in the past on the other, it could be stated that a legal
intervention in order to promote democracy might be possible in some
cases. For a close and comprehensive understanding of the Haitian “de-
mocratic intervention” it will be necessary to examine the regional con-
text in which it took place.

64 Support by the United Nations System of the Efforts of Governments to

Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies, Report of the Sec-
retary-General, Doc. A/52/513 of 21 October 1997.
65 United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/RES/55/2 of 8 September
2000.
66 See paras 135-137, World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 of 16 September
2005. The Fund will provide assistance to governmental, non-govern-
mental, national, regional, and international organizations, including rele-
vant UN departments, offices, funds, programmes and agencies. The Fund
will complement current UN efforts to strengthen and expand democracy
worldwide.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 483

b. Examining the Regional Level: The Democracy Clause of the OAS

Throughout the 1990s the OAS evolved a strong commitment to pro-

tect and promote democracy in the Western hemisphere. In contrast to
the UN’s lack of binding legal provisions for democracy promotion, the
OAS provides such binding legal foundations.67
From its very beginning “democracy” was introduced into the or-
ganizations’ framework. Indeed the founding Charter of the OAS,
adopted in 1948, refers to representative democracy as “an indispensa-
ble condition for the stability, peace and development of the region.”68
However, this provision did not promote a corresponding OAS policy
during the Cold War due to the bi-polarization of world politics. Only
in the middle of the 1980s – i.e. in midst of the Latin American opening
to democratization – did Member States undertake a profound change
of OAS policies.69
The starting point of the organization’s reform goes back to the sec-
ond amendment of its Charter in 1985 (Protocol of Cartagena de In-
dias). With it, democracy became a central pillar of the OAS’ general
mandate, especially through the modification of article 2 of the OAS
Charter. It now proclaimed the promotion and consolidation of democ-
racy as one of the organization’s “essential purposes”. On this general
ground additional provisions to protect or promote democracy were
made throughout the 1990s.
In 1991 the General Assembly of the OAS adopted “Resolution
1080” in Santiago de Chile. It was first applied in the case of Haiti.
“Resolution 1080” calls upon the Secretary General of the OAS to im-
mediately convene a meeting of the Permanent Council when facing the
“sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institu-
tional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democrati-
cally elected government in any of the Organization’s member states, in

67 For an analysis of the background of the Charter see J. Graham, A Magna

Charta for the Americas, the Inter-American Democratic Charter: Genesis,
Challenges and Canadian connections, 2002, Policy paper of FOCAL, 3,
available at: <http//:www.focal.ca/pdf/iad_charter.pdf>.
68 Preamble, OAS Charter. In accordance with article 145 of the Charter it
entered into force on 13 December 1951. Further references to democracy
are made in arts 2b), 3d), 3f), 9a), 9d) 31, 45f), 47 and 95c) of the OAS
Charter.
69 C. Gavíria, “The Future of the Hemisphere”, Journal of Inter-American
Studies and World Affairs 39 (1997), 5 et seq. (7).
484 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

order, ... , to examine the situation, decide on and convene an ad hoc

meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, or a special session of the
General Assembly, all of which must take place within a ten-day pe-
riod.” The ad hoc meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs or the special
session of the General Assembly “shall ... look into the events collec-
tively and adopt any decisions deemed appropriate, in accordance with
the Charter and international law.”70
In 1992 the Protocol of Washington introduced the suspension of a
Member State subject to the overthrow of its democratically elected
government.71 Furthermore, a wide range of instruments to promote
democracy through positive measures such as e.g. electoral assistance,
support of political parties, political dialogue or the enforcement of the
legislative branch were implemented. Institutionally this is reflected in
the creation of a Department for the Promotion of Democracy within
the OAS Secretariat in 1990, which is currently restructured and is now
part of the new Department of Political Affairs. In 2001 these and other
instruments to defend and promote democracy were joined together in
the IADC (Inter-American Democratic Charter),72 adopted unani-
mously at the General Assembly’s special session in Lima on 11 Sep-
tember 2001.73
In conceptual terms the IADC for the first time enhances negative
(defense of democracy) and positive (promotion of democracy) meas-

70 Doc. OAS AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-O/91), paras 1 and 2.

71 Doc. OAS AG/ACT/3 (XVI-E/92) referring to the modification of article
9 of the Charter of the OAS. The Protocol of Washington was agreed on 14
December 1992 and entered into force in 1997.
72 For instance, “Resolution 1080” was thereby strengthened. In face of coup
d’états which lead to the overthrow of democratic elected governments it
refers to a “… sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political
institutional process or of the legitimate exercise of power by the democ-
ratically elected government.” In turn, article 19 of the IADC extends the
elements defining the breach of democratic order as “… an unconstitu-
tional interruption of the democratic order or an unconstitutional altera-
tion of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic or-
der in a member state.”
73 All 34 Heads of State and Government signed the Charter. For an analysis
of the decision-making process which led to its adoption see note 67 as well
as A.F. Cooper/ T. Legler, “A Tale of Two Mesas: The OAS Defense of
Democracy in Peru and Venezuela”, Global Governance 11 (2005), 425 et
seq. (425).
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 485

ures to protect and support democracy in the Western hemisphere.74 Its

most important advancement can be seen in article 1 which contains a
right to democracy of the peoples of the Americas on the one hand and
which urges governments to promote and defend democracy on the
other.75 Thereby it establishes the first international norm – outside of
Western Europe – referring to a “reciprocal contract of peoples with
governments.”76 It must further be highlighted that – contrary to the
vague concept of democracy of the United Nations – OAS Member
States correspond to a particular model of democracy when they refer
to democracy, namely to representative democracy.77
Since the legally binding OAS Charter always contained references
to democracy,78 the IADC is to be treated as a commitment to interpret
the outreach of the provisions given in the OAS Charter. Moreover this
is affirmed by article 1 of the IADC which states “Democracy is essen-
tial for the social, political, and economic development of the peoples of
the Americas”. This is in line with the Preamble of the OAS Charter:
“… Representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the sta-
bility, peace, and development of the region.” With regard to their state
practice OAS Member States have been acting continuously to protect
and promote democracy throughout the 1990s. They repeatedly applied
Resolution 1080 as well as the IADC in several cases of a democratic

74 Up to the adoption of the Democratic Charter, reactive instruments in or-

der to protect democracy of Member States, once overthrown, prevailed in
the OAS; Ch. Hartmann, “Demokratie als Leitbild der afrikanischen Staa-
tengemeinschaft? Zur Theorie und Praxis demokratischer Schutzklauseln
in der Afrikanischen Union”, VRÜ 38 (2005), 201 et seq. (205), differs be-
tween two functions of democracy clauses in regional arrangements.
Firstly, the protection of democracy as in the case of the OAS and EU.
Secondly, the assessment of the democratic quality of Member States, e.g.
the African Union.
75 In the words of article 1 of the IADC: “The peoples of the Americas have a
right to democracy and their governments have an obligation to promote
and defend it. Democracy is essential for the social, political, and economic
development of the peoples of the Americas.”
76 Gavíria, see note 69.
77 See e.g. Preamble, arts 2b), 3d), 3f), 9a), 9d) of the OAS Charter. Only
Venezuela opposes this definition and insists that the term “participatory
democracy” should be included in the organization’s framework.
78 Since even the Preamble of the Charter of the OAS refers to democracy. It
was successively completed by various amendments of the Charter in 1985,
1992 and 1995. For a more detailed description see above.
486 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

breakdown in Member States.79 Member States also act with opinio iuris
in terms of their strong and repeated commitment to defend democracy
in the Americas.80
In addition, the achievement made by the adoption of the IADC
must not be underestimated due to the traditionally crucial handling of
the principle of non-interventionism into a member’s domestic affairs –
determined by past European and U.S.-American interventionism in
the Americas.81 Against this background the strong commitment to de-
fend democracy, especially through negative measures as envisioned in
the IADC – has been lowering the threshold for multilateral action to-
wards Member States.82
Notwithstanding, a military defense of democracy by the OAS on
the territory of an American state is foreseen neither in its Charter nor
in the IADC.83 In general, regional organizations are expected to be

79 Resolution 1080 was applied in the cases of Haiti (1991), Peru (1992), Gua-
temala (1993), and Paraguay (1996). The IADC in the cases of Haiti (2001),
Venezuela (2002), Bolivia (2003), Haiti (2004), Bolivia (2005) and Nicara-
gua (2005).
80 E.g. OAS, Carta Democrática Interamericana. Documentos e interpreta-
ciones, 2003, edited by H. Calle, available at: <www.oas.org/OASpage/esp/
Publicaciones/CartaDemocratica_spa.pdf>. The evolution of an opinio iuris
is affirmed by E. Lagos/ T.D. Rudy, “The Third Summit of the Americas
and the Thirty-first Sessions of the OAS General Assembly”, AJIL 96
(2002), 173 et seq. (180).
81 See article 19 OAS Charter in this respect, and H. Caminos, “La OEA: Pa-
sado, Presente y Futuro”, in: L. Perret/ A. Reus-Bazán (eds), La Organi-
zación de los Estados Americanos en el Centenario del Sistema Interameri-
cano, 1990, 16 et seq. (20).
82 Ch. Fulda, Demokratie und pacta sunt servanda, 2002, 31. Furthermore
Lagos/ Rudy, see note 80, 177 summarize the discussion whether the provi-
sions of the IADC require an amendment of article 23 of the OAS Charter.
The latter impairs the principle of non-intervention which is no bar to
measures taken “for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance
with existing treaties”. A systematic interpretation alludes to the definition
of democracy which is seen as precondition for peace in the Western Hemi-
sphere. In turn, democracy promotion is one measure to maintain peace.
Therefore an amendment of article 23 of the OAS Charter can be consid-
ered as obsolete.
83 Referring to its organizational nature the OAS – founded in 1948, was the
first regional organization established in terms of Chapter VIII of the UN
Charter. For a comprehensive analysis of the definition of regional organi-
zations under Chapter VIII UN Charter see Ch. Walter, Vereinte Nationen
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 487

predestined to resolve a conflict or dispute within the region due to

their proximity to regional problems and their legitimacy for its reso-
lution.84 Both the OAS as well as the United Nations were founded
with the purpose of maintaining peace. Although Chapter V of the
OAS Charter requests the Member States to resolve conflicts and dis-
putes within the OAS, this does not impair any competences of UN or-
gans.85 86 Once military measures are to be taken they must be legalized
by the UN Security Council.87 Finally the OAS perceives democracy, in
concordance with the United Nations’ understanding, as one precondi-
tion for peace and development in the Western hemisphere.88

c. Defining Threat to Peace: Breakdown of Democracy

The multinational military intervention “Uphold Democracy” into

Haiti on 19 September 1994 as well as the following UN peace-keeping
mission were authorized by Security Council Resolution 940 in order
to support the “[…] restoration of democracy in Haiti and the prompt
return of the legitimately elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide.”89
Thereby the Security Council mandated coercive measures in order
to promote democracy for the first time in history.90 This provoked an
extensive debate. Pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the only
reason for the use of force against a state consists in a threat to peace.

und Regionalorganisationen. Eine Untersuchung zu Kapitel VIII der Sat-

zung der Vereinten Nationen, 1996, 27 et seq.
84 R. Wolfrum, “Der Beitrag regionaler Abmachungen zur Friedenssiche-
rung”, ZaöRV 53 (1993), 576 et seq. (578).
85 Walter, see note 83, 149.
86 According to Article 54 UN Charter the Security Council must be in-
formed of all measures taken to maintain international peace by regional
organizations. For a detailed analysis see A. Frowein, “Zwangsmaßnahmen
von Regionalorganisationen”, in: U. Beyerlin et al. (eds), Recht zwischen
Umbruch und Bewahrung, 1995, 57 et seq. (66-67).
87 OAS’ sanctions against the Dominican Republic in 1960 build an excep-
tion.
88 E. Spehar, “The Role of the Organization of American States in Conflict
Prevention”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 61
(2001), 61 et seq. (64-65) and for the relation between democracy and de-
velopment see the Declaration of Managua of 10 June 1993, OAS Doc.
AG/DEC/ 4 (XXIII-O/93 as well as the Preamble of the OAS Charter.
89 See note 40, Preamble.
90 Falk, see note 39, 344.
488 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

Against this background it is questionable if the rupture with the de-

mocratic order in Haiti (see below for details) constituted a threat to
peace.
In its Resolution 940 the UN Security Council recognized that it
remained the goal of the international community to restore democracy
in Haiti and assist the prompt return of the legitimately elected Presi-
dent. It confirmed its readiness “to consider the imposition of addi-
tional measures if the military authorities in Haiti continued to impede
the activities of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) or
failed to comply in full with its relevant resolutions and the provisions
of the Governors Island Agreement.”91
The Security Council in Resolution 940 referred explicitly to a re-
gionally destabilizing factor of the Haitian situation. In its preamble it
expresses its concern not only with regard to the “humanitarian situa-
tion” and the expulsion of the UN’s civilian mission MICIVIH, but
also to the “desperate plight of Haitian refugees”,92 constituting a de-
stabilizing factor within the Americas. Neighboring countries, espe-
cially the United States and the Dominican Republic, refused to recog-
nize the Haitian refugees as “political” refugees. Instead, they referred
to them as “economic” refugees.93 Consequently, it can be assumed that
the flow of refugees constituted a destabilizing factor with regard to re-
gional peace.94
It is interesting to note that Resolution 940 was highly influenced by
regional policies. This implies that no such resolution would have been
possible in an international environment where democracy was not ac-
cepted as the only valid system of government as it was in the case of
the Inter-American System.95 Besides, American states understand de-
mocracy as one precondition for peace in the region (cf. Preamble of
the OAS Charter).
Finally, Haiti was classified as a “unique” case requiring “excep-
tional response.”96 This alludes that the Security Council intended to

91 See note 40, Preamble.

92 See note 40, Preamble.
93 L. Peral, Accion del Consejo de Seguridad en Haiti:Fortalecimento de la
Democrcia y Contencion del fluyo de Refugiados, 2004, Working Paper of
FRIDE, available at: <www.fride.org/Publications/ListPublications.aspx>,
2.
94 Falk, see note 39, 356.
95 Farer, see note 44, 51.
96 See note 40, para. 2.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 489

prevent any attempts to generalize the Haitian case in order to establish

a right to “democratic intervention.”97 But this Security Council prac-
tice cannot be welcomed because it undermines the evolution of univer-
sal international law and as the analysis of further military interventions
into Haiti will show, the Security Council adapted its decision-making
to a more universal approach. However, taking into account the specific
circumstances of the intervention as well as general provisions of inter-
national law, it cannot be presumed that it constituted a precedent of an
universal right to democracy, legalizing coercive measures in order to
promote or protect democracy.
To sum up, the military intervention into Haiti in 1994 can be con-
sidered legal and legitimate. However, taking into account the specific
circumstances of the intervention as well as general provisions of inter-
national law, it must not be presumed that it constitutes a precedent for
a universal right to democracy which could later build a criterion for
the legalization of coercive measures in order to promote or protect
democracy.

III. The Haitian Case: Peace-Keeping through State-

Building and Democracy Promotion

1. State and Democracy in Haiti

a. Historical Overview: Legacies of the Past

Political and economic instability, authoritarian leadership, as well as a

culture of violence in order to resolve social conflicts dominates Haiti.
Haitian society is marked by a bi-polar political, social and economic
structure, which divides state and nation. Political power has been oc-
cupied by the mulatto elite, which also controls the economic resources.
Power is furthermore concentrated in the urban regions, especially in
the capital Port-au-Prince. The political and economic elite is French
speaking, well-educated and pursues a politique du ventre, that is the
use of political power based on self-interest instead of welfare orienta-
tion. The majority of the Haitians belong to the marginalized, peas-

97 M. Bothe, “Friedenssicherung und Kriegsrecht”, in: W. Graf Vitzthum et

al. (eds), Völkerrecht, 2004, 608, para. 24.
490 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

antry, which has always guaranteed the revenue of the Haitian state.98
Living in the rural hinterland, the peasantry has neither access to politi-
cal power and economic resources nor to education. It consists of
blacks who speak Creole rather than the official language, French.99
Furthermore, since the end of the “Golden Age” in the 19th century,
Haitian economy has been characterized by constant underdevelop-
ment, giving Haiti its name of “the poorhouse of the Americas.”100
Once the Spanish (1492-1697) and French (1697-1804) colonial rule
were ended by a slavery revolution in 1804,101 Haitian politics have
been marked by brutal and repeated changes of mainly military leader-
ship.102 One century of chaos and tragedy prelude the authoritarian rule
exercised by the 19 years U.S. occupation of Haiti (1915-1934).103 After
the occupation Haiti again was under the rule of military leaders,
marked by erratic regime changes. This ended when François Duvalier
came to power in 1957. He established an authoritarian system, based
on personalized, centralized power and the systematic repression of the
population, mainly by the so-called Tonton Macoutes, his paramilitary,
presidential guard. Through a constitutional amendment, which deter-
mined a familial succession, Duvalier was followed by his son Jean-
Claude Duvalier, also known as Baby Doc, in 1979. He continued the
authoritarian rule of his father, although economically he was less suc-
cessful. In 1985 popular protests and claims by the economic and politi-
cal elite arose against the regime and finally led to the escape of Duva-
lier in February 1987.104

98 M.R. Trouillot, Haiti. State Against Nation. The Origins and Legacy of
Duvalierism, 1990, 83.
99 The peasantry comprises 90 per cent of the Haitians in total, thereof 60 per
cent live in the rural areas. The remaining 10 per cent refer to the mulatto,
mainly urban elite. See S. Mintz, “Can Haiti Change?”, Foreign Aff. 74
(1995), 73 et seq. (82-83).
100 Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Compare M. Gé-
lin-Adams/ D. Malone, “Haiti: A Case of Endemic Weakness”, in: R. Rot-
berg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, 2003, 287
et seq. (298).
101 Haiti was the first nation in claiming and achieving independence in the
Western Hemisphere.
102 Mintz, see note 99, 87.
103 B. Weinstein/ A. Segal, Haiti. Political Failures, Cultural Successes, 1984,
17.
104 Ibid., 47-49.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 491

After Duvalier’s downfall a military junta was to lead the transition

process until the implementation of democratic elections, scheduled for
November 1987. In consequence, popular expectations were raised that
elections would set an end to authoritarian rule. But they ceased very
early when the elections in 1987 were brutally ruptured by the mili-
tary.105 Paralyzed by coups and countercoups, the country was polar-
ized between Duvalier’s supporters and his opponents. In 1990, military
leader Prosper Avril, was finally forced to resign by popular demand
and U.S.-American pressure.106 Finally the first free and fair elections in
Haitian history took place in November 1990, under intense observa-
tion of the international community, especially the UN.107

b. Development of the State and Democracy in Haiti

After the departure of the Duvaliers and the holding of democratic elec-
tions in 1990, Haitians awaited a severance from their authoritarian
past, which had meant the preclusion of welfare and political life for
most of Haitians. But so far, in 2006, little has changed.
State structures remain underdeveloped and, consequentially, the
historical cleavage between state and nation persists. The Haitian state
is failing because its ability to provide physical and human security to
its nation is very limited.108 Physical security cannot be granted due to
the lack of an adequate number of trained police forces throughout the
country. Conversely where police are present, they very often create
violence and fear instead of security.109 Certain areas of the country are
left to self-justice or have been controlled by private armed groups, of-
ten sustained by the local population.110 Due to the absence of an effec-
tive justice system, including a court system and functioning prisons,

105 E. Mobbekk, “Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti”, Democratization 8

(2001), 173 et seq. (79-80).
106 R. Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic. The Unending Transition to Democ-
racy, 2002, 69.
107 Elections were observed by the United Nations Observer Group for the
Verification of the Elections in Haiti (ONUVEH). Compare Gélin-
Adams/ Malone, see note 100, 296.
108 Ibid., 299-300.
109 J. Mendelsson-Forman, “Security Reform in Haiti”, International Peace-
keeping 13 (2006), 14 et seq. (24).
110 International Crisis Group, A New Chance for Haiti? ICG Latin Amer-
ica/Caribbean Report No. 10 of 18 November 2004, International Crisis
Group, 14-18.
492 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

rule of law is scarcely apparent in the Caribbean country. The Constitu-

tion, which was adopted in 1987, is not yet fully implemented and this
hinders the establishment of state institutions. In turn, bureaucracy is
inflated by 45,000 public servants who are badly or even not paid at all.
Hence, corruption has been pervading public service as well as the po-
lice, who are also linked to the increasing drug trafficking activities in
Haiti.111
Human Security requires the allocation of public benefits. But the
Haitian state is marked by underdeveloped infrastructures: it lacks a
functioning telecommunication, electricity and road system. For in-
stance, parts of the country cannot be reached due to the absence of
roads.112 Further public benefits, such as a health and a social system are
not available. Correspondingly Haiti’s socio-economic performance is
weak: since the 1980s the economy has shown a negative growth rate113
and the majority of Haitians live in poverty.114
Against this background democracy was expected to give rise to
profound changes in Haitian politics at the beginning of the 1990s.
Since then, Haiti has met many challenges, again moving between au-
thoritarian rule and democratic order.
Elections have played a crucial role in Haiti since 1990. Although
first the population accepted elections to legitimize power in Haitian
politics, their adoption was restricted by the political elite, especially
the military. In this respect they were also subject to internal conflict,
mostly amongst the political elite. Later, when fraudulent elections had
taken place, this acceptance also declined amongst the Haitian popula-
tion. This is reflected in Haitian electoral history as follows: first, with

111 Fatton, see note 106, 109.

112 International Crisis Group, Haiti after the Elections: Challenges for
Préval’s First 100 Days, ICG Latin America/Caribbean Briefing No. 10 of
11 May 2006, 10-11.
113 UN/ World Bank et al., Republic of Haiti, Interim International Coopera-
tion Framework, 2004-2006, para. 21, available at: <http://haiticci.undg.
org>. Furthermore, in terms of the economic development, foreign aid and
investments rather contributed to worsen than to improve the situation due
to their massive investments, which very often were followed by sudden
withdrawal.
114 It is estimated that 75 per cent of the Haitian people live in poverty, thereof
55 per cent with less than one dollar per day. The UN’s Human Develop-
ment Index of 2005 ranks Haiti on place 153 (of 177 countries). See UNDP,
Human Development Report 2005, 221, available at: <http://hdr.undp.
org>.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 493

the elections in 1990 formally began the democratic rule, which was
soon put to an end by a military coup against Aristide in 1991.115
Shortly after Aristides’ return from exile Presidential elections were
held in 1995. These elections were subject to conflict because many
supporters of Aristide demanded the extension of the Presidents’ man-
date because he had not fulfilled his Presidency during his three-years
in exile. Through international and oppositional pressure, Aristide
acted according to the Haitian Constitution and stepped down.116 His
former Prime Minister, ally and also member of his party Fanmi
Lavalas, René Préval was then elected President.117 In contrast to the
free and fair, although in organizational terms deficient, Presidential
elections of 1995,118 the following Presidential elections in 2000 were
fraudulent.119 Aristide and his party Fanmi Lavalas declared a majority,
although many political parties had refused to participate in the elec-
tions and vote counting was manipulated in order to avoid a second
round of the elections. Nevertheless, the Provisional Electoral Council
(Conseil Electoral Provisoire, CEP), supported by President Préval,
confirmed the victory of President Aristide. In consequence, Aristide
governed on a weak legitimate basis, which inter alia led to a new out-
break of the Haitian conflict by 2001.120
Thus, Haiti has experienced repeated elections, the latest took place
in February 2006. With it the results of national elections in Haiti are
for the first time widely accepted within the population and political
elite. Altogether they were strongly supported by the international
community. Nevertheless, the country lacks the administrative institu-
tions and knowledge to organize regular elections. For instance, the
CEP has remained provisional since 1990. This constitutes one example
of the incomplete implementation of institutions foreseen in the Con-

115 Further information in the 1991 military coup see below.

116 Pursuant to article 134-3 of the Haitian Constitution of 1987, re-election of
the Haitian President is prohibited. An additional term is only possible af-
ter an interval of five years. A third term is interdicted.
117 Fanmi Lavalas is a splitter of the former Movement Lavalas, which was
created by Aristide and fell apart because many of his followers turned
away and created a new party, called Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (Or-
ganization of the People in Battle).
118 I. Stotzky, Silencing the Guns in Haiti. The Promise of Deliberative De-
mocracy, 1999, 146.
119 Parliamentary elections in 1997 were also fraudulent and weak in technical
terms.
120 See under III. 2. c.
494 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

stitution of 1987. Pursuant to the Constitution, the CEP should be

composed of regional representatives, who are not in place yet because
the respective regional and local organs have not been established.
Structural institutional blockades constricted democratization fur-
ther. Since the return of Aristide in 1994, Parliament and the Executive
could not agree on a candidate for the Prime Minister. Consequently
Préval dissolved the Parliament by 1997. He nominated independently a
Prime Minister and continued to govern on the basis of decrees, much
as Aristide did before. But in addition to that he governed on unconsti-
tutional ground,121 because, differing from other semi-presidential sys-
tems, the Haitian Constitution prohibits in its article 111 (8) the disso-
lution of the Parliament.122 In 2004 the Parliament was again dissolved
because no parliamentary election had been held in 2003 due to the
Presidents’ and Legislatives’ previous incapacity to assign the CEP. In
consequence, Aristide governed again on the basis of decrees.
Besides these institutional problems, the political culture of the Hai-
tian elite has also been retarding democratization. In general, political
culture here is characterized by a winner-takes-all mentality, combined
with a personalized, strong leadership. Throughout the 1990s, under
formal democratic rule, Haitian politics were also personalized and po-
larized by focusing on the figure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Although
he took office in order to oppose the traditional Haitian political and
economic elite, featured with a pro-poor and anti-liberal rhetoric, he
rapidly had changed his attitudes after his return to Haiti in 1994. When
he was re-elected in 2000, he was characterized as an authoritarian lead-
er. Consequentially Haitians grew increasingly disillusioned with de-
mocracy and were further alienated from politics, thus compounding
the well-worn division between the politicized urban centre and the
apolitical, non-participating rural areas.123
Finally, after the ousting of President Aristide in 2004, the Interim
Government of Alexandre Boniface was indeed legally appointed. But

121 H. Carey, “Electoral Observation and Democratization in Haiti”, in: K.

Middlebrook (eds), Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in
Latin America, 1998, 141 et seq. (151).
122 Although the Haitian Constitution of 1987 adopted many provisions of the
Fifth French Republic’s Constitution, it differs in terms of restriction of
executive, especially Presidential, powers. For a comparison of constitu-
tional law in the Haitian case see L. Aucoin, “Haiti’s Constitutional Cri-
sis”, B. U. Int’l L. J. 17 (1999), 115 et seq. (121).
123 Ch. Kumar, Building Peace in Haiti, 1998, 37.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 495

as it focused on the organization of national elections in order to fill the

existent power vacuum, it missed the opportunity to implement neces-
sary reform policies, which were necessary to produce democratic sta-
bility in Haitian politics. Instead, the status quo persisted.
To sum up, the Haitian state is not able to provide physical and hu-
man security to its citizens due to a lack of resources and functioning
state institutions. In this respect it is a failing state. Unimplemented and
weak democratic institutions prevail, especially the Parliament and
elected local institutions. Furthermore Haitian political culture is char-
acterized by authoritarian behavior of the political elite and the alien-
ation of the population from politics. In consequence, Haiti lacks a de-
mocratic order which is not consolidated yet.

2. Roots, Evolution and Surfacing of the Haitian Conflict

a. 1991: Overthrow of the First Haitian Democratic Government

On 29 September 1991, only seven months after his inauguration, the

Government of President Aristide was overthrown by a military coup
d’état, which was supported by parts of the economic sector.124 Before-
hand, Aristide had also set alight the smoldering conflict by two impor-
tant speeches. He first addressed the UN General Assembly by agitat-
ing against the Force Armée d’Haiti (FADH) and the established politi-
cal elite. In Haiti he also called on the population to inflict self justice
against members of the military.125 After the coup Haiti was once more
governed by a military de facto regime which ruled constantly by
means of repressing violence. In the aftermath of the coup the military
junta, led by General Cédras, ordered the persecution and killing of Ar-
istide’s followers.126 In turn, Aristide went into exile to the United
States.
The OAS reacted immediately. It applied Resolution 1080,127 which
had been adopted merely three months before, and condemned the
break with the democratic order in Haiti:

124 O.E. Sella, La Caída de Aristide, crónica de una frustración popular, 1996,
224.
125 Malone, see note 3, 61.
126 Estimated 200-300 people were killed in the direct aftermath of the coup.
Compare Sella, note 124, 121.
127 See note 70.
496 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

“[…] the grave events that have occurred in Haiti constitute an

abrupt, violent, and irregular disruption of the legitimate exercise of
power by the democratic government of that country.”128
So far, this Resolution constituted the strongest commitment made
to democracy in the Americas.129 The OAS undertook various efforts
to promote the restoration of democracy, e.g. delegating a fact finding
mission to the Caribbean country in order to observe the situation and
foster political dialogue, as well as economic sanctions.130 In February
1992 the fact finding mission was followed by the establishment of a
long-term mission, which later became a joint UN/OAS mission.131
Only when OAS measures, including economic sanctions, were unsuc-
cessful in November 1992, did the regional organization request sup-
port from the United Nations.132 Then the U.S. and the United Na-
tions, in cooperation with the OAS, took a leading function in the res-
toration of the regime of Aristide.
In the period from the overthrow of Aristide in September 1991 up
to the decision to intervene by military force, all negotiations – mainly
between the de facto government, Aristide and a parliamentary com-
mission – failed. Contentious issues remained unchanged during this
process. They comprised the legitimacy of the de facto government; the
acceptance of a Prime Minister appointed by Aristide; the time for the
return of Aristide; the role of the military after the return of Aristide
and whether the militias would get an amnesty when abandoning the
country.133 Meanwhile the human rights situation deteriorated in Haiti.

128 OAS Doc. MRE/RES/1/91 of 3 October 1991.

129 D. Acevedo/ C. Grossman, “The Organization of American States and the
Protection of Democracy”, in: T. Farer (ed.), Beyond Sovereignty. Collec-
tively Defending Democracy in the Americas 1996, 132 et seq. (143).
130 OAS Doc. MRE/RES/1/91 of 3 October 1991; OAS Doc. MRE/RES/2/91
of 8 October 1991 and OAS Doc. MRE/RES/3/91 of 8 October 1991. The
OAS embargo was backed by the UN, S/RES/841 (1993) of 16 June 1993.
The oil and weapon embargos’ implementation was not effective due to the
reluctance of some states, above all the exceptions made by the U.S. in or-
der to protect certain sectors of its economy. Compare also D.E. Acevedo,
“The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in Pro-
tecting Democracy”, in: L. Damrosch, Enforcing Restraints. Collective In-
tervention in Internal Conflicts, 1993, 118 et seq. Above all the Governors
Island Agreement of 9 July 1993.
131 For more information on this mission see under III. 3. c.
132 OAS Doc. CP/RES/594 of 10 November 1992.
133 Fatton, see note 106, 77-106.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 497

Self-justice, arbitrary arrests, torture and killings of Aristide followers

dominated day-to-day life in Haiti.134 In consequence thousands of
Haitians fled their country to the United States or the Dominican Re-
public.135
When the Security Council authorized the military intervention in
1994, the junta handed over power in October 1994.136 In consequence,
President Aristide returned to the country on 15 October. Since the
course of the conflict had been focused on the return of Aristide, it had
became extraordinarily personalized. Thus the Haitian conflict was
considered to be resolved for the time being.
With regard to the conflict’s form, issue, structure, and actors, it
showed one novelty in Haiti’s history. The form to carry out the con-
flict – by a coup d’état – was rather ordinary than extraordinary in the
Haitian context. Its issue also remained the same i.e., exercise of na-
tional power, although national power this time was linked to the exer-
cise of democratic power, and not to authoritarian rule as in the past.
The actors of the conflict and, for the time being, also its superficial
structures had changed. While in the past conflicts were always carried
out amongst the elite in order to maintain or gain power, now a social
conflict had erupted, which had been fermenting under the surface of
Haitian society for decades. This conflict was a conflict between the
traditional elite and the Haitian population, represented by Aristide.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the conflict was presumed to have been re-
solved by national as well as international actors, when President Aris-
tide’s power was restored. At the same time the conflict’s originating
structures remained.

b. 1994-2004: The Slow, but Predictable Return to Conflict

On his return in October 1994 President Aristide encountered the

same, even more deepened power constellations and social structures as
on his departure from the island. His opponents in the military and par-

134 I. Martin, “Haiti: International Force or National Compromise?”, Journal

of Latin American Studies 31 (1999), 711 et seq. (713).
135 M. Morley/ C. McGillion, “‘Disobedient’ Generals and the Politics of Re-
democratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti”, Political Science
Quarterly 112 (1997), 363 et seq. (364). See in this respect also the wording
of S/RES/940, see note 40.
136 For a description of the events leading to the return of Aristide see below.
498 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

liamentary opposition persisted. While maintaining his anti-neoliberal

rhetoric he had changed his economic policies because of financial re-
strictions from the international community.137
With regard to former conflicting parties, the role of the military
remained one major challenge for Aristide’s government as well as his
successor Préval. When in exile Aristide had decided that he would re-
duce the FADH from 8,000 to no more than 1,500 members. Shortly af-
ter the intervention it was reported FADH “has almost ceased to exist
as an organization.”138 In February 1995, on the retirement of the four
most senior officers of the army, FADH was dissolved.139 Thus, ex-
militias were not integrated into society due to a lack of job opportuni-
ties. Since then the “pay issue” had been a continuous subject of dispute
between Aristide and his opponents. Whilst the ex-militias demanded
pensions, Aristide insisted that the government was not able to pay the
demobilized soldiers due to a limited budget.140 In consequence, the
discontent amongst former militias grew and formed a firm opposition
against Aristide, leading to the creation of armed groups.
Aristide, in turn, worked towards his retention of power. In doing
so Aristide’s behavior became increasingly authoritarian. He rested his
power on the Interim Public Security Forces, later the Haitian National
Police (HNP) and armed gangs, the so-called Chiméres. The latter were
partly financed by Aristide and his supporters in order to intimidate
political opponents.141 Their activities spread during the 1990s and in
consequence of Aristide’s return in 2000 culminated in a systematic re-
pression of regime opponents.142
The conflict re-emerged again when the legitimacy of Aristide’s
power was at stake in 2000. After his re-election in the fraudulent elec-
tions of 2000, the polarization between Aristide and his political oppo-
nents increased further because the latter did not accept the electoral re-
sults and therefore rejected Aristide’s presidency. In consequence, ten-
sions grew steadily, the number of armed quarrels mounted. In re-
sponse to the discerning follow-up to the elections in 2000 the OAS
had established an OAS Special Mission to Strengthen Democracy in

137 Fatton, see note 106, 100.

138 Doc. S/1994/1208 of 24 October 1994.
139 Malone, see note 3, 122.
140 Mendelsson-Forman, see note 109, 19.
141 Ibid., 23.
142 D. Erikson, “Haiti After Aristide: Still on the Brink”, Current History,
February 2005, 83 et seq. (84-85).
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 499

Haiti in order to facilitate a national dialogue between the conflicting

parties.143 Nevertheless, on 17 December 2001 armed groups attacked
the Presidential Palace in Port-au-Prince. In a counter-attack Aristide
supporters set houses and offices of opposition parties on fire.144 The
OAS reacted again immediately by condemning the events which had
taken place in Haiti.145 But despite all negotiation efforts by the OAS
and national parties the situation deteriorated further.

c. 2004: Ousting of President Aristide’s Government

In February 2004 the conflict between Aristide supporters and his op-
ponents worsened significantly. Armed rebel groups, composed of
mainly ex-militias and former supporters of the military junta of 1991,
such as the Front Révolutionnaire Armé pour le Progrès d’Haiti
(FRAPH), demanded Aristide’s resignation.146 His return to presidency
through manipulated elections in 2000 and his constant refusal to re-
establish the army or to pay the ex-soldiers were the main accusations
against him.
On 5 February 2004 armed rebels occupied the city of Gonaïve, in
Northern Haiti. By 24 February 2004 they already controlled half of
the country. All over Haiti police stations were occupied by rebel
groups. Rebel groups consisted in large part of former Tonton Macoutes
and soldiers. Aristide failed to regain control over the state’s territory
because the HNP either refused to fight against the rebels or re-
treated.147 In turn, in many parts of the country, the rebels assumed po-
lice functions.148 In Port-au-Prince some slums were also dominated by
armed, partially criminal, groups. Furthermore, popular demonstrations

143 OAS Doc. CP/RES/772 (1247/00) of 4 August 2000.

144 Fifth Report of the Mission of the Organization of American States on
Haiti, OAS Doc. CP/DOC354/02 of 8 January 2002, 10.
145 OAS Doc. CP/RES/806 (1303/02) Corr. 1 of 16 January 2002.
146 Various groups, also the Armée Cannibale, which formerly worked to-
gether with Aristide, formed the alliance Front pour la Libération et la Re-
construction Nationale. Once the alliance had reached its objective, it was
dissolved and each group continued to exist on its own. See International
Crisis Group, see note 110, 10.
147 International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Transition: Hanging in the Balance,
Latin American Caribbean Report No. 7 of 8 February 2005, 5.
148 J. Cholet/ D. Flemes, “Haiti – ein Jahr nach dem Sturz Aristides. Leitet die
UN-Stabilisierungsmission die Wende ein?”, Brennpunkt Lateinamerika 5
(2005), 46 et seq.
500 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

emerged regularly and the situation was aggravated by the violent as-
saults of the Chiméres opposing the rebels. At the same time Haitians
started to flee to the United States, where they were immediately sent
back to their country due to a restrictive U.S.-migration policy.
In the course of the conflict both sides insisted stubbornly on the
following positions, finally leading to the aggravation of the situation:
on the one hand the rebels demanded Aristides resignation. On the
other hand Aristide insisted on the legitimacy of his presidency. Never-
theless he vaguely offered new elections by the end of 2004.149 Negotia-
tions between the rebel groups and the government of Aristide were fa-
cilitated by the international community, especially by France and the
U.S.
With regard to the international involvement in this crisis, it is note-
worthy that the OAS had – as in the course of the conflict in the first
half of the 1990s – taken a leading role when the crisis arose in May
2000. Only when the situation aggravated and peaceful means such as
good offices and technical assistance had failed, other actors, especially
the U.S. and France, took over the leading position. The U.S. again lob-
bied for the resolution of the conflict due to the exodus of Haitians
fleeing to the U.S. In addition, France played a far more active role at
the side of the U.S. than it played at the beginning of the 1990s.150 Sec-
retary-General Kofi Annan reacted by appointing the diplomat
Reginald Dumas from Trinidad and Tobago as his Special Representa-
tive for Haiti in order to observe the situation in that country.151
Finally, on 29 February 2004 Aristide renounced the Presidency and
fled the country because he was not able to control the situation. Before
leaving, he submitted a letter to the U.S. American embassy through
which he explained that he would resign in order to avoid a bloodbath
in Haiti.152 After he had left the country in a U.S. chartered plane to the
Central African Republic, he claimed that he had become the “victim of
a modern kidnapping.” His position was backed by the Caribbean

149 International Crisis Group, see note 110, 9.

150 This evolvement has probably two causes: first, the decreased interest of
the U.S. in the Latin American region due to its heightened engagement in
the Middle East. Second, the reluctance of France to a U.S. intervention
into Iraq in 2003. In this context the Haitian case provided a good oppor-
tunity to prove Frances’ loyalty to the last superpower.
151 Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, Doc. S/2004/300 of 16 April
2004, para. 2.
152 Erikson, see note 142, 87.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 501

Community (CARICOM), which presumed that President Aristide

had been overthrown by the U.S. and France.153
When Aristide resigned, Alexandre Boniface, President of the Su-
preme Court, became the Interim President of the country, a procedure
pursuant to article 149 of the Haitian Constitution.154 The interim gov-
ernment composed of technocrats and not politicians committed itself
to work for the organization and implementation of national, democ-
ratic elections in order to establish a new and fully legitimized govern-
ment.155 In comparison with the coup in 1991, it can be stated that this
time Haitians acted according to the Constitution and formally re-
solved the conflict in a legal way.
Although the first steps were taken on a formal level, violence per-
sisted throughout the country. Reacting immediately to the ouster of
Aristide, the Security Council had convened a special session and had
authorized – as in 1994 – a multinational force, succeeded by an UN
peace-keeping mission.156
With regard to its issue, form, structure, and actors, the re-emerged
conflict had changed in comparison to the beginning of the 1990s. First,
its issue, exercise of national power, remained. It only differed in terms
of its shaping. This time the legitimacy of the de facto government of
Aristide was at stake. Second, the actors of the conflict changed gradu-
ally. While in the beginning of the 1990s Aristide was opposed merely
by the traditional military and economic elite, now former followers of
his own turned against him, because he had not fulfilled their expecta-
tions. In the eyes of many, Aristide’s government constituted just one
more corrupt regime in Haitian history.157 Moreover, the conflict was
penetrated by criminal groups. Third, while the form of the conflict
changed from a – in the Haitian context “conventional” form of conflict
– military coup to widespread rebel insurrections, its structure re-
mained consistent with traditional conflict structures because it was a
conflict amongst the elites on access to political power. Indeed, Aristide
did not originate from the traditional mulatto elite of Haiti, but from
the rather poor, rural majority of Haitian society. Although, his origins
differ, he adapted his behavior to that of the traditional Haitian elite.

153 Ibid., 88.

154 Erikson, see note 142, para. 9.
155 See note 151, para. 19 and para. 20.
156 See under III. 3. d.
157 Fatton, see note 106, 204.
502 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

Furthermore, he had mobilized new forces and therewith introduced

new destabilizing factors into the Haitian conflict.
Finally it can be stated that the Haitian conflict is deeply rooted in
the schism between the Haitian state and nation. In reference to the
state, it was not capable to implement security reforms, which could
have prevented a military coup or the following rebel insurgencies.
With regard to the latter, this was aggravated by the fact that rebel
groups took over police functions and therefore enjoyed partly popular
support. With regard to human security the Haitian state could not
evolve an output capacity which would have improved the socio-
economic situation for its population. Here the root cause of the Hai-
tian conflict lies. Since the access to power determines the access to re-
sources, the conflict will not cease as long as power is not legitimately
re-distributed and thereby resources made accessible for the whole
population. Democracy is assumed to provide respective legitimate
procedures to re-distribute power and resources in a peaceful manner.
In the Haitian case, indeed, democratic elections took place. But they
did not lead to a sustainable re-distribution of power due to the lack of
implemented, functioning institutions and the lack of a democratic po-
litical culture. Therefore, democratic elections alone did not solve the
repeated outbreak of the conflict. Against this background the state-
building and democracy efforts undertaken by UN peace-keeping mis-
sions to resolve the Haitian conflict are questionable.

3. On the Ground: UN Peace-Keeping Approaches in Haiti

All over the world in no country have as many UN peace-keeping mis-

sions been stationed as in Haiti. Altogether since 1993 five missions
were deployed:
(a) United Nations Mission in Haiti (September 1993-June 1996 –
UNMIH),
(b) United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (July 1996-June 1997 –
UNSMIH),
(c) United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (August 1997-
November 1997 – UNTMIH),
(d) United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (December 1997-
March 2000 – MIPONUH),
(e) United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (since June 2004 –
MINUSTAH).
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 503

Additionally two civilian missions took place, the International Ci-

vilian Mission in Haiti (December 1993-December 2000 – MICIVIH)
and the International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti (March 2000-
February 2001).
In the following, special attention will be drawn to UNMIH and
MINUSTAH because of their significance with regard to military in-
terventions in the context of democratic state failing. On the one hand
both missions have been undertaken in direct reaction to a clear rupture
with democratic order in Haiti. On the other hand their mandates ad-
dressed the support of democratic institutions. In order to complete the
picture of peace-keeping in Haiti and to build a bridge between the two
highlighted missions, the remaining three missions will be examined
very briefly. Additionally, MICIVIH will be examined due to its inter-
ference with the implementation of UNMIH.

a. UNMIH (1993-1996): A Narrow View on an Ample Problem

The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established in

September 1993 for the purpose of assisting the implementation of the
Governors Island Agreement.158 The latter was agreed – after almost
one week of negotiations – between Aristide, parliamentary representa-
tives, and the de facto government of General Cédras on 3 July 1993. It
comprised the facilitation of a political dialogue under the auspices of
the United Nations and the OAS, the appointment of a new Com-
mander-in-Chief by Aristide and, in turn, the early retirement of Gen-
eral Cédras. President Aristide was to return on 30 October 1993. Fur-
thermore it requested the presence of the United Nations in Haiti in
order to support the modernization of the army and the establishment
of a police force. Subsequently another document, the New York Pact,
was signed on 14 July 1993, which provided for a six month truce to
guarantee a smooth and peaceful transition and invited Aristide to ap-
point a new Prime Minister.159 When the new Prime Minister, Robert
Malval, was then assigned and approved by parliament, the two month

158 S/RES/867 (1993) of 23 September 1993. Governors Island Agreement,

Annex to the Report of the Secretary-General of 13 August 1993, Doc.
S/26297. For a detailed analysis of the Governors Island Agreement see
Malone, see note 3, 78-98.
159 New York Pact, Doc. A/47/1000 Annex.
504 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

old UN oil and arms embargo was suspended on 25 August 1993.160 On

8 September 1993 an advance team, led by the UN/OAS Special Repre-
sentative Dante Caputo, traveled to Haiti.161 It concluded that a deep
polarization between the conflicting parties and the violation of human
rights persisted.162

aa. Deployment

Although promising at the beginning, the deployment of UNMIH

turned out to be difficult. Amid tensions, provoked by the scheduled
return of Aristide, the human rights situation deteriorated signifi-
cantly.163 UNMIH was finally dispatched on 11 October 1993, but
when it was about to land on the island, its disembarkation was pre-
vented by organized civilian armed groups – supported and instructed
by the de facto military regime. These incidents, obviously obstructive
to the implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, were addi-
tionally aggravated by further human rights abuses against supporters
of Aristide and the dismissive posture of the army against UNMIH.164
In consequence the Security Council, reacted immediately with the re-
imposition of its oil and arms embargo.165
In the period from October 1993 to September 1994 disruptions be-
tween the conflicting parties were further deepened and accordingly the
climate of repression increased in Haiti, when the bulk of MICIVIH
staff was withdrawn and the impossibility to deploy UNMIH became
evident. Diplomatic efforts by the UN and OAS continued and the
“Group of the Friends of the Secretary General for Haiti” fostered fur-

160 S/RES/861 (1993) of 27 August 1993. The oil and arms embargo was im-
posed by the Security Council upon request of the OAS (OAS Doc.
CP/RES/594 of 10 November 1992). The OAS had previously imposed a
regional trade embargo which had remained ineffective (OAS Doc.
MRE/RES/2/91 of 8 October 1991). After the imposition of the embargo
in August 1993, the UN undertook, alongside the U.S., the lead position in
the Haitian crisis.
161 Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti of 21 September 1993, Doc.
S/26480.
162 Ibid., para. 22.
163 S. Schnably, “The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the
United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala”,
Inter-American Law Review 25 (1994), 293 et seq. (6).
164 Malone, see note 3, 91-92.
165 S/RES/841 (1993) of 16 June 1993.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 505

ther political dialogue.166 Despite these initiatives the conflict remained

unsolved. The mandate entrusted to UNMIH could not be imple-
mented, but still the Security Council prolonged the mandate.167 Since
no further advancements were made, it intensified the economic sanc-
tions, reaffirming that:
“[…] the goal of the international community remains the restora-
tion of democracy in Haiti and the prompt return of the legitimately
elected President, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, under the framework of
the Governors Island Agreement.”168
It also demanded the creation of the proper environment for the de-
ployment of UNMIH.169 Given that these conditions were not estab-
lished, the use of alternative means was first hesitantly discussed.170
Once more the Security Council, supporting a request of the Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the OAS, highlighted the need to rapidly dispatch
UNMIH as soon as conditions would permit. Therefore the UNMIH
mandate was extended for one month until 31 July 1994.
When all attempts to support the solution of the conflict ended in an
impasse and when the internal pressure grew on U.S. President Clinton
due to the increasing flows of Haitian refugees into the U.S. and due to
parliamentary pressure groups condemning Clinton’s restrictive migra-
tion policy,171 the U.S. campaigned for the use of military means in or-
der to restore democracy in Haiti. Aristide, in his letter to the Security
Council on 31 July 1994 stated:
“[…] take prompt and decisive actions, under the authority of the
United Nations, to allow for [the Governors Island Agreement] full
implementation.”172

166 The “Group of Friends” was initiated by France and Venezuela in 1992. It
comprises Canada, France, United States and Venezuela from the outset,
Argentina since 1994 and Chile since 1996.
167 S/RES/905 (1994) of 23 March 1994.
168 S/RES/917 (1994) of 6 May 1994.
169 Ibid.
170 OAS Doc. MRE/ACT/94 and Ch.R. Thomas, Medio siglo de la Organi-
zación de los Estados Americanos – Panorama de un compromiso regional,
1999, 13.
171 Clinton defined the Haitian refugees as “economic” and not “political”
refugees. Therefore no asylum could be granted to them and all refugees –
estimated 38,000 from 1991 to 1994 – were sent back to Haiti. Compare
Morley/ McGillion, see note 135, 364-366.
172 Doc. S/1994/905 of 29 July 1994.
506 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

On 31 July 1994, the Security Council adopted its Resolution 940.

By the terms of this resolution, the Council acting under Chapter VII
of the Charter, authorized Member States to form a multinational force
under unified command and control, to use all necessary means to fa-
cilitate the departure of the military leadership, the prompt return of
the President and the restoration of the legitimate government authori-
ties. In Haiti the de facto government of Joinaissant, previously ap-
pointed by the military, proclaimed the emergency status over Haiti. At
the end of August 1994 Venezuela, supported by the “Group of
Friends”, tried to arbitrate in the dispute once more. Since this re-
mained ineffective, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali declared
that all attempts had failed.173 While a military intervention was pre-
pared, the United States took a further unilateral, diplomatic initiative
by sending a mission, headed by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to
Haiti. On 18 September 1994 the Carter Mission, composed of Jimmy
Carter, U.S. General Colin Powell and U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, at-
tempted to negotiate an agreement which called upon Haitian military
to cooperate with U.S. military and for Cédras to retire and leave the
country peacefully, no later than 15 October 1994.174 Hence, on 19 Sep-
tember 1994 the lead elements of the multinational force (MNF) landed
without opposition on the island.175 One month later, on 12 October
1994, General Cédras and his followers resigned from power and went
into exile to Panama.176 Finally, on 15 October 1994 President Aristide
returned triumphantly to his country and assumed power.177 In a short-
term perspective the MNF had completed its mandate and successfully
restored democracy in Haiti. The weeks following the arrival of the
MNF were marked by further improvements and politically motivated
violence as well as human rights abuses declined.

bb. Mandate

With Resolution 940 the Security Council had reinforced and extended
UNMIH’s mandate. It decided that the MNF would terminate its mis-
sion and UNMIH would assume the full range of its functions de-

173 Kumar, see note 123, 26.

174 Sella, see note 124, 247.
175 Malone, see note 3, 110.
176 Stotzky, see note 118, 40-41.
177 In consequence of Aristide’s return economic sanctions were lifted,
S/RES/944 (1994) of 29 September 1994, para. 4.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 507

scribed when a secure and stable environment had been established and
UNMIH had adequate force capability and structure.178 According to
Resolution 940 UNMIH should assist the democratic Government of
Haiti to: sustain the secure and stable environment; professionalize the
Haitian armed forces and create a separate police force and establish an
environment conducive to the organization of free and fair elections.179
While the MNF had to create a stable and secure environment UNMIH
should support the consolidation of the democratic order later on.

cc. Composition and Implementation

With regard to its implementation UNMIH advance teams were de-

ployed on the ground in order to observe the stabilization efforts of the
MNF and coordinate the foreseen transition from the MNF to UN-
MIH in the months from September 1994 to January 1995.180 UNMIH
took over from the MNF on 31 March 1995. Nearly two years after its
establishment, UNMIH started its work with a maximum of 6,000
troops and 900 civilian police officers (CIVPOL). The latter was armed
and disposed of arrest authority – a novelty in peace-keeping.181
CIVPOL next to its police functions unexpectedly helped to provide
security.182 Additionally, 460 civilian, international and local staff were
employed. It worked under the oversight of the newly appointed Spe-
cial Representative of the Secretaries General of the UN and OAS, who
also oversaw the activities of MICIVIH183 – a form of close cooperation
between the UN and a regional organization which constituted an in-
novation in UN peace-keeping missions. Once deployed on the
ground, the mandate of UNMIH was extended twice, until its final
withdrawal on 30 June 1996. At this time its contingent had been
greatly decreased to 1,200 troops and 300 police personnel.184

178 Ibid., para. 8.

179 Ibid., paras 9 and para. 10.
180 S/RES/944 (1994) of 29 September 1994, para. 1. In January 1995 its man-
date was extended until 31 July 1995, S/RES/975 (1995) of 30 January 1995.
181 See for its functions in detail, A. Dobbin et al., America’s Role in Nation-
Building: From Germany to Iraq, 2003, 76.
182 As to the unforeseen duties see, Background information on UNMIH, UN
Department for Peace-keeping, 1997, 17, available at: <http://www.un.org/
Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unmihbackgr2.html>.
183 See S/RES/867 (1993) of 23 September 1993, para. 5.
184 S/RES/1048 (1996) of 29 February 1996, paras 6 and 7.
508 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

Immediately after its arrival UNMIH undertook successfully vari-

ous security measures such as carrying out patrols and escort of hu-
manitarian relief convoys in order to sustain “the secure and stable en-
vironment”.185 It faced major challenges only once with regard to the
Haitian security situation. In November 1995 social tensions increased
and led to the killing of two deputies. UNMIH reacted with the de-
ployment of Quick Reaction Forces and re-established control.186

dd. Humanitarian Aid

One of UNMIH’s major tasks was to make humanitarian assistance

available. Thereby it provided assistance in areas such as power supply,
security of food supplies, engineering support and nutrition manage-
ment.187 In conjunction with these duties an innovative approach was
developed: for the first time a UN peace-keeping mission integrated the
work of UNDP.188 The Secretary-General of the United Nations ap-
pointed C. Ossa as his Deputy Special Representative and concurrently
UNDP Resident Representative. This was the first time that the United
Nations had linked a peace-keeping mission to development activities
in this manner. The linkage was intended to promote closer cooperation
between all concerned and to facilitate the transition from UNMIH to
continuing peace-building activities by the United Nations in Haiti.

ee. State-Building and Democracy Promotion

Throughout its implementation UNMIH’s mandate, as outlined in Se-

curity Council Resolution 940, underwent a shift from a combination
of military and police functions to primarily police functions in order
to assist an effective state-building. This evolution was determined by
the disintegration of the police forces from the FADH and the follow-
ing dissolution of the military. Against this background UNMIH sup-
ported the establishment of a 5,000-strong Haitian National Police
(HNP).189 CIVPOL mainly monitored and guided this process, most

185 See note 40, para. 9 (a).

186 Ibid., 17.
187 Ibid., 15.
188 C. Kumar/ E. Cousens, Policy Briefing: Peacebuilding in Haiti, IPA Re-
port, 5, available at: <www.ipacademy.org/Publications/Reports/Research/
PublRepoReseHaitiPrint.hmt>.
189 Kumar/ Cousens, see note 188, 5.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 509

notably by offering a trainee program.190 With reference to the concept

of UNMIH’s efforts to support the establishment of HNP, it was em-
bedded in an exceptional, comprehensive understanding of peace-
keeping, as noted by the Security Council: “[The Security Council] re-
affirms the importance of a fully functioning, national police force of
adequate size and structure to the consolidation of democracy and revi-
talization of Haiti’s system of justice.”191
Thereby, peace-keeping was closely linked to the establishment of a
solid democratic system, including a secure environment and a func-
tioning justice system. Nevertheless, although police officers were
trained, it was not sufficient that police officers knew how to arrest
somebody, while at the same time an effective court system was not
available.192 Furthermore the size of HNP was too small with regard to
a Haitian population of more than 7 million. Rural areas and slums in
Port-au-Prince – the main source of violence – were partly not covered
by police forces and consequently lapsed into self-justice.193 Insufficient
numbers of HNP were mainly determined by difficulties in recruiting
adequate personnel and by a lack of resources. Finally one major prob-
lem of the Haitian conflict was left open: former militias were neither
disarmed nor reintegrated into society. UNMIH missed to respond to
this problem due to its narrow approach, only focusing policing issues.
Apart from that UNMIH paid special attention to the planning of a
smooth and orderly transfer to the government of Haiti of its responsi-
bilities and functions. The Security Council had stressed the importance
of a fully functioning national police force for the consolidation of de-
mocracy in Haiti.194 In accordance with its mandate UNMIH provided
a twofold assistance to the local and legislative as well as to the Presi-
dential elections in June and December 1995. In cooperation with the
OAS and MICIVIH it provided successfully logistic and financial assis-
tance as well as technical assistance to the CEP.195

190 Mendelsson-Forman, see note 109, 20-21.

191 S/RES/1007 (1995) of 31 July 1995, para. 6.
192 Mendelsson-Forman, see note 109, 21.
193 Kumar/ Cousens, see note 188, 6 and 7.
194 See S/RES/1007 (1995) of 31 July 1995.
195 See note 182, 15.
510 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

ff. Fulfillment of Mandate

After 15 months (dated from the 31 of March) on the ground, UNMIH

left Haiti in June 1996, its comprehensive mandate only partly fulfilled.
Although it was effective in providing humanitarian aid and electoral
assistance, it did not achieve its primary goal of establishing a function-
ing police force. Due to a lack of man-power, equipment and knowl-
edge, the HNP was not able to protect Haitian society on its own.
Nevertheless UNMIH adopted various innovations – amongst them the
integration of UNDP.

b. UNSMIH, UNTMIH, and MIPONUH (1996-2000): A Drop in

the Ocean

The security situation in Haiti remained unchanged after the comple-

tion of UNMIH. With regard to HNP’s incapacity to fulfill its main
functions, the UN Secretary-General had already recommended con-
tinuing engagement up to June 1996.196 Although the need for assis-
tance was obvious, the permanent Security Council members’ willing-
ness to extend UNMIH’s mandate or to establish another mission de-
creased. This was aggravated by the reluctant position of China which
did not agree to an extension of the mission due to Haiti’s relations
with Taiwan.197 Nevertheless up to the beginning of 2000 three more
missions followed UNMIH, the United Nations Support Mission in
Haiti (UNSMIH), the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
(UNTMIH) and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
(MIPONUH). Owing to their similarity, the missions will be described
altogether briefly, followed by an assessment of the special issues of
each mission.198
UNSMIH, UNTMIH and MIPONUH were all requested by the
Haitian President, René Préval, in order to support the establishment
and training of the HNP.199 Only UNSMIH’s mandate was broadened
in order to support the coordination of the UN system’s efforts to

196 Doc. S/31996/416 of 5 June 1996.

197 Malone, see note 3, 134 and 137-138.
198 For an informative overview of these missions compare K. v. Hippel, De-
mocracy by Force, US-military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World,
2000, 104-126.
199 Doc. S/1996/431, Annex of 31 May 1996; Doc. S/1996/956 of 13 Novem-
ber 1996 and Doc. S/1997/832, Annex II of 29 October 1997.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 511

“promote institution-building, national reconciliation and economic

rehabilitation.”200 In the case of the other two missions, the mandates
were reduced to police activities due to the decreasing disposition of
Member States to stay strongly engaged in the Haitian case and to the
conviction that coordination functions should be undertaken by other
UN agencies. Instead of enlarging the mission’s mandates Member
States opted for using the specialized agencies in order to provide fur-
ther international assistance.201 In consequence the size of all missions
was successively reduced.202
At the same time the UN Security Council continued to stress that
only a functioning police force would lead to democratic consolidation.
Compared to UNMIH, the Security Council went even further by stat-
ing:
“[…] the importance of a professional, self-sustaining, fully function-
ing national police force of adequate size and structure, able to con-
duct the full spectrum of police functions, to the consolidation of de-
mocracy and revitalization of Haiti’s system of justice.”203
In the case of MIPONUH this affirmation was further strengthened
by encouraging Haiti “to pursue its plans in these respects.”204 Unlike
the previous missions, MIPONUH had no military component.205 Its
mandate was to continue the work of the United Nations to support
the Haitian national police and to contribute to its professionalism.
France, initially reluctant to this solution due to its possible effect on
UN peace-keeping in Africa, insisted on an exception clause in Resolu-
tion 1141: “[…] all special arrangements accorded to MIPONUH will
not constitute precedents for other operations of the same nature that
include civilian police personnel.”206

200 S/RES/1063 (1996) of 28 June 1996, para. 2.

201 S/RES/1141 (1997) of 28 November 1997, para. 3. For a short description
of the new concepts see the introduction of this article.
202 UNSMIH: 1,297 military and 291 civilian police personnel, available at:
<www.un.org/Depts/dpko/co_mission/unsmih.htm>; UNTMIH: 250 ci-
vilian police personnel and 50 military personnel available at: <www.
un.org/Depts/dpko/co_mission/untmih.htm>; MIPONUH: 300 civilian
police personnel, available at: <www.un.org/Depts/dpko/co_mission/
miponuh.htm>.
203 See note 200 para. 1 (emphasis added).
204 See note 201, para. 1.
205 Malone, see note 3, 145-147.
206 See note 201, para. 4.
512 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

Once ended, MIPONUH was substituted by a civilian support mis-

sion, MICAH (International Civilian Support Mission in Haiti), which
worked during a one year period.207 It was then fully deployed and
ready to work when the mandate expired.
One could state that UNSMIH, UNTMIH and MIPONUH con-
centrated on genuine state-building measures by supporting the estab-
lishment, training and monitoring of HNP. Alike UNMIH they did not
apply a comprehensive approach in respect of the establishment of a
police force, what lead to partially ineffective implementation of their
mandates. Furthermore the success of all three missions was restricted
due to their successively reduced contingents. To sum up, the peace-
keeping missions’ narrow focus on police reform was rather to the dis-
advantage of democratization in Haiti than to its advantage.208 Fur-
thermore it hardly complemented the strong efforts to promote eco-
nomic growth and rule of law made by other UN agencies, especially
UNDP.

c. Excursion – MICIVIH (1993-2000): Searching for a Role, though

Successful

In the environment of UN peace-keeping missions in Haiti, the Inter-

national Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH209) reveals an exception.
It will be very shortly discussed, primarily with regard to its signifi-
cance for the UN decision-making process in order to intervene coer-
cively in Haiti. It requires further attention because it was unique in be-
ing a joint mission between the UN and a regional organization, namely
the OAS.210
MICIVIH’s was established in December 1993. The joint UN/OAS
mission was given the mandate to monitor and report on the Haitian
human rights situation during the negotiation process between the mili-
tary junta and Aristide.211 After the latter’s return MICIVIH’s mandate,
indeed, still focused on human rights, but it was further broadened to

207 S/RES/1277 (1999) of 30 November 1999; A/RES/54/193 of 17 December

1999.
208 Hippel, see note 198, 117-126.
209 Acronym accordant to its French naming Mission Internationale Civile en
Haiti.
210 C. Granderson, “Institutionalizing Peace: The Haiti Experience”, in: A.
Henkin (ed.), Honouring Human Rights, 2000, 383 et seq. (384).
211 Granderson, see note 210, 386.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 513

human rights education, support to police and prison reform as well as

strengthening democracy, namely through electoral observation.212
With reference to its implementation MICIVIH rapidly took office
in various regions of the country. It was also distinguished by a special,
comprehensive training program for its personnel, and its effective re-
ports on the human rights situation. Since MICIVIH was not directly
involved in negotiations between the conflicting parties, it was able to
act in a relatively neutral way. Consequently, the mission could estab-
lish widespread relations with various sectors of Haitian society, espe-
cially civil society and local actors. Generally, given its broad mandate,
MICIVIH was poorly assigned in terms of human power and material
equipment.213
With regard to MICIVIH’s fulfillment of its mandate, human rights
education programs were first delayed because of a lack of expertise
within the mission. Step by step they were effectively enhanced
throughout MICIVIH’s duration on the ground, reaching many Hai-
tians. Electoral observation was granted in 1995, but was characterized
by incertitude with regard to determining MICIVIH’s role in the elec-
toral process. Police and prison reform was slowly addressed, partly in-
hibited by the unclear repartition of labor and competences between
MICIVIH and UN peace-keeping missions.214 This illustrates a general
problem during the implementation process, which was marked by
continuous discussions on MICIVIH’s role on the ground.
Although cooperation between MICIVIH, OAS and the UN Spe-
cial Representative was repeatedly underscored, it was inadequate on
the operational level. MICIVIH complained that it would report to the
Special Representative instead of the UN Secretary-General. Indeed,
MICIVIH’s direct influence at UN level was minimized, but nonethe-
less its effective reporting practice had influenced UN Security Coun-
cil’s decision making.215 Finally, MICIVIH’s knowledge of the Haitian
situation, especially referring to its work on the local level could have
complemented and improved the peace-keeping missions work on the

212 The terms of trade on which MICIVIH’s mandate was based, were not of-
ficially published by the United Nations. Martin provides the full text of
the terms of reference in the annex of his article. See note 134, 113 et seq.
213 Granderson, see note 210, 386-287.
214 Martin, see note 134, 713.
215 Ibid., 735.
514 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

ground, if communication between MICIVIH and peace-keeping mis-

sions would have been closer.216
Twice during its mission, MICIVIH was evacuated. The first time in
December 1993 which is to be interpreted as the UN’s response to the
hindrance of UNMIH’s deployment by the military junta. Second,
MICIVIH staff were expelled by the military when tensions during the
negotiation process increased. Both occasions influenced the UN Secu-
rity Council decision-making process and lead successively to intensi-
fying coercive measures.
To sum up, no other mission ever spent more time in Haiti than
MICIVIH. During its work in Haiti it contributed significantly to hu-
man rights education. Furthermore it was able to evolve valuable rela-
tions with Haitian organizations, especially on the local level, which
unfortunately have not been used any further in order to deepen UN
activities. The same applies to the successful, inter-cultural trainee
course to train MICIVIH personnel. Although it could not fulfill its
entire mandate due to material restrictions and to uncertainty about its
role amongst donor agencies at the beginning of its mandate, MICIVIH
may be considered as a successful mission in the domain of human
rights.

d. MINUSTAH (since 2004): A Comprehensive Venture

MINUSTAH – the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti – constitutes the

international reaction to the ousting of President Aristide on 29 Febru-
ary 2004. In its Resolution 1529 of 29 February 2004 the Security
Council stated that: “[…] the situation in Haiti constitutes a threat to
international peace and security, and to stability in the Caribbean espe-
cially through the potential outflow of people to other States in the
subregion.”217
Thereby, Resolution 1529 may be considered as a continuation of
Resolution 940218 by making special emphasis on the type of threat
which would endanger international peace, especially in the Caribbean.
In contrast to Resolution 940 of 1994, which just mentioned the desper-
ate plight of Haitian refugees. This time explicit reference is made to the
threat to international peace and security, and to the Caribbean region
in particular, through “the potential outflow of people to other States in

216 Kumar/ Cousens, see note 188, 5.

217 S/RES/1529 (2004) of 29 February 2004.
218 For an interpretation of Resolution 940 see under II. 2. c.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 515

the subregion.” This must be seen against the background of previous

disputes between the neighboring Dominican Republic on Haitian
refugees which had illegally entered Dominican territory.219 In addition,
this definition of threat to international peace and security also reflects
United States interests, which are based on the fear of an exodus of Hai-
tian refugees to the United States.220

aa. Deployment

The UN Security Council acting under Chapter VII authorized the

immediate deployment of a Multinational Interim Force (MIF), and de-
clared its readiness to establish a follow-on United Nations stabiliza-
tion force to support continuation of a peaceful and constitutional po-
litical process and the maintenance of a secure and stable environ-
ment.221 Consequently, the US-led MIF was immediately deployed in
order to contribute:“to a secure and stable environment in the Haitian
capital and elsewhere in the country … in order to support the constitu-
tional political process under way in Haiti.”222
Despite MIF’s presence, destruction of businesses, killings and other
acts of violence continued. MIF took several weeks to deploy through-
out the country and to intervene decisively to stabilize the situation.223
When MINUSTAH took over the command from MIF on 1 June 2004,
parts of the country were still under control of rebel groups, which
took over state functions. Furthermore violence in the Aristide sup-
porting slum areas in Port-au-Prince increased.224 MINUSTAH faced
major challenges in terms of the security situation and the political
process. Additionally, a flood, which caused the death of 2,000 people,
aggravated the situation.225 Against this background MINUSTAH’s de-
ployment was too slow. In consequence, in its initial phase, MI-
NUSTAH lacked sufficient manpower.

219 Peral, see note 93, 4-5.

220 Ibid., 4.
221 See note 217, paras 2 and 3.
222 Ibid., para. 2 (a).
223 International Crisis Group, see note 110, 11.
224 Interim Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Haiti, Doc. S/2004/698 of 30 August 2004, paras 1 and 13.
225 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mis-
sion in Haiti, Doc. S/2004/908 of 18 November 2004, paras 34 and 35.
516 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

bb. Mandate

In order to define MINUSTAH’s mandate according to the needs on

the ground, Secretary-General Annan dispatched an assessment mis-
sion, which worked under the auspices of Annan’s Special Adviser on
Haiti.226 On the basis of the mission’s recommendations the Security
Council adopted a comprehensive and detailed mandate for a peace-
keeping mission.227 Although its content has not been substantially
changed throughout the peace-keeping process, different emphases
were made, at different points of time, according to primary needs on
the ground. In general, three main areas for MINUSTAH activities
were stressed in the mandate: (a) to ensure a secure and stable environ-
ment,228 comprising inter alia support to secure the environment needed
for the continuation of the constitutional and political process, assis-
tance to reform the HNP, the establishment of a disarmament, demobi-
lization and reintegration (DDR) program and assistance to restore and
maintain the rule of law; (b) the political process,229 encompassing the
support of the Transitional Government in order to foster democratic
governance, institutional development, decentralization and to organize
as well as carry out national elections; (c) human rights,230 comprehend-
ing monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation as well as
the support to guarantee human rights.
While security issues dominated the agenda in the first half year of
MINUSTAH’s work, the support of the political process, primarily
elections, became more important throughout the process.231 Enhanc-
ing elections accorded to the Consensus on the Political Transition Pact,
which various Haitian actors – inter alia the Interim Government, po-
litical groups and civil society organizations, except the Fanmi Lavalas,
which refused the pact – had agreed on 4 April 2004.232 Furthermore,
MINUSTAH’s mandate was successively adapted to the Haitian In-

226 Report of the Secretary-General on Haiti, Doc. S/2004/300 of 16 April

2004, paras 2 and 20.
227 S/RES/1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004, para. 7 (I-III).
228 Ibid., para. 7 (I).
229 Ibid., para. 7 (II).
230 Ibid., para. 7 (III).
231 S/RES/1576 (2004) of 29 November 2004, para. 2.
232 See note 226, para. 4.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 517

terim Cooperation Framework (HICF), which sets out priorities to ad-

vance the Haitian situation.233
In reference to state-building, the mandate focuses again on the es-
tablishment of a functioning police force, but this time emphasizing the
need of a so called democratic policing. In addition, “the restoration
and maintenance of the rule of law” by institutional strengthening of
the correction system was also enhanced.234
Democracy and the need to support it, were addressed differently
throughout the mandating process. In its Resolution 1542 the Security
Council scarcely referred to the democratic process in Haiti. It is men-
tioned only once:
“[…] to support the constitutional and political process under way
in Haiti, including through good offices, and foster principles and
democratic governance and institutional development.”235
Although the fulfillment of this mandate would have required ac-
tivities beyond electoral assistance, between 2005 and February 2006
further Security Council resolutions concentrated explicitly on the need
to support elections.236 Referring to the wording of Resolutions 1542
and later 1608, elections are not explicitly related to a democratic order,
but indirectly to the continuation of the “constitutional process.” In
contrast, the post-electoral Security Council Resolution 1658 marks a
shift concerning MINUSTAH’s mandate, now referring explicitly to
democracy promotion:
“Stressing that the consolidation of Haitian democratic institutions
will be crucial for achieving stability and development, and that
MINUSTAH and the international community should continue to
assist in building the capacity of national and local authorities and
institutions.”237
In general, this paragraph reflects the assumption that democracy
might be one precondition for peace and stability. Whether this is true
for the Haitian case depends indeed on the will of the Haitian politi-

233 See note 224, para. 25. The HICF applied from 2004 to 2006. In 2006 the
new government of Haiti prolonged the HICF until 2007. A consensus
document, agreed by the international donor community and Haitian ac-
tors, exclusively Fanmi Lavalas.
234 See note 227, para. 7 I (d).
235 See note 227, para. 7 II (a).
236 See note 231.
237 S/RES/1658 (2006) of 14 February 2006.
518 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

cians, recently elected in February 2006. But with regard to MI-

NUSTAH, its post-electoral activities must be adjusted if effective sup-
port of Haitian authorities in order to consolidate democratic institu-
tions will be granted. In addition, Resolution 1658 also states that rule
of law and human rights are vital components of democratic socie-
ties.238 Former Security Council mandating practice in the case of Haiti
relates rule of law and human rights merely in respect to policing tasks,
that is state-building. In turn, in its constitutive mandate of resolution
1542 the Security Council highlights the need for “democratic policing
standards.”239 In consequence, with resolution 1658, the Security
Council bridges the conceptual gap between state building and democ-
racy promotion; rule of law and human rights are supposed to be a re-
sult of successful policing on the one hand and preconditions for de-
mocracy on the other.
Moreover, further aspects stand out in the Security Council resolu-
tions referring to peace-keeping in Haiti: first, the Security Council
adapted a broad concept of peace. Bridging the gap between poverty
and conflict, it assumes that poverty is a root cause of conflict in
Haiti.240 Consequently its peace-keeping approach has changed, at least
rhetorically.
On the operative level, cooperation and coordination with other
donor agencies, especially of the UN, was increased because of their
complementary relevance in the fight against poverty.241 This is also
backed by the assignment of a Special Representative of the Secretary-
General. Additionally, the inclusion of the Special Representative, ap-
pointed by the Secretary-General, in a Security Council resolution can
be interpreted as validation of this post, already initiated in the first
Haitian conflict.242 Further the UNDP Resident Representative was as-
signed Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the
Mission. This composition gives rise to the assumption that MI-
NUSTAH and UNDP exercised job-sharing, according to their com-
plementary objectives on the ground.

238 Ibid.
239 See note 227, para. 7 I (b).
240 S/RES/1608 (2005) of 22 June 2005.
241 See note 227. Additionally, a Core Group of all relevant actors and an ad
hoc group of the ECOSOC were established in order to improve the coor-
dination of external actors in Haiti. See note 225, para. 47.
242 S/RES/1542 (2004) of 30 April 2004.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 519

The Security Council asserts its above-mentioned long-term per-

spective by completing each extension of MINUSTAH with the fol-
lowing: “with the intention to renew for further periods.”243 In its ini-
tial phase, between 2004 and February 2006, MINUSTAH was ex-
tended for one year terms. This extension practice turned more restric-
tive in February 2006.244 Whether this can be interpreted as a decreasing
willingness of Security Council members to stay engaged in Haiti de-
pends on the further evolvement of MINUSTAH.

cc. Composition and Implementation

With regard to its composition, MINUSTAH constitutes a novelty as

the mission is led and mainly composed of Latin American states.245
The Latin American reluctance to interventionism, has been slowly sof-
tened throughout the 1990s.246 Moreover, with regard to international
power politics, Brazil, Argentina and Chile might have attempted to
compensate for their dismissive posture against the United States’ inter-
vention in Iraq in 2003.247 Also, the Brazilian commitment can be inter-
preted in the scope of its engagement in UN-reform, especially in its
campaigning for a permanent seat for Brazil in the Security Council,248
as engagement in UN peace-keeping missions was one criterion to
measure the ability of candidates for potential additional permanent
seats during the attempted reform process in 2005. MINUSTAH’s
composition shall not exceed a maximum of 6,700 military troops and
1,622 civilian components.249 Only for the election period 2005 to 2006,
was the size of the mission temporarily augmented to 1,897 police offi-
cers and 7,500 military troops.250 Additionally, 1,160 international civil-
ian and local staff supports the work of MINUSTAH on the ground.

243 See note 240, para. 1; S/RES/1576 (2004) of 29 November 2004, para. 1 and
S/RES/1601 (2005) of 31 May 2005, para. 1.
244 S/RES/1658 (2006) of 14 February 2006, para. 1.
245 Peral, see note 93, 2.
246 See under II. 2. b.
247 M. Aguirre, The United Nations and Spain in Haiti, 2006, Working Paper
of FRIDE, available at: <www.fride.org/Publications/ListPublications.
aspx>, 2.
248 International Crisis Group, Spoiling Security in Haiti?, Latin American
Caribbean Report No. 13 of 31 May 2005, 19.
249 See note 227, para. 4.
250 S/RES/1608 (2005) of 22 June 2005, para. 2.
520 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

In its initial phase MINUSTAH focused on security and humanitar-

ian issues. It pursued rather a reactive than proactive approach, which
was provoked by the limited commitment of UN Member States and
lead to security problems. MINUSTAH’s deployment was too slow. In
consequence, in its initial phase, MINUSTAH lacked sufficient man-
power as well as equipment.251 This was further aggravated by the slow
disbursement of funds by donors.252 Full deployment took place only
after violent campaigns of street gangs against the Interim Government
and the presence of MINUSTAH which led to the killing of Aristide
opponents and police officers in September 2004.253 Initially, MI-
NUSTAH followed a defensive approach. It acted hesitantly and failed
to improve the security situation in the countryside as well as in the
slums of Port-au-Prince. Only in 2005 MINUSTAH changed its tactics
in order to secure slum areas for scheduled elections.254 In consequence
MINUSTAH was accused and suspected of siding with Aristide oppo-
nents. These criticism deepened, when further accusations emerged that
MINUSTAH had killed civilians during its attacks in slum areas. Con-
sequently MINUSTAH’s general acceptance amongst Haitians de-
creased.
At the same time efforts to disarm rebel groups, former military and
gangs, proved to be difficult. Although an effective DDR program was
continuously discussed, its launching was delayed due to the discord
amongst decision-makers, especially the Transitional Government,
which did not fully agree on an effective program and changed its views
repeatedly.255 In consequence, estimated 300,000 weapons circulate ille-
gally in Haiti and still remain being a major problem.256

251 International Crisis Group, Haiti’s Elections: The Case for a Short Delay?,
Latin American Caribbean Report No. 9 of 25 November 2005, 3-4.
252 See note 225, para. 65.
253 Ibid., para. 4, para. 5 and para. 65.
254 Report of the Security Council Mission to Haiti, 13 to 16 April, Doc.
S/2005/302 of 6 May 2005, para. 4.
255 Although the Transitional Government insisted that the army issue should
be addressed by a legitimate elected government, it had announced com-
pensation paying for former soldiers. But due to unavailable resources
payments could not be made. See International Crisis Group, see note 147,
5-7.
256 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mis-
sion in Haiti, Doc. S/2006/60 of 2 February 2006, para. 26-27; International
Crisis Group, see note 147.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 521

dd. State-Building and Democracy Promotion

State-building measures were focused on policing issues. MINUSTAH

cooperated mainly with the HNP in order to recruit police officers and
address vetting. Furthermore certification trainings were offered.257 Al-
though advancements to reform the HNP were made, the police forces
still constitute one part of the problem. On the one hand the police sys-
tem is pervaded by criminals – also linked with drug trafficking – and
former military members, likely to oppose democratization. On the
other hand, police officers lack adequate education in terms of their ca-
pacity, role in society and human rights issues.
Democracy promotion measures were above all undertaken in the
field of elections. Besides securing the environment for parliamentary,
presidential and local elections, MINUSTAH – in close cooperation
with the OAS – also assisted the CEP to plan, organize and hold elec-
tions.258 Thereby two major challenges were faced. On the one hand
major organizational problems emerged due to the lack of permanent
state structures for the preparation of elections. For instance, the CEP
lacked capacity, voter registration moved very slowly and the insuffi-
cient installation of polling stations throughout the country and in the
slum areas of Port-au-Prince threatened the access of all citizens to elec-
tions.259 On the other hand, political polarization increased because Ar-
istide supporters refused elections and demanded Aristide’s return from
exile. Also the registration process was boycotted and further slowed
down. Consequently elections were delayed several times. Finally, on 7
February 2006, free and fair elections took place in Haiti.
In the aftermath of the elections, with a new elected government,
headed by President René Préval, MINUSTAH is now redefining its
future tasks.

ee. Fulfillment of the Mandate

To sum up, during its first two years on the ground MINUSTAH has
only partly fulfilled its mandate. Initially the stabilization of the Haitian
security situation was delayed due to its defensive and reactive ap-

257 Ibid., paras 29-34.

258 Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Gen-
eral Secretariat of the Organization of American States Concerning Elec-
toral Assistance to Haiti of 3 November 2004.
259 International Crisis Group, see note 251, 6.
522 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

proach, which was intensified through the slow deployment of troops.

Once it adapted a more robust approach, the security situation, espe-
cially in the slum areas of Port-au-Prince, improved, but did not com-
pletely stabilize. Although the organization of elections was marked by
major problems, MINUSTAH’s efforts to support the electoral process,
in close cooperation with the OAS, finally helped to make the holding
of free and fair elections possible. In turn, the support to establish a
functioning police force was unsuccessful due to HNP’s composition,
partly pervaded by criminal subjects, and its incapacity to deal ade-
quately with the situation. As mentioned also disarmament of former
militias and criminals remains a major task for MINUSTAH. Moreover
the human rights issue was limited to the observation of the human
rights situation and lacked measures to enhance the rule of law. In gen-
eral, throughout MINUSTAH’s implementation, cooperation with the
Transitional Government turned out to be difficult. Furthermore, accu-
sations that MINUSTAH had sided with Aristide opponents and killed
civilians, led to only a partial acceptance of MINUSTAH within the
Haitian population.

e. Lessons Learned: UNMIH and MINUSTAH in Comparative

Perspective

Already at a first glance the genesis from UNMIH to MINUSTAH

gives evidence of the initially outlined evolution of UN peace-keeping
during the past decade. Actually, MINUSTAH had adopted the lessons
learned from four previous peace-keeping missions in Haiti by gener-
ally applying a broader concept of peace and especially, by adapting it
to the Haitian context. While UNMIH pursued a narrow, policing-
focused approach MINUSTAH now applies a multidisciplinary ap-
proach. Taking a comparative perspective will show how this evolution
can be explained.

aa. Deployment

Both missions, UNMIH as well as MINUSTAH had difficulties with

regard to their punctual deployment, though, for differing reasons. In
the case of UNMIH external factors, that is the obstruction of the mili-
tary junta, hindered its deployment. Consequently, a fast restoration of
democracy was obstructed. MINUSTAH’s deployment – like MI-
PONUH at the end of the 1990s – was delayed due to internal organ-
izational factors. The low commitment of UN Member States to be
ready to deploy troops for the mission hindered the effective dispatch
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 523

on the ground. In consequence, the only partly deployed mission was

not capable of facing emerging security issues on the ground.

bb. Mandate and Design

Obviously, the formulation of MINUSTAH’s mandate is much more

detailed and comprehensive than that of UNMIH. This is determined
mainly by two factors.
First, the circumstances of the missions’ establishment played a cru-
cial role. Indeed, both missions were undertaken in reaction to the rup-
ture with the democratic order in Haiti. But UNMIH was established
before the conflict was finally settled. UNMIH’s deployment was first
preluded by negotiation efforts and economic sanctions, which alto-
gether led to a strong involvement and commitment of the international
community to support successfully the solution of the Haitian conflict.
Whereas, in the case of MINUSTAH its establishment took place in the
context of a lowered international interest. It was further established af-
ter a temporary conflict solution, that is the ousting of President Aris-
tide and the following Haitian response to it in accordance with the
Constitution. It was also voluntarily requested by the Interim Govern-
ment of Haiti. These points of intervention and circumstances resulted
in two different definitions of conflict resolution, which, in turn, de-
termined the mission’s design in the case of UNMIH. Here the resolu-
tion of the conflict the “restoration of democracy”, that is Aristide’s re-
turn to factual power, was the task. Thereby a purposeful and punctual
perspective was taken. Once Aristide’s power was restored, the conflict
was presumed to be solved for the time being, and an actor-focused
state-building design was implemented, which primarily lacked the sus-
tainable prevention of a renewed outbreak of the conflict. In contrast,
MINUSTAH, was established in accordance with the constitutional In-
terim Government, following a temporary conflict resolution. It should
inter alia support the constitutional process in Haiti. This enabled mis-
sion drafters to adopt a process-oriented and comprehensive design, ar-
ranged with the Interim Government.
Further, on the one hand MINUSTAH’s relatively detailed mandate
and design is owed, inter alia, to the results of the primarily unsuccess-
ful UN peace-keeping story in Haiti. Repeated failure of peace-keeping
missions urged the re-designing of such efforts in Haiti. Against this
background MINUSTAH had become the last resort to make UN
peace-keeping in Haiti a success story. On the other hand, the design of
MINUSTAH results from a general evolution of a broad concept of
524 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

peace, which widened the objectives of UN peace-keeping and also in-

cludes strategies of peace-building.

cc. Form

Both missions show a rather conventional form. Generally, following

the majority of UN peace-keeping missions, UNMIH and MI-
NUSTAH had a two-step approach. A multinational force was de-
ployed in order to secure and stable the environment. Successively, the
force was substituted by UNMIH/MINUSTAH.

dd. Composition and Implementation

MINUSTAH is the first mission to be under the command of a Latin

American force commander, namely Brazil. This reflects the lowering
of the traditionally high threshold to interventionism in the Americas.
Latin American states now seem more willing to take responsibility for
security tasks in their region. This fact could increase the acceptance of
UN peace-keeping in the region further. But this development also
shows the reduced interest of the U.S. in the Americas, triggered by an
increasing interest in other world regions, especially the Middle East.
Furthermore, UNMIH and MINUSTAH do not differ considerably
with regard to the size of their military component, which shall/did not
exceed a maximum of 6,000, and 6,700 troops, respectively. In contrast
the civilian component increased. This increase of civilian staff reflects
the adoption of a more comprehensive peace-building approach, which
requires the knowledge and capacity of civilian experts.
In reference to their implementation UNMIH and MINUSTAH
faced a common organizational problem, namely problems in connec-
tion with their late deployment. Moreover MINUSTAH met further
challenges during its first implementation period from 2004-2006. It
was, on the one hand, confronted with a difficult cooperation with the
Interim Government. On the other hand, its acceptance amongst the
Haitian population was at stake when it started its robust security cam-
paign in the Port-au-Prince slums. In consequence, the implementation
of planned and crucial policies such as the DDR program were held up.

ee. State-Building

State-building meant merely narrow policing measures throughout the

1990s. UNMIH and its succeeding missions ignored the structures and
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 525

root causes of the Haitian conflict and instead focused its symptoms.
Whereas it was obvious that the Haitian state could not grant physical
security to its citizens due to a lack of a functioning police force, UN-
MIH limited its activities to reinforce the HNP. In doing so it failed to
address major challenges, interlinked with the security issue, such as the
integration of former militias, which evolved to an armed group and
were responsible for the a renewed outbreak of the conflict in 2004.
In contrast, MINUSTAH now follows a more comprehensive and
political state-building approach, which addresses issues of physical and
human security. With regard to policing it makes use of a more systemic
design by applying “democratic policing standards”. One of the main
tasks is the vetting of police officers in order to prevent the engagement
of non-loyal officers within the HNP. Additionally, disarmament and
integration of the former military and other armed groups is focused
and shall be implemented through a wide-ranging DDR program. On
the political level MINUSTAH also tends to foster a national dialogue
amongst all relevant parties. Thereby an agreement on the role of the
military in Haitian society shall be envisioned, because besides being a
major security problem, the military is still provided for in the Haitian
constitution.

ff. Democracy Promotion

While an evolution of state-building during the last decade is obvious,

democracy promotion has hardly changed in the scope of UN peace-
keeping.260 UNMIH’s mandate accentuated the restoration of democ-
racy, whereas MINUSTAH’s mandate focus does not primarily refer to
democracy, but to the support of the “constitutional process”, both
missions’ efforts to promote democracy show no major differences on
an operational level.
UNMIH’s as well as MINUSTAH’s mandate emphasize the holding
of elections. They both were based on the assumption that elections led
to the consolidation of democracy. Since a relation between consoli-
dated democracies and peace is assumed, elections were perceived as a
significant precondition to solve the Haitian crisis. Consequently, elec-
toral assistance was presumed to be an adequate instrument. Although
elections should not be underestimated, they are only the first – formal

260 Here, only activities of peace-keeping measures are taken into account.
Whereas, it must be stated meanwhile UNDP has undertaken various ef-
forts in order to promote democracy in Haiti.
526 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

– step to be taken on the road to democracy. In the case of Haiti it be-

came clear, that elections did not solve the Haitian crisis in a sustainable
manner. Further measures, addressing the root causes of the Haitian
conflict, which lie in the dual structure of the Haitian society, must be
addressed if democratization in order to build peace, is to be achieved.
In this spirit UNMIH had clearly failed to support democratic con-
solidation in Haiti, despite its major objective to restore democracy.
MINUSTAH, in turn, is still on the ground. Its success – assuming that
UN Member States maintain their commitment – now depends on its
capacity to assess the Haitian post-electoral situation of 2006 in order
to evolve adequate strategies and measures for peace-building through
democracy promotion.
Finally, an evolution with regard to democracy on the conceptional
level has been made since UNMIH and its succeeding missions. UN-
MIH based its work on a narrow concept of democracy which primar-
ily comprised that of a functioning police which is a prerequisite of de-
mocratic order. Whereas, the concept of democracy underlying MI-
NUSTAH’s mandate primarily is a means and not the objective of UN
peace-keeping, as it was in the 1990s. In the former spirit it is presumed
to be the precondition for stability and development and is closely
interlinked with rule of law and the guarantee of human rights.261 This
is also institutionally reflected in MINUSTAH’s organization: MI-
NUSTAH disposes of a unit to monitor and support human rights. In
contrast, UNMIH had no such entity, but cooperated with MICIVIH,
instead. As already stated, in consequence of these conceptual and or-
ganizational evolutions a more comprehensive peace-keeping approach
emerges. Although this is to be welcomed, it must be critically stated
that a global, wide-ranging approach alone does not solve any conflict.
If a comprehensive approach shall be successful, its single components –
human rights, democracy, rule of law, peace and development – must be
systematically and transparently related to each other in order to estab-
lish a complementary approach.

gg. Cooperation

Since UNMIH’s and its successor’s missions one more aspect has
gained crucial relevance in UN peace-keeping, marching in step with
the evolution of a more integrative and multidisciplinary approach,
where institutionalized cooperation with other authorities became more

261 See under III. 3. d. in this article.

Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 527

relevant. First, MINUSTAH – alike UNMIH – integrated UNDP into

its mission. But this integration was formal at best. De facto coopera-
tion between both UN entities has been limited due to their overlap-
ping mandates. Second, the HIICF (Haitian International Interim Co-
operation Framework) set a framework for organized cooperation be-
tween MINUSTAH, the Haitian Government and other donors.262
Third, further enhancements were made through the creation of a Core
Group and several groups linked to ECOSOC for better coordination
between development partners, including financial organizations.263
Whether these cooperation structures will finally merge into a comple-
mentary donor strategy in Haiti, which in the long-run enables Hai-
tians to sustain their society without external support, will depend on
the further developments made by the new Government of President
Préval who assumed office in May 2006.

IV. Conclusions

More than ten years after the first UN peace-keeping mission in Haiti,
peace-building in this country is still in its infancy. Since 1991 the deep-
rooted conflict has endured. Five UN peace-keeping missions could not
reverse this. Recently, in February 2006, democratic elections promised
another start to resolve the Haitian conflict sustainably. If the interna-
tional community wants to effectively support this new process, it must
think over its peace-building strategies. MINUSTAH, which was estab-
lished in 2004, had already made a start on this.
Coming back to the initial interest of this article, it must be first
stated that the Haitian case of 1993 does not constitute a precedent for a
right to democracy in international law. No such universal right to de-
mocracy exists, although, democracy is anchored in regional interna-
tional law like that of the EU or the OAS. In particular the Inter-
American Democratic Charter constitutes an exception. Pursuant to its
article 1 peoples of the Americas have a right to democracy and their
governments have an obligation to promote and defend it. The interna-
tional community increased its commitment to democracy on a political
level, e.g. through electoral assistance or the creation of the already
mentioned United Nations Democracy Fund.

262 See note 113.

263 D. Wolter/ J. Möller, “The United Nations at Sixty: Getting Serious with
Conflict Prevention”, Friedens-Warte 80 (2005), 333 et seq. (335).
528 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

With regard to the rupture with democracy as a threat to peace, it

must be assumed that the effects for the democratic order in Haiti in
1991 constituted a threat to peace, above all international peace. The
combination of an outflow of Haitian refugees to neighboring countries
and the sensitiveness of American states to the rupture with democracy
– as democracy is perceived as a precondition for peace within the re-
gion –, were defined as threats to peace and therefore, built a legal pre-
condition for the use of force pursuant to Article 39 of the UN Charter.
On the empirical level, the comparative examination of UN peace-
keeping in Haiti brought to light that the UN developed over time a
comprehensive and political approach to keep and build peace in Haiti,
which was more and more sensitive to the specific characteristics of the
Haitian context.
With regard to the appropriateness of UN peace-keeping missions
the UN, indeed, made use of state-building and democracy promotion
as peace-building instruments in Haiti. But they were inadequate, as on
the one hand they were to some extent inadequate instruments to solve
the Haitian conflict and on the other inadequate use was made of them.
Consequently, state-building’s and democracy promotion’s effective-
ness in terms of a positive contribution to resolve the Haitian conflict
were limited. They failed to address the root causes of the Haitian con-
flict as well as, partly, its symptoms in terms of enabling the Haitian au-
thorities to guarantee physical security.
State-building was narrowly focused as the establishment of a func-
tioning police force during the 1990s. By pursuing an apolitical polic-
ing-focused approach, UN peace-keeping missions missed the chance
to take a systemic view of the Haitian conflict. Consequently, major
challenges like the integration of ex-militias into society were not ad-
dressed. Instead, ex-militias evolved to be a new destabilizing factor in
Haiti and contributed strongly to the further outbreak of the Haitian
conflict in 2004.
If state-building is to be an adequate measure to support peace-
building in Haiti, it must first develop an integrative approach to sup-
port the necessary security reform. MINUSTAH’s “democratic polic-
ing” strategy might be the beginning of that. Secondly, even more im-
portant, is that state-building must address the dual, deep rooted struc-
ture of the Haitian society which divides the urban elite with access to
resources from the marginalized rural population, excluded from state
revenues. Only if the output capacity of the state, that is its socio-
economic performance, can be improved and equitably distributed, can
peace be built.
Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping in Haiti 529

Democracy promotion in the scope of UN peace-keeping missions

in Haiti was mainly an equivalent to electoral assistance. But, since “an
election by itself can seldom, if ever, resolve a conflict about which
people feel strongly enough to resort to bloodshed,”264 electoral assis-
tance had a very limited effect in terms of peace-building. Nevertheless,
with regard to democracy promotion MINUSATH continues to focus
on electoral assistance.265 Furthermore, it was – although partly suc-
cessful in the short-run – too punctual and did not enable Haitian au-
thorities and institutions to hold elections without the support of the
international community.
Since democracy is built between elections, and not on election day,
UN peace-keeping missions, mutually with other international actors,
must take further measures to promote democracy. For instance, it is
necessary to support the implementation of the Constitution of 1987,
that is the establishment and strengthening of crucial institutions on the
national and, especially on the local level as well as to build the capacity
of the population and political elite in order to create a democratic po-
litical culture. In this respect MINUSTAH has already endorsed suc-
cessful activities on the local level. But if these shall be sustainable, co-
operation between UNDP and MINUSTAH will be essential due to
the limited duration of MINUSTAH on the ground.
Moreover, with regard to state-building and democracy, UN peace-
keeping lacks a common understanding of state and democracy. Only if
all actors on the ground, above all the national authorities and respec-
tive populations are aware of what democracy and state should be like
not only in Haiti, could an adapted state-building and democracy pro-
motion be an adequate means to build peace. Therefore, the UN should
foster a national dialogue between the political elite, civil society and

264 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Why Democracy is an International Is-

sue, Lecture at Oxford University, Doc. SG/SM/7850 of 19 June 2001.
265 Besides electoral assistance local authorities and institutions shall be sup-
ported, particularly, on the local level. Altogether the support of democ-
ratic governance plays a subordinate role in the current formulation of
MINUSTAH’s mandate. Instead the Secretary-General identifies two main
areas for its work. First, support of institutions of rule of law and state ad-
ministration. Second, ensuring a secure and stable environment as well as
police and justice/prisons system support; cf. Report of the Secretary-
General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, Doc.
S/2006/592 of 28 July 2006, paras 44 and 45 and 77-80. The Security Coun-
cil recently extended MINUSTAH’s mandate until the 15 February 2007,
S/RES/1702 (2006) of 15 August 2006.
 530 Max Planck UNYB 10 (2006)

the donor community in order to define common visions for the politi-
cal future of Haiti, and like cases.
Finally, the international community has now been engaged for
more than a decade in Haitian conflict resolution – but without con-
tinuous and sustainable success. However, for these efforts to be even-
tually brought to a successful end, a long-term effort of the interna-
tional community in the Caribbean country is clearly needed. Since UN
peace-keeping missions in Haiti had a short-term perspective, other
UN mechanisms should be given a try. In that respect, the recently es-
tablished UN Peace-building Commission should take the Haitian case
into account. This would constitute an important symbolic gesture to
confirm the international community’s commitment to Haiti and to
prevent the Haitian case from again sinking into oblivion, as has hap-
pened many times before.

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