Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies

ISSN: 1944-8953 (Print) 1944-8961 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjsb20

OSCE and Balkan security

Boyka Stefanova

To cite this article: Boyka Stefanova (2009) OSCE and Balkan security, Journal of Balkan and
Near Eastern Studies, 11:1, 43-60, DOI: 10.1080/19448950902724422
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Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies,
Volume 11, Number 1, March 2009

OSCE and Balkan security

BOYKA STEFANOVA

Introduction

This paper starts with the assertion that in the context of the post-cold war
transformation of the European security order, the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has emerged as a secondary security actor,
maintaining a niche, rather than a leadership profile in regional security. That the
OSCE should lose its role as a guardian of the regional order is by itself a puzzle.
The Organization has had a formative influence in building Europe’s security
architecture by establishing new norms of state behaviour. During the cold war, its
predecessor, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)1 was
the first pan-European institution to develop a pattern of cooperative security
relations beyond the bipolar balance of power. Since the end of the cold war, the
CSCE/OSCE has emerged as the broadest regional organization promoting
principles of democratic peace and protection of the rights of minorities. The
Organization has been credited with being a security community-building
institution that extends beyond the geographic borders of Europe.2 During the
1990s, the OSCE enhanced its organizational capacities, assumed new roles in
conflict prevention and crisis management, and contributed to the implemen-
tation of standards of multidimensional and cooperative regional security. At the
same time, its institutional model has been modified in the context of continuing
conflicts in the European periphery. At critical instances, the OSCE has had either
to defer conflict resolution functions to other security actors, or to deploy only
partial, rather than comprehensive, approaches to security management. This
retreat has been especially pronounced in the sub-region of the western Balkans
where the paradigm of cooperative security emerged as secondary to alternative
frameworks of regionalism: alliance and integration. Both NATO and the
European Union (EU) enhanced their status of security actors during the 1990s.
They expanded their respective stakes in regional governance by means of parallel
enlargement strategies and practical contributions to crisis management and
conflict resolution.
Such developments became coterminous with the relative decline of the
OSCE’s capacity to demonstrate effective leadership through socialization and
functional problem-solving. The OSCE lost its centrality as a pan-European
1
The CSCE was transformed into an organization, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), on 1 January 1995. The abbreviations CSCE and OSCE will refer to its activities
during the period 1975–94 and since 1995, respectively.
2
E. Adler, ‘Seeds of peaceful change: the OSCE’s security community-building model’, in E. Adler
and M. Barnett (eds), Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 119–160.

ISSN 1944-8953 print/ISSN 1944-8961 online/09/010043-18 q 2009 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/19448950902724422
44 Boyka Stefanova

forum of security cooperation, as similar functions, accompanied by viable

decision-making mechanisms and implementation resources were performed by
the EU, NATO and the Council of Europe. As a result, the OSCE has been
reduced to the status of a background symbolic definition of the European
regional system.3 The Organization has been notably absent from the
deliberations of UN-sponsored initiatives with regard to the status of
Kosovo—an issue of paramount importance to European security and the
continued relevance of the OSCE’s founding principles.4
Conventional explanations would attribute this apparent withdrawal to
the distribution of capabilities and differences in the mechanism of action of the
individual security institutions. Institutionalist theorizing remains focused on the
process of outcome creation and the sources of institutional influences but rarely
deals with the reflexive effects which ecological factors have upon institutions. It
would be an oversimplification to suggest that the declining security role of the
OSCE is due exclusively to the rise to leadership of other major actors in European
security. The argument presented here is that the robustness of international
institutions is affected by their surroundings. Institutions change, develop or
regress based on the reverse effects of the environment in which they operate. The
purpose of this analysis is to shed more light on the internal evolution of the OSCE
in response to security conditions and demands. An evolutionary (life cycle)
approach to the study of the OSCE is thus better positioned to explain the process
of the OSCE’s transformation into a secondary security actor. The sub-region of the
western Balkans will serve as a critical case study. It will be demonstrated that, in
parallel to the imperatives of security demand in the Balkans during the 1990s, the
OSCE’s relevance as a security institution has changed. A process of institutional
growth and innovation has been replaced by a process of specialization, followed
by rationalization and, ultimately, decline.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it outlines an evolutionary approach to
the study of the OSCE as an extension to institutionalism, democratic peace
theory and the security communities research programme. It then turns to
examine the OSCE’s security relevance in the case of the western Balkans as a
succession of three stages: innovation (1990 –95), specialization in a regional
division of labour (1995 – 99), and maturity and reflexive stage (post-1999). The
concluding discussion evaluates the effects of the Balkan conflicts on the OSCE’s
institutional evolution in terms of significant constraints to its continued
relevance to Balkan and European security.
3
F. Schimmelpfennig, The EU, NATO, and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 2003.
4
According to the Helsinki Act (1975), the OSCE’s founding principles of interstate relations in
Europe are: sovereign equality, refraining from the use of force, inviolability of borders, territorial
integrity of states, peaceful settlement of conflicts, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and equal rights and determination of peoples. See CSCE,
Final Act, CSCE, Helsinki, 1975, ,http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/
helfa75e.htm. .
 OSCE and Balkan security 45

Institutionalist perspectives on European security

OSCE through the lens of institutionalism

The OSCE represents an important case study of institutionalism in international

relations. It not only validates the institutionalist premise that regional security
outcomes are affected by the established patterns of interaction, shared ideas,
norms and rule-guided behaviour but also demonstrates that institutionalism is
compatible with democratic peace theory and the research programme of
security communities.
The core institutionalist proposition is that institutions ‘matter’; that they
constitute an independent source of influence on actor behaviour.5 Institution-
alism is optimistic and uncritical of the capacity of international institutions to
secure better outcomes than the individual actions of states, although individual
managerial and sociological approaches point out that institutions are
susceptible to adverse substitution, dysfunctionalism or even pathological
behaviour.6 Outside effectiveness, the quality of institutions most relevant to the
present discussion is their robustness, defined as the capacity to maintain
resilience and adapt to changes in the environment.7
Institutionalist perspectives differ with regard to the claims they make about
the sources of institutional influences.8 Rationalist accounts explain the capacity
of institutions to affect actor behaviour in terms of opportunities and constraints
while interests remain exogenously defined.9 Cognitive understandings
emphasize the role of ideas, communication and intersubjectively shared
norms which act as an institutional structure and endogenously determine state
interests.10 The broad middle ground is occupied by liberal approaches with a
varying emphasis upon the capacity of institutions to induce behavioural change
and/or affect the process of interest formation.
Neoliberal institutionalism assumes the compatibility of states’ interests
and the feasibility of international cooperation. Utility maximization, collective
action problems and information asymmetries explain the role of institutions
in generating state compliance. Through the concept of ‘binding institutions’,
G. John Ikenberry has argued that institutions both limit and project state
power; that they are simultaneously mechanisms of hegemonic self-restraint
5
E. Ostrom, ‘New horizons in institutional analysis’, American Political Science Review, 89, 1995,
pp. 174–178; A. Hasenclever, P. Mayer and V. Rittberger, Theories of International Regimes, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, 1997.
6
J. March and J. Olsen, ‘The new institutionalism: organizational factors in political life’, American
Political Science Review, 78, 1984, pp. 734–749. On adverse institutional influences, see G. Gallarotti,
‘The limits of international organization: systematic failure in the management of international
relations’, International Organization, 53(4), 1991, pp. 699 –732; M. Barnett and M. Finnemore, ‘The
politics, power, and pathologies of international organizations’, International Organization, 53(4), 1999,
pp. 699–732.
7
A. Hasenclever et al., op. cit., p. 2.
8
M. Blyth, ‘“Any more bright ideas?” The ideational turn of comparative political
economy’, Comparative Politics, 29(2), pp. 229–250.
9
G. Garrett and B. Weingast, ‘Ideas, interests and institutions: constructing the European
Community’s internal market’, in J. Goldstein and R. Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs,
Institutions and Political Change, Cornell University Press, London, pp. 173–206.
10
On cognitive approaches, see M. Blyth, op. cit.
46 Boyka Stefanova

and tools of power.11 Although in varying degree and with different assumptions
with regard to the causal mechanism, both rational choice and cognitive
perspectives are open to the role of ideas and norms in shaping state behaviour.
Actors’ beliefs embedded in institutions have a long-lasting importance in state
interactions.12
The proposition that ideational structures and beliefs affect actor behaviour is
a common premise of institutionalism and democratic peace theory. The latter
holds that liberal ideas, political pluralism and democratic institutions help to
prevent interstate conflict or, in the case of conflict, contribute to its effective
resolution.13 The role of democracy in conflict resolution obtains both as a
structural-institutional and a normative proposition. The structuralist version of
democratic peace theory explains peaceful relations as the externalization of the
rule of law ensured by democratic domestic institutions.14 According to the
normative version of democratic peace, thanks to the influence of international
norms, and especially the norm of peaceful resolution of conflicts, states may
abandon or reconceptualize their involvement in enmity and conflict.15 As the
number of democratic states in the international system grows, their relative
share in third-party mediation increases as well, and conflict resolution becomes
effectively determined by the democracy norm. The extension of democratic
norms of government into international norms, according to McLaughlin
Mitchell, is a valid explanation of conflict resolution in the international system.16
The history of the CSCE/OSCE validates premises of the binding and
normative influence of international institutions. The OSCE’s role is that of a
structural factor, which shapes the patterns of peace and reconciliation by
advancing cooperative conceptions of security, and that of a norm-setting
institution which promotes liberal values by guiding war-torn societies in
embracing democracy as a foundation for regional peace.
Since its creation as an institutional process under the Conference of Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE has acted as the broadest standard-setting
institution in Europe. The Helsinki Process, which commenced in 1973 and led to
the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, established a cooperative participatory environment
even without replacing the cold war logic of deterrence and competition.17 While an
11
G. J. Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major
Wars, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ and Oxford, 2001.
12
J. Goldstein and R. Keohane, op. cit. On the role of ideas in rational choice institutionalism, see
G. Garrett and B. Weingast, op. cit.
13
J. Owen, ‘How liberalism produces democratic peace’, International Security, 19(2), 1994, pp. 87–
125; T. Risse-Kappen, ‘Collective identity in a democratic community: the case of NATO’, in
P. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia
University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 357– 399; P. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identity in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1996.
14
B. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1993.
15
S. McLaughlin Mitchell, ‘A Kantian system? Democracy and third-party conflict resolution’,
American Journal of Political Science, 46(4), October 2002, p. 751.
16
S. McLaughlin Mitchell, op. cit. The theory of democratic peace otherwise makes no claims that
conflict resolution is durable, except for the structuralist argument that the democratic character of the
polity will continue to determine the behaviour of the parties at the post-conflict stage.
17
All European countries were individual signatories to the Helsinki agreements. The influence of
the great powers was thus formally mitigated. The Conference promoted an understanding that the
strengthening of European security was not directed against any state but was determined on the
basis of cooperation and confidence-building measures.
 OSCE and Balkan security 47

East–West balance of power persisted in Europe, the CSCE was originally a

secondary source of influence in regional security. It gradually acquired centrality in
the creation of formal rules, negotiation arenas and customary practices.
The end of the cold war marked a fundamental change in Europe’s security
order. The OSCE became the first security organization to institutionalize the
democratic foundations of security and promote security governance beyond its
military – strategic aspects. A decision of the Budapest Summit of Heads of State
(December 1994) transformed the Conference into Organization in recognition of its
evolving mandate and functions. Its rule-making functions gradually reoriented
to address the post-cold war security environment.
A new set of security challenges replaced the cold war threat of military
confrontation. Risks of societal disintegration and ethnic conflict at the
subnational level acquired a regional dimension to be addressed by mechanisms
of regional cooperation. Although some of the fundamental principles of the
Conference—those of state sovereignty and inviolability of borders—were not
fully compatible with the focus of domestic political stability and the protection
of minorities, other important principles—the recognition that regional security
is comprehensive and indivisible and that domestic political pluralism, respect
for human rights and regional stability are closely related—were compatible with
the realities of security demand. The CSCE was therefore conceptually well
prepared to address the pressing issues of European security. It developed into a
preferred forum of interstate cooperation.18
The OSCE’s emphasis on shared values, norms and identities was conducive
to the development of community features in the organization of regional
relations. Emanuel Adler has argued that the OSCE, and the CSCE prior to that,
has had constitutive effects over Europe’s definition as a region. Its contemporary
map has been redefined to become more that of an ‘imagined’ or ‘cognitive’
region.19 The OSCE is relevant to this process as a security community-building
institution which promotes a cooperative understanding of security, implements
liberal standards conducive to conflict prevention and trust, and provides
assistance to the post-conflict re-establishment of institutions and the rule of
law.20
The security community-building conceptualization of the OSCE, advanced
by Emanuel Adler, contributes a liberal-constructivist explanation of the capacity
of international institutions to affect security outcomes. The security community
research programme posits the creation of security communities as a gradual
process of developing mutually dependable expectations for peace.21 The concept
of a security community-building institution links institutionalism to the original
formulation of a security community which relies on communication, transactions
and empathy. It incorporates institutions as a forum of communication, a norm-
based environment, and rule-creation procedures contributing to the develop-
ment of shared values and peaceful relations.
18
R. Weitz, ‘Pursuing military security in Eastern Europe’, in R. Keohane, J. Nye and S. Hoffmann
(eds), After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA and London, 1993, pp. 342– 380.
19
E. Adler and M. Barnett, ‘Security communities in theoretical perspective’, in E. Adler and
M. Barnett (eds), Security Communities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 29–65.
20
E. Adler, op. cit., p. 132.
21
E. Adler and M. Barnett, op. cit.
48 Boyka Stefanova

All institutionalist varieties emphasize the structural influences of the OSCE

and its relevance to a dependable organization of regional relations. What these
perspectives share as well, is a rather limited treatment of institutional change.
Institutionalism explains the workings of the OSCE as a framework for the
pursuit of the converging security interests of the European states and as a
normative agent of socialization and democratization. From this perspective,
change within the OSCE is at best gradual and unidirectional, leading to the
progressive consolidation of institutional impacts.
Such propositions do not take into account the opportunity for institutions to
alter their evolutionary path, to reform or decline in the process. The evolution of
the OSCE provides evidence of a more complex trajectory of organizational
change associated with the nature of the tasks it performs and the local context
within which it operates. The proposition that patterns of regularized actor
behaviour become institutionalized, and that they are consequential to
international outcomes, therefore needs to be updated to account for the
reflexive qualities of institutions. From this perspective, institutions are the
response category of analysis, whose behaviour is subject to variation and change
as a result of exogenous influences.

Institutional evolution revisited: OSCE responses to the regional security environment

In contrast to conventional institutionalist perspectives, the proposition that

institutions evolve as a result of interaction with their environments avoids a
closed-end understanding of organizational development. The concept of
evolutionary (or life cycle) institutionalism connects institutional effectiveness to
the impact of local conditions. The latter are consequential to the capacity of
institutions to adapt and maintain their functional relevance. Evolutionary
institutionalism may be regarded as an extension to traditional institutionalist
theorizing. Such an approach approximates the development of institutions to
the life cycle of norms and is compatible with the general premises of
organizational change.22 The institutional life cycle approach is particularly
useful in explaining variation in institutional roles and their internal evolution. It
helps to better identify the sources of change endogenous to institutions and, in
the OSCE’s case, the factors which account for its declining ability to maintain its
agenda-setting capacity while responding to local security demands.
Evolutionary institutionalism is also analytically compatible with extant
conceptualizations of the OSCE as a nascent security community.23 Both
perspectives posit an organizational model in which institutional influences are
not unequivocally determined by the single act of their establishment but are
subject to change. In contrast to the security community approach, the
evolutionary perspective no longer assumes that peaceful relations unfold in a
uniform process. It holds that institutional impact takes place in an interactive
22
On the life cycle of norms and norm diffusion, see M. E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists beyond
Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1998. On
organizational processes, see R. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1987.
23
Propositions on the stage-like evolution of the security community are advanced in E. Adler and
M. Barnett, op. cit.
 OSCE and Balkan security 49

mode in which institutions evolve in response to the demand for governance.

They expand or decline depending on their varying capacity to accommodate,
neutralize or adapt to environmental influences. The institutional life cycle
perspective borrows from organizational theory and the political economy of
organizations which identify three stages of organizational development:
innovation, specialization (or process development) and standardization (or
maturity).24 There are several paths of institutional change in response to
ecological influences. Institutions may: (1) absorb external effects or interference,
whereby their institutional model remains unchanged; (2) adapt to their
environment; or (3) transform their mechanism of action through reform in the
norm structure and functional relevance. Innovation and growth is a
transformative process. Specialization is primarily adaptive in nature. Maturity
is sustained by absorption mechanisms and is inertia-driven. A stage-like
periodization of the institutional life cycle offers an alternative perspective on the
OSCE’s role in European security. It emphasizes the variation in its capacity to
affect the environment as it responds to the demand for governance emanating
from it.
It was in the context of enhanced institutional innovation and growth that the
conflicts of disintegration of former Yugoslavia of the 1990s emerged as the first
critical test of all domains of the CSCE/OSCE’s involvement in European
security. Its functions of preventive diplomacy, crisis management, conflict
resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation became inseparable from the evolution
of the conflicts and security challenges in the western Balkans. The Balkans sub-
region emerged as a source of non-trivial effects on the organizational
development of the OSCE.25
Conflict resolution efforts in the western Balkans therefore constitute not only
an important component of the OSCE’s contribution to security problem-solving
in Europe. They have been consequential to its institutional development: first,
by creating demand for new conceptual and practical approaches to conflict
prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation and, second, by
imposing constraints upon its established model of security provision.26 Parallel
24
R. Gilpin, op. cit., p. 235.
25
This analysis makes no claims that security demand in the western Balkans was the only source
of influence on the workings of the OSCE during the 1990s. The western Balkans example represents a
critical case study in developing the argument that institutions, although they affect international
outcomes, are also subject to external influences. On the applications of the critical case study method,
see A. George, ‘Case studies and theory development: the method of structured, focused comparison’,
in P. Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy: New Approaches to History, Theory and Policy, The Free Press, New York,
and Collier Macmillan, London, 1979, pp. 43–68; H. Eckstein, ‘Case study and theory in political
science’, in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds), Handbook of Political Science, Addison-Wesley, Reading,
MA, 1975, pp. 79–138.
26
A brief summary of the evolution of the Balkan crises of the 1990s provides the context to the
OSCE’s involvement in restoring peace and security in the region. The disintegration of former
Yugoslavia commenced in 1991. Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina consecutively
declared independence during the period 1991– 92. The first war began in June 1991 with a Yugoslav
Federal Army attack on Slovenia. The Bosnian war took place between 1992 and 1995. According to
the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia-Herzegovina was established as a federal state whose
cohesion was maintained by an international peacekeeping force. The supreme authority in the
country continues to rest with the Office of the UN High Representative. A NATO air campaign
(March–April 1999) put an end to Serbian oppression and atrocities in its southern province of
Kosovo. Between June 1999 and February 2008, Kosovo was governed by the UN Interim
50 Boyka Stefanova

to the Balkan crises, the OSCE’s organizational processes of rule-making and

implementation proceeded through an ascending stage of institutional
innovation, followed by a stage of specialization and institutional division of
labour, and concluding by a stage of maturity characterized by rationalization
and reflexive practices.

Stage one: institutional innovation (1990 –95). Comprehensive security from

‘process’ to ‘organization’

There is an abundant academic and policy literature on the post-cold war

evolution of the OSCE.27 It commenced in 1990 when the Bonn and Copenhagen
conferences (April –June 1990) reached a consensus that Western values and
pluralist democracies based on free elections, the rule of law and market
liberalism would establish the foundations of a new regional order. The Charter
of Paris (November 1990) recognized the end of the cold war division of Europe.
The Paris meeting adopted also the Vienna Document on Confidence and
Security Building Measures (CSBMs), including procedures for addressing cases
of unusual military activity, and created a Conflict Prevention Centre. Two
significant attributes of the CSCE model of security governance crystallized as a
result of these developments. First, the premises of democratic peace and
protection of human rights emerged as the conceptual core of the Conference28
and, second, the CSCE established an open model of cooperation with other
broadly based regional institutions—namely, NATO, the EU and the Council of
Europe.
This period marks a trend of building cross-references between NATO,
the EC/EU29 and the CSCE in terms of norms, standards of behaviour and
instruments of security management. NATO developed the concept of
‘interlocking’ and, subsequently, that of ‘mutually reinforcing’, institutions.30
The Alliance justified the purpose of its continued existence after the cold war
with the need to contribute to the regional security system by providing
implementation capacity to the CSCE’s mechanisms for conflict prevention and
confidence-building.
Such conceptual innovation was designed to capture the commonality of
political approaches to regional security, mutual complementarity of security
Footnote 26 continued
Administration Mission under the authority of the UN Security Council. The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) was transformed into a State Union between Serbia and Montenegro in 2003
whereupon Montenegro declared independence in 2006. See S. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and
Dissolution after the Cold War, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 1995; International Crisis
Group (ICG), ‘Ensuring Bosnia’s future: a new international engagement strategy’, Policy Report, 180,
February 2007, ,http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/europe/balkans/180_ensuring_
bosnias_future.pdf..
27
G. Ayteb, A European Security Architecture after the Cold War: Questions of Legitimacy, Macmillan,
Houndmills and London, 2000; M. Freire, Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of the
OSCE, Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, VT, 2003; J. Leatherman, From Cold War to Democratic Peace:
Third Parties, Peaceful Change, and the OSCE, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY, 2003.
28
T. Buergenthal, ‘Copenhagen: a democratic manifesto’, World Affairs, 153(1), 1990, p. 3.
29
The designation ‘European Union’ (EU) was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 to
replace the term ‘European Communities’ (EC).
30
NATO, Handbook, 2001.
 OSCE and Balkan security 51

strategies and constructive interdependence of the institutions relevant to

security governance.31 It did not fully reflect the CSCE’s position as the broadest
European security institution which was supposed to function beyond, and not
parallel to, regional alliances or other club-based arrangements. At the same
time, NATO’s transition towards security management outside its territorial
borders was instrumental to the development of a proactive framework of
security provision on behalf of the CSCE.
The initial stage of development of CSCE intervention procedures for the
purpose of resolution of ethnic conflicts on the territory of individual member
states preceded the Yugoslav crises of 1991. The Valletta mechanism (January
1991) was the first legal – political approach to intervention and the first
compromise with the unanimity principle of CSCE decision-making. In the case
of a dispute, the mechanism could be initiated by any member state to convene
an independent expert commission without the consent of the involved states.
At the time of the first Balkan crises, the Berlin meeting (June 1991) established an
emergency mechanism for cases of serious violations of the principles of the Final
Act or disputes endangering regional peace. A new CSCE body, the Committee of
Senior Officials (CSO), was empowered to make recommendations about
resolving conflict situations without the prior agreement of the participating
states. The EC first evoked this mechanism in the summer of 1991 with regard to
the situation in former Yugoslavia. The CSO by itself was not in a position to
advance effective recommendations due to the need to obtain Yugoslavia’s
agreement to action.32 The Moscow conference (1991) extended the Valetta and
Berlin mechanisms by developing a five-stage procedure for sending fact-finding
missions to determine human rights violations even without the consent of the
recipient country. This mechanism (although without a practical follow-up at the
time) marked the de facto conversion of the CSCE into a collective security
organization. The consensus-minus-one principle was adopted at the Council of
Ministers meeting in Prague (1992) thus increasing the CSCE’s capacity to act in
the Yugoslav crises. Although the mechanism of fact-finding missions was
formulated as a political principle and did not contain legally binding provisions,
it enhanced the profile of the CSCE as an institution functionally relevant to
regional security.33 The principle was applied in 1992 to suspend the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) for breaches of the principles of the CSCE human
dimension.34
The human dimension, a foundational domain of the Helsinki Final Act, was
considerably expanded by 1992. It had remained secondary during the cold war,
due to the impossibility to develop a regional consensus on the practical security
relevance of human rights. Even after the democratic foundations of the regional
order were established in 1990, there was no explicit recognition that forces at the
31
Ibid., pp. 341– 350.
32
G. Ayteb, op. cit.
33
The mechanism of fact-finding missions established a possibility to include experts, rather than
political representatives of the member states, in investigative missions. Consensus decision-making
within the CSO, however, was preserved. See G. Flynn and H. Farrell, ‘Piecing together the
democratic peace: the CSCE, norms, and the “construction” of security in the post-cold war Europe’,
International Organization, 53(3), 1999, p. 519.
34
Yugoslavia was suspended from CSCE membership on 8 July 1992 as a result of the 1991–92
wars in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
52 Boyka Stefanova

sub-state level and ethnic minority issues were consequential for maintaining
peaceful interstate relations.35 Innovation in this area was primarily demand-
driven. It was a response to the realities of conflict in the Balkans and the
unresolved minority issues in the former Soviet republics. The Moscow
Document (1991) confirmed the principle that matters pertaining to the human
dimension of the CSCE did not belong exclusively to the internal affairs of the
states but were the legitimate concern of all participating states.36 In 1992,
the CSCE reinforced its capacity to participate in crisis management. It created
the position of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM),
responsible for monitoring the conflict potential of threats associated with
national minorities. The HCNM position marked a significant departure from the
principle of inviolability of borders embodied in the Final Act of Helsinki. The
1992 measures linked the democratic foundations of regional order to the human
rights rationale of intervention. At the same time, placing constructive political
responsibility on the CSO and the HCNM made the previously developed
Moscow mechanism (functional at the level of participating states) practically
redundant.
The Helsinki Document (1992) completed the construction of the CSCE
collective security system. There was a CSCE-wide consensus that the CSO and
the Chairman-in-Office should be empowered to deploy political action in
response to conflict situations at the subnational level. This innovation opened
the possibility for cooperation with other regional security institutions.
According to Gülnur Ayteb, the CSCE’s Helsinki Document, NATO’s Oslo
Communiqué and the Petersberg Declaration of the West European Union
shared the common premise that the CSCE could request the assistance of these
institutions in carrying out peacekeeping tasks.37
The Helsinki Document also introduced the instrument of missions of long
duration which complemented existing instruments of preventive diplomacy
and early warning with intervention. Three such missions—Kosovo, Sandjak and
Vojvodina—were deployed in Yugoslavia in 1992. Such instruments have proved
of practical relevance to cases of sub-state conflict in Europe. Out of 13 OSCE
missions activated in various parts of Europe during the 1990s, seven have
operated in the western Balkans.38
The Helsinki summit declared the CSCE a regional organization under
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The CSCE had previously acted in this capacity
in 1991 when it provided the EC with a mandate for its monitoring mission in
Yugoslavia (ECMM).39 The CSCE’s transformation into a post-cold war
institution with a ‘life of its own’, capable of addressing conflict through
35
G. Flynn and H. Farrell, op. cit., p. 516.
36
OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Document of the Moscow Meeting of
the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1991, para. 12, ,http://www.osce.org/
documents/odihr/1991/10/13995_en.pdf..
37
G. Ayteb, op. cit., p. 92.
38
G. Flynn and H. Farrell, op. cit., p. 507. The mission in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina was
suspended after its initial one-year mandate expired in 1993 due to Yugoslavia’s refusal to renew its
agreement as a host country.
39
G. Ayteb, op. cit., p. 126. The CSCE later deployed the Spillover Monitor Mission in Macedonia in
the context of ECMM. See OSCE, Survey of OSCE Long-Term Missions and Other OSCE Field Activities,
SEC.INF/48/06/Corr.1 (2 October 2006). OSCE: Conflict Prevention Centre, 2006, p. 8.
 OSCE and Balkan security 53

preventive diplomacy, crisis management and rehabilitation mechanisms, was

thus complete prior to its formal conversion into an organization.
Missing from this process of institutional innovation is the OSCE’s own
contribution to the development of a regional culture of interlocking, or mutually
reinforcing, institutions in European security. By contrast, NATO first acknowl-
edged the need of interlocking institutional effects through its New Strategic
Concept (1991) and subsequent decision-making at the Oslo Summit, the
establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Acting on its own initiative, the EC also
launched preventive diplomacy measures, established tailor-made institutional
mechanisms of conflict mediation, such as the Badinter Commission, and
contributed to convening the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia to
deal with the peaceful settlement of the conflicts, and later of the Contact
Group.40 As Roy Ginsberg has noted, during that period the CSCE actively
‘outsourced’ its crisis management and conflict resolution responsibilities to the
EC.41 The latter benefited from a CSCE endorsement and legitimization of its
mediation activities in the Croatian war. By contrast, the CSCE deployed the
verification missions in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina (1992) following a UN
mandate. Its status of a UN Chapter VIII regional organization, however, did not
lead to further practical initiatives. The OSCE’s response to the Balkan crises was
to put into effect the regional collective security system. Following Serbian
noncompliance with a UN embargo, the CSCE formally suspended FRY from
membership. This decision, formally in compliance with the regional collective
security arrangements, was at odds with the CSCE/OSCE’s all-inclusive, inside-
out model of community-building.42
The first stage of the institutional evolution of the OSCE (1990 – 95) was thus
primarily inward-looking. The Organization designed a variety of mechanisms
to address the regional security challenges but did not engage in crisis
management when preventive diplomacy failed. The CSCE’s profile of an
inclusive norm-setting institution was reduced to that of a club-like arrangement
due to the suspension of membership rights for FRY, which prevented the
Conference from influencing its behaviour through socialization. As the CSCE
did not deploy peace-building measures, NATO emerged as the only regional
institution with an effective capacity for peacekeeping and crisis management.
In contrast to that, NATO’s innovative policies to recreate itself as an actor
indispensable to the maintenance of collective security in Europe produced
significant results. Although it originally had proposed to act under a CSCE
mandate for peacekeeping, the Alliance later moved away from the model of
40
The Badinter Commission formulated standards for recognition of the self-determination of
peoples on the territory of former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union reflected in the ‘Declaration on the
Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’ and
‘Declaration on Yugoslavia’ (1991). See R. Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics:
Baptism by Fire, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2001.
41
R. Ginsberg, op. cit., pp. 71–72.
42
Emanuel Adler has argued that CSCE’s security model differs from the other regional
organizations because it maintains an open-door membership policy. It works with the participating
countries and helps them to internalize its principles of interstate relations, rather than set admission
conditions. See E. Adler, op. cit. In contrast to such principles, FRY was suspended from OSCE
membership after 1992 and was readmitted on 8 November 2000 only following Miloševič’s fall from
power.
54 Boyka Stefanova

mandate-based security governance towards building an independent capacity

to act in crisis management. Following such premises, NATO’s involvement in
peace-building in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992 – 94) took place according to its own
initiative. By 1995 the Alliance had assumed leading responsibilities in peace
enforcement and peacekeeping in the Bosnian war.43 NATO’s air strikes were
decisive for securing a peace settlement. The Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA),
which concluded the war, was negotiated and signed without any substantive
OSCE input at the post-conflict stage. NATO completed the operational planning
of the international peacekeeping force in Bosnia (IFOR) and assumed
responsibility for the military components of the Agreement under its own
rules of engagement.44

Stage two: specialization and institutional division of labour.

‘Disenfranchisement’ of the OSCE

The implementation of the DPA marked a new stage in the OSCE’s involvement
in conflict resolution in the western Balkans. The imperatives of post-conflict
rehabilitation imposed a model of functional specialization to the detriment of
the OSCE’s multidimensional approach to security. During this stage, the OSCE
lost the agenda-setting initiative of a pan-European institution.
Pursuant to Annex II of the DPA, the OSCE assumed civilian tasks relevant to
security and peace-building, electoral monitoring and support for democratic
institutions. It received a UN mandate to organize elections and design inter-
communal confidence and security-building measures. The implementation of
function-specific tasks transformed the Organization from the broadest norm-
setting organization into a specialized politico-security actor. In line with the
democratic peace paradigm, the OSCE assisted the process of building a pluralist
society in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however without tangible input in defining the
modalities of post-conflict settlement and rehabilitation. It deployed a long-term
mission in Bosnia whose tasks included democratic control in the Armed
Forces.45
Although research on the OSCE’s contribution to European security in the
post-DPA stage acknowledges its progressive marginalization in Bosnia’s
reconstruction, the effects of ecological factors—local context and constellation of
external powers—remain poorly understood.46 The conventional view is that the
OSCE was unable to respond to the demand for military security in the Balkans
while other actors—NATO and the EU—were better equipped to provide
security problem-solving (NATO) and post-conflict economic reconstruction
43
NATO provided maritime support in enforcing the UN embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina under
Operation Maritime Monitor, maintained no-fly zones in Sarajevo, ensured protection for
peacekeeping forces in cooperation with the UN Protection Force UNPROFOR (pursuant to UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816) and enforced the UN ‘safe areas’ policy (pursuant to
UNSCR 836).
44
D. Leurdijk, ‘The UN and NATO: the logic of primacy’, in M. Pugh and W. P. Singh Sidhu (eds),
The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London,
2003, p. 62.
45
OSCE, op. cit., ‘Survey of OSCE long-term missions’.
46
M. Pugh and W. P. Singh Sidhu (eds), The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond,
Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London, 2003; G. Ayteb, op. cit.
 OSCE and Balkan security 55

(the EU).47 While this argument is correct, it does not take into account the
internal limitations of the OSCE to provide enforcement to the regional collective
security system. During the initial stages of conflict prevention and crisis
management in former Yugoslavia, the CSCE made no attempt to position itself
relative to and in cooperation with the other regional security actors, except for
deferring to them and, in individual cases, endorsing their security-related
initiatives. Subsequently, this model of involvement in regional security reached
its limits. The OSCE embarked on a process of adaptation to externally
established modalities of security governance.48
The operational problems of the OSCE as a regional institution during that
stage reflect the lack of a clear delineation of responsibilities for the individual
institutions engaged in conflict resolution. The UN failed to establish standards
for the contributions of institutions assuming regional functions under Chapter
VIII of the UN Charter.49 The OSCE – UN relationship in the context of post-
conflict reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina was based on the general
principles of consultation, coordination, cooperation and conferral of mandate.
The UN established a hierarchical division of labour in the implementation of the
DPA. It assumed supreme powers through the Office of the High Representative
in Bosnia-Herzegovina (OHR). In reality, the OHR had executive powers with
regard to the federal and local branches of government but not with regard to the
international institutions entrusted with specific tasks: NATO (security), OSCE
(elections, democratization, human rights), the Council of Europe (legal
institutions) and the EU (economic recovery). This system proved to be
dysfunctional.50 The established institutional division of labour created conflicts
between the long-term objectives and short-term problem-solving functions of
the individual security institutions. While the OSCE has sought a long-term
integrative approach to conflict resolution rehabilitation, the main concern of the
OHR has been that of passing of legislation to enable the transfer of decision-
making powers to the federal government.51
The lack of uniform standards, first reflected in NATO’s initiative for
assuming enforcement functions during the final stages of the Bosnian war
(1994 – 95), was repeatedly demonstrated in the evolution of the conflict in
Kosovo. The Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was the first OSCE mission
deployed in support of a UN resolution to verify compliance with a ceasefire.

47
G. Ayteb, op. cit.
48
During that stage, FRY continued to be suspended from OSCE membership. Also paradoxically,
Miloševič was later removed from power as a result of the actions of a strong grassroots democratic
opposition with only low-profile international support thus questioning the long-term relevance of
the OSCE’s own contribution to building political pluralism in countries affected by conflict. The
OSCE launched a field mission in FRY in 2001, after Miloševič lost the 2000 election.
49
In 1995, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations published a set of guiding principles
and mechanisms for cooperation with regional organizations but did not formulate recommendations
as to the type and modalities of operations implemented by regional organizations (and did not
publish a list of these organizations). See OSCE, Report of the Secretary-General, 1995, Chapter 4,
,http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/SG-Rpt/ch4c.htm..
50
I. Martin, ‘Is the regionalization of peace operations desirable?’, in M. Pugh and W. P. Singh
Sidhu (eds), The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO
and London, 2003, p. 48.
51
International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 18.
56 Boyka Stefanova

KVM was comprised of 2000 unarmed verifiers.52 By contrast, NATO

independently declared ‘a legitimate interest in the developments in Kosovo’.53
It later adopted an activation order to act citing ‘impending human catastrophe’
in Kosovo prior to the relevant UN resolution.54
Following NATO’s air campaign against FRY, UNSCR 1244 established a UN-
led mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The OSCE initially created a transitional task
force to prepare mission deployment and officially launched the mission in
Kosovo (OMIK) on 1 July 1999.55 UNMIK resembled the Bosnian mission by its
hierarchical structure under UN authority, but in contrast to Bosnia, it created a
pillar arrangement. Pillars I and II (under UN responsibility) were concerned
with police, justice and civil administration. Pillar III was assigned to the OSCE to
assist institution-building. Pillar IV, economic reconstruction, was managed by
the EU.56 The pillar structure was designed to remove dysfunctionalism among
the regional institutions by sustained specialization within the individual pillars.
In reality, however, the OSCE found itself at odds with the executive hierarchy of
Pillars I and II which prioritized order and security. Despite its functional
specialization, the OSCE’s mandate performed obvious cross-cutting tasks, as
human rights issues were integral to the judicial system and law enforcement
pillars (I and II). This functional overlap was particularly problematic in the area
of local policing. Although the creation of the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) was a
Pillar I task, police training was an OSCE responsibility implemented through
the KPS School which it operated. Empirical studies have noted a conflict
between the comprehensive character of human rights and capacity-building
domains and their treatment as individual issue areas under the pillar
structure.57 David Marshall contends that OMIK came to represent the actual
‘disenfranchisement’ of the OSCE as a regional organization.58
The deployment of a long-term mission in Kosovo marked the end of the
specialization stage. The focus on functionally specific tasks, such as democratic
capacity-building, reinforced the OSCE’s secondary position in the institutional
division of labour. Its platform remained collective, comprehensive and
cooperative security building bridges to human rights and the economic aspects
52
Security Council Resolution 1199 (23 September 1998) called for secession of hostilities,
withdrawal of Serbian troops and paramilitary, return of refugees and displaced persons, and access
of humanitarian organizations and international monitors in the Kosovo province. Security Council
Resolution 1203 authorized the verification regime. The OSCE mission was complemented by a NATO
air verification mission with non-combatant reconnaissance platforms. See D. Leurdijk, op. cit., p. 65.
53
NATO, Permanent Council, Press Release, 6 March 1998.
54
D. Leurdijk, op. cit., p. 71.
55
See also decision by OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEC/305 (PC Journal 237, Agenda item 21).
56
OSCE, ‘Six years onwards: putting the Helsinki Final Act into action’, Report, OSCE
Headquarters, Pristina, 2005.
57
P. V. Jakobsen, ‘Military forces and public security challenges’, in M. Pugh and W. P. Singh Sidhu
(eds), The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and
London, 2003, pp. 137– 153; J. G. Cockell, ‘Joint action on security challenges in the Balkans’, in
M. Pugh and W. P. Singh Sidhu (eds), The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond,
Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London, 2003, pp. 115–135; N. Grœger and A. Novosseloff, ‘The role
of the OSCE and the EU’, in M. Pugh and W. P. Singh Sidhu (eds), The United Nations and Regional
Security: Europe and Beyond, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO and London, 2003, pp. 75– 93.
58
D. Marshall, ‘Reviving the judicial and penal system in Kosovo’, in M. Pugh and W. P. Singh
Sidhu (eds), The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO
and London, 2003, p. 155.
 OSCE and Balkan security 57

of human security. A specialization exclusively within the human dimension

thus did not fully reflect the raison d’être of the OSCE as a security institution.
Ultimately, it led to the latter’s declining importance as a regional security actor.

Stage three: maturity and reflective stage (1999 – present)

The OSCE’s participation in the institutional division of labour in the western

Balkans was conducive to a process of rationalization of its relations with other
the regional organizations. Inter-institutional cooperation was not a priority at
the innovation stage, for example, when NATO’s proposals for creating
interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions found no direct follow-
up within the OSCE. In contrast to that, the post-1999 stage was a period of taking
stock of the Organization’s position in the regional security architecture. This
process took place without major policy innovations, as a continued adjustment
to the hierarchical division of labour established during the Balkan crises.
A number of initiatives marked the rationalization of the OSCE institutional
process.
The concluding documents of the 1999 Istanbul Summit restated the OSCE’s
principled understanding of regional security as indivisible, comprehensive and
cooperative. The Summit adopted the Charter for European Security which
confirmed the instruments of regional inter-institutional cooperation at the
political and expert level: political consultation, meetings of special representa-
tives, expert discussions and cooperation in field missions. The core operational
document, Platform for Cooperative Security, called for the development of
mutually reinforcing relations with other institutions concerned with the
principles of comprehensive security in the OSCE area.59
The OSCE also sought opportunities for issue diversification. The Maastricht
Ministerial Council (December 2003) adopted the ‘Strategy to Address Threats to
Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century’, ‘OSCE Strategy Document for
the Economic and Environmental Dimension’ and ‘Statement on South-Eastern
Europe as a Region of Co-operation’.60 These documents effectively confirmed
the OSCE’s specialization in the division of labour while acknowledging that the
regional security agenda should expand to address the terrorist threat. The
Council did not adopt new decision-making instruments but instead focused on
strengthening existing operational capabilities. It designed a Rapid Experts and
Cooperation Team (REACT), originally proposed at the Istanbul summit, and
reorganized the Conflict Prevention Centre.
A variety of initiatives for meetings and proposals for cooperation with
NATO, the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE) and International Criminal Tribunal
on Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) followed on from the 2003 Ministerial Council and
resulted in a network of inter-institutional agreements. The agreements
facilitated contacts and ongoing operations but did not formulate new visions,
mechanisms of action or operational activities. Several common tasks and joint
59
OSCE, Charter for European Security, Istanbul Summit, 1999, ,http://www.osce.org/documents/
mcs/1999/11/17497_en.pdf. ; OSCE, ‘Platform for cooperative security’, Operational Document, 1999
(para. 1), ,http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/17513_en.pdf. .
60
OSCE, Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century (2 December
2003), MC.DOC 1/03, 2003, ,http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/2003/12/4175_en.pdf. .
58 Boyka Stefanova

operations with NATO and the EU were implemented within the existing
instruments of peacekeeping and rehabilitation, such as border management in
the Preševo Valley in Southern Serbia (OSCE/NATO) in 2000 and a joint
preventive mission in Macedonia (NATO/EU/OSCE) to secure the Ohrid
Framework Agreement in 2001. Since 1999, the OSCE has regularized its contacts
with the EU.61 Rationalization of contacts has taken place also with regard to
NATO at the political and the operational level. Since 1999, however, NATO’s
core strategic interest has shifted towards the EU.62
The OSCE established cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2005. The OSCE’s field missions had been
involved in monitoring war crimes trials and its capabilities effectively
contributed to strengthen ICTY activities. The agreement thus facilitated already
existing cross-referencing between the two institutions.63 Also in 2005, the
OSCE developed closer cooperation with the Council of Europe. The two
institutions adopted a broader framework for cooperation through a joint
‘Declaration on Cooperation’ (May 2005) and, prior to that, through the creation
of a Common Catalogue of Cooperation Modalities (2000) and of a Coordination
Group (2004).64
Such proactive multidimensional initiatives may be contrasted with the lack
of OSCE initiative in the process of determination of the final status of Kosovo, a
case of significant implications for European regional order. The case provides
evidence of the declining normative relevance of the OSCE. It also reflects the
contradiction between its guiding principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act
and the realities of nation-building in Europe.
The Organization was excluded from the development of a conceptual
solution to the Kosovo self-determination deliberations. The formulation of a
Plan for Kosovo was conferred to a special representative of the UN Secretary-
General. The OSCE’s decision-making bodies failed to present a meaningful
contribution to the discussion.
By contrast, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE)
adopted a series of initiatives to prepare for its role in Kosovo at post-status stage.
The Group of Rapporteurs at PACE recommended principled measures in the
area of protection of human rights and national minorities.65 No parallel
parliamentary process developed within the OSCE. While differences in the
agenda-setting procedures at the two organizations may be attributed to the
different status of their decisions—legally binding at the Council of Europe and
politically binding at the OSCE—they also explain why the UN plan for Kosovo
was first presented for endorsement to PACE, and not to the OSCE Parliamentary
61
W. Zellner, ‘Managing change in the new Europe. Evaluating the OSCE and its future role:
competencies, capabilities, and missions’, Working Paper 13, Centre for OSCE Research, Hamburg,
p. 13.
62
NATO, ‘NATO– EU cooperation taken to a new level’, NATO Update (17 March 2003), , http://
www.nato.int/docu/update/2003/03-march/e0317a.htm. .
63
The establishment of cooperative relations was initiated by the ICTY. See address by Carla Del
Ponte, the then Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, OSCE
Permanent Council, 19 May 2005, , http://www.osce.org/documents/pc/2005/05/14388_en.pdf. .
64
OSCE, Joint Declaration with the Council of Europe, ‘2 þ 2’, 2005, , http://www1.osce.org/
documents/sg/2005/02/4318_en.pdf. .
65
Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution, Document 11018 (18 September 2006), 2006.
 OSCE and Balkan security 59

Assembly. Although the OSCE had participated in interventions to provide crisis

management and post-conflict administration in Bosnia-Herzegovina (since
1995) and Kosovo (since 1999), it failed to re-evaluate the practical relevance of
state sovereignty and inviolability of borders with regard to the realities of self-
determination in the western Balkans. Such principles had long become
incompatible with the OSCE’s human dimension which gave priority to human
rights over non-intervention. As a result, the OSCE could not play a role in the
conceptual determination of the Kosovo status, the ensuing negotiation process,
or in assisting Kosovo’s post-independence stage.
The UN Plan for Kosovo did not include a specific future role for the OSCE, as
it dealt with status and not institutional capacity-building issues. According to
Martti Ahtisaari, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the UN, the
expectation was that the OSCE will continue to assist with election monitoring,
monitoring the implementation of the settlement with regard to cultural and
religious heritage, human rights and rule of law.66
The Kosovo status case is indicative of the OSCE’s withdrawal from the
position of a norm-setting institution in Europe in favour of a sustained
functional specialization. Despite its continuing interest in designing standards
of cooperation, the OSCE has responded to the demand for conceptual
innovation by inertia. Its institutional maturity has become coterminous with
decline in its capacity to remain relevant to the imperatives of regional order. The
evidence of shifting priorities towards terrorism and the environment after 2003,
without adequate policy innovation, sustained specialization in assisting
democratic peace in the western Balkans without clear standards for measuring
success, as well as the lack of vision with regard to the redefinition of the political
map of Europe in the Kosovo status case suggest that this proposition may not be
an overstatement.

Conclusion

While examining the political applications of the democratic peace concept Bruce
Russett observed that democratic peace approaches to international relations and
security had not been effectively tried.67 Similarly, Christopher Layne (among
others) argued at the time that the ‘zone of peace’ was an illusion.68 The OSCE’s
experience in the western Balkans also suggests that the democratic peace
experiment has yet to yield conclusive results and that a paradigm shift in its
peace-building strategies may be necessary. Internally, the immediate con-
sequences of the OSCE’s involvement in the implementation of democratic peace
refer to its institutional evolution.
This paper has presented an argument with regard to the reflexive (or often
adverse) effects which conflict situations have on international institutions.
66
See Statement before the OSCE Permanent Council in OSCE, ‘OSCE to have robust role in future
Kosovo, UN special envoy says’, Press Release, 20 February 2007, , http://www.osce.org/item/
23371.html. ; OSCE, ‘OSCE Chairman meets UN special envoy for Kosovo, says organization keen to
stay’, Press Release, 9 January 2007, , http://www.osce.org/item/22873.html. . Ahtisaari visited the
OSCE after meeting with PACE, the North Atlantic Assembly and the European Council of the EU.
67
B. Russett, op. cit., p. 9.
68
C. Layne, ‘Kant or Cant: the myth of the democratic peace’, International Security, 19(2), 1994, p. 48.
60 Boyka Stefanova

The OSCE’s institutional evolution has been reshaped by the imperatives of

conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation in the
western Balkans and its problem-solving activities in the region.
During stage one (innovative response), the OSCE built upon the process of
conceptual innovation at NATO and the security challenges emanating from the
disintegration of former Yugoslavia to develop a regional collective security
system. At stage two the Organization became involved in a functional division
of labour between the regional security institutions. During this stage, the OSCE
de facto confined the principles of indivisible and cooperative security to the
premises of crisis management through democratic institutions. At stage three, it
implemented a process of rationalization of its activities by an emphasis on the
modalities of inter-institutional cooperation. This stage also marks a period of
decline as the OSCE has sought to maintain its specialization but failed to
propose initiatives relevant to its core purpose.
It may be concluded that in critical aspects, the OSCE has remained at odds
with the direction of change of European regional order. On the one hand, it has
lost the exclusivity, advantages and effectiveness of its security model, as other
actors replicate its conceptual foundations and mechanism of action. On the
other, persisting demand for security in Europe’s sub-regions continues to
depend on a subtle mix of normative impact and practical enforcement
mechanisms which the OSCE has not developed yet. As a result, the mutual
complementarity and prior interlocking effects among the regional institutions
have evolved into a hierarchical division of labour undermining the standard-
setting influence of the OSCE on European security.
The OSCE’s involvement in security governance in the western Balkans has
helped to reorient but failed to recreate the Organization as a security actor. The
OSCE has emerged as a marginal security institution in the process of conflict
resolution and reconstruction in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo. There is a
need for the Organization to re-establish its relevance to regional security.

Boyka Stefanova is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science

& Geography at the University of Texas, San Antonio, where she specializes in
European politics and comparative foreign policy. Her research interests and
publications cover the evolution of European integration and, in particular, the
democratization of Eastern Europe. Her recent work in comparative foreign
policy analysis includes her co-edited The War on Terror in Comparative Perspective:
US National Security and Foreign Policy after 9/11.

Address for correspondence: Department of Political Science & Geography, The

University of Texas at San Antonio, One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249,
USA. E-mail: Boyka.Stefanova@utsa.edu