CISM - Delegate Pack
CISM - Delegate Pack
Certified Information
Security Manager
(CISM)
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Course Syllabus
• Domain 1: Information Security
Governance
Domain 1
Information Security
1A3: Organisational Structures, Roles and
Responsibilities
Governance
B:INFORMATION SECURITY STRATEGY
• An effective governance program will use the metrics, balanced scorecard, and other means
for monitoring these key processes.
• Security processes will be changed to remain effective and to support continuous business
requirements by the process of continuous improvements.
• An organisation must also have an effective IT governance program to ensure the success of
information security governance.
• IT is the force multiplier and enabler that facilitates the business processes for fulfilling the
objectives of organisation.
Business Objectives
Security Policy
Feedback
• This is represented in the given figure. Security Standards
Security Processes
Security Metrics
• Information security governance refers to the set of top-down activities that control the
security organisation to ensure that information security supports the organisation. The
following are some activities that flow out of healthy security governance:
Program and
Processes Controls Project Metrics
Management
• This has increased to the point where organisations fully depend upon the integrity and
availability of their information system for continuing business operations.
• While building the structure of security governance, these three need to be considered.
• Information security governance is necessary to ensure that the incidents related to security do
not threaten the critical system and support the continuing viability of the organisation.
• For the protection of these assets, the required tools, controls, and processes are as complex
as the information system which is designed for protection.
• The management will not be informed or in control of these protective measures, without the
effective top-down management of the security controls and processes that are protective
assets.
• The following are activities are necessary for the protection of the organisation:
• These activities are carried out by scripted interactions among key business and IT executives
periodically.
• Meetings will consist of a discussion of the alignment with business objects, the impact of
regulatory changes, recent incidents, the effectiveness of measurements, recent audits, and
risk assessments.
• Other discussions may consist of such things like recent business results, changes to the
business, and any anticipated business events like mergers and acquisitions. The following are
the two key results of an effective security governance program:
1 2
Increased Trust Improved Reputation
• Usually, only high-risk averse organisations like insurance companies, banks, and public utilities
will define the risk appetite in actual terms.
• Other organisations are more tolerant of risk and make the risk decisions individually on the
basis of their gut feeling.
• So, many organisations are finding it important to articulate and document the risk appetite of
the organisation because of the increased influence and mandates by customers.
• Usually, risk-averse organisations have a formal system of traceability and accountability of risk
decisions back to the head of department and business executives.
• The CISO (Chief Information Security Officer) is rarely a person who takes the decisions for risk
treatment and is accountable for that decision.
information security.
• Organisational behaviour, strategies for navigating and influencing the enterprise's informal
and formal structures to get work done, norms, attitudes, amount of collaboration, the
existence or absence of turf disputes, and geographic dispersion all represent culture.
• Individual backgrounds, values, work ethics, experiences, filters or blind spots, and life views
that individuals bring to the workplace all have an impact on culture.
• Every enterprise has a culture, whether it was purposefully created or evolved over time as a
reflection of the leadership, and it must be taken into account when ascertaining roles and
duties.
• A good information security programme manager will determine the need of developing both
kinds of abilities as necessary for effective management.
• Employees in their different roles must do their duties in a way that safeguards information
assets in order to build a security-aware culture.
• All employees, regardless of their role or level within the organisation, should be capable of
defining how information security associates with their job.
• All participants must understand what behaviour is acceptable, what activities are necessary,
and what acts are explicitly prohibited in order to maintain a risk-aware and secure enterprise
culture.
• An acceptable usage policy is a user-friendly explanation of what employees should and should
not do.
• This policy can describe the expectations and responsibilities of all users in daily words and in a
straightforward, concise manner.
• It is essential to effectively convey and ensure that the acceptable use policy is read and
understood by all users. Regardless of job status, all new staff who will have access to
information assets should be provided with the use policy.
• The policy and standards for access control, categorisation, labelling, and handling of
documents and information, reporting requirements, disclosure limits, mobile computing,
unlawful uses, and enforcement are typically included in the rules of use for all workers.
• They may also contain email and Internet usage policies. The usage guidelines serve as a broad
security baseline for the entire enterprise.
• The information security manager should collaborate with the compliance department or
Human Resources (HR) to ensure that new hires understand and agree to the acceptable use
policy.
• Several enterprises have implemented ethics training to provide direction on what is lawful and
proper behaviour.
• This strategy is most commonly used when personnel is required to perform sensitive tasks
such as penetration testing, monitoring user activities, and accessing sensitive personal data.
• Personnel responsible for information security must be aware of any conflicts of interest or
behaviours that may be seen as detrimental to the enterprise.
• To ensure consistent and complete consideration, ethical conduct aims and activities should be
integrated with privacy and data protection activities and objectives.
• These activities may involve the incorporation of data ethics frameworks, which can aid in the
definition of protocols for ethical and responsible data use in the enterprise.
• In order to create a strategy, the information security manager must acquire as much
information on these overarching criteria as feasible.
• Privacy, intellectual property, and contractual, civil, and criminal law are all inextricably linked
to information security.
• Any attempt to create and implement an effective information security strategy must be
founded on a thorough grasp of the applicable legal requirements and constraints.
• Different regions in a worldwide enterprise may be subject to conflicting laws. To solve these
issues, the global enterprise may require to develop separate security strategies for each
geographic division, or it may base policy on the most stringent criteria to provide consistency
across the enterprise.
• Corporate legal departments usually concentrate on securities and contracts or company stock-
related issues.
• As a result, they are not always directly tracking regulatory requirements, and the information
security manager should not depend on the legal department to do so. The impacted
department is usually the most aware of legal and regulatory issues.
• To assure clarity on the enterprise's official position on the topic, the information security
manager should request legal review and interpretation of legislative requirements that have
security consequences.
• Automated governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) skills may aid in the maintenance of a
comprehensive catalogue of legal and regulatory requirements.
secured by the security strategy that will be developed, it is essential for the information
security manager to understand the underlying requirements for those records.
• As a contributor to strategy development, the information security leader must know the
business requirements for all sorts of company records.
• Representatives from the company legal department can usually assist in determining what
types of records must be safeguarded to preserve their confidentiality, integrity, and
availability.
• Legal affairs representatives can also advise on legal and regulatory requirements for
enterprise documentation.
• Due to the nature of the enterprise's activity, business requirements may surpass the legal and
regulatory standards set by competent legislating bodies.
• Regulations like Sarbanes-Oxley have mandated varied obligatory retention requirements for
various categories and types of information, irrespective of the storage media.
• The information security manager will be responsible for staying current with these regulations
and ensuring compliance as part of the enterprise's retention strategy.
• There may also be requirements arising from any lawful preservation order requiring an
organisation or individual to maintain specified data at the request of law enforcement or
other authorities.
• In an organisation, the board of directors is a body of people who oversee activities in the
organisation.
• The Board of directors are accountable to constituents and shareholders to perform an activity
in the best interests of the organisations without the appearance of ill-gotten profits,
impropriety, or conflict of interest as a result of their activities.
• They are responsible for the appointment of the CEO (Chief Executive Officer), in a non-
government organisation.
• Executive management has the responsibility of carrying out the directives issued by the board
of directors.
• In information security management, it includes ensuring that there are enough resources for
the organisation for the implementation of a security program, and the development and
maintenance of security controls for the protection of critical assets.
• Responsibilities of Business Process and Business Asset Owners include the following:
Functional
Access Revocation Physical Location
Definition
• Data management positions are responsible for the development and implementation of
database designs, and the maintenance of databases.
Database
Data Manager Data Scientist
Analyst
Database Database
Architect Administrator
• Security operations positions are responsible for building, designing, and monitoring the
security controls and security systems for the assurance of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of information systems.
Access
Security Architect Security Engineer Security Analyst
Administrator
Performance Position
360 Feedback
Evaluation Benchmarking
• The information security strategy covers management actions and structures that are distinct
from governance activities.
• The information security strategy will give a plan of action for the information security
manager to meet enterprise needs, such as achieving an acceptable level of risk while
optimising resources.
directors and senior management with the aim of providing strategic direction, assuring that
objectives are met, risk is appropriately managed, and enterprise's resources are used
responsibly.
• A strategy is a plan for attaining a goal. The objectives outlined in the plan define the business's
strategic orientation.
• Information security must support the business strategy and the activities that take place to
attain the objectives in order to be valuable to the firm.
• It confirms that the risk of information security is correctly controlled and that enterprise
information resources are used efficiently and effectively.
developed to ascertain whether those objectives are being accomplished. The six identified
outcomes of security governance will often provide high-level direction. The outcomes are as
follows:
Strategic
Alignment
Effective Risk
Management Value
Delivery Resource
Optimisation Performance
Measurement Assurance
Process
Integration
• The plan must explain what each of the chosen areas means to the enterprise, how each result
might be attained, and what constitutes success.
• The data owner is the person who ascertains the classification level for data and is usually the
best source for ascertaining the potential implications of data leakage.
• The categorisation level will then serve as the foundation for security operations and access
control. Most businesses will employ three or four levels of sensitivity and criticality, like
confidential, internal, and public.
• Asset classification is a difficult process for most enterprises, but it is necessary for existing
information if security governance is to be effective, efficient, and relevant.
• When done properly, classification reduces the cost of overprotecting insignificant information
while also reducing the danger of under protecting high-value information.
• If this assignment is not completed, it will get increasingly more difficult over time. Policies,
processes, and standards must be defined concurrently in order to mandate classification and
avoid related problems from worsening.
• It would be impossible to develop a cost-effective security plan that is associated with business
needs before:
Implementing a procedure to make sure that every asset has a specified owner.
• For a variety of reasons, defining long-term goals in terms of a desired level of security is
essential.
• Without a strategy, it is impossible to develop a meaningful action plan as well as the enterprise
will continue to execute ad hoc tactical points solution with nothing to give overall integration.
• The resulting non-integrated systems will cost more money, impossible or difficult to secure, and
be harder or impossible to manage. Various businesses wait until a significant catastrophe occurs
before allocating enough resources to solve these problems.
• This could lead to outcomes that are much more costly than dealing with problems appropriately
from the start.
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Ensuring Objective and Business Integration
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• Audit reports, change management activities, and steering committee conversations are
additional sources of information to direct security operations.
• For instance, the establishment of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) might permit high-value
transactions between dependable business partners or clients.
• By using Virtual Private Networks (VPNs), the sales force may be given access to secure remote
connectivity and be able to protect sensitive data well.
• In other words, information security enables business operations that would otherwise be too
risky to carry out or, as is commonly the case, be carried out in the hopes that everything will
work out as planned.
• A direct connection to particular business activities and goals must be made when formulating
strategic objectives.
• These connections can begin from the viewpoint of a particular line of business, considering
specific objectives.
• A review and analysis of each component of a specific product line can show how this strategy
might function.
• A look into the process's past might turn up past mistakes that could point out system flaws.
The research may reveal ways to reduce errors, either by putting in place more or better
controls or by assuring redundancy for more trustable automated operations, as human error
accounts for the majority of system failures.
• By enhancing business processes, lowering errors, and boosting productivity, the establishment
and analysis of business links can reveal information security vulnerabilities at the operational
level, which can significantly increase the value of information security.
• If high-level members of the key departments and business units are involved, one of the
beneficial outcomes of an information security steering group can be improving business links
continuously.
• Regular meetings with business owners to address security-related topics can help create
connections.
• This could be a chance to inform the owners of business processes about the possible
advantages that more security could bring to their system.
may have an undue influence on the objectives to be fulfilled and the activities carried out to
achieve corporate goals.
• Experiments and investigations have revealed a number of underlying reasons for poor
decision making. Awareness may result in solutions to mitigate the negative impacts. Some of
the most common pitfalls are:
• As per COBIT, it can involve high-level objectives like “protecting the interests of individuals
who rely on information, as well as the systems, processes, and communications that manage,
store, and distribute the information, against harm caused by failures of confidentiality,
availability, and integrity”.
• COBIT gives a comprehensive framework for enterprise IT governance and management that
address IT security, risk, governance, and information security in general.
• Because IT and related activities are involved in many elements of information security, it can
serve as a framework for ascertaining the intended state for effective information security.
• COBIT has various emphasis areas, each of which describes a specific governance domain,
topic, or issue that can be addressed by a set of governance and management objectives and
their components.
• Small and medium-sized businesses, risk, information security, digital transformation, cloud
computing, privacy, and DevOps are examples of potential focus areas.
• Focus areas may include a mix of generic governance components and modifications, as well as
issues for information security governance.
1. Based on
2. Open and Flexible
Conceptual Model
3. Aligned to
Major Standards
• To more effectively manage security, the BMIS model employs systems thinking to elucidate
complex relationships inside the company.
• The model's elements and dynamic interconnections define the boundaries of an information
security program and model how the program runs and responds to internal and external
change. BMIS sets the stage for frameworks like COBIT.
• To be fully understood, a system must be regarded holistically rather than simply as the sum of
its elements.
• This is at the heart of systems theory. A holistic approach looks at the system as a whole and as
a functional entity.
• Another principle of systems theory is that understanding one aspect of the system allows you
to understand other areas of the system.
Organisation
Design/Strategy
Governance
Process
People Technology
Human Factor
1 3
Organisation
Design and People Process Technology
Strategy
2 4
• Behaviours and actions in the dynamic interconnections might throw the model off balance or
bring it back into balance. The six dynamic interconnections are as follows:
Enablement and
Governance Culture
Support
• GRC is an example of the growing realisation of the need for convergence, or assurance
process integration.
• GRC refers to a strategy that enterprises can use to integrate these three areas.
• GRC, which is sometimes characterised as a single business activity, covers several overlapping
and related operations within a company, such as internal audit and compliance programmes.
• Governance is the duty of the board of directors and senior management, and it focuses on
developing the procedures that an enterprise needs to ensure that employees follow defined
policies and processes.
• People, procedures, technology, and other resources are typically included in a road map to
attain a stated, secure desired state.
• Its purpose is to map the pathways and steps that need to be taken to achieve the strategy's
objectives.
• The interactions and relationships between numerous strategy elements are likely to be
complex. As a result, it is advisable to think about the early stages of designing a security
architecture.
• Architectures can help define business drivers, resource relations, and process flows in a
systematic way.
• Architecture can also assist in ensuring that conceptual and contextual factors, like business
drivers and effects, are taken into account during the strategy creation stage.
• COBIT defines some governance system elements as factors that collectively and individually
impact whether something will work—in this case, management and governance of
information security and enterprise IT.
• The objectives cascade drives these components (i.e., higher-level goals describe what the
different enablers must attain). The following are the components of the governance system:
1. Principles, Policies, and Framework: The vehicle for translating desired behaviour into
practical guidance for daily management.
2. Processes: An organised set of actions and practises to attain specific goals and produce a
number of outputs in support of attaining overall objectives.
4. Culture, Ethics, and Behaviour: Individual and enterprise characteristics that are usually
overlooked as success elements in governance and management activities.
7. People, Skills, and Competencies: Necessary for carrying out all tasks successfully, reaching
the right conclusions, and for taking actions appropriately.
• The balanced scorecard of each organisation will represent the unique set of measurements
that reflects the type of business, style of management, and business model of an
organisation.
• It needs to be used for the measurement of the overall progress and effectiveness of an
organisation.
• The security balanced scorecard is similar to the balanced scorecard, which can be used to
measure the results and performance of a security organisation.
• The security balanced scorecard has the same four perspectives as the balanced scorecard.
• The four perspectives of the security balanced scorecard are mapped to key activities, shown
in below table:
Vulnerability Reduce vulnerabilities Protect against Manage risks Learn from incidents
Management vulnerabilities
Business Continuity Ensure continuity Provide core services Test continuity Ensure awareness
Program Ensure efficiency Include customer input Reduce reactive Continue improvement
Management processes
Architecture (EISA).
• Numerous strategies have emerged, including process models, frameworks, and ad hoc
methods. This development happened as it became clear that a perspective on architecture
that was limited to IT was unable to satisfy business design and the development of security
requirements.
• Linkages to the business side of information protection and techniques for its design are
provided by a variety of architectural approaches.
The COSO ERM Integrated Framework describes fundamental enterprise risk management
components, examines key ERM concepts and principles, recommends a standard ERM
language, and gives clear guidance and direction for enterprise risk management.
The Risk Management Code of Practice, British Standard (BS) 31100, provides a procedure
for executing and maintaining the concepts stated in ISO 31000, involving essential
functions such as identifying, responding, assessing, reporting, and reviewing.
risk management.
• The 14 sections of the ISO/IEC 27001:2013 standard can be used to assess the
comprehensiveness of an organisational security strategy and assure that all important
security elements are addressed.
• It is important to build organisational standards and policies that can be traced directly to each
standard element.
• While 27002:2013 is the standard on which an enterprise may decide to be evaluated and
certified, it is also the code of practise for information security management that supports
standard implementation.
• The NIST Cybersecurity Framework, formally known as the NIST Framework for Improving
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, provides high-level guidelines for aligning a cybersecurity
programme with organisational goals.
• The framework emphasises the importance of effective risk management integration and
extensively promotes supply chain risk management improvement.
• The NIST Cybersecurity Framework does not provide any controls that can be used.
• The NIST Risk Management Framework (RMF) gives a procedure for integrating privacy,
security, and cyber supply chain risk management activities into the system development life
cycle.
• The RMF provides provisions for assessing the continuous efficacy and efficiency of risk
management procedures, as well as a risk-based approach to categorise relevant assets,
selection, and implementation controls to attain adequate protection.
• Because the most damaging and costly compromises are generally the consequence of insider
activity, whether unintentional or intentional, the first line of defence should be to try to
assure the trustworthiness and integrity of new and existing people.
• The information security program will implement the mechanisms for assuring these traits in
the workforce (including in-house people and external service providers), but needs and plans
must be incorporated into the strategy.
• This is becoming more common as the importance and prominence of the information security
function in the organisational hierarchy have grown.
• Although reporting to the CIO was appropriate in the past, that structure has become
insufficient for successfully managing increased risk, escalating losses, and the sophistication
of attackers. Furthermore, it frequently leads to a conflict of interest.
• The cultural mix of an enterprise will influence many aspects of strategy, involving whether a
centralised or decentralised approach is more beneficial for the security enterprise.
• While centralisation and standardisation of security can provide many benefits, the structure
of an enterprise often renders this an inefficient approach.
• Multinational corporations that choose a centralised approach must carefully analyse the
various local legal requirements in each country in which they have a presence.
• For instance, some nations may forbid the storage or processing of business data outside of
their borders, and other governments may levy taxes, such as a withholding tax, on any
software or hardware used by entities under their jurisdiction, regardless of where that
software or hardware is physically located.
• It is crucial that the plan include a mechanism that defines all security duties and
responsibilities and incorporates them in employee job descriptions due to the numerous
tasks that employees must do.
• In the end, there is a better likelihood of accomplishing security governance goals if employees
are compensated based on their commitment to performing their job responsibilities.
• The annual job performance and goals of an employee may contain security-related metrics.
• To describe security roles and duties, the information security manager should collaborate
with the HR director. Each job position's specific competencies should be identified and
recorded.
• Choosing a plan that employs existing abilities is likely to be the most cost-effective option,
although it may be necessary to develop new skills or outsource certain critical functions at
times.
• A skills inventory is necessary to ascertain the resources available while establishing a security
plan.
• Proficiency testing may be useful in determining whether the necessary skills are available or
may be acquired through training.
• Because security is frequently weakest at the end-user level, training, education, and
awareness are critical components of the overall plan.
• It is critical to evaluate the requirement for the development of methods and processes that
make policies, standards, and procedures easier to follow, implement, and monitor.
• A periodic security awareness campaign intended for end users underlines the importance of
information security, and it is now required by law in several jurisdictions for a variety of
sectors.
• Evidence suggests that the majority of employees in most businesses are unaware of security
policies and regulations, even if they exist.
• Audits, both external and internal, are one of the primary methods for ascertaining
information security deficiencies in terms of controls and compliance, and they are an
important resource in strategy creation.
• Internal audits are typically undertaken by an internal audit department that reports to either
an audit committee of the board of directors or senior management in larger enterprises.
• External audits are often performed by an independent third party and may involve IT and
information security domains, depending on audit objectives.
• Because audits can give the information security manager valuable monitoring tools, the
security department must have access to this information.
• It is critical for the information security manager to have solid working relationships with other
assurance providers in order to facilitate the flow of information that is required for effective
security management.
• Many enterprises are required to file numerous audits and other reports with regulatory
bodies as a result of increased regulatory oversight.
• Many of these reports have implications for information security and can give helpful
intelligence and monitoring data to the information security manager.
• Security violations are a constant worry for information security managers, and it is essential
to develop methods for dealing with them as part of the strategy development.
• Senior management buy-in and support for these procedures are crucial, particularly in terms
of enforcement.
• Management is frequently the source of the most serious compliance issues, according to
security managers. It may be difficult to enforce compliance across an enterprise if there is a
lack of dedication and compliance in management ranks.
• The most effective way to comply in an enterprise where transparency and trust are valued
and fostered by management is likely to be a system of self-reporting and voluntary
compliance based on the knowledge that security is clearly in everyone's best interest.
be included in the information security strategy. Strategic planning involves the determination
of how to attain risk direction in order to safeguard diverse enterprise assets from a wide
variety of threats and vulnerabilities.
• The following are the elements that must be considered in strategic planning, and
subsequent operation and implementation as a part of information security itself:
Other
Vulnerability Organisationl
Assessment Insurance
Support and
Insurance
• A gap analysis is necessary for several strategy components, including maturity levels, control
targets, and risk and impact objectives.
• The analysis will determine the steps required to transition from the present state to the
desired state in order to meet the set objectives.
• This exercise may need to be performed annually, or more frequently, to give performance and
target metrics, as well as information for potential mid-course corrections in reaction to
changing surroundings or other variables.
• Working backward from the endpoint to the current state to find the intermediate steps
required to achieve the objectives is a common technique for gap analysis.
• The strategy's implementation plan will necessitate mechanisms for monitoring and measuring
progress and achievement of goals.
• As with any project plan, costs and progress must be reviewed on a continuous basis to ensure
plan compliance and to allow for prompt mid-course modifications.
• There will very certainly be a number of short-term objectives, each of which will necessitate
resources and a plan of action to attain.
• A variety of ways can be employed to continuously monitor and measure progress. On a regular
basis, one or more of the methods for assessing the present state can be used to evaluate and
chart how the current state has changed.
• The following are some essential objectives for an information security plan:
• The findings of the testing must be signed by the CFO and CEO and confirmed by independent
auditors. The findings must subsequently be published in the company's public filings with the
SEC.
• Appropriate testing plans that are consistent with the established goals and incorporate the
CSFs must be developed in order for tracking progress in the testing effort.
• Management will require reporting on the progress and outcomes of testing due to the limited
time available to execute the essential tests.
• Considerations for information security metrics involve confirming that what is being assessed
is, in fact, appropriate.
• In any objective sense, it is difficult to measure security, and very meaningless indicators are
frequently utilised merely because they are readily available.
• Metrics serve only one purpose: to deliver the information required to make decisions. It is
therefore vital to understand what decisions must be taken and who makes them, and then to
devise means to provide that information in an accurate and timely manner.
• Different metrics are more or less valuable for different segments of the organisation and
should be determined in consultation with business process management and owners.
• While technical metrics are crucial to the IT security manager, senior management usually
wants a summary of information that is important from a management viewpoint - information
that normally excludes comprehensive technical data.
Audit findings.
• The information security manager might require more in-depth tactical data, such as:
• The majority of technical security data may be valuable in organisations with an IT security
manager. This comprises:
• Once the overarching strategy has been completed, most enterprises may easily define a variety
of specific near-term targets that are in line with the overall information security strategy.
• Prioritising corrective actions should be simply based on the BIA identification of business-
critical resources and the security status as established by the previous CMMI gap analysis.
• If the security strategy objective is to attain CMMI level 4 certification and compliance, then an
example of near-term action may explain the following:
The current applications being used must be identified by each business unit.
Twenty-five percent of all data that has been kept needs to be examined to determine who
owns it and how sensitive it is.
In order to identify important resources, each business unit must complete a BIA for
information resources.
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Action Plan to Implement Strategy
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To ensure that all policies are consistent with strategic security goals, all policies must be
evaluated and amended as appropriate.
plan.
• The program is essentially the project plan for implementing and establishing ongoing
management of some or all of the strategy's components.
• The information security program protects persons who rely on information as well as the
procedures, systems, and communications that handle, store, and transmit it.
• Its goal is to keep them safe from harm caused by failures in availability, confidentiality, and
integrity. Concepts such as information utility and possession are emerging definitions (the
latter to cope with theft, deception, and fraud).
• The networked economy has undoubtedly increased the importance of trust and accountability
in electronic transactions.
When needed, information is available and usable, and the systems that provide it can
withstand attacks (availability).
Information is only observed or released to those who have a legal right to know
(confidentiality).
Trusted business transactions and information exchanges between enterprise sites or with
partners (authenticity and nonrepudiation).
Domain 2
to identify risks.
Risk identification is the process of determining the nature and type of viable threats and
examining the enterprise's vulnerabilities that are subject to those threats.
The vulnerabilities that identified threats may exploit constitute an identified risk.
Only identified risks can be assessed and treated appropriately, so risk identification is essential
to effective risk management.
It is essential to identify all information assets, involving those held by third parties. It is
necessary to identify viable threats, both potential and actual.
The viability of a threat is determined by two factors: The threat exists or could reasonably be
anticipated to materialise, and the threat is under control in some way.
These exercises consider that all significant enterprise vulnerabilities are known, as well as the
types and nature of threats that could exploit them.
Business Goals
• Internal threats are related to the employees of the organisation and the employees may be
the intentional actors of these threats.
• For the constitution of threats, the following events can take place:
• These can include both deliberate and accidental assets, like internal threats.
• The security manager who is performing a risk assessment should understand the full range of
threat actors, along with their motivations.
• It is specifically important for organisations where specific types of threat actors or motivations
are more common.
• Advanced Persistent Threats (APIs) are highly skilled, advanced attackers with a strong
motivation to exploit systems and networks.
• The increased skills available to the hacking community, as well as the efficiency of the tools
they use, raises the risk of compromise significantly.
• The information security manager should be aware that APTs pose a significant risk to
businesses of all sizes around the world and must ensure that adequate measures are in place
to detect and identify this threat.
• There are several standards and publications available to guide information technology and
security risk management approaches.
• Examples include:
o COBIT
o NISI Managing Information Security Risk: Organisation, Mission and Information System
View.
• In several cases, compromised enterprises have proof of emergent threats in their logs well
before the actual compromise, but the evidence is not acted on or not noticed.
• When combined with a threat, a lack of effective monitoring can result in a breach.
• Most technologies are designed with an emphasis on function and aim, with little regard for
security implications.
• As a result, new technology is often a source of new vulnerabilities and, in some cases, can act
as a threat agent within an information system.
• The information security manager should be aware of new technologies and plan for their
introduction in the enterprise, especially if the technologies promise cost savings or a
competitive benefit.
uncertainty on objectives." This means that results can be either positive or negative.
• Risk will be evaluated primarily from a negative viewpoint, with negative risk defined as the
likelihood of an event and its consequences.
• The likelihood, also known as probability, is a measure of the frequency that an event may
arise.
• When determining risk, likelihood is used to estimate the level of risk on the basis of the
frequency of events as well as the influence of those events that may arise in a given time
duration.
• Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) is determined by combining the likelihood or frequency with the
magnitude. The higher the frequency, the higher the likelihood and, thus, the higher the risk.
• The register must act as a central repository for all information security risks, involving specific
threats, exposures, vulnerabilities, and assets at risk. It must involve the owner of the asset,
the risk owner, and any other stakeholders.
• Because the risk register is a living repository, content must be filled out as the assessment
process begins.
• Once the efforts for risk identification, evaluation, analysis, and response have been achieved,
and other relevant information has been entered into the register, it will act as an authoritative
reference point for every risk management-related activity.
• Risk registers improve responsibility by assigning risk to risk owners and also give a tracking
mechanism to ensure risk has been mitigated in accordance with agreed-upon action plans and
timelines. There is no accountability if there is no risk register.
• The risk register gives an overview of the enterprise's risk profile. A risk profile is a necessary
component of active information risk management.
• It will provide a thorough overview of the overall risk to which the enterprise is exposed, as
well as other pertinent information.
Module 2A2:
Vulnerability and Control Deficiency
Analysis
• Something is either vulnerable or not vulnerable. In most situations, assets are vulnerable to
distinct degrees.
• The extent of exposure should be considered because it influences the likelihood that a
vulnerability will be compromised.
• These differences are important when prioritising risk management efforts, ascertaining the
level of risk within a scenario, and explaining conclusions and suggestions to management.
• Many vulnerabilities are system conditions that should be identified before they can be
addressed.
• The goal of vulnerability identification is to discover problems before they are discovered and
exploited by an adversary, which is why an enterprise must conduct regular vulnerability
assessments and penetration tests to identify, validate, as well as classify its vulnerabilities.
• A vulnerability assessment should consider both process and procedural flaws as well as logical
flaws. There is a risk where there are vulnerabilities.
• Various types of testing or subject matter expert estimates can be used to estimate the degree
of vulnerability. Estimates, like other types of valuations, can be quantitative or qualitative.
• Whatever method is used, it is essential to communicate the nature of these estimates so that
management is not misled.
• Using ranges or distributions to indicate both unlikely maximums and more probable values is
an effective approach for reflecting uncertainty in values.
• Understanding the other controls in place that may mitigate the overall exposure is required to
determine the ultimate relevance of a weak control.
• It would be inaccurate and unfair to portray a control as a major issue when, in fact, the
mixture of controls is quite robust.
• Several IT system flaws are discovered utilising automated scanning equipment, and these can
act as leading symbols of potential compromise.
• Process and performance vulnerabilities are more challenging to identify and may need a
thorough review and analysis.
• To be efficient, the assessment must take into account process, procedural, and physical
vulnerabilities, as well as technological flaws.
It is intended to give reasonable assurance that the business goals are attained and the
potential consequences of undesired events are adequately addressed.
The framework should consider people, procedures, and technology, as well as the enterprise's
physical, contractual, technical, and procedural elements.
Safeguards are any practice, process, procedure, or other instrumentation that decreases risk
via the precautionary measure to protect a business asset.
Safeguards are proactive controls because they are applied and utilised to prevent an event
from occurring.
Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPs), Employee background checks, and turnstile gates are
instances of proactive controls or safeguards.
baseline security.
The collective ability of controls to protect the enterprise's information assets determines
baseline security.
Baseline security is basically managed by the least restrictive aspect of collective standards and
is the enterprise's minimum level of security. Control objectives must also reflect baseline
security levels.
Any significant incident needs a risk assessment and a root cause analysis of the failure, which
may need increasing or altering baseline security by changing appropriate policies, procedures,
processes, standards, or controls.
Information security managers must monitor and assess events that affect security baselines
and, as a result, might influence the security posture of the enterprise.
Based on this evaluation, the information security manager should determine whether the
enterprise's security strategy, roadmap, and test plans need to be altered to address changing
risks.
These involve weighing policy alternatives with interested parties, taking risk assessment and
other factors into account, and selecting suitable prevention and control options with
acceptable costs and influences on the enterprise's capability to operate efficiently.
Risk management functions typically involve the execution of the following processes:
Recommend
Establish Identify Accept Communicate
Perform Risk Risk
Scope and Assets and Residual Risk About and
Assessment Treatment or
Boundaries Valuation Monitor Risk
Response
Risk Appetite
Implement Risk
Management Plan
Context Establishment
Communication and Consultation
Risk Assessment
Risk Analysis
Risk Evaluation
Risk Treatment
The scope of risk management activities and the environment in which risk management
operates is defined by the context, which involves the organisational structure, culture,
principles, people, infrastructure, and skills.
Roles and responsibilities, not only for the various parts of the enterprise involved in the risk
management process but also for risk and control ownership.
The risk-evaluation criteria should be determined and agreed upon. Whether or not risk
treatment is needed is usually determined by technical, operational, regulatory, financial, legal,
social, or environmental criteria or a mixture of these.
The criteria must be consistent with the scope and analysis of the enterprise's internal policies
and processes, and they should support the enterprise's objectives and goals.
Cost-benefit Analysis: To ascertain the best strategy for mitigating versus transferring the
influence of a risk event.
Risk Appetite/Risk Tolerance: The rules that ascertain whether the risk level is such that
additional treatment activities are needed.
These criteria may require to be modified later in the risk management process as a result of
changing circumstances or as a result of the risk assessment and evaluation process itself.
Business interruption is a major concern, and averting it must be a primary principle of risk
management.
Most of the time, incident management is sufficient for managing materialised risk, minimising
significant disturbance to operations and potential influences.
In some cases, incidents will escalate to tragedies, requiring business continuity and disaster
recovery.
In either case, the understanding and ability to address appropriate problems sufficiently to
assure the enterprise's survival serves as a backstop to limit risk and assure it is managed.
• It is essential for information security management to ensure that risk identification, evaluation,
analysis, assessment, and response activities are integrated into life cycle processes.
• The necessity to minimise an enterprise's negative influence and to establish a solid basis for
decision-making are the primary reasons enterprises implement a risk management process for their
IT systems.
• Risk management must be fully integrated into the System Development Life Cycle (SDLC) for it to be
effective. The SDLC of an information technology system has five phases: initiation, development or
acquisition, implementation, operation or maintenance, and disposal.
• In some cases, an IT system may be in multiple phases at the same time. However, regardless of the
SDLC phase for which the assessment is performed, the risk management methodology is the same.
• Risk management is an iterative procedure that can be conducted throughout every major phase of
the SDLC.
(Continued)
• Other business areas and activities may already have change management processes in place.
• One advantage is that many enterprises now have change management processes in place that cover
the whole enterprise.
• The information security manager should be familiar with these change management activities and
assure that security is properly integrated with business operations so that changes are not made
without considering the implications for the enterprise's information assets' overall security.
• One way to help assure this is for information security management to join the change management
committee and assure that all changes are subject to security review and approval and that proposed
changes satisfy policy and standard requirements.
• Any proposed variations must be identified and documented for further investigation.
(Continued)
• While the normal focus of change management is on hardware and software changes and security
influence, the change management process must extend far beyond system owners and the IT
population.
• Change management must involve facilities management for data centre infrastructure and any
other area that may have an influence on overall information security.
• Change management's impact on system and facility maintenance windows must be addressed by
facilities personnel and business continuity management.
• Changes in these areas are frequently not documented in a timely manner. It is possible that facilities
do not have current single-line drawings and blueprints.
(Continued)
IT Risk
Identification
Risk Response
and Mitigation
Consequences,
Resulting Asset/ Resource
Actor Type Of Threat Results or Frequency
Event
Impact
Business value is usually expressed as sensitivity or criticality. The majority of risk assessment
approaches have four distinct phases. These are some examples:
1 2 3 4
assessment approaches. The approach chosen must be specified by the best form, fit, and
function.
Depending on the enterprise and the specific requirements, approaches such as the Holistic
Approach to Risk Management (HARM), Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR), risk factor
analysis, and value at risk (VAR) may be more appropriate.
Risk scenarios in the COBIT approach include the process of identifying risk, followed by
analysis. The next step is to evaluate the risk to see if it exceeds acceptable levels.
These three steps enable the risk assessment to produce a suggestion for the best risk
response, or risk treatment.
Priorities for response are determined by a cost-benefit and risk-level analysis, with high cost-
benefit and high likelihood.
• A few of these advancements are being executed in the field of information security, and it is
likely that more refined techniques and methods will continue to be developed.
• The approach provides a reasoned, detailed analysis process that is intended to supplement
other assessment approaches with the goal of increasing accuracy.
outcomes.
This step involves ascertaining threat actor abilities and motivations, as well as the efficiency of
existing controls and the extent to which they may affect a specific identified risk. Risk analysis
includes:
Extensive investigation of the risk sources (threats and vulnerabilities) identified during the
risk identification phase.
The degree to which information assets are vulnerable to potential threats and their impact
on likelihood. The potential negative effects of successfully attacking the assets.
The likelihood of those consequences occurring, as well as the factors that influence them.
Inclusion of existing controls or procedures that tend to decrease negative risk or improve
positive outcomes.
prioritises risk based on the foregoing analysis, with assistance made for the probable margin
of error, which can be significant if reliable data is unavailable.
• This is done within the context of the enterprise's defined tolerance criteria, risk appetite, and
capacity creating a method to advise on a reasonable and suitable risk response.
• Acceptance is the most likely treatment option if the risk meets the acceptable risk criteria.
• If the risk exceeds the acceptable level and is not within the tolerance range, the most likely
treatment will be some form of mitigation.
• A system redesign can reduce technical risk, or risk sharing may be the most cost-effective
alternative.
• If there are no cost-effective alternatives for mitigating extreme risk, management may take
the decision that the activity is not worth the risk, or it may decide to take the risk if the
advantages outweigh the risks.
• Typically, risk transfer is chosen for risks with a lower likelihood but a high influence.
• Control risk should be considered if the risk is mitigated through the use of controls.
• If the results are ambiguous, inaccurate, or misleading, the risk assessment may lead to a
decision to conduct additional analysis.
• The risk ranking is derived from a mixture of all risk elements, such as threat recognition and
the characteristics and abilities of a threat source, the severity of a vulnerability, the likelihood
of occurrence when considering the effectiveness of controls, control risk, and the influence to
the enterprise should the risk be realised.
• When these are added together, they indicate the level of risk associated with a threat.
Risk treatment pits available resources against the requirement of risk reduction.
Not all risks can be mitigated or eliminated because there is not a sufficient amount of
resources to treat them all in the enterprise environment.
Risk analysts and technology architects can devise ways to bring about the greatest possible
risk reduction when risk treatment is performed at the enterprise level.
Every enterprise has a specific risk capacity, which is defined as the maximum amount of loss that an
enterprise can tolerate without jeopardising its continued existence.
The risk appetite of an enterprise is determined by its owners or board of directors, subject to the
absolute maximum imposed by this risk capacity.
Risk appetite is described as the amount of risk that an entity is willing to accept in the pursuit of its
mission on a broad scale.
As part of strategic planning, the board of directors may delegate risk appetite setting to senior
management in some cases.
Acceptable risk appetite or risk determination, as well as assessment criteria, are important to
almost all elements of information security and most other elements of organisational activities.
(Continued)
Many aspects of strategy, such as control objectives, baseline security, control execution, cost-benefit
calculations, severity criteria determination, risk management options, required incident response
abilities, insurance requirements, and feasibility assessments, will be determined by risk appetite.
Risk appetite is translated into several standards and policies that must be adjusted or confirmed on
a regular basis in order to keep the risk level within the boundaries set by the risk appetite.
The risk may be accepted within the boundaries, a formal and explicit process that confirms that the
risk requires and warrants no additional response by the enterprise as long as the specific risk and
risk environment remain substantially the same and accountability for the risk is assigned to a
specific owner.
Risk acceptance should not exceed the enterprise's risk appetite, but it should also not exceed the
risk capacity.
Risk
Risk Transfer
Mitigation
Risk Risk
Avoidance Acceptance
High Risk acceptance possible at the department level (e.g., CFO, COO, CIO)
The risk that stays after controls are executed is referred to as residual risk. Risk can never be
eradicated because a certain level of residual risk always exists even when appropriate controls
are implemented.
It must be noted that lowering one risk invariably raises another, hopefully of a lower
magnitude.
The goal is to assure that residual risk is similar to the enterprise's acceptable risk criteria or
satisfies risk tolerance criteria.
Risk tolerance is defined as the allowable variation from acceptable risk, which is typically
expressed as a percentage or range.
Acceptable residual risk must be the result of meeting the defined control objectives and be
equivalent to the enterprise's defined security baselines.
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Inherent and Residual Risk
(Continued)
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Management can use residual risk reported by a subsequent risk assessment to recognise
areas where more control is needed to further mitigate risk.
Residual risk above an acceptable level must be treated further, with the option of additional
mitigation through the execution of more stringent controls.
Risk levels below the acceptable level must be assessed to determine whether the controls in
place are still necessary and whether they can be reduced in cost by removing or modifying
them.
Vulnerabilities and threats that do not have an impact are usually insignificant and are not
regarded as a risk.
In commercial enterprises, the effect is usually quantified as a short-term direct financial loss
or a long-term ultimate financial loss.
Loss of reputation/goodwill/image.
While layering controls is a good idea, utilising too many controls to address the same risk is
wasteful and often decreases productivity. It is essential to assure that the various controls are
not all exposed to the same risk, as this would defeat the objective of layering them.
Risk assessments must be conducted from the beginning to the end of a process in order to be
effective and reasonably accurate.
This strategy will facilitate on understanding of whether upstream controls reduce or eliminate
some risk, thereby eradicating the requirement for subsequent controls. It will also assist in
determining whether there is redundant or duplicate control.
Senior management should do this in order to determine the suitable level of compliance and
priority.
Legal general counsel must evaluate regulations to specify the exposure the enterprise subject
as a result of the regulation and the current level at which the enterprise can demonstrate
compliance.
Because enforcement actions are typically initiated against those who are least compliant, the
enterprise must consider the level of enforcement and its relative position in relation to its
peers.
The possible financial and reputational consequences of full compliance, partial compliance,
and non-compliance should also be considered.
These evaluations serve as the base for senior management to specify the nature and scope of
relevant compliance activities for the enterprise.
The information security manager should be aware that senior management may decide that
risking sanctions is slightly expensive than attaining compliance, or that compliance is not
warranted because enforcement is limited, or even non-existent.
This is a management decision that must be weighed against risk and impact.
If the costs of specific controls outweigh the benefits of mitigating a particular risk, the
enterprise may decide to accept the risk instead of incurring the cost of mitigation.
Cost-benefit analysis provides a financial perspective on risk and specifies the cost of
protecting what is essential.
Yet, cost-benefit analysis is also about making wise decisions on the basis of the costs of risk
mitigation versus potential losses. Both ideas are directly related to good governance practises.
Most information security crime and loss metrics, however, are not as well established as
traditional robbery and theft statistics.
Employee productivity impacts, revenue losses, and direct cost loss events are three common
measures of potential losses.
and evaluated, its owner must be identified as a manager or senior official within the
organisation.
A risk owner is responsible for accepting risk based on the organisation's tolerance criteria and
risk appetite, and they should be able to choose the appropriate risk response based on
analyses and guidance provided by the information security manager.
This accountability includes approving controls when risk mitigation is the preferred risk
response.
The idea is to establish a direct link so that all risk is addressed through appropriate treatment
and all controls are justified by the risk that requires their existence.
Due to the shared relationship between risk and controls, the owner of a risk should also own
any controls associated with that risk and be held accountable for ensuring their effectiveness.
Risk owners may be required to prepare standard reports on the status of risk, any incidents
that may have occurred, the level of rink currently encountered by the enterprise, and the
tested effectiveness of controls in areas where there are regulations or laws that apply to risk.
Risk
Control
authority for making risk-based decisions, as well as the person who bears the loss related to
realised risk plan.
Strategically, senior management is the risk owner who is ultimately responsible for risk
response across the enterprise. From an operational and management standpoint, directors,
vice presidents, managers, and so on have the power and accountability and must be held
responsible for making risk-related decisions as part of routine operations.
The control owner and the risk owner are usually the same people because any changes or
removal of a control will impact the risk being treated, probably causing the risk to exceed the
defined risk appetite.
Control ownership, like risk ownership, falls to individuals within the enterprise who have the
authority to make control decisions and will be held responsible for how risk is managed.
Although IT staff may act as custodians/stewards of controls, it is ultimately the business unit
that bears responsibility if control is ineffective in properly treating risk. In some cases, the
business unit will not be the control owner.
On a regular basis, the results and status of this ongoing analysis must be documented and
reported to senior management.
Senior management will usually be less interested in technical details and will instead want an
overview of the current situation and indicators of any impending or immediate threat that
needs attention.
Security dashboards, stoplight charts, and heat charts are generally used to display an overall
evaluation of the security posture. Other representations of security status, like spider charts
or bar graphs, may be more effective at conveying trends, depending on the recipients.
The information security manager is accountable for managing the reporting process to assure
that it occurs, regardless of the form of reporting, and that the results are sufficiently analysed
and acted on in a timely manner.
risk (KRIs). KRIs are measures that indicate when an enterprise is exposed to risk that exceeds a
predefined risk level.
These indicators are generally developed based on experience and emerge from trends in
factors known to increase risk. They can range from increased absenteeism or turnover in key
employees to an increase in security events or incidents.
KRIS can give early warnings about potential issues or areas of particular risk. As a means of
ongoing monitoring, a variety of risk indicators can be developed for various parts of an
enterprise.
Aside from experience, KRIs can be chosen based on sources such as industry benchmarks,
external threat-reporting services, or any other factor that can be monitored and indicates
changes in risk to the enterprise.
Involvement of all stakeholders in the enterprise. The operational or the strategic side of risk
should not be focused solely by risk indicators.
To the root cause of events rather than only focusing on symptoms, confirming that the
chosen indicators drill down.
happens in an enterprise.
The primary responsibility of the information security manager is to report changes to the
suitable levels of the management at the right time.
To represent a risk status with the related and appropriate stakeholders and with top
management on the overall risk profile of the enterprise, involving modifications in risk level
and status of any open risk, the information security manager should have regular meetings.
Also, the security program should contain a procedure in that a substantial security event or
breach will trigger a report to top management and a reassessment of risk and suitable
controls because all security incidents or events are the consequence of the loss of or
deficiency of, controls.
For evaluating security events based on affect tp the enterprise, the information security
manager should have defined procedure.
every step of the risk management procedure for risk management to become part of culture
of the enterprise.
Communication should contain consultation with all related stakeholders and concentrate on
growth of a typical understanding of the goals and necessities of the risk management
program.
This procedure will permit deviations in perceptions and needs to be addressed and identified
more effectively.
Awareness is a strong mean in building the culture, shaping values and affecting the manners
of the members of an enterprise.
The risk and security awareness program should contain communication of security and risk
information, regular testing as a measure for awareness, and a medium for staff to report
security and risk issues.
The operational teams of an enterprise are usually the first to be aware of any abnormal
activities or problems.
Each team member can assist recognising vulnerabilities, suspect activity and potential attacks.
This may allow a more rapid reaction and more suitable containment of a risk when an attack
occurs.
This is acknowledge by the risk awareness that risk is an essential part of the business. It aims
to confirm the following:
The enterprise uses and recognises the available tools to manage risk.
Decisions regarding the extent and nature of documentation includes related benefits and
costs. The risk management policy, program and strategy describe the documentation
required.
Documentation should include the following at each stage of the risk management procedure:
Information Decision
Objectives Audience Assumptions
Resources Criteria
A risk register.
Domain 3
Domain 3:
This Domain Covers…
A: INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT
Program
Classification
3A3: Industry Standards and Frameworks for
Information
Development and
3A4: Information Security Policies, Procedures, and
Guidelines
3A5: Information Security Program Metrics
Management
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• Implementation of these resources also helps the governance framework principles by assisting
to confirm that the program:
It relied upon a conceptual model with specified key relationships and components.
Implements a flexible and open strategy that can be modified based on adjustments and
priorities from key stakeholders while keeping consistency and integrity.
support of the business functions and decreasing operational operation is the objective the
information security program.
• The primary task will be revolving high-level strategy into physical and logical reality through a
series of initiatives and projects for a well developed security strategy.
• Another prospect is that more useful resolutions may become available during program
development or eventually.
• A great deal of design and planning will be needed to accomplish working project plans
whether a procedure has been developed in significant detail or only to the conceptual level.
• It is important to determine the details that drive the business requirement for the information
security program. The following are the primary drivers for an information security program:
• It will still be essential to define overall objectives for security activities if security governance
has not been executed or a strategy has not been developed.
• Ready-made goals can involve conforming to a certain set of standards or acquiring a defined
maturity level relied on the CMMI model. Any security program will likely include developing,
executed and designing controls, whether physical, technical, or procedural. Metrics must be
considered as these controls are monitored and developed.
• Procedure to determine control failure and measure control effectiveness will be necessary.
Execution will generally includes a series of initiatives and projects. It usually includes skills of
project management, involving budgeting, utilising, scheduling time management skills, user
acceptance testing (CAT) and quality assurance.
• Many projects include complex or unusual technical components and may need precise
specification, engineering efforts and design.
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Information Security Program Concepts
Management and Process Concepts
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• Managing and implementing a security program will need the information security manager to
have knowledge of a number of management and procedure concepts involving:
Architectures
Budgeting, costing and financial issues
Business case development
Business process reengineering
Communications
Contingency planning
Control design and development
Control implementation and testing
Control monitoring and metrics
Control objectives
Critical thinking
Documentation
Personnel issues
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Information Security Program Concepts
Technology Resources
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• For the program to succeed, the information security manager must be adept at evaluating the
relevance and effectiveness of various solutions in line with the program's goals.
• It's essential for the manager to understand where specific technologies fit within the
framework of detection, containment, prevention, recovery, and response. This knowledge
ensures that the chosen technologies align with the strategic components of the program. For
instance, the manager should be familiar with:
• The information security manager will to determine the responsibilities, charter and the scope
of the program whether forming a new security program or coming into a current one.
• The security manager will find it hard to determine what to manage or how well a given
security function is meeting objectives without clearly defined responsibilities.
• It is essential to understand the location of information security function fits into the whole
organisational structure in terms of the chain of command.
• Numerous security program functions will already be accepted practice, if a program has been
functioning and established well.
• It would be sensitive to use any time is available to achieve insight into the existing situation if
the prior manager is available for orientation.
• On developing the correct relationships than on any particular expertise, security is often
politically charged and success may hinge more.
• It is also essential to achieve a thorough knowledge of the current state of security functions in
the enterprise.
• Reviews of recent incidents, audits and other related reports will be useful.
array of unexpected conditions for the information security manager. These involves:
Due to changes in areas of the responsibility introduced by the program, organisational resistance.
An insight that increased security will decrease access needed for job functions.
Subjective metrics overreliance.
Strategy failure.
Expectations of procedural compliance without ensuring oversight.
Delaying security initiatives, inadequate project management.
Previously hidden, damaged or buggy security software.
Poor monitoring or management of vendor third-party security activities.
Deficiency of program alignment with business objectives and goals.
• Lack of management support is most common in smaller enterprises or businesses of any size
that are not in high-security industries.
• Because such enterprises are not required to address information security, they frequently
regard it as a minor issue that adds cost with little value.
• Management may require direction on what actions are expected, as well as information on
approaches taken by industry peers to address information security.
• Even if initial education does not result in an immediate increase in support, ongoing education
should be carried out to raise awareness of security needs. The information security
programme strategy must include provisions for managing changes and updates.
• Management support necessitates an ongoing dialogue with a review of objectives and strategy
on a regular basis.
• One of the most challenging and frustrating issues the information security must address is
inadequate funding for information security initiatives. While this problem may be a sign of an
underlying deficiency of management support, there are usually other aspects the information
security manager is capable to influence.
• Some funding-related problems that may require to be handled by the information security
manager contain:
• The root cause of funding problems is usually insufficient staff to meet security program
requirements. Barriers to acquiring adequate staffing levels might incorporate:
• A variety of environmental and physical aspects may affect or constrain an information security
program.
• The prominent ones contain space, environmental hazards, capacity and availability of
infrastructure.
• The program and security strategy should make certain that conditions are made for the
consideration of adequate infrastructure capacity and environmental hazards.
• Contemplation should contain physical needs for recovery in the case of a disaster.
• The internal culture of enterprise must be considered while developing a security program.
• The culture in that the enterprise works must also be considered. A program that is at
probabilities with cultural standards may encounter resistance and may be hard to execute
successfully.
Organisational Structure
• Organisational structure will have a critical affect on how a management strategy can be
developed, executed and translated into an information security program.
• Cooperation between these functions is essential and generally needs senior management buy-
in and involvement.
• The implementation and development of a strategy consumes resources involving money and
time.
• With safety projects, however, control of precise compliance and risk with regulations are
generally the primary drivers.
Personnel
• A security strategy must assess what resistance may be experience during execution. Resistance
to important changes, along with probable displeasure against new restriction possibly viewed
as making tasks more time-consuming or difficult, should be expected.
• An adequate method must evaluate available budgets; the total cost of ownership (TCO) of
additional and new technologies; and the manpower needs of implementation, design,
maintenance, operation and eventual disarm.
• Generally, the TCO must be developed for the whole life cycle of processes, personnel, and
technologies.
Capabilities
• The resources available to execute a procedure should involve the known abilities of the
enterprise, involving skills and expertise.
• A method that depends on shown abilities is more likely to achieve than one that does not.
• Time is a main limitation in implementing and developing a strategy. There may be adherence
deadlines that must be support or met for specific strategic functions, such as a merger, that
must be assisted.
• There may be windows of opportunity for certain business activities that require distinct
timelines for execution of particular strategies.
Technology
• Technological complexness may restrain the execution of a protection strategy compatible
across the enterprise.
• There may be unsupported systems and existing legacy that are impotent to support the
security control execution until they are inactivated. Exemption procedured may be developed
to manage and assess the risk occurring from these constraints.
• This is required because the business value is a portion of the risk determination. The valuation
process, which includes connecting all values in a typical financial form, is straightforward for
some assets.
• Other possible effects can occur if the individuals suffering identity theft losses file lawsuits for
injuries, or if lawyers file class-action lawsuits on behalf of a lot of victims.
• Incorrect terms of services and products or information directed to wrong investor decisions
can result in substantial failures as a result of different legal actions.
• Types of distinct information assets that must be allocated a value and protected involve, but
are not limited to the following:
Proprietary processes and information of all kinds, containing information that can harm the
enterprise.
Future projections and current financial records.
Merger plans or acquisition.
Strategic marketing plans.
Trade secrets.
Patent-related information.
Privacy-related information, involving protected health information (PHI) and PII.
Customer data, concluding payment card information (PCI).
• Many enterprises do not have an exact list of information assets, and the struggle to categorise
and inventory their assets can seem to be a daunting task. The accurateness of the valuation is
not as essential as having a constant strategy to prioritise efforts.
• Values within the similar order of importance as the real loss are adequate for planning
objectives. Media reports include many well-documented failure strategies and loss amounts on
which to establish a valuation.
• Information asset valuation methodologies incorporate multiple variables, involving the level of
technological complexity and the level of possible consequential and direct financial loss.
• Quantitative valuation methodologies are typically the most accurate but can be quite difficult
once downstream and actual effects have been analysed.
• The foremost step in the classification process is to confirm the information asset list is done,
involving the identification of the location and purpose of each asset.
• A great benefit of information asset classification is the fact that connecting security to business
goals decreases the risk of either under-protection or expensive overprotection of information
assets.
• Providing the same high level of protection to all assets can be very costly, if the enterprise is
risk-averse and needs a high level of security,
Several approaches exist to determine the criticality and sensitivity of information resources and
the effect of negative events. A BIA is a typical process to identify the effect of adverse events.
The information security manager may use the methodologies outlined within MST, COBIT and
other frameworks that are representatives of the resources. It is essential, however, to confirm
that concerns contain both the direct impact and any downstream outcomes.
(Continued)
Identifying the critical organisational functions is the next step. The focus for each business
department or unit is to define what tasks are essential to the unit in attaining its goals.
(Continued)
(Continued)
Asset Vulnerabilities
• Being an integral part of enterprise architecture, the effectiveness of an EISA depends on it. The
loss of enterprises to adopt the concept of security architecture seems to have several
recognisable causes.
• Even though technical security has significantly improved, the lack of architecture has resulted
over time in functionally less security integration and increasing vulnerability across the
enterprise.
• This deficiency of integration donates to the raising problem in handling enterprise security
efforts effectively.
1. Business architecture, that describes the business governance, strategy, key business and
organisation procedures of the enterprise.
2. Data architecture, that defines the structure of an enterprise's physical and logical data
assets and the related data management resources.
3. Applications architecture, that gives a blueprint for the individual application systems to be
used, the relations among the application systems, and their relationships to the centre
business procedures of the enterprise with the frameworks for services to be revealed as
business functions for integration
4. Technical architecture that defines the software, network and hardware infrastructure
needed to sustain the deployment of core mission-critical applications.
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Enterprise Information Security Architectures
(Continued)
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• A business architecture describes the business governance, organisation, strategy and critical
business procedures.
• A data architecture defines the structure of an enterprise's physical and logical data
management resources and data assets.
• An architecture of application gives a blueprint for the individual application system to be used,
their interconnection and their relations to the enterprise's core business procedures.
• To give a framework for successfully managing complexity, one of the main functions of
architecture as a tool.
• As a project increases in complexity and size, numerous design and designer influences must
work as a team to make something that has the impression of being made by a single design
authority.
• As the complexness of the business environment evolves, many business operations and
support processes must combine seamlessly to give adequate management and services for
the business, its partners and customers. Architecture gives a way to handle that complexity.
• Both directly and indirectly, these objectives include demonstrating the following:
The program is being worked efficiently and with consideration for cost problems.
Information security capabilities and knowledge are increasing as an outcome of the program.
Management has a clear knowledge of information security benefits, needs, activities and
drivers.
The program contains conditions for the continuity of business of the enterprise.
• COBIT allows IT and information to be managed and governed entirely for the enterprise,
managing the IT and business functional areas of responsibility, and thinking the information-
related interests of internal and external stakeholders.
• COBIT is relied on two sets of principles: 1) principles that defines the central necessities of a
governance system for enterprise information and technology, 2) principles for a framework
that can be employed to create a governance system for the enterprise.
• COBIT involves multiple focus locations that define particular governance topics, issues and
domains that can be directed by a group of governance and management goals and their
elements.
• Based on the British Standard, this standard has been slightly expanded to include the
following control areas:
A.5 Information Security Policies
A.6 Information Security Organisation
A.7 Human Resource Activity
A.8 Asset Management
A.9 Access Control
A.10 Cryptography
A.11 Environmental and Physical Security
A.12 Operations Security
A.13 Communications Security
A.14 System Development and Maintenance
A.15 Supplier Relationships
A.16 Information Security Incident Management
A.17 Information Security Aspects of Business Continuity Management
A.18 Compliance
• Formally titled the NIST Framework for Enhancing Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, this
model gives high-level advice for aligning a cybersecurity program with enterprise goals. The
framework underlines the requirement for adequate risk management integration and it
greatly supports progress in supply chain risk management.
• The MST Cybersecurity Framework does not give commands to be used. Examination of the
gaps in conditions allows the use of controls-based frameworks to enhance information
security risk management. The following are the Components of the MST Cybersecurity
Framework:
Framework
The Framework Framework
Implementation
Core Profile
Tiers
• The system development life cycle can be integrated with security, privacy, and cyber supply
chain risk management tasks using the KIST Risk Management Framework (RMF).
• The RMF includes provisions for monitoring the ongoing efficacy and efficiency of risk
management procedures as well as a risk-based method for categorising pertinent assets,
choosing and implementing controls to ensure adequate protection, and categorising relevant
assets. The following are the RMF steps:
• It is important that all technology elements have an recognised owner and that there are no
orphan methods. This is required to confirm accountability and responsibility for keeping all
systems in adherence with security policies and for proper treatment and ownership of
associated risk to acceptable levels.
• The extensive majority of the enterprise's information will reside with IT and will be a major
priority of the information security framework, from an information security perspective.
• The information security function must sufficiently regulate the IT function and give direction
to confirm policy compliance adequate to acquire acceptable risk levels constant with the
information security strategy goals.
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Information Security Frameworks Components
Operational Components
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• Operational elements of a security program are the administrative activities and ongoing
management that should be conducted to give the needed level of security assurance.
• These operational components contain items like business operation security practices, SOPs,
administration and maintenance of security technologies.
• They are usually performed on a daily to weekly timeline. The information security manager
should give current management of the operational information security elements.
• These activities usually take place less often than operational components, possibly on a
timeline measured in years, months or quarters.
• Management policies, necessities and objectives are key in shaping the information security
program, that, in turn, describes what must be managed.
• To be the basis for changing security policies and modifying and developing standards, periodic
or ongoing analysis of risk, assets, threats and organisational impact must continue.
• The information security manager in responsible of such an operation should confirm that HR,
financial and other management functions are adequate.
• The information security manager must create a working rapport with the finance department
of the enterprise to confirm a strong working relationship, support, and keeping with financial
procedures and policies.
• Employee awareness and education about security risk is often merged with initial training and
employee orientation.
• General organisational procedures and policies, such as adequate use policies and employee
observe policies, should be administered and communicated at the HR level of the enterprise.
• At the business unit level, responsibilities and issues that are distinct to role of an employee or
enterprise should be administrated and communicated.
• Interactive education techniques, like role-playing and online testing, are usually more
adequate than a cleanly informational approach.
• The information security manager should cooperate with business and HR departments to
recognise information security education requirements.
• For extended periods, well-developed policies in a mature enterprise can stay fairly static.
• Policies must be lined up with and support the planned security objectives of the enterprise.
• For the situations in which policy compliance cannot be obtained, an exception procedure
must be established.
• The exception procedure must contain formally documented governance oversight admitting
approval of the risk made by not adhering to the information security policy.
• To modify or create standards and policies as required, one of the most essential aspects of the
action plan to implement the strategy.
• The road map must demonstrate the sequence and steps, milestones and dependencies.
• To implement the strategy following the road map the action plan is essentially a project plan.
• Each of the related 14 domains and major subsections must be the subject of one or more
policies, if the objective is ISO/IEC 27001:2013 compliance.
• This can be effectively accomplished with about two dozen particular policies for large
organisations in practice. The finished strategy gives the basis for modification or creation of
existing policies.
requirements of policy.
• Boundaries are set in terms of permitted limits on people, technologies and processes.
• To confirm security while maximising procedural options, standards must be carefully crafted
to give only the required limits.
• Multiple standards will normally exist for each policy, relying on the classification level or
security domain.
• For example, the password standard would be more restraining when retrieving high-security
domains.
• Standards are extremely effective security management tools. They define the permitted
boundaries for technology and system procedures and practises, as well as for people and
events.
• They are the legislation to the policy constitution when properly applied. They serve as a
yardstick for policy compliance and a solid foundation for audits. Standards are the primary
tool for executing good security governance, and the information security manager must own
them.
• Additional standards and norms governing format, content, and mandatory approvals must be
established. Standards must be communicated to those who are regulated by them as well as
those who are affected by them.
• Processes for review and change must also be developed. Exception processes must be
designed for standards that are not easily achievable due to technological or other constraints.
• Procedures must be clear and include all procedures required to complete certain jobs. They
must define the expected outcomes, displays, and prerequisite circumstances for execution.
Procedures must also include the procedures to take if unexpected findings arise.
• Procedures and terminology must be precise and unambiguous. For example, the phrases
"must" and "shall" are used for any necessary task.
• The word "should" must be used to refer to a desired but not required action. The words
"may" or "can" must only be used to indicate completely discretionary action.
• Discretionary tasks should only be included in procedures if absolutely essential, as they dilute
the procedures' signals.
information that will be useful in carrying out procedures, such as policy and standard
clarification, dependencies, ideas and examples, narratives defining the procedures,
background information that may be valuable, and instruments that can be employed.
• Guidelines can be beneficial in a variety of other situations, but they are discussed here in the
context of information security governance.
• Policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines should be cross-referenced so that they may be
easily understood, referred to when needed, and kept up to date.
• It is usually a good idea to have an intranet or another mechanism to keep them so that the
proper audience may access them when needed.
be measured.
• Security is defined as the absence or prevention of harm. As a result, security metrics should
inform us about the state or degree of safety in comparison to a reference point.
• Technical metrics can be used to manage the tactical operational aspects of technical security
systems.
• They can show that the infrastructure is in good working order and that technical
vulnerabilities have been found and resolved.
• They provide few indicators of policy compliance or whether objectives for acceptable levels of
potential effect are being met, and they provide little information on whether the information
security program is on track and achieving the anticipated results.
metrics, measures, and monitoring is to aid in decision making. The key to good metrics is to
employ a set of criteria to identify which of the virtually limitless number of metrics candidates
is the most appropriate. Good metrics include:
• The total security program's performance will be too far downstream to offer timely
information on implementation, thus another solution will be required.
• KGIs and KPIs can be used to offer information on the achievement of process or service goals,
as well as to identify whether organisational milestones and objectives are accomplished.
• It should be obvious that the cost-effectiveness of the security program is inextricably linked to
how well it meets the enterprise's objectives and at what cost.
• The development of a security strategy that defines security objectives in business terms and
ensures that the objectives are directly articulated from planning to implementation of
policies, standards, procedures, processes, and technology is the best overall indicator that
security activities are in alignment with business (or organisational) objectives.
• The litmus test is the ability to reverse-engineer a specific control to a specific business
requirement.
• Risk management is the main goal of all information security activities and organisational
assurance efforts. A successful risk management program is one that meets expectations and
achieves set objectives while keeping risk at levels acceptable to management in an efficient,
effective, and consistent manner. Indicators of effective risk management may include:
• When security investments are optimised in support of organisational goals, value delivery
occurs. When strategic security goals are met and an acceptable risk posture is obtained at the
lowest possible cost, optimal investment levels are reached.Key performance indicators (KGIs
and KPIs) include:
• Information security resource management refers to the processes that are used to organise,
assign, and govern information security resources, such as people, processes, and technology,
in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of business solutions. The following are
some indicators of effective resource management:
• To guarantee that organisational goals are met, information security processes must be
measured, monitored, and reported on. Effective performance measurement indicators
include:
management process.
• The ability to measure and quantify is a key principle of systems engineering. Measurement
supports correct design, precise execution to specifications, and efficient management
operations such as goal setting, progress tracking, benchmarking, and prioritisation.
• Metrics for information security programes that directly correspond to these control objectives
are critical for program management.
• That is, measurements that lack a reference point in the form of objectives or goals are not
metrics and are unlikely to be effective in program guiding.
• Metrics ultimately serve only one purpose: decision assistance. It measures to offer
information on which to build educated judgments on what it is attempting to achieve.
• The information required at the strategic level is primarily navigational in nature (i.e.,
determining whether the security program is headed in the right direction to achieve the
defined objectives leading to the desired outcomes).
• Both of the information security manager and senior management require this information in
order to provide adequate oversight.
• Management (or tactical) metrics are those required to run the security program, such as
policy and standard compliance, incident management and response effectiveness, and
personnel and resource utilisation.
• At the security management level, information on compliance, developing risk, resource usage,
alignment with corporate goals, and other subjects is necessary to make the decisions required
for effective management.
• The most popular technical and procedural metrics are operational metrics, which include
open vulnerabilities and patch management status. Purely technical metrics are particularly
important for IT security managers and system administrators. There are various other
considerations for development, including:
They include many of the previous elements (such as policies, procedures, guidelines,
practises, and organisational structures) and are the primary elements to consider when
developing an information security program.
Controls are executed to attain specific goals, and they collaborate to enable stakeholder goals
through the strategic program plan.
Control objectives aid in the alignment and achievement of security and privacy goals.
Control objectives are defined as a statement of the desired outcome or purpose of executing
control procedures in a specific process.
be based on several factors, including assuring their effectiveness, cost or potential restriction
of business activities, and optimal form of control.
IT Controls
As information and technology play such an important role in the operations of many
businesses, IT controls account for the majority of the controls they require. While technical
controls are included, many IT controls are both technical and administrative in nature.
Non-IT Controls
The information security manager should be aware that information security controls for non-
IT-related information processes, such as secure marking, handling, and storage requirements
for physical information, and considerations for dealing with and preventing social engineering,
must also be developed. Environmental controls should be considered so that otherwise
secure systems are not simply stolen, as has happened in some well-publicised cases.
The layers should be designed in such a way that the failure of one layer does not result in the
failure of the next layer. The number of layers required will be determined by asset sensitivity
and criticality, defence reliability, and degree of exposure.
Excessive reliance on a single control is likely to lead to overconfidence. A company that relies
solely on a firewall, for example, may still be vulnerable to a variety of attack methods.
A human firewall, which can serve as an additional layer of defence, can be created through
education and awareness. Another defensive layer can be created by segmenting the network.
Several security technologies have been developed over the last few decades to address the
ever-increasing threats to information resources.
The information security manager must understand how technologies can be used as controls
to achieve the desired level of security.
General, or common, controls are control activities that, as part of the security infrastructure,
support the entire enterprise in a centralised fashion.
Control activities in support of an operating system, network security, and facility security are
examples. These controls typically include centralised user administration policies, standards,
and procedures, as well as technical elements like access controls, firewalls, and intrusion
detection systems (IDSs).
Subordinate system-level activities can then inherit these general controls to achieve control
objectives.
This is due to the fact that control objectives are largely determined by management's defined
acceptable risk levels. The controls must be designed to achieve the objectives of acceptable
risk levels.
As a result, the control objectives serve as both the design objective and the subsequent
control metric for effectiveness.
Control objectives must be defined during program development and apply to physical,
administrative, and technical controls.
Control objectives necessitate the use of a variety of control types. A technical control, such as
a firewall, may necessitate a physical protection control, a configuration procedural control,
and administrative oversight.
technical and nontechnical methods. Technical controls are safeguards built into computer
hardware, software, or firmware.
Category Description
Managerial Controls pertaining to a process's oversight, reporting, procedures, and operations. Policies,
processes, balancing, employee development, and compliance reporting are examples of
these.
Technical Controls are provided by technology, a piece of equipment, or a device. Firewalls, network or
host-based intrusion detection systems, passwords, and antivirus software are some
examples. To function properly, a technical control requires proper managerial controls.
Physical Locks, fences, closed-circuit television (CCTV), and other devices installed to physically
restrict access to a facility or hardware. Physical controls necessitate maintenance,
monitoring, and the ability to assess and respond to an alert in the event of a problem.
In addition to the general safeguards provided by standard controls, the information security
manager may require a control against a specific threat on occasion. A countermeasure is a
type of control.
Countermeasures frequently provide targeted protection, making them more effective but less
efficient than broader, more general safeguards—though not always less cost-effective,
depending on the original and residual ALE associated with the threat being countered.
Countermeasures are controls that are put in place in response to a known threat. They can be
preventive, investigative, or corrective in nature, or any combination of the three. Nontechnical
countermeasures can also be used, like offering a reward for information leading to the arrest
of hackers.
Countermeasures used to address specific threats or vulnerabilities are frequently costly, both
operationally and financially, and can become a distraction from core security operations.
All efforts to protect information are built on a strong physical barrier that protects the physical
media on which the information is stored. Physical security is often provided as part of facilities
management in many businesses.
The physical security organisation may establish requirements building by building and enforce
those requirements through a combination of physical security technology and manual
procedures.
Physical and environmental controls are a subset of general controls that are used by all
computing facilities and personnel. Furthermore, some technologies include features that
enable physical mechanisms to override logical controls.
Consider operational authority and the types of controls available when determining the types
of control technologies that must be considered by the information security manager.
As the majority of technical controls are under the direct control of the IT department, it is
necessary to consider how security will be maintained. IT and the security department may
share operational authority in some cases.
In terms of the types of controls available, technologies typically fall into one of three
categories:
1 2 3
Native Supplemental Support
Control Control Control
Technologies Technologies Technologies
Dealing with a wide range of technical components previously classified as native control
technologies, supplementary control technologies, and management support technologies is
part of information security management.
The technical security architecture is made up of native control and support technologies. This
construct can be applied to individual business applications or to the enterprise as a whole,
with the goal of revealing how individual technical components interact to give overall
enterprise or application security.
The information security manager should assure that the technical security architecture
components are in sync with the enterprise's risk and threat postures as well as its business
requirements.
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The strategy's development includes determining acceptable risk and risk tolerance.
Control objectives, which define the main requirements for the controls, are determined using
acceptable risk levels.
Controls must also meet some or all of the criteria outlined in the preceding section.
Controls that affect all aspects of an enterprise, including people, technology, and processes,
are required for effective information security.
To achieve the control objectives, a combination of controls is frequently required. The control
options are virtually limitless, which adds to the difficulty.
Access control, for example, is a preventive control that prevents unauthorised access that
could harm systems. Because it detects unauthorised access, intrusion detection is a detective
control.
Backup and restoration procedures are a corrective measure that allows a system to be
recovered if the damage is severe enough that data is lost or irreparably damaged, resulting in
impact.
Compensating controls (for example, insurance) are similar to corrective controls in that they
compensate for an impact caused by a compromise.
This is a preventive control because it prevents unauthorised access to specific network ports,
protocols, or destinations.
The same firewall may have more advanced features, such as the ability to scan inbound
network traffic for malware and send alerts to an operations centre if suspicious traffic passes
through the device. This is a control for detectives.
The firewall may also include a feature that lets operations to redirect incoming traffic to a
backup site if it is discovered that a virus has reduced capacity at the primary site after
responding to the virus alert.
Because it allows the systems to resume normal operations, this is a recovery or corrective
control.
As a deterrent control against unauthorised access, the proxy service that runs on the firewall
may be capable of displaying a warning banner.
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Introduction
(Continued)
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1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8
Segregation of
Transparency Trust Zero Trust
Duties (Sod)
the system documentation, baseline security requirements must be defined and documented,
typically in standards.
Adequate traceability of security requirements must be assured and supported throughout the
life cycle. Authentication functions, logging, role-based access control, and data transmission
confidentiality mechanisms are a few examples.
The information security manager should understand the enterprise's risk tolerance and must
consult industry and regional sources to establish a baseline set of security functions that are
appropriate for organisational policies and acceptable risk levels.
Based on vulnerability, threat, and risk analysis, additional controls may be warranted, and
these controls must be involved in the requirements-gathering process.
During the design and development phases, the information security team may be consulted
to assess how well solution options meet acceptable risk requirements.
There is almost never a perfect solution, and there will always be trade-offs between security
requirements, performance, costs, and other demands.
To achieve control objectives, the information security manager must be diligent in identifying
and communicating solution deficiencies, as well as developing mitigating or compensating
controls.
To ensure that coding practises and security logic are adequate, the information security
manager should use internal or external resources to review them during development.
The information security manager must coordinate testing of originally established functional
security requirements as well as testing system interfaces for vulnerabilities during the quality
and acceptance phases.
The goal, as with other elements of the security strategy and program, is to make sure that the
layers of controls implemented achieve the agreed-upon acceptable level of risk, rather than to
ensure that the controls completely eliminate any risk.
Throughout the operation of the security program, testing and evaluation of the various
management, technical, and physical controls will be ongoing, including system-specific
controls that will be continuously assessed throughout the system life cycle.
As changes arise to risk objectives, the threat landscape, and system operation change, the
evaluation procedure should evolve to assure that control objectives, such as cost-
effectiveness and mission alignment, are met.
quantitative and qualitative compliance testing results can be used to determine control
strength.
Yet, a careful examination of the procedure may reveal that there is no evidence of review and
that subsequent response actions, including resolution, cannot be measured. The control fails
in this scenario.
However, if handwritten notes with initials and dates are recorded within IDS log reports on a
daily basis, and if the same notes contain analysis, action plans, ticket numbers, and resolution,
then the manual control is far more effective than the automated one.
Of course, no final conclusion about the strength of the control can be reached until it has
been thoroughly tested.
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Control Strength
(Continued)
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A control's strength can be measured in terms of its inherent (or design) strength and
likelihood of effectiveness. Balancing the books to account for all cash and dividing accounting
accountabilities within numerous employees are two examples of inherently strong controls.
Risk mitigation must be linked to supported business functions in order to demonstrate value
and alignment with business objectives.
This assures that information security and IT governance initiatives are automatically followed,
and that cost justification for the treatment procedure is self-explanatory and easily available.
Controls that could mitigate or eliminate the identified risk (as appropriate to the enterprise's
operations) to an acceptable level are provided during this step of the process.
When recommending controls and alternative solutions to achieve control objectives, the
following factors should be considered:
Control recommendations are the outcomes of the risk assessment and analysis process, and
they serve as input to the risk treatment process.
The recommended procedural and technical security controls are evaluated, prioritised, and
implemented during the risk treatment process.
To determine which are required and appropriate for a specific enterprise, a cost-benefit
analysis for the proposed controls should be performed to demonstrate that the costs of
implementing the controls can be justified by a reduction in the level of risk or impact.
The control implementation process should seek input from the appropriate business unit
owner for effective results.
of controls or introduce new vulnerabilities that existing controls are not designed to address.
Control testing is required in most publicly traded companies and must be executed as a
regular practise in all businesses to assure that procedural controls are carried out consistently
and effectively.
Technical or operational controls changes should be made with caution. Changes to technical
controls must be made in accordance with change control procedures and with the approval of
stakeholders.
The information security manager must conduct an analysis of the proposed control
environment to determine if there are any new or recurring vulnerabilities in the design and to
assure that the control is designed properly.
awareness techniques, an active security awareness program can significantly minimise risk.
• Common user security problems, such as password selection, appropriate use of computing
resources, email and online browsing safety, and social engineering, should be addressed
through security awareness programes.
• Education and understanding of the necessity of the information security programme is a key
part of achieving compliance with the program.
• Employee awareness should begin when they join the company and continue on a regular
basis.
• All enterprise personnel and, when applicable, third-party users must get proper training and
regular updates on the importance of enterprise security policies, standards, and procedures.
conducting the education and awareness programme, taking into account factors such as:
third-party partners, the security program should also include training relevant to the duties of
those in security-specific work tasks, including leadership roles. Particular considerations
include:
1. Executive, leader, and manager training to help them understand their roles in defining risk
expectations.
2. Training for persons in positions of authority should emphasise specific approaches for
safeguarding precious resources.
3. Physical security personnel training focuses on those who are responsible for physical
security, including environmental variables that support the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of critical organisational assets.
assessing and tracking course delivery and results should be implemented. Consider the
following when conducting such tracking:
1 2 3
Automation
Coverage Grading and
Deployment
1. Service providers
2. Outsourced operations
3. Trading partners
4. Merged or acquired enterprises
• The capacity to manage security effectively in these partnerships is a big problem for the
information security manager.
• Concerns may also be raised about incident response, business continuity, and catastrophe
recovery capabilities.
When outsourcing, the information security manager must examine numerous factors,
involving:
Ensuring that suitable controls and processes are in place to support outsourcing.
Ensuring that proper information risk management terms are included in the outsourcing
contract.
Ensuring that a risk assessment is completed for the outsourced process.
Ensuring that enough due diligence is completed prior to contract signature.
Day-to-day management of information risk for outsourced services.
Ensuring that major changes to the relationship are identified and that updated risk
assessments are conducted as needed.
Ensuring that right procedures are followed when ending relationships.
• Third-party providers of security services and outsourced IT or business operations that must
be integrated into the overall information security program are the two forms of outsourcing
that an information security manager may encounter.
• It is also likely that when the business grows, it may want more services, which may necessitate
substantially greater fees from the outsourcer.
• This could happen if the organisation determines that the constraints imposed by outsourcing
are unacceptable, or if the costs connected with a new arrangement are prohibitively
expensive. Other essential and potentially negative factors to consider while examining
outsourcing possibilities are:
manager, such as external firms that may be hesitant to share technical specifics on the nature
and scope of their information protection measures.
• From the standpoint of risk management, it is critical that incident management and response,
business continuity planning/disaster recovery planning, and testing include all critical
outsourced services and operations.
• Key clauses that should be included in a third-party contract include, but are not limited to:
their responsibilities and rights within the relationship; and 2) to give a way to resolve
problems after the contract is in effect.
• The information security manager should be aware with specific security and information
protection provisions within that framework.
• The most prevalent type of security provision is one that addresses secrecy or nondisclosure.
The information security manager must identify the particular amount of destruction required.
• The contract may also require either or both parties to maintain security procedures to
guarantee that the systems and information used in the agreement are adequately protected.
• The contract should explain what is meant by "suitable," as well as the conditions for
demonstrating the effectiveness of those safeguards.
processing facilities should be controlled based on risk assessment and clearly described in a
SLA.
• Access should be granted using the least privilege, need-to-know, and need-to-do criteria.
Third-party access must be based on clearly defined means of access, access permissions, and
levels of functionality, and access must need the asset owner's agreement.
• Access usage should be fully logged and examined on a regular basis by the security manager.
The frequency of reviews should be determined by considerations such as:
• It is also critical for the information security manager to reevaluate the program's efficacy in
light of changes in organisational demands, settings, and limits on a regular basis.
• The findings of such an analysis should be shared with the information security steering
committee or other stakeholders for discussion and formulation of necessary program
improvements.
• While the information security manager must decide the most appropriate scope for current
state assessment, the following section offers many essential topics for consideration.
• The information security manager must assess the program's documented security objectives.
Important considerations include:
Has an information security plan and roadmap for development been developed?
Have appropriate risk and impact criteria been established?
Are policies, standards, and processes complete and up to date?
Are program objectives in sync with governance objectives?
Are the objectives measurable, reasonable, and tied to specified deadlines?
Do the program objectives correspond to the organisation's goals, initiatives, compliance
requirements, and operational environment?
Is there agreement on program goals? Were goals developed collaboratively?
Have measures been implemented to track program performance and shortfalls?
Is there a regular assessment of objectives and accomplishments by management?
• Compliance criteria alignment and fulfilment are two of the most apparent indicators of
security management status. Because numerous standards specify program management
requirements, the information security manager must compare the management program—
framework and components—to mandatory and optional compliance standards. Important
considerations include:
Has management established the level of compliance that the organisation will pursue, as well as the
timetables and milestones?
Is close cooperation between the compliance and information security groups facilitated? Are the
requirements for information security compliance well defined?
Does the information security program incorporate compliance requirements precisely into its
policies, standards, procedures, operations, and success metrics?
Do the technical, operational, and management components of the program correspond to the
components required by regulatory standards?
• The level of management support and the overall depth of the existing program are revealed
by evaluating program management components. Consider the following programme
management components:
Is the program itself thoroughly documented? Have essential policies, standards, and procedures been
reduced to simple operational instructions and given to those responsible?
Do those in positions of responsibility understand their roles and responsibilities?
Are the duties and responsibilities of members of senior management, boards, and so on defined? Do
these organisations recognise and act on their responsibilities?
Are information security duties reflected in company managers' objectives and included in their
performance evaluations?
Have policies and standards been finalised, formally approved, and disseminated?
• The success with which the information security programme implements security operational
operations, both within the security organisation and in other organisational units, must be
evaluated by the information security manager. Among the most important considerations are:
Are security requirements and processes addressed in security, technology, and business unit standard
operating procedures?
Do security-related SOPs mandate accountability, process transparency, and management oversight?
Do security-related operations such as configuration management, access management, security
system maintenance, event analysis, and incident response have established SOPs?
Is a timetable of routinely conducted procedures (for example, technical configuration review) in
place? Is it possible to keep track of scheduled activities in the program?
Are there technological standards for configuring specific networks, systems, apps, and other
technology components for security?
Are there standards that address architectural security challenges like as topology, communication
protocols, and crucial system compartmentalisation?
Do high-level policies and requirements support and enforce standards? Are standards developed in
collaboration with technical, operations, and security personnel?
Are technical standards applied consistently? Do mechanisms exist to evaluate and report on technical
standard compliance on a regular basis? Is there a systematic method in place to handle exceptions?
Are important controls continuously monitored? Do controls provide failure notifications?
• The information security manager must examine the program's financial, human, and technical
resources.
• Deficiencies must be discovered and escalated to high management or the steering committee.
Consider the following:
controls that are established and executed to address or minimise threats, risks, vulnerabilities,
and impacts.
• The total quality management (TQM) system's concepts and procedures are well suited to the
unique reliance on effective, efficient management of a business process such as information
security.
to analysing and evaluating the state of various parts of the program during its creation and
management.
• Using a consistent strategy will provide trend information over time and can act as a metre for
program improvements. This is possible through a security assessment procedure similar to an
audit. Security reviews, like regular auditing procedures, have:
• Auditors identify, examine, test, and assess the effectiveness of controls in the professional
field of information systems auditing.
• An audit team gathers documentation that 1) maps controls to control objectives, 2) indicates
what the team performed to test those controls, and 3) relates those test findings to the final
evaluation while executing an audit.
• Work papers are documents that may or may not be presented with the final report.
• A framework or external standard, such as COBIT or ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002, provides a
structure for control goals, allowing an audit team to arrange its assessment of existing
controls.
• The information security manager must establish effective working relationships with auditors,
both internal and external. Internal and external auditing operations must be included into the
information security program.
• Procedures for scheduling, observing personnel activities, and providing configuration data
from technical systems should be set in advance. In some situations, an auditor's finding of a
flaw may not apply to the information security manager's unique organisation.
• If issues are discovered during an audit, the information security manager should collaborate
with the auditors to determine the related risk, mitigating variables, and acceptable control
objectives.
• The findings of the audit give robust, impartial input for the steering committee and
management to utilise in evaluating the performance of the information security program.
• Compliance enforcement refers to any activity inside the information security program that is
aimed to ensure compliance with the enterprise's security policies, standards, and procedures.
• Enforcement processes should be created with the assumption that control activities are in
place to support control objectives.
• These procedures add another layer of control to guarantee that the procedures defined by
management are followed.
• Policies serve as the foundation for all accountability for security duties across the company.
• Policies must be comprehensive enough to cover all instances in which information is handled,
while also being flexible enough to enable for new processes and procedures to grow for
different technologies while remaining compliant.
• It is the responsibility of the information security manager to guarantee that there are no
orphan systems or systems without policy compliance owners during the assignment process.
• This is a technique for business units or departments to analyse a policy and decide not to
implement it based on a variety of considerations.
• Standards define the possibilities for systems, processes, and behaviours that nevertheless
adhere to policy.
• Based on the criticality and sensitivity of the resources, the standards must be created to
ensure that all systems of the same type within the same security domain are configured and
operated in the same manner.
• It is also possible that a business scenario justifies a variation from established standards while
remaining within the policy's goal.
• Standards exceptions, like policy exceptions, must entail risk assessment and acceptance by
competent management. If exceptions must go through the change management process (if
one exists), analysing the risk of the change will be a standard element of the procedure.
• Noncompliance issues can pose a danger to the organisation, thus it is critical to design
specialised methods to deal with them effectively and efficiently. A method for identifying
criticality and then establishing a risk-based response mechanism benefits the security
manager. Noncompliance concerns and other deviations can be found through a variety of
approaches, including: • routine monitoring • audit reports • security reviews • vulnerability
scans • due diligence work.
Compliance Enforcement
• Conformity enforcement is a continuous collection of activities aimed at bringing policy and, by
default, standards requirements that are not being met into compliance.
• Legal and internal audit divisions are frequently in charge of evaluating business plans and
operations, respectively.
• Another common approach for determining system vulnerabilities is the use of external and
internal scanning and penetration testing, albeit this will only reveal the efficacy of one aspect
of the whole program.
• Continuous DDS and firewall monitoring can provide real-time information on efforts to
penetrate perimeter defences. Training help desk staff to escalate suspicious reports that could
indicate a breach or an attack can act as an effective monitoring and early warning system.
• Processes must be in place for the information security manager to determine the overall
efficacy of security investments and the extent to which objectives have been met.
• The information security manager should confirm that KPIs are created and agreed upon
during the design and implementation of the security program, and that a method to assess
progress against those indicators is implemented.
• In addition to the original procurement and implementation costs, it is critical to account for:
that allow the information security program's successes and shortfalls to be assessed.
Measuring success entails creating quantifiable objectives, recording the most relevant
metrics, and assessing results on a regular basis to identify areas of success and improvement
potential.
• The information security program must support the primary goals of the organisation. The
information security steering committee and executive management might assess the
following qualitative measures:
Is there a written link between significant organisational milestones and the information
security program's objectives?
Were there organisational goals that were not fulfilled because information security
objectives were not met?
How strong is the agreement that programme objectives are full and suitable among
business units, upper management, and other information security stakeholders?
• There are no endless resources in an information security program. The information security
manager must maximise operational productivity, especially given the increasing development
of IT firms.
• When used in a time-based comparison analysis, productivity measurements are most useful.
• Productivity is a measure of the amount of work produced per unit of resource. The
information security manager should establish regular targets for boosting the program's
productivity through specialised activities.
• Financial constraints are a common cause of security failings, including inability to prepare for
continuing maintenance requirements, thus the information security programme must be
financially sustainable.
• This procedure starts with precise cost forecasting and budgeting. The success of this operation
is often determined by comparing budget utilisation to initial forecasts, which can assist in
identifying difficulties with security cost planning.
• The information security manager should create systems to monitor the continuous cost-
efficiency of security components, which is typically performed by tracking cost-result ratios, in
addition to budgeting effectiveness.
• By assessing the overall cost of producing a certain output, this approach creates cost-
efficiency goals for new technologies and improvement goals for existing technologies.
• Personnel actions, even in a well controlled technical setting, might pose hazards that can only
be managed via education and awareness.
• Employees are the most widely used for tracking organisational awareness. The information
security manager should collaborate with the human resources department to develop metrics
for measuring organisational awareness success.
• One of the most visible aspects of an information security programme is generally the technical
security architecture.
• The information security manager must develop quantitative metrics of the technical control
environment's efficacy.
• For reporting and analysis, technical security metrics can be classified by protected resource
and geographic location. The following are some examples of technical security effectiveness
metrics:
1. Network access control devices resist probe and attack attempts; qualify based on asset or resource
targeted, source geography, and attack kind.
2. Internal network probe and attack attempts identified by intrusion detection systems; differentiate by
internal versus external source, resource targeted, and attack type.
3. The number and type of real compromises; categorise by attack severity, attack type, effect severity,
and attack source
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Measuring Information Security Management Performance
Measuring Effectiveness of Management Framework and Resources
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• Efficient information security management maximises the output of the components and
procedures that it employs. Mechanisms for collecting process input, recognising difficulties
and opportunities, tracking implementation consistency, and effectively conveying changes and
information all contribute to program effectiveness. Tracking the program's progress in this
area includes the following methods:
• Measuring, monitoring, and reporting on information security processes assist the information
security manager in ensuring that the program's operational components properly support
control objectives. Security operational performance metrics include:
regardless of its scope. In addition to countless other design issues, new or updated controls
necessitate ways for determining if they are performing as intended.
• Procedural and process controls are often just as important as operational controls, although
they are more complex to install. Monitoring the security of information systems is an essential
operational component of any information security program. The following are some examples
of commonly observed event types:
Domain 4
Incident Management
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Incident
4A3: Business Continuity Plan (BCP)
4A4: Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP)
4A5: Incident Classification/Categorisation
Incident
4B3: Incident Containment Methods
4B4: Incident Response Communications
4B5: Incident Eradication and Recovery
• The speed with which an enterprise can recognise, assess, respond to, and recover from an
event decreases the enterprise's effect and, ultimately, the incident's expenses.
• This usually leads to senior management realising that the organisation requires an effective
and quick method of responding to an issue.
• There are subtle distinctions and complexities between incident management and incident response
functions.
• The ability to give and ensure the start-to-finish management of an issue within the company is
referred to as incident management.
• This entails determining how tasks and processes interact with one another, how information is
transmitted (internally and externally), and what actions must be coordinated in order to properly
manage an incident.
• The processes, methods, and activities undertaken when responding to an incident are referred to as
incident response, and they focus on the detection, triage, containment, eradication, and recovery
steps taken to restart normal, planned operations.
• In a nutshell, incident management encompasses all of the processes, practises, and activities that
occur before to, during, and after an incident.
by natural catastrophes, the loss of critical individuals, workplace accidents, or any other
unforeseen bad occurrences caused by a shift in the threat landscape.
• Efforts must include managing and responding to occurrences involving information security,
regardless of the media (logical, physical, or human). The approach taken is based upon a
number of factors, including:
Enterprise Mission, Goals and Objectives: Is the strategy properly matched with the
organisation?
Service to be provided: What services are being committed to address the needs of
constituents?
Organisational Model and the Relationship with Various Stakeholders: Who holds the
enterprise accountable and responsible?
Funding for Start-up Costs and ongoing Operations: How will this capability be supported
financially?
Resources needed by the Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT): What
resources are required to provide the necessary capabilities to the constituents served?
• Incident management encompasses all steps taken prior to, during, and after an information
security incident occurs.
• With the following goals in mind, incident management methods must be devised to limit the
effects of an incident and enable efficient and successful recovery:
• Provide an effective technique of dealing with the problem in order to minimise the impact on the
organisation.
• Maintain or restore enterprise service continuity in accordance with business continuity and
disaster recovery policies.
Detection and Reporting: Receiving and reviewing event information, incident reports, and
alerts.
Triage: The steps performed to categorise, prioritise, and assign events and incidents in
order to maximise the usefulness of limited resources.
Analysis: The attempt to determine what happened, the impact and threat, the harm that
ensued, and the appropriate recovery or mitigation procedures.
Incident Response: The measures done to address or mitigate an incident, coordinate and
disseminate information, and develop follow-up strategies to prevent recurring occurrences.
• Incidents must be recorded so that incident response actions may be followed, information can
be provided to facilitate planning efforts, and no component of an incident is neglected
mistakenly.
• The recording is necessary in order to correctly document material, which may include forensic
data that can be utilised to pursue disciplinary or legal possibilities.
• Incidents must be categorised in order to be properly prioritised and routed to the appropriate
resources.
• Incident management comprises initial support operations that allow new occurrences to be
evaluated against known defects and difficulties in order to quickly identify any previously
identified workarounds.
• Throughout the incident's life cycle, the procedure guarantees that it is owned, tracked, and
monitored.
• Major occurrences may necessitate a response that goes above and beyond what is given by
the standard incident process, necessitating the activation of C/DR capabilities.
• The final step in an incident-handling process is incident response, which includes the planning,
coordination, and execution of appropriate containment, eradication, and recovery activities
and may involve the development of recommendations or lead to follow-on initiatives
identified during the lessons learned.
those operations has unacceptably severe consequences, the importance of good incident
management and response has expanded.
• Some of the elements that increase the importance of excellent incident management are as
follows:
The increasing incidence and mounting losses caused by information security events.
The enterprise can efficiently deal with unexpected threats to disrupt the business (e.g.,
recovery time objective [RTO] and recovery point objective [RPO]).
The enterprise will have adequate detection and monitoring capabilities to ensure that
issues are identified as soon as possible.
Personnel will be taught in incident recognition, severity criterion application, and proper
reporting and escalation procedures.
The enterprise will have responsiveness that demonstrate a clear support for the business plan
by being sensitive to the criticality and sensitivity of the resources safeguarded.
The enterprise will serve to proactively manage incident risk in a cost-effective manner, as well
as to provide integration of security-related organisational functions to maximise effectiveness.
The enterprise will give monitoring and metrics to assess the performance of incident
management and response capabilities, and it will test its capabilities on a regular basis to
confirm that information and plans are up to date, current, and available when needed.
and external resources. These resources in a typical enterprise may include, but are not limited
to, the following:
Facilities Insurance
Compliance Office HR Internal Audit
Management Provider
Sales and
Privacy Offer Public Relations Risk Management Training Partners
Marketing
(IRP). It is critical to have a defined set of policies, standards, and processes in order to:
Ensure that incident management actions are in line with the mission of the incident
management team (IMT).
Establish requirements for identified alternate personnel for all critical functions.
as rapidly as feasible.
• Failure to do so frequently results in a disaster declaration and the necessity for recovery
efforts.
• This may entail relocating to a different location to resume activities as stated in the BC/DR
plans.
Handle events as they occur so that the exposure can be limited or eliminated, allowing
recovery to occur within recovery time goals (RT0s) and recovery point objectives (RPOs).
Implement safeguards to protect and minimise the impact on assets in the case of an incident.
strategic plan. The following elements may assist in achieving this alignment:
Resources
Mission
Funding
Services
Management Support
including an incident response plan (IRP) that lays out the steps for developing the incident
response capability.
• Each enterprise requires a plan that addresses its specific needs, which are related to the
mission, size, structure, and operations of the enterprise.
• The strategy should specify the resources and management assistance that are required. The
following items should be included in the IRP:
1. Mission.
• The enterprise's size, industry, applicable regulatory requirements, and the maturity of BC, DR, and
incident response capabilities will all have an impact on the information security manager's role in
BC, DR planning, and incident response.
• In enterprises, the information security manager may be involved in all aspects of backup and
recovery (BC), disaster recovery (DR), and incident response.
• This includes helping the business units complete their business impact analyses (BIAs), collaborating
with the IT department to find suitable backup and recovery solutions, coordinating incident
response efforts as events become more serious, and providing the regular information security
services the business needs.
management also entails a number of procedures that can strike the ideal balance between
containment, prevention, and restoration.
Integrate into an enterprise's broader strategy and endeavour to safeguard and secure vital
business functions and assets.
• Incident management and response operations require resources, which must be handled
effectively.
• This is accomplished by adequate oversight, resource monitoring, and regular reporting. When
achieving all objectives is not possible, good resource management ensures that the most
critical priorities are handled first.
• Effective triage capabilities in incident response guarantee that limited resources are deployed
most effectively to restrict and limit harm.
• This is based on swiftly identifying compromised assets that must be addressed immediately,
assets that are unaffected and can wait, and assets that can be restored most efficiently with
the available resources.
CMU/SEI:
• Self Assessment - The IMT conducts self-assessment against a set of criteria to develop an
understanding of present skills. This is the simplest way because it does not necessitate the
participation of several parties. The disadvantage of this strategy is that it may only provide a
restricted picture of present capabilities as well as other characteristics that stakeholders may
find significant.
• External Assessment or Audit - This is the most complete option, including interviews, surveys,
simulation, and other assessment approaches. This option is typically utilised by a company
that already has an appropriate incident management capability but is looking to improve it or
reengineer the processes. These strategies will assist in establishing whether the existing state
is effective and, if not, in determining the intended state of incident response capabilities.
• Threats are defined as any incident that has the potential to harm an enterprise's assets,
operations, or staff. There are several threats to be considered, such as:
Vulnerability
• A vulnerability is a flaw in a system, technology, process, person, or control that can be
exploited and lead to compromise. Risk originates from a weakness that adversaries can
exploit. One part of risk management is managing vulnerabilities in order to keep risk within
acceptable boundaries set by the enterprise's risk appetite and tolerance criteria.
plan specifies the actions, personnel, and activities that will be carried out if anticipated
circumstances result in the loss of data, information systems, or processes.
• The incident response team should be formed, managed, and maintained as part of the plan.
• A gap analysis gives information on the gap between present incident response capabilities and
the target level defined by top management. When the two levels are compared, advances in
capabilities, skills, and technology can be found, including:
Processes that must be improved in order to become more efficient and effective
• The gap analysis report produced can be used for planning purposes to establish the measures
required to close the gaps between the present and intended states.
• It can also be used to determine the most effective technique for achieving the goals and
prioritising efforts. Priorities should be determined by the areas with the largest potential
impact and the best cost-benefit ratio.
put the business recovery strategies into action, key decision-making, technical, and end-user
team leaders must be identified and trained.
• Depending on the size of the business, the team could be made up of just one person. The
involvement of these teams is determined by the severity of the service disruption and the
sorts of assets lost, compromised, damaged, or endangered.
• This will make it easier to estimate the amount of the effort and activate the right team
combination. The following are some examples of the kind of teams that are frequently
required:
Emergency Action Team: First responders who have been designated to deal with fires or
other emergency response circumstances.
Damage Assessment Team: Qualified personnel who analyse the level of asset damage and
make an initial decision as to what is a total loss vs what is restorable or salvageable.
Emergency Management Team: In charge of coordinating the actions of the other recovery
teams and making critical decisions.
Relocation Team: Coordination of the process of transferring from the impacted location to an
alternative site or the restored original location.
Security Team: When the organisation does not define a designated/formal capacity, the
security team frequently becomes the de facto CSIRT. It is in charge of monitoring the security
of systems and communication links, containing any ongoing security threats, fixing any
security issues that limit the rapid recovery of systems, and assuring the appropriate
installation and operation of every security software package.
that team members are comfortable with their jobs and responsibilities, the information
security manager should create reasonable, real-world event scenarios and test the reaction
and recovery plans.
• The teams will determine the resources needed for reaction and recovery during this phase.
Training has the extra benefit of discovering and changing unclear procedures to achieve
clarity, as well as determining recovery resources that may be insufficient or ineffective.
component of any security program. When possible, implement notification methods that
allow an automated detection system or monitor to send email or phone messages. When
accidents occur, the following roles are most likely to require information:
Application development
Business process owners
Cybersecurity
HR
IT department
Legal/general counsel
Network operations
Physical and information security
Privacy department
PR/corporate communications
Risk management
Senior management
Threat intelligence team
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Challenges in Developing an Incident Management Plan
• There may be unexpected challenges while designing and maintaining an event management
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• It identifies the lowest resources required to restore and prioritises the recovery of processes
and supporting systems.
• The BIA is frequently mentioned in the context of BC and DR. Other methodologies, in addition
to the BIA, may be used to assess possible impact.
• The bottom line of risk is impact, and the range of severity in terms of the enterprise must be
identified in order to offer the necessary information and lead risk management actions.
• Although high likelihood events with little or no individual impact are not always cause for
concern, they should not be discounted without first comprehending the event's significance
within the wider system it supports.
Increasing awareness of the amount of possible loss and other negative consequences that
could emerge from specific types of mishaps caused by the loss of a specific function,
including catastrophic events that could jeopardise the business's life.
consideration of the relationships between RTO, RPO, SDO, and MTO, as the transition from
incident response to disaster recovery operations for any solution other than mirrored or
duplicate processing sites will take time.
• With the continuing expansion and widespread acceptance of cloud services, there is a shift
away from perceiving IT as a facility and toward viewing IT as a capability.
• The incident management and recovery plan must be compatible with and support the
enterprise's overall IT plan.
Long-Haul
Alternative
Redundancy Diverse Routing Network
Routing
Diversity
• Plans should include operational failover solutions to avoid servers falling down for an
extended amount of time.
• Server recovery should be part of the DRP. The employment of universal power supplies (UPSs)
and failover systems to prevent power failures of varied levels is one way for offering failover
or fault-tolerant capabilities.
• Direct attached storage (DAS) is a data storage and availability solution in which the storage
device (for example, a disc drive) is physically connected to a server or client. To access the
DAS, each user must have direct access to the server that houses the storage device.
• Current insurance policies for information systems processing typically require a multi-peril
policy tailored to provide several forms of IT coverage. Typically, an organisation cannot insure
against failure to comply with legal and regulatory requirements or any other violation of the
law. There are several types of coverage available, including:
• A disaster could be a regional event spread over a broad geographic region, or it could happen
within a single room boundaries.
• The effect of a disaster will also differ, from a full disruption to a mere slowdown in all business
activities.
Natural Disasters
Human-Caused Disasters
available resources, expected services, and the categories, types, and intensity of threats
encountered by the company.
• The state of monitoring and detection capabilities must be known, as well as the level of risk
that the enterprise is ready to take.
• An effective recovery plan strategy strikes the most cost-effective balance between risk
management, incident management and response, and BC/DR planning.
• Business continuity is defined by ISACA as "the prevention, mitigation, and recovery from
disruption“. While BCP goals include incident prevention and mitigation, the DRP focuses on
what must be done to restore operations after an incident has occurred.
• This is done to determine whether it is safe to return and to run tests to determine whether
the primary data centre and facilities are accessible, operational, and capable of operating at
regular capacity and processing load.
• The teams in charge of shifting to the alternate location and making it operational repeat the
process to return to the primary site.
• When the primary facility and data processing capabilities have been fully restored, the
recovery teams will notify the BC leader, who will then declare normalcy in cooperation with
the crisis management team and shift operations back to the primary site.
• If the primary site is completely destroyed or severely damaged, the enterprise may make a
strategic decision to convert the alternative recovery site to the primary operations site or to
identify, acquire, and establish another site where operations will eventually be restored and
which will serve as the primary site.
• This is especially true if the organisation subscribes to a third-party disaster recovery site, as
the costs of functioning from such a site for a lengthy period of time may prove prohibitively
expensive.
• Enterprises establishing a BCP should address the processes, roles, and responsibilities
involved in identifying an incident, declaring a disaster, and managing operations in a disaster
mode, but it should also define processes to restore operations at the primary site and
announce the return to normalcy.
likely to be one that addresses probable occurrences with acceptable recovery periods at a
reasonable cost.
• The overall cost of a recovery capacity includes the expense of preparing for potential
interruptions as well as the cost of implementing these in the event of an occurrence.
• The effects of disruptions can be mitigated to some extent by various types of business
interruption insurance, which should be regarded as a strategy alternative.
• Depending on the size and scale of the enterprise, as well as the state of recovery planning, the
information security manager should understand that developing an incident management and
response plan is likely to be a challenging and time-consuming task.
• It may be necessary to develop numerous alternative strategies, each with its own set of
capabilities and costs, before presenting them to management for a final selection.
include:
2. Minimise the likelihood of a Threat’s Occurrence: The best alternative is often to reduce or
eliminate vulnerabilities or exposure to reduce the possibility of a threat occurring. This goal
can be attained by putting in place the necessary physical, environmental, and security
controls.
3. Minimise the Effects of a Threat if an Incident Occurs: There are several approaches to
mitigate the effects of an incident, including good incident management and response,
insurance, redundant systems with automated failover, and other compensating or remedial
procedures.
outages occurring, the nature and amount of the impact on the enterprise's capacity to
continue operations, and total cost. Longer and more expensive outages or calamities that
disrupt the primary physical facility are likely to necessitate offsite backup options. Offsite
backup facilities that can be considered include:
Disaster
Reciprocal
Duplicate Sites Mirror Sites Recovery as a
Agreements
Service
strategy:
Nature of the
Proximity
MTO Locations Probable
Factors
Disruptions
recovery strategy decided by management. It should handle all aspects of disaster recovery.
Several elements should be addressed when constructing the plan, including:
• Preincident readiness
• Evacuation procedures
• How to claim a Disaster
• If the incident response fails, the procedures to disaster recovery are taken
• Recognise the business processes and IT resources that must be restored
• Individuals having decision-making authority and duties in the plan should be identified
• Identification of the persons (and alternatives) in charge of each plan function
• Identifying contact information
• A step-by-step breakdown of the recovery alternatives
• Identifying the various resources needed for recovery and ongoing activities
• Making certain that other logistics, such as worker transfer and temporary housing, are taken into
account
actionable event. Every action specified should identify the person responsible, alternatives in
the event of unavailability, and an expected time for completion.
• When all of the activities have been successfully executed, the process should proceed in the
part devoted to the emergency's conclusion. The following entities and personnel may receive
an alert notification, but are not limited to:
• The help/service desk is likely to receive the first reports indicating a security issue. Prompt
recognition of an ongoing event and prompt referral to appropriate parties are crucial for
limiting the damage caused by such incidents.
• Proper training also helps to lessen the likelihood that the help/service desk may be
successfully targeted in a social engineering attack aimed to get account access, such as a
perpetrator posing as a user who has been locked out and requires immediate access to the
system.
• In addition to spotting potential security incidents, help/service desk workers should be aware
of the necessary reporting and escalation procedures.
• It responds to and handles incidents in order to contain and reduce damage, limit disruptions
to business processes, and promptly restore operations.
• Incidents that are poorly managed have the potential to become disasters.
• Understanding the hierarchy and organisational structure associated with the various incident
management positions is critical.
• To avoid miscommunication during a crisis, each position must be clearly defined and
conveyed.
• The duties connected with incident management will differ from company to company.
• Typical responsibilities in incident management activities include, but are not limited to, the
following:
• A business case can demonstrate that, in many cases, effective event management and
response are less expensive than attempting to develop controls for all possible conditions.
• Tested incident management and response may also provide the firm with more revenue
opportunities by allowing for higher levels of acceptable risk based on a shown capacity and
capability to handle security issues.
• Sufficient incident response, combined with effective information security, is likely to provide
the most cost-efficient risk management strategy and may be the most wise resource
management decision.
• These elements should be included in the business case, which will be utilised to acquire the
necessary senior management commitment to ensure the program's success.
• The information security manager is responsible for a variety of incident management tasks,
including:
Creating incident management and response plans for information security incidents.
Effectively and efficiently handling and organising information security incident response
actions.
All aspects of information security incident management and response planning, budgeting,
and programme creation.
• The criteria used to measure the efficacy and efficiency of the incident management function
include incident management metrics, measures, and indicators.
• Metrics based on key performance indicators (KPIs) and programme goals (KGIs) established
for incident management should be submitted to top management as rationale for ongoing
support and funding.
• As part of the overall risk evaluation, the information security manager must understand RTOs
and how they apply to the enterprise's information resources.
• The RTO will be determined by the enterprise's business demands, which are typically
described as the amount of time required to restore an acceptable level of regular operations.
The SDO establishes the acceptable level.
• The information security manager should keep in mind that the RTO may change depending on
the month or year.
• Financial data may not be as important at the start of the month, when the new fiscal month
begins. RTOs are defined by doing a BIA in tandem with constructing a BCP.
• Because the interconnectivity of systems and their dependencies affects the order of
restoration, most or all systems associated to important business processes will require a BIA.
• A divisional supervisor's essential information asset may not be critical in the eyes of the vice
president of operations, who is able to integrate the total organisational risk in the RTO
evaluation.
• The information security manager should recognise the importance of both perspectives and
work toward an RTO that takes both into account.
• The outcome will be incorporated into the BCP, as will the extent of the services to be restored
and the priority order for system recovery. In the end, top management makes the final choice.
• Senior management is in the best position to arbitrate the needs and requirements of the
various aspects of the business, such as the regulatory requirements to which the enterprise is
subject, and to decide that what processes are the most crucial to the business's continuing
existence, in addition to determining acceptable costs.
• The enterprise can create and identify contingency strategies that will meet the RTOs of the
information resources, once the RTOs are known.
• System proprietors consistently favour shorter RTOs, but the tradeoffs in price may not be
certified.
• When necessary, near-instantaneous recovery can be performed via technologies like mirroring
of information systems, ensuring that the systems are always readily available in the case of a
disruption.
• If the RTO for a given resource is longer, then the cost of recovery is less in general.
• In case of operation disruption, the RPO is determined based on the acceptable data loss.
• It demonstrates the most current point in period to which it is sufficient to recover the data,
that is generally the latest backup. In case of interruption, RPO effectively quantifies the
allowable amount of data loss.
• It may be preferable to decrease the time between backups to stop a problem where recovery
becomes impossible because of the volume of data to be recovered, depending on the volume
of data.
• Additionally, it is likely that the time needed to restore a significant amount of data prevents
the RTO from being achieved.
• While this is generally the scope of DR and BC planning, it is an essential factor when creating a
risk management strategy.
• To meet business requirements until normal operations can be resumed, SDOs are defined as
the minimum level of service that must be restored after an event.
• By RPOs and RTOs, SDOs will be affected and must be examined in any risk management
strategy and execution. More levels of service will typically need greater resources and more
current RPOs.
• The factors may affect the MTO, such as accessibility of a recovery site which might located
remotely, limited operational capacity of the recovery site, and availability of fuel to use
emergency generators.
• The RTO will be affected by the variable, that in turn affects the RPO. To minimise risk of
inadequate recovery to the enterprise, the relationship between the MTO, RPO, and RTO must
be considered from a risk management perspective.
• To minimise the risk to the enterprise in the event of a disaster, the MTO should in any event
be as long as the AIW.
• CPIs and 'KGIs for the action should be specified and decided on by stakeholders and approved
by senior management.
• The standard range of KGIs contains the successful handling of circumstances whether by live
testing or beneath existing conditions.
• By successfully handling incidents that endangers business operations within the RTOs, key
performance measures can be identified.
evolve.
• A process must be established by the information security manager in which recovery plans are
updated as changes arise in an enterprise.
• Considering the recovery and response plan necessities in the change management process
within an enterprise is an important part of adequate response management.
• To reflect continuing recognition of changing requirements, strategies and plans for recovery
and response should be updated and reviewed according to a schedule.
• Along with others not listed, the following factors may affect neccessities and the requirement
for the plan to be updated:
A method that is suitable at one point in period may not be sufficient as the requirements of
an enterprise modification.
Modifications in business process may change the value of essential applications or result in
other applications being considered crucial.
• All aspects of the MP should be tested regularly in order to confirm success in incident response.
1. Identifying gaps
2. Verifying assumptions
3. Testing timelines
• The full scope of incident management responsibilities, including the escalation and the
involvement of, or handover to, the disaster management and recovery operation if it is the
duty of another group, must be tested up to the point of a disaster declaration, regardless of
the structure.
• Periodic testing of the response and recovery plans should be carried out by the information
security manager with help from the recovery team's structure.
• With securing the systems not only during normal operations but also during disaster events,
the information security manager is tasked with enterprises depending heavily on IT.
• The information manager can recognise important applications the enterprise needs and the
infrastructure needed to support them, based on the business impact information and risk
assessment.
• The information security manager needs to conduct accurate recovery tests for ensuring that
these are recovered in a timely fashion.
• A recovery test should seek to, at a minimal, achieve the given tasks:
• Confirm the entirety and precision of the response and recovery plan.
• Consider the performance of the personnel included in the practice.
• Evaluate the ascertained level of training and awareness of people who are not part of the
recovery/response team.
• Consider the coordination between the team members and external suppliers and vendors.
• Count the capacity and ability of the backup site to conduct defined processing.
• Evaluate the critical records recovery capability.
• Consider the quantity and state of equipment and supplies that have been reposition to the
recovery site.
• Count the general implementation of operational and information systems processing activities
connected to maintaining the business entity.
to enhance it.
• The following general types of metrics typically apply, although specific measurements depend
on the test and the enterprise:
Percentage or
Time Amount Accuracy Plans
Number
• Many manual processes are automated by these systems that provide filtered information that
can recognise potential technical incidents and alert the IMT. An effective STEM will be the
following:
• Endpoint security has been historically reactive, identifying perceived or potential security
threats utilising signatures for known attack patterns.
• EDR focuses on recognising threats, malware which are designed to avoid traditional security
defences while trying to be predictive in nature.
• Some king cyberthreat intelligence with machine learning abilities in conjunction with threat
detection and file analysis will leverage by most EDR solutions.
• EDR solutions generally make a historical audit path in which user /system manners and
security events are captured for follow-on examination by security analysts.
• EDR solutions also support in root cause analysis and not only in incident response efforts.
• A developed version of EDR, XDR takes a holistic strategy to endpoint response and detection.
• XDR not only gives an enterprise information security teams a suitable view across the
endpoints but also conducts examination of servers, the networks and cloud.
• XDR creates on the abilities of EDR, machine learning, artificial intelligence capabilities and
leveraging automation to give context about security events.
1 2 4
Security
Vulnerabilities/Wea
Security Principles knesses The Internet
5 6 7
Programming
Operating Systems Malicious Code Skills
• Team members may be recognised ad hoc, reliable full-time IMT support or committed
currently during incidents.
• The arrangement of team members set and how they will support the IMT will differ from
enterprise to enterprise.
• The team is usually lead by the information security manager. In bigger enterprises, it may be
more adequate to employ a particular IRT leader manager that concentrates on answering to
incidents.
• The SSG also authorises exceptions and deviations to normal practice. The primary tasks in the
IMT/IRT are performed by dedicated team members.
proper measures to restrict the damage to the enterprise and recover normal services. Usually,
the team will cooperate with general users, complementary groups, and business managers.
• The Following are the IRT Models that have proven to work:
1. Central IRT
2. Distributed IRT
3. Coordinating IRT
4. Outsourced IRT
Information Security Manager IMT leader and main interface to 1. Maintains and develops response capability and
SSG incident management.
2. Manages incidents and risks effectively.
Incident Response Manager Incident response team leader 1. Supervision of incident response tasks.
2. To effectively perform incident response tasks,
coordinates resources.
3. Represents incident lesson learned and response
plan to SSG members.
IT Security Specialist IRT/IMT team member, IT security 1. As a part of the IRP, performs in-depth and
subject matter expert complex IT security-related tasks.
2. Performs IT security audits/assessment as a part
of vulnerability management and proactive
measure.
IT Representatives/Specialists IT services subject matter expert 1. Give support to IRT/IMT while solving an incident.
2. Keep information system in a good condition per
company good practices and policies.
Human Resources (HR) HR area subject matter expert 1. When there is a need to investigate an employee
suspected of causing an incident, provides help in
incident response/management .
2. Integration of HR policy to support incident
response/management
Ability to Follow
Communication Leadership Skills Presentation Skills Procedures and Team Skills
Policies
Self- Time
Integrity Coping with Stress Problem Solving
Understanding Management
people, end users are the foremost line of protection in controlling safety breaches.
• Therefore, it is important for the information security manager to confirm that an enduring
awareness campaign underlines the significance of being aware in order to decrease
vulnerability to actions that may lead to a security breach.
• A skills assessment is suitable to determine whether the necessary skill is available in the
enterprise for the IRT. In some cases, appropriate education or training may be in service to
give the required skills.
• Within the enterprise, internal audits are performed by specialists and are generally intended
to improve risk and incident management and support compliance requirements.
• External audits include a third party that conducts the tasks. While most external audits are
employed as part of required conditions, they are normally exploit as part of business
association.
• Both types of audits can be suitable in studying incident management and response
capabilities and plans.
• Periodic audits of the procedures and processes determined in the methods can give validation
that security will not be compromised in policy compliance, legal requirements and the event
of an incident are addressed properly.
smaller enterprises.
• These enterprises might not have the internal resources to offer the requisite IMT/IRT
expertise in a sufficient manner. If incident management is outsourced to the same vendor as
IT operations, businesses who outsource their IT operations may profit from close integration.
• When security functions are partially or fully outsourced, the information security manager
should consider the following:
Comparing the enterprise's incident reference numbers with the agents for every relevant
incident.
Integration of the change management functions of the enterprise with the vendor’s.
Need from the vendor for regular review of incidents that happens on a regular basis
• An event is something that occurs at a typical time or place : a door opening, an account logon,
an automated procedure ending.
• These all are events that have shortage on any context that happen little to no reference.
• The related to the event or contextual data adjacent required to be examined to determine if
the event was in fact abnormal or normal.
• Proper actions can be taken once legitimacy of and event is known. The escalation and
initiation of an event to an incident is performed by the prmary investigation and then
assessing the affect to the enterprise.
• It is also reasonable to assume that the event management and response teams will face more
turmoil, confusion, and issues the more serious the incident.
• An attack that takes down IT systems or a building collapse are both examples of incidents.
• All reasonably possible events must be expected, planned for, and tested in order to give a
reasonable confidence that the enterprise will be preserved under predicable conditions.
• In the overall process of carrying out the reaction and recovery plans, developing appropriate
response and recovery methods and alternatives is a crucial step.
• It is crucial to test the plans to make sure they can be carried out as needed.
• Containment is a tactical and short-term action that is intended purely to prevent the bleeding,
not necessarily to recognise or rectify the root cause that permitted the incident to happen.
• The following are the common containment activities conducted during a security incident:
• Due to lacking or misunderstanding proper context and insight, speculation may be taken for
facts or facts downplayed often.
• There will be various communication methods and channels that ought to be defined primary
to an incident being announced.
• Every communication channel required to be clearly understood, conveyed and defined to all
impacted members to confirm the appropriate messages are communicated to their
audiences.
• The IRP should contain a directory of main IRT members, end users, information systems
owners, decision-making personnel, and others mandated to create and bring response
measures.
• Telecommunication networks are liable to the same raw disasters as data bases but are also
weak to disruptive events distinctive to telecommunications.
• These include errors, central switching office disasters, communication software glitches, cable
cuts, and security breaches from hacking and a host of additional human errors.
• Wide area networks, LANs, third-party providers, and telephone voice circuits are included in
telecommunications capabilities.
• Essential capability needs should be recognised for the diverse thresholds of outage, such as 2
hours, 8 hours or 24 hours, for every telecommunications ability.
• Continuous power supplies (UPSs) should be acceptable to give backup for both computer and
telecommunications equipment.
• The focus changes to confirming that the business can successfully return to operations after
the incident has been properly addressed and root cause problems remediated, that means
restoring affected systems to normal. To prevent same events from happening, the activities
should be implemented and planned during the recovery phase.
• Typical recovery activities conducted after a security incident has been successfully eliminated
contains the following:
allows the information security manager to improve the security programme on a continuous
basis.
• A consistent methodology must be adopted within the information security enterprise so that
when a problem is discovered, an action plan is developed to decrease/mitigate it.
• The most valuable part of the effort is the follow-up process in incident response. After the
business has successfully retrieved, activities may contain, but are not limited to, the given:
• Incident documenting
• Stakeholder feedback and review
• Completing the report for senior management
• Recognising changes required
• Recognising process issues
• Updating procedures as required
initiated attacks in security controls that have been executed. An incident review team should
be appointed by the information security manager for a systematic review of security incidents.
• The root causes of numerous system centres, such as, are nonexistent or weak vulnerability
assessment and patch management efforts.
Who is included?
What was occurred?
Location of the attack originated
Reason of the attack
What was the time frame?
How did the attack happened?
What was the attacker’s motivation?
• This information will allow the investigation of events and can be given to a forensics team or
authorities if required.
• To make sure that this record-keeping happens, one or more people must be specifically
charged with incident documentation and evidence preservation.
• Documentation of any event with potential security implications can give clarity on whether an
incident was an accident, a mistake, or a deliberate attack.
reaction to a security incident and the unavoidable wave of regulatory and legal landmines.
• A customised to the enterprise and has been vetted, tested and developed by key internal
stakeholders and legal counsel is a suitable IRP.
• The check-the-box strategy is not helpful while it may be easy to pull a standards IRP form from
the intermit when an incident actually happens. The IRP should:
Give a method for documenting the events directing to and pursuing the discovery of a
compromise.
Set an immediate and clear communication plan that contains communications to third
parties , internal contacts, customers, media and the advisors.
evidence following an incident can stop an enterprise charging a perpetrator and restrict its
options.
• This strategy is mainly recommended for law enforcement relying on the risk of the evidence
being compromised.
• This can happen as a consequence of the system exchange files overwriting evidence, malware
or an intruder removing evidence of compromise. There is the risk of tainting evidence.
• Sudden power loss and data in memory loss may result in corruption of critical information on
the hard disk as it is one argument against disconnecting power.
Chain of custody.
Checklists to obtain technicians.
Exact activity log templates for obtaining technicians.
An updated case log.
Signed confidentiality/nondisclosure forms for all technicians concerned in retrieving
evidence.
Investigation template of report.
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