Version: 28 November 2017

Contributor Profile: Ethiopia

Solomon A. Dersso, Phd
Director, Amani Africa Media and Research Services & adjunct professor of law, College of
Law and Governance Studies, Addis Ababa University
Active Armed Helicopters Defense Budget Uniformed UN UN Contribution Other
Forces1 Peacekeepers Breakdown Significant
Deployments
138,000 37 2016: US$451m 8,409 UNAMID 2,456 (2,397 Approx. 4,300
(0.65% of GDP) (642 female) troops, 11 experts, 33 in AMISOM,
World Ranking Attack: 18 (31 Oct. 2017) police, 15 SO) Somalia.
(size): 35 2015: US$339m
Multirole: 7 (0.65% of GDP) Ranking: No.1 UNISFA 4,452 (4,290
Army: 135,000 Military & troops, 78 experts, 5
Air force: 3,000 Multirole / 2014: US$375m Police police, 79 SO)
Transport: (0.71% of GDP) Contributor to
12 UN Operations UNMISS 1,494 (1,436
2013: US$351 troops, 11 experts, 25
(0.76% of GDP) police, 22 SO)

World Ranking MINUSTAH 6 police

(defense
spending): 90 MINUSMA 1 SO

* SO = Staff Officer
Defense Spending / Active troop:2 US$3,268 (compared to global average of approx. US$79,395)

Part 1: Recent Trends

Ethiopia has a long history of participation in United Nations (UN) peace operations dating
back to the 1950s. The country’s first major participation in a UN-authorized operation was
as part of the UN Command Multinational Force in the Korean War (1950-53). Ethiopian
forces were first deployed in a UN-led, blue helmet operation from July 1960 to June 1964 as
part of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), in which Let. General Kebede Gebre served
as Force Commander. Following the overthrow of Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974
and the civil war that engulfed the country for the next two decades, Ethiopia did not provide
UN peacekeepers, although the period between the 1970s and late 1980s also saw the launch
of very few new UN missions. Ethiopia resumed its participation in UN missions in the 1990s,
which coincided with the major expansion of UN peacekeeping. Accordingly, Ethiopia
deployed a battalion to the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR 2) from August
1994 to July 1995. Since then Ethiopia has deployed its personnel in eight UN peacekeeping
operations.3

Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has provided considerable numbers of forces for UN operations in
Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Abyei, Darfur and South Sudan, as well as smaller
contributions in other missions, including Haiti and Mali. 4 Most of Ethiopia’s recent UN
peacekeeping deployments have been in the Sudans: to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),
the UN-AU Hybrid Mission to Darfur (UNAMID), the UN Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS), and the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA). While its deployment
to UNAMID has been its largest sustained troop contribution, Ethiopia set a new record for
UN peacekeeping operations by supplying almost the entire military component of UNISFA,
comprising over 4,400 personnel, as well as the Force Commander and many of the mission’s
senior leadership. This mission was also notable for Ethiopia’s rapid deployment of troops:
1
 Version: 28 November 2017

within one month of the adoption of the UN Security Council resolution. Now with over
8,400 uniformed personnel serving in UN missions, since 2016, Ethiopia has become the top
contributor to UN peacekeeping operations. Ethiopia has also contributed specialized assets
and capabilities. For example, since 2010, Ethiopia also contributed five tactical helicopters
to UNAMID, although it withdrew them in 2013, apparently for financial reasons (see below).

Fig. 1: Ethiopian Uniformed Personnel in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990-2017

9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
8/1/06

8/1/13
8/1/94
8/1/95
8/1/96
8/1/97
8/1/98
8/1/99
8/1/00
8/1/01
8/1/02
8/1/03
8/1/04
8/1/05

8/1/07
8/1/08
8/1/09
8/1/10
8/1/11
8/1/12

8/1/14
8/1/15
8/1/16
8/1/17
Troops Police Experts

Outside of the UN, Ethiopia’s major significant deployment has been its unilateral
deployment to Somalia, where it maintained an unknown number of troops supporting
Somali Government and AMISOM forces.5 Since January 2014, Ethiopia became one of the
troop-contributing countries to AMISOM. The third largest TCC after Uganda and Burundi,
Ethiopia currently has about 4,400 uniformed personnel serving in AMISOM.

One of the features of Ethiopia’s deployment since the 1990s is that it has only contributed
peacekeepers to missions in Africa. With the exception of some police personnel deployed to
the MINUSTAH in Haiti, Ethiopia has not responded favourably for requests made for
deployment outside of Africa and this stance is unlikely to change in the short-term. 6
Additionally, Ethiopia’s peacekeeping contributions have mainly been limited to UN-led
peacekeeping operations, the exception being its participation in the AU Mission to Burundi
(AMIB) during 2003 and 2004 where its troops supported the implementation of the
country’s peace agreement, and AMISOM since 2014. Nevertheless, Ethiopia has pledged
contributions for the African Standby Force as part of the East African Standby Force.

In terms of composition, to date, Ethiopia’s contributions to peacekeeping have been largely

military. Since 2008, Ethiopia has contributed just over 200 police officers, a very small
number compared to its troop contributions. Its contribution of police and military experts,
which stands at 69 and 217 respectively as at 31 October 2017, is also relatively small.
Ethiopia remains a leading contributor of female peacekeepers to UN missions, but only one
served in a senior leadership role. Currently, General Zewd Kiros, a woman, serves as
UNISFA’s deputy Force Commander. Despite the fact that Ethiopia has become the top UN
peacekeeper, its participation in senior and middle level leadership of missions remains very
low. Much of the experience of participation of Ethiopians in senior leadership has been in

2
 Version: 28 November 2017

UNISFA, where so far at least five Ethiopian generals served as Force Commander. Since
2016, a general with experience in UNISFA also served as Force Commander of UNMISS in
South Sudan. Addis Ababa also has very low representation within UN DPKO, although
since 2016 an Ethiopian has joined DPKO at relatively senior level.

Part 2: Decision-making process

There is no constitutional provision that specifically stipulates the decision-making process
for the deployment of Ethiopian personnel to peacekeeping operations. Nor is there any
parliamentary legislation governing how decisions are made about Ethiopia’s participation in
peacekeeping operations. Under the 1994 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
Constitution, decisions on the deployment of the country’s security forces lie with the Prime
Minister, who is the Head of Government and the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.
Ethiopia’s recent experience in peacekeeping also illustrates that the Prime Minister is the
leading decision-making on this issue. Other major actors include the Chief of Defense Staff,
the Cabinet, the Ministry of Defence, particularly its Peacekeeping division and the Federal
Police Commission. Other role players include the chief of security services and government
security advisors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs leads the political negotiations with the
UN on the terms and conditions of Ethiopia’s contributions to UN peacekeeping operations.
The Ministry’s Permanent Mission to the UN follows up logistics support and
reimbursements.

Parliament does not ordinarily have an active role in decisions regarding peacekeeping
deployments. However, it is important to distinguish between peacekeeping operations and
combat operations. Decisions to deploy Ethiopian troops for combat operations based on a
declaration of war must be tabled and debated in Parliament. For example, in 2006 Ethiopia’s
deployment to Somalia was debated in parliament.

Once the strategic decision about deployment has been taken by the Prime Minster in
consultation with the other actors, the Ethiopian National Defence Forces, the Chief of
Defense Staff, the newly established Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre
(EIPKTC) and the Federal Police Commissioner implement the operational and technical
steps, including the selection and training of the personnel to be deployed and the
identification and supply of the provisions for the troops including equipment and logistics.

Part 3: Rationales for Contributing

Political Rationales: Ethiopia’s recent participation in peacekeeping is driven by several
political motivations. The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy of
Ethiopia (2002) acknowledges that the country’s development, peace and security is
intertwined with the development, peace and security of neighbouring countries and those in
Africa. The promotion of regional peace and security is therefore a major political
consideration in Ethiopia’s provision of peacekeepers, including to the UN. Particular
emphasis is given to stability in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
sub-region, where all of Ethiopia’s recent major deployments have taken place. Ethiopia also
recognizes that participation in international peacekeeping enhances its regional and
international influence. This is articulated as one of the secondary basic principles of the
Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy of Ethiopia (2002). Indeed, the role of Ethiopian
peacekeepers has been commended by host societies and mandating authority as well as
senior leaders of the missions in which they participated.7 In the aftermath of the Rwandan
genocide, for example, UNAMIR’s Force Commander Roméo Dallaire noted that despite
their lack of equipment, the Ethiopian contingent “were incredibly resourceful. I once

3
 Version: 28 November 2017

watched them use only long wooden switches to restrain a crowd that was trying to surge
across the bridge at Cyangugu into Zaire. The switches were the kind that might have been
used to herd cattle. The soldiers also had no compunction about getting into the fields to help
local farmers harvest the rarely planted fields.”8 Ethiopia also recognizes the diplomatic and
foreign relations leverage that peacekeeping contributions bring in pursuing its foreign policy
objectives in both bilateral and multilateral frameworks.

Economic Rationales: Economic rationales inform Ethiopia’s participation in peacekeeping

in three major ways. First, Ethiopia receives a significant sum of money as compensation for
its UN peacekeeping contributions.9 Since 2014, this also applies to its forces in AMISOM.
Although it is not the most decisive factor, this pecuniary gain is a consideration in the
country’s decision to participate and helps explain Ethiopia’s greater willingness to deploy in
UN, generally rather than AU missions. Second, peacekeeping contributions also bring
opportunities for military support from major donor countries. For example, Ethiopia receives
training and other military supports from the United States. This contributes towards
supplementing the country’s budget for building the capacity of and modernizing the army.
Third, given the emphasis of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy (2002) on
strengthening regional economic cooperation and integration in order to boost Ethiopia’s
economic development, deploying peacekeepers in the IGAD sub-region serves to advance
its national economic interests. 10 This is particularly true with respect to Ethiopia’s
deployments to the Sudans. Finally, participation in peacekeeping also accrues significant
economic benefits at the individual level to the personnel involved, although individual
peacekeepers do not keep all the UN’s monthly allowance of now approximately US$1,400.

Security Rationales: Security rationales are a major factor in Ethiopia’s peacekeeping

deployments. Both in policy and praxis, Ethiopia understands from experience that its
national security is intertwined with the security of its neighbors and the countries of the
region. Given that Ethiopia is the only country that shares borders with all the IGAD member
states except Uganda, conflicts and security problems in its neighborhood often have serious
repercussions for Ethiopia at home. This has been the major factor behind Ethiopia’s
deployments to Somalia (2006-09, and 2011-present) and to Sudan’s Abyei region. In both
cases, Ethiopia’s deployment is mainly to prevent these conflicts from undermining its own
security and to stem any wider regional security problems that may develop. 11 Ethiopia’s
integration of troops into AMISOM is in part a response to the increasing terrorist threat alert
across the region following the 21 September 2013 attack by al-Shabaab on the Westgate
Mall in Nairobi, Kenya.

Institutional Rationales: The Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy
(2002) states that Ethiopia wishes to maintain a formidable modern army and national
security infrastructure. In this context, it is possible to identify two institutional benefits that
participation in peacekeeping brings. First, it enables military and police personnel to gain
international experience and knowledge in a wide range of areas. Second, it also serves, albeit
in a limited way, as a framework for military supplies and hence contributes to Ethiopia’s
modernization endeavours.

Normative Rationales: Several normative factors are relevant to Ethiopia’s participation in

peacekeeping. The main one is Ethiopia’s historical commitment to the global collective
security system anchored on the UN Charter. 12 Because of its bitter experience from the
failure of the League of Nations system, Ethiopia’s historical commitment to the UN’s
collective security system is very well established. Its deployment of troops to Korea and the

4
 Version: 28 November 2017

Congo in the 1950s and 1960s was mainly motivated by its principled commitment to the
UN’s collective security system. This normative commitment is however constrained by
national security considerations and the limited availability of capabilities for contributions.
Currently, there is a recognition within the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy
(2002) that Ethiopia should at all times abide by international principles and norms and
promote peaceful instruments of regional and international diplomacy and take active roles in
global and regional security. Solidarity with the peoples and countries of Africa is also
another normative consideration for Ethiopia’s peacekeeping contributions. Multilateralism
and the contribution to regional peace and security is also viewed as a pillar of enhancing
national security and domestic legitimacy.

Part 4: Barriers to Contributing

Alternative institutional preferences for crisis management: Ethiopia is generally disposed to
deploying within a UN framework. This is particularly the case where it converges with the
country’s national security imperatives. A case in point is Ethiopia’s deployment to Abyei
(UNISFA). Where national security imperatives demand alternative options, Ethiopia has
chosen alternative institutional mechanisms such as the AU frameworks (for AMISOM since
2014), or it deploys unilaterally, as in Somalia (2006 and 2011).

Alternative political or strategic priorities: A major factor limiting Ethiopia’s peacekeeping

contribution to the UN is the demands of internal and regional security threats on its military
and police. Internally, concerns relating to armed rebel movements (such as the Ogaden
National Liberation Front, Ginbot 7 and the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front) and
the sporadic eruption of civil conflicts or intra-state border conflicts in some parts of the
country demand the constant presence or deployment of the army and the police. Regionally,
the descent of South Sudan into violent conflict, the lack of breakthrough in the conflict
between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the security threats emerging from Somalia, and continuing
rivalry and strategic tensions over the Nile waters all put pressure on Ethiopia’s available
military capabilities. Calculations about how peacekeeping operations impact the ability of
the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) to deal with these issues affects the scale and
duration of Ethiopia’s peacekeeping contributions.

Resistance in the military: Perhaps surprisingly for the UN’s top contributor, peacekeeping is
not generally seen as an important task for the army, although it is acknowledged to
sometimes be significant in supporting Ethiopia’s major foreign policy objectives. While
peacekeeping is thought to be of secondary importance it is gradually gaining in significance.
Issues around benefits also shape the perception of the personnel towards peacekeeping. Until
recently, a major problem witnessed in Ethiopia’s deployments has been the discontent
expressed by a number of security personnel about the lack of clear and fair payment of
allowances for their participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

Lack of fit with legislative, procurement and operational timelines: The demands of
bureaucracy regarding the reimbursement process from the UN and, significantly, the
negotiations for the supply of logistics and mission support can sometimes cause frustrations
among Ethiopian officials. In some instances, Ethiopia decided that the compensation it
received from the UN for its contribution of helicopters was not adequate. This is one of the
factors that informed the recent withdrawal of Ethiopian helicopters from UNAMID.13

Part 5: Current Challenges and Issues

The Ethiopian government continues to reiterate its commitment and willingness to make UN

5
 Version: 28 November 2017

peacekeeping contributions. It is considered to be an important tool for pursuing various

foreign policy and national security objectives, notably for stabilizing the sub-region and
Africa. One challenge is the ambiguous effect of Ethiopian national security considerations.
On the one hand, these considerations facilitate contributions to peacekeeping, especially in
the Horn of Africa. On the other hand, they can also limit the ability of the ENDF to deploy
to UN peacekeeping operations in greater numbers or beyond Africa.

In addition, the lack of a policy or strategy dedicated to peacekeeping also raises challenges.
It limits the possibility of fully exploring Ethiopia’s potential for participating in
peacekeeping and making full use of the opportunities such participation brings. It also makes
discerning and predicting Ethiopia’s future contributions difficult.

Ethiopia’s peacekeeping contribution is military heavy. A major challenge for increasing

police contributions is the problem of language proficiency.14 Additionally, the country has
very low participation in senior and middle level leadership of UN missions and in DPKO
despite being one of the top contributing countries. Poor communications skills is said to be
one of the main factors for such low levels of representation. Hence improving these skills
would enhance Ethiopia’s continued contributions to peacekeeping.

While it remains limited, there have been developments in recent years in terms of
participation of Ethiopian personnel in senior leadership positions. With respect to police,
while there is a police commander who currently serves as Chief of Staff of the UNMISS
Police Component, another one also serves in similar position in UNAMID. A third one
previously served as chief of training under UNMISS police component.

It is possible that in the light of increasing emphasis on the role of sub-regional organizations
(such as IGAD) and the AU, Ethiopia’s future contributions to UN peacekeeping will be
shaped by the level of convergence between the AU and UN. The establishment of the
EIPKTC is also a clear sign that Ethiopia will continue to make contributions and that it will
also invest more significantly in peacekeeping training both for national and regional forces.

Part 6: Key champions and opponents

As the key foreign and national policy architect and decision-maker of the country, the late
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was the champion of Ethiopia’s participation in all the various
peacekeeping operations to date. The current Prime Minister, Hailemariam Desalegn, appears
to share this disposition and it is fully supported by the Chief of the Defense Forces, General
Samora Yunis. Indeed, as noted above, whether Ethiopia provides peacekeepers has generally
remained the almost exclusive preserve of the Prime Minister and the military leadership.
There are currently no recognizable or public opponents of making larger or better
contributions to UN peacekeeping.

Part 7: Capabilities and Caveats

Ethiopia possesses military helicopters that could be hugely valuable assets to several UN
peacekeeping operations. Indeed, until they were withdrawn, Ethiopia supplied UNAMID
with five tactical helicopters since 2010. In Somalia, Ethiopian helicopters have operated
outside of AMISOM. Ethiopia also has other specialized capabilities. For example, Ethiopia
has provided UNAMID with a medium transport company, a multi-role logistics company
and a number of staff officers. It has also provided a number of staff officers for the
AMISOM Force Headquarters in Mogadishu since 2012. Ethiopia’s other specialized
capacity involves the ability to deploy female personnel. It is currently a leading contributor

6
 Version: 28 November 2017

of female peacekeepers to UN missions. In part, this is a result of relatively strong

representation of women in the army.

Part 8: Further Reading

Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy (Addis Ababa: The Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, November 2002).
Haile Araya Amdemichael, East African Crisis Response: Shaping Ethiopian Peace Force
for Better Participation in Future Peace Operations (MA Thesis Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey CA, 2006).
Abiy Hailu, “National Defence Force 21-year journey,” Ethiopian Herald, 26 May 2013.
Helping to Enhance Africa’s Peacekeeping Capacity (Addis Ababa: UNDP, 29 July 2013).

Notes
1
Unless otherwise stated, data is drawn from IISS, The Military Balance 2017 (London:
IISS/Routledge, 2017).
2
Armed Forces Spending is a country’s annual total defense budget (in US dollars) divided by the
total number of active armed forces. Using figures from IISS, The Military Balance 2017.
3
ONUB (Burundi), MINURCAT (Chad and Central African Republic), UNMIL (Liberia), UNOCI
(Côte d’Ivoire), UNAMID (Sudan), UNMIS (Sudan), UNMISS (South Sudan), and UNISFA (Abyei,
Sudan).
4
For summary information on Ethiopia’s contribution in these and earlier deployments see Zeray
Hailemariam (8 January 2016), Ethiopia’s contribution toward peacekeeping mission.
5
The author believes the ENDF force to be approximately 2,000 strong. Communication with
Ethiopian foreign affairs political office, 8 November 2013.
6
Author’s communication with Ethiopian diplomat, New York, 14 November 2013.
7
For example, “Ethiopia: Liberians laud Ethiopian peacekeeping contingent,” Ethiopian Herald, 14
June 2006.
8
Roméo Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (New York:
Carroll and Graf, 2005), p.444.
9
Author’s communication with senior Ethiopian Foreign Affairs official, 28 October 2013.
10
ICG Report, Sudan: Regional Perspectives on the prospect of Southern Sudan Independence, May
2010, 12.
11
Author’s communication with senior Ethiopian Foreign Affairs official, Addis Ababa, 28 October
2013.
12
Statement of Dr Tedros Adhanom, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the FDRE at the Reception
Marking the Official Launching of Ethiopia’s Bid to a Non-Permanent Seat of the UNSC 2017-2018
(29 February 2015), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
13
Ibid.
14
Author’s communication with an Ethiopian Federal Police Commander with experience in UN
peacekeeping operations, Addis Ababa, 2 November 2013.