Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center:

Legal Issues

Michael John Garcia

Legislative Attorney

Jennifer K. Elsea
Legislative Attorney

R. Chuck Mason
Legislative Attorney

Edward C. Liu
Legislative Attorney

May 30, 2013

Congressional Research Service

7-5700
www.crs.gov
R40139
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
 Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues

Summary
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF), which granted the President the authority “to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those ... [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” against
the United States. Many persons subsequently captured during military operations in Afghanistan
and elsewhere were transferred to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for detention
and possible prosecution. Although nearly 800 persons have been held at Guantanamo since early
2002, the substantial majority of Guantanamo detainees have been transferred to another country
for continued detention or release. Those detainees who remain fall into three categories: (1)
persons placed in non-penal, preventive detention to stop them from rejoining hostilities; (2)
persons who face or are expected to face criminal charges; and (3) persons who have been cleared
for transfer or release, whom the United States continues to detain pending transfer. Although the
Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that Guantanamo detainees may seek habeas corpus
review of the legality of their detention, several legal issues remain unsettled.

In January 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order to facilitate the closure of the
Guantanamo detention facility within a year. This deadline was not met, but the Administration
has repeatedly stated its intent to close the facility. In March 2011, President Obama issued a new
Executive Order establishing a process to periodically review whether the continued detention of
a lawfully held Guantanamo detainee is warranted, which resulted in some 80 detainees being
cleared for release and transfer to a foreign country. Efforts to transfer these prisoners and close
Guantanamo have been hampered by a series of congressional enactments limiting executive
discretion to transfer or release detainees into the United States, including, most recently, the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (2013 NDAA; P.L. 112-239) and the
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (2013 CAA; P.L. 113-6 ). By
prohibiting funds from being used to transfer or release detainees into the United States, or to
assist in the transfer or release of detainees into the country, these acts seem to ensure that the
Guantanamo detention facility remains open at least through the 2013 fiscal year, and perhaps for
the foreseeable future. Moreover, the measures appear to make military tribunals the only viable
forum by which Guantanamo detainees could be tried for criminal offenses, as no civilian court
operates within Guantanamo, unless efforts to close the facility are successfully renewed. Upon
signing each of these measures into law, President Obama issued a statement describing his
opposition to the restrictions imposed on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees, and asserted that
his Administration will work with Congress to mitigate their effect.

The closure of the Guantanamo detention facility would raise a number of legal issues with
respect to the individuals formerly interned there, particularly if those detainees are transferred to
the United States. The nature and scope of constitutional protections owed to detainees within the
United States may be different from the protections owed to aliens held abroad. The transfer of
detainees to the United States may also have immigration consequences. This report provides an
overview of major legal issues likely to arise as a result of executive and legislative action to
close the Guantanamo detention facility. It discusses legal issues related to the transfer of
Guantanamo detainees (either to a foreign country or into the United States), the continued
detention of such persons in the United States, and the possible removal of persons brought into
the country. It also discusses selected constitutional issues that may arise in the criminal
prosecution of detainees, emphasizing the procedural and substantive protections that are utilized
in different forums (i.e., federal courts, court-martial proceedings, and military commissions).

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 Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues

Contents
Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1
Detainee Transfer or Release from Guantanamo ............................................................................. 9
Transfer/Release of Guantanamo Detainees to a Country Other Than the United
States ...................................................................................................................................... 9
Transfer of Detainees into the United States ........................................................................... 16
Detention and Treatment of Persons Transferred to the United States .......................................... 19
Authority to Detain Within the United States .......................................................................... 19
Treatment of Detained Persons ................................................................................................ 23
Legal Challenges to Nature of Detention ................................................................................ 25
Removal of Detainees from the United States ............................................................................... 26
Detainees’ Rights in a Criminal Prosecution ................................................................................. 27
Right to Assistance of Counsel ................................................................................................ 31
Right Against Use of Coerced Confessions ............................................................................. 33
Right Against Prosecution under Ex Post Facto Laws ............................................................ 39
Rules Against Hearsay Evidence ............................................................................................. 44
Evidentiary Issues ............................................................................................................. 44
Constitutional Issues ......................................................................................................... 46
Right to a Speedy Trial ............................................................................................................ 48
Statutory and Regulatory Requirements............................................................................ 50
Speedy Trials under Military System ................................................................................ 51
Right to Confront Secret Evidence .......................................................................................... 52
Withholding Classified Information During Discovery .................................................... 53
The Use of Secret Evidence at Trial .................................................................................. 55
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 58

Contacts
Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 59

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 Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues

Introduction
Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Congress passed the Authorization for the Use of Military
Force (AUMF), which granted the President the authority “to use all necessary and appropriate
force against those ... [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” against
the United States.1 As part of the subsequent “war on terror,” many persons captured during
military operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere were transferred to the U.S. Naval Station at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for detention and possible prosecution before military tribunals.

Although nearly 800 persons were transported to Guantanamo from early 2002 through 2008,2 the
substantial majority of Guantanamo detainees have ultimately been transferred to a third country
for continued detention or release.3 Detainees who remain fall into three categories:

• Persons who have been placed in preventive detention to stop them from
returning to the battlefield (formerly labeled “enemy combatants” by the Bush
Administration4). Preventive detention of captured belligerents is non-penal in
nature, and must be ended upon the cessation of hostilities.

1
P.L. 107-40.
2
Most of the detainees (632) were brought to Guantanamo in 2002. In 2003, an additional 117 detainees were brought
to Guantanamo; ten arrived in 2004; 14 in 2005; five in 2007; and one in 2008. See Guantanamo Review Task Force,
Final Report, Jan. 22, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. No detainees
have been brought to Guantanamo since 2008.
3
For a detailed description of the Guantanamo detainee population, see Andrei Scheinkman et al., “The Guantanamo
Docket,” New York Times, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo [hereinafter “Guantanamo Docket”]; “Names of the
Detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,” Washington Post, http://projects.washingtonpost.com/guantanamo/. See also
Benjamin Wittes and Zaahira Wyne, The Current Detainee Population of Guantánamo: An Empirical Study, Brookings
Institute, December 16, 2008 [hereinafter “Brookings Report”]. Updates to the Brookings Report that track
developments in the Guantanamo detainee population are available at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/
1216_detainees_wittes.aspx (last updated October 21, 2009) [hereinafter “Brookings Report Update”].
4
In March 2009, the Obama Administration announced a new definitional standard for the government’s authority to
detain terrorist suspects, which does not use the phrase “enemy combatant” to refer to persons who may be properly
detained. The new standard is similar in scope to the “enemy combatant” standard used by the Bush Administration to
detain terrorist suspects. Like the former standard, the new standard would permit the detention of members of the
Taliban, Al Qaeda, and associated forces, along with persons who provide support to such groups, regardless of
whether such persons were captured away from the battlefield in Afghanistan. However, in contrast to the former
standard, the new definition specifies that persons may be detained on account of support provided to Al Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces only if such support is “substantial.” Department of Justice, “Department of Justice
Withdraws ‘Enemy Combatant’ Definition for Guantanamo Detainees,” press release, March 13, 2009,
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-232.html; In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Respondents’
Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees Held At Guantanamo Bay, No.
08-0442, filed March 13, 2009 (D.D.C.). In October 2009, Congress modified rules for military commissions pursuant
to the Military Commissions Act of 2009, enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, including by providing commissions with jurisdiction over alien “unprivileged enemy belligerents.” P.L. 111-84,
§1802 (amending, inter alia, 10 U.S.C. §§948a-948b). Commissions previously could exercise jurisdiction over alien
“unlawful enemy combatants.” 10 U.S.C. §948c (2008). Despite the difference in nomenclature, the two terms are used
to refer to similar categories of persons. In January 2010, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held
that, at minimum, the executive’s authority to detain persons in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban covered
those persons subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). Section 1021 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012, P.L. 112-81,
essentially codified detention authority standards along the lines of the definition the Obama Administration employed
in the litigation above, but it refers to “covered persons” and does not use the terms enemy belligerents or enemy
combatants.

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• Persons who, besides being subject to preventive detention, have been brought or
are expected to be brought before a military or other tribunal to face criminal
charges, including for alleged violations of the law of war. If convicted, such
persons may be subject to criminal penalty, which in the case of the most severe
offenses may include life imprisonment or death.
• Persons who have been cleared for transfer or release to a foreign country, either
because (1) they are not believed to have been engaged in hostilities, or (2)
although they were found to have been enemy belligerents, they are no longer
considered a threat to U.S. security. Such persons remain detained at
Guantanamo until their transfer may be effectuated.
The decision by the Bush Administration to detain suspected belligerents at Guantanamo was
based upon both policy and legal considerations. From a policy standpoint, the U.S. facility at
Guantanamo offered a safe and secure location away from the battlefield where captured persons
could be interrogated and potentially tried by military tribunals for any war crimes they may have
committed. From a legal standpoint, the Bush Administration sought to avoid the possibility that
suspected enemy combatants could pursue legal challenges regarding their detention or other
wartime actions taken by the executive. The Bush Administration initially believed that
Guantanamo was largely beyond the jurisdiction of the federal courts, and noncitizens held there
would not have access to the same substantive and procedural protections that would be required
if they were detained in the United States.5

The legal support for this policy was significantly eroded by a series of Supreme Court rulings
permitting Guantanamo detainees to seek judicial review of the circumstances of their detention.
Although Congress attempted to limit federal courts’ jurisdiction over detainees through the
enactment of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA; P.L. 109-148, Title X) and the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA; P.L. 109-366), these efforts were subject to judicial challenge.
In 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush that the constitutional writ of habeas
corpus extends to noncitizens held at Guantanamo, and found that provisions of the DTA and
MCA eliminating federal habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees acted as an
unconstitutional suspension of the writ.6 As a result, Guantanamo detainees may seek habeas
review of the legality of their detention. Nonetheless, several legal issues were not definitively
settled by the Boumediene decision, including the scope of habeas review available to
Guantanamo detainees, the remedy available for those persons found to be unlawfully held by the
United States, and the extent to which other constitutional provisions extend to noncitizens held
at Guantanamo.7 Litigation addressing these matters is ongoing in the D.C. Circuit, with several
rulings being issued by the circuit court of appeals. These rulings have generally been favorable
to the legal position advanced by the government.8 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari with

5
Memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, for William J. Haynes, General Counsel,
Department of Defense, Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, December 28,
2001.
6
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
7
For background, see CRS Report RL33180, Enemy Combatant Detainees: Habeas Corpus Challenges in Federal
Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia; CRS Report R41156, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy
Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.
8
See CRS Report R41156, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings, by
Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.

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respect to all such decisions thus far, but may prove willing to take on another Guantanamo case
in the future. In the meantime, it appears that the circuit court’s rulings will remain controlling.

On January 22, 2009, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13492, requiring that the
Guantanamo detention facility be closed as soon as practicable, and no later than a year from the
date of the Order.9 Any persons who continue to be held at Guantanamo at the time of closure
were to be either transferred to a third country for continued detention or release, or transferred to
another U.S. detention facility. The Order further provided that specified officials would review
all Guantanamo detentions to assess whether the detainee should continue to be held by the
United States, transferred or released to a third country, or be prosecuted by the United States for
criminal offenses.10 Reviewing authorities were required to identify and consider the legal,
logistical, and security issues that would arise in the event that some detainees are transferred to
the United States. The Order also mandated that the reviewing authorities to assess the feasibility
of prosecuting detainees in an Article III court. During this review period, the Secretary of
Defense was required to take steps to ensure that all proceedings before military commissions and
the United States Court of Military Commission Review were halted. On the same day that the
Executive Order to close the Guantanamo detention facility was issued, President Obama issued
two other Executive Orders which created separate task forces—the Special Task Force on
Detainee Disposition and the Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies—charged
with reviewing aspects of U.S. detention policy, including the options available for the detention,
trial, or transfer of wartime detainees, whether held at Guantanamo or elsewhere.11 Although
these task forces are distinct from the task force responsible for reviewing Guantanamo
detentions, their work and recommendations may have implications on U.S. policy with respect to
Guantanamo.

Since the issuance of the Executive Order to close Guantanamo, only one detainee formerly held
there has been transferred to the United States. In June 2009, Ahmed Ghailani was transferred to
the United States to face criminal charges in federal civilian court for his alleged role in the 1998
bombings of U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya (the transfer occurred shortly before
Congress enacted the first of several restrictions on the use of appropriated funds to bring

9
Executive Order 13492, “Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and
Closure of Detention Facilities,” 74 Federal Register 4897, January 22, 2009 [hereinafter “Executive Order”].
10
Id. at §4. The Order specifies that the review shall be conducted by the Attorney General (who shall also coordinate
the review process), the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director
of National Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as other officers or full- or part-time
employees of the U.S. government (as determined by the Attorney General, with the concurrence of the relevant
department head) with intelligence, counterterrorism, military, or legal expertise.
11
Executive Order 13491, “Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,” 74 Federal Register 4893, January 22, 2009; Executive
Order 13493, “Review of Detention Policy Options,” 74 Federal Register 4901, January 22, 2009. On July 20, 2009,
the Special Task Force on Detainee Disposition, which was required to issue a final report by July 21, 2009, “unless the
Co-Chairs determine that an extension is necessary,” extended by six months the period in which the Task Force will
conduct its work and submit a final report. The Task Force issued a preliminary report on the use of military
commissions to try wartime detainees (including those held at Guantanamo) and the process for determining the
appropriate forum for trials of suspected terrorists. Special Task Force on Detainee Disposition (Detention Policy Task
Force), “Preliminary Report,” July 20, 2009, available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/
law-of-war-prosecution-prelim-report-7-20-09.pdf. The Special Task Force on Interrogation and Transfer Policies
established by Executive Order 13491 issued recommendations to the President in August 2009. Department of Justice,
“Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to the President,” press
release, August 24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html.

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Guantanamo detainees to the United States12). Ghailani was convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment for his part in the conspiracy.13

On October 28, 2009, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-81) was
signed into law, and modified rules governing military commissions. Soon thereafter, the
Departments of Justice and Defense made an announcement regarding the forums in which 10
other Guantanamo detainees, who had previously been charged before military commissions,
would be tried.14 The Attorney General and Secretary of Defense determined that military
commission proceedings against five Guantanamo detainees may be resumed15 However, the
Department of Justice stated that it intended to bring charges against five detainees in the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York for criminal offenses related to the 9/11
terrorist attacks,16 and the charges brought before these individuals before military commissions
were withdrawn without prejudice in January 2010.17

The decision to try some Guantanamo detainees in federal civilian court proved controversial.
Plans to bring charges in federal court against Khalid Sheik Mohammed, the alleged mastermind
of the 9/11 attacks, were placed on hold until the Attorney General announced in April 2011 that
the Administration had reversed course and the 9/11 conspirators would be tried before military
commissions.18 The November 2010 conviction of Ahmed Ghailani for one of the more than 280
charges he faced in connection to the 1998 embassy bombings has fueled the debate over
terrorism trials. While some have characterized Ghailani’s conviction as demonstrating that
federal civilian courts serve as an appropriate forum for the prosecution of some Guantanamo
detainees, others view Ghailani’s acquittal of most charges as evidence that civilian courts are an
inappropriate forum for the criminal prosecution of wartime detainees.19

12
The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32), which was enacted within weeks of Ghailani’s transfer to
the United States, restricted the subsequent use of funds to transfer any detainee into the United States, except for
prosecution or detention during legal proceedings, provided that the executive fulfilled a 45-day reporting requirement
prior to any such transfer occurring. Later restrictions enacted after the Attorney General’s proposal to try the 9/11
conspirators in New York eliminated the exceptions to transfers to the United States, including that for prosecutions.
See, e.g., P.L. 112-81 §1027.
13
Benjamin Weiser, Ex-Detainee Gets Life Sentence in Embassy Blasts, WASH. POST, January 25, 2011. Ghailani is
appealing his conviction and sentence.
14
Department of Justice and Department of Defense, “Departments of Justice and Defense Announce Forum Decisions
for Ten Guantanamo Bay Detainees,” press release, November 13, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/
November/09-ag-1224.html [hereinafter “DOJ Announcement”].
15
Id. In a legal brief filed with the D.C. Circuit in January 2010, the government noted that the Attorney General
decided that the prosecution of an additional detainee should occur before a military commission, and the convening
authority of military commissions must now decide whether to refer charges against the detainee to a military
commission. A copy of this brief is available at http://a.abcnews.go.com/images/Politics/Final_Brief.pdf.
16
These detainees are Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Walid Muhammad Salih Mubarak Bin ‘Attash, Ramzi Binalshibh,
Ali Abdul Aziz Ali, and Mustafa Ahmed Adam al Hawsawi.
17
Dept. of Defense, “Military Commission Charges Withdrawn In Sept. 11 Case,” press release, January 22, 2010,
http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=13262.
18
Vindicating Guantanamo, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, April 5, 2011. The Department of Defense announced that charges
have been sworn against the five accused 9/11 conspirators. Dept. of Defense, “DOD Announces Charges Sworn
Against Five Detainees Allegedly Responsible for 9/11 Attacks,” press release, May 31, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/
releases/release.aspx?releaseid=14532.
19
For more information about the Ghailani case, see CRS Report R41156, Judicial Activity Concerning Enemy
Combatant Detainees: Major Court Rulings, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.

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On January 22, 2010, the Guantanamo Task Force issued its final report concerning the
appropriate disposition of each detainee held at Guantanamo. The Task Force concluded that 36
detainees remained subject to active criminal investigations or prosecutions; 48 detainees should
remain in preventive detention without criminal trial, as they are “too dangerous to transfer but
not feasible for prosecution”; and the remaining detainees could be transferred, either
immediately or eventually, to a foreign country.20

In December 2009, President Obama issued a memorandum directing the Attorney General and
Secretary of Defense to take steps to acquire the Thomson Correctional Facility in Thomson, IL,
so that at least some Guantanamo detainees may be relocated there for continued internment.21
Beginning in FY2011, however, Congress began including a provision in annual appropriations or
defense authorization enactments that barred funds from being used to construct or modify a
facility in the United States to house detainees who remain under the custody or control of the
Department of Defense (DOD).22 Although the Thomson facility was purchased in 2012,
Administration officials have averred that it will not be used to house Guantanamo detainees, but
instead serve to hold high-security prison inmates.23

Although the original deadline for the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility established by
Executive Order 13492 was not met, the Administration has stated that it still intends to close the
facility as expeditiously as possible. Efforts by the executive branch to close the facility have
been hampered by a series of congressional enactments limiting executive discretion to transfer or
release detainees into the United States, with the most significant limitations initially established
by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (2011 NDAA; P.L. 111-383),
which was signed into law on January 7, 2011, and the Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (2011 CAA; P.L. 112-10). By prohibiting funds from being
used to transfer or release detainees into the United States, or to assist in the transfer or release of
detainees into the country,24 these and subsequent similar acts seem to ensure that the
Guantanamo detention facility remains open for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the measures

20
Guantanamo Review Task Force, Final Report, January 22, 2010, available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/
guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf.
21
Presidential Memorandum Directing Certain Actions with Respect to Acquisition and Use of Thomson Correctional
Center to Facilitate Closure of Detention Facilities at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 75 Federal Register 1015,
December 15, 2009. Legislation was introduced to prevent the construction or modification of a U.S. facility to house
Guantanamo detainees. See H.R. 5822, Military Construction and Veterans Affairs and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, 2011 (111th Cong.) (House-passed version), §516.
22
The first such prohibition is found in the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY2011 (2011 NDAA),
P.L. 111-383, §1034(a)-(b) and applied only to DOD funds for FY2011. Later versions of the prohibition found in
continuing appropriations legislation have extended it to all funds made available under any act. See Department of
Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (2011 CAA), P.L. 112-10, §1114; Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (2012 Minibus), P.L. 112-55, §533; Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2012 (2012 CAA), P.L. 112-74, Div. A, §8121, Div. H, §511; Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations
Act, 2013 (2013 CAA), P.L. 113-6, Div. B, §531, Div. C, §8111.
23
U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice, 112th Cong., June
12, 2012 (statement by Attorney General Holder, in response to question by Sen. Durbin, pledging not to use the
Thomson facility to house Guantanamo detainees).
24
2011 NDAA, P.L. 111-383, §1032 (prohibiting the use of military funds to transfer or assist in the transfer or release
of Guantanamo detainees into the United States); 2011 CAA, P.L. 112-10, §1112 (barring the use of funds appropriated
or otherwise made available by the 2011 CAA or any other act); 2012 Minibus, P.L. 112-55, §532; 2012 CAA, P.L.
112-74, Div. A, §8119, Div. D, §542; National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (2012 NDAA), P.L. 112-81,
§1027; 2013 CAA, P.L. 113-6, Div. B, §530, Div. C, §8109; National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (2013
NDAA), P.L. 112-239, §1027.

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appear to make military tribunals the only viable forum by which Guantanamo detainees could be
tried for criminal offenses, as no civilian court operates within Guantanamo. When signing each
of these measures into law, President Obama issued a statement expressing his opposition to those
provisions limiting executive discretion to transfer detainees into the United States or to the
custody of certain foreign governments or entities.25 While highly critical of these provisions’
effect, President Obama’s signing statements did not allege that the restrictions on transfers to the
United States represented an unconstitutional infringement upon executive authority, or claim that
the executive branch was not legally bound to comply with the provisions’ requirements.26
President Obama did, however, state that his “Administration will work with the Congress to seek
repeal of these restrictions, will seek to mitigate their effects, and will oppose any attempt to
extend or expand them in the future.”27

On March 7, 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13567, establishing a process for the
periodic review of the continued detention of persons currently held at Guantanamo who have
either been (1) designated for preventive detention under the laws of war or (2) referred for
criminal prosecution, but have not been convicted of a crime and do not have formal charges
pending against them.28 The Executive Order establishes a Periodic Review Board (PRB) to
assess whether the continued detention of a covered individual is warranted in order “to protect
against a significant threat to the security of the United States.” In instances where a person’s
continued detention is not deemed warranted, the Secretaries of State and Defense are designated
responsibility “for ensuring that vigorous efforts are undertaken to identify a suitable transfer
location for any such detainee, outside of the United States, consistent with the national security
and foreign policy interests of the United States” and relevant legal requirements. An initial
review of each individual covered by the Order, which involves a hearing before the PRB in
which the detainee and his representative may challenge the government’s basis for his continued
detention and introduce evidence on his own behalf, must occur within a year of the Order’s
issuance. Those persons deemed to be subject to continued detention will have their cases

25
In a statement issued upon signing the 2011 NDAA into law, President Obama expressed concern that the provision
limiting detainee transfers into the United States “represents a dangerous and unprecedented challenge to critical
executive branch authority to determine when and where to prosecute Guantanamo detainees….” White House Office
of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on H.R. 6523, January 7, 2011, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/07/statement-president-hr-6523 [hereinafter “Presidential Signing
Statement on the 2012 NDAA”]. He further stated that the provision limiting executive discretion to transfer detainees
to the custody of foreign entities would “interfere with the authority of the executive branch to make important and
consequential foreign policy and national security determinations” regarding the transfer of persons captured in an
armed conflict. See also White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on H.R. 1473, April 15,
2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/04/15/statement-president-hr-1473 (disapproving
of similar restrictions on detainee transfers established by the 2011 CAA). On signing more comprehensive measures
into law as part of the 2012 NDAA, however, the President argued that some application of the restrictions might
violate constitutional separation of powers principles, in particular the bar on detainee transfers to the United States in
Sections 1027 and 1028 curtailing the President’s authority to transfer detainees abroad. White House, Office of the
Press Secretary, Statement by the President on H.R. 1540, December 31, 2011, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/31/statement-president-hr-1540. For more information about
detainee measures in the 2012 and 2013 NDAA, see CRS Report R42143, The National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2012 and FY2013: Detainee Matters, by Jennifer K. Elsea and Michael John Garcia.
26
For discussion of the legal effect of presidential signing statements, see CRS Report RL33667, Presidential Signing
Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications, by Todd Garvey.
27
Presidential Signing Statement on the 2012 NDAA, supra footnote 25.
28
Executive Order 13567, “Periodic Review of Individuals Detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station Pursuant to
Authorization to Use Military Force,” 76 Federal Register 13277, March 10, 2011 [hereinafter “Executive Order on
Periodic Review”].

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reviewed periodically thereafter. The Order also specifies that the process it establishes is
discretionary; does not create any additional basis for detention authority or modify the scope of
authority granted under existing law; and is not intended to affect federal courts’ jurisdiction to
determine the legality of a person’s continued detention.

On the same day that Executive Order 13567 was issued, the White House also released a
statement concerning matters relevant to U.S. detention policy generally and to Guantanamo
specifically.29 Among other things,30 the statement reaffirmed the executive’s commitment to
close the Guantanamo detention facility. The statement also announced that the Secretary of
Defense would authorize the swearing and referring of new charges to military commissions—a
practice which had been halted following the issuance of Executive Order 13492 in January 2009.
The White House statement also reaffirmed the Administration’s commitment to prosecute some
detainees in Article III courts, and declared that it would work to repeal legislation that bars it
from transferring detainees into the country for trial before civilian courts.

Congress has enacted similar restrictions as part of subsequent defense authorization legislation
and other measures. The National Defense Authorization Act of FY2012, P.L. 112-81, authorizes
the detention of certain categories of persons and requires the military detention of a subset of
them (albeit not necessarily in Guantanamo and subject to waiver by the President); regulates
status determinations for persons held pursuant to the AUMF, regardless of location; regulates
periodic review proceedings concerning the continued detention of Guantanamo detainees; and
continues funding restrictions that relate to Guantanamo detainee transfers to foreign countries.
Despite an earlier threat to veto the bill,31 President Obama signed the 2012 NDAA into law while
issuing a signing statement claiming that certain of its detainee-related restrictions violate
separation-of-powers principles.32 Congress continued the funding restrictions on transfers of
detainees from Guantanamo in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013 (2013
NDAA), P.L. 112-239.33 President Obama objected to these provisions in a signing statement,

29
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee Policy,” March
7, 2011, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/03/07/fact-sheet-new-actions-guant-namo-and-
detainee-policy.
30
The statement also described the Administration’s view regarding the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions. While the United States is a party to all four of the 1949 Conventions, it has not ratified either of the 1977
Additional Protocols. The Administration announced its support for the ratification of the Additional Protocol Relating
to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), which was submitted to the
Senate in 1987 for its advice and consent but has not been agreed upon by the body. The Obama Administration also
announced that, while opposing aspects of the Additional Protocol Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), it would nonetheless “choose out of a sense of legal obligation to treat the
principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains in an international armed conflict,”
presumably due to a belief that the principles contained in Article 75 reflect customary international law. Article 75
establishes fundamental guarantees for the treatment of persons captured by opposing forces in an international armed
conflict, including rights associated with a fair trial. According the White House statement, the requirements contained
in Additional Protocol II and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I are consistent with current U.S. policies and practices.
31
See Exec. Office of the Pres., Statement of Administration Policy on H.R. 1540 (May 24, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr1540r_20110524.pdf (objecting in
particular to Section 1039 [barring transfer of detainees to the United States] as a “dangerous and unprecedented
challenge to critical Executive branch authority to determine when and where to prosecute detainees, based on the facts
and the circumstances of each case and our national security interests”). At the time these objections were made public,
the bill did not yet contain the provision requiring military commission trials.
32
Presidential Signing Statement on H.R. 1540, supra footnote 25.
33
P.L. 112-239, §§1022 (prohibition of funds to construct or modify detention facilities in U.S. territory), 1027 (barring
detainee transfers into the United States), and 1028 (restricting detainee transfers to other countries).

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complaining that “The Congress designed these sections, and has here renewed them once more,
in order to foreclose my ability to shut down the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. I continue to
believe that operating the facility weakens our national security by wasting resources, damaging
our relationships with key allies, and strengthening our enemies.”34

The President also charged that the restrictions could violate the Constitution:

My Administration will interpret these provisions as consistent with existing and future
determinations by the agencies of the Executive responsible for detainee transfers. And, in
the event that these statutory restrictions operate in a manner that violates constitutional
separation of powers principles, my Administration will implement them in a manner that
avoids the constitutional conflict.35

The President reiterated his intention to work toward the closure of Guantanamo in remarks he
made at a press conference on April 30, 2013.36 Criticizing the Guantanamo detention policy as
counterproductive in terms of international support for counterterrorism efforts and as providing a
recruiting tool for extremists, he stated that his Administration would review possible
administrative actions and reengage with Congress to bring about the closure of the detention
facility.37

The closure of the Guantanamo detention facility would raise a number of legal issues with
respect to the individuals presently interned there, particularly if those detainees were transferred
to the United States. The nature and scope of constitutional protections owed to detainees within
the United States may be different from those available to persons held at Guantanamo or
elsewhere. This may have implications for the continued detention or prosecution of persons
transferred to the United States. The transfer of detainees to the United States may have additional
consequences, as some detainees might qualify for asylum or other protections under immigration
law. The Executive Order issued by President Obama to effectuate the closure of Guantanamo
also contemplates that the Administration “work with Congress on any legislation that may be
appropriate” relating to the transfer of detainees to the United States.38

This report provides an overview of major legal issues that are likely to arise in the event of
executive and legislative action to close the Guantanamo detention facility. It discusses legal
issues related to the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees (either to a foreign country or
into the United States), the continued detention of such persons in the United States, and the
possible removal of persons brought to the United States. It considers selected constitutional
issues that may arise in the criminal prosecution of detainees, emphasizing the procedural and
substantive protections that exist in different adjudicatory forums. Issues discussed include
detainees’ right to a speedy trial, the prohibition against prosecution under ex post facto laws, and
limitations upon the admissibility of hearsay and secret evidence in criminal cases. These issues

34
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on H.R. 4310, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/03/statement-president-hr-4310.
35
Id.
36
See Charlie Savage, Amid Hunger Strike, Obama Renews Push to Close Cuba Prison, NY TIMES, May 1, 2013, at
A1.
37
Id. A transcript of the President’s remarks is available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/01/us/politics/
transcript-of-obamas-news-conference.html?ref=us.
38
Executive Order, supra footnote 9, at §4(c)(5).

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are likely to be relevant not only to the treatment of Guantanamo detainees, but also to other
terrorist suspects or enemy belligerents apprehended by the United States in the future.

Detainee Transfer or Release from Guantanamo

Any proposal to close the Guantanamo detention facility must necessarily address the transfer of
persons currently detained there. While some detainees may be transferred to other countries for
continued detention, supervision, or release, some proposals to close the Guantanamo detention
facility have contemplated transferring at least some detainees to the United States, either for
continued detention or, in the case of some detainees who are not considered a threat to U.S.
security, possible release.39

Transfer/Release of Guantanamo Detainees to a Country Other

Than the United States
The vast majority of persons initially transferred to Guantanamo for preventive detention have
been transferred to other countries, either for continued detention by the receiving country or for
release.40 Decisions to transfer a detainee to another country have been based upon a
determination by U.S. officials that (1) the detainee is not an enemy combatant or (2) while the
detainee was properly designated as an enemy combatant, his continued detention by the United
States is no longer warranted.41 A decision by military authorities that the continued detention of
an enemy combatant is no longer appropriate is based on a number of factors, including a
determination that the detainee no longer poses a threat to the United States and its allies.
Generally, if continued detention is no longer deemed necessary, the detainee is to be transferred
to the control of another government for his release.42 The DOD has also transferred enemy
belligerents to other countries for continued detention, investigation, or prosecution when those

39
Initially, the Obama Administration considered the possibility of releasing at least some Guantanamo detainees who
are not considered a threat into the United States. See Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, “Media
Roundtable Discussion,” March 26, 2009, available at http://www.dni.gov/interviews/20090326_interview.pdf.
Congress subsequently enacted a series of appropriations and authorization measures that barred funds from being used
to release Guantanamo detainees into the United States or specified U.S. territories. See P.L. 111-32, §14103(a); P.L.
111-84, §1041(a); P.L. 111-83, §552(a); P.L. 111-88, §428(a); P.L. 111-117, §532(a); P.L. 111-118, §9011(a). Most of
these restrictions concerned funds appropriated for the 2010 fiscal year. Through the enactment of a series of
continuing resolutions which temporarily fund federal agencies, Congress has effectively extended the restrictions
imposed by FY2010 appropriation enactments. Further, the 2011 NDAA bars military funds appropriated for the 2011
fiscal year from being used either to release a detainee into the United States, or to assist in the release of a detainee
into the country. P.L. 111-383, §1032. The 2011 CAA imposed similar funding restrictions upon other government
agencies for the 2011 fiscal year. P.L. 112-10, §1112.The 2012 NDAA and 2013 NDAA have continued the ban
through FY2013. See P.L. 112-81, §1027 and P.L. 112-239, §1027. Other government agencies are covered in various
continuing appropriations measures. See supra footnote 24.
40
See Guantanamo Docket, supra footnote 3.
41
Declaration of Joseph Benkert, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, DOD,
executed on June 8, 2007, at para. 3, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Case No. 1:05-cv-01220 (D.D.C.
2007); Guantanamo Task Force Report, supra footnote 20, at 16-17 (discussing criteria used by Guantanamo Task
Force when determining whether a detainee was eligible for transfer).
42
Benkert Declaration, supra footnote 41.

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governments are willing to accept responsibility for ensuring that the transferred person will not
pose a continuing threat to the United States and its allies.43

On March 7, 2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13567, which establishes a process
to periodically review whether the continued detention of a lawfully held Guantanamo detainee is
warranted. The Order provides that a Periodic Review Board (PRB), composed of officials from
several departments and agencies,44 shall review the grounds for the continued detention of any
person currently held at Guantanamo who has either been (1) designated as being subject to
detention under the laws of war (i.e., a captured enemy belligerent) or (2) referred for criminal
prosecution, but has yet to be formally charged with an offense.45 The Order also establishes a
Review Committee, composed of relevant department heads and officials,46 to annually review
the sufficiency and efficacy of transfer efforts. Following the completion of the PRB’s initial
review of the disposition of detainees, and every four years thereafter, the Committee is also
charged with assessing “whether a continued law of war detention policy remains consistent with
the interests of the United States, including national security interests.”47

The PRB is required to assess whether the continued detention of any person covered by the
Order “is necessary to protect against a significant threat to the security of the United States.” In
cases where the continued detention of a Guantanamo detainee is not deemed warranted, the
Secretaries of State and Defense are charged with “ensuring that vigorous efforts are undertaken
to identify a suitable transfer location for any such detainee, outside of the United States,”
consistent with U.S. obligations not to transfer persons to countries where they may face torture.48
The PRBs were to begin reviewing the grounds for the continued detention of covered individuals
within a year of the issuance of Executive Order 13567;49 however, this process has not yet
begun,50 possibly delayed due to new requirements for status reviews imposed under Section

43
Id. In April 2010, a federal habeas court dismissed on mootness grounds the petitions of 105 former Guantanamo
detainees, including some who were transferred to the custody of a foreign country for further detention, on the grounds
that such persons were no longer “in custody under or by color of the authority of the United States,” as is required for
a court to exercise jurisdiction under the federal habeas statute. In re Petitioners Seeking Habeas Corpus Relief In
Relation To Prior Detentions At Guantanamo Bay, 700 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2010) (Hogan, J.). In reaching this
decision, the habeas court placed significant weight upon government declarations that the United States relinquishes
complete custody and control over detainees when they are transferred into the hands of foreign governments.
44
The Executive Order provides that the PRB shall be composed of “senior officials…, one appointed by each of the
following departments and offices: the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, as well as the
Offices of the Director of National Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Executive Order on
Periodic Review, supra footnote 28, at §9(b).
45
Id. at §1(a). Accordingly, the review would not cover persons who have been determined not to be lawfully detained
(e.g., those who have been ordered released by a federal habeas court) who remain in U.S. custody pending their
repatriation or resettlement to a foreign country.
46
Specifically, the Review Committee is composed of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Id. at §9(d).
47
Id. at §5(b).
48
Id. at §4(a).
49
Id. at §3(a).
50
Press Release, Human Rights First, Two Years After Executive Order, Guantanamo Periodic Review Board
Proceedings Yet to Begin (March 6, 2013), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/03/06/two-years-after-
executive-order-guantanamo-periodic-review-board-proceedings-yet-to-begin/.

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1023 of the 2012 NDAA.51 The Pentagon published implementing guidelines for the PRB process
in May 2012.52

Under the Order, the individual undergoing a review is to be provided with an unclassified
summary of the factors and information to be considered by the PRB.53 A hearing is then to be
held in which the detainee, with assistance from a government-appointed representative (along
with private counsel, if obtained by the detainee at no expense to the government), may argue that
his continued detention is unwarranted.54 The detainee has a right to present a statement to the
PRB, introduce relevant information, and to call willing and reasonably available witnesses to
provide information on his behalf.55 The detainee’s representative, who generally is to be
provided with all information contained in the government’s disposition recommendation to the
PRB (or in certain circumstances, a sufficient substitute or summary of such information), is
authorized to challenge the government’s information and present information in support of the
detainee.56 If the PRB’s initial review does not result in the individual being designated for
transfer, the PRB will continue to periodically review the grounds for continued detention,
through a review of case files every six months thereafter. Further, it must conduct a full review
and hearing every three years following its initial review.57 If the PRB does not reach a
unanimous conclusion as to whether a detainee’s continued detention is warranted, the case shall
be considered by the Review Committee for further review;58 however, the Order does not
explain the procedures used by the Review Committee in its consideration of PRB decisions, or
clearly describe the effect that its review has upon the final disposition of a detainee’s case.59

The designation of a Guantanamo detainee for transfer or release does not necessarily mean that
the individual’s removal from the Guantanamo facility will be immediately effectuated. Domestic
and international legal requirements may constrain the ability of the United States to transfer
persons to foreign countries if they might face torture or other forms of persecution. Most
notably, Article 3 of the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and its implementing legislation prohibit the transfer
of persons to countries where there are substantial grounds for believing (i.e., it would be “more

51
It has also been suggested that delays have been caused by disagreement over how to handle evidence elicited
through torture. See Savage, supra footnote 36.
52
Directive Type Memorandum (DTM) 12-005, Implementing Guidelines for Periodic Review of Detainees Held at
Guantanamo Bay per Executive Order 13567 [hereinafter “PRB Implementing Guidelines”], available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/DTM-12-005.pdf.
53
Executive Order on Periodic Review, supra footnote 28, at §3(a)(1).
54
Id. at §3(a)(2).
55
Id. at §3(a)(3).
56
Id. at §3(a)(2). The Order provides that the government-appointed representative must have appropriate security
clearance. A PRB may permit a government-appointed representative to be provided with a summary or substitute for
government information only in “exceptional circumstances where it is necessary to protect national security, including
intelligence sources and methods.” A substitute or summary may be provided to private counsel in lieu of underlying
government information in a broader range of circumstances, including when the government, rather than the PRB,
“determines that the need to protect national security, including intelligence sources and methods, or law enforcement
or privilege concerns” warrants such action.
57
Id. at §3(b)-(c).
58
Id. at §3(d). Neither the government nor the detainee is granted a right to appeal PRB rulings to the Review
Committee.
59
For example, it is unclear whether the Review Committee’s consideration of a detainee’s continued detention would
necessarily result in a final determination as to whether continued detention is warranted, or whether the Committee
might remand the case to the PRB for further consideration of a particular issue or piece of evidence.

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likely than not”) that they would be subjected to torture.60 The Bush Administration took the
position that CAT Article 3 and its implementing legislation did not cover the transfer of foreign
persons held outside the United States in the “war on terror.”61

Nonetheless, both the Bush and Obama Administrations have stated that “it is the policy of the
United States, consistent with the approach taken by the United States in implementing ... [CAT],
not to repatriate or transfer ... [Guantanamo detainees] to other countries where it believes it is
more likely than not that they will be tortured.”62 When the transfer of a Guantanamo detainee is
deemed appropriate, the United States seeks diplomatic assurances that the person will be treated
humanely by the foreign government accepting the transfer. If such assurances are not deemed
sufficiently reliable, the transfer will not be executed until the concerns of U.S. officials are
satisfactorily resolved.63 The use of diplomatic assurances in Guantanamo transfer decisions is
similar to the practice sometimes employed by U.S. authorities when determining whether the
extradition of a person or the removal of an alien by immigration authorities would comply with
CAT requirements. In January 2009, President Obama issued an Executive Order creating a
special task force to review U.S. transfer policies to ensure compliance with applicable legal
requirements.64 In August of that year, the task force issued recommendations to ensure that U.S.
transfer practices comply with applicable standards and do not result in the transfer of persons to
face torture.65 These recommendations include strengthening procedures used to obtain
assurances from a country that a person will not face torture if transferred there, including
through the establishment of mechanisms to monitor the treatment of transferred persons. If
implemented, such measures might impede the transfer of some Guantanamo detainees to third
countries. In April 2009, a D.C. Circuit panel held that a government determination that a
detainee would not be tortured if transferred to a particular country is not subject to district court
review in habeas proceedings challenging the proposed transfer.66

Of the persons held at Guantanamo who have been cleared for transfer or release, even prior to
the enactment of statutory restrictions, several dozen remained at Guantanamo either because no
country was willing to accept the detainee, or because human rights concerns have caused the
United States to refrain from transferring the detainee to a country willing to accept him.
According to the final report of the Guantanamo Task Force, a plurality of detainees who have

60
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46,
Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984). CAT Article 3 requirements were implemented by
the United States pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, P.L. 105-277 [hereinafter
“FARRA”]. For further background, see CRS Report RL32276, The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of
U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens, by Michael John Garcia.
61
United States Written Response to Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture, April 28, 2006, available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/68554.htm.
62
Benkert Declaration, supra footnote 41, at para. 6. See also Guantanamo Task Force Report, supra footnote 20, at 15
n.11.
63
Benkert Declaration, supra footnote 41, para. 7. The PRB Implementing Guidelines, supra footnote 52, state that
they are to be implemented consistent with CAT.
64
Executive Order No. 13491, “Ensuring Lawful Interrogations,” 74 Federal Register 4893, January 22, 2009.
65
Department of Justice, “Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues Its Recommendations to
the President,” press release, August 24, 2009, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/August/09-ag-835.html. The Task
Force considered seven types of transfers: extradition, immigration removal proceedings, transfers pursuant to the
Geneva Conventions, transfers from Guantanamo Bay, military transfers within or from Afghanistan, military transfers
within or from Iraq, and transfers pursuant to intelligence authorities.
66
Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Kiyemba II”), rehearing en banc denied (July 27, 2009), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010).

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been cleared for transfer but remain at Guantanamo “cannot be repatriated due to humane
treatment or related concerns in their home countries … and thus need to be resettled in a third
country....”67

Additionally, a significant number of detainees could potentially be transferred to other countries

for continued detention or supervision if the United States was assured that the receiving country
could manage the threat they pose.68 In January 2010, President Obama announced that, in light
of terrorist activities emanating from Yemen, including alleged involvement by Yemeni nationals
in the failed 2009 bomb attack on an airplane that was landing in Detroit, the United States “will
not be transferring additional detainees back to Yemen at this time.”69 The final report of the
Guantanamo Task Force identified 30 detainees from Yemen who

were designated for “conditional” detention based on the current security environment in that
country. They are not approved for repatriation to Yemen at this time, but may be transferred
to third countries, or repatriated to Yemen in the future if the current moratorium on transfers
to Yemen is lifted and other security conditions are met.70

On May 23, 2013, President Obama announced that the moratorium on detainee transfers to
Yemen would be lifted, and the feasibility of such transfers would be reviewed on a case-by-case
basis.71

Whether future diplomatic efforts will effectuate the transfer of some or all of these persons to
third countries remains to be seen. It has been reported that the U.S. refusal to resettle detainees
on its territory may be contributing to the reluctance of other countries to accept more detainees
for resettlement.72

Beginning with the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-32), Congress passed
several appropriations or authorization measures that contained provisions barring funds from
being used to effectuate the transfer of a Guantanamo detainee to a foreign State unless, 15 days
prior to such transfer, the President submits a classified report to Congress concerning the identity
of the detainee, the risk the transfer poses to U.S. security, and the terms of any agreement with

67
Guantanamo Task Force Report, supra footnote 20, at 16.
68
For example, the United States had negotiations with Yemen to transfer a significant number of Guantanamo
detainees who are Yemeni nationals to that country. These negotiations have reportedly proven unsuccessful in part
because of U.S. concerns regarding the sufficiency of Yemeni measures to minimize the threat posed by some
detainees. Brookings Report, supra footnote 3, at 22-23; Matt Apuzzo, “‘No Progress’ on Mass Guantanamo Prisoner
Transfer,” USA Today, July 7, 2008. In January 2010, President Obama announced that, in light of the recent terrorist
activities emanating from Yemen, including alleged Yemeni involvement in the failed Christmas Day bomb attack on
an airline landing in Detroit, the United States “will not be transferring additional detainees back to Yemen at this
time.” White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on Security Reviews,” January 5, 2010,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-security-reviews. On May 23, 2013,
President Obama announced the lifting of this moratorium.
69
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President on Security Reviews,” January 5, 2010,
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-security-reviews.
70
Guantanamo Task Force Report, supra footnote 20, at ii.
71
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks of President Barack Obama,” May 23, 2012, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-barack-obama.
72
Carol Rosenberg, How Congress helped thwart Obama’s plan to close Guantánamo, MIAMI HERALD, January 22,
2011, online edition.

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the receiving country concerning the acceptance of the individual, including any financial
assistance related to the agreement.73

Despite President Obama’s objections,74 the 2011 NDAA placed more significant restrictions on
detainee transfers. The act provides that, except in cases when a detainee transfer is done to
effectuate an order by a U.S. court or tribunal,75 a detainee may only be transferred to the custody
or control of a foreign government or the recognized leadership of a foreign entity if, at least 30
days prior to the proposed transfer, the Secretary of Defense certifies to Congress that the foreign
government or entity (1) is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism or terrorist organization;
(2) maintains effective control over each detention facility where a transferred detainee may be
housed; (3) is not facing a threat likely to substantially affect its ability to control a transferred
detainee; (4) has agreed to take effective steps to ensure that the transferred person does not pose
a future threat to the United States, its citizens, or its allies; (5) has agreed to take such steps as
the Secretary deems necessary to prevent the detainee from engaging in terrorism; and (6) has
agreed to share relevant information with the United States related to the transferred detainee that
may affect the security of the United States, its citizens, or its allies.76 Nearly identical
certification requirements are found in the 2011 CAA,77 the 2012 NDAA,78 and 2013 NDAA,79 as
well as two continuing appropriations measures.80

The 2011 NDAA and CAA also prohibited the transfer of any detainee to the custody or control
of a foreign government or entity if there is a confirmed case that a former Guantanamo detainee
who was transferred to that government or entity subsequently engaged in terrorist activity.81
However, these restrictions were subject to waiver by the Secretary of Defense if he fulfilled the
certification process described in the preceding paragraph and also determined that the transfer is
in the security interests of the United States.82 The prohibitions also did not apply in cases where
a transfer is done to effectuate an order by a U.S. court or tribunal. These prohibitions were
continued in subsequent legislation.83

Current restrictions are found in the 2013 NDAA84 and 2013 CAA,85 and are substantially
identical to those passed in the 2011 NDAA.86 These provisions restrict the use of funds (NDAA

73
P.L. 111-32, §14103(e); P.L. 111-83, §552(e); P.L. 111-88, §428(e); P.L. 111-117, §532(e); P.L. 111-118, §9011(e).
74
See Presidential Signing Statement, supra footnote 25.
75
This would presumably include a federal habeas court order that a detainee must be released from military custody.
76
P.L. 111-383, §1033(a)-(b).
77
P.L. 112-10, §1013.
78
P.L. 112-81, §1028.
79
P.L. 112-239, §1028.
80
2012 CAA, P.L. 112-74, Div. A, §8120; 2013 CAA, P.L. 113-6, §8110.
81
P.L. 111-383, §1033(c) (imposing a one-year prohibition on such transfers); P.L. 112-10, §1013(c) (imposing a
restriction on such transfers when effectuated using funds appropriated or made available by the 2011 CAA or any
earlier act).
82
P.L. 111-383, §1033(c); P.L. 112-10, §1013(c).
83
The 2012 NDAA also applied the restrictions on transfer to foreign countries or entities to transfers of “covered
persons” whose detention is required by Section 1022 of that statute, notwithstanding location of the detention (that is,
for those detained outside of Guantanamo). P.L. 112-81, §§1022 & 1028. The restriction is not tied to funds, but is
waivable in the interest of national security. Id. §1022.
84
P.L. 112-239, §1028 (bars funds available to DOD for FY2013).
85
P.L. 113-6, §8110 (bars funds available under “this or any other Act”).

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funds or funds under any act, respectively) to transfer a detainee to a foreign country or entity
unless the Secretary of Defense certifies, with the agreement of the Secretary of State and in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, that

(1) the government of the foreign country or the recognized leadership of the foreign entity
to which the individual detained at Guantanamo is to be transferred—

(A) is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism or a designated foreign terrorist

organization;

(B) maintains control over each detention facility in which the individual is to be
detained ... ;

(C) is not, as of the date of the certification, facing a threat that is likely to substantially
affect its ability to exercise control over the individual;

(D) has taken or agreed to take effective actions to ensure that the individual cannot take
action to threaten the United States, its citizens, or its allies in the future;

(E) has taken or agreed to take such actions as the Secretary of Defense determines are
necessary to ensure that the individual cannot engage or reengage in any terrorist
activity; and

(F) has agreed to share with the United States any information that—

(i) is related to the individual or any associates of the individual; and

(ii) could affect the security of the United States, its citizens, or its allies; and

(2) includes an assessment, in classified or unclassified form, of the capacity, willingness,

and past practices (if applicable) of the foreign country or entity in relation to the Secretary’s
certifications.

The prohibition on transferring detainees to any country or entity that has experienced a case of
“prior confirmed recidivism,” subject to limited waiver, is also continued. The certification
requirements and recidivism prohibition do not apply in the case of a detainee who must be
released or transferred pursuant to a court order or, in the case of 2013 CAA provision, a plea
agreement under a military commission entered prior to enactment of the CAA. A few detainees
have been transferred under this exception.

The Secretary of Defense may waive two of the certification requirements and the recidivism
prohibition if alternate assurances can be arranged. Specifically, the requirements of D and E
above (regarding agreements by the recipient country to implement measures to prevent the
detainee from posing a threat or reengaging in terrorist or militant behavior) may be waived, as

(...continued)
86
The 2013 NDAA provision differs from previous versions in that it (1) eliminates the exception for transfers pursuant
to a plea agreement at a military commission (although this might effectively be covered by the exception for transfers
pursuant to the order of a competent tribunal); and (2) provides that the Secretary of Defense may give favorable
consideration to detainees who have substantially cooperated with U.S. intelligence or law enforcement officials
pursuant to a plea agreement and arrangements are made for the continuation of such cooperation after the transfer. The
2013 CAA does not contain these changes.

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can the prohibition regarding countries with confirmed prior recidivism, if the Secretary of
Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Director of
National Intelligence, certifies that (1) all of the other certifications requirements are met; (2)
alternative measures to D and E are put in place to avert the threats; and (3) the national security
interests of the United States are served by permitting the transfer to go forward. The national
security waiver for the certification requirements additionally requires a certification that “it is
not possible to certify that the risks addressed in the paragraph to be waived have been
completely eliminated,” but that the alternative actions to be taken will “substantially mitigate
such risks with regard to the individual to be transferred.” A waiver of the recidivism prohibition
requires an additional certification that the Secretary has considered any case of recidivism
associated with the destination country or entity and that the alternative measures will mitigate
any risk with respect to the individual to be transferred. The certification requirements involving
security conditions in the recipient country or entity, its ability to maintain control over detention
facilities, and its status as a supporter of terrorism may not be waived.

Transfer of Detainees into the United States

Most proposals to end the detention of foreign belligerents at Guantanamo contemplate the
transfer of at least some detainees into the United States, either for continued preventive
detention, prosecution before a military or civilian court, or in the case of detainees who are not
deemed a threat to U.S. security, possible release. As mentioned earlier, several appropriations
and authorization measures enacted by Congress have barred funds from being used to effectuate
the release of Guantanamo detainees into the United States. Moreover, Congress has enacted
several measures barring funds from being used to transfer detainees into the United States or its
territories or possessions; the most significant beginning in the 2011 NDAA and CAA, which bar
funds appropriated during the 2011 fiscal year from being used to transfer detainees into the
United States for any purpose.87 These restrictions have continued through the 2013 NDAA and
CAA without modification.88

The transfer of detainees into the United States may have implications under immigration law.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) establishes rules and requirements for the entry and
presence of aliens in the United States, and provides grounds for the exclusion or removal of
aliens on account of certain activities. The INA generally bars the entry into the United States or
continued presence of aliens involved in terrorism-related activity.89 Under current law, most
persons currently detained at Guantanamo would generally be barred from admission into the
United States on terrorism- and other security-related grounds under normal circumstances. Even
if a detainee is not inadmissible or removable (“deportable”) on such grounds, he may still be
inadmissible or removable under other INA provisions.90 Accordingly, even in the absence of
recent legislative enactments barring the use of funds to release Guantanamo detainees into the
United States, the INA would generally preclude most detainees from being released into the
country, as such aliens would be subject to removal under immigration law.
87
P.L. 111-383, §1032 (applying to military funds); P.L. 112-10, §1012 (applying to any funds appropriated by the
2011 CAA or any prior act).
88
P.L. 112-55, §532; P.L. 112-74, Div. A, §8119, Div. D, §542; P.L. 112-81, §1027; P.L. 113-6, Div. B, §530, Div. C,
§8109; P.L. 112-239, §1027.
89
8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3); 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(4). For background, see CRS Report RL32564, Immigration: Terrorist
Grounds for Exclusion and Removal of Aliens, by Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
90
See 8 U.S.C. §1182 (grounds for alien inadmissibility); 8 U.S.C. §1227 (grounds for deportation).

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The INA’s restrictions upon the entry of certain categories of aliens do not appear to necessarily
bar executive authorities from transferring wartime detainees into the United States for continued
detention or prosecution. During World War II, reviewing courts did not consider an alien
prisoner of war’s involuntary transfer to the United States for purposes of military detention to
constitute an “entry” under immigration laws.91 Although immigration laws have been amended
since that time to expressly apply to certain categories of aliens involuntarily brought to the
United States (e.g., those individuals apprehended in U.S. or international waters),92 these
modifications do not directly address the ability of the United States to intern alien enemy
belligerents in the United States. Additionally, it could be argued that the 2001 AUMF, which
grants the President authority to use all “necessary and appropriate force” against those
responsible for the 9/11 attacks, impliedly authorizes the President to detain captured belligerents
in the United States, even though such persons would generally be barred from entry under the
INA.93

Even assuming that the INA’s restrictions on alien admissibility are applicable to military
detainees, the executive branch could still effectuate their transfer into the United States pursuant
to its “parole” authority. In the immigration context, parole is a discretionary authority that may
be exercised on a case-by-case basis to permit inadmissible aliens to physically enter the United
States, including when the alien’s entry or stay serves a “significant public benefit.”94 The entry
91
See United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins, 163 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1947) (alien involuntarily brought to the United
States by U.S. warship for detention had not “departed” a foreign port within the meaning of Immigration Act of 1924
provision defining an “immigrant”); In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145-146 (9th Cir. 1946) (“It is proper to note that
petitioner was brought to this country under a war measure by orders of the military authorities as a prisoner of war and
not in accord with nor under the immigration laws limiting and regulating entries of residents or nationals of another
nation.”). Subsequent developments in immigration law, including with respect to alien eligibility for asylum and
deferral of removal under CAT-implementing regulations, may nonetheless have implications for the transfer of alien
detainees into the United States, particularly if they must be released from military custody. See infra at “Transfer of
Detainees into the United States” and “Removal of Detainees from the United States.”
92
As amended in 1996, the INA now provides that “An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or
who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to
the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for purposes
of this Act an applicant for admission.” 8 U.S.C. §1225(a)(1) (emphasis added). In an unpublished opinion, the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative body responsible for interpreting and applying immigration
laws, interpreted the 1996 amendment to the INA as overruling earlier circuit court jurisprudence (including WWII-era
cases concerning the applicability of immigration laws to military detainees brought to the United States) to the extent
that such jurisprudence recognized that any “alien who is involuntarily brought to the United States by agents of the
United States is not considered to be an immigrant within the meaning of the immigration laws.” In re Alexander
Navarro-Fierro, 2004 WL 1167275 (BIA January 16, 2004) (per curium) (ruling that an alien interdicted in
international waters and brought to the United States to face criminal prosecution for drug smuggling was considered
an applicant for admission under the INA).
93
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 (2004), a majority of the Supreme Court found that Congress had authorized
the President, pursuant to the 2001 AUMF, to detain U.S. citizens properly designated as “enemy combatants” who
were captured in the conflict in Afghanistan. Id. at 518 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion), 588-589 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). A plurality of the Court held that even assuming that the Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. §4001(a), which
limits detention of U.S. citizens except pursuant to an act of Congress, was applicable to the detention of U.S. citizens
held as enemy combatants, the AUMF satisfied the act’s requirement that any detention of U.S. citizens be authorized
by Congress. Id. at 517-518 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). It could be argued that the Hamdi plurality’s reasoning
supports the argument that the AUMF authorizes the President to transfer noncitizens into the United States for
detention, even though the entry of such persons might otherwise be prohibited under the INA. On the other hand, it
could be argued that the situation is not analogous to the facts at issue in Hamdi. Whereas the Non-Detention Act
generally barred the detention of U.S. citizens “except pursuant to an act of Congress,” similar language is not found in
the INA with respect to alien inadmissibility.
94
8 U.S.C. §1182(d)(5)(A). For example, fugitives extradited to the United States whose U.S. citizenship cannot be
confirmed are paroled into the United States by immigration authorities. 7 F.A.M. 1625.6.

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of a paroled alien does not constitute admission into the United States for immigration purposes.
Despite physical entry into the country, the alien is “still in theory of law at the boundary line and
had gained no foothold in the United State[s].”95 The executive branch may opt to use its parole
authority with respect to transferred detainees in order to clarify their immigration status in case
they are required to be released from U.S. custody.96

As discussed later, an alien’s physical presence in the United States, even in cases where the alien
has been paroled into the country, may result in the alien becoming eligible for asylum or other
forms of immigration-related relief from removal. In recent years, several legislative proposals
have been introduced that address the application of federal immigration laws to the transfer of
detainees into the United States and clarify the immigration status of detainees brought into the
country.97 Notably, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83),
contained a provision barring any funds made available under the act from being

used to provide any immigration benefit (including a visa, admission into the United States
or any of the United States territories, parole into the United States or any of the United
States territories (other than parole for the purposes of prosecution and related detention), or
classification as a refugee or applicant for asylum) to any individual who is detained, as of
June 24, 2009, at Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.98

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) contained a similar restriction on using
the funds it appropriates to provide a Guantanamo detainee with an immigration benefit.99 The
funding restrictions contained in both enactments applied to funds appropriated for the 2010
fiscal year. Congress did not enact any FY2011 regular appropriations acts before the 2010 fiscal
year expired, but instead passed a series of continuing resolutions that temporarily extended
funding for federal agencies, subject to the terms and conditions of FY2010 appropriations
enactments.100 In appropriating funds for the duration of FY2011, the 2011 CAA specified that the
terms and conditions of most appropriations enactments in FY2010 remained in effect for the
duration of the 2011 fiscal year.101 The complete bar against transporting detainees from
Guantanamo into the United States has apparently obviated the need for renewal of the measure
past 2011.

The FY2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act also amended Title 49 of the
United States Code to require the placement of any person who has been detained at Guantanamo

95
Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 189 (1958).
96
Such authority was used when Ahmed Ghailani was transferred from Guantanamo to the United States in 2009 to
face criminal charges before an Article III court.
97
See, e.g., S. 108, S. 147, H.R. 374, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 553, 112th Cong. (2011).
98
P.L. 111-83, §552(f).
99
P.L. 111-117, §532(f).
100
Additional Continuing Appropriations Amendments, 2011, P.L. 112-6 (continuing funding through April 8, 2011).
Congress had previously passed five continuing resolutions to temporarily fund federal agencies after the expiration to
FY2010. P.L. 111-242 (extending funding for federal agencies at FY2010 levels through December 3, 2010); P.L. 111-
290 (further extending funding through December 18, 2010); P.L. 111-317 (extending funding through December 21,
2010); P.L. 111-322 (continuing funding through March 4, 2011); P.L. 112-4 (providing funding through March 18,
2011).
101
P.L. 112-10, Div. B.

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on the No Fly List, unless the President certifies to Congress that the detainee poses no threat to
the United States, its citizens, or its allies.102

Detention and Treatment of Persons Transferred to

the United States
Many of the rules and standards governing the detention and treatment of persons at Guantanamo
would remain applicable to detainees transferred into the United States. However, non-citizens
held in the United States may be entitled to more protections under the Constitution than those
detained abroad.

Authority to Detain Within the United States

Guantanamo detainees properly determined to be enemy belligerents may be held in preventive
detention by military authorities even if transferred to the United States. In the 2004 case of
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a majority of the Supreme Court recognized that, as a necessary incident to
the 2001 AUMF, the President is authorized to detain persons captured while fighting U.S. forces
in Afghanistan for the duration of the conflict.103 A divided Supreme Court also declared that “a
state of war is not a blank check for the president,” and ruled that persons who had been deemed
“enemy combatants” by the Bush Administration had the right to challenge their detention before
a judge or other “neutral decision-maker.”104

While the preventive detention of enemy belligerents is constitutionally acceptable, the scope of
persons potentially falling under this category remains uncertain. The Hamdi plurality was
limited to an understanding that the phrase “enemy combatant” includes an “individual who ...
was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners in Afghanistan
and who engaged in an armed conflict against the United States there.”105 Left unresolved is the
extent to which the 2001 AUMF permits the detention of persons captured away from the zone of
combat, or whether the President has the independent authority to detain such persons in the
exercise of his Commander-in-Chief power. The Court also did not define what constitutes
“support” for hostile forces necessary to acquire enemy belligerent status, or describe which
activities constitute “engage[ment] in an armed conflict.”

In December 2008, the Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal of an en banc ruling by the
Fourth Circuit in the case of al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, in which a majority of the Court of Appeals
found that the 2001 AUMF permits the detention as an “enemy combatant” of a resident alien
alleged to have planned to engage in hostile activities within the United States on behalf of Al
Qaeda, but who had not been part of the conflict in Afghanistan.106 However, prior to the Supreme
102
P.L. 111-83, §553. Unlike other restrictions imposed by the act on detainee transfers and eligibility for immigration
benefits, which apply only to the use of appropriated funds for the fiscal year, the amendment to Title 49 constitutes a
permanent statutory change.
103
Hamdi, 542 U. S. at 518 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion), 588-589 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104
Id. at 536-537 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
105
Id. at 526.
106
Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli,534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. granted by 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008), vacated and remanded
by Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009). See also Al-Marri v. Wright, 487 F. 3d 160 (4th Circ. 2007).

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Court considering the merits of the case, al-Marri was indicted by a federal grand jury for
providing material support to Al Qaeda and conspiring with others to provide such support. The
government immediately requested that the Supreme Court dismiss al-Marri’s pending case and
authorize his transfer from military to civilian custody for criminal trial. In March 2009, the
Supreme Court granted the government’s application concerning the transfer of al-Marri, vacated
the Fourth Circuit’s judgment, and remanded the case back to the appellate court with instructions
to dismiss the case as moot.107

As a result, the scope of the executive’s authority to militarily detain persons captured away from
the battlefield, including alleged members or associates of Al Qaeda or the Taliban who did not
directly engage in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, will likely remain a
matter of continuing dispute.

In January 2010, a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals considered the scope of
executive detention authority in the case of Al-Bihani v. Obama.108 In an opinion supported in full
by two members of the panel,109 the appellate court recognized that, at a minimum, the President
was authorized to detain persons who were subject to the jurisdiction of military commissions
established pursuant to the Military Commissions Acts of 2006 and 2009; namely, any person
who was “part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban,” along with “those who
purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.”110
While the panel concluded that either purposeful and material support for or membership in an
AUMF-targeted organization may be independently sufficient to justify detention,111 it declined
“to explore the outer bounds of what constitutes sufficient support or indicia of membership to
meet the detention standard.”112 It did, however, note that this standard would, permit the

107
Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009).
108
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
109
A third member of the panel issued a separate opinion concurring with the majority’s judgment. However, the
opinion did not clearly endorse the majority’s view as to the scope of the executive’s detention authority. See id. at 883-
885 (Williams, J., concurring) (arguing that petitioner was detainable on account of being “part of” an AUMF-targeted
organization, but not deciding whether a person could be detained on account of “support” for a targeted organization
that he was not also a “part of”).
110
Al-Bihani at 872 (quoting 2006 MCA, P.L. 109-366, §3, and 2009 MCA, P.L. 111-84, Div. A, §1802).
111
While it has been recognized in subsequent circuit rulings that Al-Bihani establishes, at a minimum, that the
executive may lawfully detain persons who are “part of” organizations targeted under the AUMF, there is arguably
some ambiguity as to whether its conclusion that persons may also be lawfully detained on account of providing
support to such entities is binding precedent or merely dicta. Compare, e.g., Hatim v. Gates, 632 F.3d 720 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (per curiam panel decision) (finding that district court ruling that military could only detain person who was
“part of” Al Qaeda or the Taliban was “directly contrary to Al-Bihani v. Obama, which held that ‘those who
purposefully and materially support’ al-Qaida or the Taliban could also be detained”); Alsabri v. Obama, 764 F. Supp.
2d 60, 69 (D.D.C. 2011) (Urbina, J.) (“This Circuit has stated that the AUMF authorizes the government to detain two
categories of persons: (1) individuals ‘part of’ forces associated with al-Qaida or the Taliban and (2) individuals who
purposefully and materially support such forces in hostilities against the United States.”); Almerfedi v. Obama, 725 F.
Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2010) (Friedman, J.) (recognizing that Al-Bihani established that detention under the AUMF could
be justified either on grounds that person was either a member of or provided substantial support to an AUMF-targeted
organization), rev’d on other grounds 654 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011); with Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C.
Cir. 2010) (describing circuit jurisprudence in the aftermath of Al-Bihani as having “made clear…that the AUMF
authorizes the Executive to detain, at the least, any individual who is functionally part of al Qaeda”).
112
Al-Bihani at 873-874. The Al-Bihani panel recognized that the executive was authorized to detain, at a minimum,
those persons who were triable by military commissions under either the 2006 or 2009 versions of the MCA; namely,
“those who are part of forces associated with Al Qaeda or the Taliban or those who purposefully and materially support
such forces in hostilities against U.S. Coalition partners.” Id. at 872.

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detention of a “civilian contractor” who “purposefully and materially supported” an AUMF-

targeted organization through “traditional food operations essential to a fighting force and the
carrying of arms.”113 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals thereafter denied a petition for an en
banc rehearing the Al-Bihani case,114 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.115 Accordingly, the
standard endorsed by the panel is controlling in the D.C. Circuit unless the Supreme Court agrees
to take up the issue in a future case.

The D.C. Circuit has also recognized that, when determining whether an individual was “part of”
an AUMF-targeted organization, the government is not required to demonstrate that the person
was part of the organization’s “command structure” in order to justify his detention.116 Instead, a
determination as to whether an individual is “part of” al Qaeda or the Taliban “must be made on a
case-by-case basis by using a functional rather than a formal approach and by focusing upon the
actions of the individual in relation to the organization.”117

Congress enacted a provision as part of the 2012 NDAA to clarify executive authority to detain
“covered persons” pursuant to the law of war.118 The provision appears intended to codify the
D.C. Circuit’s approach to determining who is subject to detention under the AUMF. Section
1021(b)(2) of the 2012 NDAA includes among “covered persons” subject to detention under the
authority of the AUMF: “A person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda, the
Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its
coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly
supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.”119

The NDAA provision did not attempt to provide additional clarification for terms such as
“substantial support,” “associated forces,” or “hostilities.” For that reason, it may be subject to an
evolving interpretation that effectively permits a broadening of the scope of the conflict. Certain
“covered persons” are required to be militarily detained, at least until their ultimate disposition
under the measure is determined.120 It is not clear whether the provisions apply to persons

113
Id. at 872-873. The panel found that even if petitioner was not a member of an AUMF-targeted organization, his
service as a cook for a military brigade affiliated with Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, in addition to his accompaniment
of the brigade during military operations, constituted sufficient grounds for his detention. Id.
114
A concurring opinion joined by the majority of the active appellate court judges characterized certain aspects of the
panel’s decision, concerning the application of international law of war principles in interpreting the AUMF, to be non-
binding dicta. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Sentelle, C.J., concurring).
115
131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
116
See, e.g., Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 1, 11-12 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011).
117
Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010) See also Salahi v. Obama, 625 F.3d 745, 752 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (a person who “joined and was accepted by al-Qaida fighters who were engaged in hostilities against Afghan and
allied forces … could properly be considered ‘part of’ al-Qaida even if he never formally received or executed any
orders”); Awad, 608 F.3d at 11.
118
P.L. 112-81, §1021.
119
The definition also includes “a person who planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored those responsible for those attacks.” Id. §1021(b)(1).
120
Id. §1022. (mandating military detention of a person covered under Section 1021 who is determined “(A) to be a
member of, or part of, al-Qaeda or an associated force that acts in coordination with or pursuant to the direction of al-
Qaeda; and (B) to have participated in the course of planning or carrying out an attack or attempted attack against the
United States or its coalition partners”).

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arrested or captured within the United States,121 but it appears intended to cover any Guantanamo
detainees who may be transferred into the United States and who meets those criteria.

Nevertheless, some detainees may be determined to fall outside the criteria for detention under
the AUMF, as clarified by the 2012 NDAA. In the absence of legal authority to militarily detain a
terrorist suspect, U.S. military authorities must generally release the person from custody.
However, there may be grounds for the person’s continued detention by U.S. law enforcement or
immigration authorities. If a former detainee brought to the United States is charged with a
federal crime, a judicial officer may order his pretrial detention following a hearing in which it is
determined that no other conditions would reasonably assure the individual’s appearance for trial
or the safety of the community or another individual.122 A former detainee may also potentially be
held in detention as a material witness to a criminal proceeding, including a grand jury
proceeding, if a judicial officer orders his arrest and detention after determining that it may
become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena.123

If the military lacks authority to hold a detainee brought to the United States and is unable to
effectuate his transfer to another country, the detainee might nonetheless be placed in immigration
removal proceedings and continue being detained pending removal. Detention pending removal is
generally required for aliens inadmissible on criminal or terrorism-related grounds.124 Following a
final order of removal,125 an alien is typically required to be removed within 90 days. During this
period, an alien is usually required to be detained, and in no circumstance may an alien
inadmissible or deportable on any terrorism-related ground or most crime-related grounds be
released from detention.126 If the alien is unable to be removed during the 90-day period provided
by statute, his continued detention for a period beyond six months may be statutorily and
constitutionally prohibited.127 However, those aliens who are specially dangerous to the

121
Id. §1021(e) (providing that nothing in the section is to be construed to “affect existing law or authorities relating to
the detention of United States citizens, lawful resident aliens of the United States, or any other persons who are
captured or arrested in the United States”) (emphasis added).
122
18 U.S.C. §3142. Subject to rebuttal by the person, it is presumed that a person shall be subject to pretrial detention
if the judicial officer finds there is probable cause to believe he has committed a federal crime of terrorism for which a
maximum sentence of 10 or more years’ imprisonment is prescribed. Id. at §3142(e).
123
18 U.S.C. §3144.
124
8 U.S.C. §1226. Immigration law also permits an alien to be detained for up to seven days prior to the initiation of
removal proceedings or the charging of the alien with a criminal offense, if the Attorney General certifies that there are
reasonable grounds to believe the alien is inadmissible or deportable on terrorism-related grounds or the alien is
engaged in any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States. 8 U.S.C. §1226a.
125
The removal period begins on the latest of the following: (1) the date that the order of removal becomes
administratively final; (2) if a reviewing court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s final
order; or (3) if the alien is detained or confined for non-immigration purposes, the date of the alien’s release. 8 U.S.C.
§1231(a)(1)(B).
126
8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2).
127
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court concluded that the indefinite detention of deportable aliens (i.e., aliens
admitted into the United States who were subsequently ordered removed) would raise significant due process concerns.
The Court interpreted an applicable immigration statute governing the removal of deportable and inadmissible aliens as
only permitting the detention of aliens following an order of removal for so long as is “reasonably necessary to bring
about that alien’s removal from the United States. It does not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 689 (2001). The Court found that the presumptively reasonable limit for the post-removal-period detention is six
months, but indicated that continued detention may be warranted when the policy is limited to specially dangerous
individuals and strong procedural protections are in place. Id. at 690, 701. Subsequently, the Supreme Court ruled that
aliens who have been paroled into the United States also could not be indefinitely detained, but the Court’s holding was
based on statutory construction of the applicable immigration law, and it did not consider whether such aliens were
(continued...)

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community may be subject to continued detention beyond the six-month period, subject to
periodic review. Immigration regulations permit the continued detention of certain categories of
aliens due to special circumstances, including, inter alia, any alien who is detained on account of
(1) serious adverse foreign policy consequences of release; (2) security or terrorism concerns; or
(3) being considered specially dangerous due to having committed one or more crimes of
violence and having a mental condition making it likely that the alien will commit acts of
violence in the future.128 Some reviewing courts, however, have determined that these regulations
are not based on a permissible construction of the immigration statute governing detention
following an order of removal.129

Proposals have been made to require any alien detainee released from military custody into the
United States to be taken into custody by immigration authorities pending removal. Although in
prior conflicts the United States interned “enemy aliens” and U.S. citizens who did not participate
in hostilities against the United States,130 the scope and effect of proposals requiring the detention
of specified categories of persons other than enemy combatants may be subject to constitutional
challenges.

Treatment of Detained Persons

In the absence of new legislation, the rules governing the treatment of Guantanamo detainees
would largely remain unchanged if detainees were transferred to the United States. The DTA
provides that no person in the custody or effective control of the DOD or detained in a DOD
facility shall be subject to any interrogation treatment or technique that is not authorized by and
listed in the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation, unless the person is
being held pursuant to U.S. criminal or immigration laws (in which case the detainee’s
interrogation would be governed by applicable criminal or immigration law enforcement
standards).131 The Field Manual requires all detainees to be treated in a manner consistent with

(...continued)
owed the same due process protections as aliens who had been legally admitted into the United States. Clark v.
Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
128
8 C.F.R. §241.14.
129
Thai v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004) (immigration statute authorizing continued detention of certain aliens
following 90-day removal period did not authorize indefinite detention of aliens whose removal was not foreseeable,
including those deemed specially dangerous under immigration regulations); Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir.
2008) (similar). But see Marquez-Coromina v. Hollingsworth, 692 F. Supp. 2d 565 (D. Md. 2010) (finding that
immigration regulations authorizing continued detention of specially dangerous aliens ordered removed but whose
removal was not foreseeable was based on a reasonable interpretation of immigration detention statute).
130
The Alien Enemy Act, which was originally enacted in 1798 as part of the Alien and Sedition Act, grants the
President broad authority, during a declared war or presidentially proclaimed “predatory invasion,” to institute
restrictions affecting alien enemies, including possible detention and deportation. 50 U.S.C. §§21-24. In its current
form, the act applies to aliens within the United States who are fourteen years or older, and who are “natives, citizens,
denizens, or subjects of the hostile nation or government” at war with the United States. 50 U.S.C. §21. This authority
was used frequently during World War I and World War II, and reviewing courts viewed such measures as
constitutionally permissible. See generally CRS Report R42337, Detention of U.S. Persons as Enemy Belligerents, by
Jennifer K. Elsea. See also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775(1950) (“The resident enemy alien is
constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment and deportation whenever a ‘declared war’ exists.”); Ludecke v.
Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (upholding President’s authority to detain and remove a German citizen pursuant to the
Alien Enemy Act). Whether more recent legal developments concerning the due process protections owed to
noncitizens have come to limit this authority remains to be seen.
131
P.L. 109-148, Title X, §1002 (2005); P.L. 109-163, Title XIV, §1402 (2006).

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the Geneva Conventions, and prohibits the use of torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment in any circumstance. In the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court
found that, at a minimum, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to persons
captured in the conflict with Al Qaeda.132 Common Article 3 requires persons to be treated
humanely and protected from “violence to life and person,” “cruel treatment and torture,” and
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment.” All of these
requirements would remain applicable to detainees transferred into the United States, at least so
long as they remained in military custody.

Noncitizen detainees transferred to the United States may also receive greater constitutional
protections than those detained outside the United States. “It is well established that certain
constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens
outside of our geographic borders.”133 Although the Supreme Court in Boumediene held that the
constitutional writ of habeas corpus extends to Guantanamo, it did not elaborate as to the extent
to which other constitutional provisions apply to noncitizens held at the detention facility.134 In
February 2009, a D.C. Circuit panel held in the case of Kiyemba v. Obama that the Constitution’s
due process protections do not extend to Guantanamo detainees.135 In October 2009, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari to review the Kiyemba ruling, but in March 2010 it vacated the appellate
court’s opinion and remanded the case in light of changed circumstances surrounding the
Kiyemba petitioners.136 The circuit court thereafter reinstated its earlier opinion,137 but the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.138

Regardless of the Constitution’s application to persons held at Guantanamo, the DTA and MCA
prohibit any person in U.S. custody or control (including those located at Guantanamo or

132
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
133
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693.
134
The application of constitutional provisions other than the Suspension Clause to noncitizens held at Guantanamo is
the subject of ongoing litigation. See Rasul v. Myers, 555 U.S. 1083 (2008) (vacating pre-Boumediene lower court
judgment that aliens held at Guantanamo lacked constitutional rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, and
remanding the case for further consideration in light of Boumediene decision); Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022,
1026-27 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Kiyemba I”) (finding that detainees at Guantanamo lacked rights under the Due Process
Clause), cert. granted, 558 U.S. 969 (October 20, 2009), vacated, 559 U.S. 131 (2010), reinstated, as modified, by 605
F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).
135
Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1026-1027 (citing Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit cases recognizing that “the due process
clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign territory of the United States”). In a
separate opinion concurring with the judgment of the Kiyemba majority, Judge Judith Rogers disagreed with the
majority’s interpretation of the territorial application of the Constitution’s Due Process Clause, claiming that it was
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Boumediene. Id. at 1038 (Rogers, J., concurring).
136
Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. 131 (2010). The Kiyemba case involved several Guantanamo detainees who, despite
no longer being considered enemy combatants, have not been returned to their home country of China because of
concerns that they would be subjected to torture. Two of the petitioners have been resettled in Switzerland, and Palau
has agreed to take five others, although the five have not accepted Palau’s offer. Because the Supreme Court had
granted certiorari on the understanding that no remedy was available for the petitioners other than release into the
United States, it returned the case to the D.C. Circuit to review the ramifications of the new circumstances. The D.C.
Circuit thereafter reinstated its earlier decision, as modified to take into account subsequent congressional enactments
limiting the use of funds to release any Guantanamo detainee into the United States. 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010),
petition for en banc rehearing denied, September 9, 2010. The Supreme Court then denied certiorari, 130 S. Ct. 1880
(2010).
137
605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. 2010).
138
Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).

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elsewhere outside U.S. territory) from being subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
of the kind prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.139

Legal Challenges to Nature of Detention

If transferred to the United States, detainees may be able to seek judicial review over a broader
range of actions taken against them. Besides eliminating detainees’ access to habeas corpus
review, the DTA and MCA stripped federal courts of jurisdiction to hear most claims by
noncitizen detainees. Specifically, federal courts are denied jurisdiction over “any other action
against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment,
trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has
been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is
awaiting such determination.”140

Although the Boumediene Court held that the constitutional writ of habeas permitted
Guantanamo detainees to challenge the legality of their detention, the Court declined to “discuss
the reach of the writ with respect to claims of unlawful conditions of treatment or
confinement.”141 Because the Boumediene Court left these questions unresolved, the viability of
measures stripping courts of jurisdiction to hear claims regarding the conditions of detention may
depend upon a reviewing court’s interpretation of the constitutional protections owed to
detainees.142 While measures that eliminate detainees’ ability to pursue statute- or treaty-based
challenges to aspects of their detention may be deemed permissible by a reviewing court,143
139
P.L. 109-148, Title X, §1003; P.L. 109-163, Title XIV, §1402; P.L. 109-366, §6(c).
140
P.L. 109-366, §7(a). While the DTA initially stripped federal courts of jurisdiction only over claims raised by aliens
held at Guantanamo, the MCA’s restriction upon federal court jurisdiction applies to claims by any alien in U.S.
custody who is properly detained as an enemy combatant or awaiting such a determination, regardless of the alien’s
location.
141
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 792.
142
In April 2009, a D.C. Circuit panel interpreted this court-stripping provision’s use of the phrase “any other action”
as referring to legal claims other than a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 513. In that case,
the panel found that habeas courts could consider not only Guantanamo detainees’ challenges to the legality of their
detention, but also their proposed transfer to another country (though habeas review of such transfers may be quite
limited). Id. at 513-514. Accordingly, whether Guantanamo detainees may challenge their conditions of confinement
may depend on whether a reviewing court considers these conditions to be “a proper subject of … habeas relief.” Id. at
513. Habeas courts have thus far rejected challenges by Guantanamo detainees relating to their conditions of detention.
See, e.g., Khadr v. Bush, 587 F. Supp. 2d 225, 235 (D.D.C., 2008) (“the Supreme Court appears to have left ... [the
MCA’s bar on judicial review of conditions of detention] undisturbed”); In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation,
577 F. Supp. 2d 312, 314 (D.D.C. 2008) (Hogan, J.) (“Cognizant of the long-standing rule of severability, this Court,
therefore, holds that MCA2006 MCA §7(a)(2) remains valid and strips it of jurisdiction to hear a detainee’s claims that
‘relat[e] to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement ...’”). See also In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 570 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2008) (Urbina, J.) (holding that MCA §7(a)(2) was
not invalidated by Boumediene, but declining to decide whether the constitutional writ of habeas permits challenges to
conditions of confinement). The rejection of challenges to conditions of confinement may be based, at least in part,
upon the opinion that any such claim by Guantanamo detainees does not derive from a constitutional protection to
which they are entitled. See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1026-27 (finding that detainees at Guantanamo lacked rights under
the Due Process Clause), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 458 (October 20, 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010), reinstated,
as modified, by 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011).
143
See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 875 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (2006 MCA precluded petitioner from raising claim that
government’s failure to accord him prisoner of war status violated Geneva Convention requirements), cert. denied 131
S. Ct. 1814 (2011); Noriega v. Pastrana, 564 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2009) (2006 MCA precluded petitioner, a designated
prisoner of war under the Geneva Conventions, from invoking Conventions in challenge to his proposed extradition to
France), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1002 (2010).

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measures that seek to eliminate (rather than merely circumscribe) detainees’ ability to bring
constitutional challenges regarding the circumstances of their detention would likely be subject to
serious legal challenge. Although the scope of constitutional protections owed to Guantanamo
detainees remains a matter of legal dispute, it is clear that the procedural and substantive due
process protections of the Constitution apply to all persons within the United States, regardless of
their citizenship.144 Accordingly, detainees transferred to the United States might be able to more
successfully pursue legal challenges against aspects of their detention in the United States that
allegedly infringe upon constitutional protections owed to them.

Removal of Detainees from the United States

If there are no longer legal grounds to hold a detainee, the United States must terminate custody
either through transfer or release. Persons held in the United States may have greater legal redress
against their unwilling transfer to another country than those held abroad, and may potentially
seek judicial review of transfer decisions through habeas proceedings.

CAT Article 3 and its implementing legislation prohibit the transfer of detainees from the United
States to countries where they would more likely than not face torture. This prohibition is
absolute and without regard to whether an individual has been involved in terrorist or criminal
activity. While the Bush Administration took the position that CAT Article 3 and its implementing
legislation do not govern the transfer of detainees held outside the United States, there appears to
be little if any dispute regarding CAT’s application to the transfer of persons from within the
country.145

144
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693 (“the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including
aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary or permanent”); Wong Wing v. United States, 163
U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (“all persons within the territory of the United States are entitled to the protection guarantied by
[the Fifth and Sixth Amendments], and … aliens shall not be held to answer for a capital or other infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law”).
145
U.S. law implementing CAT generally specifies that no judicial appeal or review is available for any action,
decision or claim raised under CAT, except as part of a review of a final immigration removal order. FARRA,
§2242(d). The ability of a person to raise a CAT-based claim in non-removal proceedings (e.g., in the case of
extradition or military transfers), is the subject of debate and conflicting jurisprudence. Compare Kiyemba v. Obama,
561 F.3d 509, 514-515 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010) (wartime detainees held at Guantanamo
could not bring CAT- or FARRA-based challenges to their proposed military transfer to a foreign country, as Congress
had precluded judicial review of such claims except as part of a final order of immigration removal); Mironescu v.
Costner, 480 F.3d 664 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed, 128 S. Ct. 976 (January 9, 2008) (finding that CAT-
implementing legislation precludes review of CAT-based habeas petition in extradition proceedings); with Cornejo-
Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that an individual subject to an extradition order may appeal
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), when his surrender would be contrary to U.S. laws and regulations
implementing CAT), disapproved in later appeal, 379 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2004), opinion of later appeal vacated on
rehearing by 389 F.3d 1307 (9th Cir. 2004). See also Khouzam v. Muckasey,549 F.3d 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (aliens who
have shown a likelihood of facing torture have a right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
challenge the sufficiency of diplomatic assurances obtained by immigration authorities to effectuate their removal). It
should also be noted that although U.S. legislation implementing CAT required all relevant agencies to adopt
regulations implementing CAT Article 3 requirements, the DOD has yet to implement such measures. It could be
argued that the DOD could not transfer a detainee from the United States to a third country until CAT-implementing
regulations were promulgated. See Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee
Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 657 (2006) (arguing that detainees may have a right to compel the DOD to promulgate
CAT-implementing regulations).

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Detainees transferred to the United States who may no longer be held by military authorities
might potentially seek relief from removal under U.S. immigration laws. An alien who is
physically present or arrives in the United States, regardless of immigration status, may apply for
asylum, a discretionary form of relief from removal available to aliens who have a well-founded
fear of persecution if transferred to another country. Persons granted asylum may thereafter apply
for adjustment of status to that of a legal permanent resident. Certain potentially over-lapping
categories of aliens are disqualified from asylum eligibility, including those involved in terrorism-
related activity (including members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda) and those who are reasonably
believed to pose a danger to U.S. security.146 Nonetheless, it is possible that some detainees who
have been found not to have fought on behalf of the Taliban or Al Qaeda may qualify for asylum
or other forms of relief from removal if transferred to the United States. Further, if a detainee is
declared ineligible for asylum or another form of relief from removal and is thereafter ordered
removed by immigration officials, immigration authorities may be required to provide evidence
forming the basis of this determination in the face of a legal challenge by the detainee.147 It is
important to note that asylum only constitutes relief from removal under immigration laws. It
would not bar the transfer of a detainee pursuant to some other legal authority (e.g., extradition).

As discussed, proposals may be considered that would clarify the application of immigration laws
to Guantanamo detainees transferred to the United States. Former Secretary of Defense Gates
stated that the Obama Administration will seek legislation from Congress addressing detainees’
immigration status, possibly including barring them from asylum eligibility.148 As previously
mentioned, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-83) and the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117) contained provisions barring any funds
they made available from being used to provide any immigration benefit to Guantanamo
detainees brought to the United States, or to provide for a detainee’s classification as a refugee or
applicant for asylum.149 Congress extended the restrictions imposed by FY2010 appropriation
enactments through the 2011 fiscal year,150 but has not renewed the restriction since that time.

Detainees’ Rights in a Criminal Prosecution

While many persons currently held at Guantanamo are only being detained as a preventive
measure to stop them from returning to battle, the United States has brought or intends to pursue
criminal charges against some detainees. Various constitutional provisions, most notably those
arising from the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, apply to defendants
throughout the process of criminal prosecutions. Prosecuting Guantanamo detainees inside the
United States would raise at least two major legal questions. First, does a detainee’s status as an
enemy belligerent reduce the degree of constitutional protections to which he is entitled?

146
8 U.S.C. §1158(b)(2). Members of terrorist organizations are inadmissible and ineligible for asylum. U.S. law
specifies that the Taliban is a terrorist organization for INA purposes. P.L. 110-161, Div. J, §691(d) (2007).
147
8 U.S.C. §1252.
148
Yochi J. Dreazen, Gates Seeks Congress’s Help in Closing Guantanamo, WALL ST. J., December 3, 2008.
149
P.L. 111-83, §552(f); P.L. 111-117, §532(f).
150
See supra footnote 100 (listing continuing resolutions enacted by Congress to temporarily fund agencies following
the end of 2010 fiscal year, and which generally authorized continued funding subject to the same terms and conditions
established by FY2010 appropriations measures); P.L. 112-10, Div. B (appropriating funds for the duration of FY2011,
generally under the same terms and conditions of FY2010 appropriations enactments).

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Secondly, would the choice of judicial forum—that is, civilian court, military commission, or
court-martial—affect interpretations of constitutional rights implicated in detainee prosecutions?

As previously discussed, the nature and extent to which the Constitution applies to noncitizens
detained at Guantanamo is a matter of continuing legal dispute. Although the Supreme Court held
in Boumediene that the constitutional writ of habeas extends to detainees held at Guantanamo, it
left open the nature and degree to which other constitutional protections, including those relating
to substantive and procedural due process, may also apply. The Boumediene Court noted that the
Constitution’s application to noncitizens in places like Guantanamo that are located outside the
United States turns on “objective factors and practical concerns.”151 The Court has also repeatedly
recognized that at least some constitutional protections are “unavailable to aliens outside our
geographic borders.”152 The application of constitutional principles to the prosecution of aliens
located at Guantanamo remains unsettled.

On the other hand, it is clear that if Guantanamo detainees are subject to criminal prosecution in
United States, the constitutional provisions related to such proceedings would apply.153 The
application of these constitutional requirements might nevertheless differ depending upon the
forum in which charges are brought. The Fifth Amendment’s requirement that no person be held
to answer for a capital or infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury,
and the Sixth Amendment’s requirements concerning trial by jury, have been found to be
inapplicable to trials by military commissions or courts-martial.154 The application of due process
protections in military court proceedings may also differ from civilian court proceedings, in part
because the Constitution “contemplates that Congress has ‘plenary control over rights, duties, and
responsibilities in the framework of the Military Establishment, including regulations,
procedures, and remedies related to military discipline.’”155 In the past, courts have been more
accepting of security measures taken against “enemy aliens” than U.S. citizens, particularly as
they relate to authority to detain or restrict movement on grounds of wartime security.156 It is
possible that the rights owed to enemy belligerents in criminal prosecutions would be interpreted
more narrowly by a reviewing court than those owed to defendants in other, more routine cases,
particularly when the constitutional right at issue is subject to a balancing test.

151
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764.
152
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. See also Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States, 494 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1990) (“aliens
receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed
substantial connections with the country”).
153
See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (denying motion for leave to file writ of habeas corpus by eight German
saboteurs tried by military commission in the United States, but noting that “Constitutional safeguards for the
protection of all who are charged with offenses are not to be disregarded in order to inflict merited punishment on some
who are guilty”).
154
See, e.g., Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122 (1950) (“The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment is not applicable to trials by courts-martial or military commissions.”); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 40 (“we must
conclude that §2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to
demand a jury to trials by military commission, or to have required that offenses against the law of war not triable by
jury at common law be tried only in the civil courts”). See also U.S. CONST., amend. V (“No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces”) (italics added).
155
Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 177 (1994) (upholding a narrowed interpretation of Fifth Amendment due
process rights for the context of military courts) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 301 (1983).
156
See supra footnote 130 and accompanying citations.

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There are several forums in which detainees could potentially be prosecuted for alleged criminal
activity, including in federal civilian court, before military commissions, or possibly in general
courts-martial proceedings. The procedural protections afforded to the accused in each of these
forums may differ, along with the types of offenses for which the accused may be prosecuted. The
MCA initially authorized the establishment of military commissions with jurisdiction to try alien
“unlawful enemy combatants” for offenses made punishable by the MCA or the law of war, and
afforded the accused fewer procedural protections than would be available to defendants in
military courts-martial or federal civilian court proceedings.157 The statutory framework for
military commissions was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009),
enacted as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84), so
that the procedural protections afforded to the accused (now referred to as alien “unprivileged
enemy belligerents”158) more closely resemble those found in military courts-martial proceedings,
though differences between the two forums remain.159 The modifications made by the MCA 2009
are discussed in detail in CRS Report R40932, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission
Trials and Trials in Federal Criminal Court, by Jennifer K. Elsea. Critics raised questions
regarding the constitutionality of the military commission system initially established by the
original MCA,160 and some of these arguments may also be raised even following the
amendments made by the MCA 2009. Courts have yet to rule on the constitutional legitimacy of
many procedures used by military commissions. Military commissions are not statutorily
restricted from exercising jurisdiction within the United States, and the Supreme Court has
previously upheld the use of commissions against enemy belligerents tried in the country.161

In November 2009, the Department of Justice and Department of Defense announced that
military commission prosecutions against five Guantanamo detainees, which had been halted
following President Obama’s January 2009 Executive Order, may be resumed.162 It appears likely
that several other detainees will be tried before military commissions as well.163

157
See generally CRS Report RL33688, The Military Commissions Act of 2006: Analysis of Procedural Rules and
Comparison with Previous DOD Rules and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, by Jennifer K. Elsea. The MCA
defined “unlawful enemy combatant” as a person who: (1) “has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and
materially supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful enemy combatant,”
or (2) “has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another
competent tribunal” by a certain date. 10 U.S.C. §948a(1) (2008).
158
The term “unprivileged enemy belligerent” is defined to include an individual (other than a “privileged belligerent”
belonging to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War) who “(A) has engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; (B) has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners; or (C) was a part of
al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense under this chapter.” P.L. 111-84, §1802 (amending, inter alia, 10 U.S.C.
§948a).
159
See, generally, CRS Report R41163, The Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA 2009): Overview and Legal
Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
160
See Brookings Report, supra footnote 3, at p. 8. Information regarding ongoing and completed cases can be viewed
at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/commissions.html.
161
See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 (upholding military commissions used to try eight German saboteurs in the United
States).
162
DOJ Announcement, supra footnote 14.
163
Peter Finn, Justice Task Force Recommends about 50 Detainees Be Held Indefinitely, WASH. POST, January 22,
2009. See also Obaydullah v. Obama, No. 09-5328, Brief for Respondent Department of Justice, at 8 Jan. 2010 (D.C.
Cir.) (noting that “the Attorney General has determined that petitioner’s case is appropriate for prosecution and that a
military commission is the appropriate venue for such a prosecution”).

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Detainees could also potentially be prosecuted in federal civilian court for offenses under federal
criminal statutes. Provisions in the U.S. Criminal Code relating to war crimes and terrorist
activity apply extraterritorially and may be applicable to some detainees, though ex post facto and
statute of limitation concerns may limit their application to certain offenses.164 In June 2009, one
detainee was transferred from Guantanamo to the United States for trial in federal court for his
alleged role in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.165 In November
2009, the DOJ and DOD announced plans to bring charges in federal court against five detainees
for their alleged role in the 9/11 terrorist attacks,166 but opposition to the plan caused the Attorney
General to place it on indefinite hold. The plan was eventually dropped in favor of trying the 9/11
conspirators by military commission, but Attorney General Holder did not foreclose civilian trials
for other Guantanamo detainees. Currently, funding bars on transferring detainees to the United
States seem to foreclose civilian trials for those detained at Guantanamo.

Although they have yet to be used for this purpose, military courts-martial could also be
employed to try detainees by exercising jurisdiction under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) over persons subject to military tribunals under the law of war.167 Detainees brought
before military courts-martial could be charged with offenses under the UCMJ and the law of
war, though courts-martial rules concerning the accused’s right to a speedy trial, as well as statute
of limitations issues, may pose an obstacle to prosecution.168

The executive currently retains at least technical discretion to determine the appropriate forum in
which to prosecute detainees (though various funding measures have effectively precluded
Guantanamo detainees from being tried in civilian court through the 2013 fiscal year, through
their provisions barring the transfer of detainees into the United States for any purpose). The
Administration has repeatedly expressed its desire to prosecute some Guantanamo detainees in
Article III courts and others before military commissions. Legislative proposals have been
introduced that would require prosecutions to occur in a particular forum or modify the
procedural rules applicable to the prosecution of detainees.169 Pursuant to existing statutory
authorization, the executive could also potentially modify military commission procedural rules
to some degree, including by amending existing procedures so that they more closely resemble
those employed by courts-martial.170 Some commentators have proposed the creation of an
entirely new forum for the prosecution of detainees, such as a national security court.171 The

164
See 18 U.S.C. chapter 113B (terrorism-related offenses); 18 U.S.C. §2441.
165
Department of Justice, “Ahmed Ghailani Transferred from Guantanamo Bay to New York for Prosecution on Terror
Charges,” press release, June 9, 2009, http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/June/09-ag-563.html. Ghailani was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
166
DOJ Announcement, supra footnote 14.
167
10 U.S.C. §818 (“General courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by the law of war is subject to
trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the law of war.”).
168
Id.
169
See, e.g., Detainee Trials at Gitmo Act, H.R. 388, 112th Cong. (2011).
170
The original MCA provided that the Secretary of Defense may prescribe rules of evidence and procedure for
military commissions not inconsistent with the MCA. Rules applicable to courts-martial under the UCMJ were to apply
except as otherwise specified. 10 U.S.C. §949a(a). Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of Defense published the
Manual for Military Commissions, including the Rules for Military Commissions and the Military Commission Rules
of Evidence. Under the amendments made by the MCA 2009, the Secretary of Defense retains authority to prescribe
rules for military commissions that are not inconsistent with the act’s requirements.
171
See, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith and Neal Katyal, op-ed, The Terrorists’ Court, NY TIMES, July 11, 2007; Stuart Taylor,
Jr., The Case for a National Security Court, THE ATLANTIC, February 27, 2008.

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scope and effect of such proposals may be shaped by constitutional constraints, including with
respect to the rights owed to the accused in criminal proceedings.

The following sections discuss selected constitutional issues that may arise in the criminal
prosecution of detainees, emphasizing the procedural and substantive protections that apply in
different adjudicatory forums.

Right to Assistance of Counsel

Detainees brought to the United States would have a constitutional right to assistance of counsel
in any criminal prosecution. The procedural rules for federal civilian courts, courts-martial, and
military commissions all provide a defendant with the right to assistance of counsel, but the
exercise of this right may differ according to the forum.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right “to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence.” This constitutional protection attaches at the time of indictment and
affords a defendant the right to retain counsel of his or her choosing as well as an opportunity to
consult with that counsel.172 Where a criminal defendant cannot afford to retain a lawyer, counsel
will be appointed by the court to serve at public expense,173 in which case the defendant’s choice
of counsel need not be heeded.174 The court must advise a criminal defendant of his or her right to
counsel and must ask the defendant whether he or she wishes to waive that right.175 A defendant’s
waiver is valid only if it is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.176 This standard does not require
that the defendant fully and completely comprehend all of the consequences of that waiver.177 The
right to counsel also encompasses the right of a defendant to represent himself or herself, if the
defendant intelligently and knowingly chooses to do so.178 It appears that there is no
constitutional right to continuity of appointed counsel,179 although federal law requires that
substitution of counsel serve “the interest of justice,”180 and the military justice system authorizes
substitution of detailed military counsel only for good cause.181

172
Chandler v. Freytag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954).
173
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462, 463 (1938).
174
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006).
175
Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941).
176
Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77 (2004).
177
Id.
178
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). However, “under some circumstances the trial judge may deny the
authority to exercise it, as when the defendant simply lacks the competence to make a knowing or intelligent waiver of
counsel or when his self-representation is so disruptive of orderly procedures that the judge may curtail it.” UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION (Constitution Annotated), http://crs.gov/products/conan/
Amendment06/topic_8_1_7.html. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008). The right to self-representation applies
only in preparation for trial and at trial. The Constitution does not guarantee a right to self-representation on direct
appeal from a criminal conviction. Martinez v. Court of App. of Cal., Fourth App. Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 160 (2000); cf.,
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (finding that the right to appeal, as we now know it, in criminal cases
arises from statutory rather than constitutional authority). The Martinez Court found that it necessarily followed from
this that the Sixth Amendment did not provide a basis for self-representation on appeal. 528 U.S. at 160.
179
United States v. Ghailani, 686 F. Supp. 2d 279, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing United States v. Parker, 469 F.3d 57, 61
(2d Cir. 2006).
180
18 U.S.C. §3006A(c).
181
Both the Manual for Courts-Martial and the Manual for Military Commissions require a showing of good cause for
the substitution of detailed military counsel once an attorney-client relationship has been formed. R.C.M. 505(d)
(continued...)

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 Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.182 The
standard for determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel is
two-fold. The attorney’s performance must have been deficient, and the prejudice to the defense
resulting from the attorney’s deficient performance must be so serious as to bring into question
the outcome of the proceeding.183 If there is an actual breakdown in the adversarial process, such
as a case involving “circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of
litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified,” the Sixth Amendment is violated.184

In the federal civilian courts, the right to counsel is implemented under Rule 44 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In part, this rule affords a criminal defendant who is unable to
obtain counsel the right to have counsel appointed to represent him at every stage of the
proceedings from initial appearance through appeal, unless the defendant waives this right.185 In
courts-martial, the right to counsel is implemented under Rule 506 of the Rules for Courts-
Martial (R.C.M.). Rule 506 provides that a defendant has the right to be represented at a general
or special court-martial by civilian counsel, if provided at no expense to the government, and
either by military counsel detailed under Article 27 of the UCMJ186 or military counsel of the
defendant’s own selection. As in a civilian court, the defendant may also waive the right to be
represented by counsel and may conduct the defense personally.187

A detainee subject to a military commission has the right to be represented by counsel.188 The
right is implemented by Rule 506 of the Rules for Military Commissions (R.M.C.), which
provides an accused detainee with a detailed military defense counsel. The detainee also has the
right to be represented by civilian counsel, if retained at no cost to the government. Civilian
counsel must fulfill certain qualifications, including being a U.S. citizen and having security
clearance of Secret or higher.189 As under the Rules for Courts-Martial, a defendant in a military
commission proceeding may waive his right to counsel and may conduct the defense
personally.190 In a departure from the rules governing courts-martial under the earlier rules, the
detainee did not have the right to be granted specific individual military counsel upon request.
Pursuant to modifications to military commission procedures made by the MCA 2009, the
accused is now able to request a military defense counsel of his choosing from the pool of
qualified military attorneys, if that counsel is reasonably available.191

(...continued)
(2012); R.M.C. 505(d) (2010).
182
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71-72 (1932); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
183
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
184
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).
185
FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a).
186
10 U.S.C. §827.
187
R.C.M. 506(d).
188
10 U.S.C. §§949a, 949c. Military defense counsel is to be appointed “as soon as practicable.” 10 U.S.C. §948k.
189
R.M.C. 502(d).
190
R.M.C. 506(c).
191
10 U.S.C. §949c.

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Right Against Use of Coerced Confessions

One issue that could arise in the prosecution of certain detainees involves the admissibility of
statements obtained during interrogation by U.S. or foreign military and intelligence agencies.
Some detainees currently held at Guantanamo were subjected to interrogation techniques that, if
performed in the United States, would almost certainly be deemed unconstitutionally harsh.192
The use of any such evidence, or evidence derived from it, in the criminal trial of a detainee
would likely be subject to legal challenge under the Fifth Amendment on the ground that the
statement was gained through undue coercion. As a general rule, statements made in response to
coercive interrogation methods are inadmissible in U.S. courts. Fifth Amendment protections
concerning the right against self-incrimination and due process serve as dual bases for exclusion
of such evidence.193

Under the leading Supreme Court case, Miranda v. Arizona, courts will not admit defendants’
statements at trial unless law enforcement officers issued the well-known Miranda warnings,
which typically begin with “You have the right to remain silent,” before the statements were
made.194 As a general rule, Miranda applies any time police question a defendant who is in
“custody,” broadly defined.195 In the context of terrorist suspects’ statements, at least one court
has held that Miranda applies in Article III courts even if the questioning took place outside of
the United States.196

192
See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats,
(testimony by CIA Director Michael Hayden, discussing the use of waterboarding upon three detainees currently held
at Guantanamo), 110th Cong., February 5, 2008; Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official, WASH. POST,
January 14, 2009, at p. A1 (quoting Susan J. Crawford, convening authority of military commissions, as stating that
case of a Guantanamo detainee was not referred for prosecution because “[h]is treatment met the legal definition of
torture”).
193
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 7
(1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause to the states). Throughout the nineteenth century,
courts excluded coerced statements under a common-law rule, which arose from a judicial concern that such statements
were unreliable evidence. In Bram v. United States, the Supreme Court first introduced the self-incrimination clause
rationale for excluding such statements. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1887). Other twentieth century cases articulated a due-
process rationale to exclude coerced statements. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-87 (1936) (holding
that statements obtained by torturing an accused must be excluded under the Fourteenth Amendment due process
clause, which forbids states to offend “fundamental principles of liberty and justice”). In Miranda v. Arizona, the Court
affirmed the prominence of the Baum self-incrimination rationale for excluding coerced statements. 384 U.S. 436, 444-
45 (1966). The Court has reiterated the due-process rationale in more recent cases. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United
States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000) (“We have never abandoned [the] due process jurisprudence”). For information on
more cases interpreting the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, see CRS Report R41252, Terrorism,
Miranda, and Related Matters, by Charles Doyle.
194
384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
195
Id. at 444. (defining questioning during “custodial interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way”).
196
United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 173-79 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (in a case involving a non-citizen
defendant who had been detained and interrogated in Kenya, holding that as a general rule, Miranda applies when U.S.
law enforcement officials questioned the defendant outside of the United States). This outcome seems to comport with
the self-incrimination clause rationale, espoused by the Miranda court, for excluding coerced statements; if the concern
is compelled incrimination in a current legal proceeding, the location of the interrogation seems to be irrelevant under
the constitutional standard.

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However, the Court’s recent jurisprudence has weakened Miranda’s effect by making clear that
despite the holding’s constitutional status,197 there are cases in which it is appropriate to depart
from strict adherence to Miranda warnings.198 The Miranda exception possibly relevant to the
Guantanamo detainees is the “public safety” exception, which the Court introduced in New York
v. Quarles.199 In Quarles, police officers apprehended a rape suspect in a supermarket and, on
discovering his empty holster, inquired, “where’s the gun?”200 The Court held that the suspect’s
incriminating response, “The gun is over there,” was admissible in court, despite the lack of a
Miranda warning, because the question had been necessary to secure the public’s safety in that
moment.201 Despite the Court’s emphasis in Quarles on the time-sensitive nature of the safety risk
in that case,202 some commentators have argued that the Quarles “public safety” exception should
be extended to reach interrogations of all captured terrorist suspects.203 Attorney General Holder
has stated that the “public safety” exception was used to question suspected Times Square bomber
Faisal Shahzad and suspected Detroit airline bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab prior to the
reading of their Miranda rights.204 An FBI memorandum from October 2010 advises agents that
the circumstances surrounding the arrest of a terrorist operative or leader may warrant
significantly more extensive “public safety questioning” than an ordinary arrest, and could
include questions about “possible impending or coordinated terrorist attacks; the location, nature,
and threat posed by weapons that might pose an imminent danger to the public; and the identities,
locations, and activities or intentions of accomplices who may be plotting additional imminent
attacks.”205 The memorandum further notes that in exceptional cases, an unwarned intelligence
interrogation may be necessary to collect information related to less immediate threats, where the
need to collect the information outweighs the government’s need to use such statements in court.

A second Miranda exception possibly applicable to some detainees is an exception for statements
made in response to questioning by foreign officials. In United States v. Yosef, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that “statements taken by foreign police in the absence of
Miranda warnings are admissible if voluntary.”206 The Yosef court identified two situations in
which this exception does not apply: (1) situations where U.S. interrogators are working with

197
In Dickerson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the Miranda warnings have the status of constitutional
interpretation; thus, Congress cannot eliminate the Miranda warnings requirement by statute. 530 U.S. 428, 434-435
(2000).
198
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974) (declining to strictly enforce the Miranda warnings where
police conduct “did not deprive respondent of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such, but rather
failed to make available to him the full measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda”).
199
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
200
Id. at 655.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 657-58 (reasoning that requiring police to determine whether to take the time to give Miranda warnings “in a
matter of seconds” was impracticable under the circumstances).
203
See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Becker, Legal War on Terrorism: Extending New York v. Quarles and the Departure from
Enemy Combatant Designations, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 831, 869 (2003-2004).
204
Justice Department Budget, Hearing before the Senate Comm. on Appropriations, Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice,
Science, And Related Agencies, May 6, 2010 (statement of Eric Holder).
205
See Memorandum, U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Custodial Interrogation for Public
Safety and Intelligence-Gathering Purposes of Operational Terrorists Inside the United States,” October 21, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda-text.html.
206
327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 933 (2003).

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foreign interrogators as part of a “joint venture”; and (2) situations that “shock the judicial
conscience.”207

If the Quarles public safety exception, the foreign-interrogator exception, or another Miranda
exception applied to statements made during questioning of a Guantanamo detainee, prosecutors
would need to show only that the detainees’ statements were made “voluntarily” before a court
would admit them at trial.208 For example, in United States v. Abu Ali, a case involving a
defendant who had been arrested and questioned by the Saudi government for allegedly assisting
terrorists in an attack, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld statements made to
the Saudi interrogators, despite a lack of Miranda warnings, because the court found that the
statements were voluntary.209

The constitutional standard of “voluntariness” is recognized as “the ultimate safeguard against

coerced confessions.”210 The definition for “voluntary” in this context matches the definition
employed in other due-process cases; specifically, the test for voluntariness is “whether the
confession was ‘extracted by any sort of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’”211 The
voluntariness test is a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry, in which courts examine factors such
as “the youth of the accused, his lack of education, or his low intelligence, the lack of any advice
to the accused of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning, and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or
sleep.”212 The failure to provide Miranda warnings can serve as one factor in the totality-of-
circumstances evaluation.213

Absent an exception, the failure to administer a Miranda warning to a suspect in custody results
in the exclusion of any unwarned statements at trial as part of the prosecution’s case in chief.
Evidence derived from an unwarned statement need not be excluded at trial under the “fruit of the
poisonous tree” doctrine214 unless, some courts have ruled, the evidence was uncovered (or
witness identified) as a result of a coerced statement and the government cannot show that its
subsequent discovery of the derivative evidence is so remote from the illegal action that the taint

207
Id. at 145-46. The Fourth Circuit articulated slightly different exceptions to this general rule in Abu Ali, holding that
Miranda will apply to interrogations by foreign governments when the foreign interrogators are: “(1) engaged in a joint
venture with, or (2) acting as agents of, United States law enforcement officers.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d
210, 227-28 (4th Cir. 2008).
208
See Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 232 (“When Miranda warnings are unnecessary, as in the case of an interrogation by
foreign officials, we assess the voluntariness of a defendant’s statements by asking whether the confession is ‘the
product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker.’”) (citing Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568,
602 (1961)).
209
Id at 234(“[W]e conclude that Abu Ali’s statements were voluntary. Abu Ali was intelligent, articulate, and
comfortable with the language and culture of the country in which he was detained and questioned. The district court
found, based upon copious record evidence, that he was not tortured, abused, threatened, held in cruel conditions, or
subjected to coercive interrogations. On the basis of the totality of these circumstances, we conclude that Abu Ali’s
statements were ‘the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.’” (citing Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602)).
210
See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 (noting that although Miranda and its progeny “changed the focus” of the inquiry
regarding coerced statements, the Court “continue[s] to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily” in cases
in which Miranda does not apply).
211
Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (citing Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-543).
212
Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 232.
213
Id. at 233.
214
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 631-33 (2004).

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is removed. In the trial of Ahmed Ghailani for conspiracy in relation to the 1998 embassy
bombings, the defendant’s allegedly abusive interrogation in CIA custody abroad did not
persuade the judge to dismiss charges, but it did result in the exclusion of a government witness
whose identity was uncovered during Ghailani’s interrogation and whose cooperation with
prosecutors was less than willing.215

Congress appears to have taken the position that Miranda warnings are not constitutionally
required to be given to enemy belligerents captured and detained outside the United States.
Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84), Congress has
generally barred enemy belligerents in military custody outside the United States from being read
Miranda warnings, absent a court order. Specifically, it provides that

Absent a court order requiring the reading of such statements, no member of the Armed
Forces and no official or employee of the Department of Defense or a component of the
intelligence community (other than the Department of Justice) may read to a foreign national
who is captured or detained outside the United States as an enemy belligerent and is in the
custody or under the effective control of the Department of Defense or otherwise under
detention in a Department of Defense facility the statement required by Miranda v. Arizona
… or otherwise inform such an individual of any rights that the individual may or may not
have to counsel or to remain silent consistent with Miranda v. Arizona.216

This provision is expressly made inapplicable to the Department of Justice,217 meaning that
agents of the DOJ could potentially read Miranda warnings to persons in military custody. One
instance where the DOJ might opt to read Miranda warnings to an enemy belligerent in military
custody would be when it intends to bring criminal charges against a detainee in federal civilian
court.

Under Article 31 of the UCMJ, individuals “subject to the code” who are brought before a court-
martial are protected from the use of statements obtained through the use of coercion, unlawful
influence, or unlawful inducement.218 Additionally, an individual may not be forced to incriminate
himself or to answer a question before any military tribunal that is not material to the issue and
may tend to degrade him.219 A suspect is also generally entitled to Miranda type warnings,
commonly referred to as 31 bravo rights, which require that a suspect be informed of the nature
of the accusation against him; be advised that he does not have to make a statement regarding the
offense; and be informed that any statement may be used as evidence in a trial by court-martial.
The protections of Article 31 are broader than Miranda warnings in that a suspect must receive
the warnings even if he is not in custody.220 While a strict reading of the UCMJ might support the
proposition that a captured insurgent suspected of engaging in unlawful hostilities could not be
questioned by military personnel about such activities without first receiving a warning and
possibly the opportunity to consult an attorney, developments in military case law cast that
conclusion in doubt.221 A review of Army regulations pertaining to the treatment of war-time

215
United States v. Ghailani, 743 F. Supp. 2d 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
216
P.L. 111-84, §1040 (2009).
217
Id.
218
10 U.S.C. §831(d). See also MIL. R. EVID. 305.
219
10 U.S.C. §831(a),(c).
220
United States v. Baird, 271 U.S. App. D.C. 121 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
221
Not long after the passage of the UCMJ, the Court of Military Appeals (CMA) began to interpret Article 31(b) in
light of congressional intent, wherein it discerned the aim on Congress’s part to counteract the presumptively coercive
(continued...)

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captives suggests that military authorities do not regard Article 31 as applicable to captured
belligerents suspected of violating the law of war, regardless of their prisoner-of-war status.222
Military courts have also recognized a “public safety” exception to Miranda requirements similar
to the rule applied in federal courts.223 The relationship between UCMJ Article 31 and the
provision of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act limiting the reading of Miranda rights
is not immediately clear. A narrow reading of act’s limitation on Miranda warnings might not
encompass Article 31 warnings because they technically differ from the warnings required by
Miranda.

Persons subject to a military commission also have a statutory privilege against self-
incrimination,224 though this standard is less robust than that applicable in courts-martial
proceedings. Statements obtained by the use of torture are statutorily prohibited.225 Under the
original MCA, military commissions were permitted to admit statements obtained in the course of
harsh interrogation not rising to the level of torture, if certain criteria were met. Statements made
on or after December 30, 2005, would not be admitted if the interrogation methods used to obtain
them amounted to “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” prohibited by the DTA.226 The DTA’s
prohibition applies to statements obtained through methods that, if they had occurred within the
United States, would be considered unconstitutionally harsh.227 The MCA’s requirement did not
apply with respect to the admission of statements made prior to December 30, 2005,228 meaning
that statements elicited via “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” could potentially have been
introduced into evidence in military commission proceedings.

Pursuant to amendments made by the MCA 2009, all statements obtained via torture or “cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment” are now inadmissible in military commission proceedings,
regardless of when such statements were made, except when presented “against a person accused
of torture or [cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment] as evidence that the statement was
made.”229 A detainee cannot be required to testify against himself.230 However, self-incriminating

(...continued)
effect created whenever a service member is questioned by a superior. United States v. Franklin, 8 C.M.R. 513 (C.M.A.
1952). Subsequently, the CMA determined that “person subject to the code” was not meant to be read as broadly in
Article 31 as that phrase is used elsewhere in the UCMJ. See United States v. Gibson, 14 C.M.R. 164, 170 (C.M.A.
1954) (questioning of prisoner by fellow inmate who was cooperating with investigators did not require art. 31
warning). It has also been held that interrogation for counter- espionage purposes conducted by civilian agents of the
U.S. Navy did not require an Article 31 rights warning, in a case where the suspect was found not to be in military
custody at the time of the questioning. United States v. Lonetree, 35 M.J. 396 (C.M.A. 1992).
222
See Department of the Army, AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and Other
Detainees (1997), at para. 2-1(d). (permitting interrogation of detainees in combat zones and barring use of torture or
other coercion against them, but not requiring such persons to be informed of rights under Article 31).
223
See David A. Schleuter, Military Criminal Justice §5-4(B) (5th ed. 1999).
224
10 U.S.C. §948r(b).
225
10 U.S.C. §948r(a).
226
10 U.S.C. §948r(d) (2008).
227
For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33655, Interrogation of Detainees: Requirements of the Detainee
Treatment Act, by Michael John Garcia.
228
10 U.S.C. §948r(c) (2008). In either case, however, when the degree of coercion used to obtain the statement was
disputed, the military judge could only permit its admission if the totality of circumstances rendered that statement
reliable and the interests of justice were served by its admission. 10 U.S.C. §948r(c)-(d) (2008).
229
10 U.S.C. §948r(a).
230
10 U.S.C. §948r(b).

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statements made by the accused may be introduced into evidence during military commission
proceedings when specific criteria are met. Specifically, the MCA 2009 provides that in order for
a statement made by the accused to admissible, the military commission judge must find that

(1) … the totality of the circumstances renders the statement reliable and possessing
sufficient probative value; and

(2) … (A) the statement was made incident to lawful conduct during military operations at
the point of capture or during closely related active combat engagement, and the interests of
justice would best be served by admission of the statement into evidence; or (B) the
statement was voluntarily given.231

The standards for admission of evidence in military commissions may be subject to legal
challenge, particularly by those defendants who seek to bar the admission of statements as
involuntary. Issues may also arise regarding the admissibility of any incriminating statements
made after a detainee has been subjected to harsh interrogation. In November 2008, a military
commission judge ruled that statements made by a detainee to U.S. authorities were tainted by his
earlier confession to Afghan police hours before, which had purportedly been made under threat
of death.232 The judge concluded that the coercive effects of the death threats producing the
detainee’s first confession had not dissipated by the time of the second. Subsequently, a federal
habeas court ruled that “every statement made by the detainee since his arrest [was] a product of
torture,” and could not be used by the government to support his detention.233 The detainee was
thereafter ordered released by the habeas court234 and subsequently transferred to Afghanistan. In
a separate case, however, a military judge permitted the use of a detainee’s statements despite
allegations that interrogators had threatened the youth by recounting stories of the prison rape of a
fictitious Afghan youth.235 The military commission in that case was not persuaded that any of the
statements the government sought to introduce at trial had been elicited through such tactics.

The MCA does not explicitly address evidence derived from statements elicited through torture or
coercion. However, Rule 304 of the Military Commission Rules of Evidence states in paragraph
5(A):

Evidence Derived from Statements Obtained by Torture or Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading

Treatment. Evidence derived from a statement that would be excluded under section (a)(1) of
[rule 304] may not be received in evidence against an accused who made the statement if the
accused makes a timely motion to suppress or an objection, unless the military judge
determines by a preponderance of the evidence that—

231
10 U.S.C. §948r(c). In determining the voluntariness of a statement, the presiding judge must consider the totality of
the circumstances, including, as appropriate, “(1) The details of the taking of the statement, accounting for the
circumstances of the conduct of military and intelligence operations during hostilities[;] (2) The characteristics of the
accused, such as military training, age, and education level[; and] (3) The lapse of time, change of place, or change in
identity of the questioners between the statement sought to be admitted and any prior questioning of the accused.” 10
U.S.C. §948r(d).
232
United States v. Jawad, D-021 (November 19, 2008). The government appealed the commission’s ruling to the
Court of Military Commission Review, but the case was rendered moot when the accused was found to be unlawfully
held by a reviewing habeas court and thereafter transferred by U.S. military authorities to Afghanistan for release.
233
Bacha v. Obama, 2009 WL 2149949 (D.D.C., July 17, 2009) (Huvelle, J.).
234
Bacha v. Obama, 2009 WL 2365846 (D.D.C., July 30, 2009) (Huvelle, J.).
235
United States v. Khadr, Ruling on Motions to Suppress D-94 and D-111 (August 17, 2010), available at
http://www.mc.mil.

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 Closing the Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues

(i) the evidence would have been obtained even if the statement had not been made; or

(ii) use of such evidence would otherwise be consistent with the interests of justice.

Right Against Prosecution under Ex Post Facto Laws

The ability to seek penal sanction against some detainees may be limited by ex post facto rules.
Art. I, Section 9, cl. 3, of the U.S. Constitution provides, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed.” The Ex Post Facto Clause236 “protects liberty by preventing the government
from enacting statutes with ‘manifestly unjust and oppressive’ retroactive effects.”237 This
limitation may impede the ability of U.S. authorities to pursue criminal charges against some
detainees, or alternatively inform decisions as to whether to pursue criminal charges in a military
or civilian court, as offenses punishable under the jurisdiction of one forum may not be
cognizable under the laws of another. While laws having retroactive effect may also invite due
process challenges,238 the Ex Post Facto Clause acts as an independent limitation on
congressional power, going “to the very root of Congress’s ability to act at all, irrespective of
time or place.”239 Accordingly, the Ex Post Facto Clause may be pertinent to the prosecution of
detainees regardless of whether they are brought to the United States or held for trial at
Guantanamo.

It appears that some detainees could be prosecuted for activities in federal civilian court without
running afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause, including for offenses related to or preceding the 9/11
terrorist attacks. While the number of laws criminalizing terrorism-related activity expanded in
the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some criminal statutes concerning terrorist activity and
having extraterritorial application were in effect in the years preceding, including laws relating to
acts of terrorism within the United States that transcend national boundaries; killing or causing
serious bodily injury to an American overseas for terrorist purposes; and money laundering in
support of certain terrorism-related activity.240 However, it may be more difficult to prosecute

236
U.S. CONST., Art. I, §10, cl. 1, prohibits the states from enacting ex post facto laws.
237
Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 612 (2003) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1798)). In Calder,
Justice Chase described the Ex Post Facto Clause as covering four categories of laws:
[1.] Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent
when done, criminal; and punishes such action ... [2.] Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes
it greater than it was, when committed ... [3.] Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a
greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed ... [and 4.] Every law that
alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at
the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender.
Calder, 3 U.S. at 390-391.
238
See Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 n. 10 (1981) (noting that in addition to giving protection to individuals, the
Ex Post Facto Clause “upholds the separation of powers by confining the legislature to penal decisions with prospective
effect and the judiciary and executive to applications of existing penal law”).
239
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901). See also United States v. Hamdan, D012 and D050, slip op. at 2
(June 14, 2008) [hereinafter “Hamdan Military Commission Ruling”] (ruling by military commission citing Downes
and finding that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to congressional actions directed at aliens at Guantanamo).
240
18 U.S.C. §2332b (acts of terrorism within the United States that transcend national boundaries), §2332 (killing or
severely injuring a U.S. national overseas), §1956 (criminalizing money laundering activities by a foreign person when
a transaction at least partially occurs within the United States) (2000). For further discussion on the use of terrorism
statutes in criminal prosecutions, including with respect to activities taking place outside the United States, see Richard
B. Zabel and James J. Benjamin, Jr., In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in Federal Courts, Human
Rights First, May 2008.

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some detainees on account of other types of terrorist activity or material support that occurred
abroad. In the early days of the conflict with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, many terrorism-related
statutes did not apply to wholly extraterritorial acts committed by foreign nationals that did not
injure U.S. persons. For instance, prior to 2004, federal criminal law generally did not extend to
non-citizens with no ties to the United States who provided material support to a terrorist
organization.241

Some persons could also be charged with offenses under the War Crimes Act, which imposes
criminal penalties for specified offenses under the law of war, including “grave breaches” of the
Geneva Conventions.242 For some alleged offenses, in particular those that occurred prior to
September 11, 2001, it may be difficult to establish that they were committed in the context of an
armed conflict.

Statute of limitations concerns may affect the ability of U.S. authorities to prosecute persons for
some of the offenses noted above. While the statute of limitations for most non-capital federal
offenses is five years,243 the period for terrorism-related offenses is typically eight years244 unless
the offense results in or raises a foreseeable risk of death or serious bodily injury. If such a risk is
foreseeable, then, like capital offenses,245 there is no limitation to the time within which an
indictment may be found.246

The constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws may also have implications in courts-
martial or military commission proceedings, limiting the offenses with which detainees may be
charged.247 The UCMJ provides that general courts-martial have jurisdiction to “try any person
who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment
permitted by the law of war.”248 The UCMJ does not enumerate the offenses punishable under the
law of war, instead relying on the common law of war to define the subject-matter jurisdiction in
general courts-martial. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme Court recognized that,
for an act to be triable under the common law of war, there must be “plain and unambiguous”
precedent for treating it as such.249 After examining the history of military commission practice in
the United States and internationally, the plurality further concluded that conspiracy to violate the
law of war was not in itself a crime under the common law of war or the UCMJ.250

241
See 18 U.S.C. §2339B (amended in 2004 to cover extraterritorial acts of material support by persons with no ties to
the United States who were thereafter brought to the United States).
242
18 U.S.C. §2441.
243
18 U.S.C. §3282.
244
18 U.S.C. §3286.
245
18 U.S.C. §3281. For background, see CRS Report RL31253, Statutes of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: An
Overview, by Charles Doyle.
246
18 U.S.C. §3286(b).
247
See United States v. Gorski, 47 M.J. 370 (1997) (ruling that the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to courts-martial
proceedings); Hamdan v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011). (avoiding a decision on whether
the Ex Post Facto Clause applies to military commission proceedings at Guantanamo by determining that Congress did
not intend to create retroactive offenses).
248
10 U.S.C. §818.
249
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
250
Id. at 601-612 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Although the petitioner in Hamdan had been brought before a military
tribunal established by a 2001 presidential order rather than a court-martial, the Court held that UCMJ procedural
requirements were generally applicable to these tribunals. While a majority of the Court found that the military
commissions established by the President did not comply with these requirements, Justice Kennedy declined to join the
(continued...)

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Congress’s post-Hamdan enactment of the original MCA exempted military commissions from
many UCMJ requirements applicable to courts-martial proceedings. Although military
commissions may exercise personal jurisdiction over a more limited category of belligerents than
courts-martial,251 the two forums share subject-matter jurisdiction over violations of the law of
war. However, the systems differ in that Congress defined specific offenses punishable by
military commissions, including, inter alia, murder of protected persons; murder in violation of
the law of war; attacking civilians, civilian objects, or protected property; denying quarter;
terrorism; providing material support for terrorism; and conspiracy to commit an offense
punishable by military commission.252 By statute, Congress has provided that such acts by an
unprivileged enemy belligerent are punishable by military commissions regardless of whether
they were “committed … before, on, or after September 11, 2001.”253 In enacting the original
MCA, Congress asserted that it did “not establish new crimes that did not exist before its
enactment,” but rather codified “offenses that have traditionally been triable by military
commissions.”254 Congress retained this language when it amended the statutory guidelines for
military commissions pursuant to the MCA 2009.

The Court of Military Commission Review (CMCR) heard appeals on the question of ex post
facto crimes in two cases, and in issuing its first two opinions, upheld Salim Hamdan’s conviction
for providing material support for terrorism255 and Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul’s
conviction for support of terrorism and conspiracy.256 After reviewing historical evidence of what
were arguably analogous crimes, the CMCR found that Congress could reasonably determine that
these offenses violate the common law of war.257 On appeal in the Hamdan II case, the D.C.
Circuit disagreed and reversed. In its unanimous opinion, the three-judge panel found that
Congress did not intend for the offenses it defined in the MCA to apply retroactively. Because the
court agreed that the crime of material support of terrorism did not exist as a war crime under the
international law of war at the time the relevant conduct occurred, which it found to be required

(...continued)
part of the opinion considering whether conspiracy was a cognizable offense under the law of war, finding the
discussion unnecessary in light of the Court’s determination that the military commissions did not conform to the
UCMJ.
251
Whereas military commissions may exercise personal jurisdiction over “unprivileged enemy belligerents,” general
courts-martial may potentially exercise jurisdiction over both privileged and unprivileged belligerents. See 10 U.S.C.
§818 (providing courts-martial jurisdiction over “any person who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military
tribunal”).
252
10 U.S.C. §950t.
253
10 U.S.C. §948d.
254
10 U.S.C. §950p.
255
Hamdan v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011).
256
United States v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011).
257
See Docket for Salim Ahmed Hamdan, CMCR Case No. 09-002, available at http://www.mc.mil/CASES/
USCourtofMilitaryCommissionReview.aspx. The CMCR requested oral arguments on two questions in the Hamdan
and Al Bahlul cases: whether “joint criminal enterprise” theory informs the ex post facto nature of any conviction for
conspiracy, and whether the charge of aiding the enemy is limited to “those who have betrayed an allegiance or duty to
a sovereign nation.” (The government argued that the charge of “material support of terrorism” is essentially the same
as the more familiar law of war offense “aiding the enemy”). Despite the relative dearth of cases in which persons with
no allegiance or duty to the United States were prosecuted for “aiding the enemy” or similar crimes, the CMCR viewed
the existence of such an allegiance or duty as an aggravating circumstance rather than a requirement for jurisdiction.
The CMCR gave significant weight to the fact that many foreign domestic legal systems criminalize international
terrorism, as is required by of a number of international agreements, although these statutes and treaties generally do
not treat terrorist offenses as war crimes. Hamdan v. United States, 801 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011).

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under pre-MCA law regarding military commissions, it found Hamdan’s conviction invalid. The
court also hinted that other offenses proscribed by the MCA might fall into the retroactive
category. To avoid that fate, the court suggested, an offense must be shown to be “based on norms
firmly grounded in international law.”258 Another panel of the D.C. Circuit followed Hamdan II to
reverse Al Bahlul’s conviction in a per curiam order.259 The government asked for and was
granted a petition for rehearing en banc in the Al Bahlul case, which will likely give it the
opportunity to challenge the decision in Hamdan as well.260

In addition to these offenses, the crime of “murder in violation of the law of war,” which punishes
persons who, as unprivileged belligerents, commit hostile acts that result in the death of any
persons, including lawful combatants, in the context of an armed conflict, may also be new,
depending on how it is interpreted.261 Whether the full D.C. Circuit, or possibly the Supreme
Court, ultimately deems some of the punishable offenses listed by the MCA as constitutionally
impermissible, at least when applied to activities occurring prior to the MCA’s enactment, may
turn on the degree of deference given to Congress in defining violations of the law of war. The
Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to “define and punish Offences ... against the
Law of Nations.”262 While the Supreme Court has applied stringent criteria when determining
whether an act is punishable under the law of war in the absence of a congressional declaration,263
the standard may be more lenient when Congress acts pursuant to its constitutional authority to
define war crime offenses.264

Ex post facto concerns could potentially be raised in other situations, such as when there is a
change to the statute of limitation applicable to a crime or if there is an increase in a penalty.
Statute of limitations concerns may arise in war crimes prosecutions under the UCMJ,265 though

258
Hamdan v. United States, 696 F.3d 1238, 1250 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Hamdan II).
259
Al Bahlul v. United States, 2013 WL 297726 (D.C. Cir. January 25, 2013).
260
See CRS Report WSLG493, Al Bahlul to be (Re)Heard by Full D.C. Circuit, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
261
Civilians (sometimes characterized as “unprivileged belligerents” or “unlawful combatants”) have been tried by
military tribunals for killing combatants in past wars, but the offense has been characterized as ordinary murder for
which combatant immunity is unavailable as a defense rather than a violation of the law of war. The International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has found that war crimes in the context of non-international
armed conflict include murder of civilians, but have implied that the killing of a combatant is not a war crime.
Prosecutor v. Kvocka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1 (Trial Chamber), November 2, 2001, para. 124: (“An additional
requirement for Common Article 3 crimes under Article 3 of the Statute is that the violations must be committed
against persons ‘taking no active part in the hostilities.’”); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Case No. IT-95-10 (Trial Chamber),
December 14, 1999, para. 34 (“Common Article 3 protects ‘[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities’ including
persons ‘placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause.’”); Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No.
IT-95-14 (Trial Chamber), March 3, 2000, para. 180 (“Civilians within the meaning of Article 3 are persons who are
not, or no longer, members of the armed forces. Civilian property covers any property that could not be legitimately
considered a military objective.”). For further discussion, see CRS Report R41163, The Military Commissions Act of
2009 (MCA 2009): Overview and Legal Issues, by Jennifer K. Elsea.
262
U.S. CONST., Art. I, §10, cl. 8.
263
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 602 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30 (“universal agreement and
practice” recognized offense as violation of the law of war).
264
See United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“provided that the acts in question are
recognized by at least some members of the international community as being offenses against the law of nations,
Congress arguably has the power to criminalize these acts pursuant to its power to define offenses against the law of
nations”).
265
Article 43 of the UCMJ provides that the statute of limitations for most non-capital offenses that may be tried by
court-martial is five years. The extent to which this Article might preclude prosecution of war crimes by a general
courts-martial may be an issue in assessing the appropriate forum for the prosecution of detainees, as there does not
(continued...)

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these limitations may not apply with respect to prosecutions before military commissions. These
considerations may inform decisions by U.S. authorities as to whether to pursue criminal charges
against detainees in civilian court or another forum. They may also be relevant in the crafting of
any new legislative proposals concerning the prosecution of detainees. A further ex post facto
issue could arise if the rules of evidence applicable at the time of prosecution for an offense set a
lower evidentiary bar for conviction than those applicable at the time of the commission of the
offense.266

(...continued)
appear to be a case which squarely addresses the Article’s application to war crimes prosecutions. Assuming that
Article 43 is applicable, the statute of limitations could potentially be suspended during “time of war” if the President
certifies that the limitation would be detrimental to the war effort or harmful to national security. Specifically, Article
43(e) provides that “For an offense the trial of which in time of war is certified to the President by the Secretary [of
Defense] concerned to be detrimental to the prosecution of the war or inimical to the national security, the period of
limitation prescribed in this article is extended to six months after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by the
President or by a joint resolution of Congress.”
10 U.S.C. §843(e). Military courts have previously interpreted the phrase “in time of war,” as used in Article 43 and
applied to U.S. servicemen, to be applicable to both declared wars and other military conflicts. See, e.g., United States
v. Castillo, 34 M.J. 1160 (1992) (Persian Gulf conflict was a “time of war” for purposes of UCMJ); United States v.
Anderson, 38 C.M.R. 389 (1968) (unauthorized absence during Vietnam conflict was “in time of war” for purposes of
Article 43 provision allowing suspension of statute of limitations); United States v. Taylor, 15 C.M.R. 232 (1954)
(Korean conflict was “in time of war” within meaning of UCMJ Article 43). In United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R.
363 (1970), a UCMJ provision giving military courts jurisdiction over civilians accompanying armed forces “in time of
war” was interpreted as applying only to declared wars, so as to avoid constitutional issues that might be implicated by
the military trial of civilians. This provision was subsequently amended to give courts-martial jurisdiction over civilians
accompanying the military in “contingency operations” as well. Presuming that the UCMJ’s statute of limitations is
applicable to war crimes, it could be argued that the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, authorized by Congress
pursuant to the AUMF, is “a time of war,” and that the statute of limitations for the prosecution of war crimes
committed by enemy belligerents may be suspended under Article 43(e).
266
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 530-31, 552 (2000); cf., Stogner, 539 U.S. at 615-16 (dicta). In Carmell, the
Supreme Court considered an amendment to a statute concerning certain sexual offenses which authorized conviction
for such offenses based on a victim’s testimony alone, in contrast to the earlier version of the statute which required the
victim’s testimony plus other corroborating evidence to permit conviction. The Court held that application of the
amendment to conduct that occurred before the amendment’s effective date violated the constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws. In Stogner, the Court found that the statute at issue was an ex post facto law, because it
inflicted punishment where the defendant, by law, was not liable to any punishment. However, the Court noted in dicta,
that
a statute of limitations reflects a legislative judgment that, after a certain time, no quantum of
evidence is sufficient to convict. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 322, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468,
92 S. Ct. 455 (1971). And that judgment typically rests, in large part, upon evidentiary concerns—
for example, concern that the passage of time has eroded memories or made witnesses or other
evidence unavailable. ... Consequently, to resurrect a prosecution after the relevant statute of
limitations has expired is to eliminate a currently existing conclusive presumption forbidding
prosecution, and thereby to permit conviction on a quantum of evidence where that quantum, at the
time the new law is enacted, would have been legally insufficient. And, in that sense, the new law
would “violate” previous evidence-related legal rules by authorizing the courts to “‘receiv[e]
evidence ... which the courts of justice would not [previously have] admit[ted]’” as sufficient proof
of a crime ... Nonetheless, given Justice Chase’s description of the second category, we need not
explore the fourth category, or other categories, further.
Id. at 615-16.

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Rules Against Hearsay Evidence

Hearsay is a prior out-of-court statement of a person, offered at trial either orally by another
person or in written form, in order to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In a trial before either
a civilian or military court, the admissibility of hearsay may raise both procedural and
constitutional issues. Civilian and military courts each have procedural rules limiting the
admission of hearsay evidence. Further, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause states that
the accused in any criminal prosecution retains the right to be “confronted with the witnesses
against him.”

As a practical matter, hearsay issues may arise in any prosecution of persons captured in the war
against Al Qaeda and associated forces for reasons peculiar to that context. For example,
witnesses detained by foreign governments may be unavailable to come to the United States to
testify in a federal court,267 or the government may be unwilling to make military and intelligence
assets and personnel available for testimony.268 Procedural rules and constitutional requirements
may limit the use of hearsay evidence in the prosecution of some detainees, though exceptions
may permit the introduction of certain types of hearsay evidence.

Evidentiary Issues
Federal civilian courts, courts-martial, and military commissions all operate under procedural
rules governing the admission of hearsay evidence. Procedural rules applicable to federal courts
under the Federal Rules of Evidence and courts-martial proceedings under the Military Rules of
Evidence impose largely similar restrictions on the usage of hearsay evidence. Under both the
federal and the military rules of evidence, hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it qualifies
under an exception to the hearsay rule.269 For the most part, these exceptions require the hearsay
evidence to be of a particular nature or context that gives it a greater degree of reliability than
other out-of-court statements. Examples of exceptions to the hearsay rule include “excited
utterances” made under the stress of excitement caused by a startling event; records of regularly-
conducted activity; and statements of a self-incriminating nature.270 Both sets of evidentiary rules
recognize a residual exception for statements that have “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness.”271 Examples of statements that have been held to qualify under the residual
exception include interviews of child abuse victims by specially trained FBI agents272 and
statements contained within the files of a foreign intelligence agency.273

One important aspect of the definition of hearsay is that statements made by co-conspirators in
furtherance of a conspiracy are not considered hearsay.274 For example, in prosecutions alleging
267
E.g., Abu Ali, 528 F.3d at 239-240.
268
E.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that the government informed the court
that it would not comply with the court’s deposition order in case involving person accused of involvement in terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001).
269
Federal Rules of Evidence (FED. R. EVID.) 802; Military Rules of Evidence (MIL. R. EVID.) 802.
270
FED. R. EVID. 801(D), 803; MIL. R. EVID. 801(d), 803 -804. Certain hearsay exceptions also require that the declarant
be unavailable to testify, for example, due to death or an asserted privilege.
271
FED. R. EVID. 807; MIL. R. EVID. 807.
272
United States v. Rouse, 111 F.3d 561 (8th Cir. 1997).
273
United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566 (7th Cir. 2005).
274
FED. R. EVID. 801(D)(2)(E); MIL. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).

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material support to terrorist organizations, evidence of statements by co-conspirators may be

introduced against a defendant at trial even if those statements would not have qualified under a
hearsay exception. Before these statements may be admitted, it is necessary to establish that the
conspiracy exists. The co-conspirators’ statements being offered may be considered when making
this initial determination, but are not sufficient standing alone to establish the existence of a
conspiracy.275

In comparison with the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Military Rules of Evidence, the
procedural rules for military commissions under the Military Commission Rules of Evidence are
much more permissive regarding the admissibility of hearsay evidence. Under the MCA 2006,
hearsay evidence could be admitted in commission proceedings if either (1) it would be admitted
under rules of evidence applicable in trial by general courts-martial; or (2) more broadly, if the
proponent of the evidence makes known to the adverse party the intention to offer such evidence,
and as well as the particulars of the evidence.276 In the latter case, the accused could only have
such evidence excluded if he could demonstrate by a preponderance of evidence that the hearsay
evidence was unreliable under the totality of the circumstances.277

The rules for admissibility of hearsay evidence in military commission proceedings were
modified by the MCA 2009. Under the new rule, hearsay evidence that would not be admissible
in general courts-martial proceedings may be admitted in a trial by military commission only if

(i) the proponent of the evidence makes known to the adverse party, sufficiently in advance
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to meet the evidence, the proponent’s
intention to offer the evidence, and the particulars of the evidence (including information on
the circumstances under which the evidence was obtained); and

(ii) the military judge, after taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the
taking of the statement, including the degree to which the statement is corroborated, the
indicia of reliability within the statement itself, and whether the will of the declarant was
overborne, determines that –

(I) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact;

(II) the statement is probative on the point for which it is offered;

(III) direct testimony from the witness is not available as a practical matter, taking into
consideration the physical location of the witness, the unique circumstances of military
and intelligence operations during hostilities, and the adverse impacts on military or
intelligence operations that would likely result from the production of the witness; and

(IV) the general purposes of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice will best
be served by admission of the statement into evidence.278

275
FED. R. EVID. 801(D)(2); MIL. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
276
Military Commissions Rules of Evidence (MIL. COMM. R. EVID.) 802-803 (2007). The proponent of the evidence
could satisfy the notification requirement by providing written notice of the statement and its circumstances 30 days in
advance of trial or hearing and by providing the opposing party with any materials regarding the time, place, and
conditions under which the statement was produced that are in its possession.
277
Id. at 803(c).
278
10 U.S.C. §949a(b)(3).

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Despite this modification, hearsay evidence that is inadmissible in federal civilian court or
military courts-martial proceedings might be admissible in a trial before a military commission.
As a result, prosecutors may have a broader range of inculpatory evidence at their disposal. On
the other hand, military commission rules permit a broader scope of hearsay for both parties. In
some cases, a defendant might be able to introduce more exculpatory evidence in a military
commission proceeding than in a federal court or court martial. Because prosecutors generally
choose the forum in which to prosecute a case, U.S. authorities may have the option of choosing
among the different hearsay rules to their advantage, depending upon the particular facts of a
case.

Constitutional Issues
The Constitution imposes its own limitations on the admission of hearsay evidence in criminal
cases. The protections afforded under the Confrontation Clause apply to both civilian and military
proceedings.279 While courts have yet to rule as to whether the Confrontation Clause’s protections
against hearsay extend to noncitizens brought before military commissions held at
Guantanamo,280 it would certainly appear to restrict the use of hearsay evidence in cases brought
against detainees transferred to the United States.

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that even where a hearsay exception may
apply under applicable forum rules, the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of hearsay
against a criminal defendant if the character of the statement is testimonial and the defendant has
not had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.281 Although the definition of testimonial
statements has not been thoroughly explicated, lower courts have interpreted the proper inquiry to
be “whether a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would have expected his statements to
be used at trial.”282 In the traditional law enforcement context, the Court has expressly held that
statements taken by police officers in the course of either investigations of past criminal activity
or formal interrogation would qualify as testimonial under any reasonable definition of the
term.283 In contrast, the Supreme Court has held that statements made “to enable police assistance
279
See, e.g., United States v. Coulter, 62 M.J. 520 (2005) (applying Sixth Amendment hearsay restrictions to court-
martial proceedings, including requirements of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)).
280
In the case of In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946), the Supreme Court denied application of the writ of habeas
corpus to a Japanese general who had been tried and convicted before a military commission in the Philippines. Having
found that the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the proceedings, the Court declined to consider whether the
procedures employed by the commission, which permitted significant use of hearsay evidence, violated constitutional
requirements. While the Supreme Court has not definitively addressed the question of whether the Confrontation
Clause applies to noncitizens at Guantanamo, the reliance on hearsay evidence in administrative determinations as to
whether a detainee was an “enemy combatant” informed the Court’s ruling in Boumediene that those proceedings were
an inadequate substitute for habeas corpus. 553 U.S. at 781-83. See also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638 n. 67 (Stevens, J.,
plurality opinion) (finding 2001 presidential order establishing military commissions violated statutory requirements
concerning commission procedures, and stating that “the Government suggests no circumstances in which it would be
‘fair’ to convict the accused based on evidence he has not seen or heard.”) (citing cf. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49).
281
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). This constitutional prohibition on certain types of hearsay only
prohibits the admission of statements to be used against the defendant. For example, in the Moussaoui case, involving
the prosecution of an individual for involvement in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Fourth Circuit applied Crawford and
prohibited the government from using statements in the substitutions for testimony from certain witnesses to show the
defendant’s guilt. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 481-482. Exculpatory statements in the deposition substitutions, which were
clearly testimonial, would have been admissible.
282
United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing decisions by the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits).
283
See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821, 830 (2006). The Supreme Court also recently held that affidavits from
(continued...)

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to meet an ongoing emergency”284 were not testimonial, because, objectively determined, the
purpose of the statements was to request assistance and not to act “as a witness.”285

Many of the individuals detained at the naval base at Guantanamo Bay were apprehended on the
battlefield in Afghanistan or other locations, as a consequence of their alleged actions there.
Evidence against these potential defendants may include statements regarding their activities by
persons also engaged in that conflict and subsequently captured. Sixth Amendment concerns may
be raised if prosecutory authorities attempt to introduce statements made by other persons or
detainees without presenting those declarants to personally testify in court. In these situations, the
admissibility of the statements against the defendants would appear to turn on whether the
character of the statements made is testimonial or not.286

In light of the Supreme Court’s rulings in the domestic law enforcement context, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the statements of enemy combatant witnesses obtained during formal
interrogation by law enforcement would be considered testimonial. Similarly, incriminating
statements made to U.S. or foreign military personnel by enemy combatants on the battlefield
might also be considered testimonial. Insofar as these statements are determined to be testimonial,
the Sixth Amendment would not appear to permit their use against a defendant without an
opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the declarant.

This constitutional requirement is not affected by less stringent rules regarding the admission, or
even the definition, of hearsay that may be used in different forums. While the reach of the
Confrontation Clause to noncitizens held at Guantanamo has not been definitively resolved, that
clause would clearly apply to military commissions held within the United States. Therefore,
although the evidentiary rules for federal civilian courts, general courts-martial, and military
commissions may permit different amounts of hearsay initially, prosecutors in each forum would
be subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause regarding testimonial hearsay against
the defendant, at least with respect to proceedings occurring within the United States. Lastly, non-
testimonial hearsay against the defendant, including statements which a reasonable person would
not expect to be used at trial, are unaffected by the Crawford decision, and even testimonial
hearsay may be admitted if the defense has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.

(...continued)
forensic analysts are also testimonial. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (prosecution cannot prove
that substance was cocaine using ex parte out-of-court affidavits). It is less clear whether the out of court statements
upon which the in-court opinion of an expert witness relies would also be testimonial. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct.
2221, 2255 (2012) (plurality opinion) (Thomas, J. concurring) (agreeing with four dissenting justices that the
statements upon which a DNA expert relied were hearsay, but finding no violation of the Confrontation Clause because
the statements lacked the requisite “formality and solemnity”). While these cases concern narcotics and DNA evidence,
the Confrontation Clause would likely apply similarly to other categories of chemical analyses, such as the
identification of materials used for bombs or other explosive devices.

284
Id. at 822.
285
Id. at 827-828. The statements in this case were made during a 911 call describing a contemporaneous physical
assault.
286
The character of the questioning may be relevant but does not appear to be determinative. For example, open ended
questioning may still give rise to testimonial statements that would require confrontation. Davis, 547 U.S. at n.1.

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Right to a Speedy Trial

In early 2008, the DOD announced that approximately 80 detainees being held at Guantanamo
were expected to face trial before military commissions.287 In January 2010, it was reported that
the Obama Administration intends to bring charges against about 35 detainees in military or
civilian court.288 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a speedy trial for the accused in all
criminal prosecutions.289 The protection is triggered “when a criminal prosecution has begun.”290
The invocation of the right may occur prior to indictment or formal charge, when “the actual
restraints imposed by arrest and holding” are made.291 The right has been found to extend to
civilian and military courts,292 though the nature of the right’s application to military courts may
differ from its application in the civilian context.293 Statutory requirements and forum rules may
also impose speedy trial requirements on applicable proceedings. Detainees transferred to the
United States may argue that they are constitutionally entitled to a speedy trial,294 and that denial
of this right compels a reviewing court to dismiss the charges against them.295

A reviewing court’s assessment of any speedy trial claim raised by a detainee is likely to balance
any prejudice suffered by the accused with the public’s interest in delaying prosecution. Courts
have employed a multi-factor balancing test to assess whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
has been violated, taking into account the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of the right, and the prejudice to the defendant.296 Because the remedy for

287
Department of Defense, “Charges Referred on Detainee al Bahlul,” press release, February 26, 2008, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11718.
288
Finn, supra footnote 163.
289
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The right applies to prosecutions in both federal and state courts, as the Supreme Court has
found the right to be one of the “fundamental” constitutional rights that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated to the
states. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967). Justifications for the right to a speedy trial include not only
a concern regarding lengthy incarceration but also societal interests in resolving crimes in a timely and effective
manner. See Barker v. Wingo, Warden, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) (“there is a societal interest in providing a speedy
trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the rights of the accused”).
290
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971).
291
Id. at 320.
292
See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 53 M.J. 229 (2000).
293
In his concurring opinion in the case of Reid v. Covert, in which the Supreme Court held that court-martial
jurisdiction could not be constitutionally applied to civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas during
peacetime, Justice Frankfurter wrote that
Trial by court-martial is constitutionally permissible only for persons who can, on a fair appraisal,
be regarded as falling within the authority given to Congress under Article I to regulate the ‘land
and naval Forces,’ and who therefore are not protected by specific provisions of Article III and the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments. It is of course true that, at least regarding the right to a grand jury
indictment, the Fifth Amendment is not unmindful of the demands of military discipline. Within the
scope of appropriate construction, the phrase ‘except in cases arising in the land or naval Forces’
has been assumed also to modify the guaranties of speedy and public trial by jury.
354 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
294
The Sixth Amendment provides that “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial....” The constitutional right to a speedy trial has been interpreted as generally applying to courts-martial
proceedings.
295
See Strunk, 412 U.S. at 438.
296
See Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Courts have recognized at least three types of prejudice, including “‘oppressive pretrial
incarceration,’ ‘anxiety and concern of the accused,’ and ‘the possibility that the [accused’s] defense will be impaired’
by dimming memories and loss of exculpatory evidence.” See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 654 (1992)
(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-379 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116,
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the government’s violation of the speedy trial right—dismissal—is relatively severe, courts have
often hesitated to find violations of the right. However, the Supreme Court has indicated that
extremely long delays violate a person’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial even in the
absence of “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice.”297 It is possible that a court could find
that some Guantanamo detainees have been prejudiced in any future prosecution by their long
periods of detention, since “a defendant confined to jail prior to trial is obviously disadvantaged
by delay.”298 If so, a key question in cases involving Guantanamo detainees might be whether the
prejudice suffered by detainees outweighs the public’s interest in delaying prosecution. However,
it is possible that a court would find that non-citizen detainees were not entitled to a speedy trial
right prior to their transfer to the United States,299 which may affect a reviewing court’s
consideration of any speedy trial claims.

Ahmed Ghailani, the sole Guantanamo detainee to have been transferred to the United States to
face trial in civilian court, sought dismissal of his indictment based on his claim that the
government violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial due to the five-year delay
between the time he was brought into U.S. custody and his production before the court.300 The
court denied the motion, finding that the time Ghailani spent in CIA detention was justified by the
need to interrogate him for intelligence purposes, a process that was incompatible with
prosecution in federal court.301 The time between Ghailani’s transfer to Guantanamo in 2006 and
his transfer to New York in 2009 was held not to justify postponement of trial, because the need
to prevent the defendant from returning to hostilities was not incompatible with federal
prosecution.302 The aborted military commission prosecution did not justify delay because the
government had complete discretion as to where to prosecute the defendant.303 However, although
the Guantanamo portion of the delay was attributable to the government, it was assessed as a
“neutral factor” because there was no evidence that its purpose had to do with a “quest for tactical
advantage.”304 Because Ghailani was detainable as an “enemy combatant” with or without
prosecution, the need to avoid excessive incarceration was also not a relevant factor under Barker

(...continued)
120 (1966).
297
Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 657 (1992) (holding that the government’s “egregious persistence in failing
to prosecute” the defendant for more than eight years after an initial indictment was “clearly sufficient” to constitute a
violation of the defendant’s speedy trial right, despite a lack of proof that the defendant was specifically harmed by the
delay).
298
Barker, 407 U.S. at 527.
299
See Verdugo-Urquidez v. United States, 494 U.S. 259, at 268, 270-71 (1990) (stating that “not every constitutional
provision applies to governmental activity even where the United States has sovereign power” and that “aliens receive
constitutional protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with the country”), Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (Sixth Amendment right to jury trial
inapplicable to Puerto Rico, an unincorporated U.S. territory).
300
See United States v. Ghailani, 751 F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
301
Id. at 533.
302
Id. at 536. The court pointed out that the defendant had been “no more able to engage in hostilities against the
United States while in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons pending trial on this indictment than he was at Guantanamo
in the custody of the DoD. He could have been brought to this Court in 2006 or any subsequent date to face this 1998
indictment and, at the same time, prevented from engaging in hostilities against this country.” Id.
303
Id. at 537-38. The judge contrasted this factor against situations where delay is justified by ongoing state
investigations and prosecutions.
304
Id. at 541.

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analysis. Because the court was not persuaded that Ghailani was prejudiced by the delay, it held
there was no violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

Statutory and Regulatory Requirements

In addition to these constitutional requirements, statutes and forum rules may impose speedy trial
requirements of their own. The Federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974 delineates specific speedy trial
rules in the context of federal courts.305 As a general rule, the Speedy Trial Act requires that the
government bring an indictment against a person within 30 days of arrest, and that trial
commences within 70 days of indictment.306 However, the act provides several specific
exceptions, under which the determination regarding speed of prosecution becomes nearly as
much a balancing act as under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutional right.
Potentially relevant exceptions to the prosecution of detainees permit a trial judge to grant a so-
called “ends of justice” continuance if he or she determines that the continuance serves “ends of
justice” that outweigh the interests of the public and defendant in a speedy trial, and also permit
the granting of a continuance when the facts at issue are “unusual or complex.”307 Presumably,
many of the same factors that are important in considering constitutional issues relating to a right
to a speedy trial are also relevant when interpreting the statutory requirements of the Speedy Trial
Act.308

In United States v. al-Arian, the United States charged four men with having provided material
support to terrorists, among other charges.309 The primary evidence in the case included more
than 250 taped telephone conversations, which the U.S. government had collected pursuant to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.310 A federal district court granted co-defendants’ motion for
a continuance in the case over the objection of one defendant, al-Arian, who claimed that the
continuance violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.311 The court determined that the
“ends of justice” would be served by granting the continuance because factors such as the
complexity of the case, the “voluminous” discovery involved, and the “novel questions of fact
and law” outweighed the defendant’s interest in a speedy trial.312 In addition, the al-Arian court
found that the defendant had failed to prove that he would suffer any specific prejudice as a result
of the continuance, because the period of the continuance would in any case be consumed with
discovery proceedings.313

305
18 U.S.C. §3161. Congress passed the Speedy Trial Act shortly after the Supreme Court, in Barker v. Wingo,
rejected a specific, judicially imposed time period. 407 U.S. at 523. The Barker court held that such a specific
timeframe would invade the province of the legislature. Id. The Speedy Trial Act is just the primary statute
implementing the constitutional right for defendants in federal courts. If detainees were located in another country’s
jurisdiction, then the government would have to comply with both the Speedy Trial Act and the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers. See 18 U.S.C. Appendix 2, §2, Articles III-VI.
306
18 U.S.C. §3161(b),(c).
307
18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8)(A).
308
18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(8)(B)(ii).
309
267 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1264 (M.D. Fla. 2003).
310
Id. at 1260.
311
Id. at 1267.
312
Id. at 1264.
313
Id. at 1264 n.16.

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Speedy Trials under Military System

There are no statutory or procedural rule requirements governing military commissions
concerning enemy combatant’s right to a speedy trial. While many UCMJ requirements apply to
military commission proceedings, those relating to the right to a speedy trial do not.314 Whatever
rights owed to the accused in this context are only those provided by the Sixth Amendment.

In contrast, statutory requirements and forum rules afford significant speedy trial rights to
individuals subject to courts-martial. Article 10 of the UCMJ requires the government, when a
person is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial, to take immediate steps to inform of the
accusations and to try the case or dismiss the charges and release.315 The R.C.M. implements this
requirement in Rule 707(a) with a requirement that an individual be brought to trial within 120
days of the preferral of charges or the imposition of restraint, whichever date is earliest.316 Rule
707 provides for certain circumstances when time periods of delay are excluded from the 120 day
requirement, as well as allows the military judge or the convening authority to exclude other
periods of time.317

On their face, the statutory and procedural rules concerning speedy trial rights in courts-martial
proceedings may pose a significant obstacle for their usage in prosecuting persons held at
Guantanamo. While enemy combatants may be tried by a general court-martial for war crimes
under the UCMJ,318 statutory and procedural rules governing a defendant’s right to a speedy trial
may be implicated. Arguably, the speedy trial requirement may have started to run when the
enemy combatants were placed in confinement by the United States military.319 And while it is
possible to exclude time from the speedy trial requirement for those periods when the accused
was in the custody of civilian authorities or foreign countries,320 it may be difficult to argue that
the speedy trial period did not start when the U.S. military commenced detention of the person at
Guantanamo. The government is not precluded from preferring charges to a general court-martial

314
10 U.S.C. §948b(d) (other provisions of the UCMJ specifically excluded include those related to compulsory self-
incrimination and the requirement for pretrial investigation). The MCA 2009 retains this provision.
315
10 U.S.C. §810.
316
R.C.M. 707(a) (Preferral occurs when an individual, with personal knowledge of or has investigated the matters set
forth in the charges and specifications, signs the charges and specifications under oath asserting that they are true in
fact to the best of that person’s knowledge and belief. See R.C.M. 307).
317
R.C.M. 707(c) (allowing for the exclusion of time when appellate courts have issued stays in the proceedings, the
accused is absent without authority, the accused is hospitalized due to incompetence, or is otherwise in custody of the
Attorney General).
318
Id. at 201(f)(1)(B).
319
10 U.S.C. §810 (“When any person subject to [the UCMJ] is placed in arrest or confinement prior to trial,
immediate steps shall be taken to inform him of the specific wrong of which he is accused and to try him or to dismiss
the charges and release him.”). However, enemy combatants are subject to the UCMJ as defined in art. 2 only if they
“belong[] to one of the eight categories enumerated in Article 4 of the Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War....” 10 U.S.C. §802(13).
320
See United States v. Cummings, 21 M.J. 987, 988 (N.M.C.M.R. 1986) (after being notified that the accused is
available for the immediate pickup from civilian custody, the government has a reasonable time to arrange for
transportation of the accused before the speedy trial period begins to run), United States v. Reed, 2 M.J. 64, 67 (C.M.A.
1976) (holding “the military is not accountable for periods an accused is retained in civil confinement as a result of
civil offenses irrespective of whether his initial confinement was by civil or military authority”), United States v.
Stubbs, 3 M.J. 630, 636 (N.M.C.M.R. 1977) (confinement by the U.S. military pursuant to a Status of Forces
Agreement, in order to ensure the presence of the accused at a judicial proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction, is not
attributable to the government).

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in this scenario, but the defense has the right to object to the trial on the basis of the speedy trial
requirement.321 Prosecution of detainees before a general court-martial may require modification
of applicable statutes and forum rules relating to a defendant’s right to a speedy trial.

Finally, even if the government complied with time constraints imposed by applicable statutes
and forum rules and did not violate detainees’ constitutional rights to a speedy trial under the
Sixth Amendment, it is possible that a court could hold that the government violated a defendant’s
constitutional right to a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause by “caus[ing]
substantial prejudice to [the detainee’s] right to a fair trial,” typically by intentionally stalling
prosecution in a case.322

Right to Confront Secret Evidence

The Sixth Amendment requires that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”323 However, in the context of
prosecuting persons seized in the armed conflict against Al Qaeda and associated forces, a public
trial could risk disclosure of classified information. In these cases, the government is arguably
placed in a difficult position, forced to choose between waiving prosecution and potentially
causing damage to national security or foreign relations. This dilemma was one factor leading to
the enactment of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),324 which formalized the
procedures to be used by federal courts when faced with the potential disclosure of classified
information during criminal litigation. Courts-martial and military commissions also have
procedures concerning a defendant’s right to confront secret evidence.325 The rules governing the
disclosure of classified information in military commissions were amended by the MCA 2009 to
more closely resemble the practices employed in federal civilian court under CIPA and in general
courts-martial.326

Prosecutions implicating classified information can be factually varied, but an important

distinction that may be made among them is from whom information is being kept. In some
situations, the defendant seeks to introduce classified information of which he is already aware,
typically because he held a position of trust with the U.S. government. The interests of national
security require sequestration of that information from the general public.327 In the case of
ordinary terrorism prosecutions, the more typical situation is likely to be the introduction of
classified information as part of the prosecution’s case against the defendant. In these cases,
preventing disclosure to the defendant, as well as to the public, may be required. Preventing the
accused from having access to evidence to be used against him at trial raises concerns under the
Confrontation Clause of the Constitution. Both CIPA and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure authorize federal courts to issue protective orders preventing disclosure of classified

321
R.C.M. 707(c)(2).
322
Marion, 404 U.S. at 324.
323
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
324
P.L. 96-456, codified at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §1-16. For more information about CIPA, see CRS Report R40603, The
State Secrets Privilege and Other Limits on Litigation Involving Classified Information, by Edward C. Liu
325
MIL. R. EVID. 505, MIL. COMM. R. EVID. 505.
326
10 U.S.C. §§949p-1 – 949p-1.
327
This situation has traditionally been called “graymail” to suggest that the defendant may be seeking to introduce
classified information to force the prosecution to dismiss the charges. See S. REP. NO. 96-823 at 1-4.

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information to various parties, including the defendant, in cases where nondisclosure would not
unduly prejudice the rights of the accused.328 The judge may permit the prosecution to provide an
unclassified summary or substitute statement so long as this procedure provides the defendant
with substantially the same ability to make his defense as disclosure of the classified information
itself would provide. Such a substitute submission might redact, for example, sources and
methods of intelligence gathering so long as enough information is made available to give the
defendant a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence or cast doubt on its authenticity.

Legal issues related to withholding classified information from a defendant are likely to arise
during two distinct phases of criminal litigation. First, issues may arise during the discovery
phase when the defendant requests and is entitled to classified information in the possession of
the prosecution. Secondly, issues may arise during the trial phase, when classified information is
sought to be presented to the trier-of-fact as evidence of the defendant’s guilt. The issues
implicated during both of these phases are discussed below.

Withholding Classified Information During Discovery

The mechanics of discovery in federal criminal litigation are governed primarily by the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. These rules provide the means by which defendants may request
information and evidence in the possession of the prosecution, in many cases prior to trial. There
are two important classes of information that the prosecution must provide, if requested by the
defendant: specifically Brady material and Jencks material.

Brady material, named after the seminal Supreme Court case Brady v. Maryland,329 refers to
information in the prosecution’s possession which is exculpatory, that is, tends to prove the
innocence of the defendant. For example, statements by witnesses that contradict or are
inconsistent with the prosecution’s theory of the case must be provided to the defense, even if the
prosecution does not intend to call those witnesses. Prosecutors are considered to have possession
of information that is in the control of agencies that are “closely aligned with the prosecution,”330
but, whether information held exclusively by elements of the intelligence community could fall
within this category does not appear to have been addressed.331

Jencks material refers to written statements made by a prosecution witness that has testified or
may testify. For example, this would include a report made by a witness called against the
defendant. In the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jencks v. United States,332 the Court noted the high
impeachment value a witness’s prior statements can have, both to show inconsistency or
incompleteness of the in court testimony. Subsequently, this requirement was codified by the
Jencks Act.333

328
18 U.S.C. app. 3 §3; FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1).
329
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process requires prosecution to turn over exculpatory
evidence in its possession).
330
United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1503 (1992).
331
But see United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that, on the facts of this case, the CIA was
closely aligned with special prosecutor for purposes of Brady).
332
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (holding that, in a criminal prosecution, the government may not
withhold documents relied upon by government witnesses, even where disclosure of those documents might damage
national security interests).
333
Codified at 18 U.S.C. §3500. The Jencks Act provides definitions for so-called “Jencks material” and requires
(continued...)

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The operation of Jencks and Brady may differ significantly in the context of classified
information. Under Section 4 of CIPA, which deals with disclosure of discoverable classified
information, the prosecution may request to submit either a redacted version or a substitute of the
classified information in order to prevent harm to national security.334 While the court may reject
the redacted version or substitute as an insufficient proxy for the original, this decision is made ex
parte without defense counsels’ input or knowledge. Classified information that is also Jencks or
Brady material is still subject to CIPA.335

In some cases, the issue may not be the disclosure of a document or statement, but whether to
grant the defendant pre-trial access to government witnesses. In United States v. Moussaoui, one
issue was the ability of the defendant to depose “enemy combatant” witnesses that were, at the
time the deposition was ordered, considered intelligence assets by the United States.336 Under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant may request a deposition in order to preserve
testimony at trial.337 In Moussaoui, the court had determined that a deposition of the witnesses by
the defendant was warranted because the witnesses had information that could have been
exculpatory or could have disqualified the defendant for the death penalty.338 However, the
government refused to produce the deponents, citing national security concerns.339

In light of this refusal, the Fourth Circuit, noting the conflict between the government’s duty to
comply with the court’s discovery orders and the need to protect national security, considered
whether the defendant could be provided with an adequate substitute for the depositions. The
court also noted that substitutes would necessarily be different from depositions, and that these
differences should not automatically render the substitutes inadequate.340 Instead, the appropriate
standard was whether the substitutes put the defendant in substantially the same position he
would have been absent the government’s national security concerns.341 Here, the Fourth Circuit
seemed to indicate that government-produced summaries of the witnesses’ statements, with some
procedural modifications, could be adequate substitutes for depositions.342

Within the courts-martial framework, the use of and potential disclosure of classified information
is addressed in Rule 505 of the Military Rules of Evidence. Rule 505 applies at all stages of

(...continued)
disclosure of such material to the defense, but only after the witness has testified.
334
18 U.S.C. app. 3, §4.
335
See United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that in camera examination and redaction of
purported Brady material by trial court was proper).
336
United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). Moussaoui was prosecuted for his involvement in the
conspiracy to commit the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that CIPA did not apply to question of whether Moussaoui and his standby counsel would be allowed to
depose to enemy combatant witnesses, United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 514-15 (4th Cir. 2003), both the
district court and the Fourth Circuit looked to CIPA for guidance when considering the question, see Moussaoui, supra,
382 F.3d at 471 n. 20 and accompanying text
337
FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a). The court should permit the deposition if there are exceptional circumstances and it is in the
interest of justice.
338
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458, 473-475.
339
Id. at 459.
340
Id. at 477.
341
Id.
342
Id. at 479-483. The precise form of the deposition substitutes is unclear as significant portions of the Fourth
Circuit’s opinion dealing with the substitute were redacted.

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proceedings, including during discovery.343 Under the Rule, the convening authority may (1)
delete specified items of classified information from documents made available to the accused;
(2) substitute a portion or summary of the information; (3) substitute a statement admitting
relevant facts that the classified materials would tend to prove; (4) provide the document subject
to conditions that will guard against the compromise of the information disclosed to the accused;
or (5) withhold disclosure if actions under (1) through (4) cannot be taken without causing
identifiable damage to the national security.344 Prior to arraignment, any party may move for a
pretrial session to consider matters related to classified information that may arise in connection
with the trial.345 The military judge is required, upon request of either party or sua sponte, to hold
a pretrial session in order to address issues related to classified information, as well as any other
matters that may promote a fair and expeditious trial.346

As amended by the MCA 2009, disclosure of classified information during a military commission
is governed by 10 U.S.C. §§949p-1–949p-9. The act provides that “[t]he judicial construction of
the Classified Information Procedures Act … shall be authoritative” in interpreting the statutory
requirements governing the use of classified information in military commission proceedings,
“except to the extent that such construction is inconsistent with the specific requirements” of
these statutory provisions.347 Much like in courts-martial, any party may move for a pretrial
session to consider matters related to classified information that may arise during the military
commission proceeding.348 However, in a departure from the rules governing courts-martial, the
convening authority is replaced by the military judge with respect to the modification or
substitution of classified information. Pursuant to modifications made by the MCA 2009, the
military judge shall, upon request by either party, “hold such conference ex parte to the extent
necessary to protect classified information from disclosure, in accordance with the practice of the
federal courts under the Classified Information Procedures Act.”349 The military judge may not
authorize discovery or access to the classified information unless the judge finds that the
information “would be noncumulative, relevant, and helpful to a legally cognizable defense,
rebuttal of the prosecution’s case, or to sentencing, in accordance with standards generally
applicable to discovery of or access to classified information in federal criminal cases.”350 The
military judge, upon motion of the government’s counsel, has the authority to modify and/or
substitute classified evidence during discovery, and ultimately may dismiss the charges or
specifications if he feels that the fairness of the proceeding will be compromised without
disclosure of the classified evidence.351

The Use of Secret Evidence at Trial

The use of secret evidence at trial also implicates constitutional concerns. As described above,
there may be instances where disclosure of classified information to the defendant would be

343
MIL. R. EVID. 505(d).
344
Id.
345
MIL. R. EVID. 505(e).
346
Id.
347
10 U.S.C. §949p-1(d).
348
10 U.S.C. §949p-2.
349
Id.
350
10 U.S.C. §949p-4.
351
10 U.S.C. §949p-6.

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damaging to the national security. In these instances, the prosecution may seek to present
evidence at trial in a manner that does not result in full disclosure to the defendant. One proposed
scenario (which is not authorized by the MCA) might be the physical exclusion of the defendant
from those portions of the trial, while allowing the defendant’s counsel to remain present.352
However, such proceedings could unconstitutionally infringe upon the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation.353

Historically, defendants have had the right to be present during the presentation of evidence
against them, and to participate in their defense.354 But other courts have approved of procedures
which do not go so far as to require the defendant’s physical presence in the same room as
witnesses to be confronted. For example, the government is in some cases permitted to use
depositions in lieu of live witness testimony where the witness is beyond the subpoena power of
federal courts, as is the case with foreign national witnesses overseas. In United States v. Abu Ali,
the Fourth Circuit permitted video conferences to allow the defendant to observe, and be
observed by, witnesses who were being deposed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.355 The Fourth Circuit
stated that these procedures satisfied the Confrontation Clause if “the denial of ‘face-to-face
confrontation’ [was] ‘necessary to further an important public policy,’” and sufficient procedural
protections were in place to assure the reliability of the testimony.356 Here, the Fourth Circuit
cited the protection of national security as satisfying the “important public policy” requirement,
where the government could not reasonably ensure that a defendant charged with serious
terrorism offenses would remain in its custody if he were permitted to travel abroad. The cited
procedural safeguards were the presence of mutual observation, the fact that testimony was given
under oath in the Saudi criminal justice system, and the ability of defense counsel to cross
examine the witnesses.357

CIPA does not have any provisions which authorize the exclusion of defendants from any portion
of trial, based upon national security considerations. But as noted earlier, CIPA Section 3
authorizes the court to issue protective orders preventing disclosure of classified information to
the defendant by defense counsel, for example, in order to protect intelligence sources and
methods by which evidence to be presented at trial was obtained.

Under CIPA, the admissibility of classified information at trial is determined at a pretrial hearing.
As with the case in discovery, the government may seek to replace classified information with
redacted versions or substitutions. However, in this context, the adequacy of a substitute or
redacted version is determined in an adversarial proceeding in which both prosecutors and

352
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 168 (D.D.C. 2004) (describing potential procedures under military
commissions established by Presidential order).
353
See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 634 (2006) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (stating that “an accused must,
absent disruptive conduct or consent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence against him”).
354
See, e.g., id; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 49 (2004) (“It is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no
man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine”) (internal citations omitted).
355
United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 239-240 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850
(1990)). In this case the defendant, while located in the federal courthouse in Alexandria, Va., was able to communicate
with his counsel in Riyadh via telephone during breaks in the deposition or upon the request of defense counsel.
356
Id. at 241-242 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), in which one-way video testimony procedures were
used in a prosecution for alleged child abuse).
357
Id. See also United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that exclusion of the public and the
defendant from proceedings in which testimony regarding a “hijacker profile” was presented was consistent with the
Confrontation Clause).

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defense counsel have full access to the substitute and may argue whether it provides the
defendant with “substantially the same ability to make his defense” as the underlying classified
information would provide.358

In the courts-martial context, Rule 505 of the Military Rules of Evidence governs the use of
classified information during trial. When classified material is relevant and necessary to an
element of the offense or a legally cognizable defense, the convening authority may obtain the
information for use by the military judge in determining how to proceed with the trial, or may
dismiss the charges against the accused rather than disclose the information in the interest of
protecting the national security.359 If the classified information is provided to the judge, an in
camera proceeding may be ordered allowing for an adversarial proceeding on the admissibility of
the potential evidence.360 Additionally, the military judge has the authority to issue a protective
order to prevent the disclosure of classified evidence that has been disclosed by the government
to the accused.361 In a case where classified information has not been provided to the military
judge, and proceeding with the case without the information would materially prejudice a
substantial right of the accused, the military judge shall dismiss the charges or specifications or
both to which the classified information relates.362

In trials before military commissions, the military judge shall permit, upon motion of the
government, the introduction of otherwise admissible evidence while protecting from disclosure
the sources, methods, or activities by which the United States obtained the evidence.363 An in
camera hearing may be held to determine how classified information is to be handled, from
which the detainee may be excluded in order to maintain the classified nature of the material.364
In this scenario, the detainee will not have access to the information pertaining to the source of
the evidence, but his defense counsel will be able to argue for the release of the information on
behalf of the detainee.365 The detainee will have access to all evidence that will be viewed by the
commission members.366

If constitutional standards required by the Sixth Amendment are applicable to military

commissions, commissions may be open to challenge for affording the accused an insufficient
opportunity to contest evidence. An issue may arise as to whether, where the military judge is
permitted to assess the reliability of evidence based on ex parte communication with the
prosecution, adversarial testing of the reliability of evidence before the panel members meets
constitutional requirements. If the military judge’s determination as to the reliability of ex parte
evidence is conclusive, precluding entirely the opportunity of the accused to contest its reliability,
the use of such evidence may serve as grounds to challenge the verdict.367 On the other hand, if

358
18 U.S.C. app. 3 §6(c)(1). For a discussion of the “substantially the same” standard, see United States v. Collins,
603 F. Supp. 301, 304 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
359
MIL. R. EVID. 505(f).
360
MIL. R. EVID. 505(i).
361
MIL. R. EVID. 505(g).
362
MIL. R. EVID. 505(f).
363
10 U.S.C. §949p-6(c).
364
10 U.S.C. §949p-6(a)(3).
365
Id.
366
10 U.S.C. §949p-1(b).
367
Cf. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (evidence concerning the manner in which a confession was obtained
should have been admitted as relevant to its reliability and credibility, despite court’s determination that the confession
(continued...)

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evidence resulting from classified intelligence sources and methods contains “‘particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness’ such that adversarial testing would be expected to add little, if
anything, to [its] reliability,” it may be admissible and survive challenge.368

Conclusion
Since its inception, the policy of detaining suspected belligerents at Guantanamo has been the
subject of controversy. In particular, there has been significant international and domestic
criticism of the treatment of detainees held there, as well as detainees’ limited access to federal
courts to challenge aspects of their detention. Defenders of the policy argue that Guantanamo
offers a safe and secure location away from the battlefield where suspected belligerents can be
detained and prosecuted for war crimes when appropriate. They contend that enemy belligerents
should not receive the same access to federal courts as civilians within the United States. To a
degree, these conflicting viewpoints are reflected in the divergent actions taken by the executive
and legislative branches. While the Obama Administration has made efforts to close the facility,
and has stated its interest in bringing at least some persons held at Guantanamo into the United
States for continued detention or prosecution, its efforts to close the facility have been impeded,
in part, by congressional enactments that have effectively prevented the executive from
transferring any Guantanamo detainee into the United States. It remains to be seen whether
Congress and the Administration will reassess their respective positions in the foreseeable future.

In any event, the closure of the Guantanamo detention facility may raise complex legal issues,
particularly if detainees are transferred to the United States. The nature and scope of
constitutional protections owed to detainees within the United States may be different from the
protections owed to those held elsewhere. The transfer of detainees into the country may also
have immigration consequences.

Criminal charges could also be brought against detainees in one of several forums—that is,
federal trial courts, the courts-martial system, or military commissions. The procedural
protections afforded to the accused in each of these forums may differ, along with the types of
offenses for which persons may be charged. This may affect the ability of U.S. authorities to
pursue criminal charges against some detainees. Whether the military commissions established to
try detainees for war crimes fulfill constitutional requirements concerning a defendant’s right to a
fair trial is likely to become a matter of debate, if not litigation. There is considerable
prosecutorial discretion within the executive branch regarding which forum to utilize, but
legislative enactments may potentially limit the exercise of such discretion, including by
requiring detainees to be charged in a particular forum.

The issues raised by the proposed closure of the Guantanamo detention facility have broad
implications. Executive policies, legislative enactments, and judicial rulings concerning the rights

(...continued)
was voluntary and need not be suppressed).
368
Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (admissibility of hearsay evidence), but cf. Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (“Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of
confrontation.... [The Confrontation Clause] commands ... that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing
in the crucible of cross-examination.”).

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and privileges owed to enemy belligerents may have long-term consequences for U.S. detention
policy, both in the conflict with Al Qaeda and the Taliban and in future armed conflicts.

Author Contact Information

Michael John Garcia R. Chuck Mason

Legislative Attorney Legislative Attorney
mgarcia@crs.loc.gov, 7-3873 rcmason@crs.loc.gov, 7-9294
Jennifer K. Elsea Edward C. Liu
Legislative Attorney Legislative Attorney
jelsea@crs.loc.gov, 7-5466 eliu@crs.loc.gov, 7-9166

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