Medieval Thought

The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the

Thirteenth Century
 NEW STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY
General Editor: Maurice Keen

Published

J. K. Hyde, Sociery and Politics in Medieval Italy:

The Evolution of the Civil Life, 1000-1350

Angus MacKay, Spain in the Middle Ages:

From Frontier to Empire, 1000-1500

Eric Christiansen, The Northern Crusades:

The Baltic and the Catholic Frontier 1100-1525

Edward James, The Origins of France:

From Clovis to the Capetians, 500-1000

Chris Wickham, Early Medieval Italy:

Central Power and Local Sociery 400-1000

Roger Collins, Early Medieval Spain:

Uniry in Diversiry, 400-1000

Michael Haren, Medieval Thought:

The Western Intellectual Tradition
from Antiquiry to the Thirteenth Century

Other volumes are in preparation

Medieval Thought
The Western Intellectual Tradition from
Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century

MICHAEL HAREN

New Studies in Medieval History

MAURICE KEEN

M
MACMILLAN
 © Michael Haren 1985
All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission
of this publication may be made without written permission.
No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied
or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance
with the provisions ofthe Copyright Act 1956 (as amended).
Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to
this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and
civil claims for damages.

First published 1985

Published by
Higher and Further Education Division
MACMILLAN PUBLISHERS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG2l 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world

Typeset by
Wessex Typesetters Ltd
Frome, Somerset

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Haren, Michael J.
Medieval thought.-(New studies in medieval history)
I. Philosophy, Medieval
I. Title
189 B721
ISBN 978-0-333-29464-2 ISBN 978-1-349-17856-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-17856-8
To Leslie Macfa rlane
Contents

List if Plates/Acknowledgements Vlll

Priface lX
Abbreviations X
INTRODUCTION

1. MASTERS OF THOSE WHO KNOW- PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND

THE NEOPLATONISTS 7
2. FROM ANCIENT WoRLD TO MmDLE AGEs: ADAPTATION AND
TRANSMISSION 37
St Augustine: a Philosophy of the Christian in Society 38
Boethius: Executor of Antiquity 59
John Scotus Eriugena: a Cosmic Analysis 72
3. THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES- Lome, THEOLOGY AND
CosMOLOGY 83
4. NEw SouRcEs AND NEw INSTITUTIONS 117
Arabic Thought 118
Western Translations 132
New Institutions- the Rise of the Universities 137
5. ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY- THE FIRST
PHASE OF AssiMILATION 145
6. ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY-
SYSTEM BUILDING AND CoNTROVERSY 161
EPILOGUE 207
Notes 213
Bibliographies 237
Index 261

Vll
List of Plates
1. Genesis initial, showing the creation (thirteenth century)
2. Socrates and Plato (thirteenth century)
3. Fortune's Wheel (fourteenth century)
4. Monk writing (twelfth century)
5. Monastic school, probably representing that of St Victor (thir-
teenth century)
6. A scholar's hand of the thirteenth century- considered to be that
ofThomas Aquinas

Acknowledgements
The cover illustration (Ms.Auct. F. 6. 5, fol. r), Plate 2 (Ms. Ashmole
304, fol. 3lv) and Plate 5 (Ms. Laud Misc. 409, fol. 3v) are reproduced
by permission of the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Plate I (Ms. Burney
3, fol. 5v) is reproduced by permission of the British Library. Plate 3
(Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, Ms. 66, page 66) is reproduced
by permission of the Master and Fellows of Corpus Christi College,
Cambridge and the Conway Library, Courtauld Institute of Art. Plate
4 (CUL, Ms. li.4.26, fol. 63v) is reproduced by permission of the
Syndics of Cambridge University Library. The author and publisher
are grateful to Aberdeen University Photographic Department for
supplying the print for Plate 6, taken from F. Steffens, Lateinische
Paliiographie (Trier, 1909), Plate 95.

viii
Preface

IT is agreeable to recall the help which I have received and the debts
which I have incurred while engaged on this book. The late Denis
Bethell was responsible for suggesting it to me and he encouraged my
earliest progress in it. I am deeply conscious of the stimulus which he
afforded. Maurice Keen, as general editor, has helped me greatly by
his judicious comments and suggestions and his characteristic
courtesy has added much to the pleasure of writing. Leslie Macfar-
lane read a large part of the work in draft and Michael Richter the
whole. From both I derived valuable insights. I also profited from a
reading of the first chapter by William Charlton and from discussing
my ideas at a formative stage with jeremy Gatto. To all I am grateful.
I hope they will feel that some of the seed of their good advice bore
fruit. For such as fell on stony ground I apologise.
My wife, Elspeth, has been a constant counsel and critic, whose
lively interest in the classical period and clear judgements helped me
over many difficulties of formulation and expression. My sister-in-
law, Anne, took from me a large part of the burden of making a clean
typescript. I am grateful to the publishers for patiently awaiting
completion and for their assistance throughout.
One debt is old and of peculiar status. It is that which I owe for my
interest in medieval thought. I acknowledge it in the dedication.

Dublin MICHAEL HAREN

June 1984

IX
Abbreviations

AHDLMA Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen

Age
BGPMA Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie [und
Theologie] des Mittelalters
Chart. Univ. Par. Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis
CHLGEMP The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early
Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cam-
bridge, 1970)
CSEL Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum
PL Patrologia Latina, ed.J. P. Migne

X
Introduction

Tms book in some respects defies its title. Important areas of the
intellectual composition of the middle ages have been consciously
omitted. Broadly speaking, theology is not considered, to the extent at
least that it derived from scripture rather than from philosophical
reflection, though exceptions have been admitted where necessary in
order to illuminate particular aspects of a thinker's method. Nor do I
deal with literature as such, music, art, architecture or law, except for
passing references - as, for instance, to their place within the
programme of study or to how, in the case oflaw, it was affected by
evolving techniques of criticism. The emphasis is on speculative
thought, not however considered in the abstract but as manifesting
the continuing vitality of an aspect of classical culture in the medieval
world.
Medieval thought stemmed from the confluence of the speculative
legacy of antiquity with a powerful new religious orientation and
changed structures of society. Once again in the history of culture
'captive Greece' demonstrated its power to take captive. In the course
of doing so its ideas too were changed and given new application. The
process was not without its turbulent episodes and these are a part of
the theme. But the result was an outlook and a critical approach of
immense depth and sophistication. The systems of thought thus
generated were the products of the greatest minds of western Europe
within the period surveyed: Augustine, Scotus Eriugena, Anselm,
Abelard, Aquinas, Bonaventure, to name only the most outstanding.
A study of their methods and conclusions is indispensable for an
understanding of medieval civilisation and of the subsequent intellec-
tual history of Europe.
Of the several foundations and components of medieval thought,
the review pays most attention to the classical legacy. This is because
it is an aspect with which students in the English-speaking world are
progressively less acquainted. Little is said within by way of
introducing specifically Christian concepts, though the more techni-
cal points are explained as the need arises. However, the same degree
of familiarity with the Christian background as heretofore can no
longer be assumed and some preliminary remarks seem called for.
Christianity began as a messianic movement within] udaism. Soon
2 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

after the death ofJesus its message was carried into the Gentile world
chiefly through the mission of Paul. Paul's letters or 'Epistles' are its
earliest writings. The principal source for Jesus' life and teaching are
the four Gospels, compiled on the basis of earlier material and
traditions between c. AD 70, the probable date of the first, that of
Mark, and c. 110, the probable date of the last, that of John. Paul's
letters were written before Christianity began to be persecuted by the
Roman authorities. This and the fact that Paul himself, though aJew,
was a Roman citizen, explains his positive attitude towards temporal
power, which he regarded as having divine sanction. As will be seen,
this aspect of his teaching had an important influence. A quite
different view was taken by the Book of Revelation, written probably in
the reign of the emperor Domitian (81-96). This saw Rome as one of
the great enemies of Christianity and prophesied the imminent
overthrow of the empire and the ushering in of Christ's kingdom.
Apart from its own scriptures (the New Testament), Christianity
accepted the canonical books ofjudaism (the Old Testament), seeing
itself as the fulfilment of prophecies which they contained.
In its initial phase Christianity owed nothing to speculative
philosophy and shows little evidence of contact with it. An exception
to this may be the prologue to the Fourth Gospel (the Gospel ofjohn),
which presents Christ as the eternal Logos, a term current in
contemporary thought. There are possibly echoes of Stoicism in Paul
but he was generally dismissive of worldly wisdom. His letters are not
philosophical in inspiration; they are rather an urgent statement of
the divine purpose in history. As Christianity met the classical
systems, points of special sensitivity and even of incompatibility were
identified between the Christian and pagan perspectives. One such
was the doctrine of the creation of the world, described in the Old
Testament Book of Genesis as a deliberate act of God and as
accomplished over a period of six days. Moreover, Christianity saw
the world as subject to providential care and God as intervening in it.
On these points it was at odds with the Aristotelian and Neoplatonist
analyses. Another sensitive matter, debated between Christianity
and Neoplatonism, was the Christian doctrine that the bodies of the
dead would be resurrected at Christ's second coming. The way in
which this would take place was subject to varying interpretations
within Christianity itself but it was particularly problematical for
those Neoplatonists who saw flesh and spirit as radically foreign to
each other. When Neoplatonist apologetic ceased, this debate lost its
 INTRODUCTION 3
topicality but aspects of the resurrection of the body featured as a
minor issue in the reception of Aristotle's philosophical works during
the thirteenth century.
Close contact between Christianity and classical philosophy is
evident from about the middle of the second century. Jus tin Martyr
(d. 162-8), a Greek Samarian who had studied philosophy at
Ephesus before converting to Christianity, was open in his apprecia-
tion of all wisdom and had an especially high regard for Plato, despite
errors which he considered him to have made. His attitude was both
representative of and influential on a strand of contemporary
Christianity, mainly though not exclusively in the east. A similar
outlook is found in Clement of Alexandria (d. c. 215), who valued
logic in particular as a tool of the theologian and philosophy as a
preparation for theology. The same acceptance of logic and philo-
sophy but with a marked loftiness of tone appears in Clement's
younger contemporary at Alexandria, Origen (184--c. 254). He had
studied philosophy perhaps under the same teacher as Plotinus, the
Neoplatonist. With appropriate emendations from a Christian pers-
pective, Origen took large elements of philosophy, especially of
Stoicism and Platonism, as a matter of course, and relied on it to
answer the attacks of pagan philosophical apologetic. His account of
the soul corresponds to aspects of contemporary Platonism, particu-
larly the idea that souls inhabit bodies as a result of a Fall and are
destined to recover their true state upon their achieving release from
material attachment. Origen held that no part of creation was to be
considered permanently alienated from its source and that all rational
creatures could eventually, through purgation, return to their
Creator, though they might be subject to recurring Falls. His doctrine
that even the devil could be saved was condemned at Alexandria and
he withdrew to Palestine where he spent about the last twenty years of
his life. Despite the distrust in which he was held by many, his
influence in the east was great. In the next century, it affected the
Cappadocian Fathers - St Basil of Caesarea (c. 330--79), Basil's
friend, St Gregory Nazianzen (c. 329--c. 390), and above all, Basil's
brother, St Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394), all ofwhom and particularly
Gregory of Nyssa were also heavily and directly indebted to
Neoplatonism.
The continuous subject of the present study begins in Chapter 2
with the thought ofSt Augustine, the greatest of the Latin Fathers and
the major theological authority of western Christendom during the
4 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

middle ages. Chapter 1 is an introductory survey of the Greek systems

whose impact on Christian thinkers is the main theme of the book.
There are distinct advantages in approaching medieval thought by
way of a preliminary review of the classical background. First, it is a
convenient introduction to terminology and preoccupations which
will become current in the middle ages and is an economical point of
reference when classical ideas are explored by later writers. Similarly,
it is a point of reference by which to measure modifications and
elaborations of the original ideas. Secondly, it provides a criterion by
which to estimate the progress of the movement by which the middle
ages gradually recovered large parts of the ancient heritage. In
particular, it gives substance to the distinction between the logical
and the philosophical phases of Aristotelianism from the eleventh to
the thirteenth century. This distinction is an important feature of a
history of medieval thought. From being first known to the middle
ages in his own right as a logician, Aristotle became in the course of a
century offervid activity between 1150 and 1250 a challenging and
provocative expounder of the natural order. The broad shape of the
book is thus that it begins with an account of a body of ideas and ends
at a point where they have been reabsorbed into the western Latin
tradition.
The term tradition itself is an aspect of the book's title which
requires some definition, since it might give a misleading impression
ofhomogeneity. In fact, there are several traditions or, better, several
strands within the tradition. First, there is the Platonist strand. This
was transmitted to the west principally in the works of Augustine and
in the theological tractates and the Consolation if Philosophy by
Boethius but was augmented by the pseudo-Dionysius and the other
translations and independent work ofjohn Scotus Eriugena. It is the
dominant feature of Chapter 2. Then there is the Aristotelian strand,
at first, as has ,been indicated, an education in method- the principal
theme of Chapter 3- and then in the substance of scientific thought.
Between the reception of the Aristotelian logical and philosophical
systems there has to be considered another strand in which too
various perspectives were comprised. This is the Arabic philosophical
tradition, the subject of the first part of Chapter 4. It was based on the
Greek authorities but contained its own interpretations and insights,
some of which were to be congenial, others devastatingly unsettling to
the Christian world. The rest of Chapter 4 describes how the Latins'
corpus of philosophical texts was expanded by the translation
 INTRODUCTION 5
movements of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and how at
approximately the same time, but independently, new educational
structures were being evolved in the rise of the universities. Chapter 5
considers the early period of the reception of Aristotle's philosophy in
the west, c. 1210-50, a time when its implications and the implica-
tions of some of the Arabic elaborations of it were only partly
understood. Chapter 6 considers an even shorter period, c. 1250-77,
one of intense activity. This is the period of Bonaventure, Albert and
Thomas Aquinas, whose approaches and contributions are examined
in turn. It is also a period during which Aristotle was being studied in
the major arts faculty of Europe, in a formal, exegetical fashion,
divorced from the wider theological considerations with which it was
soon to be confronted. This confrontation with radical teaching in the
arts faculty at Paris was a dramatic manifestation of the intellectual
tensions felt at the time. However, the underlying problems were not
confined to the arts faculty. They were problems attendant on the
meeting of diverse perspectives. The intellectual crisis of the thir-
teenth century derived from the fact that Aristotle was both an
authority who could not be long ignored and an authority who in
major respects sat most uneasily within a Christian outlook, espe-
cially since that outlook had been deeply influenced at an early stage
by an approach which Aristotle's surviving works were in part aimed
to demolish.
This outline has perhaps already signalled two aspects of my
treatment for which a final word of explanation is required. In the first
place, my approach is more thematic than chronological, though I
have tried to present my themes firmly within a chronological
framework. Inevitably, however, there is some chronological overlap
between my chapters. In the second place, the reader will notice a
marked imbalance towards the later period, with between a quarter
and a third of the book devoted to the thirteenth century. This seems
to me a just reflection of the greatly heightened level of activity at that
time.
This is a book for historians seeking an introduction to a subject
whose technical aspects can be initially forbidding. It is a description
of a tradition - the transmission of ideas and their interpretation.
There is no attempt to evaluate the ideas themselves by modern
critical standards. Attention is paid throughout to the stages in the
evolution of the tradition, the sources on which it depended, the
discrepancy which existed from time to time between the availability
6 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

of texts and their actual circulation and use, the institutions which
fostered intellectual developments and the general historical back-
ground. I have not tried to be encyclopaedic in my approach. In so
rich and complex a subject selection was necessary. The criterion
adopted was that the treatment should serve as a foundation for direct
reading of the texts of the major thinkers within the period surveyed
and as a starting point for study of later developments. I have
assumed that a majority of my readers are unlikely to know classical
languages. I have therefore always quoted in translation in the text,
from the most accessible satisfactory version where such existed. I
have however given sufficient reference to permit the reader to consult
the original or to find the passage in another translation. Where there
was no satisfactory or readily accessible translation I have made my
own. I have also normally used translated titles, while giving the
standard titles as necessary to provide a recognised frame of
reference. In some cases, where either the translated title was more
cumbersome or the original sufficiently familiar, I have used the
latter, while providing a translation on the first occurrence at least.
1. Masters of Those Who Know- Plato,
Aristotle and the N eoplatonists

'MASTER of those who know' was Dante's tribute to Aristotle whom in

the Divine Comedy he saw accorded a place of honour in the highest
state to which the unbaptised could aspire. 1 It was a proper
recognition of Aristotle's pre-eminent influence on the intellectual life
of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. But Plato was to
be found in the next room 2 and had Dante been fully aware of his
contribution to the medieval heritage he would doubtless have
allowed of their closer association. With the benefit of a historian's
perspective, he might have extended the title not only to Aristotle's
own master but to their common disciples, the Neoplatonists, who
were the principal channel ofPlatonism to the middle ages and who so
profoundly influenced the formulation of Christian ideas in the
patristic age. In a history of medieval thought the dominating
contribution of these giants among ancient philosophers is a more
obvious feature than the primacy of any one. They are conveniently
treated together, for despite the differences between their systems
they are linked in a direct line of intellectual descent.
In a book of this kind a survey of Greek speculation is inevitably
ancillary to the main theme. The object is to review those aspects of
the classical background which are indispensable to an understand-
ing of later developments. This dictates the emphases of the present
chapter. Stoicism and Epicureanism, so important in their own right,
are mentioned only incidentally, though there will later be occasion to
notice certain contributions of Stoicism. With the exception of part of
the Timaeus and later ofthe Meno andPhaedo, Plato's dialogues were not
directly known in the medieval west. In particular, a whole dimension
of his thought, on political and social organisation, was forgotten
since this was an area ignored by Neoplatonism. It is therefore
omitted here. All that is aimed at is an indication within the space
available of the metaphysical problems which he posed and the
nature of the solution which he offered. Aristotle's is a different case.
His logical works were early translated and by the later middle ages
his system was known in its full range. A summary of his thought is
insufficient. The student must familiarise himself with at least the
principal texts through which it was expounded. An attempt is

7
8 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

therefore made to introduce them in the course of the discussion.

Similar considerations of utility affect the presentation ofNeoplaton-
ist doctrine.

Plato: the Background to his Thought

Plato's predecessors have only a remote significance for medieval

thought, through the direction which they gave to philosophical
inquiry. Their influence on Plato himself was profound. It may be
briefly stated under three main heads. From the school of Pythagoras
(fl. 530 Be) he derived the doctrine of the permanence of the soul,
which the Pythagoreans had expressed in terms of transmigration.
His idea that order in the universe could be reduced to mathematical
formulae was possibly also borrowed, with modifications, from them.
The theory underlies his description of the composition of bodies, in
the Timaeus, and another application of it will be noted later. His
second principal debt was to earlier speculations on the nature of
reality. These had been dominated by the problem of interpreting
change. Heraclitus (fl. 500 Be) had taught that change was the
natural condition of reality and had emphasised the relativity of
things as we experience them. But he had also held that the
divergences were aspects of the same reality and that accordingly
reality was one. His thought can therefore be seen as aiming at a
resolution of the antithesis between the Many - the plurality of the
world as experienced- and the One, the point at which differences are
ignored in favour of a judgement of similarity or cohesion. This was
certainly a feature of the thought of Parmenides (fl. 475 Be), the
founder of the Eleatic school, called after his birthplace. He had
begun, however, with the opposite emphasis. To notice change and
plurality was to be deceived by appearances; reality as perceived by
reason was one- constant Being. Such a monolithic concept of Being
forbade change. If a thing did not exist (was not already Being) it
could not change and if it did exist it was Being before and after
'change'. One's impression of change, derived from sense experience,
must therefore be corrected by an intellectual judgement which
dismissed it. The solution was more logical than satisfying. However,
its central tenet, that behind the facade of impermanence lay a
continuity, was capable of more sophisticated development- either in
the direction of materialism or of idealism. The former was the path
chosen by the early atomists who saw reality as composed of
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 9
indestructible particles. The latter was the direction taken by Plato's
thought. It implied a narrow interpretation of reality, its identifica-
tion with the universal truths discerned by the mind.
The third major influence upon Plato was an emerging philosophy
of man, above all as elaborated by Socrates (c. 4 70--399 BC). Although
the earliest phases of Greek thought had been biased towards
cosmology - analysis of the structure of the world - there was a
natural overflow from this to ethics. An understanding of the physical
universe had implications for man's concept of his own role within it
and a close association between the two studies long continued as a
feature of classical thought, notably in the Stoic and Epicurean
systems and in Neoplatonism. Socrates seems to have inherited both
interests but he abandoned cosmology early to concentrate on man
himself. In this he resembled his contemporaries, the Sophists. Where
he differed from the latter, at least as they are represented in the
Socratic tradition, was in his retention of the spirit of abstract inquiry.
They meanwhile gained a reputation for being concerned more with
practical pursuits, such as rhetoric, than with raising the level of
human consciousness. Socrates devoted his life to this aim. Not only
that but his stubborn acquiescence in his own execution was intended
as an example of right conduct- the observance in accordance with
the civic laws of an unjust judgement on the charge that he was an
atheist and corruptor of youth.
In the case of Socrates the connection between speculation and
ethics derived from his identification of virtue with knowledge of the
Good, knowledge being understood in this context as conviction
rather than simple recognition offact. On the supposition that all men
act in pursuit of an object which they consider beneficial, the fact that
they do evil may be attributed to their imperfect understanding of
what they seek to obtain. From this stemmed the disciplined search
which Socrates conducted for the Good through criticism of the
various interpretations which may be offered of it.

Plato: Knowledge and Being

The figure of Socrates dominates Plato's writings but it is generally

agreed that the latter's doctrines, at least in their advanced form, are
his own construction even when attributed to Socrates as a character
in the dialogues. Plato gave a much wider dimension to the search for
standards, extending it beyond morality to the whole of knowledge. It
10 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

was in the course of doing so that he tacitly developed a theory of

knowledge (or 'epistemology') and a theory of being (or 'ontology').
These are the central features of his thought, encapsulating vital
philosophical questions which were to preoccupy all later thinkers.
The conclusion ofParmenides that there was no change superseded
the information conveyed by sense experience while even that of
Heraclitus, that there was more to reality than change, implied that
the senses were an inadequate guide to knowledge. Plato's thought
was deeply affected by this tendency to divorce the sensual and the
intellectual. It was also deeply affected by the first proposition in
Heraclitus' analysis, that the physical world was one of constant flux,
a state of becoming rather than of being. His own solution was to
accept the fact of change in the world experienced by the senses but to
deny that the latter was a proper object of knowledge or that its
entities were fully real. This refusal to ascribe reality to the individual
objects of experience was not a reflection of scepticism about their
actual existence; they were real enough as stimulants to the senses. It
was an intellectual judgement on their character. Being subject to
change they were always in transit from one mode of existence to
another and this was true even of things which were comparatively
stable. Therefore they did not lend themselves to definition in that
they could not be said to be completely one thing rather than another.
The problem was particularly acute in the case of evaluations based
upon experience. These were always relative, for what appeared
beautiful, good, true or just in one context might appear to
disadvantage in different circumstances or upon comparison. In any
case, the search for definitions could not be satisfied by the discovery
of particular instances of beauty, goodness, truth or justice- however
true to type they might be considered in the light of such a definition-
for they did not, like the latter, state a general law. Plato's argument
was that knowledge in its full sense must be of something constant and
that it must be certain and of general application. Knowledge of this
kind was an understanding of principles or, as they are usually
referred to in accounts ofPiato's theory, of'Forms'. 3 When Diogenes
the Cynic attempted to ridicule the notion of 'Forms' by protesting
that he could see the cup but not 'cupness', Plato attributed this to his
having eyes but no intellect. 4 So far as concerned the values to which
Socrates' inquiries had been directed, knowledge consisted of being
able to state what constituted justice and so on. In regard to material
objects it consisted equally in being able to state what their essential
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS ll
feature was -what aspect of their reality caused the mind to classify
them as one type of being rather than another.
The Forms are being at its most intelligible level. What is their
exact status? It is quite basic to Plato's position that they are
principles which are discovered rather than invented by the knowing
mind. They are objective principles. In what sense are they said to be
so? At this point Plato's theory becomes notoriously difficult to
interpret. He speaks of the Forms as having an existence independent
of the world of sense experience in which they are represented. There
is an obvious sense in which principles or standards are prior to the
objects of experience, for the former are the criteria by which the latter
are classified and judged. But Plato's account envisages a still more
transcendent status for these principles. Firstly, it is asserted that the
human soul (in this sense, mind) is peculiarly equipped to discover
them because it has known them in an earlier, disembodied,
existence. The doctrine of the soul's pre-existence and of its recollec-
tion of the Forms is an aspect of the religious element in Plato's
thought (Socrates in the Meno attributes it to men wise in religious
matters and to inspired poets 5 ) and is probably due to Pythagorean
influence. Secondly, Plato's cosmology is founded upon the transcen-
dence of the Forms. The dialogue in which this is chiefly expounded is
the Timaeus. It too contains religious presuppositions and it is
noteworthy that its eponymous disputant is a Pythagorean. Its
central theme is a creation myth in which the Craftsman or Father of
the visible world with his mind on the patterns of the Forms moulds
the chaotic elementary material of the universe. It is debatable how
far Plato intended either his account of Recollection (anamnesis) or of
the Craftsman to be taken literally. At the very least however both are
graphic representations of the doctrine that standards are absolute
and are outside of the process of change and becoming. The myth of
the Craftsman is more. It is a statement that the world is the product
of intelligent and consequently of intelligible design and the best
embodiment which can be achieved of eternal principles. These were
Plato's characteristic contributions to the history of thought and the
power and fascination of his interpretation of reality ensured its
survival in the face of the sharp challenge which it was offered almost
as soon as it had been formulated.
Plato's search for a rational account of reality did not end with the
discovery of the Forms. He became concerned with the relation of the
Forms to one another and the need to posit a principle which would
12 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

represent a common bond between them. Such a principle he refers to

variously as the Good or Absolute Beauty though it is more readily
recognisable as Being. From accounts of what Plato taught in lectures
it appears that his later thought was devoted to showing that the
Forms were in fact mathematical principles. This became the
mechanism for imparting to them the unity which he had been
seeking. In this construction, all order resulted from the interaction
between two ultimate terms, the One- an ideal number- seen as the
principle of order and specification, and the Dyad or Indefinite
Duality, the principle by which the One is multiplied and frag-
mented. This rather esoteric line of thought continued after Plato's
death and in Neoplatonism 'the One' finally replaces terms such as
'the Good' or 'Absolute Beauty' as an expression of ultimate cohesion.

Aristotle: Life and Works

A notable feature of Plato's actiVIty as a philosopher is that he

established an institution devoted to intellectual inquiry. This was
the Academy, founded at Athens in 388 BC, whose name is used by
historians to refer to various phases of Platonist thought. Plato's most
famous pupil, Aristotle (384/3-322/1 Bc), 6 was a member of the
Academy from the age of about seventeen until shortly after Plato's
death. He subsequently spent about five years in Asia Minor and the
Aegean conducting those observations into biology - particularly
marine biology- which were to leave such a heavy imprint upon his
philosophy; later he acted for a few years as tutor to the son of Philip of
Macedon, the future Alexander the Great. In about 335 BC he
returned to Athens and founded there his own institute of study, the
Lyceum, in competition with the Academy. 7
Whereas the surviving corpus of Plato's works are those composed
for publication, his lectures being known only in small part and
indirectly, the opposite is the case with Aristotle. Except for
fragments, what survive are in effect his lectures at the Lyceum,
organised as we know them not by himself but in the edition of
Andronicus of Rhodes, head of the Lyceum c. 60-50 BC, by which
they first became widely known. While his published works were
Platonic in form and content, being mostly products of his period at
the Academy and soon after, the extant treatises represent his
independent thought, much of it elaborated in friendly reaction
against the theories of his master. At best they are notoriously
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 13
pedagogical in style and are often so compressed as to be difficult to
follow. Although they are by a highly systematic thinker, they are not
of a piece but reflect the development of Aristotle's mind over several
decades. This point, which is of great importance for a critical
reading, was established by modern scholarship8 and was not
appreciated by earlier interpreters.
The most important of Aristotle's writings intrinsically and in
terms of their influence on medieval thought may be listed under four
headings: (i) the logical works; (ii) the works on the structure of the
universe. Among these chief place must be accorded to theP/rysics and
to the series of treatises grouped under the title, Metaphysics, a term
which was probably not originally intended to describe their content
but merely to indicate their position 'after the Physics' in the corpus of
his works; (iii) treatises on psychology, most important of which is the
great work, De Anima ('On the Soul'); (iv) the social treatises, most
important of which are the Nicomachean Ethics and the Politics.

Aristotle: Logic

The logical treatises of Aristotle have been known collectively since

the sixth century AD as the Organon or 'Instrument'. The term was
originally given currency by Neoplatonist philosophers of the third
century AD as a description simply of the discipline oflogic. Its later,
restricted, use is a compliment to Aristotle's outstanding contribution
in the field. Both in its own right and as a title for the Aristotelian
corpus it neatly implies the propaedeutic function oflogic, its role as
an ancillary subject for the philosopher. This is wholly in keeping
with Aristotle's own view. He distinguished three types of knowledge
or 'science', theoretical, practical and productive. The first is defined
as encompassing mathematics, physics and metaphysics, the second
is concerned with human conduct and the third with manufacture of
the useful or beautiful. Logic is not for him a branch ofknowledge but
a constituent of it and a necessary preparation for its acquisition. It is
subordinate to the philosopher's purpose, as conceived by Aristotle,
which is the attainment of truth. Yet it is intimately connected with
his search. In his approach to logic Aristotle is therefore a metaphysi-
cian as well as a logician. Not only are the two aspects of his system
congruent but much ofhis logic has an ontological import. On the one
hand, it is not a treatment of reality; on the other, it is not, considered
as a whole, an analysis of thought patterns as self-contained. It is an
14 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

examination of thought about reality and of thought as a reflection of

reality, reality itself being the subject of his 'scientific' treatises. For
that reason, in an abstract presentation of Aristotle, there is much to
be said for dealing with his logic last. In a survey of medieval thought,
however, it is the first aspect ofhis system to demand attention since it
was, for long, all that educated men in western Europe knew of his
work at first hand.
The Organon consists of six treatises. The first of these, the
Categories, is devoted to the meanings of words considered in isolation
from the propositions where they are combined. Although elsewhere
there are minor differences in Aristotle's listing of them, here the
'categories' or ways in which we think about things are given as ten:
substance; quantity (e.g. length); quality (e.g. colour); relation (that
is, as expressed by relative terms or terms of comparison); location;
time; posture; state (e.g. 'shod', 'armed'); activity; passivity. Of these
terms, 'substance' is the most complex and the most important for
understanding Aristotle's thought. In its primary sense, substance is
an individual thing. The other categories are predicates of substance
and substance is regarded as being distinct from the amalgamation of
predicates. In this primary sense, substance is not itself a predicate.
However, the Categories admits of the term's extension in a secondary
sense to include the universal concepts of species and genus into
which substances in the primary sense are classified. In doing so it
reveals the continuing influence ofPlato's realism. By allowing for the
secondary sense of substance it is affirming that these universal
concepts are not simply products of the mind's activity but have an
extra-mental status or justification.
While the Categories considers how individual words describe
reality, the De Interpretatione ('On Interpretation') is an examination
of words combined as propositions. It is in their combination only
that words are capable of conveying truth or falsehood. In its analysis
of the grammatical form of propositions and particularly in its
identification of the range of meanings conveyed by universal and
particular, affirmative and negative statements, the De lnterpretatione
lays the foundation for a study of the syllogism. This is the subject of
the third treatise of the Organon, the Prior Ana()' tics.
The syllogism was Aristotle's great contribution to formal logic. It
is an argument consisting of two premisses, called the major and the
minor, and a conclusion. The major premiss is so called because it
contains the term known as major- that which is predicated in the
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 15
conclusion- the minor premiss contains the minor term- that which
is the subject of the conclusion. The premisses share a term, called the
middle term, the varying functions of which determine the 'figure' of
the syllogism. Aristotle distinguished three figures: the first has the
middle term as the subject in one premiss and the predicate in the
other; the second has the middle term as predicate in both premisses;
the third has the middle term as subject in both premisses. Of these
figures, the first is the most important as Aristotle goes on to show that
the others can be reduced to it. An example of a syllogism of the first
figure would be:

All men are rational.

All philosophers are men.
Therefore: all philosophers are rational.

The principles discovered by Aristotle's analysis were taken over and

elaborated by medieval logicians who identified the range of valid
syllogisms by artificial Latin names in which the vowels 'A', 'E', 'I'
and '0' represented the universal affirmative, the universal negative,
the particular affirmative and the particular negative propositions
respectively. So, for example, the four syllogisms of the first figure
were known as 'Barbara', 'Celarent', 'Darii', and 'Ferio'. Combined
in mnemonic rhymes, these names showed at a glance what kind of
conclusion could be drawn from a set of premisses. The system is
esoteric but to those who were rigorously trained in it, it became
second nature.
As an exposition of deduction through the mechanics of the
syllogism the Prior Ana!Jtics had an unparalleled influence on the
method of philosophy. The Posterior Ana!Jtics is less purely formal in
content. Book 1 consists of a treatment of demonstration as an
application of the principles of the syllogism to scientific reasoning.
But Aristotle makes clear that he does not consider all knowledge to
depend on demonstration, the starting point of which must be based
elsewhere. The question is resolved at the end of Book n, where he
shows that induction- inference from the particular, which is the
subject of sense knowledge, to the general, which is the product of
abstractive knowledge - supplies the first premisses from which all
deduction derives. Though the subject is very scantily dealt with, here
is the characteristic Aristotelian approach to epistemology.
The last two treatises of the Organon are of little importance for an
16 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

exposition of Aristotle's mature thought. The Topics is an early work

which precedes the composition of the Analytics. It considers the art of
argument as a general dialectical exercise, though even at this stage in
his development Aristotle has in mind its use for scientific knowledge.
The De Sophisticis Elenchis ('On Sophistical Refutations') is an
appendix to the Topics. It is a study of fallacy and its title reflects the
Socratic antipathy to the Sophists as anti-philosophers, mystifying
their hearers by tricks of reasoning. In fact, while some of the fallacies
which Aristotle reviews amount to mere quibbling, others are more
subtle traps into which the incautious philosopher might himself fall.
The De Sophisticis Elenchis is therefore a useful via negativa or deterrent
inculcation of the principles of valid argument.

Aristotle: Knowledge and Being

The reader of the Organon would already have been introduced to the
doctrine on which Aristotle's theories of knowledge and being rest.
This is 'substance'- the first of the categories- a concept of central
importance in his thought. It was through it that he directed the
search for understanding to the concrete world of individuals. Plato
had contrasted the intelligible and fully real status of the Forms with
the objects of experience. The latter, relative, unstable, in a continual
state of becoming something else, lent themselves in his view only to
an imperfect degree of knowledge. Aristotle contradicted him. In the
order of being or reality he insisted on the primacy of the individual
thing- substance in its first sense, as defined in the Categories. The
corollary is his emphasis on the primacy of sense experience, contact
with the individual thing, in the generation of knowledge. When he
said that it was only in a secondary and derived sense that the term
'substance' could be applied to the universal concept he was
implicitly rejecting the theory that the elements of intelligibility in
things were in some way separate from them. In the Metaphysics he is
more explicit. There he repeatedly criticises the notion of subsistent
Forms as uneconomical and vague. For him, 'substance' is the bridge
between things as we experience them and things as we understand
them. By observing individual beings - substance in the primary
sense- the philosopher isolates essential characteristics and knows
substance in the secondary sense. It is only by this process of
abstraction from reality as he experiences it that he arrives at an
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 17
understanding of the natures of things, the principles by which they
are classified, and at a general concept of undifferentiated being.
It is obvious that such a theory ofknowledge required an answer to
the problem of change, that apparent instability in things which had
vexed earlier thinkers including Plato himself. The most general
solution which Aristotle propounds is the distinction, advanced
mainly in Book 9 (0) of the Metaphysics, between potentiality and
actuality. It is an attempt to render all change intelligible by denying
that it is catastrophic. According to this analysis, before the change
took place the subject had the capacity to change in that way and
therefore already was potentially what it was to be actually. To the
modern reader this seems a platitude. But Aristotle was confronting a
tradition in Greek thought which emphasised the stability of what
exists to the point of excluding change as logically impossible and
hence illusory. Moreover, his assertion that change is the realisation
or actualisation of a potentiality did not merely serve as a counter to
the static view. In its own right it offered a highly optimistic
interpretation of change as development, the fulfilment of capacity. It
was a piece also with his wider philosophy and played a part in his
explanation of cosmology, psychology and ethics.
The basis of a related but more particular account of change was
supplied by the doctrine of substance. In this context, Aristotle made
a distinction between two types of change. The more easily resolved is
what he broadly calls 'alteration' .9 This is better known as 'acciden-
tal' change, from the terminology developed in the Topics, 10 where he
differentiates between predicates which state the essence or comprise
the definition of a thing and those - accidental predicates - which
signify an attribute not relevant to the definition. In this case, the
subject of the change does not need to be redefined as a result of it. In
Aristotle's terms, there is continuity of substance. The second type of
change, 'substantial' change, what Aristotle calls 'coming to be and
passing away', 11 requires precisely such a redefinition. Here the
original substance disappears to be replaced by a new one. The
discontinuity is apparently complete. But Aristotle insisted that in
this process too there is an element of constancy as well as an element
of change. Accordingly he distinguished two corresponding features
in all being which undergoes substantial change, 12 matter and form.
These two features are only notionally distinct in that there is no
experience of matter in this sense neither does it exist apart from form.
Conversely, form does not exist apart from matter, at least in the
18 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

terrestrial world. (It will be seen later that the 'prime mover' or
'movers' of Aristotle's system is a special case.) Form represents the
discontinuity in substantial change. It is the principle by which the
new substance is determined or constituted as something- a being of
a certain class- just as it is the principle by which the old substance
was determined as a being of a different class. Matter represents the
element of continuity, expressing the relationship which we judge to
exist between old substance and new. It is a difficult term to use
because of its association. 13 Matter- referred to by the Aristotelians of
the middle ages as 'first matter' (materia prima) - is not something
material. In Aristotle's analysis the material something is substance-
the composite of matter and form. Matter in the metaphysical sense
does however retain one of the nuances of 'material' in its everyday
usage. It implies the capacity of things to exist with extension, to
occupy a certain spatial position. It does not itself constitute their
extension, of course, as is implied by matter in its everyday sense.
Only as considered in combination with form can it be said actually to
have this or any other characteristic. This aspect of matter, though,
explains why the heavenly bodies of Aristotle's universe- otherwise
quite unlike other material substances in that they are exempt from
all change except local motion - should be considered as composite
substances. If they were pure form, they could have no local motion.
To say that matter represents the element of continuity in
substantial change is to describe it from the point of view of change
which has occurred. It can also be viewed as the capacity of a thing to
undergo change - a complex of changes in the case of terrestrial
substances, a strictly limited change in the case of the heavenly
bodies. Stated in this way it corresponds to the concept of potentiality.
Similarly, form corresponds to actuality. However, 'matter and form'
do not simply repeat the point made in the distinction between
potentiality and actuality. They are an important amplification of the
notion of substance and they led Aristotle to a fuller elaboration of his
theory of knowledge. 'Hylomorphism', as the doctrine of matter and
form is known, 14 served him well in establishing that the universal
element or principle of classification is immanent in the thing. Form
immanent in substance is his answer to Plato's transcendent form. At
the same time it served him well in retaining the objectivity of form.
On this point he is in agreement with Plato. Both thinkers locate the
basis of classification in the character of external reality rather than in
the mental structure of the observer. For both, the universal concept
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 19
is a recognition by the mind of an order which really exists, not an
imposition of order by the mind. It is in this sense that both their
philosophies are said to be 'realist'. This fundamental similarity
between them can easily be lost sight of in view of the critical and
highly apologetic approach which Aristotle adopts towards his
master and in view of the different ways in which they state the
objective reality of the universal. The similarity becomes more
apparent as Aristotle explores the implications of his refinement on
the concept of substance. In his analysis, the principle of individua-
tion - the element in the composition of substance to which its
individual characteristics are attributed- can only be matter. Form is
the universal element by which a thing is constituted and rendered
recognisable as a member of a certain class. Yet matter, as
indeterminate, is the aspect of reality which is impervious to the
intellect. There is therefore the paradox in his thought that the fully
real is not fully knowable or is unknowable precisely at the point- its
individuality - at which it is said to be fully real. The difficulty is
probably best understood as a relic of Platonism. Aristotle's failure to
resolve it may be partly due to the fact that as a working biologist his
preoccupation was with the species rather than with the individual.
However, as it stands, the harmony of his theory of knowledge and
being is seriously marred by the discrepancy.

Aristotle: Causation and Cosmology

Aristotle refers to matter and form as two of the four 'causes' of

change. This is an unfamiliar use of the term 'cause'. Matter and form
are more easily thought of as philosophical conditions or aspects of
the philosophical explanation of the phenomenon. The other two
factors which he identifies are the final and the efficient or moving
causes. 15 The 'final cause' represents change as intelligible from its
effects. Considered from this aspect, the process of substantial change
is seen to be directed, de facto and unconsciously, towards the
production of new form. The new form is therefore, viewed in
retrospect, the terminus and in that sense the purpose or 'final cause'
of the activity. Accidental change, considered as a stage in the full
realisation ofform- such as growth to maturity- can also be seen to be
directed towards a final cause. Both accidental and substantial
change must also normally be explained by reference to an efficient
cause. This is cause in its familiar sense - the agency by which a
20 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

process is instigated and completed. Aristotle's account of the

mechanism of efficient causation is an aspect of his wider cosmologi-
cal doctrine.
The universe as Aristotle conceives it is divided into _two regions-
the superlunary and the sublunary- governed by different laws. The
superlunary region is constituted of a single element, 'ether', which
tends to circular movement. The sublunary region by contrast is
constituted offour elements- fire, air, water and earth- which tend to
rectilinear movement, the first two upwards and the second two
downwards. This is the physical basis of the distinction between the
continuous, unvaried patterns which seemed to be the condition of
the heavenly bodies and the state of change and decay which obtains
below. The four elements are the material cause of change and
decay/ 6 in the case of the complex organisms which they combine to
form and which disintegrate on their dissociation. They too are being
continually transformed into one another. The efficient cause of both
processes ofinteraction is the varying influence of the sun through the
changing seasons.
In Aristotle's theory, this seasonal effect of the sun is due to its
annual movement as observed from the earth. The earth itself,
spherical in shape, lies at rest in the centre of the universe. The
astronomical appearances produced by its daily rotation and annual
orbit of the sun, as well as the particular courses of the planets, are
attributed to the movement round it of an elaborate system of
concentric spheres in which the heavenly bodies are embedded. The
outermost of these spheres is that of the fixed stars and the innermost
that of the moon. Their arrangement and number Aristotle based,
with modifications of his own, on the conclusions of the near-
contemporary astronomers, Eudoxus and Callippus, from whom he
borrowed the idea of a geo-centric universe composed of spheres.
The annual approach and retreat of the sun thus establishes a link
between the continuity of manifold change in the sublunary world
and the continuity of the simple 'accidental' change- regular local
motion- to which alone the superlunary world is subject. But physics
does not constitute a self-contained explanation of activity in
Aristotle's universe. The main argument which he presents for the
existence of a source of cosmic activity is the need to avoid an infinite
regress of objects that are moved. This requirement, combined with
his theory that everything which is in motion is moved by something,
demanded a source of motion that was itself motionless. And since
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 21
motion is the actualisation of a potentiality, the concept of an ultimate
source of motion translated readily into the doctrine of potentiality
and actuality. Expressed in these terms, the 'unmoved mover' is the
prime agent in the reduction of potentiality to actuality and is defined
as actuality without potentiality. Furthermore, since matter is
identified with potentiality the purely actual must be immaterial.
This is an important line of thought for it led Aristotle to fuse
cosmology with theology.
The existence of the unmoved mover is postulated in Book vu of the
Physics 17 and established in Book vm. 18 Its nature and operation are
developed mainly in Book A of the Metaphysics. 19 The fixed stars,
comprising the first sphere, are apparently regarded as living beings,
which desire to achieve the perfection of motionlessness exhibited by
the unmoved mover. Unable to do so, they imitate it as closely as
possible by the circular motion natural to their element. This is the
primary cosmic movement, a revolution from east to west. Transmit-
ted through the inner spheres it becomes the common movement of
the planets. The effect is produced only indirectly by the unmoved
mover, which acts as the final and only thus as the efficient cause of
movement in the first sphere. Its own integrity is therefore preserved
complete. Although Aristotle refers to this unmoved mover as God
and portrays a being with an intellectual life it is not a God who could
be the object of religious worship or who might be thought of as a
creator. Indeed it is quite unaware of anything outside itself and its
sole activity consists in consciousness of its own perfection. Nor is it a
unique principle. The various courses of the planets, which Aristotle
supposed to be governed by as many as fifty-five spheres, some of
them moving in opposite directions, cannot derive from a single
source. Accordingly, he was forced to allow a plurality of unmoved
movers - one for each particular motion. This conclusion seems to
have been a development in his thought from an initial preference for
a simple model. He saw the difficulty of explaining the plurality
philosophically 20 and that and the relationship between the unmoved
movers remains a problem in the interpretation ofhis theory. But the
fact that he was prepared to make the adjustment to meet the
astronomical evidence emphasises the bond between his theology and
his cosmology. His 'unmoved mover', one or many, is merely the
eternal explanation of eternal motion in an eternal universe, an
ultimate term which must be posited if an infinite series is to be
avoided. Quite detached from the effects which it accidentally
22 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

generates it stands in as sharp contrast to the Craftsman of Plato's

Timaeus as to the God of Genesis, epitomising the mechanical nature of
Aristotle's account of reality.

Aristotle: Psychology

Aristotle's psychology or 'theory of soul' is best approached after his

Physics and Metaphysics for it involves a special application of the
general principles discovered there. While the Physics discusses nature
as a whole, the De Anima ('On the Soul') deals with one aspect-living
things. In it, soul is defined as 'the first actuality of a natural body
which has life potentially'. 21 What Aristotle means is that in all living
substances which come into being and pass away one must admit the
same distinction between potentiality and actuality or matter and
form on which he bases his wider explanation of substantial change.
In their case, the corresponding distinction is between body and soul.
Soul is the form or actuality of the substance, by which it exists and is
defined as a member of a species; body is that which has a potentiality
for changing. As in the general application of the hylomorphic
doctrine, the distinction between the two aspects is a notional one.
Substance is never to be envisaged as first a body requiring only the
addition of a soul to be a live body, any more than as first a
disembodied soul and then an embodied one. Plato had presented just
such an a priori view of soul and Aristotle's doctrine is a rejection of it.
'Body' as an aspect of substance is equivalent to 'live body'; it is an
organism with a unity. Dead body, by contrast, lacks unity; it is
simply a collection of a variety of substances in the course of
dissociation from one another.
Having thus defined his subject, Aristotle distinguishes between
three types of soul- vegetative, sensitive and intellective, in ascending
order of refinement. The vegetative soul is characterised by the basic
functions of nutrition and reproduction, necessary for the main-
tenance oflife. The sensitive soul is characterised in addition by sense
perception, more or less complex depending on the species of animal
life. This includes, in the case of animals with multiple sense faculties,
the capacity to integrate the information derived from the various
organs of sense - eyes, ears, touch, nose and taste - so that, for
instance, noise may be related to an object seen. This synthetic
faculty, which Aristotle refers to as the 'common sense', is fallible,
unlike the operations of the special senses. The latter, being directly
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 23
stimulated by their object, he considers to be incapable of deceiving.
Also represented as an extension of sensation are the faculties of
imagination and memory. 'Imagination'- the rendering of Aristotle's
phantasia- consists of the production of images in response to sensual
stimuli. It seems to be a faculty which is possessed in rudimentary
fashion by all animal life since Aristotle argues that desire, which is
the cause of movement in animals, presupposes imagination. 22 But it
is chiefly considered and is most easily appreciated as a faculty of
higher animals. Memory is the retention of images and is to be
distinguished from recollection- deliberate and spontaneous recall-
which is a feature of the intellective soul alone. 23
The analysis of this last, the highest type of soul, is one of the most
obscure aspects of Aristotle's thought, the obscurity being com-
pounded by the probability that the principal text for it is corrupt.
The passage, in Book m, Chapter 5 of the De Anima, reads as follows:

And ... mind as we have described it is what it is by virtue of

becoming all things, while there is another which is what it is by
virtue of making all things: this is a sort of positive state like light;
for in a sense light makes potential colours into actual colours.
Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassible, unmixed, since it is
in its essential nature activity (for always the active is superior to
the passive factor, the originating force to the matter which it
forms). Actual knowledge is identical with its object: in the
individual, potential knowledge is in time prior to actual know-
ledge, but in the universe as a whole it is not prior even in time.
Mind is not at one time knowing and at another not. When mind is
set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and
nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternal (we do not,
however, remember its former activity because, while mind in this
sense is impassible, mind as passive is destructible), and without it
nothing thinks. 24

Aristotle justifies his distinction of these two aspects of mind by

reference to his general doctrine of potentiality and actuality in the
operations of nature. On this model the passive intellect is a
potentiality for acquiring the abstracted form of a new reality and the
actualisation of its potentiality is, as dsewhere in Aristotle's
metaphysics, due to the operation of a principle already active - in
this case the 'active intellect'. However, his argument on the point is
24 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

very brief and he need not perhaps be taken to have regarded it as

definitive. A point of some importance which emerges from what he
says is that mind is, in one respect at least, an active principle. The
conclusion would seem to invite consideration of the part which mind
itself might play in shaping our view of the world. Aristotle neither
tackles this nor shows any consciousness of a difficulty. It may
therefore be supposed that he does not attribute to the 'active
intellect' a definite character such as would impede the corre-
spondence between mental concept and external reality upon which
his philosophy rests.
The direction in which he does pursue the implications of this
feature of mind suggests that his treatment of the topic may have been
designed as an answer to the Platonic theory of anamnesis as an
explanation of the a priori element in thought and to the associated
doctrine of the soul's immortality. It is true that no reference is made
to the Platonists at this point but in what he goes on to say he can
hardly have been oblivious of the rival doctrine of the soul which he
had himself at one time championed. 25 Mind, he proposes, considered
as an active principle not undergoing change, 'alone is immortal and
eternal'. This is a sudden twist given to what has until now been a
consistent view of soul, that it is a simple actualisation and that it is
only notionally a distinct feature of being. What is now apparently
envisaged is not indeed that the soul but that an aspect of the soul is
capable of separate and eternal existence. Since this enigmatic
statement is difficult to reconcile with Aristotle's general outlook it is
impossible to offer a confident interpretation of it. Possibly in making
it he had no clearly developed view on the questions which were to vex
later commentators. The immortal 'active intellect' has been under-
stood in various ways: it has been identified with Aristotle's God,
particularly in the Neoplatonist tradition; it has been thought of on
the one hand as a feature of the individual and on the other as being
identical within members of the species. The last interpretation seems
the least problematical. It is difficult to see how the active intellect
which is not affected by the individual's experience and which
transcends bodily function could be thought of as having distinguish-
ing features even during the life of the individual. This is all the more
so after his death when, on Aristotle's own principle, memory ceases.
But the question of its status remains. Is it an intellectual substance?
The only example of such explicitly recognised in Aristotle's universe
is the unmoved mover or movers. If it is conceived to be a substance it
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 25
will either be identified with the unmoved mover or distinguished
from it on a basis which is quite unclear. If it is not a substance it has
in Aristotelian theory no separate existence. Perhaps Aristotle's
reference to immortality is simply an assertion that in his highest
activity man - briefly as an individual, eternally as a species -
approximates to the divine life. The question is intractable but judged
against the Pythagorean-Platonic doctrine with which he was quite
familiar his own accommodation of immortality is remarkably spare.
His brief account was to prove the single most controversial aspect of
his thought in the medieval context.

Aristotle: Political Science

Aristotle's definition of political science is wider than ours. He

includes under it what we should call ethics. The particular and
general aspects of his topic are treated separately. The Nicomachean
Ethics considers the nature of the good life for man. It is the more
complete and is probably the later version of his teaching on this
subject. 26 The Politics, a collection of several originally independent
works, considers how man may organise in society to achieve the good
life. The two treatises are intended to be complementary and together
they constitute a study of human conduct, without formal distinction
between private and public. It should be clear at once therefore that
Aristotle does not subscribe to a dual standard of morality. When he
distinguishes, as he occasionally does, between a good citizen and a
good man 27 he is not conceding a moral autonomy to the former. He is
merely recognising the fact that not all constitutions are sufficiently
demanding to allow of an equation between conformity to law and the
whole of the virtuous life. Another, technical, reason for the
distinction is that the good man possesses the virtue of practical
wisdom which is not necessarily part of the condition of being a good
citizen. But coincidence, at least on the level of behaviour, between
the two categories is the ideal and is the mark of a good constitution.
This does not at all mean that he makes individual morality subject to
public interest. Quite the reverse is true. The state exists to facilitate
and promote man's progress in virtue and there is a perfect harmony
between the public and private good.
The analysis of political science so defined rests on general
philosophical principles, most important being the teleological bias,
the preoccupation with explaining things in terms of their purpose,
26 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

which is the characteristic feature of Aristotle's thought. However, as

is equally characteristic of his method, there is constant reference
throughout to how men actually behave and this observational
dimension is generally successful in inhibiting the adoption of
arbitrary standards. So in the Ethics we continually find such remarks
as 'All men have not the same views about what is to be feared', 28
'With regard to desires, they would seem to fall into two classes', 29
'Men who know nothing of the theory of their subject sometimes
practise it with greater success than others who know it' 30 and so on.
By the same token, the Politics incorporates the results of an ambitious
comparative study of political institutions.
From the beginning of the Ethics Aristotle accepts as a working
hypothesis that the good is that at which all things aim. 31 This
teleological criterion then becomes the means to a more precise
definition of the good for man. Wealth, for instance, is not the good for
it merely serves to get something else. 32 Similarly, honour, pleasure,
intelligence and other advantages, while chosen for their own sake as
worth having, are also chosen as contributing to the good life which is
what Aristotle implies by the word generally translated as 'happi-
ness'.33 In accordance with the concept of actuality which runs
through his philosophy, this happiness is conceived as a state of
activity with its own dynamic; and since rationality is the distinctive
feature of man, full human happiness is an activity of the reason. The
consideration leads to a view of the ethical life as directed towards a
very specialised and intellectual end - the contemplation of
philosophical truths, in which man finds his highest fulfilment and
resembles the divine.
In this sense, Aristotle's political science assumes the propaedeutic
character of his logic. The normal approach to happiness is a
programme of training designed both to free the subject from those
dispositions which would impede his progress and to promote those
which will aid him. This is the foundation for Aristotle's detailed
consideration of the virtues, to which most of the Ethics is devoted. His
general concept of virtue is of a trait which can be cultivated to the
point where it becomes a deeply ingrained part of the personality.
Considered in detail, the virtues are of two kinds, intellectual -
wisdom, intelligence (or insight) and prudence- and moral, such as
liberality and temperance. 34 The intellectual virtues are acquired
through education, the moral through practice or habit. The link
between the two orders is forged by the intellectual virtue of prudence
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 27
or 'practical wisdom' which represents the guiding role of reason in
determining correct behaviour and is one of the central concepts ofhis
moral theory. Not that Aristotle accepts that knowledge of the good or
of virtue necessitates action in conformity. He insists that virtue and
vice are equally matters of choice and he attacks the Socratic axiom
that 'nobody acts in opposition to what is best' and that one can only
do wrong out of ignorance, 35 as providing a possible excuse for
dereliction. But he admits the force of the argument properly
understood 36 and his own treatment vacillates between attributing
perverse conduct on the one hand to lack of conviction about the good
and on the other to the force of passion or other irrationality.
The central importance of 'practical wisdom' emerges from
Aristotle's definition of virtue. This is 'a disposition of the soul in
which, when it has to choose among actions and feelings, it observes
the mean relative to us, this being determined by such a rule or
principle as would take shape in the mind of a man of sense or
practical reason'. 37 What Aristotle is saying is that it is impossible to
define for example justice a priori, outside of the circumstances in
which a just act is to be performed. However,justice is not subjective
or a matter of whim. Practical wisdom, which is reason applied to
moral action, recognises the justice inherent in the situation and in
accordance with it dictates the course to be followed. I tis an approach
which very much limits what may usefully be said about the virtues
on the general level. His lengthy review of justice, which occupies
Book 5 of the Ethics and is of considerable importance for its wider
relevance, illustrates this point. Aristotle recognises two senses of
'justice': a general or universal, which refers to the observance oflaw,
and a special or particular, which refers to fair dealing. The second is
further subdivided into distributive justice, which is the allocation of
the community's possessions in accordance with desert, corrective
justice, which remedies grievances between parties, and justice of
exchange, which is the reciprocity governing trade. The first sense of
the term was prompted by a nuance in the Greek word for justice,
implying conformity to law, and Aristotle's acknowledgement of it is
simply a clearing of the way to a consideration of justice in its
particular aspects. The whole, with its specific reference to the
political dimension38 and its influential addendum on equity, 39
amounts to a masterly description of the social and legal context of
justice rather than the statement of a unifying principle. In his
discussion of the other moral virtues Aristotle is at pains to show that
28 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

each is a mean between extremes of conduct. The device is in fact

specious as a definition, being rather a broad guideline to determining
virtue and an observation on how it appears when it has been
determined. In the final analysis virtue consists in doing that which a
reasoning man would approve.
Books 8 and 9 of the Ethics are devoted to friendship as an
ingredient of happiness. In the course of his treatment Aristotle
makes, not for the first time, the famous point that 'Man is a social
animal' observing that 'the need for company is in his blood' .40
Among the other reasons for having friends is that 'association with
virtuous persons may form in a way a training in virtue'. 41 We have
therefore here an adumbration of the wider social environment in
which the Aristotelian life of virtue is to be led. Throughout the Ethics
the habitual nature of moral virtue has been emphasised and the
corollary is an emphasis on the importance of the social context.
Hence the intimate relationship which obtains between the ethical
and political aspects of Aristotle's theory of conduct.
It is by presenting the state as the culmination of primitive forms of
association- the family, the village and so on- that Aristotle justifies
his contention in thePolitics 42 that it is a natural society. While the less
complex groupings are designed to preserve life, the state serves the
purpose of the sufficient life. It has an educative role of which a
detailed examination is undertaken in the last two books of the
treatise. This positive attitude to the state is the foundation of
Aristotle's social theory. Some political association is necessary for
man if he is to fulfil his potential for happiness as defined in the Ethics.
(Aristotle supposes that there may be individuals who are so bestial or
so god-like that they can dispense with it43 but they are by definition
abnormal.) There is however no 'natural' form of government.
Aristotle was well aware that the state could be successfully organised
in different ways. These are classified as rule by the one, by the few
and by the many- corresponding to monarchy, aristocracy and what
he normally calls 'polity'. Each of them is legitimised by an
orientation towards the common good and it is this criterion which
distinguishes them from their deviant counterparts, tyranny, oligar-
chy and democracy. Although in theory monarchy of the virtuous
man is the best government, in practice polity is recommended. This
is a balance of sectional interests- government by the many but not
by the mass of have-nots. Though not his own invention it seems a
typically Aristotelian compromise between extremes. It was perfectly
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 29
in accord with the mainstream of medieval views on political
organisation at the time the Politics was received in the west. For their
part, the theses, lost for many centuries, that the state is a natural
organ and that citizenship is a craft with its own authenticity and
integrity, were to revolutionise political theory.

From Plato to Neoplatonism

While Plato's Academy remained active in Athens into the Christian

era, as a school of thought it went through several transformations.
Faced with challenge by the schools of Stoicism and Epicureanism-
whose founders, the Cypriot Zeno and the Athenian Epicurus,
belonged to the next generation after Plato - the original Academy
retreated into a position of scepticism or philosophical agnosticism.
This phase is known to historians of ancient thought as the Middle or
Second Academy. The attitude lasted for over a century and a half
during which the chief activity of the Academy was the refutation of
rival theories. This cultivated suspension ofjudgement was modified
by the mid-second-century thinker, Carneades ofCyrene, founder of
the so-called New Academy, in to an acceptance of a formal theory of
probability as the guide to life and action. Though ofrelatively slight
intrinsic importance, the position has a wider interest in that it was
adopted and propagated by the Latin writer, Cicero (106-43 sc). His
philosophical influence was small compared to his immense literary
stature but no student of medieval thought can ignore its significance
for the early development of St Augustine. 44
At this point the Academy had no more than a historical
connection with Plato. Its temper was anything but denominational.
Indeed, an outstanding feature of the reversion towards a positive
philosophy in the century which straddles the beginning of the
Christian era and in the two centuries following is its receptivity to a
variety of ideas. In favour were not only the doctrines of Plato and
Aristotle, whom commentators of the period tended to reconcile, but
ofStoicism and revived Pythagoreanism. This return to dogmatism is
known by the transitional title, Middle Platonism. The term covers
an assortment of thinkers - at Athens, at the other major Greek
cultural centre, Alexandria, and elsewhere - within the period
c. 80 BC-AD 220 and includes a wide range of interpretations. It is
therefore impossible to summarise but its most notable features can be
stated briefly. The first principle from which all reality derived was
30 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

generally conceived to be 'Mind'. This concept is characteristic of the

contemporary reconciliation of Plato and Aristotle for it was a
combination of the idea of the Good and the Unmoved Mover.
Middle Platonism tended to represent the Forms as thoughts of Mind,
thus giving them a definite status which they had lacked in the classic
version. There was an increasing stress, moreover, on the transcen-
dence of Mind - a point chiefly owed perhaps to the Pythagorean
influence - and its relation to the material world only through
intermediaries, such as the Second Mind or Logos (Word) and the
World Soul.
The interest of Middle Platonism from the medieval standpoint is
on several levels. Firstly, it represents the most important ingredient
of the Greek philosophical outlook during the first two centuries of
Christianity. The effects of its terminology, whether absorbed directly
or, as is more likely, through Hellenic influences on Judaism, are
apparent in the prologue to the Johannine gospel. It had already, in
the thought of Philo of Alexandria (c. 20 BC--c. AD 40), made inroads
into Jewish theology and it deeply affected the thought of the early
Christian theologians Clement of Alexandria (c. 150--215) and
Origen (184--254). Secondly, its scholarship made some direct
contribution to the sources of medieval thought. The influential
commentary by Chalcidius on the Timaeus- the only one of Plato's
dialogues known to the Latin west until the twelfth century- seems to
relate to Middle Platonism rather than to later developments, despite
the fact that it was written probably in the middle of the fourth
century. 45 Thirdly and most importantly it was the indispensable
preliminary to Neoplatonism. The latter was to have an unrivalled
influence on Christian thought in the early medieval centuries, was
effectively to constitute the medieval view of Platonism and was even
to bulk large in the process by which Aristotle was received in the
west.

Neoplatonism

'Neoplatonism' refers primarily to the system constructed by the

Greek writer Plotinus (AD 204/5-270) and to reworkings of his
thought by his immediate disciples and by schools in several parts of
the Greek world until about the sixth century. Plotinus was born in
Egypt and received his philosophical training at Alexandria. He
himself taught at Rome, from c. 244 almost until his death, and there
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 31
established a coterie which included his literary executor and
biographer, Porphyry. Porphyry was responsible for editing the
master's writings as a collection of six groups of nine treatises known
accordingly as the Enneads (literally 'nines'). Although Porphyry
knew and carefully listed the approximate chronology of the treatises,
he decided to arrange them by subject matter. The first three Enneads
form a group dealing mainly with the world: the first Ennead is on
man and ethics, the second on the physical world and the third on
philosophical problems concerning the world, such as fate, pro-
vidence, eternity and time. The fourth Ennead deals with Soul, the
fifth mainly with Mind and the sixth with Being and the One.
Plotinus' thought revolves round two principal topics, the origin of
reality and its destiny. It is a description of descent from unity and
perfection to multiplicity and of a reversionary process of ascent. The
tendency of Middle Platonism to explain reality by a transcendent
principle was taken by Plotinus to its logical conclusion. 'Mind'
seemed an inadequate final term, being a complex where thought and
the object of thought were distinguishable. Plotinus posited instead a
principle, the One, which represented the ultimate simplicity. Its
simplicity and transcendence is such that it surpasses all categories
and is incapable of being the subject of predication. This is a
formidable barrier indeed to philosophical discussion. Most of his
thought about the One is inevitably therefore an examination of its
effects and implications rather than an attempt to explore its nature.
However, despite the handicap, Plotinus' concept of the One is not
devoid of positive content. Central to his account of reality is the
doctrine that good, of which the One is the absolute type, is
necessarily productive. Thus the One, without effect upon itself and
without deliberation or intent, generates the first being according to
our categories. This process of generation, or emanation as it is
usually called, is explained in its first and subsequent stages in
Aristotelian hylomorphic terms. From the One derives a potentiality
for being - the matter of intelligent life - which is attracted to
contemplate its source and thereby receives as its form and according
to its potentiality the image of the One. This first being, Mind, is the
nearest approximation to the simplicity of the One but it is itselfless
than a unity. Its intellectual life consists of a direct and eternal
apprehension of all that is intelligible - that is the forms of reality
including, in Plotinus' analysis, the forms of individual beings. (The
attribution of individuating characteristic to form was not accepted
32 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

by all Neoplatonist thinkers but it was a development of great

importance for medieval thought.) It is to be noted that Mind does
not produce the forms by thinking them. They are in fact the nature of
Mind and in knowing them Mind knows itself, in accordance with the
Aristotelian principle that thought and its object are identical. In this
way Plotinus retains the objectivity of the forms while managing to
incorporate them into the system of emanation. He also accords to the
forms a coherence and an interpenetration which they lacked in the
original Platonic theory, though it will be remembered that Plato in
his later thought had searched for just such a unified relationship
between them. This unity in plurality is the best realisation which
Mind, by contemplating the One, can achieve of the simple unity
exhibited there.
The creative effusiveness of goodness is not yet exhausted. As Mind
is produced by emanation from the One it in turn generates the
principle called Soul. A borrowing from the Timaeus, it is the bridge
between the intellectual and the sensible worlds. Precisely because it
is a bridge, Soul is conceived as having two parts, the second of which
is sometimes presented by Plotinus as a separate principle, Nature. In
its higher part, Soul remains intent on contemplating Mind; in its
lower part it is the principle of order in the material world and
reproduces there by emanation the forms contained in the thought of
Mind, reflections of which are contained in Soul at both levels. The
forms of corporeal beings are individual souls which have the
bi-partite character of universal Soul and are never therefore
completely incorporated. While they have a function of organising
matter, they are linked in a chain of emanation to the highest realities.
They are capable by contemplation of retracing their descent from
Mind and ofbecoming alive to the knowledge of reality which is their
birthright.
The outer limit of the Plotinian universe in terms of ontological
gradation is matter. This is the opposite pole of indeterminacy from
the One, of which it is the weakest reflection. Whereas lack ofform is
ascribed to the One because of the inadequacy of thought to conceive
its richness, the indeterminacy of matter is its complete emptiness. It is
the point at which emanation from the One and therefore intelligibil-
ity and order ceases. Strictly considered matter is a pure potentiality
for being formed, a necessary factor in the universe. In this statement
the concept is recognisably Aristotelian. But Plotinus also takes a
more hostile view of matter. The relation between the individual soul
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 33
and the matter which it informs is not the close and easy bond of
Aristotelian hylomorphism. In his account of the composition of
bodies there is a dualism which belies the Aristotelian terminology
and proclaims the true affinity of his thought with the Pythagorean-
Platonic tradition. Matter is regarded with suspicion as a seductive
and contaminating indeterminacy, contact with which has a stultify-
ing effect upon the soul. It obscures its true character and brings it, at
the lowest level of material being, almost though not quite to the point
of extinction.
This equivocation on the status of matter is symptomatic of a
general tension, frequently noted by commentators on Plotinus'
thought, between two opposing perceptions. On the one hand there is
the optimistic view of Soul's descent according to which it enters
matter through 'a desire of elaborating order on the model of what it
has seen in Mind' .46 (Desire must be understood metaphorically, for
the process is an automatic and necessary one, a stage in the
self-diffusion of good.) On the other hand there is the pessimistic
view, derived from Plato himself and reinforced perhaps by the
ideology of the contemporary mystery cults, that the incarnation of
Soul is a regrettable degeneracy. The emphasis as between these two
approaches varies depending on whether Plotinus is analysing
creation or developing its moral implications. He himself was a
mystic and this dimension of his experience is a major influence upon
his theorising. Release from material entanglements is a prerequisite
for the soul's effecting its cosmic return. More than this, the reunion of
Mind with the One which is inaccessible to intellect can be achieved
only in ecstasy, the goal of the purified soul. Porphyry reports
Plotinus' death-bed confidence in the return of the divine in man to
the divine in the All. 47 His system is the most profound and complete
example in Greek philosophy of the close association between
cosmology and religious outlook. Their mutual interplay constitutes
the richness and is essential to an understanding of his thought.
Porphyry's edition of Plotinus' writings was undoubtedly his
greatest service to Neoplatonism but several of his own works were
influential. His Isagoge or 'Introduction' to the Categories of Aristotle is
one of the most important examples of the scholastic activity of the
period. It became a standard accompaniment to the Organon and was
indirectly to be the starting point for the early medieval debate over
the status of universals. In addition, some of his philosophical
writing, now for the most part lost, was known to St Augustine and
34 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

was frequently referred to by him as typifying the Neoplatonist

position. So far as can be established Porphyry seems to have
presented on several points a simplified version ofPlotinus' thought,
though it must be said that Plotinus was not always internally
consistent and was capable of giving rise to differences of interpreta-
tion. In particular, Porphyry tended to reduce the distinction
between Mind and the various levels of Soul and to emphasise the
dualism between soul and matter. He also contributed heavily to the
polemics of Neoplatonism. It is not certain that Plotinus knew
Christianity though he was a relentless critic of the gnosticism with
which it was widely associated. Porphryry however attacked Christ-
ianity directly. This and the attempt to align with pagan religion in a
common front is a feature of the later history of the movement.
Iamblichus, a pupil of Porphyry and the leading figure of the Syrian
school, incorporated the pagan gods into the Plotinian system and
otherwise expanded and complicated its hierarchy. More important
than this however is the change of ethos which becomes apparent in
Neoplatonism at this time. Plotinian mysticism was supplemented
and partially overshadowed by the mechanics of theurgy, a kind of
cosmic acupuncture by which it was considered possible to reach out
to the divine beings by a manipulation of material objects associated
with them. This element ofNeoplatonism had an influence, particu-
larly in the Renaissance, quite disproportionate to its value in the
system. Although a bizarre notion it did however rest on a philosophi-
cal point of some importance: a definite approbation of matter as a
feature of the universe, in contrast to the equivocal stance ofPlotinus
on the subject.
It was the strand of Neoplatonism associated with lamblichus
which was adopted by the Platonic Academy at Athens. Ironically, its
conquest of the latter was not effected until the early fifth century
from which time it continued to dominate its ancestral home until in
529 the emperor Justinian closed the school there as inimical to
Christianity. Its most important figure was Proclus (412-85). His
Elements rif Theology consisted of 211 propositions which presented
Neoplatonism in textbook fashion, eliminating many of the tensions
and discrepancies found in the Enneads and integrating the contri-
butions of lamblichus, modified on some points, with the thought of
Plotinus. Although a derivative thinker, Proclus eventually rivalled
Plotinus as a source of western knowledge of Neoplatonism. The
works of the pseudo-Denis (c. 500), the fountain-head of mystical
 PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS 35
theology in the middle ages, drew heavily on the Athenian school and
probably on Proclus himself. A version of the Elements circulated
among the Arabs as a work of Aristotle and thence passed into the
Latin west where it was known as the Liber de Causis (Book of Causes).
Other works by Prod us, on providence and the status of evil, were
also known there by the mid-thirteenth century.
The final chapter of Neoplatonism which is relevant to this
background survey is its progress at Alexandria. There it was largely
free of the pagan polemical associations which it had acquired
elsewhere. The chief activity of the Alexandrian school was the
continuance of the tradition of scholarship and commentary on the
texts of Plato and Aristotle, with special emphasis on Aristotle's
logical works.
In this brief statement of the later history of Neoplatonism, the
concern has been less with variation of doctrine than with the
identification of centres and channels of influence. Within the broad
limits of a spiritual interpretation of reality, a hierarchical structuring
of the universe and the reference of all that exists to a unitary
principle, there was considerable range of expression and interest
among the several thinkers and schools. The differences of emphasis
are crucial to the specialist in tracing the pedigree of individual
authors. The gener~l reader is more impressed with how completely
Neoplatonism in one form or another constituted the intellectual diet
of Europe in the early middle ages. The reason for this was partly its
inherent attractions, despite certain problems, for Christian thinkers
and partly the absence of a rival. The linguistic gulf which opened in
late antiquity between the Greek world and the Latin threatened to
cut the latter off from all that has been the subject of this chapter.
What material was at first available for philosophical study was
scanty in the extreme. Much of the intellectual history of Europe for
over a thousand years is an account of the process by which Greeks
spoke to Latins. Neoplatonism as the dominant philosophical system
of the late classical world was in occupation of the lines of
communication. Its impact was felt first.
2. From Ancient World to Middle Ages:
Adaptation and Transmission

ScHOLARS now generally agree that the term 'Dark Ages' will not
serve as a judgement on the period from the fall of Rome to the
Carolingian 'renaissance'. Yet it is not clear what if anything should
replace it. The truth is that this like most periods of history is an
obvious blend of darkness and light, of death and birth. Although far
from being a golden age of intense creativity, neither is it a time of
obscurantist indifference, let alone hostility to learning. One of the
great contributions of St Augustine to Latin Christianity was his
justification of the role of secular learning for the theologian. His own
world view, which he bequeathed to the early middle ages, as well as
his spiritual progress towards Christian belief were heavily indebted
to ancient philosophy. Boethius saw himself as retrieving the
treasures of Greek thought for a world losing contact with them. His
younger contemporary, Cassiodorus, and other contributors to the
encyclopaedic tradition more modestly performed a similar role for
the liberal arts and for a wide range of ancient lore. The theme of
adaptation and transmission lends whatever coherence the intellec-
tual history of western Europe may be said to possess in this
transitional period. The coherence should not be exaggerated.
Activity was sporadic and, like its subject matter, piecemeal.
Politically, the period begins and ends with instability and
fragmentation. The short-lived though impressive Carolingian
empire and its patronage of the arts is the background to the work of
the last thinker in this chapter ,John Scotus Eriugena. He lived indeed
when the revived empire was already being partitioned and repar-
titioned among Charlemagne's heirs but his career is unthinkable
without the cultural stimulus which it had afforded. The fragmenta-
tion was never again successfully repaired, though imperial unity
remained as a potent ideal both for theorists and practitioners of
politics. In an important respect, from the viewpoint of the intellec-
tual historian, the fragmentation of Europe had never been overcome
even by Carolingian power at its fullest. The Greek world remained
apart. The close ecclesiastical contacts which had been fostered
between Rome and Constantinople in the century before 750 proved
not to be of lasting significance. 1 Charlemagne's acclamation as

37
38 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

emperor by spontaneous action of the pope on Christmas Day 800

symbolises a changed orientation in both ecclesiastical and political
terms. In this respect, the political and intellectual histories of Europe
in the period 400--1000 are in tandem. The gulf between east and
west, already evident on the level oflanguage and thence of thought at
the beginning of our period, is politically solidified. Intellectually,
Scotus Eriugena stands as an exception to this generalised picture but
only as an exception proving the rule. It was the very unfamiliarity of
the Greek material on which he worked that gave a radical flavour to
his thought when read in a Latin context.

I St Augustine: a Philosophy of the Christian in Society

The Historical Background to St Augustine's Thought

Historians study movements of speculative and political thought

against their cultural background. In the case of no medieval thinker
is this more necessary or more rewarding than in St Augustine's. His
career illustrates many of the most important intellectual trends of the
late empire and reflects its chronic political problems. Born in Latin
Africa in 354 to a pagan father and a Christian mother, St Monica, he
received the Latin rhetorical education which despite its pagan
content was prized by Christians everywhere as an avenue to social
advancement. His youthful religious opinions demonstrate the
attraction of Gnostic sects, of which Manicheism was only one. His
conversion to Christian faith is one of several testimonials to the
spiritual power of Neoplatonism in the Milan of St Ambrose. As a
bishop he combined a respect for and pride in North African tradition
with an adherence to catholicism as it was emerging in contradistinc-
tion to the exclusivity of rigourist, local churches. His greatest work,
the Ciry qf God, grew into an interpretation of history and an analysis
of the relationship between religion and society at a time when the
Roman empire was dissolving.
The reign ofDiocletian (284-305) is a convenient point at which to
begin surveying the history of the Roman world in so far as it bears on
St Augustine's life and writings. Under Diocletian commenced the
last great persecution of Christianity. In its incidental consequences
this was to leave a mark on North African religious life for over three
hundred years. Diocletian had divided his empire into a western half,
which became the responsibility of his co-emperor, Maximian, and
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 39
an eastern, which he ruled himself with the aid of a deputy. The
campaign against Christianity began in the east and lasted longer
there. In 303-4 edicts were issued closing churches, requiring that
copies of the Scriptures should be surrendered for burning and
ordering the arrest of clergy and compliance with general sacrifice. In
305 both emperors abdicated and persecution in the western
provinces ceased. The suffering was relatively severe in North Africa,
where Christianity had uncharacteristically spread amongst the
peasantry.
Diocletian's persecution was followed after a brief interlude by the
reign of Constantine (312-37) under whom Christianity was officially
tolerated and lavishly patronised. If Constantine expected religion to
be a unifying bond in his empire he was disappointed. His attention
was quickly drawn to the fundamentalist claims of the North African
church as it had emerged from the persecution. Here a schism had
developed, formally from a dispute between two rival claimants to the
see of Carthage. These were Caecilian, a representative of that party
in the church which had bowed before the storm by allowing books to
be surrendered for burning, and Donatus, whose name has become
identified with the rigourist movement. The issue was not confined to
past behaviour for the Donatists stigmatised as invalid the acts of
bishops who had in any way compromised with the secular
authorities. Constantine made a number of efforts to resolve the
schism but without success. Donatism was to surface as a major topic
of controversy during St Augustine's episcopacy. The other great
religious issue during Constantine's reign was the division in the
eastern church over the views of Arius, a priest of Alexandria.
Influenced by Neoplatonist emphasis on the indivisibility and
transcendence of the One, Arius insisted that in the Trinity, the Son
must be inferior to the Father. The dispute provided a classic example
of imperial intrusion into theological discussion. The council of
Nicaea in 325 at the behest of the emperor accepted a western
formula, defining the relationship between Father and Son as
homoousion or identity of substance. The rift was patched over rather
than healed, for large sections of the eastern church, Arians and
non-Arians, regarded this dogma as heretical. However, Arianism
itself gradually dwindled in importance, being confined in the end
mainly to those barbarian tribes who received Christianity early- the
Visigoths, Ostrogoths, Vandals, Burgundians and Lombards.
The conversion of Constantine was a decisive event for the triumph
40 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

of Christianity. His deliberate preference for Christians was calcu-

lated to influence the educated and upper classes on whom the new
religion had made only a limited impression. The policy was
continued under his sons, who had been reared as Christians. In 360,
however, the last surviving son, Constantius II, emperor in east and
west, died and was succeeded by his nephew, Julian. A sincere,
ascetic pagan and devoted admirer of Greek civilisation, Julian
initiated not a persecution of Christians but a reversal of Constan-
tine's policy of patronage. His aim of encouraging a return to
paganism through public incentives was frustrated by his death, on
campaign in Persia in 363. Julian's object had been by no means a
forlorn hope. The contest in 386 between St Ambrose and Sym-
machus, prefect of the city of Rome and a champion of the pagan
cause, over the removal of the altar of Victory from the Senate House
was a further indication of the strength which paganism derived from
its roots in Roman tradition. 2 The destruction of so many temples in
the reign ofTheodosius I (379-95) is as much a sign of anxiety that
they might be reinstated as of the emperor's determination to
establish Christianity officially. This lingering uncertainty but more
especially the rearguard polemical action which pagan intellectuals
continued to mount explains the detailed and sometimes tiresome
apologetic of the early books of the City of God.
While these great internal changes were taking place, the northern
and eastern frontiers of the empire were crumbling under the pressure
of migrating barbarian tribes. Theodosius I had some success in
dislodging the Ostrogoths from the Danube region, where they had
settled in large numbers, but the Visigoths remained as an
entrenched enclave there and in the Balkans. The decade and a half
after Theodosius' death was dominated by a contest between Alaric,
leader of the Visigoths, and Stilicho, the Vandal general whom the
Romans -long dependent on barbarian troops- had commissioned
for the defence of the west. Stilicho defeated an attempt by the
Visigoths to invade Italy in 401. However, relations between him and
the Romans deteriorated; a mutiny was fomented among his troops
and he was executed. Military obstacles to Alaric were now reduced
and on 24 August 410 he took and sacked Rome itself. The city had
not been entered since the Gaulish siege of39l BC and the psychologi-
cal effect on pagans and Christians throughout the empire was very
great. Strategically, the event was ofless significance. In the following
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 41

year Alaric died and his successor led the Visigoths to new pickings in
Gaul.
In addition to being threatened in this way from the east, Gaul and
later Spain were also subjected to the southward drive of Vandals,
Alans, Sueves and Burgundians who had crossed the frozen Rhine in
the winter of 406. A Roman revival, aided by treaties with the
Visigoths, achieved a large measure of pacification in Spain for the
next decade and the Vandals were confined to the north-western
province of Galicia. In 429, however, encouraged by the disorder of
Roman Africa, they crossed the straits of Gibraltar and established
themselves there. One of the questions with which St Augustine was
preoccupied in the last year of his life was the poignant one, whether
the clergy should flee with other refugees or remain to the last to offer
what comfort they could to the victims ofinvasion. 3 As he lay dying in
430 his episcopal city of Hippo, to the west of Carthage, was under
siege and nine years later Carthage too fell.
St Augustine's Early Life
Augustine's early life is one of the best known intellectual odysseys in
literature. 4 In several important respects his youthful experience had
a marked influence on his mature thought, not least in his abiding
consciousness of how precarious was the quest for wisdom and how
apparently arbitrary was the divine purpose in regard to individuals.
The principal source for it is his autobiographical Confessions. This
book, cast in the form of a long, reflective prayer, was composed in
397, about ten years after the last events described there. By then,
Augustine was forty-three and had been a bishop for two years.
Although the Corifessions is a document of great frankness and of a
degree of minute psychological observation unparalleled in the
ancient world, its author is a man severely critical of what he regards
as a mis-spent youth. The perspective has to be remembered in
evaluating his judgements upon it. This said, the Confessions, sup-
plemented by the more explicitly philosophical Soliloquies (written at
Cassiciacum in the winter of 386-7), are an invaluable and easy
introduction to Augustine's mind and the influences which helped to
form it.
The Corifessions provides evidence of two sorts of influence on the
young Augustine: personal and intellectual. Of the personal relation-
ships mentioned there, three groups stand out. First, there is his
42 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

mother, Monica, whose concern for his welfare he undoubtedly found

oppressive at the time but who emerges from his later account as a
model of Christian constancy. Second, there is the long liaison with an
unnamed mistress by whom, in 372, he had a son, Adeodatus ('the gift
of God'). Augustine writes glowingly in the Confessions of Adeodatus'
intellectual prowess. 5 He was present at the discussion recorded in On
the Happy Life (written in the autumn of386) and participates with his
father in the dialogue on epistemology, The Teacher (written in 389, the
year of Adeodatus' death). Third, there is society with his friends, not
all of them named. Friendship, among the most highly regarded of the
classical virtues, remained as an important element of Augustine's life
after his conversion, though he was careful to emphasise its subordi-
nation in his new vision of the hierarchy of goods. 6 His first decision
after conversion was to retire to Cassiciacum, north of Milan, in the
company of his friends. Their discussions there are the basis of his
earliest extant writings -Against the Academics (Contra Academicos), On
the Happy Life (De Beata Vita) and On Order (De Ordine). 7 As a bishop,
he lived among his own monastic community - the model of the
Augustinian canons of the middle ages- whose members helped to
spread his reforming influence among contemporaries.
It is the intellectual influences, however, which are the more
obviously and directly relevant to an understanding of Augustine's
thought. By citizenship and cultural orientation he was a Roman. His
formal education was as a Latin rhetorician: he studied first in
Thagaste, his native town, to the south-west of Carthage, then in
neighbouring Madauros and finally in Carthage itself. Later he
taught rhetoric in Thagaste, Carthage, Rome and Milan. The
training centred on the arts of effective speaking and writing and was
an alternative to the less practical pursuit of philosophy. In the
Confessions, Augustine often dwells on the antithesis between form and
content, epitomised in this distinction between the disciplines, and
identifies his sensitivity to form as an impediment to his spiritual
progress. He was first drawn to philosophy through an exhortatory
essay on the subject by Cicero, the great model of the rhetoricians.
This work, the Hortensius, is now lost and even the work on which it
was based, Aristotle's Protrepticus, is known only in fragments. It is
significant for this one episode. Even so there is an irony, for as has
been noted Cicero advocated a sceptical approach to philosophical
questions. Augustine was later to argue against this agnosticism but
not until it had rendered him a final service.
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 43
The tributes which Augustine pays to the effect of the Hortensius on
him, at eighteen or nineteen, are warm. 8 Though not baptised, he was
familiar with the tenets of Christianity from his mother. Stimulated
by the H ortensius to search for wisdom, he turned to the Scriptures. His
reaction was that of the rhetorician: 'To me they seemed quite
unworthy of comparison with the stately prose of Cicero.' 9 But
rebarbative style was neither the only nor the most serious of his
objections. At this time he began his association with Manicheism, an
illegal but influential sect named after the Babylonian prophet, Mani
(c. AD 216-77).
Manicheism derived partly from Christianity, which it regarded as
an incomplete revelation. A powerful element in its teaching was a
critique of the Gospels as reliable narrative and a rejection of the
image of God as presented in the Old Testament. However, its
characteristic doctrine was dualism. It explained the universe as a
compound of two eternally conflicting principles, Light and Darkness
or Good and Evil, each of which was conceived as being limited and
material. The struggle between them was at its most acute in man,
who was a particle of light imprisoned in a body. This analysis
dictated the Manichees' arcane programme of salvation- discrimina-
tion between foods containing light and dark particles and, for the
higher orders, sexual abstinence, based on a refusal to procreate and
thus extend the realm of evil.
In the Confessions, Augustine is contemptuous of Manicheism. Yet
it had held his attention for some ten years. Not only did it offer a
solution to the perennial philosophical problem of the nature and
origin of evil but it explained the experiences of spiritual struggle and
lapse as due to an agency foreign to man's true nature. Augustine's
earliest objections to its teaching stemmed from dissatisfaction with
its spurious scientific and astronomical observations. The first refuge
in his disenchantment was Ciceronian scepticism which he embraced
with fervour as a relieffrom Manichean dogmatics. 10 In this state he
was exposed to the attractions of Neoplatonism. Now resident at
Milan, he found in the preaching of St Ambrose and in his contacts
with other Christian intellectuals there a philosophical exposition of
Christianity which he was later to amplify by a close reading of the
Pauline epistles. He was also introduced to copies of Neoplatonist
works. 11 These were Latin translations made by Marius Victorinus
(d. c. 362), himself a convert to Christianity and an African. Augus-
tine did not then know enough Greek to read them in the original and
44 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

was probably never sufficiently competent to do so extensively. 12 It is

not certain what were the treatises which made so profound an
impression on him at this time, 13 but it seems probable that they
included sections of Plotinus' Enneads and some of Porphyry. His
initial enthusiasm for the vision of a spiritual reality which they
presented was complete. Only gradually did he become conscious of
the technical difficulties of Neoplatonism for the Christian. At the
time, its effect was to dispel the lingering problems of Manicheism
and to leave the way open for his acceptance of Christianity. 14

The Character rif St Augustine's Thought

Almost all that Augustine wrote - some 105 extant books, not
counting his letters, several of which circulated as treatises in their
own righe 5 - dates from after his conversion to Christianity in August
386. All of these works are informed by a conviction of the truth of
Christianity. He was aware of the formal distinction between
conclusions based on revelation and those derivable from
philosophising, in a modern sense, but he would not have regarded as
a useful exercise the attempt by a Christian thinker to preserve it.
Nor, in neglecting to do so, was he offending against the philosophical
norms of the ancient world. His conception of philosophy as an
answer to the quest for human fulfilment would have agreed with that
ofVarro, whom he cites as having listed 288 opinions on the subject. 16
It is in this sense that he thinks of Christianity as philosophy. Though
the verdict would not have been approved by a Neoplatonist of
Porphyry's bent, their modes of thought were not so different. It has
been convincingly shown that Augustine's readiness to interpret the
Scriptures as oracles which have been realised 17 is a direct counter to
Porphyry's attempt to enlist the pagan revelatory utterances in the
service ofNeoplatonism. 18 Augustine was not the first to recognise the
susceptibility of Scripture to this kind of exposition. Philo of
Alexandria had sometimes presented the Old Testament in such a
light, in response to a similar though less explicit stimulus. 19 The
importance of the technique in Augustine's case is that it is at once
symptomatic of the integral character of his thought, in which
philosophy- in the modern sense- at its best complements Scripture,
and of the intellectual climate in which he wrote. The difference in
emphasis as between 'rational' and mystical or revelatory truths in
Augustine and Neoplatonism, even of the Porphyrian strand, is quite
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 45
clear. For Augustine, Scripture is always the primary datum and
philosophising a useful tool for expounding and understanding it. 20
For pagan Neoplatonists, rational reflection must be the starting
point and central feature of their system, if only because of the dearth
of alternatives. But the gulf between philosophy and theology - as
they would now be understood - was not so marked nor did the
transition from one to the other involve such a wrench as the modern
reader might be inclined to suppose. Not only is this consideration
necessary for understanding the character of Augustine's writings. It
helps to explain both his own intellectual progression at the time ofhis
conversion, and that of others such as Marius Victorinus who had
trodden a similar path and by whose example he had been inspired. 21
The essential difference between rational philosophy and Christ-
ianity to Augustine's mind is that the one is fallible and the other
certain. This is the brunt of his apologetic against the Platonists as
against all the pagan schools. Where he felt that a justification of his
method was required it was not against the philosophers but against
the tradition in Christianity itself, particularly marked in sections of
the North African church, which would dispense with philosophising
altogether. The attitude is epitomised in a famous outburst by
Tertullian (c. 160-c 220): 'What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?
What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What
between heretics and Christians? ... Away with all attempts to
produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic and dialectic
composition. We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ
Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel.' 22 Against this way of
thinking, Augustine argued explicitly in his treatise On Christian
Doctrine (De Doctrina Christiana). The considerations which he adduces
are, appropriately and typically, drawn directly from Scripture,
figuratively interpreted:

If those who are called philosophers, especially the Platonists, have

said things which are indeed true and are well accommodated to
our faith, they should not be feared; rather, what they have said
should be taken from them as from unjust possessors and converted
to our use. Just as the Egyptians had not only idols and grave
burdens which the people of Israel detested and avoided, so also
they had vases and ornaments of gold and silver clothing which the
Israelites took with them secretly when they fled, as if to put them
to better use. They did not do this on their own authority but at
46 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

God's commandment, while the Egyptians unwittingly supplied

them with things which they themselves did not use well. In the
same way all the teachings of the pagans contain not only simulated
and superstitious imaginings and grave burdens of unnecessary
labour, which each one of us leaving the society of pagans under the
leadership of Christ ought to abominate and avoid, but also liberal
disciplines more suited to the use of truth, and some most useful
precepts concerning morals. Even some truths concerning the
worship of one God are discovered among them. These are, as it
were, their gold and silver, which they did not institute themselves
but dug up from certain mines of divine Providence .... When the
Christian separates himself in spirit from their miserable society,
he should take this treasure with him for the just use of teaching the
gospel. And their clothing, which is made up of those human
institutions which are accommodated to human society and
necessary to the conduct of life, should be seized and held to be
converted to Christian uses. 23

Begun about the time he became bishop, On Christian Doctrine offers

the key to his subsequent massive output in support and defence ofhis
view ofChristianity. It laid the foundations, moreover, of that learned
Christianity which was to reach its finest expression in the 'human-
ism' of the fifteenth century but which had a worthy tradition
throughout the middle ages. 24
The supercilious tone of these references to the Platonists in On
Christian Doctrine may be attributed to the nature of the case which
Augustine was making there. Elsewhere, he could be more open in his
appreciation of what they had to contribute. 25 There has been much
debate over the extent of Augustine's direct knowledge of Platonism
and the sources on which he relied. The questions have proved
difficult to resolve. It is easier to suggest in general terms what he
owed to the Platonist- and particularly the Neoplatonist- analysis.
Four propositions are of outstanding significance. Firstly, as we have
seen, it impressed him at a critical stage with a perception of the
universe as derived from a unitary and non-material principle. To the
importance of this, his own acknowledgements are ample testimony
and he relied upon it heavily in his controversies with the Manichees.
Secondly, Neoplatonism presented him with a universe in which
there was an objective and intelligible order. The concepts of order
and disorder are recurring features of his thought. Thirdly, he took
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 47
over the Neoplatonist view of soul as a dynamic principle, a substance
ruling a body. It led him to think of soul as identical with personality
and afforded him the basis of a moral theory which in the last resort
always insists on man's responsibility for his actions. The fourth point
of indebtedness is the least technical and the most far reaching.
Augustine's philosophy like Plato's is one not of argument but of
vision and his vision has a distinctly Platonist quality. Though
imperfectly read in the literature of Platonism, he had penetrated to
its essential feature, the recognition that perfection like all the
absolutes is of the transcendent not of the mundane. It is an insight
which affected more than his epistemology. It had most profound
implications for his moral theory, his ecclesiology and his concept of
the place of the Christian in society at large.
As a final comment on the character of Augustine's thought, it is
well to note that much of it was elaborated in response to· rival
theories. The earliest writings are devoted to a resolution of the
problems associated with his own recent intellectual positions- the
brief period of scepticism and the more formidable Manichean
dualism. His ecclesiology was largely developed in argument with the
rigourist thesis of the Donatists. His moral theory, expounded in
defence of freedom of the will against the Manichees, again became an
urgent topic when, from 411 onwards, Pelagius and his followers
advanced their voluntarist doctrine of human perfectibility and
appealed to Augustine's own earlier views to refute his theology of
predestinating grace. The chief source for his views on the relation-
ship between Christianity and secular society is the Ciry of God (De
Civitate Dei), begun as a defence against pagan apologetic. It is not
possible here to follow these successive discussions in detail. Their
significance can, however, be appreciated by considering three
central features of Augustine's thought- his theories on knowing and
willing, on the relationship between God and creatures and on the
organisation and implications of the Christian life.

St Augustine: Knowing and Willing

Augustine's refutation of scepticism takes several forms. Least

important is the dialectical and rather crude attempt, in Against the
Academics, to demonstrate the insufficiency of the theory of probability
as a guide to action. 26 The strongest formal argument is what is
sometimes called the Augustinian 'Cogito' - by analogy with the
48 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

formulation 'Cogito ergo sum' ('I think, therefore I am'), of the

seventeenth-century French philosopher, Descartes. The very act of
doubting .conveys at least one certainty - that the doubting agent
exists. This appears in an undeveloped form in the first work to be
completed by Augustine after his conversion, On the Happy Life (De
Beata Vita), written between Books I and n ofAgainst the Academics. It is
used with more confidence in several of his later works. 27 Its
importance for the character ofhis thought is that it is symptomatic of
his Platonist conviction that certainty is attained from abstract
reflection rather than by reference to sensible reality.
Augustine's account of sensation follows closely from his view of the
nature of the soul. In On the Quantiry of the Soul (De Quantitate Animae),
written in 388, he defined soul as a 'rational substance adapted to
ruling a body'. 28 Although he later reduced the dualism implicit in
this statement by defining man as a composite- a 'rational substance
made up of soul and body' 29 - he continued to take an a priori view of
soul, 30 regarding it as a principle in its own right, superior to body,
and incapable of being acted upon by it. This conception of the
primacy and ruling function of soul led him to think of sensation as
proceeding from the soul. Sensation, for Augustine, is the soul's
responses to the circumstances arising from its union with a body.
Even though sensation has the material as its object, it presupposes,
in his view, a spiritual principle transcending and assessing the
material. 31
For Augustine as for Plato, the points of reference for the
assessment of the world of sense experience are the absolute standards
or archetypal Forms, which in accordance with the Neoplatonist
tradition he locates in the divine mind and regards as the exemplars of
creation. Knowledge of them is not based on experience of sensible
reality but comes from within the soul itself. However, where Plato
had invoked 'reminiscence' to explain the mind's access to universal
ideas, Augustine preferred 'divine illumination'. 32 God, the 'inner
teacher', provides the conditions under which it is possible for man to
glimpse eternal truths of which God is the foundation and which, as
Augustine held, constitute a proof of his existence. The notion of
illumination itself derives ultimately from Plato's conception that the
Form of the Good reveals the whole of the intelligible world like a
sun. 33 Its exact epistemological function in Augustine's theory is far
from clear. 34 In fact, its point there is only partly epistemological.
Like so much else in his thought, the need for divine illumination
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 49
serves to emphasise man's essential dependence, a dependence which
extends even to the exercise of that capacity- rationality- by which
the human species is defined.
This process of knowing reveals one aspect of soul's operations.
Another aspect, which had great significance for Augustine's early
thought, is its implications for moral theory. The connection is best
studied in On Free Will (De Libero Arbitrio), a treatise, mostly in
dialogue form, which Augustine began in 388 but which he did not
complete until some eight years later. Its fundamental arguments are
aimed at the Manichees: the soul rules the body in virtue of the
subordination of lower reality to higher. There is no external force
capable of binding the soul to evil action. Therefore, evil action is due
to its own will or free choice. But the interest of the treatise is by no
means confined to its application against Manicheism. There is also
laid the foundation of much of Augustine's later thought. How is it, he
asks, that if all men will and choose happiness and the will is an
efficacious agent, not all obtain happiness? 35 It is the Socratic
question and it is answered, in what will become typical Augustinian
terms, by distinguishing between the orders of the objectives at which
the will aims. 'It is ... manifest that some men are lovers of (that is,
will to achieve) eternal things, others of temporal things.' 36 The
security of their happiness is determined accordingly. Here is
adumbrated an argument which will be a central thesis of the Ciry of
God.
Because of the nature of its apologetic, On Free Will is a highly
optimistic statement of Augustine's theory of moral choice. It
contained much to which the Pelagians could later appeal as seeming
to corroborate their views. However, read as a whole it cannot be said
to be formally inconsistent with Augustine's later pessimistic state-
ments on the subject, in his controversy with the Pelagians over the
necessity of grace for human perfection. The differences are largely of
emphasis and perspective. The last part of On Free Will may date from
as late as 396. This would make it close in time to the treatise To
Simplician, On Various Questions, in the second book of which the Epistle
to the Romans is expounded along rigorously predestinatory lines. 37
For that reason, it is not at all surprising to find towards the end of On
Free Will what is surely the key to understanding Augustine's doctrine
of the effect of the grace of election upon the will.

The will is not enticed to do anything except by something that has

50 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

been perceived. It is in man's power to take or reject this or that,

but it is not in man's power to control the things which will affect
him when they are perceived. We must admit therefore, that the
mind is affected by perceptions both of superior things and of
inferior things. Thus the rational creature may take from either
what it will, and, according to its deserts in making the choice, it
obtains as a consequence either misery or happiness. 38

Election is to the will what illumination is to the mind. It is the grant

of a conviction as to the true nature ofhappiness sufficient to produce
free conduct directed towards its attainment. In so far as this is simply
a recognition of the bond between insight and action, Augustine is
fully in accord with the Socratic tradition. But his theory departs
radically from it in allowing for the inscrutable and irreproachably
arbitrary act of God which supplies the conditions of varying
motivation.

St Augustine: God and Creatures

Augustine's treatment of moral choice is simply a particular applica-

tion of a general principle in his thought, that God is the ultimate
source of all good- including, that is, man's virtuous acts. The more
general application of the principle can be followed in his account of
the origin of reality. His Literal Commentary on Genesis (De Genesi ad
Litteram), written in the period 401-14, contains a detailed analysis of
the work of creation in which the biblical narrative is amplified by the
use of philosophical material. A prime example is his application of
the Stoic theory of 'seminal reasons' to show that creation included,
latently at least, all the causes of subsequent developments in the
physical order. Although God rested from his labours on the seventh
day, he had already established germinally in the perfected condi-
tion of his creation a dynamism sufficient to account for what
followed. 39 This idea would play an important part in the defence of
God's unique creativity mounted by some thirteenth-century
theologians against the challenge of the naturalistic Aristotelian
theory.
A more explicitly philosophical summary of the origin of reality is
found in On the Nature of the Good (De Natura Boni), written in 404. God
is the supreme good and alone is unchangeable. All that exists is
created by him. (This is to deny any independent, co-eternal
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 51

substratum from which reality might be brought into being; on the

model of Plato's Timaeus. Augustine did not reject the idea of such a
substratum or prime matter but insisted that it too must owe to God
whatever being it may be said to have.) Everything that exists apart
from God - all created spiritual and all corporeal reality - is
essentially mutable. (This, and the point made at the beginning of the
treatise, that while things have their origin from God they are not part
ofhim, is a rebuttal of the Manichean view that the highest aspect of
man derives from the divine substance. Mutability epitomises the gulf
between God and creatures, mirroring the Platonic distinction
between the absolute and the relative.) No creature is absolutely good
but all are relatively good. There is no such thing as evil, only degrees
of good. 'All things are good; better in proportion as they are better
measured, formed and ordered, less good where there is less of
measure, form and order.' 40 Where there is no measure, form and
order, there is no goodness but that is to say that there is nothing. Evil
is defined in relation to goodness, of which it is a corruption, being evil
only in so far as it is corrupt. Similarly, the very notion of
corruptibility implies a degree of goodness, that which can be
corrupted. Only rational beings are capable of happiness or its
opposite and their happiness consists in exercising the power which
they have not to be corrupted. It is at this point alone in the universe
that disorder is possible, for 'terrestrial things', that is infra-rational
beings, 'have peace with celestial things, being as it were submissive
to things which are more excellent than they are' .41 Even this capacity
for disorder, however, is part of the cosmic order and its consequences
become part of the order ofjustice. 42
It can be readily seen from this exposition how much Augustine's
cosmology owed to the classical outlook, especially Neoplatonism.
Where he departed from it, it was in response to the demands of
Judaeo-Christian revelation. Several of these divergences, such as his
Trinitarian doctrine and his insistence on a resurrection of the body ,43
for all their importance theologically, had little general effect upon the
character of his thought. One difference however is of profound
significance: his infusion of the J udaeo-Christian concept of a free and
deliberate creation to replace the Neoplatonist structure of mechani-
cal and necessary emanation. Not that he regarded this as a
controversial point. He was familiar with the doctrine of the Timaeus
and considered it to be so close to Genesis as to suggest that Plato
might have been influenced by Judaism. 44 However, the effect of
52 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

attributing all that exists to a free act of the creator was not only to
break the chain of necessity in the process of outgoing but also in that
of cosmic return. Augustine's view of the relation of creatures to
creator is one of total dependence and contingency, unmitigated by
any necessity, whether in the analysis of origin or of destiny. The
question only became critical in regard to the destiny of man himself,
but it is precisely the relationship between man and God which is the
core of Augustine's thought. Here there was the complication of what
Augustine saw as man's vitiated nature. The story of man's primal
disobedience and its consequences was understood by him as a
breach of cosmic harmony. Though perfect in its origin, man's nature
seemed manifestly imperfect. There is, in Augustine, a rift between
man and his origin which defies his own powers to transcend. This is a
concept quite foreign to the pagan Neoplatonist account. It is the
point at which Augustinian theology is most sharply distinguished
from the classical philosophical tradition.

St Augustine: Christian Life

So far as Augustine may be said to have a political or social theory, it

is rooted in a particular view of the history and destiny of mankind.
His interpretation of history is noteworthy on several counts. It is
another point on which he is distinguished sharply from the pagan
philosophical tradition; to some extent also it distinguishes him from
the Latin Christian tradition in which he wrote. In the first place,
against the Neoplatonist theory of cosmic cycles, developed from the
Stoics, according to which universes succeed one another indefinitely
and souls transmigrate, he offered a linear view of history. He thus
safeguarded the unique character of the divine interventions in
human affairs which constituted Judaeo-Christian revelation, and
preserved the value of the individual lives on the basis of which men
are eternally established as elect or reprobate. Secondly, he relied on
Scripture for an interpretation of the past which could not be attained
by philosophical reflection alone. It is an excellent example of the
priority and indispensability of revelation in Augustine's system.
Thirdly, in his mature thought, he refused to speculate on the detailed
course of the relationship between God and man after the conclusion
of this revealed or 'sacred' history. His diffidence contrasts with the
earlier, chiliastic outlook ofChristianity. This had lasted longer in the
west than in the Greek church where it had been effectively
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 53
discouraged by the theology of the Alexandrian school. According to
Augustine, the sixth day of the world began with Christ's nativity and
its length is unknown. 45 It is followed by the seventh day, when
eternal rest begins. His stance on this subject was important. Even his
authority did not quell millenarian expectation, which continued
sporadically throughout the middle ages, receiving its fullest intellec-
tual expression in the works ofJoachim ofFiore (c. 1145-1202), but it
ensured that it would be a minority attitude set against an official and
standard view formed by his account. 46
The success of Augustine's analysis of the Christian life is largely
due to the fact that he thus accepted a framework in which the end of
the world might be indefinitely delayed, and that in accepting it he
laid down principles applicable to all times. He retained the sense of
Christian detachment from the world, typified by chiliasm, but
adapted it to a new environment. Where hostility to Christianity was
no longer generally overt and where it was being officially patronised
by the state which had once persecuted it, the distinction between
spiritual and secular values was less marked. Augustine devoted
much thought to maintaining that distinction in circumstances where
the Christian was called upon to take an active part in society.
Detachment or other-worldliness is the dominant theme of Augus-
tine's description of the Christian life. The classic expression of this
detachment and of its opposite, worldliness, is found in the City of God,
on which he was engaged from 413 to c. 427. In his Retractations,
completed in 427, in which he surveys and frequently corrects his
writings, and in the course of the work itself, Augustine shows that he
thought of the City of God as falling into two parts. Its first ten books
are an attack on polytheism, whether inspired by the desire for earthly
or for eternal happiness (Books I-V and VI-X, respectively). They
contain much that is of interest for assessing his knowledge and
appreciation of classical culture. This is particularly true as regards
classical philosophy and in the arguments of Books VI-X he has the
Neoplatonists chiefly in mind. But the subject of the second part of the
work, comprising its remaining twelve books, is of more universal
significance. It is the origin, history and destiny of two 'cities' or
mystical societies - the City of God and the earthly city, or as he
sometimes calls it, the City of Man, or of the Devil- which between
them encompass all created rational beings. Augustine's account of
them, written comparatively late in his life, contains directly or by
implication many of his most important perceptions.
54 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

The very definition of the two 'cities' derives from Augustine's

basic insight: the relationship between happiness and right ordering
of the affections. He had long before observed how 'Some men are
lovers of eternal things, others of temporal things'. The City of God is
an analysis of the logic of these diverse orientations. Two loves create
two societies47 and these societies are as different as the goals by which
they are attracted and defined. In terms of its remote ancestry, much
of Augustine's psychological and social doctrine can be read as an
adaptation of the Platonic theory of eros (love), particularly the
distinction which Plato had made in the Symposium and in thePhaedrus,
between physical and heavenly eros. 48 Love, for Augustine, is the
motive force of the will. 49 'My love is my weight', he remarks in the
Confessions: 50 that is, I gravitate towards the object of my affections.
But the love of higher things- summed up in the idea oflove of God-
he regarded as being beyond the capacity of man's debased nature.
Where it exists in man it must be attributed to the grace of election. A
statement of the membership of the city of God involves the use both
of the concepts of spontaneous love of God and of love of God
generated by grace. Thus, it includes the good angels of Christian
biblical exegesis and that part of the human race- Augustine tends to
think of them as a minority - who have been elected by grace to
eternal salvation and, by virtue of the conviction which they have
been granted, choose the heavenly goal. The rest of mankind and the
fallen angels are members of the earthly city.
The human membership of these cities is known only eschatologi-
cally- at the Last] udgemen t. In the course ofexpounding Revelation
20. 2-3, Augustine interprets the reference there to the devil's
confinement under seal, as follows: 'And the addition of "set a seal
upon him" seems to me to mean that it was designed to keep it a secret
who belonged to the devil's party and who did not. For in this world
this is a secret, for we cannot tell whether even the man who seems to
stand shall fall, or whether he who seems to lie shall rise again.' 51
Accordingly, there is no visible society either of the unregenerate or of
the elect, though there is of course in the case of the elect a community
of minds devoted to the same perfect object, just as there is, with less
unity of purpose, a tacit agreement among the unregenerate on the
priority of what are objectively lesser goods. The church itself is a
mixed society, as Augustine had vigorously maintained against the
Donatists. The concept which he held of the church and the triumph of
which he did much to ensure was an expansive one, capable of
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 55
including all within its membership. This meant, as he realised, that
some church members would be Christian only in the formal or
external sense. 5 2 By accepting this and at the same time defining true
Christianity in terms as rigorously exclusive as those ofDonatism, he
managed to combine two divergent approaches to ecclesiology. The
achievement of the perfect society, which was the Donatist aim, was
transferred by Augustine from the mundane to the transcendent
order. 53
The state too is a mixed society. Augustine's attitude towards it is
never hostile, though taken as a whole it is reserved. He would have
accepted Aristotle's dictum that man is a social animal but the
political ordering of society he regarded as a consequence of human
nature only in the sense that human nature was debased. 5 4 This is by
no means to disparage the state's legitimacy. He followed St Paul
(Romans, 13) in regarding government as part of the providential
decree, and his tendency is to emphasise the coercive function of the
state as imposing an order upon men who are for the most part
incapable of generating their own good order. In his combination of
pessimism and authoritarianism he has been well compared to
Hobbes. 55 His lively regard for the blessings of peace no doubt reflects
an apprehension born of an unstable world. It must be one reason for
his ready acceptance of government as divinely ordained. There is
also, however, the fact that he was writing when the catholic position
was immune from persecution. Several of his firmest statements on
deference to authority are made with the Donatists in mind. 56 It
should not be assumed that had circumstances been otherwise he
would have found it impossible to make the same transition as
sixteenth-century Calvinists from the doctrine of non-resistance,
which characterised the early phase, to the justified rebellion held by
Knox and the Huguenots. Augustine was neither a systematic nor a
wholly consistent thinker. However, as it was elaborated, the trend of
his thought on this point is clear. It exalts the legitimacy of temporal
authority and emphasises the duty ofobedience, except where there is
conflict with divine law. Even then, the duty to refuse obedience is
not developed into a right of resistance and it would appear that the
subject's only alternative is to follow the lead of the martyrs. 57
For the most part, Augustine's view of the state is as of something
peripheral - a context, largely neutral, in which the Christian lives
according to his own principles. His theory is a minimalist one. He
rejected Cicero's definition of a republic as 'a multitude joined
56 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

together by agreement on law (or right) and by community of

interest'. 58 In doing so he was rejecting the classical concept of the
state. There· was no consensus as to law or right considered
absolutely. Among the multitude embraced by the secular framework
were the citizens of the heavenly city for whom law meant the law of
God and right an absolute principle. The extent of their agreement
with their secular fellows must be more modestly stated than in the
classical formula. But they did have basic interests in common, and
this community of interest is for Augustine what defines the state. 5 9
The state has a law and a resulting peace which is to be used but not
mistaken for the goal. 60
This resignation to the disparity between heavenly and earthly
standards helps to explain the narrow elaboration of Augustine's
'political thought' and in particular his lack of interest in prescribing
for the reformation of earthly society. His general reticence on the
point is well illustrated by his treatment of one important aspect of
justice- ownership of property:

If we look carefully at what is written: 'The whole world is the

wealth of the faithful man, but the unfaithful one has not a penny,'
(Proverbs 17 .6) do we not prove that those who seem to rejoice in
lawfully acquired gains, and do not know how to use them, are
really in possession of other men's property? Certainly, what is
lawfully possessed is not another's property, but 'lawfully' means
justly and justly means rightly. He who uses his wealth badly
possesses it wrongfully, and wrongful possession means that it is
another's property. You see, then, how many there are who ought
to make restitution of another's goods, although those to whom
restitution is due may be few; wherever they are, their claim to just
possession is in proportion to their indifference to wealth. Obvious-
ly, no one possesses justice unlawfully: whoever does not love it
does not have it; but money is wrongly possessed by bad men while
good men who love it least have the best right to it. In this life the
wrong of evil possessors is endured and among them certain laws
are established which are called civil laws, not because they bring
men to make a good use of their wealth, but because those who
make a bad use of it become thereby less injurious. This comes
about either because some of them become faithful and fervent -
and these have a right to all things - or because those who live
among them are not hampered by their evil deeds, but are tested
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 57
until they come to that City where they are heirs to eternity, where
the just alone have a place, the wise alone leadership, and those
who are there possess what is truly their own. 61

On the level of strict theory, only the just have a true title to
ownership, but Augustine does not advocate its application. The
perfect and imperfect, ideal and mundane, remain sharply dif-
ferentiated and effectively separate. 62 However, although this is
Augustine's approach, his line of argument here has a wider
significance. It was taken over and developed by a series of thinkers in
the later middle ages, notably Giles of Rome, Richard FitzRalph and
John Wyclif, and was to be a fertile source of radical reforming theory.
Augustine's chief preoccupation in defining the role of the state is
with ensuring that the Christian can never allow his horizons to be
limited by inferior standards. He is constantly concerned to maintain
the distinction between the two dimensions, absolute and relative.
While doing so, however, he does not oppose the Christian's
participation in affairs of state. Indeed he is careful to show that there
is no incompatibility between the spiritual vocation and the discharge
of public responsibility. He was conscious of the need to reassure
opinion within the African church on this point:

We find now the citizen of Jerusalem, citizen of the kingdom of

heaven, involved in earthly administration, as for instance, wear-
ing the purple, being a magistrate, an aedile, proconsul, emperor,
governing the earthly republic; but he has his heart above if he is a
Christian, ifhe is of the faithful, of the devout, ifhe sets slight value
on where he is at present and places his hopes on where he is not
yet .... Let us not despair therefore of citizens of the kingdom of
heaven when we sec them engaged in some of Babylon's affairs or
on something earthly in the earthly republic.

(The converse is that the exercise of ecclesiastical office is no

guarantee of election.) 63 He was also conscious of the need to silence a
strand of pagan apologetic which associated Christianity with the
decline of Roman power. He replied specifically to charges that the
gospel precepts against rendering evil for evil and requiring the
turning of the check were incompatible with the duties of citizenship.
The precepts, he says, refer to internal disposition rather than to
external action. 64 In particular, he allowed of the 'just war' - that
58 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

fought in defence or to redress an injury - and did not forbid the

Christian to take part in it, any more than to exercise other offices
within the state. 65 His intention should be to effect a salutary remedy
and he should be without rancour. As always for Augustine, it is
preservation of personal or moral integrity, in a way reminiscent of
Stoic ethics but here associated with the pursuit of higher aims, which
marks the Christian, even in secular activity, and distinguishes him
from his non-Christian fellow.
The strict tenor of Augustine's thought on the nature of the two
cities, as summarised here, would seem to demonstrate the futility of
secular intervention in spiritual matters, and the superfluity of any
theocracy. There is however the paradox that in combating first the
Donatists and then the Pelagians he was prepared both to condone
and to invoke the use of coercion against them by the imperial
authorities. It is possible that in no small part this dark side of
Augustine's episcopal career was a pragmatic reaction which he then
sought to justify on the theoretical level. But the attitude is not
entirely out ofkeeping with some ofhis general perceptions. 66 He was
aware from his own experience of the force of external stimuli in the
achievement of conversion, even allowing for the fact that divine
predestination was both a prerequisite for conversion and in itself an
effective direction towards it. It is the dilemma which faces all who
believe in an inexorable process- whether to aid it or simply await it.
Having once allowed, in contrast to the Donatists, for a church that
was mixed, the theoretical obstacle to secular coercion was much
reduced. Augustine did not promote a union of church and state. If
this was because he considered it fantastic and impractical within the
contemporary context, he showed a discernment which lesser think-
ers in the Augustinian tradition sometimes lacked. Nor does his
thought, on the whole, envisage the fusion of secular and spiritual
ends, even in a hierarchical relationship: quite the reverse. However,
it is undeniable that his theorising, elaborated over a long period and
in response to a variety of problems, contained the germs of such a
high ecclesiastical doctrine. His medieval commentators who
developed that position were not perhaps thereby doing violence to
classic Augustinianism. Given Augustine's own capacity to develop
his views in reaction to changed circumstances, they might be said to
have merely updated him in a manner of which he would perhaps
have approved. But a development it was. In the last analysis, the
relationship of state to church in Augustine's own writings cannot be
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 59
neatly stated. They contain as much to justify a theory of radical
dissociation as of partnership.

II Boethius: Executor of Antiquity

The Historical Background to Boethius' Work

In the half century following St Augustine's death, the barbarian

tribes consolidated their occupation of most of the western part of the
Roman empire. By the late fifth century, Britain w,as lost to the Angles
and Saxons- though the Britons continued to mount a resistance-
while the Vandals had secured control of Roman North Africa. Most
of Spain became a Visigothic kingdom and Gaul a Frankish kingdom
under Clovis. In Spain at least and to an extent also in Africa, the
invaders retained the Roman administrative system, while replacing
the military structure. The process of change was therefore less
sudden than might be thought. As may be expected, the continuity
was greatest in Italy. The deposition in 476 of the last Roman
emperor in the west, the ironically named Romulus Augustulus, by
Odoacer, king of the East German federates, is not regarded by
modern scholars as the significant event that it appeared to historians
of the older school. Nor was it regarded by contemporaries as the
demise of Roman authority in Italy. In theory, this authority was now
resumed by the Eastern emperors. To it, the barbarians who now
ruled Italy looked for the titles which would justify and clothe with
legality their jurisdiction over Roman citizens. Through the agency of
the senate, Odoacer negotiated with the emperor, Zeno, for the style
of patrician and though the emperor refused it, he was forced to
accept the de facto regime. There was a weakness in this situation from
Odoacer's viewpoint, as he was vulnerable to attack by rival forces
acting with the emperor's connivance. The threat materialised in 488
when Zeno, to rid himself of the Ostrogoth king, Theoderic, who was
ravaging Thrace, commissioned him to expel Odoacer from Italy. In
493 Theoderic killed Odoacer, occupied Ravenna, the seat of his rule,
and took his place as unofficial regent. As such, he retained the
ancient forms. The senate remained, as an institution of prestige, and
the civil administration was for the most part exercised by Romans,
holding the traditional offices. As the Ostrogoths were Arians there
was a religious difference between the two peoples. Theoderic's policy
however was one of toleration, unlike Vandal rule in Africa under
60 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

which catholicism was remorselessly persecuted. 'We cannot give

orders as to religious belief,' he is reported as saying, 'since no one can
be compelled to believe against his will.' 67
The career of the aristocrat, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius,
is itself an illustration of the administrative continuity. He was born
probably about 480. His father had been prefect and consul under
Odoacer. Symmachus, his guardian after his father's death and later
his father-in-law, was leader of the senate. 68 Nothing is known of
Boethius' earliest relations with the new king but in 510 he became
consul, an appointment in Theoderic's hands. The nomination of his
sons, Boethius and Symmachus, as joint consuls in 522 was a signal
compliment to him. In the same year, he became Master of Offices, at
the head of the civil government. The turn in his fortune, which was
the occasion of the Consolation qf Philosophy, was as dramatic as job's.
In 523 Theoderic suspected a plot on behalf of the emperor or, as is
more likely, on behalf of the emperor's nephew, justinian, the power
behind the throne. He arrested the pro-consul, Albin us, whose letters
had been intercepted. When Boethius intervened for the defence, he
too was arrested on a charge of treason. It was during his imprison-
ment at Pavia, awaiting execution, that the Consolation was written.
Albin us and he were not the only notable casualties of the purge. In
the following year Symmachus also was executed.

Boethius the Logician

These distinguished figures, Symmachus and Boethius, combined an

active part in public life with a lively interest in scholarship. It is an
indication of the growing rift between the Greek and Latin worlds as
well as ofhis own intellectual bent that Boethius proposed to translate
the complete works of Plato and Aristotle, with a commentary
harmonising their differences. 69 A synthetic treatment of the two
philosophers was not at all an original project. As has already been
noted, it was characteristic of Middle Platonism and remained a
salient feature ofNeoplatonism. Nor did Boethius feel rigidly bound
by the programme. 70 In the event, he seems not to have got beyond
Aristotle's logic. His contribution here, however, was of momentous
importance. Working in a scrupulously literal fashion, he translated
all of the Organon, though his version of the Posterior Anarytics has not
survived. He also translated thelsagoge or Introduction which Porphyry
had written as an accompaniment to Aristotle's Categories, and
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 61
produced two editions of a commentary upon it. The first edition of
his commentary he based on a Latin paraphrase of the Isagoge by
Marius Victorious which continued to be influential in the middle
ages. Having subsequently made his own translation, he issued the
second and fuller edition of his commentary. A point of great interest
for the middle ages about these expositions ofthelsagoge was that they
contained an explicit discussion of the status of universal concepts. As
for the Aristotelian works themselves, commentaries by Boethius on
the Categories and on the De lnterpretatione (the latter in two editions,
one avowedly for beginners and the other for advanced students) were
to have wide circulation. Less important was his commentary on
Cicero's Topics, a reworking by the great Latin rhetorician of
Aristotle's treatise of the same name. Boethius compiled too a number
of independent treatises on special aspects of logic, namely the
syllogism (three treatises, entitled 'Introduction to the Categorical
Syllogism', 'On the Categorical Syllogism' - in two books, of which
the first broadly parallels the 'Introduction'- and 'On the Hypotheti-
cal Syllogism'), 'division' (that is, analytical method) and 'topical
differences' (the technique of argument in logic and rhetoric).
Boethius' knowledge of late classical scholarship may not have
been so extensive as was once thought. It is possible that much of the
material on which he based his logical commentaries and indepen-
dent treatises came from scholiastic notes in contemporary editions of
the Organon, 71 though it need not be assumed that he was wholly
dependent on such aids since it is at least as likely that he had direct
access to the authorities on which they were based. Certainly, he is a
writer whose influence far exceeded his originality. Moreover, in
assessing his influence on logical study some qualification is neces-
sary. He was not the only source for a knowledge of ancient logic in the
early middle ages. Much of the doctrine of the Categories, some of the
De Interpretatione and a compressed treatment of the syllogism was
provided by Book IV of the immensely influential Marriage of Philology
and Mercury (De Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae) by Martianus Capella.
The evidence of surviving manuscripts clearly indicates the impor-
tant part played by Martian us' treatise in the tenth-century revival of
logic. 72 As for a text of the Categories, the most influential version
during the Carolingian renaissance was a paraphrase dating prob-
ably from the second half of the fourth century and wrongly attributed
to St Augustine. It was not until the eleventh century that Boethius'
translation supplanted this as the standard source. For the De
62 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

lnterpretatione, a Latin work known as Perihermeneias -a transliteration

of the Greek title- attributed to the second-century writer Apuleius
was used in the middle ages, as will be noted later. However, when all
is said, Boethius remains the pivotal figure in the history of medieval
logic. Without his translations and explanatory treatises, the history
not only oflogic but of philosophical debate in the early middle ages
would have been different and the progress towards a recovery of the
ancient expertise slower and more painful.

Boethius the Christian Theologian

Boethius is now generally accepted as the author of four theological

treatises. Three of these (I, II and v in the manuscript order) relate to
contemporary concern with the formulation of doctrine on the Divine
Trinity. A fourth (m in the manuscript order) is in fact a purely
philosophical essay on being and goodness. The authorship of a fifth
treatise (Iv in the manuscript order), with the late title De Fide
Catholica, which is also attributed to him, has been much debated but
now seems probable. 73 This theological writing has a twofold interest.
In the first place, Boethius' elaboration of the doctrine of the Trinity
presages the philosophical approach to theology which will be so
prominent a feature of the intellectual history of the high middle ages.
His 'sacred treatises', especially the De Trinitate ('On the Trinity')
were a source and model of much later work. He was not, of course,
the earliest exponent of the method in the Latin church. Besides the
highly philosophical content of much ofSt Augustine's work, to which
Boethius acknowledged his indebtedness, there is the example of
Marius Victorious' Neoplatonist defence of the Nicene creed. 74 But
Boethius is noteworthy for having explicitly advocated the disciplined
reconciliation of reason and faith and for the confidence with which he
wrote to that end. Secondly, and with more immediate point, his
theological writing is significant for an interpretation of the Consolation
rif Philosoplry. It may also have had a bearing on the circumstances
surrounding his fall from favour with Theoderic.
The fact that the Consolation rif Philosophy is devoid of Christian
reference led critics in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to
challenge the medieval tradition that Boethius had been a martyr and
to question whether he had been a Christian at all. However, his
formal religious position at least was established by a fragment of
Cassiodorus published in 1877 and known after its discoverer as the
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 63
Anecdoton Holderi. This credited Boethius with having written 'a book
on the Holy Trinity, certain doctrinal articles and a book against
Nestorius'. 75 Nestorius, a fifth-century archbishop ofConstantinople,
had held that there were two persons as well as two natures in Christ,
against the more generally accepted doctrine that there were two
natures but one person. Nestorius' views in turn had evoked an
extremist reaction, the Monophysitism ofEutyches, who insisted that
there was only one nature in Christ, the divine nature. The formula
'two natures and one person' was sanctioned by the council of
Chalcedon in 451. Nestorius was condemned and Nestorianism
rapidly dwindled in the Greek world, though it spread through Persia
and as far as India and China. Monophysitism, however, endured as
an obstacle to the religious unity of the Greek empire. When Boethius
wrote his Trinitarian essays (c. 512-22) strenuous efforts were being
made by the court of Constantinople to resolve the issue. Theo-
paschism, a version of the catholic position, advanced by a group
of Latin-speaking Scythian monks to the effect that 'one of the Trinity
suffered in the flesh', was promoted as a possible compromise. It has
been plausibly argued that Boethius' treatment, particularly his tract
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium ('Against Eutyches and Nestorius'),
should be interpreted as a contribution specifically to this quest for a
settlement. 76 Albinus is known to have been interested in the
Theopaschite debate and it is probable that Symmachus too was
involved in the contacts over it. Theological unity would have been a
notable advantage to Justinian in his aim ofpolitical unity through-
out the empire. In such circumstances, Boethius' involvement in the
theological debate may well have aggravated Theoderic's suspicions.
His denial of the charges against him might simply indicate that he
did not regard any association with imperial policy as treason. It is
not therefore incompatible with this interpretation of his theological
activity or with the philosophical integrity which readers of the
Consolation would wish to attribute to him.

The Consolation of Philosophy

The central themes of the Consolation are not at all original. They are
variation of fortune (Books n-m), the nature of evil (Books m-rv) and
the compatibility of providence with freedom of choice (Book v). In
his treatment of them, moreover, Boethius has been shown to draw
heavily on the Greek tradition. 77 But the book is not simply a mosaic
64 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

of doctrine from the various schools. The circumstances in which

Boethius ppses these time-honoured problems removes them from a
purely speculative plane and the urgency which they acquire gives his
treatment of them a unique character. The Consolation demands
reading both as a record of the philosopher's reaction to personal
crisis and as evidence of the intellectual climate of the time. The two
aspects are closely linked. The intellectual historian is interested in
the problems which are tabled for discussion, though in large part
they may be supposed to derive from Boethius' predicament; he is
interested still more in the materials which were available or which
were chosen for their solution. The distinction between what was
available and what was chosen leads in particular to questions
regarding the depth ofBoethius' Christianity. Assuming him to have
been indeed the author of the theological tractates attributed to him,
he was, in western terms, an orthodox Christian. Did he, as has been
emphatically argued, abandon Christianity and turn to philosophy as
the sole consolation?78 Or did he tacitly set out to keep separate the
dictates of faith and reason and thereby merit the title which has been
accorded him of being the first scholastic?79 The problem which the
reader sees in accepting the second interpretation is that it injects an
element of artificiality into the work, reducing the realistic description
of the prisoner's dejection and gradual rationalisation of his plight to
literary verisimilitude. The victim of the mental depression portrayed
in Book 1 may only with difficulty be supposed capable of spontane-
ously excluding one of his sources of support. That is not to say that
the Consolation is devoid of artifice. The sufferings of the prisoner and
the effect on him of Philosophy's appearance are described in a highly
technical, almost stilted, fashion. 80 But it seems best to take the order
of progression in the Consolation at face value. Boethius may be
assumed to have been a Christian, in the sense of a believer in a
personal God and in a providential ordering of the universe. These
two fundamental doctrines, easily reconciled with prosperity, were
put under the severest pressure and perhaps even shattered by the
reversal of his fortunes. It should be remembered what alternative
interpretation of man's cosmic role presented itself. A prominent
strand of the classical culture in which Boethius was steeped was that
man is either the plaything of chance or the pawn of an inexorable
Fate. In this context the Consolation exhibits a real development.
There is a psychological progress from a point where the possibility of
providence requires detailed explanation to a position where it is
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 65
considered reconciled or at least reconcilable with the inequity of the
world's order as man experiences it.
The form of the Consolation is five books of alternating prose and
metrical verse passages. The combination of prose and verse derives
ultimately from the satires of the Greek Cynic philosopher Menippus
(third century BC) but the technique had been imitated in Latin by
Varro and had also been used by Martian us Capella in his Marriage rif
Philology and Mercury. Not only is Boethius' poetry highly accomp-
lished; it discharges a function similar to that of the myth in Plato's
dialogues, by encapsulating the point at issue and advancing it rather
more freely than is possible in prose.
Book r is largely autobiographical. It describes the prisoner's
account of his career and high intentions to his visitor, the Lady
Philosophy, whose disciple he has long been. These passages are of
great interest in providing hints of the circumstances of Boethius'
downfall and offering historical insights into the character of
Theoderic's regime. This is particularly true of Chapter 4, where
Boethius is shown restraining excesses among Gothic officials in Italy
and enjoying the king's support in doing so. But the theme of
principal concern to the work as a whole is the puzzle posed by the
prosperity of the wicked, succinctly stated in metric 5:

For why should slippery chance

Rule all things with such doubtful governance?
Or why should punishments,
Due to the guilty, light on innocents?81

This leads directly to an examination of the fickleness of Fortune,

which is the subject of Book n. Fortune gives, Fortune takes away and
will suffer no rebuke for doing so, justifying herself in an image which
becomes part of the stock in trade of medieval moralists:

I may boldly affirm that if those things which you complain have
been taken from you had been your own, you should never have lost
them. Must I only be forbidden to exercise my right? It is lawful for
heaven to bring forth fair days and to hide them again in darksome
nights. It is lawful for the year sometimes to compass the face of the
earth with flowers and fruits and sometimes to cover it with clouds
and cold .... And shall the insatiable desire of men tie me to
constancy, so contrary to my custom? This is my bent, this is the
66 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

sport in which I continually indulge. I rotate my wheel with speed

and take a pleasure in turning things upside down. Ascend, if you
will, but with this condition, that you think it not an injury to
descend when the course of my sport so requires. 82

Philosophy then proceeds to rationalise this state of affairs, in what is

undoubtedly the most successful part of the Consolation. What is
presented, tacitly, is the Stoic doctrine: man's happiness is not or
should not be dependent on the accidental gifts of Fortune but
consists in his own integrity. Furthermore, loss of Fortune is a
valuable lesson which the philosopher should be glad to learn.
Book III extends this consideration of true happiness. By expound-
ing the Socratic doctrine that the purpose of men's actions is the good
as they see it, Philosophy faces up to the apparent prosperity of the
wicked in their designs. Their accomplishment of their purposes,
given that these are misguided, is in fact a greater evil than their
failure to accomplish them. They have sought the good without
having properly discerned in what it consists and therefore obtain
only the shadow of it. The argument is continued in the first four
chapters of Book IV. These rest ultimately for their substance on
Plato's Gorgias, the dialogue in which Socrates smartly quashes the
contention that might is right. Wicked men too desire the good but are
powerless to obtain it. They are therefore unhappy when they attain
their desire and particularly so when they remain unpunished. Those
who commit wrong are more to be pitied than those who suffer it.
The prisoner is now in quite a different mental state to that of Book
I. The nominal purpose of the Consolation has been achieved, though
some of its most important arguments as it stands are yet to come.
The remainder of Book IV considers how the existence of evil is
compatible with the idea of divine governance of the world. 83 A basic
and explicit conception underlies the discussion: since God, though
omnipotent, is incapable of doing evil, evil is not a positive factor but a
deprivation or absence of good. It is the same definition as that
arrived at by St Augustine and it comes from the same, Neoplatonist,
philosophical tradition. The solution offered is that all that appears
wickedly done is part of the providential dispensation- of which Fate
is the cosmic agent- and tends towards a beneficial result.
Book v examines an implication of this doctrine of providential
disposition, querying how it can be compatible in the first place with
chance and in the second with human freedom. On the first point, it is
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 67
suggested that chance, in the sense of an uncaused event, does not
exist. There is what readers of Horace Walpole would recognise as
Serendipity, a fortunate concurrence of circumstances, which is also
part of the providential ordinance. The resolution of the second point
depends on a precise definition of the sphere in which Providence
operates- an extension of the distinction between Providence and
Fate made in Book rv. This introduces, not for the first time in
Boethius' writing, 84 a concept of eternity different in quality from that
of perpetuity. The two orders, of eternity and of time - even
considered as indefinitely prolonged - are distinct. The eternal does
not impinge on the order of time and eternal awareness of an event no
more determines it than the detached observation of events in the
temporal order influences them. The treatment is subtle, draws
heavily on Aristotelian logic and is important for having provided a
terminology for the discussion of the problem. But it is essentially a
limited exercise on a technical topic. Its conclusion, that the nature of
divine awareness, abscinded from time, does not affect the quality of
what to man are future events, became the standard medieval opinion
on the subject.

Boethius and the Liberal Arts Tradition

Boethius' logical corpus and the ever popular Consolation qf Philosophy,

which attracted a long line of translators and commentators,85 are his
most important achievements for the history of thought. However, he
also stands with a number of other authors as having made a more
general contribution to the educational syllabus of the middle ages.
The classical Roman curriculum of the liberal arts, as defined by
Marcus Terentius Varro (116--27 Be), had consisted of nine subjects-
grammar, logic, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music,
medicine and architecture. In the middle ages, medicine eventually
became a university subject, while architecture was a craft learnt in
apprenticeship and practice rather than in school. The other seven
liberal arts continued to be studied, at least nominally, throughout
the middle ages, though the actual content of the teaching varied in
intensity, becoming more thorough in the twelfth century and
reaching a height of professionalism in the arts courses of the
universities. At an early stage, the programme became formally
divided into a first and second phase, the trivium and quadrivium. 86
The trivium- grammar, logic and rhetoric- dealt with techniques of
68 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

discussion. The quadrivium- geometry, arithmetic, astronomy and

music- constituted a 'scientific' syllabus, summarising the principles
of order in the physical world. The most convenient single source
available for these subjects was the allegorical treatment given them
in Martianus Capella's Marriage qf Philology and Mercury. Martianus
wrote in Roman North Africa in the early fifth century. The first two
books of his treatise are a fanciful allegory on the betrothal and
marriage of the maiden Philology to Mercury, the god of eloquence.
They describe Philology's ascent to heaven, with some cosmological
detail on the relationship of the planets, and portray the pagan
heavenly court. The remaining seven books allow the attendants
whom Mercury has brought for his bride to introduce themselves.
They are the seven liberal arts in the order (Books III to IX
respectively), Grammar, Dialectic, Rhetoric, Geometry, Arithmetic,
Astronomy, Music. Martianus' work was probably based in large
part on Varro's nine-volume treatise on the disciplines which was lost
early in the post-classical period. It therefore constituted a direct link
with the classical Latin encyclopaedia. IfBoethius' logical works are
more particularly inspired by his philosophical interests, they also
follow, with his contributions to the quadrivium, in this line of
didactic writing. His 'scientific' works in fact antedate his logical
ones. They originally consisted of three treatises, one each on
geometry, arithmetic and music, that on music being an account of
harmonic theory. The first of these has left no trace - a pseudo-
Boethian work on the same subject has survived- but his accounts of
arithmetic and music were widely used as textbooks in the middle
ages.
The same concern with the conservation and transmission of
learning, though with a specifically Christian bias, is evident in the
career ofBoethius' contemporary Cassiodorus. Born around 485 to a
Calabrian family, he became quaestor and secretary to Theoderic
and later, like Boethius, consul and master of offices. He is another
example of the scholar and intellectual actively involved in the Gothic
administration. His political career survived the crisis of 523 but
ended with the Byzantine invasion ofltaly whenjustinian succeeded
(536-63) in restoring direct imperial government. Having failed in his
first project of establishing a school of theology in Rome, Cassiodorus
took refuge in the monastic life, centred on his villa of Vivarium in
southern Italy. Here he set his monks to study and copy patristic and
secular authors. Although his monastery probably foundered
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 69
immediately upon his death, it is significant in foreshadowing the
future of learning in Europe until the rise of the cathedral schools.
However, Cassiodorus is important for more than having established
a model of intellectual monasticism. 87 His own Institutions of Divine and
Human Readings, written c. 562, is in its inspiration the Christian
counterpart to the pagan encyclopaedia of the arts. The first book
details the theological treatises necessary for monastic reading. The
second details the disciplines necessary for a comprehension of the
Scriptures. These are the seven liberal arts, to which the Institutions
provides a bibliography. Cassiodorus thus presents the arts as
ancillary to scriptural study. In the event, the two books of his
Institutions frequently or indeed usually circulated apart. 88
The compilations of Martianus Capella and Cassiodorus were
favourite textbooks of the early middle ages. As representatives of the
encyclopaedic tradition they were joined in the early seventh century
by the Erymologies of Isidore of Seville. This impressive if unevenly
erudite work is an attempt to organise . the whole of knowledge
through an explanation of the meanings of words. Besides the seven
liberal arts, which occupy its first sections, the Erymologies covers the
terminology of a host of subjects, including medicine, law, chronol-
ogy, the bible, theology, ecclesiology, geography, geology, and a
range of ordinary human activity. Its influence would be difficult to
exaggerate. It became the standard work of reference in monastic and
cathedral libraries throughout Latin Christendom and is one of the
first sources to be consulted in the search for the intellectual pedigree
of subsequent writers in the next four centuries. 89

Education and Culture in a Period of Transition

The education system oflate antiquity was organised on a mixture of

public funding and private fee-paying. Elementary schooling in
reading, writing and arithmetic was not supported by the authorities.
It was provided either within the household, as usually in the case of
the aristocracy, or by schoolmasters charging per pupil. A higher
education in grammar and rhetoric was available at most principal
towns, where professorships were frequently established at municipal
or in the most important centres at imperial expense. It will be
obvious that this level of the structure was especially vulnerable to the
disruption caused by the invasions. However, as with political and
administrative institutions, ancient education had a lingering con-
70 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

tinuity under the barbarians. It faded out gradually rather than

disappearing at once. Again, the degree of continuity varied between
regions. The amount of information available to historians for a
reconstruction of the picture also varies. For the most part it is meagre
indeed. What can be pieced together has mainly to be inferred from
the records of those whose outlook and level of attainment is known
and from standards of administration. One general point needs to be
remembered. Although some philosophy had been taught in the west,
notably at Rome, the great philosophical centres of antiquity had
always been in the east, at Athens and Alexandria especially. It is not
clear at which of these centres Boethius had received his advanced
training but his was the last generation in the west to enjoy this
benefit. Despite justinian's closure of the school of Athens in 529, the
teaching of philosophy continued in the Greek world. The fact would
be of great significance for Latin culture in the high middle ages from
the transmission of texts to the Arabs, a process which will be
examined in due course. As far as concerns this early period, however,
when one speaks of a limited survival of classical culture and teaching
in the west what is involved is learning at a much humbler level than
that enjoyed by Boethius and his distinguished contemporaries. In
effect, it is the liberal arts programme- or rather, parts of it- with
perhaps medicine and Roman law too continuing to be taught for a
time. 90
In Rome, the liberal arts were still being taught c. 550 when
Gregory the Great was a youth, though as he was an aristocrat his
accomplishments cannot be taken to prove what was available
generally. There is also evidence of teaching in Ravenna at this time.
Justinian's temporary and partial reconquest of the west had some
significance for education. In his Pragmatic Sanction (554) he made
provision for the maintenance of masters in grammar, rhetoric,
medicine and law, with the declared purpose of ensuring a supply of
trained people. It is not certain, though, how far or whether the
measure was implemented; probably it was insufficient to repair the
havoc wreaked by the war of reconquest. In any case, there was soon
(568) a new invasion of northern and shortly after of central Italy, by
the Lombards. Byzantine rule was now much reduced, being
confined to the coastal region round Ravenna and a narrow corridor
between centre and north. It seems that by the end of the sixth
century the classical schools had generally been lost. Now what
education there was centred on the church and was concerned
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 71
primarily with maintaining church services and training clerics. This
appears to be the case even in Rome which remained under Byzantine
control during the seventh century. Rome at this time had resources
which impressed visitors from northern Europe. The Lateran library
which had received some part of the collection at Vivarium served as
a source of texts and there are several instances of borrowings from it
by northerners. However, the intellectual climate of the city was
defensive and its impact very limited. Later, there would be an
expansion of education in northern and central Italy, favoured by the
more settled conditions of the late seventh and early eighth centuries
and the easier relations which accompanied the conversion of the
Lombards from Arianism to catholicism. Later still, towards the end
of the tenth century and during the eleventh, secular education in
grammar, rhetoric and most characteristically in law would emerge
as a vigorous feature of the life of the northern cities.
Conditions in Gaul after the Frankish conquest of the first half of
the sixth century varied markedly between north and south. In
Aquitaine, Provence and Burgundy, Roman culture remained strong
and continued so for another century. The municipal schools did not
survive beyond the late fifth or early sixth century but after their
demise aristocratic families continued to provide an education in the
home. However, this seems to have ceased or its products cease to be
evident by about the middle of the seventh century. In North
Africa, the Vandals had initially been at best uninterested in Latin
culture. Gradually they began to make concessions to it. Schools
revived in the late fifth century and when Justinian reinvaded he
found them still in being. Roman education was still being main-
tained in Carthage up to the Arab conquest in 698. This fact was of
some importance for the European scene, as it has been shown that the
culture of Spanish monasteries was influenced by continuity of
relations with North Africa. Even if there were no other evidence, the
work oflsidore of Seville would be enough to suggest that Spain was
an especially strong centre in the seventh century. Medicine, law and
letters remained alive. The old aristocracy had retained their culture
and by the beginning of the seventh century contacts with their
Visigothic counterparts began to draw the latter to imitate them.
During the century, the Visigothic court at Toledo actively patron-
ised learning. But the chief institutional strength lay in the monas-
teries adjacent to large towns like Seville, Toledo and Saragossa.
Devotion to learning was by no means the only element in the Spanish
72 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

monastic outlook; there was also an ascetic strand, inimical to secular

culture, and this strand came to dominate. However, the greater
monasteries" were cultural centres. Not only were they important in
their own right but their members when appointed to bishoprics
helped to maintain educational standards outside. It was to this
intellectual monasticism that Isidore of Seville owed his training and
the resources on which he drew.

III John Scotus Eriugena: a Cosmic Analysis

The Background to Eriugena's Work

The Visigothic culture which had produced Isidore of Seville was

submerged in the Islamic invasion which swamped the Spanish
peninsula- with the exception of the Basque land and the adjoining
coastal region- in 711. From then until the Carolingian renaissance,
some seventy years later, the focus on intellectual developments
moves to the north-western periphery of Europe. Ireland had never
been part of the Roman empire but Christianity had brought with it a
Latin culture which continued, at least as far as grammar and
rhetoric were concerned, in Irish monasticism during the sixth
century. Columbanus in particular was widely read in classical
poetry and was himself a fine metric poet and rhetorician. He was the
greatest of the Irish missionaries to Europe (c. 591-615) and the
founderofBobbio, later to become a major centre. Northern England,
where Irish and Roman Christianity met somewhat stormily in the
mid-seventh century, proved an especially fruitful area of cultural
exchange. The Northum brian, Benedict Biscop, founder of monas-
teries at Wearmouth and Jarrow, knew Greek as well as Latin. He
had studied on the continent and visited it often. He was also for a
time an associate of Archbishop Theodore ofTarsus, the Greek monk
who was appointed to Canterbury in 669, and of Theodore's
companion, Abbot Hadrian, a monk of African extraction imbued
with the Greek culture of southern Italy. The fusion of these various
influences produced at Wearmouth and Jarrow an outstanding
scholar in the Venerable Bede (673-735 ). A little later they produced
Alcuin, at York, the centre of a thriving school and library. It was
with Alcuin (c. 730-804) that the northern learning came to be
formally transplanted into the Carolingian empire. In 782, Alcuin
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 73
accepted an invitation from Charlemagne to become head of the
king's palace school at Aix-la-Chapelle.
The history of general learning and literary activity during this
period lies beyond the scope of the present survey. Charlemagne's
policy was aimed at raising the level of basic education, especially in
the church. Through the work of teachers like Alcuin and the latter's
pupil, the encyclopaedist, Rhabanus Maurus (c. 776--856), who
became archbishop ofMainz in 84 7, and through the establishment of
monastic and capitular schools, he promoted an expanding knowledge
of the liberal arts. The 'renaissance' was not directly concerned with
furthering speculative thought. However there are some suggestions
of philosophical interests. Alcuin was not an original thinker but his
writings show an understanding of the philosophical content of
ancient texts - those of the Fathers, especially St Augustine, and of
Boethius. He was keenly interested in logic and promoted the study of
it both through his own textbook on the subject, De Dialectica, and
through the copying of texts, notably the pseudo-Augustinian
Categoriae Decem ('Ten Categories'). Moreover, evidence of the
philosophical activity of Alcuin and his circle has been augmented by
the case for the provenance of a number of texts from the period,
preserved most fully in a Munich manuscript and referred to
accordingly as the 'Munich passages' .91 One of these passages, the
Dicta Albini ('Sayings of Albinus'), may probably be taken to be by
Alcuin himself. The remaining fourteen seem to have been written or
collected by his friend and pupil, the Anglo-Saxon monk, Candidus.
These texts raise such questions as the soul's capacity to know, the
nature of existence, the existence of God and the implications of his
creation of man in his 'image'. They also provide evidence of
contemporary assimilation of the doctrine of the Categories and
preoccupation with the technique of argument. Although greatly
indebted for their starting points to St Augustine's De Trinitate ('On
the Trinity'), among other works of late antiquity, they reveal
considerable sophistication of interest and of treatment. Candidus
may also have written several sermons of philosophical import, in
which, among other matters, the topics of 'being', 'potentiality' and
'volition' are examined. 92 He was probably the author too of a treatise
on the beatific vision. 93 All in all, he emerges as a figure of
considerable importance for his period. Certainly, the material with
which he is associated is an important demonstration of the concerns
of his milieu.
74 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

To the evidence of the 'Munich passages' and related material may

be added the work of another pupil of Alcuin, Fredegisus of Tours
(d. 834). His letter On Nothing and Darkness (De Nihilo et Tenebris) treats
nothingness as substantial- as being something. From a letter written
c. 830 by Ago bard, bishop ofLyons, to refute his views, it appears that
he subscribed to a Platonic theory of the pre-existence of the soul
which may have had some currency in Alcuin's circle. 94
Further documentation of a philosophical outlook, contemporary
with the century's greatest thinker, comes from the controversy over
the soul between Ratramnus ofCorbie, writing probably before 864,
and an unnamed monk. 95 The discussion here started from St
Augustine's analysis of soul in On the Quantiry of the Soul. Augustine
had set out three approaches to the subject without a firm decision in
favour of any: that all souls are one- a statement of their specific and
generic unity; that individual souls are quite separate- a statement of
the opposite perspective; and the synthesis that they are both one and
many, a position which he seems to have found absurd. In his
treatment, Ratramnus was at pains to show that genera and species
were mental constructs abstracted from individuals. In this he relied
on Boethius, particularly on the first commentary on the Isagoge, but
his bias was unequivocally towards the absolute priority of indi-
viduals. His opponent, by contrast, seems to have insisted on the
reality of genera and species at the expense of allowing for real
individuating difference. The unnamed monk attributed his views to
his master, an Irishman, Macarius, who is not otherwise known.
Apart from their intrinsic interest, the discussions and views which
we have been considering of Alcuin, Candidus, Macarius, his pupil
and Ratramnus are important for another reason. They help to place
in context the work of the Irishman, John Scotus Eriugena. This is
particularly so of the controversy over the soul. It supplies a record,
though meagre and somewhat tenuous, of ultra-realist teaching on
the part of another Irish master, Macari us. Its interest is the more in
view of the contacts which Irishmen on the con tin en t at this time are
known to have maintained with one another. 96 Eriugena remains a
towering figure in his originality and genius but it is now more
apparent than formerly that there existed among his immediate
predecessors and contemporaries a certain level of philosophical
literacy which gives his work the greater point.
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 75
Eriugena's Career and Writings

Eriugena's biography is very imperfectly known. Since he was writing

up to 875, an approximate date of8l 0 has been arrived at for his birth.
He was called 'Scottus'- or 'Irishman'- by his contemporaries and
the best manuscript tradition of his works preserves the tautology,
'Eriugena', 'of the Irish race', as part of his name. In addition, the
contemporary writer Prudentius of Troyes testifies to his Irish
provenance. Apart from these references, however, he appears to
history only as a continental figure. Professor Bieler has pointed out
that the Irish exiles in the Gaul of Charlemagne and his successors
were a different historical phenomenon from the missions of the
seventh and early eighth centuries. 97 They were attracted both by the
intellectual life of the Carolingian court and the episcopal sees and by
the security which Gaul afforded them at a time when Irish
monasteries were being subjected to the Viking raids. The question
whether Eriugena could have obtained his knowledge ofGreek, which
was by no means perfect, and his generally advanced training in
Ireland is a controversial one. In reaction to exaggerated earlier
accounts of what the Irish had to offer to the continent, Dom
Cappuyns was dismissive; his views have been challenged by
Professor O'Meara. 98
A point more susceptible of definitive statement is Eriugena's
acquaintance with his main Greek authority, Dionysius the pseudo-
Areopagite. This was reputedly the convert made by St Paul at
Athens; hence the great reverence accorded him by Eriugena and the
later mystics. In reality, he was a fifth- or early sixth-century
Christian writer who may have been a Syrian monk. Due to a further
confusion between the pseudo-Areopagite and the undated Parisian
martyr, Bishop Denis, who became France's patron saint, his works
were of peculiar local interest. In 827, the Greek emperor, Michael II,
had presented Louis the Pious, Charlemagne's son and successor,
with the Greek text. An earlier attempt to translate them had resulted
in an unsatisfactory version and in 860 Charles the Bald com-
missioned Eriugena to do the work.
The treatises of the pseudo-Dionysius comprise the Celestial
Hierarchy, the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, the Mystical Theology and the
Divine Names, as well as ten separate Epistles. The Mystical Theology and
the Divine Names were the most influential. Besides their general
Neoplatonist content, their central theses are the inadequacy of the
76 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

common attributes, just, good and so on, as names for God and, as an
extension of this point, the distinction of three levels of theology.
These are the affirmative (cataphatic), by which an attribution is
made, the negative (apophatic), by which it is at once denied, and the
superlative, which is both affirmative and negative, in that it uses
attributes in a transcendent sense while denying that predicates
derived from knowledge of finite things can apply to God. Eriugena
translated the Dionysian corpus and commented on most of it. He
also translated a Greek commentary upon it, theAmbigua ofMaximus
the Confessor (580--662). Maxim us had modified the doctrines in the
light ofhis special expertise in Aristotelian logic and had related them
to a Christological pattern. According to this, Christ was the Logos or
Word through whom the ideas or archetypes of creation were realised
and through whom the Neoplatonist return of all things to their
source was to be effected. In addition, Eriugena translated On the
Creation of Man, a work of St Gregory of Nyssa (d. 394). Its
Christianised account of the Neoplatonist descent and return of the
soul heavily influenced his own treatment of this topic in the
Periphyseon.
Eriugena's precise indebtedness to Greek authors may be summar-
ised by recalling the important point made by Professor Sheldon-
Williams.99 It is that apart from his dialectical doctrine of the fourfold
division of nature, which seems to come directly from Alexandrian
logical theory, he had no first-hand knowledge of the pagan
philosophers. Even of Aristotle his knowledge is confined to Boethius'
commentary on the De Interpretatione and to the pseudo-Augustinian
paraphrase of the De Categoriis. His Greek sources therefore are
Christian and his Neoplatonism largely the product of the pseudo-
Dionysius, Maximus the Confessor and Gregory of Nyssa.
Because the Periphyseon, written c. 864-6, is so heavily indebted to
the pseudo-Dionysian corpus it is difficult to imagine what form
Eriugena's ideas would have taken had he not come into contact with
it. There are, however, some indications of the direction in which he
would have tended. According to Prudentius of Troyes, he had
already embarked on a radical line of cosmological speculation before
his discovery of the pseudo-Dionysius. The source for it was said to be
Martianus Capella's Marriage of Philology and Mercury, on which
Eriugena was writing a commentary in 859-60. It could have
provided the basis for reflection on the soul's journey through the
planetary spheres and on the impossibility of a local hell, since there
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 77
was no space outside the cosmos. 100 Another possible source was the
Commentary on the 'Dream of Scipio' (Somnium Scipionis), by the early
fifth-century author, Macrobius. The 'Dream of Scipio' was an
extract from the Republic of Cicero and contained a statement of the
Platonic doctrine of the soul. It became influential as a school text in
the early middle ages. Eriugena shows some evidence of having read
Macrobius. 101 On the theological level, Eriugena's preference for a
naturalistic, quasi-Pelagian approach to human perfectibility is
detectable as early as 850 in his treatise On Predestination. 102 This was
directed against the extreme Augustinianism of Gottschalk, whose
doctrine of double predestination, that is of the damned as well as of
the elect, had been condemned two years before by the Council of
Mainz. Eriugena's defence offree will, his criticism of the concepts of
predestination and prescience as applied to God, his insistence on the
unreality of evil and his denial that it is a proper object of divine
knowledge made a sufficiently disturbing package for his own treatise
in turn to be condemned at two local synods. Finally, like all
Christians, he had in the Fourth Gospel a stimulus to philosophical
interpretation of salvation history. It is significant that after the
completion of the Periphyseon he was drawn to write both a homily on
the Prologue to that Gospel and a commentary on the Gospel itself.
These various pointers combine to suggest that the broad lines of
Eriugena's thought as elaborated in the Periphyseon may have
developed before he began his translations. In particular, the general
structures round which the work is built must have been deeply laid in
his outlook. They are dialectical method and confidence in the power
and role of reason. The two are complementary. Eriugena's rational-
ism has a metaphysical basis. For him, reason is the natural impulse
of the soul towards its source. It is a part of the divine creation and its
object is the theophanies or manifestations of God in his progress from
unity to multiplicity. 103 Eriugena's definition of nature too relates it
closely with the One, so that philosophy extends to a consideration of
the 'divine, eternal and immutable'. This is the explanation of his
astonishing observation in the commentary on Martianus Capella
that 'no one can enter heaven except by philosophy'. 104 The high
value set upon reason emerges even more explicitly from a passage in
the Periphyseon where Eriugena expounds the difference between
reason and authority. The 'Master' of the dialogue has made the
Dionysian point that the nature of God is ineffable and that names are
inadequate. The 'Disciple' requests that the argument be supported
78 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

by references to the Fathers. But the Master urges that this would be
to imply a false priority, 'For authority proceeds from true reason but
reason certainly does not proceed from authority. For every authority
which is not upheld by true reason is seen to be weak, whereas true
reason is kept firm and immutable by her own powers and does not
require to be confirmed by the assent of any authority.' 105 The
dialectical method is an unavoidable corollary to this. For Eriugena
there is no question of dialectic's being an order imposed on reality by
the mind. It is an order rooted in the nature of things: 'The art of
dialectic, which divides genera into species and resolves species into
genera, was not fashioned by human devices, but created in the
nature of things by the Author of all arts that are truly arts; and
discovered by wise men and, by skilful research, adapted to use.' 106
Theology and analysis of the universe are inextricably connected and
dialectic is the method appropriate to both.

Eriugena: the Periphyseon

The Periphyseon or On the Division of Nature 107 comprises five books in

dialogue form between a master and his disciple. In the first chapter
ofBook 1 a twofold scheme of the division of nature is proposed. The
first scheme is the more fundamental and defines Eriugena's concept
of nature. It is a startling comprehensive term: 'The first and
fundamental division of all things which either can be grasped by the
mind or lie beyond its grasp is into those that are and those that are
not. Nature is the general name for all things, for those that are and
those that are not.' 108 In other words, every object of thought is
embraced in the term nature. Idealism can go no further.
Later, five modes of interpretation are distinguished in this
primary division, 'this basic difference which separates all things'. In
the first place, being or non-being is considered according to
perceptibility - that is according to whether or not it can be
predicated by intellect or sense. God is not perceived in this way and
according to this mode shall be said not to exist. Secondly, being and
non-being is determined according to its place in the Neoplatonist
concept of the hierarchy linking creator with the lowest creation and
vice versa. In this, the intellectual power is highest. To the extent that
being is predicated of a creature of a higher order it is denied of a lower
and vice versa. This is what constitutes the difference in things.
Thirdly, it is considered according to actualisation, a mode which
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 79
recalls the Aristotelian distinction between potentiality and actuality.
Fourthly, it is considered according to the faculty of perception. This
is really a subdivision of the first mode. If a thing is perceptible to the
intellect it is said truly to be, if perceptible to the senses it is said not
truly to be, in accordance with the Platonic doctrine that it is the
intelligible which is fully real. Fifthly, there is a mode pertaining to
man only, as having in Eriugena's system freedom of will. This is the
mode 'according to the realisation of God's image': to the extent that a
man is removed from similarity to God, he is said not to be.
The second scheme of the division of nature is introduced between
the statement of the first scheme and its elaboration. It is less radical
though it is better known as a feature of Eriugena's thought. The
scheme is a fourfold division between: (i) that which creates but is not
created- that is God, the source of creation; (ii) that which is created
and creates. This concept, which is the subject of Book n, is a fusion of
Neoplatonist and Christian idioms. The Neoplatonist Logos- the
expression of the divine mind and the eternal embodiment of the
archetypes of creation - is identified with the second person of the
Trinity; (iii) that which is created but does not create- that is, the
created universe which is the subject of Book m; (iv) that which does
not create and is not created- the subject of Books IV and v. This is
·God considered as the end of the universe in a Neoplatonist reversion
up the hierarchy, of bodies to souls, of souls to causes and of causes to
God, who will be all in all.
Eriugena's analysis, which can only be briefly outlined here, raises
a number of problems in the context of Christian theology. The first
problem is peculiarly one for a tradition where the authority of St
Augustine was paramount. He considered Augustine to be a major
support for his position and cites him more frequently than any other
single writer. But it is Augustine as interpreted in the light of the
pseudo-Dionysius when there is any conflict between the two. 109 In
particular, Eriugena's endorsement of the Neoplatonist return of all
things to their source is an implicit statement of a theology of man's
perfectibility which is radically different from that of St Augustine.
He upholds the role and efficacy of grace but it is a grace which is
given to the elect to proceed beyond the state of original, primordial
perfection which all are considered capable of achieving. The special
status accorded to the elect is referred to as 'deification', which is 'the
passing of the saints into God not only in soul but in body, so that they
are one in Him and with Him when nothing animal, corporeal,
80 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

human or natural remains in them'.no The term is highly contenti-

ous, as Eriugena was well aware. However, despite the language in
which the process is described, it is clear that he wished to safeguard
the continued distinct existence of the individual soul. 111 In this
respect the claims of Christianity and of Neoplatonist mysticism
agreed.
The second problem is whether Eriugena's notion of nature,
particularly as regards the cosmic return, is a pantheistic one. He was
certainly conscious that his scheme might be interpreted in that sense
and was anxious to disavow the doctrine, which was in any case
incompatible with a Neoplatonist regard for the transcendence of the
One. Yet the insinuation of pantheism is at some points very strong
and indeed the Periphyseon was to be condemned on this count by
Honorius III in 1225.
The third problem is related to the first. What is the place of evil in
Eriugena's system? He followed the Platonist tradition and Augustine
closely in ascribing the origin of evil to the will. But what becomes of
evil in the cosmic return? Since it is not part of God's creation it
cannot be subsumed and if it cannot be subsumed it cannot exist in
the final condition of nature when God is all in all. Is it possible
therefore to have eternal damnation? Eriugena goes to considerable
lengths in fact to reconcile the scriptural datum with his Neoplatonist
system. There is no localised hell but the wicked are eternally
punished, despite their having regained the state of pristine perfec-
tion. Their unhappiness consists in a continuing attachment to the
memory of their former temporal state. It is a subtle solution, similar
to the psychological doctrine of hell propounded by Origen.n 2 One
feels, however, that the Disciple is justified in his puzzlement over the
apparent permanence of tension in a nature which has been purified.
One feels also that Eriugena would have been happier to have
followed the doctrine to its logical, Origenist conclusion and to have
regarded hell as an incomplete state, capable of remedy. That he did
not do so illustrates how a philosopher's bias can be restrained by
overriding considerations - in this case, the force of established
theology.

Eriugena: the Subsequent Tradition

The sources for assessing Eriugena's influence are scattered and

fragmentary. Recent important research into it has drawn skilfully on
 FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES 81
two pieces of evidence: a set of contemporary notes and glosses which
have been variously taken to have been written by Eriugena himself
but which it is now argued are in the hands of two ofhis closest circle,
and the manuscript witness to an evolution in the text of the
Periphyseon. 113 The evidence shows both that he had associates who
read him attentively and that he in turn was conscious of his
readership. Among identifiable figures connected with him is his
friend, Wulfad, a monk at the court of Charles the Bald, who is known
to have possessed his translations of pseudo-Dionysius and Maxim us
as well as the Periphyseon. 114 The Irishman, Martin ofLaon, master of
the cathedral school there, can be shown to have read the Periphyseon
at an early stage though he was not expert enough to have been much
influenced by it. 115 Moreover, a body of glosses on Boethius' sacred
treatises, on Martianus Capella's Marriage of Philology and Mercury
and, most importantly, on the pseudo-Augustinian paraphrase of the
Categories (Categoriae Decem) bear the influence of his thought. In
particular, Heiric, master of the monastic school of St Germain at
Auxerre c. 865, drew on Eriugena in writing his glosses on the
Categoriae Decem and Eriugena's influence is also apparent in the work
ofHeiric's pupil, Remigius of Auxerre. Remigius wrote commentaries
on a range of classroom texts - Scripture, the grammatical authors,
Donat and Priscian, Boethius' Consolation of Philosophy and Martian us
Capella. He taught probably first at Auxerre, then at the cathedral
school of Reims in the last decade of the ninth century and perhaps
afterwards at Paris.
While it is clear therefore that Eriugena's readership in his own
time and in the next generation was greater than has usually been
recognised, his influence when viewed in longer perspective was
much less than he deserved. St Anselm of Bee's follower, Honorius
Augustodunensis, made substantial borrowings from the Periphyseon
and there are other indications that it had some currency in northern
France in the twelfth century. The Latin corpus of the pseudo-
Dionysius did carry a small part of the Periphyseon in the form of a
gloss 116 and further work in the history of mysticism may reveal as yet
undiscovered disciples of its doctrine. But its effects so far known are
trifling for a system of such power and challenge. Even before the
pronouncement of Honorius III, which followed use of it by the
heretic Amaury of Bene, Eriugena's reputation was tarnished.
Berengar of Tours appealed, mistakenly, to his authority against the
possibility of transubstantiation and suffered condemnation at the
82 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

Council of Rome (1050). If the legend that Eriugena was stabbed to

death by the pens of his students is apocryphal it contains perhaps an
element of truth. At all events, the relative obscurity into which his
synthesis fell was a misfortune for western thought. It had opened a
window on a parallel view of the universe, that of the Greek patristic
tradition. Latin Christendom had lost contact with this other vision
and on the whole it was to remain uncomprehending, even hostile,
towards it.
Eriugena was the last systematic thinker before St Anselm ofBec in
the late eleventh century, and St Anselm springs from a different
tradition. In the interval between them activity was more humdrum
though it was ultimately to be fruitful for the speculative movement.
The kind of explanatory writing which has been noted in the case of
Heiric and Remigius of Auxerre was continued. It produced new
glosses, reworkings of already existing glosses and, occasionally,
independent treatises. Martianus and Boethius continued to be read.
In particular, metric 9 of Book III of the Consolation of Philosophy - a
passage inspired by Plato's Timaeus- called on all the philosophical
reserves which contemporary scholars owned. Gradually there came
more direct contact with the Timaeus, through increasing use of
Chalcidius. Macrobius' commentary on the Dream of Scipio also
gradually became better known. By the eleventh century Chalcidius
and Macrobius had joined the syllabus as standard authors. 117 This is
one area in which the ninth-century achievement was continued and
augmented. Scholarship on Boethius, on Martianus, on Chalcidius
and on Macrobius would eventually reach its peak in the cosmologi-
cal writing of the twelfth century. Another area is the development
and expansion of logical expertise. Extension of the logical pro-
gramme was the foundation of the major speculative endeavours of
the eleventh and twelfth centuries. It is only by following its course
that they can be understood.
3. The Central Middle Ages- Logic, Theology
and Cosmology

The Character and Context of Thought in the Central Middle Ages

VIEWED from the perspective of the ancient philosophical tradition,

the history of thought in the period c. 1000 to c. 1150 comprises two
main strands. First, there is the Aristotelian contribution, which may
be fairly said to be the more distinctive. Nothing is so characteristic of
the thought of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries as the way in
which Aristotle's logic at once stimulated a desire for intellectual
order and was grasped as the means to achieve it. Secondly, there is
the Platonist contribution. Directly and indirectly it exercised
important influences on the intellectual life of the time. Its most direct
influence was on the cosmological speculations of the twelfth century.
Some note has already been taken of the Platonist sources on which
these rested and more will be said in due course. Of the indirect
influences of Platonism, two stand out. The twelfth century sees the
revival of a philosophical mysticism based on the Neoplatonist
tradition as known especially through the works of the pseudo-Denis.
It is associated principally with the school ofSt Victor at Paris, most
notably with Hugh and Richard of St Victor. The second indirect
influence of Platonism at this time is the most pervasive of all. It
derived from the recognition accorded to St Augustine as the greatest
of the Latin fathers. From what has already been said about St
Augustine's philosophical outlook it will be clear that this was a
modified Platonism. However, taken with the general bias of
Boethius, it largely explains the fact that at the beginning of the
period the prevailing assumptions, epistemological and ontological,
were ultra-realist in character.
In assessing the importance of Aristotelian logic to the intellectual
life of the early middle ages it is important to .remember the intimate
connection which obtained in much of the Organon between the
method and the subject of philosophical discussion. A substantial
part of it was not a purely formal logic but was logic with a
philosophical dimension. This was particularly true of the Categories,
which was known early. Only by keeping the wider issues in mind can
one understand the intensity of debate which technical problems

83
84 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

excited. The use made by Boethius of Aristotelian terms in his sacred

treatises further encouraged movement between the logical and
ontological levels. His review of the categories in On the Trinity was an
influential source of philosophical logic. St Augustine's work of the
same title supplied other leads. As a result, questions such as the
nature of universal concepts, the relationship between genus, species
and individual or the meaning and reference of the term 'substance'
were not thought of as purely logical. They had metaphysical and
theological implications which rendered them potentially controver-
sial. So, for instance, underlying St Anselm's debate with Roscelin
over the Trinitarian doctrine that three persons shared one nature
was the logical issue of the status of universal concepts. What reality
did the concept 'nature' have, set against distinctness of person? 1
Even on the level of terminology logic could thus have proved a
disturbing and challenging subject. It was bound to be especially so
when applied directly as a method of theological inquiry. In their
reverence for the authority of the past, men were apt to forget that
traditional belief had itself been cast in a logical and philosophical
mould. The re-examination of doctrinal formulations remained a
delicate issue throughout the period- as indeed, in varying degrees,
for the whole of the middle ages and beyond.
As a final comment on the general character of thought in the
period, a point may be noted which strikes the reader as soon as he
approaches the works ofSt Anselm or Peter Abelard, to take the most
important exponents of the dialectical method. These reveal the same
conflation of theology and philosophy into a single perception of truth
as was found in the case ofSt Augustine. The two components may be
unravelled in the search for influences and the theological writing of
the eleventh and twelfth centuries provides much material from
which the philosophical and logical capacity of contemporaries can
be judged. It should not be forgotten however that the separation of
the purely philosophical or logical content of such writing results in
an artificial construct. The preservation of boundaries between the
data of revealed religion and rational enquiry was a response to the
rediscovery of the complete Aristotelian philosophical system and is
not a feature of this earlier period.
Apart from the stimulus of particular sources and literary influ-
ences, the nature and pace of intellectual development in the period
was closely bound up with the institutional context. In the ninth
century, Christian Europe had been subjected to three separate
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 85
waves of invasion- from Vikings in the north, Moslems in the south
and Magyars in the east. The effects of these external threats would
probably not have been sufficiently deleterious in themselves to halt
the intellectual progress which Charlemagne had nurtured. Indeed,
by favouring a concentration at the centre, as at the court of Charles
the Bald, such conditions could indirectly be fruitful, at least for a
time. More significant in the long term was the internal political
fragmentation which followed on the divisions and subdivisions of the
Frankish empire among Charlemagne's successors. Scholarship lost
the determined patronage which it had briefly enjoyed and the
relative security and ease of communications which might have been
fostered by centralised rule. Particularism is the most evident feature
of the political and social life of the later ninth and of the tenth
centuries. The bonds of society were those local and personal
relationships into which men entered for their greater protection and
from which the feudal system emerged in north-western Europe. 2 The
results were by no means wholly inimical to intellectual development.
Local lords could be generous in their foundation and endowment of
monasteries and it was the monasteries that provided the strongest
initial impetus to a revival in study. However, this revival lay in the
future. Meantime, learning often remained latent in the monasteries,
apart from those practical studies, such as grammar, chronology,
music and penmanship, which were essential to the organisation of
Benedictine monasticism. The most important function which the
monasteries performed in the interval until the later part ofthe tenth
century was simply the preservation of texts on which the later
recovery was based. They thus provided the necessary framework for
the transmission of ideas, even when they were making no original
contribution themselves.
Monasteries were not the only institutions with libraries and
schools. Cathedrals offered another source of intellectual revival. An
impressive example of an early cathedral library is provided by the
reconstructed list of books known to have been collected at Laon
between the middle of the ninth century and about the end of the first
quarter of the tenth. It numbers around three hundred items,
excluding minor hagiographical and liturgical material, and contains
patristic and exegetical works, historical and chronological
authorities, texts of medicine and law and some of the products of the
Carolingian renaissance. 3 There was not, at least in northern Europe,
a continuous and widespread tradition of study in the cathedral
86 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

cloisters to match that cultivated under the rule of Benedict. But

cathedrals were a potential focus of resurgence and at Reims, during
the teaching of Gerbert of Aurillac, there was a brilliant instance of
the contribution they could make. Gerbert began his career as a
Benedictine monk of the Cluniac reform- a movement founded in
910, about thirty years before his birth - and ended it as Pope
Sylvester II (999-1003). His reputation for scholarship he made at
Reims. 4 As master of the cathedral school there, from 972 to 989, with
a brief intermission, he expounded the trivium and quadrivium,
introducing students to a breadth of disciplines not elsewhere
available in the Latin west. He throws into relief several of the most
important trends of the time. More than anyone else, he established
Boethius as the master of philosophical technique for a world which
knew no Greek. He himself lacked the single-minded attachment to
logic which was to be the principal feature of philosophical method in
the next century and a half, but his very range of interests pointed the
way to the main areas of intellectual activity in northern Europe in the
eleventh and twelfth centuries- logic, Latin literature and scientific
study. His contributions to this last were mainly in the areas of
mathematics and astronomy. Some of his familiarity with these
subjects he may have owed to contacts, probably indirect, with
Moslem learning. He had studied in Spain and is known to have been
supplied later with textbooks on arithmetic and astronomy by friends
whom he had made there. In one respect, though, his stay in Spain
was unproductive. He does not appear to have known anything of the
corpus of Aristotle's philosophical works, which would later be
discovered in part through that channel. However, the fact that he
was sent to Spain by his abbot for instruction implies a recognition of
this source of learning and is a harbinger of future developments.
Lastly, Gerbert's career momentarily draws together both the
monastic and the cathedral dimensions and suggests the future
integration of the strands of scholarship.
Monasteries and cathedrals provided an institutional framework
for the revival of learning in northern Europe. In Italy, the
autonomous urban schools were the dominant centres. As demand
increased, however, and particularly as, in the course of the eleventh
century, a training in logic came to be seen as the key to intellectual
progress, there was considerable opportunity for individual freelance
teachers. They claimed or were given the epithet 'peripatetic', in
elegant allusion at once to their Aristotelian pedigree and to their
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 87
mobility. Like the ancient Sophists, they purveyed a valued commod-
ity to an eager market and their activities must have done much to
advertise as well as to inculcate the new techniques. Peter Abelard,
born in Brittany in 1079, recalled in his autobiography how he
renounced the prospect of knighthood to travel about the provinces,
'disputing, like a true peripatetic', wherever he heard that there was
keen interest in the art of dialectic. 5 But although he was indeed a
wandering scholar, his career coincides with the growth of the
permanent centre ofhigher teaching and illustrates its attraction. The
story of his wanderings is in part that of the rise of the Paris schools to
pre-eminence, at first in France and eventually, for the study of arts
and theology, in Europe as a whole.
The gradual decline in importance of monastic as against non-
monastic schools is a feature of the history of learning from the
eleventh century onward. Several factors probably contributed to
this. Although the scope which cathedral schools afforded could
easily be exaggerated, they did have advantages over their monastic
counterparts. Those which were located in important regional centres
were well placed to benefit from a rapid growth of urban prosperity,
fostered by an expanding economy and a consequent increase of trade
in the period. Then, even against neighbouring monasteries, the
regime of cathedrals imposed fewer demands to detract from
scholarship and teaching, particularly as compared with the Cluniac
system, under which elaborate liturgies and formal biblical reading
vied with opportunities for study. For their part, the new and highly
successful ideals of Augustinian and Cistercian monasticism repre-
sented in their different ways a diminution of the place of scholarship
and teaching. The Cistercians deliberately removed themselves from
centres of population. The Augustinians, while they established
themselves in towns, did not usually concern themselves with
providing external education, though the Augustinian abbey of St
Victor in Paris which maintained a distinguished open school for at
least thirty years after its foundation in 1110 is a notable exception. 6
The Benedictines continued to produce important authors of their
own throughout the middle ages and even the Cistercians eventually
succumbed to the attractions of academic study. However, after the
eleventh century, monasteries as such generally ceased to be at the
forefront of intellectual endeavour. In their turn, the cathedral
schools north of the Alps, the urban schools in Italy and the
independent schools of private masters were to give way to institu-
88 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

tions exclusively devoted to the furtherance of learning within a

professional and highly formalised structure. This, though, is a
development outside the scope of the present chapter.

The Foundations qf Logical Study

The most evident feature of logical studies in the period to c. 1250 is

their complete dependence on the discoveries of the ancients.
Aristotle had left by far the greatest literary legacy, in the six treatises
of the Organon, and this fact alone was sufficient to establish the
dominance of Aristotelian logic in the middle ages. In the ancient
world, his approach was rivalled and partly supplemented by Stoic
work. Recognising the interplay between thought and its expression,
the Stoics had made logic a central part of their philosophy. By the
same token, they had extended it to include an analysis oflanguage
and their contributions became incorporated in classical grammati-
cal theory. As a result, some of the Stoics' linguistic approach to logic
was transmitted to the west in the Grammatical Institutions of Priscian
(fl. AD 491-518). 7 This became an immensely influential textbook of
Latin grammar. Through it, Stoic logic must be counted a source of
the sophisticated attention to the levels of meaning compressed
within a term and of the careful, sometimes pedantic, analysis of
statement which is common to the method of men as diverse as
Berengar, Lanfranc, St Anselm and Peter Abelard.
The principal source of logical technique was however the
Aristotelian corpus. Through more and better texts knowledge of it
gradually extended. In the Carolingian period, the programme of
logical study revolved around the Categories and the De /nterpretatione.
But the assimilation even of these treatises was imperfect. For a text of
the Categories, scholars such as Alcuin and Eriugena were dependent
on the pseudo-Augustinian paraphrase. 8 Although Boethius' literal
translation had some currency in the early period, not until the
eleventh century did it replace the paraphrase as the standard text. 9
As additional guidance, Porphyry'slsagoge was available in Boethius'
translation and from the middle of the ninth century Boethius' two
commentaries on Porphyry's work were known. A little later, towards
the end of the ninth century or early in the tenth, Boethius' own
commentary on the Categories began to be read. As for the De
lnterpretatione, it was known at first only indirectly, through Boethius'
first commentary upon it, though some translated sections were
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 89
preserved as lemmata in the transmission of the commentary.
Boethius' commentary could be supplemented by Apuleius' Periher-
meneias, which incorporated Stoic and Aristotelian theory. In the
course of the ninth century, the full translation became available.
Boethius' second commentary on the De Interpretatione came into
circulation at about the same time as did his commentary on the
Categories.
This original core of study was expanded in the period c. 970-1040
to include the independent logical works ofBoethius: On Division, On
Topical Differences and the three treatises on the syllogism. On Topical
Differences served, with Cicero's Topics, as a substitute for the
Aristotelian work at a time when the translation of this was still
unknown. Similarly, two of the treatises on the syllogism - On the
Categorical Syllogism and the Introduction to the Categorical Syllogism -
deputised for the Prior Ana(ytics. The third treatise, On the Hypothetical
Syllogism, went beyond Aristotle's teaching to analyse the mechanics
of conditional propositions. This neglected subject had been
developed by the Stoics and their discoveries had passed into the
Neoplatonist literature, from which Boethius had absorbed them. 10
As may be expected, the expansion of the syllabus was gradual and
uneven. An important, early part seems to have been played by the
Cluniac monastic scriptorium. With the Cluniac house of St Benoit
(or Fleury) sur Loire, near Orleans, is associated a manuscript dating
from the late tenth or early eleventh century of most of the Boethian
treatises - excluding the first commentary on Porphyry and the
commentaries on the De Interpretatione. It derived from a codex made
for a contemporary of the author himself. 11 The route by which this
text was discovered is uncertain but the discovery was probably the
product of a conscious search for better texts which was taking place
at Fleury and elsewhere during this time. 12 Already, in the last
quarter of the tenth century, Abbo, abbot of Fleury, had produced
commentaries on Boethius' treatment of the categorical and
hypothetical syllogism. 13 At approximately the same period, Gerbert
was using these and the other treatises of Boethius in his teaching at
Reims. However, it would be wrong to assume from this remarkable
concentration of activity that the extended programme rapidly
became commonplace. Even by late in the following century, at
Norman Bee, it may well be that St Anselm had missed all contact
with it. It has been pointed out that for all his powerful expertise, his
technical logical learning may have been based on the old core of the
90 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

Categories and De Interpretatione .14 Abelard, by contrast, was familiar

with the whole range of Boethius' treatises and their importance to
him cannot be missed. 15 Abelard in fact stands at a new turning point
in the history of Aristotelian logic. From the second decade of the
twelfth century more texts of the Organon began to circulate. The De
Sophisticis Elenchis, hitherto quite unknown, became available, as did
the Topics and the Prior Analytics- all in Boethius' translation. In the
middle of the century, the translation by James of Venice of the
Posterior Analytics supplied the Latin world with the last text of the
Organon still unknown. 16 The rate at which knowledge was expanding
in the leading circles can be plotted reasonably closely. Abelard, the
greatest teacher ofhis age, did not know the text of the Topics or of the
Posterior Analytics and was diffident on the subject of the De Sophisticis
Elenchis. The Englishman, Adam ofBalsham, called Adam Parvipon-
tanus or Adam Petit-Pont from the location of his school at one of the
bridges on the Seine, in his novel Art of Discourse (Ars Disserendi),
written in 1132, shows contact both with the Topics and the De
Sophisticis Elenchis .17 The collection of texts in the Heptateuchon of
Thierry of Chartres (d. after 1151) included the Prior Analytics, Topics
and De Sophisticis Elenchis but not the Posterior Analytics. John of
Salisbury, whose Metalogicon was completed in 1159, displays a
familiarity with the whole of the Organon and conceives logic in its
fullest Aristotelian terms. 18

The Problem of Universals

Attention has already been drawn to the philosophical dimension

underlying some early medieval logical discussions. This is well
illustrated by what is called the problem of universals. Universals are
the general terms used of a multiplicity of individuals- such as the
words 'man' or 'humanity', applied to all men, or 'white' or 'black',
applied to some. The problem which they raised could be variously
stated. What was the genesis of such terms in the mind? What degree
of reality did they possess? What was the relationship between
general terms and the individuals of which they were used? In the
literature of western philosophy, the issues had first emerged from
Plato's search for objective standards. Following the trend of
Socrates' investigations, Plato had begun by seeking to define the
principles of conduct and evaluation and had ended by attempting to
explain the basis of all intelligibility. When early medieval logicians
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 91
discussed the nature of universal terms they were dealing with the
same problem but in a more direct and abstract fashion. The
preliminary, concrete stage of the inquiry was by-passed and the
problem was posed in terms of the thought processes involved in
classification. That it could be posed so directly was due to the
existence of a locus classicus for treatment of the subject.
The fullest such source was a passage in Boethius' second
commentary on Porphyry's lsagoge. It might be thought that
Porphyry would have presented a highly Platonised version of
Aristotle's Categories. In fact, the tendency of Neoplatonist logicians,
conscious of the discrepancies between Plato and Aristotle and
anxious to minimise them, was to strip Aristotle's logic of its
philosophical framework and use it as a formal instrument. 19 So,
Porphyry did no more than raise the problem of universals- or, more
precisely, of the fundamental classes, genera and species- leaving
aside the questions 'wpether they subsist or are posited purely and
simply in intellects alone and whether, [if] subsistent, they are
corporeal or incorporeal, and whether they are separate or consist in
and through the objects of sense experience' as matters requiring
deeper consideration. 20 In his second commentary on the text,
Boethius explained the problem, gave the differing interpretations of
Plato and Aristotle and refused to judge between them, while offering
the Aristotelian solution as the more appropriate in the present
instance of an accompaniment to the Categories. 21
Boethius' passage provided the starting point for the most success-
ful treatment of the topic in the central period, that of Peter Abelard.
When Abelard took up the problem it was already controversial.
However, the details of earlier contemporary solutions are imper-
fectly known. Roscelin (c. 1050-1125) was a canon ofCompiegne and
later a teacher at Loches near Vannes, where he may have had
Abelard among his pupils. His ideas are known mainly from his
opponents on the Trinitarian issue, who included St Anselm and
Abelard himself, and from a late reference in John of Salisbury's
Metalogicon. 22 Roscelin's Trinitarian doctrine was taken as emphasis-
ing the distinctness of Persons at the expense of divine unity. On the
logical question he is identified with the assertion that universal terms
are merely a 'sound' (flatus vocis). The view that universals are merely
words or names is known as nominalism but the label is imprecise and
to apply it to Roscelin is doubly hazardous as it is not clear how he
understood the view ascribed to him. However, if he may be taken as
92 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

typifying a minimalist theory of the significance of universal terms,

William ofChampeaux ( 1070-1121) represents the opposite perspec-
tive. It would be consonant with the individualism of the age as with
the peripatetic and eclectic nature of study that proponents of one
interpretation should have had masters of a different bent. William
may have been a pupil of Roscelin, though this is not firmly
established. The main sources for William's logical views are the
criticisms of his own rebellious pupil, Abelard. William taught
extreme realism; that is, he began not by asking how the concept of
class could be reconciled with the existence of individuals but by
accepting the priority of the universal concept and seeking to define
individuals by reference to it. His first formulation of the matter was
that the species, for instance humanity, existed entirely and identi-
cally in each individual, variation between individuals being due to
accidental differences. Under attack from Abelard he modified his
statement to an assertion that the species existed in a similar way or
without difference, rather than identically, in its individual members.
IfWilliam's teaching rested on the difficulty offinding a philosophical
definition of the individual, he was making a valuable point. Abelard
however treats him with scorn and says that his vacillation resulted in
his being wholly discredited among his pupils. 23
Abelard's own doctrine on the subject of universals is developed in
his various logical works. Of these the most important are the
Dialectica- in form, an original textbook- which went through several
revisions in the period c. 1118-37, the Logica 'Ingredientibus', which
consists of glosses on the lsagoge, the Categories and the De Interpretatione
and was completed before 1120, and the Logica 'Nostrorum Petitioni
Sociorum', an elaborated gloss on the Isagoge, completed c. 1124. 24
There are also insights to be derived from some of his theological
writing. 25 In his analysis, understanding functions on the images
which are retained by the mind after sense experience and which
continue to exist independently of the objects which first gave rise to
them. Here is the foundation of a psychological account of universals.
However, the principal element in Abelard's approach is an examina-
tion not of the conceptual but of the verbal or significative aspects of
classification. He considered the universal to be a word, though not in
the sense attributed to Roscelin. In Abelard's fully developed usage
there is a distinction, not however consistently maintained, between
'vox' or 'utterance', which describes the physical sound, and 'sermo'
or 'expression'. 26 A universal 'expression' conveys an apprehension of
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 93
the common 'status' characteristic of the individual members of a
class. This 'status' is an objective reality, discovered rather than
introduced by the mind, but it is not subsistent as in the crude
interpretation of the Platonic theory.
The Aristotelian character of Abelard's treatment of the question is
very apparent and this despite the fact that he criticises Aristotle for
using the description 'universal' of things as well as words, whereas he
himself is careful to ascribe universality to words only. In particular
the way in which the mental concept is constructed recalls the
Aristotelian theories of imagination and abstraction. Yet Abelard's
direct knowledge of Aristotle did not extend beyond the logical works
and did not even include the complete Organon. If he had had the
Posterior Analytics, he would have found a short discussion there of the
process of abstraction. The most likely sources for his reconstruction
of an Aristotelian theory of cognition are the commentaries of
Boethius, that on the Topics of Cicero, where Aristotelian and Stoic
doctrines mix, as well as those on the De Interpretatione and on the
Isagoge, the starting point of the discussion. Abelard's adroit analysis
is a reminder both of how dependent thinkers were on Boethius'
legacy and of how much that legacy contained.
The solution that universals are abstracted by the mind from
experience of individual beings became generally accepted with
Abelard and was to receive powerful reinforcement as more of
Aristotle's works became known. The only significant further
development of the topic by contemporaries is its treatment by
Gilbert of Poitiers (Gilbert de Ia Porree) (c. 1076-1154). He
attempted to integrate the theory of abstracted universals with the
Platonist doctrine, absorbed early into Christian thought, that the
forms of creation were eternally located in the divine mind. Abelard
too held this doctrine though it had no part in his theory of
knowledge. 27 For Gilbert and some other masters it became the basis
of a metaphysical interpretation of universals. Bernard of Chartres,
called by John of Salisbury 'the foremost Platonist of our time' ,28
taught that the 'ideas' were eternal, though posterior to God, and
distinguished the ideas which are the patterns of creation from ideas
embodied in matter. 29 The most likely sources of the terminology of
his analysis are Boethius' On the Trinity and Chalcidius' commentary
on the Timaeus. Gilbert, who had probably studied under Bernard,
developed his own statement of the theory mainly in the course of
commenting on this treatise of Boethius. 30 He identified universals
94 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

with the 'native' (or generated) 'forms' (native forme); these were
copies of the divine ideas or exemplars; they were concrete in created
substances, to which they gave the property of being a determinate
thing, and were abstracted from substances by the knowing mind.
This theory was well known to John of Salisbury, who had studied
under Gilbert and who gives a clear and concise account ofit. 31

Logic and Theology, an Eleventh-century Dilemma

Roscelin's contribution to the debate over universals has introduced

another controversial facet of the logical revival, the application of
logic to religious doctrine. The claims of the new logicians to analyse
theological formulations were not admitted without a struggle and
long continued to be a source of unease. Anti-intellectualism was a
recurring theme in the medieval as in the early church. Its most
important proponent in the eleventh century was the Italian regular
hermit, reformer and cardinal, StPeter Damian (1007-72). A notable
part of his opposition to what he regarded as the intrusion oflogic into
theology was his ridiculing of the principle of non-contradiction as
applied to God. His stance is of interest not only in the context ofhis
time but as foreshadowing the attack on 'rational theology' from quite
a different quarter in the fourteenth century. His letter to his friend,
Desiderius, abbot of Monte Cassino, written about 1067, was a
trenchant defiance of those who seemed to curtail divine omnipotence
by an appeal to logical arguments. God's power is not restricted even
by past events, which he could cause not to have happened just as he
could have prevented their ever having happened. Peter Damian was
not simply opposed to learning. He distinguished between the pursuit
of secular studies by monks, to which he was opposed, and its general
utility for clerics, which he admitted. He was prepared, moreover, to
allow a subordinate role to the arts in theological inquiry provided
that the distinction of subject matter be always preserved: logic like
rhetoric pertained to the human not the divine order. 32
In fact, the defenders of orthodoxy had little choice but to meet the
logicians on their own terms. Even the method of Peter Damian's
letter concedes as much. The point emerges clearly from the
controversy between Berengar and Lanfranc over eucharistic doc-
trine.33 This raged in the early l060s. Berengar (d. I 088) was, from at
least 1032, master of the school at the collegiate church ofSt Martin at
Tours. His intellectual pedigree was impeccable for he was a pupil of
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 95
Fulbert, bishop of Chartres (1006-28) and founder of the school there,
who in his turn was a pupil of Gerbert of Aurillac. Berengar's
eucharistic theory reflects several sources of influence. His interest in
the subject was awakened by reading a treatise of the ninth-century
writer, Ratramnus of Corbie, whom he understood as offering a
purely symbolist interpretation of the sacrament. Ratramnus' treat-
ise, mistakenly attributed to John Scotus Eriugena, supported
Berengar in his conviction that his own analysis was the traditional
and authoritative position. The other sources of his stance are
methodological. He was firm in his assurance that logic was the
means to truth and recognised no barriers to its use. Berengar's
logical method, as evidenced by his arguments in this instance, was a
combination oflinguistic or grammatical scrutiny and an application
of the Aristotelian concepts of substance and accidents. 34 Scrutiny of
the exact form and literal meaning of texts was a recognised tool of
contemporary biblical scholarship, to which Berengar was probably
introduced by Fulbert. 35 Attention to the grammatical structure of
the words of consecration led Berengar to argue that the pronoun
'this' in 'This is my body' implied continuity of the subject which it
denoted, namely the bread. The same conclusion was dictated, he
believed, by the permanence of the accidents, or physical appear-
ances, of the bread and wine. The eucharist therefore did not involve a
substantial change of bread and wine into body and blood but a
symbolic or spiritual change. This view was the subject of a
succession of condemnations, culminating in Berengar's grudging
retraction at the Lateran council of 1079.
Lanfranc (c. 1010--89) was thoroughly familiar with the techniques
on which Berengar drew. He had abandoned a career as a lawyer in
his native Lombardy to pursue the study of grammar and logic in
northern France and for a short time at least he attended Berengar's
lectures at Tours. Having entered the abbey ofBec in Normandy, he
made it an important centre of learning in the liberal arts and in
theology, open to non-monastic as well as to internal students.
Indeed, it was a large part of his offence in Berengar's eyes that in
championing the cause of a real, substantial change in the eucharist
he was debasing the skills which he possessed. The acrimony of the
dispute tends to obscure the fact that despite the differences between
the two protagonists, Lanfranc was closer intellectually to his
opponent than he was to Peter Damian and others of the period who
professed implacable hostility to the contamination of sacred with
96 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

profane. Lanfranc was shy of Berengar's assertiveness in applying

logic to doctrine but in controverting it he gave to the disputed topic a
degree of logical and philosophical formality which it had lacked
before, though his precise terminology was not adopted by the
Lateran council and his own contribution to the formulation of
eucharistic doctrine was slight. The effect of the controversy was to
demonstrate the attractions of logical techniques for theology as
much as its dangers. The attractions seem to have been felt more
keenly than the dangers in Lanfranc's own monastery at Bee. There,
shortly afterwards, St Anselm began to elaborate an argued theology
which in originality and scope went beyond anything that either
Lanfranc or Berengar had contemplated.

Logic and Theology - St Anselm

St Anselm was born in I 033 of a lesser noble family at Aosta, then

within the kingdom of Burgundy. As a young man he crossed the
Alps, probably for reasons of family connections rather than, as may
have been the case with Lanfranc, from a resolve to pursue the logical
and grammatical studies flourishing in the north. 36 In about 1059 he
began to attend Lanfranc's school at Bee, first as a secular scholar,
then, in 1060, as a monk of the community. In 1063 he succeeded
Lanfranc as prior of Bee, on the latter's departure to the abbacy of
Caen. In 1078 he became abbot of Bee and in 1093, much to his own
discomfiture, succeeded Lanfranc in the see of Canterbury.
St Anselm's writing is of several types. It includes argued
theological treatises, a teaching manual on an aspect oflogic, entitled
De Grammatico ('On Grammar'), devotional treatises, and letters, of
which the text of nearly four hundred survives. The theological
treatises are the principal source for his distinctive contribution to the
intellectual tradition. As a body of thought they display two related
features, systematic development of a number of basic ideas and· a
high level of internal consistency. This synoptic quality may be
variously explained. In the first place, St Anselm inherited from
Augustine a sense of hierarchical order in the universe. It was a
perception which he received, as it were, ready made. He did not work
towards it like Augustine in the face of competition from rival theories
nor did he have to defend it or distinguish it against the claims of a
near relation as Augustine had had to mark his own position from
pagan Neoplatonism. Though the superstructure of Anselm's
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 97
thought was his own and was designed and executed with originality
and skill, it rested on the Christian Platonist foundation which
Augustine had so firmly laid. This is a large part of the reason for its
apparently effortless progress. Secondly, Anselm wrote in an atmos-
phere almost wholly free from contention. This contrasts not only
with the context in which Augustine had written but with that in
which Anselm's older and younger contemporaries, Berengar, Lao-
franc and Peter Abelard made their contributions to dialectical
theology. Except for the courteous exchange of views with Guanilo,
the sharper encounter with Roscelin and a tract (written in ll 02) on a
doctrinal issue between the Latin and Greek churches, Anselm's
writing is unmarked by controversy. The only evidence of pressure
which it reveals is that of a readership eager for a considered
statement of his views. 37 Thirdly, Anselm began to write comparatively
late in life when his ideas on the issues which he first addressed had
already been formed. The Monologion, the earliest of his major works,
dates from c. l 076 and contains the material of discussions which he
had been conducting with the brethren at Bee. TheProslogion, written
in 1077-8, represented a new discovery but one wholly consonant
with his general outlook. The De Veritate ('On Truth'), written
between l 080 and l 085, begins from the same Platonist premise as the
Monologion, that relative concepts and states require the postulation of
an absolute. Later ( l 094-8), in the Cur Deus Homo ('Why did God
become Man?'), he made a new departure, prompted by some of the
implications of his recent debate with Roscelin over Trinitarian
doctrine. Of these four treatises, the first three are eloquent testimony
to the continuing power of Platonist philosophy, as mediated chiefly
through Augustine; the last is a remarkable product of the application
of contemporary logical method to a problem which was peculiar to
Christian theology. Together, they provide a conspectus of Anselm's
philosophical presuppositions and of his technique.
The title which Anselm originally gave the Monologion ('Soliloquy')
- 'An Example of Meditating about the Rational Basis of Faith' -
signals the approach which he was to adopt throughout his systematic
work. What this 'example' comprised was an attempt to establish
rationally the existence, creative activity and trinity of God. The
Platonic character of the inquiry is clear from the outset: 'It is ... easy
for someone to ask himself the following question: Although the great
variety of goods that we perceive through the senses or distinguish
through the mind are so numerous, are we to believe that there is one
98 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

thing through which all good things are good, or are we to believe that
different goods are good through different things?' 38 The argument is
that relative concepts require absolutes for their foundation: 'All
other goods are good through something other than what they are and
... this other alone is good through itself. But no good which is good
through another is equal to or greater than that good which is good
through itself. Hence, only that good which alone is good through
itself is supremely good.' 39 The same logic is applied to the act of
existing, from which it follows that 'there is something which -
whether it is called a being, a substance or a nature- is the best and
the greatest and the highest of all existing things' .40 This being exists
through itself and all else exists by virtue of it.
Then follows a discussion of how the relative world may be
conceived to exist through this supreme being. The suggestion that
there is a substratum of matter, having an existence independent of
the supreme being, is rejected as implying an illogical plurality of
absolute principles. The alternative, pantheistic theory, that the
world is constructed from the matter of the supreme being, is
dismissed on the grounds that it implies a change in what is perfect.
There remains creation from nothing. Thejudaeo-Christian doctrine
thus stands on purely rational considerations.
Anselm next (Chapter 8) tackles the question what is meant by
nothingness, countering an ultra-realist fallacy which would accord
some degree of being to this concept. His insistence that 'nothing'
signifies complete lack of being, like his rejection of an independent
matter or substratum of the universe, was true to Augustine's own
analysis of creation and may be thought to have been simply
prompted by it. But the misconception of nothingness exemplified in
the ninth-century treatise On Nothing and Darkness by Alcuin's pupil
Fredigisus of Tours may still have had some currency and Anselm
may here be confronting a genuine contemporary puzzle. The
concept is explained again in Chapter 19, where it is shown that
nothing existed before or will exist after the supreme being. 41
The only existence which created reality had prior to its creation
was as a thought in the mind of the creator, expressing the nature of
the thing (Chapters 9-1 0). This thought (ratio) is the natural word or
sign, the conception which precedes language (Chapter 10). To this
extent, the creator resembles a craftsman, who knows in advance
what he will make. But the craftsman's concepts are related in some
way to objects of which he has experience and his execution of his
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 99
concept depends on the materials available, whereas the creator's
concepts are truly original and his execution is unfettered. Lastly on
this theme, it is shown that the created world is dependent on the
creator not only in its origin but for its continued conservation
(Chapters 13-14).
The rest of the Monologion (Chapters 15-80) is almost entirely
devoted to establishing what can be known of the nature of the
supreme being and the necessity for human happiness of striving after
such knowledge. The most interesting part of the discussion concerns
the problem of making statements about the supreme being. Rela-
tional terms- such as the term 'supreme' itself- are inappropriate as
they do not reveal the substance of the subject to which they are
applied. Of non-relational terms, those may be used which indicate
'whatever in every respect it is better to be than not to be' .42 Such
terms are predicated substantively, to describe the essence of the
supreme being; this follows from its absolute character, as established
in the opening chapters of the treatise. Anselm then demonstrates,
successively, that the supreme being is simple (Chapter 17), without
beginning or end (Chapter 18), omnipresent (Chapter 20), unre-
stricted by place or time (Chapters 21-24) and immutable (Chapter
25). Discussion of this last aspect involves a distinction between
substance and accidents and leads Anselm to consider the funda-
mental question in what sense the supreme being can be said to be a
substance. As may be expected, the analysis is heavily indebted to
Aristotle's Categories. Anselm recognises the two senses of substance-
universal and individual. Neither sense, however, seems to apply to
the supreme being, 'for neither is it common to many substances, nor
does it have anything essentially in common with any other
substance' .43 This is the Neoplatonist point that the One transcends
all the categories. Like Boethius before him, who had stressed that
substance as applied to God was really super-substance, Anselm
allows the force of the consideration. The supreme being, which is
absolute, is radically different to the beings of which it is the cause.
'Hence, if it ever has some name in common with others, without
doubt a very different signification must be understood in its case.' 44
However, Anselm is searching for a positive theology and is evidently
reluctant to abandon the familiar terminology. His resolution of the
dilemma is markedly diffident: 'Nevertheless, since it not only most
certainly exists but even exists supremely, and since the being of any
thing is usually called substance, surely if[ the Supreme Being] can be
100 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

acceptably called anything, there is no reason not to call it a

substance.' 45 The problem of terminology recurs near the end of the
treatise. By a long process of inference (Chapters 29--65), during
which the guiding hand of faith is at its most evident, Anselm has
elaborated an account of Trinitarian doctrine. He is at pains to point
out the deficiencies of his explanation. It is an ineffable doctrine.
Though capable of a degree of rationalisation it is incapable of being
rendered comprehensible and ultimately must be accepted on faith.
How to refer to this trinity? The only terms available are 'persons' and
'substances'. Anselm finds them well suited to signify a plurality in
the supreme being, 'since the word "person" is predicated only of an
individual rational nature'- an echo ofBoethius' classic definition 46 -
'and since the word "substance" is predicated mainly of individual
things, which mostly exist in plurality'. 47 How then to express the
unity? Here 'substance' is the only possible term but it is to be
understood as signifying simply 'being', in the sense that being is
opposed to nothingness. 48
The Monologion is an interesting source for testing the philosophical
vocabulary of the eleventh century, as derived from St Augustine,
particularly his treatise On the Trinity, the sacred treatises ofBoethius
and the Categories of Aristotle. Its chief claim to originality is not its
content but the theological method which its author expressly adopts.
It is an indication of the intellectual climate that the form of the
exercise was determined by the request of the monks for whom
Anselm wrote. As he records in the preface, they asked 'that nothing
at all in the meditation would be argued on Scriptural authority, but
that ... rational necessity would tersely prove, and truth's clarity
would openly manifest, whatever the conclusion of the distinct
inquiries declared' .49 In keeping with this ascetic prescription,
Anselm omitted all citation of authorities from the work. The fact
disturbed his former mentor, Lanfranc, to whom he sent it initially for
approval. But despite the novelty ofform, Anselm's conservatism and
regard for authority is explicit. 'If in this investigation', he affirms in
Chapter I, 'I say something that a greater authority does not
mention, then even if my statement is a necessary consequence of
reasons which will seem [good] to me, I want the statement to be
accepted as follows: It is not thereby said to be absolutely necessary
but is only said to be able to appear necessary for the time being.' 5°
His explanations of religious truths have the character of a
hypothesis. 5 1 In the Proslogion, where he had no precedents on which
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 101
to rely even had he wished, he made the clearest statement possible of
the priority offaith in the attainment of a true understanding: 'I do
not seek to understand in order to believe, but I believe in order to
understand. For this too I believe, that "unless I believe, I shall not
understand".' 52 The sentiment is borrowed from St Augustine and
accords with his theory of knowledge. This programme, 'Credo ut
intelligam' ('I believe in order to understand'), was neatly conveyed
in the title which Anselm originally intended for theProslogion, 'Fides
quaerens intellectum' ('Faith in search of understanding').
TheProslogion ('An Address') is similar in spirit to theMonologion. It
sets out Anselm's daring 'ontological argument' for the existence of
God. 'The fool has said in his heart "There is no God".' (Ps. 13.1.)
The statement, Anselm concluded, is in fact absurd. The concept
'God' is such that denial of his existence is a contradiction in terms.
God is the being than which no greater can be thought. Such a being
cannot exist in the understanding alone- and it does exist, according
to Anselm, even in the understanding of the fool who makes the denial
- for it can be thought of as existing also in extra-mental reality.
Moreover, not only is it apparent on this reasoning that the being
than which no greater can be thought has extra-mental existence, it
alone has such existence necessarily in that it cannot be thought not to
have it. This is the real achievement though probably not, as has been
argued, 53 the real intention of Anselm's 'proof: it constitutes a
definition of the concept of God as that of a necessarily existing being.
The method by which the original concept is teased and amplified is
characteristic of the period. In particular, it recalls Berengar's
analysis of the language of the eucharistic formula. 54 However, while
the form of Anselm's argument is logical its foundation is metaphysi-
cal. It derives from the realist's confidence that the idea in the mind
and the extra-mental existence of the object of thought are linked in a
common scale of being. It is not surprising to find that Anselm's
argument is foreshadowed in St Augustine. 5 5 Since Anselm regarded
the ontological proof as his own discovery he was probably uncon-
scious of any model but it reflects a habit of thought which is
thoroughly Augustinian.
The Proslogion was challenged shortly after it began to circulate.
Guanilo, a monk of Marmoutier near Tours, pleaded two main
contentions on behalf of the fool- a denial that the mind has more
than a nominal concept of God and a denial that the existence of the
concept in the mind would imply its existence in reality any more than
102 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

to have a concept of an island excelling all others would make it

impossible to doubt its actual existence. He also made an interesting
use of the argument underlying the Augustinian 'Cogito': 56 if I am
able to doubt my own existence, which I know most certainly, why
should I be unable to doubt the existence of God? If, on the other
hand, it is impossible for me genuinely to doubt my own existence,
then the property of not being able to be thought not to exist does not
belong uniquely to God. In his reply to Guanilo, Anselm restated his
own case, jovially rejecting the appropriateness of the analogy
between the concept at issue and that of the imaginary island. 57 The
debate is an outstanding instance of the fascination which logical
technique exercised for contemporaries. Anselm seems to have
realised that it would be of perennial interest and ordered the
preservation of Guanilo's criticisms and of his own reply as an
addendum to the Proslogion. 58
TheDe Veritate is a short dialogue between a master and his disciple
aimed at exploring the concept oftruth. 59 The fundamental insights
are Platonic and Augustinian but the economical and controlled way
in which the argument proceeds, through a careful employment of the
Aristotelian technique of definition by successive division and
subdivision, stamps it as of its time. 60 Truth is eternal, absolute and
unified (Chapters I, 10, 13); this absolute is the foundation of all
aspects of truth- truth of statement and signification (Chapter 2),
truth of thought (Chapter 3), truth of the will (Chapter 4) and of
action (Chapter 5), and truth of the senses, which is not impaired
even when the impressions derived from sense experience are
erroneous (Chapter 6); all things depend for the truth of their being
on 'supreme truth' (Chapter 7); the ordering of the world is therefore
a right ordering despite the apparent anomaly and impropriety of evil
(Chapter 8);justice and truth are synonymous with rightness; justice
is rightness of the will motivated or 'preserved' by rightness itself
(Chapter 12).
The Cur Deus Homo, a treatise in two books, also uses the dialogue
form. Here the participants are Anselm himself and Boso, a monk of
Bee whom Anselm had summoned to Canterbury. He seems to
represent the demanding younger generation of monks who time and
again called upon Anselm to expound burning issues of the day. 61 The
Cur Deus Homo is supremely a work where faith seeks understanding.
Whereas in theProslogion Anselm had set out to demonstrate that God
was a necessary being, he now set out to demonstrate that the
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 103
Incarnation was a necessary sequel to the Fall, required to repair a
breach in the cosmic order. The main argument runs as follows: man
was created by God for blessedness; by original disobedience this is
forfeited; God's justice demands a satisfaction which is outside of
man's capacity; the defect can be repaired only by the agency of a
God-Man; repair of the defect is necessary if God's original purpose is
not to be thwarted. In advancing this syllogistic theory of salvation
(or 'soteriology') Anselm probably had two sets of potential critics in
mind, whose challenges he attempted to meet. 62 The Incarnation
needed to be justified against Jewish criticism that it represented a
frivolous derogation from God's transcendence. Within a Christian
perspective, Anselm's theory countered a contemporary version,
known to have been current at the school ofLaon. This presented the
devil as an entity with legal rights; the Fall was an act of homage
which made man the devil's vassal; the death of the God-Man was an
unwarranted extension of the devil's claims, as a result of which he
lost them totally. Anselm too used feudal imagery in his account but
not as the foundation of it. Intellectually, his analysis was a
considerable advance on the other view, though it did not succeed in
ousting it. Nor did he solve all the problems which his own approach
raised.
Anselm's influence on the next generation was much less than
might be expected. He did have followers and imitators, among them
Gilbert Crispin, abbot ofW estminster, and Odo, bishop ofCambrai-
both of whom shared his concern to defend Christian soteriology
against Jewish criticism- and the prolific but superficial Honorius
Augustodunensis. 63 This external evidence combines with internal
indications that in his writings he was supplying a contemporary
demand. However, he made little impact on the teaching of the
cathedral schools, so important for the future of the dialectical
movement. It is difficult to account for this failure to win a wider
following but it seems that a difference of taste was involved.
Although the concerns and activities of cathedral school theologians
were varied, Anselm somehow slipped through the mesh of their
interests. His synthetic approach to speculative theology, the careful,
discreet elaboration of central themes, seems not to have caught the
imagination. The method of much twelfth-century dialectical theol-
ogy has a new flavour. The propositions of faith were, however
reverentially, seen as material to be dissected, reduced to their
components, analysed and reported on. It was a detached, formal
104 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

inquiry, bound by its own rules of argument, and the test of its value
was conformity to those rules. This highly professional, 'academic'
quality contrasts with Anselm's style. Rather than more adventurous
topics or more radical conclusions it marks the difference between
cathedral school and monastic theology. It also helps to explain why
the application of logic to theology should again have become
controversial in the first half of the twelfth century.

Logic and Theology- Peter Abelmd

Peter Abelard was born in 1079 at Le Pallet, near Nantes in Brittany,

the son of a landed knight. As he shows no interest in the scientific
subjects of the quadrivium, it may be assumed that his studies were
confined to the trivium - grammar, rhetoric and logic. These he
would have pursued in local schools, including, probably, that of
Roscelin (c. 1095) at Loches. In about 1100 he transferred to the
school of William of Champeaux at the cathedral church of Notre
Dame in Paris. His attacks on William over the question of universals,
begun while he was still his pupil, continued after he had set up his
own school, first at Melun (1103) and then at Corbeil. Following
William's entry into the regular life at the monastery of St Victor,
Abelard taught for a short time at Notre Dame; then after an interval
in Melun again, he opened his school in Paris itself, in the area of
MontSte Genevieve, outside the city boundary, on the left bank of the
Seine. Having established his reputation as a logician, at William's
expense, he decided shortly after 1113 to apply himself to theology,
under Anselm ofLaon. Anselm's expertise as a scriptural exegete was
held in high regard and has been confirmed by modern scholarship
but Abelard soon grew impatient, commenting later that when
Anselm lit his fire he gave out smoke rather than light. His
disenchantment at first took the form of non-attendance at lectures
but then he began to lecture himself, expounding the difficult and
neglected text of the prophet Ezekiel. The success of this enterprise
and the reaction to it of Anselm's supporters resulted in Abelard's
returning to Paris (c. 1114) where he was invited to teach theology in
the cathedral school. The sequel is well known: his love affair with
Heloise, niece of Canon Fulbert, their secret marriage, which barred
him from ecclesiastical promotion, his mutilation by Fulbert's
agency, Heloise's retirement to the convent of Argenteuil and
Abelard's own profession as a monk ofSt Denis (c. 1119). It was at
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 105
this period that he wrote his first theological treatise, 'On the Divine
Unity and Trinity' (also known as the Theologia 'Summi Boni').
Attacked by Alberic ofRheims and Lotulf of Novara, former pupils of
Anselm ofLaon, it was condemned at the council ofSoissons in 1121.
The set-back however was temporary. The next eighteen years,
during which Abelard is known to have taught at the Paraclete, a
hermitage which he established near Nogent-sur-Seine (c. 1121-9),
and again at Mont Ste Genevieve (c. 1135-6, 1139-40), were a period
of intense intellectual effort. The work condemned at Soissons was
revised and extended as the Theologia Christiana. It included in its
range of topics Trinitarian doctrine and the nature of creation,
especially the question whether God can do better than he does.
These were also part of the later unfinished Theologia 'Scholarium',
intended as a comprehensive textbook. The Sic et Non, an exercise in
the dialectical presentation of theological issues, was probably in
preparation from the mid-1120s. The Commentary on the Epistle to the
Romans, in which Abelard expounded his theory of grace and his
soteriology, and the Ethics 'Sci to teipsum' ('Know thyself') date from
c. 1136. The Dialogue between a Philosopher, a jew and a Christian is
another vehicle for the dialectical presentation of issues. It may be
from approximately 1136, though some scholars date it to the last
years of Abelard's life, 1140-2. 64
Abelard's views as expressed in his various writings attracted the
attention of a battery of critics during his life, including Hugh of St
Victor, Walter of Mortagne, an associate of the circle of Laon, the
Cistercian William of St Thierry and, above all, St Bernard of
Clairvaux. It was mainly due to Bernard's determined prosecution,
based on information supplied to him by Abelard's other opponents,
that a list of propositions attributed to him was condemned by a
council at Sens in 1140 and a number of them transmitted for censure
by Pope Innocent Il. 65 On his way to defend himself in Rome,
Abelard was invited by Peter the Venerable, abbotofCluny, to retire
from the world. He died at a daughter house ofCluny in Aprilll42.
The controversies and censures which punctuated Abelard's life for
long misled historians in their assessment of his work. Modern
scholarship has discredited the portrayal of him as a sceptic and
freethinker and has restored him to his rightful place as a theologian
of serious purpose in the dialectical mould. In a letter to Heloise
recorded by his supporter Berengar of Poitiers and written shortly
before or immediately after the council ofSens, Abelard protested the
106 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

sincerity of his faith: 'I do not wish to be a philosopher if it means

conflicting with Paul nor to be an Aristotle if it cuts me off from
Christ.' 66 It represents not a late change of mind but his consistent
position except, indeed, in so far as it poses a dichotomy, untypical of
his general perception of the relationship between reason and faith.
This is characterised by a profound conviction of the unity of truth, an
idea confidently expressed in one of his logical works where he
defends the uses of dialectic for the Christian against the accusations
of his critics that it 'destroys faith by the entanglements of its
argumentation':

But if they grant that an art militates against faith, without any
doubt they are admitting that it is not knowledge. For knowledge is
a comprehension of the truth of things; wisdom, in which faith
consists, is a species of it. This (sc. wisdom) is the discernment of
what is honourable or useful. But truth cannot be opposed to truth.
Truth cannot be opposed to truth or good to good in the way that
false can be found set against false or evil against evil; all things that
are good are harmonious and congruent. All knowledge is good,
even knowledge of evil, and cannot be lacking in the just man. For
the just man to be on guard against evil it is necessary for him to
have known in advance what evil is: he could not avoid it unless he
knew what it was .... On these grounds therefore we prove that all
knowledge, which is from God alone and proceeds from his gift, is
good. Consequently it must be allowed too that the study of all
knowledge is good ... but study of that learning is especially to be
undertaken in which greater truth is seen to be present. This
however is dialectic, for to it all discernment of truth or falsehood is
subject, in such a way that as the leader of the whole realm of
learning it has all philosophy in its princely rule. 67

Knowledge as the gift of God recalls St Augustine's theory of divine

illumination. Abelard accepted the theory but as so often in his use of
traditional terminology his adaptation revolutionised the perspec-
tive. For Augustine 'divine illumination' expressed distrust in the
power of human reason. For Abelard it expressed assurance that
human speculation, like human endeavour generally, was a gift of
God and evoked a response from him. So, in his Theologia 'Summi
Bani' and his Theologia Christiana, he was prepared to argue that Plato
and other Gentile philosophers had been guided to an understanding
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 107
both of the unicity and trinity of God. He was later to modify and
finally to reject the idea that they had found the doctrine of the
Trinity. 68 St Augustine had considered the same point seriously and
was otherwise concerned to show that the philosophers might be
considered friendly neighbours. His inclination, though, was to be
defensive; if the Platonists had attained to truth, the explanation was
that either they had borrowed from the Scriptures or they had enjoyed
a separate revelation through a study of what God had made. 69
Abelard was assertive. The philosophers, by their high standards of
morality, had shown themselves worthy of such a revelation. 70 The
originality of Abelard's statement of the point should not be
exaggerated. He was doing no more than to follow the trend of
Augustine's optimistic pronouncements, while ignoring the restric-
tive, even pessimistic, vein of the saint's thought. However, it is this
difference of tone, the unfailingly optimistic view of man's relation-
ship with God, that is the core of Abelard's theology and, more than
any single doctrine, lends it an air of novelty.
Abelard also adopted the Augustinian psychology, with its presup-
positions of the superiority of the soul, its direction of the body and its
moral agency and responsibility. 71 Although one of the principal
effects of the Fall, in his account as in that of Augustine, is that the
ruling function of soul is liable to misdirection and disruption, this is
never such as to detract from man's accountability for his actions.
Accountability is the subject of the Ethics, 'Sci to teipsum'. The work
was in two books, of which Book rand only a fragment of the second
survives. Its title- 'Know thyself'- echoes the Delphic counsel to
seekers of wisdom 72 but the treatise itself is wholly Christian in
orientation, being an analysis of evil and goodness considered as
disobedience and obedience to God. It ends with a treatment of
confession as a means of obtaining remission of sin, a topic which
received much elaboration in the course of the twelfth century.
Abelard emphasises the interior disposition of the penitent. This is in
keeping with his general approach. His chief contribution to moral
theology in the Ethics is his definition of sin as a matter of consent, the
thesis that action divorced from the intention which produces it is
morally indifferent and the consequence that ignorance of the true
nature of the action excuses from guilt. It is the intention that
determines the morality of action and it is consent to what is known to
be evil that, from the point of view of the agent, constitutes sin. The
consideration led him to propose that the Jews were guiltless of
108 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

Christ's death and that given their convictions they would have
sinned by failing to persecute him.
From this assertion of the internal character of morality it followed
that neither virtue nor vice are augmented by the accomplishment of
the agent's intention. The whole analysis was deeply disturbing to
Abelard's critics. 73 In particular, the thesis that the actual execution
of an intention is morally indifferent ran counter to a well established
penitential tradition, the spiritual counterpart of the old Germanic
laws governing redress of injuries, which required minute examina-
tion of the external content of the sinful act and established the degree
of satisfaction accordingly. 74 What his critics failed to recognise was
that Abelard was true to a strand of thought which in theological
terms had its precedent in St Augustine's doctrine of moral integrity.
In philosophical terms it went back further, to ancient Stoicism. In
fact, the psychological account of morality was too powerful to be
excluded. 75 It rapidly became absorbed into penitential discipline.
Even then, however, the external dimension remained significant, for
if the act did not contribute to the individual's guilt it might leave him
entrammelled in a nexus of social obligations arising from it. This
aspect, which was to become the province of the canon lawyer, was
not part of Abelard's analysis. To that extent, his theory of sin might
seem unbalanced and unsatisfactory even when the logic of his
position was incontrovertible.
While the Ethics is undoubtedly Abelard's most original contri-
bution to doctrine, the Sic et Non ('For and Against') is his most
interesting exercise in dialectical method. It consists of 158 theologi-
cal questions followed in each case by a collection of the often
conflicting patristic solutions to them, generally without resolution of
the dissension. It was a challenge 'such as may excite tender readers
to the supreme endeavour of inquiring for truth and may render them
sharper by their inquiry. For this is the definition of the first key of
knowledge, namely assiduous or frequent questioning .... By calling
into question (dubitando) we come to inquiry; by inquiring we reach
the truth.>7 6 The intention was not to bring patristic opinion into
disrepute but to suggest the role which dialectic could play in clearing
the ground:

Diligent discussion is also necessary when there are diverse

pronouncements on the same matter, as to what is intended to have
the force of precept, what to constitute an indulgent remission or
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 109
what an exhortation of perfection, so that we may seek a remedy for
contradiction by adverting to diversity of [authorial] intentions. If
precept is in question, is it general or particular ... ? Distinction
has also to be made between the timing of and reasons for
dispensations because often what is found allowed at one time is
found forbidden at another, and what is generally commanded, as a
rigorous standard, is sometimes tempered by dispensation. These
are points over which it is especially necessary to make distinction
in the enactment of ecclesiastical decrees or canons, for generally
an easy solution to controversies will be found if we can establish
that the same words are used in different senses by different
authors. The careful reader will try in all these ways ... to resolve
contradictions in the writings of the saints. But if it happens that a
contradiction is so explicit that by no argument can it be resolved,
the authorities must be compared and that one retained in
preference which is better testified and has greater corroboration. 77

The juxtaposition of contraries was a technique practised in the

schools and was not invented by Abelard. It was soon to bear fruit in
canon law and theology respectively in the Decretum ofGratian (post
1139--ante 1155), the foundation of medieval canonical scholarship,
and the four books of the Sentences of Peter Lombard (1150/4-7), the
university textbook of the medieval theologian. It is not clear how far
these seminal compilations were influenced by the method of the Sic et
Non and how far they were independently conceived but between
them the three works represent a triumph of productive criticism.
Among the controversial theological positions of Abelard were
several doctrines concerning creation and salvation history. Influ-
enced by the Timaeus, Abelard argued that God necessarily acts for
the best and cannot be presumed capable of making the world better
than he did. It was a question bristling with difficulties whatever the
answer given to it. Abelard's line of thought evoked little argument
from his critics but it readily lent itself to being interpreted as
restrictive of divine freedom. He was aware of the hazard and sought
to avoid it by stressing that the necessity was not an external
constraint but an implication of God's nature, which is perfect
goodness. 78
The absence of external constraint on divine action is the
foundation of Abelard's soteriology. Like St Anselm he rejected the
theory that the Incarnation took place to redeem mankind from the
110 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

devil's dominion. Despite the force of the Cur Deus Homo, the
dominion theory was still being maintained in the school of Anselm of
Laon and Abelard's review of the question, for which the main source
is the Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, may plausibly be seen as a
direct challenge to his former associates there. 79 But ifhe himselfhad
read the Cur Deus Homo, as seems likely, its satisfaction theory, with its
emphasis on the claims of divine justice, found no favour with him. It
began from the wrong pole of the relationship between man and God,
implying that it was God's integrity which somehow needed to be
restored rather than man's. 80 The sole reason for the Incarnation is
the divine goodness which spontaneously seeks man out, liberates
him from sin, reconciles him and enables him to turn to God. 81 The
aspect of Christ's mission on which Abelard lays most stress is its
exemplary quality by which man is shown the nature of perfect
living. 82
The spontaneity with which God approaches man is also the basis
of Abelard's account of justification. For all the charges of Pelagian-
ism brought against him by his critics, it is clear that he adhered to the
Augustinian terminology of predestination83 and was prepared to
accept it as a mystery. However, he was anxious to emphasise that it is
man's responsibility whether he reacts to grace with energy or with
torpor and to this end he rejected the concept of successive enabling
graces as a preliminary to meritorious acts. In fact, he cannot be said
to have resolved the tension latent in this attempt to reconcile divine
initiative with human responsibility. Not only can he not be convicted
of having neglected divine initiative, in the very emphasis which he
placed upon it he raised the problem whether it could be imputed to
man as a fault that he did not accept the grace offered: 'Perhaps
someone may say that it is his fault in that God has willed to give him
that grace which he gave in equal measure to him and to the just but
that he did not will to accept it when offered. To this I reply that it is
impossible for him to accept it without the grace of God. Since God
did not will to give him the grace to accept the gift offered and since he
could not accept it without this grace, it is wrong to ascribe it to his
fault that he did not accept the grace offered.' 84 The clarity with
which he recognised the problem may suggest that he was uncomfort-
able with it. At least one of his sympathisers presented man's natural
disposition to do good in a way that diminished the role of grace. 85
However, this was contrary to Abelard's stated position, which was to
accept the primacy of grace with the difficulties which it entailed.
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES Ill
In his theology Abelard aimed to analyse the content of faith in
such a way as to facilitate the intellectual conviction by which it was
grasped. For him, to suppose that the act offaith involved less than an
intellectual conviction was meaningless. This is also the view which
he attributes to his students as the recipients ofhis treatise On the Unity
and Trinity: 'They demanded something intelligible rather than mere
words. In fact they said that words were useless if the intelligence
could not follow them, that nothing could be believed unless it was
first understood .... ' 86 Lip-service to credal formulae was, he urged,
not only inadequate but blasphemous. 87 The sentiment is the
Christian counterpart to the ancient philosophical maxim that the
unexamined life is not worthy of man. There is nothing artificial
about Abelard's approach to theology, no attempt to exclude
Christian dogma in order to work towards it from elementary
principles. Quite the reverse, his standpoint is that of a believer bent
on examining and expounding the nature of his commitment. In this
sense, he conforms to the spirit ofSt Anselm and his method might as
justly be described as 'faith in search of understanding'. But
conservative minds, on guard for any suggestion that reason is the
criterion of what should be believed, saw his efforts as radical and
disturbing. They were confirmed in their suspicions by his earliest
excursion into the most difficult area of patristic-conciliar theology,
the doctrine of the Trinity. However, novelty of method or of
conclusions is only a partial explanation of the antagonisms which he
aroused. These stemmed in large measure from the context in which
he moved and particularly from the existence of a well-established
school at Laon with which he had taken issue and whose adherents
were able to mount and promote an effective campaign against him.

Logic and Theology - the School of St Victor

The Augustinian abbey and school ofSt Victor in Paris was founded
by William of Champeaux who gave up his archdeaconry at Notre
Dame and retired there for a few years before becoming bishop of
Chalons-sur-Marne in 1112-13. Its chief claim to a place in the
intellectual history of the twelfth century, however, derives not from
him but from two later members of the community, Hugh
(d. 1140/l), who was possibly a native of Saxony, and Richard
(d. 1173), who may have been a Scot.
Hugh ofSt Victor is best known for his Didascalicon, written in the
112 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

late 1120s. Subtitled On the Study of Reading, it was intended as a guide

for students at the abbey school, which was still at this period open to
secular scholars. The work's nearest literary affinity is to the
encyclopaedic tradition, especially as mediated by the Institutions of
Cassiodorus, but it also breathes the spirit of Augustine's On Christian
Doctrine, both in its appreciation of the role of secular learning in the
pursuit of divine wisdom and in its strict subordination of one to the
other. 88 To understand it correctly, it has to be remembered that the
Didascalicon deals merely with the first stage in man's ascent to
wisdom - reading; the subsequent stages are meditation, prayer,
performance (action) and contemplation (the condition of the
perfect).
Hugh describes the Didascalicon as comprising two parts, the first
dealing with the secular arts, the second with scripture. Each part has
three subdivisions. The first part is the more significant as a channel
of ancient learning. It presents philosophy as divided into four
branches, reflecting, with modification, Aristotle's treatment of the
subject. 89 The four branches are theoretical (whose subject is
wisdom), practical (whose subject is conduct), mechanical (contain-
ing various useful arts) and logical. The theoretical branch consists of
theology, mathematics (understood as the quadrivium) and physics;
the practical branch is subdivided into solitary (ethical), private
(economic) and public (political); within the logical branch is
distinguished a linguistic strand and a rational or argumentative one.
This division was not exclusive to Hugh- it is found independently in
his near contemporary, William of Conches90 - but the popularity of
the Didascalicon made it an important source of the idea. Familiarity
with this detailed schema of knowledge was a valuable preparation
for the reception and even the discovery of new texts of Aristotle,
enabling them to be located readily within a general system.
Besides this review of the arts, Hugh also wrote a Summa of
theology, On the Sacraments (De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei), the
structure of which he sketched in Book 6, Chapter 4, of the
Didascalicon. It is in two parts, beginning with the creation, proceed-
ing through the institutions of the church and ending with the general
resurrection and the final states of the wicked and of the just. Part 1
contains material closest to philosophical concerns. It deals among
other topics with creation, divine knowledge, foreknowledge and
providence, the divine nature, the Trinity, the divine will, spiritual
substance, human free will and original sin. 91 While not a polemicist,
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 113
Hugh sought to counteract the tendency of Peter Abelard's thought
concerning divine foreknowledge and immutability, especially the
proposition that God cannot improve on what he does. That creation
should be incapable of improvement would be to suppose either that
it was supremely good - an attribute of God alone - or that it was
irreparably flawed, the very implication that the 'optimistic' thesis
sought to avoid. 92
In the De Sacramentis, Hugh offered an explanation of the Trinity
based on the distinction between intellectual power (mens), wisdom
and love. 93 The quest for a satisfactory rational basis of the doctrine
was a current preoccupation, already noted in the cases of Roscelin
and Abelard and to be found also in William of Conches. After Hugh,
in the school of St Victor, Achard, second abbot of the monastery
(d. 1171), wrote on the topic, trying to state 'necessary reasons'
behind the mystery. 94 This is the keynote of Richard of St Victor's
treatise, On the Trinity. The work is in six books. The Prologue and the
first chapter of Book 1 make clear that the programme is 'faith in
search of understanding', although St Anselm's phrase is not
explicitly recalled. There is a hint of Abelard's spirit in the sense of
obligation with which Richard invests proceeding beyond faith to
understanding. 'It ought to be insufficient for us ... to hold on faith
the truths of eternal realities, unless it be given to us also to establish
by the witness of reason that which is held on faith. And let not that
knowledge of eternal truths which is by faith only be sufficient for us,
unless we may grasp also that knowledge which is by understanding,
even if we are not yet capable of that which is by experience.' 95 Faith
is the starting point for knowledge of 'eternal truths' since some of
what we are enjoined to believe not only transcends reason but
actually seems to contravene it 'unless, that is, these articles be
discussed by a profound and most skilful inquiry or better still be
made manifest by divine revelation'. 96 However, although the entry
to such truths is by faith, one must not halt there but always press on
to the inner and deeper recesses ofunderstanding. 97
The object of the treatise is, accordingly, to find necessary reasons
for eternal truths and it is based on the conviction that 'for the
explanation of any realities whose being is necessary there must be
not only probable but necessary arguments, although for the time
being it may be that they lie hidden from our efforts'. 98 The arguments
for the existence of God hinge on the Platonist perception that the
relative and contingent require an absolute. 99 The unique character
114 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

and attributes of this absolute are established in turn, in the

remainder of Book I and through Book n. This however is the less
ambitious part of the inquiry. In Book III Richard proposes to show
the rational justification of the doctrine of the Trinity. The argument
here is from the character of perfect love. The necessity that perfect
love be directed towards another requires that there be a second
divine person and the necessary desire of these two persons to have a
common object of love requires that there be a third. Book IV
examines the concept of'person' in order to show the compatibility of
unity and trinity. Boethius' definition of 'person' - 'the individual
substance of a rational nature' - is criticised: a divine person is 'an
incommunicable existence of the divine nature' .100 Book v is an
account of the processions of the persons in the Trinity. Book VI
explains the names of the persons by human analogies.
Not all the Victorines were well disposed to the investigation of the
mysteries of faith. One member of the house, Walter, a contemporary
ofRichard, took the view that such investigation created a confused
and dangerous maze. 101 He seems to represent an anti-intellectualist
current there towards the end of the century, contrasting with the
approach of Hugh and Richard and perhaps reflecting an inevitable
tension within it. 102 Hugh and Richard express the earlier and general
spirit of the school, which accepted dialectical theology as part of a
progressive schema of knowledge. According to this, intellectual
apprehension of eternal truths, attained under the guidance of faith,
culminates by divine grace in direct experience. The last element is a
reminder of the mystical dimension to St Victor. Both Hugh and
Richard wrote treatises based on the pseudo-Denis and mediated his
doctrine to the high and late middle ages. The way in which its two
greatest figures underpin dialectical method with a sense of spiritual
insight, pressing all three levels of human knowledge - faith,
intellection and experience - into a single-minded and integrated
quest, is the distinctive quality of the school in its time.

Twelfth-century Cosmology

The twelfth century saw an attempt on the part of a series of thinkers

in northern France to combine the few strands of ancient scientific
theory then available into a general understanding of the structure of
the universe. The principal source for it was Chalcidius' partial
translation of the Timaeus and his commentary on it. This was
 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES 115
supplemented by the 'scientific' treatises of the quadrivium, notably
Boethius' On Arithmetic and On Music and Martianus' On the Marriage
qf Philology and Mercury, by the account of the soul in Macrobius'
commentary on the Dream qf Scipio and by leads in Boethius' other
writings, the theological treatises as well as the Consolation of
Philosophy. Boethius' theological treatises were particularly valuable
in providing a statement of Aristotelian hylomorphism, using the
vocabulary of matter (materia) and form, while Chalcidius provided
an alternative vocabulary for the same doctrine. 103 The related
doctrine of actuality and potentiality was also reconstructed, from
references in Aristotle's De Interpretatione and from Chalcidius'
distinction between 'possibility' - lack of form - and effect. Thus,
although twelfth-century cosmologists might think of themselves as a
distinct group, 'lovers of Plato', 104 their Platonism was a hybrid. It
could not be otherwise, given that their very scanty knowledge of
Plato was derived from late classical sources, dating from the period
when thinkers had been labouring to reconcile a variety of systems.
The literature of this strand of twelfth-century thought consists
partly of glosses on the authorities and partly of 'original' treatises.
Among the first class are glosses on Boethius' On the Trinity and on
Genesis by Thierry the Breton (known as Thierry of Chartres from
the fact that he became chancellor there in 1141) and by his pupil,
Clarembald of Arras, who wrote in the late 1150s and who also
glossed another of Boethius' 'sacred treatises', on the concepts of
substance and goodness. 105 Also in this class are glosses on the Timaeus,
on Macrobius and on Boethius' Consolation by William of Conches
(died c. 1154). Among the second class are a Philosophy qf the World by
William of Conches and a literary work, Cosmographia, by Bernard
Silvestris (Bernard of Tours), written probably 1143-7, which
presents its cosmology through an elaborate allegory and a mixture of
verse and prose. 106
As a systematic treatise, William's Philosophy of the World and its
revised version, the Dragmaticon, provides a good summary of the
scientific knowledge of the period and of its application in a Christian
context. By philosophy William means 'the true comprehension of
things which exist and are not seen and of things which exist and are
seen' .107 Thus, his subject is all reality. In Book 1 of the Philosophy he
proceeds to discuss the possibility of knowledge of God in this life (we
are not wholly ignorant- we know that he exists- but we do not know
him perfectly). From this follows examination of the proofs for God's
116 THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES

existence- the creation of the world and its rational ordering- and of
aspects of Trinitarian doctrine. The most interesting discussion is of
the nature of the World Soul, on which he cites three views: that it is
the Holy Spirit; that it is 'a natural force (vigorem) implanted in things
by God, in virtue of which some things have life only, others have life
and feeling and discernment'; and that it is 'a certain incorporeal
substance which is whole in individual bodies, although on account of
the lethargy of some bodies it does not exercise the same effect in
all' .108 The remainder of Book 1 discusses angels and the elements
which constitute the visible world. William's elements are atoms,
which he is careful to distinguish from the four visible 'elements',
earth, water, air and fire. For his source here William cites
Constantine the African's Pantechni, an eleventh-century Latin ver-
sion of the theoretical books of a comprehensive treatise on medicine
by a tenth-century Arabic writer, Ali ben Abbas. This and other
medical material from Arabic and Greek, including treatises by
Galen (c. AD 130-201) and Nemesius ofEmesa (c. AD 390), was now
coming into circulation in the west. Its influence was not confined to
the theory and practice of medicine but can be discerned, as here, in
contemporary philosophicalliterature. 109
The rest of the Philosophy surveys the physical universe. Book u
deals with the ether and astronomy, Book III with air, meteorology
and the final conflagration of the world- a notion derived from Stoic
theory but compatible with Christian eschatology- and Book IV with
earth as a constitutive 'element', geography and life on earth,
including observations on human biology and anatomy.
The works of Thierry, of William of Conches, by extension and
analogy ofCiarembald of Arras and Bernard Silvestris, and of Gilbert
of Poitiers were for long regarded by historians as the products of a
single school- the school of Chartres- with a distinctive humanistic
and scientific outlook. This view has been effectively challenged in
terms both of the careers of the masters once thought to have
comprised the school and the interpretation of their interests. no It can
now be seen that theirs was not a localised perception but that of a
generation steeped in common sources. The interests which they
shared represent 'a phase in the continuous development of western
studies and of medieval humanism' .m Their writings contain the
fullest accumulation in the Latin west of the ancient teaching on the
structure of the universe and man's place within it before the new
access of Aristotelian science.
4. New Sources and New Institutions

THE first half of the twelfth century represents an end and a beginning
in the rediscovery of Aristotle. The logical corpus was now complete
and the new material was being gradually assimilated. The recovery
of the philosophical and scientific system, on the other hand, was only
beginning and what had been found was not yet part of the
educational programme. The second phase of recovery and absorp-
tion lasted more than a century and proceeded along two routes, from
Greek and from Arabic. Direct translations from Greek were the most
important and the most enduring source of new Aristotelian texts.
Although problems of circulation and particular defects meant that a
demand existed too for indirect versions, these could be no more than
temporary substitutes. The chief contribution of Arabic culture to the
intellectual movement in western Europe lay not so much in the
Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian texts which it transmitted as in
the stimulus which its philosophers and commentators gave to
reflection upon them. The absorption of Aristotle's philosophy by
Latin scholars is inextricably bound up with their discovery of Arabic
thought. Thus the student of the western tradition finds that the path
from Athens to Paris and Oxford leads through Baghdad and
Cordova.
The mention of Paris and Oxford introduces another theme of the
present chapter. Long before this momentous extension of the sources
ofEuropean learning was complete new educational institutions were
appearing through which its effects could be realised. From the
thirteenth century onwards the reception of the new texts and the
debate over their implications took place mainly within the 'schools'
or universities. These were a development unique to western Europe.
They provided a structured and highly professional setting for the
propagation and continuance of the new programme of study. The
extent to which they were responsible for its massive impact on the
European outlook is one of several features of the western tradition
which are illuminated by a comparison with the Arabic world.

ll7
118 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

I Arabic Thought

The Character and Context of Arabic Thought

The direct contribution which Arabic commentators and

philosophers made to the understanding of Aristotle is the principal
interest of their thought from the European perspective and will be
the main subject here. There is however a secondary aspect which
deserves notice. The speculative movement in Islam affords several
interesting analogies to its Christian counterpart. There is ample
evidence in Islam of the tension between reason and faith which is a
recurrent feature of Christian thought. The tension is represented in
Islam both by the differences between philosophers and theologians
and by divergent approaches within theology. The divergence was
especially marked between the Mu'tazilites, a school of speculative
theology patronised by the Abbasid Caliphs of the ninth century, and
the followers of Abu'l-Hasan al-Ashari (d. 935). A one-time adherent
of the Mu'tazilite school, he departed from them and established a
fundamentalism which came to dominate Islamic theology. The
issues which divided the Mu'tazilites and the Asharites included their
views on the nature of divine power, its scrutability or inscrutability,
and the question whether the categories of good and evil were
essentially rational or whether they depended simply on divine
ordinance. The Mu'tazilites grounded themselves on the rationality
and objective justice of divine action, emphasised the freedom of
man's will and in general aimed at elaborating a coherent system of
'natural' or rational theology. For their part, the Asharites insisted on
the absolute power of God, especially as regards his inscrutable
predestination of man. In their view, this determined the particular
acts of man's will, which were held to be a part of the divine creation
and to have God as their eternal author. To the charge that
predestination implied an injustice in God, they pleaded that by his
absolute power God was above and exempt from all obligation and
that it was therefore impossible for him to act unjustly. These
differences of approach mirror divisions which were latent indeed in
Christian theology too throughout the middle ages and which were to
come to the fore in the later period.
However, while there were striking coincidences between the
preoccupations of speculative theologians in Islam and Christianity,
it would be wrong to ignore important differences between the two
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 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 119
intellectual contexts. Although questions posed by philosophy inevit-
ably influenced Islamic theological discussion and although Moslem
philosophers in turn were conscious of the force of revealed theology,
the formal gap between theology and philosophy was much wider in
Islam than in Christianity. In the Islamic world the pursuit of
philosophy remained a private activity. It never attained the position
which it rapidly established in the western universities, where a
mastery of Aristotelian texts came to be a prerequisite for entry to the
advanced faculty of theology. The Moslem system of higher educa-
tion centred on training in Islamic law and was relatively little
influenced by philosophical studies. 1 This lack of an institutional
framework was a serious handicap. It tends to be obscured by the
brilliance of what was achieved in the field by individual effort but it
largely explains the failure of philosophy to maintain itself in the long
term as an intellectual force in Islam.
The lack of an institutional framework is true of the teaching of
philosophy as distinct from the work of translation, scholarship on
texts and their conservation. For this essential preparatory work there
did exist at the crucial junctures facilities provided by official
patronage. The availability of these depended on the interests of
individual rulers. Before reviewing the history of the philosophical
movement it is therefore necessary to take some note of the political
structure of the Islamic world.
In 644, on the assassination of Omar, second successor of the
Prophet, the headship of Islam passed to the Ommayad caliphate,
though its position was not established until 661. The Ommayads
presided over the lightning expansion of the Arab empire from its
initial gains, which included Syria, Palestine, Egypt and parts of
Persia, under Omar. Eastwards, the Islamic conquest was pushed to
the Indus valley and the frontiers of China. Westwards, it extended
through north Africa and into Spain and Gaul. Here it was halted by
Charles Martel at the battle ofPoitiers in 732 and shortly afterwards
was forced back to the Pyrenees. In 750, the Ommayad caliphate was
overthrown in the east and replaced by the Abbasid dynasty,
descendants of the Prophet's uncle. They championed the cause of
non-Arab Moslems and their advent saw an increasing Persian
influence in government and the transfer of the caliphate from
Damascus to Baghdad. Their rule lasted nominally until the Mongol
sack of Baghdad in 1258. From the late eighth and early ninth
centuries the Abbasids ceased to control north Africa, west of Egypt.
120 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

Their authority was never accepted in Spain. There, the continuance

of the Ommayad dynasty had been secured by the escape of a sole
survivor from the coup of 750.
Although the Abbasids purported to inaugurate a regime of strict
adherence to Islam, it was under them that Greek thought first began
to be absorbed into Moslem culture. For the most part, the Arabic
corpus of Greek thought was received indirectly, from Syriac rather
than from Greek. Translations into Syriac are known from about the
middle of the fifth century, when the great debates over the person of
Christ stimulated the search for a philosophical foundation to
theology. After the repression of Nestorianism and the attempted
repression of Monophysitism 2 several waves of refugees fled to the
east, mainly to the Persian empire, and it was to this line of exiled
Christian scholarship that the first Arabic versions were owed. 3 The
work of translating afresh began at the Abbasid court of Baghdad in
the middle of the eighth century and is associated with practitioners of
medicine there under the Caliph al-Mansur (754-75). Among the
treatises translated at this time were Aristotelian logical texts, for
which there had been an early demand in Syriac as aids to scriptural
exegesis. The movement continued under the Caliphs Harun al-
Rashid (786-809) and Ma'mun (813-33) as well as at the instigation
of wealthy private patrons who funded the search for texts and
recruited translators. Now philosophical and scientific texts began to
be rendered. The most systematic of the Arabic translators was
Hunain ibn Ishaq (809-73), whose activities scholars designate as the
second phase of the translation movement. With the cooperation of a
number of colleagues, including his son and his nephew, he collated
texts, revised earlier versions and extended the corpus, usually
through translations first into Syriac and then freely into Arabic. His
son, Ishaq, is credited with the translation of parts of the Metaphysics
and Ethics of Aristotle, the latter's De Generatione et Corruptione ('On
Coming to Be and Passing Away') and Plato's Sophist and some of the
Timaeus. It seems that by the middle of the century most of the
Metaphysics- known to Arabic readers as the 'Book of Letters', from its
internal organisation - had been made available. The process of
improving versions and adding new texts continued at Baghdad for
another century and a half, until by the middle of the eleventh century
Arabic thinkers had at their disposal all the works of Aristotle now
extant, with the exception of the Politics and parts of the Ethics.
As a general comment, the syllabus of writings which passed into
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 121
Arabic reflects the dominant interests of the late classical schools.
Aristotle figured largely but not exclusively. Plato too was known.
Probably through paraphrases rather than in their integrity several of
his dialogues were studied. These included the Timaeus and Sophist,
already noted, the Phaedo, a source for Plato's doctrine on the soul,
and the Republic and Laws, which in default of Aristotle's Politics were
the Arabic source for Greek political theory. The Arabs also had
Neoplatonist texts. 4 Most significant was the so-called Theology of
Aristotle, an arrangement by an unknown author of Books IV-VI of
Plotinus' Enneads. The Theology was the principal Arabic source for
Neoplatonist emanationist theory. It coloured the interpretation of
the genuine works of Aristotle by Arabic philosophers down to Ibn
Rushd (Averroes), who rejected its implications. The Liber de Causis
('Book of Causes'), a version ofProclus' Elements of Theology, is another
possible Arabic source of Neoplatonism at an early stage. However
the date ofits compilation is uncertain and its influence, if any, before
the twelfth century is unknown. 5
In addition to these works, the Arabs possessed an important body
of late classical scholarship on Aristotle. Of particular significance
was a strand of commentary developing his psychological doctrine.
The enigmatic remarks in Book m, Chapter 5 of the De Anima and an
equally puzzling passage in On the Generation of Animals, where
Aristotle referred to the intellect as coming 'from outside' ,6 evoked a
series of resolutions. Common to them was an analysis which
required in the act of knowing a capacity for understanding, an object
capable of being understood and an explanation for the fusion of the
two poles. It was on the third aspect that the several interpretations
varied significantly. The question was whether the active principle of
intellection inferred from Aristotle's account- the agent intellect of
the commentaries- was a faculty of the soul or something acting upon
the soul from outside. Theophrastus, head of the Lyceum after
Aristotle, seems to have considered the agent intellect to be both
immanent and transcendent. Later commentators emphasised one or
other of these features. Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. AD 200)
presented the agent intellect as something extrinsic to the soul and his
discussion of it suggested its identification with the prime mover.
Themistius (fl. c. AD 360) rejected this last point and held the agent
intellect to be internal to the soul and to be a constitutive aspect of it.
That this was Aristotle's sense seemed to him to be established by the
assertion that the agent intellect alone was immortal and eternal. The
122 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

statement would be untrue of the prime mover because there were

other immortal movers in the Aristotelian universe. It made sense
only if Aristotle were distinguishing one aspect of the soul from others.
Themistius' analysis became very influential in the thirteenth century
but among the Arabic philosophers Alexander's view prevailed, at
least as regards the externalisation of the agent intellect. This had
important consequences not only for the character of Arabic thought
but also for the reception of Aristotle in the west.

The Development of Islamic Thought

The first systematic Arabic philosopher is generally considered to be

AI Kindi (died c. 873). He lived mainly at Baghdad, where he served
as court astrologer. Although much of his work is lost, he is known to
have been a prolific writer in scientific, mathematical and philosophi-
cal subjects. In common with the Mu'tazilite movement, of which he
is probably best considered a part, his philosophical interests
included a range of theological matters, especially questions concern-
ing the divine unity and justice, the character of divine agency, the
absolute creation and end of the world, revelation, miracles and the
resurrection of the body. On these he sought to vindicate Scripture
against rival Greek theories, while remaining confident that there
could be no essential disparity between revelation and the conclu-
sions of rational inquiry.
Several of AI Kindi's scientific and logical treatises were translated
into Latin in the twelfth century. 7 However, his chief interest from the
western viewpoint lies in his exposition of Aristotle's theory of the
intellect. Here he was greatly affected by the late classical interpreta-
tions, particularly that of Alexander of Aphrodisias. AI Kindi
accepted the idea of an active intellect which was an external agent as
the common doctrine of Plato and Aristotle but he refused to identify
it with God. His treatise On the Intellect 8 contains a general classifica-
tion of the types of intellect, adapted from Alexander. In it he
distinguished between the active intellect and the several wholly
internal intellectual aspects of the soul: the potential intellect (a
receptivity to the effect of the active intellect), what may be called the
activated intellect (as having been brought from potentiality to
actuality) and the 'manifest' or 'demonstrative' intellect (the acti-
vated intellect considered as functioning). 9
With AI Farabi (d. 950), a Turk who received a part of his
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 123
philosophical training at Baghdad, the influence of the Theology of
Aristotle becomes apparent. AI Farabi accepted the Neoplatonist
vision of the universe as a necessary emanation and, again under
Neoplatonist influence, ignored the Islamic doctrine of the resurrec-
tion of the body, which AI Kindi had accepted on the authority of
revelation. The fact is symptomatic of a general difference of outlook
between the two thinkers as to the relationship between reason and
faith. AI Farabi attempted to explain revelation in terms of
philosophical concepts, considering it to be an inferior vehicle of truth
in a symbolic form, designed for the untrained. However, unlike his
near contemporary, AI Razi (d. 925/32), he did not disparage
revelation altogether but accepted it as sufficient to enlighten
non-philosophers on the principles of living well and thus to qualify
them for happiness in the after-life, should they act accordingly. He
held that the souls of those who never attained enlightenment, either
through philosophy or through symbols, would perish with their
bodies.
AI Farabi too composed a treatise on the psychology of knowing,
called in the west De intellectu et intellecto ('On the intellect and what is
understood'). 10 At its most basic level, intellect is the 'practical
reason' of Aristotle's Ethics. At its highest level, it is the divine intellect
ofthe Metaphysics. Of special interest, though, is his treatment of the
intellect described in Aristotle's De Anima. Like AI Kindi, AI Farabi
understood the active intellect as a separate substance, activating the
potential intellect in man. The active intellect itselfhe located within
the Neoplatonist system of emanations from the One and within
Aristotle's astronomical framework. It is the last of the immaterial,
spiritual substances and the mediator between the heavenly and the
sublunar world. As such, it is eternally the same; its function, the
shedding ofintellectuallight, is unconscious; the diversity of its effects
-the fact that men's understanding varies- stems from variety in the
potential intellects upon which it acts. The location of the active
intellect within a cosmological model is the most significant feature of
this analysis for subsequent development. However, it is interesting
to note that elsewhere AI Farabi found a place for it too within the
'symbolic truth' of Islamic revelation. There it is represented by the
angel who communicated the Koran to Mohammed. 11
AI Farabi was arguably the most original philosopher of the eastern
Islamic world but the leading figure from the European viewpoint is
undoubtedly the Persian, Ibn Sina (980--1037), known to the Latins
124 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

as Avicenna. Although some of his works are in Persian, he chiefly

wrote in Arabic, which is the language of his great philosophical
encyclopaedia, the Kitab al-Shifa ('Book of Healing'), and of its
abridgement, the Kitab al-Najat ('Book of Salvation'). It is not clear
whether the Najat was known in the west, but theShifa, called in Latin
the Liber Su.fficientiae ('Book of Sufficiency'), exercised an important
influence through independent circulation of its sections on
metaphysics and psychology.
One of the fundamental aspects of Avicenna's cosmology was his
distinction between necessary and possible being. This he also
expressed as a distinction between essence and existence, between the
concept of the nature of a specific being and its instantiation. The
perception was not perhaps his own. He may have found the germ of it
in a logical distinction made by Aristotle, and similar ideas occur in
Plotinus and in AI Farabi. 12 Moreover, the distinction between
necessary and possible being, that is between uncaused and caused,
may well have followed from philosophical reflection on the Islamic
doctrine of creation from nothing, 13 although Avicenna developed the
point in quite a different fashion. Whatever its source, the analysis
underlay much of his own thought and was a major influence on
western treatment of the matter. The dependence of possible being on
a cause of its existence, combined with rejection of an infinite chain of
causation, is Avicenna's main proof for the existence of God, though
he also accepted the Aristotelian argument to a prime mover. 14 The
relationship between God and the sensible world is traced through a
chain of intelligences which as in Neoplatonist doctrine are the
product of a succession of emanations. The first intelligence is
produced by the self-contemplation of the One. Although a necessary
emanation, it is not the cause of its own existence. The notional
possibility which is a part of its essence gives rise in its self-
contemplation to the matter of the first sphere, while its inherent
necessity gives rise to the soul by which the first sphere is informed.
From the first intelligence there also emanates, through its contem-
plation of the One, a lower intelligence. It too has its proper sphere,
produced as before. So there emanate in all ten intelligences. The last
of these is the agent intelligence, the 'giver offorms' to the sublunar
world. Although the caused universe is contingent in the sense that all
its beings depend for their existence on a cause- unlike the first cause,
God, in whom essence and existence are synonymous- Avicenna
regarded the process of causation itself as necessary. This mechani-
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 125
cal, determinist view of creation was at best remote from Islamic
teaching and was perhaps irreconcilable with it but it need not be
assumed that Avicenna took this view. Because he allowed no
distinction between God's knowledge and his will, emanation as a
result of divine self-knowledge could equally be seen as a product of
the will. 15
In his account of knowing, Avicenna followed the now established
view that the agent intellect was an external principle, which he
identified with the tenth intelligence. The latter was therefore the
source of forms epistemologically as well as ontologically. If the soul,
considered as mind, is to apprehend the forms, according to
Avicenna's theory it is necessary for it to acquire the disposition to
unite itself to the agent intelligence. During the soul's union with a
body, the stimulus for this is experience, generating images in the
mind. After separation from the body, the soul can accomplish the
union without the mediation of images. Clearly, Avicenna has taken
the Aristotelian terminology in a Platonist sense, not least in
conceiving of the soul as a substance in its own right, spiritual,
immortal and capable of independent existence. For him as for
Aristotle the soul is the actuality or perfection of the human being,
conferring specific determination (constituting the being as one
which can grow, reproduce, move and reason). However, in
Avicenna's theory the principle which the soul informs is not prime
matter considered absolutely but prime matter which already
possesses a degree of unspecific organisation, the aptitude or 'form' of
a body .16 The dissolution of body therefore carries no insinuation that
soul too passes out of existence. 17 But while holding firmly to the
continued existence of the human soul, Avicenna rejected the
Platonic notion that it exists before its union with a body. His reason
is that pre-existing souls of the same species would be indis-
tinguishable.18 It is through union with a body that the soul acquires
individuality, which it retains after separation upon bodily death.
With Avicenna, Islamic philosophy reached a peak of systematisa-
tion. As a fully elaborated explanation of the universe his thought
could easily seem to pose a challenge to the theological account. The
emergence of a strain of fundamentalism in Islamic theology as
represented by the Asharite school has already been noted, in
particular its concern with the absolute power of God. Later thinkers
of the type developed the implications of absolute power in new
directions, which militated against the perceptions of a system such as
126 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

Avicenna's. While they admitted the argument for God's existence

from the contingency of the world, they were shy of the Aris-
totelian-Neoplatonist structure of necessary causation and as a
philosophical counterblast fell back instead on versions of the atomic
theory. The association or indeed the duration of atoms, of which
creation was seen to be composed according to this, was left wholly
subject to the divine will. The relationship between cause and effect in
the universe was illusory: what appeared to be an effect of a natural
cause was really, like the existence of the cause itself, an effect of
divine action. 19
The fullest development of this anti-rationalist critique was a
treatise by the Persian philosopher and mystic, AI Ghazali (Algazel)
( 1058-1111), a product of the Asharite movement. His Incoherence of
the Philosophers (Tahiifut al-Faliisifah) was radically intransigent on the
main issues. Among other propositions, AI Ghazali asserted the
creation of the world in time against the theory of eternal emanation.
He defended God's knowledge of particulars, a central doctrine of the
Koran, against the view that the prime mover or One was uncon-
scious of the effects which it generated. He disallowed a refinement by
Avicenna who had given God a knowledge of the universe through its
operating causes, as disclosed in his self-knowledge, but not of
particulars as such which Avicenna had held to be the subject of finite
knowledge. And he maintained the 'occasionalist' thesis, that the
relationship of what appears as cause and effect is not a necessary one
but a result of the two events being joined in that sequence by God.
This divine conjunction of 'cause' and 'effect' is distinct from the
miracle, which is God's production of the 'effect' without his first
producing the 'cause'. 20 AI Ghazali's aim was to cast doubt on the
theses of the philosophers in order to emphasise the indispensability
of Scripture. However, when his thought first became known to the
west in the twelfth century, it was through an earlier treatise, the
Intentions of the Philosophers (Maqasid al-Faliisifah ), in which he
patiently and scrupulously summarised the views which he intended
to demolish. Ironically, therefore, he was taken as a representative of
the very perspective which he opposed and served as a source for
understanding the systems of AI Farabi and Avicenna, where their
own treatises were unavailable. 21
After AI Ghazali, the interest in Arabic philosophy from the Latin
viewpoint switches from the eastern to the western part of the Islamic
world. The beginnings of the philosophical and scientific movement
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 127
in Islamic Spain probably date from the ninth century. However, it
was in the second half of the tenth century that a determined effort
was made under the Ommayad caliph, AI Hakam II, to establish
Cordova as a centre oflearning in competition with Baghdad and to
equip it with the necessary texts. A theological reaction set in after AI
Hakam's death but it proved to be merely a temporary check. The
high point of the western Islamic philosophical movement was the
twelfth century, at a time when Almohad rulers, with a power base in
Morocco, were making strenuous attempts to hold off the Christian
reconquest of southern Spain. The two earliest Islamic figures of note,
Ibn Bajja (Avempace) and Ibn Tufayl (Abubacer), were hardly more
than names to the Latin world. They continued the strand of Arabic
Neoplatonism and asserted the harmony of faith and reason. Ibn
Bajja used the techniques both of synthetic exposition and of
commentary on the Aristotelian texts.
Close textual study, inherited from the classical scholastic tradi-
tion, had been the principal activity of Arabic thinkers until Avicenna.
He too is known to have commented on the Aristotelian corpus 22 but
his influence was chiefly exercised through his synthetic expositions.
With the next and greatest thinker of the western group, Ibn Rushd
(Averroes), there was a deliberate return to textual exposition as a
means of restoring what was meant to be a more faithful Aristotelian-
ism than that of Avicenna. Averroes was born in Cordova about 1126
and spent his life partly in Spain and partly at the court of the
Almohad caliphate in Morocco. It was at the suggestion of the caliph,
Abu Ya'qub Yusuf (d. 1184), an informed patron of learning, to
whom he had been introduced by Ibn Tufayl (c. 1168), that Averroes
began the task of expounding Aristotle's works, thus earning his Latin
title, 'the Commentator'. His commentaries were of several kinds:
'small' and 'middle' commentaries, which were really paraphrases of
the texts, and 'great' commentaries, in which the text was presented
separately and was accompanied by a detailed interpretation. In all,
of the several types, Averroes composed thirty-eight commentaries on
Aristotle, of which fifteen were translated into Latin in the thirteenth
century. 23 Apart from them, he also wrote several independent
treatises. The most notable of these were an analysis of the
relationship between reason and faith and a defence of philosophising
aimed against AI Ghazali's views and trenchantly entitled The
Incoherence rif the Incoherence (Tahiifut al Tahiifut, translated into Latin as
Destructio Destructionis, 'The Destruction of the Destruction'). Of
128 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

Averroes' commentaries, the most important were the 'great' com-

mentaries on the Physics, Metaphysics and De Anima, written between
1180 and 1190. The first two of these, with the Tahiifut, set out his
cosmology. The great commentary on the De Anima contained his
important interpretation of Aristotle's psychology.
Averroes' cosmology reveals a different perspective from that of
Avicenna, whose emanation theory he criticised. Instead of viewing
the universe as the result of a series of emanations, Averroes sought to
explain it in terms of the doctrines expounded chiefly in Aristotle's
Physics and Metaphysics, in terms of matter and form, potentiality and
actuality and motion. The material world was a compound of matter
and form. For Averroes the central question regarding it was not what
was the source of form but what explained the process by which
material substances eternally took on new forms or were drawn from
states of potentiality to actuality. The answer was that there existed a
'final' cause, an unmoved prime mover whose condition the whole
universe strove to resemble. Averroes accepted the astronomical
evidence for a multiplicity of moving causes, the intelligences, but
reconciled this with monotheism by ranking them in a hierarchy with
one highest cause, that is, God. This highest cause he considered
capable of affecting all the intelligences directly and not simply of
producing the first intelligence, as in the emanation theory. In
keeping with his adherence to Aristotle's analysis, he also dismissed
Avicenna's distinction between essence and existence and especially
the implication that essence was logically prior to existence and that
existence was an accident of essence. For Averroes, existence was an
inherent feature of all substance.
In his psychology Averroes agreed with Avicenna in taking the
agent intellect to be a substance external to the soul. However, he
made a significant departure from Avicenna's account. For Averroes,
the potential or 'material' intellect is not a property of the individual
soul but an effect of contact between the agent intelligence and what
he called the 'passive' intellect of the individual. The latter was the
Aristotelian 'imagination', a product of sense knowledge and as such
an aspect of bodily function. Not only did an external agent cause the
transition from intellectual potentiality to actuality, as in Avicenna's
system, but the very potentiality which became actualised was
external to the soul and only temporarily united with it. This strange
analysis is a complex of philosophical perceptions. The soul inform-
ing the body was individual- being individuated by the matter which
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 129
it informed- but it was wholly conterminous with the body and upon
the disintegration of the latter gave way to new forms. Intellection, by
contrast, was a spiritual act, transcending bodily function, and as
such was immortal. But the intellect was not individualised; it did not
inform matter and was the same for all members of the species. In his
insistence that intellect in both its active and potential aspects was
separate from the soul, Averroes can be seen to have been making
several points. He preserved the principle that soul is simply form to
the body's matter; he accepted that intellect was incorruptible; and he
affirmed the similarity and hence the unity of the act of understanding
throughout the species at the cost of reducing to a minimum or even
abolishing its individual character. In so far as understanding had an
individual character this derived from the images produced by sense
experience in the passive intellect, which ceased on death. Whatever
his own rationalisation of his position may have been as a Moslem
believer, 24 his interpretation offered the least possible scope within
the Aristotelian framework for a concept of personal immortality. It
was the gradual appreciation of this threat which rendered his views
so controversial in the thirteenth century.
The several apparent incompatibilities between Averroes'
philosophical conclusions and Islamic faith have often given rise to a
feeling that he was insincere as a believer or that he maintained a
doctrine of'double truth', an acceptance of the disharmony and yet of
the equal validity of the teachings of faith and reason. It is now clear
that such an interpretation is unfounded. 25 Averroes was continuing a
long tradition among the Islamic philosophers which saw reason and
revelation as teaching essentially the same truths though expressing
them differently. Their spheres, though distinct, are complementary.
In some respects revelation goes beyond the capacity of reason, in
which case it is a necessary supplement.

Medieval Jewish Thought

In a general review, medieval Jewish thought may be treated as a

branch of Arabic culture. Arabic translations were the source for
Jewish thinkers' knowledge of the ancient tradition and several of the
principal Jewish philosophical treatises were themselves written in
Arabic. So the Guide of the Perplexed by the twelfth-century Jew, Moses
Maimonides, was written in Arabic and translated into Hebrew, from
which the influential Latin version stemmed. Like their Islamic
130 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

counterparts, these Jewish treatises served the Latin Christian world

in two ways. On a basic level they were a source of knowledge of the
classical systems, mainly Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism. On a
higher level they served as a paradigm of systematic treatment and a
stimulus to further reflection, particularly as regards the relationship
between philosophy and faith. Here, the problems in the Jewish and
Christian contexts were similar and partly shared.
The earliest figure of note from the western viewpoint was the
Egyptian, Isaac Israeli (d. c. 955). He is usually held to have been the
firstJewish Neoplatonist thinker. He was also a medical writer and it
was as such that he was regarded by Maimonides, who dismissed his
claims as a philosopher. 26 Certainly he was unoriginal but his Book of
Definitions, translated at least twice into Latin, was a secondary source
for such theories as Aristotelian causation, the Neoplatonist concepts
of'lntelligence' and 'Nature' and the Platonic doctrine on the soul. 27
The first and most original Jewish synthesiser was the Spaniard,
Solomon Ibn Gabirol (c. 1021-58), known to the west as Avicebron.
His Fountain of Life (Fons Vitae), in five books, was a concentrated
argument cast in dialogue form expounding Neoplatonist doctrine. It
contained no internal evidence that its author was a Jew and it did not
expressly deal with religious dogma. However, Avicebron's firm
ontological distinction between God and created being and his
analysis of the process of creation were important modifications of
Neoplatonism in favour of Jewish belief. Avicebron saw created
being, considered without further specification, as constituted of
'universal matter' and 'universal form'. 28 The theory did not imply
that all created being was corporeal. It served to distinguish created
being from the Creator, who was perfectly simple and unitary.
Corporeal being was constituted by a common, unspecific form, the
form of being a body. In addition to this common form, all corporeal
beings had forms proper to the various levels of activity which
characterised their species.
Besides making this ontological distinction between God and
creatures, Avicebron stressed the contingency of creation. In this he
may be compared with Avicenna. However, where Avicenna saw the
contingency as theoretical, for Avicebron it was real. The basis of this
contingency is the divine will, which Avicebron treats almost as if it
were a separate divine being. Will is a divine power 'constituting and
moving all things'; it is that 'retaining and sustaining the essence of all
things'; it is a power 'creating the intelligible substances' and 'making
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 131
matter and form and binding them together'. 'Nothing exists without
it, since from it is the being of all things and their constitution.' 29 Will
is thus interposed between Creator and creation. Its role is to correct
the N eoplatonist schema of necessary emanation in favour of divine
freedom and purpose.
To the extent that the Fountain of Life reconciled Neop1atonist
cosmology with the requirements of jewish belief, it did so tacitly. It
contained no explicit treatment of the problem of relating pagan
thought to a revealed religion. This problem is the theme of the
best-known work of medieval jewish thought, the Guide ofthe Perplexed
by Moses Maimonides ( 1135-1204). Maimonides was born at
Cordova, like his contemporary, Averroes, but was forced into exile in
Egypt in his early twenties by the intolerance towards non-Moslems
of the new Almohad rulers of Spain. The Guide was written in Egypt
but its philosophical perceptions seem to reflect the cultural back-
ground of Spain and Maimonides may have derived his interest in the
central problem which it tackles from similar debates in western
Islam. It is not formally a philosophical work, though it contains
much philosophical teaching. It sets out to explain toajewish reader,
already versed in philosophy, the true meaning of difficult terms and
passages in Scripture, which might otherwise give rise to an
intellectual tension between the promptings of intellect and the
apparent demands of the Law. This is the perplexity to which the title
alludes and the purpose of the work is to resolve it by showing the
essential compatibility of Scripture and philosophy. It is an esoteric
discussion avowedly cloaked in obscurity so as to be inaccessible to
more than a sophisticated elite. Not only are philosophy and religion
compatible but study of philosophy is seen by Maimonides as a duty
imposed by the fact that knowledge is the precondition for love and
that apprehension of nature is the preparation for true worship of
God. 3 ° Furthermore, knowledge or more particularly 'acquisition of
the rational virtues ... the conception of intelligibles, which teach
true opinions concerning divine things' is the individual's 'true
perfection' which gives him 'permanent perdurance' .31 The Aris-
totelian influence cannot be missed here but there is also perhaps a
hint of the insistence on enlightenment as a precondition of immortal-
ity evinced by AI Farabi, for whom Maimonides had a high regard.
Maimonides' own views on the philosophical grounds for immortality
are difficult to decipher .. He seems to accept that intellects, though
immortal, do not have individual differences, a view for which he
132 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

quotes the authority of Avempace. 32 However, he does not treat the

subject as a major issue between philosophy and religion. As regards
the eternity of the world, which had been a vexed question in Islam as
it was later to be in the west, Maimonides held it to be a possibility
and cautioned that proof of God's existence should not rest on the
proposition that the world was created in time. In this respect he
anticipated the views of St Thomas Aquinas who maintained a
similar position, probably under Maimonides' influence.

II Western Translations

Translation into Latin of the philosophical works of Aristotle and of

the Arabic philosophers and commentators whom we have been
considering took place over more than a century and was accomp-
lished by scholars of various provenance. The process is conveniently
described under two aspects: translation from Greek and translation
from Arabic.
The greatest figure of the Graeco-Latin movement in the twelfth
century is james ofVenice. As noted already, he was responsible for
completing and partially revising the Graeco-Latin corpus of Aristo-
tle's logical treatises. 33 Besides this important contribution, he
translated (c. 1125-50) the Physics- with an anonymous introduction
to it, called On Intelligence (De intelligentia) - the De Anima, the
Metaplrysics, at least in part, 34 and five of the lesser scientific treatises of
Aristotle, known as theParva Naturalia (the 'small works on nature').
James points to the importance of the Mediterranean world, and
probably of Constantinople, as a source of extended knowledge of the
Greek tradition. From this world too came the only medieval
translations of Plato- Henricus Aristippus' versions of the Meno and
Phaedo (the latter begun in 1156), the dialogues in which Plato
developed his doctrine of the soul, its immortality, pre-existence and
recollection of the Forms. Henricus Aristippus appears as archdeacon
ofCatania in Sicily in 1156 and as a representative of the king ofSicily
at Constantinople in 1158. In 1160 he became the king's chief
minister. Of Aristotle, he translated only Book IV of the Meteorology.
The identity of the other Graeco-Latin translators of the century is
not known. A version of the Physics was made anonymously about the
middle of the century but it survives only in small part and in a single
manuscript. 35 Another anonymous worker rendered On Coming to Be
and Passing Away (De generatione et corruptione), more or less contem-
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 133
poraneously with an Arabo-Latin translation of the same treatise.
Another provided an almost complete translation of the Metaphysics,
the version known as the 'middle Metaphysics' from its chronological
place in the transmission of this text. Yet another provided Books n
and III of the Nicomachean Ethics, the text known as the 'old Ethics'.
Thus, by the end of the twelfth century a considerable amount of
Aristotle's philosophical writings had been translated directly. It was
little used, however, before about the second quarter of the thirteenth
century. The 'middle Metaphysics', for instance, apparently
remained unknown until the middle of the thirteenth century, a fact
which explains the ready demand for the Arabo-Latin version of
Michael the Scot. Nor was the corpus ofGraeco-Latin translations of
Aristotle much enlarged in the interval. Someone did render the
whole of the Nicomachean Ethics in the early thirteenth century but only
Book r circulated, being known accordingly as the 'new Ethics'. From
about the middle of the century, however, there was a transformation.
By now the translations of james of Venice were circulating widely.
Moreover, new and improved versions were in hand or were soon to
be made. Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln and formerly, as is
thought, first chancellor of Oxford university, translated the
Nicomachean Ethics (c. ?1246). His version, with some revisions,
became the standard text. He also translated Aristotle's De Caelo ('On
the heaven')- perhaps completely, though only a fragment survives-
a commentary on it by the sixth-century commentator, Simplicius,
two spurious Aristotelian treatises and the works of the pseudo-Denis,
on which he commented himself. 36 Among his assistants were an
Englishman, John of Basingstoke, who had studied in Athens, and
Master Nicholas the Greek, a Sicilian who became a member of
Grosseteste's household c. 1237. But the most important translator of
the century was the Dominican, William ofMoerbeke (c. 1215--86), a
native of the Low Countries, who travelled and worked in Greece and
in central Italy and died as archbishop ofCorinth. Mainly in the years
c. 126~70, he made new translations or revisions of texts of Aristotle
already available or partly available in Graeco-Latin versions. He
also enlarged the corpus by adding the Politics, which was as yet quite
unknown, and the Poetics- on literary theory- the teaching of which
was already known through Hermannus Alemannus' translation of
Averroes' middle commentary. His achievement was fundamental.
With a few exceptions- the Poetics, for which Averroes' commentary
continued as the most influential source, the logical works, for which
134 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

the old translations remained authoritative, and Grosseteste's Ethics,

the more influential, revised version of which may itself be by
Moerbeke- the medieval Latin texts of Aristotle were henceforward
virtually those established by him. In addition to Aristotle, he
translated several treatises ofProclus- statements on providence and
on the nature of evil, a commentary on Plato's dialogue, the
Parmenides, and, most notably, the Elements of Theology. He was
therefore almost certainly the first to recognise the true attribution of
the doctrine contained in the pseudo-Aristotelian Book of Causes,
derived from it. 37 He also translated a body of ancient commentary on
Aristotle: Alexander on the Meteorology and De Sensu, Ammonius (fifth
century AD) on the De lnterpretatione, Simplicius on the Categories and
De Caelo, and, as part of the contemporary concern with determining
Aristotle's psychological teaching, Themistius on the De Anima and
the discussion of intellect by the sixth-century Alexandrian Mono-
physite Christian, John Philoponus. The two last were translated in
1267 and 1268 respectively while Moerbeke was a chaplain at the
papal court of Clement IV in Viterbo. Although there is no sound
evidence that in any of this activity Moerbeke was being directed by
his confrere, Thomas Aquinas, the latter as we shall see made early
use of most of his translations.
While the long process of translation from the Greek was in train,
there was a steady absorption into Latin of Aristotelian and
Neoplatonist doctrine from Arabic. This took place mainly in the
Spain of the Christian reconquest but Sicily too was an important
centre. Like the southern coast of the Italian peninsula, the island had
been anciently settled by Greek colonists. From 902 to 1091 it had
been under Arab rule and there remained a considerable Moslem
element after its conquest by the Normans. Its culture was thus a
unique blend of Latin, Greek and Arabic strains.
The meeting of cultures in Spain attracted scholars from many
parts of Europe. Among foreign translators known to have been active
in the twelfth century are Hermann ofCarinthia (c. 1138-43) and his
pupil, Rudolf of Bruges, Hermann's contemporary and occasional
colleague, Robert of Chester, Plato of Tivoli (c. 1134-45), Daniel of
Morley (c. 1180), Alfred ofSareshel (c. 1180) and, most important of
all, Gerard ofCremona (d. 1187). In the early years of the century,
Adelard of Bath may have worked in Spain, as he did in southern
Italy and in Syria. If so, he is one of a significant English contingent
there. With Robert of Chester, Daniel of Morley and Alfred of
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 135
Sareshel, he played a part in the awakening of a scientific interest in
England. Besides these foreign scholars there were several native
figures, including the shadowy Petrus Alfonsi (c. 1115), Hugh of
Santalla (c. 1135), John of Seville (c. 1130-40) and Dominic Gun-
disalvi (c. 1150-90).
The earliest phase of this activity was the translation of mathemati-
cal, medical and astronomical texts. It was carried on in a number of
cities - Barcelona, Tarazona, Segovia, Leon and Pamplona. The
most important translations from a philosophical viewpoint were
those made in the middle and later years of the century at Toledo.
Historians are now cautious about attributing them to a 'school' or
otherwise going beyond the meagre evidence which exists for the
methods used to produce them. A famous letter attached to the
translation of Avicenna's psychology dedicates that work to Arch-
bishop John of Toledo (c. 1152-66) and names the translators as
Avendauth, a Jew of whom little else is certainly known, and
Archdeacon Dominic, who is generally taken to be Gundisalvi.
According to it, Avendauth translated word for word from Arabic
into the vernacular and Dominic translated the vernacular word for
word into Latin. 38 It is unsafe however to assume that this was the
standard method of translation from Arabic to Latin. It is also unsafe
to identify Avendauth with the 'John' who is found elsewhere as a
collaborator, apparently with the same Dominic, in the translation of
AI Ghazali's Intentions qf the Philosophers, or to identify that 'John' with
John of Seville. 39
In fact, the Spanish translation movement in the twelfth century is
full of unresolved problems. Attributions are subject to revision.
However, a general picture emerges clearly enough to show the main
lines of the process of transmission. Avicenna' s psychology, referred
to above, was an extract from the Kitab al-Shifa, its provenance being
indicated in its alternative title, Book ofthe Soul (Liber de Anima) or Sixth
on Natural Phenomena (Sextus de Naturalibus). His metaphysics was
similarly extracted and entitled Book of First Philosophy or Divine
Knowledge (Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina) .40 It was
translated at Toledo after 1150 either by Gundisalvi or Gerard of
Cremona. To them is also variously attributed the translation of AI
Farabi's On the intellect. As noted already, Gundisalvi is credited with
a share in the translation of AI Ghazali's Intentions. This had a
complicated circulation: it was sometimes known as the Summa of the
Theory qf Philosophy and sections became separated as the 'Logic' and
136 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

'Philosophy' or 'Metaphysics' of Algazel. 41 Gundisalvi is credited too

with a share in the translation oflbn Gabirol'sFountains qfLife. H:e may
also be the author of several independent treatises, on cosmology and
psychology, derived in part from the works of AI Farabi and Ibn
Gabirol. 42 These were influential in the thirteenth century, especially
for their arguments in favour of immortality. Gerard ofCremona by
contrast appears only as a translator. Apart from the doubtful
attributions referred to, he is credited with one of the two Latin
translations of AI Kindi's On the intellect. 43 He has also the distinction
of being the only known twelfth-century translator of Aristotle from
the Arabic. His interests here seem to have been strictly in the
scientific books: the Meteorology (Books 1-m); the Physics; On the heaven
(De caelo); On Coming to Be and Passing Away (De generatione et
corruptione); and the Posterior Analytics, which though a logical work
was valued as an explanation of scientific theory. 44 Besides these
genuine works he also translated the pseudo-Aristotelian Book qf
Causes.
Activity at Toledo continued into the thirteenth century. Herman-
nus Alemannus completed his translations of Averroes' middle
commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics and Poetics there in 1240 and
1256, respectively. The Latin translation of Maimonides' Guide qf the
Perplexed, from the Hebrew rather than the Arabic, was made there
c. 1240. But the main extensions to the Latin world's knowledge of the
Arabic tradition in the thirteenth century were carried out elsewhere.
Michael the Scot is the principal figure. His earliest known connec-
tion indeed was with Toledo, where he translated an Arabic
astronomical treatise, in 1217, and, shortly after, part of Aristotle's
zoology (De Animalibus). In 1220 he appears in Italy and he seems to
have done his main work there, dying in 1236 after several years as
astrologer at the court of Frederick II in Sicily. Michael translated
Averroes' great commentaries on the Physics, De Caelo, De Anima and
Metaphysics. His translation of this last provided Latin readers with a
valued text of Aristotle's work. The passages of the Metaphysics,
preserved as lemmata in the commentary, were extracted and
circulated as a continuous text (the 'new Metaphysics'). Though not
complete, it was still the best available while the Graeco-Latin
'middle Metaphysics' remained unknown. The number of surviving
manuscripts indicates a lively demand for it. 45 Michael is perhaps
also the translator of several of Averroes' short and middle commen-
taries- the short commentaries on the De Caelo, the Parva Naturalia
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 137
and the De Animalibus and the middle commentaries on On Coming to
Be and Passing Away and on the Meteorology (Book IV). Of other
translations of Averroes during the century may be noted William of
Luna's rendering of the middle commentaries on most of the Organon
and on Porphyry'sisagoge. William seems to have been a Spaniard but
he worked in Naples; his precise dates are not known. Averroes' main
independent work was not made available until the translation of the
Incoherence of the Incoherence by Calo Calonymus at Arles in 1328, long
after the reception of the commentaries had established him as both a
corner-stone and a stumbling block of Latin Aristotelianism. 46

III New Institutions- the Rise of the Universities

Forms of Organisation
Over the same period that new sources were becoming available to
western scholars, the structures of teaching and learning were being
transformed by the rise of the universities. 47 From now until the
Italian Renaissance and the advent of the Christian humanist
movement in northern Europe in the fifteenth century they are the
dominant feature of the intellectual scene. The earliest universities
were spontaneous developments from the educational trends of the
twelfth century. In its original, customary use, the term studium
generate ('general centre of study'), eventually the most common
medieval designation of a university, probably indicated the capacity
of certain centres to attract students from beyond their immediate
area. The first to emerge were the law schools of Bologna, the arts and
theology schools at Paris and Oxford and, with a more doubtful
claim, the medical school at Salerno. Of these, Salerno gave way to
Montpellier as the leading medical centre but the others continued to
be premier institutions within their principal disciplines. Later,
universities were established by enactment: as with the creation of
notaries public, the function attached peculiarly to the two universal-
ist authorities, the empire and the papacy. By the end of the middle
ages, it has been estimated, 48 Europe had some seventy universities,
all but a handful of which were deliberate creations. Several of the
already existing studia generalia had their status ratified under this
procedure. However, their original status was a simple recognition of
acquired prestige and the emergence of formal structures for the
organisation and protection of the studium was equally a spontaneous
138 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

response to circumstances. The response varied according to local

conditions. This is clearly seen in the case of the two prototype
universities - the students' university, or rather universities, of
Bologna, and the masters' university of Paris. The history of their
development illustrates the essential nature of the medieval univer-
sity.
The history of the Bologna studium in particular reveals clearly the
nature of the 'university' as at once a monopolistic professional
association and an organisation for the protection of its members. In
Bologna, the tension between the predominant element of the
academic body, the foreign or non-citizen students, and the civic
context resulted in the development of a startling constitution. The
students gained the controlling power, which they exercised through
their elected representatives- rectors and councillors- and through
their mass meetings or congregations. Though this constitution was
imitated elsewhere- notably at Padua, where it lasted longer, and in
several of the fifteenth-century French provincial and Spanish
foundations- it was uniquely indigenous to Bologna.
A principal expression of the twelfth-century renaissance in central
Italy was the vigorous concentration on Roman civil law. Its most
famous early exponent was Irnerius, who taught at Bologna between
1116 and 1140 and whose reputation was possibly the crucial factor in
determining the location of the main Italian law studium there. 49 The
special governmental features of an Italian city state themselves
fostered a concentration on civil law. At the same time, they posed
problems for an emergent studium generate, drawing the bulk of its
student population from outside the commune, for such students had
no rights of citizenship. Moreover, since civil law was particularly
attractive to laymen, for whom it opened up a lucrative career, there
was a community in Bologna unprotected either by citizenship or by
clerical privilege. The special vulnerability of foreign lay students as
well as the Hohenstaufen political interest in cultivating Roman law
study is reflected in the Authentic Habita of Emperor Frederick
Barbarossa, issued in 1158. Besides according the student a general
protection, this decree gave him the right of trial at his choice by
either his doctor or the bishop, as an alternative to the podesta of the
commune. One feature of the Authentic is that its natural tendency
would be to convert the original contractual bond between masters
and students into a stronger,jurisdictional one and make the masters
the natural defenders of academic freedom. However, this was
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 139
counterbalanced by the fact that the commune began to require an
oath from the masters to restrict their teaching to Bologna, a
manoeuvre aimed at depriving the studium of mobility. This develop-
ment, dating from about 1189, is seen as crucial and it was followed
within a few years by the emergence of the student guilds or
'universities'. At an early stage, there were four of these- Lombards,
Tuscans, Romans and Ultramontanes - but by the middle of the
thirteenth century they had resolved into two: the university of
citramontanes, for 'foreign' law students of the Italian peninsula, and
the university of ultramontanes, for law students from beyond the
Alps. These acted as communal bargaining groups both with the
masters, over fees and the general regulation of the academic life, and
with the commune. The latter by 1252 had accorded them full
recognition as the competent authority within the studium.
Whereas Bologna is the archetype of the student university and of
the law studium, Paris represents the masters' university and the arts
and theological studium. Theology was taught at Bologna, mainly by
the friars, but it was not incorporated into the university system. The
germ of the Paris studium was the cathedral school of Notre Dame. It
was the chancellor of Notre Dame who licensed teachers, though his
claim to a licensing monopoly was challenged by the abbot of St
Genevieve. The precise aspect of tension between town and gown
which promoted the formation of the guilds at Bologna was absent
here for both masters and students had clerical status, as confirmed
by Pope Celestine III in 1194 and King Philip Augustus in 1200. In
Paris, the threat to academic independence came from the same
source which had fostered the development of the studium in the first
place - the chancellor of the cathedral. Moreover, the problem
affected masters rather than students. Hence the emergence of a
masters' guild or 'university', known from the last quarter of the
twelfth century. This guild succeeded, with the aid of a decree of the
Third Lateran Council (1179), in carrying its point that the
chancellor should license all qualified candidates without charge. At
this stage, the chancellor still determined the qualification of a
candidate for licensing and the corporate identity of the masters who
by the subsequent ceremony of inception controlled entry into their
guild was a check on the use of his prerogative. The statutes granted
to them by the papal legate, Robert de Courcon, in 1215, recognised
their right generally to control the studium, short of dissolving it. For
his part, the chancellor was required to license any candidate in the
140 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

higher faculties of theology, canon law and medicine who was

presented by a majority of the masters and any candidate in arts who
had the support of six masters. A dispersal by the masters in 1229 over
a dispute between town and gown ended in a broader settlement
which confirmed and augmented their privileges against chancellor
and bishop. This settlement was enshrined in the papal bull Parens
scientiarum ('Parent of sciences') of 1231, which is taken as the symbol
of the university's effective independence.
During this early and critical stage of its development, the
university enjoyed the advantage of continuous papal support. In the
problem which it confronted immediately after the settlement with
the chancellor, this support was lacking and the university initially
failed in its object. The fresh crisis arose over the emergence of an
important new element in the teaching system- the mendicant friars,
particularly the Franciscans and Dominicans, founded in 1209 and
1215 respectively. The friars' schools at Paris served as centres of
study in theology for the ablest members of the orders throughout the
provinces. Accordingly they insisted that their members who had
already taken an arts training elsewhere be exempt from the general
requirement at Paris that entrants to the higher faculties should first
be masters of arts and thereby members of the masters' guild. There
were other grounds of friction. The mendicants had remained at Paris
during the dispersal of 1229-31 and by opening their schools to
seculars had strengthened their position in the theology faculty,
which they were for a time to dominate. In 1253 matters came to a
head when the university stipulated that masters in all faculties swear
obedience to its statutes, including the important obligation of taking
strike action by ceasing to teach if called upon. When the mendicant
masters again refused to cooperate they were expelled from the
university. Pope Alexander IV, elected in December 1254, took their
part and when they were readmitted in 1261 it was with a diminished
position in the theology faculty but otherwise on the same terms as
before.
The university of Paris consisted of four faculties - arts, theology,
canon law and medicine- each with its own internal organisation.
The arts faculty was by far the most populous and it succeeded in
establishing itself as the predominant voice in the university. It alone,
because of its size, was divided into nations- French, Norman, Picard
and English-German. The rector of these nations from the second
half of the thirteenth century was recognised as head, under the
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 141
chancellor, of the university, though he had no authority to interfere
in the affairs of the superior faculties. In the general congregation of
the university, each nation of the arts faculty and each of the superior
faculties had one vote and a simple majority was decisive. Since the
congregation at Paris, being a much smaller institution than its
counterpart at Bologna, played a principal role in the direction of the
studium, the arts faculty had an effective controlling interest.

The Structure of Studies

The structure of studies in the universities varied from one institution

to another and within the same institution at different stages of its
development. It is impossible therefore to do more than present a
composite picture, reflecting the basic features of the system in its
maturity. The central feature of the programme was the 'lecture', or
expository reading, based on the prescribed books of the syllabus. In
the law universities these were the texts of Roman or canon law. In the
theology faculties they were the Bible and the Sentences of Peter
Lombard. In the arts faculties they were the trivium, with its
expanded logical content, parts of the quadrivium, though this was
sometimes totally neglected, and the philosophical works of Aristotle,
as these came to be approved. The staple lectures were those given
'ordinarily', by the regent masters- masters who had completed the
full course, had incepted and now remained to teach, or 'rule the
schools', either in accordance with their statutory obligation, dis-
charging their 'necessary regency', or by choice. The ordinary
lectures were supplemented by 'cursory' lectures, given by bachelors
at times when the masters were not lecturing. The bachelor's cursory
lectures served a double function: they inculcated the text on students
and they provided the future master with a forum in which to develop
his own expertise. Conferral of the 'degree' of bachelor was in the
masters' universities the prerogative of the regents. In the Bolognese
system it was controlled by the students. In both cases the masters
controlled admission to their own ranks. In the masters' universities
the procedure was as follows: after completing all the statutory
exercises, including participation in disputations as well as lecturing,
the bachelor was given leave to incept. There followed an interval of
six months or a year, varying from one university to another, until the
inceptor proceeded to the public acts which marked the commence-
ment ofhis magistracy. These were in two stages: a disputation in the
142 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

evening (the vesperiae) and another the next day. After incepting, the
new master was bound to a period of regency lasting one or two years,
the time varying between different universities and faculties. The
process was a lengthy one for those students who completed the full
programme or who followed a degree in arts with a degree in a higher
faculty. Though again there were variations, the magistracy in arts
might take six years, followed by a necessary regency. The magistracy
in theology, for instance, might take a further ten to fourteen years. At
Paris, the bachelor in this faculty, who must be at least twenty-five
years old and have studied theology for seven or eight years, was
admitted to lecture first on the Bible for two years. He then became a
bachelor of the Sentences, lecturing on the Lorn bard's text for two years
or later for one. At Oxford, lecturing on the Sentences preceded
lecturing on the Bible.
One function of the master was to lecture. Another was to hold
formal disputations. These were of two kinds: 'ordinary' disputations
on a specific theme ('disputed questions') and the free questions or
'quodlibets'. The first type may have had its origin in the less
formalised analysis of problems arising from the texts. It was a major
part of the teaching programme and was conducted at frequent
intervals- 'disputable days' - throughout the year. The 'quodlibet'
(literally, 'whatever you will') was an opportunity to explore matters
of current topicality and its incidence was restricted to two seasons-
specific weeks in Advent and Lent. In the disputation, a problem was
posed, a 'respondent' bachelor or advanced student, at least, tried to
resolve it and to deal with criticisms of his solution and finally the
master gave his views or 'determination'. In time, the determination
tended to become separate from the process of disputation.
In essence, lecturing and disputing were oral exercises but their
respective methods of textual exposition and dialectical presentation
of issues became the basis of a substantial body of theological and
philosophical writing. The disputation is well represented in the
surviving literature, both in the form of texts approved by the master
himself- 'authorised texts' or ordinationes - and in the form of
unrevised notes of the proceedings- 'reported texts' or reportationes. In
either case these may be of ordinary or of quodlibetal disputations.
The influence of the disputation is clear also in works which were not
themselves the direct products of university teaching, as in StThomas
Aquinas' Summa Theologiae ('Summa of Theology'), whose method is
the posing of a question, the presentation of difficulties and their
 NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS 143
resolution. The most important literature of speculative theology
generated by university lecturing is the Commentary on the Sentences,
extant usually in an edited form for many late medieval theologians.
The disputations of the arts faculty are sometimes referred to as
'sophismata' (literally 'sophisms') because the discussion and resolu-
tion of logical problems was a major feature of them. The lecturing
technique of the arts faculty both directly and by imitation has left a
very large literature of philosophical commentary.
5. Aristotelian Philosophy in the University-
the First Phase of Assimilation

ARISTOTLE's thought, both in its own right and as interpreted in the

Neoplatonist and Arabic traditions, contained several areas of special
interest and sensitivity for Christians. Among the problems posed by
his Physics and Metaphysics were the nature of causation, in particular
the compatibility of his analysis with the idea of a free creation and of
a contingent universe, whether he had taught that the world was
eternal and whether, if he had, this error could be refuted philosophi-
cally.
The questions posed by his psychological theory were especially
important and difficult. They revolved round the nature of soul and of
intellect. The relation of soul and body raised a complex of problems,
ofwhich three were central. Could the soul of man be considered at
once as a substantial form in the true Aristotelian sense and as an
entity capable of surviving the death of the body? In the composition
of soul and body what was the principle from which man's
individuality derived? Should the various operations of the higher
species of life - possessed of sensation and, in the case of man,
rationality, as well as the capacity to grow and reproduce - be
attributed to a plurality of souls coexisting within the organism or
should they be regarded as faculties of one soul? 1 A related question
concerned the origin of soul. From a theological perspective all were
agreed that the rational soul- whether as a single substantial form
with sensitive and vegetative powers or as the final perfection
supervening upon separate, lower forms - was directly created.
Within this agreement, there was a wide range of views as to the stage
at which the rational soul was infused into the organism, most opinion
favouring a late entry. However, there was disagreement as to
whether lesser souls were also directly created or were produced in the
natural process of generation.
There was also a complex of problems bearing on intellection. Was
abstraction from sense experience a sufficient explanation of all our
concepts? How did abstraction work? Were concepts derived by the
agency of the soul itself or must they be referred to an external source?
In other words, was the active intellect of which Aristotle had spoken
a power of the soul or was it something influencing the soul from

145
146 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

outside? Al Farabi and Avicenna had taken the latter view and were
clearly understood to have done so. Averroes had gone a stage further
and had made both the active and passive aspects of intellection
external to the soul, with devastating consequences for the
philosophical basis of individual immortality. However, his theory
was at first misunderstood by his Latin readers. His description of the
operation of the agent intellect led some to think that he made it part
of the soul. 2 Paradoxically, therefore, the effect of Averroism in its first
phase, from 1230 to c. 1250, was to promote the doctrine of the agent
intellect as a power of the soul. It did not engender that doctrine,
which can be seen some ten years before the reception of Averroes'
works at Paris in the treatise On the powers if the soul (De potentiis animae
et obiectis), written by an English master c. 1220. This presented
Augustinian 'illumination' and Aristotelian 'abstraction' as two
operations, higher and lower respectively, of the human intellect and
seems to have been an important influence in the direction of
maintaining the intellectual integrity of the soul. 3 The mistaken
interpretation of Averroes to the same effect was therefore congenial
to and in all probability largely prompted by a theory already
current. 4
Finally, there were problems stemming from Aristotle's Ethics, such
as the nature ofhappiness, man's capacity to attain it and whether the
will was determined by knowledge- that is, whether the maxim that
all human action was directed towards the achievement of a good
which was perceived entailed an intellectual determinism incompat-
ible with freedom of will. The relationship between intellect and will
also raised theological problems, particularly regarding divine free-
dom in creation. These topics were often to be debated, especially in
the later middle ages, under the abstruse and at first sight highly
remote question whether the intellect or the will was supreme.
The attempt to reconcile the claims of Christian teaching and of
Aristotelian philosophy in these areas is one of the most prominent
and most interesting preoccupations of the great systematic thinkers
ofthe thirteenth century, St Bonaventure and StThomas Aquinas.
But the same themes and problems recur, with varying degrees of
emphasis and often tackled piecemeal, in the work of lesser figures
both in the arts and theology faculties throughout the period.
Inevitably, the reconciliation between the Aristotelian and Christian
dimensions was on some points an uneasy one, involving transforma-
tions of perspective which disturbed conservative minds and invited
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 14 7
censure from authority. However, there was an intellectual penalty to
be paid for failure to maintain a synthetic approach. This was the
sundering of unity between the philosophical and theological planes
with a resulting agnosticism in the face of theological issues, an
agnosticism founded not upon unbelief but upon the assertion that
faith and revelation alone afforded the basis for understanding the
relationship between God and man. The threat will become real only
after the close of our period but already it is evident in the tensions
which begin to be felt in the first three-quarters of the thirteenth
century.

The lrifluence of Aristotle in the West to c. 1250

Little is known about the earliest phase of the reception of Aristotle's

philosophical works at Paris. The first substantial evidence of their
impact is indirect. In 1210 the provincial synod ofSens, of which the
bishop of Paris was a member, issued a condemnation of two minor
thinkers, Amaury of Bene and David of Dinant, and a number of
named clerics who are otherwise unknown. The tenet with which
Amaury and David are associated is pantheism, failure to distinguish
between the universe and God. It was not an Aristotelian position,
though it could perhaps be loosely derived from the Neoplatonist
emanation theory of the Book of Causes, still at this time part of the
Aristotelian corpus, or from a Neoplatonist elaboration of Aristotle's
authentic works. In fact, Amaury's principal authority was the
Periphyseon of John Scotus Eriugena, which was condemned with
Amaury's own doctrine at the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215. David
of Dinant, whose thought has been reconstructed in part from the
strictures of Albert the Great against him and from fragments of his
writings, did use thePirysics and Metaphysics of Aristotle. 5 At all events,
the condemnation at Sens was extended to include the stipulation
that 'neither the books of Aristotle on natural philosophy nor the
commentaries shall be read (legantur) at Paris publicly or secretly and
this we forbid under penalty of excommunication' .6 The effect of this
decree was incorporated in the statutes promulgated for the univer-
sity by the papal legate, Robert de Courcon, in 1215. Regulating the
syllabus of the arts faculty, he repeated the ban on Aristotle's 'books
of metaphysics and of natural philosophy' the 'Summae upon them'
and the 'doctrine of Master David of Dinant and of Amaury, the
heretic' and added the name of'Maurice ofSpain' (Mauricii hispani). 1
148 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

The identity of this last figure has been much discussed but remains
unknown. One suggested explanation of the name is that it is a
corruption of 'Spanish Moor' (Maurus hispanus), in which case the
reference would be to Averroes. If so, the measure was preventive
since it was another decade and a half before the works of Averroes
were received at Paris. The Summae or commentaries referred to are
generally taken to be the works of A vicenna.
Several points must be noted about these early prohibitions. First,
they were local to Paris. Other universities were not affected. Indeed,
the university of Toulouse in 1229 was advertising as one of its
advantages the fact that 'those who wish to scrutinise nature's bosom
to the marrow may there hear the books [of] natural [philosophy]
which were prohibited at Paris' .8 Study of the philosophical works
continued unimpeded at Oxford throughout the period to 1277 and
there will be occasion later to notice their free study in the arts faculty
at Naples. Secondly, the prohibition on 'reading' is best understood to
refer to reading in the sense of lecturing rather than to personal use.
Thirdly, the prohibition seems to have been felt in the arts faculty
rather than in the theology faculty at Paris. It may well be that its
origin lies in an incipient tension between the two faculties such as
was to come to a head in the years 1270--7. 9 Certainly, one of its effects
was to retard the penetration of Aristotelian scientific doctrine among
the arts masters, as is shown by the evidence in so far as it exists of
their activity in the period up to c. 1240.
One of the most valuable documents for assessing the state of
teaching in the Paris arts faculty at this time is a 'crib' to aid students
preparing for examination, composed by a master of arts around
1230--40. 1° From this, it is clear that the staple fare then was logic and
grammar. Of Aristotle's philosophy, the Ethics alone (both the 'new'
and 'old' Ethics) was examined in detail, though a general knowledge
of the subject of the Physics and Metaphysics was expected, of such a
kind as to confirm that these books were not taught.
The impression gained from this source is corroborated by what is
known of the teaching directly. The most important writing in the
area of grammar and logic comes in fact from just after 1240. This is
the Logical Textbooks (Summulae Logicales) of Peter of Spain, which is
assigned with probability to his period as a master of arts at Paris a
little before 1246. A pupil of the English master, William of
Shireswood, who also wrote on the subject, Peter went on after a
further period teaching at Siena to become archbishop of Braga in
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 149
Portugal and, briefly, pope as John XXI (1276-May, 1277). His
Summulae, one among several works ofits kind by himself and others,
established itself as a standard textbook for the rest of the middle
ages. 11 It combined the techniques derived from Aristotle's Organon
with a close attention to language as a vehicle of meaning. The
properties of terms and the modes of signification became the focus of
attention for logicians who were thoroughly accomplished in all that
Aristotle's Organon could teach them. Although the emphasis was new
and to that extent merited the description 'logic of the moderns'
(logica modernorum) by which the development came to be known, the
interest itself was not new. It has already been noted as a feature of the
earlier period. Nor was the terminist logic at first overtly speculative.
However, when the great task of absorbing Aristotle and his
commentators was complete the development served as a fresh
stimulus and to an extent provided a new vocabulary and new rules
for philosophical discourse.
Besides logic, the surviving literature of the arts faculty at this time
reflects study of Aristotle's Ethics .12 This work was not affected by the
prohibition. However, the interpretation given to Aristotle's doctrine
was heavily conditioned by a theological perspective. This at least is
the evidence of a surviving fragment of a course given by an arts
master, c. 1235-40, on the 'new' Ethics - that is, on Book r of the
Nicomachean Ethics. 13 In accordance with a doctrine otherwise known
to have been current in the faculty, the master took the wholly
unAristotelian position that happiness is something to which man
unites himself rather than holding that it consists in an activity of
man. In other words, happiness is identified with God. Aristotle's
criticism of the Platonic doctrine of a 'subsistent Good' the master
explained as being directed against an implication that man was
capable by his own efforts of uniting himself with the good. The
doctrine, that is, which Aristotle had rejected was the denial that
grace was necessary for happinessP 4 This and some other aspects of
the master's interpretation is a warning against identifying too
readily the reading of Aristotle with the absorption of his teaching. As
already noted in the case of Averroes, the first reaction to an
unfamiliar position might be a confused attempt to accommodate it
within the existing outlook.
Allowing for occasional breaches of the prohibition, which are
known of only indirectly/ 5 the evidence such as it is agrees in
suggesting that until about 1240 Aristotle's natural philosophy was
150 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

not taught in Paris. When the change came it seems not to have been
as a result of a revocation of the ban. Gregory IX had repeated it in
1231 to the effect that the forbidden works should not be 'used' until
they had been examined and purged of all suspicion of error and had
established a commission, of which nothing more is heard, for the
purpose. 16 Indeed in 1245,just when it was falling into disuse in Paris,
the ban as reformulated by Gregory was extended by Innocent IV, as
part of the Paris statutes, to the university of Toulouse which had so
far rejoiced in its liberty. 17 Moreover, as late as 1263 it reappeared for
Paris, probably as a diplomatic fossil, in a bull of Urban IV. 18
However, by the time at least of Roger Bacon's magistracy in arts at
Paris, which fell within the period 1240 to 124 7, the constraint was no
longer felt. Bacon was probably not the first to lecture on the scientific
works there after the prohibition. He may, for instance, have been
preceded in this by Robert Kilwardby, the later archbishop of
Canterbury, who had been regent in arts at Paris in the late 1230s and
early 1240s. 19 The matter is not certain but Bacon was without doubt
one of the first in the field, leaving extant commentaries from this time
on the Metaphysics ,Physics, On coming to be and passing away, the zoology,
the De Anima, On the heaven and earth, the pseudo-Aristotelian work On
Plants (De Plantis) and the Book of Causes. 20
The breadth ofBacon's teaching is a valuable if puzzling witness to
the progress of Aristotelianism in Paris at this time. A few years later,
the de facto recognition of the prohibited Aristotle to which his regency
attests finds a limited formal confirmation. In 1252, new statutes
promulgated for the English-German nation - one of the four
groupings within the arts faculty - made Aristotle's De Anima
required reading, along with the traditional texts of logic and
grammar. Then, unambiguously and definitively, in 1255, an act of
the entire faculty listed as part of the programme all the available
philosophical works- the important item still missing from the corpus
being the Politics- together with several pseudo-Aristotelian treatises,
including the Book qf Causes. Probably the intention of the act was not
to innovate but to regulate existing practice and to ensure uniformity
in the syllabus. 21
It is unsafe to attribute the fact of Bacon's commenting on the
scientific works at Paris or the content of his commentaries to the
influence of a scientific tradition at Oxford, reaching back to the
twelfth century and now reinforced by the unfettered study of
Aristotelian philosophy. For one thing, the details of Bacon's early
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 151
studies are very imperfectly known. 22 For another, it has not been
shown that the English scholars who had contact with Spain in the
twelfth century were associated with an Oxford school. As regards the
first decades of the thirteenth century, there is some evidence, though
by no means abundant, for the progress of Aristotelianism at Oxford.
One name of importance is that of John Blund, who was born
probably c. 1185. It is not known whether he studied arts at Paris or at
Oxford; perhaps the former is more likely. After a brief regency at
Oxford before the strike of 1209 there, he taught at Paris where he
began to study theology, becoming a master in that faculty c. 1220. As
a result of the strike in Paris in 1229 he returned to Oxford to teach
theology. His treatise On the Soul (De Anima) is the work of a master of
arts rather than of a theologian. 23 It is overtly based on Aristotle, from
whom there are many quotations, but it is Aristotle as interpreted by
Avicenna, whom john follows in emphasising the substantiality of the
soul and its capacity for independent existence. A later figure, almost
exactly contemporary with Bacon himself, is Adam Buckfield, whose
commentaries on several of Aristotle's scientific works survive. 24 In
addition, Adam Marsh, who is otherwise known only as a theologian,
was respected by Bacon as an expert in the natural sciences and in
languages. 25
The greatest representative of Aristotelianism at Oxford, however,
was Robert Grosseteste (1170/75-1253), whose activity as a trans-
lator has been noticed earlier. 26 Grosseteste began to study Aristotle's
philosophical works after c. 1220, when he was already a theologian of
standing. 27 In common with other thinkers of the period, his view of
Aristotle was heavily influenced by the Neoplatonism of the commen-
tators. This is very clear as regards his understanding of Aristotle's
theory of the soul, where Grosseteste accepted broadly the interpreta-
tion of Avicenna in taking the soul to be a substance in its own right. 28
In epistemology, he accepted the theory of abstraction but combined
it with the Augustinian theory of illumination, at least in so far as it
made God the ultimate source ofintelligibility. 29 As regards Aristo-
tle's Physics, he recognised clearly the doctrine of the eternity of the
world and wrote against it in a treatise On Finitude (De Finitate). 30 In
view of the preoccupations of contemporaries these are important
points on which to note his reactions to Aristotelianism. But the most
interesting meeting between Aristotelianism and Grosseteste's
general outlook was in a more technical area of cosmology as explored
by his famous metaphysics of light.
152 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

The theory was expounded principally in the treatise On Light (De

Luce ), written c. 1225--8. Its sources are partly biblical - Genesis, as
interpreted notably by St Augustine and by St Basil, the fourth-
century Greek Father, whose Hexaemeron (Work on the Six Days qf
Creation) Grosseteste read; partly philosophical- the Neoplatonist
emanation theory, absorbed probably through the Book of Causes and
Avicebron, and the notion of a form of corporeality which Grosseteste
identifies with light; and partly scientific, with influences from
Arabian astronomy, from alchemy and, characteristically, from
mathematics. 31 All these strands are combined with principles
derived from Aristotle to produce a cosmology whose distinctiveness
rests on two main features, the concept of light and the appeal to
mathematics. The production of the spheres is attributed to the
radiation oflight. The spheres themselves, thirteen in number, are a
hierarchy; the outermost sphere is most rarefied, the innermost- that
of the earth - is most dense. The assertion of a common principle
binding the heavens and the earth was at odds with Aristotle's system
in which the heavens are composed of a fifth element, ether,
qualitatively different from the four elements of the sublunar world.
However, although Grosseteste was evidently ill at ease with
Aristotle's account and seems to have been conscious of his own
originality, 32 he did not find it necessary to break with Aristotle
completely. His cosmology in fact blends the two ideas. So, despite
the fact that light is common to the spheres, the qualitative gap which
separates the superlunary and sublunary world of Aristotle's system
is maintained. The four lowest spheres are the elemental regions of
fire, air, water and earth, in descending order of rarefaction, and, as in
Aristotle, are alone subject to generation and corruption. The second
distinctive feature of Grosseteste's cosmology is his appreciation of
mathematics as the key to understanding the universe. His universe
is, of course, unAristotelian in that it is the product of a free act of
divine creation. But the real novelty is his conceiving God as a
mathematician, an idea reminiscent of Plato's portrayal of the
Craftsman in the Timaeus. Like Plato, Grosseteste saw the universe as
constructed on numerical and geometrical principles. It is not useful
to compare his outlook with that of a modern scientist. Nor is it
necessary to do so in order to appreciate that his emphasis on the
quantitative aspect is notable of its time. 33
This is a convenient point at which to notice another attempt to
reorientate scientific method, since although it falls outside the period
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 153
under discussion it may have been prompted in part by Grosseteste's
example. Perhaps partly under the influence ofGrosseteste, whom he
greatly respected, Roger Bacon abandoned the method of his Paris
commentaries in favour of an approach which centred on the study of
languages and the use of mathematics, optics, alchemy, astrology and
analysis of experience- mystical as well as sensory. His views were to
be expounded in a series of treatises- the Opus Maius (Greater Work),
the Opus Minus (Lesser Work) and the Opus Tertium (Third Work) -
written in 1266--7 in an unsuccessful attempt to secure papal
patronage for a reorganisation of the programme oflearning. Bacon's
was an eccentric and at times incoherent genius but his intellectual
acumen was shrewd; though himself a pioneer in the introduction of
the Aristotelian treatises to the university curriculum and a great
admirer of Aristotle, he was quick to see the danger of confining the
curriculum to a narrow exposition of authority.
While the arts faculty at Paris had been moving slowly towards a
study of Aristotle's philosophical works, members of the theology
faculty had been absorbing the new material and applying it in their
teaching. The Summa Aurea (Golden Summa) of William of Auxerre,
written about 1220, is an early example of the process. It is of
considerable interest for its transitional quality, combining as it does
a knowledge - necessarily partial - of Aristotelian philosophy and a
recognition of some of the problems which the latter posed, with
preoccupations which will soon appear anachronistic. The Summa
follows the order of material in the Sentences of Peter Lombard. Books
I and II provide the main topics for assessing William's philosophical
outlook. In Book I he deals with the relations between reason and
faith, the knowability of God and proofs ofhis existence. As regards
the last, he uses the argument from causality and the impossibility of
an infinite series of causes. 34 He also adopts St Anselm's proof, both in
its own right and in a developed way: the idea of the highest or best, he
suggests, must include the possession of all perfections, including
'being'. 35 Later, in a manner which recalls so much twelfth-century
theology, he tries to demonstrate rationally the doctrine of the
Trinity. He then deals with God as creator and the relationship
between the world and the divine ideas. In his explanation of creation
he is evidently much influenced by the Neoplatonist perspective.
Thus, he uses the term 'outflowing' (fluere) to describe the produc-
tion.36 But he is at pains to confute a principal aspect of the
Neoplatonist account, according to which the One was separated
154 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

from the world by a series of intermediate effects. 37 He also rejects the

opinion, which he knows to be Aristotle's, that the world is eternal.
He rejects too Plato's teaching that the world was made out of
pre-existing material. Plato's error, he says, lay in his conceiving God
as a human craftsman. 38 However, while William does thus address
himself to problems posed by the cosmology of the ancient
philosophers, it is significant of the contemporary climate and ofhis
own perceptions of the intellectual threat faced by Christian theology
that he pursues in much greater detail the Manichean analysis, the
basis of the Cathar heresy in southern France. As may be expected, he
relies heavily for his criticism of it on the arguments ofSt Augustine. 39
William has absorbed something of the Aristotelian theory of
knowledge from the De Anima 40 and is familiar with the theory of
abstraction, current in the schools from the mid-twelfth century, but
his own account of cognition is principally influenced by St Augus-
tine. He seems to be uninterested in or only barely aware of the
distinction between the several types of intellect. Similarly, he shows
no sign of interest in the problems posed by the relationship between
form and matter in the composition of man.
William of Auxerre was active in theological circles at Paris from at
least 1219 until 1231 - the year of his death- when he was named by
Gregory IX as one of the commission to examine Aristotle's works.
He was, therefore, professionally a close contemporary of Philip the
Chancellor. Philip had taught theology probably from before 1210
and in 1218 had become chancellor of the university. His Summa de
Bono (Summa on the Good) was probably written c. 1230. 41 William's
Summa Aurea is one of the sources used but whether due to the interval
between the two works or to Philip's special interests, the greater
attention which he gives to Aristotle's metaphysical doctrine, at least
in its psychological aspect, is striking. As its title suggests, Philip's
treatise is an analysis of goodness in general. He explores the relation
between goodness and being, unity and truth. Beginning with the
supreme Good he moves to created natural good, discussing in turn
the angels, corporeal beings, man and moral good and evil. Then he
turns to supernatural good- that is grace- first as regards angels,
then as regards man. He discusses the relationship between grace and
human action, with subsequent treatment of the virtues.
The section on man considers especially his metaphysical composi-
tion. Philip's main problem is how man should be described in the
Aristotelian terminology, an investigation which he conducts under
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 155
the question 'whether in man the rational and sensible soul is one or
whether they are different souls'. 42 His own preference is difficult to
determine. He quotes Aristotle's concept of soul as being 'the
perfection of a natural organic body' and seems clear that such a view
is incompatible with a plurality of souls in man- one which he would
have in common with vegetable life, a second which he would have in
common with brutes and a third which would be his specifically
human soul. However, he quotes the opinion of 'some' that man is
composed of three 'substances' of this sort, which combine in one soul
to give him life. According to this theory, there would be not three
souls but three component parts:

But although [according to this theory] there are three incorporeal

substances, yet there are not three souls, in that 'soul' is the
designation of a perfecting principle (anima nomen est perfectionis).
Therefore there is no vegetable soul except in plants and such like
because it is their complete perfection. And there is no sensitive soul
except in brutes, because there again it is the perfection. In man,
though, these are as it were the matter for the rational; the rational
is the completion and it alone is the soul in man. And these three are
united so that there is one soul; and that they are a soul they owe to
the completing principle (habent a completivo); and so there are three
incorporeal substances and one soul. ... 43

This attempted compromise between the propositions that there are

three souls in man and that there is one soul only seems to invite
several objections in terms of contemporary preoccupations. Thus, it
might well be asked whether the human soul remains a 'soul' after
vegetation and sensation cease, since whatever an 'incorporeal
substance' is it is something less than a soul according to the
distinction suggested. Similarly it would appear that what is created
by God- in accordance with the theological doctrine on the human
soul- would not in this analysis be a soul but something which by
virtue of the naturally generated 'substances' becomes a soul. Philip,
however, seems to find the view tolerable. It is by no means clear,
though, that he subscribes to it, for later he goes on to say that he has
been able to find nothing in Scripture contrary to the thesis that there
is one substance with rational and sensitive - including therefore
vegetative- powers and that Augustine is hesitant on the point. 44 The
great interest of his treatment is not for his resolution of the dilemma
156 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

but for the evidence which he provides of contemporary discussion

and the extent to which it was stimulated by the penetration of
Aristotelian ideas.
Problems of the soul have an important part also in the thought of
William of Auvergne. He taught theology from 1222 to 1228, after
which he was bishop of Paris until his death in 1249. His most
important works are sections of an encyclopaedic review of theology
and philosophy entitled Magisterium divinale sive sapientiale ('Magister-
ial survey of theology or philosophy'). It was planned in seven parts of
which the first three had as their subjects respectively the Trinity, the
created universe and the soul, while the remainder were on the
incarnation, ecclesiastical institutions and morality. Several of these
parts circulated as independent treatises. Despite its theological title,
the first part, De Trinitate ('On the Trinity'), has a good deal of more
general interest. Its first thirteen chapters cover the topics of existence
and essence and the divine attributes and operations. 45 However, the
most explicitly philosophical parts are those on the created universe
(De universo creaturarum), which was probably written mainly
c. 1231-6, and on the soul (De anima), which is judged to belater. 46 In
these treatises he made a determined effort to assimilate the new
material where possible and to correct it where necessary. William
seems to have been well acquainted with the theories of Avicenna and
Avicebron. The latter he took to be a Christian because of the
resemblance between the divine will as expounded in the Fountain of
Life and the Christian doctrine of the Logos or Word. 47 He refers to
Averroes as a 'most noble philosopher' and regards him as one of the
fundamental sources but he gives no indication which of his writings
he had read. 48 It will be remembered that this was well before the true
import of Averroes' interpretation of Aristotle's psychology was
recognised. William knew a broad range of Aristotle's own works
including the Metaplrysics, the De Anima, thePirysics, On Coming to Be and
Passing Away, the meteorology, the mineralogy, the zoology and part
at least of the Nicomachean Ethics. He also used the Book qf Causes. 49
William's discussion of the soul amply reveals the dilemma which
faced Christian thinkers of the period in trying to combine the
concepts of the human soul as capable both of independent existence
and of being related to the body in such a way that the unity of the
resulting organism was not imperilled. His treatment is much
influenced by Avicenna and amounts to a Platonic concept of the soul
expressed in Aristotelian terminology. Thus it is the soul rather than
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 157
the man that thinks, 50 a position required not least, according to
William, to guarantee knowledge to the separated soul- the soul after
bodily death. He denies that soul and body constitute a single
substance51 or that matter is the principle of individuation. 52 He
appears to hold that in all bodies there is a form of corporeality so that
in living beings there is a medium between soul and unorganised
matter. 52 This idea will be met again as it recurs in various forms
throughout the century. However, he rejects the proposition that
there is a plurality of souls in man- rational, animal and vegetative. 53
He is at pains to stress the unity of soul. 54 Moreover, despite his
general Platonist bias, he is anxious to adhere to the language of
Aristotelian hylomorphism. He uses it to confute the Platonist
doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul and rejects any insinuation
that the union of soul with body is a degradation or the result of a
fall. 55
Besides his general discussion of soul, William tackles the problems
of intellection as bequeathed by Arabic elaborations of Aristotle. The
separate active intellect of Avicenna is replaced by God, who is the
ultimate source of intellectual concepts in the sense that he is the
foundation of all intelligibility. 56 The soul as 'placed on the horizon of
two worlds'- the sensible and the spiritual- has by the nature with
which it is created an apprehension of absolute principles. 57 The
problem which caused Plato to posit the world of ideas and which
William believes caused Aristotle to posit a separated active intellect
is thereby explained, through what is in effect a variant of the
Augustinian theory of illumination.
In his cosmology, William takes trouble to deny that the world is
eternal. 58 He follows Avicebron in seeing the divine will as the cause of
the universe, being careful to make clear that although the divine will
operates from eternity its effect is not necessarily eternal. 59 In this
respect his argument foreshadows that adopted later by Thomas
Aquinas. However, William goes beyond this to insist that the world
must necessarily have had a beginning, 60 a tenet which was also to
have currency later.
All the theologians considered so far in this context were seculars.
However, the new philosophical material was also finding its way into
the theology being taught within the recently established mendicant
orders whose members were so soon to emerge as the dominant
figures on the scene. It was bound to do so since the orders were
around this time attracting established secular teachers into their
!58 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

ranks. The first mendicant master of theology at Paris was the

Dominican, Roland of Cremona. He had lectured on the Sentences
under John of St Giles, a secular master teaching in the order's
convent of Saint-Jacques, in 1228-9. Although he continued to
lecture on the Sentences after his inception, his Summa on the Sentences
must be from close to this date as it seems to have been completed
before the reception of Averroes. 61 He shows some familiarity with
Aristotle's philosophical works. About a year after Roland's incep-
tion, his master, John of St Giles, entered the order, thus giving the
Dominicans at an early stage two chairs within the faculty. The
Franciscans were not far behind. The Englishman, Alexander of
Hales, who had been a regent master for some ten years, entered the
Franciscan order in 1236. He continued teaching apparently until his
death in 1245. He is thought to have been the first to use the Sentences of
Peter Lombard as an 'ordinary' textbook in theology. His commen-
tary on it, which survives, was completed before 1230. It reveals a
knowledge of Aristotle's philosophical works as also of the Book of
Causes and Avicenna, though the exact degree of acquaintance is
difficult to judge. The Summa Theologica (Summa ofTheology) attributed
to him is, rather, representative of the first generation of Franciscan
theological work at Paris. It was compiled over the period c. 1240-56
and includes, among other contributions, work by Alexander's pupil,
the Franciscan John ofla Rochelle. 62
John of Ia Rochelle is an interesting figure in his own right. His
Tractatus de Anima (Treatise on the Soul) and the later Summa de Anima
provide welcome evidence from which to assess the impact of
Averroes in the first phase. In his analysis of the powers of the soul,
John identifies a lowest sense of the term 'reason' (ratio), as the point
at which the soul is mingled with the body and is dependent on it.
This he finds to correspond to the corruptible element of intelligence
which Averroes opposes to the incorruptible intellect. The function of
this 'reason' is to act as an intermediary between sensation, which
does not have the intelligible as its object, and intellection which does
not have the sensible as its object. Moreover, it is the specific feature
of man, distinguishing him from the angels, with whom he has
intelligence in common, and the brute animals, with whom he has
sensation in common. It exists in the rational soul only by virtue of
soul's union with body. It therefore perishes with the body, whereas
the intellective faculty, which for John is also part of the soul,
survives. 63 It has been pointed out that despite the superficial
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY 159
similarities between John's doctrine on the matter and that of
Averroes, their perspectives are in fact very different. 64 The 'reason' of
which John speaks here is a power of the spiritual soul, by which the
lowest spiritual substance - the human soul - is joined to a body.
What he conceives to be the counterpart in Averroes is a power of a
soul indissolubly linked to a body but temporarily joined through this
power to the separated and immortal intellect. John's 'reason' is
perishable because the soul, which is capable of independent
existence, is only temporarily joined to a body. The dissolution of the
counterpart in Averroes is the dissolution of the individual personal-
ity. If it is clear that John was in contact with the new access of
authority it is equally clear that on this point he misunderstood its
import. Given the complexity and unfamiliarity of the issues
involved, it is hardly to be wondered at that their treatment by the
first generation of Latin thinkers to encounter them should in some
respects be na"ive. Even so, these initial attempts to read and absorb
were a necessary preparation for what was to follow.
6. Aristotelian Philosophy and Christian
Theology- System Building and
Controversy
Bonaventure: Life and Works

ST Bonaventure was born Giovanni Fidanza in Bagnoregio near

Viterbo probably in 1217. He studied arts at Paris (c. 123~2) before
joining the Franciscan order there in 1243. He then studied theology
under the regency of Alexander of Hales and, after the latter's death
in 1245, under lesser known Franciscan masters. He received the
licence in theology in 1253 and taught untill257, though because of
the dispute between secular and mendicant masters he was not
recognised as a master of the faculty until the autumn of 1257. Earlier
in the same year he had become minister general of the Franciscan
order and from this time he ceased to teach. However, in several series
of university sermons he exercised an important influence at Paris in
the period around 1270, when the first condemnation of the tenets of
'radical Aristotelianism', as current in the arts faculty, was issued. In
1273 he was appointed cardinal bishop of Albano. He died at Lyons,
where he had been attending the general council, on 15 July 1274.
Bonaventure's earliest and most substantial work is the Commentary
on the Sentences, composed while he was a 'bachelor of the Sentences' in
1250--2. Also academic in origin and form are several 'Disputed
Questions': 'On the knowledge of Christ', 'On the mystery of the
Trinity' and 'On evangelical perfection'. The last set are only of
marginal interest in a philosophical context; they relate to the dispute
(1254-6) between the mendicant orders, Dominican and Franciscan,
and William of StAmour, a secular master in the theology faculty,
over the question whether the life of poverty was sanctioned by the
Gospel. In addition to the academic works, several non-academic
treatises are valuable as sources of Bonaventure's thought. These
include On the Retracing qf the Arts to Theology (De reductione artium ad
theologiam), which is possibly contemporaneous with the Commentary on
the Sentences, the Breviloquium (literally 'a short treatise'), composed
c. 125 7, and a mystical work, the Itinerary qf the Mind to God (Itinerarium
Mentis in Deum ), written in 1259 while Bonaventure was staying at the
Franciscan convent of La Verna where St Francis had received the

161
162 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

stigmata in 1224. In addition to the treatises, several hundred of

Bonaventure's sermons survive, either in an authorial or in a
'reported' version. The sermons are an additional source from which
to illustrate themes developed in his teaching works and non-
academic treatises. Many, especially of the more than one hundred
delivered in Paris, reflect contemporary issues of debate and
developments within the university.
The Commentary on the Sentences is the chief source of Bonaventure's
thought, containing a systematic exposition ofall its main features. As
usual with the genre, Book n, especially the sections on creation
(distinctions 1-16) and man (distinctions 17-23), and to a lesser
extent Book I, on the divine trinity and unity, are the most important
for a treatment of philosophical topics. Among the many theological
points discussed in the 'Disputed Questions' there are some of
particular philosophical concern. Question 2 'on the knowledge of
Christ' discusses how God knows creation, thereby raising the issue of
exemplarism. Question 4 examines the knowledge of the human
intellect. The questions 'on the mystery of the Trinity' are mainly
devoted to arguing that doctrine, but article I of Question 1 contains a
treatment of the existence of God as a matter beyond doubt.
On the Retracing qf the Arts to Theology considers briefly how the
various disciplines and levels of knowledge, the mechanical arts,
sense experience, philosophy, study of scripture, contribute to and are
part of a theological knowledge. The work is influenced by the
Didascalicon of Hugh ofSt Victor but is much less detailed in its survey
of the arts than Hugh's work, familiarity with which is clearly
supposed. The Breviloquium is a digest of theology. Part II contains an
account of creation and of metaphysical constitution, though
presented in a dogmatic rather than an argued fashion. The short
Itinerary qf the Mind to God is a powerful statement of Bonaventure's
conviction that created reality is a world of signs pointing to the
creator, that the creator is present in it and that reflection upon it at its
various levels leads to knowledge of God. The treatise is full of
Platonist perceptions derived from St Augustine and the pseudo-
Denis who, with St Anselm, are the chief influences upon it, but the
influence of Aristotle is also evident, in the treatment of sense
experience. Chapter 1 outlines the theme of ascent. Chapter 2
considers how the visible world 'that enters our mind through the
bodily senses' leads to contemplation of God. It is an account of the
process of sensation and 'imagination' and of the exercise of
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 163

judgement on sensation. Our judgement is exercised on the basis of

'laws by which we judge with certainty about all sense objects that
come to our knowledge'. 1 These laws are immutable, absolute,
eternal and simple 'since they are intellectual and incorporeal, not
made but uncreated, existing eternally in the Eternal Art, by which,
through which, and according to which all beautiful things are
formed' .2 Chapter 3 considers how the working of the intellect leads to
God, again by way of the Platonic argument:

Our intellect does not make a full and ultimate analysis of any
single created being unless it is aided by a knowledge of the most
pure, most actual, most complete and absolute Being, which is
Being unqualified and eternal, and in whom are the essences of all
things in their purity. For how could the intellect know that a
specific being is defective and incomplete if it had not knowledge of
the Being that is free from all defect? 3

A similar point emerges from the perception of necessary inferences:

Necessity of inference does not follow from the existence of the thing
in matter, since it is contingent; nor from its existence in the mind,
because that would be a fiction if the thing did not exist in reality.
Hence it must come from the exemplarity in the Eternal Art, in
reference to which things have an aptitude for each other and a
relation, because they are represented in the Eternal Art. 4

Similarly, a consideration of the various sciences leads to God, in

accordance with the argument of On the Retracing: 'All these branches
of knowledge have certain and infallible laws and beacons shining
down into our mind from the eternal law. And this our mind,
enlightened and overflooded by so much brightness, unless it is blind,
can be guided through itself to contemplate that eternal Light.' 5
Above the evidence of the human intellect is the evidence of the
human soul, considered as the image of God, reformed through grace
(Chapter 4). Having thus considered God as outside, through his
vestiges in the visible world, and as within, in the soul, the next step is
to consider him as above the soul, as 'Being Itself', 'so absolutely
certain that it cannot be thought not to be' (Chapter 5). 6 Here is a
clear echo of the Anselmian argument, already adopted by Bonaven-
ture in the Commentary on the Sentences and invoked by him again in his
164 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

Collations on the Six Days. 7 Chapter 6 is a consideration of God as

goodness which is self-diffusive in the highest degree. The treatise
ends (Chapter 7) with the transition to mystical contemplation.
Of Bonaventure's sermons, three series are of particular relevance
in the present context. They are the Collations on the Ten Commandments
(Collationes de decem praeceptis), the Collations on the Seven Gifts (sc. of the
Spirit) (Collationes de septem donis) and the Collations on the Six Days (sc.
of creation) (Collationes in Hexaemeron). The term 'collation' or
'conference' has various meanings but in this case denotes university
sermons delivered in the Franciscan convent at Paris. A note to one,
the shorter and probably unofficial, version of the Collations on the Six
Days records that they were given in the presence of'various masters
and bachelors of theology and other friars to the number of about one
hundred and sixty' .8 The Collations on the Ten Commandments were
preached in the Lent of 1267. For the most part they are a
straightforward exposition of the decalogue, but the sermon on the
first commandment attacks in passing the eternity of the world and
the unity of the intellect. 9 The Collations on the Seven Gifts date from
February to May of the following year. The seventh collation in this
series, on the gift of 'counsel', contains an attack on secular masters
critical of the friars' vocation. 10 The eighth, on the gift of'understand-
ing', contains an attack on three principal errors associated with
radical Aristotelianism: the eternity of the world, determinism and
the unity of the intellect, 11 though Bonaventure does not say that he
has university masters in mind. The Collations on the Six Days were
preached between Easter and Pentecost 1273. They are specially
interesting in that they were given at a time when the threat from
radical Aristotelianism had been clearly perceived and in that their
subject demanded close attention to cosmological theory. Collation I
contains criticism of those 'who believe the world to have been created
in eternity' .12 Collation IV, on natural understanding, includes
discussion of fundamental metaphysical divisons - substance and
accident, universality and particularity, potentiality and actuality,
unity and multiplicity, simplicity and composition, causation- with
criticism of rival philosophical theories. Collation VI contains a
trenchant defence of exemplarism and of Platonic ideas and divine
foreknowledge and providence against Aristotle. The same theme
and the questions of the eternity of the world, the unity of the intellect
and the afterlife are taken up in Collation vn. Aristotle is identified
with the first and third of these errors- the eternity of the world and
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 165

the failure to envisage an afterlife. It is noted that Averroes (the

'Commentator') interprets him as having taught the unity of the
intellect. However, Aristotle is excused on the eternity of the world
'for he understands it as a philosopher, speaking in the order of
nature, i.e. saying that it could not have a beginning by nature' .13
Moreover, Bonaventure allows that Aristotle 'may have had an
opinion concerning eternal happiness, but did not mention it because
it may not have seemed relevant' .14 He also suggests an acceptable
interpretation of Aristotle's supposed view on the intellect, 'that he
understood intelligence to be one in relation to the influencing light'-
a theory which would be in harmony with divine illumination- 'and
not in itself, for it is numbered according to the subject', 15 that is,
according to the individuals who possess intellect. Thus, although the
collation is at pains to show the shortcomings of the philosophers and
how their conclusions are surpassed by the certainty of revelation, it
cannot be said to be hostile to Aristotle. This remains the impression
even after allowing for the fact that there may have been an incentive
when countering the radical views of rival interpreters to show that
Aristotle could be read in an acceptable sense. Collation XIX is more
reactionary. It cautions against descending from Scripture and
patristic writings to the 'summas of the masters because error is
sometimes found in them' .16 This applies even to the masters of
theology, who are the class referred to here. However, philosophy is
regarded as 'the greatest danger'. 'Let the masters beware, then, not
to commend or appreciate too highly the sayings of the philosophers,
lest the people take it as a pretext to return to Egypt [a symbol of
defection from godliness], or dismiss because of their example the
waters rif Siloe [ cf. I sa. 8.6. 7] in which is supreme perfection, and go to
the waters of the philosophers in which there is eternal deceit.' 17
These strictures, unusually severe for Bonaventure in their apparent
dismissal of philosophy, have to be read in the context of con-
temporary controversy. The series of collations continues with
expositions of mystical theology and ends incomplete, being inter-
rupted by Bonaventure's elevation to the cardinalate in May 1273.

The Character of St Bonaventure's Thought

The characterisation of Bonaventure's thought has been one of the

most debated topics in medieval intellectual history. 18 In particular,
the interplay of Augustinian and Aristotelian elements in it has
166 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

proved difficult to evaluate. Certainly, there is no m1ssmg the

Augustinian spirit of his outlook. It is apparent not so much from the
high regard in which he holds Augustine's authority- for Augustine
was regarded as a common master by all western theologians 19 - as
from the way in which his thought is dominated by man's search for
God. This dominating concern gives his writings the quality already
noted in those of Hugh and Richard of St Victor, both heavily
influenced by St Augustine. Like the Victorines, Bonaventure
integrates the several levels ofhuman knowledge into a singleminded
quest and, as in their case, the spiritual dimension is always overt in
his treatment of philosophical and theological problems. However, if
there is no missing the Augustinian and mystical aspects of his
thought there is no missing either the fact that he writes in an
intellectual context revolutionised by the reception of Aristotle's
'scientific' works. It is the question ofhis reaction to the new material
that has divided scholars - whether he should be regarded as
generally hostile to it or, in so far as he was favourable to it, the degree
to which he assimilated it and whether in his assimilation he is best
regarded as an eclectic. Therefore he has been described alternately
as an Augustinian-Neoplatonist who opposed the invasion of Aris-
totelian 'scientific' doctrine and as a representative of a less com-
pletely developed Aristotelianism than that espoused by St Thomas
Aquinas. More recently, his thought has been convincingly presented
as a genuine and original synthesis, a systematic rather than an
eclectic blend of Augustinian-Neoplatonist and Aristotelian percep-
tions.20 The nature of this system as well as its relevance to the issues
of contemporary controversy can be illustrated by examining three
central themes: Bonaventure's theories on sense perception and
knowledge, on creation and causality and on the relationship between
soul and body in man.

Bonaventure: Sense Perception and Knowledge

Bonaventure's account of sense perception is fundamentally that of

Aristotle, whose definition of the subject he prefers to those offered by
Augustine and Boethius. 21 Sensation is attributed to the soul and
body as a composite rather than being referred, as in Augustine, to the
soul. The Aristotelian terminology of the 'common sense' and the
'imagination' is accepted and nothing in the Aristotelian account is
contradicted. 22 However, while sensation is the only route to
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 167

knowledge of the sensible world and is taken to be the starting point of

all knowledge, when it comes to our judgements on the nature of
experience and in particular to our value judgements, Bonaventure
follows Augustine in requiring access by the mind to unchanging
standards against which the data of sense experience can be
measured. 23 As in Augustine's analysis, this awareness of an immut-
able, absolute and perfect order is regarded as being beyond what can
be attained by sense experience of a contingent and changing world
and is attributed to a divine illumination of the mind. The theory of
divine illumination is the epistemological complement of the theory of
exemplarism in creation, which Bonaventure also holds. Denial of
exemplarism he regards as the major weakness of Aristotle's system,
containing within it the seeds of other errors, including the absence of
divine providence and the assertion that the world is eternal. 24 This
double function of the theory of exemplars in Bonaventure's thought
is quite in keeping with Augustine's perceptions, though the cos-
mological aspect- the role of exemplarism in creation- has acquired
a particular point in the thirteenth-century context. More generally,
divine illumination for Bonaventure has similar implications to what
it had for Augustine. It at once emphasises man's dependence on God
in the progress to understanding and guarantees him an internal,
reflective route to certainty of God's existence, though it does not
convey a knowledge of God's essence. The religious, even mystical,
dimension to the epistemological theory explains the fervour with
which its defenders adhered to it in the face of challenge from those
who insisted on the sufficiency of the Aristotelian account of the way
in which the mind knows. 25

Bonaventure: Creation and Causality

For Bonaventure, as for other Christian theologians, the origin and

explanation of the universe is a God who creates deliberately and
freely from nothing - that is, without any pre-existing substratum,
like chaos or matter, as in classical theories - and who knows the
effects of his activity. As in the Augustinian system, God knows the
universe by knowing the exemplar ideas upon which it is modelled.
These ideas are coeternal with God and are part of him - in
Trinitarian doctrine they are the Word, the second person of the
Trinity- not separate and independent as in the original Platonic
version of the Craftsman's activity. In this perspective, the universe is
168 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

clearly posterior to God, in the sense of being related to him as effect to

cause. Bonaventure also holds that it is posterior in the sense of being
created in time. He is flatly opposed to the thesis, which he diffidently
recognises as being Aristotle's, that the universe is eternal. Not only is
such a theory repugnant to revelation, it is also in Bonaventure's view
absurd. This position, clearly taken up in Bonaventure's Commentary
on the Sentences, 26 was a subject of controversy. It was challenged
implicitly by St Thomas' analysis, which treated the eternity of the
world as an open question philosophically while being resolved
theologically through revelation. It also seemed to be challenged by
the radical Aristotelians of the arts faculty at Paris in so far as they
were prepared to defend Aristotle's account.
In his investigation of the structure and production of the universe,
Bonaventure uses Aristotle's terminology of causation 27 but with
certain modifications and extensions which alter the import of
Aristotle's theory in significant respects. In the first place, he has
absorbed Avicebron's doctrine that there is matter and form in all
created beings. 28 As with Avicebron, this doctrine of 'universal
hylomorphism' is meant to contrast the complexity of creatures with
the simplicity and unity of the Creator. It does not imply for
Bonaventure that all creation is corporeal. In accordance with
biblical revelation and supported by an argument from hierarchical
symmetry in creation, 29 he accepts the existence of angels, who are
spirits without bodies but who are nonetheless, on this metaphysical
analysis, compounded of form and matter. In their case, the matter is
a pure spiritual matter, which expresses the element of contingency
and potentiality in their nature- the fact that they have been brought
into being and are mutable, for instance in their will- but which does
not carry the implications of capacity for spatial extension or for
substantial change which attach to matter in the physical world. For
Bonaventure, hylomorphic composition is the corollary of complexity
and contingency and the counterpart of any distinction between
potentiality and actuality.
The concept of a matter which is the created substratum of the
universe, spiritual and corporeal, combined with reflection on the
description of creation in the Book of Genesis, prompted Bonaventure
to further refinements on the Aristotelian analysis. With Aristotle,
'form' and 'matter' were principles deduced from the actual state of
the physical world. When these principles were introduced into an
account of how the world came to be, there was a subtle shift of
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 169

perspective. It was tempting to think of matter not as a notional

abstraction simply but in the sense of an actual principle from which
things could be and were produced. Both concepts are present in
Bonaventure's thought. Certainly, he takes matter in its ultimate
degree of abstraction to be characterless and so incapable of being
distinguished as the matter of spiritual and corporeal beings. 30
However, a distinction at some point between the matter of spiritual
and corporeal beings is necessary. While the matter of spiritual beings
has the function in his thought simply of expressing their complexity
and contingency in contrast to God, the matter of corporeal beings
serves, in addition, to explain their capacity for being bodies and for
undergoing substantial change. Bonaventure therefore treats the
matter of the physical world as having several layers of actuality. Like
Avicenna, he attributes the common features of corporeal beings-
their spatial extension and other properties - to a preliminary,
non-specific organisation of matter, a 'form' of corporeality. 31
Moreover, he regards corporeal matter as having inbuilt dispositions
for acquiring forms. These inherent dispositions were created in
matter by God along with matter itself. Following Augustine, from
whom he borrows the theory, Bonaventure refers to them as the
'seminal reasons'. Like Augustine, he employs them in order more
clearly to subordinate secondary causality to the overall creative
activity of God. The secondary, natural causation is real in that its
agency is necessary for the actualisation of the potential form but the
secondary cause is not the originator of the form, which is already
latent in the seminal reason. Besides its role as a safeguard for the
unique creativity of God, the doctrine of seminal reasons had other
uses. It helped to emphasise the sense of continuity underlying
substantial change, for the form which gives way to new form does not
wholly go out of existence any more than it wholly came into existence
under the influence of the secondary agent; it returns to a potential
state in matter from which it can again be actualised given the right
conditions. Bonaventure found this particularly apt when consider-
ing the theological doctrine that man's body would be resurrected. 32
'Seminal reasons' also served to mitigate the bluntness of Aristotelian
theory on the composition of living beings. According to this, form
was united with matter directly, a doctrine which Bonaventure in the
height of the controversies described as 'insane' ,33 though he does not
seem to have thought that Aristotle taught it. 34 By contrast,
Bonaventure insisted that the union of substantial form with matter
170 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

was accomplished by virtue of a preliminary level of organisation in

the matter itself, which had a form of corporeality and contained
within it in a latent fashion all the principles of higher organisation,
except, as will be seen, for the human soul. It was this last aspect- the
union between the human soul, the highest form of the corporeal
world, and the body- which lent the whole question a special edge.

Bonaventure: Soul and Body in Man

For Bonaventure, the human soul is a compound of matter and form.

Several considerations prompted him to adopt this view. In the first
place, as with the angels, this composition expressed the complexity
and contingency which characterised all created beings. As in the
case of angels, the matter of which the soul is compounded is spiritual
matter. Secondly, hylomorphic composition in the soul was part of
Bonaventure's contention that it was a substance in its own right, not
dependent for its substantiality on its informing a body. Thirdly,
hylomorphic composition provided the soul with a principle other
than corporeal matter by which its individuality could be explained.
Bonaventure considered that individuation must be attributed to the
union of matter and form, not to form or to matter alone.
Since Bonaventure accepted the Aristotelian principle that soul is
the actuality of a living body, his theory of soul must show how a
substance, already composed of matter and form, could enter into a
true unity of composition such as that posited in the Aristotelian
analysis between soul and body. So he emphasised that it was an
inherent aspect of the form of soul that it should inform a body as well
as its spiritual matter. Its union with a body is not therefore
considered to be a demeaning of its true condition, as in the Platonist
view, but is a completion of its natural condition and a satisfaction of
its appetite. It is tempting to compare this appetite to the desire for
imposing order which is the motivation for the embodiment of soul in
matter according to the optimistic strand ofNeoplatonist thought on
the subject, though with Bonaventure there is no question of the soul's
pre-existing its union with a body. 35 In the completeness of its union
with a body and in its life-giving and organising function, the human
soul is the counterpart of the animal soul in brutes and the vegetable
soul in plants. It differs from them however in its origin and in its
destiny. The souls of lower beings are activated from the seminal
reasons of matter. The human soul is directly created by God when
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 171

the matter exists for its informing activity. It does not pre-exist the
body but is created when the appropriate matter is engendered in the
natural process of reproduction. As for its destiny, the human soul is
unique in surviving bodily death.
This soul is the single substantial form of the body. It is the
principle of man's intellective and voluntary functions. Bonaventure
rejected the position adopted by Avicenna that the active aspect of
intellection was to be attributed to an external principle- the agent
intellect. A fortiori, he rejected the externalisation of the potential
intellect, as attributed to Aristotle by Averroes. The soul is also the
principle of the sensitive and vegetative functions of the human
organism. A theory of the plurality of forms has sometimes been
ascribed to Bonaventure whereby the human soul would be regarded
as the final, rational, perfection of a being whose vegetative and
sensitive functions are due to separate and lower informing prin-
ciples. Although some passages ofhis thought can be taken to suggest
such a theory, careful analysis of his views as a whole has shown that
he held the unity of substantial form in all organisms. 36 However, as
explained above, in discussing Bonaventure's views on causality, the
substantial form supervenes upon a matter which according to him
already possesses a degree of organisation - matter disposed in a
non-specific way to be a body and disposed through the combination
of the four elements so as to be capable of being informed by a soul. 37

Albert the Great

Just about the time that Bonaventure joined the Franciscans and
began his studies in theology, his older contemporary, Albert of
Lauingen, arrived in Paris. Albert was by then in middle age, though
the work for which he is remembered lay in front of him. Born in
Swabia ofknightly family, around 1200, he had been sent as a young
man by his uncle to the nascent university ofPadua. 38 There he joined
the Dominicans in 1223 under the influence of Jordan of Saxony, St
Dominic's successor as master general. He probably went immedi-
ately to Cologne for his novitiate and theological study. For
approximately the next twenty years there are only slight indications
of his intellectual interests. He wrote on Scripture, is said to have
lectured on the Sentences at Cologne and to have been 'lector' in
various Dominican convents of the German province. He also
acquired some knowledge of Aristotelian philosophy and conducted
172 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

investigations into natural phenomena, especially the metals mined

in eastern Germany.
In 1243-4 or perhaps earlier, Albert was sent by the then master
general of the Dominican order, John of Wildeshausen, to study
theology at Paris. After a period lecturing on the Sentences under
Gueric of St Quentin, the longstanding occupant of the Dominican
chair for foreigners, 39 he became a master of theology in the spring of
1245 and succeeded to the chair. His extant Commentary on the Sentences
is an edited version on which he was engaged up to March 1249, that
is four years after his inception as master, by which time he had
already returned to Cologne ( 1248) as founding regent master of the
Dominican studium generate there. Before the completion of his
Commentary, or perhaps before he had even begun it, he had written a
large theological work known as the Summa Parisiensis ('Paris
Summa'), 40 based in part at least on disputations which he held during
his regency. 41
Although the date of Albert's Aristotelian commentaries is not
generally agreed, some historians assigning them early in his career,
more recent scholarship takes them to have been written between
1250 and 1270. 42 Already in his theological works he had given proof
ofhis interest and erudition in the Aristotelian philosophical texts but
now he moved from writing on theology to writing on those texts
themselves. This was a startling enough transition for a medieval
theologian but it was doubly so for a Dominican. The 1228 statutes of
the order directed that the brethren 'shall not study in the books of the
Gentiles and the philosophers, although they may inspect them
briefly'; they forbade them to learn secular sciences, even the liberal
arts, without special dispensation, and required that they read only
theological works. 43 It is hardly surprising then that Albert should
have encountered some hostility and criticism. 44 However, rather like
St Anselm ofBec in his day, he also seems to have met an inquisitive
demand among the brethren, for in his Physics he claims that it was
they who had over a number of years been asking him for such a book
so that they could attain the whole of natural knowledge and
understand Aristotle. 45
Albert's commentaries more resembled the type composed by
Avicenna than those by Averroes. They were paraphrases, with
amplifications, digressions and explorations of areas which it seemed
had either not been dealt with by Aristotle or where Aristotle's
treatment if it existed had not come down. He declared his intention
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY I 73
in this fashion of making Aristotle intelligible to the Latins. Many of
his additions and elaborations were truly Aristotelian in spirit, being
based on his own observations of natural phenomena, from which he
was quite prepared to correct the ancient authorities where necessary.
In other respects, his understanding of Aristotle was much affected by
Neoplatonist influences. Chief among these must be counted the
pseudo-Denis, in whom he was deeply read and on whom he
commented, the pseudo-Aristotelian Book of Causes, on which he also
commented, and Avicenna. In particular, he borrowed heavily from
the latter's psychological doctrine. He differed from him indeed in his
account of intellection, making the active intellect a power of the soul
whereas Avicenna had made it an external principle. But in his
explanation of the soul's relation to the body the influence of
Avicenna is very clear. 46 Albert tries to fuse the Platonist and
Aristotelian perspectives, with the emphasis being laid on the soul's
substantiality as the basis of its immortality. He thinks of the soul
therefore in two ways. The first way is as it is in itself, a spiritual
substance, with a disposition towards being the perfection of a body;
he considers 'perfection'- Avicenna's usage- more in keeping with
the notion of substantiality than 'form'. The second way is as it is
related to the body, to which it is the principle of operation as a sailor
to a ship: 47

This is more evident if the intellective or rational soul be said to

move the body and to be its actuality (actus), as a sailor is the
activity and mover of a ship. For the sailor moves the ship by
intellectual design, which is the science of navigation, and yet the
sailor exercises no function in the ship which is not accomplished
by a physical movement and instrument, such as the top-sail or
tiller or rudder or oar; and yet the navigator is wholly separated
from the ship. And similarly, if the soul thus moves the whole body
under the command of intellect, the whole soul is essentially
separated from the body, although it has many powers and
operations of sensation and vegetation, which are not accomp-
lished without physical instruments. 48

As a sailor has a status independently of a ship so has the soul

independently of a body; but there is also a certain dependence
between them. The interdependence between soul and body is such in
Albert's view that a substantial union results- an idea certainly not
174 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

conveyed by the analogy of the sailor and the ship, as Thomas

Aquinas pointed out. 49 Despite his efforts to combine the two, Albert
is clearly closer to the Platonist than to the Aristotelian perspective.
His analysis is markedly cruder than that of Bonaventure. However,
while insisting on the soul's substantiality, Albert does not make it
derive from composition of matter and form within the soul. Indeed
he wholly rejects the concept of spiritual matter. 50 The soul, like all
created beings, is complex- and thus stands in contrast to God, who
is simple - but the complexity stems from distinction within it of a
principle of existence, not from hylomorphic composition, as in
Bonaventure's account. 51
Albert's teaching responsibilities at Cologne came to an end in
1254 on his election as prior of the German province of the order, a
position which he held for three years. The commentary on the De
Anima is known to have been written during his period as provincial.
It has proved a useful reference point for the dating of many of his
other commentaries. 52 It was preceded by a batch of commentaries on
aspects of inanimate nature, including the Physics, the De Caelo ('On
the heaven'), De Generatione et Corruptione ('On Coming to Be and
Passing Away'), meteorology and mineralogy, though these need not
perhaps be supposed all to have existed in a finished state. 53 It was
followed by commentaries on other works of Aristotelian natural
science - on the Parva Naturalia (the 'small treatises on nature',
dealing with a range of biological and psychological topics: sensation,
memory, breathing, sleep, dreams and divination, length of life,
youth and age, life and death), on plants and on zoology. This last, the
commentary on Aristotle's De Animalibus, he is known to have been
engaged on c. 1261, during his time as bishop of Regensburg, the see
to which he was appointed by Pope Alexander IV in 1260 but which
he resigned in 1262. His commentaries on the Ethics, Politics and
Posterior Ana(ytics may come from the period c. 1262-3. His commen-
tary on the Metaphysics seems to be later, c. 1264-7. Around 1263 or a
little after, he wrote a short treatise On the Unity of the Intellect (De unitate
intellectus), which may have been based at least in part on a
disputation which he had held while at the papal curia in Anagni in
1256-7. 54 It defends individual immortality but does so in an abstract
fashion, against the view of Averroes rather than against any
contemporary proponents of it. The atmosphere had quite changed
when, some six or seven years afterwards, in reply to a query sent to
him by an observer in Paris, perhaps just before the condemnation of
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 175

1270, Albert dealt with the same matter - and with twelve other
doctrines included in that condemnation - as proceeding from
ignorance of philosophy, 'since many at Paris have followed not
philosophy but sophisms'. 55 From 1269 until his death in 1280, Albert
lived in semi-retirement at Cologne. He continued to write at least
until c. 127 5. His unfinished Summa Theologiae (Summa of Theology), in
two books, dates from this period.
Albert's immense output has yet to be evaluated fully. The
difficulties in doing so are increased by the explanatory form of his
philosophical writings and by his own warnings that what he says in
the course of exposition should not necessarily be taken as his own
view. 56 As compared with the great synthetic undertakings of St
Thomas, his pupil from the Cologne studium, his approach is
inevitably seen as a transitional phase in the reception of Aristotle.
However, in one respect at least its significance is apparent. Albert
realised very clearly that Christian thinkers could not ignore the huge
access of new learning, that they would have to examine it closely and
while preserving their own principles work out the terms of an
intellectual relationship. This involved for the first time in the Latin
tradition a definition of the scope of philosophy and theology. Albert
addressed the problem at the beginning both of his Commentary on the
Sentences and of his Summa Theologiae. 57 The clearest delineation is in
the later work:

There are two manners of revelation. One manner is through the

light connatural with us, and this is the manner of revelation to the
philosophers. This light indeed cannot be except from the first
light, of God, as Augustine says in the book, The Teacher, and this is
very well proved in the Book of Causes. The other light is for the
perception of entities above the world and this is raised above us.
And in this latter light this science [sc. theology] is revealed. The
first light shines forth in things known through themselves, but the
second in the articles of faith. 58

The Augustinian-Neoplatonist character of the statement is explicit.

Philosophy and theology are distinct disciplines with different
starting points but underlying them is a common foundation. They
are unified in their origin. Both considerations are important for an
understanding of Albert's purpose.
176 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

St Thomas Aquinas: Life and Works

St Thomas was born c. 1224--5, probably at Roccasecca, one of the

family castles, in the north-west of the kingdom ofSicily. 59 The name
Aquinas is from the family lordship around Aquino. At the age of five
or six, Thomas was brought as an oblate to the Benedictine abbey of
Monte Cassino, perhaps with the intention that he should become
abbot in due course. This event probably took place after the treaty of
San Germano (1230) the immediate prelude to which had seen strife
at Monte Cassino between forces of Emperor Frederick II and the
papacy. During his lifetime, Thomas' family was associated with both
the imperial and papal causes, the connection being closer at first
with the interests of Frederick II. However, after the latter's formal
deposition by the council ofLyons in 1245, Thomas' brother Reginald
was involved in an assassination plot on the emperor and was
executed. The period of peace initiated by the treaty of San Germano
was terminated by the excommunication of Frederick in March 1239
and in April of that year Monte Cassino was occupied and fortified by
imperial troops. There is no evidence that Thomas had made his
profession as a monk and he probably returned home at this time. In
the autumn of 1239 he entered on the arts course at Naples university
and here first began to study Aristotle- probably the Metaphysics as
well as the works on nature and the logic. The fact that Thomas was
thus introduced to Aristotle's philosophy at Naples when it was
forbidden to arts students at Paris is a reminder of the diversity of
reaction to the new material and of the importance of the region as a
centre for translations.
Thomas did not incept in arts at Naples but instead joined the
Dominican order, possibly in April 1244. While on his way to a
general chapter at Bologna in May, in company with the master
general, he was seized and detained by his family for over a year in an
attempt to make him follow a more established regular life. A little
treatise, On Fallacies for certain Nobles in Arts (De fallaciis ad quosdam
nobiles artistas), and another on a logical subject may be products of
this period ofconfinement. 60 After his release, he was sent by the order
to Paris where it is likely that he spent the years 1245-8, as a member
of the convent of Saint-Jacques. When, in the middle of 1248, Albert
the Great went to establish a Dominican studium generate at Cologne,
Thomas may have accompanied him. Certainly, he studied under
him there from 1248 to 1252, during which time Albert is known to
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 177
have lectured on the Bible, the pseudo-Denis and the Nicomachean
Ethics.
In the autumn of 1252 Thomas went to Paris, on Albert's
recommendation, to study theology. In view of the biblical training
which he had already had he began immediately as a 'bachelor of the
Sentences', on which he lectured for four years. He received the
chancellor's licence to incept in theology probably a little before
March 1256, during the. dispute between secular and mendicant
masters, and incepted in April or May. He began teaching as a regent
master in September 1256 but it was not until about a year later that,
with Bonaventure, he was accepted by the university.
In this first academic period, Thomas produced a number of works.
They include, besides his Commentary on the Sentences, treatises On Being
and Essence (De ente et essentia) and On the Principles qfNature (De principiis
naturae), written before his inception, and a number of questions
disputed during his regency, quodlibets and a series of questions On
Truth (De veritate). As a regent he would also have been engaged on
biblical exegesis. The corpus of his works includes a substantial body
of scriptural commentaries, which scholars assign with varying
degrees of certainty to the several phases of his teaching career. The
Summa contra Gentiles (Summa against the Pagans) too is generally thought
to have been begun before Thomas returned to Italy at the end of the
academic year 1258--9. According to an early fourteenth-century
source, the work was undertaken at the request of St Raymund of
Pennaforte, a former master general of the Dominican order, as a tool
for missionaries among the Moors in Spain. Despite the 'against' of its
title, the work is not polemical but is rather a serious and meticulous
attempt to build on philosophical foundations which were now in
large part shared by both Christian and Moslem cultures. Of its four
books, the first three aim to set out theological positions which can be
established by philosophical reasoning alone, while the fourth book
complements them by an exposition of scripturally revealed doctrine.
Book I treats of God, the manner of discussing him, whether his
existence can be proved, his nature and attributes; Book n considers
God as creator and the nature of creation, with special attention to the
nature of man; Book III considers God as the good and the end of
purposive action and his providential government, particularly as
regards rational creatures; Book IV expounds Christian teaching on
the Trinity and Incarnation (Chapters 2-55), the sacraments (Chap-
ters 56-78) and the resurrection of the dead and their final states
178 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

(Chapters 79--97). The earliest date for the writing of Book II is 1261,
established by the fact that Thomas there uses William ofMoerbeke's
translation of Aristotle's On the Generation qf Animals, completed in
December of the previous year. Book IV was completed in 1264, while
he was at the court of Urban IV in Orvieto. 61
In September 1265 Thomas was assigned by the chapter of the
Roman province of the order to establish a centre of study in the
convent of Santa Sabina on the Aventine hill in Rome. 62 He remained
based at Santa Sabina until his departure for Paris late in 1268. 63 His
teaching there has left a substantial legacy. The ten disputed
questions On the Power qf God (De potentia) probably belong to his first
year at Santa Sabina and most of the series of sixteen questions On
Evil (De malo), to his second and third years there. Among the topics
treated in On the Power qf God which are of central relevance to his
thought are the nature of creation and of created matter and the
simplicity of the divine essence. The questions On Evil discuss the
nature of evil and examine the seven deadly sins. A question On
Spiritual Creatures (De spiritualibus creaturis) was possibly disputed in the
period c. 1267-8 and edited later. It considers the union of the human
soul and body, the Averroist doctrine of the unicity of the potential
intellect and the nature of 'separated substances', that is, angels.
During his teaching at Santa Sabina, Thomas seems also to have
lectured again on the first book of Peter Lombard's Sentences- the book
which dealt with the divine trinity and unity and the divine attributes
- perhaps as part of a deliberate programme to set the more usual
Dominican theological training, with its emphasis on moral and
sacramental theology, in a more general, dogmatic framework. 64 This
interpretation would help to explain too the character of Thomas'
greatest work, the Summa Theologiae (Summa of Theology) .65 Begun at
Santa Sabina, avowedly 'for the instruction of beginners', it was
intended as a complete and systematic guide to the subject. The
Summa is divided into three principal parts, the second part being
subdivided into a first and second part. The sections are known
accordingly as Prima Pars ('First Part'), Prima (Pars) Secundae (Partis)
('First Part of the Second Part'), Secunda (Pars) Secundae (Par tis)
('Second Part of the Second Part') and Tertia Pars ('Third Part'). 66
The Prima Pars deals, after preliminary discussion of the nature of
theology, mainly with God and creation but includes treatment of
human nature and the intellectual life. The Secunda Pars deals with the
moral life of man, the first subpart dealing with general aspects, the
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 179

second with particular vices and virtues. The unfinished Tertia Pars
deals with the Incarnation, the life of Christ and the church's
sacraments. The Prima Pars was completed in Italy before Thomas'
return to Paris. The Secunda Pars was probably begun in Italy but was
mainly written in Paris, the first subpart being completed late in 1270
and the second early in 1272. The Tertia Pars was begun in Paris and
was continued in Naples- where Thomas went after leaving Paris-
from September 1272 to December 1273, at the point when he gave up
writing altogether. 67
It is probable that Thomas' recall from Rome to Paris in 1268 by
the Dominican master general was intended primarily to strengthen
the order there against the renewed anti-mendicant attacks of certain
secular masters, most notably the theologian Gerard of Abbeville,
rather than to combat radical Aristotelianism within the arts
faculty. 68 He was however to be heavily engaged on both fronts during
his second Paris regency. In reading the final questions of the Secunda
Secundae, on action and contemplation and the pastoral and regular
life, it is well to remember that they were written not as an abstract
essay but at a time when religious vows as a means to perfection and
in particular the place of the mendicant orders within the church were
being hotly debated in the university. The controversy over radical
Aristotelianism was the occasion of two polemical treatises by
Thomas, On the Unity of the Intellect (De unitate intellectus) and On the
Eternity of the World (De aeternitate mundi), both written in 1270. The
subtitle, 'against the Averroists', given to the treatise On the Unity ofthe
Intellect in some manuscripts, correctly denotes its purpose. It was
written to refute the views of certain Paris upholders of the doctrine of
Averroes on the unity of the intellect and was directed perhaps in
particular at Siger of Brabant. About a year before, probably, in the
theological faculty, Thomas had examined the same and related
matters in a set of Disputed Questions on the Soul (Quaestiones Disputatae de
Anima), which are a very full source for his views on this subject. 69 The
topic of On the Eternity of the World was also relevant to the views of the
radical Aristotelians. However, contrary to what was long the view of
historians, it was not in fact aimed at them. Its target was rather the
approach of conservative members of the theology faculty, apparently
as represented by the Franciscan, John Pecham, in two questions
disputed shortly after his inception which took place, probably, late in
1269. 70 On the Eternity of the World maintained the position which
Thomas had already taken up in his Commentary on the Sentences
180 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

(2.1.1.5), in the Summa contra Gentiles (2.38) and most recently in the
Summa Theologiae ( l. 46. l-2), that the eternity of the world was an
open question which could not be determined philosophically. 71
During his second Paris regency Thomas had first-hand experience
of the ease with which Aristotle could, to his mind, be misinterpreted.
This may well have been a consideration behind the effort which he
devoted, at a time when he was otherwise already overburdened, to
producing commentaries on the Aristotelian texts. 72 In the case of two
texts at least there may, however, have been a more particular motive.
It has been shown that the commentary on the De Anima, the
completion ofwhich is certainly after late November 1267, need not
be considered to post-date On the Unity of the Intellect, as is sometimes
thought, and that on the evidence of the manuscript tradition there
are grounds for supposing that it was in fact completed before
Thomas left Italy. In that case, the suggestion that it was part of the
'research' for his work on the corresponding section of the Prima Pars
(questions 75-89) is a very attractive one. 73 The commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics can be regarded as having an analogous role in
relation to the writing of the Secunda Secundae, 74 which is in turn
broadly contemporaneous with the exploration of related topics in the
disputed questions On the Virtues (De Virtutibus), held during the
second regency. 75 But Thomas' commenting activity at this time went
beyond what would seem necessary on the score of research alone and
the needs of the arts faculty may indeed have been the stimulus. Less
well known than the controversy between Thomas and the radical
Aristotelians is the fact that he had a considerable following among
the masters of arts. In a letter written after his death to the Dominican
chapter, the rector and procurators of the arts faculty recalled how
they had earlier petitioned for his return to Paris and now specifically
asked that they be sent philosophical writings on which he was
thought to have been engaged since his departure, including works on
logic which they had asked him to write. 76 It is very likely therefore
that Thomas would have been conscious of a demand for explanatory
aids. In this period he commented on the Physics, the Posterior Analytics,
the De Interpretatione, which he left unfinished, the Politics, the Ethics
and two of the Parva Naturalia (On Sense and Sensation and On Memory).
He also began work on the Metaphysics and Meteorology. These he
continued at Naples, where he also took up the De caelo (On Heaven)
and On Coming to Be and Passing Away, both of which, and the
Meteorology, he was to leave unfinished. While at Paris he commented
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 181

too on the Liber de Causis, now recognised as by Prod us rather than by

Aristotle.
Late in April 1272, Thomas left Paris for Italy. In june of the same
year he was assigned by the chapter of the Roman province of his
order to found a new provincialstudium, which it was intended would
eventually become a general studium of the order, at a place of his
choice. He chose Naples and from the autumn ofl272 until December
1273 lectured in theology at the Dominican priory there, apparently
as a master both in the Dominican studium and in the university of
Naples. 77 During this period, he worked on the Tertia Pars of the
Summa Theologiae and the commentaries on Aristotle, already noted,
as well as on works of biblical exegesis. To it may belong also the
unfinished treatises, Compendium Theologiae (Compendium of Theology),
the date of which is very uncertain, and De substantiis separatis (On
Separate Substances, sc. angels), which may however belong rather to
the second Paris regency.
From December 1273 Thomas ceased to write. In February 1274,
his health already severely impaired, he died north ofNaples while on
his way to attend the general council due to meet at Lyons later in that
year.

Aquinas: Existence and Nature rif God

A principal characteristic of Aquinas' thought is the way in which he
combines a clear and scrupulous distinction between two sources of
knowledge- reason and revelation- with a confidence that truth itself
is one and common to them both. The point is not that the conclusions
of the two sources are always rigidly separated- though this is the
strategy of the Summa contra Gentiles- or that Aquinas' philosophising
is not influenced by his belief. It is that his writing exhibits a general
critical awareness, arising from the distinction between reason and
faith, of the method of procedure and the foundation of an argument.
This is explicit and especially pertinent in his consideration of what
can be known of God.
Regarding proof of God's existence in the Summa contra Gentiles,
Aquinas addresses two preliminary objections from quite different
perspectives. There are those who consider the undertaking superflu-
ous since they hold the existence of God to be self-evident and there
are those on the other hand who hold that the attempt is vain, that the
matter cannot be rationally established but must be accepted on
182 MEDlEY AL THOUGHT

faith. 78 In the first case he has principally in mind those who rely on
the 'ontological argument' as advanced by St Anselm, the force of
which he denies on the grounds that it involves an illicit transition
from the conceptual to the real order. 79 The main part of his answer to
the second position is to offer a series of proofs for God's existence. He
is well aware however of the limitations and difficulties of the exercise.
The human intellect cannot 'through its natural power' comprehend
the substance of God- what God is: 'For according to its manner of
knowing in the present life, the intellect depends on sense for the
origin of its knowledge; and so those things that do not fall under the
senses cannot be grasped by the human intellect except in so far as the
knowledge of them is gathered from sensible things.' 80 The principle
here is that while the recognition that something is an effect implies
recognition- and in that sense knowledge- of the cause, it does not
imply knowledge of all the characteristics of the cause. Aristotle
acknowledged this when he said that our intellect was as deficient in
relation to the prime beings (sc. the unmoved movers) as the eye of a
bat in relation to the sun. 81 Evidently, there is need for revelation if
men are to know the truth about God in so far as it is unattainable by
reason. However, even the truth attainable by reason is so profound
that it cannot be reached except after much study or without risk of
error. It is not effectively within the grasp of most men. Aquinas
argues therefore that it is fitting that that body of truth too should be
revealed and proposed as a subject of belief. He thus explains how
Scripture and Christian credal formulae to an extent duplicate what
can in his view be established by philosophical inquiry. 82
Aquinas' proofs for God's existence proceed from the nature of
external reality. In the Summa Theologiae he sets out five proofs. The
first is Aristotle's argument from the fact of motion in the universe to a
cause of motion which is itself unmoved. 83 The proof did not rest on a
contention that there was a beginning to motion. Aquinas was
prepared to accept as philosophically tenable the proposition, held by
Aristotle himself, that motion was eternal. It rested rather on the
contention that an infinite series of dependent causes is absurd. In the
Summa contra Gentiles, this presupposition is examined and defended in
detail. 84 The contention that an infinite series is impossible underlies
too the second and third proofs. The second - also from Aristotle -
asserts that there cannot be an infinite series of efficient causes. 85 The
third is based on the distinction between essence and existence,
drawn by Avicenna, and is an argument from contingent to necessary
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 183

being. In the Summa contra Gentiles, Aquinas explains it as follows:

We find in the world . . . certain beings, those namely that are

subject to generation and corruption, which can be and not-be. But
what can be has a cause because ... it must be owing to some cause
that being accrues to it. ... We must therefore posit something that
is a necessary being. Every necessary being, however, either has the
cause of its necessity in an outside source or, if it does not, it is
necessary through itself. But one cannot proceed to infinity among
necessary beings the cause of whose necessity lies in an outside
source. We must therefore posit a first necessary being which is
necessary through itself. 86

The fourth proof is the Platonist perception, already familiar from the
thought ofSt Augustine and Anselm, that relative states of being and
relative values require the postulation of an absolute. The absolute in
each case is identified with God, who as the supreme being is also the
supreme truth and the supreme good. 87 This argument should not be
regarded as a Platonist stray marshalled into the service of proving
God's existence. It is in fact one of the central concepts of Aquinas'
thought as will be seen from the role it plays in his ethical theory
where it caps the teleological structure taken over from Aristotle. The
fifth proof is itself teleological and derives from the apparently
intelligent design of the world, especially the observation that
unconscious things betray a purpose in their mutually beneficial
ordering, which cannot derive from themselves and cannot be
attributed to chance. The conclusion is that there exists an intelligent
being directing all natural beings to their ends. 88
Having in this fashion shown that 'a first being, whom we call
God' 89 exists, the next step is to investigate his properties. Aquinas
applies two methods to the purpose. The first is the negative theology
of which the most thorough exposition known in Latin was the works
of the pseudo-Denis. Granted that one cannot know what God is, 'for
by its immensity, the divine substance surpasses every form that our
intellect reaches' ,90 the philosopher may still proceed by knowing
what he is not. So, God is immutable, without beginning or end, and
thus eternal,91 lacking potentiality92 or matter93 or any composition,94
including composition of essence and existence, 95 incorporeal, 96
without accidents97 and, as absolute being, not classifiable in terms of
genus or species. 98 Finally, the most general of the negative predica-
184 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

tions, God is infinite, that is, his manner of being is not limited. 99
However, Aquinas does not rely only on negative attributes to
describe God's nature. In the Summa contra Gentiles he goes on to
analyse the basis of positive predication concerning God. The gulf
which separates the infinite being from finite beings forbids the
application of predicates to them 'univocally'- that is, in precisely the
same sense. 100 But neither are predicates applied to them 'purely
equivocally' - in totally different senses. 101 There is, Aquinas
maintains, a likeness between creatures and Creator: it is the likeness
of relative to absolute on which the fourth of his proofs of God's
existence rests. This means that attributes applied to God and
creatures signify a likeness; but they also signify an unlikeness. The
perfections which are attributed are like; the manner in which they
are attributed is unlike. This type of predication, which is neither
'univocal' nor 'equivocal' but has something in common with both,
Aquinas calls 'analogical'. Perfections in creatures are attributed to
God- to whom they properly belong - but in an absolute sense of
which we have no experience and which we cannot therefore fully
understand. What is said of God on the basis of rational inquiry
remains always a description of the cause in terms of the effect and is
inevitably deficient, 'for every effect which does not equal the power of
the agent cause receives the likeness of that agent not to the full
measure but incompletely' .102
The philosopher may then, in this analogical fashion, attribute to
God perfections the concept of which has been derived from
creatures. So, God is said to be good - supremely good - one,
intelligent, possessed of will, and so on. This may, though, give rise to
a misunderstanding. The perfections in question are not synonym-
ous: they express different concepts, derived from experience. How-
ever, the description of God's nature in this diverse and piecemeal
fashion is a reflection of man's intellectual processes and limitations
rather than of diversity in God. As has already been stated, God is
simple, without composition of any kind. The attributes predicated of
God are distinct only in man's perception of them. In God,
knowledge, will, goodness, truth and so on are perceived aspects of a
perfect unity and simplicity. The point is fundamental, not only to the
matter immediately in hand- the inquiry into what the philosopher
can know about God- but also to the solution of another, related
problem. God must be shown to know and will a multitude of things
without derogation from his own simplicity. Aquinas' answer to the
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 185

difficulty is tacitly to borrow the Platonist theory of exemplar ideas, 103

now identified with the divine essence. God knows and wills his own
essence and all actual and possible imitations of it. It is in this way
that his knowledge and will is conceived to extend to individual
beings. 104 God is utterly simple and his knowing and willing, which
are identical with him, are also simple. The suggestion of complexity
and plurality, while inescapable, is wholly anthropomorphic.

Aquinas: Creation and Causaliry

The basic attribute of God from the philosopher's viewpoint is that he

is the cause of the universe. In common with all Judaeo-Christian
thinkers Aquinas differs from the classical Greek theories in seeing God
as a creator- as having made the world from nothing. 105 God creates
deliberately but creation must not be taken as implying a change in
him; it is an eternal act ofhis will. It does not follow, however, that the
effect of the creative act is eternal: 'Just as the [divine] intellect
determines every other condition of the thing made, so does it
prescribe the time of its making .... Nothing, therefore, prevents our
saying that God's action existed from eternity, whereas its effect was
not present from eternity but existed at that time when, from all
eternity, he ordained it.' 106 As has already been noted, Aquinas
considered that the question whether the universe is eternal is capable
of being neither proved or disproved philosophically. The arguments
for either position were stated in the Summa contra Gentiles 107 but
Aquinas was to have occasion to return to the matter, specifically in
his polemical treatise, On the Eterniry qf the World, the circumstances of
which have already been noted.
God's creative activity is unique but this does not involve for
Aquinas, as it did for Bonaventure, the postulation of seminal reasons
as incomplete forms in created matter. Nor does his view of matter
accord it any level of actuality such as attached to it in Bonaventure's
thought. His understanding of the structure of the physical universe
adheres closely to the Aristotelian account of causation both in its
terminology - when allowances are made for the idea of deliberate
creation- and in its spirit. 108 Creation is not thought of as involving
the production of a matter which has actuality apart from a
substantial form. For Aquinas, creation involved the production of
distinct substances which as far as the physical world is concerned are
substances compounded of matter and form. 109 The process of
186 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

generation and decay in which substances take on new forms is

sufficiently explained, in the normal pattern and for non-rational
beings, by the influence of created substances as agents. These
secondary agents are maintained in being by God's conserving power
and are therefore subordinated to his creative activity but they have a
real agency of their own, for the exercise of which they were created. 110
By this line of thought, Aquinas renders seminal reasons in the
Bonaventurean sense superfluous.
The only principle in relation to which matter has any actuality for
Aquinas is substantial form. 111 The union between matter and
substantial form is therefore direct, as in the classic Aristotelian
theory, without the mediation of a form of corporeality or of
substantial dispositions in matter. The pure potentiality of matter-
its lack of character- and the direct union of matter and form are for
him indispensable to the unity of the substance. In his developed
thought, he accepts fully and literally the Aristotelian view of soul as a
body's 'first actuality', in virtue of which the substance is constituted
a member of a species. As with Bonaventure's analysis, the critical
issue in this regard for Christian theology was the union between
body and soul in man. It is in this context that the implications of the
theory must now be considered.

Aquinas: Soul and Body in Man

In Aquinas' thought, as with Aristotle, composition of matter and

form is restricted to substances which are either subject to substantial
change - the condition of all terrestrial substances - or to local
motion, as in the case of the heavenly bodies. The attribution of
matter to angels and the rational soul is rejected. Both angels and the
rational soul are composite but the composition is of potentiality and
actuality, essence and existence, not of matter and form. Angels are
created spiritual substances, wholly separate from matter - that is,
neither having matter in their composition nor any affinity for matter.
Since it is in relation to matter that substances are individuated in the
Aristotelian theory, there is no principle whereby multiple members
of an angelic species could be distinguished. Therefore each angel
must be its own species. 112 The rational soul is directly created by God
as the form of a human substance. 113 Although it is without matter it
has a natural aptitude for informing matter, in contrast with an angel.
Having no principle of individuation within itself- like all other
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 187

substantial forms it is specific rather than individual in character,

considered in the abstract- it is individuated by the act of informing
matter. It does not pre-exist the human body, which itself only comes
into existence as a result of the informing act of soul. However,
although the beginning of the soul's existence is the beginning of the
existence of the body of which it is the life-giving act, the soul does not
pass out of existence when, at death, it is separated from the body.
The principal reasons for supposing the soul's immortality are two.
Firstly, although it comes into existence with a body it does not owe its
existence to a body. Secondly, its characteristic feature, rational
functioning, by which it is distinguished from lower forms, is
conceived to be immaterial. Hence it is taken in the last analysis to be
independent of body, although while soul and body are united the
soul is dependent on the body for the sense experience upon which,
again in accordance with the Aristotelian theory, intellection is
based. 114
In his account of the process of knowing, Aquinas adopted the
Aristotelian epistemology fully and dispensed with the theory of
divine illumination as it was understood in the Augustinian tradition.
What the mind knows it knows by abstraction from sense experience
in virtue of its natural intellectual powers. In accordance with
Aristotle's account in the De Anima, Aquinas conceives these powers
as active and potential (or passive). The distinction accords with the
general principle already noticed that there is potentiality in all
created things. The human intellect as created and finite must have
an element of potentiality, for only the divine intellect is wholly
actual; a created intellect 'is not actual in relation to all that can be
understood' . 115 Since the human intellect has no innate ideas it is
clear that 'initially we are solely able to understand and afterwards we
come actually to understand' .116 There must also be an active
intellective power. The reason is that Aristotelian 'forms' are not
actually intelligible, existing as they do united with matter, so that
'nothing in the physical world is actually ready for understanding' .117
The process of intellection is not therefore considered to be
adequately explained by the mind's receptivity to the intelligible
forms latent in the images produced, as in the Aristotelian account, by
sensation. These provide the material of but do not themselves
constitute criticised mental concepts. The extraction of the universal
element from the particular images produced by sense experience is
attributed to an activity on the part of mind itself. This is Aquinas'
188 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

understanding of the Aristotelian active intellect and he insists that it

is a power which belongs to the soul. 118 The first argument advanced
in support of this in the Summa Theologiae is that even if there were a
separate active intellect it would still have its counterpart in the soul.
This is an argument based on the very Neoplatonist perspective from
which the concept of a separate agent intellect itself derives, that
lower realities reflect higher realities. The second argument is rather
an assertion: experience of our intellectual functioning confirms that
we possess this active power. 119 From this follows the resolution of the
next question posed, 'whether there is one abstractive intellect for all
men': 'For if the abstractive intellect were some disembodied
substance not belonging to the soul, there would be one abstractive
intellect for all men. Those who speak of the unity of the abstractive
intellect think just that. But if the abstractive intellect is a power
belonging to the soul then there must be as many of them as there are
souls, and there are as many souls as there are men .... It is
impossible for a single identical power to inhere in distinct sub-
stances.' 120
Through his treatment of intellection Aquinas makes the union of
soul and body to be the most intimate possible. Intellective function is
seen as integral to the soul, while the-dependence of soul on body for
the exercise of this function through abstraction from sense experi-
ence shows that its union with body is to its advantage, not a mark of
its degradation as frequently implied in the Platonic theory. Here are
the two supporting pillars of Aquinas' structure, which collapses if
either is weakened. If the unity of the human substance requires that
soul and body be seen to form a real composition and not as in the
Platonic theory an accidental union of two substances in which one,
the soul, enters another, the body, and moves or uses it to the latter's
advantage only, the immortality of the soul in such a composition
requires that an immaterial intellective function should be assigned to
it. This latter requirement is clearly opposed to the theory of Averroes
who had wholly separated the principles of intellection and that by
which the body was informed. Aquinas regarded the opinion of
Avicenna, who had made only the active aspect of intellection
external, as more tolerable. 121 However, as will be clear from what has
been said, he was opposed to this also, insisting that both the active
and potential principles of which Aristotle had spoken were integral
to the soul. Through the translation of Themistius' commentary on
Aristotle's De Anima, completed by William of Moerbeke in
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 189

November 1267, he found himself equipped to challenge the Arabic

psychological tradition on its own grounds - the interpretation of
Aristotle's theory. Insistence that separation of the intellect from the
soul is a corruption of Aristotle is the main line of attack in the
polemical treatise On the Unity rif the Intellect (De Unitate Intellectus)
written in Paris in 1270.
The natural bond between soul and body and the dependence of
the soul on the imaginative power as its source of and point of
reference for abstracted concepts has a further implication. That is,
that the soul in its disembodied condition between death and the final
judgement when, according to Christian belief, the body is resur-
rected, is in a state contrary to its nature. 122 One consequence of this,
which Aquinas himself seems to have developed only over a period/ 23
is that its natural power of knowing is impaired- though Aquinas
held that the souls of the beatified would enjoy a supernatural degree
of knowledge. Another consequence is that the separated soul is an
imperfect substance, an incomplete personality: it is something less
than the man, who is a composite of soul and body. 124 For this and
related reasons, Aquinas argues that the doctrine of the resurrection
of the body is supported and apparently demanded by philosophical
considerations. 125 The point was a bold one, expressing at once the
reality of the hylomorphic composition of man and the harmony and
convergence of reason and revelation.

Aquinas: Moral and Social Theory

Aquinas' epistemology, cosmology and psychology are recognisably

Aristotelian, when allowance is made for significant differences such
as the concept of a providential creator, the elaboration of the
distinction between essence and existence to which his perception of
the gulf between creator and creation led him and his precision
concerning personal immortality. In his moral and social theory,
however, his belief in man's supernatural end prompted him to
transcend Aristotle's account. Therefore, although the influence of
Aristotle on this part of his system is considerable, it rather provides
the starting point and affects the method of the analysis than
constitutes its principal import and direction. Thus the Aristotelian
teleological norm, that man's actions- those of the will, actus humani
('human actions'), rather than the involuntary actus hominis ('actions
of a man'), as Aquinas distinguished them- are directed towards the
190 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

achievement of the good, underlies his moral theory. But this has a
different significance for him from that it had for Aristotle. Given the
doctrine that man has a supernatural final state of happiness, it was
impossible for a Christian thinker to adhere to the spirit of Aristotle's
ethics without proposing two ends, one attainable on the natural level
and another on the supernatural level. As will be seen, Aquinas does
indeed recognise such a distinction- in view of Aristotle's treatment
he could hardly do otherwise- but he does not allow himself to be
forced by it into compartmentalising his moral theory. For him, no
good can satisfy man short of the ultimate, knowledge and possession
of the Good. It is towards this that man's desires are seen as being
directed. So, although a large part of Aquinas' discussion of morality
is modelled on the Nicomachean Ethics, eventually Aristotle's account is
superseded. Since man has a supernatural end, there are also
supernatural virtues which he can acquire only through supernatural
grace:

A man is perfected by virtue towards those actions by which he is

directed towards happiness. . . . Yet man's happiness is
twofold .... One is proportionate to human nature, and this he can
reach through his own resources. The other, a happiness surpas-
sing his nature, he can attain only by the power of God, by a kind of
participation in the Godhead .... Because such happiness goes
beyond the reach of human nature, man's natural resources by
which man is able to act well according to his capacity are not
adequate to direct him to it. And so to be directed towards this
supernatural happiness, he needs to be divinely endowed with
some additional sources of activity; their role is like that of his
natural capacities, which direct him, not, of course, without God's
help, to his connatural end. 126

These additional sources of activity are the theological virtues of faith,

hope and charity. 127
Among the most important insights which Aquinas did derive from
Aristotle were his perception of man as a continuous agent in his
moral choices and of virtue as a general disposition. 128 The latter in
particular is the inspiration for the very fine and full treatment of the
intellectual and moral virtues, and by extension, for the similar
treatment of the theological virtues, in the Secunda Pars of the Summa rif
Theology. The treatment is in two parts: a general consideration of
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 191

virtue, in the First Part of the Secunda Pars, and a detailed investigation
of individual virtues in the Second Part of the same. But Aristotle may
not have been the only model. It has been argued very plausibly that
this whole latter part (Secunda Secundae) may have been intended as a
substitute for the less organic type ofSumma rif Virtues and Vices (Summa
de Virtutibus et Viti is) which was one of the principal sources of
contemporary moral theology at a pastoral level, both within the
Dominican order- which Thomas probably had chiefly in mind- and
outside. 129 The suggestion of a clear practical purpose of this kind
seems to be confirmed by the distinction of approach outlined in the
prologue to the Secunda Secundae. According to this, individual
treatment of the moral topics is to be followed by an examination of
'people in their respective callings', with the promise firstly of'themes
related to all stations in life' and secondly 'details related to particular
callings'. 130 Analysis of the relationship between moral obligation and
social or vocational standing was one of the most prominent subjects
of medieval moralising. It was the foundation of a thriving genre of
'estates' literature- Latin and vernacular- in the later middle ages
and in the hands of the canon lawyers and writers on penance was an
important vehicle for the application of precept to social organisa-
tion. Measured against that tradition, Aquinas' consideration of the
'particular callings' is in fact sketchy and on a very general level.
Perhaps he felt that the area had been or was being sufficiently
explored by the canonists - such as his confrere, Raymund of
Pennaforte- whose speciality it had become. 131 But there does seem
in what he says, by way of outlining his subject, to be a hint of this
particular dimension. However that may be, what he did achieve was
a magisterial analysis of the virtues and vices- with special emphasis
on justice and injustice. It found a ready demand. It was adopted in
large part by another Dominican, John ofFreiburg (c. 1297-8), into
what became perhaps the most important Summa for Corifessors of the
middle ages and was used, directly and indirectly, by other treatises of
the type. 132 Thus vicariously and through the wide circulation
achieved by the Secunda Secundae in its own righe 33 Aquinas' treatment
of the subject must be reckoned one of the most influential theoretical
essays ever written.
The determinant of morality throughout Aquinas' system is
reason. Reason proposes the object for the will's exercise of choice,
'for will ... is directed by reason and understanding, not only in us
but in God' .134 Its role is central to the discussion of virtue in the
192 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

Secunda Pars where, as in Aristotle's Ethics, the link between the

intellectual and moral virtues is forged by prudence, which is 'right
reason about things to be done', 135 'a virtue of the utmost necessity for
human life' . 136 Reason, indeed, is at the very basis of the moral law.
Law at its most fundamental level, as stated by Aquinas, is the
'eternal' law, which is the divine will for the ordering of the created
universe in accordance with the divine reason. That part of the divine
law which stems from the nature of man and is discernible by him
through rational reflection is the 'natural' law. 137 It incorporates such
principles, at their broadest, as the rational pursuit of good, the
preservation of one's life and the perpetuation of the species. Since
man is a political animal- and, as Aquinas tends to express it also, a
social animal- the precepts of naturalla w will also be precepts which
are conducive to good social organisation. However, these precepts
will also be expressed in 'human', positive law, which is morally
binding in so far as it is true to its purpose- that is, in so far as it is just.
In case of conflict with divine law, human law must always be
disobeyed. 138
Compared with St Augustine's view of the state, Aquinas' most
important departure was his acceptance of Aristotle's principle, set
out in the Politics, that man was by nature political and that the state
was a natural society. 139 He knew the Politics from about 1260 and
commented on part of it about 1270. However, the greatest influence
on his theory of society was exercised by the Nicomachean Ethics. He
had been introduced to this by St Albert at Cologne, in Grosseteste's
translation, with particular direction towards its social and political
implications. 140 Aquinas drew on the treatment of association
developed under the topic of friendship in Book VIII of the Ethics to
support his defence of the regular life against William ofSaint-Amour
in the treatise Against the attackers rif divine service and the regular life
(Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem), written in October 1256. 141
Friendship itself, between governed and governing, is recommended
as one of the sources of political stability in the unfinished treatise On
Princely Government (De regno or De regimine principum) which Aquinas
wrote for a king of Cyprus- probably the young Hugh II, who died in
December 1267. 142 With the rule of the well-loved king is contrasted
that of the tyrant, which 'being hated by the community, cannot long
endure; for that cannot last for long which is against the desire of
many'. 143 As was no doubt inevitable in the context, Aquinas
endorses monarchy as the best form of government and that which is
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 193

to be preferred, despite the risk that it may degenerate into tyranny .144
It will be remembered that Aristotle, though he considered monarchy
of the virtuous man to be a theoretical ideal, recommended polity in
practice. This latter was the constitutional theory on which Marsiglia
of Padua, writing some sixty years later than Aquinas and with a
quite different political context in mind, was to base his Difender qf the
Peace, the most thorough-going medieval application of Aristotelian-
ism to political organisation.
Aquinas' political thinking is as much a transformed Aristotelian-
ism as is his general morality. The occasion ofthe transformation was
the same in each case - regard for a higher dimension than that
developed by Aristotle. The difference between the Christian and the
classical perspectives is apparent in the treatment of the ruler's
motivation in On Princely Government. Aristotle had proposed honour
and glory as the proper and sufficient reward of a ruler, meaning by
that to restrain his self-interest. Aquinas thinks it fragile and inferior:
'Human glory is an insufficient reward for the kingly office' .145

Rather, we consider them happy who rule wisely, who prefer the
suppression of evil to the oppression of peoples, and who carry out
their duties, not from a desire of empty glory but for love of eternal
blessedness. We say of such christian rulers that they are happy in
this life by reason of their hope and will be so hereafter, when all our
hope shall be fulfilled. Nor is there any other reward which could
make a man happy or which could be considered a fitting
recompense for kingship . . . God alone is fitting reward for a
king.146

In this respect the ruler is merely the man writ large. His reward will
be greater in that his responsibilities are greater. 147 His fundamental
responsibility derives indeed from the Aristotelian nature of society,
the object of which is the virtuous life. 148 But here again what is in
question is the virtuous life with a supernatural dimension. 149 Kings
cannot guide to this end; it is the duty ofpriests. 150 Temporal affairs
and spiritual are distinct but there is a hierarchy of ends. Therefore,
'Those who are concerned with the subordinate ends of life must be
subject to him who is concerned with the supreme end and be directed
by his command'/ 51 and 'because the aim of a good life on this earth is
blessedness in heaven, it is the king's duty to promote the welfare of
the community in such a way that it leads fittingly to the happiness of
194 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

heaven; insisting upon the performance of all that leads thereto, and
forbidding, as far as possible, whatever is inconsistent with this
end'. 152 Aquinas is far from envisaging a hierocracy. The state has a
natural justification and an autonomy within its peculiar sphere. But
while not dependent on the church for its raison d'etre, it is notionally
subordinate to it and in matters affecting the supernatural end must
be actually so. In view of the point of departure from Augustine the
destination at which Aquinas has arrived comes as a surprise, though
the position is entirely consistent with his principles. While according
the state a natural legitimacy, in contrast with Augustine, he requires
from it a positive role bearing on the supernatural end, a thesis from
which Augustine, in the abstract at least, had stopped short.

Radical Aristotelianism and the Condemnations

The inclusion of the new philosophical material on the syllabus of the

Paris arts faculty had important repercussions. It meant that in the
foremost arts-theology studium of Christendom, pari-passu with the
great developments in theology, Aristotle and his pagan and Islamic
commentators were being studied by masters who had no formal
responsibility to relate his teaching to that ofChristianity. Given their
statutory obligation from 1255 to teach Aristotle, it was not difficult
for regents in arts to conceive their function as that of expounding the
sense of the text. This is what the most outstanding and controversial
figures among them, Siger ofBrabant and Boethius of Dacia, claimed
to do. It was not part of the programme of the arts faculty to make a
theological synthesis nor would its members have been considered
competent to do so. There is no reason to suppose that either Siger or
Boethius saw their method as innovatory. It is more likely that they
conceived their function to be that of exegetes, in accordance with
what was a well established scholastic practice of'lecturing' upon an
authority. Nor are there any grounds for attributing to them a theory
of'double truth', such as was denounced by the prologue to the 1277
condemnation: 'For they [sc. the unnamed teachers of the errors
condemned] say that these things are true according to philosophy
but not according to the catholic faith, as if there were two contrary
truths and as if the truth of sacred Scripture were contradicted by the
truth in the sayings ofthe accursed pagans of whom it is written, I will
destroy the wisdom if the wise [ 1 Corinthians 1. 19] inasmuch as true
wisdom destroys false wisdom.' 153 So far as the direct written
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 195

evidence of teaching goes, the idea of a 'double truth' was a gloss on

the position of those who held the offending articles rather than a
theory maintained by them. 154 When forced to confront a divergence
between Aristotle and faith, Siger identified truth with the latter. In
the early phase of his teaching it does not appear that he gave any
attention to the problem of such divergence. In the later phase he
made it clear that he considered Aristotle capable of error and that
philosophical conclusions might be wrong even when the reasoning
behind them could not be faulted. This is not a doctrine of 'double
truth' and it is something less too than a claim that philosophy is
autonomous. Taken at face value, it is not so very far removed in
substance from the attitude of Augustine and Bonaventure. The
perspective however is different. In Siger there is lacking the sense of
spiritual vision that supports Augustine and Bonaventure in their
conviction that reason is a fallacious guide to truth.
There has been much debate over how the views of Siger and his
associates in the arts faculty may best be characterised. For long they
were identified as 'Latin Averroists'. While the term serves to
describe a position on the nature of intellect, it has been rightly
criticised as being too narrow and in some other respects inaccurate
as a description of the body of controversial teachings. The term
'integral Aristotelianism' has some merit except that it ignores the
fact that the masters concerned, like the rest of their generation,
expounded Aristotle in the light of Avicenna and Averroes, among
other commentators, and with a large contribution from Neoplaton-
ism. More recently, Professor van Steenberghen, whose own
researches have transformed our understanding of Siger and his
context, has given currency to the term 'radical Aristotelianism' as a
description of the movement. This does capture very neatly the effect
upon contemporaries, though it has to be remembered that Aris-
totelianism itself was radical in a Christian context and required little
teasing from its expositors to render it so. It is clear from the writings
or recorded lectures ofSiger and Boethius that they had arrived at a
compelling insight into the nature of the universe based on Aris-
totelian principles. There is no doubt that they were fascinated by it.
No doubt also they communicated their fascination to their youthful
audiences. Judging by the written evidence, neither was a lacklustre
teacher. Their flair and the sensitive character of the material which
they handled combined powerfully to disturb a balance which was
already precarious.
196 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

The works of Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia are the

principal literary witnesses to radical Aristotelianism. Siger was born
around 1240 and became master of arts at Paris in about 1265 or a
little before. From shortly after that time until his flight from Paris in
1276 he was a prominent figure in the arts faculty. 155 The substantial
written corpus of his teaching consists partly ofunrevised reportationes
- that is, notes taken by a member of the audience - and partly of
'official' versions, apparently edited by the master himself. They fall
into several periods, reflecting important developments in Siger's
outlook. The first period which has been distinguished is that
preceding the condemnation issued by the bishop of Paris, Stephen
Tempier, on 10 December 1270. To it belong two works of interest as
sources for Siger's controverted views, a logical question exploring
the relationship between concept and reality and entitled 'Whether it
would be true to say "Man is an animal", ifno man existed' (Quaestio
utrum haec sit vera "homo est animal" nullo homine existente), and the
important set ofQuestions on the Third Book ofthe De Anima (Quaestiones in
Tertium De Anima), which are held to date from the beginning of the
academic year 1269--70. In the logical question, Siger resolves the
problem posed by dismissing it as an unreal one since the human
species is eternal. He does so without any reference to the discrepancy
between the Aristotelian and Christian perspectives. 156 The work on
Book III of the De Anima consists of eighteen questions, divided into
four chapters. The first chapter is devoted to differentiating between
the intellect and the sensitive and vegetative parts of the soul; the
second discusses the nature of intellect, considered in itself; the third
discusses intellect considered in relation to bodies; the fourth deals
with the possible, that is the 'potential', and agent intellect. In his
treatment, Siger subscribes with minor differences of expression and
emphasis to Averroes' theory that intellect is external to the
individual. He gives no sign that he is aware of or concerned by a
conflict between this outlook and Christian teaching on immortal-
ity.ts7
This direct evidence of radical teaching in the arts faculty in the
period before the 1270 condemnation is complemented by several
other literary sources. The Augustinian friar, Giles of Rome, was at
Paris as student, master and bachelor from probably the early 1260s
to 1278, when his attack on the doctrine of the plurality of forms
resulted in his expulsion for a time from the university. He was the
author of, among other works, a treatise On the errors of the philosophers
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 197

(De erroribus philosophorum), written between 1268 and 1274, but

perhaps around 1270, 158 in which he catalogued what he considered
to be the errors of Aristotle himself and of his Arabic disciples. The
work is a valuable judgement on the controversial aspects of
Aristotelianism but it is not linked specifically to contemporary
expositions. However, Giles knew some at least of what was being
taught by the radical masters. In a passage of his Commentary on the
Sentences, the redaction of which dates from after 1295, he recalled how
as a bachelor he had seen a great master, 'a major figure in
philosophy, who was then at Paris, resolved on holding the opinion of
the Commentator [sc. Averroes] that man does not understand [sc. as
an individual]' .159 If this refers to Giles' period as a bachelor of arts-
as suggested by the context in which he saw the 'major figure'
concerned- rather than as a bachelor in theology, it is a scene from
c. 1265. 160 There is no means of identifying the teacher in question.
The Collations of Bonaventure ('On the Ten Commandments' and
'On the Seven Gifts') are important as the first known stirrings of
disquiet at current views in the years 1267 and 1268. As already
noted, the 1267 set attacked though in general terms and without
attribution the doctrines of the eternity of the world and the unity of
the intellect- two tenets which appear in the works ofSiger discussed
above. Criticism of the eternity of the world and the unity of the
intellect was renewed in the 1268 set, which also attacked neces-
sitarian determinism. 161
The next piece of evidence is of outstanding interest. This is
Thomas Aquinas' tract On the uniry if the intellect, written in 1270. In it
he attacked two contentions: first, that the possible (or potential)
intellect was a separate substance and not the form of the body, and
secondly that it was one for all men. The approach to the first is in
large part an exploration of Aristotle's own meaning and the views of
his interpreters, Greek and Arabic. As far as the Greek tradition went,
Aquinas took full advantage of the recently available text of Themis-
tius' commentary on the De Anima. The weight of authority, he found,
was heavily against Averroes who emerged therefore as 'not so much a
Peripatetic [sc. an Aristotelian] as a perverter of Peripatetic philo-
sophy' .162 He then proceeded to consolidate his own interpretation by
a series of arguments in favour of the doctrine that the intellect was a
power of the human soul. A principal consideration advanced is the
difficulty otherwise of explaining how it is that the individual
understands. Nothing in what Aquinas says suggests that he was
198 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

aware of any challenge to the view that it is the individual who

understands. As regards the second contention against which he
wrote, his task was easy, since the position became untenable if it were
accepted that the intellect was a part of the soul which informed a
body. Having made his point and having raised a number of absurd
consequences of the doctrine that the intellect is one, he proceeded to
criticise the arguments put up against the doctrine that it is multiplied
by the number of individual men. A notable feature of the tract is that
it is aimed both at a particular figure - not named, but taken to be
Siger, a view which has some manuscript authority- and at a group
who teach Averroes' doctrine on the intellect. However, although it
tackles the same general teaching as that contained in Siger'~ Questions
on the Third Book of the De Anima, there is no certainty that Thomas had
this text to hand and he must at least have had some other source for
the views which he combated. Such a source might have been notes
taken at Siger's lectures. 163 The challenge offered in the final
paragraph ofThomas' tract ('Ifthere be anyone ... who wishes to say
something against what we have written here, let him not speak in
corners, nor in the presence of boys who do not know how to judge
about such difficult matters; but let him write against this teaching if
he dares') 164 suggests that he was thinking to some extent of oral
teaching. This is confirmed by the impression gained from the tract
that he was in doubt on certain points about the exact nature of the
opposed views.
Another piece of supplementary evidence for radical Aristotelian-
ism in its early phase is by its nature somewhat hazardous but it
agrees well enough in its main features with what is known otherwise.
This is the syllabus condemned in 1270. To a considerable extent it
reflects the preoccupations evident in Bonaventure's collations and in
some other of his sermons. It may be that Bonaventure exercised a
significant influence in the framing of the condemnation, though it is
not known by what procedure Bishop Tempier drew up his list-
whether or not, that is, he was assisted by a commission, as in 1277. 165
The text is brief enough and of sufficient interest to quote in full: 166

These are the errors condemned and excommunicated together

with all who shall have taught them knowingly or have asserted
them, by the Lord Stephen, bishop of Paris, in the year of Our Lord
1270, on the Wednesday after the feast of the blessed Nicholas in
winter:
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 199

The first article is: that the intellect of all men is one and the same
in number.
2. That this is false or inappropriate: man understands.
3. That the will of man wills or chooses out of necessity.
4. That everything that is done here below is subject to the
necessary causation of the heavenly bodies.
5. That the world is eternal.
6. That there never was a first man.
7. That the soul which is man's form in that he is man is
corrupted on the corruption of the body.
8. That the soul separated [sc. from the body] after death does
not suffer from corporeal fire.
9. That free will is a passive not an active power; and that it is
moved necessarily by the object of desire.
10. That God does not know individual things.
11. That God does not know things other than himself.
12. That human acts are not ruled by the providence of God.
13. That God cannot give immortality or incorruption to a
corruptible or mortal being.

How far do these articles respond to what is known of radical

teaching in the period up to 1270? For some of them no contemporary
source has as yet been found to which they might refer. This is the case
with articles 4 (astrological determinism) and 13 (divine power
regarding immortality). The remote pedigree in Aristotelian and
Neoplatonist thought of the articles which bear on free will, divine
knowledge and divine providence is clear enough, and an exposition
of the texts could easily give rise to them. Neither providence nor
divine knowledge of the world had any place in the Aristotelian or
Neoplatonist systems. The knowledge of Aristotle's unmoved Mover
is self-centred. There are traces in Siger of this outlook as regards the
way in which subsistent intelligences have knowledge but his point
was not a denial that God knows individuals and such a contention is
not compatible with his general views. 167 As regards free will, Thomas
Aquinas had already pointed out in On the uniry if the intellect how it was
subverted by the doctrine of a unique intellect, for it 'follows that
there would be no difference among men in respect to the free choice
of the will, but it [the choice] would be the same for all, if the intellect
in which alone would reside pre-eminence and dominion over the use
of all other powers is one and undivided in all. This is clearly false and
200 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

impossible. For it is opposed to what is evident and destroys the whole

of moral science and everything which relates to the civil intercourse
which is natural to man.' 168 Moreover, apart from this aspect and the
more general cosmic determinism condemned in the syllabus, the
framers of it were concerned by the Aristotelian account of human
motivation, as reflected in the second part of article 9. This subject
would receive more detailed attention in the condemnation of 1277.
Siger does not seem to have consciously denied freedom of will but the
psychology of motivation was a delicate topic and it is noteworthy
that his treatment of moral responsibility in a treatise on lmpossibles
(lmpossibilia ), which probably comes from the period 1271-4, does
have a determinist flavour. 169
Four articles of the syllabus reflect Siger's teaching directly. These
are articles 1 (the unicity of the intellect), articles Sand 6 (the eternity
of the world and of the human species) and article 8 (that the
separated soul does not suffer corporeal fire). The last point Siger had
maintained in the Questions on the Third Book of the De Anima. 170 Some
others, for instance article 2 (that the individual does not understand)
and article 7 (that the soul which is the human form disintegrates with
the body) might have been thought to follow from his known views on
the intellect, but they are not found in the writings. Article 2, if
directed at him, seems to be a distortion ofhis actual position. 171 Siger
held that the union between the principle by which man understood
and his body was not the union of substantial form and matter, in
Aristotelian terms. But his view of the interaction between the
principle of intellection and man's sense experience left room, in his
own opinion at least, for an individual character to thought. It
appears however that some of the arts masters were more extreme in
this respect. Giles of Rome's recollection, already quoted, is one
testimony to the extreme position. Moreover, in a treatise written in
1275, On the plurality of the possible intellect (De pluralitate intellectus
possibilis), he records that there were divergent reactions among the
radical masters to the criticisms of Thomas' On the unity of the intellect.
Some defended their position while conceding Thomas' point that the
individual does understand. Others denied the point. 172 As already
noted, Thomas himself showed no sign in his tract that he was aware
of a contention that the individual does not understand. However,
that is the view maintained a little later in an anonymous commen-
tary on the De Anima emanating from the arts faculty at some time
after Thomas' tract and before 1275. Here the presupposition that the
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 201

individual understands is rejected flatly. 'They accept', says the

anonymous author, 'that man properly understands; but they do not
prove it. On this basis, they have an argument. But if the basis is
untrue they have no argument. Well then, I do not concede that man
understands, in a proper use oflanguage. If the point is once conceded
I do not know how to reply; but I deny the point, and rightly so;
therefore my reply will be easy.' 173 This is an example of precisely the
extreme reaction of which Giles speaks. If, as is possible, the
anonymous commentary intervened between the publication of
Thomas' tract in 1270 and the condemnation of the same year, it may
be the source of the view stigmatised in article 2.
Several ofSiger's writings or reported lectures are judged to come
probably from the period 1271 to 1274. Those which contain insights
on the controversial questions include a Treatise on the eternity of the
world (Tractatus de eternitate mundi), the treatise on Impossibles (Impos-
sibilia), already noted, a lecture On necessity and contingency of causes (De
necessitate et contingentia causarum), a commentary on Aristotle's
Metaphysics and a treatise On the intellective soul (De anima intellectiva). In
several, the author is at pains to emphasise that his approach to the
subject is expository rather than dogmatic. In discussing the eternity
of the world, Siger sets out the Aristotelian position on species,
carefully noting that the doctrine is that of Aristotle, and denies that
the contrary can be proved. The treatise on Impossibles is devoted to a
series of sophisms including, besides the matter already noted, the
proposition 'God does not exist'. In his analysis of it Siger expounds
the Neoplatonist theory of necessary causation, but makes it clear
that he does so 'according to the statement of the philosophers'.
Similarly, in discussing necessity and contingency, he sets out the
Neoplatonist theory, again stressing that this is the viewpoint of the
philosophers. In commenting on the Metaphysics, however, he departs
from this apparent professional detachment. He does again purport
to set out the opinions of the philosophers. But he also faces the
question how there can be a contradiction between their conclusions
and the doctrines of faith. His explanation is that any philosopher,
however great, can be mistaken. The truths of faith, on the other
hand, are founded on the prophets and catholic truth is not to be
denied on grounds of philosophical argument, even where the
argument cannot be refuted. It would seem that there has been a
development either in Siger's views or in his sensitivity to their
effect. 174 The same sensitivity is evident in On the intellective soul. This is
202 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

his next extant treatise on the highly charged psychological problem

after the Questions on the Third Book of the De Anima. There is late
authority from an Italian source that Siger composed a reply to
Aquinas' criticisms. The reply, referred to by the title, On the Intellect
(De intellectu), maintained the earlier teaching, at least in its main
lines. It was a different work from On the intellective soul and is now lost.
The latter itself is incomplete, though the final chapter was probably
never written. 175 It is a confused treatise. Siger argues that on the very
Aristotelian principles accepted by Aquinas the intellect must be one.
He then concedes that several philosophers, Avicenna, Algazel and
Themistius, have held otherwise. Because of this difficulty and others
he has for long been uncertain what the solution is and what
Aristotle's own position was. Accordingly, it is necessary to adhere to
faith which surpasses all human reason. However, he then proceeds
to analyse man as a composite- his intellect coming from outside- in
a modified version of the Averroist position. 176 The equivocal attitude
here proved to be merely a stage in the development of Siger's
thoughts on the subject. These are revealed again by his Questions on
the Book of Causes (Quaestiones super lib rum de causis) which probably date
from c. 1275-6. Now Siger recognises that the doctrine of the unique
intellect is 'in our faith heretical and it seems also to be irrational'.
After setting out the arguments on either side he takes a stand
remarkably similar to that of his former opponent in the matter,
Thomas Aquinas. 177 Thus in his last known lectures Siger did a
volte-face on his original teaching about the intellect.
Of the life and career ofBoethius of Dacia little is known. A native
of what is modern Denmark, he taught in the arts faculty at Paris up
to c. 1277. After the condemnation of that year he seems to have
entered the Dominican order. 178 There is manuscript evidence that
teachings by him were included in the condemnation of 1277 and this
is confirmed by recent investigation. 179 About a dozen writings by
him survive. Most important among them are two treatises: On the
highest good or on the life of the philosopher (De summo bono sive de vita
philosophi) and On the eterni{Y of the world (De eternitate mundi) .180
In On the eterni{Y of the world Boethius takes a position similar to that
of Thomas Aquinas: he holds that the philosopher as such cannot
show the world to have begun- that is, not to be eternal- but he
affirms vigorously that it must be held as an article of faith that the
world did begin and he regards the contrary as false. His treatment
includes an explicit analysis of the division between reason and faith
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 203

which is of considerable interest as an example of thinking in the arts

faculty on this point:

There are many things in faith which cannot be demonstrated by

reason, for instance that a dead body returns to life as the same
individual and that a thing which is generated returns without
generation [references to the Christian doctrine that the body is
resurrected at the end of the world]. On the one hand, he who does
not believe this is a heretic; on the other, he who seeks to know it by
reason is a fool. Therefore, because effects and works are from
power and power is from substance, who dares to say that he knows
perfectly by reason the divine substance and all its power? That
would be to say that he knows perfectly all the immediate effects of
God: how they are from him, whether in time or from eternity, and
how they are conserved by him in being and how they are in
him .... And who is there who can sufficiently investigate this?
And since there are many points in these matters which faith posits
and which cannot be investigated by human reason, therefore
where reason falls short, faith supplies the defect .... 181

The most notable feature of his thinking here is how far it is removed
from the notion of a 'double truth' .182
Boethius' treatise On the highest good is a very fine and concise essay
on the Aristotelian doctrine that the intellectual life is the highest
good for man. The author declares at the outset that his investigation
is being conducted 'by reason', with the implication that he is
eschewing theological insights. There is no doubt that this formal
method explains the almost complete lack of Christian content, the
only hint of such being a suggestion that 'he who is more advanced in
the happiness which we know by reason to be possible for a man in
this life, is closer to the happiness to which we look forward by faith in
a future life'. 183 To suppose that the author intended to exclude a
theological dimension from human happiness would be wrong.
However, as it stood, the work was an unnervingly powerful
statement of how far the Nicomachean Ethics could carry towards a
purely naturalistic account of human orientation and activity. The
threat was felt, as appears from the inclusion in Tempier's 1277
syllabus of the proposition 'that there is no more excellent state than
to devote oneself to philosophy' .184
The period between the condemnation of 1270 and that of 1277 was
204 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

one of great turbulence in the Paris arts faculty .185 The disarray
manifested itself in the contest over the election of a rector in
December 1271. A majority - representing conservative views, as
appears - supported one candidate, Alberic of Reims. A minority
supported an unnamed figure who was in all probability Siger
himself. In March 1272 the split was aggravated when the dissident
minority elected a rector and other officers of its own. This situation
lasted until a settlement was effected by the papal legate, Cardinal
Simon de Brion, in 1275. In April 1272 the conservatives enacted
statutes forbidding any arts master to determine in theological
matters or to teach against faith in philosophical matters. This
indicates the nature of the underlying issue. The episode is a salutary
caution against identifying the whole of the faculty with the views of
its most famous and most outspoken masters.
The settlement of 127 5 had a large measure of success but it did not
solve all the faculty's problems. The issue behind the enactment of
April 1272 was still alive. 186 In September 1276 a decree of the whole
university forbade masters or bachelors of any faculty from lecturing
in private except on books oflogic or grammar. Lecturing was to be in
publicly accessible places where faithful record could be taken of what
was said. In November, the inquisitor of France, the Dominican,
Simon du Val, cited Siger of Brabant and two others, Gosvin of Ia
Chapelle and Bernier de Nivelles, of whom little else is known, to
appear before him. Probably Siger and Gosvin had already fled to
Italy, where Siger was to die at the hands of a demented secretary
several years later.
Two weeks after the inquisitor's action, Cardinal Simon moved to
punish those guilty of a range of offences against clerical discipline.
Whether it was the case, as suggested by Professor van Steenberghen,
that the philosophical crisis had its counterpart in a moral decline, 187
it seems likely that the ecclesiastical authorities thought so and were
determined to bring the university to order on both counts. On 18
January 1277, the day on which Siger and his colleagues were due to
appear before the inquisitor, Pope John XXI - the former Master
Peter of Spain - took the initiative. He wrote instructing Bishop
Tempier to inquire into the errors current in the university and to
report on them. The bishop immediately appointed a commission of
sixteen theologians, including the prominent secular master, Henry
of Ghent, to conduct the investigation. The commission proceeded
with great urgency. With equal urgency, the bishop, by his own
 ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 205

authority, on 7 March published a list of 219 propositions said to

emanate from the arts faculty. The propositions were 'strictly
forbidden' and 'totally condemned' and those who taught or held
them excommunicated, unless they approached the bishop within
seven days. In a further hint of a perceived connection between moral
and intellectual decadence, there was also banned, in the prologue to
the syllabus of propositions, a late twelfth-century work on courtly
love, a work on divination and several unnamed works on the same
subject and on magic and astrology.
Tempier's 1277 condemnation does not lend itself readily to
summary but a general outline is necessary. The list of propositions is
usually studied in the ordering given it by the pioneering researcher in
the subject, P. Mandonnet. 188 Mandonnet grouped them in two
broad sections: errors in philosophy ( 179 propositions) and errors in
theology (40 propositions). He also subdivided them thematically.
The errors in philosophy fall under the following subject headings: 189
the nature of philosophy (seven propositions, including 'that there is
no more excellent state than to devote oneself to philosophy' ( l ;40));
the knowability of God (three propositions); the nature of God (two
propositions); divine knowledge (three propositions, including that
'God does not know things other than himself' ( 13;3) and that 'the
first cause has no knowledge offuture contingents' (15;42)); divine will
and power (eleven propositions, including that 'in making whatever
is caused directly by him God does so necessarily' (20;53) ); the
causation of the world (six propositions); the nature of the intellig-
ences (twenty-three propositions); the function of the intelligences
(eight propositions); the heaven and the generation oflower beings
(nineteen propositions); the eternity of the world (ten propositions);
necessity and contingency (fifteen propositions); the principles of
material beings - that is, matter, form and the elements - (five
propositions); man and the agent intellect (twenty-seven proposi-
tions); the operation of the human intellect (ten propositions); human
will (twenty propositions, including several asserting the determina-
tion of the will by the good); ethics and morality (ten propositions, in-
cluding several concerning immortality and the nature of happiness).
The important questions of the sources of the propositions and the
immediate targets of the condemnation have been greatly illuminated
by recent scholarship. 190 In the case of those for which an exact or
close parallel exists in contemporary writings it seems that one need
look no further than the arts faculty, the explicit object of the
206 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

proceeding as announced in Tempier's prologue. Of the propositions

which can be attributed with either certainty or probability, some
forty-four come from Siger, sixteen from Boethius and fourteen from
the works ofanonymous arts masters. In a large number ofother cases
it is possible that the views of Siger or Boethius were implicated.
Commentators both in the middle ages and in modern times have
noted that a number of propositions reflect doctrines of Thomas
Aquinas. In fact, only one can be said with certainty to be directly
drawn from him and this is not a doctrine but rather an explanatory
comment of no importance. 191 However, several other propositions do
correspond to Aquinas' views even though it is likely that the source
was similar statements by arts masters. The most generally interest-
ing examples of this category are a series of propositions expressing
the theory of individuation by matter and founding all knowledge on
sense experience. 192 Several also dealt with the relationship between
knowing and willing in a manner which would have been hostile to
Aquinas' outlo"ok. 193 No reference was made however to the sensitive
doctrine of the unicity of substantial form. This now became the
object of attention elsewhere.
Eleven days after the Paris condemnation, Archbishop Robert
Kilwardby, a Dominican and former master at Paris, in a visitation of
the university of Oxford, forbade the teaching there of a series of thirty
propositions, of which sixteen were philosophical. 194 The most
important feature of the list was the determined attack which it
mounted on the unicity of substantial form. Included in it was not
only the unicity of substantial form (propositions 7 and 12) but
various related theories. Thus, it was forbidden to teach that there
was no form of corporeality (proposition 13), that the intellective soul
was united directly to matter- the position, it will be remembered,
which Bonaventure had attacked so fiercely- (proposition 16), that
matter had no active potentiality, that is, no inchoate form or seminal
reason (proposition 3), that privation (lack of form) was pure
nothingness (proposition 4) and that form corrupted into pure
nothingness (rather than into a pristine state of 'active potentiality')
(proposition 2). In all this, Kilwardby had made a significant
departure. It might very well have been imitated in its turn. On 28
April the pope ordered Bishop Tempier to proceed to a new
investigation, this time to include the theology as well as the arts
faculty. However, three weeks later John XXI was dead and no further
condemnation ensued at Paris.
Epilogue

IT is convenient to end an account of the medieval recovery of ancient

thought and its penetration of western consciousness with the 1270s.
The Aristotelian corpus was now complete and, except for the recently
discovered Politics, its implications had been recognised and its
doctrine had made a massive impact on the intellectual system. The
impact of the Politics is part of the wider political and ecclesiastical as
well as intellectual history of the fourteenth century. However, to end
in the 1270s carries one serious risk, that of attributing too much
importance to the local condemnations and censures 1 which mark the
decade so heavily. Unquestionably the condemnations are significant
but it needs to be distinguished in what their significance lies and in
what it does not.
To take the former aspect first: apart from their immediate
implications for the two universities concerned, the chief significance
of the condemnations is that they were symptomatic. They are the
high-water point of a tide of unease which had ebbed and flowed over
Aristotle's doctrines and the comments of his interpreters since these
began to be understood. In their apprehension of the dangers of
naturalism and determinism associated with the new philosophical
material they expressed a real mood of anxiety. They did not discover
the problems. Still less did they resolve them. What they did was to
publicise them and for a time to focus attention sharply on them. The
intellectual content of the condemnations was slight. The 1277 Paris
list in particular was hastily drawn up, uncoordinated and miscon-
ceived in many of its assumptions. The effect ofTempier's interven-
tions even on the 'radical Aristotelianism' which occasioned them is
difficult to gauge. It is clear that in the case ofSiger of Brabant, the
principal representative of that outlook, there had been a marked
development towards moderation before his flight from Paris. How
far this development was due to the constraints imposed by the
condemnation of 1270 and the fear of further disciplinary action and
how far to the force ofThomas Aquinas' critique is difficult to judge. A
fortiori, it is impossible to estimate the respective effects of argument
and repression on that part of radical Aristotelianism which is largely
hidden from historical view.
One can more confidently state two respects in which the

207
208 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

condemnations were not significant. They did not end, nor did they
aim to, the study of Aristotle's philosophy either at Paris or at
Oxford, either in the arts or the theology faculty. This is true
moreover even of the study of Aristotle with the aid of Averroes'
commentaries. In this respect the later condemnations are different to
that of 1210. Aristotle was firmly established as the core of the
university arts course and continued as such for the rest of the middle
ages and long beyond. Neither did the condemnations, in effect,
seriously threaten the Thomist system as a contribution to medieval
theology. The glancing blow struck by the 1277 Paris list at certain
positions defended by Aquinas, notably individuation by matter, and
the more directly aimed shots of the Oxford condemnations were
more than counterbalanced in their potentially damaging conse-
quences by the speed with which the authorities and individual
members of the Dominican order rallied to the support of its greatest
teacher.
The speed of the Dominican reaction is indeed impressive. The
general chapter of the order meeting at Milan in 1278 despatched two
visitors to England in the aftermath of Kilwardby's censures to
punish, exile and deprive from office Dominicans critical of Thomas'
teaching. 2 The following year, meeting at Paris, it provided for the
punishment of all in the order who spoke or wrote irreverently or
unbecomingly of him or his works, whatever their private opinions
might be. 3 This official reaction, however, interesting as it is, reveals
nothing about the issues judged important. The contributions of
individual apologists are more informative. In 1277, Peter of
Conflans, William of Moerbeke's predecessor in the title of arch-
bishop of Corinth, wrote to Kilwardby disapproving of the content
of the Oxford syllabus. Although the text ofhis letter is not known its
substance can be deduced from Kilwardby's reply to it, written in the
same year. 4 The principal points of debate between them were the
interrelated questions whether prime matter should be considered as
pure potentiality, whether it contained seminal reasons and whether
substance was constituted by a single, simple form.
In March 1278 Kilwardby was appointed a cardinal and resigned
the see of Canterbury. He was succeeded the following year by the
Franciscan, John Pecham, who had established himself at Paris and
later at Oxford and the Roman curia as a theologian of stature, with
decided views against unicity of form. In October 1284 Pecham
confirmed his predecessor's prohibitions. Then, in June 1286, he
 EPILOGUE 209
proceeded against the Oxford master, Richard Knapwell, a Domini-
can, who had in a disputed question held in favour ofunicity ofform.
Knapwell's statement of the theory was assessed for its theological
import, in particular as regards the nature of Christ's body between
death and resurrection and the effect of transubstantiation in the
Eucharist. 5 On these grounds the theory was deemed heretical by a
synod at London and those who held it were excommunicated.
Knapwell was not an isolated figure. He must have been encour-
aged in his stance by the attitude of the English provincial ofhis order,
William Hothum, whose pupil he seems to have been. Both before
Pecham's renewal of the Oxford censures, in a meeting with him, and
soon after the renewal, in an address to the university, Hothum had
urged moderation, pointing out that there was diversity of view over
the question of substantial form. After Knapwell's condemnation,
Hothum appealed on his behalf to the pope - unsuccessfully as it
turned out, for Nicholas IV, a former Franciscan, resolved the case by
imposing perpetual silence on Knapwell. Other Oxford supporters of
the Thomist position at this time were the Dominicans, Robert
Orford, Thomas Sutton and William Macclesfield. 6 Knapwell,
Orford and Macclesfield all wrote replies to the Correctorium Fratris
Thomae (Correction of Brother Thomas) of the Franciscan, William de la
Mare, Pecham's successor to the Franciscan chair at Paris. This
treatise, compiled in 1279, consisted of propositions culled from
Aquinas' principal works and accompanied by criticisms of their
divergence, real or apparent, from the teaching of Augustine and
Bonaventure. Especially criticised were Aquinas' treatment of matter
as pure potentiality, devoid of seminal reasons, his ascribing indi-
viduation to matter, his denial of universal hylomorphism and his
maintenance of the unicity of substantial form. 7 The Correction became
influential in the Franciscan order through an act of the general
chapter in 1282 which directed that it be used as clarification when
the works of Thomas were read. 8
The early Oxford upholders of Aquinas' views had their counter-
parts at Paris in, among others, the Dominicans Bernard of Trillia,9
Giles ofLessines and john of Paris. Giles ofLessines wrote a treatise,
On the Unity of Form (De unitateformae), in 1278, aimed at Kilwardby's
reply to Peter ofConflans. 10 John of Paris, a notable political thinker
along the lines suggested by Aquinas, wrote a criticism of William de
la Mare which circulated under the title Correction of the Corruption of
Thomas (Correctorium corruptorii Thomae). 11
210 MEDIEVAL THOUGHT

In view of the evidently denominational character which the

controversy early assumed it is worth observing that there was at first
dissension within the Dominican order itself over Aquinas' disputed
theories. Kilwardby was a Dominican and by his forthright action he
doubtless hoped to stem the progress of Thomism among his
confreres as well as in the university generally. 12 That there was other
opposition in the order to Aquinas' doctrine is shown by the repeated
injunctions of chapters against criticism of it. However, Aquinas'
doctrine was within a remarkably short time given an official status
for Dominicans. The general chapter at Saragossa in 1309 required
that teaching throughout the order be in accordance with it. That at
Metz in 1313 was even more explicit on the point and in addition
made study in Aquinas a prerequisite for those, the most able
members of the order, who were to be sent to Paris university. 13
Aquinas' 'rehabilitation' was complete with his canonisation in 1323
and the subsequent declaration by the then bishop of Paris that the
1277 condemnation was void in so far as it affected him. 14 Thus,
through the steady patronage of the Dominican authorities, Aquinas'
system was accorded a guaranteed place among the schools of
medieval theology.
With this much said by way of perspective on the condemnations,
the 1270s can properly be taken as the end of an era in the intellectual
tradition. Greek philosophy held no more shocks. The next major
access of texts, the recovery of Plato, found a place already prepared
both by the long centuries of acquaintance with his outlook and the
special cultural spirit of the Italian renaissance. The character oflate
medieval thought does not derive from new discoveries of ancient
authorities but from grappling with problems recognised in the
course of reflecting on material which was already established as part
of the intellectual vision and from a redefinition of the respective
scope of faith and reason. Appreciation of the subtle and rigorous
analyses offered by the major late medieval thinkers, Duns Scotus and
William ofOckham, and their disciples, has been steadily growing in
recent decades so that the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can no
longer be treated as an addendum to or even a decline from the
achievements of the thirteenth. This makes it more than ever difficult
to view the thirteenth century, despite its magnificent accomplish-
ments of intellectual endeavour, as the apex of medieval thought.
Such a judgement is in any case more philosophical than historical.
But new regard for the later period does nothing to diminish the
 EPILOGUE 211

importance of the thirteenth century as a pivotal point in western

cultural history. It represents the culmination of a lengthy process by
which Latin intellectuals received increasingly more complex and
challenging lessons from the ancient masters. The content of those
lessons, the manner of their delivery, the challenges which they posed
and the extent to which the challenges were met have been the
interlocking themes of the present study.
Notes
I. MASTERS OF THOSE WHO KNOW- PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS

I. Dante, Inferno, Canto IV, I. 131.

2. Ibid., I. 134.
3. It is also known as the theory of 'Ideas'. 'Forms' is preferable, however, since
'Ideas' in so far as it implies subjectivity conveys the wrong impression of Plato's
doctrine.
4. See D. Ross, Plato's Theory of Ideas (Oxford, 1951), p. 172.
5. Plato, Meno, 8la.
6. From his birthplace, Stageira in Chalcidice, Aristotle is sometimes, usually in
older works, referred to as 'the Stagirite'.
7. The Lyceum, so-called from an area of the city, sacred to Apollo, had an adjoining
promenade or 'Peripatos'. From this the school acquired the soubriquet 'Peripatetic'
which is sometimes used to refer to it.
8. The great contribution in this direction was made by W. Jaeger, Aristotle.
Fundamentals of the History of his Development first published in German in 1923. (2nd edn,
Oxford, 1948.)
9. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 1.2; 317a 25. Elsewhere, Aristotle dis-
tinguishes 'change of size' and 'local motion' from 'alteration' but the most important
point is the isolation of the special character of substantial change.
10. Aristotle, Topics, I.5; 102•-J02b.
II. Aristotle, De Generatione et Corruptione, 1.2; 317a 25.
12. This is the characteristic application of the doctrine. 'Being which undergoes
substantial change' is almost synonymous with 'material being'. The exceptions are the
heavenly bodies which, however, as explained below, are also thought of as composites
of matter and form.
13. A similar difficulty existed in Greek.
14. The term derives from the Greek for 'matter' and 'form' or 'shape'. The
following account of the tension between Aristotle's theory ofknowledge and of being
derives from the analysis of E. Zeller, for which see his Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics
(translated from his Die Philosophic der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung by B. F.
C. Costelloe andj. H. Muirhead), I (London, 1897), 328-80. Not all scholars follow
Zeller's interpretation. For a recent review of the problem, see W. K. C. Guthrie,
Aristotle an Encounter (A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. vi; Cambridge, 1981),
pp. 209-22.
15. The four causes are reviewed in Physics, n.3; 194b 16-34.
16. The elements are not to be confused with the notional 'first matter', being
themselves substances compounded of matter and form.
17. Aristotle, Physics, 242a 19.
18. Ibid., 258b 10 et seq.
19. Aristotle, Metaphysics, A, especially Ch. 7; 1072a-1072b.
20. Ibid., Book A.8; 1074a 30-5.
21. Aristotle, De Anima, n, I; 412a 27.
22. Ibid., III, II; 434a 5-10. Sometimes he tends to the view that animals do not have
imagination. The conflict is probably a matter of definition.
23. Ibid., 10; 433b 21 et seq.
24. De Anima, III, 5; 430" 15-25. Translated by J. A. Smith, in The Works of Aristotle
translated into English, ed. W. D. Ross, vol. III (Oxford, 1931 ). For another translation,

213
214 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 1-2

with minor differences, see Aristotle's De Anima Books II and 111, translated with
Introduction and Notes by D. W. Hamlyn (Clarendon Aristotle Series, Oxford, 1968),
p. 60. The thirteenth-century Latin translation by William ofMoerbeke rendered the
last part of the passage as follows: 'Only separated, however, is it what it really is. And
this alone is immortal and perpetual. It does not remember, because it is impassible;
the passive intellect is corruptible, and the soul understands nothing apart from this
latter.' See Aristotle's De Anima in the Version rif William rif Moerbeke and the Commentary rifSt
Thomas Aquinas, translated by K. Foster and S. Humphries with an introduction by I.
Thomas (London, 1951 ), pp. 425--6.
25. In an early dialogue, the Eudemus, of which only fragments survive.
26. References to the Ethics below are all to the Nicomachean Ethics.
27. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, v, 2; tr.J. A. K. Thomson (Harmondsworth, repr.
1971), p. 144. Aristotle, Politics, III, 4, tr. T. A. Sinclair (Harmondsworth, repr. 1970),
p. 107.
28. Nichomachean Ethics, III, 7; tr., p. 95.
29. Ibid., III, II; p. I 05.
30. Ibid .. , VI, 7; p. 180.
31. Ibid., I, I; p. 25.
32. Ibid., 5; p. 31.
33. Ibid., 7; pp. 36-7.
34. Ibid., 13; pp. 53-4.
35. Ibid., VII, 2; p. 195.
36. Ibid., 3; p. 202.
37. Ibid., II, 6; p. 66.
38. Ibid., v, 6-7; pp. 156-68.
39. Ibid., 10; pp. 166-8.
40. Ibid., Ix, 9; p. 277. For an earlier statement of the dictum, cf. ibid., I, 7; p. 37.
41. Ibid., IX, 9; P· 279.
42. Aristotle, Politics, I, 2; tr. p. 28.
43. Ibid., p. 29.
44. See below, pp. 42-3.
45. SeeR. T. Wallis, Neo-Platonism (London, 1972), p. 166; J. Dillon, The Middle
Platonists (London, 1977), pp. 401-8.
46. Enneads, IV. 7. 13; cf. Plotinus, The Enneads, tr. S. McKenna (3rd edn, London,
1962), p. 356.
47. Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, in McKenna, cited above, p. 2.

2. FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES: ADAPTATION AND TRANSMISSION

I. On this subject seeR. W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages
(Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 53-67.
2. The classic account is that of G. Boissier, La Fin du Paganisme (Paris, 1909),
pp. 231-91.
3. St Augustine, Epistula 228, ed. A. Goldbacher, CSEL, vol. LVII, part 4 (Leipzig,
1911; repr. New York and London, 1961), 484--96.
4. For a detailed account, seeP. Brown, Augustine of Hippo (London, 1967), andj.J.
O'Meara, The Young Augustine (London, 1954).
5. St Augustine, Corifessions, IX. 6, 14; tr. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth, 1961),
p. 190.
6. See e.g. Corifessions, II. 5; tr. Pine-Coffin, p. 48; cf. Soliloquies, xu: tr. J. H. S.
Burleigh, Augustine: Earlier Writings (London, 1953), pp. 35--6. For a review of this
aspect see Brown, Augustine of Hippo, pp. 200--2.
7. This is not to accept the absolute historicity of these dialogues. Cf.j.J. O'Meara,
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 215
tr., St. Augustine Against the Academics (Ancient Christian Writers, no. 12, Westminster,
Maryland, 1950), pp. 23-32, and his 'The Historicity of the Early Dialogues of St
Augustine', Vigiliae Christianae, 5 (1951), 150-78.
8. See Confessions, 111. 4; tr. Pine-Coffin, pp. 58-9; Soliloquies, x, Burleigh, Augustine,
p. 33.
9. Confessions, III. 5; tr. Pine-Coffin, p. 60.
10. The mood of enthusiastic doubt, giving way to a quest for new certainty, is
captured with remarkable intensity in Confessions, VI. II: 'What great men the
Academics are! Can there be nothing known for certain about the rule of living?'
II. Confessions, vn. 9; tr. Pine-Coffin, p. 144. Ibid., VIII. 2; p. 159.
12. For an examination of Augustine's progress in Greek, seeP. Courcelle, Late Latin
Writers and their Greek Sources (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. 149-65.
13. For a convenient summary of the bibliography and arguments, see R. J.
O'Connell, St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, Mass., 1968),
pp. 1-28.
14. The view that Augustine was converted to Platonism and adapted Christianity
to that outlook rather than vice versa is an extreme statement of the case and does not
accord with his later treatment of the differences between them. He resolved these by a
highly eclectic approach to Platonist doctrines. For a judicious review of this question,
see O'Meara, St. Augustine Against the Academics, pp. 19-22 and his Charter of Christendom:
The Significance of the City of God (New York, 1961 ), pp. 62-87. Augustine's thought in
the period immediately after conversion is analysed in detail, from the point of view of
Plotinian indebtedness, by O'Connell, St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man.
15. For a list ofSt Augustine's works, see H. Marrou, Saint Augustine and his Influence
through the Ages (New York, London, 1957), pp. 182-6.
16. St Augustine, City of God, XIX, I, 2. Varro's lost compendium, On Philosopky, was
probably an important source of St Augustine's knowledge of ancient schools.
17. E.g. ibid., XVI. 18-40 passim; xvn. 17-22passim.
18. See O'Meara, Charter of Christendom, pp. 74 ff., and his Porphyry's Philosophy from
Oracles in Augustine (Etudes Augustiniennes, Paris 1959). On this aspect ofNeoplaton-
ism, seeR. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (London, 1972), pp. 105 ff.
19. See H. Chadwick, 'Philo and the Beginnings of Christian Thought', in
CHLGEMP, pp. 150-2.
20. 'When Augustine speaks of understanding he always has in mind the product of
a rational activity for which faith prepares the way.' E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of
St. Augustine (London, 1961), p. 36.
21. It may even be that Porphyry himself can be considered an example of the type.
He may have been a Christian for a time or, perhaps, disposed to become one. Cf. F.
Copleston, A History of Philosophy, I, part 2 (New York, 1962), 218.
22. Tertullian, Prescription against Heretics, 7, in A. Roberts and]. Donaldson tr., The
Ante-Nicene Fathers, m (repr. Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1973), 246.
23. St Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, II. 40; tr. D. W. Robertson,Jr (The Library of
Liberal Arts Press, 1958), p. 75.
24. Cf. ibid., p. X.
25. See e.g. Corifessions, vn and Ci~y of God, vm. See also J. J. O'Meara,
'Neo-platonism in the Conversion ofSt Augustine', Dominican Studies, III ( 1950), 331-43
and his 'Augustine and Neoplatonism' in Recherches Augustiniennes (Paris, 1958), I,
91-111.
26. See O'Meara, St. Augustine Against the Academics, m, 7-9; pp. 113-21.
27. For detailed references to these, see Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 41-2.
28. De Quantitate Animae, XIII. 22; ed. Migne, PL, XXXII, 1048.
29. St Augustine, De Trinitate, xv. 7. II; ed. W.J. Mountain and F. Glorie (Corpus
Christianorum, Series Latina, La, 1968), p. 474. Cf. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 47.
216 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

30. 'He felt from the beginning that the body and soul together make the man, but he
continued throughout his life to reason as though the soul were one substance which
uses that other substance, the body.' Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 48.
31. For a full discussion of this subject, see ibid., pp. 59--65.
32. In the Soliloquies, Augustine had been prepared to suppose that this reminiscence
might indeed be the route by which the mind attained to higher knowledge. (Soliloquies,
xx. 35; tr. Burleigh, Augustine Earlier Writings). Later, he rejected the theory. Cf. Gilson,
Christian Philosophy, pp. 71-2. For Augustine's discussion of whether knowledge is
learned, see The Teacher (De Magistro), tr. Burleigh, Augustine Earlier Writings.
33. 'Plato ... saw that God alone could be the author of nature, the bestower of
intelligence and the kindler of love by which life becomes good and blessed.' St
Augustine, City of God, XI. 25; tr. P. Schaff, in A Select Library if the Nicene and Post-Nicene
Fathers, series I, vol. II (repr. Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1973), p. 219. For Augustine's
acquaintance with the doctrine, through Neoplatonism, see Gilson, Christian Philosophy,
p. 77.
34. For a discussion of the difficulties, see Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 80--96.
35. St Augustine, On Free Will, 1. XIII-XIV; tr. Burleigh, Augustine Earlier Writings,
pp. 129--30.
36. Ibid., xv, p. 131.
37. St Augustine, To Simplician, On Various Questions, tr. ibid., pp. 376--406.
38. On Free Will, 111. xxv. 74; ibid., p. 215.
39. See De Genesi ad Litteram, v. 7. 20. ed. I. Zycha (CSEL, xxvm), p. ISO. Cf.
CHLGEMP, pp. 397-400.
40. St Augustine, On the Nature if the Good, m; Burleigh, Augustine Earlier Writings,
p. 327.
41. Ibid., vm; p. 328.
42. For the whole schema, see ibid., 1-xxiii; pp. 326--33.
43. Augustine attempted to show, against Porphyry, that even the resurrection was
in keeping with Platonist principles. City of God, XIII,. 16--18.
44. Ibid.' VIII. II; XI. 21.
45. See City if God, XXII. 30; in ibid., xx. 8, Augustine says that it is called 'a thousand
years'. See further, R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology if St
Augustine (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 17-21, and G. Folliet, 'La typologie du sabbat chez
Saint Augustin: son interpretation rnillenariste entre 388 et 400', Revue des Etudes
Augustiniennes, II (1956), 371-90.
46. On the history of medieval millennia! speculation and activity, see N. Cohn, The
Pursuit if the Millennium (London, 1957) and M. Reeves, The Influence if Prophecy in the
Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 1969).
47. City if God, XIV, 28.
48. For fine insights into this, see A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus, Christian Faith
and Greek Philosophy (London, 1960), especially pp. 91-2.
49. Cf. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 134-5.
50. Confessions, XIII. 9. I 0. '
51. City of God, xx. 7; tr. Schaff, Select Library, p. 427.
52. See, e.g., City if God, 1. 35. On the problem of ambiguity in Augustine's use of his
terms, see Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 181.
53. Augustine probably owed the idea of two mystical cities to the African
theologian, Tyconius, who had abandoned the Donatist view that the church was a
pure society. See further, Markus, Saeculum, pp. 115-22.
54. See ibid., pp. 95, 204-5, 210.
55. SeeP. Brown, 'St Augustine', in B. Smalley (ed.), Trends in Medieval Political
Thought (Oxford, 1965), pp. 1-21 (reprinted in P. Brown,Religion and Society in the Age if
St Augustine (London, 1972) ); see also M.J. Wilks, 'St Augustine and the general will',
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 217
Studiapatristica IX (Texte und Untersuchungen 94, Berlin, 1966), 487-522 and H. A.
Deane, The Political and Social Ideas rif St Augustine (New York, 1963), pp. 144, 235--6.
56. E.g. Epistle cLxxxv, ii. 8-9: CSEL, LVII, 7-8; Contra Litteras Petiliani, II, 20, 45:
CSEL, LII, 45. This is not to deny that obedience is part of his general doctrine nor to
imply that it was assumed for the purpose of coercing opponents. Cf. Deane, Political
and Social Ideas, p. 190.
57. Cf. Deane, Political and Social Ideas, pp. 151-2.
58. City of God, II. 21; XIX. 21.
59. Ibid., XIX. 24.
60. Ibid., 27.
61. St Augustine, Epistola 153; tr. W. Parsons, St Augustine's Letters, III (The Fathers of
the Church; Washington, 1953), 302.
62. Cf. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 177: 'To transfer the rules obtaining on one
level to the other is to confuse and upset everything.'
63. St Augustine, £narrationes in Psalmos, Ll. 6 (Corpus Christianorum, Series Latina,
XXXIX, 627); cf. Deane, Political and Social Ideas, p. 130.
64. St Augustine, Epistola 138. 13; tr. P. Schaff in A Select Library of the Nicene and
Post-Nicene Fathers, series I, vol. 1 (repr. Grand Rapids, Michigan; 1973), 481-8.
65. On the doctrine of the just war, see F. H. Russell, The just War in the Middle Ages
(Cambridge, 1975).
66. For important treatment of the subject, seeP. Brown, 'St Augustine's Attitude to
Religious Coercion',journal rif Roman Studies, LIV (1964), 107-16 and also his 'Religious
Coercion, in the later Roman Empire: the case of North Africa', History, XLVIII ( 1963),
283-305 (both reprinted in Religion and Society in the Age of St Augustine).
67. Cassiodorus, Variae, II. 27; quoted H. M. Barrett,Boethius, Some Aspects rifhis Times
and Work (New York, 1965), p. 31.
68. Boethius' father-in-law was a great-grandson ofSymmachus, the champion of
paganism against St Ambrose.
69. The fullest statement of his intention is contained in In librum de Interpretatione
(editio secunda), 1. 2; ed. Migne, PL, LXIV, 433.
70. Boethius' authorial intentions and his achievements of them have been
examined by A. Kappelmacher, 'Der schriftstellerische Plan des Boethius', Wiener
Studien, Zeitschriftfur Klassische Philologie, XLVI (1929), 215--25 and L. M. De Rijk, 'On
the Chronology ofBoethius' Works on Logic', Vivarium, II (1964), 1-49, 125--62.
71. See J. Shiel, 'Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle', Mediaeval and Renaissance
Studies, IV (1958), 217-44.
72. The evidence is summarised in W. H. Stahl, R. Johnson and E. L. Burge,
Martianus Capella and The Seven Liberal Arts, vol. 1 (New York, 197l),p. 115.
73. See H. Chadwick, 'The Authenticity of Boethius' Fourth Tractate De Fide
Catholica', Journal rif Theological Studies, n.s. XXXI (1980), 551-6 and Boethius, the
Consolations rif Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy (Oxford, 1981), pp. 175--80.
74. See CHLGEMP, pp. 331-40.
75. See Barrett, Boethius, p. 143.
76. See W. C. Bark, 'Theodoric vs. Boethius: Vindication and Apology', American
Historical Review, XLIX (1944), 410--26. See also V. Schurr, Die Trinitiitslehre des Boethius
im Lichte der Skythischen Kontroversen (Paderborn, 1935) and Chadwick, Boethius, the
Consolations, pp. 180--90, for the background.
77. See especially, P. Courcelle, Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources, tr. H. E.
Wedeck (Cambridge, Mass. 1969), pp. 295--322. Professor Courcelle's account of
Boethius' dependence on Alexandrian writers for his logical doctrine must be read in
the light of Shiel, 'Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle'.
78. See the argument of A. Momigliano, 'Cassiodorus and Italian Culture of his
Time', Proceedings rif the British Acadenry, XLI (1955), 207--45. The question has been
218 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

reviewed by Chadwick, Boethius, the Consolations, who suggests that the Consolation 'is a
work written by a Platonist who is also a Christian but is not a Christian work', p. 249.
79. For example, by E. K. Rand, Founders of the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass.,
1928), Ch. 5.
80. See W. Schmid, 'Boethius and the Claims of Philosophy', in Studia Patristica,
Papers Presented to the Second International Conference on Patristic Studies held at Christ Church,
Oxford, 1955, part n, eds K. Aland and F. L. Cross (Berlin, 1957), pp. 368--75. On other
aspects of literary design in the work, see A. Crabbe, 'Literary Design in the De
Consolatione Philosophiae' in M. Gibson, ed., Boethius, his Life, Thought and lrifluence
(Oxford, 1981), pp. 237-74.
81. Boethius, The Consolation if Philosophy, eds H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (Loeb
edition; London; Cambridge, Mass., repr. 1953), p. 157.
82. Ibid., p. 181 (slightly revised).
83. The references to God here and elsewhere in the Consolation are not evidence of
the author's Christianity. Nor is his use of the Platonic doctrine of recollection proof
against it (for example, Book v, metric 3).
84. It occurs also in De Trinitate, IV.
85. For details of these, see H. R. Patch, The Tradition of Boethius (New York, 1935);
P. Courcelle, La Consolation de Philosophie dans Ia Tradition Litteraire (Paris, 1967) and
'Etude critique des commentaires sur Ia Consolatio Philosophiae de Boece du IXe au XVe
siecle', Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age, XIV (1939), 5--140, J.
Beaumont, 'The Latin Tradition of the De Consolatione Philosophiae' in Gibson, ed.,
Boethius, pp. 278--305.
86. The term 'quadrivium' or more authentically 'quadruvium' derived from
Boethius himself. Its complement, 'trivium', seems to have been a coinage of the
Carolingian period. SeeM. L. W. Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Europe AD 500 to
900 (2nd edn London, 1957), p. 41.
87. He did not actually found intellectual monasticism. On earlier and independent
contemporary examples of the type, see P. Riche, Education and culture in the Barbarian West
Sixth through Eighth Centuries, tr.J.J. Contreni (Columbia, S.C., 1976), pp. 158--61. The
importance of the library at Vivarium for the transmission of classical texts is not now
considered to have been so great as was once thought. For a recent statement, see L. D.
Reynolds and N. G. Wilson, Scribes and Scholars (Oxford, 1974), pp. 72-4.
88. SeeR. W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (repr. London, 1967), p. 166.
89. Among other works oflsidore which served to transmit a knowledge specifically
of ancient philosophical schools may be noted the De natura rerum (on the physical
world), the De dif.ferentiis rerum (on biblical and theological terms) and the Liber
numerorum (on the symbolism of numbers).
90. I acknowledge my debt for what follows to the two fundamental studies by P.
Riche, Education qna Culture andLes Ecoles et I' Enseignement dans /'Occident Chretien de Ia Fin
du VeSiecle au Milieu du Xle Siecle (Paris, 1979).
91. See]. Marenbon, From the Circle if Alcuin to the School if Auxerre: Logic, Theology
and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981), pp. 44-55, 151-66.
92. See ibid., pp. 57-62.
93. Ibid., pp. 39-40.
94. Ibid., pp. 64-5.
95. See ibid., pp. 67-70 and CHLGEMP, pp. 573-5.
96. See Marenbon,From the Circle'![ Alcuin, pp. 105--11; cf.j.J. Contreni, 'The Irish
Colony at Laon during the time of John Scottus' in jean Scot Erigene et l'Histoire de la
Philosophie (Actes du Colloque no. 561 du CNRS a Laon, du 7 au 12 juillet 1976,
organise parR. Rogues; Paris, 1977), pp. 59-67.
97. See L. Bieler, Ireland, Harbinger of the Middle Ages (Corrected reprint, Oxford,
1966), p. 166.
 NOTES TO CHAPTERS 2-3 219
98. M. Cappuyns, Jean Scot Erigene: sa uie, son oeuure, sa pensee (Paris, 1933); J. ].
O'Meara, Eriugena (Cork, 1969).
99. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, 'Eriugena's Greek Sources' in].]. O'Meara (ed.), The
Mind of Eriugena (Dublin, 1973), pp. 2-5.
100. See CHLGEMP, pp. 577-8 and O'Meara, Eriugena, p. 19.
101. See CHLGEMP, p. 523, n. 5.
102. Eriugena already knew Origen's De principiis by this time, see ibid., pp. 583-4.
103. Cf. M. L. Uhlfelder and]. A. Potter,John the Scot, Periphyseon, On the Diuision of
Nature (Indianapolis, 1976), pp. xxvii-xxviii.
104. Annotationes in Marcianum, ed. C. Lutz (Cambridge, Mass., 1939), 57.15, p. 64.
This might be thought, from the context, to apply to the classical heaven only but as the
editor shows, pp. xvi-xvii, it is part of a general emphasis in the work on the power of
reason.
105. Periphyseon, 1. 69. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, ed. and tr. John Scotus Eriugena,
Periphyseon, I (Dublin, 1968), pp. 197-9.
106. Periphyseon, IV. 4; tr. Uhlfelder and Potter,John the Scot, p. 215.
107. Periphyseon ('Concerning Nature') is the more general title; cf. CHLGEMP,
p. 520, n. 2.
108. Periphyseon, 1. (Prologue); Sheldon-Williams, p. 37.
109. Sheldon-Williams, 'Eriugena's Greek Sources', p. 5.
110. Periphyseon, v. 38; tr. Uhlfelder and Potter,John the Scot, p. 351.
Ill. See, for example,Periplryseon, v. 8; Uhlfelder and Potter ,John the Scot, pp. 28~9.
112. On Origen's doctrine, see, e.g. CHLGEMP, pp. 190-2.
113. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin, pp. 8~109.
114. See ibid., pp. 111-12.
115. See ibid., pp. 109-11.
116. See CHLGEMP, pp. 532-3. Cf. Periphyseon, ed. Sheldon-Williams, I (Dublin,
1968), 24.
117. SeeM. Gibson, 'The Continuity of Learning circa 850-circa 1050', Viator, VI
(1975), [1-13], 12.

3. THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES - LOGIC, THEOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY

I. St Anselm's defence of Trinitarian doctrine and his report ofRoscelin's views is

contained in his Epistola de lncarnatione Verbi, of which there are two recensions, edited in
F. S. Schmitt, Sancti Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi, Opera Omnia, vols I and n
(Edinburgh, 1946).
2. See the account in R. W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (repr. London,
1967), Ch. 2.
3. See]. J. Contreni, The Cathedral School of Laonfrom 850 to 930, its Manuscripts and
Masters (Miinchener Beitrage zur Mediavistik und Renaissance-Forschung, 29;
Munich, 1978).
4. Gerbert may have taught less intensively during his second period at Reims. Cf.
P. Riche, Les Ecoles et l'Enseignement dans !'Occident Chretien de La Fin du Ve Siecle au Milieu du
Xle Siecle (Paris, 1979), p. 180.
5. See Peter Abelard, Historia Calami/alum, ed. in]. T. Muckle, 'Abelard's Letter of
Consolation to a Friend (Historia Calami/alum),, Mediaeval Studies, XII (1950), r163-213],
175--6; tr. B. Radice, The Letters of Abelard and HeLoise (Harmondsworth, 1974), p. 58.
6. See B. Smalley, The Stud_y of the Bible in the Middle Ages (2nd edn., Notre Dame,
1964), pp. 83-4.
7. See E. A. Moody, Truth and Consequence in Medieual Logic (Amsterdam, 1952),
220 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

pp. 1-3. On the difficulties experienced by early twelfth-century scholars in disentangl-

ing logic and grammar, see R. W. Hunt, 'Studies in Priscian in the Eleventh and
Twelfth Centuries', Mediaeval and Renai~sance Studies, I (1941-3), 214-23.
8. Seej. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre: Logic, Theology and
Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981), p. 16; cf. L. Minio-Paluello,
'N uovi impulsi allo studio della logica: Ia seconda fase della riscoperta di Aris totele e di
Boezio', in La Scuola nell' Occidente Latino dell' Alto Medioevo, n (Settimane di studio del
Centro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto Medioevo, XIX, Spoleto, 1972), pp. [743-66]747-8.
In what follows, I rely heavily on this lucid article which supplements the earlier
standard account by A. van de Vyver, 'Les Etapes du Developpement Philosophique
du Haut Moyen-Age', Revue Beige de Philologie et d'Histoire, VII ( 1929), 425-52.
9. See Minio-Paluello, 'Nuovi impulsi', pp. 753-4. The vulgate text of the literal
translation of the Categories was a composite of a polished version by Boethius and
what was probably an earlier version by him, see Minio-Paluello, Aristoteles Latinus, I
1-5, Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, pp. x-xi, xxi.
10. See H. Chadwick, Boethius, the Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosopky
(Oxford, 1981), pp. 167, 173.
II. See Minio-Paluello, 'Nuovi impulsi', p. 751; Chadwick, Boethius, the Consolations,
pp. 255-6. Cf. 0. Lowry, 'Boethian Logic in the Medieval West', in M. Gibson, ed.,
Boethius, his Life, Thought and Influence (Oxford, 1981), pp. 95-6.
12. See Minio-Paluello, 'Nuovi impulsi', pp. 751-4.
13. Ibid., p. 760 and see A. van de Vyver, Abbonis Floriacensis Opera Inedita:
Syllogismorum Categoricorum et Hypotheticorum Enodatio (Bruges, 1966).
14. See Minio-Paluello, 'Nuovi impulsi', p. 765.
15. See the analysis of sources of Abelard's independent textbook of logic, the
Dialectica, in Petrus Abaelardus, Dialectica, ed. L. M. de Rijk (2nd edn, Assen, 1970).
pp. xiv-xviii. These include all the Boethian commentaries and independent treatises,
besides the texts of the Isagoge, the Categories (in the composite literal version) and the
De Interpretatione.
16. The intense interest in the new or less familiar texts of the Organon at this time
resulted in new versions even of those translated by Boethius; see Minio-Paluello,
'Nuovi impulsi', pp. 749-50.
17. See de Rijk, Petrus Abaelardus, pp. xvii-xviii, on Abelard. For the text of Adam of
Balsham's Ars Disserendi see L. Minio-Paluello, Twelfth Century Logic, I (Rome, 1956).
Cf. L. Minio-Paluello 'The Ars Disserendi of Adam of Balsham "Parvipontanus" ',
Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies, III ( 1954), 116-69; Lowry, 'Boethian Logic', in Gibson,
ed., Boethius, pp. 111-12.
18. For an outline of the Heptateuchon, which now survives only on microfilm, see
Gibson, ed., Boethius, pp. 108-9. Cf. A Clerval, Les £coles de Chartres (Paris, 1895),
pp. 220--48. For John of Salisbury's understanding, see Metalogicon, 11. 3; tr. D. D.
McGarry, The Metalogicon ofJohn of Salisbury. A Twelfth Century Difense of the Verbal and
Logical Arts of the Trivium (Berkeley; Los Angeles, 1962), p. 78.John ofSalisbury was
avant-garde in this respect. The absorption of the new logic into the educational syllabus
was gradual. The Posterior Analytics in particular caused difficulty. See L. Minio-
Paluello, 'Jacobus Veneticus Grecus, Canonist and Translator of Aristotle', Traditio,
VIII (1952), (26.'}-304] 267, 270 n. 13.
19. See A. C. Lloyd, 'Nco-platonic Logic and Aristotelian Logic', Phronesis, I
(1955-6), 58-72, 146-59, especially pp. 155-7.
20. Porphyry, Isagoge, I 10--14, in Aristoteles Latinus, 16-7, Categoriarum Supplementa,
eds L. Minio-Paluello and B. G. Dods (Bruges; Paris, 1966), p. 5.
21. Boethius, In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta, editio secunda, at I 10--11, ed. S. Brandt
(CSEL, XLVIII; 1906), pp. 159-67.
22. Metalogicon, 11. 17; McGarry, The Metalogicon, p. 112.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 221
23. Historia Calamitatum, edition cited inn. 5 above, 178; Radice, Letters of Abelard and
Heloise, p. 60.
24. The Logica 'Ingredientibus' is edited in B. Geyer, Peter Abelards Philosophische
Schrifien (BGPMA, vol. xxi, Parts 1-4; Munster, 1919-33), to which there is an
addendum in Minio-Paluello, Twelfth Century Logic, n (Rome, 1958), pp. 1-108. The
commentary on De Differentiis Topicis edited in M. dal Pra,Pietro Abelardo Scritti Filosofici
(Rome; Milan, 1954), is probably also to be grouped with theLogica 'lngredientibus'
which may have been intended also to include commentaries on the other Boethian
independent treatises. The Logica 'Nostrorum Petitioni Sociorum' is edited in Geyer,
Abelards Philosophische Schriften, 505-80. Several lesser works, called lntroductiones
Parvulorum, are edited in dal Pra, Pietro Abelardo.
25. M. M. Tweedale, Abailard on Universals (Amsterdam; New York; Oxford, 1976),
is a convenient source of reference to his texts on this problem.
26. On Abelard's varying terminology see B. Stock, The Implications of Literacy.
Written Language and Models of Interpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton,
1983), p. 394, n. 340.
27. Cf. Tweedale, Abailard on Universals, p. 185.
28. Metalogicon, IV. 35; McGarry, The Metalogicon, p. 259.
29. See ibid., p. 260; cf. ibid., n. 17, pp. 113-14.
30. SeeN. Haring, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers (Toronto, 1966),
pp. 80-90, 100. Gilbert, who became bishop of Poi tiers in 1142, was tried before the
council of Reims ( 1148) over theological implications of his theory but managed to
clear himself.
31. Metalogicon, II. 17; McGarry, The Metalogicon, p. 115.
32. On Peter Damian's attitude to secular learning, see Riche, Les Ecoles,
pp. 339-43.
33. R. W. Southern, 'Lanfranc of Bee and Berengar of Tours' in Studies in Medieval
History presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke, eds R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pantin, R. W.
Southern, (Oxford, 1948), pp. 27-48, describes the methods of the participants. M.
Gibson, Larifranc of Bee (Oxford, 1978), describes the dispute against its historical and
theological background. See also, J. de Montclos, Larifranc et Birenger, Ia Controverse
Eucharistique du Xle Siecle (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Etudes et Documents, 37;
Louvain, 1971).
34. The philosophical terminology was still uncertain, see Southern, 'Lanfranc of
Bee', pp. 40-1; cf., Gibson, Lanfranc of Bee, pp. 89-91.
35. See Smalley, Study of the Bible, pp. 47-8.
36. The details of Anselm's biography are known from the Vita Anselmi written by his
friend Eadmer, a monk of Canterbury. The standard secondary account is R. W.
Southern, St. Anselm and his Biographer (Cambridge, 1960).
37. See ibid., p. 51.
38. M onologion, I; translated in Anselm of Canterbury, M onologion, Proslogion, Debate with
Guanilo and Meditation on Human Redemption, tr. and ed. J. Hopkins and H. Richardson
(London, 1974), p. 5.
39. Ibid.; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 6.
40. Ibid., m; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 6.
41. St Anselm dealt with the topic again in connection with the status of evil in his De
Casu Diaboli ('On the Devil's Fall'), written about a decade later.
42. Monologion, xv; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 24.
43. Ibid., xxvn; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 42.
44. Ibid., XXVI; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 41. For Boethius' use of'supersubs-
tance' see De Trinitate, IV, inBoethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, eds H. F. Stewart and
E. K. Rand (Loeb edn; London; Cambridge, Mass., repr 1953), pp. 1&-17. However,
he also used the term 'substance' as peculiarly appropriate to God, ibid., pp. 1&-17. On
222 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

the terminological contradiction see Marenbon, From the Circle rif Alcuin, pp. 28--9.
45. St Anselm, Monologion, xxv1; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 41.
46. Boethius, Contra Eutychen, m; Stewart and Rand, Boethius, pp. 84-5.
47. St Anselm, Monologion, LXXIX; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 85.
48. Ibid., Lxxx; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 85. 'Therefore it seems- or rather it
is unhesitatingly affirmed- that this Being which we call God is not nothing.'
49. Ibid., Preface; Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 3.
50. Ibid., Hopkins and Richardson edn, p. 5.
51. 'The demonstrations of reason are in varying degrees provisional.' Southern, St
Anselm, p. 56.
52. Proslogion, 1; translated in E. R. Fairweather, A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to
Ockham (The Library of Christian Classics, x; Philadelphia, 1956), p. 73. St Anselm's
quotation follows St Augustine's preferred reading oflsaiah, vii. 9, from a pre-Vulgate
translation of the Bible.
53. SeeK. Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens lntellectum (London, 1960).
54. See Southern, St. Anselm, pp. 23-5, 58, and also his 'Lanfranc of Bee and
Berengar of Tours', 46.
55. This aspect of St Augustine's thought, with its implications for St Anselm's
argument, is examined inj. F. Callahan, Augustine and the Greek Philosophers (Villanova,
1967), pp. 1-47.
56. Cf. above, pp. 47-8.
57. See Hopkins and Richardson, Anselm rif Canterbury, pp. 115-20, 123--34.
58. For suggestions as to St Anselm's intention here, see G. R. Evans, Anselm and
Talking about God (Oxford, 1978), p. 67.
59. The lreatise is translated in R. McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers, 1
(New York; Chicago; Atlanta; San Francisco; Dallas, 1929), pp. 150--84.
60. Cf. Evans, Anselm and Talking about God, p. 7.
61. See Southern, St Anselm and his Biographer, pp. 82-3.
62. See ibid., pp. 85-91.
63. See ibid., pp. 203--26. St Anselm's influence and the change from the monastic to
the cathedral scene are the subject of G. R. Evans, Anselm and a New Generation (Oxford,
1980).
64. The collected edition of Abelard's works is Opera Petri Abaelardi, ed. V. Cousin (2
vols; Paris, 1849-50). The texts mentioned are available in individual editions, as
follows: Peter Abaelards Theologia 'Summi Boni', ed. H. Ostlender (BGPMA, xxxv, 2-3;
Miinster, 1939); Petri Abaelardi Opera Theologica, ed. F. M. Buytaert (Corpus Christ-
ianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis, XI-xn; Turnhout, 1969) contains the 'Commen-
taryon Romans' (CCCM, XI) and the Theologia Christiana and the shorter versions of the
Theologia 'Scholarium' (CCCM, xn); Peter Abailard, Sic et Non, A Critical Edition, ed. B. B.
Boyer and R. McKeon (Chicago; London, 1976--7); The Ethics rif Peter Abelard, ed. and
tr. D. E. Luscombe (Oxford, 1971 ); Petrus Abaelardus, Dialogus inter Philosophum,Judaeum
et Christianum, ed. R. Thomas (Stuttgart; Bad Cannstatt, 1970) and Peter Abelard. A
Dialogue rif a Philosopher with a Jew, and a Christian tr. P. J. Payer (Toronto, 1979).
65. See D. E. Luscombe, The School rif Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 103--42.
E. M. Buytaert, 'The Anonymous Capitula Haeresum Petri Abelardi and the Synod of
Sens, 1140', Antonianum, XLIII (1968), 419-60, reviews some of the textual problems.
66. Epistola, xvn, 375c; Radice, Letters rif Abelard and Heloise, p. 270.
67. Dialectica IV. I (prologue); ed. de Rijk, pp. 469-70.
68. SeeR. E. Weingart, The Logic of Divine Love. A Critical Anafysis rifthe Soteriology of
Peter Abailard (Oxford, 1970), pp. 13, 16.
69. St Augustine, De Civitate Dei, vm. 9-12.
70. See Weingart, Logic of Divine Love, p. 14.
71. See ibid., pp. 38--9.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 3 223
72. On the medieval use of the maxim, see P. Courcelle, ' "Nosce teipsum" du
Bas-Empire au Haut Moyen-Age. L'heritage profane et les developpements chretiens',
II Passaggio dall 'Antichita al Medioevo in Occidente (Settimana di studio del Centro Italiano
di Studi sui!' Alto Medioevo, IX, Spoleto, 1962), 265-95, and also Courcelle's Connais
Toi-Meme de Socrate a saint Bernard (Etudes Augustiniennes, 3 vols, Paris, 1974-5). See
also The Ethics, ed. Luscombe, p. xxxi, n. 2.
73. See Luscombe, The School, pp. 130-2, 139.
74. Abelard however did not advocate the abolition of the canonical penances
themselves, which he saw as a safeguard against arbitrary decisions on the part of the
confessor. See D. E. Luscombe, 'The Ethics of Abelard: Some Further Considerations'
in E. M. Buytaert (ed.), Peter Abelard. Proceedings of the International Conference Louvain May
10-12, 1971 (Louvain, the Hague, 1974), pp. [65-84], 83-4.
75. This has been studied by 0. Lottin,Psychologie et Morale aux X lie et X life Siecles, n
(Louvain; Gembloux, 1948), especially pp. 421-89.
76. Abelard, Sic et Non, eds Boyer and McKeon, p. 103.
77. Ibid., p. 96.
78. The argument is developed at length in Theologia Christiana, v, ed. Buytaert (see
n. 64above), xii, 347-72. For the critical reaction, see Luscombe, The School, pp. 134-6.
79. See Weingart, Logic of Divine Love, pp. 83-4.
80. See ibid., p. 88.
81. See ibid., pp. 71, 93,202.
82. On the critical reaction to Abelard's soteriology, see Luscombe, The School,
pp. 137-9.
83. See Weingart, Logic qf Divine Love, pp. 74-8, 202.
84. Abelard, Commentarium in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos, IV (1x. 21); ed. Buytaert (see
n. 64 above), xi, 240.
85. Such is the view of the 'Sentences of Hermann', see Luscombe, The School,
pp. 162-3. The anonymous Senten tie Parisienses I are more faithful to Abelard's written
position but show some wavering, see The School, p. 167. For other echoes of the
dilemma, see The School, p. I 71.
86. Abelard, Historia Calamitatum, edition cited inn. 5 above, 192; Radice, Leiters qf
Abelard and Heloise, p. 78.
87. See Weingart, Logic qf Divine Love, p. 3.
88. A careful discussion of the affinities of the Didascalicon and original features of the
work is found in The Didascalicon qf Hugh qf St Victor, tr.J. Taylor (New York; London,
1961), pp. 28--36.
89. The modification is the distinction oflogic as a fourth branch. For the sources of
Hugh's schema, see ibid., pp. 161-2 (note 21 ).
90. See ibid., p. 8.
91. The work is edited in Migne, PL, cLxxvi, cols 173-618.
92. Ibid., cols 214-15 (DeSacramentis 1. 2. 22). Cf. Luscombe, The School, pp. 190-1.
For a general comparison of the thought of Abelard and Hugh, see The School,
pp. 183-97.
93. De Sacramentis, 1. 3. 21, 26-9; Migne, PL, CLXXVI, cols 225, 227-31.
94. SeeM. Th. d'Alverny, 'Achard de Saint-Victor, De Trinitate, de Unitate et
Pluralitate Creaturarum', Recherches de Thtologie Ancienne et Medievale, XXI ( 1954),
299--306 and J. Ribaillier, Richard de Saint Victor, De Trinitate. Texte critique avec
introduction, notes et tables (Textes philosophiques du moyen age, vi; Paris, 1958),
pp. 27-33.
95. De Trinitate, Prologue (890 D). For a Latin text with French translation, see G.
Salet, Richard de Saint- Victor, La Trinite (Sources Chretiennes, 63; Paris, 1959). The
passage quoted is on, p. 58.
96. De Trinitate, 1. I; Salet, La Trinite, pp. 64-5.
224 NOTES TO CHAPTERS ~

97. Ibid., 3; pp. 68-9.

98. Ibid., 4; pp. 70-1.
99. Ibid., 8; pp. 78-9.
100. Ibid., IV. 21-2; pp. 278-83. On the significance of the definition, see Salet, La
Triniti, pp. 487-9.
101. Walter of St Victor, Contra Quatuor La~yrinthos Franciae, ed. P. Glorieux,
AHDLMA, XIX (1952), 187-335.
102. Cf. Smalley, Study rif the Bible, p. l 05.
103. Chalcidius translated the Greek word for matter (hyle- meaning also 'wood') as
silva ('wood'). Thus, in the twelfth century, matter- the principle organised by form-
was variously referred to as hyle, the transliteration of the Greek also found in
Chalcidius, silva and materia.
104. See Guillaume de Conches, Glosae super Platonem, ed. E. Jeauneau (Textes
Philosophiques du Moyen Age, 13; Paris, 1965), p. 211.
105. The treatise known in the middle ages as De Hebdomadibus, edited by Stewart
and Rand, Boethius, pp. 38-51.
106. The glosses ofThierry and Clarembald have been edited by N. M. Haring, for
which see the Bibliography. For William of Conches' glosses on the Timaeus, see
Jeauneau, Guillaume de Conches; for his glosses on Boethius' Consolation, see). M. Parent,
La Doctrine de Ia Creation dans !'Ecole de Chartres (Publications de I'Institut d'Etudes
Medievales; Paris and Ottawa, 1938). William's Philosophy rif the World (De Philosophia
Mundi) is printed in Migne,PL, CLXXII, 39-102, as a work ofHonorius Augustodunensis;
also ibid., xc, as a work of Bed e. There is a modern edition of the first book, ed. G.
Maurach (Leiden, 1974 ). On Bernard Silvestris, see Bernard Silvestris, Cosmographia, ed.
P. Dronke (Leiden, 1978) The Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris, trans. W. Wetherbee
(New York; London, 1973), B. Stock, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Centu~y, a Study rif
Bernard Silvester (Princeton, 1972), and for the wider literary context, W. Wetherbee,
Platonism and Poet~y in the Twelfth Centu~y, the Literary bifluence rif the School rif Chartres
(Princeton, 1972).
107. Migne, PL, CLXXII, 43.
108. Ibid., 46. On William's difficulties with the 'World Soul' and his changing views
about it, see R. W. Southern, Platonism, Scholastic Method and the School rif Chartres (The
Stenton Lecture, 1978; University of Reading, 1979) pp. 21-4.
109. See R. McKeon, 'Medicine and Philosophy in the Eleventh and Twelfth
Centuries', The Thomist, XXIV (!961), 211-56. Cf. T. Silverstein, 'Guillaume de Conches
and Nemesius ofEmesa',H. A. Woifsonjubilee Volume Uerusalem, 1965), 11, 719-34.
110. See R. W. Southern, Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford, 1970),
pp. 61-86.
Ill. See ibid., p. 78.

4. NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS

l. On the isolation of philosophy in Islamic culture, see F. E. Peters, Aristotle and the
Arabs: the Aristotelian Tradition in Islam (New York; London, 1968), pp. 71-5.
2. For the issues involved, see above, p. 63.
3. In what follows, I am much indebted to Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs, as also to his
Aristoteles Arabus (Leiden, 1968), M. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy (New York;
London, 1970) and R. Walzer, Greek into Arabic, Essays on Islamic Philosophy (London,
1962).
4. On this aspect, see especially, G. C. Anawati, 'Le neoplatonisme dans Ia pensee
musulmane: etat actuel des recherches', in Plotino e it Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente
(Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei; Rome, 1974), pp. 339-405.
5. According to the different views, the work may have been compiled at Baghdad in
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 225
the ninth or tenth century or not until the twelfth century in Moslem Spain. The former
view is now more generally favoured. Cf. ibid., pp. 352-60.
6. De Generatione Animalium 11. 3; 736" 27 ff.
7. See A. Nagy, 'Die philosophischen Abhandlungen des Ja'qub ben Ishaq
Al-Kindi', BGPMA, n, Part v (Munster, 1897).
8. There were two medieval Latin translations, of which one was by Gerard of
Cremona. Both are printed in ibid., pp. 1-11.
9. AI Kindi's treatment is discussed by E. Gilson, 'Les sources greco-arabes de
l'augustinisme avicennisant', AHDLMA, IV (1929-30), [5-149], 22-6.
10. The Latin text of AI Farabi's treatise is edited with a French translation in ibid.,
10~ I and discussed in pp. 27-38.
II. Cf. R. Walzer, 'Early Islamic Philosophy', CHLGEMP, pp. 643-69, at p. 663.
12. Cf. S. M. Afnan, Avicenna, his Life and Works (London, 1958), p. 118; A.-M.
Goichon, La Philosophie d'Avicenne et son Irifluence en Europe Midievale (2nd edn; Paris,
1979), pp. 22-7.
13. Cf. Afnan, Avicenna, pp. 121-2.
14. Cf. ibid., pp. 13~2; Coichon, La Philosophie d'Avicenne, p. 22-6.
15. Cf. Afnan, Avicenna, pp. 172-3.
16. Cf. Goichon, La Philosophie d'Avicenne, pp. 47-8; G. Verbeke, 'Introduction sur Ia
Doctrine Psychologique d' Avicenne' inS. van Riet (ed.), Avicenna Latin us, Liber de Anima
seu Sextus de Naturalibus, Iv-v (Lou vain; Leiden, 1968), pp. [I* -73*], 40* -I*.
17. For the central discussion of this see Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Anima, part v,
Ch. 4; ibid., pp. 113-26.
18. Cf. Verbeke, 'Introduction'; ibid., p. 31*.
19. Cf. Fakhry, History rif Islamic Philosophy, pp. 238-9.
20. Cf. ibid., pp. 244-61.
21. Cf. below, pp. 135-6.
22. See Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs, pp. 16&-7.
23. On the history of Averroes' commentaries, see H. A. Wolfson, 'Revised Plan for
Publication of a Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem', Speculum, XXXVIII (1963),
88-104.
24. For an interesting discussion of this, see F. C. Copleston, A History rif Medieval
Philosophy (London, 1972), p. 124.
25. See M. Fakhry, 'Philosophy and Scripture in the Theology of Averroes',
Mediaeval Studies, (1968), 78-89.
26. SeeS. Pines, tr., Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (Chicago; London,
1963), p. lx.
27. Two Latin versions- one by Gerard of Cremona, the other an abridgement
probably of an independent translation- are edited inJ. T. Muckle, 'Isaaclsraeli,Liber
de Difinicionibus', AHDLMA, XI (1937-8), 299-340.
28. A detailed analysis of this doctrine and of the confusions implicit in it is found in
J. Schlanger, La Philosophie de Salomon ibn Gabirol, Etude d'un Nioplatonisme (Leiden,
1968), Ch. viii.
29. See C. Baeumker, ed., 'Avencebrolis (Ibn Gabirol), Fons Vitae ex Arabico in Latinum
translatus ab Iohanne Hispano et Dominica Gundissalino', BGP MA, vol. 1, Part 2 (Munster,
1892) (containing Books 1-m of the Fountain of Life) and Parts 3-4 (Munster, 1895)
(containing Books Iv-v of the same). The passages quoted are respectively from Fons
Vitaei.2,Baeumkeredn,p. 4,11. 14-15;L5,p. 7,11. 14-15;m.57,p. 205,1. 23;v.37-8,
p. 326, ii. 1-7; v. 39, p. 327, II. 14-17.
30. See Guide, III. 51; Pines, Moses Maimonides, pp. 618-22 and cf. also pp. cxvi-cxvii.
31. Ibid., III. 54; p. 635.
32. Ibid.,!!. 74; p. 221. Cf. Pines, Moses Maimonides, p. ciii.
33. Cf. above, p. 90. The fundamental account of James' activity is L. Minio-
226 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

Paluello, 'lacobus Veneticus Grecus, Canonist and Translator of Aristotle', Traditio,

VIII (1952), 26.:r-304.
34. Only Books I-III and part of Book IV survive.
35. See Minio-Paluello, 'lacobus Veneticus Grecus', p. 265, n. 2. Cf. also his 'Note
sull' Aristotele Iatino medievale', Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, XLII (1950), 222-31.
36. For a survey ofGrosseteste's career, translations and writings, seeJ. McEvoy,
The Philosophy rif Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 1982), especially, as regards the present,
pp. 8-11,21-4,69-123.
37. See L. Minio-Paluello, 'Aristotele dal Mondo Arabo a quello Latino' in
L'Occidente e /'Islam nell'Alto Medioevo (Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi
sull' Alto Medioevo, xu, 2-8 aprile 1964; Spoleto, 1965), pp. [603--37), 632-3.
38. The Latin text of this dedicatory letter is printed in S. van Riet, ed., Avicenna
Latinus, Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus I-II-III (Louvain; Leiden, 1972),
pp. 103*-4*.
39. Cf. ibid., pp. 98*-IOO*; L. Thorndike, 'John of Seville', Speculum, XXXIV (1959),
20-38. For argument that Avendauth should be identified with the contemporary
savant and author Abraham ibn Daud, seeM. T. d' Alverny, 'Avendauth?', Homenaje a
Millas-Vallicrosa, I (Barcelona, 1954), 19-43, 3.:r-8.
40. SeeS. van Riet (ed.), Avicenna Latinus, Liber de Philosophia Prima sive Scientia Divina
I-IV (Louvain; Leiden, 1977).
41. On this, see D. Salman, 'Aigazel et les Latins',AHDLMA, x (193.:r-6), 103--27;J.
T. Muckle (ed.), A/gaze/'s Metaphysics, A Mediaeval Translation (Toronto, 1933); C. H.
Lohr, 'Logica Algazelis. Introduction and Critical Text', Traditio, XXI ( 1965), 223--90.
42. See Gilson, 'Les sources greco-arabes', 80, and his 'Avicenne en Occident au
Moyen Age', AHDLMA, xxxv1 (1969), [89-121), 99-100. One psychological treatise,
entitled De Anima, is edited by J. T. Muckle, Mediaeval Studies, II (1940), 23--103.
Another, De Immortalitate Animae, is edited by G. BUlow (BGPMA, vol II, Part 3;
Munster, 1897).
43. Cf. Nagy, 'Die philosophischen Abhandlungen'. On the techniques ofGundis-
salvi and Gerard see M. A. Alonso, 'Traducciones del Arcediano Gundisalvo',
Al-Andalus, xu (1947), [29.:r-338), 308--15.
44. See Minio-Paluello, 'Aristotele dal Mondo Arabo', pp. 612-13.
45. The numbers of surviving manuscripts for the several translations of the
Metaphysics are as follows: James of Venice (original), 5; James of Venice (revised,
c. 1220-30), 41; 'middle Metaphysics', 24; Michael the Scot, 126; William of
Moerbeke, 217. These figures are taken from the calculations by B. G. Dod, tabulated
in The Cambridge History rif Later Medieval Philosophy, eds N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny andJ.
Pin borg (Cambridge, 1982), p. 77, and see pp. 74-9 for the circulation of other texts.
Surviving manuscripts are surveyed in Aristoteles Latinus, Codices, Pars Prior & Pars
Posterior, eds G. Lacombeet al. (Rome, 1939-Cambridge, 1955), and in the editions of
individual texts within the series.
46. A minor treatise of Averroes, De substantia orbis (On the substance of the globe),
being an analysis of Aristotelian physics, was available from about 1230-1.
47. The following account draws on A. B. Cobban, The Medieval Universities, their
Development and Organization (London, 197 5), and on the classic study, H. Rashdall, The
Universities rif Europe in the Middle Ages, eds F. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, 3 vols
(Oxford, 1936).
48. See Cobban, The Medieval Universities, p. 116.
49. Imerius' role as a teacher of civil law at Bologna may have been paralleled by
Gratian in canon law. But the evidence for Gratian's career is slight and it is not certain
that he taught. See J. T. Noonan, 'Gratian Slept Here: the Changing Identity of the
Father of the Systematic Study of Canon Law', Traditio, xxxv (1979) 14.:r-72.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5 227

5. ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY - THE FIRST PHASE OF

ASSIMILATION

I. On the history of this question, see the important study by D. A. Callus, 'The
origins of the problem of the unity of form', The Thomist, XXIV (1961), 120-49. Cf. 0.
Lottin, 'La pluralite des formes substantielles avant saint Thomas d'Aquin. Quelques
documents nouveaux', Revue neo-scolastique de philosophie, xxx1v (1932), 449-67.
2. See D. H. Salman, 'Note sur Ia premiere influenced' Averroes' ,Revue neo-scolastique
de philosophie, XL (1937), 203-12, and his, 'Jean de Ia Rochelle et les debuts de
l'Averroisme latin', AHDLMA, xv1 (1948), [133-44), 133-4; R. Miller, 'An aspect of
Averroes' influence on St Albert', Mediaeval Studies, XVI (1954), 57-71, 61-2.
3. See D. A. Callus, 'The powers of the soul, an early unpublished text',Recherches de
Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, XIX (1952), 131-70 and R. Gauthier, 'Le cours sur
l'Ethica nova d'un maitre es arts de Paris (123~1240)', AHDLMA, XLII (1975),
[71-141), 80--5.
4. In this regard, Salman, 'Jean de Ia Rochelle', 144, seems to me very just:
'Les esprits de ce temps et de ce milieu sont rigoreusement impermeables aux erreurs
d'Averroes, que leur mentalite irremediablement latine et chretienne ne leur permet-
trait meme pas de concevoir. lis ne peuvent toucher une these ou un texte sans aussitot
les transposer selon des categories augustino-chretiennes .... Et c'est en fonction de
cette puissante mais aveugle faculte d'assimilation qu'il faut comprendre Ia premiere
influence d'Averroes dans le moyen age latin.'
5. For further details see F. van Steenberghen, La Philosophie auXI!Ie Siecle (Louvain;
Paris, 1966), pp. 88--91 and citations there.
6. The full text is printed in H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, Chart. Univ. Par., 1 (Paris,
1889), 70, no. II. For a translation, see L. Thorndike, University Records and Life in the
Middle Ages (New York, 1944; repr. 1971), pp. 26-7.
7. Chart. Univ. Par., 1, 78--9, no. 20. Cf. Thorndike, University Records, pp. 27-30.
8. Chart. Univ. Par., 1, 129-31, no. 72. Cf. Thorndike, University Records, pp. 32-5.
9. Cf. van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au Xllle Siecle, pp. 94-6.
10. The document, preserved in a Barcelona manuscript, was first studied by M.
Grabmann, 'Eine ftir Examinazwecke abgefasste Quaestionensammlung der Pariser
Artistenfakultiit aus der ersten Hiilfte des 13 Jahrhunderts', Revue neo-scolastique de
philosophie, xxxv1 (1934), 211-29. For a recent review with notices of subsequent
publications, see van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au XIlle Siecle, pp. 119-31
II. See Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales, ed. I. M. Bochenski (Turin, 1947); Peter rif
Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises, tr. j. P. Mullally, with
an introduction by J.P. Mullally and R. Houde (Milwaukee, Wise., 1964).
12. See 0. Lottin, 'Psychologie et Morale a Ia Faculte des Arts de Paris aux
approches de 1250' in his Psychologie et Morale au Xlle et XIJle Siecles, 1 (Louvain;
Gembloux, 1942), 50~34.
13. See Gauthier, 'Lecours sur l'Ethica'.
14. Ibid., 77-8.
15. In 1231 Gregory IX commissioned the abbot of St Victor and the prior of
Saint-Jacques to absolve those who· had incurred excommunication on this account.
Chart. Univ. Par., 1, 143, no. 86.
16. Ibid., 136-9, no. 79, and 143-4, no. 87; Thorndike, University Records, pp. 38--40.
For discussion, see van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au XIlle Siecle, pp. 106-9.
17. Chart. Univ. Par., 1, 18~, no. 149.
18. Ibid., 427, no. 384. See van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au XJJie Siecle, p. 146.
19. For this suggestion, see van Steenberghen, p. 137.
228 NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

20. See T. Crowley, Roger Bacon. The Problem if the Soul in his Philosophical Commentaries
(Louvain; Dublin, 1950), pp. 73-4; D. E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the
Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1930), pp. 151-71.
21. Chart. Univ. Par., I, 227-30, no. 201, for the 1252 statute, 277-9, no. 246, for that
of 1255. Cf. Thorndike, University Records, pp. 52-6 and 64-6, respectively. For
discussion, see van Steenberghen, La Philosophic au XII/e Siecle, pp. 357-60.
22. See Crowley, Roger Bacon, pp. 19--25.
23. See D. A. Callus, 'The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul' in Autour d'Aristote.
Recueil d'Etudes de Philosophie Ancienne et Mediivale riffert ii Monseigneur A. Mansion
(Louvain, 1955), pp. [471-95], 481. The treatise is edited by D. A. Callus and R. W.
Hunt, Johannes Blund Tractatus de Anima (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, 2; London,
1970).
24. See D. A. Callus, 'Introduction of Aristotelian learning to Oxford', Proceedings of
the British Academy, XXIX ( 1943) [229--81], 258--9; cf. van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au
X/lie Siecle, pp. 176--7.
25. See Callus, 'Introduction', 262-3; cf. Crowley, Roger Bacon, pp. 27-8;]. M.G.
Hackett, 'The Attitude of Roger Bacon to the Sci entia of Albertus Magnus', in Alberius
Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed. J. A. Weisheipl (Toronto, 1980),
pp. [53-72], 70--1.
26. See above, p. 133.
27. See]. McEvoy, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 1982), pp. 8--9.
28. See ibid., pp. 268 If.
29. See ibid., pp. 346--50.
30. See ibid., pp. 230--1.
31. See ibid., pp. 152-5, 158--62, 165, 181.
32. See ibid., pp. 180--2, 186--7.
33. On Grosseteste's concept of God as a mathematician, see ibid., pp. 168--80.
34. See C. Ottaviano, Guglielmo d'Auxerre (t 1231) Ia Vita, le Opere, il Pensiero (Rome
[ 1929]), pp. 58--9.
35. See ibid., p. 61.
36. See ibid., p. 78.
37. The discussion of this point is found in a section which links the subject of Book I
with that of Book II: fos 36v-37v in the sixteenth-century edition ofF. Regnault, Guilelmi
Antissiodorensis Aurea in quattuor Sententiarum Libras perlucida Explanatio (Paris, n.d.).
38. Ibid., Book II, tractate vii, cap. i, fo. 56r.
39. Ibid., and cap. ii, fos 56v-58'.
40. 'Aristotle says that the soul is in a certain respect all things since the images of all
things come to be impressed on the soul.' Ibid., tractate v, cap. i, fo. 51v(a).
41. See L. W. Keeler, Ex Summa Philippi Cancellarii Quaestiones de Anima (Munster,
1937), p. 8.
42. Ibid., pp. 28--39.
43. Ibid., pp. 32-3.
44. Ibid., p. 39. The editor notes that in fact Augustine is not hesitant but takes the
view that there is one soul with several powers.
45. A. Masnovo, Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a San Tomaso d'Aquino (3 vols; Milan,
1930--45) draws heavily on these sections and contains an illuminating account of
William's outlook.
46. See E. A. Moody, 'William of Auvergne and his Treatise De Anima', in his Studies
in Medieval Philosophy, Science and Logic. Collected Papers 1939-1969 (Berkeley; Los Angeles;
London, 1975), pp. [1-109], 9.
47. See ibid., p. 12.
48. See R. de Vaux, 'La Premiere Entree d'Averroes chez les Latins', Revue des
Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, XXII (1933), pp. [193-245], 235.
 NOTES TO CHAPTERS .'Hi 229
49. See Moody, 'William of Auvergne', p. 12.
50. See ibid., p. 27.
51. See ibid., pp. 37-8.
52. See ibid., pp. 55, 78.
53. See ibid., p. 28.
54. See ibid., pp. 28-31.
55. See ibid., pp. 32, 34.
56. See ibid., pp. 68-9.
57. See ibid., p. 70.
58. See Masnovo, Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a San Tomaso d'Aquino, pp. 133-52.
59. See ibid., pp. 136-7.
60. See ibid., p. 139.
61. See de Vaux, 'La Premiere Entree', 234-5.
62. See van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au Xl/Ie Siecle, pp. 16H.
63. See Salman, 'Jean de Ia Rochelle', 135-7.
64. Ibid., 143-4.

6. ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY - SYSTEM BUILDING AND

CONTROVERSY

I. 2. 9; Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, with an Introduction, Translation and Commentary, ed.

P. Boehner (Works of St Bonaventure, vol. 2; New York, 1956), p. 57.
2. Ibid., pp. 57-9.
3. Ibid., 3. 3; p. 65.
4. Ibid., p. 67.
5. Ibid., 7; p. 71.
6. Ibid., 5. 3; p. 81.
7. Commentary on the Sentences 1. 8. I. I. 2; Opera Omnia (Quaracchi, 1882), 154; 4.
Collations on the Six Days, v. 31; tr. J. de Vinck (The Works rif Bonaventure, vol. 5; Paterson,
New jersey, 1970), p. 91.
8. S. Bonaventurae, Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana Quaedam Selecta, ed. F.
Delorme (Quaracchi, 1934), p. 275.
9. Collation II. 25; Opera Omnia, V (Quaracchi, 1891) 514(b).
10. Collation VII. 17-18; ibid., 492-3.
II. Collation VIII. 16-20; ibid., 497-8.
12. 1. 16; tr. de Vinck, p. 9.
J3. VII 2; p. JJQ.
14. Ibid ..
15. Ibid.
16. XIX. II; p. 289.
17. Ibid., 12; p. 290.
18. For a comprehensive review, see J. F. Quinn, The Historical Constitution rif St
Bonaventure's Philosophy (Toronto, 1973), pp. 17-99.
19. A point well made in D. A. Callus, The Condemnation rifSt Thomas at Oxford (The
Aquinas Society of London, Aquinas Paper No. 5; Blackfriars, Oxford, 1955), where it
is cautioned that Augustinians and Aristotelians ought not be be regarded as rigid
classifications.
20. By Quinn, Historical Constitution.
21. See ibid., p. 370.
22. Cf. above, pp. 22-3.
23. Cf. above, p. 48.
24. See Quinn, Historical Constitutions, pp. 620-6.
25. 'The theory of illumination and of knowledge in the eternal principles appeared
230 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

to the followers of the Augustinian tradition, such as john Peckham and Matthew of
Acquasparta, as a sacred repository which religious sentiment was passionately
concerned to protect.' E. Gilson, The Philosophy oJSt Bonaventure (Paterson, New Jersey,
1965), p. 351.
26. II, I. I. 2, Opera omnia (Quaracchi, 1885), ii, 19--24.
27. Cf., above, p. 19.
28. Bonaventure probably absorbed this doctrine through his master, Alexander of
Hales. Bonaventure seems not to refer directly to Avicebron or to the Fountain of Life.
See Quinn, Historical Constitution, p. 159, n.50.
29. For the details of this, see Gilson, Philosophy, pp. 215-16.
30. Commentary on the Sentences, II. 3. I. I. 2. Conclusion; (edition cited in n. 7
above), II, 96-8. Cf. Gilson, Philosophy, pp. 225-6.
31. Cf. above, p. 125. Although some interpreters of Bonaventure considerlightto be
the form of corporeality, this does not seem to be correct, although light is common to
bodies in Bonaventure's system. See Quinn, Historical Constitution, pp. 103-4, 113n.
32. See Quinn, Historical Constitution, pp. 305-6.
33. Collationes in Hexaemeron 4. 10. Cf. The Works of Bonaventure, tr.J. de Vinck, v. 64:
'Hence it is unsound to propose that the final form is added to prime matter without
something that is a disposition or potency towards it, or without any other intermediate
form.' 'Unsound' is too weak a translation for the word used (insanum).
34. Bonaventure interpreted Aristotle as having held a position similar to his own on
'seminal reasons'. See Commentary on the Sentences, II. 7. 2. 2. I. Conclusion, 2. 18. I. 3,
edition cited inn. 7 above, II, 198(a), 440(b).
35. Cf. above, p. 33.
36. The question is exhaustively considered by Quinn, Historical Constitution,
pp. 219-319.
37. Cf. ibid., pp. 294-308.
38. I follow here the dating suggested by J. A. Weisheipl, 'The Life and Works ofSt
Albert the Great', in his Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, Commemorative Essays 1980
(Toronto, 1980), pp. 11-51.
39. That is, for members of other than the French province of the order. See ibid.,
p. 23 and]. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, his Life, Thought and Work (New York,
1974), pp. 58-67, for the Dominican chairs at Paris.
40. An extract from this had an independent circulation under the title, Summa de
Creaturis. See Weisheipl, 'The Life and Works', p. 22.
41. There is a separate record of these disputations in his surviving Quaestiones
disputatae.
42. The view of Fr Weisheipl and broadly of Franz Pelster; see ibid., p. 27.
43. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, Chart. Univ. Par., I (Paris, 1889), 112 (no. 57).
44. On this, see E. A. Synan, 'Albertus Magnus and the Sciences', in Weisheipl,
Albertus Magnus, pp. [ 1-12], 8-9. On differing interpretations of the passage, see F. van
Steenberghen, La Philosophic au Xllle Siecle (Louvain; Paris, 1966), pp. 275-7.
45. See Synan, cited in n. 44 'above.
46. This aspect of Albert's thought has been well studied. See A. Schneider, Die
Psychologic Alberts des Crossen nach den Quellen dargestellt (BGPMA, vol. IV; Munster,
1903-6); A. C. Pegis, St Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century
(Toronto, 1934), pp. 77-120; K. Park, 'Albert's Influence on Late Medieval Psychol-
ogy', in Weisheipl, Albertus Magnus, pp. 501-35.
47. The metaphor originated with Aristotle, De Anima, 2. I (413a, 4-10), who raised
the question whether the soul might not be regarded in that way but did not pronounce
on it. It was taken up by Avicenna, unenthusiastically: see S. van Riet, ed., Avicenna
Latinus, Liber de Anima seu Sextus de Naturalibus I-l/-111 (Louvain; Leiden, 1972), I. I.
p. 34, II. 19-22.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 231
48. De Anima, 2. I. 4; ed. C. Stroick (Alberti Magni Opera. Omnia, vol. VII, Part I;
Miinster, 1968), p. 70(b).
49. Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, 2. 57.
50. Cf. Pegis, St Thomas and the Problem qf the Soul, pp. 112-13.
51. Albert uses the distinction formulated by Boethius in the treatise on being and
goodness known as De Hebdomadibus ('Quomodo substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint
cum non sint substantialia bona'), between 'being' and 'that which is', as the means to
express this composition. As Albert puts it, the 'quo est', that by virtue of which
something exists, is distinct from the 'quod est', that which is. Cf. ibid., pp. 11.'>-16.
52. See Weisheipl, 'The Life and Works', pp. 30--1, 39, 40--2.
53. On the dating of the minerology and discussion of cross-references between the
commentaries, see Albertus Magnus, Book qf Minerals, tr. D. Wyckoff (Oxford, 1967),
pp. xxxv-xli.
54. See De Unitate lntellectus, ed. A. Hufnagel (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, vol. XVII,
Part I; Miinster, 1975), pp. ix-x.
55. De Quindecim Problematibus, I; ed. B. Geyer (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, vol. XVII,
Part I; Miinster, 1975 ), p. 34(b). For argument in favour of dating this consultation to
1274-5, see F. van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant (Louvain; Paris, 1977;
Philosophes Medievaux, xxi), pp. 122-8.
56. See van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au Xl/Ie Siecle, pp. 292-300, for a review of
this question.
57. SeeR. Mcinerney, 'Albert and Thomas on Theology', in A. Zimmermann, ed.,
Albert der Grosse, seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung (Berlin; New York, 1981 ), pp. [50--60),
50-I.
58. Summa Theologiae, I. I. 4; ed. D. Siedler (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, vol. XXXIV,
Part I; Miinster, 1978), p. 15(b).
59. The following account of Aquinas' career is principally and generally indebted
to Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino. Not all Aquinas' works are detailed but mainly
those which are necessary to convey an impression of his intellectual interests and
teaching activities or to provide a basis for the discussion below of the central features of
his thought. Some treatises on special subjects which are sources for particular aspects
are introduced at the appropriate juncture in the discussion of his thought. Weisheipl
includes a full catalogue of authentic works with argument concerning their dating and
details of editions.
60. See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, pp. 34, 386.
61. See ibid., pp. 144-5.
62. On the nature of this studium, see Leonard E. Boyle, The Setting qf the Summa
theologiae of Saint Thomas (Toronto, 1982; Etienne Gilson series, 5 ), pp. 8-10.
63. The idea that Thomas spent 1267-8 at Viterbo has no basis, seeR. A. Gauthier,
'Quelques questions a propos d u com men taire de S. Thomas sur le De anima', Angelicum
Ll (1974) (419-72), 438-42.
64. See the interesting argument in Boyle, Setting qf the Summa Theologiae, pp.
11-20.
65. See ibid., p. 15.
66. In citations, these parts are often abbreviated to Ia, Ia nae, IIa IIae and ma
respectively.
67. Fora summary of the evidence, see Weisheipi,Friar Thomas D'Aquino, pp. 361-2.
68. See ibid., pp. 236--8.
69. See ibid., pp. 250--4. For criticism of the manuscript tradition which assigns these
questions to Paris, see Gauthier, 'Quelques questions', 452-3, n. 44bis.
70. See I. Brady, 'John Pecham and the Background of Aquinas' De Aeternitate
Mundi' inS/ Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies (Toronto, 1974), II, 141-78,
where Pecham's questions on the subject are edited, at 15.'>-78.
232 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

71. See F. van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism (Washington,
D.C., 1980), pp. 9--12.
72. See Weishdpl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, pp. 280--5, 316-17, for this suggestion and
for a review and dating of the commentaries. For that on the De Anima, see Gauthier,
'Quelques questions', 443-54.
73. See ibid., 452-4.
74. See ibid., 454.
75. On these, see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, pp. 254-5.
76. See ibid., pp. 332-3, 294.
77. Ibid., pp. 295-6.
78. Summa contra Gentiles, I. 10--13.
79. The question is argued in ibid., 10 and Summa Theologiae, Ia. 2. I.
80. Summa contra Gentiles, I. 3; tr. A. C. Pegis,J. F. Anderson, V.J. Bourke and C.J.
O'Neil, On the Truth of the Catholic Faith (New York, 1955-7), I, 64.
81. Ibid.; tr., 65.
82. /hid., I. 4.
83. Summa Theologiae, I a. 2. 13.
84. Summa contra Gentiles, I. 13.
85. Summa Theologiae, Ia. 2. 13.
86. Summa contra Gentiles, I. 15, where the argument is to the conclusion that God is
eternal; tr., 1, 98--9.
87. Summa Theologiae, Ia. 2. 13.
88. Ibid.; cf. Summa contra Gentiles, I. 13.
89. Ibid., I. 14; tr. 1, 96.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid., I. 15.
92. /hid., I. 16.
93. Ibid., I. 17.
94. Ibid., I. 18.
95. Ibid., I. 21-2.
96. Ibid., I. 20.
97. Ibid., I. 23.
98. !hid., I. 24-5.
99. Ibid., I. 43; cf. Summa Theologiae, Ia. 7. I.
100. Summa contra Gentiles, I. 32.
10 I. Ibid., I. 33.
102. Summa Theologiae, Ia, 13. 5.
103. In the Summa contra Gentiles the theory is not identified as such but in the Summa
Theologiae, Ia. 15. I, Aquinas says that Plato's error, for which he was criticised by
Aristotle, was in making the ideas subsistent and independent of intellect, the
implication being that the location of ideas in the divine intellect would have been
acceptable to Aristotle.
104. Summa contra Gentiles, I, 49--54, 69, 74-8.
105. The point is argued in Summa contra Gentiles, 2. 16.
106. Ibid., 2. 35; tr., pp. 102-3.
107. 2. 31-8.
108. A good statement is Aquinas' short, early treatise, On the Principles of Nature (De
Principiis Naturae), probably written during his period as a bachelor of the Sentences.
See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, p. 387, no. 59.
109. For a comparison of Aquinas and Bonaventure on this point see Quinn,
Historical Constitution, pp. 109--12, and references there.
II 0. See Summa Theologiae, I a. 105. 5.
Ill. See Summa contra Gentiles, 4. 81.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 233
112. See, e.g. Summa contra Gentiles, 11. 93.
113. A full account of Aquinas' understanding of the matter is found in De potentia,
q. 3, a. 9.
114. Summa Theologiae, Ia. 75. I; cf. ibid., 5.
115. Ibid., 79. 2; Blackfriars tr., p. 151.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid., 79. 3; tr. p. 157.
118. Ibid., 79. 4.
119. Ibid. (Responsio).
120. Ibid., tr. pp. 163-5.
121. Compendium Theologiae, 86.
122. Although Aquinas usually describes the state as praeter naturam ('beyond
nature'), in the Summa contra Gentiles, 4. 79, when considering the implications for a
resurrection of the body, he describes the state as contra naturam ('contrary to nature').
123. See the argument of Anton C. Pegis, 'The Separated Soul and its Nature in St.
Thomas', in StThomas Aquinas 1274-1974, I, 131-58.
124. See Summa Theologiae, Ia. 75. 4.
125. See Summa contra Gentiles, 4. 79.
126. Summa Theologiae, Ia nae 62. I; Blackfriars tr., vol. XXIII, 139 (slightly modified).
127. Ibid., Ia nae 62. 3.
128. Cf. the discussion in A. H. Armstrong and R. A. Markus, Christian Faith and
Greek Philosophy (London, 1960), p. 112.
129. See Boyle, Setting rif the Summa theologiae, pp. 15, 2~3.
130. Summa Theologiae, na nae, Prologus; Blackfriars, tr., vol XXXI, xxi.
131. For a general review, seeP. Michaud-Quantin, Sommes de Casuistique et Manuels
de Confession (Louvain; Lille, 1962; Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia, XIII).
132. See Leonard E. Boyle, 'The Summa Confessorum of john ofFreiburg and the
Popularization of the Moral Teaching ofSt Thomas and some of his Contemporaries'
in St Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974 Commemorative Studies, n, 245-68.
133. See Boyle, Setting of the Summa theologiae, p. 23.
134. Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate, 23. 6.
135. Summa Theologiae, Ia nae 57. 4; Blackfriars tr., vol. XXIII, p. 51.
136. Ibid., 57. 5; p. 55.
137. The discussion of law occupies Summa Theologiae Ia nae, 9~7.
138. Summa Theologiae, Ia nae, 96. 4.
139. In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle described man as a 'social' animal, so that a
similar perception could have been derived from there. As has been noted already,
Aquinas tends to describe him as 'political and social'.
140. See J. Catto, 'Ideas and Experience in the Political Thought of Aquinas', Past
and Present, LXXI (1976), 3-21, 8-9.
141. Cf. ibid., 10.
142. See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino, pp. 190, 194-5; Catto, 'Ideas and
Experience', 12 et seq.
143. De Regimine Principun, 10; partially ed. and tr., A. P. D'Entreves (tr. J. G.
Dawson), Aquinas Selected Political Writings (Oxford, 1965 ), pp. 56--7.
144. De Regimine Principum, 6.
145. Ibid., 7; D'Entreves,Aquinas, p. 37.
146. Ibid., 8, quoting from St Augustine; D'Entreves, Aquinas, 45-7.
147. Ibid., 9.
148. Ibid., 14.
149. 'Thus the final aim of social life will be, not merely to live in virtue, but rather
through virtue to attain to enjoyment of God.' Ibid.; D'Entreves, Aquinas, p. 75.
150. Ibid.; D'Entreves,Aquinas, pp. 76--7.
234 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

151. Ibid.; D'Entreves,Aquinas, p. 77.

152. Ibid., 15; D'Entreves, Aquinas, p. 79.
153. From the text of the condemnation as translated in R. Lerner and M. Mahdi,
eds,Medieval Political Philosophy, A Sourcebook (Toronto, 1963), pp. [337-54], 337.
154. See J. F. Wippel, 'The Condemnations of 1270 and 1277 at Paris',journal qf
Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies, vn (1977) [169--210], 172, n. 8.
155. Throughout the following account ofSiger and of radical Aristotelianism I am
indebted to F. van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant (Philosophes Medievaux, XXI;
Louvain; Paris, 1977), 'Siger de Brabant et Ia condamnation de l'aristotelisme
heterodoxe le 7 mars 1277', Academie Royale de Belgique Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des
Sciences Morales et Politiques, 5th ser., LXIV ( 1978), 63--74, and Thomas Aquinas and Radical
Aristotelianism (Washington, D.C., 1980).
156. See van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, pp. 50-I.
157. See ibid., pp. 339--47, for a fuller analysis.
158. Cf. ibid., p. 7 I.
159. See M. Giele, F. van Steenberghen and B. Bazan, eds, Trois Commentaires
Anonymes sur le Traite de l'Ame d'Aristote (Philosophes Medievaux, xi; Louvain; Paris,
1971), p. 18, for text of the passage.
160. See ibid., p. 20.
161. See above, p. 164.
162. See B. H. Zedler, tr., Saint Thomas Aquinas On the Unity qfthe Intellect against the
Averroists (Milwaukee, 1968), p. 47; Leonine edition, vol. XLIII (Rome, 1976), 302 (cap.
ii, 155).
163. See van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, p. 60.
164. Zedler, Saint Thomas Aquinas, p. 75; Leonine edition, 314 (cap. v, 435).
165. See van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, pp. 75--7.
166. Chart. Univ. Par., I, 486--7; cf. van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, pp. 74-5.
167. Quaestiones in Tertium de Anima, q. 17; in B. Bazan (ed.), Siger de Brabant,
Quaestiones in Tertium de Anima, De Anima lntellectiva, De Aeternitate Mundi (Philosophes
Medievaux, xm; Louvain; Paris, 1972), pp. 63-4. Cf. R. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219
Articles Condamnes aParis le 7 mars 1277 (Philosophes Medievaux, xxn; Lou vain; Paris,
1977), pp. 37-8.
168. Zedler, Saint Thomas Aquinas, pp. 60-1; Leonine edition, 308 (cap. iv, 91-5).
169. See van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, p. 94.
170. q. II; ed. Bazan, Siger de Brabant, pp. 31-5.
171. See van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, pp. 68, 77-8.
172. See Gieleel a/., Trois Commentaires, pp. 17-18.
173. lgnoti Auctoris Quaestiones in Aristotelis Libros I et II de Anima, II. 4; ibid., p. 75, II.
42-7.
174. Because of this feature, van Steenberghen argues that the commentary on the
Metaphysics is later than the De Aeternitate Mundi, the lmpossibilia and the De Necessitate
and close in time to the De Anima lntellectiva, c. 1273. Maitre Siger, pp. 9&-7.
175. See ibid., p. 99.
176. De Anima lntellectiva, cc. 7-8; ed. Bazan, Siger de Brabant, pp. 101-1 I.
177. For an analysis, see van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, pp. 377-83.
178. See van Steenberghen, La Philosophic au Xllle Siecte, p. 402.
179. See Hissette, Enquete, p. 314.
180. These are edited most recently, with a third treatise, inBoethii Daci Opera, vol. c
VI, partu, ed. N. G. Green-Pedersen (Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi;
Copenhagen, 1976).
181. Ibid., p. 356.
182. For a review of the conflicting interpretations of Boethius' position, see van
Steenberghen, La Philosophie au Xllle Siecle, pp. 404-5, 407-11.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 6 AND EPILOGUE 235
183. Green- Pedersen, Boethii Daci Opera, p. 372.
184. See Hissette, Enquete, pp. 15--18.
185. See van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger, pp. 80-8.
186. See ibid., pp. 140 ff.
187. 'Le tableau qu'il trace des moeurs qui s'etaient introduites dans certaines
couches de Ia population universitaire est eloquent; cette degradation morale n'est sans
doute pas sans relations avec le desarroi des idees et Ia crise philosophique.' Ibid.,
p. 145.
188. P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin au XI/Ie Siecle, 2me partie
(2nd edn; Louvain, 1908), pp. 175--91.
189. Dual numbering in the references to propositions represents the Mandonnet
and the original ordering respectively.
190. Especially Hissette, Enquete.
191. In commenting on the Nicomachean Ethics, Aquinas refers to death as the
greatest terror. The context makes it clear that the meaning is 'as regards this life'. The
statement, as collected in a compendium, where the wording is 'that death is the end of
terrors', is condemned in proposition 213; 178. See Hissette, Enquete, pp. 304-7.
192. See propositions 42;96, 43;81, 110; 191; cf. 116;97, 147; 124 (individuation}. 142;
122. 146; 187 (knowledge).
193. Propositions 162;173, 163;163, 164;159, 165;158, 166;130.
194. Chart. Univ. Par., I, 55S-9, no. 474.

EPILOGUE

I. For convenience, I occasionally use the term 'condemnations' to refer to the

Oxford censures as well as those at Paris, although Kilwardby maintained that his was
a prohibition against teaching rather than a formal condemnation.
2. Chart. Univ. Par., I, 567, no. 481; see F.J. Roensch, Earry Thomistic School (Dubuque,
Iowa, 1964), p. 14.
3. Quoted ibid., pp. 15, 25, n. 69.
4. See ibid., pp. 174-8.
5. See D. A. Callus, 'The Problem of the unity of Form and Richard Knapwell', in
Melanges rifferts aEtienne Gilson (Toronto; Paris, 1959), pp. 123-60, 157-8; cf. Roensch,
Earry Thomistic School, pp. 180-2.
6. See ibid., pp. 41-5 7, for details of their careers and writings.
7. William de Ia Mare's Correctorium is edited with the textofKnapwell's reply, by P.
Glorieux, Le Correctorium Corruptorii 'Quare' (Bibliotheque Thomiste, 9; Kain, 1927).
8. See Roensch, Early Thomistic School, p. 15.
9. His career and work are reviewed in the introductions to Bernardi Triliae
Quaestiones de Cognitione Animae Separatae a Corpore. A Critical Edition rif the Latin Text with
an Introduction and Notes, ed. S. Martin (Toronto, 1965} and Bernardi de Trillia Quaestiones
Disputatae de Cognitione Animae Separatae, ed. P. Kunzle (Corpus Philosophorum Medii
Aevi Opera Philosophica Mediae Aetatis Selecta, I; Bern, 1969). See also Roensch,
Early Thomistic School, pp. 84-8.
10. See ibid., pp. 89-92.
II. See ibid., pp. 9S-104. For his political thought, see W. Ullmann, A Histo~v of
Political Thought: the Middle Ages (Harmondsworth, 1965), pp. 200-4.
12. Callus, 'The Problem', pp. 131-3, discusses the influence of Aquinas' teachings
on the younger generation of seculars and even perhaps of Franciscans at this time.
13. See Roensch, Earry Thomistic School, p. 18; cf. ]. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas
D'Aquino, His Life, Thought and Work (New York, 1974), pp. 342-3.
14. Chart. Univ. Par., n, 280, no. 838.
Bibliographies
There are two bibliographies, the first of works in English, the second of works in other
languages. Neither is comprehensive but between them they are intended to provide an
orientation in the subject, to supply immediate needs for further reading on the main
themes of the book beyond what could be included in endnotes, and to indicate sources
of more detailed bibliography. Each bibliography is divided as follows:
J. GENERAL REVIEWS AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS
2. SOURCES
3. SECONDARY WORKS (by chapter divisions)

A. BIBLIOGRAPHY oF WoRKs IN ENGLISH

I. GENERAL REVIEWS AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS

E. Gilson, History qf Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1955) is excellent
not only for its text but for the detailed discussions and references in its extensive
notes. Other good surveys are A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1962) and F. C.
Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy (London, 1972) and A Histo~y of Philosophy,
val. n (London, 1950); see also J. R. Weinberg, A Short History qf Medieval Philosophy
(Princeton, 1964): these are clear accounts written by philosophers. D. Knowles, The
Evolution qf Medieval Thought (London, 1962) and G. Leff, Medieval Thought St Augustine to
Ockham (Harmondsworth, 1958), are by historians. R. L. Poole ,Illustrations of the History
qfMedieval Thought and Learning (2nd edn; London, 1920), was a perceptive treatment in
its time and while requiring correction in the light oflater work remains stimulating. R.
W. Southern, The Making of the Middle Ages (London, 1953), has a fine discussion of the
early medieval tradition of thought as part of a wider historical survey. J. Marenbon,
Early Medieval Philosophy (480-1150) (London, 1983), tries to isolate the specifically
philosophical elements in the thought of the period and pays close attention to the
logical aspects. R. Klibansky, The Continuity qfthe Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages
(London, 1939), was an important corrective of an older perspective. It has been
reissued with a new preface and four supplementary chapters (Kraus: New York;
London; Nendeln, 1981). A. H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History qf Later Greek and
Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1970) has strong essays on late classical Greek
developments, the Greek patristic tradition, with a consideration of Eriugena's
relationship to it, Augustine, and the period from Boethius to Anselm. N. Kretzmann,
A. Kenny andj. Pin borg, eds, The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosopkyfrom the
Rediscovery qf Aristotle to the Disintegration qf Scholasticism (Cambridge, 1982), is written
very much with philosophical interests in mind. It has detailed treatment of logic and
thematic surveys. It provides extensive biographical and bibliographical guidance. A
Piltz, The World qf Medieval Learning (Oxford, 1981 ), is attractive and lively. A. Murray,
Reason and Society in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1978), examines the relationship between
aspects of intellectual development and the social context. R. R. Bolger, The Classical
Heritage and its Benificiaries (Cambridge, 1954), is of interest to our theme though wider
than it. R. R. Bolger, ed., Classical Influences on European Culture AD 500-1500 (Cam bridge,
1971) (conference papers), has some treatment of speculative ideas. W. Ullmann, A
History qf Political Thought in the Middle A~es (Harmondsworth, 1965), is a good
introduction to this subject; see also C. H. Mcilwain, The Growth of Political Thought in
the West from the Greeks to the End of the .\1iddle Ages (New York, 1932) and A. P.

237
238 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

d'Entreves, The Mediaeval Contribution to Political Thought (Oxford, 1939). R. W. and A.J.
Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theo~y in the West, 6 vols (Edinburgh, 1903-36) is
uneven but important. A. C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo: the History of Science AD
400-1650, 2 vols (2nd edn; London, 1952), is a good introduction, providing an account
of the mechanics of cosmological theories. L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and
Experimental Science, vols 1-2 (New York, 1923), is a standard authority. For general
intellectual surveys, see F. B. Artz, The Mind of the Middle Ages AD 200-1500 (3rd edn;
New York, 1965), which has an extensive bibliography, and H. 0. Taylor, The
Mediaeval Mind. A History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages, 2 vols
(4th edn; London, 1927). On the monastic scene,]. Leclercq, The Love of Learning and the
Desirefor God (New York, 1962), is a favourite (from French). Helen Waddell, The
Wandering Scholars (London, 1927), is a splendid evocation of the learned world before it
became over-serious.
The New Catholic Encyclopaedia, 15 vols (San Francisco; London; Toronto; Sydney,
1967), provides scholarly biographical articles on many medieval writers, with
bibliGgraphies. The relevant sections of G. C. Boyce, ed., Literature of .\1edieval Histo~y
1930-1975. A Supplement to L.}. Paetow's A Guide to the Study of !vfedieval Histo~y, 5 vols
(Millwood, New York, 1981), are very helpful. E. A. Synan, 'Latin Philosophies of the
Middle Ages', in Medieval Studies. An Introduction, ed. J. M. Powell (Syracuse Univ.
Press, 1976), is a useful introductory and bibliographical essay. For individual authors,
note: Augustinian Bibliograph_y 1970-1980: with Essa_ys on the Fundamentals of Augustinian
Scholarship, compiled by T. L. Miethe, foreword by V. J. Bourke (Westport, Conn.;
London, 1982); M. Brennan, 'A Bibliography of Publications in the Field ofEriugenian
Studies, 1800-1975', Studi Medievali, 3rd ser., XVIII, I (1977), 401-47; Thomistic
Bibliography 1940-1978, compiled by T. L. Miethe and V. J. Bourke (Westport, Conn.;
London, 1980). On an important subject: E.J. Ashworth, The Tradition ofJ1edieval Logic
and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century: A Bibliograph_y from
1836 Onwards (Toronto, 1978). C. H. Lohr, 'Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries',
Traditio, XXIII (1967), 313-413; XXIV (1968), 149-245; XXVI (1970), 13~216; XXVII
(1971), 251-351; XXVIII (1972), 281-396; XXIX (1973), 93-197; XXX (1974), 1]9-44,
apart from its value as a listing, gives a good impression of the extent of activity.
Among serial publications of the English-speaking world containing material in the
field may be noted especially: Speculum (the journal of the Mediaeval Academy of
America) (1926-- ); Jfediaeval Studies (Toronto, 1939- ); Mediaeval and Renaissance
Studies (London, 1941- ); Traditio (New York, 1943- ). Vivarium (Assen, 1963- )
publishes mainly in English.

2. SOURCES

The subject is well served by sources in translation. Useful conspectuses are C. P. Farrar
and A P. Evans, Bibliograph_y of English Translations from Medieval Sources (New York,
1946) and M. A. Ferguson, Bibliography of English Translations from Medieval Sources
1943-1967 (New York; London, 1974). See also the listing of editions and translations in
Speculum (1973- ) and in theRepertorium Fontium Historiae .\fedii Aevi (Rome, 1962- ).
The following list of selected sources reflects broadly the order of treatment in the
text. Of sources used by medieval authors, the most important is Aristotle, for whom
the standard translation isj. A. Smith and W. D. Ross, The Works of Aristotle translated
into English (Oxford, 1910-52). Plato's Timaeus, Meno and Phaedo may be found, for
example, in the five-volume translation by B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato (3rd edn.;
Oxford, 1892). Plotinus, Enneads, tr. S. McKenna (3rd edn; London, 1962); also by A.
H. Armstrong in the Loeb Classical Library series, 3 vols (London, 1966--7). Proclus,
ElemenlsofTheology, ed. and tr. E. R. Dodds (2nd edn; Oxford, 1963). Macrobius: W. H.
Stahl, tr. .\facrobius, Commenta~y on the Dream of Scipio (New York; London, 1952). For
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 239
Martian us Capella's Marriage of Philology and Mercury, see vol. n of W. H. Stahl, R.
Johnson and E. L. Burge, Martianus Capella and the Seuen Liberal Arts (New York:
London, 1977).
There are many collections of translated readings from medieval authors. See
especially, R. McKeon, Selections from Medieval Philosophers, 2 vols (New York, etc.,
1929); A. Hyman andJ.J. Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages: the Christian, Islamic and
Jewish Traditions (New York, 1967);J. F. Wippel and A. B. Wolter, Medieval Philosophy
from St Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa (New York, 1969); H. Shapiro, Medieval Philosophy
(New York, 1964). E. Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1974),
is very valuable.

The principal authors are well represented in translation. Among the most useful
texts thus available are, by author:
St Augustine: A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers rifthe Church (Buffalo,
1886), The Catholic University rif America Patristic Studies (Washington, D.C., 1922- ),
Ancient Christian Writers: the Works rif the Fathers in Translation (Westminster, Md; London,
1946- ), The Fathers of the Church (New York, 1947- ) and The Library of Christian
Classics (London; Philadelphia, 1953- ) have published various works of Augustine.
Very useful tabular guides may be found in an addendum (adapted by J. J. O'Meara)
to H. Marrou,Saint Augustine and his Influence through the Ages (New York; London, 1957)
and interspersed through P. Brown, St Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (London, 1967).
The following texts will be found particularly valuable: Confessions, tr. R. S. Pine-Coffin
(Harmondsworth, 1961); CityrifGod, tr. H. Bettenson (Harmondsworth, 1972);Against
the Academics, tr. J. J. O'Meara (Ancient Christian Writers, no. 12; 1950); On Christian
Doctrine, tr. D. W. Robertson (Indianapolis; New York, 1958). J. H. S. Burleigh,
Augustine Earlier Writings (London, 1953), is an important collection.
Boethius: H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, eds and tr.,Boethius, The Theological Tractates
and the Consolation of Philosophy (London; Cambridge, Mass., 1918; rev. edn by S. J.
Tester, 1973). E. Stump, tr.,Boethius's De Topicis Differentiis (Ithaca; London, 1978) is.an
excellent translation and study. The Consolation rif Philosophy, tr. V. E. Watts
(Harmondsworth, 1969).
Cassiodorus: L. W. Jones, tr., An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings by
Cassiodorus Senator (New York, 1946), for the Institutions.
Pseudo-Dionysius: C. E. Rolt, tr., Dionysius the Areopagite, On the Divine Names and The
Mystical Theology (London, 1920). The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, tr. T. L. Campbell (New
York; London, 1981).

John Scotus Eriugena: I. P. Sheldon- Williams, ed. and tr., Periphyseon I-III (Dublin,
1968--81 ). M. L. Uhlfelder andJ. A. Potter, tr.,}ohn the Scot, Periphyseon (Indianapolis,
1976) (an abridgement).
Fredegisus: On Nothing and Darkness, tr. J. F. Wippel and A. B. Wolter, Medieval
Philosophy from St Augustine to Nicholas rif Cusa (New York, 1969), pp. 103-8.
Peter Damian: On Divine Omnipotence, ibid., pp. 143-52.
Anselm ofBec: S. N. Deane, tr., St Anselm, Basic Writings (2nd edn; La Salle, Illinois,
1962), contains Monologion, Proslogion and Cur Deus Homo, though it is not the best
translation of any. J. Hopkins and G. Richardson, tr., Anselm of Canterbury, vol. 1
(London, 1974), contains Monologion, Proslogion and the debate with Guanilo. M. J.
Charlesworth, tr., Proslogion with a Reply on Behalf rif the Fool by Guanilo and the Author's
Reply to Guanilo (Oxford, 1965). The Cur Deus Homo is translated with the Proslogion and
extracts from other works in E. R. Fairweather, ed., A Scholastic Miscellany, Anselm to
Ockham (The Library of Christian Classics, 10; Philadelphia, 1956).J. Hopkins and G.
Richardson, Truth, Freedom and Evil, Three Philosophical Dialogues (New York, 1967). D.
240 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

P. Henry, ed. and tr., The De Grammatico if St Anselm: the Theory if Paronymy (Notre
Dame, 1964).
Peter Abelard: D. E. Luscombe, ed. and tr., The Ethics ofPeter Abelard (Oxford, 1971).
P.J. Payer, tr., Dialogue between a jew, a Christian and a Philosopher (Toronto, 1979). B.
Radice, tr., The Letters if Abelard and HeLoise (Harmondsworth, 1974), includes the
autobiography, Historia Calamitatum. See also J. T. Muckle, tr., The Story if Abelard's
Adversities: a Translation with Notes if the Historia Calamitatum (Toronto, 1954). J. R.
McCallum, Abelard's Christian Theology (Oxford, 1948), contains extracts from the
Theologia Christiana.
John of Salisbury: D. D. McGarry, tr., The Metalogicon ifjohn of Salisbury (Berkeley;
LosAngeles, 1955).
Bernard Silvestris: W. Wetherbee, tr., The Cosmographia of Bernardus Silvestris (New
York; London, 1973).
Hugh of St Victor: J. Taylor, tr., The Didascalicon if Hugh if St Victor (New York;
London, 1961).
The Arabic and Jewish tradition: substantial extracts from this are found in A.
Hyman and J. J. Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages: the Christian, Islamic and Jewish
Traditions (New York, 1967), which also gives more detailed information on transla-
tions. AI Ghazali: Al-Gha;;;ali's Tahafut al-Falasifah (Incoherence if the Philosophers}, tr.
(into English) S. A. Kamali (Lahore, 1958). The work can in fact be followed from
reading the translation of Averroes' refutation, see below. Avicenna: Avicenna's
Psychology An English Translation if Kitab al-Najat, Book II, chapter VI, tr. F. Rahman
(London, 1952). Averroes: The Incoherence if the Incoherence, tr. S. van Bergh, 2 vols
(Oxford, 1954). Averroes on the Harmony if Religions and Philosophy, tr. G. F. Hourani
(London, 1961). Averroes on Aristotle's De Generatione et Corruptione, Middle Commentary and
Epitome, tr. S. Kurland (Cambridge, Mass., 1958). Avicebron: Ibn Gabirol, The
Fountain if Life, tr. H. E. Wedeck (New York, 1962) (an abridgement). Moses
Maimonides: S. Pines, tr., Moses Maimonides, The Guide if the Perplexed (Chicago;
London, 1963).
L. Thorndike, University Records and Life in the Middle Ages (New York, 1944; repr.
1971), is a splendid source of translated texts on the universities.
Robert Grosseteste: On Light is translated in Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 254-263; also tr. C.
C. Riedl (Milwaukee, 1942).
Roger Bacon: R. B. Burke, tr., The Opus Majus of Roger Bacon 2 vols (New York, 1928;
repr. 1962). D. C. Lindberg, Roger Bacon's Philosophy if Nature, a Critical Edition with
English Translation, Introduction and Notes if De Multiplicatione Specierum and De Speculis
Comburentibus (Oxford, 1983).
Albert the Great: On the Six Principles, H. Shapiro, Medieval Philosophy (New York,
1969), pp. 266--93. Albertus Magnus Book if Minerals, tr. D. Wyckoff (Oxford, 1967).
On thirteenth-century logic: Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected
Anonymous Treatises, tr. J. P. Mullally (Milwaukee, 1964). William if Sherwood's
Introduction to Logic, tr. N. Kretzmann (Minneapolis, 1966); William of Sherwood,
Treatise on Syncategorematic Words, tr. N. Kretzmann (Minneapolis, 1968).
Bonaventure: The Works if Bonaventure, tr. J. de Vinck (Paterson, New Jersey,
196(}.. ). St Bonaventure's De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam, ed. and tr. E. T. Healy
(New York, 1955). St Bonaventure's ltinerarium Mentis in Deum, ed. and tr. P. Boehner
(New York, 1956). Breviloquium, tr. E. E. Nemmers (StLouis: London, 1946). Disputed
Questions on the Mystery if the Trinity, tr. Z. Hayes (New York, 1979) with an important
introduction.
Thomas Aquinas: the Blackfriars edition of the Summa Theologiae 60 vols (London,
1964-76) has a facing English translation and is conveniently divided thematically.
The Summa Contra Gentiles is translated by A. C. Pegis,J. F. Anderson, V.J. Bourke and
C. J. O'Neil, as On the Truth of the Catholic Faith, 5 vols (New York, 195.'}-7). Among
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 241
other works available in translation are (De Regno:) On Kingship, tr. G. B. Phelan and I.
T. Eschmann (Toronto, 1949); see also text of Book I in A. P. d'Entreves, Aquinas
Selected Political Writings, tr.J. G. Dawson (Oxford, 1959). (De Unitate Intellectus:) On the
Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists, tr. B. H. Zedler (Milwaukee, 1968). (De
Aeternitate Mundi:) On the Eternity of the World, tr. C. Vollert (Milwaukee, 1965). (De Ente
et Essentia:) On Being and Essence, tr. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1949); see also Aquinas on Being
and Essence: a Translation and Interpretation, by J. Bobik (Notre Dame, 1965). (Quaestio
Disputata de Anima:) The Soul, tr. J.P. Rowan (StLouis, 1949). (De Libera Arbitrio:) On
Free Chuice, tr. A. C. Pegis (New York, 1945). (Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia:) On the
Power of God, tr. L. Shapcote, 3 vols (London, 1932-4; I vol., Westminster, Md, 1952).
(Quaestiones Disputatae de Veri/ate:) Truth, tr. R. W. Mulligan et al., 3 vols (Chicago,
1952-4). StThomas Aquinas, Quodlibetal Questions/ and 2, tr. S. Edwards (Toronto, 1983),
illustrates the method well and has a good introduction. Of the commentaries on
Aristotle, see Aristotle's De Anima with the Commentary of St Thomas Aquinas, tr. K. Foster
andS. Humphries (London; New Haven, 1951 ); Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, tr.
C. I. Litzinger, 2 vols (Chicago, 1964); Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, tr.J. P.
Rowan, 2 vols (Chicago, 1961 ). For other translations, see the catalogue of authentic
works inJ. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: his Life, Thought and Work (New York,
1974).
Siger of Brabant: On the Necessi{y and Contingenq of Causes, in H. Shapiro, Medieval
Philosophy (New York, 1964), pp. 415--38.
Boethius of Dacia: On the Supreme Good or On the Life of the Philosopher, in J. F. Wippel
and A. B. Wolter, Medieval Philosopkv from St Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa (New York,
1969), pp. 369-75.
Giles of Rome, On the Errors of the Philosophers, in H. Shapiro, Medieval Philosopkv,
pp. 386-413.

3. SECONDARY WORKS

More information of a specialist nature may be found in the endnotes. For more
detailed bibliography, consult works cited in section I and particular studies.

l. MASTERS OF THOSE WHO KNOW- PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS

There are several good introductions to the thinkers considered here, among them: W.
K. C. Guthrie, Socrates (Cambridge, 1971 ); G. M. A. Grube, Plato's Thought (London,
1935) and I. M. Crombie, Plato, the Midwife's Apprentice (London, 1964), who offer
varying interpretations. See alsoj. E. Raven, Plato's Thought in the Making (Cambridge,
1965). F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (London; New York, 1937) presents the
Timaeus. J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford, 1981) is a short review; W. D.
Ross, Aristotle (5th edn; London, 1960) is standard; G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle, the Growth
and Structure of his Thought (Cambridge, 1968) is a very stimulating presentation
especially of Aristotle as a scientist. A. H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy
(4th edn; London, 1970) is a readable general guide which covers Neoplatonism well.
For more detail on late classical developments, see P. Merlan, From Platonism to
Neoplatonism (3rd edn; The Hague, 1968), J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London,
1977), R. T. Wallis, Neo-Platonism (London, 1972),]. M. Rist,Plotinus: the Road to Reality
(Cambridge, 1967) and A. H. Armstrong, ed., The Cambridge History of Later Greek and
Early Medieval Philosopkv (Cambridge, 1970).
E. Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic and Christian Thinkers (Cambridge,
1983), investigates the effect on medieval thinkers of the unresolved tension in
Aristotle's thought between the conception of individuals and universals. The
collection of papers by H. A. Wolfson, Studies in the History of Philosophy and Religion, I
242 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

(Cambridge, Mass., 1973), contains important studies on several themes of central

interest in the classical, patristic and later periods. D.J. O'Meara, ed., Neoplatonism and
Christian Thought (Albany, New York, 1982), is useful generally on this subject and has
treatment of Augustine, Eriugena and Aquinas. R. A. Norris, God and World in Early
Christian Theology. A Study in justin Martyr, lrenaeus, Tertullian and Origen (London, 1966) is
a clear and readable review of this formative period. L. G. Patterson, God and History in
Early Christian Thought. A Study rifThemesfromjustin Martyr to Gregory the Great (London,
1967) also provides useful background.]. N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (5th edn;
London, 1977), studies the development of patristic and conciliar theology. A Louth,
The Origins rif the Christian Mystical Tradition -From Plato to Denys (Oxford, 1981) is
discursive but raises many points of interest to our subject. H.J. Blumenthal and R. A.
Markus, eds, Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought: Essays in honour rif A. H. Armstrong
(London, 1981) has several contributions of interest, especially regarding Augustine.

2. FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES: ADAPTATION AND TRANSMISSION

I. St Augustine
P. Brown, St Augustine rif Hippo: a Biography (London, 1967) is not only the best account
of Augustine's life but is a classic of historiography. See also G. Bonner, St Augustine rif
Hippo: Life and Controversies (London, 1963); J. J. O'Meara, The Young Augustine
(London, 1954).
For Augustine's thought in general, E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy rif St Augustine
(tr. L. E. M. Lynch) (London, 1961 ), is a splendid guide. On his political ideas, seej.
N. Figgis, The Political AspectsofSt Augustine's City rifGod (London, 1921 ); N.H. Baynes,
The Political Ideas rif St Augustine's De Civitate Dei (Historical Association Pamphlet;
London, 1936); H. A. Deane, The Political and Social Ideas rif St Augustine (New York;
London, 1963 ); R. A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine
(Cambridge, 1970);J.J. O'Meara, Charter if Christendom: the Significance rifthe City rifGod
(New York, 1961 ); J. H. S. Burleigh, The City rif God: a Study in St Augustine's Philosophy
(London, 1949). R. E. Meagher, An Introduction to Augustine (New York, 1978), has
useful readings and a partial listing of Augustine's writings. R. H. Barrow ,Introduction to
St Augustine, the City rifGod (London, 1950) has judicious selections with summary and
commentary. F. E. Cranz, 'The Development of Augustine's Ideas on Society before
the Donatist Controversy', Harvard Theological Review, XLVII (1954), 255-316, is full of
clear insights. W. H. C. Frend, 'The Roman Empire in the Eyes of Western Schismatics
during the Fourth Century AD', Miscellanea Historiae Ecclesiasticae (Lou vain, 1961 ), 9-22,
reprinted in Frend, Religion Popular and Unpopular in the Early Christian Centuries (London,
1976), examines western Christian hostility to the mixture of sacred and profane, an
important theme for understanding Augustine's theory. R. A. Markus, 'Two
Conceptions of Political Authority: Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIX 14-15, and some
Thirteenth-century Interpretations', Journal of Theological Studies, new series, XVI
(1965), 68-100, discusses Augustine's own views and the later reading.
R. A. Markus, Christianity in the Roman World (London, 1975), provides good
background. A Momigliano, ed., The Coriflict between Paganism and Christianity in the
Fourth Century (Oxford, 1963), deals with the context and has treatment of pagan
apologetic and Christian Platonism. P. Brown, Religion and Society in the Age rif St
Augustine (London, 1972), collects a number of penetrating essays by the author; his
Society and the Holy in Late Antiquity (London, 1982), collects others written since; see
especially 'Eastern and Western Christendom in late Antiquity: a parting of the Ways',
which urges a new perspective on the theme with cautions against too great an
emphasis on the factor of language. R. A. Markus, From Augustine to Gregory the Great
(London, 1983 ), is a collection of articles by another leading interpreter. P. Courcelle,
Late Latin Writers and their Greek Sources (English tr.; Cambridge, Mass., 1969), is an
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 243
important study of the cultural background both of Augustine and Boethius. See also
C. N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (London, 1939).
For rival views on the church to Augustine's, see W. H. C. Frend, The Donatist Church
(Oxford, 1952); J. Ferguson, Pelagius (Cambridge, 1956); and R. F. Evans, Pelagius
Inquiries and Reappraisals (London, 1968), which is very useful too on Augustine himself.
For Augustine's contribution to doctrine, see E. Teselle, Augustine the Theologian
(London, 1970 ). R. W. Battenhouse, ed., A Companion to the Study ofSt Augustine (Oxford,
1955 ), is helpful in general. G. R. Evans, Augustine on Evil (Cambridge, 1982), covers a
theme of philosophical and theological interest. A. W. Matthews, The Development of St
Augustinefrom N eoplatonism to Christianity (University of America Press, 1980), on a much
debated aspect.

2. Boethius
H. Chadwick, Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy (Oxford,
1981 ), has replaced H. M. Barrett, Boethius: some Aspects qf his Times and Work
(Cambridge, 1940), which served English readers well for many years. M. Gibson, ed.,
Boethius, his Life, Thought and Irifluence (Oxford, 1981 ), is especially valuable on the
'influence'. See also H. R. Patch, The Tradition qf Boethius (Oxford, 1935). E. K. Rand,
The Founders qf the Middle Ages (Cambridge, Mass., 1928), presented in Chapter 5 an
influential view ofBoethius.
M. W. Laistner, Thought and Letters in Western Europe 500-900 (London, 1957), is a good
general survey of this period. L. D. Reynolds and N. G. Wilson, Scribes and Scholars. A
Guide to the Transmission f!!Greek and Latin Literature (2nd edn; Oxford, 1974 ), is a valuable
introduction to the physical aspects of textual transmission.J.J. O'Donnell, Cassiodorus
(Berkeley; London, 1979), is the most recent study of this figure. See also A.
Momigliano, 'Cassiodorus and the Italian Culture of his Time', Proceedings qf the British
Acaderrry, XLI ( 1955 ), 207-55. G. A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular
Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill, North Carolina; 1980), on this
subject. P. Riche, Education and Culture in the Barbarian West Sixth through Eighth Centuries
(translated from the 3rd French edition by J. J. Contreni; Columbia, South Carolina,
1976). M. Herren, 'On rhe Earliest Irish Acquaintance with Isidore of Seville', in E.
James, ed., Visigothic Spain: New Approaches (Oxford, 1980), pp. 24~50, is interesting.

3. John Scotus Eriugena

On Eriugena's main Greek authority, see S. Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena. An
Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution qf the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition (Leiden, 1978).
J. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic, Theology and Philosophy
in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981 ), has shed new light on Eriugena's context.
The most important work on Eriugena himself is in section B, but J. J. O'Meara,
Eriugena (Cork, 1969), is a good, short introduction. P. 0. Kristeller, 'The Historical
Position ofJohannes Scottus Eriugena', in J. J. O'Meara and B. Naumann, eds, Latin
Script and Letters AD 400-900 (Leiden, 1976 ), pp. 156-64, is useful as an outline. H. Bett,
Johannes Scotus Erigena (Cambridge, 1925 ), is the only full study in English. J. J.
O'Meara and L. Bieler, eds, The Mind of Eriugena (Dublin, 1973) (collected conference
papers), has important contributions. The relevant chapters of Armstrong, ed.,
CHLGEMP, are very good. On Eriugena's use of his sources see the study by I. P.
Sheldon-Williams in O'Meara and Bieler, The Mind of Eriugena, and more recently, E.
Jeauneau, 'Pseudo-Dionysius, Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor in the
Works of John Scottus Eriugena', in U.-R. Blumenthal, ed., Carolingian Essays
(Washington, D.C., 1983). D. J. O'Meara, 'The Problem of speaking about God in
John Scottus Eriugena', ibid., discusses the question of affirmative and negative
theology.J. Marenbon, 'Wulfad, Charles the Bald and John Scottus Eriugena', in M.
244 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Gibson and J. Nelson, eds, Charles the Bald, Court and Kingdom (Oxford, 1981), pp.
37~3, reviews the dispute over Eriugena's autographs.
There is also English material in the collected conference proceedings noticed in
section B.

3. THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES - LOGIC, THEOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY

Logical revival and Schools: M. Gibson, 'The Continuity of Learning circa 85~irca
1050', Viator, VI (1975), 1-13, is a most useful review of school studies in a neglected
period; see also her 'The Artes in the Eleventh Century', in Arts Liberaux et Philosophic au
Moyen Age (Actes du !Verne Congres International de Philosophie Medievale;
Montreal; Paris, 1969) and, a localised treatment, L. M. de Rijk, 'On the Curriculum of
the Arts of the Trivium at St Gall from c. 850-c. 1000', Vivarium, 1 ( 1963 ), 3~6. R. L.
Benson and G. Constable, with C. D. Lanham, eds, Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth
Century (Oxford, 1982), contains a number of pertinent essays, some of which are
specially noted below. On the character of medieval logic in both the central and high
periods there is a substantial bibliography, for which see the bibliographical aids cited
in section I, and note T. Gilby, Barbara Celarent. A Description rif Scholastic Dialectic
(London, 1949), E. A. Moody, Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic (Amsterdam,
1952), L. M. Rijk, Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to the History rif Early Terminist Logic,
2 vols (Assen, 1962-7), and Ph. Boehner, Medieval Logic. An Outline '!fits Developmentfrom
1250 to 1400 (Manchester, 1966). More particularly of interest to the subject of the
development of logical study in the period is the very clear account by 0. Lowry,
'Boethian Logic in the Medieval West', in Gibson, ed.,Boethius, pp. 90-134. See also N.
Kretzmann, 'The Culmination of the Old Logic in Peter Abelard', in Benson et al.,
Renaissance and Renewal, pp. 488-511. B. Stock, The Implications rif Literacy. Wrillen
Language and Models ofInterpretation in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries (Princeton, 1983 ),
ranges widely over the thinkers considered in this chapter, examining their sensitivity
to the relationship between language and reality. J. W. Baldwin, The Scholastic Culture rif
the Middle Ages 1000-1300 (Lexington, Mass., 1971 ), is a useful survey of the period.
On Gerber! of Aurillac, see 0. G. Darlington, 'Gerbert, the Teacher', American
Historical Review, Lll (1946-7), 456-76.
On Berengar, A. J. MacDonald, Berengar and the Reform of Sacramental Doctrine
(London, 1930) but see section B for more recent treatment. M. Gibson, Larifranc rif Bee
(Oxford, 1978), is the standard work but see also the illuminating study by R. W.
Southern, 'Lanfranc of Bee and Berengar ofTours', in R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pan tin and
R. W. Southern, eds, Studies in Medieval History presented to Frederick Maurice Powicke
(Oxford, 1948), pp. 27-48.
Anselm of Bee: J. M. Hopkins, A Companion to the Stur{y rif St Anselm (Minneapolis,
1972), is very useful. R. W. Southern, St Anselm and his Biographer (Cambridge, 1963 ), is
standard and a classic. On aspects of his method, see G. Evans, 'The Nature of St
Anselm's Appeal to Reason in the Cur Deus Homo', Studia Theologica, xxx1 ( 1977), 33-50;
G. Evans, 'St Anselm and Sacred History', in R. H. C. Davis and J. M. Wallace-
Hadrill, eds, The Writing rif Histo~y in the Middle Ages. Essays presented to R. W. Southern
(Oxford, 1981 ), pp. 187-209; and E. J. O'Toole, 'Anselm's Logic of Faith', Analecta
Anselmiana, 111 (Frankfurt/Main, 1972), 146--54. D. P. Henry, The Logic rif St Anselm
(Oxford, 1967), is a technical treatment. R. D. Shofner, Anselm Revisited. A Stud_y '!{the
Role '![the Ontological Argument (Leiden, 1974 ), provides a conspectus of modern interest
in Anselm's method. Cf., from a philosophical viewpoint, R. R. La Croix, Proslogion 11
and Ill. A Third Interpretation rif Anselm's Argument (Leiden, 1972). G. R. Evans, Anselm and
Talking about God (Oxford, 1978 ), studies the formulation of a theological language. G.
R. Evans, Anselm and a New Generation (Oxford, 1980), discusses Anselm's influence, and
her Old Arts and New Theology, the Beginnings rif Theology as an Academic Discipline (Oxford,
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 245
1980), is characteristically stimulating on a topic of centre! concern. G. R. Evans, Alan
qf Lille, the Frontiers q[Theology in the Later Twelfth Century (Cambridge, 1983), provides
more material for assessing the contribution of the arts to theology.
Peter Abelard: J. G. Sikes, Peter Abailard (Cambridge, 1932), needs to be read with
more recent treatment, especially as regards the dating of some of Abelard's works. L.
Grane, Peter Abelard. Philosophy and Christiani!r in the Middle Ages (English tr.; London,
1970), is very readable. M. T. Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli, The Logic of Abelard
(English tr.; Dordrecht, 1969), contains an account of the relationship of his logical
works and examines his method. M. M. Tweedale, Abailard on Universals (Amsterdam;
New York; Oxford, 1976), is a convenient presentation, with analysis, of his texts on this
question. R. E. Weingart, The Logic qf Divine Love. A Critical Anairsis of the Soteriologr qf
Peter Abelard (Oxford, 1970), is an illuminating study. D. A. Luscombe, The School qf
Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 1969), is essential for Abelard's context, influence and critics.
E. M. Buytaert, ed., Peter Abelard (Lou vain; the Hague, 1974 ), consists of conference
papers, with several of importance, in French and English. P. L. Williams, The Moral
Philosophy qf Peter Abelard (Lanham, Maryland, 1980). N. M. Haring, 'Abelard
Yesterday and Today', in Pierre Abelard, Pierre le Venerable. Les Courants Philosophiques,
Litteraires et Artistiques en Occident au Milieu du Xlle Siecle, ed. R. Louis,J.Jolivet andj.
Chatillon (Paris, 1975), pp. 341-403. R. Klibansky, 'Peter Abelard and Bernard of
Clairvaux', l11ediaeval and Renaissance Studies, v (1961 ), l-27, is a good, general account
of the different perspectives.
0. Brooke, 'The Speculative Development of the Trinitarian Theology of William of
St Thierry in the A enigma Fidei', Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Midievale, XXVII ( 1960),
193-211; xxvm ( 1961 ), 26-58, is an enlightening account ofWilliam's useofhis sources
and the point of his hostility to Abelard.
Gilbert of Poitiers: N. M. Haring, 'The Case of Gilbert de Ia Porree, Bishop of
Poitiers 1142-1154', Mediaeval Studies, XIII (1951), 1-40. L. 0. Nielsen, Theology and
Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study qf Gilbert Porreta 's Thinking and the Theological
Expositions qf the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130-1180 (Leiden, 1982).
John of Salisbury: C. C.]. Webb,john qf Salisbury (London, 1932). H. Liebeschutz,
Mediaeval Humanism in the Life and Writings qfjohn of Salisbury (London, 1950). R. H. and
M.A. Rouse, 'John of Salisbury and the doctrine ofTyrannicide', Speculum, XLII ( 1967),
693-709, examines a crux of political theory of interest also for thirteenth-century
treatment of the same problem.
R. W. Southern, 'Aspects of the European Tradition ofHistorical Writing: 2. Hugh
ofSt Victor and the Idea of Historical Development', Transactions of the Royal Historical
Sociery, 5th ser. xxt (1971), 159-79, discusses the theme with reference to the De
Sacramentis.
R. Klibansky, 'Standing on the Shoulders of Giants', Isis, XXVI (1936), 147-9, on a
famous phrase.
R. W. Southern, Medieval Humanism and Other Studies (Oxford, 1970), contains his
important critique of the 'school of Chartres' and is otherwise of interest. For other
accounts of 'Chartres' see N. Haring, 'Chartres and Paris Revisited', in J. R.
O'Donnell, ed., Essays in honour of Anton Charles Pegis (Toronto, 1974), pp. 268--329; P.
Dronke, 'New Approaches to the School of Chartres', Anuario de £studios Medievales, VI
(1969), 117-40; R. Giacone, 'Masters, Books and Library at Chartres according to the
Cartularies of Notre-Dame and Saint-Pere', Vivarium, XII (1974), 30-51. Cf. also R. W.
Southern, Platonism, Scholastic Method and the School qf Chartres (The Stenton Lecture,
1978; University of Reading, 1979), for an examination of the 'Platonism' of'Chartres',
and his 'The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres', in Benson et al., Renaissance
and Renewal in the Twelfth Centu~y, pp. 113-37. Whatever the view taken of'Chartres',
twelfth-century cosmology loses none of its interest, see: N. M. Haring, 'The Creation
and Creator of the World according to Thierry ofChartres and Clarembaldus of Arras',
246 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

AHDLMA, xxn (1955), 137-216; S. Gersh, 'Platonism-Neoplatonism-Aristotelian-

ism: a Twelfth century Metaphysical System and its Sources', in Benson et al.,
Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, pp. 512-34; J. Silverstein, 'Elementatum:
its Appearance among the Twelfth Century Cosmogonists', Mediaeval Studies, XVI
( 1954), 156-62; M. Gibson, 'The Study of the "Timaeus" in the Eleventh and Twelfth
Centuries', Pensamiento, xxv ( 1969), 183-94, on a principal source. P. Dronke, Fabula.
Explorations into the Uses of M_yth in Medieval Platonism (Leiden; Cologne, 1974), W.
Wetherbee, Platonism and Poetry The Litera~y Influence rif the School rif Chartres (Princeton,
1972), and B. Stock, Myth and Science in the Twelfth Century. A Study rif Bernard Silvester
(Princeton, 1972), share interests.
M.D. Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century (Chicago, 1968), is selected
chapters from his La Thiologie au Douzieme Siecle.
S. Kuttner, 'Gratian and Plato', in C. N. L. Brookeetal., eds, Church and Government in
the Middle Ages. Essays presented to C. R. Cheney (Cambridge, 1976), on a particular aspect
of the philosophical influence and see other bibliography there for the philosophical
influence on legal theory.
B. Smalley, 'Ecclesiastical Attitudes to Novelty c. I 100--1250', Studies in Church
History, XII (1975), 113-33, considers the appreciation of change as development as
both regards religious organisation and intellectual outlook.
R. M. Thomson, 'England and the Twelfth Century Renaissance', Past and Present, CI
(1983), 3-21, reopens this subject with interesting reflections on the geography and
regional character oflearning.

4. NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS

Arabic thought and its influence: N. Daniel, The Arabs and Mediaeval Europe (2nd edn;
London; New York, 1979), provides a general survey with chapters on theological and
scientific influences; see also W. Montgomery Watt, The bifluence rif Islam on Medieval
Europe (Edinburgh, 1972). Montgomery Watt's Islamic Philosophy and Theology (Ediri~
burgh, 1964), is very helpful as an introduction; see also CHLGEMP, part vm (by R.
Walzer). More detailed but still offering a clear outline isM. Fakhry, A Histo~y rif Islamic
Philosophy (New York; London, 1970). I. Husik, A History rif Mediaeval jewish Philosopky
(New York, 1916; repr. 1974), is still useful as an introduction to this strand. I. I. Efros,
Studies in Medieval jewish Philbsophy (New York; London, 1974), is more specialised than
will suit the purposes of the general reader. F. E. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs: the
Aristotelian Tradition in Islam (New York; London, 1968), is especially valuable and may
be supplemented by consulting his Aristoteles Arabus (Leiden, 1968). R. Walzer, Greek
into Arabic, Essa_ys on Islamic Philosophy (London, 1962), is also important on the eastern
translation process.
S. M. Afnan, Avicenna, his Life and Works (London, 1958), is less useful for the
historian of the western scene than Goichon's study in section B. W. Montgomery
Watt, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of Al-Ghazali (Ed in burgh, 1963), is a valuable account
not only of this figure but of the Islamic philosophical context. On the development of
the theory of the intellect there is little in English but seeR. Walzer, 'Aristotle's Active
Intellect vov9 1TOLTJTLKO~ in Greek and Early Islamic Philosophy', in Plotino e il
Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei; Rome, 1974),
pp. 422-36. B. H. Zedler, 'Averroes on the Possible Intellect', Proceedings '![the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, xxv (1951), 164-78, is a clear analysis.
Translations: there are good general accounts by D. C. Lindberg, 'The Transmission
of Greek and Arabic Learning to the West', in Lindberg, ed., Science in the Middle Ages
(Chicago; London, 1978), pp. 52-90, and M.-T. d'Alverny, 'Translations and
Translators', in Benson et al., Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Centu~y, pp. 421-62.
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 247
C. H. Haskins, Studies in the History of Mediaeval Science (Cambridge, Mass., 1927), was
the pioneering work and is still important. L. Thorndike, 'John of Seville', Speculum,
XXXIV ( 1959), 20-38, is judicious. D. H. Salman, 'The Mediaeval Latin Translations of
Alfarabi's Works', New Scholasticism, xm (1939), 245-61.]. T. Muckle, 'Greek Works
translated directly into Latin before 1350', Mediaeval Studies, IV ( 1942), 34-42, is useful
for the early period. L. Minio-Paluello, 'Iacobus Veneticus Grecus Canonist and
Translator of Aristotle', Traditio, vm (1952), 265-304, and see his Opuscula, the Latin
Aristotle (Amsterdam, 1972), for the author's principal articles on this theme before
1969. C. S. F. Burnett, 'A Group of Arabic-Latin Translators Working in Northern
Spain in the Mid-12th Century', Journal qf the Royal Asiatic Society, I (1977), 62-108. L.
Thorndike, Michael Scot (London, 1965). R. Lemay, Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism
in the Twelfth Century: the Recovery qf Aristotle's Natural Philosophy through Arabic Astrology
(Beirut, 1962). J. A. Weisheipl, The Development of Physical Theory in the Middle Ages
(University of Michigan, 1959), is a useful short survey of some of the effects of the
translations. W. F. Ryan and C. B. Schmitt, eds, Pseudo-Aristotle. The Secret of Secrets.
Sources and Influences (London, 1982), contains specialist studies on this, the most widely
diffused of the spurious works attributed to Aristotle in the middle ages.
Universities: H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, ed. F. M.
Powicke and A. B. Emden, 3 vols (Oxford, 1936), is fundamental. A. B. Cobban, The
Medieval Universities, their Development and Organization (London, 1975), is a very clear
account. Of particular relevance is G. Leff, Paris and Oxford Universities in the Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Centuries. An Institutional and Intellectual History (New York, 1968). L. J.
Daly, The Medieval University 1200-1400 (New York, 1961), is also useful. D. L. Douie,
The Conflict between the Seculars and the Mendicants at the University qf Paris in the Thirteenth
Century (Aquinas Society of London, Aquinas Papers, no. 23; London, 1954), on this
problem.J. W. Baldwin, 'Masters at Paris from 1179 to 1215: a Social Perspective', in
Benson et al., Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, pp. 138-72. A. G. Little and
F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians c. AD 1282-1302 (Oxford, 1934), though a little
later than our period has among other aspects a good account of academic exercises.

5. ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY - THE FIRST PHASE OF

ASSIMILATION

and

6. ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY - SYSTEM BUILDING AND

CONTROVERSY

Much of the material for the period covered by Chapter 5 is of a specialist nature. For
particular aspects, see the endnotes. The best survey is that by F. van Steenberghen,
noted in section B. As the bibliography for the thirteenth century and especially forSt
Thomas Aquinas is very large, I mainly confine the present to more general works. I
have also kept in mind the interests of historians rather than of philosophers. For more
detailed bibliography, consult the works mentioned and the bibliographical guides
listed above.
F. van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West. The Origins qf Latin Aristotelianism (2nd edn;
Louvain, 1970), is a good introduction to the period; see also his The Philosophical
Movement in the Thirteenth Century (Belfast; Edinburgh, 1955) (lectures). A series of
studies by W. H. Principe, under the general title, The Theology qfthe H_ypostatic Union in
the Ear£y Thirteenth Centu~y (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Studies and Texts,
VII, XII, XIX, xxxii; Toronto, 1963-75), though concerned with a specific theological
doctrine, contain treatment of the philosophical presuppositions and provide short
biographies and extensive bibliographies for the theologians considered. These are:
248 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

William of Auxerre (vol. 1; 1963); Alexander of Hales (vol. II; 1967); Hugh of
Saint-Cher (vol. m; 1970); Philip the Chancellor (vol. Iv; 1975 ). On the early period at
Oxford, see D. A. Callus, 'Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford', Proceedings
riftht British Academy, xxiX (1943), 229-81; c( Callus, 'Two Early Oxford Masters on the
Problem of Plurality of Forms. Adam of Buckfield. Richard Rufus of Cornwall', Revue
Neoscolastique de Philosophie, XLII ( 1939), 411-45. C. H. Lawrence, St Edmund rif Abingdon
(Oxford, 1960), is the standard study of a figure whose scholastic career is of interest. S.
P. Marrone, William rif Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste. New Ideas rif Truth in the Early
Thirteenth Century (Princeton, 1983), considers developments in epistemology in the
period.
L.]. Bowman, 'The Development of the Doctrine of the Agent Intellect in the
Franciscan School of the Thirteenth Century', The Modern Schoolman, L (1972-3),
251-79, sketches the doctrine through the century among teachers of this order. There
are several important studies ofBonaventure:J. G. Bougerol, Introduction to the Works rif
Bonaventure (Paterson, New Jersey, 1964; translated from French), is very useful; E.
Gilson, The Philosophy rif St Bonaventure (Paterson, New Jersey, 1965; translated from
French), is a valuable interpretation; J. F. Quinn, The Historical Constitution rif St
Bonaventure's Philosophy (Toronto, 1973), is exhaustive and judicious. R. McKeon,
'Philosophy and Theology, History and Science in the Thought of Bonaventura and
Thomas Aquinas', in D. Tracy, ed., Celebrating the Medieval Heritage: a Colloquy on the
Thought rif Aquinas and Bonaventure (The journal rif Religion, LVIII, Supplement, 1978), is a
useful consideration of the method of the two thinkers.
]. A. Weisheipl, ed., Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, Commemorative Essays 1980
(Toronto, 1980), serves as a valuable review of the main features and problems. J.
Dunbabin, 'The Two Commentaries of Albertus Magnus on the Nicomachean Ethics',
Recherches de Thiologie Ancienneet Midievale, xxx ( 1963), 232-50, is an important study. L.
A. Kennedy, 'The Nature of the Human Intellect according to St Albert the Great', The
ModernSchoolman, XXXVII (1959-60), 121-37.
]. A. Weisheipl,Friar Thomas d'Aquino, his Life, Thought and Work (New York, 1974), is
the standard biography, with a useful catalogue of authentic works. Among the
introductions to Aquinas' thought note especially: J. Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas
(New York, 1962): M.-D. Chenu, Towards Understanding StThomas (Chicago, 1964); F.
C. Copleston, Aquinas (Harmondsworth, 1955 ); A. Kenny, Aquinas (Oxford, 1980). The
two latter are readable discussions from a philosophical viewpoint. E. Gilson, The
Christian Philosophy rif St Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956), is an excellent study. A. C.
Pegis,St Thomas and the Problem rifthe Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Toronto, 1934 ), is also
excellent on this aspect. StThomas Aquinas Commemorative Studies, 2 vols (Toronto, 1974),
contains important articles, some of which are signalled in the endnotes; see also, G.
Verbeke and D. Verhelst, eds, Aquinas and the Problems rif his Time ( Mediaevalia
Lovaniensia, series 1, Studia 5; Louvain, 1976) and A. Parel, ed., Calgary Aquinas Studies
(Toronto, 1978) (especially E. Synan, 'Aquinas and his Age'). B. Moiidin, St Thomas
Aquinas' Philosophy in the Commentary to the Sentences (The Hague, 1975), is technical but
useful in examining a rather neglected work. J. Doig, Aquinas on Metaphysics. A
Historico-Doctrinal Stutly rifthe Commentary on the Metaphysics (The Hague, 1972), is a close
exposition. R.J. Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism. A Study rifthe Plato and Platonici Texts in
the Writings I![ Saint Thomas (The Hague, 1956), on an aspect of Aquinas' thought which
has received insufficient emphasis. The evolving interpretation of Aquinas' political
thought as bearing on the De Regno in particular may be followed in L. E. Boyle, 'The De
Regno and the Two Powers', in O'Donnell, ed., Essays in honour rif Anton Charles Pegis,
pp. 237-47, and]. Catto, 'Ideas and Experience in the Political Thought of Aquinas',
Past and Present, LXXI (1976), 3-21; cf. also the first study (by L. Genicot, in French) in
Verbeke and Verhelst, eds, Aquinas and the Problems rif his Time, which provides a
convenient review. T. Gilby, Principality and Polity: Aquinas and the Rise rif State Theory in
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 249
the West (London, 1958). P. E. Persson, Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Rtvelaton in Aquinas
(Oxford, 1970). R. Mcinerney, Ethica Thomistica: the Moral PhilosopkyrifThomas Aquinas
(Washington, D.C., 1982).
]. McEvoy, The Philosopky of Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 1982), is a splendidly clear
analysis. See also J. McEvoy, 'The Chronology of Robert Grosseteste's Writings on
Nature and Natural Philosophy', Speculum, LVIII (1983 ), 614-55. A. C. Crombie, Robert
Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science 1100-1700 (Oxford, 1953), for an
assessment of Grosseteste within this strand.
D. E. Sharp,Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1930), was
pioneering and remains fundamental. T. Crowley, Roger Bacon. The Problem rif the Soul in
his Philosophical Commentaries (Lou vain; Dublin, 1950). S.C. Easton, Roger Bacon and his
Searchfor a Universal Science (Oxford, 1952).
E. M. F. Sommer-Seckendorff, Studies in the Life ofRobert Kilwardby (Rome, 1937), and
D. Douie, Archbishop Pecham (Oxford, 1952), on these figures.
]. A. Weisheipl, 'The Parisian Faculty of Arts in Mid-Thirteenth Century:
1240-1270', American Benedictine Review, xxv (1974), 200-17, is a general account of
developments in the curriculum and of the academic exercises.
Controversy and condemnation: F. van Steenberghen, Thomas Aquinas and Radical
Aristotelianism (Washington, D.C., 1980). E. P. Mahoney, 'Sense, Intellect and
Imagination in Albert, Thomas and Siger', in Kretzmann et al., eds, Cambridge History rif
Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 602-22, is recommended as a clear survey, which gives
careful attention to the nuances in Siger's position.]. F. Wippel, 'The Condemnations
ofl270 and 1277 at Paris' ,Journal rif Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vn (1977), 169-201.
D. A. Callus, 'The Condemnation ofSt Thomas at Oxford' (The Aquinas Society of
London, Aquinas Paper no. 5; London, 1955).

B. BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WoRKS IN OTHER LANGUAGES

I. GENERAL REVIEWS AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS

M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, 2 vols (Freiburg, 1909-11; repr.
Darmstadt, 1961) is by a scholar who did much to establish the study of the subject;
also by him are Die Philosophie des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1921 ), and, with more specialised
treatments, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, 3 vols (Munich, 1926-56). Also fundamental
treatments and the starting point for much subsequent work were M. de Wulf, Histoire
de Ia Philosophie Medievale, 3 vols (6th edn; Louvain, 1947) (also available in English),
and B. Geyer, Die patristische und scholastische Philosophie (vol. II ofF. Ueberweg, Grundriss
der Geschichte der Philosophie) (Berlin, 1928). P. Vignaux, La Pensee au .'vfl!J'en Age (Paris,
1938) is a good synthesis.
A. Siegmund, Die Uberlieferung der griechischen christlichen Literatur in der lateinischen
Kirche bis ;cum 12.Jahrhundert (Munich, 1949), covers an important strand. C. von Prantl,
Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, 4 vols (Leipzig, 1855-70; repr. 1955), is still basic for
this subject. For more recent studies, consult Ashworth, The Tradition rif Medieval Logic,
cited in section AI. 0. Lottin, Psychologie et Morale aux Xlle et Xllle Siecles, 6 vols
(Louvain, 1942-60), is a study of a specific theme which casts light on the thought of
many major and minor figures. W. Beierwaltes, Platonismus in der Philosophic des
Mittelalters (Darmstadt, 1969), is a collection of essays on a subject for which there is
more bibliography below (Chapters 1-3). P. Wilpert, ed., Die Metaphysik im Mille/alter
ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung (Berlin, 1963; Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 2) (conference
papers), has a number of specialist studies of central interest. P. Duhem, Le Systeme du
Monde: Histoire des Doctrines Cosmologiques de Platona Copernic, 10 vols (Paris, 1913-59), is
the monumental account of this subject.
F. van Steenberghen, Introduction a!'Etude de Ia Philosophie Midiivale Recueil de Travaux
250 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

qfferii !'Auteur parses Collegues, ses Etudiants et ses Amis (Louvain: Paris, 1974: Philosophes
medievaux, xvm), is a mine of information on the history of study of the subject and
some of its principal themes. Steenberghen's La Bibliotheque du Philosophe Midieviste
(Louvain; Paris, 1974; Philosophes medievaux, XIX), is very useful. ForSt Augustine
there are C. Andresen, Bibliographia Augustiniana (Darmstadt, 1962) and T. van Bavel,
Repertoire Bibliographique de Saint Augustin (1950-1960) (The Hague, 1963 ). C. Vasoli, ed.,
II Pensiero Medievale, Orientamenti Bibliografici (Bari, 1971 ), is an invaluable guide.
Of serial publications may be noted especially: Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Lilleraire
du M'!)len Age (Paris, 1926- ), Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Midievale (Louvain,
1929- ) and Revue du Moyen Age Latin (Lyons-Strasbourg, 1945- ). The various
monograph volumes ofBeitriige ;z:ur Geschichte der Philosophie [und Theologie] des Mittelalters
(Miinster, 1891- ), have supplied a wealth of studies and texts. The series Settimana di
Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto Medioevo (Spoleto, 1954- ) has explored a
number of central themes. Revue d'Hi:stoire Ecclesiastique (Lou vain, 1900- ) publishes
an annual bibliography of publications in this and related fields. Other indications of
relevant serial publications may be got from the endnotes, within, or from the list in
Vasoli, ll Pensiero Medievale. C. Leonardi, ed., Medioevo Latino: Bolletino Bibliografico della
Cultura Europea dal Secolo VI al XIII (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto
Medioevo, 1980) is the first of what is intended as an annual review.

2. SOURCES

The following list of selected sources reflects broadly the order of treatment in the text.
Though more and more replaced by critical editions, J. P. Migne, ed., Patrologia
Latina, 221 vols (Paris, 1844-55 ), remains an immensely valuable collection for texts up
to the early thirteenth century. The series Corpus Christianorum (with its Continuatio
Medievalis) (Turnhout, 1954- ) and Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vie-
nna, 1866- ) are also fundamental. There are series devoted to individual authors as
will be noted below. It is not possible here to provide a comprehensive guide to the
works of individual authors; for more detail see the works cited under sections AI and
Bl above and the bibliographies in specialised secondary studies.
St Augustine: for a full list of Augustine's works and of editions to that date see the
bibliographical guide (adapted by J. J. O'Meara) in H. Marrou, Saint Augustine and his
Influence through the Ages (New York; London, 1957). Important additions, from the
Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, are as follows: vol. XXXII (1962) - De Doctrina
Christiana, De Vera Religione; vols L, La ( 1968) -De Trinitate Libri XV; vol. XXIX ( 1970) -
Contra Academicos, De Beata Vita, De Ordine, De Magistro, De Libero Arbitrio; vol. XLIV
(1970)- De Diversis Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum; vol. XXVII (1981)- Confessionum Libri
XIII. The Bibliotheque Augustinienne edition of the City rif God, Oeuvres de Saint
Augustin, La Cite de Dieu, 5 vols (Desclee de Brouwer [Paris], 1959-..DO), is conveniently
divided and has facing Latin text and French translation.
Martianus Capella: De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, ed. A. Dick (Leipzig, 1925;
corrected repr., Stuttgart, 1970); also ed. J. C. King (Tiibingen, 1979).
Macrobius: In Somnium Scipionis, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig, 1970).
Boethius: De Consolatione Philosophiae, ed. L. Bieler (Corpus Christianorum, xCiv;
1954). Opuscula Sacra (with De Consolatione Philosophiae), ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K.
Rand (London; Cambridge, Mass., 1918; rev. edn by S. J. Tester, 1973). Logical
Works: the Commentaries on Porphyry'slsagoge are edited by S. Brandt (CSEL, XLVIII;
1906); those on De lnterpretatione, by C. Meiser (Leipzig, 1877-80); that on Cicero's
Topics in M. Tullii Ciceronis Opera Omnia, ed.J. C. Orelli andj. G. Baiter, v, I (Zurich,
1833). DeSyllogismis Hypotheticis, ed. L. Obertello (Brescia, 1969). Otherwise the text is
that ofPL, LXIV. Boethius' translations are edited in Aristoteles Latinus as follows: I (1-5)
(Bruges; Paris, 1961 ), Categoriae vel Praedicamenta; I (6-7) (Bruges; Paris, 1966 ),
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 251
Categoriarum Supplementa (including Porphyrii lsagoge): II (1-2) (Leiden, 1965), De
Interpretatione vel Periermenias; m (1-4) (Bruges; Paris, 1962), Analytica Priora; v (1-3)
(Leiden, 1969), Topica; all the foregoing are edited by L. Minio-Paluello; VI (1-3), ed. B.
G. Dod (Leiden; Brussels, 1975 ), De Sophisticis Elenchis. The treatises De Arithmetica and
De Musica are edited by G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1867).
Cassiodorus: lnstitutiones, ed. R. A. B. Mynors (Oxford, 1937).
Isidore of Seville: Etymologiarum sive Originum libri XX, ed. W. M. Lindsay, 2 vols
(Oxford, 1911 ). Etymologies: Livre XVII, de /'Agriculture, ed. and tr. (into French), J.
Andre (Auteurs Latins du Moyen Age; Paris, 1981) (the first volume of a series which
will eventually cover all twenty books). Traite de Ia Nature, ed. and tr. J. Fontaine
(Bordeaux, 1960).
Fredegisus: De Substantia Nihili et de Tenebris, ed. Monumenta Germaniae Historica,
Epistulae, IV (Berlin, 1895 ), 552-5; see also, C. Gennaro, Fridugiso di Tours e il De
Substantia Nihili et Tenebrarum Edizione Critica e Studio lntroduttivo con una Aggiunta
Palaeograjica (Padua, 1963 ). Agobard's Letter to Fredegisus is edited in Monumenta
Germaniae Historica, Epistulae, v (Berlin, 1898), 210-21.
John Scotus Eriugena: Periphyseon, 1-lll, ed. I. P. Sheldon-Williams (Dublin,
1968--81 ). De Divina Praedestinatione Liber, ed. G. Madec (Corpus Christianorum,
Continuatio Medievalis, L: 1978). Annotationes in Marcianum, ed. C. Lutz (Cambridge,
Mass., 1939). Expositiones in lerarchiam Coelestem (Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio
Medievalis, XXXI; 1975 ). Homelie sur le Prologue de Jean, ed. E. Jeauneau (Paris, 1969).
Commentaire sur l'Evangile de jean, ed. E. Jeauneau (Paris, 1972). E. Jeauneau, Quatre
Themes Erigeniens (Montreal; Paris, 1978), prints in Part II, a version of Book I of a
commentary on Martian us Capella, De Nuptiis, liber I, which differs from that edited by
Lutz.
Ratramnus of Corbie: Liber de Anima ad Odonem Bellovacensem, ed. D. C. Lambot
(Namur; Lille, 1952).
Remigius of Auxerre: Remigii Antissiodorensis Commentum in Martianum Capellam, ed. C.
E. Lutz (Leiden, 1962-5 ).
For commentaries by Bovo of Carvey (late ninth or early tenth century) and
Adalbold of Utrecht (early eleventh century) on Boethius' Consolation, see R. B. C.
Huygens, 'Mittelalterliche Kommentare zum 0 qui perpetua', Sacris Erudiri, VI (1954 ),
373-427. See also for Adalbold, E. T. Silk, 'Pseudo-Johannes Scott us, Adalbold of
Utrecht and the Early Commentaries on Boethius', Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies, m
(1954), [1-40], 14-24.
Abba of Fleury: Syllogismorum Categoricorum et Hypotheticorum Enodatio, ed. A. van de
Vyver (Bruges, 1966).
Gerbert of Aurillac: Gerbert's pupil, Richer, left an important account ofhis master's
method; see Richeri Historiarum Libri Quatuor, m, 46-7, ed. G. Waitz (Monumenta
Germaniae Historica, Scriptorum Rerum Germanicarum; Hanover, 1877).
Peter Damian: Pierre Damien Lettre sur Ia Toute-Puissance Divine, ed. A. Cantin (Sources
Chretiennes, 191; Paris, 1972). Latin text with facing French translation.
Lanfranc and Berengar: Lanfranc, Liber de Corporeet Sanguine Domini, PL, cL, 407-42.
Berengar, De Sacra Coena adversus Lanfrancum, ed. A. F. and F. T. Vischer (Berlin, 1834)
also W. H. Beekenkamp (The Hague, 1941).
Anselm of Bee: Opera Omnia, ed. F. S. Schmitt, 6 vols (Edinburgh, 1946-61 ).
Gilbert Crispin: C. C. J. Webb, 'Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of Westminster: Dispute of
Christian with a Heathen Touching the Faith of Christ', Mediaeval and Renaissance
Studies, m (1954), 55-77. Giselberti Crispini Disputatio Judei et Christiani, ed. B.
Blumenkranz (Utrecht: Antwerp, 1956).
Peter Abelard: the Historia Calamitatum is edited by J. T. Muckle in Mediaeval Studies,
xn (1950), 163-213 and by J. Monfrin (2nd edn; Paris, 1962). (Note that although the
title Historia Calamitatum is universally established, it has poor manuscript authority
252 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

and is probably a construction.) For logical and theological works respectively see
notes 24 and 64 to Chapter 3.
A certain amount of specialised material, by anonymous or attributed authors,
illustrative of the logical movement from the twelfth century, has appeared in the
periodical, Universite de Copenhague, Cahiers de 1'/nstitut du Moyen-Age Cree et Latin
(cited below as CIMAGL); see especially: S. Ebbesen, 'Anonymi Bodleiani in
Sophisticos Elenchos Aristotelis Commentarii Fragmentum', CIMAGL, VIII (1972),
3-32 (a fragmentary survival, dated c. 1150); Ebbesen, 'Paris 4720A. A Twelfth
Century Compendium of Aristotle'sSophistici Elenchi', CIMAGL, x (1973), 1-20 (edited
extracts); Ebbesen, 'Anonymus Aurelianensis II, Aristotle, Alexander, Porphyry and
Boethius. Ancient Scholasticism and Twelfth Century Western Europe', CIMAGL, XVI
(1976), 1-128; N.J. Green Pedersen, 'William of Champeaux on Boethius' Topics
according to Orleans Bib!. Mun. 266', C/MAGL, XIII (1974), 13-30 (edited fragments
from a manuscript which contains many references to contemporaries of Abelard; with
argument that a Magister W. is William of Champeaux); Green Pedersen, 'On the
Interpretation of Aristotle's Topics in the Thirteenth Century', C/MAGL, IX (1973),
1-46 (a consideration of the terminology used by a number of thirteenth-century
commentators on the work, with edited selections).
John of Salisbury: Metalogicon, ed. C. C. J. Webb (Oxford, 1929); Policraticus, ed. C.
C.J. Webb (Oxford, 1909).
Gilbert of Poi tiers: The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert qf Poitiers, ed. N. Haring
(Toronto, 1966).
Peter Lombard: Libri IV Sententiarum, ed. A. Hey sse (Quaracchi, 1916 ). Sententiae in IV
Libris Distinctae (Quaracchi, 1971- ).
Hugh ofSt Victor: Didascalicon, De Studio Legendi, ed. C. H. Buttimer (Washington,
D.C., 1939).
Richard ofSt Victor: Richard de Saint Victor, De Trinitate Texte Critique avec Introduction,
Noteset Tables, ed.J. Ribaillier (Paris, 1958). Richard de Saint- Victor, La Trinite, ed. and tr.
G. Salet (Sources Chretiennes, LXIII; Paris, 1959) (Latin text with facing French
translation).
Walter ofSt Victor: P. Glorieux, 'Le Contra Quatuor Labyrinthos Franciae de Gauthier
de Saint-Victor, Edition Critique', AHDLMA, XIX (1952), 187-335.
Thierry of Chartres: Commentaries on Boethius kY Thierry qf Chartres and his School, ed. N.
M. Haring (Toronto, 1971 ).
William of Conches: see notes 104 and 106 to Chapter 3. TheDragmaticon was printed
as Dialogus de Substantiis Physicis, ed. G. Gratarolus (Strasbourg, 1567).
Clarembald of Arras: Life and Works qf Clarembald qf Arras, ed. N. Haring (Toronto,
1965).
Bernard Silvestris: Cosmographia, ed., with introduction and notes, P. Dronke
(Leiden, 1978).
AI Farabi: for his treatise on the intellect, see note 10 to Chapter 4.
Avicenna: Avicenna Latinus, ed. S. van Riet, 3 vols (Lou vain; Leiden, 1968-77 ).
AI Ghazali: see note 41 to Chapter 4.
Averroes: Mediaeval Academy of America, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in
Aristotelem, including Compendia Librorum Aristotelis qui Parva Naturalia Vocantur, ed. A. L.
Shields (Cambridge, Mass. 1949); Commentarium Medium in Aristotelis De Generatione et
Corruptione Libros, ed. F. H. Fobes and S. Kurland (Cambridge, Mass., 1956):
Commentarium Magnum in Aristotelis De Anima Libros, ed. F. S. Crawford (Cambridge,
Mass., 1953 ). Other commentaries are printed in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois
Commentariis (Venice, 1562-7 4).
Isaac Israeli: J. T. Muckle, 'Isaac Israeli, Liber de Definicionibus', AHDLMA, XI
(1937-8), 299-340, prints two versions of a translation.
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 253
Ibn Gabirol (Avicebrol): see note 29 to Chapter 4.
Domininic Gundisalvi: see note 42 to Chapter 3.
Plato Latinus, ed. R. Klibansky (Londo11, 1940-62): 1, Meno; 11. Phaeda; III. Parmenides;
IV. Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus, ed. J. H. Waszink.
Aristoteles Latinus, ed. G. Lacombe, L. Minio-Paluello et al. (variously at Bruges-
Paris, Louvain-Leiden, 1939- ).
The Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecum under the direction of G.
Verbeke has published a number of Latin texts oflate antique Greek commentaries; see
especially,
Themistius: Commentaire sur le Traiti de l'Ame d'Aristote Traduction de Guillaume de
Moerbeke (Louvain; Paris, 1957);
John Philoponus: Jean Philopon Commentaire sur le De Anima d'Aristote Traduction de
Guillaume de Moerbeke, ed. G. Verbeke (Louvain; Paris, 1966);
Nemesius ofEmesa: Nemesius d'Emese De Natura Hominis Traduction de Burgundio de Pise,
ed. G. Verbeke andJ. R. Moncho (Leiden, 1975) (a mid-twelfth-century translation of
a treatise from the late fourth-century AD in which medical and philosophical theory
blends).
H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, eds, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, 4 vols (Paris,
1889--97), is indispensable for documentation on the history of the university and the
thirteenth-century philosophical context.
P. Glorieux, Repertoire des Maitres en Thiologie de Paris au X !lie Siicle, 2 vols (Paris,
1933--4 ), and La Faculte des Arts et ses Maitres au X file Siecle (Paris, 1971 ), A. B. Emden, A
Biographical Register of the University qf Oxford to AD 1500, 3 vols (Oxford, 1957-9), and A
Biographical Register of the University of Cambridge to 1500 (Cambridge, 1963 ), are standard
guides to individual figures.
John Blund: Johannes Blund Tractatus de Anima, ed. D. A. Callus and R. W. Hunt
(London, 1970).
William of Auxerre (Guilelmus Antissiodorensis): Aurea in Quattuor Sententiarum Libras
Perlucida Explanatio (Paris [ 1500)). A new edition is in progress: Magistri Guillelmi
Altissiodorensis Summa Aurea, ed., J. Ribaillier (Spicilegium Bonaventurianum, 16-- .
Paris; Quaracchi, 1980- ).
William of Auvergne (Guilelmus Alvernus): Opera Omnia (Venice, 1591 ); also
printed Paris, 1516 and Orleans, 1674-5. J. R. O'Donnell, ed., 'Tractatus Magistri
Guillelmi Alvernensis De Bono et Malo', Mediaeval Studies, VIII (1946), 245-99, and
'Tractatus Secundus Guillelmi Alvernensis De Bono et Malo', ibid., XVI (1954),
219--71. B. Switalski, ed., William of Auvergne De Trinitate. An Edition afthe Latin Text with
an Introduction (Toronto, 1976 ).
Alexander of Hales: Summa Theologica, 4 vols (Quaracchi, 1942~). Glossa in Quatuor
Libras Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, 4 vols (Quaracchi, 1951-7).
Philip the Chancellor: Ex Summa Philippi Cancellarii Quaestiones de Anima, ed. L. W.
Keeler (Munster, 1937).
John of La Rochelle: Tractatus de Divisione Multiplici Potentiarum Animae, Texte Critique
avec Introduction, ed. P. Michaud-Quantin (Paris, 1964 ).
Robert Grosseteste: Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, ed. L. Baur
(BGPMA, Ix; Munster, 1912). Roberti Grosseteste Commentarius in VIII Libras Physicorum
Aristotelis, ed. R. C. Dales (Boulder, Colorado, 1963). Robert GrossetesteHexaemeron,
ed. R. C. Dales and S. Gieben (London, 1982).
Roger Bacon: The Opus Maius qf Roger Bacon, ed. J. H. Bridges 3 vols (Oxford,
1897-1900). Fratris Rogeri Baconi Opera Quaedam hactenus inedita, ed.J. S. Brewer (Rolls
Series; London, 1859), for Opus tertium, Opus Minus and Compendium Philosophiae. Fratris
Roger Bacon Compendium Studii Theologiae, ed. H. Rashdall (Aberdeen, 1911). Rogeri
Baconis Mora/is Philosophia, ed. F. Delorme and E. Massa (Zurich, 1953). Opera hactenus
254 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

inedita Rogeri Baconis, ed. R. Steele and F. Delorme, 16 fascicles (Oxford, 1905-40). K.
M. Fred borg, L. Nielsen andJ. Pin borg, ed., 'An Unedited Part of Roger Bacon's Opus
Maius: De Signis', Traditio, XXXIV (1978), 75-136.
Robert Kilwardby: De Ortu Scientiarum, ed. A. G. Judy (London, 1976).
St Bonaventure: S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, 10 vols (Quaracchi, 1882-1902).
Collationes in Hexaemeron, ed. F. Delorme (Quaracchi, 1934): another redaction of this
work.
Albert the Great: Opera Omnia, ed. A. Borgnet, 38 vols (Paris, 1890-9). A new, critical
edition is in progress: Opera Omnia, ed. B. Geyeret al. (Munster, 1951- ).
StThomas Aquinas: for the various editions see the catalogue of authentic works inj.
A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino, his Life, Thought and Work (New York, 1974). The
preferred edition is generally the Leonine edition of the Opera Omnia (Rome, 1882- ).
Two important sets of texts have been published in this series since Weisheipl's
catalogue was compiled: Opera Omnia, vol. XLII (Rome, 1979) (containing, inter alia, De
Regno ad Regem Cypri); Opera Omnia, vol. XLIII (Rome, 1976) (containing, inter alia, De
Principiis Naturae, De Aeternitate Mundi, De Unitate Intellectus). The Blackfriars edition of
the Summa Theologiae, 60 vols (London, 1964-76), provides a Latin text with facing
English translation, in conveniently divided sections.
Siger of Brabant: Questions sur Ia Metaphysique, ed. C. A. Graiff (Louvain, 1948;
Philosophes medievaux, I). Les Quaestiones super Librum de Causis de Siger de Brabant, ed. A.
Marlasca (Louvain; Paris, 1972; Philosophes medievaux, xn). Quaestiones in Tertium de
Anima. De Anima Intellectiva. De Aeternitate Mundi, ed. B. Bazan (Louvain; Paris, 1972;
Philosophes medievaux, xm). Siger de Brabant, Ecrits de Logique, de Morale et de Physique
(Louvain; Paris, 1974; Philosophes medievaux, XIV). Questions sur Ia Physique d'Aristote,
ed. P. Delhaye (Louvain, 1941; Les Philosophes Belges, xv).
Boethius of Dacia: Opera in Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, ed. J. Pin borg
(Copenhagen, 1969- ).
Three anonymous commentaries dating from the 1270s on the De Anima are edited in
M. Giele, F. van Steenberghen and B. Bazan, Trois Commentaires Anonymes sur le Traite de
l'Amed'Arislote (Louvain; Paris, 1971; Philosophes medievaux, XI).

3. SECONDARY WORKS

More information of a specialist nature may be found in the endnotes. For more
detailed bibliography, consult works cited in section I and particular studies. As the
bibliography is intended primarily for English readers, the list does not normally
include titles for which there is a satisfactory English translation or studies the results of
which are incorporated in English publications.

I. MASTERS OF THOSE WHO KNOW - PLATO, ARISTOTLE AND THE NEOPLATONISTS

J. Danielou, Platonisme et Theologie ii1_ystique (2nd edn; Paris, 1953 ), is an important study
both for general background and for the character of Christian mysticism. On
particular influences, see P. Henry, Plotin et !'Occident (Louvain, 1934) and J.
Flamant, Macrobe et le Neoplatonisme' Larin a Ia Fin du !Ve Si'i!cle (Leiden, 1977). The
collection, Platino e it neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Accademia Nazionale dei
Lincei; Rome, 1974), has several important articles.

2. FROM ANCIENT WORLD TO MIDDLE AGES: ADAPTATION AND TRANSMISSION

I. St Augustine
On the Platonist contribution to Patristic thought, see E. von lvanka, Plato Christianus
Ubernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Viiter (Einsiedeln, 1964 ), and as
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 255
affecting Augustine in particular, C. Boyer, Christianisme et Nio-platonisme dans /a
Formation de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1920). See also Boyer'sL'Idee de Veriti dans /a Philosophie
de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1920), and his Essai sur /a Doctrine de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1932).
R. Holte, Beatitude et Sagesse: St Augustin et /e Prob/eme de /a Fin de /'Homme dans /a
Philosophie Ancienne (Paris, 1962), covers a theme of considerable interest. On the more
general context, H. I. Marron, Saint Augustin et Ia Fin de Ia Culture Antique (2nd edn, with
Retractatio; Paris, 1949), is stimulating. For the Corifessions seeP. Courcelle, Recherches sur
les Confessions de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1950). E. Lamirande, L'Eg/ise Ci/este se/on Saint
Augustin (Paris, 1963), examines the development and implications of Augustine's idea
of the city of God. J. Chaix-Ruy, Saint Augustin Temps et Histoire (Paris, 1956), examines
an important aspect of Augustine's outlook. G. de Plinval, Pi/age, ses Ecrits, sa Vie et sa
Riforme (Lausanne, 1943), is a useful treatment of this figure.

2. Boethius
The best treatment is now that by Chadwick, in section A, which provides an up to date
bibliography, but see also L. Obertello, Severino Boe:;.io, 2 vols (Genoa, 1974). On
Boethis' influence, two studies by P. Courcelle remain fundamental: La Consolation de
Phi/osophie dans Ia Tradition Littiraire Antecedents et Posteriti de Boece (Paris, 1967 ), which
includes iconography, and 'Etude Critique sur les Commentaires de Ia Consolation de
Boece, IX-XVe Siecles', AHDLMA, xn (1939), 5-140. See also F. Troncarelli, 'Per
una Ricerca sui Commenti Alto medievali al De Conso/atione di Boezio', in Miscellanea in
Memoria di Giorgio Cencetti (Turin, 1973), pp. 363-80. As regards the tradition of
commentary, H. Silvestre, 'Le Commentaire Inedit de Jean Scot Erigene au Metre IX
du Livre III du "De Consolatione Philosophiae" de Boece', Revue d'Histoire Ecc/esiasti-
que, XLVII (1952), 44-122, is of interest although the commentary in question is not now
thought to be by Eriugena. On the influence of the sacred treatises see G. Schrimpf, Die
Axiomenschrift des Boethius (De Hebdomadibus) als philosophisches Lehrbuch des Mittela/ters
(Leiden, 1966) and M. Cappuyns, 'Le plus ancien Commentaire des "Opuscula sacra"
et son Origine', Recherches de Thio/ogie Ancienne et Midieva/e, m ( 1931), 237-72.
On Macroobius: J. Flamant, Macrobe et /e Nio-Platonisme Latin ii la Fin du IVe Siecle
(Leiden, 1977), and for influence beyond, M. Schedler, Die Phi/osophie des Macrobius und
ihr Einjluss auf die Wissenschaft des christlichen Mitte/a/ters (BGPMA, vol. 13, Part I;
Miinster, 1916 ). P. Courcelle, 'La Posterite Chretienne du Songe de Scipion', Revue des
Etudes Latines, XXXVI ( 1958), 205-34, considers the early influence and the formation of
the tradition.
J. Fontaine, Isidore de Seville et Ia Culture C/assique dans l'Espagne Wisigothique, 2 vols
(Paris, 1959), is authoritative.

3. John Scotus Eriugena

On other philosophical work contemporary with Eriugena, a subject which has
received important recent attention in English, see J.-P. Bouhot, Ratramne de Corbie
Histoire Littiraire et Controversy Doctrinales (Paris, 1966), and P. Delhaye, Une Controverse
sur l'Ame Universelle au IXe Siecle (Lille; Namur, 1950). M. Cristiani, Dal/' Unanimitas all'
Universitas da A/cuino a Giovanni Eriugena: Lineamenti ldeologici e Terminologia Politica della
Cu/tura del Seco/o IX (Rome, 1978), considers the intellectual history.in its wider context
and shows how the predestinarian controversy had political implications.
On Eriugena's major Greek authority, seeR. Roques, L'Univers Dionysien: Structure
Hierarchique du Monde seton /e Pseudo-Den_ys (Paris, 1954 ).
M. Cappuyns, Jean Scot Erigene sa Vie, son Oeuvre, sa Pensee (Lou vain; Paris, 1933;
reprinted Brussels, 1969), is fundamental; see also M. dal Pra, Scoto Eriugena (Milan,
1951 ). P. Mazzarella, 1/ Pensiero di Giovanni Scoto Eriugena Saggio lnterpretativo (Padua,
1957) and G. Bonafede, Scola Eriugena (Palermo, 1969), are both centred on the
Periphyseon. G. Schrimpf, Das Werk des Johannes Scottus Eriugena im Rahmen des
256 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Wissmschaftsverstiindnisses seiner Zeit eine Hinfiihrung zu Periphyseon (BGPMA, Neue Folge,

xxm; Munster, 1982), presents that work more comprehensively. On particular
aspects and problems, see C. Allegro, Giovanni Scoto Eriugena Fede e Ragione (Rome, I 974)
(on tile theme of faith and reason); E. Jeauneau, Quatre Themes Erigeniens (Conference
Albert-Ie-Grand, 1974, Montreal; Paris, 1978), Part I of which consists of short,
pleasing essays on themes in Eriugena; Jeauneau, 'Jean Scot Erigene et le Grec',
Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi, XLI (I 979), 5-50, on Eriugena's knowledge of Greek and
motives in translating. jean Scot Erigi!ne et l 'Histoire de la Philosophie (Colloques
Internationaux du C.N.R.S., Laon 7-12 juillet 1975; Paris, I 977), consists of collected
conference papers ranging over Eriugena's context, thought and influence. G.
d'Onofrio, 'Giovanni Scoto e Boezio: tracce degli "Opuscula Sacra" e della "Con-
solatio" nell' Opera Eriugeniana', Studi Medievali, 3rd ser. XXI, 2 (1980), illuminates
aspects both of Eriugena's thought and Boethius' influence. Also on sources is a
collection of conference papers, W. Beierwaltes, Eriugena Studien zu seinen Quellen
(Heidelberg, 1980). See also Beierwaltes, 'Eriugena Aspekte seiner Philosophie', in H.
LOwe, ed., Die lren und Europa imfriiheren Mittelalter, II (Stuttgart, 1982), 799-SI8. The
latter collection also includes a study of the controversy over predestination: G.
Schrimpf, 'Der Beitrag des Johannes Scottus Eriugena zum Priidestinationsstreit',
ibid., 8 I 9-65. P. Lucentini, Platonismo Medievale: Contributi per !a Storia dell' Eriugenismo
(Florence, 1979), on the tradition.

3. THE CENTRAL MIDDLE AGES - LOGIC, THEOLOGY AND COSMOLOGY

Schools: P. Riche, Les Ecoles et l'Enseignement dans !'Occident Chretien de la Fin du Ve Sii!cle au
Milieu du Xle Sii!cle (Paris, 1979). La Scuola nell' Occidente Latino dell' Alto Medioevo
(Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto Medioevo; 2 vols, Spoleto,
1972), has particularly important sections on the school from Cassiodorus to Alcuin,
and the Carolingian school from Alcuin to Remigius of Auxerre. See too G. Beaujean,
'L'Enseignement du "Quadrivium"', ibid., pp. 639-67; L. Minio-Paluello, 'Nuovi
impulsi allo studio della logica: Ia seconda fase della riscoperta di Aristotele e di
Boezio', ibid., pp. 743-66; J. Chatillon, 'Les Ecoles de Chartres et de Saint Victor',
ibid., pp. 795-839. G. Pare, A. Brunet and P. Tremblay, La Renaissance duXlie Sii!cle: les
Ecoles et l'Enseignement (Paris; Ottawa, I 933 ), and see also, P. Delhaye, 'L'Organisation
Scolaire au X lie Siecle', Traditio, v (1947), 211-68, which is a useful, briefreviewofthe
educational context before the universities. E. Lesne, Histoire de la Propriete Ecclisiastique
en France, 6 vols in 8 (Lille, I 910-43), v (I 940): Les Ecoles de la Fin du VIlle Sii!cle ala Fin du
X lie Siicle, has a wealth of information.
Logic: A. van de Vyver, 'Les Etapes du Developpement Philosophique du Haut
Moyen-Age', Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire, VII (I 929), 425-52, is fundamental; see
also Minio-Paluello, 'Nuovi impulsi'. Jean Isaac,Le Peri Hermeneias en Occident de Boece a
Saint Thomas (Paris, 1953), on this book of Aristotle's Organon. J. Reiners, Der
Nominalismus in der Friihscholastik (BGPMA, vol. vm, Part 5; Munster, 1910), on one
aspect. On a major figure, F. Picavet, Gerber! un Pape Philosophe d'apri!s l'Histoire et d'apri!s
la ligende (Paris, I 897 ), and U. Lindgren, Gerber! von Aurillac und das Quadrivium:
Untersuchungen zur Bildung im Zeitalter der Ottonen (Wiesbaden, 1976).
J. Gonzette, Pierre Damien et !a Culture Profane (Lou vain; Paris, I956 ), on this figure.
J. de Montclos, Lanfranc et Birenger, !a Controverse Eucharistique du Xle Siecle (Lou vain,
1971), is the fullest study of the dispute. A. Cantin, 'Ratio et Auctoritas dans Ia
Premiere Phase de Ia Controverse Eucharistique entre Beranger et Lanfranc', Revue des
Etudes Augustiniennes, xx (1974), 155-S6, discusses the application oflogic to theology.
Anselm of Bee: the best general study is in English. More recent treatment of
particular aspects includes: R. Pouchet, La Rectitudo chez Saint Anselme Un ltiniraire
Augustinien de l'Ame aDieu (Paris, I 964), on a concept which involves philosophical and
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 257
theological insights, especially bearing on soteriology; F. S. Schmitt, 'Anselm und der
(Neu-)Platonismus', Analecta Anselmiana, I (Frankfurt/Main, 1969), 39-71, which
re-examines Anselm's Platonism on a number of specific points: K. Flasch, 'Der
Philosophische Ansatz des Anselm von Canterbury im Monologion und sein Verhalt-
nis zum Augustinischen Neuplatonismus', ibid., II (Frankfurt/Main, 1970), 1--43; P.
Mazzarella, 'L'Esemplarismo in Anselmo d'Aosta e in Bonaventura da Bagnoregio',
ibid., I, 145--64, which examines the role of creation as an image of the creator in both
thinkers. See also R. J ave let, lma,ge et Rassemblance au Dou:deme Siecle de Saint Ansel me ii
Alain de Lille, 2 vols (Strasbourg, 1967).
M.-Th. d' Alverny, 'Achard de Saint Victor, Eveque d'Avranches- Disciple de Saint
Anselme', Analecta Anselmiana, 11 (Frankfurt/Main, 1970), 217-22, briefly places this
figure within the tradition.
Peter Abelard and contemporary theology: J. ]olivet, Arts du Langage et Thiologie chez
Abelard (Paris, 1969 ). J. Cottiaux, 'La Conception de Ia Theologie chez Abelard', Revue
d'Histoire Ecclesiastique, xxvm (1932), 247-95, 535-51, 787---S28 (defending Abelard's
orthodoxy, with close textual analysis). R. Thomas, ed., Petrus Abaelardus (1079-1142)
Person, Werk und Wirkung (Trier, 1980). E. Bertola, 'Le Critiche di Abelard ad Anselmo
di Laon ed a Guglielmo di Champeaux', Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, LII (1960),
495-522 (discussing the historical value of Abelard's criticisms of his masters). A.M.
Landgraf, Introduction ii l'Histoire de Ia Lilferalure Thiologique de Ia Scolastique Naissante
(Montreal; Paris, 1973), is a translation with revision of Landgraf, Einfiihrung in die
Geschichte der theologischen Literatur der Friihscholastik (Regensburg, 1948). M.-D. Chenu,
La Thiologie au Douzieme Si.ecle (Paris, 1957) (collected studies on the theme). R. Blomme,
La Doctrine du Pichi dansles Ecoles Theologiques de Ia Premiere Moitie duXlie Siecle (Louvain,
1958), on a theological theme which has an interest for Abelard's views. A. Lang, Die
theologische Prinz:.ipienlehre der milfelalterlichen Scholastik (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1964 ),
studies the development of theological method. J. de Ghellinck, Le Mouvement
Theologique du Xlle Siecle (2nd edn; Bruges; Paris, 1948), especially for the context of
Peter Lombard. P. Delhaye, Pierre Lombard, sa Vie, ses Oeuvres, sa Morale (Montreal;
Paris, 1961 ). Several studies helpfully focus on aspects of the influence of the liberal arts
programme on the philosophical-theological movement; see: M.-D. Chenu, 'Gram-
maire et Theologie aux Xlle et Xllle Siecles', AHDLMA, x (1936), 5-28;J.Jolivet,
'Elements pour une Etude des Rapports entre Ia Grammaire et !'Ontologie au Moyen
Age', inJ. P. Beckmann et al., eds, Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, 2 vols (Berlin;
New York, 1981 ), I, 135-64; P. Delhaye, 'L'Enseignement de Ia Philosophie Morale au
Xlle Siecle', Mediaeval Studies, XI (1949), 77-99: cf. Delhaye, '"Grammatica" et
"Ethica" au Xlle Siecle', Recherches de Thiologie Ancienne et Midievale, xxv
(1958), 59--110.
Gilbert of Poi tiers: H. C. van Elswijk, Gilbert Porrela, sa Vie, son Oeuvre, sa Pensee
(Lou vain, 1966 ), and particularly on the controversy surrounding him, A. Hayen, 'Le
Concile de Reims et l'Erreur Theologique de Gilbert de Ia Porree', AHDLMA, x
(1935-6), 29--102.
M.-D. Chenu, 'Platon a Citeaux', AHDLMA, XXI (1954), 99--106, criticises the
tendency to distinguish too sharply between a theology hostile to the philosophical
strand and the intellectualist approach.
Hugh ofSt Victor: R. Baron, Science e/ Sagesse chez:. Hugues de Saint- Victor (Paris, 1957)
and Etudes sur Hugues de Saint-Victor (Desclee de Brouwer, [Paris], 1963); D. van den
Eynde, Essai sur Ia Succession ella Date des Ecrits de Hugues de St-Victor (Rome, 1960).
T. Gregory, Platonismo Medievale Studi e Ricerche (Rome, 1958) and E. Garin, Studi sui
Platonismo Medievale (Florence, 1958), are important for this strand. For brief and
specific treatment see E. Jeauneau, 'L'Heritage de Ia Philosophie Antique durant le
Haut Moyen Age', in Settimana di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto
Medioevo, XXII (Spoleto, 1975), 17-54.
258 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Much of the literature on the cosmology of the period centres on the concept of the
'school of Chartres', for criticism of which see the bibliography in section A. However
one regards the strand of thought in question, the traditional approach to describing it
has contributed much of lasting importance and has a historiographical interest of its
own. A. Clerval, Les Ecoles de Chartres au Moyen Age (Paris, 1895), was the pioneering
study. On individual figures, see: E.Jeauneau,' "Nani gigantum humeris insidentes",
Essai d'Interpretation de Bernard de Chartres', Vivarium, v (1967), 79-99, and 'Le
Prologue in Eptatheucon de Thierry de Chartres', Mediaeval Studies, XVI (1954 ), 171-5;
T. Gregory, Anima Mundi La Filosofia di Guglielmo di Conches e Ia Scuola di Chartres
(Florence, 1955). On the 'school': E. Jeauneau, 'Note sur !'Ecole de Chartres', Studi
Medievali, 3rd series, v ( 1964) 821--65, and 'Macro be, source du Platonisme Chartrain',
Studi Medievali, 3rd series, 1 (1960), 3-24; J. M. Parent, La Doctrine de Ia Creation dans
!'Ecole de Chartres (Paris; Ottawa, 1938). M.- T. d' Alverny, 'Le Cosmos Symbolique du
Xlle Siecle', AHDLMA, xx (1953), 69--81. On the influence of medical theory: A.
Birkenmajer, Le Role joue par les Medecins etles Natura/isles dans Ia Reception d'Aristote aux
X/leet XllleSiecles (La Pologne au VIe Congres International des Sciences Historiques;
Warsaw, 1930); H. Schipperges, 'Einflusse arabischer Medezin auf die Mikrokosmos-
literatur des 12. Jahrhunderts', in Antike und Orient im Mittelalter: Vorlriige der Kolner
Mediaevistenangung 1956-1959, ed. P. Wilpert (Berlin, 1962; Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 1),
pp. 129-53.

4. NEW SOURCES AND NEW INSTITUTIONS

Arabic thought and its influence: G. Quadri, La Philosophie Arabe dans /'Europe Medievale
des Origines ii Averroes (Paris, 194 7) (translated from the Italian), is valuable. On Islamic
theology: L. Gardet and M. M. Anawati, Introduction ii Ia theologie Musulmane (Paris,
1948). G. C. Anawati, 'Le Neoplatonisme dans Ia Pensee Musulmane: Etat Actuel des
Recherches', in Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e in Occidente (Accademia N azionale dei
Lincei; Rome, 1974), pp. 339-405, is a good statement. L'Occidente e !'Islam nell' Alto
Medioevo (Settimane di Studio del Centro Italiano di Studi sull' Alto Medioevo, xu;
Spoleto, 1965), has pertinent studies. For individual figures, see: A.-M. Goichon, La
Philosophie d'Avicenne et son Influence en Europe Medievale (2nd edn; Paris, 1979); E. Gilson,
'Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age', AHDLMA, XXXVI (1969), 89-121; L.
Gauthier, Ibn Rochd (Paris, 1948); J. Schlanger, La Philo sophie de Salomon ibn Gabirol Etude
d'un Neoplatonisme (Leiden, 1968); H. Serouya, lt1aimonides, sa Vie, son Oeuvre, avec un
Expose de sa Philosophie (Paris, 1951). On the intellect there is extensive coverage: 0.
Hamelin, La TMorie de l'lntellecl d'apres Aristo/e el ses Commentaires (ed. E. Barbo tin; Paris,
1953); E. Barbotin, La TMorie Aristoteticienne de l'lntellec/ d'apres Theophras/e (Louvain;
Paris, 1954 ); P. Moraux, Alexandre d'Aphrodise Exegete de Ia Noetique d'Aristote (Liege;
Paris, 1942). The introductions to G. Verbeke, ed., Themistius, Commentaire sur le Traite de
l'Amed'Aristole, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke (Louvain; Paris, 1957), and Verbeke,
ed., Jean Philopon, Commentaire sur le De Anima d'Aristole, Traduction de Guillaume de
Moerbeke (Louvain; Paris, 1966), are important. See also, G. Verbeke, 'Introduction
sur Ia Doctrine Psychologique d' Avicenne', inS. van Riet, ed., Avicenna Latinus, Liber de
Animaseu Sextus de naturalibus IV-V (Lou vain; Leiden, 1968). The influence of the Arabic
theories on the Latin tradition is studied in E. Gilson, 'Les Sources Greco-Arabes de
l'Augustinisme Avicennisant', AHDLMA, IV (1929-30), 5--149, though the term
'augustinisme avicennisant' is not helpful. A. Rohner, Das SchOpfungsproblem bei Moses
Maimonides, Albertus Magnus und Thomas von Aquin (BGPMA, vol. XI, Part 5; Munster,
1913), on a sensitive and central question.
Translations: M. Steinschneider, Die Europiiischen Ubersetzungen aus dem Arabischen bis
Mille des 17.jahrhunder/s (Vienna, 1904-5; reprinted, Graz, 1956 ), is the basic catalogue
of western translations but is outdated on many points, especially of attribution. L.
 BIBLIOGRAPHIES 259
Minio-Paluello, 'Aristotele dal Mondo Arabo a quello Latino', in L'Occidente e /'Islam
nell' Alto Medioevo, is important for calling attention to several misinterpretations. M.
Grabmann, 'Aristoteles im Zwoelften Jahrhundert', Mediaeval Studies, xn (1950),
123-62, is a useful review of the scene and of scholarly activity in it. For individual
authors and translators, see: M. T. d'Alverny, 'Notes sur les Traductions Medievales
des Oeuvres Philosophiques d'Avicenne', AHDLMA, XIX (1952), 337-58; d'Alverny,
'Les Traductions d' Avicenne (Moyen Age et Renaissance)', in Avicenna nella Storia della
Cultura Medievale (Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei; Rome, 1957), pp. 71-87 and a
series of articles by her, entitled 'Avicenna Latinus' in AHDLMA, XXVIII-XXXIX
(1961-72); H. Bedoret, 'Les Premieres Traductions Toledanes de Philosophie,
Oeuvres d'Alfarabi', Revue Neo-Scolastique de Philosophie, xu (1938), 80-97; M. Alonso
Alonso, 'Traducciones del Arcediano Gundisalvo', Al-Andalus, xn (194 7 ), 295--338; M.
T. d'Alverny, 'Avendauth?', Homenaje a Millas-Vallicrosa, 1 (Barcelona, 1954), 19-43,
which cleared cluttered ground. R. Lemay, 'Dans l'Espagne du Xlle Siecle. Les
Traductions de l'Arabe au Latin', Annates, Economies, Societes, Civilisations, XVIII (1963),
639-65, is a useful survey of translators and of the geography of the process.
Universities: J. Verger, Les Universites au Moyen Age (Paris, 1973 ); S. d'lrsay, Histoire
des Universites Fran(aiseset Etrangeres, 1 (Paris, 1933); butseeprincipallysectionA, above.
J. Destrez, La Pecia dans les Manuscrits Universitaires du Xllle et du X/Ve Siecle (Paris, 1935 ),
on an aspect of book production. P. Glorieux, La Faculte des Arts et ses Maltres au X/lie
Siiicle (Paris, 1971 ), is mainly a listing but has a short introduction. Glorieux, La
Littirature Quodlibetique, 2 vols (Paris, 1925--35), is the fundamental work on this subject.
The collection Arts Liberaux et Philosophie au Moyen Age (Actes du IVe Congres
International de Philosophie Medievale, Montreal, 1967; Montreal: Paris, 1969) has a
section on the arts in the university.

5. ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY - THE FIRST PHASE OF

ASSIMILATION

and

6. ARISTOTELIAN PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY - SYSTEM BUILDING AND

CONTROVERSY

F. van Steenberghen, La Philosophie au Xllle Siecle (Louvain; Paris, 1966), is an

indispensable survey which provides extensive bibliography. His 'L'Organisation des
Etudes au Moyen Age et ses Repercussions sur le Mouvement Philosophique', Revue
Philosophique de Louvain, LII (1954), 572-92, is a useful statement on the programme of
studies; cf. P. Glorieux, 'L'Enseignement au Moyen Age. Techniques et Methodes en
Usage a Ia Faculte de Theologie de Paris au Xllle Siecle', AHDLMA, XXXV (1968),
65--186.
On the 1210 condemnation there is a series of studies: G. Thery, Autour du Deere! de
1210: I. David de Dinan! (Bibliotheque Thomiste, vi; Paris, 1925 ), andAutour du Deere! de
1210: II. Alexandre d'Aphrodise (Bibliotheque Thomiste, vn; Paris 1926); G. C. Capelle,
Autour du Deere! de 1210: Ill. Amaury de Biine. Essai sur son Panthiisme Forme/ (Bibliotheque
Thomiste, xv1; Paris, 1932).
K. Jacobi, Die Modalbegri.ffe in den logischen Schriften des Wilhelm von Shyreswood und in
anderen Kompendien des 12 und 13 jahrhunderts: Funktionbestimmung und Gebrauch in der
logischen Anaryse (Leiden, 1980 ), is for the specialist in this area.
A. Masnovo, Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a San Tomaso d'Aquino 3 vols (Milan, 1930-45),
provides useful coverage of a period which is rather neglected. C. Ottaviano, Guglielmo
d'Auxerre (t 1231). La Vita, le Opere, it Pensiero (Rome, [1929)). M. Baumgartner, Die
Erkenntnislehre des Wilhelm von Auvergne, (BGPMA, vol. n, Part I; Munster, 1893). A.
260 BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Quentin, Naturkenntnisse und Naturanschauungen bei Wilhelm von Auvergne (Hildesheim,

1976). A. Forest, 'Guillaume d'Auvergne, Critique d'Aristote', in Etudes Midievales
O.ffertes a M. le Doyen Augustin Fliche de l'lnstitut (Montpellier, 1952), pp. 67-79. E.
Gilson, 'La Notion d'Existence chez Guillaume d'Auvergne', AHDL!oJA, xv (1946),
55-91.
On the developing character of thought: R. de Vaux, Notes et Textes sur l'Avicennisme
Latin aux Confins des Xl/e et Xllle Siecles (Bibliotheque Thomiste, xx; Paris, 1934); E.
Gilson, 'Les Sources Greco-Arabes de l'Augustinisme Avicennisant', AHDLMA, IV
(1929-30), 5-149; E. Bertola, 'E Esistito un Avicennismo Latino nel Medioevo?' Sophia,
xxxv (1967), 318-34; xxx1x (1971), 278-320; R. de Vaux, 'La Premiere Entree
d'Averroes chez les Latins', Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Thiologiques, XXII (1933),
193-245. P. Glorieux, 'Les Annees 1242-1247 a Ia Faculte de Theologie de Paris',
Recherches de Thiologie Ancienne et Midievale, XXIX (1962), 234-49. F. Pelster, 'Adam von
Bocfeld (Bockingfold), ein Oxforder Erkliirer des Aristoteles urn die Mitte des xm
Jahrhunderts, sein Leben und seineSchriften',Scholastik, XI (1936), 196-224.0. Lottin,
'La Pluralite des Formes Substantielles avant Saint Thomas d'Aquin. Quelques
documents nouveaux' Revue Neoscolastique de Philosophic, xxx1v (1932), 449-67.
F. van Steenberghen, 'Albert le Grand et l'Aristote!isme', Revue lnternationale de
Philosophic, XXXIV (1980), no. 133-134,566-74, is a useful general statement. B. Geyer,
'Albertus Magnus und die Entwicklung der Scholastischen Metaphysik', in P. Wilpert,
ed., Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, n; Berlin, 1963), pp. 3-13
(a conference paper from a useful collection). G. Wieland, Untersuchungen ;::um
Seinsbegriff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Gros.ren (BGPMA, Neue Folge, vol. VII;
Miinster, 1971 ), on Albert's treatment of a central concept. A. Zimmermann, ed.,
Albert der Grosse, seine Zeit, sein Werk, seine Wirkung (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, x1v; Berlin;
New York, 1981 ), is a valuable collection treating Albert's philosophical and scientific
work and his influence. H. Ostlender, ed., Studia Albertina. Festschrift fur Bernhard Geyer
(BGPMA, Supplementary vol. IV; Munster, 1952), is largely devoted to theological
aspects of Albert's work; among the aspects of philosophical interest covered, note A.J.
Backes, 'Der Geist als hiiherer Teil der Seele nach Albert dem Grossen', pp. 52-67,J.
Hansen, 'Zur Frage der anfangslosen und zeitlichen Schiipfung bei Albert dem
Grossen', pp. 167-88; A. Hufnagel, 'Das Person-Problem bei Albertus Magnus',
pp. 202-33 (on an aspect which was a topic also in the twelfth century). F. Ruello, La
Notion de Verite che;:: Saint Albert le Grand et che;:: Thomas d'Aquin de 1243 a 1254 (Louvain;
Paris, 1969), is a detailed and interesting study of this aspect in the early thought of
both figures. See also, on another aspect, G. de Mattos, 'L'Intellect Agent Personnel
dans les Premiers Ecrits d'Albert le Grand et de Thomas d'Aquin', Revue Nioscolastique
de Philosophie, XLIII (1940), 145-61.
Controversy and condemnations: E.-H. \Veber, La Controverse de 1270 al'Universite de
Paris et son Ritentissement sur Ia Pensee deS. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris, 1970), has been
challenged by B. Bazan, 'La Dialogue Philosophique entre Sigerde Brabant et Thomas
d'Aquin. A propos d'un Ouvrage Recent de E. H. Weber, O.P.', Revue Philosophique de
Louvain, LXXII (1974), 53-155. Weber maintained his position in the course of his
Dialogue et Dissensions entre Saint Bonaventure et Saint Thomas d'Aquin a Paris (1252-1273)
(Paris, 1974), and in 'Les Discussions de 1270 a l'Universite de Paris et leur Influence
sur Ia Pensee Philosophique deS. Thomas d'Aquin', in A. Zimmermann, ed., Die
Auseinanderset;::ungen an der Pariser Universitiit im XIII Jahrhundert (Miscellanea
Mediaevalia, x; Berlin, 1976). F. van Steenberghen, Maitre Siger de Brabant (Louvain;
Paris, 1977), is now the standard account of this figure. R. Hissette, Enquete sur les 219
Articles Condamnis aParis le 7 mars 1277 (Louvain; Paris, 1977), is an indispensable and
judicious analysis.
Index

Abbasids, 118-20 AI Ghazali (Algazel), 126, 127,

Abbo of Fleury, 89 135-6, 202
Abelard see under Peter AI Hakam II, 127
Abubacer see Ibn Tufayl Ali ben Abbas, 116
Abii Ya'qiib Yiisuf, 127 AI Kindi, 122, 123, 136
Academy, Middle, 2~30, 60 al-Mansur, 120
New, 29 Almohads, 127, 131
Plato's, 12, 29, 34 AI Razi, 123
Achard of St Victor, 113 Amaury of Bene, 81, 147
actuality and potentiality, 17, 18, Ambrose, St, 38, 40, 43
23, 79, 115, 128, 164, 168 Ammonius, 134
Adam of Balsham (Adam Analytics see under Prior; Posterior
Parvipontanus, Adam anamnesis see recollection
Petit-Pont), 90 Andronicus of Rhodes, 12-13
Adam Buckfield, !51 Angles, 59
Adam Marsh, !51 Anselm ofBec, St, I, 81, 82, 84, 88,
Adelard of Bath, 134 96-103,109, Ill, 113,153,
Adeodatus, 42 16:!, 163, 172, 182, 183
Africa, 38, 39, 45, 57, 59, 71, Anselm of Laon, 104, 105, 110
119 Aosta, 96
Agobard of Lyons, 74 Apuleius, Perihermeneias attributed
Aix-la-Chapelle, 73 to, 62,89
Alans, 41 Aquinas, see under Thomas
Alaric, 40 Arabic philosophy, 4-5, 35, 70, 117,
Al-Ashari, Abu'l-Hasan, 118 118-32
Albano, 161 see also under individual figures
Alberic of Reims (twelfth century), Arabs, conquests of, 71, 72, 85,
105 11~20
(thirteenth century), 204 architecture, 67
Albert the Great, 5, 147, 171-5, Argenteuil, 104
176, 177, 192 Arianism, 39, 5~60, 71
Albinus, 60, 63 Aristotelianism, 2, 4, 5, 145-59,
Alcuin, 72-3, 74 164-206
Alexander IV, 140, 174 see also under individual works and
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 121-2, authors
134 Aristotle, 3, 4, 5, 7, 12-29, 30, 35,
Alexander the Great, 12 55, 60, 76, 88, 91, 106, 112,
Alexander of Hales, 158, 161 121, 122, 145
Alexandria, 3, 29, 35, 39, 53, 70, see also individual works qf
76, 134 Arius, 39
AI Farabi, 122-3, 124, 126, 131, Aries, 137
136, 146 arts, liberal, 67-9
Alfred of Sareshel, 134 see also trivium and quadrivium

261
262 INDEX

Asharites, 118, 125, 126 Bernier de Nivelles, 204

Athens, 12, 29, 34, 70, 75, 133 Bieler, L., 75
atomic theory, 8, 116 Bobbio, 72
Augustine, St, I, 3, 4, 29, 33, 37, Boethius, Anicius Manlius
38-58,59,66,73, 74, 79,80, Severin us, 4, 37, 60-9, 73, 86,
83, 84, 96, 97, 100, 101, 106, 99, 166
107, 108, 112, 152, 154, 155, and the liberal arts, 67-8, 82, 115
162, 166, 169, 183, 192, 194, Consolation qf Philosophy of, 4, 60,
195, 209 62,63-7,82,115
paraphrase of Categories logical works of, 60-1, 74, 76, 83,
(Categoriae Decem, De 88-90, 91' 93
Categoriis), wrongly sacred treatises of, 62, 84, 93,
attributed to, 61, 73, 76, 81, 100, 114, 115
88 Boethius of Dacia, 194-5, 202-3,
Augustinian monasticism, 87, Ill 206
Auxerre, 81 Bologna, I 76
Avempacesee Ibn Bajja university of, 137, 138-9, 141
Avendauth, 135 Bonaventure, St, I, 5, 146, 161-71,
Averroes (Ibn Rushd), 121, 127-9, 174, 177, 195, 197, 198,206,
131, 136, 146, 148, 149, 158, 209
165, 171, 172, 174, 188, 195, 'Book of Causes' see Liber de Causis
197-8 Bosi, 102
Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol), 130-1, Braga, 148
136, 152, 157, 168 Britain, barbarian invasion of, 59
Avicenna (Ibn Sina), 123-6, 127, Burgundians, 39, 41
135, 146, 148, 151, 156, 158,
169, 171, 172, 173, 182, 195, Caecilian, 39
202 Caen, 96
Callippus, 20
Baghdad, 119, 120, 122, 123, 127 Calo Calonymus, 137
Bagnoregio, 161 Calvinism, 55
Barcelona, 135 Candidus, 73
Basil, St, 3, !52 Canterbury, 102, 150, 208
Bee, 89, 95, 96 Cappadocian fathers, 3
Bede, the Venerable, 72 Cappuyns, M., 75
being, Parmenides on, 8 Carneades of Cyrene, 29
Aristotle on, 16-19 Carthage, 39, 41, 42, 71
Avicenna on, 124ff. Cassiciacum, 41, 42
Benedict Biscop, 72 Cassiodorus, 37, 62, 68-9, 112
Benedictine monasticism, 85, 86 Catania, 132
see also Cluniac monasticism Categoriae Decem (De Categoriis),
Berengar of Poi tiers, I 05 pseudo-Augustinian, see under
Berengar of Tours, 81, 88, 94-6, 97, St Augustine
101 Categories, of Aristotle, 13, 16, 33,
Bernard of Chartres, 93 60, 61, 83, 88, 90, 99, 100, 134
Bernard ofClairvaux, St, 105 Catharism, 154
Bernard Silvestris, 115, 116 Celestine III, 139
Bernard of Trillia, 209 Chalcedon, council of, 63
 INDEX 263
Chalcidius, 30, 82, 93, 114 David of Dinant, 14 7
Chalons-sur-Marne, Ill De Anima, of Aristotle, 13, 22-5,
Charlemagne, 37, 73, 75,85 121, 123, 128, 132, 134, 136,
Charles the Bald, 75, 81,85 150, 154, 156, 174, 188
Charles Martel, 119 De Animalibus, of Aristotle, 136, 137,
Chartres, school of, 116 150, 156, 174
China, 119 De Caelo, of Aristotle, 133, 134, 136,
Christianity, origins of, 2 150, 174
early contacts with pagan De Categoriis (Decem Categoriae),
philosophy, of, 2-3 pseudo-Augustinian, see under
Cicero, 29, 42, 43, 55, 61, 77,89 St Augustine
Cistercian monasticism, 87, 105 De Generatione et Corruptione, of
Clarembald of Arras, 115, 116 Aristotle, 120, 132, 136, 137,
Clement IV, 134 150, 156, 174
Clement of Alexandria, 3, 30 De Intelligentia, 132
Clovis, 59 De Interpretatione, of Aristotle, 14,
Cluniac monasticism, 86, 87, 89, 61, 88, 90, 115, 134
105 Delphic oracle, I 07
Cluny, 105 Denis, pseudo- see Dionysius the
Cologne, 171,172,174,175,176, pseudo-Areopagite
192 Denis, St, patron of France, 75
Columbanus, 72 Denmark, 202
Constantine, 39, 40 De Plantis, !50
Constantine the African, 116 Descartes, 48
Constantinople, 37, 63, 132 De Sensu, of Aristotle, 134
Constantius II, 40 Desiderius, 94
Corbeil, 104 De Sophisticis Elenchis, of Aristotle,
Cordova, 127, 131 16, 90
Corinth, 133, 208 devil, doctrine on, 3, 53, 54
cosmology, 9 Diocletian, 38-9
Aristotle's, 19-22 Diogenes the Cynic, 10
Avicenna on, 124fT. Dionysius the pseudo-Areopagite,
Grosseteste on, !52 4, 34,75-6,79, 81, 83, 114,
other thirteenth-century 133, 162, 173, 177, 183
treatment of, 154, 164 Dominic, St, 171
Plato's, II Dominic Gundisalvi, 135
twelfth-century, 114 Dominican order, 140, 157-8, 161,
Craftsman, Platonic figure of the, 171-2, 176-81,202,204,
II, 22,152,154,167 208-10
creation of the world, 2, 50, I 09, Domitian, 2
112, 145, 152, 154, 162, 164-5, Donatism, 39, 47, 54, 55, 58
167-70, 185-6 Donatus, grammarian, 81
Cyprus, 192 schismatic, 39
Duns Scotus see John

Damascus, 119 Egypt, 119, 131

Daniel of Morley, 134 Eleatic school, 8
Dante, 7 elements, theory of, 20, 116
264 INDEX

Elements if Theology, of Prod us, 34, Gaul, 41, 59, 71, 75, 119
35, 121, 134 Genesis, Book of, 2, 50, 51
England, 72 Gerard of Abbeville, 179
see also Canterbury; Jarrow; Gerard ofCremona, 134, 135
Oxford; Wearmouth; Gerbert of Aurillac, 86, 89, 95
Westminster; York Gilbert Crispin, 103
Enneads, ofPlotinus, 31, 34, 44, 121 Gilbert ofPoitiers, 93, 94, 116
Ephesus, 3 Giles ofLessines, 209
Epicureanism, 7, 9, 29 Giles of Rome, 57, 196--7, 200
Epicurus, 29 Gosvin of Ia Chapelle, 204
epistemology, 10 Gottschalk, 77
Eriugena see John Scotus Eriugena grace, 47,49--50, 79, 110, 114
ethics, early theories of, 9 Gratian, 109
Abelard on, 107-8 Greece, 133
Aquinas on, 189--92 see also Athens; Corinth
Ethics, of Aristotle, 13, 25--8, 120, Gregory IX, 150
123, 133, 136, 146, 148, 149, Gregory the Great, St, 70
156, 174, 177, 192,203 Gregory Nazianzen, St, 3
Eudoxus, 20 Gregory of Nyssa, St, 3, 76
Eutyches, 63 Guanilo, 101-2
evil, problem of, 51, 63, 66, 80, 102, Gueric of St Quentin, 172
106

Fall, doctrine of a, 3, 52, 103 Hadrian, Abbot, 72

fate, 64 Harun al-Rashid, 120
feudalism, 85, 103 Heiric of Auxerre, 81, 82
Fleury see St Benoit sur Loire Heloise, 104, 105
Forms, Platonic doctrine of, 10-12, Henricus Aristippus, 132
31-2, 48, 132, 149 Henry of Ghent, 204
fortune, figure of, 65--6 Heraclitus, 8, 10
France, 87, 114, 154 Hermann of Carinthia, 134
see also Argenteuil; Auxerre; Bee; Hermannus Alemannus, 136
Chartres; Cluny; Corbeil; Hippo, 41
Gaul; Laon; Laches; Lyons; Hobbes, Thomas, 55
Marmoutier; Melun; Holderi, Anecdoton, 63
Nantes; Nogent-sur-Seine; Honorius III, 81
Paris; Reims; St Benoit sur Honorius Augustodunensis, 81, 103
Loire; Sens; Soissons Hortensius, of Cicero, 42-3
Francis, St, 161 Hugh II ofCyprus, 192
Franciscan order, 140, 157-9, 161, Hugh ofSt Victor, 83, 105, 111-14,
209 162, 166
Fredegisus of Tours, 74 Hugh ofSantalla, 135
Frederick II, 136, 176 humanism, 46, 116, 137
Frederick Barbarossa, 138 Hunain ibn Ishaq, 120
Fulbert, canon at Notre Dame, 104 Ishaq, son of, 120
of Chartres, 95 hylomorphism, 18
in the twelfth century, 115
Galen, 116 see also matter and form
 INDEX 265

lamblichus, 34 John of Salisbury, 90, 93,94

Ibn Bajja (Avempace), 127, 132 John Scotus Eriugena, l, 4, 37, 38,
Ibn Gabirol, see Avicebron 74, 75--82, 147
Ibn Rushd, see Averroes John of Seville, 135
Ibn Sina, see Avicenna John ofToledo, 135
Ibn Tufayl (Abubacer), 127 John ofWildeshausen, 172
illumination, Augustinian theory of, John Wyclif, 57
48, 106, 146, 165, 167 Jordan of Saxony, I 71
imagination, Aristotle's theory of, Judaism, l-2, 30, 51, 103, 107-8,
23, 166, 189 129--32
Incarnation, discussion of the, Julian the Apostate, 40
102-3, 109--10 Justin Martyr, 3
Indus, 119 Justinian, 34, 60, 63, 68, 70, 71
Innocent II, 105
Innocent IV, !50 Koran, the, 123, 126
intellect, 23-5, 121-2, 125, 128-9,
131-2, 14~6, 164, 187-9, Lanfranc,88,94-6,97, 100
19~202,20~6 Laon, 103, 105, ll I
Ireland, 72 Lateran, Third Council of the, 139
Irnerius, 138 Fourth Council of the, 147
Isaac Israeli, I 30 La Verna, 161
lsagoge, of Porphyry, 33,60-1,88, law, study of, 71,137,138-9,141
91, 137 Islamic, I 19
Isidore of Seville, 69, 72 Jewish, 131
Italy, 40, 59, 65, 70, 87, 133, 134, Laws, of Plato, 121
136,204 Leon, 135
see also Albano; Bagnoregio; La Le Pallet, 104
Verna; Milan; Naples; Liber de Causis ('Book of Causes'),
Orvieto; Padua; Pavia; 35, 121, 134, 136, 147, 150,
Ravenna; Rome; Sicily; 156, 158, 173
Siena; Viterbo libraries, 71, 72,85
Loches, 104
James ofVenice, 90, 132, 133 logic, 13-16, 33, 60-2, 67-8, 73, 76,
]arrow, 72 78,83-4,86-114,117,143,
Jesus, sources for life of, 2 148-9, 196
Joachim of Fiore, 53 Logos, doctrine of, 2, 30, 76, 79
John XXI, 149, 204, 206 Lombards, 39, 70, 71
see also Peter of Spain Lotulf of Novara, 105
John, St, Gospel of, 2, 30, 77 Louis the Pious, 75
John ofBasingstoke, 133 Lyceum, 12, I 21
John Blund, 151 Lyons, 161, 181
John Duns Scotus, 210
John ofFreiburg, lSI Macarius, 74
John of Paris, 209 Macrobius, 77, 82, 115
John Pecham, 208, 209 Magyars, 85
John Philoponus, 134 Maimonides, 129, 131-2, 136
John ofla Rochelle, 158-9 Mainz, 73, 77
John ofSt Giles, 158 Ma'mun, 120
266 INDEX

Mandonnet, P., 205 Mu'tazilites, 118, 122

Manicheism, 38, 43, 47, 49, 51, 154
Marius Victorinus, 43, 45, 61, 62 Nantes, 104
Mark, St, Gospel of, 2 Naples, 137, 148, 176, 17!f-81
Marmoutier, 101 Nemesius of Emesa, 116
Marsiglio of Padua, 193 Neoplatonism, 2-3, 7, 9, 12, 30-S,
Martian us Capella, 61, 65, 68, 69, 38,39,43,44-7,48,51,52,
76, 77, 81, 82, liS 60,66, 76, 78, 79,80,83, 91,
Martin of Laon, 81 96,107,113, liS, 121,123,
matter and form, Aristotle on, 124, 127, 130, 145, 147, 151-2,
18-19 153, 170, 173, 188, 195, 199,
Aquinas on, 185--7 201
Averroes on, 128 Nestorianism, 63, 120
Avicebron on, 130 Nestorius, 63
Bonaventure on, 168-70 Nicaea, council of, 39: creed of, 62
see also hylomorphism Nicholas IV, 209
Maximian, 38 Nicholas the Greek, 133
Maximus the Confessor, 76, 81 Nicomachean Ethics see Ethics, of
medicine, study of, 67, 71, 116, 130, Aristotle
137 Nogent-sur-Seine, lOS
Melun, 104
Menippus, 65 Odo, bishop ofCambrai, 103
Meno, ofPiato, 7, II, 132 Odoacer, 59, 60
Metaphysics, of Aristotle, 13, 16, 17, Omar, 119
21, 22, 120, 123, 128, 132, 133, O'Meara, J. J., 75
136, 145, 147, 148, ISO, 156, Ommayads, 119, 120, 127
174, 176, 201 ontology, 10
meteorology, 174 see also being
Meteorology, of Aristotle, 132, 134, Organon, the, 13--16, 33, 60, 61, 83,
136, 137, 156 88, 90, 149
Metz, 210 Origen, 3, 30, 80
Michael II, 75 Orleans, 89
Michael the Scot, 133, 136 Orvieto, I 78
Milan, 38, 42, 43 Ostrogoths, 39, 40, 59
millenarianism, 52-3 Oxford, 137, 142, 148, lSI, 206,
minerology, 156, 174 208-10
Mohammed, 119, 123
monasticism, contribution to Padua, 138, 171
learning of, 68-9, 85 Palestine, 3, 119
see also Augustinian; Benedictine; Pamplona, 135
Cistercian; Cluniac pantheism, 80, 98, 147
Mongols, 119 Paraclete see under Nogent-sur-Seine
Monica, St, 38, 42 Paris, 81, 87, 90
Monophysitism, 63, 120, 134 bishop of, 147: see also Stephen
Monte Cassino, 94, 176 Tempier; William of
Montpellier, 137 Auvergne
Morocco, 127 cathedral of Notre Dame, 104,
'Munich passages', 73 Ill, 139
 INDEX 267
Paris - continued 120, 121, 133, 136, 150, 174,
Dominican house of 192, 207
Saint-Jacques, 158, 176 Porphyry, 31,33-4,44
Franciscan convent, 164 see also Isagoge of
Mont Ste Genevieve, 105, Portugal, 149
139 Posterior Ana(ytics, of Aristotle, 15,
StDenis, 104 60, 90, 93, 136, 174
St Victor, 83, 87, 104, 111-14 Prior Ana()'tics, of Aristotle, 14, 90
university of, 137, 139-41, 142, Priscian, 81 , 88
147-50,171,172 ,176-81, Proclus, 34, 35, 134
194-210 Protrepticus, of Aristotle, 42
Parmenides, 8, 10 providence, 2, 64, 66-7, 112, 164,
Parmenides, of Plato, 134 199
Parva Naturalia, of Aristotle, 132, Prudentius ofTroyes, 75, 76
136, 174 pseudo-Denis or pseudo-Dionysius,
Paul, St, 2, 43, 75, 106 see Dionysius the
Epistle to the Romans, of, 49, 55, pseudo-Areopagite
110 Pyrenees, 119
Pavia, 60 Pythagoras, 8
Pelagianism, 49, 58, 77, 110 Pythagoreanism, 8, II, 29
Pelagius, 47
Persia, 40, 119, 120 quadrivium, 67-8, 112, 115, 141
Peter Abelard, 1, 84, 87, 88, 90, 91,
92, 97, 104-11, 113
Peter of Conflans, 208, 209 Ratramnus of Corbie, 74, 95
Peter Damian, St, 94, 95 Ravenna, 59, 70
Peter Lombard, Sentences of, 109, Raymund of Pennaforte, St, 177,
141, 142, 153, 158, 178 191
Peter of Spain, 148-9 reason and faith, 44-5, 77-8, 94-6,
see also John XXI 97,103-4,105--7, 113,114,
Peter the Venerable, 105 122, 123, 127, 129, 131-2,
Petrus Alfonsi, 135 146-7, 175, 181-5, 194-5
Phaedo, of Plato, 7, 121, 132 recollection (anamnesis), Platonic
Philip Augustus, 139 theory of, II , 24, 48
Philip the Chancellor, 154-6 Regensburg, 174
Philip of Macedon, 12 Reims, 81, 86,89
Philo of Alexandria, 30, 44 Remigius of Auxerre, 81, 82
Physics, of Aristotle, 13, 21, 22, 128, Republic, of Plato, 121
132, 136, 145, 147, 148, 150, resurrection of the body, 2, 122,
151, 156, 174 123, 169, 189
Plato, 3, 7, 8-12, 17, 18-19,29--30, Revelation, Book of, 2, 54
33,47,48, 51, 54,60,66,90, Rhabanus Maurus, 73
91, 106, 121, 122, 210 Richard FitzRalph, 57
Plato of Tivoli, 134 Richard Knapwell, 209
Plotinus, 3, 30ff., 44, 124 Richard of St Victor, 83, Ill,
see also Enneads of 113-14, 166
Poitiers, battle of, 119 Robert of Chester, 134
Politics, of Aristotle, 13, 25--6, 28-9, Robert de Courcon, 139, 147
268 INDEX

Robert Grosseteste, 133, 134, Somnium Scipionis, commentary on,

151-2, 192 see under Macrobius
Robert Kilwardby, 150, 206, 208, Sophist, of Plato, 120-1
210 Sophists, 9, 16, 87
Robert Orford, 209 soteriology see Incarnation,
Roger Bacon, 150, 153 discussion of the
Roland of Cremona, !58 soul, Plato on, II
Rome,2,37,40,42,68, 70,71,82 Aristotle on, 22-5
Dominican convent of Santa in Augustine, 48-9
Sabina, I 78-9 in Neoplatonism, 32-3
Romulus Augustulus, 59 thirteenth-century discussion of,
Roscelin, 84, 91, 92, 94, 97, 104, 145--6, 151, 154-9, 170-1,
113 173-4, 186--9
Rudolf of Bruges, 134 see also intellect; world soul
Spain, learning in, 71-2, 86, 127,
130-1' 134-6, 151
St Benoit sur Loire, 89 barbarian invasions of, 41, 59, 71
Salerno, 137 Christian reconquest of, 127, 177
San Germano, treaty of, 176 Islamic invasion of, 72, 119, 120
Saragossa, 71, 210 Stephen Tempier, bishop of Paris,
Saxons, 59 198,203,204,206,207
schools, ancient, 69ff. Stilicho, 40
cathedral, 81, 86, 87, 116 Stoicism, 2, 3, 7, 9, 29, 50, 52, 66,
monastic, 81 88-9, 93, 108, 116
urban, 71, 86, 87 substance, Aristotle on, 16--17
see also universities medieval discussion of, 84, 95,
science, 116 99--100
see also under Aristotle; cosmology; substantial form, plurality of, 145,
quadrivium 154-6, 171
'Scipio, Dream of', commentary on Sueves, 41
see under Macrobius Sylvester II see Gerbert of Aurillac
Segovia, 135 Symmachus (late fourth century),
'seminal reasons', 50, 169, 170, 40
185--6, 209 (late fifth-early sixth century), 60
Sens, 105, 147 Syria, 119, 134
Seville, 71
Sheldon-Williams, I. P., 76 Tarazona, 135
Sic et Non, 108 Tertullian, 45
Sicily, 132, 134, 136 Testament, New, 2
kingdom of, 176 Old, 2, 43, 44, 104, 115, 152, 168
Siena, 148 Themistius, 121-2, 134, 188, 197,
Siger of Brabant, 194-202, 204, 202
206, 207 Theoderic, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 68
Simon de Brion, 204 Theodore of Tarsus, 72
Simon du Val, 204 Theodosius I, 40
Simplicius, 133, 134 Theology of Aristotle, the, 121
Socrates, 9, 10, II, 90 Theopaschism, 63
Soissons, 105 Theophrastus, 121
 INDEX 269
Thierry of Chartres, 90, 115, 116 Varro, 44, 67,68
Thomas Aquinas, St, I, 5, 132, 134, Vikings, 85
142, 146, 168, 174, 175, Visigoths, 39, 40, 41, 59, 71
176-94, 197-8, 199, 202, 206, Viterbo, 134, 161
207-10 Vivarium, 68, 71
Reginald, brother of, I 76
Thomas Sutton, 209 Walter of Mortagne, 105
Timaeus, ofPlato, 7, 8, II, 30, 32, WalterofStVictor, 114
51, 82, 109, 114, 120-1, !52 Wearmouth, 72
see also Chalcidius Westminster, 103
Toledo, 71, 135, 136 William of Auvergne, 156-7
Topics, of Aristotle, 16, 17,90 William of Auxerre, 153-4
of Cicero, 61, 93 William ofChampeaux, 92, 104,
Toulouse, 148, ISO Ill
Tours, 94, 95, 101 William of Conches, 112, 113, 115,
translations, 60-2, 75-6, 90, 117, 116
120-2, 129, 130, 132-7,210 William of Hothum, 209
Trinity, doctrine of, 39, 51, 62, 63, William Macclesfield, 209
84, 91, 100, 107, Ill, 112, William de Ia Mare, 209
113-14, 116, 153, 156, 167 William of Moerbeke, 133-4, 188,
trivium, 67-8,104,112,141 208
William of Ockham, 210
universals, medieval treatment of, William ofSt Amour, 161, 192
84,90-4 William ofSt Thierry, !OS
universities, rise of, 87-8, 117, 119, William ofShireswood, 148
137-43 world soul, 32, 116
and reception of Aristotelian Wulfad, 81
philosophy, 147-59, 194-206
Urban IV, ISO York, 72

Vanda~,39,41,59, 71 Zeno, founder of Stoicism, 29

van Steenberghen, F., 195, 204 Greek emperor, 59