KENYA947
KENYA947
KENYA
MULTIPARTYISM BETRAYED IN KENYA
Only one year after multiparty elections, the hopes of Kenyans have been shattered by the evident derailment of
the democratisation process. There are visible signs of the unwillingness of the government to fully accept the
democratisation process in Kenya.... There have been calculated moves to silence the voices of democracy, as
seen in the arrests, confinement in police cells, and arraignment in court of protagonists of democracy under
flimsy charges. Such acts are aimed at intimidating and defaming the victims, as well as other potential
supporters of justice and peace. The continued harassment of a section of the media and the banning of some
publications are but some of the incidences of the government's efforts to barricade the corridors of democracy
that had begun to open.
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................... 2
RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................................................... 31
To the Kenyan Government.............................................................................................. 31
To the International Community ..................................................................................... 32
INTRODUCTION
In December 1992, Kenya held its first multiparty elections since independence in 1963. Daniel
arap Moi, head of state since the death of Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta, in 1978, was returned to
office; Moi's party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), gained one hundred of the 188 elected
seats in parliament. The election victory was based on only 36 percent of the popular vote, and owed
much to divisions within the political opposition.1 However, President Moi has not attempted to rule in
the spirit of a government that has only minority support among the general population. Although the
legalization of political opposition parties, formally banned from 1982 until 1991, has resulted in some
improvement in respect for basic political freedoms and civil rights, the new KANU government has
proved to be no more tolerant of criticism than the old.
Since winning the election, government harassment of the political opposition has steadily
increased: opposition politicians have been the target of spurious criminal charges, of unwarranted
restrictions on their freedom to hold meetings and consult their constituencies, and even of arrest without
charge. Similar tactics have been used against the independent press, and several magazines critical of
the government have been forced to close. Journalists have been the subject of arrest, detention and
criminal charges for writing articles criticizing government policies.
Perhaps of most concern, political violence C which erupted during the year leading up to the
election C has continued to affect the rural areas of western Kenya. In November 1993, Human Rights
Watch/Africa estimated that 1,500 people had died and 300,000 had been displaced since the "ethnic
clashes" first broke out in late October 1991.2 A program for resettlement of those displaced by the
clashes has had only limited success, and as recently as March 1994 further violence in the Rift Valley
resulted in the deaths of at least eighteen and the displacement of thousands from their farms to camps at
local church centers and elsewhere.
The government blames the violence on the opposition parties, churches and the media, warning
of the dangers of "tribalism" inherent in a multiparty system, and saying that calls for increased
democracy are nothing more than subversion. However, successive reports C including both a 1992
parliamentary committee made up only of KANU members and the latest eyewitness accounts C have
alleged that government security forces are not acting to defend those who have been attacked and even
that high-ranking members of the government are involved in provoking violence. The majority of the
victims have been members of the Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya ethnic groups, associated with the opposition
parties.
International attention to Kenya, which was crucial in President Moi's decision to repeal the
article in the constitution making Kenya a one-party state and to call elections, has failed to sustain
pressure for the respect of human rights. Bilateral aid to Kenya, suspended in November 1991 at a
meeting of the "consultative group" of donors, on economic, political and human rights grounds, was re-
pledged in November 1993. The donors did caution, however, that the Kenyan government would need
1 The coalition calling for the end of one-party rule in Kenya, known as the Forum for the Restoration of
Democracy (FORD), split during the course of the election campaign C largely along ethnic lines C into two main
groups, FORD-Kenya and FORD-Asili ("Original" FORD), to which were added a breakaway group from KANU, the
Democratic Party (DP). The election was also marred by government harassment of the opposition during the
campaign and there were widespread allegations of government manipulation of the election process. However, the
Commonwealth Observer Group at the elections concluded that "Despite the fact that the whole electoral process
cannot be given an unqualified rating as free and fair ... we believe that the results in many instances directly reflect,
however imperfectly, the expression of the will of the people." The Presidential, Parliamentary and Civic Elections in
Kenya: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1993, p.40.
2 Divide and Rule: State Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya (NY: Human Rights Watch, November 1993), p. 1.
The United States, in particular, previously outspoken on the need for Kenya to improve its
human rights record, has become increasingly reluctant to criticize the government in public statements.
Although President Moi portrays any call for his government to show greater respect for democracy and
human rights as illegitimate interference in Kenya's internal affairs, individuals active in the movement
for the protection of human rights in Kenya insist that pressure must be maintained.
In late October 1991, violence broke out at a farm in Nandi District, on the border of Rift Valley,
Nyanza and Western Provinces in western Kenya. Although it seemed initially that the fighting was a
simple land dispute between members of the Luo and Kalenjin (Nandi) ethnic groups, it later appeared
that the attacks were motivated by the call for "non-indigenous" groups to leave the Rift Valley,
associated with the idea of majimboism (regionalism in Swahili) sponsored by several high-ranking
government ministers.3 Leaflets signed by a group calling itself the Nandi Warriors warned Luos to leave
the area by December 12, 1991 or "face the consequences." Violence spread to neighboring districts: by
December 1991, when Parliament repealed the section of the constitution making Kenya a one-party
state, large areas of the west of Kenya had been affected and tens of thousands displaced from their land.
Eyewitness reports of the violence were remarkably similar. Farms occupied by members of the
Luo, Kikuyu or Luhya ethnic groups were attacked by groups of "Kalenjin warriors," as they came to be
known, coming from one or other of the subgroups of the Kalenjin ethnic group.4 Non-Kalenjin houses
were burnt and their owners driven away. The attackers were often dressed in an informal uniform of
red or black t-shirts, their faces marked with clay in the manner of initiation candidates, and armed with
bows and arrows or pangas (machetes).
Violence escalated during 1992, as the opposition mobilized for the election. Members of the
opposition parties charged the government with complicity in the violence, stating that close associates of
President Moi had deliberately provoked attacks. These allegations were supported by reports from the
National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Catholic Church, who had taken up the task of
caring for the clash victims.
3 Majimboism is a form of ethnic regionalism that was promoted by the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU)
at independence. KADU's support came mainly from the minority ethnic groups of Kenya, including the Kalenjin,
and President Moi was one of the party's leaders. KADU voluntarily dissolved itself into KANU soon after
independence, and the idea of majimboism was dropped. However, KANU politicians close to Moi, from the
Kalenjin and Maasai ethnic groups, revived the calls for majimboism as a way of countering the demand for
multipartyism in Kenya. Under the cover of a call for regional autonomy, prominent MPs have demanded the
forcible expulsion of all ethnic groups from the Rift Valley except for those pastoralist groups C Kalenjins, Maasai,
Turkana and Samburu C that were on the land before colonialism. While many Kenyans have no quarrel with the
concept of regionalism, per se, they view these calls as nothing less than calls for ethnic cleansing. Divide and Rule,
p.12.
4
The Kalenjin are made up of a number of smaller groups C of which the Nandi are one C speaking Nilotic
languages and sharing similar cultural traditions. Together they form about eleven percent of the Kenyan
population. In precolonial times, the Kalenjin were largely pastoralists and had few political links; the sense of a
common "Kalenjin" identity was born as a result of British colonial policies, and has strengthened since
independence. President Moi is a Kalenjin. The Luhyas are similarly made up of several smaller ethnic groups, the
collective description also dating from the colonial period.
Many expected that the violence would cease after Moi's victory in the election of December 1992.
But although some areas were restored to calm, outbreaks of violence continued. During 1993, clashes
were concentrated in Trans Nzoia and Bungoma districts of Western Province, and in Uasin Gishu and
Nakuru districts of the Rift Valley. In October, violence flared at Enosupukia in the previously unaffected
district of Narok in the south of the Rift Valley, when Kikuyu farms in the region were attacked by
Maasais. The Maasai minister of local government, William ole Ntimama, stated that he had "no regrets
about the events in Enosupukia because the Maasai were fighting for their rights."5
In November 1993, Human Rights Watch/Africa published a report on the "ethnic clashes"
entitled Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya, which estimated that the violence had by
that date left at least 1,500 dead and as many as 300,000 internally displaced. The report concluded that
the ethnic violence had been deliberately manipulated and instigated by Moi and his inner circle in order
to undermine the political opposition and limit the effect of democratic reforms. The government had
failed in its duty to punish those responsible for the violence and had exhibited outright hostility towards
those who sought to help the victims.
Little has changed since the publication of the report. While a resettlement program has been
instituted, with the joint backing of the Kenyan government and the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), the majority of the displaced victims are not yet able to return safely to their land.
Moreover, renewed outbreaks of violence have occurred despite government assurances that everything
is being done to maintain law and order. These new clashes have been concentrated in the Rift Valley,
where the great majority of the victims have been Kikuyus.
In January 1994, approximately 4,000 Kikuyus fled from their homes at Mwoyoi Scheme and
Nyandonche, Ibere, Nyaiguta, Masimba and Tilango Farms in Trans Mara sub-district of Narok province,
after their farms had been attacked by Maasais. Property valued at approximately KShs. 40 million [U.S.
$667,000] was destroyed and looted.6 The Kikuyu owners alleged that a meeting had been held at
Lolgorien Division headquarters of the local administration, which non-Maasais had been barred from
attending, where a resolution had been passed to evict them. On February 21, there was a raid by
approximately fifty Kalenjins on Kianjogu village in Laikipia District. The attack resulted in several
injured and the death of one Kikuyu villager, Kuria Njoroge, as well as the burning of four houses. The
victims of the attack reported that their attackers identified themselves as "tribal executioners who will
return soon to finish all of you."7
On May 1, 1994, eight people were killed and twenty-six seriously injured when over one
hundred attackers chanting majimbo slogans attacked Mtondia village, approximately ten kilometers
from Kilifi town in Coast Province, hundreds of miles from the Rift Valley, where clashes had previously
5
"Minister: `No Regrets' Over Events," Daily Nation, Nairobi, October 20, 1993.
6
In this report, an exchange rate of 60 Kenyan shillings to the US dollar is used.
7
"Evicted Group in Plea," Daily Nation, February 19, 1994.
In September 1993, after two years of inaction, the government designated Burnt Forest one of
three "security operation zones.". The declaration of the security operation zones in the Burnt Forest,
Molo and Londiani areas gives the government extraordinary powers to limit access to the region and to
enforce law and order within the area.10 The security zone regulations grant the police powers to arrest
without a warrant any person suspected of having committed an offense in the area. The regulations
prohibit, among other things, the possession of firearms or offensive weapons in the zone; the publication
of any information concerning the security zone when deemed necessary by the minister; and the entry of
any unauthorized person into the zone.11
Following a period of relative calm, sporadic attacks in the Burnt Forest area began to cause
renewed concern in January 1994. These attacks increased in intensity and culminated in an outbreak of
widespread violence from March 28 to April 4, 1994. According to the NCCK, the violence affected three
communities in the Burnt Forest area: Kesses, Ainabkoi and Burnt Forest divisions.12 Incidents of ethnic
fighting, predominantly between Kalenjins and Kikuyus, took place on a number of farms (including
Bindura, Chakaiya, Emkwen, Kaplanga, Kiptega, Kiruka, Kondoo, Lorian, Olare, Rolian, Rukuini, Rurigi
and Usalama farms), and at a number of trading centers (including Burnt Forest, Kamuyu, Kidigia and
Lorian trading centers).13
8
"Thousands Flee in Fear of Fresh Attack," Daily Nation, May 4, 1994.
9
"Luos Targeted in Violence, Kilifi Attack: A Genesis of Clashes at Coast?," Clashes Update (Nairobi: NCCK), issue
no. 16, May 25, 1994.
10
Under the Constitution, the President has powers to seal off any part of the country when public order is
threatened. These powers are also set out in Part III of the Preservation of Public Security Act.
11
The Preservation of Public Security (Molo, Burnt Forest and Londiani areas) Regulations, 1993. Kenya Gazette
supplement no. 60, September 17, 1993. Sections 13(1) and (2) state that "no person shall, without lawful authority or
excuse, proof of which shall lie on him, be in, enter, or attempt to enter the prescribed zone," and "any person who is
in, or who enters or attempts to enter the prescribed area in contravention of paragraph (1) shall be guilty of an
offence and liable to a fine of ten thousand shillings or to imprisonment for one year or to both."
12
Telephone interview with Rev. Peter Gathuru, NCCK, May 3, 1994.
13
Interview with Moses Wanyama Masinde, NCCK, May 11, 1994.
14
The names of those known to have been killed were released by the Office of the President as: Kikuyu --
The restrictions on access to the security operation zones have been strictly enforced by the
security forces against journalists, clergy, human rights groups and even relief organizations since
September 1993.15 Accordingly, detailed first-hand information on the recent outbreak of violence in the
Burnt Forest security operation zone has been extremely difficult to obtain. In preparing this account,
Human Rights Watch/Africa has relied on information from secondary sources, including Kenyan
government statements, local press clippings and interviews with clergy and international relief workers
in the Eldoret area who have been feeding the displaced. It has been impossible to verify each account
due to the restrictions on access. All sources are cited in the following chronology:
$ On January 3, 1994, Kalenjins attacked Kondoo farm (number 3) leaving six dead and houses in
the area burnt and looted.16
$ On February 17, 1994, eleven houses were burnt on Kondoo farm (number 7).17
$ On March 10, approximately eleven houses were burnt and property destroyed in an attack on
Kondoo Farm. On March 13, the district commissioner (DC), Wilson Chepkwony, toured the
affected areas and assured residents that the situation was under control and that peace had been
restored.19
$ On March 20, a man was killed in renewed ethnic violence at Kiptega in Burnt Forest according to
the district commissioner. Fifteen houses were burnt and several people injured. Two people
Muchina Wamuchuma, Njenga Waocha, Peter Kahungi Gichuru, Samuel Karanja Muchina, David Mwangi Kungu,
Muthiora Mwarura, Eva Wambui Kamau, Maina Njuguna, Gerald Mutahi, Njoroge Ng'ang'a, Kariuki Mungai,
Japhet Kiilu Ngahu; Kalenjin -- John Cheruiyot, Koskei Kibore, George Tamunywet, Kipsewere arap Kiptere,
Charles Mnichus; and one unknown person believed to be Kikuyu. Statement by Assistant Minister Julius Sunkuli,
as reported in Economic Review (Kenya), April 11-17, 1994.
15
On September 3, 1993, a Red Cross food convoy containing seven tons of grain intended for clash victims was
barred entry into Molo by security forces. A group of Dutch Parliamentarians visiting Kenya were also prohibited
access to the Molo area on September 6, 1993. On September 10, 1993, police arrested Presbyterian Ministers
Timothy Njoya and Johnson Nyutu along with Bedan Mbugua, the editor of The People newspaper, when they
attempted to enter the Molo area. The same month, thirteen opposition MPs were arrested and charged with
breaching the peace when they attempted to enter a security operation zone on a fact-finding mission. Three priests
have been arrested and charged for entering the area, including Fr. Francis Mirango who is from an area in one of the
security zones. In April 1994, Fr. Stephen Mbugua of St. Joseph seminary in Molo and Fr. Ndenyere of Olenguruone
Catholic parish were arrested and released on bond after they had gone into a security zone to distribute food relief
and pray with a group of displaced Kalenjins (Dorobo). Journalists have also been prohibited from entering the
security zones. Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya, Africa Watch, New York: November 1993,
pp. 39-41 and interview with Ernest Murimi, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, May 16, 1994.
16
Press statement by farmers from the Burnt Forest security zone of Uasin Gishu district of the Rift Valley
province, March 28, 1994.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
"A Chronology of Events," Economic Review, April 11-17, 1994.
$ On March 21, at Kondoo farm (number 3), one person was killed, three injured, 152 houses burnt
and approximately 300 cattle stolen in a third attack.22
$ On March 24, Uasin Gishu district police head, Charles Issika, called a press conference to display
a petrol bomb which he said was recovered from an arrested arsonist at Kiptega. The same day,
the district commissioner announced that peace had been restored and that action would be taken
against those spreading rumors or creating alarm.23
$ On March 28, according to a statement by Assistant Minister Julius Sunkuli, violence began when
fighting broke out between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu communities after a Kikuyu man, John
Kinyanjui Kamau, allegedly hurled a grenade at a Kalenjin farm at Kiptega.24 The fighting
resulted in the death of two people C Mr. Muchiri and Mr. Mjenga Roja C and over fifty houses
burnt at Kondoo farm (number 1). The fighting then spread to all the Kondoo farms (numbers 1-
9).25 At Kondoo farm (number 5), three residents were killed and over 250 houses burnt. On
Kondoo farms (numbers 6 and 7), a total of ninety houses were burnt and cattle stolen. At
Rukuini farm, two houses were burnt and grain destroyed.26 Schools in the area were closed. The
Kikuyu residents allege that the attacks took place because they had been returning to plough
their farms. Local authorities immediately assured residents that extra security had been
deployed to bring the situation under control.27
$ On March 29, Kalenjin "warriors" attacked Kikuyus at Rurigi farm for approximately five hours.
Four people were left dead, thirty were wounded and approximately 200 houses were torched to
the ground. Police on the scene only shot in the air, allowing the attackers to continue with
impunity. Extra security did not arrive at the farm until two days later.28 The same day, two
Kalenjins (Jonah Cheruiyot and Kipkoske arap Bore) were killed at Kamuyu and Usalama farms,
leaving fifteen houses burnt, according to District Commissioner Chepkwony. The district
commissioner stated that the violence began after Kikuyu slaughtered three cows belonging to the
20
"Man Dies in Fresh Violence," Daily Nation, March 22, 1994.
21
Press statement by farmers from the Burnt Forest security zone of Uasin Gishu district of the Rift Valley
Province, March 28, 1994.
22
Ibid.
23
"A Chronology of Events," Economic Review, April 11-17, 1994.
24
"Moi Slaps Curfew on Burnt Forest," Daily Nation, April 6, 1994 and "A Chronology of Events," Economic Review,
April 11-17, 1994.
25
"Two Killed in Burnt Forest," Daily Nation, March 30, 1994 and interview with Moses Wanyama Masinde,
NCCK, May 11, 1994.
26
Press statement by farmers from the Burnt Forest security zone of Uasin Gishu district of the Rift Valley
Province, March 28, 1994.
27
"A Chronology of Events," Economic Review, April 11-17, 1994.
28
Tribal Clashes Resettlement Volunteer Service, "Politically-Motivated Tribal Clashes in Kenya," fifth update,
March 1994, p.3, and interview with Moses Wanyama Masinde, NCCK, May 11, 1994.
$ Six people were killed on March 30 in another outbreak of violence on various farms. The district
commissioner announced that those killed included two Kalenjins and two Kikuyus at Olare
scheme; a Kalenjin, George arap Kibogoyo, at Lorian farm; and a Kikuyu, Peter Koigi, who was
shot by police. At Kitingia trading center near Burnt Forest, five houses and eight shops were
burnt in another attack.31 Kalenjins also attacked Bindura farm residents who had been living at
the farm's market center since being displaced in a similar 1992 attack, resulting in two deaths.32
The same day, eleven Kalenjins pleaded not guilty to the charge of possession of offensive
weapons in the local court. They were released on bail pending the trial.
$ In the first week of April, Kalenjin warriors attacked Kimuri and Rono farms on the outskirts of
the security zone. A priest that witnessed the destruction noted that all the houses burnt
belonged to Kikuyus. No Kalenjins on the farms had been displaced, but all the Kikuyus had fled
the area.33 On April 2, local clergy witnessed houses being burned while the police standing
approximately 100 meters away took no action.34
$ Two market centers C Kamuyu and Lorian C were attacked by Kalenjins (dates unknown).35
$ At Rolian farm, the violence resulted in the death of one man and eighty houses burnt. At
Kaplanga farm, twenty-five houses were burnt and looted (dates unknown).36
The violence caused thousands of terrified Kikuyus to flee the area. An eye-witness described the
situation he encountered on March 30:
I witnessed a massive crowd at Burnt Forest Centre while smoke was visible from afar.
The victims running for refuge were gathering all along the main Uganda road looking for
means of transport in vain. They clutched the little they were able to save. Children and
women were exhausted, hungry and miserable while men were desperate. People are still
flowing to Eldoret NCCK Centre. Some come with nothing as they are robbed along the
way.37
29
Letter from Wangari Maathai, Tribal Clashes Resettlement Volunteer Service, to Killian Kleinschmidt, UNDP
Senior Technical Advisor, April 11, 1994.
30
"A Chronology of Events," Economic Review, April 11-17, 1994.
31
"Seven More Killed as Clashes Escalate," Daily Nation, April 1, 1994.
32
Letter from Wangari Maathai, Tribal Clashes Resettlement Volunteer Service, to Killian Kleinschmidt, UNDP
Senior Technical Advisor, April 11, 1994.
33
Telephone interview with Catholic priest (name withheld on request), May 13, 1994.
34
Interview with Moses Wanyama Masinde, NCCK, May 11, 1994.
35
Telephone interview with Rev. Peter Gathuru, NCCK, May 3, 1994.
36
Press statement by farmers from the Burnt Forest security zone of Uasin Gishu district of the Rift Valley
Province, March 28, 1994.
37
Written account of eyewitness (name withheld by request), Eldoret, April 4, 1994, sent to Tribal Clashes
Although the recent fighting in Burnt Forest appears to have died down, thousands of Kikuyu
families have been driven off their farms. The relief community in the clash areas has mobilized to
address the crisis area providing medical and food supplies. Most of the displaced have not returned for
fear of recurring violence. For some, this is the second or even third time that they have been displaced.
A number of the attacks took place on market centers where displaced victims from previous attacks
were staying because they were still too scared to reside on their property. In contrast, it appears that the
local Kalenjin community have been able to remain on their farms for the most part, mirroring the pattern
of violence and displacement that has characterized the situation since 1991.
District Commissioner Wilson Chepkwony, announced that the government would donate ten
sacks of maize meal.40 Although the amount was inadequate to address the needs of all those displaced,
the Catholic Church did acknowledge receiving and distributing the food on behalf of the government.41
In the past, food relief pledged by the government was often never actually received by the displaced.42
38
"Seven more killed as Clashes Escalate," Daily Nation, April 1, 1994.
39
"Moi Slaps Curfew on Burnt Forest," Daily Nation, April 6, 1994 and "Eighteen Killed in Clashes, says Govt,"
Daily Nation, April 8, 1994. The ban on offensive weapons was already in effect in the security operation zone areas
under Sections 4(1) and (3) of the Preservation of Public Security Regulations, 1993.
40
"Seven More Killed as Clashes Escalate," Daily Nation, April 1, 1994.
41
Telephone interview with the office of Bishop Cornelius Korir, Eldoret, May 2, 1994.
42
In 1992, the government pledged to provide approximately US $125,000 of food and other relief supplies to the
displaced clash victims. However, Human Rights Watch/Africa was able to trace the distribution of only a tenth of
this sum -- an inadequate amount to begin with given the scale of the crisis. Divide and Rule, p.53.
The recent outbreak of violence in the Burnt Forest C one of the security operation zones in which
extra security has been deployed C is particularly disturbing because of the implication that the
government is either unable or unwilling to take effective measures to stop the clashes. As several of the
incidents described above indicate, there is continuing evidence that police often make no real attempt to
halt attacks. Many believe that if the violence could break out in a protected zone such as Burnt Forest,
government assurances of security, particularly over the long term, are meaningless. Moreover, despite
government announcements of arrests, it does not appear that the few cases which have been brought to
court in connection with the recent violence have been vigorously pursued. Under international law, the
government has an obligation to protect its citizens from extra-legal or arbitrary killings, to investigate
violations when they occur and to bring the perpetrators to justice.43
President Moi continues to blame the political opposition, the clergy and the press44 for the
violence and has accused "certain embassies" of "showing open support for subversive elements
operating in the country in the name of democracy."45 He has neither acknowledged his government's
ultimate responsibility to end the violence nor taken steps to censure members of his government who
make statements inflaming ethnic sentiments.
Minister for Local Government William ole Ntimama, a Maasai, has stated publicly on a number
of occasions that the Kikuyus displaced in the Enosupukia clashes of October 1993 would not be allowed
by the Maasai to return to their homes. Other similar statements by Mr. Ntimama have provoked
incidents of violence. Kipkalia Kones, a Kalenjin minister of state in the President's Office, has also made
such statements. Shortly before the violence broke out in Burnt Forest, Mr. Kones threatened to lynch
and forcibly expel Luo people from Bomet and Kericho districts if they supported the opposition FORD-
Kenya.46 In April 1994, KANU Assistant Minister Shariff Nassir told Kenyans that until Kenya reverted
to a one-party state, the ethnic violence would continue.
At Makutano Stadium in Kapenguria, Home Affairs Minister Francis Lotodo gave a speech on
November 28, 1993, telling Kikuyus that they had forty-eight hours to leave West Pokot District. He also
43
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (International Covenant), to which Kenya is
a party, and report of the Human Rights Committee, 37 UN GAOR Supp. (no. 40) Annex V, general comment 7(16),
para 1 (1982) UN Doc. A/37/40(1982).
44
For example, on April 5, 1994, the state-run radio station reported that President Moi accused the Daily Nation
newspaper of "fanning tribal animosity ... by publishing false reports [and] ... called on the country's media to play a
more responsible role in promoting a harmonious co-existence among the different communities." He also called on
the churches to preach to the people the importance of maintaining peace "instead of using the pulpit to criticize the
government and making inflammatory statements." KBC radio, Nairobi, as reported in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (SWB) AL/1965 A/2, April 7, 1994.
45
KBC radio broadcast, Nairobi March 3, 1994, as reported in SWB AL/1938 A/2, March 5, 1994.
46
"Burnt Forest: Name Takes on a Meaning of its Own," Economic Review, April 11-17, 1994 and "Wamalwa Wants
Kones Arrested," Daily Nation, April 6, 1994.
However, when opposition members make similar statements, they are immediately censured.
For example, on December 6, 1993, FORD-Kenya MP George Kapten was arrested for a comment he
made on November 18, 1993 at Matulo Friends Church in Bungoma district to the effect that non-
Kalenjins in Trans Nzoia district would fight back if attacked.50
In a March 1994 pastoral letter, the nation's Catholic bishops criticized the government's inaction
on the ethnic violence:
The so-called majimboism or political regionalism, denying the human rights of the
citizens to choose their own place of dwelling and their freedom of movement was
preached by some KANU leaders before the elections and continues to be implemented
with violence through the wrongly called ethnic clashes. The government has not spared
any efforts to persuade public opinion that the clashes are caused by the opposition
leaders, but Kenyans now have the conviction that these clashes could not have taken
place nor continued for such a long time without the passive and sometimes active
collaboration of the authorities. Should Kenyans believe that our numerous, well trained
and well equipped army and police can be defeated by a small group of village warriors
armed with pangas and rungus? Should we believe that the police and the army did their
best but unfortunately always arrived late?51
In the same statement, the bishops also censured the government for its callous treatment of the
displaced in various areas and the continued violence, stating:
It is well known who ordered the demolition of Maela camp and of Nakuru kiosks. It is
well known who sent bulldozers to Burru Thessalia holding ground to evict people who
had been in due right of tenancy of the land for more than fifty years. We could add many
other names to the list: Enoosupukia, Likoni, Molo, Kapenguria, Sirisia, Olenguruone,
Turbo Scheme, Rironi, etc. The president himself visited some of the affected areas and
called for peace, but soon after his departure the clashes started again. Should we believe
the words about national unity pronounced by our president during the past celebration
of Kenyatta day, or the words inciting to tribal revenge pronounced in parliament by one
of his ministers with total impunity and even supported by many KANU members of
parliament? We confirm here what we expressed last year ... never before in the history of
47
"Remaining Kikuyus Told to Move Out by Lotodo," Daily Nation, November 29, 1993.
48
"Tension rise in W. Pokot," Daily Nation, November 30, 1993.
49
"`Majimbo' is the Answer -- Biwott," Daily Nation, November 29, 1993.
50
"Events in the Clash Areas," Clashes Update, NCCK, Vol. 2 issue no. 11, December 18, 1993.
51
"On the Road to Democracy," pastoral letter issued by the Kenya Episcopal Conference, March 12, 1994 as
reported in Economic Review, March 21-27, 1994, p.9.
In response to the pastoral letter, President Moi attacked the Catholic church at a rally in Karbanet on
April 7 stating that the church statements would be responsible for causing a civil war in the country.53
Government incitement to violence has gone beyond statements by ministers. When the clashes
first erupted in November 1991 there were numerous reports that the so-called Kalenjin warriors
responsible for the attacks had been transported to the sites of the clashes by government trucks and
trained on farms belonging to government ministers. These reports were later substantiated in a KANU
Parliamentary Select Committee report.54 Disturbingly, there are allegations that the recent violence was
also provoked. A number of displaced victims have alleged that they witnessed a helicopter landing
shortly before the violence began in the area. A Kikuyu survivor, Kimani Kariuki, recounted to the press
that he had witnessed a helicopter carrying Kalenjin warriors which had landed on the farm of a
prominent Rift Valley politician shortly before nearby Rurigi farm was attacked.55 Other displaced
victims told local clergy that shortly after the helicopter was seen landing, young men armed with sticks
and arrows began burning houses and chasing Kikuyus out of Burnt Forest trading center.56 While
Human Rights Watch/Africa has not been able to verify these allegations, they clearly merit serious
concern and investigation: instead, the news editor of the paper publishing the account has been charged
with subversion.57
At a press conference held in Nairobi on March 28, thirteen displaced Kikuyu residents of Burnt
Forest issued a statement complaining that the local authorities had not taken any action even against
known perpetrators of the violence. The displaced stated:
We want to tell the world that these clashes are occurring in the so-called security zones
which the government brought into force last year. We want to remind the world that the
government blamed the earlier clashes on outsiders. Hence the idea of security zones to
keep outsiders out ... The current wave of arson, murder and destruction of property is
aimed largely at the Kikuyu in the area ... [but] all administrative positions in the area are
held by Kalenjins to whom we cannot report when we are killed or our property is stolen
or destroyed. We have been attacked a thousand times in the presence of the DC [District
Commissioner], DO [District Officer], chiefs and assistant chiefs and their policemen and
yet nothing is done. The policemen merely fire in the area. Warriors walk openly with
arrows and bows and are never arrested58 ... our children are sick with sleeping in the
52
Ibid.
53
"Moi Cautions Kenyans Over Civil War Threat," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, April 8, 1994, as
reported in NEXIS.
54
Republic of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and Other
Parts of Kenya (September 1992).
55
"A Chronology of Events," Economic Review, April 11-17, 1994.
56
Interview with NCCK representative (name withheld on request), May 11, 1994.
57
See below, under "Intimidation of the Press."
58
This is contrary to Section 4(1) of the Security Operation Regulations which prohibits any person from being "in
possession or under his control in the prescribed area any offensive weapon shall be guilty of an offense and liable to
imprisonment of not less than five years or not more than ten years." Section 4(3) defines an offensive weapon as "any
article made or adapted for use for causing injury to a person or capable of being so used, or intended by the person
having it with him for such use, and includes any bow and arrow, axe, rungu, panga, simi, spear or similar weapon."
The displaced also charged that the violence had been organized with the cooperation of a senior State
House official, with the purpose of driving the Kikuyu community out of the area:
We know for a fact that, high government officials led by the comptroller of State House,
Mr. Abraham Kiptanui and his Uasin Gishu councillor and brother Samuel Ngelel and an
in-law and also councillor Kibet Sitienei are the main organizers of the current wave of
mayhem in Uasin Gishu. We have evidence of Mr. Kiptanui's involvement through his
meetings with the arsonists in local hotels and use of his vehicles ... These heinous crimes
are planned at the Olare Guest House. Mr. Kiptanui meets his arsonists in this hotel.
Transport and food is arranged here. Ranking arsonists use a dark blue Peugeot 204 car
[license plate number] KTT679 fitted with a radio call for communication with arsonists in
the field. Mr. Kiptanui visits arsonists in a Pajero. The vehicles used in the operations are
[license plate numbers] KUD301, KAB026F, KAB562L, KJK400, KWP998, KXV700,
KTH848 and KAA139C.60
These charges were denied by Mr. Kiptanui and District Commissioner Chepkwony. So far as Human
Rights Watch/Africa is aware, the government has not undertaken any investigation into the
accusations.61
The displaced from this recent violence join the other Kenyans who have been terrorized off their
land. Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, it is likely that at least 300,000 Kenyans, largely
children, have been affected by the clashes since 1991.65 The vast majority of the displaced belong to the
59
Press statement by farmers from the Burnt Forest Security Zone of Uasin Gishu district of the Rift Valley
Province, March 28, 1994.
60
Ibid.
61
"Seven More Killed as Clashes Escalate," Daily Nation, April 1, 1994 and "A Chronology of Events," Economic
Review, April 11-17, 1994.
62
Telephone interview with the office of Bishop Cornelius Korir, Eldoret, May 2, 1994.
63
Telephone interview with Rev. Peter Gathuru, NCCK, May 3, 1994 and interview with Moses Wanyama
Masinde, NCCK, May 11, 1994.
64
Telephone interview with international relief worker (name withheld on request), May 2, 1994.
65
A recent NCCK figure, based on October 1993 food registration figures, estimates the total number of displaced
to be 304,833, confirming the estimate of Human Rights Watch/Africa published in November 1993. The breakdown
of the figures is as follows: Uasin Gishu 112,524; Trans Nzoia 77,724; Bungoma 35,963; Turkana 23,614;
The situation for the displaced from Burnt Forest is no exception. The camps are overcrowded
and grossly inadequate. The situation is exacerbated by seasonal rains. Many are living in open
makeshift structures covered with plastic sheeting or under corrugated metal sheets leaned against walls
of nearby buildings. At the NCCK community center, the 2,500 displaced are living in three classrooms
and a church or outside in tents or makeshift structures, sharing six pit latrines which were built by the
NCCK. Conditions, while inadequate, are slightly better at the Burnt Forest church compound.
The Kenya Government/UNDP program has initiated its resettlement efforts in the Mt. Elgon
area of Western Province in cooperation with local nongovernmental organizations. Although it is
difficult to specify how many people have returned to their land, one relief worker put the number at
approximately 30,000 people (Kalenjin and Luhya).69 Others estimate that no more than 5 percent of this
number have actually returned. The NCCK believes that most continue to live at the foot of the Mt.
Elgon area for fear of attack if they return to their farms.70 Human Rights Watch/Africa has information
Kisii/Nyamira 33,863; Kisumu 14,625; Nandi 6,520. A February 1994 UNDP programme report/proposal estimates
the number at 260,000. The vast majority are children.
66
Government of Kenya/UNDP Programme Document: Programme for Displaced Persons, Inter-agency joint
programming, October 26, 1993.
67
Interview with foreign diplomat (name withheld by request), March 29, 1994.
68
Telephone interview with international relief worker (name withheld on request), May 2, 1994.
69
Ibid.
70
The Christian Reformed World Relief Committee (CRWRC) created seven new camps at Tuyandet, Namorio,
Chebukube, Wamono, Chemoge, Kiniama and Wasio for the displaced. However, since these camps are in the heart
of the Kalenjin (Sabaot) community, most Luhyas have been unwilling to move to these camps where they could
receive relief assistance. Interview with Moses Masinde, NCCK, May 11, 1994.
It is difficult to determine the extent of the threat of further attack against those who attempt to
return to their homes. However, there are sufficient reports of threats or actual violence against those
returning to indicate a more serious problem. For example, in December 1993, members of a Luhya
family who had returned to their farm in Chesiro, Chepkube district, were attacked. Within a week of
their return, five unknown assailants attacked the farm, leaving its owner Moses Wanjyenji Kisibo dead,
his wife Pileao Halayi Kisibo badly beaten and their two daughters Rose Mutengo (age sixteen) and
Caroline Nandutu (age twelve) raped.72
While the church and local relief organizations working with the displaced have welcomed the
resettlement efforts begun by UNDP, they continue to have misgivings about the Kenyan government's
commitment to the program. The success of the Kenyan government/UNDP proposal for resettlement is
ultimately contingent on the active involvement of the government to maintain peace and provide
security. UNDP Resident Representative David Whaley has also stated that a necessary precondition for
the success of the proposal is that the government create "an enabling environment."73
lack of political will on the part of the government has dragged out the peace and
reconciliation pace. On a general level, peace was coming slowly. However, in many
areas, insecurity has remained the order of the day making it difficult to reconcile and
resettle the victims. Such areas as Miteitei in Nandi; Kerisoi in Molo; and Endebess,
Saboti, Chebukube, Chebwek and Chemoge in Mt. Elgon will take longer to resettle.
These are areas which need more than food relief to reconcile the warring communities.
The political will is needed. The recent clashes in Burnt Forest have set back the process
and pointed out the difficulties that go along with reconciling, resettling and rehabilitating
the over 300,000 victims displaced by the clashes in Kenya.75
Ernest Murimi, of the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, noted to Human Rights
Watch/Africa, that "The displaced are ready to go back as long as the government will assure them
protection. But [high-ranking government officials such as KANU Local Government Minister William
ole] Ntimama and others are still advocating violence ... the problem is with the leaders."76
71
Interview with Moses Wanyama Masinde, NCCK, May 11, 1994.
72
"Killings: A Drawback to Resettlement," Clashes Update, NCCK, vol. 2, issue no. 12, January 25, 1994.
73
"Enabling Environment a Must to Resettle Victims," Clashes Update, NCCK, vol. 2, issue 11, December 18, 1993.
74
"State Attacked Over Victims of Violence," Daily Nation, January 19, 1994 and "Government, NGOs Cooperation:
Only Way to Resettle Victims," Clashes Update, NCCK, vol. 2, issue no. 12, January 25, 1994.
75
Interview with Moses Wanyama Masinde, NCCK, May 11, 1994.
76
Interview with Ernest Murimi, Catholic Justice and Peace Commission, May 16, 1994.
In its November 1993 report, Human Rights Watch/Africa reported an incident when
government authorities had cleared a camp of displaced Luhyas and Tesos at Endebess in Trans Nzoia
district in June 1993. The camp residents had fled there after an attack by Kalenjins in December 1991.
Local government authorities first closed down a school formed for the displaced children and then
evicted the camp residents, without providing any alternative accommodation or assistance. Camp
residents were forced to relocate to neighboring farms because it was still unsafe to return to their land.
Already impoverished from being displaced, the camp residents were forced to live in crowded
makeshift shelters with no protection from the rain.78
There were expectations that this sort of harassment would cease, particularly once the Kenyan
government/UNDP plan for resettlement of clash victims had begun. However, on January 5, 1994,
government officials ordered a similar demolition of a camp of displaced people at Maela, near
Enosupukia. Approximately 30,000 people, predominantly Kikuyus, had sought refuge there in October
1993 after being attacked in their houses in Enosupukia by approximately 500 Maasais, carrying knives
and sharpened sticks. The area's Kikuyu population had been strong supporters of the FORD-Asili
district party chair, Horoun ole Lempaka. Approximately 10,000 of those displaced settled in a makeshift
camp at nearby Maela.
The displaced Kikuyus who sought refuge at Maela were living in squalid conditions under
plastic sheeting on church grounds. The overcrowding led to shortages of food, water and medical
supplies. According to Reverend Gathere, a local priest, twenty-two camp residents died by the end of
the year, including eleven children.79 In November 1993, representatives of the U.S. Embassy visited the
camp, after much difficulty in receiving permission from local authorities. In response to the camp
conditions, U.S. Ambassador Aurelia Brazeal declared the camp a disaster area and pledged U.S. $25,000
to purchase and distribute shelter materials and potable water.80
On January 5, 1994, local government officials accompanied by over twenty police demolished the
temporary structures and closed down a medical clinic and a makeshift school at the camp. Local
government authorities also pressured church officials to stop a church feeding program for the Maela
camp residents. The residents were told by local authorities that they posed a security risk to the area.
Only after intense international and media pressure did local government authorities abandon their
actions against the camp residents. In February, the displaced rebuilt the makeshift housing which had
been pulled down by the local authorities. They remain at Maela to date, living in congested conditions
sometimes without sufficient food.
Although Maela is not in a security operation zone, where official regulations prevent reporting,
the local authorities and security forces have restricted access to relief organizations, journalists and
77
"State Attacked Over Victims of Violence," Daily Nation, January 19, 1994.
79
"Clash Victims `Distrust' Government," Daily Nation, January 1, 1994.
80
U.S. Agency for International Development, "Kenya -- Civil Strife/Drought," fact sheet #2, April 15, 1994.
At another camp for displaced people at Thessalia Mission in Kericho District, the local
authorities have been denying access to the 630 camp residents, despite the fact that it is not in a security
operation zone. On April 10, 1994, FORD-Kenya MP Mukhisa Kituyi, was prevented by police from
entering the camp area to donate fifteen bags of maize to the residents. The police told him that they had
been given instructions by the district commissioner not to permit access to the displaced. According to
the NCCK, children in the mission have begun to suffer from malnutrition and one child has died of
measles. The displaced were forcibly and illegally evicted from their ninety-two-acre farm, which they
had owned since 1978, by Administration Police. There have been leaflets calling on Kalenjins to
purchase the land.82
Although freedom of expression has increased to some degree since the height of repression in
the 1980s and early 1990s, the independent press in Kenya continues to face harassment for reporting
critically on politically sensitive issues. Although the government has been most sensitive to press
reports on the violence, harassment of journalists has not been confined to those seeking to overcome the
news blackout created by the security operation zones. Others writing or publishing articles critical of the
government have also faced judicial action. These actions by the government violate the free speech
provisions in the Kenyan Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.83
Reporting on events pertaining to the "ethnic" conflict has become increasingly difficult for
journalists. Following negative international publicity on the government's role and inaction in ending
the violence, the government has tried to censor any information on the clashes. Since last September,
two years after the violence began, the government has used the Security Operation Regulations to deny
the media access to three of the worst-hit areas C Molo, Burnt Forest and Londiani. According to Rift
Valley provincial commissioner, Ishmael Chelang'a, the primary reason for the creation of the zones was
to keep away "those who did not wish us well and who were spreading rumours, lies and propaganda."
He has also accused the press of worsening the situation by "giving the outside world the wrong
picture."84 Similarly, President Moi has been quick to blame the press for inciting the violence "by
publishing tribal articles."85
In the past four months, there have been numerous cases of government harassment of the press
for reporting on the clashes including:
81
"Events in the Clash Areas, Clashes Update, issue no. 16, May 1994.
82
Telephone interview with Mukhisa Kituyi, FORD-K MP for Kimilili, May 4, 1994.
83
Section 79 of the Kenyan Constitution and Article 19 of the International Covenant.
84
"Molo: State to Review Order -- PC," Standard, February 12, 1993.
85
"Parties to Blame," Daily Nation, December 3, 1993.
$ On March 16, Ngumo Kuria, Standard newspaper Nakuru bureau chief, and Peter Rianga Makori,
a provincial correspondent, were arrested and charged with subversion under Section 77 of the
Kenyan Penal Code, for "an act prejudicial to the security of the state" by writing a report
"intended or calculated to promote feelings of hatred or enmity between different races or
communities in Kenya." They were charged after the publication of an article alleging that nine
people had been killed and hundreds of others displaced by renewed "ethnic" fighting in Molo,
one of the areas of the Rift Valley worst affected by violence over the past two years. A week
later, the managing editor of the Standard, Kamau Kanyanga, and the deputy chief sub-editor,
John Nyaosi, were also charged with subversion for editing the article. The case is currently
pending. All four were granted bail on March 31.87 The published story quoted an eyewitness
source who claimed to have seen the violence. Government statements that the incident had not
occurred were later confirmed to Human Rights Watch/Africa by clergy assisting the displaced in
the area.
$ On April 11, Mutegi Njau, news editor of the Daily Nation, and Evans Kanini, Eldoret
correspondent, were arrested in Nakuru. They had been summoned to the office of the Rift
Valley provincial criminal investigations officer to answer questions relating to an article entitled
"Clashes: Bishops Condemn the Govt," published in the April 4 edition of the paper. The article
had quoted a displaced clash victim from Burnt Forest claiming that he had seen a government
helicopter transporting Kalenjin attackers land on the farm of an unnamed "prominent Rift Valley
politician" shortly before violence had erupted on the nearby Rurigi farm. Mr. Njau was charged
with subversion and released on bail. The charges are pending.88
$ Daily Nation correspondent Austin Kiguta, based in Laikipia was interrogated by police and made
to record a statement after he wrote an article on property destruction at an East Laikipia farm.
$ Fifteen thousand copies of the book Kenya: Return to Reason, written by FORD-Asili leader
Kenneth Matiba, were confiscated by police from the printer Colourprint Ltd at 11:00 P.M. on
January 13. The book documented the government's activities since it took power and contained
for the most part documented and public information. The publication was officially banned by
the government on January 14.89
86
"Target Reporters Arrested at Maela," Daily Nation, January 10, 1994.
87
"Standard Newsmen Released on Bail," Daily Nation, April 1, 1994 and "Journalists on Subversion Charge,"
Society, April 4, 1994 and Amnesty International, Urgent Action, AFR 32/05/94, March 1994.
88
"Moi Slaps Curfew on Burnt Forest," and "Newsmen Grilled," Daily Nation, April 6, 1994.
89
"Copies of Matiba Book Impounded," Daily Nation, January 14, 1994 and "Leaders Condemn Book Ban," Daily
Nation, January 17, 1994.
$ On March 11, Kisumu bureau chief of the Daily Nation newspaper, Caleb Atemi, was arrested and
interrogated by CID personnel over his coverage of a by-election in Lugari.91
$ A BBC correspondent, Abu Mbelezi, was detained, searched and interrogated at Mombasa
Airport on April 1 as he prepared to return to London. His tape cassettes and notebooks were
confiscated and he was questioned about a meeting he had earlier that day with Sheikh Balala of
the unregistered Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK).92 As a result, Mr. Mbelezi missed his flight. His
materials were returned to him before he left the following day.93
$ On May 15, Daily Nation correspondent, Oloo Janak was summoned for questioning by the police
after writing a story which quoted the Migori town council chairman complaining about
deteriorating security and the rising crime rate in the town. The council chairman subsequently
denied making the statement when questioned by the police, but did admit talking about the
security situation and the police.94
$ In May, security forces confiscated copies of an edition of the London Financial Times which
contained an articled on the Kenyan economy which was deemed unhelpful to the government.
The article by reporter Leslie Crawford had stated that Western donors were divided over
whether to resume aid to Kenya and some were becoming alarmed by the political events in
Kenya and "face[d] an awkward dilemma" over whether to continue aid support. The report
concluded by stating: "Kenya's aid partners have come to believe that the harassment and
incarceration of opposition politicians, ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley, and the government's
crackdown on the press are no random occurrences, but the actions of a regime which has not
shed its authoritarian instincts."95
The government has not hesitated to conduct campaigns of threats, arrests, charges and seizures
against publications which have been particularly critical of government policy. Two such publications
90
"Copies of Nation Seized," Daily Nation, January 15, 1994.
91
"Nation Man Arrested by CID Officers," Daily Nation, March 11, 1994.
92
The government continues to deny the registration of the IPK as a political party, although the Societies Act
nowhere prohibits religion-based political parties. The Attorney-General has maintained that the registration of
sectarian parties would contradict the spirit of the law, which proscribes organizations "incompatible with peace,
welfare, or good order in Kenya." The government's refusal to permit the IPK to register caused political violence in
Kenya's coastal cities in 1993. In May 1993, the leader of the IPK, Sheikh Khalid Balala, was arrested and charged for
threatening to kill KANU leaders. He continues to be harassed by the government. Human Rights Watch World
Report, 1994, NY: Human Rights Watch, December 1993, p.14; US Department of State Country Report for Human Rights
Practices for 1993, Kenya, February 1994.
94
"Newsman Grilled by Police," Daily Nation, May 16, 1994.
95
"Donors `Alarmed' by Events in Kenya," Daily Nation, May 11, 1994, and "Kenya: A Very Private Affair," Africa
Confidential, vol. 35, no. 10, May 20, 1994.
On May 31, 1994, Attorney General Amos Wako indicated that all sedition charges were under
review and might be dropped; however, in the same statement, he said that it was a serious offense under
Kenyan law to utter words or remarks that are derogatory of the president, reportedly stating that
"although the head of state was subject to criticism, it must be with respect and without resorting to
abusive and insulting language."97 Moi himself has criticized the press on many occasions, for disloyalty
and "promoting tribalism and lies."98
The statement made by Mr. Kariuki referred to a judgment in which a five-judge bench of the
96Facing the Democractic Challenge: Freedom of Expression in Multiparty Kenya, Washington DC: Robert F. Kennedy
Memorial Center for Human Rights, February 1994; Kenya: Shooting the Messenger:, London: Article 19, Issue 28,
October 29, 1993; Divide and Rule, p.58, "The Tortuous Path Journalist Tread," The People, April 24-30. 1994 and US
Department of State Country Report for Human Rights Practices for 1993, Kenya, February 1994.
97
"AG may drop sedition cases," Daily Nation, June 1, 1994; KBC Radio, May 31, 1994, as reported in SWB
AL/2012 A/3, June 2, 1994.
98
"President Moi criticizes British MP's comments in Swahili Madaraka Speech," KBC Radio, June 1, 1994, as
reported in SWB AL/2014 A/1, June 4, 1994.
99
"Court of Appeal Ruling on Dons Reeked of State Interference," The People, March 6-12, 1994.
100
The government has had a long-standing practice of using the criminal justice system to penalize critics.
Charges such as sedition and contempt of court have been regularly used to harass critics, and the courts have been
reluctant to oppose the government by standing up for individual rights. Human rights activists within the country
and internationally have consistently identified the lack of an independent judiciary as a major obstacle to lasting
change in Kenya. Following sustained local and international pressure criticizing the role of British Chief Justice Alan
Hancox in the erosion of the independence of the judiciary in Kenya, President Moi replaced him in March 1993 with
another expatriate judge, Fred Apaloo, a Ghanaian. While many Kenyan jurists were optimistic about the new Chief
Justice, there are increasing complaints that he has done little to change the functioning of the Kenyan judiciary in the
one year since his confirmation. In May 1994, two judges of the High Court publicly criticized the judicial system.
Justices D.K.S. Aganyanya and Richard Kuloba independently commented on the pervasive lack of confidence in the
courts as an impartial organ of dispensing justice. Justice Aganyanya commented on the increasing corruption
involving magistrates and judges and Justice Kuloba criticized the appointment of judges on the basis of their
ethnicity. In June 1994, the contract of another expatriate judge, Ghanaian Edward Torgbor, was terminated after ten
years' service. Torgbor had been one of two judges presiding over a petition brought by FORD-Asili leader Kenneth
Matiba against President Moi, and had given a historic ruling against the president. "Have Kenyans Lost Faith in the
Courts?" The People, May 8-14, 1994; George Owuor & Mburu Mwangi, "Torgbor: Lawyers answer registrar," Daily
Nation, June 5, 1994.
The contempt charges against Mr. Kariuki and the others raise serious questions about Kenyan
judiciary's compliance with the standards of due process set out in Kenyan and international law. For
example, two of the three judges hearing the contempt case were the very judges that were the subject of
Mr. Kariuki's alleged comment. Despite requests that the judges recuse themselves from the case due to a
conflict of interest, the judges deliberated the case. The charges were also brought with a haste that is
contrary to the defendant's right under the Kenyan constitution to adequate time and facilities to prepare
his defence. On March 31, the court issued warrants of arrest for Mbugua and Makali for not appearing
in court despite the fact that they had not been served with papers notifying them of the court date. On
April 15, Mr. Kariuki's lawyer, Martha Karua, was thrown out of court by the judges and forced to
withdraw from the case after being threatened with contempt of court charges herself by the judges C a
denial of legal counsel of one's choice C after she had filed an affidavit questioning the neutrality of the
third judge.
On June 2, 1994, the Court of Appeal found the four parties guilty of contempt. Lawyer G.B.M.
Kariuki was ordered to pay KShs.500,000 [U.S. $8,300] or serve a six-month sentence. Editor Bedan
Mbugua was ordered to pay KShs.400,000 [U.S. $6,700] or serve five months. Journalist David Makali
was ordered to pay KShs.300,000 [U.S. $5,000] or serve four months. The publishing company, IMS, was
fined KShs.500,000 [U.S. $8,300]. The court also gave the defendants only one week to pay the enormous
fines or face prison sentences. Each was also ordered to submit an apology to the court and pay for its
publication in the daily newspapers. Finally, The People was ordered not to publish until IMS had paid its
fine. Because the case had been brought in the Court of Appeal, there could be no appeal against the
judgment.
The day after the decision, IMS paid its fine, and The People appeared the following day. Mr.
Kariuki also paid and submitted an apology, which was only accepted in an amended version. However,
Mr. Mbugua and Mr. Makali refused to pay their fines or submit an apology, stating that Kenya's law of
contempt of court
has a chilling effect on the work of journalists and will seriously inhibit the willingness of
the people of this nation from voicing opinions critical or contrary to the government
position. Its application on us clearly falls within an insidious pattern of abuse of the
judicial process. It is intended to silence and intimidate the government's critics.102
Messrs. Mbugua and Makali are currently serving their prison sentences.
The legalization of multipartyism and the presence of opposition politicians in Parliament has
allowed greater freedom to criticize government policies than was possible under one-party rule.
101
See below, "The Case of the University Lecturers."
102
"Press statement by Bedan Mbugua and David Makali before offering themselves to go to prison," June 8, 1994.
"The license should be used to inform the government about public meetings so that the
authorities can provide security," noted opposition MP Martha Karua, "to facilitate, not to obstruct
legitimate activity."104 In practice, however, the law gives local authorities sweeping powers to interpret
whether a meeting might "prejudice the maintenance of public order." This discretionary power is
misused to prevent opposition party members from holding public meetings of any kind, including non-
political workshops and seminars. Workshops for educational purposes do not require a license. The
government's actions against the political opposition constitute an illegal restriction on their freedoms of
association and expression which are guaranteed in the Kenyan constitution and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.105 The government's zeal in monitoring and restricting opposition
activity and speech is all the more striking in comparison to its inaction with regard to its own KANU
members of Parliament who are able to make statements with impunity, particularly with regard to
ethnic sentiments.
A report by the Church of the Province of Kenya (the Anglican church in Kenya) on freedom of
association listed dozens of cases between 1986 and 1993 in which the government had denied licenses to
meet to those who were regarded as likely to crticize government policies. It stated: "If indeed the
Constitution guarantees Kenyans the right to hold meetings, the denial of licenses to hold public
meetings should not arise."106
The government's arbitrary application of the law prompted the Catholic bishops to state in
March 1994:
What Kenyans citizens have witnessed since that constitutional change [to a multiparty
system] in 1991 is far from leading to democracy. First of all, we can say that there is no
noticeable change as far as the one-party system is concerned. Though there are several
parties, after the elections KANU continues to ignore other parties. Not to be a member of
KANU is interpreted as being against the government of Kenya. This is the clear
implication of the words pronounced by a minister in the President's office when he
affirmed that only those areas that supported the KANU government would benefit from
the national resources controlled by the ruling party. It is important to notice that this is
not an isolated statement but the same has been repeated by many people in the highest
authority of the government. How could this statement be acceptable in a democratic
society?107
103
Laws of Kenya, Public Order Act (cap. 56), Section 5(3) give the local district commissioner the power to grant a
license if "satisfied that the meeting or procession is not likely to prejudice the maintenance of public order or to be
used for any unlawful or immoral purpose." The penalty for holding an unlicensed meeting is up to three years
imprisonment.
104
Interview with Martha Karua, Democratic Party MP for Kirinyaga, May 13, 1994.
105
Sections 79 and 80 of the Kenyan Constitution and articles 19, 21 and 22 of the International Covenant.
106
Church of the Province of Kenya "Curbing of Freedom of Association in Kenya," as quoted in R. Carver,
"Kenya: Aftermath of the Elections," Refugee Survey Quarterly, Vol.13, No.1, Spring 1994.
107
"On the Road to Democracy," pastoral letter issued by the Kenya Episcopal Conference, March 12, 1994 as
reported in Economic Review, March 21-27, 1994, p.9.
The increasing frequency with which opposition politicians are being harassed prompted one
opposition MP to lament "in 1993, it was much better for us."109 In 1993, thirty-six of the eighty-five
opposition members of Parliament were jailed at different times for at least short periods.110
The increased harassment, according to one respected Kenyan lawyer, is due to government
orders from the top to the local district commissioners, following the death of former FORD-Kenya
leader, Oginga Odinga. In 1993, the government and FORD-Kenya had adopted a policy of cooperation.
However, following the death of Mr. Odinga in January 1994 and finding less support in the current
FORD-Kenya leadership, President Moi announced that KANU would no longer cooperate with the
political opposition. He also told the Kalenjin community to cooperate with the Kisii and Maasai ethnic
groups, but not with "their FORD-Kenya neighbours." The President also stated that he had done a lot
for the Luo ethnic group, "but they were not grateful." President Moi's statement was followed by an
announcement by KANU Secretary-General Joseph Kamotho that KANU would "declare war" against
the opposition.111 Human rights lawyer Gibson Kamau Kuria explained that:
the government has realized what pluralism is all about. It is now realizing that it means
being judged by higher standards; that alternative views can be legally expressed. This
appears to be something that the government finds difficult to take. Secondly, the
discovery by the government that although it rigged the elections and retained power, it
emerged weaker in terms of legitimacy because even according to the rigged elections, 3.4
million Kenyans voted for opposition parties, and only 1.9 million for KANU. So, its
claims that it is representing the majority of people were eroded. We have, therefore, seen
rule by some form of consensus being replaced by rule by force.112
All the opposition MPs who are harassed have been publicly outspoken against government
policies. Some of the cases of members of Parliament who have been harassed in 1994 include:
$ On March 16, anti-riot police dispersed a seminar of approximately 100 representatives from
women's groups in the Kisumu Rural constituency who were to discuss the role of non-
governmental organizations in development and how to initiate development projects using
locally available resources. The keynote speaker at the event was MP Anyang' Nyong'o, the area
MP.113 The police stated that the meeting had not been licensed. A similar workshop held the
day before on March 15 was held without interruption by the police at Bar Korwa Catholic
108
"Anti-KANU Areas to `Miss Out'," Daily Nation, January 20, 1994.
109
Interview with Kiraitu Murungi, FORD-K MP for South Imenti, Meru, May 17, 1994.
110 Failing the Democratic Challenge, p.25; Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights 1993, p.129.
111
"Moi Cuts Links with FORD-K," Daily Nation, February 12, 1994 and interview with Kenyan lawyer (name
withheld on request), May 1994.
112
Interview with Gibson Kamau Kuria, lawyer, May 9, 1994.
113
See below The Case of Anyang' Nyong'o
$ In March, Maore Maoka, a DP MP for Ntonyiri constituency, Meru, decided to attend a public
meeting held regularly by the provincial administration and chiefs, to which the public is invited.
When the local government officials saw him, they disbanded the meeting and refused to
continue in his presence.115
$ MP George Nyanja from FORD-Asili was denied a license to hold a meeting in his constituency
(date unknown).
$ A public meeting called for March 5, by DP MP Martha Karua in her constituency Gichugu,
Kirinyaga District, was cancelled by the local authorities hours before the meeting was to begin,
despite the fact that she had received a license. The local district officer stated that the stadium
was being used by the local school children and had cancelled the meeting on those grounds
despite the fact that under the law only a district commissioner can retract a license. Undeterred,
Ms. Karua reassembled the meeting outside the offices of the district officer, Mr. Gachanja, who
had cancelled the meeting. She and the other scheduled speakers addressed the crowd standing
on a Landrover car. During that time, they were surrounded by twenty police armed with tear
gas dressed in riot gear.116
$ FORD-Kenya MP Paul Muite was forced to leave an area of his Kikuyu constituency on March 8,
when he went there with film crew to investigate allegations that land was being sold off by local
officials. The local district officer evicted Mr. Muite and the journalists.
$ A meeting to be addressed by five FORD-Asili MPs in Githunguri was ordered dispersed by the
local District officer and the crowd of supporters teargassed.
$ MP Kiraitu Mirungi of FORD-Kenya was unable to hold a planned seminar in Meru town on
March 4 to discuss education and agricultural production in his area. The district commissioner
refused to allow the meeting to be held and insisted that a license was required and that he would
not grant one. Security officials were posted at the Pig and Whistle Hotel, where the seminar had
been scheduled, to prevent the meeting from taking place.117 On April 16, MP Murungi applied
for a license to hold a fund-raiser for a water project in Igoji, a town in his constituency of South
Imenti, Meru. The district commissioner denied the license but licensed a public KANU rally for
the same day.118
$ In April, DP MP for Kangundo, Joseph Mulusya, was arrested and charged for holding an illegal
meeting. The charges came shortly after he had been present in an area where a KANU rally was
being held.119
114
Interview with Angang' Nyong'o, FORD-K MP for Kisumu Rural, May 16, 1994 and "Police Storm Convent,"
Daily Nation, March 17, 1994.
115
Interview with Kiraitu Murungi, FORD-K MP for South Imenti, Meru, May 17, 1994.
116
Interview with Martha Karua, DP MP for Kirinyaga, May 13, 1994.
117
"MPs send Protest Note to Moi," Daily Nation, March 22, 1994.
118
Interview with Kiraitu Murungi, FORD-K MP for South Imenti, Meru, May 17, 1994.
119
Interview with Martha Karua, DP MP for Kirinyaga, May 13, 1994.
$ A request for a license for the DP to hold a rally in Kirinyaga on April 23 was never responded to
by the district commissioner. Other MPs, such as the vice-chair of DP, Agnes Ndetei, have been
unable to get an answer to requests for a license to hold a meeting despite repeated requests.121
$ On April 23, police used tear gas to disperse a peaceful meeting of over 600 FORD-A members
who were attending a conference. The police raided the meeting, acting on a court injunction
restraining the meeting from taking place obtained by a disgruntled FORD-A member, Salim
Ndamwe, on the grounds that the purpose of the meeting was intended to suspend him from the
party. The meeting was held the following day after the injunction expired.122
$ On April 24, FORD-Kenya MP Mukhisa Kituyi was harassed and arrested by police in his
constituency, Kimilili. Dr. Kituyi was arrested when he had gone to inspect a bridge in his
constituency. The police superintendent and the head of the Criminal Investigations Division
along with their deputies arrested him at gunpoint without a warrant. They drove him in a
circuitous route through three districts C Bungoma, Kakamega and Kisumu C before arriving in
Kericho District. He was held overnight without charge and was told that he could not use the
telephone because they did not want anyone to know his whereabouts. The following day, he
was driven 100 km to appear in court in Kisii district where he was charged with holding an
illegal rally at Muhoroni, where he had opened the local FORD-Kenya offices on April 10, and for
having "uttered words to being into disaffection the name of his Excellency the President." Dr.
Kituyi pleaded not guilty and was remanded in Kisii prison that night before being released the
following morning on bond. The charges are currently pending.123
$ On May 7, thirteen FORD-Kenya officials were arrested and held overnight in Nakuru for
allegedly holding an illegal meeting in their offices.124
$ On May 15, DP MP for North Imenti, Meru, David Mwiraria, applied for a license to hold a public
rally. Three days before the scheduled meeting, he contacted the district commissioner who
informed him that the license could not be issued because the application had been lost.125
$ On June 4, a rally at Nyamira, addressed by Kenya Social Congress leader George Anyona was
violently broken up by police after a license had been refused by the Nyamira district
commissioner.126
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
122
"Ford-Asili Meeting Goes Ahead Following Expiry of Court Injunction Against It," KTN TV, Nairobi, April 23,
1994, as reported in SWB AL/1981/ A/3, April 26, 1993.
123
Telephone interview with Mukhisa Kituyi, FORD-K MP for Kimilili, May 4, 1994.
124
"Police Arrest 13 FORD-K Officials," Standard, May 8, 1994.
125
Interview with Kiraitu Murungi, FORD-K MP for South Imenti, Meru, May 17, 1994.
126
"Opposition Parties Form New Political Alliance," AFP June 5, 1994, as reported in FBIS-AFR-94-109, June 7,
However, on June 1, Rift Valley Provincial Commissioner Ishmael Chelang'a announced that he
was directing the provincial administration to start issuing licenses for public meetings.128 On June 4, an
opposition rally was held at Kamukunji stadium in Nairobi at which a new coalition was announced, the
United National Alliance, the first large political gathering since the elections in December 1992.129
The thugs broke down the doors and asked for Dr. Nyong'o and his father. Dr. Nyong'o's mother,
Dorca Nyong'o, who is approximately seventy years old, was badly beaten and her arm injured. Several
neighbors who attempted to help Ms. Nyong'o, as well as Dr. Nyong'o's uncle, William Oduogo Owi,
were also beaten by the attackers. In the ensuing fighting, Mr. Owi was hit on the head with a hammer
causing his death. The police did not appear on the scene until two hours later.130
While the identity of those who attacked the MP's home is unknown, it is widely believed that the
attack was politically motivated, particularly since few belongings were stolen as well as the fact that
there have been other similar attacks on the houses of Webuye MP Musikari Kombo and Kisumu Rural
MP Job Omino.
Following the attack, Dr. Nyong'o issued a public statement that "this regime does not care any
more about what happens to Kenyans. It is driving us systematically towards civil war." On March 11,
Dr. Nyong'o was arrested and interrogated for six hours by the police for an allegedly "seditious"
statement before being released without charge on police bond.
1994.
127
George Munei, "Bishop, MPs in clash with police," Daily Nation, June 10, 1994; "A-G sued over police action,"
Daily Nation, June 21, 1994.
128
Joseph Ngugi, "PC gives order on rally permits," Daily Nation, June 2, 1994.
129
"Opposition Parties Form New Political Alliance," AFP June 5, 1994, as reported in FBIS-AFR-94-109, June 7,
1994.
130
Interview with Angang' Nyong'o, FORD-K MP for Kisumu Rural, May 16, 1994
In September 1993, Mr. Wamwere was rearrested, shortly after the government had declared its
security operation zone regulations, along with well-known lawyer Mirugi Kariuki and others. Mr.
Kariuki is a Nakuru-based lawyer who has represented prominent government critics and numerous
clash victims. Messrs. Wamwere and Kariuki and others were charged with possessing seditious
publications, administering an unlawful oath and travelling in a proscribed area. The allegedly seditious
publications included leaflets published by the NDEHURIO on the issue of the ethnic violence which the
government charged were "calculated to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against
the government of Kenya."131 Messrs. Wamwere and Kariuki were held in prison in Nakuru until
October 19, 1993, when they were released on bail. The charges are still pending.
Shortly after his release, Mr. Wamwere was arrested yet again. On November 5, 1993, along with
fourteen others, Mr. Wamwere was accused by the government of attempting to raid Bahati police station
in Nakuru and rob two police constables of their rifles on November 2, 1993. He was charged with
attempted robbery under Section 297(2) of the Penal Code and being in possession of firearms without a
certificate under Section 4(1) of the Firearms Act. The first count carries the death penalty and the second
a term of imprisonment.132
The government has alleged that at approximately 2:30 A.M. on November 2, 1993, Mr. Wamwere
and others attempted to raid Bahati police station and that in the course of the raid two of the attackers
were shot by the police. The initial police press conference announcing the raid described the
perpetrators without reference to Mr. Wamwere or the three others now facing charges.133
Eleven of those initially charged with Mr. Wamwere were released in January 1994 after the state
dropped the charges.134 Charges against Mr. Wamwere and three other defendants remain. The three are
Godfrey Ngengi Njuguna; James Maigwa (Mr. Wamwere's brother-in-law); and Charles Kuria Wamwere
(Mr. Wamwere's brother). The four have been held without bail since November 1993. They have been
held in Nakuru prison, where there is severe overcrowding, diet is poor and prisoners have frequently
been denied adequate medical treatment. Human Rights Watch/Africa shares the fears of others that the
arrest of Mr. Wamwere and his co-accused is part of a pattern of harassment of human rights activists,
opposition figures and journalists, and especially those who C like Koigi wa Wamwere C are attempting
to investigate or report incidents of political violence.135
The trial began on April 12, 1994. If convicted, the accused face mandatory death sentences. An
International Bar Association observer attending the trial concluded that the trial did not conform to
international standards of fair trial and noted among other things:
131
Charge sheet as reported in Failing the Democratic Challenge, p.35.
132
Report by International Bar Association trial observer, Anthony Mmieh, May 1994.
133
Ibid.
134
Those released without charge included Mr. Wamwere's brother John Njoroge; a cousin Geoffrey Kuria
Kariuki; Wilfred Kinuthia Ngengi; Jimmy James Waigwa; Daniel Kigoche; Francis Ngigi Kabeta; Stephen Kariuki
Muigai; Ephraim Muchiri Muhoro; Samwel Mwangi; George Kariuki Wanjau; and Douglas Wokabi Toto.
135
"Kenya: Human Rights Activist on Trial For His Life," Amnesty International, AFR 32/WU 01/94, April 14,
1994.
He concluded his report by stating that the "procedural anomalies would result in miscarriage of justice
to the accused persons."137
Since November 29, 1993, university lecturers at Kenya's four universities C Nairobi University,
Kenyatta University, Moi University and Egerton College C have been on strike. The strike was called in
connection with an application to the registrar of trade unions to form an association, the University
Academic Staff Union (UASU), under the Trade Union Act (Cap. 233). A union by the same name had
operated at the universities until 1982, when its registration was cancelled as part of a general crackdown
on civil society by the government of President Moi.
The lecturers first filed their application in October 1992. After receiving no response from the
government office for over a year, the university lecturers began a strike in November 1993 in protest at
the registrar's delay in making a decision that usually takes no more than six months. Soon after the
strike began, the registrar's office issued a rejection of the application. In January 1994, the vice-
chancellors of the four universities warned lecturers that their contractual terms of employment did not
allow for trade unions. Twenty-three lecturers were subsequently dismissed from their positions on the
grounds that they were in breach of contract by not conducting classes.138
Conditions for faculty members on Kenyan university campuses have deteriorated as the cost of
living has increased significantly and class sizes have doubled, particularly after an expansion of student
enrollment in 1987. The lecturers said that their call for a union was made in order to facilitate
negotiations with the university administrations for better living and working conditions, in particular
salary scales, medical insurance, housing and pensions.
A press release issued by former lecturers who had been members of UASU before it was banned
by President Moi in 1982 stated:
The demand by the dons at our public universities to register the Staff Union, and to use
the union to represent their interests, is legitimate and constitutional. It cannot be denied
by any authority whatsoever. There is therefore no need to victimize any university
lecturer for exercising the rights guaranteed by the Constitution. As former dons at our
public universities, it is amazing to us that the government, having once registered the
University Staff Union in the late seventies, should now argue that such a union is not
registerable today. It was illegal to ban the union in the first place. But now that
136
Report by International Bar Association trial observer, Anthony Mmieh, May 1994.
137
Ibid.
138
KBC radio, Nairobi, January 16, 1994 as reported in SWB AL/1898 A/4, January 18, 1994. The following
lecturers were dismissed. University of Nairobi: Korwa Adar (UASU Chair), Churchill Kibisu, Eric V.J. Makokha,
Charles Nyamachanja, Omari Onyango. Kenyatta University: Charles Maranga, Kilemi Mwiria. Moi University:
Pamala Abuya, Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, Nyaduwa Odhiambo, Joyce Nyairo, Odeke Ogunde, Richard Ogunde,
Peter Omboto, Francis Opar. Egerton University: Airo Akodhe, Yunus Khan, Wanjala H. Khisa, Kimani Njuguna
Kimani, Kibiwott Kurgatt, James Mwanjewe, F.M. Muchoki, Gathogo K. Thuo.
Student organizations, clergy, the political opposition and the Kenya National Union of Teachers also
came out in support of the faculty's right to register UASU, citing the government's refusal to register the
union as a breach of Section 80 of the Kenyan Constitution which guarantees the right of association.140
The university lecturers have filed two claims in the High Court protesting the refusal of the
registrar to register UASU. The first is an appeal against the registrar's refusal, under Section 18 of the
Trade Union Act, which states: "If the registrar refuses or cancels a trade union registration, the
complainant has a right to ask for the intervention of the High Court." The second claim is a
constitutional reference asking the court to declare the registrar's refusal unconstitutional in respect of
Section 80 of the Kenyan Constitution, which guarantees the right of association. Both claims are
currently pending in the High Court.
A third case, asking for the dismissals to be set aside, was rejected by the High Court in February
1994. Pending an appeal of that decision, the lecturers applied for an order from the court that they be
allowed to stay in university housing until the hearing in the Court of Appeal was decided. As the basis
of their claim, the lecturers relied on an October 1993 Court of Appeal judgment which had been given in
similar circumstances and ruled that an employee in a legal dispute with an employer had a right to
remain in company housing until the dispute was ruled on by the courts.141
Under the common law doctrine of precedent, as applied in Kenya, the only way a decision of the
Court of Appeal can be overruled is by convening a bench of five judges, instead of the usual three, in a
later Court of Appeal case. This usually occurs when one or both of the parties petition the court for the
two additional judges citing the reasons why they believe the precedent should be overruled. In this
case, neither side petitioned for a bench of five to hear the lecturer's application for an injunction.
However, Chief Justice Fred Apaloo convened a bench of five on his own initiative. According to
Kenyan lawyers, while this step is within the discretionary powers of the chief justice, it is highly unusual
and has never been taken before.
Few were surprised when the five-judge bench handed down a ruling on March 2, overruling the
case precedent and allowing the university to evict the organizers of the strike from university housing.
The judges also went further in their 25-page judgment, and commented at length on the dismissal of the
lecturers from their positions, despite the fact that this application did not deal with the merits of that
issue.
In January, while the cases were still pending, President Moi stated publicly that the registration
of UASU would not be permitted, adding that the formation of a trade union for academic staff would
lower the prestige of the country's universities.142 In February, President Moi made another statement at
a public rally at Kerugoya Stadium in Nairobi ruling out the registration of UASU.143 These declarations
by President Moi are believed by many Kenyan lawyers to be prejudicial to the outcome of the pending
139 "Press Release C The Crisis of Our Universities," as reported in Daily Nation, January 7, 1994.
140 "University Faculty on Strike in Kenya," Committee for Academic Freedom in Africa, newsletter No. 6, spring 1994.
141 Nyamogo vs. Kenya Post and Telecommunications (October 1993). In this case, Ochieng Nyamogo, an employee
with KPT, successfully obtained an interim injunction restraining his employer from evicting him from company
housing until his appeal against an early forced retirement had been duly determined.
142 "Moi Rules Out Dons' Union," Daily Nation, January 1, 1994.
143 "Court of Appeal Ruling on Dons Reeked of State Interference," The People, March 6-12, 1994.
The security forces have also harassed the legal counsel of the striking lecturers. On January 14,
lawyer Gibson Kamau Kuria was prevented from entering the university compound by security officials.
Mr. Kamau Kuria was told that they had been issued orders by the Vice-Chancellor of the University to
bar him from the premises.145
The government's refusal to allow university lecturers to form a union for purposes of improving
their working conditions is a violation of Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights which guarantees freedom of association and to which Kenya is a party. The many procedural
concerns in the various court applications relating to the UASU registration, including President Moi's
public statements opposing the union, also raise serious questions about judicial independence from the
executive branch and the possibility of a fair trial from the Kenyan court system in political cases.
In November 1991, at a consultative group meeting in Paris, the World Bank and Kenya's bilateral
donors announced the suspension of over one billion dollars of program aid to Kenya, on governance,
economic and human rights grounds. Following the suspension, the Moi government reintroduced a
multiparty system and released prominent political prisoners. Elections were held in December 1992. In
November 1993, the World Bank and Kenya's bilateral donors met once again in Paris to reevaluate their
decision and to decide whether to resume the disbursement of aid.
At the consultative group meeting in November 1993, Kenya's donors pledged $850 million in
new aid for 1994 C $170 of that amount being balance of payments assistance from the World Bank which
would go directly to the Kenyan treasury. The aid was conditional on arrangements being made for the
repayment of U.S. $700 million of debt arrears.146 The donors stated that the decision to pledge a renewal
of aid was motivated by several factors, including "significant efforts of the government to reestablish an
appropriate macroeconomic framework and initiate structural reforms ... in particular, the progress in
liberalizing the external sector, strengthening monetary control, enforcing financial sector discipline and
liberalizing maize imports and movement."147
However, the donor countries cautioned that "the translation of these indications of new
commitments into disbursements in 1994 depends on progress in implementing the economic reform
agenda, as well as strong positive steps on human rights, governance, and corruption."148 Bilateral
donors acknowledged that Kenya's multiparty elections were a major and welcome first step to
developing "an environment conducive to a more democratic and open society." However, the World
Bank statement noted that
special concern was expressed over recent incidents of ethnic clashes. Bilateral donors
144
See Justice Enjoined: The State of the Judiciary in Kenya, Washington DC: Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for
Human Rights, 1992.
145
"Dons' Case Fails to Take Off," Daily Nation, January 15, 1994.
146
"Kenya foreign aid resumed despite graft and violence," The Guardian (London), November 24, 1993.
147
World Bank Press Release, Meeting of the Consultative Group for Kenya, November 23, 1993.
148
Ibid.
In January 1994, Kenya successfully negotiated with the Paris Club of creditors to reschedule $500
million of debt.150
When the World Bank and Kenya's donors meet on July 20, 1994 to evaluate Kenya's human
rights record, they will find that the human rights situation has remained unchanged for the most part in
the six months following the last consultative group meeting and that their stated concerns continue to go
unaddressed.
In November 1991, the U.S. took part in the decision of the consultative group of bilateral donors
to suspend aid to Kenya; although the U.S. continued to provide development aid, totalling about $18
million a year, to nongovernmental organizations working in Kenya. In September 1993, the State
Department announced the release of $3.73 million of pipeline money in military assistance to assist the
Kenyan government in providing security along the border with Somalia. Commendably, the
department issued a public statement that "[t]he decision to release these funds is based solely on the
need to respond to an extraordinary security threat. The release does not constitute satisfaction with the
human rights situation in Kenya, a matter which remains of deep and fundamental concern to the United
States."
Several statements were also issued throughout 1993, by the State Department or by the embassy
in Nairobi, protesting actions taken by the government against freedom of expression. Nevertheless, in
contrast to the critical stand previously taken by Ambassador Hempstone, the U.S. failed to take a strong
position holding the Kenyan government responsible for the violence in the Rift Valley Province. In
September 1993, the only statement issued on the violence publicly welcomed the government's decision
to declare security zones, showing unwarranted faith in the good behavior of the security forces in these
circumstances. The statement was subject only to the "hope that the increased security measures will be
accompanied by measures to allow access to the affected areas by the press and political representatives
of all concerned."
On November 9, 1993, as a result of recent clashes, Ambassador Brazeal declared Maela displaced
camp area a disaster and released $25,000 for the purchase of shelter materials and water to the displaced.
U.S.AID announced in April 1994 that it had programmed $22.4 million, including emergency food aid,
in assistance during FY 1994, for the relief of clash victims and to alleviate the effects of drought.151
149 Ibid.
150 Leslie Crawford, "Kenya reaches Paris Club deal," Financial Times, London, January 26, 1994.
"Kenya C Civil Strife/Drought," OFDA Fact Sheet #2, April 15, 1994.
151
RECOMMENDATIONS
$ Continuing and past attacks should be thoroughly investigated and charges brought and
vigorously pressed where there is evidence against individuals alleged to be directly responsible
for killings and destruction of property or to have planned such acts.
$ In all cases, the criminal law must be applied without regard for ethnic group, political party or
other status: instructions should be given that government officials or members of the Kalenjin or
Maasai ethnic groups must be subject to the same penalties as opposition politicians or Kikuyus, if
they are involved in criminal wrongdoing.
$ Free movement should be permitted in the "security operation zones," with security escorts if
reasonably necessary, to all duly accredited press correspondents, church relief officials, and
human rights groups.
$ Charges such as sedition that have been brought against politicians or journalists on the grounds
only of travelling within the clash areas or of publishing reports of events in the clash areas
should be dropped. In other cases, where charges involve concrete allegations such as possession
of firearms, damage to property or bodily injury, the charges should be carefully reconsidered
with a view to confirming that the evidence is sufficient to warrant criminal prosecution; where it
is not, charges should be dropped.
$ Where clash victims have congregated in camps, local government officials should be given
instructions to facilitate assistance by local and international relief groups. In no circumstances
should such camps be dispersed forcibly and without notice. Where legitimate reasons for
152
"US Envoy Moose praises Moi for curbing ethnic violence," KNA news agency, April 7, 1994, as reported in
SWB AL/1968 A/11, April 11, 1994; "Changes Please US Envoy," Daily Nation, June 8, 1994; George Owuor, "Parties'
conduct worries US envoy," Daily Nation, June 12, 1994.
$ Licenses to hold political or other meetings should be refused only when there are legitimate
security concerns. Instructions should be given to all local government officials that there should
be no distinction between opposition and KANU politicians when applications to hold meetings
are considered.
$ In all trials, the rights of due process, set out in the Kenyan constitution and in international
instruments, should be scrupulously adhered to; the government should be sure to avoid in all
cases the appearance or fact of influencing the judiciary in its deliberations.
$ The government should permit the registration of the University Academic Staff Union (UASU)
and reinstate the lecturers who were dismissed.
$ Foreign governments should maintain a consistent and unequivocal human rights message to the
Kenyan government. Foreign governments should publicly raise human rights concerns with the
Kenya government and call for the government to act to address these concerns.
$ Governments and international relief organizations giving aid to Kenya should continue to
consult and cooperate with the local nongovernmental community in distributing relief to the
clash victims outside government channels.