'Much Ado About Religion'

A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the

Agamadam bara,
a Satirical Play by the ninth century Kashmirian philosopher
Bhatta Jayanta

D.Phil, thesis

15 January 2004

Csaba Dezso
Balliol College

DEPOSITED os
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Contents
Abstract ii
Acknowledgements iii
I INTRODUCTION iv
Bhatta Jayanta's life v
A champion of orthodoxy xiv
A curious play (kimapi rupakam) xxv
Sources
The manuscripts of the Agamadambara bdi
The interpretation of some unusual aksaras Ixiii
The editio princeps Ixvii
A note on the edition and the translation
Conventions Ixviii
Sandhi, punctuation, orthography box
The Prakrit passages box
The translation and the notes Ixxi
II SANSKRIT TEXT 1
Prastdvand 2
Prathamo 'nkah 5
Dvitiyo 'nkah 26
Trttyo 'nkah 48
Caturtho 'nkah 79
III ENGLISH TRANSLATION 107
Prologue 108
Act One 111
Act Two 151
Act Three 177
Act Four 233
Works Consulted 272
'Much Ado About Religion'
A Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Agamadambara,
a Satirical Play by the ninth century Kashmirian philosopher Bhatta
Jayanta
Submitted in Hilary Term 2004 for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by Csaba Dezso of Balliol College, Oxford

This thesis contains a critical edition and annotated translation of the Agama-
dambara, a four act play by Bhatta Jayanta. The Agamadambara is a unique
college-drama written by an eminent ninth century Kashmirian naiyayika philo-
sopher, which gives a comprehensive picture of the contemporary religious de-
bates as well as the 'Religionspolitik' of the royal court.
The introduction provides an account of Bhatta Jayanta's life and works,
placed in the intellectual and historical context of his time. The question of
conservative versus pragmatic attitude towards the heterodox religious schools
is also dealt with.
The introduction next examines what makes Jayanta's play so unique and
unorthodox. It also considers the phenomenon of 'philosophical plays' in the
light of the discussions on the nature and relation of poetry and sastra, doctrinal
or scientific literature. An analysis of the dominant aesthetic mood (rasa) of
the play closes this section.
There follows a description of the sources consulted for the text of the
Agamadambara. These comprise two manuscripts in Jaina DevanagarT script,
and the editio princeps. The methodology of the edition of the Prakrit passages
in classical Indian dramas in general and in the Agamadambara in particular is
also discussed.
Three registers of apparatus contain variants to the accepted text of the play,
a Sanskrit translation (chdya) of the Prakrit sentences, and testimonia from
Jayanta's magnum opus, the Nyayamanjan. In the notes to the translation the
reader will find long quotations from various Sanskrit works. The aim of these
quotations is to place Jayanta's ideas in the intellectual context of his age and
thereby to make their interpretation more accurate.

11
Acknowledgment s
This thesis could not have been completed without the support of various indi-
viduals and institutions. In the first place I must thank my supervisor, Professor
Alexis Sanderson of All Souls College, who has been invariably generous in shar-
ing his vast knowledge and his materials. The English translation of the title of
Jayanta's play also does credit to his ingenuity. I thank Dr. Harunaga Isaacson,
who tirelessly corrected my mistakes throughout the formation of the thesis and
helped me in every way both during and after the period of his supervision. I
thank Dr. James Benson, who was also my supervisor for a short time, for care-
fully correcting the draft chapters of the thesis and giving helpful comments.
I owe a debt of gratitude to many fellow Indologists for their contributions
to the interpretation of the text: Dr. Dominic Goodall, Dr. Somdev Vasudeva,
Dr. Alex Watson, Dr. Kei Kataoka, Dr. Judit Torzsok, Dr. Ryugen Tanemura,
Mr. Peter Bisschop, Mr. Lance Cousins, Dr. H. N. Bhatt, and scholars and stu-
dents in various reading groups from Oxford and Hamburg to Philadelphia and
Tokyo.
I thank Mr. Yatin V. Shah, Trustee of the Hemacandracarya Jaina Jiiana
Mandira, Patan, and the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, for
their kind approval of and support in acquiring copies of the manuscripts of the
Agamadambara.
I thank the Scatcherd European Scholarships, the Soros Foundation, and
the Boden Fund for financial support during my DPhil studies in Oxford, and
the Max Miiller Fund for help with study tours to India and Nepal to collect
manuscript materials.
Last but not least I would like to express my gratitude to my first teachers in
Indology, Prof. Csaba Tottossy and Dr. Maria Negyesi, and to my parents and
friends for their help and support in various ways.

111
 Part I

Introduction

IV
Chapter 1

Bhatta Jayanta's life

Although several details of Bhatta Jayanta's life are lost for us, his personality
takes a more distinct shape than that of many classical Indian poets and philo-
sophers. His son, Abhinanda introduces his epitome of the Kddamban with a
short genealogy: 1
saktindmdbhavad gaudo bhdradvdjakule dvijah\
ddrvdbhisdram dsddya krtaddraparigrahah ||5||
tasya mitrabhidhdno 'bhud dtmajas tejasdm nidhih\
janena dosoparamaprabuddhendrcitodayah ||6||
sa saktisvdminarn putram avdpa srutasdlinam\
rdjnah karkotavamsasya muktdptdasya mantrinam \\7\\
kalyanasvamindmdsya ydjnavalkya ivdbhavat\
tanayah suddhayogarddhinirdhutabhavakalmasah \\S\\
agddhahrdaydt tasmdt paramesvaramandanam\
ajdyata sutah kdntas candro dugdhodadher iva ||9||
putram krtajandnandam sa jayantam ajvjanat\
dsit kavitvavaktrtvaphald yasya sarasvati ||10||
vrttikdra iti vyaktam dvitiyam ndma bibhratah]
vedaveddngavidusah sarvasdstrdrthavddinah \\ll\\
jayantandmnah sudhiyah sddhusdhityatattvavit\
sunuh samudabhut tasmdd abhinanda iti srutah ||12||

There was a gauda Brahman by the name Sakti, [born] in the Bhara-
dvaja family, who moved to Darvabhisara and married [there]. He
had a son called Mitra, a treasury of majestic luster, whose rise was
hailed by the people, roused due to the cessation of dangers, like
the sun [Mitra] whose rising is worshipped by the people who have
woken at the end of the night. He obtained a son, Saktisvamin,
1 Kadambankathasara, pp. If. Cf. BxJHLER 1873, pp. 103ff. Biihler identified this Abhin-
anda with the author of the Ramacarita-mahakavya. The latter poet, however, calls himself
the son of Satananda (see Ramacarita, p. 39.)

V
 Bhatta Jayanta's life

versed in the Vedas, the minister of king MuktapTda of the Karkota

dynasty. He had a son called Kalyanasvamin, who shook off the dirt
of existence with wealth acquired by pure means, like Yajnavalkya,
who destroyed the stains of existence with the accomplishment of
pure Yoga. Prom that man of profound heart a beautiful son was
born: Candra, an ornament of the Supreme Lord, as the lovely moon
[Candra], Siva's ornament, was produced from the milk-ocean of
unfathomable depth. He begot a son, Jayanta, who made people
happy, and who became poet and teacher as a result of his eloquence.
Then to that wise man named Jayanta, who had a well-known second
name 'The Commentator', was learned in the Vedas and the ancillary
Vedic sciences, and expounded the meaning of all sdstras, a son was
born, known as Abhinanda, conversant with the true nature of good
literature.
Prom these verses it appears that Jayanta's ancestors were Gauda (Bengali)
Brahmans who traced their descent back to the sage Bharadvaja. One of them,
called Sakti, settled in Darvabhisara, a territory at the frontiers of Kashmir,
which, as Stein pointed out, "comprised the whole tract of the lower and middle
hills lying between the Vitasta and Candrabhaga." 2 In the mid-ninth century a
rich merchant, called Nara, set up his own throne there;3 a few decades later, as
Kalhana reports,4 the lord of Darvabhisara fled from king Sankaravannan (883-
902), who was leading a campaign against Gurjara. Later the same Kashmirian
king assassinated Naravahana, the king of Darvabhisara. 5
Reverting to Jayanta's ancestors, Sakti's son, Mitra, was held in great esteem
by his contemporaries, while his grandson, Saktisvamin, gained influence on the
political life of Kashmir: he became the minister of king Lalitaditya-Muktaplda
of the Karkota dynasty (c. 724-761).6
Jayanta himself gives us valuable information about his grandfather in the
Nydyamanjan (vol. I, p. 653) : 7
asmatpitdmaha eva grdmakdmah sdmgrahamm krtavdn\ sa istisamdp-
tisamanantaram eva gauramulakam grdmam avdpa\
2RT(S), vol.1, p.32 (note ad Rajatarangini 1.180).
3 Rajatarangini 4.712.
4 Rajatarangini 5.141.
5 Rajatarangini 5.209. Nara and his son Naravahana figure in the pedigree of the Kash-
mirian Lohara dynasty (see Rajatarangini 7.1282).
6 On the chronology of the Karkota dynasty see RT(S), vol. I, pp. 66ff. Kalhana does not
s

mention Saktisvamin. He does however mention a minister of Lalitaditya called Mitrasarman

(Rajatarangini 4.137f.).
7It is remarkable how stubbornly some mistakes endure. Stein in his note to Rajatarangi-
ni 8.1861 wrongly attributed the Nydyamanjan to Abhinanda (RT(S), vol. I, p. 144), but he
corrected his mistake in the Corrigenda et Addenda (RT(S), vol. II, p. 555). One might think
that after several publications of the Nyayaraanjari its authorship is public knowledge, still
Majumdar writes the following in his Concise History of Ancient India (New Delhi, 1983 [!],
vol. Ill, p. 764): 'However, Abhinanda the author of the Nyayaraanjari has quoted Vacaspati
several times, and Abhinanda's son [!] Jayanta declares himself to have been Rajasekhara's
contemporary.' (This is all the more surprising since on pp.695, 731, and 811 Majumdar
refers to 'Jayanta's Nyayaraanjari'.}

VI
 Bhatta Jayanta's life

'My own grandfather, desiring a village, performed the samgmham

sacrifice. Immediately after the completion of the sacrifice he ob-
tained the village of Gauramulaka.'
Gauramulaka, as Cakradhara, the commentator of the Nyayamanjan, remarks,
was Jayanta's ancestral village.8 According to Stein,9 Gauramulaka or Ghora-
mulaka was situated to the north of RajapurT (Rajaurl), in the direction of the
Rattan PIT range. On the other hand, the state of RajapurT was included in
Darvabhisara. 10 If my interpretation is sound, Abhinanda might refer to this
improvement of Kalyanasvamin's financial position in verse eight above.
Jayanta also mentions his father, Candra, in the Nyayamanjan with highly
appreciative words: 'he filled the quarters with [his] fame, brilliant as the
moon'. 11 Raghavan suggests that Candra was a devotee of Siva; 12 on the other
hand, the expression paramesvaramandanam might refer to the fact that Candra
rendered valuable services to the monarch.
Prom the information we have gleaned above it appears that Jayanta was
born in a wealthy and respected orthodox Brahman family. He soon turned out
to be a child genius: at a tender age he composed a commentary to Panini's
grammar and earned the name "(New) Commentator", (Nava-)Vrttikara. 13
Later he made himself master of various sdstras and a^araas, 14 distinguished
himself in scholarly debates, 15 and passed on his knowledge to a circle of stu-
dents. 16
Jayanta seems to have written three works on Nyaya, of which only two
are extant: his magnum opus, the Nyayamanjan ("A Cluster of Flowers of
[the] Nyaya[-tree]"), and the Nyayakalika ("A Bud of [the] Nyaya [-tree]"). 17 A
Third work called Pallava (possibly Nyayapallava, "A Twig of [the] Nyaya [-
Granthibhaiiga, p. 35: gauramulakdkhyo granthakrdabhijanagrdmah\
9RT(S), vol. II, pp. 144f. (note to verse 8.1861)
10RT(S), vol.1, p. 33 (note to verse 1.180), vol.11, pp. 144f. (note to verse 8.1861); see also
Rdjatarangim 8.1531.
11 Nyayamanjari, vol. II, p. 718: ... vydptadigantarasya yasasa candrasya candratvisa ...
12 Agamadambara (ed. pr.), p. i.
13 See Agamadambara, Act Four, verse 52: bdlakaver ... jayantasya; Agamadam-
bara, Prologue: saisava eva vydkaranavivaranakarandd vrttikdra iti prathitaparandmno
bhattajayantasya. Also Kadambarikathdsdra, verse 11 (quoted above), Nyayamanjari, vol.11,
p. 718: anvartho navavrttikdra iti yam samsanti ndmnd budhah\
14See Kadambarikathdsdra, verse 11 (quoted above), Agamadambara, Act Four, verse 52:
avalokitasakalasdstrasdrasya ... tattvavido bhrastabhrdnter jayantasya, Agamadambara, Act
Two, 11.405f.: asesabhavdgamaparage bhattajayante.
15 See Nyayamanjari, vol. II, p. 718: vddesv dttajayo Jayanta iti yah khydtah satdm agramh.
16 Jayanta's play was staged by his sisyaparisad.
17According to Steinkellner (1961, p. 159), '[d]ie verffentlichte Nyayakalika ist kein Jay-
antawerk, sondern eine spate Kompilation von Jayanta-Satzen' (note 16: 'Nach Angaben von
V. Raghavan, Madras.') Marui, however, after careful consideration, is inclined to accept
Jayanta's authorship (see MARUI 2000). A cursory glance at a manuscript of the Nydyakalikd
(Banaras Hindu University, 328405) made it clear to me that a critical edition of the text
is a desideratum. According to Marui (p. 97; unfortunately the edition of Ganganath Jha,
Allahabad, 1925, was not at my disposal) the Nyayamanjan and the Nyayakalika share the
opening verse starting namah sdsvatikdnanda.... The BHU MS, however, does not contain this
verse, and the text begins with the verse surasurasiroratnamarzcikhacitanghraye..., which is
the third verse at the beginning of the Nyayamanjari. Marui also quotes the closing sentences

Vll
 Bhatta Jayanta's life

tree]") is quoted in the Syddvddaratndkara~, ls Raghavan assumed that it was a

'moderately sized metrical gloss on Gautama'. 19 Prom the opening and clos-
ing benedictory verses of the Nydyamanjan we can presume that Jayanta was
a devotee of Siva,20 while the fact that he thinks very highly of the Athar-
vaveda21 might indicate, as Raghavan pointed out, 'that Jayanta belonged to
the Atharvaveda'.22
As we have seen Abhinanda admires his father's poetic talent,23 and in one
of the raaw/a/a-verses, instead of praising Bana (the author whose work he
epitomizes), he extols Jayanta's eloquence:24
sarasdh sadalamkdrdh prasddamadhurd girah\
kdntds tdtajayantasya jayanti jagatTguroh\ \
'Victorious are the pleasing words of my father Jayanta, the teacher
of the world, which are full of rasas, endowed with proper alaiikdras,
and sweet with lucidity, like beloved women who are full of feeling,
wear beautiful ornaments, and are charming with graciousness.'
Though the style of the Nydyamanjan amply confirms Abhinanda's above quoted
words, only one kdvya work of Jayanta is extant: the Agamadambara, a play in
four acts. Since a verse that is quoted in the play (Act Four, verse 53) as Jay-
anta's wise saying (suktam) is also found in_the Nydyamanjan (vol.1, p. 640),
it seems probable that Jayanta wrote the Agamadambara following his major
work on Nyaya.25
The Agamadambara provides valuable details about Jayanta's political ca-
reer. We learn that he was the adviser (amdtya) of king Sankaravarman (883-
902), and played a great part in banishing the heterodox sect of the Black-
Blankets from Kashmir. 26 The nilambaras and their sad fate are also mentioned
of the Nyayakalika, which contain a lacuna in the edition. With the help of the BHU MS we can
complete and improve the text: *ity etad aprabhdvitasvamatabhedam akrtaparamatdksepam
(conj. : ity apramdvita0 MS, ity etad +++++ ed.) sodasapaddrtha*tattvam (ed. : °tattvdm
MS) *balavyutpattaye (ed. : valavyupattaye MS) *kathitam\ (MS : om. MARUI 2000, ed.?)
*ajdta(ed. : ajndta0 MS)rasanisyandam anabhivyaktasaurabham\ nydyasya kalikdmdtram
jayantah paryadidrsat] \
18 See STEINKELLNER 1961, p. 159; Agamadambara (ed. pr.), p. v, note 8; MARUI 2000, p. 93.
19 Agamadambara (ed. pr.), p. v.
20The first verse in the Nyayamanjari is addressed to Sambhu, the second to BhavanT,
the third to Ganapati. In the penultimate verse of his work Jayanta says that he com-
posed the Nydyamanjan 'meditating on the feet of [6iva] whose diadem is the crescent' (can-
drakaldrdhacudacaranadhydyt), and in the closing verse he again pays reverence to Sambhu.
21 Cf. Nyayamanjari, vol.1, p. 5: tatra vedds catvdrah\ prathamo 'tharvavedah... ; in the
section on vedaprdmdnya Jayanta spares no pains to prove the Veda-status of the Atharvaveda,
and he even asserts that it is actually the foremost of all the four Vedas (Nydyamanjan, vol. II,
p. 626: atharvaveda eva prathamah).
22 Agamadambara (ed. pr.), p. iii.
23 Kddambankathdsdra, verse 10, quoted above.
24 Kddambankathdsdra, verse 2.
25Actually there are many more parallel passages in the two texts (without the indication
of the source in the play), as the register of testimonia in the edition will show.
26 See Act Two, 11.405fT.: nanv asau raja snsankaradevah\ sa hi varndsramadharmamar-
ydddcdryas tribhuvanaraksadiksito devah svata eva pratikriydm atra jdndti, visesato 'sesabha-

Vlll
 Bhatta Jayanta 's life

in the Nydyamanjart27 :
asitaikapatanivitdviyutastrTpumsavihitabahucestam\
nildmbaravratam idam kila kalpitam dsid vitaih kaiscit] \
tad apurvam iti viditvd nivdraydm dsa dharmatattvajnah\
rdjd saiikaravarmd na punar jainddimatam evam\ \
asitaika0 em. ISAACSON : amitaika0 ed; °dviyuta° Pathantaras and So-
dhanas, at the end of vol. II. : ° dniyata0 ed. ('unrestrained')
'Some rakes, as we are told, invented this Black Blanket Observance,
in which men and women wrapped together in a single black veil
make various movements. King Sankaravarman, who was conversant
with the true nature of Dharma, suppressed this practice, because
he knew that it was unprecedented, but he did not [suppress] the
religions of Jains and others in the same way.'28
vdgamapdrage pdrsvavartini tatrabhavati bhattajayante\; Act Three, 11.34ff.: ddlune khu Ide
samkalavamme] tado vi visa/me se bamhane tassa amacce dulddlajayamte, jehim te tavassino
nflambald vadia pittiya vedavdhila tti latthddo niwdsidd}; ibid, verse 8: rajasau bhuvanesu
visrutaguno dharmaikatdndsayo, mantn sdstramahdtawiriharandsrdnto jayanto 'py asau\
27 Nydyamanjari, vol. I, p. 649
28This verse started an avalanche of misinterpretations. First Jacob made the follow-
ing observation (JACOB 1911, p. 511): 'From the concluding words it would appear that
the king was a Jain.' Then M. R. Kavi deleted Yasovarman of Kanauj from the pages of
history (KAVI 1940, pp. 45ff), and identified the Kashmirian Sankaravarman, who is called
Yasovarman in the Agamadambara, with the patron king of Bhavabhuti and Vakpatiraja
(ibid. p. 50). The fact that 'Kalhana devotes a vague and dark page in depicting this sover-
eign's [Sankaravarman's] conquests and political career' induces Kavi to think that 'pages in
Kalhana's transcript were misplaced and several lines referring to Lalitaditya should come in
the history of Sankaravarman' (p. 47). To quote some more of Kavi's utterly unfounded asser-
tions: 'All these characters [in the Agamadambara] are real persons and may be assumed as
contemporaries of Jayanta and Sankaravarman' (p. 48); 'Visvarupa is spoken of in high terms
in the drama and as a great mTmamsaka' (ibid.); Visvarupa is the same as the commentator
of the Yajnavalkya Smrti, who is also called Bhavabhuti; Umbeka is also called Bhavabhuti:
therefore 'Umbeka, Bhavabhuti, Visvarupa [... ] are the different names of the same person'
(ibid.); 'Visvarupa of the drama can be suggested as his [Sankaravarman / Yasovarman's]
court poet Bhavabhuti' (p. 49); 'Sahata, also called Dhairyarasi is described as the guru of
Jayanta' (ibid.); 'ManjTra, an officer of the king, was a poet representing one of the three
schools of poetic composition as detailed by Kuntaka in his VakroktijTvita' (p. 50), etc. etc.
Now Hegde in his article about Bhatta Jayanta ingeniously combined Jacob's and Kavi's
guesswork in the following way (HEGDE 1983, pp. 5f): 'The king Sankaravarman, according
to Mr. Ramakrishna Kavi who dates it on the basis of the Rdjatarangim of Kalhana, lived
about 850 A.D. (...) A certain prince of the name of Sankaravarman is mentioned in the
Rdjatarangim, who was a Jaina by religious practice. Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj notices that the
Rdjatarangim has fixed the time of this prince in between 883 A.D. and 902 A.D. and also that
he was worthless. Sankaravarman alias Yasovarman also was a Jaina. It is not possible to find
out the relation between these two Sankaravarmans, because that part of the Rdjatarangim is
missing, or to think otherwise, not properly descriptive in nature. But the time gap between
these two persons is only 30 to 50 years. Hence Sankaravarman who lived between 883 and
902 A.D. might have been an immediate or the next successor of the king Sankaravarman
otherwise called Yasovarman who lived in 850 A.D. Due to some failures in the statesmanship
of Bhatta Jayanta, Sankaravarman, the prince, might have put him to jail. But as we do
not observe even a single word of censure of the king Sankaravarman from the pen of Bhatta
Jayanta, we can easily assume that the king was controlled by the prince Sankaravarman who

IX
 Bhatta Jayanta's life

We know from Abhinanda that Jayanta's great-grandfather, Saktisvamin, was

a minister of the Kashmirian king MuktapTda-Lalitaditya, who reigned between
c. 724-761. 29 This information makes it probable that Jayanta was in his fifties-
sixties at the end of the ninth century.30
Kalhana does not give a favourable account of the king whom Jayanta served
as adviser. Having secured the throne for himself by defeating a rival yuvaroja,
king Sankaravarman embarked on a campaign against Gurjara.31 Naravahana,
the king of Darvabhisara fled from the advancing army to the mountains. 32
Sankaravarman uprooted the king of Gurjara, who handed over the Takka-land
to save his own country.33 After his successful digvijaya the king of Kashmir
founded Sankarapura, and together with his wife, Sugandha, the daughter of
Svamiraja, 'the ruler of the northern region' (udakpathaprabhoh), they built two
Siva-temples there: Sankaragaurisa and Sugandhesa.34 As Kalhana remarks
with his usual malice: 'Poets and kings of these modern times augment their
own work by plundering the poems or the property of others. Thus this ruler,
who possessed but little character, had whatever was of value at Parihasapura
[the town built by Lalitaditya], carried off in order to raise the fame of his own
city.'35
Later Sankaravarman came more and more under the sway of avarice and
became 'master in exploiting his people'.36 Since his campaigns had probably
emptied the treasury, the king introduced fines, taxes, systematic forced la-
bour, and established two new revenue offices.37 He also deprived the temples
from the profits they had from the sale of various articles of worship, simply
'plundered', as Kalhana puts it, sixty-four temples through special "supervising"
officers,38 resumed under direct state management villages held as agraharas by
brought the circumstantial force on the king to put Jayanta in an isolated dungeon. The
verse in the NM: rajnd tu gahvare 'sminn asabdake ... etc. supports the above argument
positively.'
29 On the chronology of the Karkota dynasty see RT(S), vol. I, pp. 66ff.
30Cf. HACKER 1951, pp. HOff.
31 Rajatarangim 5.136 seqq. 'The name Gurjara is preserved in that of the modern town
of Gujrat, situated in the Panjab plain about five miles from the W. bank of the Cinab [... ]
The name of the modern town is also used in an extended sense for the designation of the
neighbouring territory, comprising the upper portion of the Doab between the Jhelam and
Cinab rivers to the foot of the Bhimbhar hills. [... ] It appears that the older name Gurjara
had, at the time of the events here related, a much wider territorial application.' (RT(S),
vol. I, p. 204, note ad w. 143-144.)
32 Rajatarangini 5.141; a few years later Sankaravarman assassinated him, see Rajatarangim
5.209.
^Rajatarangini 5.150.
34 Rajatarangim 5.156-158. The ruins of Sankarapura can bee seen at the modern town
of Patan (RT(S), vol. I, pp. 206f, note ad v. 156). 'Svamiraja may be supposed to have been
a ruler in the Dard territory, or in some neighbouring tract.' (RT(S), vol.1, p. 207, note ad
v. 157.)
^Rajatarangim 5.160-161, tr. Stein in RT(S), vol. I, p. 207.
36prajapidanapanditah, Rajatarangini 5.165.
37 Rajatarangim 5.167ff.
38 Rajatarangim 5.168-169: dhupacandanatailadivikriyottham samddade\ dravinam deva-
vesmabhyah krayamulyakalacchalat\\ pratyaveksdm mukhe dattva vibhaktair adhikdribhih]
catuhsastim suragrhan mumosetarad anjasa\\
 Bhatta Jayanta's life

the temples, and manipulating the weight hi the scales he cheated the temple-
corporations (parsads), reducing the allotment assigned as compensation for the
villages. 39 The villages gradually sank into poverty under the fiscal oppression,
while clerks, secretaries, and tax-collectors (kayasthas, diviras) ruled.40
Unlike his father Avantivarman, who showered honours and fortunes on
scholars and poets,41 Sankaravarman was not a liberal patron of arts: as Kalhana
says, it was due to him that the learned were not respected.42 The king was
so afraid of spending money that he turned his back on the worthy, and as a
result such eminent poets as Bhallata had to live in penury,43 while the low-
born Lavata, who was made treasurer (ganjavara), thrived.44 Sankaravarman
himself, giving proof of his boorishness, refused to speak Sanskrit, and used
apabhramsa instead, a language fit for drunkards in Kalhana's esteem.45
Jayanta gives a more favourable account of king Sankaravarman in his Aga-
madambara. He is said to be 'supremely devoted to Siva', and 'merciful to all
religious schools'.46 The Saiva Abbot also holds a high opinion of the king: 'The
merits of this king are celebrated all over the world, and his attention is solely
devoted to social and religious order';47 'As long as His Majesty Sankaravarman
righteously rules the country which has fallen to him, the kingdom belongs to
the virtuous alone, but he supports it.'48 In the fourth act the hero of the play,
looking at the assembly of scholars, exclaims as follows: 'How wonderful! Now
the kingdom looks exactly like Brahma's heaven the kingdom of His Majesty
Yasovarmadeva49 of holy fame, whose heart is with the Destroyer of the Cities
[of the demons, i.e. Siva], an ocean of enviable virtues, who adorns his ear by
listening to the valuable [advices] of the learned, and fulfils the wishes of every
honest man.'50
The two sadhakas in the play, however, who represent a more antisocial form
of Saivism, are not satisfied either with the king,51 or with the present state of
the kingdom, because 'in every region, every single town, every village, every-
where the sound of Veda-recitation grates on the ear, the smell of ghee stings
39 Rdjatarangini 5.170-170, see also Stein's notes in RT(S), vol. I, pp. 208f.
40 Rajatarangim 5.175ff.
41 Rajatarangim 5.33f. Kalhana mentions Muktakana, Sivasvamin (the author of the
Kapphinabhyudaya), Anandavardhana, and Ratnakara (who composed the Haravijaya) as
members of Avantivarman's sabha.
42 Rajatarangim 5.179: nimittam sarvavidydndm anddare.
43 Rajatarangini 5.204: tydgabhtrutayd tasmin gunisangapardnmukhe\ dsevantdvard vrttih
kavayo bhallatddayah\ \
44 Rajatarangim 5.177, 205.
45 Rajatarangim 5.206.
46 Agamadambara, Act Three, 11.159f.: paramamdhesvaro hi raja sankaravarmadevah, sar-
vdsramesu ca daydluh]
Ibid, verse 8a: rdjdsau bhuvanesu visrutaguno dharmaikatdndsayo.
48Ibid. 11. 219f.: srfsankaravarmani dharmena medinim samdgatdm sdsati sddhundm eva
rdjyam, tasya param bhrtih\
49 Sankaravarman used the same name on his Karkota-style coins (see RAY).
50 Agamadambara, Act Four, 11. 76ff.: oho bata puraharahrdayasya sprhaniyagunodadher
vibudhagundkarnanakarndlankdrasya puritasakalasddhujanamanorathasya punyayasasah sn-
yasovarmadevasya brahmalokanirvisesam evedam drsyate rdstram\
51 Agamadambara, Act Three, 1.34: ddlune khu Ide samkalavamme.

XI
 Bhatta Jayanta's life

the nose, the smoke of sacrifice brings tears to the eyes'.52 They are particularly
upset because the king, shoulder to shoulder with his 'rough' (visama) adviser,
Jayanta, has 'nabbed the mendicant NUambaras, beat them to jelly, and ex-
pelled them from the kingdom, on the grounds that they were outside Vedic
religion. And if any other mendicant is caught, who is outside Vedic religion,
he'll be beaten up, killed, thrown in jail, [or] slain.'53 And indeed a herald comes
and proclaims the order of the king:54
ye 'trdnddijagatpravdhapatitd ndndgamdh sddhavas
te tisthantu yathasthitdh svasamayddistds carantah kriyah\
ye tu prastutadharmaviplavakrtah papas tapopdyinas
te ced dsu na ydnti ghdtayati tan dasyun iva ksmdpatih\
Those virtuous people who have fallen into the beginningless stream
of the world and belong to various religions they should remain
as they are, performing practices prescribed by their own religious
discipline. Those criminal false ascetics, however, who devastate the
established social and religious order if they don't leave immedi-
ately, the king will strike them like thieves.
On the basis of the information gathered from Jayanta's play and the Rdjata-
rangini we can sketch the portrait of a king who kept a fast hold on his country.
Sankaravarman appears to have exercised tight central control over both fiscal
and religious matters in Kashmir, and preferred his subjects to be dutiful and
conformist. He certainly disliked the squandering of money, and a nobleman
who organized lavish dinners for mendicants instead of offering his wealth and
services to the king could surely expect the confiscation of his property. 55
In a verse in the Nyayamanjan Jayanta gives curious details about the cir-
cumstances among which he wrote his magnum opus:56
rdjnd tu gahvare 'sminn asabdake bandhane vinihito 'ham\
grantharacandvinoddd iha hi mayd vdsard gamitdh\ \
'I had been transferred by the king to this forest, a wordless place of
confinement. I have spent the years here with the pastime of writing
a book.'
Cakradhara, the commentator of the Nyayamanjan supplements this rather
enigmatic verse with the following information:57
52 Ibid. 11. 81ff.: visae visae naale naale game game thole thale vedajjhayanasaddena tuttamti
kannd, ajjagamdhena tuttadi ghane, jannadhumena galamti askvi\
53 Ibid. 11.34ff.: jehim te tavassino nilambald vadia pittiya vedavahila tti latthado niwdsidd]
anne ya je vedavdhile tavassi labbhadi, se pittiyadi mdlmdi bamdhiadi ghalliadi\
54Agamadambara, Act Three, verse 1.
55 Cf. Agamadambara, Act Two, 11.315ff. Sankaravarman's policy in religious matters was
revived by Yasaskara (939-948), who restored order in Kashmir after the chaotic reigns of
various debauched kings following the death of Sankaravarman. Yasaskara, himself a Brahman
and elected as king by an assembly of Brahmans, was a champion of orthodoxy, and, similarly
to Sankaravarman, he was not favourably disposed towards anti-dharmic religious practices
(cf. Rajatarangini 6.108ff).
56 Nyayamanjan, vol.11, p. 199.
57 Granthibhanga, p. 167.

Xll
 Bhatta Jayanta's life

kasmire kvacit khasadese cirakdlam *atavydm asau (conj., or pos-

sibly dranye 'sau : dranyd[nyd]m asau ed.) snsankaravarmano
rdjna djnayd sthitavdn iti vdrtd]
'The report runs that he spent a long time by His Majesty king
Sankaravarman's order in the forest, somewhere in Khasa-land in
Kashmir.'
As Wezler has already pointed out,58 it is unlikely that Jayanta wrote the Nydya-
manjan as a political prisoner like Gandhi or Nehru. The territory of the khasas
or khasas was, according to Stem, 'restricted to a comparatively limited region,
which may be roughly described as comprising the valleys lying immediately
to the S[outh] and W[est] of the PTr Pantsal range, between the middle course
of the Vitasta in the W[est] and Kastavata (Kistvar) in the E[ast].'59 We
also gather from the Rdjatarangim that the rulers of RajapurT (RajaurT) were
khasas, just like then: troops.60 On the other hand, the hill-state of RajapurT
was included in Darvabhisara,61 where Jayanta's forefathers had settled, and
Ghoramulaka or Gauramulaka, Jayanta's ancestral village was, as Stein writes,
'probably situated to the north of RajaurT in the direction of the Rattan Pa-
range'.62 It appears that Jayanta was sent by the king to this hill-region of
the khasas, not very far from his homeland.63 Since Sankaravarman led his
campaign through territories lying to the southwest from Kashmir, one might
think that Jayanta was sent there with some kind of political commission.64 The
word bandhana, however, suggests that this may not have been a promotion, but
it was not a life-long exile either since he seems to have returned to the circle
of his students as their professor.

58WEZLER 1976, p. 344.

59 RT(S), vol.1, p. 47, note ad verse 1.317.
60Cf. e.g. Rdjatarangim 7.979, 1271, 1276 seqq., and Stein's note quoted above.
61 Rajataraligim 8.1531, RT(S), vol.1, p. 33, note ad verse 1.180.
62RT(S), vol. II, p. 144, note ad verse 8.1861.
63To the east from RajapurT lies the valley of the upper Ans River, which was called
Pancagahvara and was inhabited by khasas (see RT(S) vol.1, p. 47, note ad verse 1.317).
Could the word gahvare in Jayanta's verse refer to this territory?
64In fact Kalhana makes mention of the son of a minister whom 6ahkaravarman made
'lord of the Gate' (dvaradhipa), and who was killed at a place called VTranaka (Rdjatarangim
5.214). As Stein has shown, '[t]he term dvaradhipa [... ] along with its equivalents, dvdrapati,
dvdresa, dvdrddhisvara, dvdrandyaka, dvaradhikarin [... ] designated the high officer who
held charge of the passes leading into Kasmir' (RT(S) vol.1, p. 213, note ad verse 214). In
Rajataraligim 7.217 we read about a dvaradhikarin who fell in a battle with the khasas, while
in 7.576 seqq. Kalhana writes about another 'lord of the Gate' who led expeditions against
RajapurT.

Xlll
Chapter 2

A champion of orthodoxy

The leading character of Jayanta's play is a young and dynamic Mlmamsaka

who has just finished his Vedic studies and so become a 'graduate', snataka.
His ardour knows no bounds: he is eager to find someone who dares to be an
'enemy of the Veda' (vedadvis), in order to stamp him flat with the ram of
reasoning: 1
svddhydyah pathito yathdvidhi pardmrstdni cdngdni san
mimdmsdpi nirupiteti vihitam karma dvijanmocitam\
nityddhutakutarkadhusaragirdm ydvat tu vedadvisdm
nyakkdro no, krtah krtdrtha iva me tdvan na vidydsramah\\
'I have duly studied the Veda, mastered the six auxiliary sciences,
and examined MTmamsa as well. Thus I have performed the du-
ties appropriate for a twice-born person. But until I humiliate the
enemies of the Veda, who dirty their speech with incessantly bran-
dished pernicious [or: faulty] argumentation, the efforts I made hi
my studies will be as if fruitless.'

The raison d'etre of Nyaya, as delineated by Jayanta in the Nyayamanja-

n, appears to be remarkably similar to the Graduate's mission. According to
Jayanta, the primary task of Nyaya is to protect the authority of the Veda (ved-
aprdmdnyaraksd) .2 However, as Kataoka pointed out,3 this prayojana does not
tally with the statements of older Naiyayikas, who proclaim that Nyaya provides
us with the knowledge of the real nature of the objects of cognition (prameya-
tattvajndna, and above all dtmajndna), which results in liberation (apavarga),
independently of the Veda.4 Vatsyayana includes Nyaya hi the traditional list
1 Agamadambara, Act One, verse 11.
2 Cf. Nydyamanjari, vol. I, p. 7: nyayavistaras tu mulastambhabhutah sarvavidyanam ved-
apramanyaraksahetutvatl; ibid. p. 11: yasya hi vedaprdmdnye samsaydnd viparyastd vd matih,
tarn prati sdstrdrambhah\
3 KATAOKA 1999, pp. 5ff.
4Cf. Nydyasutra 1.1.1: tattvajndndn nihsreyasddhigamah; Nydyabhdsya ad loc.,
p. 2: dtmddeh khalu prameyasya tattvajndndn nihsreyasddhigamah], ibid. p. 6: iha

XIV
 A champion of orthodoxy

of four sciences, identifying it with dnviksiki. 5 Each of the four sciences provides
us with the true knowledge (tattvajndna) of its own subject, and leads us to the
appropriate benefit (nihsreyasa). Accordingly Nyaya reveals the true nature of
the Self, and thus it liberates us from transmigration.6
Beside fulfilling its particular purpose (prayojana), Nyaya also contributes
to the other sciences, furnishing them with a valid method of argumentation.
Says Vatsyayana: 7
seyam dnwksiki pramdnddibhir vibhajyamdnd
pradipah sarvavidyandm updyah sarvakarmandm\
dsrayah sarvadharmdndm vidyoddese prakirtitd\ \
'This dnwksiki, which is divided into such categories as pramdnas
etc., is proclaimed hi the treatment of sciences to be the light of
all sciences, the means of all actions, and the substratum of all
dharmas.'
We find the same verse in the Arthasdstra, in the section describing the four
sciences:8
dnviksiki trayi vdrttd dandanitis ceti vidydh\
(...)'
tabhir dharmarthau yad vidyat tad vidyanam vidyatvam\
sdmkhyam yogo lokdyatam cety dnwksiki^
dharmddharmau trayydm arthdnarthau vdrttdydm naydnayau danda-
nitydm baldbale caitdsdm hetubhir anwksamand lokasya upakaroti
vyasane abhyudaye ca buddhim avasthdpayati prajndvdkyakriydvai-
sdradyam ca karoti\
pradipah sarvavidyandm updyah sarvakarmandm\
dsrayah sarvadharmdndm sasvad dnviksiki matd\ \
'Anwksiki, the three Vedas, economics, and politics: these are the
sciences. (...) The sciences are called vidyds since one can know
(vidydt) dharma and artha with their help. Samkhya, Yoga, and
Lokayata: these [come under the heading] dnviksiki. Anviksiki, inas-
much as it investigates with logical reasons [what is] religious merit
and demerit in the three Vedas, profit and loss in economics, good
and bad conduct in politics, and the strong and weak points of these
[sciences], is of service to mankind, steadies the mind in bad and
tv adhyatmavidyayam atmavijnanam tattvajnanam, nihsreyasddhigamo 'pavargapraptir iti\
Nyayavartika, p. 10: param tu nihsreyasam [ = apavarga} atmadeh prameyasya tat-
tvajndnad bhavati\ On the differences among Naiyayikas regarding apavarga, see SLAJE,
'Nihsreyasam...'.
5 Nyayabhasya, p. 2: imas tu catasro vidyah prthakprasthanah pranabhrtam anugrahayopa-
disyante, yasam caturthiyam dnviksiki nydyavidyd\
Nyayabhasya, p. 6: tad idarn tattvajnanam nihsreyasddhigamas ca yathdvidyam vedi-
tavyam\ iha tv adhyatmavidyayam dtmavijndnarn tattvajnanam, nihsreyasddhigamo 'pavar-
gapraptir iti\\
7Nyayabhasya, p. 5.
8 Arthasastra 1.2.1; 1.2.9-12.

XV
 A champion of orthodoxy

good luck, and makes one skillful in thinking, speaking, and acting.
Anwksiki has always been accepted as the light of all sciences, the
means of all actions, and the substratum of all dharmas.'
Prom Kautilya's description it appears that the category of "investigative
science" includes several schools of learning which are not necessarily rooted in
Vedic orthodoxy. For Vatsyayana, Nyaya fulfills the role of dnviksiki inasmuch
as it establishes and employs the method of logical inquiry; the results of this
inquiry, however, must be in conformity with the information received from
sense perception and scripture:9
kah punar ayam nydyah? pramdnair arthapariksanam\ pratyaksdga-
mdsritam cdnumdnam\ sdnviksd\ pratyaksdgamdbhydm iksitasydrtha-
sydnviksanam anviksd\ tayd pravartata ity dnviksiki nydyavidyd nyd-
yasdstram\ yat punar anumdnam pratyaksdgamaviruddham nydyd-
bhdsah sa
'But what is this Nyaya? The examination of things with the help
of means of valid cognition. As for inference, it is based on sense
perception and verbal testimony. It is the same as anviksd. Anviksd
is a subsequent examination of something that has been examined by
sense perception and verbal testimony. That [science] which operates
with this [anviksd] is dnviksiki, alias the science of Nyaya, or the
doctrine of Nyaya. That inference, however, which contradicts sense
perception or verbal testimony is an illusive reasoning.'
Orthodox writers on dharmasastra also expressed the view that not every
kind of reasoning is commendable. Manusmrti 7.43 mentions dnviksiki among
the sciences a king should study. Medhatithi (ninth century) comments on this
verse as follows: 10
dtmane yd hitanwksiki sd tarkdsrayd, tdm sikseta (...) yd tu bau-
ddhacdrvdkdditarkavidyd sd ndtiva krtvd kvacid upayujyate\ pratyu-
tdstikyam upahanti *tasya (conj. : om. ed.) yo ndtinipunamatih]
'That dnviksiki which is beneficial for himself is based on reasoning:
he should study that. (...) That [dnwksiki], however, which is the
science of reasoning of Buddhists, Carvakas, and other [heretics], is
not useful anywhere at all, on the contrary, it destroys conviction in
orthodox Vedic values11 if one is not very intelligent.' 12
9 Nydyabhdsya, p. 3.
10 JHA, vol. 2, p. 14, Medhatithi takes dnmksikim catmavidydm belonging together, and
interprets dtmavidydm in a slightly forced way.
11 Cf. Medhatithi ad Manusmrti 4.30 (JHA, vol.1, p. 342): haitukdh nastikah\ nasti
parcdokah, ndsti dattam, nasti hutam ity evarn sthitaprajndh]
12 Cf. Medhatithi ad Manusmrti 2.11 (JHA, vol. 1, p. 72): hetusastram nastikatarkasastram
bauddhacdrvakddisastram yatra vedo 'dharmdyeti punah punar udghusyate\; Medhatithi
ad Manusmrti 12.106 (JHA, vol.2, p.485): tarkeneti tarkapradhdnd granthd lau-
kikapramdnanirupanapard nydyavaisesikalokdyatika ucyante\ tatra vedaviruddhdni
bauddhalokdyatikanairgranthddmi paryudasyante\

XVI
 A champion of orthodoxy

According to Jayanta, Nyaya is not only in conformity with scripture but it

is also "the main supporting-pillar of all sciences, because it is the means of the
protection of the Veda's authority". 13 It is Aksapada's Nyaya which is referred
to as tarka and nydyavistara in the list of the fourteen sciences, 14 and not any
other doctrine: 15
yatah, sdmkhydrhatdndm tdvat ksapanakdndm kidrsam anumdno-
padesakausalam\ kiyad eva tattarkena vedaprdmdnyam raksyate, iti
ndsdv iha ganandrhah\ bauddhds tu yady apy anumdnamdrgdvagdha-
nanaipunoddhurdm kandhardm udvahanti, tathdpi vedaviruddhatvdt
tattarkasya katham vedddividydsthdnamadhye pdthah\ anumdnakau-
salam api kidrsam sdkydndm iti pade pade darsayisydmah\ cdrvdkds
tu vardkdh pratikseptavyd eva\ kah ksudratarkasya tadiyasyeha ga-
nandvasarah\ vaisesikdh punar asmadanuydyina evety evam asydm
janatdsu prasiddhdydm api sattarkydm idam eva tarkanydyavistarasa-
bddbhydm sdstram uktam\
For, what sort of skill do the mendicant Samkhyas and Jains, to
begin with, have hi teaching reasoning? To what extent is the au-
thority of the Veda protected by then: tarka? Thus it does not qualify
to take it into account here. As for the Buddhists, although they
walk with then* head high in the air because of their dexterity in
delving deep into the ways of reasoning, nevertheless, because their
tarka is opposed to the Veda, how could it be mentioned among
the sciences headed by the Veda? And we shall also demonstrate at
every step what the Buddhists' skill in reasoning is like. As for the
wretched Carvakas, they must simply be discarded. What scope is
there for counting their trifling tarka among [the fourteen sciences]?
The Vaisesikas, on the other hand, just follow us [Naiyayikas]. Thus,
even if this group of six tarkas is well-known among the people, it is
this sdstra [of Aksapada] alone which is referred to with the words
"tarka" and "nydyavistara".'1
Jayanta's rigour with which he separates Veda-protecting Nyaya from het-
erodox tarkas will appear even more marked in the light of the works of some
earlier Naiyayikas. Bhavivikta, who appears to have written a commentary on
Rajasekhara in his Kavyamvmamsa (Third Adhyaya, p. 4) divides anmksiki or tarka into two
main categories: purvapaksa (prima facie view) and uttarapaksa (the established view). To
the former type belong the heterodox schools of the Buddhists, Carvakas, and Jainas, while the
latter comprises Samkhya, Nyaya, and Vaisesika. Jayanta in the sarvagamapramanya section
of his Nyayamanjari (vol. I, p. 648) also rejects the teaching of Lokayata on the ground that
it is based on purvapaksa arguments.
13 Nydyamanjan, vol. I, p. 7: nyayavistaras tu mulastambhabhutah sarvavidyanam vedapra-
manyaraksahetutvat\
14 Nyayamanjari, vol. I, p. 8, quoting Yajnavalkya-smrti 1.3 and another verse of unknown
source. As Kataoka pointed out (KATAOKA 1999, pp. 17ff.), this fourteen-fold list enables
Jayanta to limit the scope of all sciences to the transcendental (adrsta), and to place the four
Vedas (and not trayf) headed by Atharvaveda on the top of the hierarchy of vidyas.
15 Nyayamanjari, vol. I, pp. 8f.

XV11
 A champion of orthodoxy

the Nydyabhdsya probably in the period between Dignaga and Dharmaklrti, 16

was, according to Cakradhara, one of the "old Carvakas" (cirantanacdrvdkdh) 17
mentioned by Jayanta in his Nydyamanjan. 18 Similarly Aviddhakarna, who also
wrote a Bhdsyattkd before the time of Dharmaklrti, seems to have composed a
Carvaka Tattvatikd as well. 19 As Wezler observes,20
'Beide, Aviddhakarna wie Bhavivikta, scheinen mir gute Zeugen
dafiir zu sein, dafi sich das Nyaya-System nicht nur das Wort anmksi-
ki als Selbstbezeichnung angeeignet hat, sondern dafi sich seine Ver-
treter, zumindest in einer bestimmten Epoche, auch nicht der
gestellten oder selbst gewahlten Aufgabe entzogen haben, ein frem-
des, aber ebenfalls dnwksiki enthaltendes System mitzubehandeln,
eine Aufgabe, die zu erledigen fur sie vielleicht nicht wissenschaft-
lich interessant war, sich ihnen aber doch als gewinnbringend oder
politisch ratsam empfohlen haben mag.'
Jayanta, far from making excursions to the field of heterodox tarkas, takes
a strong line against "depraved logicians" (dustatdrkikdh] and their destructive
speculations:21
vedesu hi *tdrkika(Saiada, MSS as reported by Dr. Isaacson in an
email of 2. vii. 2003. : dustdrkika0 ed.)racitakutarkavipldvitaprdmd-
nyesu sithilitdsthdh katham iva bahuvittavyaydydsddisddhyam vedd-
rthdnusthdnam ddriyeran sddhavah\ kirn vd *taddnim (Sarada MSS as
reported by Dr. Isaacson in the above cited email: om. ed.) svdmini
parimldne tadanuydyind mimdrnsddividydsthdnaparijanena krtyam
iti\ tasmddasesadustatdrkikopamardadvdrakadrdhataravedaprdmdnya-
pratyayddhdyinydyopadesaksamam aksapddopadistam idam nydyavis-
tardkhyam sdstram sdstrapratisthdnanibandhanam iti dhuryam vidyd-
sthdnam\
For why would the pious take the trouble to perform what the Vedas
teach, which can be accomplished [only] by spending a lot of money
and [by exerting] a lot of effort etc., if their confidence in the Vedas,
the authority of which has been ruined by the vile tarka invented
by logicians, is shaken? Or, once the master has withered, what
should then the attendants, Mlmamsa and the other sciences, do,
who follow him? Therefore this sdstra, taught by Aksapada and
called Nyayavistara, which is able to teach reasoning that inspires
a firmer confidence in the authority of the Veda through erasing all
depraved logicians, is the support of the foundation of the sdstras,
and thus it is the principle science.'
16Cf. STEINKELLNER 1961, p. 153; WEZLER 1975, p. 143.
17 Granthibhaiiga, p. 197.
18 Nyayamanjan, vol.11, p. 249.
19 Cf. STEINKELLNER 1961, pp. 153ff.
20WEZLER 1975, p. 145.
21 Nydyamanjari, vol.1, p. 7.

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 A champion of orthodoxy

According to Jayanta, MTmamsa, the science which could be regarded as

the primary Veda-protector, has a different, more important task: the exam-
ination of the meaning of Vedic texts (arthavicdra).22 On the other hand,
Mlmamsakas are "rambling on an illusive path on which progress is blocked by
the multitude of thorns of faulty speculation" (kutarkakantakanikaraniruddha-
sancdramdrgdbhdsaparibhrdntdh),23 and thus then* theories of svatahprdmdnya
( "all means of cognition are valid by themselves") and apauruseyatva ( "the Veda
has no author") are inadequate to protect the Veda. It is only the Nyaya theory
of dptoktatva ("verbal testimony is valid because it has been pronounced by a
reliable person", who is God himself in the case of the Veda) that is able to
establish and defend the authority of the Veda,24 which is, in Jayanta's view,
Nyaya's principal mission. 25
Considering all this it may seem surprising that the leading character of Jay-
anta's play, the crusader of Vedic orthodoxy, is a Munamsaka. In the first act
Sankarsana systematically refutes in front of distinguished and 'unbiased' um-
pires26 the bhiksu's arguments about "Universal Momentariness" (ksanikatva)
and "Consciousness as the Only Reality" (vijndnavdda). Thus he scores his first
victory against the depraved logicians who try to undermine Vedic order,27 and
summons the Buddhists to stop deceiving themselves and others with the prom-
ise of a better afterlife for those who follow the Buddha's doctrine. In the second
act the Mlmamsaka lets another heterodox teacher, a Jain monk, slip, not con-
sidering him a significant threat to the established socio-religious order. 28 The
debauched behaviour of the Black-Blankets, however, requires instant measures,
as do the shady practices of the Saiva adepts.
Problems start to emerge for our hero in the third act of the play, when he has
to refine the circle of those sects whose presence in the kingdom is unwanted.
In fact, the Mlmamsaka is ready to form an alliance with the Saiddhantika
Saiva professor against the irreligious Carvakas, represented by the arrogant
Vrddhambhi who outlines a clear program: 'I am going to take this opportunity
to do away with God, set aside the world-to-come, demolish the validity of the
22 Nyayamanjari, vol. I, p. 10.
23 Nyayamanjari, ibid. Cf. KATAOKA 1999, pp. 26ff.
24 Cf. Nyayamanjari, vol. I, p. 10, pp. 430ff, KATAOKA 1999, pp. 27ff.
25As for the true knowledge of atman and the other prameyas provided by Nyaya, Jayanta
certainly does not deny that it leads to liberation, but he adds that the fact that it leads
to liberation is understood on the basis of scripture alone (tasya tu prameyasyatmader apav-
argasadhanatvadhigama dgamaikanibandhanah, Nyayamanjari, vol.1, p. 22). See KATAOKA
1999, pp. 23ff.
26 One of them is called Visvarupa, whose name might echo that of a commentator of the
Nyayabhasya (cf. STEINKELLNER 1961, p. 158; WEZLER 1975, pp. 139ff.)
27The bhiksu whom the Mlmamsaka defeats is called Dharmottara, just as one of Dhar-
makirti's most prominent followers, who, according to the Rajatarangini (4.498), settled in
Kashmir. His arguments are similar to those of DharmakTrti on the one hand, and to the
views of vijnanavada as presented by Kumarila. The MTmamsaka in his refutation (just as
Jayanta in the Nyayamanjari) draws upon Kumarila's Slokavartika.
28 As Jayanta reports, king £ankaravarman also gave quarter to the Jains (Nyayamanjari,
vol. 649). On the other hand, the Jain theory of anekantavada is not far removed from certain
ideas expounded by Kumarila (cf. UNO).

XIX
 A champion of orthodoxy

Vedas, and thereby turn this king back from this wrong path and establish him
on the right track, so that he, concentrating on worldly prosperity, can enjoy his
kingship for a long tune.'29 Now the question may arise whether the Carvakas
or Carvaka ideas had a real influence on the Kashmirian monarch. According
to Kalhana's account, Sankaravarman was a king who 'concentrated on arthd1
above all, and he had no scruples about fleecing the temples hi order to fill the
treasury. On the other hand, as Jayanta shows in the Nydyamanjari, Lokayata
was not a long-forgotten philosophy in the ninth century. Apart from such "old
Carvakas" (cirantanacdrvakdh) as Bhavivikta,30 Jayanta also had to deal with
"well-educated Carvakas" (susiksitacdrvdkdh), such innovators as Udbhata,31
whom he simply calls "the shrewd Carvaka" (carvakadhurtah).32 It is certainly
tempting to identify this Udbhata with the sabhdpati of king JayapTda (Rd-
jatarangim, 4.495, 7.482, 8.2227) and / or with the dlamkdrika author of the
Kdvydlankdrasdrasangraha. The former would also indicate that a Carvaka
could occupy an influential post in the royal court at the end of the eighth
century. Whatever may be the truth about the identity of these Udbhatas, the
fact that Jayanta took the trouble to refute the ideas of the Carvaka Udbhata
on several pages of the Nydyamanjan shows that this tradition was very much
alive in his time, and a king like Sankaravarman may well have been responsive
to its anti-religionist ideas.
The MTmamsaka and the Saiva professor defeat their Carvaka opponent with
an exemplary division of labour. Dharmasiva proves the existence of the soul,
transmigration, and God, while Sankarsana keeps his own counsel: it would
indeed be strange if a MTmamsaka brought up arguments in support of the ex-
istence of an omniscient, omnipotent Creator. But he immediately hurls himself
into the fray when the authority of the Veda is to be established, while the Saiva
dcdrya keeps in the background, perhaps because Siva's scriptures are nearer
to his heart, or because, as he himself points out to the MTmamsaka, he would
use the paratahprdmdnya argument ("validity is established through another
cognition") instead of svatahprdmdnya ( "the validity of a cognition is given by
itself") to prove the validity of scripture. The moral is that, notwithstanding
a few doctrinal differences, MTmamsakas and Saiddhantika Saivas should join
their forces to defeat the ndstikas and thereby prevent the king from ruling in
an inordinately materialistic way.
The viskambhaka preceding the final act makes it clear that Sankarsana has
lost the trust of Vedic Brahmans:33
saivapdsupatapdncardtrikdh sdnkhyasaugatadigambarddayah\
29 Agamadambara, Act Three, 11.232ff. As Raghavan suggested, 'Vrddhambhi is likely
to be an echo of the ancient school of Arthasastra, cited by Kautilya as the AmbhTyas'
(Agamadambara (ed. pr.), pp. xxiv f.). According to these AmbhTyas, the prince should
be tempted, in order to prove him, with hunting, gambling, alcohol, women, and suggesting
him to seize power from his father. Kautilya rejects this theory (Arthasastra, 1.13).
30Cf. Nyayamanjan, vol. II, p. 349, Granthibhanga, p. 197.
31 Cf. Nyayamanjan, vol.1, pp.94, 326, 451; vol.11, pp.8, 348, 687; Granthibhanga, pp.19,
197, 198.
32 Nyayamanjari, vol. I, p. 168; Granthibhanga, p. 43.
33 Agamadambara, Act Four, 11. 5ff.

XX
 A champion of orthodoxy

sarva eva hi yathdsthitd ime sndtakasya dhig apdrthakam srutam \ \

Saivas, Pasupatas, Pancaratrikas, Sankhyas, Buddhists, Sky-Clad
Jains and other [heretics]: all of them have remained as they were.
Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate!
This lamentation of the rtirij makes a sharp contrast to the entrance verse
of the Munamsaka in the first act, in which he took an oath to humiliate all the
enemies of the Veda, and thereby to make his learning fruitful. 'But, my friend,'
explains the (perhaps older and more experienced) upddhydya to the rtvij, 'he
has become the king's man by now. And the king is supremely devoted to
Siva, so Sankarsana has to be completely focussed on propitiating Hun. For in
a monarch's vicinity [his] men keep repeating his words, but, eager to increase
their own influence, they do not distinguish between good or bad, like echoes.'34
Sankarsana is indeed in a great dilemma: either he should enter into a debate
and prove the falsity of the teachings of the Bhagavatas, an dgama supported
by the queen and another member of the court, just as he did in the case of the
nastikas, or he should defend them, in which case he would completely lose his
face before the Vaidikas. That the Bhagavatas were indeed striving to achieve
Vedic status for their dgama in Jayanta's time is also indicated by Cakradhara's
following remark:35 'Bhagavat Puskaraksa, the principal mendicant, who wrote
a commentary to the sutras of Bhagavat Badarayana, accepted the view that
the Paficaratra and other [dgamas] are based on the Veda.' Sankarsana cannot
resolve the tension between his devotion to Visnu and his duty to reject all non-
Vedic scriptures as a MTmamsaka. It is the great naiydyika scholar, Dhairyarasi,
who smoothes all differences away as the arbitrator appointed by the court in
the debate between Vaisnavas and Vaidikas. Sankarsana's only task is to give
tacit support, which he happily accepts.
Dhairyarasi's mission is not to enter into a controversy or to defeat any-
body in a debate; on the contrary, he comes to pour oil on troubled waters.
Accordingly he delivers a long lecture instead of discussing things, and his over-
whelming authority gives even more emphasis to his words. He proves to be
a real sarvdgamaprdmdnyavddin ("one who holds the validity of all religious
scriptures"), and his argumentation mirrors exactly the views presented by Jay-
anta in his Nydyamanjan.36 In his magnum opus Bhatta Jayanta, the orthodox
Brahman and naiydyika philosopher, concludes the first part of his comments
on the validity of scriptures with the following words: 'Any religion which is
outside the Veda is nothing but deception/37 The circle of acceptable religions,
however, is wider for Jayanta than for a Mimamsaka such as Kumarila, since he
also includes the Paficaratra and the Saiva dgamas, on the grounds that, firstly,
34 Agamadambara, Act Four, 11. llff.: bho vayasya, nanu rdjapuruso 'sdv adya samvrttah\
raja ca paramamdhesvara iti taddrddhanaikatdnabuddhind tena bhavitavyam. yatah, samipato
bhumibhrtdm hi purusds taduktam evdnuvadanta dsate\ svavrddhilubdhds tu na sddhv asddhu
vd vivecayanti pratisabdakd iva\\
35 Granthibhariga, p. 112: bhagavadbddardyanasutravrttikrtd bhagavatpuskardksena parivrd-
jakamukhyena pancardtrdder vedamulatvam angikrtam\
36 Nydyamanjan, vol. I, pp. 640ff.
37 Nydyamanjari, vol. I, p. 639: vedabdhyas tu yah kascid dgamo vancanaiva sa\

XXI
 A champion of orthodoxy

their author, just as the author of the Veda, is a "reliable person", namely God,
and, secondly, they are not incompatible with the Veda.38 On the other hand the
Buddhists and the so called "liberators from transmigration" samsdmmocakas,
are still considered as vedabahya and therefore not authoritative.
At this point Jayanta's exposition about the validity of scriptures takes a
surprising turn: 'Others have accepted the validity of all scriptures because
cognition without supersession [by a subsequent cognition] or uncertainty has
arisen from all of them.'39 He does not tell us explicitly who hold this peculiar
view, nor if he supports or rejects sarvdgamaprdmdnya. Still it is significant that
he presents it as the concluding paksa in the context of the validity of religions,
and he takes pains to enumerate arguments supporting this position. One has
the impression that Jayanta must have suffered real pain, especially when he
tries to find excuses even for Buddhism. He manages to show that the doctrine
of nairatmya serves only 'to induce the relaxation of the Self',40 and that the
Knowledge that Buddhists strive after is 'very similar to the Self because of its
freedom and independence'.41 He also demonstrates that the Buddha is just as
omniscient as Kapila and the other sages, and finally 'as for the refutation of
the doctrine of caste in Buddhist scriptures, its purpose is [only] to laud the
high degree of [the Buddha's] compassion that seeks to help all [creatures], and
it should not be taken literally'.42 If one holds the view that God is the author
of all valid scriptures, says Jayanta, then we may argue that only the body of
the Buddha was the son of Suddhodana, his soul was Lord Visnu personally.43
If one says that all valid agamas must be based on the Veda, then assiduous
experts are ready to find some Vedic grounds even for wearing red robes, or for
smearing oneself with ashes and carrying a skull.44
The key to Jayanta's turnaround is given at the end of the section dealing
with dgamaprdmdnya in the Nydyamanjari (pp. 648-649). First Jayanta enu-
merates those criteria on the basis of which an dgama can be regarded as valid:
it must have obtained celebrity with which nobody finds fault, many learned
people should accept it, it should not appear to be unprecedented, its raison
d'etre must not be greed, etc., and finally it should not cause abhorrence among
people.45 Then Jayanta gives an example how these liberal principles can be
38 Nydyamanjan, vol. I, p. 637: atah dptapranvtatvdd veddviruddhatvdc ca na tayor [i.e.
saivapancardtrayor] aprdmdnyam\
39Ibid. p. 640: anye sarvdgamdndm tu prdmdnyam pratipedire] sarvatra bddhasandehara-
hitapratyayodaydt\ \
40Ibid. p. 641: nairdtmyavddinas tv dtmasaithilyajanandya tathopadisanti\
41 Ibid.: svaccham tu jndnatattvam yat tair isyate, tat svdtantrydd andsritatvdd dtmakalpam
eva\
42Ibid. p. 643: yad api bauddhdgame jdtivddanirdkaranam tad api sarvdnugrahapravanaka-
rundtisayaprasamsdparam na ca yathdsrutam avagantavyam]
43Ibid. p. 644: sarvram eva suddhodanasydpatyam ndtmd. atah pratiyugam visnur eva
bhagavdn dharmarupendvataratity dgamavidah pratipanndh.
"^Ibid. p. 647: evam raMapataparigrahabhasTnakapdladhdmnddimulam apy abhiyuktd la-
bhanta eva\
45Ibid. p. 648: naitad asty avigitdm ye prasiddhim prdpur dgamdh\ krtas ca bahubhir yesdm
$istair iha parigrahah\\ adya pravartamdnds ca ndpurvd iva bhdnti ye\ yesdm na mulam
lobhddi yebhyo nodvijate janah\\ tesdm eva pramdnatvam dgamdndm ihesyate\

XX11
 A champion of orthodoxy

x
put into practice: king Sankaravarman suppressed the practice of the Black-
Blankets, but he spared for instance the Jains.46 Thus the criterion of validity
is not so much the veracity of propositions in a given scripture, but rather the
degree of its recognition and its inherent possibilities of overthrowing social or-
der.47 This was probably fitting in the broader 'Religionspolitik' of the king,
which, as Wezler pointed out, could motivate Jayanta's whole exposition of the
sarvdgamapramdnya-theary in his Nyayamanjan.48 That this was really the
case is clearly demonstrated in the Agamadambara, which, as Wezler observes,
'hat es im wesentlichen den Charakter eines, wie wir sagen wiirden, Dokument-
arspiels, das jene religionspolitische Mafiname Konig Sankaravarmans, ihre Vor-
geschichte und ihre Folgen zum Gegenstand hat'.49
We should keep in mind that, while Dhairyarasi is delivering his lecture, the
Mimamsaka sits in the audience and is supposed to agree fully to such ideas as
'Siva, Pasupati, Kapila and Visnu, Samkarsana, the Sage Jina, the Buddha, or
Manu are one',50 'let all these sacred scriptures have no beginning, similarly to
the Veda',51 etc. Dhairyarasi declares that infatuation cannot be regarded as
the cause of acceptance in the case of old-established religions, and 'if someone
objects that we cannot know that there were Buddhists in former times, then
the same suspicion may be raised concerning the Brahmans'.52 'Or if you say,'
continues Dhairyarasi, 'that greed and the like are the visible source in this case,
the heterodox will retort that the Veda is also a means of livelihood.'53 And
the Mimamsaka applauds with enthusiasm.
When Dhairyarasi makes the peroration of his most elaborate speech, Sankar-
sana bursts out in jubilation: 'Honourable Dhairyarasi, be sure that, in a manner
of speaking, we have been revived, beatified, purified, nourished, made to ex-
perience the goal of this worldly existence by this novel river of erudition which
has risen from Your Honour. How wonderful!'54 Then he manages to collect
the remains of his former adamance and declares that the various religious tra-
ditions should remain clearly separated from each other, while those who spoil
sdstra and dharma with their ill-conduct must be banished. 55
46 Nydyamanjan, vol. I, p. 649, quoted above.
47On the ground of sarvdgamaprdmdnya only anti-social sects and Lokayata are rejected,
the latter because its statements are based merely on purvapaksa statements in Vedic texts
(cf. Nydyamanjari, vol.1, pp. 647f).
48 See WEZLER 1976, p. 340.
49Ibid.
50 Agamadambara, Act Four, 11. 330f.: ekah sivah pasupatih kapilo 'tha visnuh sankarsano
jinamunih sugato manur va; cf. how the hungry ascetic blurs the distinction between the
Buddha and the Jina in Act Two.
51 Ibid. 1.405: tendnddaya eva vedavad ime bhavantv dgamdh
52 Ibid. 11.442ff.: vydmohdc ca hi vartante kdmam katipayair dinaih\ so 'yam yugapadasthdyi
vydmoha iti vismayah\\ purdpi saugatd dsann iti kendvagamyate\ purdpi srotriyd dsann iti
kendvagamyate\ \
53Ibid. 1.446f.: lobhddi drsyamdnam vd yadi mulam ihocyate\ vedo 'pijwikopdya itijalpanti
ndstikdh\ \
54Ibid. 11.488ff.: drya dhairyardse, vayam tdvad ucchvdsitd iva, sdlitd iva, pawtrzkrtd ivdp-
ydyitd jtvalokaphalam anubhdvitd iva bhavatprabhavaydbhinavayd sarasvatyd] aho dscaryam!
55 Ibid. 11.508ff.

XXlll
 A champion of orthodoxy

And the right person to decide such delicate issues as 'which conduct is
wicked enough to be suppressed', and 'what are the criteria of this wickedness',
is the king himself, and those people in his service who put his orders into
effect. Sankarsana's position in these questions, just as his career and livelihood
as a married t householder, depends on the will of his superiors, as Jayanta, who
served king Sahkaravarman as his adviser, knew very well.

XXIV
Chapter 3

A curious play (kimapi

rupakam)

Considering the fact that fate was not merciful to such celebrated and outstand-
ing plays as Visakhadeva's DevTcandragupta, and that whole dramatic genres
such as the mthi survive only in meagre quotations (apart from its late 'rein-
carnation' in an altered form), 1 we should be grateful to the Jains of Gujarat
who preserved, thanks to their commendable diligence and curiosity, a unique
college-drama written by a Kashmirian philosopher. The dramatic qualities of
the Agamadambara leave much to be desired by classical Indian standards of
dramaturgy. As Raghavan remarks hi his introduction, 'when he [Jayanta] made
his debut on the stage with this new play of his, he knew he was making the
pandits of Natya Sastra prick their ears.'2 In this chapter we shall examine
what makes Jayanta's play so unique and unorthodox. First we shall deal with
the Prologue, which already reads as a parody of a traditional prastdvand. A
closer look will, however, reveal that although Jayanta was using the standard
introductory devices in a novel way, his Prologue, in spite of all its strange-
ness, alludes elegantly both to the plot and the leading aesthetic relish of the
play. Then we shall consider the phenomenon of 'philosophical plays' in the
light of the discussions on the nature and relation of poetry and sdstra, doc-
trinal or scientific literature. Finally we shall study the predominant rasa of the
Agamadambara.

3.1
Indian dramatists had an excellent means with which they could gently intro-
duce the spectators to the world of the play. The prologue (prastdvand, sthdpand
or dmukha) of a classical Indian play provides information about the author, the
1 Cf. RAGHAVAN 1978, pp.872ff.
2 Agamadambara (ed. pr.), p.viii.

XXV
 A curious play

story, the characters, and the main sentiment or savour the audience is going
to relish during the performance. In usual practice the Director (sutradhara)
enters the stage after the preliminaries (purvaranga) are over and the initial
benediction (nandi) has been recited. In the Bhasa-plays he is just about to
make an announcement when a sound coming from off-stage interrupts him and
at the same time introduces the first character who is about to enter the stage.
In other plays the Director has a chat with an actress (nati), who is also his
wife, or the comic actor (vidusaka), or an assistant (pariparsvika) about the
actual occasion of the performance, the qualities of the sponsor, the author,
and the audience, then sometimes about domestic matters, which turn out to
be similar to the story of the play. The end of the prologue is always linked in a
more or less direct way to the plot: the Director infers from some noise that one
of the characters is about to enter, sometimes because he has overheard (and
misunderstood, as in the Mudrdrdksasa) the words of the sutradhara.
The prologue can be defined in semiotical terms as one of the 'rhetorical' or
'presentational' devices that draw the attention of the audience to the theatrical
and dramatic realities, to the fact that what is going on is actually a perform-
ance. Although they appear outside the theatrical frame, in fact they confirm
it 'by pointing out the pure facticity of the representation'.3 To employ another
method of analysis,4 the prologue with the actor talking to another actor about
the play to be performed and about (or to) the audience whose favour is to
be gained, appears to belong to the actual world, as opposed to the world of
the drama. At the end of the Sanskrit prastavana, the two worlds almost seem
to merge: the action happening off-stage and already inside the drama-world,
e.g. the crying of the apsarases because the demons have kidnapped UrvasT, is
audible for the Director, just as the words said by the sutradhara, e.g. reciting
a verse about the eclipse of the moon (candrasya grahanam), can be overheard
by a character belonging to the world of the play. This proximity of the two
worlds ensures the smooth transition of the audience between the actual and
the fictitious worlds, but in a way that the two worlds are kept separate: the
Director exits before the apsarases or Canakya enter.
'But surely', one might object, 'the Director, the Actress, and the Assist-
ant all say the words contained in their script, they also play roles, how could
they belong to the actual world?' The objection is correct: the prastavana
is certainly part of the play. In it the drama-world is disguised as the actual
world. The sutradhara is a character just like Canakya; he is never the ac-
tual referent but only a possible surrogate, even if he is played by the actual
director. 5 Abhinavagupta has already observed this with his usual acumen in
his commentary to the Natyasastra. He observes that one of the obstacles to
aesthetic experience is 'one's emotional response to pleasure and pain even if it
is restricted to another person' (paragatatvaniyamabhdjdm api sukhaduhkhdndm
samvedane). The solution is the blurring of the actual identity of that 'other
3 ELAM 1997, p. 90. Other 'presentational' devices are e.g. the epilogue, the induction, the
play-within-the-play, the aside directed to the audience, etc.
4 ELAM 1997, pp. 99ff.
5 Cf. ELAM 1997, pp. 109f.

XXVI
 A curious play

person': the costume and other theatrical conventions hide the 'actor-ness' of the
actors, which has, however, been revealed hi the preliminaries and the prologue
(purvarangdniguhanena prastdvandvalokanena ca ... natarupatddhigamas).6
So far so good. But why does Bharata describe the prastdvand twice in the
Natyasastra: once as part of the purvaranga, and for the second time as part of
the bhdrati vrtti (the dramatic style in which the verbal aspect is predominant)?
Abhinavagupta has the following answer:7
dvividhd prastdvand bhavati purvarangasydiigabhutd anyasya vd\ ta-
tra purvarangdnge *'sydm (GOS : 'sydh Parimal) kavir uddsmah]
sthapaka eva svatantro nirmd*tdstv (conj. : °td tv eds.) anyo
vd kavir dhruvdgdndddv api\ (...) sd dvitiyd yd vrttibhedamadhye
pathitd\ evam prarocandddv api mantavyam\ yad aha "tatra *kaddcit
(conj. : kdcit eds.) kdvydbhimukham my ate purvarangavidhih tada-
bhimukham vd kdvydrambhas, tad bhavati sd dvividhd" *ityddi (GOS
: ityddih Parimal) |
The prologue is of two kinds: that which is part of the preliminaries,
and [that which is part] of something else. Of these two, the poet
is not involved in that one which is part of the preliminaries. The
sthapaka may be its independent composer, or another poet, as well
as in the case of the dhruvd-songs. (...) The second kind [of pro-
logue] is that which is mentioned among the varieties of dramatic
style. The same should be held about the exciting of the spectators'
interest, etc. As [someone] said: "There [in the prologue] sometimes
the performance of the preliminaries is directed towards the play [i.e.
the drama written by the playwright], or the beginning of the play
[is directed] towards that [i.e. the preliminaries]. Therefore it [the
prastdvand} is of two kinds.", and so forth.
Commenting on the second occurrence of the prologue in the Natyasastra, A-
bhinava says:8
evam ca yadd sthdpako 'pi sutradhdratulyagundkdro rdmddivad eva
prayujyate tad *eva (conj. : evam eds.) kavikrtam amukham bhavati\
And thus, when the sthdpaka, having similar qualities and bearing
as the sutradhdra, is also presented on the stage like Rama and other
[characters], that alone is the prologue written by the poet.
6 Abhinavabhdrati (Parimal), vol.1, p. 279; Abhinavabhdrati (GOS), vol.1, p. 274; GNOLI
1968, pp. 15f., cf. also Abhinavabharati (Parimal), vol.1, p. 251; Abhinavabharati (GOS),
vol. I, pp. 244f.
7 Abhinavabharati (GOS), vol. I, pp. 247f., Abhinavabharati (Parimal), vol. I, p. 254.
8 Abhinavabharati (GOS), vol. Ill, p. 93, Abhinavabharati (Parimal), vol. Ill, p. 89; cf.
Natyadarpana, p. 136: kaddcit tu sandndikam rangam anusthaya visrdnte sutradhdre
tattulyagunakrtih sthapaka amukham anutisthati\ tatha canangavatyam ndtikdydm drsyate
purvarangdnte sthdpakah\ atra ca pakse dmukhdnusthdne 'pi kaver vydpdrah, sthdpakasya
sutradhardnukarino ramanukarino natasyeva kavinaiva pravesat\

XXV11
 A curious play

What we have in practice is essentially the latter kind of prologue. All

the existing Sanskrit (and Prakrit) plays begin with a pmstdvand, dmukha, or
sthapana, and it is unlikely that any of these prologues preserve the impromptu
(or precomposed) introduction by a director. But precisely because the actors
appear as actors hi the prologue, the audience perceives their performance as if
it were part of the actual world. This enables the poet to address the audience
through the Director: he can introduce (or even praise) himself and the merits
of his play, or he can defend his work against its critics. Since the prologue has
metadramatic functions, that is, it focuses the attention of the audience on the
theatrical and dramatic realities, it also provides an excellent opportunity for the
playwright to 'talk shop': he can define his position on dramaturgical questions,
on the justification of dramatic art, or on the relation between the actual world
and the drama-world. The prastavana of the Agamadambara, however unusual
it may seem at first sight, fulfills these functions of the prologue of a classical
Indian play.

3.2
But at first sight it is a very strange prologue. At the beginning of an ordinary
Sanskrit play, the Director usually enters the stage hi high spirits. He feels happy
and honoured to put on the most excellent play of the most excellent poet to
the most excellent audience, not to mention the most distinguished sponsor.
Certainly there are individual differences among the playwrights: Rajasekhara
has a particular weakness for self-admiration (yad vd kirn vinayoktibhih?),9 while
Kalidasa vindicates a place for himself with proper pride by the side of his
glorious predecessors. The criticisms against his art seem to cut Bhavabhuti
to the quick, but he is confident that the merits of his plays are conceded by
some people, or at least will be acknowledged in the future. The Director in
Syamilaka's bhana summons the wet blankets and hypocrites to leave, because
the wags want to enjoy the performance. A typical example of the sutradhard's
efforts to kindle the interest of the spectators in the poet and his work is found
hi the plays of king Harsa: 10
snharso nipunah kavih parisad apy esd gunagrdhini
loke hdri ca vatsardjacaritam ndtye ca daksd vayam\
vastv ekaikam apiha vdncitaphalaprdpteh padam kirn punar
madbhdgyopacaydd ayam samuditah sarvo gundndrn ganah\ \
The illustrious Harsa is a clever poet, and this audience can appre-
ciate the merits [of one's art]. The story of King Vatsa has a grip
on people, and we are experts in theatrical art. Each one [of the
above] facts could be the cause of obtaining the desired result on the
present occasion, how much more this whole group of merits which
has arisen due to the accumulation of my good fortune?
9 Balabharata, verse 5.
10 Ratnavalt, p. 327, also found in Priyadarsika and Nagananda.

XXV111
 A curious play

In glaring contrast with the confidence of an average prostdvand, Jayanta's

play promises to be a dead frost right in the beginning. The Director does not
beam on the audience as usual, on the contrary, he is utterly fed up with his
profession and tired of life in general. Moreover, he is supposed to stage a trashy
play of a dilettante poet (Jayanta), and it is insufficient solace for him that the
audience is equally dilettante (students of philosophy).
However if we examine the prologue of the Agamadambara closely we shall
discover that Jayanta achieved his highly unconventional prastdvand by util-
ising entirely conventional techniques. The Ndtyadarpana mentions several es-
tablished methods of transition from the (pseudo-real) world of the prologue to
that of the drama. One of these methods is the avalagita, which is defined by
some theoreticians as follows: 'doing something else having entrusted one's own
occupation to another character'. 11 The example which is cited to illustrate
this dramatic device is strikingly similar to what happens in the prologue of
Jayanta's play:
yathd krtydrdvanasydmukhe
sutradhdrah (nihsvasya) drye, nanu bravimi,
vdkprapancaikasdrena nirvisesdlpavrttind\
svdmineva natatvena nirvinndh sarvathd vayam\\
tad gacchatu bhavati putram mitram vd kamapi puraskrtya kramd-
gatdm imam kujwikdm anuvartayitum\
tatah kramdd aha
parigrahorugrdhaughdd grhasamsdrasdgardt\
bandhusnehamahdvartdd idam uttvrya gamyate\ \
atra svajwikdm ddresu niksipya paralokahetukdryakaranam svayam
dsritam\
As in the prologue of the Krtydrdvana:
'DIRECTOR (sighing). Why, I'll tell you, my lady.
I have become completely disillusioned with [my profession of] being
an actor, which only consists of verbosity and the moods of which
are wishy-washy and trivial, as if with a boss whose tongue is always
wagging and who gives a small salary without any discrimination
[among his employees].
So, my lady, please carry on with this wretched profession I inherited,
and put at the head [of the troupe] anyone, [either] a son or a friend.'
Later on he says:
'Here I go ashore from the ocean of secular life in the household,
which abounds in large crocodiles: the members of my family, and
has great whirlpools: the affections for one's relatives.'
Here [in this prologue the director] entrusts his own profession on his
wife and becomes himself engaged in an activity which is a means
of [attaining a better] afterlife.
11 Natyadarpana, p. 132: kecit tu patrantare svavyaparam niksipya yat kdryantarakaranam
tad avalagitam ity ahuh\

XXIX
 A curious play

Judging from its fragments surviving in quotations, the Krtydrdvana must

have been a remarkable play. It was well-known in Kashmir, and Sankuka
quoted from its sixth act, which means that Jayanta might also have been
familiar with it. 12 But already the prologue of king Harsa's play, the Ndgdnanda,
contains a very similar scene. The director's wife tells her husband that his
parents have renounced this world and left for the forest. The Director is deeply
moved by this news and is ready to give up his inherited wealth (tyaktvaisvaryam
kramdgatam) and follow his parents, just as Jlmiitavahana, the hero of the
play, relinquishes his kingdom to serve his parents in the forest. We can trace
this motif back as far as the Lokdnanda, a Buddhist play by Candragomin
surviving only in Tibetan translation. 13 The Ndgdnanda is a play in which
quietude (sdnta) is the leading aesthetic relish, which is well suggested by the
resigned, disillusioned attitude of the Director. The Lokdnanda, apart from
being also a sdntarasa-play, is called i ndtaka-sdstrd> (zlos gar gyi bstan bcos) in
its colophon, 14 that is a play in which a doctrinal subject (the Buddha's teaching
in this case) is introduced. The Agamadambara was perhaps the first classical
Indian play which had sdnta as its dominant rasa and which presented the
teachings of various religions, but definitely not from the Buddhist perspective.
Apart from such introductory devices as the avalagita, the entire behaviour
of the actors conversing in the Prologue foretells in many ways the story of the
actual play. Sometimes the actors tell us explicitly which role they are going
to take, and the Director often becomes the protagonist, as for instance in the
Priyadarsikd, 15 or one of the first characters who enter the stage. 16 Therefore
it is very tempting to imagine that in the Agamadambara the Director re-enters
after the Prologue as the Vedic graduate and the Assistant as the Boy, his
sidekick. The Director gives up his profession with the resolution to 'strive
to reach the highest goal of man' and to 'acquaint himself with holy places',
starting with a Buddhist monastery. And this is more or less the agenda of
the Graduate, with the exception that he already knows how worthless most
teachings are and he is 'testing' them for the sake of demolishing their false
doctrines. We might say that the Graduate is as uncompromising in doctrinal
truths as the Director is in questions of dramaturgy. On the other hand, both the
Assistant and the Boy represent a more conformist attitude: they also observe
the rule of falsity in the world, but they do not consider it as their duty to
lead a crusade against mayo", Universal Delusion. Everyone has to make a living
somehow, either as an actor, or as a Jain monk. Are we entitled to ruin then*
12 Abhinavabharati ad Natyasastra 19.88 (ed. Parimal, vol. Ill, p. 52), pointed out by
Raghavan (Some lost Rama plays, p.30). On Sankuka's date see p. xxxviii.
13According to Hahn he is probably identical with the grammarian Candragomin, and can
be dated to the fifth century A.D. (Candragomins Lokanandanataka. Nach dem tibetischen
Tanjur herausgegeben und iibersetzt von Michael Hahn. Wiesbaden, 1974.) See also STEINER,
pp. 23ff.
14 Hahn's edition, pp. 196f; he translates it as 'lehrreiche SchauspieF.
15 In the Karpuramanjan, the Director and his wife are said to have taken the roles of the
king and the queen.
16E.g. in the Malatimadhava and the Viddhasalabhanjika. In the Uttararamacarita, the
Director turns into a resident of Ayodhya already in the Prologue.

XXX
 A curious play

existence in the name of some Ultimate Reality? The Graduate permits the
Buddhists to go on with their hypocritical conduct as a way of livelihood, but
he asserts roundly that Buddhism is actually harmful for someone who hopes
for a better afterlife. But what about the Jams, Saivas and Vaisnavas? Does
one have the right to upset their beliefs? And what of the depraved practices of
the nildmbaras? Should we persecute them, or should we just wave our hand in
resignation and refer to general tendencies in the Age of Decadence? And what
happens if our sponsor, may he be a king or the producer of a play, requires us
to act against our principles?
We shall return to these questions, but first let us see what is exactly that
makes this play so despicable for an actor who has turned grey in the honourable
service of dramatic art.

3.3
According to Indian authorities on aesthetics, certain types of man are simply
incapable of appreciating the beauties of poetry. It is pointless to test the vera-
city of poems, says Anandavardhana, and if somebody had the impudence to
employ for instance the methods of logic to prove that a piece of art is true or
false, he would only make himself ridiculous. 17 Such a person, as Abhinavagup-
ta remarks in his commentary, is certainly not a connoisseur, but only 'a fellow
who is hard-hearted because of the application of dry logic, and who is therefore
unable to feel [aesthetic] delight'. 18 Ritualists were considered perhaps the most
hopeless cases hi this respect. Uttungodaya at least, who wrote a commentary
on Abhinavagupta's Dhvanyalokalocana, has a poor opinion of them: he men-
tions the mvmamsakas and the srotriyas as the typical representatives of those
who are quite incapable of art and honeyed phrases. 19
The cobbler should stick to his last, and one should not apply mimdmsaka
exegesis hi the interpretation of poetry.20 And what's more, one should not write
a poem hi the style of a scientific treatise. Kdvya, poetry, and sastra, doctrinal
or scientific literature,21 have always been regarded in Indian aesthetics as two
distinct worlds. Bhamaha, the ancient Kashmirian alaiikarika, holds a much
17 Dhvanyaloka 3.33+ (KRISHNAMOORTHY, p. 222; MASSON-PATWARDHAN 1970, vol.11,
p. 179): kavyavisaye ca vyangyapratitmam satyasatyanirupanasyaprayojakatvam eveti tatra
pramanantaravyaparapariksopahasayaiva sampadyate\
18 Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 3.33 (quoted in MASSON-PATWARDHAN 1970, vol.11, p. 143):
nayam sahrdayah kevalam suskatarkopakramakarkasahrdayah pratitim paramarstum nalam
ity esa upahasah\
19Uttungodaya's Kaumudi ad Locana (quoted in MASSON-PATWARDHAN 1970, vol. II, note
144): adhikdn ca kdsthdprdptasahrdayabhdvah kascid eva na sarvah, mimdrnsakasrotriyddes
tatprakdrddarsandt\; anye tv iti\ mimdmsakasrotriyddtndm idr&i cdtuktih durlabheti
sahrdaydndm ity uktam\
20This is why Abhinavagupta criticizes Bhatta Nayaka's way of analysing a poem (Locana
ad Dhvanyaloka 2.1, ed. Kavyamala, P-77): jaimimyasutre hy evarn yojyate na kdvye 'pi|
21 This category includes technical literature, law-books, and any kind of specialist book,
but also manuals on ritual and philosophy, and even the Vedas themselves. We may say that
sastra is a treatise which contains teaching about the real nature of things.

xxxi
 A curious play

higher opinion of a poet's work than pure scientific knowledge:22

adhanasyeva ddtrtvam klibasyevdstrakausalam\
ajnasyeva pragalbhatvam akaveh sdstravedanam\ \
vinayena vind kd snh kd nisd sasind vind\
rahitd satkavitvena kidrsi vdgvidagdhatd\ \
gurupadesdd adhyetum sdstram jadadhiyo 'py alam\
kdvyam tu jdyate jdtu kasyacit pratibhdvatah] \
If someone who is not a poet knows the sdstras, it is just as the
munificence of a pauper, the dexterity of an effeminate in handling
weapons, or the pretentiousness of a fool. What is wealth without
self-control? What is night without the moon? What skill in speech
can there be if one is not a true poet? Even a thick-headed person
can learn sdstra following the teaching of his master, but poetry is
born rarely and only for a few people who have inspiration.
Rajasekhara also distinguishes these two genres, but he thinks that there are
some channels of contact:
iha hi vdnmayam ubhayathd sdstram kdvyam ca\ sdstrapurvakatvdt
kdvydndm purvam sdstresv abhiniviset\ na hy apravartitapradlpds
tamasi tattvdrthasdrtham adhyaksayanti\ (...)
bhavati prathayann artham Imam samabhiplutam sphutikurvan]
alpam analpam racayann analpam alpam ca sdstrakairih\\ 23
For here [in our system] literature is of two kinds: sdstra and kdvya.
Because [the study of] sdstra must precede [the writing of] poetry,
first one should delve into scientific works, for those who do not
use a lamp cannot observe the multitude of real things. (...) The
sdstrakavi is someone who exposes hidden things, makes obscure
things clear, composes an extensive [treatise] out of a small [subject],
and a concise one out of a vast [subject].
pratibhdvyutpattimdms ca kavih kavir ity ucyate\ sa hi tridhd] sdstra-
kavih, kdvyakavir, ubhayakavis ca\ 'tesdm uttarottanyo ganydn' iti
sydmadevah\ 'na' iti ydydvarvyah\ yathdsvavisaye sarvo ganydn\ na
hi rdjahamsas candrikdpdndya prabhavati, ndpi cakoro 'dbhyah ksiro-
ddharandya\ yac chdstrakavih kdvye rasasampadam vicchinatti, yat
kdvyakavih sdstre tarkakarkasam apy artham uktivaicitryena slatha-
yati\ ubhayakavis tubhayor api vanydn yady ubhayatra param praw-
nah sydt\ tasmdt tulyaprabhdvdv eva sdstrakdvyakavi\ upakdryopakd-
rakabhdvam tu mithah sdstrakdvyakavayor anumanydmahe\ yac chds-
trasamskdrah kdvyam anugrhndti sdstraikapravanatd tu nigrhndti\
kdvyasamskdro 'pi sdstravdkyapdkam anurunaddhi kdvyaikapravana-
td tu virunaddhi\ tatra tridhd sdstrakavih\ yah sdstram vidhatte, yas
ca sdstre kdvyam samvidhatte, yo 'pi kdvye sdstrdrtham nidhatte\^
22 Kavyalankdra 1.3-5.
23 Kavyamvmamsa, Second Adhyaya, pp. 2f., 5.
24Ibid. Fifth Adhyaya, p. 17.

XXXll
 A curious play

That poet is called [real] poet who has imagination and learning.
And he is of three kinds: the poet who writes sastra, the poet
who writes kavya, and the poet who writes both. According to
Syamadeva, the above order is also the order of their excellence.
Rajasekhara disagrees. Each of them exceeds [the other two] in
his own field. For the swan is not able to drink moonlight, nor the
Cakora bird to separate milk from water. As for the poet who writes
sastra, he ruins the harmony of aesthetic flavours in a poem; as for
the poet who writes kavya, he makes flaccid with the variety of dic-
tion in a technical work even a subject which is tough because of
logical arguments. But the poet who can write both [sastra and
kavya} is better than either of the other two if he is skillful in both
fields in the highest degree. Therefore the poet who writes sastra
and the one who writes kavya are of equal rank. We admit, how-
ever, that the poet who writes sastra and the one who writes kavya
can mutually benefit each other. For education in sastra benefits
poetry, but exclusive proficiency in sastra suppresses it. Education
in kavya, too, aids the perfection of sentences in a scientific work,
but exclusive proficiency in kavya suppresses it.
Of these two, the poet who writes sastra is of three kinds: the one
who composes a doctrinal or scientific treatise, the one who intro-
duces poetry in a sastra, and the one who puts a doctrinal or sci-
entific subject into poetry.
This passage makes it clear that the word kavi could also be applied to
writers of doctrinal and scientific
f
works.25 There also seems to have been a
view, represented here by Syamadeva, which placed the writers of kavya before
the authors of sastra, and preferred those who could stand the test in both fields.
If we have a look at the history of Sanskrit literature, we do find examples of
such 'crossbreeds' of a swan and a cafcora-bird. Anandavardhana is just one
of these geniuses, who is not far removed from Jayanta's time and who was
also his compatriot. Today he is best known for his highly influential work on
aesthetics, but he composed several poems as well. Of these only a citrakavya,
the Dewsataka survives, but he also refers to his mahakavya, the Arjunacarita
(Dhvanyaloka, 3.10-14+) and a Prakrit poem called Visamabdnalila (Dhvanyd-
loka, 3.15+)- He must have had great confidence in his erudition in philosophy,
which is proved by the fact that he ventured to interpret Dharmakirtian ideas in
a commentary on Dharmottara's Pramanaviniscayatika (mentioned in Locana
ad Dhvanyaloka 3.47).
25When Bhamaha classifies poetry according to its subject matter, he does mention sastra
as a possible subject (Kavyalankara 1.17):
vrttadevadicaritasarnsi cotpadyavastu ca\
kalasastrasrayam ceti caturdha bhidyate punah\\
Then [fcdtrc/o] is [also] divided into the following four categories: that which
relates the past feats of gods and other [heroes], that which has a fictitious
story, that which is about art and that which is about doctrine or science.

xxxm
 A curious play

Being such a versatile writer, it is natural that Anandavardhana also took

interest in the nature of relation between sdstra and kdvya. His work on this
topic, the Tattvdloka, is unfortunately lost for us, but the following passage from
the Dhvanyaloka and Abhinavagupta's commentary thereon throws some light
on it:26

Anandavardhana: tad evam anukramamnirdistena vdkyena bhaga-

vadvyatirekinah sarvasydnyasydnityatdm prakdsayatd moksalaksana
evaikah parah purusdrthah sdstranaye, kdvyanaye ca trsndksayapari-
posalaksanah sdnto raso mahdbhdratasydiigitvena vivaksita iti supra-
tipdditam\
So thus it has been well established that the sentence announced
in the chapter of contents, which reveals that nothing is permanent
except for the Lord, wishes to express that with regard to the sdstra
aspect it is the single supreme goal of man, namely moksa, which
is predominant in the Mahdbhdrata, and with regard to the kdvya
aspect it is the aesthetic relish of quietude, which is characterised
by the full development of the dying away of desires.
Abhinavagupta: sdstranaya iti\ tatrdsvddayogdbhdve purusendrthyata
ity ayam eva vyapadesah sddarah, camatkdrayoge tu rasavyapadesa
iti bhdvah\ etac ca granthakdrena tattvdloke vitatyoktam iha tv asya
na mukhyo 'vasara iti ndsmdbhir darsitam\
'With regard to the sdstra aspect.' Since it [i.e. the sdstra aspect]
has no connection with aesthetic relishing, it is this term alone [i.e.
"goal of man"] which is appropriate, inasmuch as "man strives to
obtain it"; but when [in the kdvya aspect] there is a connection with
aesthetic wonder, then the designation of rasa [is appropriate]: this
is what he means. And the author has set this forth in detail in
the Tattvdloka, but the present context is not the best occasion for
[discussing] it, so I have not expounded it.
Some works could be regarded both as sdstra and as kdvya, depending on
the way of approach. This was especially true in the case of literary pieces that
also had a religious importance, such as, for instance, the Mahdbhdrata. Bhoja
lists both kdvyasdstra and sdstrakdvya among the varieties of sravyakdvya.27
He mentions the Bhattikdvya and (extending the category to drsyakdvya) the
Mudrdrdksasa as examples of kdvyasdstra, that is a poetic composition in which
a scientific or doctrinal subject is introduced (yatrdrthah sdstrdndm kdvye nives-
yate). Sdstrakdvya, on the other hand, is apparently a scientific composi-
tion written in the manner of poetry, e.g. the Kdmandakiya-mtisdra, and the
Rativildsa. 28 Put differently, kdvyasdstra is essentially a piece of poetry which
also teaches us some sdstraic subject, while sdstrakdvya is essentially a sdstra-
treatise 'dressed up' as a poem. As Raghavan observed, among Rajasekhara's
26 Dhvanyaloka ad 4.5 (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 278); Locana ad loc., Kashi ed. p. 533.
27RAGHAVAN 1978, p. 593.
28 Ibid. pp.607f.

XXXIV
 A curious play

sdstrokavis, the second type writes sastrakavya, and the third type writes kavya-
sdstra.29
Nevertheless there are clear differences between poetic and scientific dictions,
and if a Fachidiot sastrakavi ventures to write pure poetry, the consequences,
as Rajasekhara pointed out, can be disastrous. 30 We have already met the
view that the source of poetry is the poet's imagination or inspiration (pra-
tibha) rather than his erudition. In the opinion of Udbhata, the eight-century
Kashmirian rhetorician, poetry and science also differ in their domains:31
astu nama nihsimdrthasarthah\ kimtu dvirupa evdsau, vicdritasu-
sthah, avicdritaramamyas ca\ tayoh purvam dsritdni sdstrdni, tad
uttaram kdvydni\
Let there be a limitless multitude of subjects, but this [multitude]
is only twofold: [either] well-established [even] after they have been
analysed, or pleasing [only] as long as they are not analysed.32 Of
these two, scientific works are concerned with the former, poems
with the latter.
According to a certain Aparajiti, who is probably the same as Bhatta Lollata,
another Kashmirian living perhaps in the ninth century, only those things are
worth including in a poetic composition which are 'tasty' in an aesthetic sense.33
Rajasekhara, however, considers the expressions of the poet more important
in this respect than the chosen subject:34
dm iti ydydvanyah\ asti cdnubhuyamdno rasasydnuguno vigunas cdr-
thah, kdvye tu kavivacandni rasayanti virasayanti ca ndrthdh, an-
vayavyatirekdbhydm cedam upalabhyate\
29 Ibid.: yas ca sdstre kdvyam samvidhatte, yo 'pi kdvye sdstrdrtham nidhatte, cf. above.
30Bhamaha put it clearly (Kdvydlankdra 1.12):
ndkavitvam adharmdya vyddhaye dandanaya ca\
kukavitvam punah saksanmrtim ahur manisinah\\
If someone is not a poet, this fact is not a sin, it does not result in disease or
punishment. The wise say, however, that being a bad poet equals incarnate
death.

31 Quoted in Kavyamvmamsd, p. 44. On Udbhata see p. xx above.

32The concept of avicaritaramamyata appears in Carvaka context as well, e.g. in the
conclusion of Jayarasi's Tattvopaplavasimha (TUS (GOS), p. 125): upaplutesv eva tattvesv
avicaritaramamyas sarve vyavahara ghatanta iti. Jayanta also quotes this Carvaka view both
in his magnum opus, and in his play: Nyayamanjari, vol. I, p. 317: avicaritaramanryataiva
tattvam na tu laksananiyamah sakyakriyas tasyeti; Agamadambara, Act Three, 11.324f.: tad
ayam avicdrita eva ramamyo vyavahdrah, etad eva ca tattvam iti tattvavidah. As we have
seen above (p. xx) Cakradhara, the commentator of the Nydyamanjan identifies the 'well-
trained Cdrvdkas (susiksitacdrvdkdh)' with Udbhata and co. (udbhatddayah), and the 'cun-
ning Carvaka (cdrvdkadhurtahy with Udbhata himself.
33Quoted in Kdvyamimdmsd (Ninth Adhyaya, p. 45): astu nama nihsimdrthasdrthah, kirn
tu rasavata eva nibandho yukto na nvrasasya iti dpardjitih] Aparajiti is probably another
name of_ Lollata, since the second one of the two verses following this sentence, also writ-
ten by Aparajiti according to Rajasekhara, is attributed to Lollata by Hemacandra in the
Kdvydnusdsana, p. 307.
34 Kdvyamimdrnsd, ibid.

XXXV
 A curious play

'Amen', says Rajasekhara. Certain things that we perceive are con-

genial to aesthetic relish, others are uncongenial. In poetry, however,
it is the expressions of the poet which do or do not possess aesthetic
relish, and not the subject, and we ascertain this fact through pos-
itive and negative concomitance.
Perhaps the most important difference between sdstra and kdvya lies in their
function. While we study the sdstras in order to receive instruction about the
true nature of things, this does not seem to be enough reason to read poetry.
Bhamaha named proficiency (vaicaksanya) in the four goals of man and the
arts, pleasure (pnti), and fame (kfrti), as the threefold gift of poetry.35 Later
aestheticians, however, disagreed. Dhananjaya and Dhanika felt strongly on this
point:36

dnandanisyandisu rupakesu
vyutpattimdtram phalam alpabuddhih\
yo 'pztihdsddivad aha sddhus
tasmai namah svddupardnmukhdya\\
Homage to that holy fool, who has turned his back on charm, and
who says that the only fruit hi plays that drip bliss is learning,
similarly to legends and the like.

Avaloka ad loc.:
tatra kecit dharmdrthakdmamoksesu vaicaksanyam kaldsu ca\ karo-
ti kTrtim pntim ca sddhukdvyanisevanam\ \ ityddind trivargddivyutpat-
tim kdvyaphalatvenecchanti tannirdsena svasamvedyah paramdnanda-
rupo rasdsvddo dasarupdndm phalam na punar itihdsddivat trivargddi-
vyutpattimdtram iti darsitam\ nama iti solluntham]
In this context some people assert with verses such as the following
that the fruit of poetry is learning the three goals of man, etc.:
'Adherence to [i.e. reading and composing] good poetry bestows
proficiency in dharma, artha, kdma, moksa, and the arts, and it also
gives fame and pleasure.' In order to refute this it has been shown
that the fruit of the ten kinds of plays is the tasting of aesthetic
relish, which everyone experiences in himself, and which is of the
nature of the highest bliss, and [this fruit is] not just education hi
the three goals of man, etc., like hi the case of legends, etc. The
word "homage" is used ironically.

Bhatta Nayaka expressed a similar opinion on this subject. He held that the
major effect of poetry is the enjoyment (bhoga) of aesthetic relish, which enjoy-
ment is similar to the Brahman-experience (brahmdsvdda). Any instruction a
poem may give us is secondary (vyutpattir ndma apradhdnam eva).37
35 Kdvydlarikdra 1.2.
36 Dasarupaka 1.6.
37 Quoted by Abhinavagupta in Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 2.4.

XXXVI
 A curious play

Abhinavagupta also quotes Bhamaha's verse to show that the audience can
derive both instruction and pleasure from poetry, but then he remarks that
of these two pleasure is the predominant result.38 Then he relates one of his
favourite allegories to illustrate that different literary genres teach us in different
ways: the Veda (= sdstro) instructs in the manner of a master, we learn from
the legends hi the way we learn from our friends, and poetry teaches us after
the fashion of a loving wife.39 Abhinavagupta takes the view (following his
teacher) that it is pointless to separate pleasure and instruction in poetry, since
without delight coming from the tasting of rasa no lesson can enter the hearts of
the connoisseur audience.40 Accordingly drama, too, does not instruct us as a
rigorous professor, but rather it 'increases our understanding.'41 Certainly the
conduct of the hero is set as a good example to the spectators, but still before
that then- imagination is expanded through the savoring of rasa, which is an (at
least) equally important side of instruction.42
Poetic diction can facilitate the mastering of any kind of teaching. Princes,
for instance, must be educated to become righteous kings. But, given their
natural inclinations, they would be bored to tears while listening to the sastras.
Poetry, however, is an excellent way to engage their interest: 'entering into
the hearts [of the princes, etc.]', says Abhinavagupta, 'is accomplished by the
tasting of aesthetic relish alone.'43 Reading a scientific treatise can be a painful
experience for a sahrdaya. It is like swallowing a bitter medicine, to use this
ancient allegory, while reading poetry is almost equivalent to drinking ambrosia,
which is sweet and healthy at the same time.44 It is an ancient wisdom that if
you don't want to frighten people away from your sastra, the trick is to drip some
poetic honey into bitter science.45 'How great is the weight put on the poet's
shoulders!', sighs Bhamaha. No wonder: all words and meanings, all arguments
and arts, if they deserve then: name, become the components of poetry.46
38The poet's happiness is provided by his fame (Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 1.1.)
39 Locana ibid. (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 17): tathdpi tatra prftir eva pradhdnam\ anyathd
prabhusammitebhyo vedddibhyo mitrasammitebhyas cetihdsddibhyo vyutpattihetubhyah ko 'sya
kdvyarupasya vyutpattihetorjdydsammitatvalaksano viSesa iti pradhdnyendnanda evoktah\ Cf.
also Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 3.10-14.
40 Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 3.10-14.
41 Natyasastra 1.115. (ed. GOS, vol.1, p. 41): : dharmyam yasasyam dyusyam hitam
buddhivivardhanam\ lokopadesajananam ndtyam etad bhavisyati\\ Abhinavagupta ad foe.:
nanu kim guruvad upadesam karoti? nety dha\ kintu buddhim vivardhayati\
42 Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 2.4.
43 Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 3.10-14 (ed. Kdvyamald, p. 183): hrdaydnupravesas ca
rasdsvddamaya eva. Cf. Vakroktifiirita, prose after 1.3 (ed. p. 10): abhijdtdh khalu
rdjaputrddayo dharmddyupeydrthino vijigzsavah klesabhiravas ca, sukumdrdsayatvdt tesdm\
tathd saty api taddhlddakatve kdvyabandhasya kndanakddiprakhyatd prdpnotity abhidhatte
dharmddisddhanopdyah\
44 Cf. Vakroktijivita, prose after 1.5 (ed. p. 15): duhsravadurbhanaduradhi-
gamatvddidosadusto 'dhyayandvasara eva duhsahaduhkhaddyi sdstrasandarbhas
tatkdlakalpitakamamyacamatkrteh kdvyasya na kathancid api spardhdm adhirohatity
etad apy arthato 'bhihitam bhavati\ katukausadhavac chdstram avidydvyddhindsanam\ dhlddy
amrtavat kdvyam avivekagaddpaham\\
45 Cf. Kdvydlankdra 5.3: svddvJcdvyarasonmisram sdstram apy upayunjate\ prathamdlidha-
madhavah pibanti katu bhesajam\ \
46Ibid. 5.4: na sa sabdo na tad vdcyam na sa nydyo na sd kald\ jdyate yan na kdvydngam

XXXV11
 A curious play

3.4
We can ascertain from the foregoing that, according to the standards of classical
Indian aesthetics, it was not completely impossible to write a play introducing
philosophical subjects, but it was apparently a daring enterprise, and the poet
must have reckoned with the scathing criticism of the sahrdayas.
When Jayanta composed his unique play, probably at the very end of the
ninth century, studies in poetics and poetry itself had achieved a high standard
in the kingdom of Kashmir. We have already met the name of Bhamaha, the an-
cient dlankdrika (eight century or earlier). Udbhata, who wrote a commentary
on Bhamaha's work, may be identical with the sabhapati of king JayapTda (779-
813) mentioned in the Rdjatarangim. This king sponsored a remarkable circle
of intellectuals: Kalhana mentions the poet Damodaragupta and Vamana (pos-
sibly the author of the Kdvydlankdrasutra), who were also his ministers, and sev-
eral other poets; the grammarian KsTra was the king's teacher, and the Buddhist
philosopher Dharmottara also entered his kingdom.47 About half a century
later long Avantivarman (855-883) was a similar patron of literature. Kalhana
names four illustrious members of his sabhd: Anandavardhana, Muktakana,
X

Sivasvamin (the author of the Kapphindbhyudaya) , and Ratnakara (who wrote

the Haravijaya) .48 As we have seen, Avantivarman's successor and the king
of Jayanta's play, Sankaravarman (883-902), was more interested in military
conquests than in literature: Bhallata and other poets led a miserable existence
during his reign, and horribile dictu the king himself spoke apabhramsa instead
of Sanskrit.49 According to Kalhana, Sankaravarman put a certain Nayaka in
charge of the two new Siva-temples.50 It is very tempting to identify this Nayaka
with Bhatta Nayaka, the famous aesthetician, who wrote his Hrdayadarpana in
order to demolish the d/ivam-theory.51 Another important source of aesthetic
theory was certainly the Ndtyasdstra. Its most famous commentary was written
by Abhinavagupta, but his work was not unprecedented. He quotes among oth-
ers three Kashmirian commentators: Udbhata, Bhatta Lollata, and Sankuka.
We know from Abhinavagupta that Sankuka contested the views of Lollata. 52
Kalhana mentions a poet called Sankuka, who composed a kdvya about the
battle between the mighty Mamma and Utpalaka, which took place around
851.53 On the other hand, we know about a Lollata who commented on the
aho bhdro mahdn kaveh\\
47 Rajatarangini 4.495 seqq.
48 Rdjatarangini 5.34.
49 Rajatarangini 5.204 seqq.
50 Rajatarangini 5.159.
51 On Bhatta Nayaka see KANE, pp. 221ff. Abhinavagupta refers to him as one who uses mi-
mdmsaka ideas in literary criticism (Locana ad Dhvanydloka 2.1, ed. Kavyamala, p. 77:
jaiminiyasutre hy evam yojyate na kdvye 'pi\)~, and judging from a verse of invocation
also quoted by Abhinavagupta he seems to have been a devotee of Siva (nemos trailoky-
anirmdnakavaye sambhave yatah] pratiksanam jagannatyaprayogarasiko janah\\, Abhinava-
bhdrati (GOS), vol. I, p. 6). Now the Nayaka who was placed in charge of the two Siva-temples
is called both caturvidyah and vdgdevikulamandiram in the Rajatarangini.
52 Abhinavabhdrati (GOS), vol. I, p. 266.
53 Rdjatarangim 4.703 seqq.

xxxvm
 A curious play

Spandakdrikd of Vasugupta,54 who was the teacher of Kallata, who lived under
Avantivarman (855/6-883).55 Now certainly everything depends on the identity
of the above Sankukas and Lollatas, but it is at least not impossible that both
were roughly of the same age and lived under the reign of Avantivarman. In
that case Jayanta might have known then: works.
That Jayanta was familiar with the dhvani-theory becomes clear from the
Nydyamanjan:56
etena sabdasdmarthyamahimnd so 'pi vdritah\
yam any ah panditammanyah prapede kamcana dhvanim\ \
vidher nisedhdvagatir vidhibuddhir nisedhatah\
yathd
'bhama57 dhammiya msattho', 'ma sma pdntha grham visa ] \
mdndntaraparicchedyavasturupopadesindm\
sabddndm eva sdmarthyam tatra tatra tathd tathd\\
athavd nedrsi cared kavibhih saha sobhate\
vidvdmso 'pi vimuhyanti vdkydrthagahane 'dhvani\\
tad alam anayd gosthyd vidvajjanocitayd dram
paramagahanas tarkajndndm abhumir ayam nayah\
prakrtam adhund tasmdd brumo na bhdty anumdnatah
tanur api satdm arthdpatter visesa iti sthitam\\
By this greatness of the word's signifying power that so-called i dhvani'>
is also refuted to which another self-appointed scholar resorted. [When
there is] the understanding of a prohibition from [hearing] an in-
junction, [and] the comprehension of an injunction from [hearing] a
prohibition, as for example [hi the verses beginning with the follow-
ing words]: 'Walk confidently, pious man...', [and] 'Don't enter the
house, traveler...', it is nothing but the signifying power of words
[which operates] in all such cases in various [appropriate] ways
words that refer to the real nature [of things] which can be precisely
determined with the help of other means of valid knowledge. Or
rather it is not right [to open] such a discussion with poets. Even
the wise go astray on the path which is hardly passable due to [the
difficulties in explaining] the sentence-meanings. So let's finish at
last this discourse which is suitable [only] for the wise. This highly
impenetrable issue is beyond the reach of logicians. Therefore now
I shall speak about the subject in hand: it is proved that sensible
people do not see the slightest difference between inference and pre-
sumption.
It appears that Jayanta was not only acquainted with the rf/wam-theory,
but he probably knew the Dhvanyaloka as well, since the two verses he refers to
54 GNOLI 1968, p.xvii, note 2.
55 Cf. Rajatarangim 5.66.
56 Nyayamanjarz, vol. I, p. 129f.
57 bhama] em. following Dhvanyaloka 1.4+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 8.) : bhava ed.

XXXIX
 A curious play

are the first two examples of dhvani cited by Anandavardhana. 58 In this case
the 'self-appointed scholar' may well have been Anandavardhana himself,59 and
this attribute also betrays that Jayanta did not have a high opinion of him. On
the other hand Jayanta probably knew that the refined aesthetes shuddered at
the views of the 'dry logicians', so while he modestly (?) declines to deal with
the impervious subject of words and then: meanings, he also suggests that poets
or literary critics are even less competent to handle the problem.
This does not mean, however, that Jayanta did not speak about poets with
the greatest respect, provided that they stick to their last. 'Kalidasa's beautiful
expressions', he says, 'are, so to say, sprinkled with ambrosia, smeared with
sandal, [and] washed by moon-beams. Bana's words bedazzle crowds of poets
with the formidable / spacious arrangement of their letters, which is congenial
to the aesthetic relish manifested [in the text].'60 He was probably familiar
with the poetry of his native land as well, and he does mention one famous
Kashmirian kavya: the Kuttanimata (cf. Nyayamanjari, vol.1, p. 649).
But Jayanta was not just an appreciative reader of poetry. We find ample
evidence hi the Nyayamanjan of his poetic vein and gift for satire. He took
care to mix the right quantity of honey into his sastra, although in his opinion
the sutras of Gautama are already 'the most excellent juice (rasa) extracted
from the cluster of the medical plants of nyaya\61 If we did not know the
Agamadambara and were to speculate which Indian philosopher might have
endeavoured to write a play, Jayanta would be perhaps the most likely guess.

3.5
'My friend,' complains the Director to his Assistant in the Prologue of the
Agamadambara, 'as is well known, I have exerted myself in the staging of the
58 Dhvanyaloka 1.4+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 8). The second verse quoted by Ananda-
vardhana is actually a Prakrit poem which seems to be slightly different from the verse Jayanta
refers to, but both illustrate the phenomenon of 'vidhibuddhir nisedhatah'. Perhaps Jayanta
relied on his memory and recalled a verse very similar to the one in the Dhvanyaloka. It
is interesting to note that Bhatta Nayaka also commented on these two verses. According
to him it is not the arthasamarthya, that is the suggesting power of the content expressed
by the words, which brings about the apprehension of the hidden intention, but the words
themselves, when applied in a skillful way (Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 1.4, ed. Krishnamoorthy,
pp.29, 31).
59 Cf. Granthibhanga, p. 32: etena panditammanya ity anandavardhanacaryam dhvanika-
ram paramrsati\
60 Nyayamanjan, vol. I, p. 582: amrteneva samsiktdh candaneneva carcitdh\ candrdmsubhir
ivonmrstdh kdliddsasya suktayah\ | prakatarasdnugunavikatdksararacandcamatkdntasakalaka-
vikiddh bdnasya vdcah\ The invocatory verses of the Nyayamanjan and the Harsacanta re-
semble each other in many respects.
61 Nyayamanjan, vol.1, p. 3: nydyausadhivanebhyo 'yam dhrtah paramo rasah. Jayanta
placed a high value on correct and clear usage, and he could not refrain from mocking the
wise DharmakTrti who 'could not put together correctly even a pair of words when he wanted
to formulate a definition' (Nyayamanjan, vol. I, p. 259: iti sunipunabuddhir laksanam vak-
tukdmah padayugalam apidam nirmame ndnavadyam\). Both Cakradhara, the commentator
of the Nyayamanjan, and Abhinanda, Jayanta's son, praised the poetic quah'ties of Jayanta's
writings.

xl
 A curious play

ten dramatic styles as taught by Bharatamuni. But today the circle of pupils
of this honourable Bhatta Jayanta, who is also well known as the Writer of
the Commentary because he wrote an exegetical work on grammar when he
was just a child, has ordered me to put on the work of their teacher, a new,
extraordinary play called Much Ado About Religion. So how shall I stage it,
since it is not worldly, does not follow the dramatic rules, and has never been
performed before? Therefore it is better just to give up this wretched livelihood.'
His last objection against the play, namely that there is no tradition of its
performance the director could rely upon, is a well-known complaint since the
time of Kalidasa, although in the Motavikagnimitra the Director shows more
solidarity with the author and actually defends the play against this charge.
The first two objections deserve closer attention.
To begin with, why is it a problem if a play is 'not worldly' ? Well, a refined
connoisseur might say that if a play is riddled with disputes on utterly abstract
topics such as, 'Can this pot be destroyed by a hammer, or are there only pot-
phases perishing in every moment?', it might prove to be a trifle boring for the
average audience (not to speak about the spoiled princes). After all the main
purpose of drama is entertainment. Already the gods addressed Brahma with
the following words: 'we want something to play with, which has to be pleasing
both to our eyes and our ears.'62 This 'plaything', says Abhinavagupta, 'is
similar to a bitter medicine coated in sugar', a familiar concept, but 'the sole
effect of which is the distraction of the mind'.63 One should find pleasure in
watching a play and in listening to it: it is not a means to generate religious
merit (na dharmasadhanam, Abhinavabharati ad Natyasastra 1.11). The diction
of a play should be straightforward and agreeable (sakyam), and not for the
most part ugly and harsh (durbhagaparusaprdyam, Abhinavabharati ibid.).64
As Dhananjaya observed with a sharp eye: 'The spectators amusing themselves
with characters such as Arjuna are just like children playing with clay elephants:
they relish their own zeal.'65 A good performance holds the audience, diverts
their mind from everyday miseries:66
duhkhartdndm sramdrtandm sokdrtdnam tapasvindm\
visrantijananam kale ndtyam etad bhavisyati\\
This [thing called] drama will be the production of repose in the
appropriate time for those who are tormented by suffering, fatigue,
or grief, [and also] for ascetics.
62 Natyasastra 1.11 (GOS, vol. I, p. 10): kridamyakam icchamo drsyam sravyam ca yad
bhavet]
63 Abhinavabharati on loc. cit. (GOS ibid.): gudapracchannakatukausadhakalpam cittavi-
ksepamatraphalam.
64Another interpretation of drsyam sravyam ca given by Abhinavagupta (GOS p. 11):
drsyam iti hrdyam sravyam iti vyutpattipradam iti pritivyutpattidam ity arthah.
65 Dasarupaka 4.41b-42a: kridatam mrnmayair yadvad balanam diriradadibhih\ svotsdhah
svadate tadvac chrotfnam arjunadibhih\\; cf. Natyasastra verses between 1.119 and 120 (GOS
vol.1, p. 44, Abhinavagupta does not comment on them): vinodakaranam loke natyam etad
bhavisyati\
66 Natyasastra 1.114 (GOS vol. I, p. 40).

xli
 A curious play

So even ascetics, who might be inclined to contemplate the ultimate questions

of existence, would prefer to be entertained while watching a play and to forget
about their self-afflicted tortures67 (including the mental tortures of thinking
about hammers approaching pots from various angles, our man of taste might
add). As for those fortunate ones who are not familiar with suffering, for in-
stance the spoiled princes, drama gives them useful instructions about the way
of the world (lokavrtte).68
The objection that they do not please the general audience was brought up
against santarasa-pl&ys hi general (and, as we are going to see, the Agamadam-
bara is such a play, if we can label it in any way at all). 'Even if it is not within
everyone's range of experience,' says Anandavardhana in defence of sdntarasa
occurring in plays such as the Nagdnanda, 'just because of that it cannot be
rejected as a special state of mind of illustrious persons who are different from
the plebs.'69 So even a philosophical play can be a hit, one just has to find the
right audience. And that's the conclusive argument of the Assistant in reply to
the hesitation of the Director: what could be a better audience than the devoted
philosophy-students of professor Bhatta Jayanta? They'll just love the play.
But there are other problems, too, with the Agamadambara. Some critics
would say that actually it is too laukika in the sense that it is very closely linked
with the time and place of the author. Abhinavagupta was an eminent promoter
of the thesis that aesthetic experience is essentially supramundane, alaukika. 70
In his view, 'the heart [of the spectator] becomes similar to a spotless mirror
because he forgets about his everyday Me in the world due to the relishing of
the appropriate songs and music'. 71 'Due to listening to the recitation [of the
actors] and [watching] the entering of other characters', says Abhinavagupta,
'an apprehension arises [in the mind of the spectator]. [This apprehension] has
as its object such [characters] as Rama and Ravana, it is not embraced by the
influence of any particular place or time, [and] it is not the domain of [any]
reflection on whether it is to be regarded as a cognition which is correct, or
false, or which is a doubt, or a supposition.'72
Already Bhatta Nayaka had pointed out that when we watch a Rama-play,
we do not regard Slta as our own beloved, so the erotic rasa we relish cannot
67 Cf. Abhinavabhdrati ad Natyasastra 1.114 (GOS vol.1, p.39): tapasvindm anavara-
takrcchracdndrdyanddydcaranakalitadaurbalydtisayaparikhinnahrdaydndm visrdntijananam
duhkhaprasaranavighdtakam \
68Abhinavagupta commenting on Natyasastra 1.115 (lokopadesajananam ndtyam) (Abhi-
navabhdrati (GOS), vol. I, pp. 40f): ye na duhkhitah sukhabhuyisthavrttaya eva rdjaputrddyds
tesdm lokavrtte dharmddyupdyavarge upadesakdry etan ndtyam\ lokasabdena lokavrttam\
nanu kim guruvad upadesam karoti? nety dha\ kintu buddhim vivardhayati\
69 Dhvanydloka 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): yadi ndma sarvajandnubhavagocaratd
tasya ndsti naitavatasav alokasdmdnyamahdnubhdvacittavrttivisesah pratikseptum sakyah\
70 Most of Abhinavagupta's predecessors did not consider rasdsvdda as something essentially
different from our everyday experiences.
71 Abhinavabhdrati ad Natyasastra 1.107 (GOS vol. I, p. 36): ucitagitdtodyacarvandvismrta-
sdmsdrikabhdvatayd vimalamukurakalpibhutanijahrdayah.
72 Abhinavabhdrati ibid.: pdthydkarnanapdtrdntarapravesavasdt samutpanne desakdlavi-
sesdvesdndlingite samyanmithydsarnsaya^ambhdvanddijndnavijneyatvapardTnarsdndspade rd-
mardvanddivisayddhyavasdye...

xlii
 A curious play

be awakened by the actual Slta. To say that each spectator remembers his
own beloved during the performance might be correct (especially if the per-
formance is boring), but it does not explain how the play contributes to our
aesthetic experience. As for Rama, we cannot actually recall his heroism since
we have never witnessed his heroic deeds. If we learn them from some written
testimony, this knowledge still does not guarantee that we can relish mrarasa. 73
One of the key concepts of Bhatta Nayaka's aesthetic theory is 'generalisation',
sddhdramkarana. 74 Words in poetry have a special function called bhdvakatva
( "bringing into being") by Nayaka, which gives rise to the aesthetic experience of
rasa in the audience. This special operation must necessarily comprise the gen-
eralisation (or universalisation, depersonalisation) of the various factors which
contribute to the arising of rasa, that is to say the vibhdvas, anubhdvas, and
vyabhicanbhavas (eliciting factors, indicatory symptoms, and ancillary mental
states). 75 Now if we see king Udayana and Ratnavallon the stage, we can easily
be convinced that they are not our personal acquaintances, the lovely garden in
which they sit is not one particular garden in our city, and the heroin's oblique
glances or blushing do not have any personal relationship with us, since they are
more than the amorous gestures of just one particular girl. But what happens
if the scene of the plot is the city we live in, the time is the reign of our king,
and the events happening on the stage give us the strange feeling of deja vul
The factors that produce the rasa are also capable of shielding our aesthetic
relish from various obstacles,76 so if the vibhavas, anubhavas, and vyabhicd-
rins do not function properly, we might expect that the "wonder" camatkara
of our aesthetic perception will be blocked. One of the major obstacles oc-
curs when the spectators regard these factors as real, actual, and personal.
The right way to counteract this obstacle is to employ the theatrical conven-
tions (natyadharmins), which include various dances, makeups, the stage, cos-
tumes, and other alaukika accessories. These conventions hide the identity of
the actor (which was, however, revealed in the preliminaries of the play), and
distance the performance from all actualities.77 To sum up, they contribute to
the aesthetic experience through the accomplishment of the state of generality,
sddhdrambhdva. 78
Anandavardhna held that Valmlki's grief (soka) felt upon the lamentation
of the kraunca-bird was transformed into verse (sloka). 79 But Abhinavagupta
73 See Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 2.4.
74It was accepted by Abhinavagupta, and probably already by Tauta (Abhinavagupta fol-
lows his teacher when he writes: nartakdntare 'pi ca rdmo 'yam iti pratipattir asti\ tatas
ca ramatvam sdmdnyarupam ity dydtam\, Abhinavabhdratt ad rasasutra, GOS, vol.1, p. 269;
GNOLI 1968, p. 7).
75 Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 2.4. See also Kdvyaprakdsa, vol. I, p. 216ff; GEROW-AKLUJKAR,
p. 86.
76 Abhinavabhdrati ad rasasutra (GOS, vol. I, p. 274): tatra vighndpasdrakd vibhdvaprabhr-
tayah\
77 Abhinavabharatl (GOS) ibid. The spectator's cognition cannot rest either in the actuality
of the actor, or in the reality of the character.
78'Abhinavabharatl (GOS), vol. I, p. 275.: esa sarvo munind sddhdrambhdvasiddhyd rasa-
carvanopayogitvena parikarabandhah samdsritah\
79 Dhvanyaloka 1.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 12): tathd cddikaver vdlmikes sannihitasa-

xliii
 A curious play

hastens to remark that it was rather karunarasa that was felt by the first poet
and not actual grief, since in the latter case the poet would merely suffer, and
he could in no way experience aesthetic pleasure which is indispensable for
composing a poem. 80 The same observation holds good with regard to the
audience of kdvya. According to Bhatta Nayaka, if a performance produced
sorrow in the spectators, they would never return to the theatre to watch a play
in which karuna is the dominant rasa.81
It is easy to see that if, for instance, the Rama-story had been presented to an
average Indian audience, no spectator would have had any difficulty in distan-
cing what was happening on the stage from the realities of his own life. But what
would have happened if Havana himself had been among the audience? This is
precisely what occurs in the third act of Rajasekhara's play, the Balaramayana,
when the king of the raksasas, who is pining for Slta, sends for the troupe of
Kohala to perform Bharata's brand-new play, called Sitasvayamvara, in order
to distract his mind. He could not have opted for a worse kind of entertainment.
First he seems to enjoy the show, gloating over the princes' fiasco as they try
to bend Siva's bow in vain. He becomes a bit annoyed with the playwright
when one of the characters remarks that f
even Ravana's arms would fail to ac-
complish this great deed. When king Satrunjaya is introduced as a great hero
who wishes to defeat Indrajit, Ravana draws his sword to protect his dearest
son, and Prahasta, his general, has to remind him that they are just watching
a play. But Ravana has entered too far into the dramatic world. When one of
the contestants tries to carry away Slta forcefully, his anger makes him spring
up, just to realise within seconds that he has made a fool of himself again.
When all the other kings have failed to bend Siva's bow, and the door-keeper
is still musing if he should announce finally the young prince of the suryavamsa,
Ravana suddenly decides to act and rises to enter into the contest. 'My lord',
says Prahasta, 'this is not Janaka's daughter, and this is not the bow of the
moon-crested god.' 'What is it then?' asks Ravana at a loss. And Prahasta
benignly informs him: 'It is a play.'82 Then Rama enters and vows that either
he will string the bow or the bow will break. 'This is indeed the thunder of
an actor',83 laughs Ravana, and when Rama does start bending the bow he
says, 'This is how an actor shows off'.84 When the bow miraculously bursts
in Rama's hands, Ravana accuses the poet that he has given the reins to his
imagination: 'This is the wish-granting speech-cow of poets, which gives birth
hacarivirahakdtarakrauncdkrandajanitah soka eva slokataya parinatah\
80 Locana ad loc. (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 39): na tu munch soka iti mantavyam\ evam
hi sati tadduhkhena so 'pi duhkhita iti krtvd rasasydtmateti niravakasam bhavet\ na ca duh-
khasantaptasyaisd daseti\
81 Quoted in Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 2.4. We might add that while Abhinavagupta would
have no objection against the arising of karunarasa in the spectators, he would definitely
oppose the arising of actual soka in them.
82 Balardmdyana, Act Three, verse 67+: PRAHASTAH: deva! neyam jdnaki, na cedam
aindusekharam dhanuh\ RAVANAH: tat kim idam? PRAHASTAH: preksanakam idam\
83Ibid., verse 74+: idam tan natagarjitam ndma\
84Ibid.: iyam api sd natavibhisikd\

xliv
 A curious play

[i.e. makes real] even to unreal things'.85 But when king Janaka places Sfta's
hand on Rama's, Ravana looses his self-control, and exclaims: 'Ah, what?! This
falsely and vainly sophisticated bug of a ksatriya-boy is clutching Sfta's hand,
although I, the lord of Lanka, am present! So he is as good as dead.'86 Prahasta
cannot help laughing to himself, and remarks somewhat ironically: 'Lord of the
rdksasas] The performance is almost over. So please, Sure, consider the actors'
talent hi clever acting and the way they intensify the aesthetic relish.' Ravana
pulls himself together and feels like an idiot: 'Why, this is a play. I've become
enraged for no reason.'87 Needless to say, his aesthetic pleasure is completely
ruined, and the only thing he feels is fury.88
The third act of the Bdlardmayana is an excellent study of the complete
failure of a dramatic performance.89 Ravana's is a typical example of a gross
error in theatrical framing. 'The theatrical frame', writes Elam, 'is in effect the
product of a set of transactional [actor-spectator] conventions governing the par-
ticipants' expectations and their understanding of the kinds of reality involved
in the performance. The theatregoer will accept that, at least in dramatic rep-
resentations, an alternative and fictional reality is to be presented by individuals
designated as the performers, and that his own role with respect to that rep-
resented reality is to be that of a privileged "onlooker".'90 But there are cases
when the operation of the dramatic and theatrical conventions (natyadharmins)
fails, the spectators mistake the performance for real-life activity, and they start
collecting money for the liberation of a poor slave-girl they have seen in a soap-
opera.91 But apart from such gross mistakes as running up to the stage and
trying to change the course of events, the collapse of boundaries between real
and fictional worlds in the mind of the spectator results in the failure of any
kind of aesthetic experience, since the adequate emotional answer for something
we perceive as actual can only be actual itself, that is, it cannot be rasa, only a
sthayibhdva.
There was a view current among Sanskrit aestheticians that if the aim of
the poet is to satisfy his king, he may present the deeds of the latter in a
play.92 Abhinavagupta, however, did not share this opinion, precisely because
85 Ibid., verse 77+: seyam kavmdm vacanakdmadhenuh, yad asadbhutam api sute\
86 Ibid., verse 84+: ah, katham ayam alikadurvidagdhah ksatriyabatuklto mamdpi lankesva-
rasya puratah sttdydh pdnim pdnind pidayati! tad esa na bhavati\
87Ibid., verse 85+: PRAHASTAH: rdksasapate! paryavasitaprdyah preksdvidhih\ tad bhdva-
yatu caturdbhinaydm buddhim rasavrddhim ca nartakanam devah\ RAVANA (sasmaranalajjam
dtmagatam): katham preksanakam etat\ mudhd samrabdham asmdbhih\
88Ibid., verse 90: ydtah padam mama rusdm ca mrsaiva rdmah\
89 Other examples from Sanskrit literature are the third act of Harsa's Priyadarsikd, and
the seventh act of Bhavabhuti's Uttarardmacarita. See also BANSAT-BoUDON 1992, p. 148ff.
90ELAM 1997, p. 88.
91 As it actually happened in Hungary. 'Gross errors in framing,' observes ELAM (pp. 89f.),
'[...] are less common in the theatre than with popular mass-media drama [...], since the
conventionalized markers are much clearer. The legend of the cowboy spectator who shoots
the stage villain is fairly apocryphal (although Goffman [...] reports an actual case of a
drunken Virginian spectator shooting a "devil" represented by a mere puppet).'
92 This view is also represented in the Ndtakalaksanaratnakosa (p. 3): vartamdnam api
nrpater mahabhutasya kavibuddhiprakarsad dsdditabijabindvddikam yadi bhavati, bhavaty eva
ndtakavisayam\. But cf. Ndtyadarpana, p. 25: vartamdne ca netari tatkdlaprasiddhibddhayd

xlv
 A curious play

he reckoned the spectators should maintain a certain emotional distance from

the performance:93
'prabhuparitosdya prabhucaritam kaddcin ndtye varnamyam' iti 'ya-
thd daitydh surair jitd' (Ndtyasdstra 1.57) ity etasmdl labhyata iti
kecid dhuh\ tad asat, dasarupakalaksanayuktivirodhdt\ tatra hi kincit
prasiddhacaritam kincid utpddyacaritam iti vaksyate\ na ca vartamd-
nacaritdnukdro yuktah, vineydndm tatra rdgadvesamadhyasthatddind
tanmayibhdvdbhdve prrter abhdvena vyutpatter apy abhdvdt\
Some people assert that the view, according to which sometimes
the deeds of a ruler may be presented in a play in order to satisfy
the ruler, follows from the verse '[at the end of the ndndi, a rep-
resentation was made of] how the gods defeated the demons'. That
[assertion] is not correct, because it contradicts the definition of the
ten dramatic genres. For, as it will be shown [in the following], in
[these dramatic genres] sometimes the deeds of a well-known [hero],
and sometimes the deeds of an invented [hero] [are presented]. But
the imitation [in a dramatic representation] of the deeds of a contem-
porary person is not appropriate, since in this case the disciples [i.e.
the spectators] could not identify themselves [with the presentation]
because of their [various emotions] such as lust, hatred, or indiffer-
ence; thus they would not feel pleasure, and therefore no instruction
could take place either.
If an individual of the real world appears as a character in the dramatic
world, their 'trans-world identity' can be the source of problems. Rolf Hoch-
huth's play Soldiers 'was banned in England because the central figure, "Chur-
chill", was seen at once to refer to and to defame (through inventive elabor-
ation) the W0 [real world] original. Arguments in favour of the autonomy of
the dramatic world in this case were not persuasive.'94 The main criterion in
determining the 'trans-world identity' of a character in a play and a historical
figure is, as Elam pointed out, 'to consider the culturally determined essential
properties of the figure hi question and to judge whether they are preserved in
the world of drama'.95 This question appears in the context of prasiddhatva
in Sanskrit dramatic theory. Classical Indian plays can be divided into two
broad categories on the basis of their plot. On the one hand there are those
plays the story of which is the invention of the poet (utpddyavastu). Among the
classical genres of Indian drama, prakaranas are the typical representatives of
this group.96 On the other hand the story of several plays can be traced back
rasahanih sydt\
93 Abhinavabhdrati ad Ndtyasdstra 1.58 (tato brahmddayo devdh prayogaparitositdh) (GOS,
vol.1, p. 27). Cf. GNOLI 1968, p. 64, note 1; BANSAT-BOUDON 1992, p. 128, note 212.
94 ELAM 1997, p.106.
95 ELAM 1997, ibid.
96 Ndtyasdstra 18.45 (GOS, vol.11, p. 430): yatra katrir dtmasaktyd vastu sartram ca
ndyakam caiva\ autpattikam prakurute prakaranam iti tad buddhair jneyam\ \

xlvi
 A curious play

to some well-known (prokhydtd) source, such as the puranas or the epics. The
nataka belongs to this category. As Bharata teaches hi the Ndtya^dstra:97
prakhyatavastuvisayam prakhydtoddttandyakam caiva\
rdjarsivamsyacaritam tathaiva divydsrayopetam\ \
[That play is called a nataka} the subject of which is a well-known
plot, which also has a well-known, illustrious hero, which presents
the deeds of those who belong to the families of sage-like kings, and
which is endowed with [the moth0 of] divine assistance as well.
The above interpretation of prakhyatavastuvisayam is roughly the same as that
of Sankuka.98 Abhinavagupta (following his teacher, Bhatta Tauta) preferred a
more precise definition of prasiddhatva (renown, celebrity), consisting of three
factors: 'A certain person acted in a certain way hi a certain place' (amuka
evamkdri amutra dese) 99 For example, everybody knows that the scene of king
Udayana's adventures is mainly KausambI, and if a poet continuously presented
him as residing in some other place, without mentioning that he has some reason
to be there, such a description would not be plausible and therefore it would
ruin the aesthetic relish of the play. 100
This does not mean, however, that a poet cannot modify a traditional story
hi any way, or cannot expand it with freshly invented episodes. Since the dra-
matic world is always conceived as a 'hypothetical variation' of the actual real-
ity, even when the two worlds are brought into contact, the characters in a
play are only the possible varieties of their real counterparts, who serve as a
model or a point of departure for the poet. 101 In fact, sometimes he has to
make some modifications in order to preserve the aesthetic unity of the play.
Anandavardhana put great emphasis on the autonomy of the poet in fashioning
his own world of poetry. 102 He lists several means which can assist a poetic work
in the suggestion of rasas and the like. One of these means is as follows: 103
itivrttavasdyatdm kathancid rasdnanugundm sthitim tyaktvd punar
utpreksydpy antarabhistarasocitakathonnayo vidheyah]
Having left out a situation he met in the context of a narrative,
which is in some way not in harmony with the rasa [of the poem
or play], [the poet] should further introduce a story, even if he has
invented it, which is appropriate to the rasa he has in mind.
97 Natyasastra 18.10 (COS, vol.11, p. 412).
98 Abhinavabharatt ad loc. (GOS, vol. II, p. 411): prakhydte bharatadau yad vastu tad visayo
'sya ... iti srtsankukah\ ' "Its subject is a story [which is found] in a well-known [source] such
as the Mahabharata", says &nsahkukah.'
99 Abhinavabharati, ibid.
100 Abhinavabharatz, ibid.: cakravartino 'pi hi vatsardjasya kausambwyatirikte visaye
karyantaropaksepena vina yan nirantaram nirvarnanam tad vairasyaya bhavati, tatra
prasiddhikhandanena pratitivighatat, ka katha rasacarvanayah\
101 Cf. ELAM 1997, p. 109.
102 Cf. Dhvanyaloka 3.42+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 250): apare kavyasamsare kavir ekah
prajapatih\ yathasmai rocate visvam tathedam parivartate\\
103 Dhvanyaloka 3.11+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, pp. 142f.)

xlvii
 A curious play

But, as Abhinavagupta points out, some stories require too drastic modific-
ations to become fit for dramatic representation. First of all, if a poet presents
a deity as the main character of his ndtaka, he has two options to choose from.
He can invest his divine hero with human emotions, such as longing for the be-
loved, fear, or astonishment, but then his hero would become nothing more than
a human being. On the other hand, if he stuck to the divinity of his hero, the
attribution of mental anguishes to a god would contradict our knowledge about
the nature of divine beings. The poet's other option would be to present his
hero as a real god, free from all the painful and interesting human emotions, but
then the play would lack any variety and therefore it would lose its attraction
for the spectators' heart. And since the gods never suffer, how could we learn
from their stories the means of obviating our painful experiences?104
Roughly the same train of thought can be applied to the presentation of
contemporary figures in ndtakas. Although Anandavardhana encourages the
poets to get rid of any motif which could hinder the aesthetic experience and to
insert freely invented stories, since after all their task is to write kavya and not
itihasa, 105 still the more recent events are described in a story, the more difficult
it becomes to alter any incident without running up against the incredulous
indignation of the audience. And if we cling to the bare facts, what's the point
in writing poetry? Says Abhinavagupta: 106
ata eva pratitivighdtasya vairasyaddyinah sambhavo yatra, tan nd-
take nopanibaddhavyam] tena vartamdnacaritam cdvarnaniyam eva,
tatra vipantaprasiddhibddhayddhydropasydkincitkaratvdt\
For this very reason, if with regard to [some story or other motif
in a play] there is a possibility of contradicting common knowledge,
which could cause the lack of aesthetic relish, that [sort of story,
etc.] should not be written in a ndtaka. Therefore the deeds of
a contemporary character should definitely not be related, since in
such a case the attribution [of invented qualities to the character]
could not succeed because of the opposition of the contradictory
common knowledge.
Certainly it would not be fair to accuse Jayanta of crude naturalism. His
play is rather a curious melange of the real and the fictional. One could call
it a Dokumentarspiel107 inasmuch as its plot is based on the events of the
104 Abhinavabhdrati ad Natyasastra 18.10 (GOS, vol.11, p. 412): yadi tu mukhyatvena-
iva devacaritam varnyate, tat tdvad vipralambhakarunddbhutabhaydnakarasocitam cen ni-
badhyate, tan mdmtsacaritam eva sampadyate, pratyuta devdndm *adhyadhanam (conj. :
adhiyddhdnarn ed.) prasiddhivighdtakam\ tatra cokto dosah\ vipralambhddyabhdve tu kd
tatra vicitratd, ranjandyd etat*prdnatvdt\ (conj. RAGHAVAN : ° pramdnatvdt ed.) ata eva
hrdayasamvddo 'pi devacarite durlabhah\ na ca tesdm duhkham asti, yatpratikdropdye vy-
utpddanam sydt\
105 Dhvanydloka 3.11+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy p. 144): kavind kdvyam upanibadh-
natd sarvdtmand rasaparatantrena bhavitavyam] tatretivrtte yadi rasdnanugundm sthitim
pasyet tdm bhanktvdpi svatantratayd rasdnugunam kathdntaram utpddayet\ na hi kaver
itivrttamdtranirvahanena kincit prayojanam, itihdsdd eva tatsiddheh\
l°^Abhinavabhdratz ad Ndtyasdstra 18.10 (GOS, vol.11, p. 413).
107WEZLER 1976, p. 340.

xlviii
 A curious play

f
playwright's recent past: Sankaravarman and Sugandha were a real royal couple
ruling in the last decades of the ninth century, most probably the king did ban
the sect of the nf/am&aras, and the concept of sarvdgamaprdmdnya seems to
have been an important
f
issue of that period. But we can be sure that for
instance the two Saiva sddhakas in the cremation-ground, or the servant who
dupes the Jaina monk, were invented by Jayanta on the basis of his experiences,
or rather his prejudices. The same is true about the Buddhist monk, whose name
Dharmottara echoes that of the famous Buddhist philosopher, or the hero of the
play, the Mimamsaka Sankarsana, who might represent a portion of Jayanta's
own character.
The elusiveness of the Agamadambara could be very disturbing for an expert
in ndtyasdstra. Should one classify it as a ndtaka, with the king as its real hero?
This solution is not very plausible, since the king, apart from being vartamdna,
does not even appear on the stage, even if his interests stand clearly behind
the course of events. Is it then a prakarana? Not quite, since its story is not
entirely invented, and even if Bharata allows the poet to derive the plot and
the characters of his prakarana from a text which was 'not handed down by the
ancient sages' (anarsa), provided that he endows the events and characters with
new qualities, 108 this only means, in Abhinavagupta's interpretation, that the
playwright may borrow the plot from such collections as the Brhatkathd (e.g.
the story of Muladeva), or from the works of some earlier poet (e.g. the deeds
of Samudradatta). He certainly cannot pick up a story from just anywhere
he pleases (tatra yo 'nutpddyo 'mso na kutrastho grdhyah), and I doubt that
Abhinavagupta would have rejoiced in a prakarana which had a contemporary
setting. 109
On the other hand, a prakarana is taught to be a play which presents
the stories of Brahmins, merchants, ministers, priests, officials, and travelling
tradesmen, and such stories should be 'of various kinds' (naikavidham), which
in Abhinavagupta's interpretation means, 'connected with various rasas' (an-
ekarasayuktam). 110 And Jayanta does introduce such characters: the hero of
the play is a 'twice-born', who becomes later the subordinate of amdtya Jay-
anta; we witness the complaints of two Vedic priests in the prelude before the
last act, and even a rich merchant, who sponsors a huge feast for the ascetics,
gets an important role in the second act (although he does not actually enter the
stage). But are there servants, rakes, and courtesans appearing in the play? 111
Well, one could possibly say yes. The ceta in the prelude of the second act
108 Ndtyasdstra 18.46 (GOS, vol.11, p. 430): yad anarsam athdhdryam kdvyam prakaroty
abhutagunayuktam\ utpannabijavastu prakaranam iti tad api vijneyam\ \
109 Abhinavabhdratz ad loc. (GOS, vol.11, pp. 429f): yatra samutpddyam na bhavati ta-
tra yo 'nutpddyo 'rnSah na kutrastho grdhya iti darsayitum aha 'yad anarsam' ityddi\
'anarsam' iti purdnddivyatiriktabrhatkathddyupanibaddham muladevacaritddi\ 'dhdryam' iti
purvakavikdvydd vdharamyam samudradattacestitddi\ Cf. SRINIVASAN, p. 73, which contains
Schmithausen's emendations proposed for the rest of the passage.
110 Cf. Ndtyasdstra 18.48 (GOS, vol. II, p. 431): vipravaniksacivdndm purohitdndm amdtya-
sdrthavdhdndm\ caritam yan naikavidham jneyam tat prakaranam ndma\\, and Abhinava-
gupta's comm. ad loc.
111 Ndtyasdstra 18.50 (GOS, ibid.): ddsavitasresthiyutam vesastryupacdrakdranopetam\

xlix
 A curious play

does not require further comment. The decadent life of the Buddhist monks is
pretty close to a vita's, and both the maidservants and the Jain nun (and the
ceta disguised as a Jain nun) are all for amorous entertainment. But can, for
instance, the lengthy lecture of the Naiyayika professor at the end of the play
be fitted into a prakarana, or indeed into any kind of play?
The Director simply calls the Agamadambara 'an extraordinary / strange
play' (kimapi rupakam), without any further specification, and I think we should
reconcile ourself to the fact that this play is truly asdstnyam. Still, no Sanskrit
drama can oppose the classical tradition to such an extent as not to have a pre-
dominant aesthetic flavour, and the nature of this rasa is well worth examining.

3.6
Already Raghavan observed that the Agamadambara can be fitted in the tra-
dition of 'philosophical plays' in classical Indian literature, other examples of
which include the Sdnputraprakarana of Asvaghosa, and the Prabodhacandrodaya
of Krsnamisra. 112 He also pointed out that the dominant rasa of these plays
is santa, the aesthetic relish of quietude. 113 Santa is a relatively new arrival
in the system of rasas, and its very existence was the subject of serious debate
among Indian aestheticians. 114 Nevertheless if we examine two early definitions
of santarasa, the interpolated passage in the Natyasastra 115 and the verses of
Rudrata, 116 we find that several of its characteristics are found in Jayanta's
play. True knowledge is essential to attain final liberation from the world of
eternal rebirth: the Mlmamsaka hero of the play is convinced that he possesses
this knowledge, and he is ready to defend it against deluded heretics who are
completely mistaken about the real nature of things. The quest for liberation
112 Agamadambara (ed. pr.), p. viii.
113 RAGHAVAN 1975, p. 40.
114Cf. MASSON-PATWARDHAN 1969, passim. The verses dealing with santarasa are clearly
interpolations in the text of the Natyasastra, and already Abhinavagupta mentioned that
they could not be found in all manuscripts (Abhinavahupta's comm. on these verses (Abhi-
navabhdrati (GOS), vol.1, p. 333:) drantanapustakesu 'sthdyibhdvdn rasatvam upanesydma'
ity anantaram 'sdnto ndma samatfidyibhdvdtmaka' ityddi sdntalaksanam pathyate\). Cf.
SRINIVASAN, pp. 51fF.
115 Natyasastra after 6.82 (GOS, vol. I, pp. 326ff): atha sdnto ndma samasthdyibhdvdtmako
moksapravartakah\ sa tu tattvajndnavairdgydsayasuddhyddibhir vibhdvaih samutpadyate\
tasya yamaniyamddhydtmadhydnadhdranopdsanasarvabhiltadaydlingagrahanddibhir
anubhdvair abhinayah prayoktavyah\ vyabhicdrinas cdsya nirvedasmrtidhrti-
sarvdsramasaucastambharomdncddayah\ atrdrydh slokds ca bhavanti moksd-
dhydtma*samutthas (v.l. °nimittas) tattvajndndrthahetusamyuktah\ *naihsreyasopadistah
(v.l. nihsreyasasamyuktah) sdntaraso ndma *sambhavati (v.l. vijneyah)\\ buddhmdriya-
karmendriya*samrodhddhydtmasamsthitopetah (v.l. °nirodhato 'dhydtmasamjnitas caiva\)
sarvaprani*sukhahitah (v.l. °hitah khalu) sdntaraso ndma vijneyah\\ na yatra duhkham na
sukham na dveso ndpi matsarah\ samah sarvesu bhutesu sa sdntah prathito rasah\\
116 Kdvydlankdra 15.15-16 (quoted in RAGHAVAN 1975, p. 48): samyagjndnaprakrtih sdn-
to vigatecchandyako bhavati\ samyagjndnarn visaye tamaso rdgasya cdpagamdt\\ janma-
jardmarandditrdso vairdgyavdsand visaye\ sukhaduhkhayor anicchddvesdv iti tatra jdyante\ \
Rudrata flourished between 825 and 850 according to KANE 1971, p. 155), and was probably
Kashmirian.
 A curious play

is incompatible with plunging into mundane pleasures, so no wonder that our

hero is deeply shocked and disgusted when he witnesses the depraved practices
of the Buddhists and the ntldmbaras, but praises the asceticism of the Jains
and the saivas. He also betrays great compassion when he lets the Jain teacher
beat a retreat. The sole obstacle for him in realising complete dispassion is his
ambitious nature, but his initial zeal will much abate towards the end of the
play.
But already the nandi and the prastdvand indicate clearly the rasa of the
play. The opening benediction invokes Brahman 'by which beginningless ig-
norance is gradually destroyed', and 'at the very start of whose "descent" to
the level of consciousness desires for the enjoyment of other pleasing objects
cease (samyanti]\ Then in comes the Director whose disillusion with his pro-
fession and life in general does not seem to be completely out of place if we
consider that nirveda was held by many to be the permanent mental state be-
hind santarasa. 117 Abhinavagupta attributed this view to Anandavardhana, 118
who actually preferred to use the expression 'bliss of the destruction of desires',
trsndksayasukha. 119
As we have already seen, Anandavardhana believed that Vyasa had a double
objective in view with the Mahabharata: on the level of sdstra he wanted to
direct our attention towards moksa, and on the level of poetry he intended to
compose an epic with quietude as its predominant rasa, and he achieved his
goal by evoking dispassion in the reader. This becomes clear from the rather
pessimistic conclusion of the Mahabharata, 'which produces sadness by the cruel
end of the Vrsnis and the Pandavas'. 120 The great BhTsma's admonishing words
are part of this concept: 121
yathd yathd viparyeti lokatantram asdravat\
tathd tathd virago 'tra jay ate ndtra samsayah\ \
As the unsubstantial course of worldly things goes gradually amiss,
so does disaffection arise with it by degrees, there is no doubt about
this.
But the predominance of moksa and santarasa has already been suggested in
the Contents (anukramani) of the epic, namely in the following sentence: 'And
the eternal Blessed Vasudeva is glorified here' (bhagavdn vdsudevas ca kirtyate
'tra sandtanah, Mahabharata 1.1.193). Says Anandavardhana:122
anena hy ayam artho vyaiigyatvena vivaksito, yad atra mahdbhdrate
pdndavddicaritam yat kirtyate, tat sarvam avasdnavirasam avidyd-
prapancarupam ca\ paramdrthasatyasvarupas tu bhagavdn vdsudevo
117Cf. Abhinavabharati (GOS), vol. I, p. 327: tattvajnanotthito nirveda [santasya sthayi] iti
kecit\
118 Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 3.26, 4.5.
119 Dhvanyaloka 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): santas ca trsnaksayasukhasya yah
pariposas tallaksano rasah pratiyata eva\
120 Dhvanyaloka 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 274): vrsnipandavavirasavasanavaimanasya-
dayinim...
121 Dhvanyaloka ibid., cf. Mahabharata 12.168.4.
122 Dhvanyaloka 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 276).

li
 A curious play

'tra kvrtyate\ tasmat tasminn eva paramesvare bhagavati bhavata

bhdvitacetaso, ma bhuta vibhutisu nihsdrdsu rdgino, gune.su vd naya-
vinayapardkramddisv amisu kevalesu kesucit sarvdtmand pratinivista-
dhiyah\ tathd eagre, pasyata nihsdratdra samsdrasyeti\ amum evdrthd-
tisayam dyotayan sphutam evdvabhdsate vyanjakasaktyanugrhitas ca-
sabdah\ evamvidham evdrthara garbhikrtam sandarsayanto 'nantara-
slokd laksyante 'sa hi satyam' ityddayah]
For by this [sentence] the following meaning is intended as the sug-
gested one: 'Here, in the Mahabhdrata, the deeds of the Pandavas
and others, which are sung, are all tragic in their conclusion and
are essentially the manifold manifestation of ignorance. But [in fact]
the Blessed Vasudeva, whose true nature is the ultimate reality, is
glorified here. Therefore concentrate your thoughts only on that
blessed Greatest God, do not hanker after unsubstantial riches, and
do not focus wholeheartedly just on these few good qualities such as
righteous conduct, discipline, valour, and the like. And thus behold
in what follows the insubstantiality of the world.' The word "and",
which is endowed with the power of suggestion, shines forth clearly,
illuminating the same superior sense. The immediately following
verses, beginning with 'for he is reality', are seen to reveal the same
meaning, which is hidden within them.
It is the same revelation about the shadowy nature of our reality which is
the wellspring of the Director's highly unprofessional behaviour. He realised
that 'being an actor is indeed an extremely wretched means of supporting one's
family, hi which one is continuously practicing a display of utterly false beha-
viour', and he is not consoled by the fact that 'all this multitude of creatures,
from Brahma down to the animals, roams about in worldly existence through
Illusion alone'. His disillusion (nirveda), which has reached its apex when he
was asked to stage an utterly worthless play, turns him towards the highest goal
of man, and provides the play the keynote of sdntarasa.
Nevertheless there was a significant opposition against the acceptance of
santa as the ninth rasa, and even those who acquiesced in its existence had
serious doubts about the possibilities of its presentation on the stage. The
Dasarupaka refers to 'some people' who list santa among the other rasas, but
Dhananjaya hastens to add that 'it cannot thrive hi plays'. 123 Dhanika in his
commentary mentions the radical view of those who deny in toto the possibility
of a quietistic rasa, 'since it is impossible to destroy desire and hatred which
reached [our present age] in a beginningless continuity of time'. Others include
it in the heroic, or the repulsive, or other rasas. 124 'However that may be', says
Dhanika, 'we do not accept at all that quietude (sama) could be the permanent
sentiment in ndtakas and other [kinds of drama] the soul of which is performance,
123 Dasarupaka 4.35: samam api kecit prdhuh pustir natyesu naitasya\\
124 Avaloka ad loc., p. 202: anye tu vastutas tasyabhavam varnayanti,
anadikalapravahayataragadvesayor ucchettum asakyatvat\ anye tu wralnbhatsadav ant-
arbhavam varnayanti\

lii
 A curious play

since it is not suitable for performance because it consists of the cessation of

all activities.' 125 Therefore the permanent sentiment of the Ndgdnanda cannot
be s'ama, especially because the hero is in love and becomes the king of the
vidhyadharas, neither of which facts goes well with quietude. The permanent
sentiment of this play is fortitude (utsdha), and its rasa is the compassionate
kind of heroism (dayawra). 126
This kind of criticism was already familiar to Anandavardhana, who spoke
up for the presence of sdnta even in the dramatic genre. According to him,
even if its permanent sentiment, that is the pleasure of the cessation of all
desires (trsndksayasukha) 'might not be part of everyone's experience, still it
cannot be rejected as the special mental operation of exalted persons who are
not like the other people'. 127 It is not right to include sdnta in vfra, since
heroism necessarily contains some egoism, which runs counter with quietude. 128
Abhinavagupta adds that its equation with repulsion is equally misleading, since
jugupsd is only the transitory ancillary sentiment of sdnta. He also observes that
even if the culmination of sdnta cannot be presented because of the absence of
indicatory symptoms (anubhdvas), its earlier phases can, through such signs as
self-control, religious observances, and even bearing the yoke of a kingdom. 129
But even Anandavardhana's eloquent justification was not enough to dispel
all doubts about the aesthetic relish of quietude. The author of the Candrikd
commentary on the Dhvanydloka remarked that l sdntarasa should not be em-
ployed as the leading [relish of a poetic work].' 130 Even Abhinavagupta admitted
the following: 131
sdntablbhatsarasau tu caramapumarthayogdt, tatra ca sarvasya nd-
dhi*kdre 'pi (conj. : °kdro 'pi ed.) kasyacid apascimajanmano 'dhi-
kdrdn ndtake yady api tatphalapradhdnatayd prddhdnyam avalam-
beydtdm, tathdpi ndsau pracuraprayoga iti tayoh purusdrthapravara-
prdnitayor api virddirasdntarddhydvdpendvasthdpanam\
But although the rasas of quietude and repulsion, because they
are appropriate to the ultimate goal of man [i.e. liberation], and
since some extraordinary people of excellent birth are qualified [for
moksa], even if not everyone is qualified for it, could become predom-
inant in a ndtaka inasmuch as that [i.e. liberation] is the principally
125 Avaloka, ibid.: yathd tathdstu, sarvathd ndtakdddv abhinaydtmani sthdyitvam asmdbhih
samasya nesyate, tasya samastavydpdrapravilayarupasydbhinaydyogdt\
126 Avaiofca, ibid., p. 203: yat tu kaiscin ndgdnandddau samasya sthdyitvam upavarnitam,
tan malayavatyanurdgendprabandhapravrttena, ante vidyddharacakravartitvaprdptes ca
viruddham\ (...) ato daydwrotsdhasya tatra sthdyitvam...
127 Dhvanydloka 3.26+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 182): yadi ndma sarvajandnubhavagocaratd
tasya ndsti, naitdvatdsdv alokasdmdnyamahdnubhdvacittavrttivisesah pratikseptum sakyah]
128 Dhvanydloka, ibid.: na ca mre tasydntarbhdvah kartum yuktah, tasydbhimdnamayatvena
vyavasthdpandt, asya cdhankdraprasamaikarupatayd sthiteh\
l29 Locana ad loc.
l30 Locana, ibid. (Kashi ed., p. 394): ddhikdrikatvena tu sdnto raso na nibaddhavya iti can-
drikdkdrah\
l3l Abhinavabhdratf ad Ndtyasdstra 18.110 (GOS, vol.11, p. 451); cf. J.C. WEIGHT, 'Vrtti in
the Dasarupakavidhdnddhydya of the Abhinavabhdrati 1 in: BSOAS 26 (1963), pp. 92ff.

liii
 A curious play

intended result, still this is not an extensive practice. Therefore even

if these two [i.e. quietude and repulsion] are animated by the best
of the human goals, still they are employed with other rasas such as
heroism mixed into them.
Before expounding his own ideas, Abhinavagupta refers to several theories
about the sthdyibhdva of santarasa. Among those who held the opinion that
it was nirveda, some made reference to the Nydyasutra. 132 Others, however,
adopted the belief that any of the eight permanent mental states can be the
sthayi of sdnta: 133
anye manyante\ ratyddaya evdstau cittavrttivisesd uktdh\ tata eva ka-
thitavibhdvaviviktasrutddyalaukikavibhdvavisesasamsraydh vicitrd eva
tdvat\ tatas ca tanmadhydd evdnyatamo 'tra sthdy^ tatra andhatd-
nandamayasvdtmavisayd ratir eva moksasddhanam iti, saiva sdnte
sthdyiniti\ yathoktam, eyas cdtmaratir eva sydd dtmatrptas ca mdna-
vah\ dtmany eva ca santustah tasya kdryam na vidyate\ \' iti\ evam
samastavisayam vaikrtam pasyatah, visvam ca socyam vilokayatah,
sdmsdrikam ca vrttdntam apakdritvena pasyatah, sdtisayam asam-
mohapradhdnam wryam dsritavatah, sarvasmdd visayasdrthdd bi-
bhyatah, sarvalokasprhaniydd api pramaddder jugupsamdnasya, apurva-
svdtmdtisayaldbhdd vismayamdnasya moksasiddhir iti, ratihdsddmdm
vismaydntdndm anyatamasya sthdyitvam nirupaniyam\
'Others embrace the following view: "It is delight etc. which are
taught as the eight particular kinds of mental operations. It is they
that first of all become very diverse when they are connected with
special, supra-mundane eliciting factors (vibhdvas) such as the study
of Scripture, which are different from the [already] mentioned elicit-
ing factors. And therefore any one among just these [eight vibhdvas]
[can be] its [i.e. sdntarasa's] permanent [mental basis] sthdyi. Of
these, delight which has as its object one's own self which is full of
unimpaired bliss, is a means of attaining liberation, so it is indeed
a permanent mental state of sdnta. As it is taught, 'That man has
nothing left to accomplish whose delight is in his Self alone, who is
contented in his Self, and who finds complete satisfaction in his Self.'
(Bhagavadgztd 3.17) Likewise, that person succeeds in attaining lib-
eration who notices that everything is grotesque, who considers the
whole world lamentable, who notices that worldly affairs are harm-
ful, who resorts to great heroism which is based on true insight, who
is afraid of all the multitude of sense-objects, who is disgusted by
women and the like, even if the whole world lusts after them, and
who is astonished when he obtains the unprecedented excellence of
132 Abhinavabharati (GOS), vol. I, p. 329: nanu mithyajnanamulo visayagandhas tattvajnanat
prasamyattti duhkhajanmasutrendksapadapadair vadadbhir mithyajnanapacayakaranam tat-
tvajnanam vairagyasya dosapdyalaksanasya kdranam uktam\ nanu tatah kim? nanu
vairagyam nirvedah\
133 Abhinavabharati (GOS), ibid. (I am following the reading of RAGHAVAN 1975, p. 109.)

liv
 A curious play

his self. Therefore any one of [the eight permanent mental states]
beginning with delight, laughter, etc. and ending with wonder, can
be seen as the permanent [basis of sdnta].'
This could also explain why the Agamadambara, an allegedly santarasa play,
resembles a kaleidoscope of various sentiments. The MTmamsaka hero is fully
self-confident in his knowledge, which entitles him to enlighten and humiliate
those who stray in darkness. He truly admires himself, but he is also capable
of appreciating other people's values, such as asceticism. The batu calls him
'supremely compassionate' when he refrains from beating up the Jains with a
stick. He mocks the hypocrite behaviour of the Buddhists, is utterly disgusted
and shocked by the eccentric ritual of the nflambara couples, and is even unwill-
ing to enter into a debate with them because of the dangers of their impurity.
So is Sankarsana a true santarasa hero? I cannot help hearing a tone of gentle
irony in the way Jayanta presents the MTmamsaka. Sankarsana is too much of
an idealist, who believes that it is his sacred duty to turn back to the right track
all who deviated from it, even in the service of worldly authorities that (mis)use
his zeal for their own purposes. He is too self-conceited, therefore he has to fail
and realise that his knowledge was not yet adequate.
If we glance over the Dhvanyaloka-pass&ges about the role of santarasa in
the Mahabharata, it appears that although Anandavardhana did distinguish the
doctrinal and the poetic aspects of the epic, he also held that the emotions
awakened by the narrative can assist the reader in attaining liberation: 134
pdndavddicaritavarnanasydpi vairdgyajananatdtparydd vairdgyasya
ca moksamulatvdn moksasya ca bhagavatprdptyupdyatvena mukhya-
tayd gitddisu pradarsitatvdt parabrahmaprdptyupdyatvam eva para-
mparayd]
Even the description of the deeds of the Pandavas and other [heroes],
since its aim is to produce disillusion, since disillusion is the basis
of liberation, and since liberation had been shown in the Gitd and
other [sacred texts] to be the most important means of attaining
the Lord, [therefore even this description] is indirectly a means of
attaining the highest Brahman.
But the first theoretician who explicitly stated that there is an intimate relation
between Brahman-experience and aesthetic relish in general appears to have
been Bhatta Nayaka, whose ideas are condensed by Abhinavagupta as follows: 135
bhdvite ca rase tasya bhogo yo 'nubhavasmaranapratipattibhyo vila-
ksana eva drutivistaravikdsdtmd rajastamovaicitrydnuviddhasattva-
mayanijacitsvabhdvanirvrtivisrdntilaksanahparabrahmdsvddasavidhah\
'And after the rasa has been produced [through the operation of the
words called "bhdvakatva, bringing into being"], its enjoyment [be-
comes possible], which very much differs from [ordinary] cognitions
134 Dhvanyaloka 4.5+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 278).
l35 Locana ad Dhvanyaloka 2.4 (ed. Kavyamala, p. 83, ed. Kashi, p. 183).

Iv
 A curious play

[whether] direct experience or memory, whose nature is melting, in-

tensity, and expansion, 136 which is characterised by the repose in
the beatitude of the true form of one's consciousness which is full of
purity (sattva) blended with the variety of energy (rajas) and dark-
ness (tamas), and which is similar to the experience of the highest
Brahman.
Mammata also summarises the theory of Bhatta Nayaka: 137
kdvye ndtye cdbhidhdto dvitiyena vibhdvddisddhdranikarandtmand bhd-
vakatvavydpdrena bhdvyamdnah sthdyi sattvodrekaprakdsdnandamaya-
samvidvisrdntisatattvena bhogena bhujyate iti bhattandyakah\
'In poems and in plays the permanent sentiment is transformed [into
rasa] by the operation of "bringing into being" which is essentially
the generalisation of the eliciting factors and [the indicatory symp-
toms and the temporary mental states] and which is different from
[the word's operation called] denotation, [and then rasa] is enjoyed
with enjoyment which is the same in its essence as the repose in
[one's] consciousness which is full of bliss and radiance due to the
abundance of purity (sattvay this is what Bhatta Nayaka says.
If we review the opening benediction of the Agamadambara, it might appear
less puzzling now in the light of Anandavardhana's and Bhatta Nayaka's ideas.
The invocation of the Brahman at the beginning of a sdntarasa-play seems
natural. The Brahman's 'descent' to the path of consciousness might signify the
prelude to the highest kind of mystical experience which must entail the arising
of disillusion (virdga, nirveda) and the gradual awakening to the knowledge of
reality. That this experience also involves bliss might sound perhaps unusual
from the mouth of a Naiyayika, 138 but we might say that someone who proceeds
on the path leading to final liberation will rejoice as this radiant reality dawns
upon him. And one station along this path may well be a play with quietude
as its predominant rasa which distracts the spectator from the everyday world
and directs his attention towards higher truths.
The fictitious world of drama offers an excellent analogy with the illusory
nature of the world we live in. The world we call 'actual' 'is nevertheless a
possible world in itself that is, a construct deriving from the conceptual and
textual constraints on the spectator's understanding.' 139 The poet has an al-
most divine autonomy in fashioning his poetic world. 'In the boundless world
136 Ingalls (-Masson-Patwardhan) translate vistara as 'expansion', and vikasa as 'radiance'
(Dhvanyaloka(H.OS), p. 222), GNOLI (1968, p. 108) as 'enlargement' and 'expansion', respect-
ively, vikasa might also have the sense of 'cheerfulness'. Raghavan notes (RAGHAVAN 1978,
p. 426, note 1) that in the Dasarupaka the mental state of vikasa corresponds to the erotic
and the comic rasas, while vistara to the heroic and the marvellous.
137 Kdvyaprakasa, vol. I, pp. 217ff.
138 Jayanta (together with the mainstream naiyayikas) held that the liberated state of the
soul is not a blissful state, since it is equally without suffering and pleasure (cf. Nyayamanjari,
vol.11, pp. 436ff). Bhasarvajna represents another view among the naiyayikas, namely that
the liberated soul does experience beatitude (cf. Nyayabhusana, pp. 594ff).
139 ELAM 1997, p. 108.

Ivi
 A curious play

of poetry', says Anandavardhana, 'the poet is the only Creator. This whole
universe revolves as he pleases. If the poet is amorous, a world full of flavour
arises in the poem. If the same [poet] is disenchanted, all that world is without
flavour. In a poem a good poet freely makes insentient things behave as sen-
tient and sentient beings as insentient, as he pleases.' 140 A comparable idea is
expressed in the words of semiotic analysis as follows: 'It should not be thought
that the "accessibility" of dramatic worlds renders them always and necessarily
realistically mimetic. On the contrary, it is precisely the constant assumption
that WD [the dramatic world] is denned in relation to Wo [the actual world] as a
hypothetical variation which allows any number of invented and even fantastic
elements to be introduced into the drama without destroying the audience's
ability to recognize what is going on.' 141
The actor also participates in the creation of the dramatic universe: he
infuses Me into the characters invented by the playwright or, put differently,
he dissembles his real identity. As the Director says in the Agamadambara: 1*2
'Shame, for shame, being an actor is indeed an extremely wretched means of
supporting one's family, in which one is continuously practicing a display of
utterly false behaviour. Hara, Visnu, Brahma, a sage, a king, a brutish fool, a
rake, a coward, a hero, a happy man, a sad one: taking all roles the actor plays,
feeling no shame before the people in reality he is [just] resorting to craft to
fill his belly.' But his Assistant reminds him that he is no exception: 'Who
among gods, humans or animals has ever escaped from deceit and then reached
the supreme goal? All this multitude of creatures, from Brahma down to the
animals, roams about in worldly existence through Illusion alone. Is your lot
any worse?' Creative illusion rules the whole world.
Theatre and acting are excellent allegories of the world that surrounds us
and the activity of the Creator who puts on the masks of worldly phenom-
ena. In fact, Bharata says in the very first verse of the Natyasastra: 'I shall
teach the science of dramaturgy which was related by Brahma as an illustration
(udahrtam) .' 143 Now it is certainly possible to take the word udahrtam simply
to mean 'announced', but Bhatta Nayaka understood this sentence as an allu-
sion to the allegorical nature of drama. This is how Abhinavagupta presents
Nayaka's ideas: 144
140 Dhvanyaloka 3.42+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 250): apare kavyasamsare kavir ekah
prajdpatih\ yathasmai rocate visvam tathedam parivartate\\ srngari cet kavih kavye jdtam
rasamayam jagat\ sa eva vttardgas cen nirasam sarvam eva tat\ \ bhavan acetanan api cetana-
vac cetanan acetanavat\ vyavaharayati yathestam sukavih kavye svatantratayd\ \ Abhinava-
gupta hastens to add in his commentary ad loc. that an 'amorous' poet is not an actual
womaniser (strvuyasani), but someone who is filled with the aesthetic relish of the Erotic.
141 ELAM 1997, p. 107.
l*2 Agamadambara, Prologue, 11.6ff.
143 Natyasastra 1.1 (ed. GOS, vol.1, p. 1): ndtyasdstram pravaksydmi brahmana yad
udahrtam (v.l. udiritarri)\
144 Abhinavabhdrati ad loc. (ed. GOS, vol.1, pp. 5f). It seems likely (as already T. R.
Chintamani observed in 'Fragments of Bhattanayaka', Journal of Oriental Research, Madras,
vol. I, p. 268.) that Abhinavagupta does not actually quote Bhatta Nayaka, but just elaborates
an interpretation of what was probably the introductory verse of the Sahrdayadarpana.

Ivii
 A curious play

bhattandyakas tu 'brahmand paramdtmand yad uddhrtam, avidydvi-

racitanissdrabhedagrahe yad uddharamkrtam ndtyarn tad vaksydmi\
yathd hi kalpandmdtrasdram tata eva anavasthitaikarupam, ksanena
kalpandsatasahasrasaham, svapnddivilaksanam api susthutardm hrda-
yagrahaniddnam, atyaktasvdlambanabrahmakalpanatoparacitam rd-
mardvanddicestitam asatyam kuto 'py adbhutavrttyd bhdti, tathd bhd-
samdnam api *caramapumarthopdyatdm (conj. ISAACSON : ca pum-
arthopdyatdm ed.) eti, tathd tddrg eva visvam idam asatyandmaru-
paprapancdtmakam atha ca sravanamananddivasena paramapumar-
thaprdpakam, iti lokottaraparamapurusdrthasucanena sdntarasopa-
ksepo 'yam bhavisyati, 'svam svam nimittam dddya sdntdd utpadyate
rasah' iti\ tad anena pdramdrthikam prayojanam uktam\' iti vyd-
khydnam sahrdayadarpane paryagrahit\ yad aha
'namas trailokyanirmdnakavaye sambhave, yatah]
pratiksanam jaganndtyaprayogarasiko janah\ \' iti\
Bhatta Nayaka, however, embraced the following interpretation [of
Ndtyasdstra 1.1] in his Sahrdayadarpana: 'Drama, that was presen-
ted as an example by Brahma, the Supreme Self, that is to say that
was made into an example of the grasping of insubstantial multifari-
ousness created by ignorance that is what I shall teach. For just as
the fictitious story of Rama, Ravana, and other [characters], which
is essentially just fancy and therefore does not have a single, estab-
lished form, [but] is accompanied by a vast number of fancies in every
moment, which [story], though different from dreams, is the cause
of rapture, [when it is] performed by the actors who have not aban-
doned their own identity and who are similar to Brahma, appears
in an extraordinarily wonderful way; [and] even while appearing as
such, it becomes a means of [attaining] the highest goal of man, in
the same way this whole world is exactly like that [drama], inasmuch
as it consists of the diversity of names and forms, and it also leads us
to the highest goal of man through reading the scriptures, reflection,
and [meditation]. Thus, through referring to the highest goal of man
which transcends this world, this [verse] may be an allusion to the
aesthetic relish of quietude, on the basis of the verse "resorting to its
respective cause [each] rasa arises from sdnta " . 145 Therefore by this
[verse] the ultimate object [of the Ndtyasdstra] has been declared.'
[Bhatta Nayaka embraced this interpretation] when / for he said,
'Obeisance to Siva, the poet who composes the triad of the worlds,
thanks to whom people relish the performance of the world-play at
every instant'.
So illusion is not that harmful after all, at least if we know how to handle it. It
145One of the interpolated verses on santa, Ndtyasdstra 6. (ed. GOS, vol. I, p. 329). The
edition actually reads 'svam svam nimittam dsddya Sdntdd bhdvah pravartate\ something
which for Abhinavagupta, who was very particular about the precise differentiation of rasa
and bhdva, would clearly not have suited.

Iviii
 A curious play

would be a mistake to look upon the imaginary world of theatre as something

real or actual, and when we watch the characters on the stage being engaged
hi wooing or lamenting, then" identity as actors always lurks hi the back of our
awareness. And as the actor's emotions are not 'real' so our emotional responses
are different from our everyday sentiments: we savour these sentiments in a pure
form while the fictitious world of the play enraptures us. Moreover, precisely
through this rapture we also learn a lot about the real, unobscured nature of
our mental attitudes: our understanding is augmented.
One of the various terms used to describe aesthetic experience is visranti,
reposeful awareness, that is the cognition of the fundamental emotions hi then-
pure, universalised form, free from all obstacles. 146 This 'mental repose' en-
tails a higher stage of concentration, and it is also a blissful state147 akin to
the beatitude of mystical experience. To regard santa as the basis of all other
rasas seems to have been a logical step. 148 As Gerow observed, 149 'Since all
the dramatic rasas aim at a state of mental repose (visranti), the reductionist
"insight" that all the rasas are fundamentally sdnti is neither very daring nor
very unexpected, particularly hi the spiritual-devotional climate hi which Abhi-
navagupta lived. Santa was a rasa whose tune had come which, if it did not
exist, would have had to be invented.' In Abhinavagupta's view the relishing
of santarasa is a more conscious kind of aesthetic experience, since hi it any
emotion can be savoured in its universalised rasa-form as a temporary hue on
the surface of the uniquely permanent Self. 150 This kind of aesthetic rapture
can teach us the most about the true nature of any experience. But even if we
regard santa as essentially the artistic representation of disenchantment born
from the realisation of the illusory nature of existence, it can still be regarded
as occupying the highest rank among all rasas since it directs our attention
towards liberation, the supreme goal of man.
The characters and then- transactions we see on the stage are merely the
products of the poet's and the actors' creative skills; still we are both delighted
and taught by the play. According to Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinavagupta, the
same is true about the world outside the theatre. God likes to play. He disguises
his real identity with a multitude of appearances, but we can cast a glance behind
all these masks with the help of His scriptures and practising meditation. And
when we have recognised the illusory nature of all worldly phenomena we still
have the choice of being entertained by this illusion, as if watching an amusing
performance.
The Agamadambara begins with the complaints of an artist, who is fed up
146 Abhinavabhdrati ad rasasutra (ed. GOS, vol.1, p. 274): tathd hi loke sakalavigh-
navinirmuktd samvittir eva camatkdranirvesarasandsvddanabhogasamdpattilayavisrdntyddi-
sabdair abhidhiyate\
147 Abhinavabhdrati ibid. (ed. GOS, vol.1, p. 276): avisrdntirupataiva duhkham\ tata eva
kapilair duhkhasya cancalyam eva prdnatvenoktam rajovrttitdm vadadbhir ity anandarupata
sarvarasdndm]
148 Abhinavabhdrati on santarasa (ed. GOS, vol.1, p. 333): tatra sarvarasdndm sdntaprdya
evdsvddah, visayebhyo viparivrttyd\
149 GEROW-AKLUJKAR, p. 81, note 6.
150 Cf. Abhinavabhdrati (GOS), vol. I, p. 330.

lix
 A curious play

with deceiving people. He wants Truth instead of Delusion, and he hopes to

find it among the teachings of philosophies. But what happens if the venerable
masters of various doctrines turn out to be more interested in making a good
living than in Truth and Reality? What if being a monk or a Vedic priest is
just an occupation, a job like being an actor? Or even if we suppose that the
followers of these doctrines are not just cynical opportunists but they really
believe in what they teach, what guarantees that all these religions are not just
roles in the gigantic play of the Lord? Says Ksemaraja, 'The positions, i.e. the
tenets of all doctrines beginning with [that of] the materialists, are the adopted
roles of that Self like [those] of an actor, which it takes on at pleasure.' 151
One possible attitude is to say that God fools the followers of all the other
religions to a higher or lesser degree, but the world-view that / follow allows
me to understand His real nature. Or one might arrive at an extremely liberal
position and say that God takes on various roles to propound various teachings,
and he does so not just for fun but out of compassion towards us, miserable
creatures with limited capacities. So in fact all scriptures derive from God, each
of them being adjusted to our particular needs and talents.
This latter view seems to be triumphant at the end of the Agamadambam,
but not with the active participation of the MTmamsaka protagonist. He could
not resolve the tension between his religion as a devotee of Visnu and his duty to
protect the Veda as a MTmamsaka. 152 Or rather, there was one solution for him:
devotion to God and asking for his illuminating favour. 153 He visits the nearby
RanasvamT-temple where he sings praises to the Lord who 'shows the right path
to liberation' (vyanjate moksasanmdrgam). Unfortunately the manuscripts of
the play are fragmentary at this place, but from the auspicious omen of the
sound of a conch-shell we may safely infer that Visnu dispelled the doubts of
his devotee, as a result of which he was able to rejoice in the ultraliberal lecture
delivered by the great Naiyayika scholar.
At the beginning of the play we saw that art could not make the Director,
a determined and uncompromising seeker after Truth, entirely happy. Learned
scrutiny of the true nature of things may have given satisfaction to the snataka,
especially when he defeated his opponents, but ultimately it could not give
him serenity and peace of mind. That direct experience of the Lord's grace is
superior to both aesthetic rapture and philosophical investigation was expressed
by Anandavardhana in the following beautiful verse: 154
yd vydpdravati rasdn rasayitum kdcit kawndm navd
drstir yd parinisthitdrthavisayonmesd ca vaipascit^
151 Pratyabhijndhrdayam 8+ (ed. p. 16): sarvesdm cdrvdkddidarsandndm sthitayah
siddhdntds tasyaitasydtmano natasyeva *svecchayd grhitdh (em. SANDERSON : svecchava-
grhitdh ed.) krtrimd bhumikdh\
152 Agamadambara, Act Four, verse 5: ye visvasthitisargasamhrtidasdparydyasampddana-
kriddsaktamater matam bhagavato ndrdyanasydsritdh\ taddrsteh katham anyathatvam anaya
brumo vayam jihvayd saksydmah krtindm trayimayadhiydm sthdtum katham vdgratah\ \
153 Agamadambara, Act Four, verse 7: pathi vedavirodhaddrune nipunendpi na sakyanirnaye\
kim aham karavdni hanta me saranam sdrngarathdngasankhabhrt\\
154 Dhvanydloka 3.43+ (ed. Krishnamoorthy, p. 256.)

Ix
 A curious play

te dve apy avalambya visvam anisam nirvarnayanto vayarn

srdnta naiva ca labdham abdhisayana tvadbhaktitulyam sukham\ \
That which is the extraordinary, fresh vision of poets, active hi mak-
ing the rasas tasteful, and that which is the [vision] of the wise,
opening upon thoroughly ascertained things as its object: resorting
to both, while I was ceaselessly observing the world, I became tired
and I could not find bliss equal to devotion to you, O God resting
on the sea.

bci
Chapter 4

Sources

4.1 The Manuscripts of the Agamadambara

Pa Patan, Hemacandracarya Jaina Jnanamandira MS 17472. Paper, Jaina
NagarT. 18 folios of unknown dimensions (only a photocopy was at my
disposal) with 16 lines to a side and approximately 53 aksaras per line.
Foliation is at the bottom right-hand corner of the rectos. Each page has
a blank space in the centre and two double marginal lines on both sides.
Undated.
Pu Pune, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, MS 437 of 1892-95. Paper,
Jaina NagarT. 37 folios of unknown dimensions (only a photocopy was at
my disposal) with 9 lines to a side and about 45 aksaras per line. The title
of the text appears as satmatanataka at the top left-hand corner of f. lv ,
and as sa° ma° na° at the same place on the following folios. The act
number is indicated as anka 1 at the top right-hand corner of fols. lv and
2V , and as anka 2 on f. 16W . There is foliation both at the bottom of the
right-hand and at the top of the left-hand margin of the versos. Undated.

The two manuscripts have several common characteristics: anusvdra is used

throughout in place of the homorganic nasal, the signs for ca and va are often
hardly distinguishable, and v is frequently written in the place of b (especially in
MS Pa). Both contain a few propria manu marginal corrections, insertion points
are tagged with kakapadas, and lacunae are marked with raised dashes. Both
manuscripts are written in a kind of Jaina DevanagarT, but while Pa consistently
uses prsthamatras, in Pu e, ai, o, and au appear mostly as top-strokes.
Both manuscripts show similarities with other Jaina NagarT manuscripts
dated to the 15th century, e.g. MS A (dated VS 1541) and MS P (dated VS 1521)
of the Paumacariu, the Patan MS (dated VS 1484) of the Vijnaptilekhasamgraha,
and MS P of the Kuvalayamala (undated, "but according to expert opinion [... ]
may be assigned to the 15th century A.D.", p. 2).
Since Pa and Pu share the same lacunae in Acts Two and Four as well as

bcii
 Sources

several errors, they plainly appear to be closely related. A relatively long pas-
sage in the Prologue (11.26f.: °mdrthe paryavasitah? sarva evdyam brahmddis
tiryakparyanto jantugrdmah samsdre mdyayaiva parivartate\ bhavatah kirn adhi-
kam jdtam?) which is omitted by Pu alone makes it clear that Pa could not
copy from Pu. On the other hand, while Pa often has the correct reading where
Pu's reading is erroneous, there are a few instances where the situation is the
opposite, e.g. Act One: 1.264: sarvam omitted by Pa (haplography); 1.130:
ihamtar Pu, ihambhar Pa; 1.275: apavarga0 Pu, avarga0 Pa; Act Two: 1.184:
himsd ndsatyam Pu, himsd ndmasatyam Pa; 1.271: kvedam Pu, ksedam Pa;
1.290: kimcid Pu, kimci Pa; 1.302: bhos tapo° Pu, bhos tvapo0 (?) Pa; Act
Three: 1.219: kdsmdkam dkulatd Pu, kasmakarmakulata Pa; 1.429: evopalabhy-
ate Pu, evopapalabhyate Pa; 1.530: samayah Pu, sasamayah Pa; 1.532: eva tathd
Pu, etathd Pa; Act Four: 1.35: bruvdnds Pu, dhruvdnds Pa; 1.41: °mdtram Pu,
°mdvam Pa; 1.105: saharsam Pu, rdhursam Pa; 1.414: na jana° Pu, jana° Pa.
While it is not impossible that Pu copied from Pa and occasionally corrected
its readings, it might be slightly more probable that both Pa and Pu derive
(possibly independently) from the same manuscript. The fact that the title
Sanmatandtaka figures on f. l v of Pu but is nowhere found in Pa perhaps also
corroborates the above conclusion (though this title might actually have been
invented by Pu's scribe). Furthermore in Act Two 1.166, while Pa clearly reads
jhdijjadi, Pu indicates a lacuna and reads ~ ijjadi.
Written by a Kashmirian author, the Agamadambara must have had Sarada
manuscripts. In fact some errors in the existing manuscripts point to a Sarada
archetype, e.g. confusing su and d in Act Three, 1.32.

4.1.1 The interpretation of some unusual aksaras

A very similar letter appears in BUHLER 1896, Table V. 'Nordliche
Alphabete von ca. 800-1200 p. Chr.', XX (Jayaccandra 1175 p. Chr.)
/ 45, and also in Table VI. 'Alphabete aus nordlichen Handschriften',
XVI (Deccan College 1880/1, Ms. no. 57, 1081 p. Chr.) / 49; in
both cases it is interpreted as jya. The same letter in MS P (BORJ No. 154 of
1881-82) of the Kuvalayamdld is read as jfj'a, and the editors have the following
remark about the scribe^ "His jja looks like dya and is read by some as jya" * In
the manuscripts of the Agamadambara this aksara occurs only in Prakrit words,
and only once in MS Pu (Act One, 1.13: ajja° is written with this letter in both
manuscripts). In Sanskrit words both Pa and Pu use the usual Devanagarl form
of jya and jja (e.g. Prologue, 1.55: niyujyantdm; Act One, 1.347: salajjam; Act
Three, 1.229: sdmrdjya0 ).
When we find this dt/-like letter in MS Pa,
in the majority of the cases Pu has the more or less ordinary Devanagarl
ligature jj: Act One, 1.72: °sijjamte; Act Two, 1.36: ajj'o, 1.161: pajjaliyam,
1.166: jhdijjadi, khavijjai', 1.212: kajjaveld, 1.308: caccijjamta, 1.344: pijjai',
1.345: bhumjijjai] pdvijjai\ 1.346: sosijjai] lamghijjai] 1.348: parisosijjai]
1 Kuvalayamala, p. 2.

Ixiii
 Sources

but sometimes Pu writes the standard Devanagari aksara jy: Act One, 1.172:
ujyanesu; Act Two, 1.7: pijyadi, 1.8: ajya, 1.65: °ubbhijya°, 1.105: ajya.
Finally there are instances when both Pa and Pu write the DevanagarT lig-
ature jj in Prakrit words: Act One, 1.41: vajjadi] Act Two, 1.7: khajjadi,
1.8: kajjalaa, 1.43: nijjine, 1.56: lajjd0 , 1.85: ajja, 1.267: ajja, 1.281: ajja,
1.308: °lakkhijjamta°, 1.312: ajja, 1.356: avijja0 ; Act Three, 1.57: pajjalide,
1.71: laskijjamti, 1.82: <y)'a0 , 1.106: ° bhavijjamto; Act Four, 1.134: ajj'a.
This dy-like sign is used in MS Pa as an equivalent of Sanskrit dy in SaurasenT
(jy in MS Pu) and MagadhT (jy and jj in MS Pu), of Sanskrit ry in SaurasenT (MS
Pu has the same sign) and MagadhT (jj in MS Pu), of Sanskrit jv in MaharastrT (jj
in MS Pu), and in passive forms with °ijja° in SaurasenT, MaharastrT, Apabhramsa
(jj in MS Pu in these languages), and MagadhT (jy in MS Pu).
We can also observe that when MS Pa writes this cfa/-like sign in Prakrit
words other than MagadhT, MS Pu has jj, except in Act One, 1.173 ujyanesu,2
and in Act One, 1.13, where ajja0 is written with the same dya-like sign in both
manuscripts. In MagadhT words, we find either jj or jy in MS Pu in places where
MS Pa has this dy-like letter.
In transcribing this dy-like aksara I have followed the readings of MS Pu, and
indicated its occurrence in the manuscripts with an asterisk in the apparatus.

This aksara occurs in both manuscripts. A very similar letter in

BUHLER 1896, Table VI. 'Alphabete aus nordlichen Handschriften',
XVI (Deccan College 1880/1, Ms. no. 57, 1081 p. Chr.) / 23, is in-
terpreted as jjha. In the Agamadambara it appears once in a Sanskrit
word: Act Two, 1.365: °ojjhita°, which makes it probable that it should
be read as jjha in the Prakrit passages as well. Cf. Act Four, 1.134, where
Pa writes °majjhe with this yj-like letter, while Pu uses the approximately
standard-looking DevanagarT ligature jjh. In some cases it is very difficult to
distinguish this sign from the ligatures bbh and st.

This sign also occurs in both manuscripts. It looks like a DevanagarT

ska ligature, and in fact we find it hi the Sanskrit word ayuskamam
(Act Four, verse 48). It appears very frequently in MagadhT words as
the equivalent of Sanskrit ksa (e.g. luske — Skt. vrkse, Act Three, 1.12).

2 Cf. VON HlNUBER, §249: "In der Kompositionsfuge unterbleibt die Palatalisation [... ]
wegen der Funktionsstarke des anlautenden y- [...]; Skt. udydna > Asoka, P[ali] uyydna
[...], SjaurasenT] (BHASA) uyyana [...]."

btiv
 Sources

Figure 4.1: MS Pa, folio lv

bcv
 Sources

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Figure 4.2: MS Pu, folio T

Ixvi
 Sources

4.2 The editio princeps

The Agamadambara was first edited by V. Raghavan and A. Thakur, two emin-
ent Sanskrit scholars, in 1964, and was published as 'Ancient text No. 7' in the
Mithila Institute Series. The edition was based on the same manuscript mater-
ial (MSS Pa and Pu) that was available for myself. The book also contains an
Introduction in which Raghavan discusses the life and works of Bhatta Jayanta,
the peculiar style of the play, its plot and characters, the various philosophical
schools presented in the play, and its relation with the Nyayamanjan.
As Raghavan and Thakur point out in the Preface,3 'The nature of the ma-
nuscript materials at the disposal of the editors did not allow them to prepare a
faultless text. Especially the Prakrt portions were very defective and even after
corrections and emendations they could not be made quite satisfactory. Dr. P.
L. Vaidya, Dr. H. L. Jain and Dr. A. N. Upadhye very kindly read the Prakrt
passages and suggested many important emendations especially in the prakrt
[sic] dialogues and the Apabhramsa [sic] song of the Nflambaras towards the
end of Act II.' Despite these difficulties the editors succeeded in repairing the
text in many cases, often suggesting plausible emendations both in the Sanskrit
and the Prakrit portions. Their apparatus draws attention to parallel pas-
sages from the Nyayamanjan and other philosophical texts, and the various ap-
pendices (slokasuci, upayuktani vrttdni, grathantarasamvadah, visistasabdasuci,
prdkrtasandarbhacchdyd, suddhipatram) also prove to be useful. On the whole
we can say that the Sanskritists of today may consider themselves fortunate that
the first edition of such a difficult text on the basis of such meager manuscript
material was prepared by two most erudite scholars.
Nevertheless the editio princeps has its own shortcomings. Its careful colla-
tion with the manuscripts shows that the editors often resorted to silent emend-
ations or conjectures (marked as "RT (em.?)" in the apparatus). In the Prakrit
passages we can frequently observe an inclination on the part of the editors to-
wards "normalising" the text on the basis of Prakrit grammars, while in other
cases they leave "anomalous" Prakrit words unchanged. On the other hand
it seemed to be possible to improve upon the text of the Agamadambara with
the help of further emendations, as the apparatus of my edition will hopefully
demonstrate. There still remain a few passages where I could not make any use-
ful amendments to the text of the first edition and had to employ crux marks to
indicate my puzzlement. I am confident, however, that competent Sanskritists
and Prakritists will suggest plausible solutions for these corrupt readings.

3 Agamadambara (ed. pr.), pp. (2)-(3).

Ixvii
Chapter 5

A note on the edition and

the translation

5.1 Conventions
The apparatus is fully positive. In the bottom register each entry consists of a
lemma, followed by a lemma sign (]), followed by the sigla of the manuscript (s)
(Pa, Pu) and / or the editio princeps (RT) that read the accepted text, followed
by the variant readings separated by commas. In case neither the reading of the
manuscripts nor the emendation of the editores principes are considered to be
satisfactory, the lemma sign is followed by em. (i.e. "emendation", indicating
small repairs in the text) or conj. (marking bolder conjectures). The difference
is of course subjective. The emendations and conjectures of others that I have
accepted are attributed, as well as the emendations of the first editors ("em.
RT", or "RT em.?" when the emendation is silent). Other signs employed
in the register of variants: Aac = the reading of A before correction (ante
correctionem), Apc = the reading of A after correction (post correctionem);
[[xy]] = xy written in the manuscript and then canceled ([[ ]] = the effaced
aksara is not legible); U = gap in the manuscript or in the editio princeps;
— lacuna in the manuscript (marked with the same signs in the main text
of the edition; in the translation lacunae are marked as <...>); \xy] = xy is
not interpretable for me, probably corrupt (marked with the same signs in the
textus receptus); (xy) — xy is omitted in the manuscripts, and has been added
as a conjecture (marked with the same signs in the main text).
The middle register of the apparatus (when there are three registers on a
page, otherwise the one above the bottom register of variants) records testimonia
and parallels, mainly from the Nyayamanjan, and only occasionally from other
texts (quotations of parallel passages from other Sanskrit works will be found in
the Notes to the translation). The topmost register contains the Sanskrit chayd
of the Prakrit sentences if there are any on the page.

bcviii
 A note on the edition and the translation

5.2 Sand hi, punctuation, orthography

Sandhi has been normalised in the Sanskrit passages of the play. All punctuation
is mine and I have not reported when I deviated from the manuscripts in this
respect. In several cases I have silently changed the anusvdras of the manuscripts
to homorganic nasals. Another feature of the manuscripts not reflected in the
apparatus is the confusion of b and v.

5.3 The Prakrit passages

The Agamadambara, just as the majority of classical Indian dramas, is multi-
lingual. SaurasenI is spoken by the Boy, the Disciple in the first act, the Jain
Mendicant, the Nun, and the Ascetic in the second. One of the most remarkable
features of Jayanta's play is the length of the Magadhl passages: the words of
the Servant in the second act, and the dialogue of the two Adepts in the third.
The ntiambara couples sing in Apabhramsa, and a few verses of the play (e.g.
verse 4 in Act Two) are written in MaharastrT.
Editing the literary and artificial Prakrits of the dramas has many pitfalls.
As Steiner pointed out, 1
The problem which an editor faces when dealing with the differ-
ent Prakrits of a play is that, in contrast to Sanskrit, he is usually
confronted with a relatively poor Prakrit textual tradition of less
strictly normed languages. Moreover, our knowledge of Prakrit is
far below the level attained in Sanskrit. With that the question is
open whether, and to what degree, the playwrights actually followed
the general rules of Prakrit, or, to what extent the original Prakrit
of the plays had already been standardized.
Two extreme positions have been taken in this matter: Pischel and Hilleb-
randt were of the opinion that the texts should be normalised on the basis
of the rules laid down by the Prakrit grammarians, even if this means going
against the manuscripts, while Hertel and more recently Salomon expressed the
view that the readings of the manuscripts are of greater importance than the
grammars.2 'In order to be able to write a literary Prakrit different from col-
loquial language', writes Steiner, 'the playwrights themselves needed a Prakrit
grammar which furnished them at least with the general rules.'3 The editor,
however, has to face the fact that the available Prakrit grammars on Sauraserii
and Magadhl often contradict each other. What would be the preferred course
of action when, for instance, in MagadhT Sanskrit ks is supposed to become sk
according to Vararuci (11.8), hk according to Hemacandra (4.296), sk accord-
ing to Ramasarman (2.2.15) and Purusottama (12.6), while in the manuscripts
1 STEINER 2001, p. 63.
2 Cf. ibid., pp. 63f.
3 Ibid., p. 67.

bdx
 A note on the edition and the translation

of the Agamadambara we find either sk or kkh (the latter being the SaurasenT
equivalent of fcs)?4 Gawroiiski's following observation seems to be appropriate: 5
Die Prage also, ob alle Regeln der Grammatiker gegen die Hands-
chriften durchzufiiren sind, ist entschieden zu verneinen. Die Gram-
matiker bilden eine wichtige Quelle unserer Kenntnisse, aber sie
stehen nicht iiber, sondern neben den Handschriften. Sie miissen
immer zur Vergleich herangezogen werden, diirfen aber nie als das a
priori richtige enthaltend angesehen werden. Und wenn die Regeln
der Grammatiker mit unseren, aus den Handschriften deduzierten
Regeln nicht iibereinstimmen, wohl aber durch ihre Ungenauigkeit
Zeugnis davon ablegen, dafi die Praxis der MSS. schon zur Zeit
jener mittelalterlichen Grammatiker ebenso inkonsequent war, wie
sie heute ist, dann miissen wir unbedingt unseren Regeln eben in
dem Grade Vorzug geben, wie man einem kritischen Verfahren vor
einem kritiklosen Vorzug gibt.
On the other hand, as Steiner rightly points out, the assumption that 'each
poet did hi fact write (or dictate) Prakrit in an entirely precise and consistent
manner is a problematic one. Was there ever a completely regular Prakrit
and, especially, a consistent orthography? Is it not imaginable that the Prakrit
speaking persons of a drama occasionally used different grammatical or phonetic
forms of one and the same word?'6 Thus both appa and atta are used in
the Saurasem and MagadhT passages of Jayanta's play, and pace Pischel who
gives atta as the correct form in these dialects,7 it is not inconceivable that the
playwright did not bind himself to either of them.8 Finally one should also take
into account the possibility that 'certain forms used by poets in individual cases
could in fact be traced back to the grammarians.'9 Accordingly the MagadhT
word nasti (— ndsti) in the Agamadambara can be connected with Hemacandra
4.289: sasoh samyoge so 'gnsme\ 10
Steiner examined the oldest available manuscripts of Harsa's Nagananda
(AD 1155/56) and discovered several Prakrit forms that appear to be irregular
according to Pischel's grammar. 11 While editing the Agamadambara I found
many of these "irregular" forms in the manuscripts, e.g. janami and janavide
4 Another example is Sanskrit tisthatu, which in MagadhT should become cisthadu (v.l.
cista0 , citta0 ) according to Vararuci (11.14), citthadu according to Purusottama (12.33), and
cisthadu (v.l. cittha0 ) according to Hemacandra (4.298). The Manuscripts of the Agamadam­
bara have citthadu.
5 GAWRONSKi, pp. 280f., quoted (approvingly) in STEINER 1997, p. 163.
6 STEINER 2001, p. 70.
7 PlSCHEL §401.
8 Another example is the occurrence of both °ijjai and °mdi as passive forms in SauraseriT
and MagadhT.
9 STEINER 2001, p. 70.
10 Hemacandra is certainly later than Jayanta, but many of his rules may well go back to
earlier Prakrit grammars. Cf. GAWRONSKI, p. 280: 'wir haben ja alien Grund, zu vermuten ...
dafi sie [sc. die Grammatiker] zum grofien Teil "Beispile wie die Regeln von ihren Vorgangern"
heriibernahmen.' (quoted in STEINER 2001, p. 69, note 25.)
11 See STEINER 1997, chapter 9.

Ixx
 A note on the edition and the translation

in Magadhl, ayya used universally for Sanskrit an/a, khu after e and o, etc.
Some of these "irregularities" occur already in the fragments of Asvaghosa's
plays. These facts also confirmed that normalisation solely on the basis of
Pischel's grammar and the mediaeval Prakrit grammarians may not be the only
true method of editing dramatic Prakrits.
To summarise, I have preserved many readings of the manuscripts even if
these readings were not in perfect conformity with the rules laid down by the
Prakrit grammarians (often contradicting each other) or in Pischel's grammar. 12
On the other hand I emended the text when the reading of the manuscripts
(often discrepant) went against the most fundamental rules of the given dialect,
e.g. s, r, and o to s, I, and e in the Magadhl passages.
Finally the following observation of Steiner is well worth taking into consid-
eration for the editors of Sanskrit dramas: 13
One of the most important criteria for future critical revisions of play
editions is the comparative reading of accurately (or at least more
accurately) transmitted texts of the same literary genre as well as
texts and manuscripts of the same age and place of origin.

5.4 The translation and the notes

Translating the Agamadambara has proved to be a demanding enterprise. On
the one hand the translator is supposed to transmit (at least to a certain extent)
the literary qualities of the play, including Jayanta's sense of humour and satire.
On the other hand the reader expects a clear interpretation of the complicated
arguments of the philosophical debates. Since I am not a native speaker of Eng-
lish, I could only make an attempt at producing a readable (and in some cases
hopefully enjoyable) translation. As for the second task, I have tried to formu-
late even the more demanding arguments in a lucid way, using square brackets
to add information that helps the understanding. Many excellent Sanskritists
helped to polish my translation, all remaining shortcomings are due to my in-
adequacy.
The reader will find long quotations in the notes from various Sanskrit works.
The aim of these quotations is to place Jayanta's ideas in the intellectual context
of his age and thereby to make their interpretation more accurate. The notes
to the first act contain several extracts from the works of DharmakTrti and
Kumarila, Jayanta's two main sources in presenting and refuting the Buddhist
theories of ksanikatva and vijnanavada. I have also quoted from satires dir-
ected against Buddhism in order to point out various patterns also used by
Jayanta. The majority of the notes written to the second act treat the prob-
lems of editing the Prakrit passages, but the Jain doctrine of anekdntavdda and
the mysterious sect of the nilambaras are also dealt with. The annotation to
the third act has quotations from Naiyayika-Vaisesika and Saiddhantika Saiva
12The reader will find references to these rules in the endnotes.
13 STEINER 2001, pp. 71f.

Ixxi
 A note on the edition and the translation

works, showing their affinity in the questions of proving transmigration and the
existence of God. Finally the most frequently cited texts in the notes to Act
Four are Yamuna's Agamapramanya, which attempts to prove the authority
of Pancaratra, and Rumania's Tantravarttika, which presents a strictly ortho-
dox view of the validity of religious traditions, which is challenged by the more
liberal and pragmatic theory of sarvagamapramanya.

0
 Part II

Sanskrit Text
 311*1*1 «*V}

t II

qi 10
: II * II

11*1^: is
II STC^fr

20

Mala II
II ^TTr0 II
2 °^4j)ddJ ] em.RT, °^<dd PaPupc , °3<ld ° Puac SfirM S^"° ] conj.De-
zso-Isaacson, Wf%?Tt 5^"° RT(conj. ?), -Hf^rMil-A 0 Pa, ^IP^r^^i^ 0 Pu 5=TT-
^F^- ] PuRT , HKJr) Pa 6 3T^t 3Tft ^7cT =TFf ] PapcPu , 3T^t 3f$T ^Zvf ^TFT
RT(misreading Pu?) , at^'HWdrJ ^TTT Paac 6 °^c*d° ] em.RT, ogTTT0 PaPu
7 °^H<: ^»dH° ] em. RT , °^«l<^d«s( ° PaPu 8 R*^° ] PuRT , (q^SI 0 Pa
9 ^T: ] PuRT , >ftT Pa 9 ^T: ] PaRT , ^TT: Pu 9 °JTf^° ] PuRT , '
|"° Pa 10 ^-Hl^KlfH 0 ] PuRT, 'H«l1«hKlfc| °Pa 10^"] conj.Isaacson,
PaPuRT 12 °Wfrq~] PaRT, °W[[ ]]f^T Pu 12 *P*KI ° ] em.RT,
Pa , «h«JlPM<il 0 Pu 15 cRlvT ] em. RT , ar«l*i PaPu 21 fqPl<jtl>i ] em. ,
) PaPuRT
 25

II 3 II

II 30

35

IH

'TPT RTJ^FM ^H«T» y <i) ^r»oq fn fa i ^rl ^o vs.

40

ii ^rr 0 ii
I ^i i fa T»*I "il <4 PI m 1 1 : <a rq i *\ q -ril q,rTi«hK^i PPI ^ i : I
, cTT qT: S

cPTT SPr^rPrr fa ^ I : I 45

: II Y II

37 Cf. Kadambankathasara l.llab: ^r1*K ?cT «ZTIfi" l" TR" VRf: I; NM II

718.6: ST^ff Hq"<£lri«hK ^T *T SRTfcr TFW

26 f. °*TPf. . .MlIdH^ ] om. Pu 26 f. tmi^ Hl<^q ] Pa , ti^KHi-H^q RT ( em. ?)

28 °3*5Er* ] PuRT , «3oq-° Pa 29 ^|c|<*Mfd ] em. RT , Hfq"<^ci PaPu 31
em. RT , *HNHv PaPu 31 ° 4)^^11 5^° ] PaRT , °4)<^H[[ ]] Puac ,
Pupc 31 °^T^r° ] PapcPuRT , °?T[[ ]pT° Paac 31 °|T ^I^HI<hH ] RTpc ,
PaPu , °ft SfHI«h)4l RTac 36 3RT ] PapcPuRT , 3T[[ ]] Paoc 37 fq~-
; o ] PaPupc RT , fqq<,"||«; ^° Puac 40 ^^ifqcM^i ] em. ,
PaPu , ^xjd^NI em. RT 42 T ] em. RT , T PaPu 46
PuRT , UHlRj|«M'W 0 Pa 46 M^^-J ] em. RT , 5T*pfT PaPu
 so

~ 55

60

65
fn*ehM*l II
qii II

58 o ] RT(em. ?), ° PaPu 60 ] PuPapc RT, TrT0 Paac

PaRT, ^ Pu 61 ] PaRT, Pu 63^"°] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 64- ] conj.Isaacson, PaPuRT
 II <RT:

: II 10

ii ^rr° ii
^ TI i R

ftrtvt *IMI ^m ^rqi^i*<tirHMi i is

ii Tqr° ii

II : II

20

8 f.
13 * ^«J«ri , «hi-i ^-itnii •^rqi^'Wrqi-i 17

3 ff. = NM II 424.9-12.
5 $RHI ] PaPuNM , ffcrfvTT RT ( em. ?) 6 ^HH^^n^RifH ] RT ( em. ?) NM ,
H PaPu 8 ^TW0 ] RT(em. ?), ^FFT° PaPu S^T] PuRT,
Pa 8vdc|HJU| ] FaRT, ^FPT Pu H^IT0 ] PaRT, ^^T° Pu l
PaRT, ^TT° Pu 13?>TT] conj. , f^ PaPuRT 13 <TTT] conj. , ^" PaPuRT
13 ^TilR ] PaPuRTpc , ^IrcllR RTac 133TW*mT] conj., 3r^jT*H¥T PaPu,
RT ( em. ?) 15 §W ] PaPupcRT , ^3T (?) W Puoc 15 ^^41 ] em. RT ,
PaPu 15 ^r«IN^ri|lH ] em. RT , ^rqitirMl-l PaPu 17
em.RT, °£|T^| PaPu 17 ^^pjufr ] PaRT, ^^« Pu 22 °3JTTT ] RT(em. ?),
1T« PaPu
 : II ^ II
{ H ^nr° ii )
tf q i i^wi o <<M«HHdT HT| rTT " 25
! friid fa q *i R ?
II
TFT
I
: I 30

3 II

Rl H^<HO) f^" ^

d Mdlfd: I
35

: ? m II
II
ft" ^'-MI , <ni ^«i ui tmiv<5«r<g 40

25 f.
d ? 40 f.

30 ff. NM II 298.5-10 (bauddhapaksa):

24(3TT0 ) ] em.RT, om.PaPu 26f^^° ] em. , |":^^"° Pa, |":^"° PuRT 26 JW-
fFf] RT(em. ?), fWcqT^T PaPu 30 °T^T° ] PapcPuRT, °TR>T0 Paac 31°TTft]
em. RT , °IJ^T PaPu 31 ^TFT ] RTpc PaPu , ^U|Hv RTOC 36 fqvil^lfd ] em. RT ,
PaPu 36^TST5nr:] RT(em. ?), Mt^lfN: PaPu 38q<M^l ] Papc PuRT,
Paac 40 iT ] PaPuRTpc , ^T RTac 41 °^W 3T^° ] em. ,
em. RT , 0^":^T° PaPu 41 f"ig|w|MlK^T ] em. Isaacson , fwigi«lHlK^ em. RTpc ,
PaPu , ftg|U|l J IKl( RTac 42 f^": ] PaRT , ftr8f : Pu
 V9

- 45

qT f-i«il«i*n*JT
n
*ft ^r^rr, fr so

: II

: I 55

II ^ II

50 f. Hlffd

44 ff. NM I 196.1-2: 3TcT

T2RTFT: , ?f?rr: Rh^l-dl^' (PVin I p. 70.9-11) ?f^T I; also NM II
493.10-13 (bauddhapaksa):

48 NM II 439.3-4 :
qT 5iMtiTifa*iv ll 50 f. NM II 296.11-16:
qT qT

: I vr»^lH*Tl''i<-d-i
%T : , «hl«hKuIHN'HI I 54 ff. NM II 300.1-4 (bauddhapaksa):
i. e.
I

45 ° ] em. Sanderson , PaPuRT 47 ] em.Isaacson,

PaPupc , °dt Puac , em.RT 50 PaPuRTpc ,
RTac 50 3>^r ] PaPuRTpc , RTac 51 ^J^T ] PaPu , RT 51
PaPuRTpc , IH^HI RTac 54 (Hr^l: ] PaRT , farTT Pu 55 ^TTSfT0 ] PapcRT ,
Paac (?), Pu 57 °H^T: ] em.RT, : PaPu
 *» dltl si
qT *-qi<*si*l qT

r *TTqT 65
d^rr

^ II
II
, Tf?*r - 70

70 ff.
fq 511^1 tii qT

59 NM II 299.3-4 (bauddhapaksa):
cT%q" M<HI'4'Hdv ' ^Tl (cf. PV (Pandey) 2.3ab:
CT3T5T M<^l^fldv I) 61 ff. NM II 306.3-13 (bauddhapaksa):
f^" fcjdl i-q^irni ^Tq^T, afs^HOol qTI
flf ^c!" x^^^HT: II IT crf|"
: I snTTql^ avrvn^l (i.e.
I *TTqT f^" f<i
(i.e. snTTqTT) ^«HlrH* %?T, ^l^q" ^q^q T THqTT I 3THq»iirH«h

I; also NM II 307.1-7 (bauddhapaksa): 3rfT ^T ^T5TfT

T ^qH*<M''i*-Md I a^Hi<5irHtoi*n(qii*iiql
ff^T 1%^: ^«IH^-: I 67 f. NM II.296.15-197.3 (bauddhapaksa): %T

em.RTpc , d)HI^ PaPu, dl^ RTac 62 °^d" ] PaPuRTpc ,

U fd~ RTac 63 qT ] PuRT, ^T Pa 63 °3Wf ] PaRT, °f$RT Pu 65 °q~ HT° ]
Papc PuRT, 0 qT*TT0 Paac 66 *T*T° ] em. RT, *RT0 PaPu 68 °^nfT ] em. (also
Papc ?), 0^TTfT Pa(ac?) PuRT 68 |":^T^1" ] PaPu, g":HT«f*r em.RT 7(
PaPuRTpc , ^Tf^T RTac
 , oT 3nf TJflf rWn^vi Rmi<T>is HiO^I^ ? 3Tr«it
, |quu||U| q~T ^l«lal ft" Wl~ fa 3J

i
II PTCf: II

x> : \* II 80
7 f-i<jrH*»
77 NM II 488.4-13 (bauddhapaksa): d-eMd — fT dNdv

^i far
I 5lHI«hl<.M" W ^IH WRTI; also
NM II 492.15-493.3 (bauddhapaksa): 3||<hK^VI IdmfH f^" m<fcfir*{**n

iv I 78 f.
NM II 489.12-17 (bauddhapaksa):

qT
: em. Isaacson, ed.:
79 f. NM II 490.15-17 (bauddhapaksa): 5TRT

71 fqUU||W|U| ] PaRT , (q"U||U)U| Pu 71 MlO^R ] em. , M I ("^ R; PaPuRT 72

qT d^T ] em. , 3fU|«tNldU| PaPu , ^^q"l^«l RTac , ^ qj %TJf RTpc 72
^3T^] em.RTpc , M*||^MM| *^~ Pa, M«hl(f|v3Mid Pu, H«hll>|vJMtd RTac 72
conj. , Rilfrid) PaPuRT 72 fq~ ^TT r"l<*id"l ] conj.Isaacson, Fq"!^!^*!^"! PaPu,
"! RT(em. ?) 73 SFTd^T d^] conj. , 3T^Td~ d^T PaPuRT 73
] PaPu, °4>{)A|Rj RTpc , °*Ri|Ri RTac 73 ^TITW ] conj. , ^tT^ PaPu,
" RT(em. ?) 75 TT^rfH'] conj.Isaacson, ^^f^ PaPuRT 76
conj.Isaacson, °dM<l° Pa, °dl^<l ° Pu, °dlH<l° RT 76 °<g=td*i 0 ] PuRT,
Pa 785^1^"°] em.RT, y<hW ° PaPu 79^%] em. Isaacson,
PaPuRT
 II T^": II
cHTT

90

fq~
" 95

II : II
: fqt ^n
": II ioo

: nfool ^T^ifqlV M^isil-i ^iif-i W

85 f.
vI 94 ff.

] RT(em. ?), £^"° PaPu 82 Hq"«IHI ° ] PuRT, Hc(l«IHI 0 Pa 90

PaPuRTpc , °q^T° RTac 95 "^^"° ] em. RT , TW° PaPu 95 H^fl" ]
PaPu, H^T RT(em. ?) 96 rtRK^ ] PaRT, ^f%^1" Pu 96 trfeWT ] PaPu,
om.RT 97 3rnrf<rore1" ] em.RT, 3INRl^ PaPu 97 ««|fu«|^l ] PaRT, °cj|u|«{l
Pu 99 qW ] PaRT , q^T Pu 100 (H^lTi: ] em. , Pl'eniTi: II { II Iq *<r»*-*i «?> : II
}em.RT, fT:^JRT: PaPupc , Pi^hld: Puac 103 ^T«TRT: ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu
 105

*i«q4)i: I d^HI-H

no

I us

: II 120

*i 'M Rt
!ai : I
125
111 I 115 f. T
i I 119
105 f. NM I 7.6-9:

:? 122 fF. cf. NM II 347.13-16:

106 -4|sfc|{l ] em. RT , rMrhlO PaPu 107 ^^l4lc) ] em. RT , 3J>Ml4l^ PaPu
STCzfT] RT(em. ?), 3TTdTT PaPu 115 T^] PaPuRTac , ^^f RTpc 115
PaPuRTac , »»fr ^ RTpc 115 *FTr° ] paRT , *R>ro Pu 119
RT(em. ?), 3TF2JT PaPu 122 TTT^T^ ] RT(em. ?), <H"T)^+ PaPu 124
?T0 ] RT(em. ?), °-^|y ° PaPu 125 °f?W0 ] RT(em. ?), °f^nPT° PaPu 125
T° ] Papc PuRT, °f?lT0 Paac
 3|HIH««A JTWT

fa CM fa Pi fa ei: fin Id ^$1

: II II
H *: II

i fq
- 135

140

WTRT

I *p I
133 fF.

127 MRj|4t fn4"1*Hv ] em. , HRsi-ft In^uulAi^ Pa , Pu ,

M"3 em.RT 128 °¥^"° ] RT(em. ?), 0^f0 PaPu 128 ° ] PapcPuRT,
Paac ISOSfFrT0 ] PuRT, Pa 130 ° : ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 133 3TGST ^ra" ] PaRT , Pu 133 ^TFT ] PaPu , TT"-
RT 133 °Jtfk3r° ] PaPuRTpc , °JTfeaT° RTac 133 ] PaPuRTpc ,
RTOC 134 ° ] PaPuRT pc , ro RTac 134
RT(em. ?), M«*h<d° PaPu 135 era.RTpc , °(H
RTac , °nJ|^d<M^irc|fM«M ° (?) Pa , Pu 135
RT(em. ?), 0^3TWT° PaPu 136 "f^T^T 0 ] em.RT, Pa, 'l*!^0 Pu
136 »«^«I^K 0 ] conj. , °M)M^K° PaPuRT 138 RT(em. ?),
PaPu 139 °TTfT° ] PaRT, °TT^cr<> pu
 - 145

II
I cRT

il d^TT JW: II iso

i -^j *t
II ^Z": II

II 155
qT

II qT: II

ieo
fqt fT ryi^D^^^W^TT TRPT

II

145 ff.
^Tlvsi-Ti-^^i ?T £3<^ I 154
159 ff. 3TTST, T ?^%%cRr I T?*!",

iJa^i

145 °*Jq"° ] conj. , 0 ^° PaPuRT 145 °JPC° ] PaPuRTpc , 0TF^T0 RTac 146
f. o(u|oH<*jr<<i 0 ] PaRT , 0f^nrfTT° Pu 146 ^ftSTWT1^^ ] em. ,
PaPu , *ft3TTjfn=3!»r em. RT 146 <^fl"fd ] PuRT , ^'fd Pa 152
conj.Isaacson, fvr^T^Tt^Rt ^":^II(H PaPu,
RT ( em. ?) 154 3TWT° ] em. , 3TqT° PaPuRT 154
RTpc (em. ?), ^^TTPT0 PaPu, °M^TlH <> RTac 156 ^T° ] PuRT, ^T° Pa
159 ^T3r ] em. , 3T%3T PaPuRT 159 l^il"! ] PaRT , 1{^I«I Pu 160
PaRT, °*4^|U|| «rfo Pu i60*^«fyi ] RT(em. ?), 4>3«W PaPu 160
] em. , fwN^dl PaPu , fuiM^dl RT ( em. ?) 161 TTW^T ^qw?i«; ] em. ,
)<i RT(em. ?), TRnT^q^ftT PapcPu , MN<J|° Paac 163 ^WT« ] PaRT,
Pu 163 oJPRT^TT 0 ] em.RT, °H<y«>MH ° PaPu
 II q^T: II
^
fV PTSTT °r
II ^TRT° II
i^K: I 170
II q^r: II
"I q ml r> TTT
f?t IT ("I^HS^ ^nroit q'^-d'jj ^^n $vs ii
II ^TcT° II
I TTT ^T HiHf"«a : xm ^ *iTTi ^-t i H i : 175
I

166 ff. 3TPI", ^HR" T^T, ITT f^r^: ^fad^ sfT fM««fa T cPTT
172 f.
183

PaPuRTpc , 3T5ZT, ^^" RTac 167 °$cMy ] PaPu,

RT (em. ?) lesfeftftr] conj. , fc^U PaPuRT 168 1^ ^ I Ri <*T° ] PaPu,
3T° RT (em.?, unmetrical) 168q^3TOr] RT(em. ?), ^STfT PaPu
em.RT, ^vrill *~ Pa, ^vrl||Ul^ pu 172 3TTOT ] PaRT , 3T Pu 173
RT(em. ?), °f^~ PaPu (unmetrical) 173^n"ft] PaRT , *PTT Pu (unmetrical) 176
] PuRT , °T^r^T0 Pa 176 °^T ] em. RT , °^<H^ PaPu 178 °fT-
] PaRT , °fMt^ Pu 179 fa^f: ] PaRT , fa^f Pu 185 sll^UI* ] PuRT ,
Pa 185 f«i«<yir<«IIHI ] em. RT , faqTSfT i^qi^q PaPu
 II

II :
I SiMr^ 3iis,?>*jJ*i: I
: , 3TTfq~2RTII 190

195

200

: II

, RhH^H MlRidl ^ftf I 205

II ^TT° II

ftri
2°7 f^ftqt

199 A 1.4.29.

187 °M«yci ^<4*1I 0 ] conj. , °H«aci ^r^ilHI ° em.RT, PaPu

T] RT(em. ?), q^T PaPu 194^TrT° ] PaPu, em.RT
] em.RT, °*iqg>l PaPu 195f^lfd ] PaPu, ^Rl I em.RT 195 T
PuRT, q^1"Pa 195^«c|HI *l«i^HN^ ] conj.
em.RT 197^1^"] PuRT, dl^|U| Pa 200 ^WT: ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 201 fH^:] PaPu, fH^f: (fe|J|d*D em.RT 202 fevj|-HHl ] PaRT ,
^fl" Pu 203 {illfl-i} ] conj. Sanderson , om.PaPuRT 205^:111^1"] em.RT,
PaPu 207 *TTTft ] RT ( em. ?), T^T PaPu
 v II
dr^*i<M<?r«i<t^imi*i? 3HT HWIH! - 210

: II

215

II felt

: MIHMI 220

II dTT: xqsi-n ^Rnq^TT 3m*i<M : II

{ II MlRN^l: II }
frrTt" fqq^Mifqq
225

II

230

213 f. cf. NM 1642.9-12:

210 T] em. , *T PaPuRT 213 ] RT(em. ?), ° PaPu 213

] conj.Isaacson, °fd Pa, °f^RTfe"0 Pu, RT(em. ?
] conj.Isaacson, SMIM TT^f0 PaPuRT 216 fa«Kcl ] PaRT,
Pu 217 f*T: ] em.RT, sl4)H: PaPu 217 0H^T«r] RT(em. ?), H^PT PaPu
219 «|dl4) ] PuRT , c|dl4) Pa 219 5fd«(^«l: ] PuRT , s(d«^«l: Pa 222
RT(em. ?), M (cl^lfd PaPu 223 {5TTf^n~:} ] em.RT, om.PaPu 224 o
RT (em.?), °M*ffa'fl PaPu 224 c|«JH^U*^l«< ] em.RT, PaPu,
conj.RT 225 I TJT* ] RT (em. ?), M*4||H: I dNjfl °PaPu
 : II

235

: ? II II

I 240

ii n ii

5TT1V 0 II 245

II tsiia«r>: II

II PT^p, <slM**il^ II
250

II ^RT° II

240 cf. NM I 27.13-28.3: *T^ ^T fHil^fMHMR^n'ldl 3T(T

v I; also NM II 635.1-3:
fH I
, cT%nfT

232 ^-^-d ] em. RT , ^^d PaPu 234 ^H<HT^ ] PuRT , qtUHrq Pa

236*fq~5rT ff^T] PaPu, *Tq^rT: I ff^T RT(em. ?, unmetrical) 237
em.RT, °RHK$d) Pa, °fq^lT f^ft Pu 241%q"*qt] conj.RT,
PaPu 241 T^WT ] PaRT , H^d) Pu 242 W«TT ] em. RT , *Tc*TT PaPu ,
conj.RT 244 °^: ] PaRT, «*j Pu 246 °HqT: ] PaRT, °HWT Pu
248 ^HIU* ] PaRT , ^^I'H* Pu
 : II

255

q i <s*i I ^i

qiq 200
sfr
II ^^ II

f-iqly|*ii^lfa II ^3 II
II 265

II
270
II 7Tfir° II

II

275

: &"i*i«'irq*il
II
PuRT, 5rT3"Pa 258 °^TT° ] PapcPuRT, °«JHHI° Paac 258
: ] PapcPuRT , °^'WdJ I ^TcT Paac 258 °f^: ] PaRT , °f*T%: Pu
259 *K«II° ] RT ( em. ?), *<«ll° PaPu 261 H° ] PapcPuRT ,
d ° Paac 264^"] PuRT, om.Pa 266
em. Isaacson , ^cJrcm PaPuRT 267 fF. iT^:...^dlH^ ] om.Paac , inserted
on the margin Papc 272 ^c|f^dl: ] PapcPuRT , ^Rlf^dl: Paac 275
PuRT , 0 '-McjJlo Pa 276 %^tT ] PaPuRTpc , %^N" RTac
 280

:il
I : 285

: II

• 29°
II

sfr

295

285 ff. NM II 303.14-304.3 (bauddhapaksa):

«I«Jr
289 f. NM II 300.1-6 (bauddhapaksa) HNHJ

rTFT ^iqiiv ^TrT ^*iq«*<icl II 295 ff.

NM II 323.11-15: <hl4«hKuIHN ITT ^-K-rlR^I'd §<?MHi«5: I
TqTT <r»K«i FTRT 1 T
If'Mfd: f^gT ^i«n-n\ II
283 H^rhl ] em. RT , -f^?h) PaPu 284 ff. II
conj.Sanderson, II HTcT: II 25abcd II ": II
PaPuRT 285 °q^wn"° ] em. , °q^JT° PaPuRT 288 f^WT ] em. RT , f^TRT PaPu
290 *TW ] em. Sanderson , cfcq" PaPu , cTW RT 293 aihiWl ] PaRT ,
«TT Pu 293 oMN^dd<IHv ] em. RT , «MNTfd<i PaPu 295 ^r^RT ] PaPu ,
RT(em. ?)
 ST^FTT

: ? II RVS II
II TW: II
"*"~ ' "" 300

II ^TcT: II

310

300 f. NM II 324.1-3:
a
304 f. NM II 322.1-6:
: I a>TT r — <r><Hi<5ii TFT?
la I *TlT
-icis I; also
NM II 343.5-14: T Hl^i 1! crlHIrHM H
^" «l*?<dHv ll ^4" -H-rilfHHI S^^T W fRT

: I <M4«M^»i»iiq
: II;
also NM II 344.1-6:

298 *<«!! ° ] em. , +<?"!! » PaPuRT 303 ^^^^1^^ ] PaPu, ^tT^^^H RT

(em.?) 307 °*rTq~ ^^l 1^ ] conj.Isaacson, °^N^d^ conj.RT,
PaPu 308 fr*T: ] PaRT, ^r*T Pu
 :ll
315

320

'Moil
II PWII
-~^- r..........—.r.r.n. .
Tl - 325

cHTT

330

313 ff. NM II 325.5-10:

: I

: I 322 ff. NM II 327.5-8: -i ja'<j«i ja<,rqirqfq<TK»Mi*idj -T

: I -HIH^H: 5T«qTr: *INHWIrM^IHq'd II

331 ff. NM II 327.13-15: <hK*<»MmK«hl^rq'<$lHKM<5:J*ri'M

313 flrcllRifd ] em. RT , HrqTfef*ro PaPu 313 °FqHiJ4| 0 ] em. RT , °fcm^° PaPu
313 fq^^l" 0 ] PaPuRTpc , q"<?<d[l 0 RTac 317 FTT^ql^ ] em.Isaacson,
PaPuRT 318 °«n^ ] em. , 0 «TT%T PaPuRT 318 fH^l^f^ 0 ] em. RT ,
PaPu 319cfr^Nr° ] RT(em. ?), cR^"0 PaPu 323 °ol(RA*l ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 325 ^f^TKqvT0 ] em. RT , -M^'STf* PaPu 326 °^dN° ] Papc
PuRT, °ctq~0 Paoc 326<t>N-ti<l*TT0 ] RT(em. ?), *N'd<*Tro PaPu 328 qT]
PaPupcRT , ^H" Puac 331 °|^T fq~° ] em. RT , °|^fqL° PaPu
 SWTt

qT I qi3«ia <M<J*i ? II W II
V X »
335

II ft II

340

Mi*iai : I
: , far ^

345

349
337 S. NM II 328.3-12: ^NH

: , Mfddl f^ir*Ti
I JJ3", t
qT

: I
337 °cqTrf?T0 ] em. RT , ^ufa 0 PaPu 337 HH'dX 0 ] em. RT , Hc«l-r1^ 0 PaPu
338 VT%cT ] RT ( em. ?), HTW Pa , *TTW Pu 339 fTlM^mH. 1 paPu , om. RT 341
I*l° ] RT(em. ?), fclHI^ 0 PaPu 342 °4>K«IHI° ] RT(em. ?), °*KU|^TT0 Pa,
3TT° Pu 342 f^TrET: I f^R" vJTTcT^? ] conj.Sanderson-Dezso, f^T: I

PaPuRT 343 °%Tq~° ] em. RT , °RUq ° PaPu 343 ^" ] PuRT , T Pa 344 fqTT-
HFT° ] em. RT , fq^TFT0 PaPu 345 *T?T$~ ] PaPupcRT , Tc^" Puac 345 'HHH: ]
RT(em. ?), flHH° PaPu 349 0 qT=^T] RT(em. ?), °qT^T PaPu 349^] Pa,
Pu , ^" RT
 II : II 350

: II 355
I

ii ?fd~ IH^IK^PTI n
II STTcT 0 II
I <M l*i Id xrMf*i5i'm qiRHdl S^f ^: I
xr^sT

d<lM MldlyH^«l OTFT

365

v II ^^ II
II ^RT° II 370

351 a « , ^' o 353

359 ad pratyabhijna cf. NM II 329 ff. 360 ff. NM II 338.8-9:

I rRT ^T %i ("!<»> yif^ ?T«^"? 371 ff. NM
II 496.11-14:
lldHlfd

351 ^TOfo ] RT(em. ?), "° PaPu 353 3^T^TT3T ] RT(em. ?), ^qtni«T(?) Pa,
Pu 353 ^3TRT ] em. , T^T PaPuRT 353 tfgtJ5W ] em. RT ,
PaPu 355^RT?T0 ] RT(em. ?), ^TcT° PaPu 356 f. °-MNH I T ] em.RT,
PaPu 359 yr^rH^I^I ] em. RT , HrMfajflNI PaPu 359 qifacil ] RT ,
PaPu
 Rr>*iirM-t: x^c^r^l^KH-M^ qT I

, ^ ^ II 375

II tW: II

II ^TrT° II

IITW: II sso

II ^ra"0 II

381 f. NM II 497.5-11 (bauddhapaksa):

f|T

cKfdR*) 5«^: FTTcT? 384 ff. NM II 497.17-498.5:

^1 : I T f^"

386 ff. cf. NM II 499.16-500.10:

] em.Isaacson, ^ <Jldd PaPuRT 374 °cT] PaRT, °rT Pu

379 ^T-f ] RT ( em. ?), =T ^ PaPu 386 dHIHv ] RT ( em. ?), sKdM PaPu
 390
II ^TTcT 0 II
^RTT:
II
*Tl»i*iq^)HHI^ H^": I 395
II ^TrT° II
:I

: I 400
II 3* II

II
II ^R S|f: II 405

388 ff. NM II 508.11-12: T ^" ?IMrc|

388 T ^ ^RT° ] RT(em. ?), ^-f ^r?T0 PapcPu, rTCT° Paac 389 5TPT ] PaRT,
^TFT Pu 389 3F^T° ] PaRT , 3fr^T° Pu 389 'Dc^lRi 0 ] em. RT , ^f
PaPu 389 °5t^r° ] PaRT, 0^r° Pu 390 0 r«IH«IMK«llRifd ] conj.,
d PaPuRT 3973T^T] RT(em. ?), STfcT PaPu 399 °*ift^ ] PaRT,
Pu 400 ^PT: ] em. RT , Sfa": PaPu 402 <t
em. , «?i*irT)-f>-««|^IDq-UrH<h: PaPu, «hl^3>^«*-q ^1^*^11 51^1 em.RT
 II cRT: Ufa Slid %cf: I %T: II

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r fr aif^i *re^r 3r%^rlr % w

10

2 S. T M)i|d 4T)drtl ^TT T T <ilHII ^FTR" <*-Md I

: II 6 ff. cfrT
dl^^T)

'FIT ftiMwi^q^ila: I 11 ff.

Hi <T>WI i t*>«fM- I

: I %ET: ] PaPu, %S": RT(eyeskip) 3 3PT ] em.RT, %4t Pa"° ,

Papc , Rnff" Pu 5 fq"$l^ ] conj. , f^iJ-Nd PaPuRTac (unmetrical) , f«l$N*! RTpc
(unmetrical) 5 qT^WqT5Ttr ] conj.RT, q^UNIifU PaPu 6 "iRn ] PaPu, WfN"
RT(em. ?) 6*^q~fW°] PapcPu, ^qT fW0 Paoc , ^q" q^TST0 RT(dittogra-
phy) eST^nTT] em.Isaacson, ST^TWT conj.Bhat, ^««l I Pa, ^^TWT PuRT 6 °3T-
RT(em. ?), °<*miU| PaPu 73TTW] PaPu, 3TW RT ( em. ?) 7
conj. , atlfq'^RjAI^ PaPu, ^if^^RjAI^ RT(em. ?) TMvHlj ] Pu,
^T Pa, (MvTMlRj RT 7^f5t]em. , ^" PaPu, 1TTT em.RT 83T^T]
Pa , 3Tr3T RT 8 3TFRt ] PaRT , 3TRR^~ Pu 8 T?r ] em. , W PaPu
RT ( em. ?) 9 pjJUKfvhrifHtH^ ] Pa , Ril<JKrW»<irH«H^ Pu ,
RT(em. ?) 9 srf^T] em., STffT PaPu, vrf&T RT(em. ?) 9W 3T] em. ,
3T PaPuRT 9^"] PaRT, ^>f%" Pu 9?IT] em. , *TT PaPuRT 11
conj. , fq"fd)l{ PaPuRT 11 ^^FT0 ] conj.RTpc , 0HtTT° PaPuRTac 11
em.RT, °'Hq"^<il PaPu llrt^^ld ] PaPu, t*J«H«l1^fd RT(em. ?)
PaPu, ^^"° RT(em. ?) 12^qT»T3ro ] PuRT , ^q^T3T° Pa 12 °q^l<^ ] em. ,
PaPu, 0 qTT^ RT(em. ?) 13 ^T^T ] PaRT , *Tfft Pu
 15

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II cRT: : §TTW?r: I
^fa-T 20

ii
^R^" ^ ft" ^^ftrar «r Trftw?
25

14 f.
17 f.

20 ff.
-TST: , an-wl
24
26 f.

em., f3T PaPuRT 14 ^TT ] em. , HT PaPu, 3f conj.RT 14 °qTT-

RT(em. ?), ^qTT^t PaPu 14 l"lc»idri 0 ] em., l"i«*ir> 0 PaPu,
^ RT(em. ?) 14 °t|^l^ ] em.RT, °'^T^" PaPu 14^^"°] PaPu,
RT ( em. ?) 15 frfq^" ] em. RT , $fc|<i<A PaPu 15 M Al l^cl ] em. , iJ W l^'ol PaPu ,
TSn^rff RT(em. ?) 17«rfT° ] em.RT, srffcT0 PaPu ITlT^lT] em. , I^TT PaPuRT
PaPupcRT, Puac I ] RT(em. ?), PaPu
: I : ] PaPu , : RT ( eyeskip ) 19 HWT ] PaPu , RT ( typo )
RT(em. ?), PaPu 20 PaPu, RT(em. ?)
RT(em. PaPu 21 RT(em. ?), HTqlfr PaPu
PaRT, PaPu , . ?) 24^"] em.,
RT(em. ?) PaPuRTpc , RTO em.RT,
PaPu 26^] RT(em. ?), PaPu 26 °q^T ] em.RT, PaPu 27
RT(em. ?), PaPu 28 fa ^^ ] PapcPuRT, Paac
 3THiq)^R« I dT so
II cPTT <h<lfd I

35

II §TT° ,' II

40

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29 f. -ti-i-i
:I 32
1 34
36 f.
I 39 f.
I 42 f. srf^T qi<r>anfVq(-i , f

em. , PaRT , Pu conj.

em.RT RT(em. ?), PaPu
c||u|i||U| ] RT ( em. ?) 30 °^~ ] em. , °^ft PaPuRT 30
^"] em. , PaPuRT 32 "^^T] RT(em. ?), ^WT Pa, ^T Pu 32
em., WT PaPuRT em.RTpc , PaPuRTac 34 em.RT,
PaPu 34 RT(em. ?), PaPu 34 RT(conj. ?),
PaPu 34 em.RT, °^lfM«l PaPu 36
PaPu, RT(em. ?) 36 RT(em. ?), ^T° PaPu 36 ^NT ] em.,
em.RT 36 conj., 3T^r5fr* Pa, 3fwft PuRT 36
PaRT, PaRTpc , ^"KRHpK^ PuRTac 37
f^"] em.RTpc , PaPuRT PaPu,
PaPu, RT(typo?) 39 IT^T ] RT(em. ?), TT^TT PaPu 42
em.RT, cll^d<n-H("l PaPu 42^1^ ] em., <)^i PaPuRT 43
RT(em. ?), fjrfW*T PaPu 43 <f)^H ] em.RT, ^t*T PaPu
 II ^: II
? 45

II
ft"

II z*:, n

50

55

60

II STT° II
45 3»" HrM^:5<l4|| H*<HI^ ^I: 47
49 3Tnl", fdftr^M TT <5**N<jTiiTi: I
52

56 3TFF, hH') -H-HK^clNI ^vrviilHNIH q«*cl ? 59

«nlV>*Nl: I 61 qir>3»*iil\^q x5»Rn<iiR*i

45 °fW° ] PaPu, °^r:° RT(em. ?) 45°^T7TTT^] PaRT, *V*rTtT pu 45 q-

317^ ] em. , 4Ull4l PaPuRT 48 ^'^FT ] RT ( em. ?), f=r:HHI PaPu 49 3^T ]
PaPu, 3F?3r RT(em. ?) 49^^^° ] conj. , ^f^f° Pa(?) Pu, fff° em.RToc ,
P^° em. RTpc 49 HHK?KrH4-^ ° ] PaRT , 0T^^fH^ 0 Pu 52 °f>T^ ]
PaPuRTpc , Ofir^ RTac 52iT3^] em.RT, J^ PaPu 53^1^^° ] PaRT,
Pu 53q^tf^"] PaRT, cj«)f^ Pu 54 STrfoft ] PaRT, 3T>pjft" Pu 54 IV-
] PaRT , oT^r° Pu 56 3TW ] PaPu , SFroT RT ( em. ?) 56 TT^ ] PaPu ,
em.RT 56°^!^] em.RT, 0f^TT PaPu 56 0f^T^r] PaPuRTac ,
conj.RTpc 57Ttq] PaPu, om.RT 59qt"] PapcRT, q^ Paac ,
Pu
 II ^T: II
rn 3f fa ^o - 65

n ^r: n
rT^t"

75

II «TT° II
63 ^TcT: ^pT:? 65 f. cRT:
68
70 «ri> , ^« fiflKlf'Mfd: I rRT: ^T:? 72 3ffFJ", cRT
TT n
75 ^"T f^" ti^^a: (?) f. . . f I

75 cf. NM II 390.5-6 (quoting Sankhyakarika 21):

] em.RT, cRTTPa, rlrfr Pu 65df^HM^d° ] em. , ^f5qw*5T° Pa,

Pu , df®HvJMid° em. RT 65 °fc|^^i <1 ] em. , °(q<,W° em. RT , ^(
PaPu 65 ^fwi^cfllJ ] RT (em. ?), ^ f"l -«^vil ^ PaPu 66
em. , ^KfKH^ "l^^l^ PaPuRT 66 cRfT0 ] em. , cTW° PaPuRT 68 3T-
PaPuRTpc , "^ RTac 70 fft^T ^" ] PaRT , ffT^TT ^R" Pu 70
PaPuRTpc , °f RTac 723pSEr]PaPu, «TFJT RT ( em. ?) 72
em., *Md«4 em.RT, ^JrH^ PaPu 72 STfaT^ ^rfWST ] em.RTpc ,
PaRToc , flTfarat ^T° Pu 72 ^fui^^^«M*i ] em. RTpc , ^R»MH^U| ri'H PaPuRTac
RT(em. ?), M(U^ U f^TST Pa, Tf^frRT Pu 73^^^"!^ ] em.,
RT(em. ?), ^"N^uil^ PaPu 733TWIW] em. , ^TTOTf^T Pa, ^"1^1 Pu,
RT ( em. ?) 73 W^~ ] em. , T5Rt PaPuRT 75 tl^l<^ ] conj. ,
RT(em. ?), 4I^I<) PaPu
 II ^r: II
ft" *r
II 8JTT0 II

ft"
ss

90

II ^r: II

95

ft" M^llRl
: II

79 ctli , " *TT T gf"? 81

I 83 qi«>, *" ^Tl cJI'H^'l* " <r»*qiH I 85
^ftf^Tsfr? 87 f^F 5?r|lill 4>P<U||R-I ? 91 fT ftRF,
94
I 97

em.RTpc , ^frWfH PaPuRToc 81 *T] RT(em. ?), T PaPu

RT(em. ?), ^Wldl Pa, 3(U|d) Pu 83 <ilfNTllw|y!r] em.Bhat,
PaPuRT 83 *<MW* ] em. , <hri4«-H PaPu , *^R4fH RT ( em. ?) 85
PaRT, W3TT Pu 85 ^fs^WT ] PaRT, ^foH"!! Pu 90 Ufa^fcfT] em.RT, ^T-
PaPu 91 fR*f] RT(em. ?), ffl" PaPu 91 ^<ilfl ] em. , f^T5T PaPuRT
94 dN*l° ] em. , dWfl* PaPu , d!H*l° RT ( em. ?) 94 «IN**f4l ] em. , 3TT-
PaPu, 3u^<r^f5T RT(em. ?) 95 $SKr>5^l ] conj. , ^r«r>w^^ti PaPu,
conj.RT, M«hri fcU$J conj.RT 96 ^TT^ft: ] PaRT, MK*H Pu 97 T-
RT(em. ?), MJIlRK^H PaPu
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115 oras-ST ] RT(em. ?), PaPu RT (em. ?), I^T PaPu 115
«icl^] PaRT, 3TcTt Pu em.RT, PaPu 116 {SprorT ^fal-
3TT 3TT°) ] conj., om.PaPu, em.RT 116 ] PaPu, 3T-
RT(em. ?) 117 f Pa, Pu, » RT(em. ?)
119 ITT] em.RT, JTfPaPu ] RT(em. ?), «TT° PaPu 125 fV] PaPu,
ft"RT(em. ?) 125 ^t>] PaPu, ^TTtfV RT ( em. ?) 125 Pa, ^««|<5|
RT(em. ?), SHIRTY Pu 127^=^uft] PaPu, ^ U ^T RT(typo) 128 II ]
PaPu, II fa*=b I Til II {M^^I*:)em.RT 130 (^TcT0 ) ] em.RT, om. PaPu 131
RT ( em. ?), Tftfff PaPu 131 Wife ] em. RT , H^T PaPu , H^T conj. Goodall
] RT(em. ?), J^"° PaPu 132 ^FT° ] PaRT, %^t *T° Pu
 II ^r: II 135
HT qft^TI dW ^T dq*-tf)"i
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II q-er: II 140
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136 ^TT I: I 141 ff.

136 3J«4HI ] PaPu , ^vrvjJHI RT ( em. ?) 138 °5TT ] em. , °5TTT PaPuRT 141
PaRT, -H") Pu 141 3(^"0 ] PapcPuRT, ^TT^0 Paoc 142 3TCZT-
PaPu, RT(em. ?) 142 HT^T^° ] PaRT, *UH**° Pu 142 cTT
con. , c PaRT, cTlW Pu 142 frl"^ ] em.RT, fwi^^ Papc (?),
Paac (?) Pu 143 Ht ] PaRT , ^ Pu 143 TSTmt ] PaRT , ^3Tmt Pu
145 ^>TT0 ] RT(em. ?), ^TfT0 PaPu 147TfT^rT0 ] PuRT, MR*! 0 Pa 150 ST-
con., iv PaPu,
em.RT 153 °>T] em.RT, «*[ PaPu 153
em.RT, PaPu 155 ] PaPuRTpc , f^TqfV0 RTac
 srfwr d
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165

II ^ II
ii psrr: ii
1*1* 170

: I : I
175

159 ff
162 ff.
:ll 165 ff.

169
RT(em. ?), °$II*-MI PaPu 160 ^qT^TT0 ] em.RT, PaPu
] PuRT, ^rr5r*f^rPa 161 ^T^^r0 ] PaRT, °T^T° Pu
PaPu, f^FT° RT(typo) 163 °^T° ] PapcPuRT, °^"° PaQC 163
PaPuRTpc , °f^f|JJ| 0 RTac 163 oUUIJl^^lUJ ] conj.
Pa, Pu, °^«<J|q^>|u| em. RTOC , em. RTpc 164
PaPu, RT(em. ?) 166 RT(em. ?), Pa,
; Pu (The lacuna is marked by one dash in the manuscript.) 166
PaRT, °3f|r Pu 166<dfq"vJM|$ ] PuRT, *f Pa 166 PaPuRTpc ,
flO<Hx RTOC 167 <^fH^g° ] PaRT, Pu 172 RT(em. ?),
PaPu 173^1?^: 'H^-^l: ] RT(em. ?), PaPu 173
PaRT, ^tn"° Pu 173 °NfMMv ] em.RT, PaPu 174q"° ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu
 II r: II

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190

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cf: I
II ^T?T° II 195

Prat,

^TRT ^iq^q-Hiqi : I

200

183 °vrr«> ] PaPupcRT , °^T° Puac 184 TT HlflrM ] PuRT , flHIHUrM Pa

184 0^T0 ] conj. , °^T° PaPuRT 185 ^fWT° ] conj.Isaacson, "SrfWT0 PaPuRT
185 ahf^^PM ] PapcPuRT , sh«Jlf^^rM Paac 185 WT° ] PuRT , ^T^° Pa 187
RT(em. ?), <hlrMI PaPu 189 ^^^>rtMm^^lA<l ] em.RT,
" PapcPu , ^j^^i^l 1*1 ^T Paac 189 *HI^4l ] PaRT , ^clKAl Pu
193 ^4*^ ] PaRT , ^Id^*^ Pu 194 M^d: ] PaRT , 5T^T: Pu 196
em.RT, ^^AJd PaPu 199 f?": ] PaRT, ^H": Pu
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 3*m*is*<i \

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- 225

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II 3: II 230

41 "i i "I II II
II

II : II 235

?
II ^TrT0 I

- 240

245
225 f. i ? d<5-l-i
231 f.
t---t 236 ? 243

223 °J7^T ^cTr ] Pa, °HHIHc|dl Pu, °*r^Rcn"em.RT 225 ^5^T ] PaRT,
Pu 225 $fH"ll ] PaPuRTpc , ff^RT RTac 225 ^TTR"0 ] em.RT, ^q^ ° PaPu
226 OtT ] em.RT, ^ PaPu 229 ^fHlfHf^ ] em. , ^^Hlf*i^cq PaPu, 3RTT-
: I cRT em.RT 229 ^JT^* ] em.RT, ^T^t° PaPu 232jf^[FT] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 232 OTPTTT] RT(em. ?), °J|NI«I PaPu 236 ^T T] conj. , Of
PaPuRT 236 Jl^fc ] em. , J|*4)^R PaPuRT 237 ^TcT° I '
RT (em. ?), ^T?T I fl<slM I flfVld PaPu
 Sff:

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^TR"
%* II 255

250
II qr: II
ffw f^" fr ncid

II dlT: : II
HRf)i*iRi II 265
II «: II
fq~

257 ff.

262 f.
I 267

] RT(em. ?), PaPu PuRT, ^<d Pa 254

] PaRT, o Pu 257 ] em.RT, PaPu 258
RT(em. ?), TT^T° PaPu 259 RT(em. ?), PaPu 260
T*^T] RT(em. ?), PaPu 262 ffw ] PaRT, ^fw Pu 264 f. cTTT-
^T: I dlM^ ] PaPu, : I RT 267 ] RT(em. ?), PaPu
267 ^f^pil^^n ] em. RT , l PaPu
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 II

fr op anr^T w ^TFT or qirof op <H^U| or 3<ifiu| op 3juuir*r q^r ft"

Oq^v} fqf"iqt)*^ I op *T*T ^q" ^" ^qvyf^<^|u|f^H^ ^^|
op <}q^Ri ? 3T Ht" ^fo^i qSlfq'^^! I ^fN^ifi^^ *V sjsfcH I 295
ii ii

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mi:? srfr

cTTT° I
- 305
ft" ft"
ft" ft"

292

: I
a I 299 I d^^ ^qnv I 305 ff.
: I I

: I f. . .

292 ^^l« ] PaPu , RT ( typo ?) 292 ] PaRT , Pu 292

37^-] RTac (em. ?), RTpc , 3T^T paPu PaRT, 3FIr«r Pu
294 ^W° ] PaRT , 0 Pu 297 HHMI 0 ] em. RT , PaPu 302 Ht-
] PuRT, (?) Pa 3053TfF RT(em. ?), ^^||UJ PaPu 305^-
RT(em. ?), PapcPu, g^¥ Paac 305 em.RT, $*l\<\ PaPu
306 ] conj. , PaPuRT 306
fq~] RT(em. ?), PaPu em.RT, PaPu
PaPuRTpc , fr^T RTac
 310

315

320

i ^i M

qf: II 325

ii ^TcT° i
cR": I
326 f.

308 OfiHdd 0 ] PaRT, Md 0 Pu 308 fT] PaPupcRT, W Puoc 309

] PaPu, ^70 RT(em. ?) 309 0^jRT° ] PuRT, 'W'cr0 Pa 309 °T-
] RT(em.?), '^c^ ° (?) Pa, °c|c$^ Pu 309^"?^] PaPu, ^t ^ ^
RT(em. ?) 310 «W ] em.RT, °^° PaPu 310^° ] PaPu, ^T° RT( ty­
po?) 310 f. ^t~?%...^3T^3TI] PaPu, om.RT 311 °^T° ] em., OT7^T° PaPu
311 0 ^fa*° ] em. , o^R*id° PaPu 311 ^TOf0 ] PaRT, ^f° Pu
RT(em. ?), <i$<1 PaPu 314 ''^I'Ofd ] em.RT, °«t>Hlfd PaPu 315
RT(em. ?), dAld PaPu 320dMl«IH'H| ] em.RT, aHir*! PaPu 326
Papc PuRT , ^tTT° Paac 326 uft?H<l ] PaPu , uDri«l^l RT ( em. ?) 329
] RT(em. ?), '^TTfcTT0 PaPu
 3im*is*«i\

tI 330
II f-t^i

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II dTT° II
up I dsfcfa
IV MR«H*jfd I ^TT

340
II rRT:
«i Pt d

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345

337 S. : I
: %"
343
344 345
:I 346 cRT
347 i TT I
330 PuRT , °I4I^J|I ° Pu 332 em. RT ,
•^fdlH Pa , ^fdlH Pu 337 aUU ] em. RT , PaPu 337
T° ] em. RT , PaPu 337 0Tn7t ] PaRT , Pu 337 f«T ] em. RT ,
PaPu 338 ] RT(em. ?), PaPu RT(em. ?),
PaPu 338^"] em.RT, ^TJ PaPu 339 qTld«l ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 339 f. ^ifa I f% ] em. RT , cf'dlfH f^T PaPu 343 Hf^TSft ] PaPu ,
RT ( em. ?) 344 PMvrMl^ ] PuRT, f^rST*?" Pa 344 °HtW ] em.RT,
PaPu Hq~] em.RT, W PaPu
345 Hq~ 345 ] PuRT, Pa
r°] RT(em. ?), ^ PaPu 345 ] PuRT, Pa
conj.RT, ITS' - - - PaPu (The lacuna is marked by two dashes in
345 Hl*^ ] con.RT
the manuscripts. ) 346 ] RT(em. ?), T Pa, Pu
PuRT, Pa 346 PaPupcRT, PuQC
 fwr *h~ ft" T 350

355
ft" finj
fir

348 349
I 350 JJ«IMJ f^TT: , Ht
351 ld : f. . . f 352
353 354
355
356 357 f. f. . . f

] PuRT, MP<<HlRiMvrt *T Pa 348 em.RT, ^ PaPu 349

] PaRT , faWFjffflT- pu 349 ^JC ] PaPu , em. RT 349
em. RT , ^uj$ PaPu 349 MP<'H*-H U4^ ] em. RT , PaPu 350
PaRT, JpT Pu 350 ] em.RT, M PaPu 350 Hi" ] conj. ,
PaPuRT 35of*TT] RT(em. ?), PaPu 351 M*l»^ ] conj.Sanderson,
PaPu, M<iHd em.RT 351 WH^] conj., PaPu, HTT em.RT 351
] PaPu , 4$*fi em. RT 351 3T ... fWT ~ ~ ~ ] PaPu ( The lacuna is marked by
a dash in the manuscripts.), cTT ^ft f"ig^ fi^vntl^l^ IV^tfi conj.Sanderson,
WT f"!3^ U^Ml^M fH<.m1 em.RT 352 ff^ ] Pu , ^t PaRT
PaRT , ^3T ^ Pu 352 RMl|u| ~ ~ "" The lacuna is marked by nine lines of dashes
in Pa and by nine lines of empty space in Pu. 354 ^TT^T ] conj. , ^TTTTT PaPu , MH<*1
RT(em. ?) 354^] conj., W PaPuRT 354 ST STJ^T ] conj., 3^31% PaPuRT
con. 355 ^3TT conj., ^"PaPuRT em.RT,
PaPu 355 ° conj. , °^" T PaPuRT 356 eft fV ] conj. , PaPu ,
em.RT 356 PaPupc , «^T^T Puac , 'TH^t RT ( em.
PaRT, Pu 356 " ~ ~ ] conj. 3573TWT] RT(em. ? Pa,
Pu em.RT, ^U|fa PaPu 358 T^T ] RT(em. ?), PaPu
3581V] PaPupcRT, M^" Puo 358 conj.
PaPu, °H)?i«K<A IT conj.RT
 Rid") 4)

: II
II

: «r»i<il 365

0^ 370

5t a
(II ^5": II)
i 375
u w^r° u

375

360 °^W ] em. RT , °&T° PaPu 360 «hR»Md ] em. RT , «T>frMci ° PaPu 361
frsT0 ] PapcRT, ^TT f%T^T0 Paoc , cJHfajJ|o pu 365 °^T: ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 365^fr^tf^RT° ] RT(em. ?), SfH^RnHd 0 PaPu 367 ^t^n^*] conj. , TT-
Pu, %^Frlt: conj.RT 367 'frfcr0 ] conj. , °f^T° PaPuRT 367^vP?T-
r] PuRT, *<WN«{Jd Pa 368 <=T) ] conj. , om.PaPu, (ff) conj.RT 368 °3T-
em. RT , °3W PaPu 370 -"MHI-ft^Kfd ] em. , -q«5*ii-fi^i^fn Pa , T-
ifd Pu, ^TsAJHHI ^<fd RT(em. ?) 372cF^"° ] conj. , cTrT° PaPuRT
372 °^f"° ] PaPu, °H^° em.RT 373°^^-] RT(em. ?), °^W PaPu 374 <^-
f:> ] RT(em. ?), om.PaPu 377%^ ^^-HNHI (^PT) ^cFR^T0 ] conj.RT,
PaPu 378 f^^^lc) ] PaRT , fq^qta Pu
 H ^o ii
II ^": I

II ^T^T0 II

II ^ H
I 390
II 5nRT° II
: I cTT ^Zl", P=i-n*(

: II)
I f ^T vj||U||(^ i ^u- ip M<J<d T" 395

: I 400
II ^^:
^ H
385 f. aTTr F ^TRnT? T ^^IIKJlM «»Kt«^: ^cT: I 3ifMi«?>
I 390 f. WT ^J f||J-HdHr S^Pt^F ^TT ^lq^i^i «j«rn q" I 395 f.
, 5T ^" MfdHlfd I c^q" ^Mlfa I ^^if-i ^T: xq4*iii l*T ^Ro^i: I cRT

381 qrl'W ] PaRT , f^vjl'W Pu 381 «4MU|^ ] em. RT , °^F^TT PaPu 382 3T-
fT fT??"0 ] conj.RT, 3rfT ^Rf conj.RT, fT[[^]]%^5" Pa, fT %rT Pu 383 T]
PaRT , om. Pu 385 3H^r 3T^3T fq~ ] RT ( em. ?), 3T^T 3T5q" fq" PaPupc ,
puac 386 3Tq~] RT(em. ?), HTq~ PaPu 388vJRT^rft] em.RT,
PaPu 3903Tt] em.RTpc , 3T^t RTac , :3Rt PaPu 390 ffS^T ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 390^ffT] em.RTpc , ^flT PaPuRT00 393 °*IHIMMHJ em.RT,
PaPu 394 (q^T:) ] RT(em. ?), om.PaPu 395 MfeHlfa ] em. ,
PaPuRT 395 ^lUllf^ ] PaPuRTpc , ^Hlf^ RTac 395 T^ft ] PaRT ,
Pu 396 M^)^|{) ] em.RTpc , M«f)3|l<?l RTOC , M«i)^l^ PaPu 400
RT(em. ?), 4<bl4ll PaPu
 405

II q: II
410

402 ?T: 410 f.

404TF5TT] RT(em. ?), TF3T PaPu em.RT, PaPu 407

P<MMH*n**n ^PT^": ] em.RT, ° 'I> PaPu em.RT,
PaPu 409 3T: ] RT(em. ?), ^^": PaPu PaPuRTpc ,
RTac 410 Of] em.RT, ^ PaPu 410 ] RT(em. ?), °*MI PaPu 410^"-
RTpc , cff^T PaPuRToc
 II rRT: M fa Slid UIN«t>: I *TTV?T: , H%f feat

^ Sq<r>)<»M Ti

: HT^RT: I lifter: flN«h: II

T^TT
I <f <irc|l II 10

r ftr ^i
i
2 ff.
I ^i*-Ma ^qri HtoiM-iiq^i: I cRT
? 6 l^T $H$IM*J/dR.d l^^MI-^^ r«iHrMcl I 8 t^f HT
i*
ff.

>: I 'HIM*: ] PaPu, -HIH*: I RT(em. ?) 2 ° W T° ] conj.Isaacson,

T0 conj.RT, °oniro PaPu 2^pJt~] PaRT, ^t Pu 23fh^TT^"] em.RT,
PaPu sl^aTTr g-] conj. , f^TST ^" PaPuRT 3 3NT ] RT(em. ?), WT^" PaPu
3 M<rtl<H ul I «!$!<:} ] em.RT, 'HWI^^q?!^ PaPu 3 fM^q^^pi ] RT(em. ?), fq~3T-
q^TTT PaPu 4 o:^] RT(em. ?), 0^ft PaPu 4%W] PaPu, ^T RT(em. ?)
6 o^t] RT(em. ?), °^fr PaPu 6 ^T] RT(em. ?), W PaPu 6
em.RT, 34HNc) PaPu 6 ri<H^<lT] PaPu, r>(W>^lR; RT(em. ?) 8
em. RTpc , *Tf53?T PaPuRTac 8 ^ if ] PaPu , iTTr T^T em. RT 9
em., 3^fW3T^ PaPuRT 9^7T] PaPu,
PaRT, M<i4ll^ Pu ll*l««ll*i «i^w^>'x?>«rr ] conj., H I «l*l«l<*r>ii ?><*?> -aft" Pa,
Pu, T1^" «l^l<r)ror<T>^rr conj.RT 11^"] em.RT, ^T PaPu
11 5RTfq~3T ] RT (em. ?), ^TTTfq^T PaPu 12 ^tW % ] PaPuRT00 , ^t^" 1%" RTpc
12 q^UII^IM ] conj. , q~9W*nT Pa, q^ui^MtOI Pu, q"N"l«1<^ em.RT 12
PaRT, ojfg- Pu 12^" qT] RTpc , ^ qT PaRTac , ^ T Pu 12
q%] em. , lnfW.^fd Pa, fH^r^fd Pu, P-I^R<h^fd RTac , fui^ff^Rt RTpc
12 ^^T ] PaPu , <§*% RT ( em. ?) 13 ^pRfd ] conj. , tffR^qfri PaPu ,
RT ( em. ?) 13 H^q"U|l^ ?RW ] conj. , ^^r>q«n^" QlWl conj. RTpc ,
PaPu, ^tfryq^TT^" ?RW conj.RTac
 I 15

II

"i on
•:ll

or ~

II 5r*PT: II

15 q <*<•*« <*»§•«<»> »rq «4i^i<,: ^ I 17

20 f.

I 23 ?F -i^^i^i «i*K^«<r»i TT *iK*itla ^THiq^i ? 25

^TfT I *HrM4JH4l|W|(di I afRT: ^HiH^ ^rf^RT: I 27

14 ^UT ] PaPuRTpc , H^ RTac 15 c||^| ] em. , «ll^l PaPuRT 15

RT(em. ?), ^II^R* PaPu 17clT] em., ^RT(em. ?), cPT PaPu
conj., U|<*MH'*t>^l ul PaPu, w|^tO*i«.^l«l RT(conj. ?) 18
conj., A*<i *fT PaPuRT 20 T5TT0 ] RT(em. ?), 5TT° PaPu 20
conj., ^1^ PaPu, ^T em.RT 20 ^T ] em. , ^T PaPuRT 20 $Trt4 ] em.RT,
d^fri'i PaPu 2lf|TnT] RTpc , ff^TT PaPuRTac 21^E|TT] conj. Isaacson,
^" PaPuRT 215FT] RT(em. ?), ^FT PaPu 21 Mril^^ ] PapcPuRT,
Paac 23 ^tcT° ] RT(em. ?), WTcT° PaPu 23 »l«<^>r>*<h^rr] conj.,
conj.RT, T3TWT?y^>T PaPu 23 W Hl^la f^T] conj., Til *H^(T« PaPu,
frf conj. RT 23?PTT%f5r ] RT(em. ?), ^RT%fW PaPu 25TT3TT ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 25 ffftfr ] conj. Isaacson , sfrf^tT Pa , ^lf5T Pu , ^tfV RT ( em. ?) 25 3T-
f?T ] em. RTPC , 3nfr PaPuRT00 25 ^^T ] PaRT , ^ Pu 27 ^T ] em. RT ,
PaPu
 °P ^T T^fTT f«M<id) ?
30

nil

frT 35

I ^TT 3T" ft" cTFT

40

29 f. srf^T, 3r1%cr aiqq^, f^" r^TT

32 tfTii«-MRi ^T ^<i4|*^ I cRT r^ldHl'xfc'^ ^T^T: I 34 ff.

4)^11: FT: I ^JTT fM«|l^: , JTRT ^TSTnT: , R<(i| J|-^IH: I

PaPuRToc , 3TT RTpc 29 ^Tq~] conj.RT, ^T PaPu 29 ^T] RT

(em.?), ^TPaPu 29f*c(<id1 ] PaRT, Rh«(^dl Pu 293PUT] em.,
Pu 29^TTT] RT(em. ?), W& PaPu 30 §e«^ ] Pa, f^^
RT(em. ?) 30 3ffe ] em.RTpc , ^ff^ PaPuRTac 32 f^STST ] conj.
PaPu, ff^TRTac , f%W RTpc 3234ll«l*4i^j ] conj., ^H<Mt^ PaPu,
conj.RT 34<4I^«1 ] Pa(?) RT, -H^ul Pu 34 (fq~) ] em.RT, om.PaPu
em.RT, ^75RmiTPaPu 35%f^] PaPu,
RT(em. ?), H^l fa$|UJl Pa, ^TqTJHPfr Pu 35«?lw«itOl ] Pa, "liwq^l Pu 35%-
em. RT , ^<c||f^^fe PaPu 36 rt£\4\ ] PaPu , «^ci*l RT ( em. ?)
36 uiglKI ] em. , ui^l PaPuRTpc , H^l RTOC 36 3TT ] PaRT ,
Pu 36%] PaPu, ^RT(em. ?) 36tf«MRi ] em.RT, ^fr PaPu S
conj., q^STfTPaRT, ^T3Tf^ Pu 37^(^3^] PaRTpc , Mf^^Rj Pu,
RTOC 37^FPJfr3T] conj., TmtST PaPu, Tjft RT(em. ?) 38 ^rT] em.RT,
^T PaPu 38 fTET^T] PaPu, PM^M^ RT(em. ?) 38 ^RW] RT(em. ?), ^fw
PaPu 38*T9F^] RT(em. ?), ^N^ PaPu 38^1"°] RT(em. ?), H^° PaPu
39 STTSgfTfer ] em. , ^-«^lRj<fl" PaPu , ^^iRi^T RT ( em. ?) 39 $fr><;f^««Ni ° ]
em. RT , ^f^T I ^Ri^U| Pa , ^R«i^ I f^«^»i Pu 40 Bi<r>P^c;i ] em. ,
em. RT , 31 «J **<*! PaPu 40 J|^*^ ] em. , •M««-§ PaPu , '|-«^*^ RT
 - I

: I

5PTT: II 45

II ": II

II SHTTT: II so

II

II SPTif : II
55

42 *<«IN ! 44 q^TFT *^-l^d , W ^-1, S5 ^MHd: ? 46 ff.

49 ^RT:? 51 cRT:
: I %T ^T TT^TT xqlf^a: I 53 ^RT: ? 55 ff. cRTt TRTT

41 H^FT ] PapcPuRT , *TOW Paoc 44 °^f ] PaRT , °?55" I ^ Pu 46 ^~-

T] em.RT, ^T PaPu 46 3Tf*TT ] em.RT, Ajffd PaPu 46 ^TT ] conj. Isaacson,
3T vjfT PaPu, ^TT ^Tt em.RT 46 ^l»ll«»«r>q*^"l ] RT(em. ?), 1«ll«;«f>q*^"l PaPu
46 ^J<hR^4l«l"ll*:l ] em.RT, $i«hfo$|W||^ PaPu 46%^T] conj., ^T RT(em. ?),
Paoc , ^T PapcPu 47 Pnwi^lV^^nr^q^lR* ° ] conj. ,
PaPu, i|U|^H»<H^q'ilj • RT(em. ?), 47q^r>ctl ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 47f^?T] conj., Ri<*M PaPu, Ri«.| em.RT 51%^] em.RT, cTT
RT(em. ?), T3RY PaPu 51^|U||fc|^ ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 55 r>l^«l ] em.RT, «iiJ«l PaPu 55 ^l«ll<;«?>q*^ ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 55 i**i*l") ] RT(em. ?), 4<h^ PaPu 55HI"l ] conj.RT,
PaPu 56M^cjfc|U| ] conj.RT, M^cjfbiui PaPu 56il*frV^T] RT(em. ?), 3T-
Pa , ^IsnRo^ Pu 56 PI^WI^ ] em. RT , ^I<H«^I^ PaPu 56
em. , q^«HWl^ em. RT , q^<H<r>^ PaPu
 II d^: II
"T
II 5TW: II
dT
II T: II
UT <^<Ul<ttl^ <T»l^>n*in*l§l^
Of

5HHT: II es

TO

59 ^T«f 5<,i^i<,^3i*<'rl-i x^qi*>ci ^rMi-«HfTI 61

63 f.
I 66 fU^-H ^T Hir^cl ? 68 f. TT ^T TT5T:
I 71 f.

57 ^TTr^y^>Tr3TT ] em. , ^**i*1rt'«t>q^1lt'i PaPu , fetJ-HroHTvrSTT em. RT 57

«i^ ] PaPu , H^ilR^^ RT ( typo ?) 59 W] PaPu , om. RT 59
conj. , MvT^li<i PaPu, HvrM)*J< RT(typo?) 593TT^^T] PaPu,
RT(em. ?) 61cTr^T7T] conj., ^MJM< PaPu, *imM<i em.RT 6
Pu 61 J|^|J-^ ] RT(em. ?), i|-«^^ PaPu 63 *Tl*Ul?ft^ ] em.,
PaPuRT 63^>TryW0 ] Pa, *I^^ ° PuRT 633fT7Tt] conj., 3i^i* PaPu,
RT(em. ?) 63^"] conj., cl^ PaPu, cH£ RT 64 "T ^T^] conj.,
PaPu, W ^l^lR em.RT 66 3TT f^"] conj. , ^TT f^F em.RT, 3!Tfa~ PaPu
68 ii«hl(H ] conj., 4l^»fH PaPuRT 68r5TSR?T] em.RT, ^TaSHnJT PaPu
] RT(em. ?), T^RMHTtT PaPu 68 ^TpSr f^T ] em., ffef^T f^T PaPu ,
RT ( em. ?) 69 rt>4)lJ ] conj. , W^ PaPuRT 69 W^qRi ] PaPu ,
RT(em. ?) 71 <rtfW»^1d) ] PaPu, ^R^^dl RT(em. ?) 71
em., tfH> RT(em. ?), ^ PaPu 71"] em., * Htl" PaPuRT
71 °^r^] PaPu, °^rf^ RT(em. ?) 72 fc^d^ ] RT(em. ?), R^rl^ PaPu
72 J|3I^ ] RT ( em. ?),
 : II

: i wr: u 75

: II

: II so

: II

II MR'hlHd: I 5T«m": II

74 *I<4N. cRTRT: I cT^ ^TRcT 5OTRT T M«Jrl cTTW r^ w^N I 76

m4cl i 79
81 ff.

I 85 f.

74 a<NM>i ] PaPu, aiNHtt RT(em. ?) 74T»TT] Papc (?) RT,

Paac (?), Tl HT%" Pu 74 ^R-W ] PaPu, ^^ RT(typo) 74 1^^" ] PaRT,
ftrSTfT Pu 76 0 ^J^t] RT(em. ?), °^t PaPu 76 ^1T ] RT(em. ?), ^TT PaPu
76 Hc)f$l ] RT(em. ?), H^f^ PaPu 76 fff^i" ^T ] em. , f|^ ^q" PaPuRT
PaPu, fK7^"RT(em. ?) 81 °3T^T ] RT(em. ?), °^°r PaPu 82 ^T-
em. RT , ^J^T PaPu 82 ^TFT ] em. , ^TWT PaPuRT 82 ST^tT ] em. ,
PaPu, ST^tT em.RT 82 fr^ ] PaPu, j»rt*i RT ( em. ?) 83 rT3m1"-
em., ^arftftr PaPu, t^^^H^ em.RT 83 ^T] RT(em. ?), &tW PaPu
83 '3^] PaRT, °3T^ Pu 85^] RT(em. ?), ^ PaPu 85^] Pu, 0^-
T PaRT 85 4J*R«iilU| ° ] conj.RT, 'HfclrtN"! ° PaPu 85 rt^^^ ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 85 3P%f|r ] em. , 3T ^^(^ PaPuRT 85 r^Httg* ] PaRT ,
Pu 85 ^T] RT(em. ?), 3TtT PaPu 86 STFt^ ] RT(em. ?), 3KUU^ Pa,
Pu 86 3MH*h^n* ] em. , ^MN^R? PaPu , ^^)fW>^(^ RT ( em. ?)
 90

95

II

100

II cRT: t M Rr<4 rr>^ m <r>q ^

^i^-^n qcR*iqd^a H Rq K

105

?q"
88 f. : I
98 f.
: I Rd rM Rd ^I^N I 106 f.

] em.RT, 3mFT° PaPu SsfelTSff] RT(em. ?), PaPu 88

] FaRT , ^T3T I ^T Pu 88 <J|<**»Tll ] conj. , ""I^OI Pa , Pu ,
RT(em.?) 89«ft^] RT(em. ?), SftGRt PaPu 89 3F^W ] RT (em. ?),
PaPu 89^"] PuRT, ^Pa 9lVTf0 ] PaRT, VR"* Pu 93^"] em.RT, ^ft* PaPu
94 °f^rr° ] conj.Isaacson, 0fqTT0 PaPuRT 96 ^^Piq ] em.RT, ^t^Piq Pa,
?) Pu 98 SZfa* ] PaRT , Pu 98 ^l«r»oP|w| ° ] em. RT ,
OT° PaPu 98 *^f ] em. , *T^ PaPuRT 98 cTT ] em. , 5TT PaPuRT 98
PaRT, a^f^tPu 99 J|^*^ ] PaPu, TT^^RT(em. ?) 101 °qTT: ] PaRT,
^T° Pu 106 TT] RT(em. ?), HT PaPu 106 ^^<Haiq^f^ ] conj.RT,
PaPu 106 Sr^TMlcJvr^id) ] conj., STfa^Hvrvildt PaPu, STPT^qviMial RT(em. ?)
107 MU|^1 ] em. RT , W% PaPu
 II

<drwK«i«ri*«<i: JH-q^n jom^^qSdlH'Hl: no

II *: II

I ^ fq~
II • II
:I «'' — 115

120

° II

II *T: II
JT ^ft <r>^>«»^ ^q~ *II^«M«I ^TPT qq^^i ^" qq^'da I 125
II F ° II
:I

112 f.
( °!THTT?) " sr HK^I Hclrf I 121
125

112 °cJc(lJf)U| ] RT(em. ?), °-«l«l4U| PaPu 112 ^ri^«T>«« ] em.,

PaPuRT 112 dNUI ] RT(em. ?), dlM^I PaPu 113 ^'ll"l^l ] conj. ,
PaPu, ^J|fuKJ|(w|«;i RT 113 °H«5iq"l ] conj., oTT3nq«l PaPu,
em.RT 113TqT^T] em.RT, ^qTtT PaPu 114 ^Tf° ] PaPu, ^TrT° RT(em. ?)
116^] Pa, T^PuRT lie^T^q^nTT] RT(em. ?), ^qTHTT PaPu 118 ^cTT
qT] em.RT, «W<MI Pa, PdNI Pu 121 IWr] PaPu, ^TTRT(em. ?) 121 3T-
«fT ] PaRT , «n^TT Pu 122 ^f ° ] PaPu , ^TcT° RT 125 cTHT ] em. RT ,
PaPu 125 *fr ] PaPu , om. RT 126 flf » ] PaPu , ^TcT° RT 127
PapcRT, tiqW0 Paac , ^«INMH 0 Pu
 IN" ^IKHHII^Idl <MIMId M^M TFT
TTI 130

II ^Tf ° II 135
": I cFT
______ ^^ *<. «K. **• «t

fr Mh

II

ii ^<r: H^nrr a^i^i i ><«^^ HVFCT: T: 11

I 3?^" ^T ^dq^Piyil ft"

134 *pF ^<;*\ I 139 *<<5i- Sii5HM*«i I 141 f.
T sfT viR'ilV: HVFrT 3n*j*iR^^I>INId: I d<^l^: VIHIWI*^ I 146 ff.
: I ^" ^TPT *ii^^i Hmsriitri^qsi^wi «riwi*-q<.nhc|<i^n^c| rqi rl"

129 T ] PaPupcRT, ^TPuac 129*WT] PaPupcRT, °cfT Puac (?) 131

Tf) ] conj.RT, om.PaPu (unmetrical) 132 ^^T] em.RT, ^" PaPu 135
PaPu , ^7rT° RT 136 °*rfT° ] PaRT , °HT° Pu 139 f. ^I^Ri I
em. RT , 3J|U|«jRi f^T PaPu 141 MUlgl ] em. , MUl^l^ft PaPuRT 141
PaRT, 3mt Pu 141 ^T] PaPupcRT, ^ofp Puac 142^7] RT(em. ?), cT PaPu
143 *Tf « ] PaPu , ^TcT0 RT 145 *hjT^T: ] PuRT , H¥TcT: Pa 146 H^^T ] PaPu ,
146 °^ftf° ] PaRT, *<5ftf* Pu 146 °<H3lrt* ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 147 °f*<i<id1l ] RT(em. ?), °Rhc|<id1 PaPu 147 (^fer %) ]
conj.RT, om.PaPu 147rJ?Kl"] PaPu, <4*dl<l RT(em. ?) 147 W&T ] PaPu,
RT ( em. ?) 147 3?^ ] em. , 3<*T PaPu , ^ITror^fr em. RT 147
em.RT, ^j*« PaPu 147 fr ] PaPu, f^RT(em. ?)
 nd IPK.4J ' XH?d [ :lU>h4J 991 njid IllattjJSto ' XH 'raa [ 991
6ST XH
-J& 8ST (i -raa ) XH ^UJfc^P ' njij [ ^(^jtea.py 2,Qi n^d 4kU£ ' XH "
nj]2j j blftlkN 'XH'raa [Ji I blnt^ 'J
[ >fe^k
'XH'ra8 f ltb^i<lot» tl^LklKlS OST "did kkj 'XH'raa
OST XH o JilB ' nd?d [ o^H ef'T (i -nra ) XH <fc>»K '^d^d
i<ttT»uj
tvlt>h> £91 : Dfcijte^P blkK
I Iblr
II :k II
II A IIJa^A^Lb !lPl>DISkkJ<l>
IlPh^J ttftkjfclkbktt ! ID&JIfe
591 II Jzaiik II
091 Klkbb
KJ
J. t K>b
( II :_L^1 II }
I tea. ir
'42k
I InlkK tb^k i I
 S6T
B6T 3D?d bU n ' IHModM [ o JsdJhtko Z6T XHnd?d
881 M13J »bfeb| B 'XH'1119 [ »fa^b| 0 L9~l
t
rbllfcbJK C8T XH o JilB ' nd?d oH S8T XHnd?d
|^-t In kj IftblbD ' 'fuoo [ \\n k^ IftblbD T8T 'fuoo trjvtcs ^.UU^h '
' XH 'fu™ [ Uxtvlnk.DI^K T8T XHnd?d 1^^ ' ' raa
92,1 XH
Jblteb TgT
S6T II ^kln
->IO>Kb
061 || ^ H Jib b^lUj^tb IDIrirx PJbUfr
| :0»>lgk |bltjkk>|fc (jpbkJIbVi ^ £ I K
I tblltbJK
kfe Inb^bP j
081 II tk II
TkklCelbfcJkb^ bb IklK kU
J^kJ>b i IDbk
 II *?:
fr ^tTti^i
II cRT: !Tq~5R*TT^TWl~ ^llnR&L: ^M^PAN^ f^T^RT H R<4 K :

200

^TT
ii srcrat
«v
205
II

210

M! fq IV: ? ^1" qTT f%^": ?

"4 *tla I d^^ii vji-txqi^i ^RT T ^-iiJii^ai fq^Ri d M! ^ -t i : ,

197
conj. , ^y^J^TPaPu, ^«*^*^*l RT(em. ?) 198xq^irMI° ] PapcPu
RT, yfcJ^lfHl 0 Paoc 200 Hl$ll ] conj. , °ti J9|*i PaPuRT 201
em.RT, °f^TWTRf1" PaPu 202=TT?T] PaPu, ^Tem.RT 202^] conj
PaPuRT 202 f. °f^dlffd° ] PaPu, °fT«7cn" fd"° RT(em. ?)
conj., HhHI^ri PaPu(unmetrical) , f«T>*ii5>wf*ia : conj.RT 205
RT(em. ?), °^TcT: II ^M*:ll PaPu 206 Hf ° ] PaPu, ^Tcf° RT 207
ift ] PapcRT , yuiHIJ-Tl Paoc , m«IHIHl Pu 213 3T^T° ] em. RT , vjffET0 PaPu
214 °f^T: ] RT(em. ?), °f%^: Pa, °f^T: Pu 214^1"^TT] PaPu, [3PT] ^t
RT 214TT3TW 0 ] RT(em. ?), ^IrHI 0 PaPu 215 °^d"l ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 216 d^TRT0 ] RT(em. ?), d^HIHI 0 PaPu 216 °^TT TT?TT ]
em.RT, °^d<MI PaPu 217 °M<*HHI° ] PaPu, °H«i^qHl 0 RT(em. ?)
 qT?

TT >jfd~: I 3414)4 , f cq- 220

fr <<i<^ H*R5<i)

225

- 230

235

223 fF. vilild, vPT^" ^^K+: I ITT ^R^ ^Ft sfT ^: M^Ud:
d: f • • • t

219 *IHII*^l^r4dl ] PuRT , <M^Hi«r»5»«ni Pa 219 °q"i ] em. RT ,

PaPu 220 ^««l4l«(^ ] PapcPuRTpc , ^c||£|c(Hv Paoc , H«ll<Jc|^ RTOC 220
em.RT, 5R^~° PaPu 222 oT7€t^"° ] em.RT, OTT^"° PaPu 222
PaPu, *tyi-TKdl° RT(typo) 223H^K«hl ] em., ^%K«h PaPuRT
em. , T" PaPu, ^T em.RT 224 * ] conj. , 4i^d< PaPu, +<d) em.RT
225 ^^K«^ ] em. , *T;F PaPu , ^^ em. RT 229 Rj^H^I: ] em. , fcl'WAIH^ PaPuRT
229 ^l^-<c|Hl ] em. RT , <H*<«<*3 PaPu 230 ^^^fi ] em. Isaacson , M^pfi PaPu ,
em.RT 230 °^t^° ] PaRT, 0^r° Pu 231 °HT^T° ] RT(em. ?), °^TT-
PaPu 232 °^<h<J^"] conj. , °i|*^$l PaPuRT 232 3Tf^T° ] RT(em. ?), rT-
PaPu 232 °c!N<H< ] PaPupcRT, °^mT Puoc 233 ^<iMIH|W^ ] em.RT,
PaPu 234 °f¥T ] PaPuRTpc , °f%T RTOC 234 0*raf?T ] em. Isaacson ,
PaPuRT 235 ff?T ] add. RT , om. PaPu 236 °^T^ ] PaPuRTpc ,
RTac 236 r^llH ] PuRT , rH^lH Pa
 240

245

250

II
? ffil" <h*ih ^JN^^ui j} Rd I : FT: I
II
255

<4ila ^TSTS

^ff
" 260

260 cf. NM I 488.13:

237 °CTRTc] em.RT, *J-i|>|4|d Papc , °W|l>|A|d Paac , e»T I >HTcl Pu,
238 0^~: ^T0 ] em.RT, '^fenJT0 PaPu 238 °HW° ] PaPupcRT , 0 H^Fren" 0 Pu
238 °MK^ J4JI ] conj.RT, om.PaPu 239 °?T: Hf » ] Pa, °^FT° PuRT 239 °^
T° ] em.RT, °c^T° PaPu 241 f. 511^"! Iff^T] em.RT, WT^tf^T PaPu
^TT0 ] em.RT, 44v&\ » Pa, ^^T° Pu 255 ^cllHl^ 0 ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 256^"°] PERT, ^^° Pu 257 °$T: ] RT(em. ?), °^T: ( °^T: ?) PaPu
259 ^T f|r ] em. RT , *T ^ PaPu
 -fuoo
' uosoiresi -fuoo [ ' (^ 'tua )
[ oiJilS&iZ: nj '£H?d [
njij-rao 'xH'f [o Tie
69Z
OSTB ! l
Uujbk
t4UU b \> K~»0»11 1 b fa te || llPtfeJr
I b.
-KJIUIbfi PJkjfebJ
' iPblrk kbi blkb4 | :Wlfc J*
- IDbtlt
ilh II
Ilk UuJIrttN InJ^k IPIh KjmihbJ b(-rb>i
02.Z
lb-><!> jyy
 : II f II
II

II *TfT° II
fl fT: I 285

u
1*^ ^ •> 290

RllHMIdl

I 295

n f^r° n
300
n

288 f. cf. NM 1 314.1-4: <i:*i«Mr»<53ii*)<;rqf^iiirH q I ^fq»iiHNf'i*IHl

(Vakyapadiya 1.32) 291 S. cf. NM I 316.9-15: 3TrT ^ql^HHMIHM^-rl : 5FTT-

(em. : Ofer° ed.)
Tf*T *Hiqcil I ^TjHMM^I-l-t faf-inicTl T ^^f: II (Vakyapadiya 1.42) 3TJT ^",
: I 3Tf^<j?T>a^^-*il'^«lqNiMHI«y^ II (Vakyapadiya
1.34) 302 cf. NM I 317.4-5:
: II

288 T° ] PaPuRTpc , T RTac 295 °MI<lc) ] RT(em. ?), 01QRI" PaPu

 II ^T° II 305

Ri<t>ai<4i*i 13

II

310

FT
5TPJIT 3M*l««Jld<*l TSTH^dld I 315

320

II
306 f. cf. NM I 317.6-8: MrMSi^aHfH H<;i«Jvnia
qT iarq agniq^cl vJi^i qT r>«»)<?»i: I 320 f. cf. NM I
318.13-319.4: T T «fdHIHNHI^llH«*>) y
q~ q^i: anqq q^M (following the reading of Pathantarani at the end of vol. I)

I T q^trit i^^-M^wi^^iw^*^ I 320 on pratibha see

NM I 275.9-276.5: ^MrM^j ^^cT (i.e. SrPTT), ^[A|HJ4lr^l^— T— W-

306 ^MI^>^ircJIH<J-) ] conj. , ^Nlfj^l^cql^- PaPu,

em. RT 307 3P=Hiflfl MMl^d T q^N^,Hv ] em. RT , 3T>f TTFT
PaPu 309 f^T ] PaPuRTpc , f^T RTOC 311 JreTJTcTT ] PaPu ,
em.RT 312 HFq~° ] PaPu, HT^T° RT(typo?) 317^°] PapcPuRT,
Paoc 320^qTTI 3Tfq"° ] RT(em. ?), ^Tl *TTfq~° PapcPu,
Paac 320 ond ] em. RT , oTft PaPu
 3im*i««A

T lqR;a*)q
I a<s«<*ifq^iR<j ,
: I 325

qT

330

335

iq

324 ff. cf. NM 1 317.9-14: 3TMifq-«iiRcii*i»ri<4clq

?ft" 5^<?n: I
: II
: II 330 ff. cf. NM I 314.5-10:

: I cTTqTT WKfM *J*ft~ 5^fl" ^ SH^Rfd il^jrl II ^ ^ MrMWd)

334 ff. NM I 319.11-12:

oMlfHy^ ulldv I; NM I 322.6-323.2: ^KjfM ^MnHr^KJHN^IHI-^l Hlffd

323 oHNflM^H^ ] RT(em. ?), 0^NI«I'^^ PaPu 327 «lfdH ] RT(em. ?),
330°3raft] em.RT, °^T«^" PaPu 330 °T 3< M -rSI I <( ° ] RT(em. ?),
PapcPu, °TT ^H<JI<i 0 Paac 330 o5nTf*TRf^T^r° ] conj.RT,
PaPu 331 °^F ] em. RT , °TRT PaPu 331 ^RTTOT0 ] em. RT ,
PUOC 332 ^r^0 paRT , ^r^0 PU 335
PaRT, cTST^TT0 Pu 335 °^TI 1" ] conj.Sanderson, °t PaPuRT 337
PaRT , HNNI Pu 337 °^~ ] PapcRT , °^lt PaacPu 337 cT 5T° ] PaPu ,
5T° RT(em. ?)
 d I

345

l: II ^^ II
II *TfT0 II
^-Ti $fr qi^TT cfr Jhm^f) sfr ^Hu
II ^ II 350

355

342 Nyayabhasya ad Nyayasutra 1.1.7 344 ff. cf. NM I 326.7-327.2:

I ^TT ^HI^HHI^: MIHI"^ %T ^^ci I 3RTT f^"

: I sfTW 5»coa T TT qcai: II 349 f.

cf. NM I 317.2-3:
357 f. cf. NM I 494.1-5: 3^J^"I *<i<»niRi T f^TTT^I *f*Tf f^"

339 ^HlHclMKUII 0 ] PaPu, °HlHn»l«h<«ll ° RT(em. ?) 342 5T° ] PuRT, 3TT° Pa

344 °*JrT5r° ] PaPu, °*1^rHV( ° em.RT 344 (^CM[<UXala^-1l ^") ] conj. , om.
PaPuRT 347 °TJT° ] em. RT , 0T5TRr° PaPu 349 °^3Rt ] PaPuRTpc , °3RT RT
351 °^%T ] PaRT , °^H)H^ Pu 354 ^T^0 ] era. RT , ^c3~° PaPu 355
em. RT , $TMlRi PaPu 358 0ferRTT: ] em. RT , 'fc'iqi: PaPu
 ^v
I 360

II ^ II

IT
II ^aj 0 II 365

3i«**ii*ii'<i*m*i , T

qT HcT tnqcHq qT I 370

II ^ II

II
^ I 375

II HfT° II

360 cf. NM I 493.10-15: T f|r Hl«f aiHI1tH^K«lc^-l ^*ilR«q^ ( dhumddivan: MSS,

dhumad iva: ed. ) HSRiw^vJlill^l^M (makkola-: em., kakkola-: ed)

II srf^TI; cf. Pramanavartika (Pandey) pramdnosiddhi 13-14. 363 ff. cf. NM

494.6-14
5 FT ci<;*fl^aiH II -T *i m q
( ° sddharanamatram atra: MSS, ° matrasadharanyam atra: ed. ) «T
I fwl" , ^fT ( dhume: MSS, d/mmo ed. ) 5FT Hq^-l fa
TT
«IHI-M*1l<M:N«Mr>in;fqD«1«l
:I 377 cf. NM I 503.12-13:

363 °^T: ] em.RT, °^T: PaPu 369^141-^1^] RT(em. ?), HFTF^T PaPu 370
°S"] RT(em. ?), °PT PaPu 371 Mdl^l^ ] PaPu, Mq"^^ RT(em. ?)
PaRT , ^TTT0 Pu 377 3*cltt ] PaRT , ^TTTT Pu
 II 380

II ^T° II

II

w 390

, fqT

395

5fr

386 cf. NM 1 112.6: I 390 f. cf. NM I 501.3-

7:

i II 397 S. cf. NM I
501.8-10:

381 q^"] conj. , rETf PaPuRT 385 ^KTT* ] PaRT, Pupc , Pua
385 (qT) ] em. RT , om. PaPu 386 °Rl^ ] PaRT , Pu 386
em. , 4>rHd PaPuRT 388 °R^'Mfd ] RT(em. ?), °l PaPu 391
RT(em. ?), 3RT +1 <"i PaPu 391 °^"° ] RT(em. ?), PaPu 393
em.RT, HNHlf*! PaPu 393 ^rf^T0 ] RT(em. ?), PaPu 399
RT(em. ?), °fr^df§ PaPu
 II f^l " II 400

f f^TT ^T BfRT?
II >T3T° II
f^rr ^f ^nfrr? *i4ftfd f|" T f^rTf^^ft^TRTr , srfr
i fa»^ ^ ^" T ft^rr %%ftr T ft^r: i
405
ii

II
410
II

ii ^r° ii

ii ^r° ii 415
I

420

416 ff. cf. NM II 277.14-278.6: sH^^I^-N^tWfT f^3" R-i^-HlrHH: I

-*^ (Nyayasutral.l.lQ) I; also

NM II 289.4-5: ^d^^-i 51 Ci^, 5(0^^1^, ^51*1 (KqqJ T 5i

401 37W ] PaPuRTpc , 3TW RTac 405 d«<H^) 0 ] PaPu , d«l) ° RT ( em. ?)
405 0TFT 0 ] PaPu, °JTPr RT(em. ?) 405 °flRtf^T^TPTr ] conj. , 0f?
PaPuRT 405 f^T^" ] em.RT, Rh^fd PaPu 406 °f^% ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 412 HR^Ri ] PaPuRTpc , HR^lfd RTac 416
em.RT, d-^*1*<l9«M ° PaPu
 425

II

qT

i<*imi rT iH^ I Hrild W t" T- 430

qT ^

435

II 440

II

II

445

II

II T° II

428 <h<JlR<i 0 ] PaRT, *<ii^U Pu 429 °tT° ] PuRT, oTT0 Pa 433

^ T] em. , °f%^T PaPu, °f^ ^T T RT(em. ?) 434 Sr^nTT0 ] em.RT,
PaPu 437°5RT|r ] em.RT, «XWT» Pa, °^TTr° Pu 437 M"^l ] em.RT,
: PapcPu,
 450

HvT

:i 455
ii

460

«**1M*1 465

453 ff. cf. NM I 488.15-18:

?; also NM I 510.7-9:

' (Slokavartika, sambandhaksepaparihara 75) ?fo" I 455 cf. NM I

510.10-11: ^d^qnv , %d"^fMamiCl ^fqqH^f'a q|cqil\^'SiiniMi^rqj« I 457 ff.
cf. NM I 510.11-511.4: cHTT ^FT ITq- <hPy^ ^NilRf^^l^ iMlRif^^Ml qT 50"-

(ms. kha : ed. ), tl*-HMi*)iqid I

qT dTT ?ITtT
*^*!'HIHM*K<hK uirHld ^M" d":
I ,

451 °^Frr° ] em. RT , 0^Tf 0 PaPu 451 «rT ^T5T ] PaRT , °d!T>r Pu 451
TT° ] em. , 3TW0 PaPuRT 453 ^T«f ] RT(em. ?), ^ PaPu 455
RT(em. ?), ft>IIMI 0 PaPu 455 'H*-HMI ° ] em., fl**MI° PaPu, em.RT
PaRT, cfWr Pu 463 ^W, TT^JFT ] RT(em. ?), PaPu
465 'H*^M-Mv ] em. , PaPu , em. RT
 ar«r»4nf: <*- cl I T
470

dr«?>*i lfwd 475

480

435

485 NM I 511.14-18: qT : I

qj
qTII' (cf. MBh 3.31.27 )

468 ?T° ] RT(em. ?), %3T° PaPu 468 °*JH<hKIM*K° ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 469 ofr: ] PaPu, 'f^T: RT(typo) 470 cHqTT: ] em.,
PaPu, *HW: RT (em.?) 471 °5RTr ] em.RT, °fecft PaPu 472
] conj.Isaacson, ^fHdHPM^ *TT° PaPuRT 473 ^^TT° ] em.RT, ^TT° PaPu
474 0 ] em.RT, °-H^< 0 PaPu 4745^^°] PaPu, Sf° RT(em. ?)
conj.Isaacson, 0^TTcT0 PaPuRT 475 °^:<fl«»><,a^i ] em.RT, °f:^a«<i
PaPu 4765TT%cFT0 ] em.RT, ^rr^cT0 PaPu 476W^rf^T] PuRT, ^fq^fa Pa
480 o^mTT 0 ] em.RT, °5Tm^ PaPu 481 STfrT0 ] PaPuRTpc , STFfr0 RToc (typo)
482 - em., PaPu, c||^dHd^l RT(em. ?) 483
] em. , 'H^IHI^i^q" PaPu , em. RT
 3TII
II

H
, qilviqi4 490

495

rqni*ix

soo

•T ftf F««ir<Ha<4i %T:

505

501 fF. cf. NM I 442.11-14: W

cRT I

] PuRT, °dl Pa 486^T...^T] RT(em. ?), ^T.. .^T PaPu 4881£-

em. , TT^T I ^° RT(em. ?), l(dd^° Pa, ^cT^° Pu 489 ^^K*l * ]
conj. , *TfTII ^il*l° PaPuRT 489MP<H«<Pr1 ] conj.Isaacson, MPi^hlHPd PaPuRT
490 *TfT0 ] PaPu, om. RT 490 0^FJ~ ] PaRTpc , °3t4~ PuRToc 491 3T^IT0 ]
PaPu, 3TVT° RT (em. ?) 491 **$fa^fi^ ] RT (em. ?), «*>^fa^4T PaPu 496 ^TT-
PaRT, ^TTcTT Pu 496 °^F^] PaRT, °4^ Pu 498 °UA|f|^^] em.RT,
Pu 4985nTT1T] PaRT, «Mm Pu 502%Tt] RT(em. ?), %3"° PaPu
503 (Hrtj ] em. , (HrM ° PaPuRT 504 vtmi"*l «hf*< fT° ] em. ,
PaPuRT
 II ^J° II

II 33 II
II

II f^T° II 515

: FTT^T

^TFT M^|
I 520

: I

510 ff. cf. NM I 418.15-419.10:

: II

TI; also NM II 211.6-212.3: x«MPi«?>rq

II fcn<4i«M<><h'tt'tt*1qi r&.<^ifH [i.e

«||W4d fftril 3TcT Tq" MHI^M ^T^" Pi*n(a*i ^cT: I ^1^" «T>4(«i
: I (...)

qT

I 520 cf. NM I 664.7-8: qTW*T

ffa~ 5TTHI<*><l: ^Rf^T I 521 f. cf. NM II 212.3-5: 3?cT

510 H^fcd ] PaPu , HrqRrl RT ( em. ?) 516 °f£ S^" ] PaRT , °fHt 5^" Pu
516 3To3~: ] PaRT , ^I«3" Pu 516 Hq"d^ ] PaRT , M«l^d Pu 517 FTRT *T ] PaRT ,
•HlrH Pu 521 °5rnTW° ] em.RT, °TI^T»I O PaPu
 3T*T ^l<*H*H"iai ? II ^6 II
II ^§T° II 525

II ^RT° II

530

II ** II

ii 3irro ii 535

II ^FT° II

529 ff. cf. NM I 590.15-591.4:

: I; also NM I 691.7-12:

I 533 f. cf. NM I 270.11-271.8:

qT ^4T: I T

" rfcff

536 cf. NM II 131.2-3:

a: II

530 WW: ] PuRT, *T HTT^T: Pa 532 °q" rPTT ] PuRT, 0 TOT Pa 533
t=T° ] RT(em. ?), ^^T^: PaPu 534 °T^~: ] PaRT, °T^ Pu
 fr»f*q*ifin
540

545

"t | 550

ii ^ra~° ii
538 fF. cf. NM II 108.3-16: $|<^<M[H<^ Hi 41*1: ,

I; also NM II 131.8-10:
£rH4ld I 549 ff. cf. NM I 692.3-8:

ffo"
*Tq"fo~, dd^l d^|lf^ ul: MHI^I-rKHl^ o^" xi*-n»M ^HcT, T ^i«t^*i I; also
NM I 693.17-694.3: W ^TT«rqTfo~— ^T^" S^ X*ll«ll-niPl^waMl 5TRW
51 «;<•*« vjHiwiiTiifii^Qirqi-iHiMid I

rTPT Hrd Mi*n u ^*nq^(d

] em.RT, ^RWT0 PaPu 538 °qTFT° ] em.RT, °qTT° PaPu 538^"-
CT] PaRT, ^TT Pu 539 IrtPsM « ] RT(em. ?), f^f?:0 PaPu 539 °TFRt] PaPu,
RT(typo) 541 °r^T] RT(em. ?), °c^t PaPu 542 qTtT* ] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 543 °5nfT: ] RT(em. ?), o^rrfro PaPu 545 ^t^TT° ] PaPu,
RT(em. ?)
 ^- sfr *ftw ITT i

555

II
II ^
II
II Hf° II

I3 fI
565
II

: II

•v 570

I 575

562 f. cf. NM I 615.18-616.4: 'cfcTMHI"! «IK<.NU|HiM<}yr«lldv ' (Jaiminisutra 1.1.5)

3 fa l-i -ii f-i^fpi ^T^^T: , *ft qnsMi^-i <r»«n<i-i T
' (Vaisesikasutra 10.2.9) ?!%" ' *H -sil <J <=f
v ' (Nyayasutra 2.1.68)

552 °^t] PapcPuRT, °^T^fPaac 552 f] PaRT , f Pu 557^91%°] em.RT,

dd^lfd PaPu 562%^RT° ] em. , ^Jt S^RT0 PaPuRT 562 ^^^ ] em.RT, °^fr
PaPu 562 f^F] PaRT, f^" Pu 562^«ll^«rMI ] conj.Goodall, %T ^ff PaPuRT
] em. , ^cIMI 0 PaPuRT 572MriH-rl(1 ] PaPu, MrM-td'O RT(typo)
573 °IT^ZfT ] PaRT , °JT« Pu
 fir

580

II Y^ ||
II *T£T° II 585

578 oH^M^Hi^ 0 ] em.RT, °^^I^0 PaPu 580 °<n ] PaPupcRT, "TlTt Puoc
582°^] PaRT, °^T Pu 583 ^^cri"] RT (em.?), H^TT PaPu 58
RT(em. ?), Hl^lUI 0 PaPu 584 HT c^^" ] em., HT«T^ PaPuRT
] conj. , ciiqls^i*!! ^Mc^q «*«qR<iai PaPu,
conj.RT
 'XHld
81
' XH 'raa [ b4hb 81 njij u^bbb '(i 'uia ) XH [ ^J^^^bJ 91
-nra [ ojrvn IT BJ ih^cbUl^ ' XHnd [ t^^^lt^ 6 ?d o J^ilt ' X^d [
Z XH'raa ojiilfcio 'nd?d [ oJaLiteo S njBj o^hitio 'XH'raa [
'XH -tna [Jdttilno ^ ,,XH ob^o ' ^XH^d^d [ o^jL^o T
02 II olh£
II bifc II
II
si Ife
' !Ub | "kboDbjk Up I lt>D
II Hfter tbj>IKIrbJ
bk.
I t
IklHfelb
PJ
 - 30

PI I'd

q-M l*ifd HUIIfd^q" ^lil^^MH^-tJUd T- 35

: mg<|Rl<M: II Y II 40

45

I
II •=ftlrq<t» II
Hr>r*iq ? 50
26 lJq"^|q" ] em. Isaacson , l3qilqJMv PaPuRT 30 °fTf^T ] PuRT , °^<fd Pa 31 ^T-
em.RT, vjtrM-ri ?fe" PaPu 33^] PaRT, 1" Pu 33 ^frP> ] PaRT, ^~
Pu 35 ^-r1^5l1^"ll ] em. RT , «T!<tal§ni Pa , «-nci5Jl^«il Pu 35
PuRT , ^qT° Pa 35 ^I^il^^-Ll 0 ] em. RT , -M^il^H'W 0 Pa (?) Pu 39
PaRTpc , ilM^^llMH Pu, ^l^-iltAIIM^ RTOC 39S^TT] RT(em. ?),
] RT(em. ?), WT^TPa(?) Pu 41 °HNHv ] PuRT,
q~ Pa 464^1^° ] em.RT, $Ml^° PaPu 47 °wl ° ] em.RT,
PaPu 47 *lfaPHd[ Hh^^l'-M 0 ] em. RT , *lfHlr4>^WT 3T^° Pa , «hi(^iR=i
Pu
 W: 1 <H: ti^titigjl: ti^lddl: I

55

ixain: , I TTlt

H Rq K : II
65

: FT: I W: ,

: II ^ II 70

II ^ II
fq~

72 ff.
: 1 cTcT fllHId
:\

61 NM II 389.13:

52 WT° ] em.RT, *PT° PaPu 54 ^^(1 ] RT(em. ?), *\\*4\ Pa, Pu

56^T] em., TPaPu, ^ em.RT 57 °^TT ] RT(em. ?), °^TT PaPu
em.RT, cf%% PaPu 61 0iH<Hdl 0 ] em.RT, °f!K^dV PaPu 63
em., (fH^I-rft II |c|^h*-H*:ll }em.RT, om.PaPu 66 f^Hfacii: ] em.RT,
f^TT: PaPu 69 ^T° ] PaPupc RT , ^T° Puoc 69 ] PaRT ,
Pu egf^r^TT] PaPupcRT, fd^l Puoc 7 :] RT(em. ?), it : Pa,
: Pu
 75

I 3TPTT

so
: II ^ II

90
V9

dTT: 95
II ^^: II
73 STW ] em. , STW PaPuRT 73 Rl^dril ] em. , PaPuRT 73
PaRT, W^T Pu 73 ^F5^] RT(em. ?), ^^ Pa, Pu 74
V%W 3TCZft] conj. PaPu,
em.RT 78 °rRT^T] RT(em. ?), : PaPu 79 : ] em.RT,
: PaPu SO^otl ] em.RT, ^o*j PaPu 81
em.RT, °(H^: PaPu 82 ] conj.RT, : PaPu,
conj.RT 82 °^ff° ] RT(em. ?), °^f^0 PaPu 82 em.RT,
(?) pa, o^TjffT* Pu 83°«T^T] PaPu, 83
PaPu, °"° RT(em. ?) 86 °^T° ] PapcPuRT, Pao 87
PaRT, °T!WTT^~ Pu
 ii ^RT° , *<i*i*i«i<4 ^r VJII^H HHN ii
wo

ll*m-*1Hl [-1*5^11-^^1^^ II ^ II

105

{ II *mr: II )

no
,
I

97
101 0 «h1u|*° ] em.RT, o«h)u|«h° PaPu 101 °?5ytT0 ] em.RT, °r>l ° PaPu
lOll^fl^] RT(em. ?), fc|,MeJ PaPu 102 ^^PFT ] conj.Sanderson, *qgi|<4 PaPu
RT 103 OJTn1"] conj. , °JTnt° PaPuRT 103 °r>M»<i <> ] conj.Sanderson,
PaPuRT 103 °^lM^ ] conj. , °^f?%" PaPuRT 104 f.
conj. , T«TT%% TT^=T Pa, T*nf^- ^ftR; Pu,
em. RT 106 <1«f>*(ll*i ~ ~ ~ ] RT conjectured a lacuna at this point,
which is not indicated in the manuscripts. 107 (*H?*K:) ] em.RT, om.PaPu 108 ~
] conj., ^M^I^M PaPu, ;3TW W^T conj.RT 108
em.RT , sH^JUII^^ PaPu 108 5^T~ ~ ~ ] The lacuna is marked by an empty space
in the manuscripts. 109 *T 3JMIrM ] PaPu , tf*imr«H em.RT 109 3>fW: ] conj. ,
PaPuRT 110 Md)d° ] em. RT , Mdlfd 0 PaPu 111 °^T: , cRT ] em. RT ,
Pa, °d^M^ Pu 111 OTTT° ] RT(em. ?), °^TT PaPu 111
em.RT, $4 Id PaPu 112 cf^cTPT" ~ ~ ] PaRT, rf^T^"~ ~ ~ Pu, the lacuna
is marked by six dashes in the manuscripts. 112 * 1*^*1* ] conj. , H-^H * PaPuRT
Ttr] em.Sanderson, Sft^T0 PaRT, 3TTt?T0 Pu 113 "fT^FrT 0 ] em. , °fT-
° PaPu , "ill^^'d ° RT ( em. ?) 113 q^fafa ] The lacuna is indicated
by seven dashes in the manuscripts.
 II
*PTT yfa*NH: I us
II HR^blHPTi II

120

^TR"

: I

: II ^ II 125
II ^Td~° II
t I 3TFt ^^^il^iHQiHidl ^Tl«r>: I T "

130

II : II
I dT
II ^Td~° II 135

%^
II
134 3Rj^ ^r^TFTW ^i^^Mq^ii^iM Rmfa I cRT

114 STRT° ] em. , ~ ~ ~ q~: I PaPu, ~ ~ " q~: (^RT°) em.RT 115 STT ] em.RT,
d^^ PaPu 118 H«t»c*lR>*l C^T) ~ ~ ~ ] conj.Sanderson, H«fc<ittR>a ~ ~ ~ The lacuna is
marked by three dashes in the manuscripts. 120 °3lt H«f ° ] conj. , °3UH^ ° PaPu ,
em.RT 123^RTc^rT: ] PaPu, ^^IrMI em.RT 124 °<J»dHI ] PaRT, °^"-
Pu 128 ^q"° ] conj. , Sanderson, ^Tq"° PaPuRT 129 °^lfH ] PuRT ,
Pa 131 °Hvj1<l 0 ] em. RT , °^vjKI ° PaPu 134 Sf^ir ] PaPu ,
RT(em. ?) 136 qlTn" ] conj., T PaPuRT 136 tl<5^llj em.RT,
PaPu
 II M^n*-M II

, i I

JTra~: MdlRl

: WT: II II
145

: I 150

T^TII

: I
155

: ti ^i <4 : I

140 ] conj.Isaacson, PaPuRT 140 : ] PaRT,

Pu 142 °d)TlHdA|l ] em. RT , PaPu 142 T ] PaRT ,
Pu 143 ] em.RT, PaPu 143 RT(em. ?),
PaPu 149 ] em.RT, PaPu 150 : ] PaRT,
Pu 152 em.RT, PaPu ] RT(em. ?),
Pa, Pu 154 °itT: ] RT(em. ?), PaPu 155
conj. , om.PaPuRT 157^"] em. , ^ PaPuRT 162 ] PaRT, Pu
 3ti*i*i««r}.

: I SHRq^f JT: u
TT
II 170

: I cRl ^q^aq^i ^Tr HI«rKI hHM ^$Hd ^q^rT: I ITS

II qlfr* II

II

II qlfcf: II

II

cTI
185 NM I 430.10-11: *W: U^M^IUIMJ MWIw-Mfafd Jj^ldlH^ I T f^"
'II = SV codana 47 (v.l. in SV(V, M, T)
'); AD Third Act: ^

163 { 0TrF5T0 ) ] em.RT, om.PaPu 165 °Mfa*iMI ° ] conj.Sanderson,

conj.Isaacson, °VlfdHmi 0 PaPuRT 168°vrgr^T] PaRT, °^Rc^ Pu 169 °JT-
] conj. , °Sn|dT l^T PaPu , ^M^dilcJ em. RT 172 °%fd" f^^T ] em. RT ,
*j PaPu 174 Ht ] PaRT , clt Pu 175 °^>TfT ^fHlHf: ] PaPu ,
: em. RT 175 cTcff ] em. Sanderson , WT PaPuRT 177
PaRT , *° Pu 180 °^": ] PupcRT , °d: PaPuac 184
conj., 0 fdr=IH 0 PaRT, 0^TrFro Pu 184 %T: ] em.RT, %T PaPu
 : II II

%TT qi*nMHid : qT 190

195

f^T: , ti

qT WT

189 ff. NM 1 434.9-435.5: Hi*H«««i

(= SV codana 62ab, v.l. in SV(T) and SV(V):

ct II' (= SV codana 68, reading in

SV(M, T, v): ) ?r i 190 f. NM 1 431.9-16:

(= SBh(F) ad MS 1.1.4
(p. 26), v.l.
I II' (= SV codana 53) 193 f. AD Third
Act: : I; also NM I 129.12-13:
I *I«*MI*H ^TTII 198 NM I 579.16-580.2:
IT
H<4Hi
HTII; also NM I 590.14: ciiq<;

186 ] conj. , °5^"° PaPuRT, °f[T0 conj.Isaacson, conj.Kataoka 187

° ] conj.Isaacson, °5MIHq"K° PaPuRT conj., %% PaPuRT
192 conj. , PaPuRT
 200

<nr*T , ^T-f vjUld cTT: qvMIl: II ^ II

205

II ^o II

199 fF. NM I 589.15-590.9: at*ll<?> ^f ^>rl 'HII'^HI*^ I

I 3?fT T ^HTT d<lR(yHl:

fqf«1«l^i I cTPRT
: I

201 ff. NM 574.5-8: li HiHi«q-irMai*)i*iq rq^H^i^n^ t«i*«-i*iv , T-

edac)

' 202 f- NM
also NM I 573.4-7: M<*farMrcm&~ SfT ql^" a^^iirM^ I
: II cWT ^ ^f«J«W) T^TT: 4*4^*1 : ^•tiirqiq^ <r>K<r>«T>^^iiqq^ I; also NM
I 696.5-6: «hl±Mldv M«J<^HHl: ^'«=^«^< <r>rq*i^*i<4d I 204 f. NM I 575.4-5:
I f^<Jd I *Rfq~ 1% SfT M^mfd: 3Klt FT^cT I^ll ; also
NM I 577.12-14 T ^T: WTPtcT: *Pyd *fy^ q^FT *dU
I 206 NM I 503.12-13:

I; also NM I 581.13-14:
tTq~ ^c(t S-pfaRTFT T JJHfd'tMrtlH ^W>": I 207 NM I 583.1-5:

FTW HlfVd T ^T ^Ifr4|«( I 208 NM I 575.4-5:

201 ^iTqTlq^ro ] em.RT, ^Hq^^PH ° PaPu 209 °g^TT° ] PaRT, °*3^T° Pu

 a fq" il ''I fa 4l 210

215

ft^TT

220

f*r»rr ^3 / N^

_____^^ ____^^ __ ___ »*n. * *•*„

=~ --—-- - | 225

cPTT

210 f. NM I 575.6-9:

213 f. NM
I 645.10-11: T
215 f. NM I 500.11:
I
222 NM I 56.11: T ^ H)vjHI^ 5FTFT H^?T I; also NM II 436 1-3:

: I T yAMlHIci M^l"l ^lH I 226 NM I 630.7-9:

I 228 ff. NM I 574.12-15: '

' (= SV vakyadhikarana 366)
I -T

210 °fWT] conj. , °fqTfT PaPu, °f%rlT RT 212^" ^"] PaPu, om.RT 214
°rTT: ] RT(em. ?), °cTT PaPu 215 °^t S^] em.RT, °*TT^[ Pa, °^TT^ Pu
220 0 fq^TT] em.RT, °fq^T: PaPu 227 ^T ] em.RT, «hl-t1l PaPu 227 (°T-
5"°) ] em.RT, om.PaPu 228^] PuRT, ^" Pa
 I 230

II *t II

*RT: VNd»ti II 301| 235

240

234 ff- NM I 435.18-436.4: 3f<|£" ^ fq«i<}

: | cHT TTcT TTq- ^FT HIHIUild qUrTPT: I; also NM I 481.13-16

also NM 1 576.6-8:
<<»mv I; also NM I 583.13-584.2:
^n I
i
I at*Hi<;m>ir<4<4i<«q l

TTT>T: i 239 ff. NM n 118.11-12: ^r-f f^: ^I^JJUT iiRn %cr,

230 °qlTT0 ] em.RT, °q!T0 PaPu 232 3T° ] RT(em. ?), ^T° Pa, %"° Pu 232
d ] conj. , ^Mvnf^ioM^rH^iM^d PaPu,
em.RT 233 °*Rf"l ] em. Sanderson , °*<l PaPu, °*"l RT(em. ?) 236
°^T] RT(em. ?), °^T PaPu 237 <>*TRTT T° ] em.RT, °HMI^° PaPu 241 °rIT
^T° ] PuRT, °Wr*n"° Paac (?), 0 cT^r° Papc (?) 242°^] PaRT, ( hardly legible
syllables, probably deleted: ) °3>t" I ^iq*lRl*(*lT ( some more deleted syllables) 3?f I Pu
 r^ *
T$T «l<4 ^Hfc^lHI ^g.T.I^I'H iq^il 245

<T»f*nf*ixi<4: ~

sfr oijcj^iO s^^xrH^ n ^ n 250

255

243 NM I 409.11-410.2: ^i«*q~: Hori^i l«<N*ld^*l I

: II ^Mlqtoqq^i^ f" qTrT: ^i«Aia >a^ai I
l II; NM I 596.17-597.2: T ^" d*JH (i.e.
ti*-qHT: I rTTf^fi^q-^: Md^^^H TTq^Mdl^ld , 'f^Tl" sfN"fq^rTT^c|ld '

:I 245 NM I 696.5-7:

ff^TI 251 NM 1 576.8-13:

em. : 'HfMd ed. ),

I 252 ff. NM I 586.3-13: 3iCk viR4i?»*i*TA»i

<f»rffa
*cffd ^l-Htd II *T*TT Hi^ai ^TfT nf
^TfT cPTT

II

244 <?MM° ] em. RT , ^TT: 5T° PaPu 245 qa^l "° ] em. RT ,
PaPu 247 °qW° ] em.Isaacson, °T?K;5ro PaPuRT 247 «T>^*ld ] conj. ,
PaPu 248 +fMI4»l * ] em. RT , 3HRT ^TT0 PaPu 250 °<fcrMd ] em. Isaacson , °?T-
r*zfc PaPuRT 251 W] em.RT, ^3" PaPu 251 HTCRf ] em.RT, i|^d PaPu
252*dl<) ] PaRT, *dUl Pu 253ift^"] PaRT , TJt^TT Pu 254 °^>Fr: ] PaRT,
(?) Pu 255 ^rfW ] PaRT , <T^f*Tq" Pu
 Z9Z ?d llflo ' XHnd [ ollflo 092
DJfe *>* UJ^jfr^bj DJ^tt \>llf^lf IkbJ
b4«fefi :iT-§'989 I HN 'JEF
'P 'J 99^ I SJ^fobJk ID|nK !tb^k!Ult>^ Jail
I "2 ft. :
||Jbtfe!fe
KJIb
PMN
II ^A II ^J^JK J^Jl J^L PJ>jT^bJ p
DJi Jt KVItlf>Utrx Kbit
S92 >fcx| b. U D DP
I I Kb It J*
 II *3 II 280

qT qlfV qT

f fq^iidi _ \$ • •
r=- *n- -> "" (I 285

290

^" qT qv^TTII Yt ||

295

277 f- NM I 588.11-12:
H*HI«II*Hiqiriv , ^rSIHqH'M^-l^l I 279 ff. NM I 588.17-589.1:
f|r
I 285 f. NM I 644.1:
*FTqTT MUldfd I; NM I 644.6-7: STlff^T *fM?i
288 ff. NM
640.9-10:
277 T ] em. RT , T Pa , T Pu 278 M«ldl ] em. RT , WRfT PaPu 278
d: ] conj.RT, qqi^ll^M ~ ~ ~ cTqi*i<r>*fc! PaPu (the lacuna
is marked by two dashes in the manuscripts) 280 °«;*la q^T° ] em. RTpc ,
RTac , °fT ^rPf %qT° PaPu 281 °q^fr] RT(em. ?), °q^fT PaPu
RT(em. ?), *rMd PaPu 284 °TT^5"° ] em.RT, °5n7T° Pa,
Jf° Pu 285 0 cT^r^qt° ] PaPupcRT, ^d^rH^q"! 0 Puac 286^"] RT(em. ?),
PaPu 286 °T5T° ] RT(em. ?), 0^T^r> PaPu 288 H^"] RT(em. ?), Hqf PaPu
290 cT] PaPupcRT, IT- puoc 292 °q¥T] em.RT, oq5^ PaPu 293 f.
*T] conj. , q^-^PT0 Pa, %T ^FT° Pu, %rM~ ^TFT° em.RT
 fir fa Rid:

300

(T) d

srf^T
II v\ II

297 ff. NM I 642.14-643.12:

sfr : I

5 CM 11 fa -•'K fa fd

' (SBh ad MS 1.1.2)

11X1-

301 f. NM I 640.12-14:

I 303 ff. NM I 640.15-641.3: J fqTtMt

(Calicut MS : 5FTI% ed.) qT
: I
: II (nRi^ld I

em.RT, PaPu 296 °q^":^ ] em.RT, PaPu 297

f. »W|^^<?'W 0 ] em.RT, Pu, Pu
:] em.RT, ^4^K: PaPu 298 RT(em. ?), °^RFT PaPu
300 : ] RT(em. ?), Pa, ^dfd: Pu 300 ] PaPupcRT,
Puloc 301 RT(em. ?), a Pa,
Pu 301 (^0 ] em. RT, om. PaPu 301 ] PaRT, Pu 302
em.Sanderson, 3"T: PaPu, g[T: em.RT PaRT, Pu
 305

FT 310

II

I 315

II ^^ II

t m* II 320

305 f. NM I 641.4-12: M$d

cT^Ti H H; ^i f-n I 'W*^ 511-iarq 3RT
I fjc^rqc Hqi^irMc ^" qT: I
: I f^TT fqp^^i xrMi*i*i ^Tq ^TTT I

: I 307 ff. NM I 644.1-4

la I 317 S. = NM I 640.17-18, cf. MBh

12.336.77 323 f. NM I 588.11-16: ^q" vH^lr^^^d^ ^T TTq" q«5MM^«r>:

ill^HJ <*>dVMc|Jld ^T: I q^qY q^f^^Tr: 3T*T T Tf^cTT ^"H' ^f^T, cfcT

305 oyi^lUTq" 0 ] em.Isaacson, °ill^|l: Hrq~° PaPuRT 308 ^T^TT: ^T ] PaRT,

Pu 309 H^"° ] Papc (?) RT, Hqt° Paac (?), ^ Pu 310
RT(em. ?), JTTTl Pa, ^TFf Pu 314 ^^ ] PaPupcRT, ^fq Puac
 dr xo - . . --

I 325

: 'HHKptil: II ^ II
S*T fa^l: 330

TT
HlRrf ^":
": ^i i Ri ^i c\
^_____
^PWWV"""V^ A
___
W^P^^^ kk « _. A hi

I 335

^ ?Tt
* I 340

5fT
^<gj fa

326 ff. NM I 644.5-6:

d I 330 S. NM I 644.6-7:
334 NM I 589.9-14:
II
I
^ II 336 f. = Bhagavadgtta 10.41. 337 °«|-««^Tq~] Kashmirian
reading, Vulgate: °3T^ 339 ff. NM I 633.9-11: * ^Hlcq *HNMx I

328 °?T3Fr qq"° ] PapcPuRT , °fFT qq~° Paac 329 ^Hfd ° ] PaRT ,
: Pu 331 °gfr: ] PaRT, °*[fT Pu 332°^^^^] PaRT, *fdH^I Pu 334^-
] conj.Sanderson, fT*T*ft PaPuRT 336 ^RJT] PaRT, 3RT Pu
] PapcPuRT , fq~y/dfad^ Paoc 337 d^l 0 ] PuRT , dvift^i « Pa 339
em. RT , IFT0 PaPu 341 HTTq75T° ] PuRT , ^Rq^T° Pa 342
RT(em. ?), °«Hf<K34l: Pa, °q^R^T^T: Pu 342°TRTT] RT(em. ?),
PaPu
 f|r 41RHJ
^Hta ¥FT **mi<Mi «v ' '

r 345

sfr -qi^HHl: UHM: u ^ 11

1 * fl
*1Hlt*tl^5li: I 350

Mi*H"<4i ^
Vlr^^dl: II ^^ II

': II ^ II
355

: II ^ II

360

343 f. NM I 279.1-4:

5TIT ^iiti i*i*Hiq-ii**imx*i^*id I ; also NM I

633.14-634.2: T ^tMr^Wf^t ^iiMc^Wt*) ^T MIHI" ^a'1' : I
fd I 345 ff. NM I 636.7: 3T [Myil^l ] T ^^NHv fa^p M")dl
; also NM I 640.7-8: tii ^W «?>'^ m '^1 n^^^ii I
fl«ll<i<S4lHld II 357 ff. NM I 625.16-19 (on the validity of the Atharvaveda) :

346^] PaRT, ^Pu 346T^T° ] RT(em. ?), JTr^T0 PaPu 347 5R^] PaRT,
Pu 348HTTT:] em.RT, 'HIHI-^I: Pa, tl^i'Mt Pu 350 <WT] PaRT,
Pu 351 «HIU*lldv H^TT] RT(em. ?), MIHI l>A|l'H*Tr PaPu 351
em. , dry"fldl<( PaPuRT 352 MrM^dl: ] conj.Isaacson, xr^qiti: PaPu,
em.RT 353 q^T: *^T ] Pa, %^T: *W Pu, ^^l-Wd RT(em. ?) 354
: ] conj.Sanderson, *IHId^dl: Pa, «M*ilt*la[ Pu, «r»i*i*l^qai RTOC ,
: RTpc 354^7^°] PaPu, ^TTl'0 RT(em. ?) 356 °^r^rat ] RT(em. ?),
i^i PaPu 357 ^JH fad I ] conj.Sanderson, ^J«T>f^ai PaPuRT
 365

': II ^ II

370

«r»4 ui: i«n*m -qu^a 3im«H 375

livsoli

368 ff. NM I 620.14-621.2: *!%T T ^Mr^N *HfMf«i*lRt

I 373 ff. NM I 588.18-589.4: l**iH f^ 3*4"

I rTT

: I; also NM I 590.1-3:

fcT,
378 ff. NM I 640.12-14:

I; also NM I 643.10: 3rf*U>l<>kW

361 WTT] PaPu, Hiy<l«l em.RT 361 °] PaRT, °^T Pu 363

em.RTpc , 3TZRfT PaPuRTac 363Tf3T3"] em.Sanderson, ^trT(?)fr° Pa,
)^T° Pu, *l^c||H 0 RT 365 °AII^I° ] PaRT, °^rr^T° Pu 374 °4|~-
PaRT, °4^^llM Pu 374 ^HI^(4ldlHv ] em.Kataoka, ^*H^Rtai*lv PaPu,
RT 375 rRTRT ] em.RT, driHI PaPu
 380

M<'H<'H<t><HI

385

wr ,
II V9^ II 390

395

383 ff. NM I 641.8-9: ^ JTMMi|)^N3Ml4^4i4Ufa«IK: I (V»«4i ^ fqp'i'ii

I 387 ff. NM I 626.2-3:

379HfaT* ] em.RT, TT° PaPu 379fTT° ] em.RT, ^TT0 Pa, ^TT0 Pu 381
conj.Isaacson, ^r^fWT PaPuRT 383 ^pTTf^r> ] RT(em. ?), ^TT-
PaPu 387%T] em.RT, %^T PaPu 387 (^T) ] RT(em. ?), om.PaPu 388
conj.Sanderson, HT^° PaPu, WT 5^° RToc (em. ?), Ht S^° conj.RTpc
391 °5n=*f ] conj.Sanderson, °^R=«ft PaPuRT 391 ^TTT^r5T0 ] PuRT, ^*iq^ ° Pa
392 0H^] conj.Sanderson, °WT Pa, °W I Pu, °W: em.RT 394
conj. , °^5T PaPuRT 396HmFT° ] em.RT, ^TOT^T0 PaPu 398
em.RT, °U^oi|c|R4t<|d: PaPu
 400

qj T T qTW q Nl>: I 405

410

qTII 6^ II
*i *

399 f. NM I 552.3-7, 10-11: TT^T si^wicqif^ti 1*11^*1 *iRi

I T •«fl vi<ipM^$i»M<;j'<rM«ic<:i
^i'iiav I ^" T — 'T f^" ^7^ HiR 34^*1 i
' ( TV ad MS 1.2.2 ) f?T I (...)
I; also NM II 253.7-9:

T' (TV ad MS 1.2.2) ff^T I 408 f. NM

I 645.6-10: 3TT^ Hcfaic^ fl^lJIHMIHIu^H^HM Wlv I ^Tt f|r

l' (cf. TV ad MS 1.3.2) T ^T ^<4l^ UHM: I 414 ff. NM

I 635.9-13: ^TT HclHHMJ ^TIW HI*H«M ^, a^HMiPiai^i: xa)d: ^i

f|r a^«*

399 JTtc^Tfc0 ] em.RT, <flrtlRs° PaPu 403 M^»n*i^ tin *i: ] em.RT,
TT PaPu 404 °JT*TT: ] em. RT , °TFTT PaPu 405 t ] PaRT , ^RT Pu 406 *T-
th ] em. RT , Spl"0 PaPu 407 UNRHfrlH ] em. RT , Mi^ftiRll PaPu 407
Papc PuRT , ^T Paac 407 01TTT: ] em. RT , OTTTT PaPu 409 °w
em.Isaacson, <>U4|Hrc|| 0 PaPu, °™T H&l e RT 411 °T ] em.,
PaPu, °*t^T RT(em. ?) 411?^] em., ff^T PaPuRT 414 °lft^t ] em.RT,
PaPu 414 T ^FT° ] PuRT , ^Ff Pa
 415

%|T

FT, dltf<IH*JNhl^d W:il<£>ni

I 420

:ll £XII

425

430

435

420 f. NM I 645.12-14:
(MS 1.3.2) ?fir, ^T%^ HlWlfd ^T ^rM^HIHH? 422 ff. NM I 645.15-646.7:
>: I
I

419 °TVTT0 ] em. RT, °JT^"° PaPu 421 ": ] em. Isaacson, ^["* PaPuRT 428
5T: ] conj.Isaacson, JT: PaPuRT 428 "HN^rt ] conj.Isaacson, °*TT^ PaPuRT|
429 ^IcT: ] em.RT, oETcT: Pa, ^ZRT: Pu 433 °^T] PuRT, °^TI T Pa
em.RT, SlW PaPu 436 <&<&<* } em.RT, f^ Pa, ^~ ^ pu
 440
fir

450

II ^ II

O7T d^^Td" 455

mr: a \^ n

441 NM I 648.11-12:
447 S. cf. NM 1.637.18-638.3:
, -T

: i ; also NM 1.644.14-645.2:
-iifVci ? iiRn I
: I
fHfH«»MI*l: MlfuiH) S^pftrTT ff^T cfT
453 f. NM I 491.13-14: T *<*l<iH3$ ^IW ^>w -la^^*f: II

439 0^raffep> ] em.RT, °<*HfalV0 PaPu 440 «0^ ] PaRT, STTt^T Pu 446
em. , % em. RT, T PaPu 448 'MtffMd) ] PaRT, °y<rtlMd1 Pu 456 T-
0 ] conj.Isaacson, <^<iHI 0 PaPu, ^rRT° em.RT 458 T^RFTT0 em.RT,
° Pa, fH-il° Pu
 46o

fi -
: I 465
TFT

470

475

cHTII II

464 ff- NM I 648.10-13:

: II 473 ff. NM I 648.17-649.2: cKfc^cHd " sT MI^I'WI: I

] PaPu, ^rT^RT0 em.RT 461fjf^dd^l ] conj.RT, ^iq^a^l PaPu

465 >fq~ fq"° ] PaRT , ^fq~° Pu 466=TFTT] em.RT, ^IH^ PaPu 469
RT(em. ?), ^cjP>ll PaPu 469^TT: ] em.RT, ^<«|: PaPu 470
T° ] RT(em. ?), °^Pr° PaPu 471 ^f^KT^ 0 ] em.RT, ^RST^ 0 Pa,
Pu 473 0lftcT° ] em. Sanderson , °^llfd 0 PaPuRT 473 f. °*i
em. , °*Mll«h4>c^ rtlHIK em.RT, °H<4<rtll**rcmiHlk PaPu 477
PuRT, STTHtfT0 Pa 4783Tf»*ff] RT(em. ?), ^1^ PaPu
 qiRt-i: , 485

490

S^fr <*lRrl TJWT T ^ft" ST TTTT

: ^T^T T ^Id) TT: II oY ||

495

: II

479 ff. NM I 638.16-18:

479 f. TZr %f] conj.Kataoka, ^ PaPu, f J em.RT 480 °^° ] RT(em.

?)> °^f^° PaPu 482 H$^ ] RT(em. ?), *T^tT PaPu 483^"] PaPu, om.RT
484 ^ciN^ 0 ] em.RT, °^dN«i 0 PaPu 485^^1° ] em.RTpc , ^J^"0 PaPuRTac
] RT(em. ?), frT^° PaPu 486^° ] PaPu, WRT° RT(em. ?) 488
conj. , $cUU||R4dl em.RT, ^q^llciai Pa, ^"1 ^1(^01 Pu
488 °fcH«|4U ] PERT , ^i^TcRTTFr^lT Pu 490 qmi*«i ] PuRT , qi^M^i Pa
492 cllfkl JpfT T ^flT 5^"] conj. , Hlfkl T ^ft S^T PaPu,
conj.RT 492T^Tf] RT(em. ?), M<HI PaPu 493
em. RT , Hl^dHI^ ^l^d^H PaPu 494 I^t ] PuRT , T^RT Pa 497
em.RT, ^cMNf^d PaPu 497 0 q^HT ] RT(em. ?), «4^H\ PaPu
RT(em. ?), qT Pa, q^T Pu 499dNqHI^4) ] conj.RT, aiq^l^l PaPu
 { II Hf ° II ) 500

i ^nrrfr

sos

- 510

°
sis

: I

520

I
500 {^Tf °) ] em. , (HTcT°) em.RT, om.PaPu 501 0TT0 ] conj.Sanderson, «1T-
PaPuRT 5029l^R*rM 0 ] conj.RT, 5l^lfd*rM° PaPu 506 Hf ° ] PaPu,
° RT(em. ?) 507 M<fM<H-H«hl"lHH ] em.RTpc , M<fM<^<^«l1fH PaPuRTac
] PuRT, ^TON^lfa
^l Pa 508 0^fT°
0 f ] PuRT, °^^rr° Pa 510
RT(em. ?), PaPu 510 °f^TTfT: ] RT(em. ?), PaPu
n ] em. RT , PaPu 511 Hliql ] conj. , JTFRTt PaPuRT 512 f|[-
RT(em. ?), ft^T PaPu 514 tff° ] PaPu, ^TcT° RT(em. ?) 515
Papc PuRT, H^€N" g% Paac 516 <>»«(c<«hl*h ] em.RT, ooqiq^njl PaPu
516 %^T: ] PuRT , %*TT Pa 518 O fa^g ] PaRT , °fH<|*1^ Pu 519
em.RT, W PaPu 520 *Tf « ] PaPu, ^TcP RT(em. ?) 521 q"l^*l « ] PaRT,
Pu 522 °Wn° ] PupcRT, °W^° PaPu00
 II ^° II 525

H I

: II

525 ^Tf ° ] PaPu , HRT° RT ( em. ?) 527 SRJIotHHlHI 0 ] em. RT ,

PaPu 529^f« 5f : ] Pa, ^^Mf • «HIHHv Pu 529 Colophons:
0 011 H^l^^ II 0 Pa, ^^Tll ^ftll Pu
 Part III

English Translation

107
 Prologue

May that Brahman shine forth for you, by which beginningless ignor- (1)
ance is gradually destroyed; in which intense, fresh joy coruscates;
at the very start of whose 'descent' to the level of consciousness1
desires for the enjoyment of other pleasing objects cease.

At the end of the benediction the DIRECTOR [says].

Shame, for shame, being an actor is indeed an extremely wretched means of
supporting one's family, in which one is continuously practicing a display of
utterly false behaviour.
Kara, Visnu, Brahma, a sage, a king, a brutish fool, a rake, a coward, (2)
a hero, a happy man, a sad one: taking all roles the actor plays,
feeling no shame before the people2 —in reality he is [just] resorting
to craft to fill his belly.
Better, then, that I should wind up this vile craft, which bears small fruit but
which causes great trouble and yet more shame, attach myself to some household
of a guru in some ashram, and strive to reach the highest goal of man, [which
is] the cessation of all sufferings, (reflecting) So to whom should I consign this
wretched burden of my family, which is hardly more than an object of pity,
before I leave? (looking ahead) Well, let me first find out what he thinks.

Enter the ASSISTANT. He looks at the Director.

Why is his face haggard with disillusion today? I'll ask him. (approaching) Sir,
why so sorrowful a face? Surely you haven't been engaged by the pupils of that
Writer of the Commentary for some task?
The DIRECTOR repeats what he said above up to 'sufferings'.
ASSISTANT. Don't be disillusioned, there's no need. Who among gods, humans or
animals has ever escaped from deceit and then reached the supreme goal? All
this multitude of creatures, from Brahma down to the animals, roams about in
worldly existence through Illusion alone. Is your lot any worse?
Our conduct cannot be different from that of the whole world that (3)
is fooled by Illusion: not ultimately true.

108
 Prologue

DIRECTOR. My friend, it is as you say. But even though our conduct is no worse
than theirs, still I find it impossible to carry on with it.
ASSISTANT. Why, sir?
DIRECTOR. My friend, as is well known, I have exerted myself in the staging of the
ten dramatic styles as taught by Bharatamuni. But today the circle of pupils
of this honourable Bhatta Jayanta, who is also well known as the Writer of the
Commentary because he wrote an exegetical work on grammar when he was just
a child, has ordered me to put on the work of their teacher, a new, extraordinary
play called Much Ado About Religion. So how shall I stage it, since it is neither
worldly, nor does it follow the dramatic rules, and has never been performed
before? Therefore it is better just to give up this wretched livelihood.
ASSISTANT. Sir, say not so. As you know, the commands of these honourable pupils
of the Writer of the Commentary cannot be disregarded. As for your worry that
it does not follow the rules, what blame is there in that for the director?
That poet makes a poem disregarding the teachings of Bharata, and (4)
his pupils propagate it in that way, too, [and] your audience are
those same [pupils]. So just put it on. Why would someone else, a
bystander find fault with it?
DIRECTOR. I don't care about people's abuse.
ASSISTANT. So are you afraid of some danger from the king?
DIRECTOR (smiling). It's not that either.
ASSISTANT. Then why procrastinate? Assign the actors their various parts—the
Buddhist, the Jain, and so forth.
DIRECTOR. My friend, I simply cannot carry on with this intolerable profession of
acting full of trickery and illusion.
Let the poem flout the rules or follow them, let the people be angry (5)
or pleased—as for me, I am disillusioned: I shall quit my profession
now and acquaint myself with holy places.
As far as you are concerned, you can either support my indigent family, or follow
me. But myself, since I am eager to know the truth, I have to go now into
this great monastery nearby,3 where hundreds of monks, who have transcended
passion, live, and which shows the path to final release.

Exeunt ora&o.4

109
 Prologue

Notes to the Prologue

1 ex conj. DEZSO-ISAACSON.
2 ex conj. ISAACSON.
3 Dr. Isaacson's conjecture (natiduranirvanamargadesini} , which is supported
by the awkward position of natidure, would mean: 'which shows a relatively
short path to final release' (cf. Act One, 1.48: ayam eva nirvanamargo nediyan).
On the other hand, as Prof. Sanderson has also pointed out to me, natidure
fits the context well: the Director, seeing the monastery nearby, decides to start
his life as a wandering pilgrim there. Another argument defending the word
'natidure' might be that it helps the transition to the first act the beginning of
which is actually set in the vicinity of a Buddhist monastery.
4 A detailed interpretation of the Prologue can be found in the Introduction,
Chapter 3.

110
 Act One

Then enter the Buddhist monk, seated on a stool and dressed in a

red robe, and the lay disciple in front of him. 1
MONK (with dispassion).
In this beginningless existence this is the way things are, alas: de- (1)
hided creatures are born and then die, and dying they are born
again. A wise man, seeing that this is the path of sorrows, should
direct his thoughts towards the state in which birth and death come
to a close. 2
DISCIPLE. O Reverend, what is this place which is outside the transactions of birth
and death? And by what means is it reached?
MONK. My intelligent friend, if you are eager to learn, then strive to comprehend
now the Four Noble Truths.
DISCIPLE. O Reverend, what are those Four Noble Truths?3
MONK. My intelligent friend, Suffering, the Cause of Suffering, the Cessation of
Suffering, and the Path: these are the Four Noble Truths.
DISCIPLE. O Reverend, that much isn't enough to enlighten me. Please teach me
the details.
MONK. Sir, I'll make you understand.
First of all, everything is Suffering, which is directly experienced and (2)
the contrary of happiness. That from which it arises is the Cause, the
power of delusion. Cessation is Extinction, the end of all afflictions.
[And] the Path is taught by the right-thinking to be the means to
attain that.
DISCIPLE. O Reverend, by what means does the Self4 leave behind5 these deep
waters of suffering, which have been flowing continuously for a long time and
which are difficult to cross, and then settle in Nirvana?
MONK. Good fellow, you haven't got it right. In fact, there is no such thing as a
Self which escapes the straits of suffering and arrives at Nirvana. Surely,
It is this that is the firm pillar upholding the prison of existence, (3)
which causes terrible pain—people's obsession with a permanent
Self.6

Ill
 Act One

To explain,
A creature who thinks "this is me", will inevitably be convinced (4)
that "this is mine"; and thinking [in terms of] "me" and "mine",
the dull-minded will surely not give up [his] wrong desires.
For someone whose craving has not stopped, cultivation of dispassion (5)
is remote; and if dispassion has not been practiced, how can one cross
over [the ocean of] existence?
DISCIPLE. O Reverend, if no [permanent] self exists at all, 7 then who experiences
the suffering of existence? Or who rises out of it and arrives at8 the house of
Nirvana?
MONK (smiling). My child, cessation, Nirvana, final beatitude, or completion would
be all the more impossible if there were a permanent self. For what is permanent
can never cease. Therefore this [i.e. everything] is just consciousness, contamin­
ated by the various forms of joy, sorrow, etc., having a broad variety of aspects
in accordance with the various latent impressions which have been operating in
a beginningless continuum,9 — [when] by this path of the cultivation of there
being no self etc. [it has become] grounded in pure consciousness alone, with
its many kinds of defilements, caused by the mass of various adventitious prop­
erties, having been removed, 10 let it remain in a stream, or let the stream itself
be cut off: this is indeed the shortcut to Nirvana.
DISCIPLE. O Reverend, if there is no permanent self, who enjoys the fruit of his
actions in the next world? And in the present, 11 too, whose are these activities
which are based on memory?12
MONK. I'll make you understand properly.
Permanent entities cannot have causal efficacy either gradually or (6)
instantaneously; and since they cannot have efficacy, they are not
ultimately real. 13
For so say the wise: "Only that which has causal efficacy can be ultimately
real." 14 Furthermore,
This pot, 15 whether perishable by nature or not, does not perish (7)
because of a cause such as a hammer. Either [, in the first case,] the
cause would be useless, or [, in the second,] incapable; or because it
[i.e. that cause] might not appear even in an aeon, it [i.e. the pot]
might not perish.
Therefore entities perish immediately after coming into existence, (8)
but they appear the same [as before] because they are in the same
continuum. And because they exist in a continuum, the bringing
about of effects [such as the illusion of a stable] agent [who is also
the] enjoyer [of the fruits of the deeds of that agent, and] memory
etc. are easy to account for. 16
DISCIPLE. If all entities are momentary, [i.e.] do not remain for a second moment,
then how can consciousness make them its object? It is quite clear that an

112
 Act One

object must be revealed17 either together with consciousness or afterwards and

by it. Or even if it produces18 cognition, it cannot be made its object without
that [cognition] being restricted19 or taking on a form [of the object]. Otherwise
we cannot account for the perception of something momentary. 20
MONK. Sir, if you see21 clearly then there isn't even such a thing as an entity which
becomes the object of consciousness. It is consciousness alone that appears,
inlaid with blue, yellow, and other22 forms. Why?23
People do not have a simultaneous cognition, with two forms, of
the cognition and its object. 24 And if the object, which is devoid
of consciousness, is grasped by cognition whose nature is radiance,
[then] grasping [i.e. cognition] would be [grasped] first, just as [the
light of] a lamp [must be grasped first before one can grasp the object
which it illuminates] .25 But cognition cannot be grasped without a
form. Therefore it is only this [cognition] that shines with various
forms. How could there be any other objective entity?26
Therefore everything is empty, everything is momentary, everything (10)
is without an [enduring] essence, everything is suffering. Meditating
thus one reaches Nirvana.

The sound of the wooden gong comes from behind the scene.

DISCIPLE (listening). O Reverend, that must be the sound of the wooden gong
which indicates27 the time for the whole community of the monks to come
together. So it is for your Reverend to decide [what we ought to do].
MONK. In that case let's make sure that we are not late. 28 (They stand up, walk
about, and look around.) Here comes a young brahmin, his dark chest marked
by a sacred thread white as a lotus-fiber, and with a bamboo staff in his hand.29
So let us take appropriate action lest he makes us miss the appointed time.
DISCIPLE. O Reverend, this young brahmin has been standing here30 for quite a
long time. At the very moment you sat down under this tree he came here,
though Your Reverend did not notice him. Hidden by the net of creepers, he
overheard the whole teaching Your Reverend gave.
MONK. In that case why should I be late now on account of such a person?

Exit [the MONK] together with the DISCIPLE.

Then enter the GRADUATE as described above, and the BOY.

GRADUATE.
I have duly studied the Veda, mastered the six auxiliary sciences, (11)
and examined Mlmamsa as well. Thus I have performed the du­
ties appropriate for a twice-born person. But until I humiliate the
enemies of the Veda, who dirty their speech with incessantly bran­
dished pernicious [or: faulty] argumentation, the efforts I made in
my studies will be as if fruitless.31

113
 Act One

And these stupid students of Suddhodana's son32 are the foremost among those
who vandalise the Veda. So it is they whom I shall first punish like thieves.

He walks about.

BOY. Sir, I have brought the bathing things here. You were going to bathe, sir.
GRADUATE. So what?
BOY. The circumstances are clearly not favourable [to hold a debate]. All these
people on the road must be going to the monastery.
GRADUATE. Let's rather have a look at the monks in this monastery [first], and
then bathe.
BOY. As you command, sir.

Both walk about.

GRADUATE (looking ahead). O how charming is this monastery!33 Since here

There are temple-towers rivaling the peaks of the Himavat, bright (12)
with moonbeams; cool mango-groves; delightful vine-bowers full of
grass;34 and female bees, their bodies reddened by the lotus-pollen,
are roaming above the lotus-ponds, the water of which bristles with
emerging lotus-shoots, and imitates the autumn sky.
(He looks at the lotus-pond.)
The water of the lotus-pond is beautiful because of the groups of (13)
trees on the bank reflected with then: branches downwards and their
extensive roots upwards. Here inside [the water] birds are seen sit­
ting on the boughs of trees, eating fruit-bits with their beaks open
/ turned upwards. 35
BOY. Sir, behold the abundance of offerings, consisting of flowers, incense, and
anointments of sandal, camphor, saffron, and musk, [offered] to golden Buddha-
images, from which dense, great effulgence is streaming forth, which are nicely
coloured and adorned with decoration. [These images] are placed in the interiors
of high temples, which are similar to Mount Meru and decorated with colourful
flags trembling in the gentle36 breeze. How wonderful!
GRADUATE (looking). Clearly this is not a seminary for ascetics, this is a royal
garden! O tempora o mores!
The rich, being robbed by their rakish guides and having completely (14)
lost their way on a 'commendable'37 path, throw away their various
riches on unsuitable things.
Even if this religion is not authoritative,38 what is the use of this wealth of
means of enjoyment which befit those who have not peace, for people who have
allegedly turned away their mind from sensual pleasures, who are devoted to
the repeated cultivation of meditation39 and who sustain their life in whatever
way?

114
 Act One

BOY. Sir, look, look, in the tower of this whitewashed mansion, which completely
fills the ten quarters with masses of fragrance of perfume, flowers, and incense,
these [Buddhist] adherents seem40 to be ready for the meal.
GRADUATE. Well observed. So perhaps these monks would feel that they should
restrain their behaviour if they noticed us.41 So now we shall observe their
practice for a second right here in this bower of creepers, unnoticed by them.42

They do so.

GRADUATE (looking full of expectation). Goodness! None of them has even taken
a bath, eager to have the meal of the convent.43
BOY. Let alone bathing, they haven't even changed their clothes!
GRADUATE (looking carefully). Even their procedure for purification by sipping
water is the same as that of Sudras! Golly! People from the four varnas and
even those from the mixed varnas are all eating in one and the same row! How
pleasant is the observance in this ashram!44
BOY. Sir, there is more than that! Look, these attending maidservants with their
plump45 breasts, who are ready to serve the food, cast their glances with various
amorous gestures on the faces of the monks! And here some drink is being served
in a spotless jar.
GRADUATE.
There is wine here concealed behind the name 'fruit-juice' [and] pre- (15)
tended to be something else,46 and there is meat free from the three
conditions [of impurity].47 Oh, how painful is this asceticism!
BOY. Sir, look, look, this monk48
Although thirsty, is not drinking the beverage, in which a water-lily (16)
is whirling, with his tongue so much as [he is drinking] the open-eyed
faces of the maidservants with his glances.49
GRADUATE. All right, we have seen the monastic discipline of those who are free
from passion.
BOY.
Living in pleasure-gardens, drink and food both easy to obtain, no (17)
trouble caused by restrictions: lucky are those who become adher­
ents [of Buddhism].
GRADUATE. Enough of joking now. Here comes the famous great scholar called
Dharmottara, the Buddhist monk; having finished his meal, he is descending
from the palatial building and sits down on the grassy spot, in the shade under
a tree. So let's approach him.
Then enter the Buddhist MONK as described above, and his Dis-
CIPLE.

115
 Act One

MONK. Sir, have you treasured up in your heart the teachings of the most com­
passionate Lord Bodhisattva?
DISCIPLE. Please, Reverend, favour me again [with your teaching].
MONK. This young brahmin whom we saw before is still [there]. I see that his face
looks like that of someone who is eager to speak.
GRADUATE (approaching). Monk, how are you? I trust that your religious observ­
ance proceeds without impediments. 50
MONK. Welcome. This grassy spot is not impure. Please sit down.
GRADUATE (sitting down). But what have you, [his] mentor, taught to him about
which you ask him now if he has mastered it?
MONK (to his Disciple). Reply to his question.
GRADUATE What an insult: "disciple, reply"! Boy, listen to what he says.51
MONK. Brahmin, surely the proper usage is "learn from him" [what he says].
GRADUATE. O you red-robed fellow, ravings like this are not governed by the rule
"[the noun denoting] the teacher [is in the ablative case] if there is a formal
instruction". Look, "he hears [e.g. the story] from the actor ['actor' is in the
genitive case in Sanskrit]" is the only appropriate way of usage here. 52
MONK. O how abusive is this twice-born for whom the teaching53 of the supremely
compassionate Lord Buddha, the only master of the three worlds, is raving!
GRADUATE (to the DISCIPLE). As for you, tell me now what did he teach you.
DISCIPLE. Why, the master has taught me the Four Noble Truths: Suffering, the
Cause of Suffering, the Cessation of Suffering, and the Way.
GRADUATE (smiling). That's the teaching of the supremely compassionate one?
This is not raving where the realisation of having no Self is celebrated as the
path leading to salvation?
MONK. Brahmin! The teaching about Ultimate Reality seems to be raving54 for
the likes of you, whose minds are muddied by the cultivation of the doctrine
that55 the slaughtering of animals like the one [sacrificed] for Agni and Soma is
a means to attain salvation!56
GRADUATE. What? This depraved Buddhist finds fault even with Vedic sentences!
What shall I do? In whose presence shall I speak? This monastery is crowded
only with the community of renegades. (He looks around [and says] delightedly.)
Great! As a reward of my good works, Visvarupa and these other many hon­
ourable professors, who are eager to see the garden of the monastery, have come
handy [for me] as arbiters. All right, I've got the opportunity to punish [these]
criminals.

Then enter as many ARBITERS as can be afforded.

ARBITERS. [Judging] just by the lustre of their faces, this graduate [called] Sahkarsa-
na and this Buddhist monk [called] Dharmottara appear to be quarrelling.
Come, let's have a look.

They make a few steps around the gathering.

MONK. Welcome, gentlemen, please take a seat here.

116
 Act One

Saying this he points at the grassy spot.

ARBITERS, (sit down and ask the MONK). What is the subject of this discussion?
MONK. That person invested with the sacred thread regards the teaching of the
Bodhisattva as if it were raving.
GRADUATE.
Here I am, and here is this monk; you are prudent arbiters; so where (18)
could there be another opportunity like this to consider the strong
and weak points [in one's arguments]?
ARBITERS.
If the speech you make is correct, moderate, [and] its source is the (19)
established truth; if [that kind of speech] which is full of Quibbles,
Futile Rejoinders, and Vulnerable Points, with a noisy mass57 of
[bad types of] disputation, is to be avoided; [if] there is no envy at
all in your heart, no roughness in your words, no frowning on your
face; [in brief:] if this is a discussion among virtuous persons, then
we are always ready to serve as assessors. 58
MONK AND GRADUATE. It will be as you command, gentlemen.
ARBITERS. So which one of you has put forward his thesis first ?
GRADUATE. The monk has indeed set forth the prima facie view while teaching
the disciple.
MONK (to the GRADUATE). Have you heard it?
GRADUATE. Yes, I have.
MONK. If so, then repeat it.
GRADUATE. Fine. I'll repeat it now in a few words.
Suffering; its cause; its cessation; the path to attain it, called the (20)
Realisation of [having] No Self; it is established through the estab­
lishing of Momentariness.
[Things are] momentary because they exist, [and] since [their] de- (21)
struction does not require any cause. Activities such as memory
[are possible] because of causal relations in the continuum.
[But] no external thing, even if it were momentary, can become the (22)
object of cognition. It is only this consciousness which shines forth,
studded with a multitude of forms.
Therefore everything is empty, everything is momentary, everything (23)
is without an [enduring] essence, everything is suffering. Meditating
thus one reaches Nirvana.
(To the MONK.) Is it OK like that?
MONK (contemptuously). Yes, briefly.
GRADUATE. So now listen [to my arguments] in this matter.
ARBITERS. We hang upon your lips.
GRADUATE.

117
 Act One

Even if there might exist this aforementioned path to final beatitude, (24)
provided that Momentariness was established, still entities, when
thoroughly examined, do not come in contact with Momentariness.
MONK. Why?
GRADUATE. Simply because there is no logical reason [for it].
MONK. But surely the logical reason has been put forth: 'because of existence'.
GRADUATE.
The concomitance [with the probandum, i.e. 'momentariness'] of (25)
the proof 'existence' which is taught [by you, Buddhists] cannot be
ascertained in a straight way, as in the case of smoke and fire, [since]
no example appears [to support it] and [since therefore] it is useless.59
MONK.60 If so then what of it? Ascertaining the concomitance even by means of
logical discontinuance is still an ascertainment of the concomitance.61
But that existence [which is nothing else but causal efficacy], be­
ing excluded from permanent things because of the absence of both
gradual and instantaneous [efficacy], will set its foot in momentary
entities, because it cannot go anywhere else.62
GRADUATE.
Existence is all the more excluded even from your momentary things, (26)
just as from permanent things, because they, too, cannot have the
invariably concomitant property [of gradual and instantaneous effic­
acy].
Look,
If this entity performed an action after it has arisen, in that case it (27)
could not be momentary. [Or,] if it is embraced by death immedi­
ately after coming into being, how could it have another opportunity
to act?63
MONK. But surely, causal relationship is only this much among momentary things:
'after cognising A, B is cognised', that is merely 'arising [of a cognition] after
getting [a former cognition]'.64
GRADUATE. There is more to be said in this matter, [but] let us leave it aside.
However, I put forth the following: on the basis of this view the condition of
being a cause is not real itself, since entities are material causes with regard to
a particular thing.
In65 that state of affairs [which you, Buddhists, assert (tatro)], all (28)
[operations], which are brought about by causality, such as the cap­
ability of [every individual] awareness [in a stream] to experience the
results of its [past] actions, would fail. [Or] let there be some kind
of causal relation here [i.e. among the cognition-phases belonging to
the same continuum]: [it] would be the same with regard to other
fi.fi.
cognition-phases which have arisen in other streams.

118
 Act One

The MONK draws on the ground with eyes downcast.

GRADUATE.
Or even if the causal relation is established as really true, because (29)
the otherness of the awarenesses remains, how could someone enjoy
the fruits of his own actions?
Moreover, [in the argument] 'things are momentary because of [their] existence',
this logical reason is contradictory, since it proves the opposite of the property
to be established.67
MONK. How so?
GRADUATE. It has been stated that momentary entities cannot be efficacious.
Permanent things, however, together with the assisting factors, are indeed able
to act either gradually or instantaneously: this is causal efficacy, and in this
way their stability is proved.

The MONK remains silent.

GRADUATE.
The destruction of things also depends on some cause, just as their (30)
coming into being, for the agreement in presence and in absence [of
cause and effect] is similar for both [perishing and arising].
MONK. But surely, as for the cause of destruction, the agreement in presence and
in absence [of cause and effect] is established in another way, since it [i.e. the
assumed cause of destruction, such as a hammer] is the cause of a different
continuum [, such as the continuum of shard-phases, and not of the perishing
of the pot].68 As for the cause of arising, the agreement in presence and in
absence [of cause and effect] cannot be thus [i.e. cannot be otherwise accounted
for], because there is no other [kind of] effect.
GRADUATE (smiling). Out of desire or aversion? Some people hold that we can
hardly say that there is no other [kind of] effect, since manifestation and the
like can [also] take place.69
MONK.
No effect has ever been seen arising without the causes of arising. (31)

GRADUATE.
Have you ever seen an effect being destroyed without the causes of
destruction?
MONK. Surely the outcome would be that no pot could be destroyed even with the
passage of aeons if there was no cause of destruction present.
GRADUATE (with a sneer). Mercy on us! If the pot is eternal then worldly affairs
are finished, people are extirpated, the eternal death of the world, which is
nothing but a pot, is breathing down our neck! For let that thing be eternal

119
 Act One

which has no cause to destroy it, like for example space: what's the problem
with that? But composite entities do have a cause of destruction, because the
separation of their constituents etc. must inevitably take place. 70 Moreover,
you imbecile, don't you notice that, even accepting your position, the stream
of pot-moments is not destroyed just as [the pot is not destroyed, as you claim,
according to our position]? If a cause of a different stream has appeared in it [i.e.
in the stream], well, then, according to my position, the cause of destruction
will also appear in the same way: the course [of reasoning] is the same. So such
is this position of momentariness.

The MONK, embarrassed, remains [silent].

DISCIPLE. Hey, you damned brahmin, how dare you insult the Reverend?
BOY. Hey, you cross-breed, that's how you speak to the tutor?
DISCIPLE. Whose tutor is this? Only this camel-faced feller's.

The BOY jumps up angrily and wants to slap the face of the DIS­
CIPLE.

GRADUATE, MONK, ARBITERS. Keep your hair on!

They separate them.
GRADUATE. What's more, this logical reason is contradicted by recognition which
grasps stable things, [when we think] 'this is that same thing [we have seen be­
fore] '. Or let us leave aside recognition. The perception of someone who does not
wink, which grasps objects as having unbroken existence, that [perception], too,
does undoubtedly contradict [the hetu}. And although there is such a percep­
tion, some ignoramuses claim that 'perception grasps [single object-] moments
[or phases]': clearly this [claim] is also refuted, since a moment cannot last for
long, and in this case [of the perception of someone who in not winking] grasping
happens in that way.
ARBITERS. Don't go into further details.
We have listened to this course of argumentation expounded by you, (32)
Graduate, which delighted our ears. It has refuted the doctrine of
momentariness. But say something about the doctrine of conscious­
ness [being the only reality].
GRADUATE. Listen, Monk!
Let there be no [simultaneous] perception [of the form of] of both (33)
the object and [cognition] which grasps it. If you say, 'let the nature
of cognition shine forth', [then] does it make manifest its own form,
or [the form] of something else? There is no cognition in the form
of 'I am blue'; rather this cognition of the other thing as different,
namely 'that [thing is blue]', agrees [with the facts]. Therefore this
external object of cognition must exist. 71

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 Act One

MONK. If it exists, [then] why is it not experienced?

GRADUATE. Who on earth said that it is not experienced? Surely it is experienced
[in the form of] 'this is blue'.
MONK. Good fellow, this is the appearance of cognition, since cognition is of the
nature of light; this is not the appearance of an object, since it has an insentient
nature; and even you said that there is no [simultaneous] appearance of both.
GRADUATE. Cognition, too, inasmuch as it shines forth, shines as the shining forth
of something else, not as the shining forth of its own self, since this shining is
the shining forth of what is to be shone on, and not just the shining forth of
shining. For this is the way lights are.72 It has been said: 'The three lights
[namely cognition, word, and fire] illuminate themselves and other things.'73
But it is not really cognition that shines forth then [i.e. when the object is
grasped], 74 for it is forms such as blue that shine forth. And forms such as blue
are not 'cognitions', because they [i.e. forms such as blue] are not established by
positive and negative concomitance to have the nature of cognition in the way
that [speckled cows are established through positive and negative concomitance]
to be cows. 75
The MONK draws on the ground in silence, with eyes downcast.
GRADUATE. O honourable Arbiters, tell us which one of the two positions is su­
perior?
ARBITERS. Why are you asking us? The Monk himself supports your position by
keeping silence.
GRADUATE. Then I am going to have a bath now. 76 Please excuse me. As for you,
you have seen the spectacle, now do as you please. (To the MONK.)
Monks, if this effort of yours is for the sake of [a better] afterlife, (34)
then stop, enough of it, [since] it brings about the opposite result.
If this exertion [of yours], namely resorting to masses of hypocrisy
and humbug, is in order to make a living, then go on with it as you
wish.

Exeunt omnes.

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 Act One

Notes to Act One

1 The First Act of Jayanta's play begins with an introductory scene (vi-
skambhaka), which is set in the garden of a vihara, most probably in or near
Srmagara. The characters are: a Buddhist Monk, who is a distinguished scholar
(his name1 Dharmottara, echoes the name of the great logician of the 8th cen­
tury, cf. Agamadambara (ed. pr.), p.xxiv; Rdjatarangim 4.498.), well versed in
the Teaching of the Buddha, confident in his knowledge, and his Disciple, who
is ready to learn, although perhaps not blessed with great acumen. The Disciple
speaks Saurasem.

2 Jayanta used the same verse in the Nyayamanjan (II 424.9-12) to conclude
his comments on Nyayasutra 1.1.19: punarutpattih pretyabhdvah, 'The state
after death is rebirth'.

3 ex conj. The sentence as it stands in the manuscripts (kirn una te cattdri

ajjasaccd) is completely ungrammatical.
The conjunct consonants jja in the word ajja° are written in the manu­
scripts with a letter which looks like dya. On the reading of this sign see the
Introduction. In other cases our manuscripts write the Prakrit word ayya with
the standard Devanagarl ligature yya (cf. STEINER 1997, pp. 173ff.).
4 appd occurs/• in Maharas* trl, ArdhamagadhT, Jaina-Maharastrl
* *
, and Jaina-
*
Saurasem. The Saurasem (and MagadhT) form of Sanskrit atmd should be atta
*

(PlSCHEL §401, cf. Act Two, 1.39: attaparammuho).

5 mottuna is a MaharastrT (and Jaina-Maharastn) form of the absolutive,
(PlSCHEL §586). In Saurasem (and MagadhT) the prevalent absolutive ending is
-ya (PlSCHEL §590).
6 The Buddhist opponent in the Nyayamanjan (vol.11, p. 298) calls the at­
tachment to a Self 'the anointed, principal delusion' (murdhdbhisiktah prathamo
mohah), the termination of which entails that the attachment to anything be­
longing to a Self (atmvyagraha) also ceases. The realisation of having no self
(nairdtmyadarsand) is said to be the door to Nirvana, and the way leading to
it is to establish that all things are momentary, which helps one to realise that
cognition, too, has no permanent substratum (asraya) such as a Self.
The Monk's thoughts on sthiratmagraha have interesting parallels in the
Pramdnavdrttika. Dharmaklrti held that satkdyadrsti or satkdyadarsana ('the
[false] notion [that the five constituents] form a Self or belong to a Self: dtmadrs-
tir dtmiyadrstir vd: Abhidharmakosabhdsya p. 281), which is nothing else but
delusion or ignorance (moha, avidyd), is the fundamental condition behind all
false mental attitudes (klesas), all flaws (dosas), and all stains of consciousness
(malas). Cf. Pramdnavdrtika with svavrtti (GNOLl) p. Ill, v. 222:
sarvdsdm dosajdtindm jdtih satkdyadarsandt\
sdvidyd tatra tatsnehas tasmdd dvesddisambhavah\ \ ;

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 Act One

Pramdnavdrttika, pramanasiddhi 214c-215b (VETTER 1990, p. 112, v. 212):

mohavirodhdn maitrydder ndtyantam dosanigrahah]
tanmulds ca maldh sarve sa ca satkdyadarsanam\\.
(In the Abhidharmakosabhdsya (loc. cit.) satkdyadrsti is only one among many
other dosas; see VETTER 1990, p. 42, n.l.) As Dharmakirti explains, the [false]
notion of a Self results in the attachment to things belonging to this Self. These
two notions generate affection towards atma and dtmiya, which in turn produces
hatred and all the other flaws (Pramdnavdrtika with svavrtti (GNOLi) p. 111.18-
19: dtmadarsanam dtmiyagraham prasute\ tau ca tatsneham sa ca dvesddm iti
satkdyadarsanajdh sarvadosdh\). Dharmakirti summarises his views on this is­
sue in the following verses (Pramdnavdrttika, pramanasiddhi 219-221, VETTER
1990, pp. 117-119, w. 217-219):
yah pasyaty dtmdnam tatrdsydham iti sdsvatah snehah\
snehdt sukhesu trsyati trsnd dosdms tiraskurute\\
gunadarsi paritrsyan mameti tatsddhandny upddatte\
tendtmdbhiniveso ydvat tdvat sa samsdre\\
dtmani sati parasamjnd svaparavibhdgdt parigrahadvesau\
anayoh sampratibaddhdh sarve dosdh prajdyante\ \
'The one who sees a Self [apart from the constituents] has an eternal attachment
towards this [Self] [because he thinks:] "[this is] me" . Because of this attach­
ment, he desires things that cause pleasure, [and] desire conceals the faults [of
these things]. He notices [only] the advantages, ardently longs for [things which
he considers pleasant, and,] thinking '[these are / must be] mine', lays hold of
the means [with which he can obtain] them. Therefore as long as one clings to
a Self, one transmigrates. When there is [the notion of] a Self, there is also the
concept of the 'other'. From the distinction between one's self and something
else, accepting and aversion [arise]. All [other] flaws come about firmly connec­
ted with these two.'
As Vetter pointed out (VETTER 1990, p. 126f., n.l.), Dharmakirti claims that
the naiydyika methods of meditation on suffering are not much use if the notion
of a Self remains unchanged, cf. Pramdnavdrttika, pramanasiddhi 228c-230b
(VETTER 1990, p. 126, w. 226-227):
duhkhabhdvanayd sydc ced ahidastdngahdnivat\
dtmiyabuddhihdnydtra tydgo na tu viparyaye\\
upabhogdsrayatvena grhttesv indriyddisu\
svatvadhih kena vary eta vairdgyam tatra tat kutah\\;
cf. Nydyabhdsya ad 1.1.9.
/

7 According to PISCHEL (§§ 95, 336), eva becomes jeva, jevva in SaurasenI
(yeva, yevva in MagadhT), and its initial j (y) is doubled after short vowels,
-e, and -o. Hemacandra (4.280) and Purusottama (9.28) teach that Sanskrit
eva becomes yyeva in Saurasenl (Pseudo-Vararuci 12.23 prescribes jevva (v.l.
jjevva), and Ramasarman 2.1.37 jjevva or jevva). Our manuscripts know only
yyeva (both in SaurasenT and in Magadhl), similarly to the old Nepalese ma­
nuscript of the Nagananda, in which the form yyeva prevails (STEINER 1997,
p. 200). Steiner draws our attention to the following facts: 'Nun findet sich

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 Act One

yyeva aber u.a. auch in den beiden nepalesischen Palmblatt-Mss A und C

der CouLSONschen Malatlm.-Ausgabe, von denen letzteres—wie das Nag.-Ms
A—auf das Jahr 1156 n. Chr. datiert ist. Das lafit vermuten, dafi die Form
y(y)ev(v)a auch noch im 7./8. Jh. in den Schauspielen gebraucht worden ist
oder zumindest gebraucht werden konnte. (...) Das Nag.-Ms A macht nach
dem Gesagten jedenfalls wahrscheinlich, dafi Harsa die Form yyeva (oder yeva)
gebrauchte, wobei noch offen bleiben mufi, ob es sich hier um eine lokale oder
gar individuelle Besonderheit—etwa die Vorliebe fur altertiimliche Formen—
handelt, oder ob wir mit y(y)eva die im Schauspiel-Prakrit auch noch des 7.
Jh.s gebrauchliche Form vor uns haben. Die genannten Malatlm.-Mss scheinen
letzteres zu bestatigen. Ein weiteres Indiz fiir die Authentizitat dieser Form
konnte darin gesehen werden, dafi das Nag.-Ms A ausnahmlos das wohl jiingere
yyeva, nicht aber das altere yeva iiberliefert hat. Dazu stimmt wiederum, dafi
auch Pufrusottama], Namis[adhu] und He. [= Hemacandra] nur die Form yyeva
lehren.' (STEINER 1997, pp. 205-207.)

8 SaurasenT padivajjadi suggests prativrajati as its Sanskrit chayd (see Pl-

SCHEL §197), but pratipadyate might also be possible (PiSGHEL §280: Sanskrit
dya > SaurasenI jja).
9 Cf. Pramdnaviniscaya I p. 70.9-11, ~ Nyayamanjan 1.196.1-2: ekam
evedam samvidrupam harsavisadadyanekakaravivartam pasyamah, tatra yathestam
samjndh kriyantdm\ 'We see that this [i.e. everything one directly experiences]
is one, it has the nature of consciousness, it has many [illusory] modifications,
such as joy, dejection, and the like: it can be labelled as one wishes.'
The Vijfianavadin's position as it is presented in the Sunyavada section of
Kumarila's Slokavdrttika also offers interesting parallels: Slokavdrttika (with
Tdtparyatika) sunyavdda 15-17b:
matpakse yady api svaccho jndndtmd paramdrthatah\
tathdpy anddau samsdre purvajndnaprasutibhih\\
citrdbhis citrahetutvdd vdsandbhir upaplavdt\
svdnurupyena nilddigrdhyagrdhakarusitam (v.l. -dusitam)\\
pravibhaktam ivotpannam ndnyam artham apeksate\
'In my view, although in reality the nature of consciousness is pure, still, in this
beginningless existence, because of the disturbance [of consciousness] caused by
latent impressions in accordance with their own character—impressions which
are produced by former cognitions and are manifold because they have manifold
causes—, [cognition] arises as if being divided, overlaid by [the forms of] 'cog-
niser' and 'cognised' such as 'blue', and it does not require any other [external]
object [to appear variegated].'
10 Cf. Pramdnavdrttika, pramdnasiddhi 207cd (VETTER 1990, p. 105, v. 205ab):
ukto mdrgas tadabhydsdd dsrayah parivartate\
'The path has been stated. Through its practice the basis transforms.'
According to Manorathanandin, the 'path' has been defined as 'the insight that
there is no self (comm. ad loc.: nairdtmyadarsanalaksanah) , cf. Pramdnavdr-

124
 Act One

ttika, pramanasiddhi 137c-138b (VETTER 1990, p. 42, v. 135). Prajnakaragupta

explains the 'transformation of the basis' as follows (Pramdnavdrttikabhdsyam,
p. 142,30-31): dsrayasya cittasantdnasydlayasya vd parisuddhatvam bhavati\ 'The
stream of cognitions or the substratum consciousness becomes pure.' In Manora-
thanandin's interpretation (comm. ad loc.): tasydbhydsdd dsrayah klesavd-
sandbhutam dlayavijndnam parivartate, klistadasdnirodhdt klesavisamyuktacit-
taprabandhdtmand parinamati\ 'Through its [i.e. the path's] practice the basis,
[i.e.] the substratum consciousness, which is basically the impressions of defile­
ments, transforms, [i.e.] since the denied state has been destroyed, it changes
into a stream of cognitions which is disconnected from defilements.' Dharmaldr-
ti's statement and its various possible interpretations are discussed hi FRANCO
1997, pp. 82ff; VETTER 1990, p. 105, n.l; both referring to Schmithausen's stud­
ies. As Franco observes (FRANCO 1997, p. 85), 'in view of v. 208ab it seems
that Dhannakirti understood the transformation of the basis as the complete
elimination of all the defiled dharmas which are not the own nature of cognition,
but which are accidental to it; the cognition itself is pure and luminous'. Cf.
Pramdnavdrttika, pramanasiddhi 210cd (VETTER 1990, p. 108, v. 208ab):
prabhdsvaram idam cittam prakrtydgantavo maldh\
'This consciousness is luminous by nature, the defilements are adventitious.'
Cf. also Panjikd ad Tattvasaiigraha 544: tesdm cdvidyddmdm tattvajndndd
vigatau satydm yd nirmalatd dhiyah sd nirmuktir ity ucyate\ yathoktam, 'cit­
tam eva hi samsdro rdgddiklesavdsitam\ tad eva tair vinirmuktam bhavdnta iti
kathyata' iti\ 'And when, after the disappearance of ignorance and the other
[bonds] due to the knowledge of reality, the cognition becomes pure: this [pur­
ity] is called "liberation". As it has been stated, "The world of transmigration
is nothing but consciousness infused by defilements such as passion. And it is
that same [consciousness], when free of those, which is said to be the end of
existence".
The same verse is alluded to in Alokamdla v. 4 (LINDTNER p. 122):
rdgddimalinam cittam samsdras tadwviktatd]
samksepdt kathito moksah prahmdvaranair jinaih\ \
'The world of transmigration is [nothing but] consciousness dirtied by such [de­
filements] as passion. The Buddhas who have cast away the obstructions have
taught in brief that liberation is the state of being separated from those [de­
filements].' Lindtner (p. 123) also mentions other texts which quote the verse
found in in the Panjikd.
11 According to PISCHEL (§144), inhim is used hi MaharastrT, while it is 'quite
foreign to SaurasenI and Magadhl'.
12 The Disciple's question alludes to a well-known objection against the
Buddhist position: if there is no permanent substratum, i.e. no Self, functioning
as the basis of the stream of cognitions, the one who performs an action and the
one who experiences its result cannot be the same person. This would entail the
impossibility of karmic retribution and all other activities (e.g. memory) which
require the permanence of the agent's self-identity. Says Rumania (Slokavdrtti-

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 Act One

ka (with Nyayaratnakara) dtmavdda 32-33ab):

nairdtmyavddapakse tu purvam evdvabudhyate\
madvinasat phalam na sydn motto 'nyasydtha vd bhavet\ \
iti naiva pravrttih sydn na ca vedapramdnatd\
'But if the position of the doctrine of having no Self [were accepted], then one
would think before [setting about something]: "Since I shall perish, there can
be no fruit [of my action for me], or [the fruit] will fall to someone other than
me", so there would be no activity, and the Veda would have no authority.' (See
also Slokavdrttika (with Nyayaratnakara} dtmavdda 3-4.)
But, as Jayanta remarks, even rich Buddhist devotees, for whom vedaprdmdnya
is not of crucial importance, would not see the point of giving donations and
thereby increasing their own merit (Nydyamanjan II. p. 296).
Sabara already pointed out that remembrance is impossible if only the mo­
mentary constituent of consciousness exists (Sdbarabhdsya(F) ad mimdmsdsutra
1.1.5, p. 54: ksanike vijndnaskandhamdtre smrtir anupapanneti\). But, as the
Buddhist opponent holds in the Slokavdrttika (Slokavdrttika (with Nyayaratna­
kara) dtmavdda 103 seqq.), memory, just as desire, can be explained with the
help of impressions (vdsands) existing in the same continuum.
Krsnamisra puts similar questions in the mouth of the Jain monk, who
represents the digambarasiddhdnta in the Third Act of Prabodhacandrodaya
(a refreshing farcical interlude in an allegorical play, satirising the 'heretical'
sects of Buddhism, Jainism, and Somasiddhanta), in order to demonstrate that
Buddhist philosophy comes off second best even when compared with a practical
way of thinking. 'Tell me now,' the ksapanaka asks the bhiksu, 'for whose sake
do you observe any vow if you perish in each moment?' (Prabodhacandrodaya
p. 188: bhana ddva khanavindsind tue kassa kae vadam dhaltadi?) The bhiksu's
answer is in conformity with Buddhist doctrine: 'Listen: someone who is charac­
terised by consciousness, and is included in my continuum, will attain liberation,
after the impressions (of his past perceptions) have been completely uprooted.'
(Ibid.: are sruyatdm. asmatsamtatipatitah kascid vijndnalaksanah samucchin-
navdsano moksyate.) 'O you fool,' bursts out the Jain monk, 'if someone will
attain liberation in some age, what could he do for you who perish right now?'
(Ibid. p. 190: ale mukkha, kassim pi mannantale ko vi mukko bhavissadi, tado de
sampadam natthassa kirisam uvadlam kalissadi?) Even a Jam monk can notice
how 'deeply illogical' Buddhism is—at least, that is what Vedantist propaganda
insinuates.
Similar subjects are dealt with in Tattvasangraha 476-545, the section on
karmaphalasambandha (involving the refutation of the objections of krtandsa
and akrtaprdpti). According to the Buddhist position, the connection between
actions and their results is established on the basis of causality alone, without
any need for a stable Self (Tattvasangraha 501). In fact, causality is possible
only in the case of momentary entities, and this is precisely what the Monk is
going to demonstrate.
13The Monk's exposition of the doctrine of momentariness is based on two
well-known arguments: vindsitvdnumdna ('the inference [of momentariness] from

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 Act One

the perishing nature [of produced entities]') and sattvanumana ('the inference
[of momentariness] from the existence [of things]'). (These two terms were used
by Frauwallner in FRAUWALLNER 1935, p. 217, and attested by Mimaki in the
works of Karnakagomin and Ratnaklrti (MiMAKl 1976, p. 233, n.110).) Modern
scholars agree that sattvanumana was established by Dharmaklrti in his Pra-
mdnaviniscaya (cf. STEINKELLNER 1968-69, YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 231, n.4); it
was already attributed to him by Arcata in his commentary to the Hetubindu
(quoted in MiMAKl 1976, pp.235f, n.114).
In order to prove that existence and momentariness are invariably concomit­
ant properties, Dharmaklrti uses the so-called sddhyawparyayabadhakapramana,
'a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of
the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the
logical reason (hetu)]1 (cf. YOSHIMIZU 1999, pp. 233f.), that is he proves that
whatever is not momentary cannot really exist. Cf. Hetubindu p. 4*, 6f.: yat sat
tat ksanikam eva, aksanikatve 'rthakriydvirodhdt tallaksanam vastutvam hiyate\
'Whatever is existent must be momentary. If it were not momentary, because
[non-momentariness] contradicts causal efficacy, it would be deprived of the
condition of being a real thing, which [=since this condition] has that [i.e.
causal efficacy] as its defining mark.' More explicitly hi Hetubindu p. 19*, 10-
13: saktir hi bhdvalaksanam, sarvasaktiviraho 'bhdvalaksanam\ na cdksanikasya
kvacid kdcic chaktih, kramayaugapadydbhydm arthakriydvirahdt\ tasmdd yat sat
tat ksanikam eveti vydptisiddhih\ 'For capacity is the defining mark of an entity,
[and] the absence of all capacity is the defining mark of a non-entity. And a
non-momentary thing does not have any capacity with regard to anything, since
[such a thing does] not [have] causal efficacy either gradually, or simultaneously.
Therefore the invariable concomitance, namely "whatever exists is momentary",
is established.' Pramdnaviniscaya II p. 29*,15-24 spells out the two alternat­
ives of krama and yaugapadya (tr. of the Tibetan text in STEINKELLNER 1979,
p. 93: 'Dieses Nichtaugenblickliche ist (namlich) nicht imstande, einen Zweck
zu erfullen (*arthakriyd), weil sowohl bei Allmahlichkeit (*krama) als auch bei
Gleichzeitigkeit (*yaugapadya) [seines Wirkens] em Widerspruch besteht. Es ist
(zunachst) nicht (imstande), allmahlich (*kramena) (einen Zweck zu erfullen),
weil bei einem (Ding), wenn es (von Mitursachen) unabhangig bloB durch sein
Vorhandensein Wirkendes ist, eine Verzogerung (*ksepa) (seines Wirkens) nicht
am Platz ist. Ein (Ding), das friiher nicht Wirkendes ist, konnte es namlich
auch spater nicht sein, weil (sein) Wesen nicht veranderlich ist (*avikdra).
Wenn es aber (von Mitursachen) abhangt, (so) haben wir (diesen Fall schon
oben) besprochen. (note 336: Der Verweis bezieht sich auf die obige Wieder-
legung der Moglichkeit, dafi die ewigen vedischen Worter von Mitursachen
abhangen konnten (18,24ff).) Es ist auch nicht gleichzeitig (*yaugapadyena}
wirkend, weil sein (hi der einen Phase gegebenes, fahiges) Wesen auch spater
nicht nichtwirkend sein kann. Daher hat dieses jedweder Fahigkeit bare (Ding)
das Merkmal eines Seienden iiberschritten.').
As Yoshimizu pointed out (pp. 237f, 246ff), in Pramdnavdrttika, svdrthdnu-
mdna Dharmaklrti refutes the causal efficacy of permanent things in the lar­
ger context of establishing the non-eternity of Vedic words (cf. Pramdnavdrti-

127
 Act One

ka with svavrtti (GNOLi) p. 131, w. 251-252 and comm., p.H3,20ff., 116,15ff.,

p. 130,3ff., p. 131,7ff.) which is a serious challenge for all mimdmsakas. Cf. also
Tattvasangraha 385-427, and Dharmottara's Ksanabhaiigasiddhi (FRAUWALLNER
1935), p. 242, 256.
14 Cf. Pramdnavdrtika with svavrtti (GNOLI) p. 84, v. 166ab: so pdramdrthiko
bhdvo ya evdrthakriydksamah\-
Pramdnavdrttika, pratyaksam 3ab: arthakriydsamartham yat tad atra paramd-
rthasat\ ;
Pramanavarttika, pramdnasiddhi 3: pramdnam avisamvddi jndnam, arthakriyd-
sthitih\ avisamvddanam... ;
Hetubindu p. 19*,10-13: saktir hi bhdvalaksanam, sarvasaktiviraho 'bhdvalaksa-
nam\
On the meaning of the term 'arthakriyd' see M. Nagatomi, 'Arthakriyd' in
Adyar Library Bulletin 31-31, 1967-68, pp. 52-72.
15 In the following verses the Monk puts forward vindsitvdnumdna ('the infer­
ence [of momentariness] from the perishing nature [of things]'). As an example
of this argument we can quote the Tattvasangraha (353-355):
tatra ye krtakd bhdvds te sarve ksanabhanginah\
vindsam prati sarvesdm anapeksatayd sthiteh\ \
yadbhdvam prati yan naiva hetvantaram apeksate\
tat tatra niyatam jneyam svahetubhyas tathodaydt\ \
nirnibandhd hi sdmagn svakdryotpddane yathd]
vindsam prati sarve 'pi nirapeksds ca janminah\ \
'Among those [entities] the ones which are made are all momentary, since none
of them depends on [any other external cause] with regard to its perishing. If
A does not depend at all on another cause to be B, then A must be regarded
as necessarily [being] B, since it arises as such due to its own causes. For just
as the aggregate [of causal factors] does not require any other cause to produce
its effect, [in the same way] all things that have once arisen do not require [any
other external cause] with regard to their perishing.'
We find a similar argument already in the Abhidharmakosabhdsya (p. 193):
dkasmiko hi bhdvdndm vindsah\ kimkdranam? kdryasya hi kdranam bhavati,
vindsas cdbhdvah\ yas cdbhdvas tasya kirn kartavyam? so 'sdv dkasmiko vindso
yadi bhdvasyotpannamdtrasya na sydt pascdd api na sydd bhdvasya tulyatvdd\
'For the perishing of things is spontaneous. Why? Because an effect has a cause,
but perishing is non-existence. And what can be done with something that is
non-existence? If a thing did not perish spontaneously as soon as it had arisen,
it would not perish later either, since the thing would be the same [later as it
was before, when it did not perish].'
If one postulated a cause for perishing, such a cause would not be able
to achieve anything. As we read in the Panjikd (ad Tattvasangraha 383-384):
bhdvah svahetor utpadyamdnah kaddcit prakrtyd svayam nasvardtmaivotpadyate,
anasvardtmd vd\ yadi nasvaras tasya na kimcid vindsahetund, svayam tatsva-
bhdvatayaiva ndsdt\ (...) athdnasvardtmeti paksas taddpi ndsahetur akimcitkara

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 Act One

eva\ tasya kenacit svabhdvdnyathdbhdvasya kartum asakyatvdt\ tathd hi, yadi

svabhdva utpdddnantaram na vinasyet, tadd pascdd api sa eva sthitidharmd
svabhdvas tadavastha iti kim ndsahetund tasya krtam ye.no, vinasyet? 'When
an entity is arising due to its own cause, is it perhaps produced as perishable
by itself, or as not perishable? If it [arises as] perishable [by nature], then no
cause of destruction could do anything to it, since it perishes by itself because
it has that [i.e. perishing] as its inherent nature. (...) If [one holds] the [other]
position, namely that [the entity arises] with a nature which is not perishable
[by itself], in that case, too, the cause of destruction could not do anything,
since nothing can make it [i.e. the entity] to have a nature other than its own
inherent nature. To explain, if the inherent nature [of the entity] did not per­
ish immediately after its coming into being, then later, too, the same inherent
nature, whose characteristic is stability, would be in the same state, so what
can be done to it by the cause of destruction so that it may be destroyed?'
Dharmaklrti also employed vindsitvanumdna in his works (see Pramanavdr-
tika with svavrtti (GNOLl) p. 98,4-100,24; ibid. p. 141,17-150,5; Pramdnavinis-
caya II pp. 26*-32* (together with sattvanumana}] Hetubindu pp. 7*-19* (to­
gether with sattvanumana). See also Steinkellner's analysis in STEINKELLNER
1968-69.) He also pointed out that if a pot had to wait for a hammer to be des­
troyed it might wait for eternity (Pramdnavdrtika with svavrtti (GNOLl) 98,14-
17, cf. Pramdnaviniscaya II p. 27*): yady api bahulam vindsakdrandni santi,
tesam api svapratyayadhmasamnidhitvan navasyam samnidhanam iti kascin na
vinasyed api, na hy avasyam hetavah phalavanto vaikalyapratibandhasambhavdt\
'Even if there are many causes of perishing, they do not necessarily appear [to­
gether] in proximity [with the object], because they appear [together] in prox­
imity [with the object] depending on their own causes. Therefore some thing
might not even perish [at all], for causes do not necessarily have a result, be­
cause the [complex of causal factors] may be defective or an impediment might
occur.'
The Buddhist concludes that things perish as soon as they have arisen, and
their permanence is just an illusion. As Dharmakirti says (Pramdnavdrtika with
svavrtti (GNOLl) 100,3-7): uktam cdtra na vindso ndma anya eva kascid bhdvdt,
svabhdva eva hi ndsah, sa eva hy ekaksanasthdyi jdta iti\ tarn asya manddh sv-
abhdvam urdhvam vyavasyanti, na prdk, darsane 'pi pdtavdbhdvdd iti tadvasena
pascdd vyavasthdpyate, vikdradarsaneneva visam ajnaih\ 'And it has been stated
with regard to this that there is no such thing called 'perishing', completely dif­
ferent from the entity, for the inherent nature itself [of that entity] is perishing,
for it itself arises as existing for a single moment. The slow-witted ascertain
this inherent nature of that [entity] later, not earlier, because, although they
see it, [their sight] lacks sharpness. Therefore, thanks to this [imperfect vision]
[the perishing nature of the entity] is ascertained later, just as ignorant people
[ascertain] poison only having noticed the disease [caused by it].'
All kinds of causal relations can be explained with the help of santdna. Says
Santaraksita (Tattvasaiigraha 543):
kesdmcid eva cittdndm visistd kdryakdryitd\
niyatd tena nirbddhdh sarvatra smaranddayah\ \

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 Act One

'The distinctive condition of being an effect or a cause is restricted only to

particular cognitions [in the continuum]. For this reason remembrance and
[enjoyment, recognition, etc. can take place] hi all cases without any imped­
iment.' See also Pramdnavdrttika, pramdnasiddhi 271c-272b (VETTER 1990,
p. 161, v. 269):
anyasmaranabhogddiprasangas ca na bddhakah\
asmrteh kasyacit tena hy anubhuteh smrtodbhavah\\
'Such unwanted consequences as "someone else will remember [the thing that
another person experienced]", or "someone else will enjoy [the results of actions
made by another person]" do not oppose [our position], for [there is] no 'person'
[who] remembers. Therefore a memory arises from an experience.'
Therefore there is no need to postulate a 'person' as an agent ( Tattvasan-
graha 504):
kartrtvddivyavasthd tu santdnaikyavivaksayd\
kalpandropitaivestd ndngam sd tattvasamsthiteh\ \
'But the condition of being an agent and [enjoyer, etc.] is accepted as a purely
mental construction with the intention to refer to the unity of the continuum;
it is not a component of the real nature of things.' The same is pointed out by
Rumania's Buddhist opponent (Slokavdrttika (with Nydyaratndkara) dtmavdda
35ab):
kartd ya eva santdno nanu bhoktd sa eva nah\
'Surely, for us the same continuum [of cognitions] which is the agent [of actions
that bear fruits] is also the enjoyer [of the results of these actions].'
16 One might find the compound kartrbhoktrsmrtyddikdryaghatand strained.
As Dr. Isaacson points out in a letter of 5. xi. 2002, 'what we expect is really
karmabhogasmrtyddikdryaghatand, especially since he is summing up the answer
to the updsakd's question: 'kassa kammabhoo ... kassa sumarananibamdhand
homti vavahdrd.
17 pakdsijjade is a strange, one might even say impossible formation. In Sau-
rasenl one would expect something like pakdstadi, while in MaharastrT pakdsijjai]
and in Jaina-Saurasenl pakdsijjadi (see PlSCHEL §535).
18 ex conj. jinimto or rather jinamto would suggest jayan as its Sanskrit
equivalent (cf. PlSCHEL §473), but the sense requires rather janemto (janayari).

19 ex conj. ISAACSON.
20 The translation of the last two sentences is based on a reading that contains
several tentative conjectures.
The Disciple's question is a well-known objection against the theory of mo-
mentariness. We find it e.g. in Tattvasangraha (490): ksanasthdyi ghatddis cen
nopalabhyeta caksusd\ na hi nastdh pratiyante cirdtitapaddrthavat\ \ 'If the pot
exists only for a moment then it cannot be perceived by the sense of sight, for
[things] that have perished, just as things that vanished long ago, cannot be
perceived.'

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 Act One

Dharmaklrti first establishes that the object must exist before its cognition
(Pramdnavdrttika, pratyaksa 246): asatahprdg asdmarthydt pascdc cdnupayoga-
tah\ prdgbhdvah sarvahetundm ndto 'rthah svadhiyd saha\\ 'Since that [thing]
which does not exist before [its effect] is not capable [to produce the effect],
and [that thing which exists] after [an effect] is of no use [for bringing about
that effect], all causes exist before [their effects]. Therefore the object does not
[exist] simultaneously with its cognition.' Then he answers the above objection
(ibid. v. 247, = Pramdnaviniscaya I p. 60, v. 20): bhinnakdlam katham grdhyam
iti ced grdhyatdm viduh\ hetutvam eva yuktijnd jndndkdrdrpanaksamam\ \ 'If [the
opponent objects:] "how can the object of cognition exist at a different time
[from the subject]", [then we answer that] Logicians mean by the condition of
being the object nothing but the condition of being the cause which is able to
imprint its form on cognition.' It is this 'imprint' which is grasped by cognition
and not the actual object: this is the theory of sakaravijnana, 'form-possessing
cognition'. This position does not exclude the existence of an external object
(accepted by the sautrantikas), but it can easily be adopted by those who believe
that nothing actually exists outside this multiform cognition (vijndnavddins).
21 ex conj. ISAACSON. Instead of this conjecture one might consider yadi
tattvam prcchasi (see Nydyamanjan II 156.18).
22 ex conj. ISAACSON, supported by the frequency of expressions such as
nilddi in the same context.
23 It is again the Vijnanavadin in the Slokavarttika whose arguments are re­
markably similar to those of the Monk in Jayanta's play. According to Rumania's
Buddhist opponent, we do not ascertain two separate forms: one belonging
to cognition and the other to its object (Slokavarttika (with Tatparyatlka)
sunyavada 6ab): na cdpy dkdrabhedena jndnajneydvadhdrand]). Kumarila ex­
pounds the MTmamsaka position as follows (Slokavarttika (with Tdtparyatikd)
sunyavada 10cd-12):
ekam dkdravad vastu grdhyam ity adhyagismahi\\
tad yady dkdravdn artho bdhyah kalpyeta tasya ca\
grdhyatvam anyathd na sydd iti grdhakakalpand\\
tendkdravatah klptdd grdhydd dkdravarjitam\
vastvantaram prthak kalpyam (v.l. prakalpyam sydd) grdhakam nispramdnakam\ \
'We hold that a single form-possessing thing is cognised. If that thing were pos­
tulated to be an external form-possessing object, then we should postulate a
subject of cognition, since its [i.e. the external thing's] condition of being an
object of cognition would not be otherwise possible. Therefore one should pos­
tulate another thing as the subject of cognition, which would be separate from
the postulated form-possessing object of cognition, [and which would also be]
devoid of form, and lacking any proof [of its existence].'
After showing that it is more 'economical' to postulate a single, form-
possessing cognition which has the aspects of both subject and object, the
Buddhist advances another argument (Slokavarttika (with Tdtparyatikd) sunyavada

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 Act One

21-22):
itas cdkdravaj jnanam, yasmdt tad vah (v.l. tadvat) prakdsakam\
svayamprakdsahmasya bdhyasyopdyasammatam\ \
na cdgrhite jndndkhyaprakdse (v.l. jndndkhye prakdsyo) 'rtho 'vadhdryate\
tadadhmaprakdsatvdd dipdbhdse yathd ghatah\\
(...) 31-32:
tasmdt purvagrhitdsu buddhisv arthopalmbhanam\
na copalabdhir astiha nirdkdrdsu buddhisu\\
vivekabuddhyabhdvdc ca sdkdrasya ca darsandt\
dkdravattayd (v.l. sdkdravattayd) bodho jndnasyaiva prasajyate\ \
'Cognition is form-possessing for the following reason as well: since you [also]
accept that it [i.e. cognition], being an illuminator, is a means of [illuminating]
the external object, which is not luminous by itself. But if the light called 'cog­
nition' is not grasped, the object will not be ascertained, since its illumination
depends on that [cognition], just as a pot [is cognised] after the shining forth of
the light. (...) Therefore objects are apprehended after [their] cognitions have
been grasped. And no apprehension is possible in this case if the cognitions
are formless. Since we do not cognise any distinctness [i.e. two distinct forms],
and since we see something which has form, it follows that it is cognition alone
which is apprehended as the form-possessing entity.'
24 Cf. Sdbarabhdsya(F) p. 28,14-16 (bauddhapaksa): arthajndnayor dkdrabhe-
dam nopalabhdmahe\ pratyaksd ca no buddhih\ atas tadbhinnam artharupam
ndma na kimcid astiti pasydmah\ 'We do not perceive [two] separate forms:
one belonging to the object and the other to the cognition. On the other hand,
cognition is directly perceptible for us. Therefore we realise that there is no
object-form separate from that.'
25 Cf. Sdbarabhdsya(F) p. 28,20-30,1: utpadyamdnaivdsau jndyate jndpayati
cdrthdntaram pradipavad iti yady ucyeta, tan na. 'If [the Buddhist] were to say
that [cognition], precisely when it is coming about, is cognised and makes the
object cognised, similarly to a lamp, then [our answer would be that] this is
wrong.'
See also Nydyamanjan II 490.10 (~ Pramdnaviniscaya I p. 96, v. 55cd):
apratyaksopalambhasya ndrthadrstih prasiddhyati] 'For [a cognition] whose per­
ceiving is [itself] not [directly] perceived, cannot cognise the object.'
Cf. Sdbarabhdsya(F) p. 30,3-5 (bauddhapaksa): nanu utpanndydm eva bu-
ddhdv artho 'jndta' ity ucyate, ndnutpanndydm\ atah purvam buddhir utpadyate,
pascdj jndto 'rthah\ 'Surely the object is said to be 'known' only after the cogni­
tion has arisen, [but] not when it has not yet arisen. Therefore first the cognition
arises, and after that the object is cognised.'
26 Cf. Nydyamanjan II 495.15-16 (~ Pramdnaviniscaya I p. 86, v. 38; cf.
Pramdnavdrttika, pratyaksa 327):
ndnyo 'nubhdvyo buddhydsti tasyd ndnubhavo 'parah\
grdhyagrdhakavaidhurydt svayam saiva prakdsate] \

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 Act One

'There is nothing else [than cognition itself] to be ascertained by cognition.

[On the other hand] it [i.e. cognition] is not ascertained by another [cognition],
because [in that case, too,] the object and subject of cognition [each having
distinctive features] would be wanting. [Therefore] it shines forth by itself [both
as subject and object].'
Also Pramdnavdrttika, pratyaksa 354 (= Pramdnaviniscaya I p. 90, v.45):
avibhdgo 'pi buddhyatma (: reading in VETTER 1966, p. 90, n. 6, see also MIMAKI
1976, p. 288, n. 308 about other readings; the Pandeya-edition has buddhyatma-}
viparydsitadarsanaih\
grdhyagrdhakasamvittibhedavdn iva laksyate\\
'Although the nature of cognition is undivided, those whose vision is faulty see
it as being divided into object, subject, and consciousness.'
Also Pramanavarttika, pratyaksa 328:
nilddirupas tasydsau svabhdvo 'nubhavas ca sah\
mlddyanubhavdt khydtah svarupdnubhavo 'pi san\\
'Forms such as blue are its [i.e. cognitions] inherent nature, and this [nature]
is ascertaining. Although it is the ascertaining of its own form, still, because
forms such as blue are ascertained, it is called ['the cognition of blue' etc.].'
27 The word pisuna also means 'betraying, treacherous', or as a noun, 'in­
formant'.
28 'Delicious meals served in the vihdrd1 were one of the main attractions of
Buddhism according to satirical literature. In the Bhagavadajjukvya (probably
the oldest Sanskrit comedy still extant), Sandilya, the pupil who pokes his nose
into everything, relates how he tried out various religions just to find out where
he could eat his fill. Buddhism seemed to ^be promising in this respect because
monks get breakfast every morning, but Sandilya realised soon that he could
not appease his hunger in the vihara, because 'these sons of slaves eat only
once a day' (Bhagavadajjukiya, p. 8). The commentary, which gives a philo­
sophical / allegorical interpretation of the whole prahasana, takes the expres­
sion dasydh putrdh as referring to the unacceptable tenets of the Buddhists like
veddprdmdnya, nairdtmya, etc., and ekakdlabhaktatva as referring to ksanikatva
(ibid. p. 13).
Buddhism, as we are often told, equals dolce far niente, but is it possible
to stop on a slope as slippery as this? The satirist's answer is clear: when hu­
man weakness has once tasted pleasures, it asks for more. The Buddhist monk
in king Mahendravarman's comedy, the Mattavildsa, first praises the wise soli­
citude of buddhasdsana, which teaches living in palace-like buildings, sleeping in
well-made beds, enjoying brunch in the morning, tasty juices in the afternoon,
pan of the finest quality, and dressing in soft clothes (Mattavildsaprahasana,
p. 12: bhoh paramakdruniena bhaavadd tahdgaena pdsddesu vdso, suvihiasayye-
su pajjaiikesu saanam, puvvanhe bhoanam, avaranhe surasdni pdnadni, panca-
sugandhovahiam (em. Shastri, also supported by the mss. used by Unni in his
edition (Mattavilasa Prahasana of Mahendravikramavarman, ed. and tr. by
Dr. N.P. Unni, Trivandrum, 1974, p.49.)) tambollam, sanhavasanaparidhdnam

133
 Act One

ti edehi uvadesehi bhikkhusaiighassa anuggaham karantena...). But if the Lord

is so provident, and especially if he is omniscient (that is, omniscient in the
matters of both moksa and sukha), why has he omitted booze and women
from his Teaching? (Ibid.: ... kinnu hu itthidpariggaho surdvdnavihdnam ca na
dittham? ahava kaham sawajno edam na pekkhadi?) Or is it possible that
something went wrong in the course of the transmission of the text? Or rather
the surly old monks envy the younger brethren these pleasures? As a conclusion
the bhiksu draws up a programme, which reminds us of contemporary debates
about the original teaching of the Buddha (and even the efforts of modern philo­
logists to find their own ideas reflected in ancient texts): 'Let's find the codex
archetypus and let's prepare a complete critical edition!' (Ibid.: kahim nu hu
avinatthamulapdtham samdsddaeam. )

29 Cf. Manu-smrti 4.35-36.

30 According to PISCHEL (§266), iha is a false form in SaurasenT, although

Hemacandra (4.268) permits it beside idha.

31 The Mlmamsaka's career starts as a glorious campaign against heretics, but

by the fourth act it will prove to be a complete failure for the representatives
of Vedic orthodoxy (verse 1): sarva eva hi yathdsthitd ime sndtakasya dhig
apdrthakam srutam] [OFFICIANT.] 'For all of these [heretic sects] have remained
as they were. Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate!'
32 The Mlmamsaka looks upon the Buddha as simply the mortal son of a
human king; cf. Nyayamanjarf I 644.8: nanu buddhah suddhodanasya rdjno
'patyam, sa katham isvaro bhavet?
33 The following description of a gorgeous Buddhist monastery might seem
exaggerated, but we know from Kalhana that several Kashmirian vihdras were
very rich indeed owing to generous donations, e.g. the Rajavihara, the founda­
tion of Lalitaditya (RajataranginT 4.200), who also presented a glorious copper
statue of the 'Great Buddha' (ibid. 4.203); his minister Cankuna also sup­
ported the building of a vihara and a stupa, and had golden Buddha-images
made as well (ibid. 4.211). Another telling example is the beginning of the last
chapter of Ksemendra's Avadanakalpalata, which was actually written by his
son, Somendra (Avadanakalpalata, 108: Jimutavdhandvaddna). In the first verse
Somendra muses upon the beautiful paintings depicting the Buddha's glorious
deeds. These paintings used to decorate 'cavities (cells?, niches?) shining with
gold' (kanakacitraguhagrhesu) in a courtyard belonging to the Great Vihara (ur-
uvihdra). But in the following stanza Somendra tells us that his father composed
the Avadanakalpalata as a kind of substitute for these pictures, 'lest mankind
be agitated because of their loss' (ma bhut tadvirahakulam jagad iti). The treas­
ures of the Buddhist monasteries often aroused the interest of Kashmirian kings,
who plundered and sometimes, just for good measure, even burnt down some
of the vihdras. These atrocities became more frequent from the end of the 10th
century according to the Rdjatararigim, e.g. in the reign of Ksemagupta (6.171

134
 Act One

seqq.), and especially that of king Harsa (7.1097 seqq.). King Sankaravarman,
whom Jayanta served as an advisor (amaiya), often resorted to confiscations in
order to fill his treasury (Rdjatarangim 5.165 seqq.), and viharas like the one
described by the snataka and his pupil could easily become a choice morsel for
the king. On the other hand, the high taxes introduced during his reign were
probably very effective in holding back the rich from further donations.

34As Dr ISAACSON pointed out to me, Vallabhadeva glosses kusavanti in his

commentary ad Raghuvamsa 14.28 as sadvalacitdni. The description suggests a
place that is ideal for assignations.

35 This verse (very appropriate from the mouth of a Vedic graduate) must
have brought to the audience's mind the well-known description of the Cosmic
Tree (Rgveda 1.24.7, Katha Upanisad 6.1, Bhagavadgitd 15.1 seqq.), and the
other famous Vedic image of the two birds nestling on the same tree (Rgveda
1.164.20, Mundaka Upanisad 3.1 seqq.).

36 maua is a MaharastrT form, Saurasem has miu for Sanskrit mrdu (PiSGHEL
§52).
37 'Commendable' in an ironical sense. Or, as Dr Isaacson suggests in a letter
of 5. xi. 2002, 'it might be possible to interpret the idea as being that the rich
people are actually trying to follow a praiseworthy path, not that of Buddhism,
but that of religion iiberhaupt, or of charity, donating to the religious. But des­
pite this commendable intention they are led astray by the Buddhist vitas.'1
One might also consider emending the text to vandhye, 'fruitless'; cf. verse
25a where we have almost certainly a corruption in the manuscripts: °vandyd-
tmanah for ° vandhydtmanah. As Prof. Sanderson has pointed out to me, con­
fusing unaspirated and aspirated voiced consonants is a common error of the
Kashmirian manuscript transmission.
38 On the use of the particle kila at the head of a sentence, see GOODALL 1998,
p. 169, n. 26, mentioning other occurrences, e.g. Nyayamanjaril 631.16-17: kila
dvividho vedah sruyamdnah anumiyamdnas ca\.
39 On samddhibhdvand see Abhidharmakosa 8.27 and bhdsya ad loc. (ed.
Pradhan, p. 451).
40 According to PlSCHEL (§143, §336, see also Vararuci 12.24, Purusottama
9,29), 'ma is the single prevailing form in Saurasem and MagadhT for Sanskrit
wa, while MaharastrT, ArdhamagadhT, and Jaina-Maharastrl have va, vva (Pi-
SCHEL §92, §143). In Hemacandra's grammar we find the following general rule
(2,182): miva piva viva wa va via ivdrthe vd\
41 Brahmanical invective against Buddhism insinuates that as soon as Buddhist
monks think they are out of the range of the pious Addbrahmins' severe sight,
they fling themselves wholeheartedly into pleasures. Public censure is the only
retarding force: the bhiksu in the Mattavildsaprahasana (who has already ex-

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 Act One

pressed his will to reform Buddhism in order to include more pleasure) is

afraid to drink booze because 'many people / great, exemplary people will see',
mahdjano pekkhissadi (p. 16).

42 The following denigrating description of life in a Buddhist monastery has

many parallels in Sanskrit literature. A popular anonymous quatrain gives a
kind of distillate of the stereotypical insinuations ('heavy drinking, overeating,
casual sex with ill-reputed women') directed against Buddhist monks:
bhikso kanthd slathd te nanu sapharavadhe jalikaisatsi matsydms
te 'mi madydvadamsdh pibasi madhu samara vesyayd ydsi vesyam]
dattvarmam gale 'nghrim kimu tava ripavo bhittibhettdsmi yesdm
cauras tvam dyutahetoh katham asi kitavo yena ddsisuto 'smi\\
'Monk, your rags are loose!' 'Surely it serves as a net for killing carp.' 'You
eat fish?' 'It is a side-dish to go along with wine.' 'You drink wine?' 'Together
with whores.' 'You go to whores?' 'After putting my foot on the throat of my
enemies.' 'You have foes?' 'Those in whose wall I've made a breach.' 'You are
a burglar?' 'Because of gambling.' 'What? You are a gamester?' 'Since I am
the son of a servant-maid!'
We find this verse in two Kashmirian texts, and in Haribhadrasuri's vrtti to
the Dasaveyaliya-sutta (8th century). This latter commentary by a Jain au­
thor enframes the poem in a story about a false ascetic (see BOLLEE 1974:39,
n. 65. Unfortunately the text was not at my disposal.). The Lokaprakasa, which
was attributed to the Kashmirian polygraph Ksemendra, but which is rather
a 'guide book for everyday transactions for people during the 17th century in
Kashmir' (Lokaprakasa, p. 1), places the stanza at the end of a section listing
various kinds of rascals (ibid. p. 57). An earlier Kashmirian text in which we
find this verse denouncing a certain monk is the /msya-section of Vallabhadeva's
Subhdsitdvali (No. 2402, I was quoting the quatrain according to this source).
The hero of the poem declares, somewhat proudly, or at least as if speaking
about the most natural way of life, that he has actually broken all the funda­
mental moral precepts (pancasilani; since he is a gambler, we can be quite sure
that he often cheats and lies as well) that are compulsory even for upasakas,
not to speak of bhiksus. And the way this 'confession' blossoms out is also
very Buddhistic: the necessary concatenation of 'meat—wine—sex—poker—
villainy' forms a mock-causal sequence parodying one of the pillars of Buddhist
philosophy: the pratitya-samutpada (as Siegel has already observed in SIEGEL
1989:211). Just as we arrive at avidyd as the 'basic root' of all other nidanas,
in the same way, after peeling off the outer layers to get to the kernel, our
bhiksu finally announces the fundamental cause of all his vices: 'I am the son
of a slave'. The audience (naturally anti-Buddhist, and accepting the orthodox
Brahmanical values such as caturvarnya) laughs at the bhiksu: 'Of course he is
a rogue, what else can you expect from a lowborn?' And what else could you
expect from a religion that admits such lowborn rascals?

43 ex conj. ISAACSON.

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 Act One

44 It is the same 'lack of restraint' which horrifies the son of a Buddhist

merchant in a story of the Kashmirian Somadeva's Kathdsaritsdgara. The son
despises his father and calls him 'criminal' (papa) for short, and when his father
asks him why, the son launches an invective which is a typical example of or­
thodox Brahmanical aversion towards Buddhism (Kathasaritsagara, 6.1.18-20):
tdta, tyaktatrayTdharmas tvam adharmam nisevase]
yad brdhmandn parityajya sramandn sasvad arcasi\ \
sndnddiyantrandhmdh svakdldsanalolupdh\
apdstasasikhdsesakesakaupmasusthitdh\\
vihdrdspadalobhdya sarve 'py adhamajdtayah\
yam dsrayanti kirn tena saugatena nayena te?\\
'My father, in that you disregard the brdhmanas and always honour Buddhist
mendicants, you have abandoned the religion of the three Vedas and follow
anti-religion. What has that doctrine of Sugata got to do with you, to which all
kinds of low-caste men attach themselves, in order to fulfil their desire to live
in a vihdra (or: in a place of pleasure), men who are devoid of restraints like
bathing and the rest, who long to eat whenever they please, who feel content
having discarded their loin-cloth and all their hair including the lock of hair [on
the crown of the head]?'
Brahmanical criticism accused Buddhists of denying caste distinctions only
to justify their illicit relations with low-caste women. The Jain mendicant in
the Latakamelaka, a prahasana from the \\th century, tries to keep away from
the bhiksu who is 'polluted by the touch of people belonging to improper castes'
(asadisajddiphamsadusido, p. 25). 'O, you fool, there is no caste at all!' replies
the bhiksu, so how could his favourite washerwoman sweetheart pollute him,
especially if there is no permanent Self?
45 thora is MaharastrT for Sanskrit sthula, in SaurasenT one would expect thula
(PlSCHEL §127).
46 One might consider accepting the reading of the manuscripts (pakvarasa-
sabdanihnuta-madyavyapadesam, 'which is concealed behind the word "fruit-
juice", [but] the [real] name of which is booze'.
Satire insinuates not just that Buddhist monks run after women and drink
wine, but also (what is even worse) that they pretend the opposite. Hypocrisy
is one of the most important targets of satire, and especially that of the Sanskrit
satirical monologue, the bhdna. When the vita in the Padmaprdbhrtaka notices
a bhiksu hurrying out of the courtyard of a courtesan, it is not Buddhism that
he attacks in the first place, but the depraved behaviour of the monk: 'O, how
excellent is the Buddha's teaching, which is being honoured day by day, even
if such false, uselessly shaved monks spoil it! Or rather, the water of a sacred
place is not spoiled because crows have drunk from it.' (Padmaprdbhrtaka, p. 36
(23.5ff.): aho sdristhatd buddhasdsanasya, yad evamvidhair api vrthdmundair
asadbhiksubhir upahanyamdnam pratyaham abhipujyata eva. athavd na vd-
yasocchistam tvrthajalam upahatam bhavati. Although we might suspect a slight
irony in the background, the real target here is the individual, and not reli-

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gion as such.) The monk perceives him and tries to beat it, but the vita does
not want to miss his chance: 'He will not get off unhurt from the range of
my word-arrows!' (Ibid. 23.10: mama vdksaragocardd aksato no, ydsyati.) So
he addresses the bhiksu: 'Hey, monastery-zombie, where are you going now,
alarmed like an owl by daylight?' (Ibid. 23.13: oho vihdravetdla kveddnim uluka
iva diva saiikitas carasi?) The monk gives the worst possible answer: 'I am
just coming from the viharaS (Ibid. 23.14: sampratam vihdrdd dgacchdmiti.)
This is just fuel to the vita's fire: 'I know that your reverence's frequenting
the monastery (or: your addiction to pleasures, vihdrastlatd) is genuine!' (Ibid.
23.15: bhutdrtham jane vihdrasUatdm bhadantasya!) The bhiksu is still in denial:
'I have come to comfort with the Buddha's words Sanghadasika, who is af­
flicted by the death of her mother.' (Ibid. 23.18-19: mdtrvydpattiduhkhitdm
sanghaddsikdm buddhavacanaih paryavasthdpayitum dgato 'smiti. Cf. SIEGEL
(1989:212-213): 'It is insinuatingly ambiguous as to just what "to comfort"
means, just as it is ambiguous as to just how the girl "serves" the brother­
hood. The equivocality between the incongruous spheres of experience, the
religious and the erotic, creates the comic tension.') 'A monk who enters the
courtyard of a courtesan, either out of [a moment of] delusion or even by ac­
cident, is of no account, like the OM used in the sutras of Dattaka,' (ibid.
24: vesydnganam pravisto mohdd bhiksur yadrcchayd vdpi\ na bhrdjate prayukto
dattakasutresv ivomkdrah\\) remarks the vita with an edge. But the bhiksu still
shields himself with the Buddha's teaching: 'Forgive me, sir, but surely one
should be kindly disposed towards all beings.' (Ibid. 24.1: marsayatu bhavdn
nanu sarvasattvesu prasannacittena bhavitavyam iti.) Finally the vita becomes
tired of such a great hypocrisy, especially when the monk tries to escape un­
der the well-known pretext that he must not miss breakfast-time, because 'one
should also avoid eating at the inappropriate time' (ibid, p.37 (24.8): gacchdmy
aham akdlabhojanam api parihdryam iti.). 'Ha, ha! That crowns all!' explodes
the vita. 'That's all that was wanting: the meal-time of this monk is run­
ning out, although he has never transgressed the five precepts! Beat it!' (Ibid.
24.9: hi hi sarvam krtam. etad avasistam askhalitapancasiksdpadasya bhiksoh
kdlabhojanam atikrdmati. dhvamsasva.) And the bhiksu dashes off, perhaps
with a sigh of relief.
47 See L. SCHMITHAUSEN, 'Essen, ohne zu Toten. Zur Frage von Fleischverzehr
und Vegetarismus im Buddhismus' (in Die Religionen und das Essen, ed. Perry
Schmidt-Leukel, Kreuzlingen: Hugendubel Verlag, 2000), pp. 151f.: 'Das Tier ist
also nicht eigens fur den Buddha geschlachtet worden. Dies (und nicht der Kauf
oder die Zubereitung) ist fur den Buddha (bzw. die Redaktoren des Vinaya) das
Entscheidende, und in diesem Sinne ist auch die abschliefiend formulierte Regel
zu verstehen, der zufolge die Monche Fleisch unter der Bedingung annehmen
diirfen (oder sogar miissen?), dafi es dreifach rein (tikoti-parisuddha) ist. Diese
Bedingung ist erfiillt, wenn sie weder gesehen noch gehort haben, dafi das Tier
eigens fur sie geschlachtet worden ist, noch auch einen begriindeten Verdacht
in diese Richtung hegen. Mit dieser Regel ist, nach Auffassung des Vinaya, der
Monch in den Augen der Gesellschaft (darum geht es hier!) ausreichend vor

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 Act One

Vorwiirfen geschiitzt.' For further details about the 'three conditions' (drstam,
srutam, parisankitam) see also Chandra Shekhar PRASAD, 'Meat-Eating and
the Rule of Tikotiparisuddha' in Studies in Pali and Buddhism. A Memorial
Volume in Honor of Bhikkhu Jagdish Kashyap, ed. A. K. Narain, Delhi, 1979,
pp.289-295.

48 The following two verses are in MaharastrT.

49 The faces of the maidservants corresponding to the beverage and then- blue
eyes to the water-lily (this interpretation was suggested by Dr. Benson).

50 ex conj. The word te in this sentence looks superfluous, and can be ex­
plained by dittography.

51 ex conj. The Monk will clearly protest against the use of the genitive case.
2 The grammatical rule in question is Astddhydyi 1.4.29: dkhydtopayoge.
Patanjali's examples for the use of sru- with the genitive case-ending are (Mahd-
bhdsya ad loc.): natasya srnoti, granthikasya srnoti\
53 ex conj. SANDERSON. Adding a word with a similar meaning to the
sentence seems to be necessary.
54
ex conj. ISAACSON.
55 ex conj. ISAACSON.
56 Jayanta remarks in the Nydyamanjan that animal sacrifices prescribed
in the Veda often deter the tender-hearted who may say, 'What would impi-
ousness be [in a scripture] in which slaughtering living beings is a meritorious
duty?' (Nydyamanjan 1 642.11-12: yatra prdnivadho dharmas tvadharmah tatra
kidrsah?}
57 I supply again vacah and take kathddambaram as a bahuvnhi. Otherwise
0 dambaram (neuter) does not seem to be in the right gender; on the other hand,
its emendation means that we have to emend heyam and °prdyam as well.
58 Jayanta recommends the use of vdda in the Nydyamanjan as follows (Nyd­
yamanjan I 27.1-3): vdde tu vicdryamdno nydyah samsayacchedanenddhyavasi-
tdvabodham adhyavasitdbhyanujndm ca vidadhat tattvaparisuddhim ddadhdtiti
vitardgaih sisyasabrahmacdribhis saha vddah prayoktavyah\ 'In a discussion, how­
ever, the way of argumentation, inasmuch as it is examined, produces the real­
isation of what has been determined and the consensus in what has been determ­
ined through removing the uncertainties, and thus it brings about the faultless
ascertainment of reality. On these grounds the wise who have subdued their
passions should enter into discussion with their disciples and with their fellow-
scholars.' But on certain occasions other kinds of debate may prove to be more
useful (ibid. 4-6): jalpavitande tu dustatdrkikoparacitakapatadusanddambara-
santrdsyamdnasaralamatisamdsvdsanena taddhrdayasthatattvajndnasamraksand

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 Act One

ya kvacid avasare vitardgasydpy upayujyete\ 'On some occasions, however, even

the wise who have subdued their passions may find it suitable to use wrangling
dispute and destructive criticism in order to protect the knowledge of reality
which exists in the heart of the tender-minded, through fortifying them when
they are frightened by the noisy arrogance of deceitful objections concocted by
a vicious logician.'

59 The Graduate's objection asserts that the Buddhist sattvanumana is not

valid because of the fault of asddhdrandnaikdntikatd, 'the impossibility of draw­
ing a conclusion due to exclusiveness [of the logical reason]'. The classical ex­
ample of this fallacy is the fifth syllogism in Dinnaga's hetucakra: sabdo nityah
srdvanatvdt\ 'Sound is eternal because of its audibility.' The problem with this
syllogism is that the hetu (logical reason or middle term: 'audibility') belongs
exclusively to the paksa (subject or minor term: 'sound'), and therefore it is im­
possible to produce an example (drstanta) which is different from the paksa. In
the case of sattvanumana ('everything is momentary because of its existence'),
we face a similar problem, since all existing things are part of the paksa, and
nothing else is left to serve as a similar instance (sapaksa). On the other hand,
the Buddhist cannot show a counterexample (vipaksa) either, the thing which
does not possess the hetu being non-existent in this case. (Compare with the
standard Indian example of syllogism: 'this mountain is fire-possessing, because
it is smoke-possessing, like a kitchen (sapaksa), unlike a pond (vipaksa}\] Cf.
MIMAKI 1976, pp. 46ff.
60 The second half of verse 25 clearly contains Buddhist arguments, which
are based on accepting vyatirekavyapti, therefore Prof. Sanderson's conjecture
seems to be justified.
61 This means that it is possible to show the concomitance of sattva and
ksanikatva in the following way: 'something that is not momentary, does not
exist'.
62 The Monk replies to the Graduate's objection by putting forward the
sddhyaviparyayabddhakapramdna, 'a means of valid cognition which refutes the
[possibility of the] opposite of the property to be proven [co-occurring with the
proving property, i.e. the logical reason (hetu}]\ In the case of sattvanumana,
this means to establish that the assertion 'something that is not momentary, ex­
ists' is not valid. DharmakTrti formulates the argument in the following way (He-
tubindu p. 4*,3-7): anvayaniscayo 'pi svabhdvahetau sddhyadharmasya vastutas
tadbhdvatayd sddhanadharmabhdvamdtrdnubandhasiddhih\ sd sddhyaviparyaye
hetor bddhakapramdnavrttih\ yathd yat sat tat ksanikam eva, aksanikatve 'rtha-
kriydvirodhdt tallaksanam vastutvam hiyate\ 'As for the determination of the
positive concomitance in the case of the inherent nature being the logical reason,
it is proving that the [presence of the] property to be established is connected
with the mere presence of the proving property, because [the property to be
established] is in reality the inherent nature of that [thing which possesses the
proving property]. This [proving] is the operation of a valid cognition which

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 Act One

refutes [the co-presence of] the logical reason in the case of the opposite of the
property to be established. For instance: Anything that exists is momentary
without exception. If it were not momentary, since [the condition of being
non-momentary] contradicts causal efficacy, it would lack the condition of be­
ing an entity, which [condition] is characterised by that [causal efficacy].' (Cf.
YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 234.)

63 See note 20. Kumarila highlights the same problem when he claims that
the theory of vasanas is incompatible with the postulated momentariness of
cognitions (Slokavarttika (with Tatparyatika) nirdlambanavdda 181cd-185ab):
ksanikesu ca cittesu vino.se, ca niranvaye\\
vdsyavdsakayos caivam asdhitydn na vdsand\
purvaksanair anutpanno vdsyate nottarah ksanah\\
uttarena vinastatvdn na ca purvasya vdsand]
sdhitye ca (v.l. 'pi) tayor naiva sambandho 'stity avdsand\\
ksanikatvdd dvayasydpi vydpdro na parasparam\
vinasyac ca katham vastu vdsyate 'nyena nasyatd\\
avasthitd hi vdsyante bhdvd bhdvair avasthitaih\
'Since cognitions are momentary and since they perish without a trace, and
since the one that receives the imprint and the other that imparts it do not exist
simultaneously, there can be no impression. The subsequent [cognition-]phase,
which has not yet arisen, cannot be imprinted by the preceding [cognition-
] phases, and the preceding [cognition-phase] cannot receive any impression from
the subsequent one, since it has already perished. And even if they existed
simultaneously, there could be no connection [of any of the accepted types, e.g.
samyoga, samavdya] between them, and thus there can be no impression. Since
both [cognition-phases] are momentary, they cannot operate on each other. How
could something which is being destroyed be imprinted by another [thing] which
is [also] being destroyed? For [only] enduring entities are imprinted by [other]
enduring entities.'
64 The same objection is sprung on Santaraksita (Tattvasangraha 500):
etenaiva prakdrena smrtyddmdm asambhavah\
ekddhikarandbhdvdt ksanaksayisu vastusu\\
'In the same way [as we have shown that 'bondage' and 'liberation' is inter-
pretable only if there is a single substratum: the Self,] remembrance etc. would
also be impossible if things were momentary, since there would be no single
substratum.' (As KamalasTla points out in his commentary, Mr. Smith would
experience something and Mr. Brown would remember it.)
The Buddhist, however, maintains that causality is sufficient to ensure such op­
erations as memory (ibid. 501-503):
atrdbhidhiyate sarve (: conj., ed.: sarva-) kdryakdranatdsthitau\
satydm avydhatd ete sidhyanty eva (: conj., ed.: evam) nirdtmasu\\
yathd hi niyatd saktir bydder ankurddisu\
anvayydtmaviyoge 'pi tathaivddhydtmike sthitih\\
pdramparyena sdksdd vd kvacit kincid dhi saktimat\

141
 Act One

tatah karmaphalddmdm sambandha upapadyate\\

'We answer this objection as follows: if the relation between effect and cause
is present, then all these [operations such as memory] are truly established,
without any hinderance, [even] if things do not have a Self. For just as the
capacity of seeds etc. is restricted to [bringing about] sprouts etc., even if they
do not have an [enduring] essence that could be connected [with both seed and
sprout], the same is true about mental [operations]. For [only] a particular thing
has the capacity [to cause a particular effect] at a particular time, either indir­
ectly or directly. That is why relations such as that of action and result are
possible.'
Ibid. 509-510:
atrocyate dvitiye hi ksane karyam prajdyate\
prathame kdranam jdtam avinastam tadd ca tat\ \
ksanikatvdt tu tat kdryaksanakdle na vartate]
vrttau vd viphalam karyam nivrttam tad yatas tadd\ \
'We answer [your objections] as follows: the effect follows in the second moment.
In the first [moment] the cause arises, and then [i.e. at that moment] it does
not perish. But since it is momentary, it does not exist at the moment of the
effect. Or if it did exist, it would be useless, since the effect has already been
accomplished by then.'
Ibid. 516-517:
na hi tat karyam dtmtyam samdamseneva kdranam\
grhitvd janayaty etad yaugapadyam yato bhavet\ \
ndpi gddham samdliiigya prakrtim jdyate phalam\
kdmwa dayitdm (: em., ed.: dayitd) yena sakrdbhdvas tayor bhavet\\
'For this cause does not produce that effect by seizing it as if with a pair of
tongs, since this would mean that [cause and effect exist] simultaneously. Nor
does the effect arise embracing closely its cause as a lover [embraces] his beloved,
as a result of which they would exist at the same moment.
Ibid. 521:
ya dnantaryaniyamah saivdpeksdbhidiyate]
kdryodaye sadd bhdvo vydpdrah kdranasya ca\\
'It is the necessity of immediate succession that is said to be the 'dependence'
[of the effect on its cause]. And the 'operation' of the cause with respect to the
arising of the effect is always its [mere] presence / existence.'
We have already seen (note 20) that according to DharmakTrti the condition
of being the object of cognition is nothing but the condition of being the cause
which imprints its form on cognition. In the Svavrtti he provides a detailed
analysis (p. 149,21-150,2): ye kaddcit kvacit kenacij jndtdh santo na jndyante
tesdm sattdnubandhi ndsa iti brumah\ ta eva krtakd anitydh sddhyante\ na hy
ayam sambhavo 'sti yat te jndnajananasvabhdvdh punar anastd na janayeyur
apekseran vd param\ tajjananasvabhdvasya nispatteh\ na ca tesv anapeksesu kasy-
acit kaddcit kimcij jndnam nivarteta\ na caivambhutam kimcid asti\ sarvasya
kenacid kaddcid jndndt\ jndnamdtrdrthakriydydm apy asdmarthye vastv eva na
sydt\ tathd hi tallaksanam vastv iti vaksydmah\ tasya ca vindsdvyabhicdrdt sa
sattdnubandh^ 'We say that the perishing of those things which, having been

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 Act One

cognised sometime somewhere by somebody, are not cognised, is attached to

[their] existence. It is these things that are produced [and] are proved to be
impermanent. For it is not possible that those things, which have the inher­
ent nature of producing cognition, could, while not yet destroyed, not produce
[cognition], or that they would require some other [assisting factor], since [their]
inherent nature, which is producing that [i.e. cognition], is complete. And,
since they do not require [some assisting cause], [theoretically] no cognition
would ever cease for anyone. But nothing like that [actually] takes place, for
everything is cognised by some particular person at a particular time. [There­
fore these cognisable entities must perish.] If [something] were incapable even
to perform the action of merely [producing] cognition, then it would not even
be an entity. To explain, we shall teach that an entity is characterised by that
[i.e. arthakriydkdritva]. And since this [entity] necessarily perishes, it [i.e. per­
ishing] is attached to existence.' (I am following Yoshimizu's interpretation in
YOSHIMIZU 1999, p. 244f.)
In Ratnaklrti's Sthirasiddhidusana we find a detailed illustration of the oper­
ation of causality in the stream of consciousness (118,14 in MIMAKI 1976, p. 164):
tathd hi updddnopddeyabhdvasthitacittasantatim apy dsrityeyam vyavasthd su-
stheti katham dtmdnam pratyujjwayatu\ tatra kdryakdranabhdvapratitis tdvad
andkuld\ tathdpi prdgbhdvivastuniscayajndnasyopddeyabhutena tadarpitasamskd-
ragarbhena pascddbhdvivastujndnendsmin satidam bhavatiti niscayo janyate\ 'To
explain, the determination [of the ascertainment of causality] is also well-estab­
lished resorting to the stream of consciousness which consists in the relation
between the material cause and its effect, so why should one resuscitate the
Self? First of all, the ascertainment of causality in that [stream] presents no
problem. Still [, to go into further details,] the determination [of positive con­
comitance] in the form of 'when there is A, there is B' comes about through a
cognition of an object that exists subsequently [CB], which [cognition] is the ef­
fect (upddeya) of [another] determining cognition [O4 , being the material cause,
updddna of CB] of an object that existed previously [A], and which [cognition,
i.e. CB] contains the impression imprinted by that [i.e. O4].' (I am following
Mimaki's interpretation.)
65 ex conj. ISAACSON. If one follows RAGHAVAN and THAKUR'S conjecture,
the second sentence requires a masculine subject, and bhoga is the only candidate
I could think of. One might also consider conjecturing hetuphalabhdvavasas tu
ko 'pi.
66 Kumarila argues that causality does not work in the way the Buddhist
imagines it (Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyattkd) sunyavdda 171cd-172ab):
santdndntaravac caisdm nisedhyd hetusddhyatd\ \
vdsyavdsakabhdvas ca jndnatvdd ekasantatau\
'The condition of being cause or effect and the relation between something that
receives an imprint and something that imparts it must be rejected between
these [cognitions in] the same continuum, since they are cognitions, just as [cog­
nitions in] another continuum.'

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 Act One

Ibid. 176cd-177cd:
caitrajndnam tadudbhutajndndmsagrdhyabodhakam\ \
jndnatvdn na bhaved yadvat tasya dehdntarodbhavam\
'The cognition of Smith cannot ascertain an object of cognition which is a sec­
tion of the cognition that has arisen in him, because it is a cognition, just as
[a cognition] that has arisen in another body [cannot ascertain] it [i.e. Smith's
cognition].'
Later he shows that whether one denies or accepts the working of causality
in the continuum of cognition-phases, this continuum cannot fulfil the role of a
stable entity (Slokavdrttika (with Nydyaratndkara) dtmavdda 33cd-34):
janmdntare 'bhyupete 'pi jndnamdtrdtmavddindm\ \
jndndndm ksanikatvdd dhi kartrbhoktranyatd bhavet]
niskriyatvdvibhutvdbhydm na ca dehdntardsritih\\
'For even though rebirth is accepted [by the Buddhists], the one who acts and the
one who experiences [the results of this action] would be different for those who
hold that the 'Self is merely [a stream of] cognitions, because of the moment-
ariness of [the individual] cognitions [hi this stream], and, since [the cognition-
phases] are inactive and not omnipresent, they cannot attach themselves to
another body.'
Ibid. 36-40:
kartrtvam eva duhsddham dirghakdlesu karmasu]
satsu jndnasahasresu kulakalpopamam hi tat\ \
vyatirikto hi santdno yadi ndbhyupagamyate]
santdnindm anityatvdt kartd kascin na labhyate\ \
bhoktur atyantabheddc ca prasajyetdkrtdgamah\
krtandsam tu na brumah krtam naiva hi kenacit\\
santdndnanyatdydm tu vdcoyuktyantarena te\
tatra coktam, na cdvastu santdnah kartrtdm vrajet\\
santdnaksanikatve ca tad eva, aksanikas tv atha\
siddhdntahdnih, evam ca so 'pi dravydntaram bhavet\\
'In the case of activities which require a long time, it is impossible to establish
that there could be any performer at all. For even though there might be thou­
sands of cognition-phases, [if you say that they are the agent,] this would be
like a ritual procedure [which is performed in stages over several generations]
of a family. For if you do not accept that there is an [entity called] 'stream'
[of consciousness] which is separate [from the individual cognitions], we find no
agent because of the impermanence of the members of the stream. And since
the one that experiences [the result of the action] is completely different [from
the agent], it would follow that one would attain [the result of] an act one did
not perform. As for the loss of [the result of one's] action, we do not [even] men­
tion it, since nobody has performed any action at all. [If you accept that the
continuum is a real entity], if the continuum is not different [from the individual
cognitions], then [you would be talking about] these [cognitions] using another
expression, and I have already set forth the objection against this [position]. On
the other hand [, if you say that the continuum is separate and permanent,] the
continuum cannot become the agent, inasmuch as it is a non-entity [since only

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 Act One

momentary entities exist in your system]. If the continuum is momentary, then

the same [objection would apply as in the case of momentary cognitions]. If it
is not momentary [and still a real entity], then you would be giving up your own
doctrine, and in this way it would also be a another substance [i.e. the atman].
Ibid. 43-50:
santdno 'yam sa eveti na tv abheddd vino, bhavet\
vdyudipddisantdne vdyutvddir na bhidyate} \
jndnatvendpy abhinnatvam sunyavdde nirdkrtam\
tathaiva karmabhir vesta phaldrtham cittavdsand] \
na cdtra vdsandkdlam kincic cittam avasthitam\
avastutvdc ca santdnah karmabhir naiva vdsyate\\
tatpdramparyajdte 'pi bhunjdne karmanah phalam\
tdddtmyena vind spastau krtandsdkrtdgamau\\
santdndntarajebhyas ca yo hetuphalabhdvatah\
visesah so 'pi dussddhah parihdro na cdnayoh\ \
tasminn asaty api bruydh parihdram tvam anyathd\
samdnaprthivwdsajndnatvddyavisesatah\\
samdna iti ndpy etad ekatvdnugamdd vind\
tena yaccittajam tasya santdna iti vo mrsd\\
na hi yacchabdatacchabdau vartete bhinnavastuni\
tenaikdtmakataistavyd tatsantdndtmavddibhih\ \
' [If you say that] it is the same continuum [that performed the action]: it can­
not be unless [these two] are not separate. In the case of [other] 'streams' such
as wind or light, the condition of being 'wind' etc. is not different [from mo­
ment to moment]. As for [your claim that] it is not unchanging inasmuch as it is
cognition: this was refuted in the [chapter on] sunyavdda. And similarly the im­
pression on consciousness which you postulate accounting for a fruit [produced]
by actions [has also been refuted]. Furthermore, no cognition remains as long
as the impression [exists, since cognitions are momentary]. And the continuum,
since it is not a real entity [for you, inasmuch as it is permanent], actions do not
leave their imprint on it in any way. Even if [you say that a cognition-phase]
arisen in the same [uninterrupted] series experiences the result of the action
[performed by another cognition-phase in the same series], without the iden­
tity [of the one who acts and the one who experiences the result, the unwanted
consequences of] the loss [of the result] of something that has been done and
the attainment [of the result] of something that has not been done are evident.
Furthermore, it is also impossible to prove [that there is a] causality-based differ­
ence [of the cognition-phase that experiences the result] from [cognition-phases]
arisen in other streams, and the two [above mentioned unwanted consequences]
cannot be avoided. Even if there is no [difference caused by causality], you
may say that [the above mentioned unwanted consequences] can be avoided in
another way, [but then not just the agent cognition-phase and the experiencing
cognition-phase would be connected by common characteristics] because [char­
acteristics] such as being in the same earth, or having the same condition of
being cognition can be equally applied [to cognitions in other continuums as
well]. And to say that something is the 'same' is not possible without accepting

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 Act One

[its] 'oneness'. Therefore you are wrong [when you say] 'it is the stream of that
[awareness] from which awareness [the agent-cognition] has arisen', since the
words 'that—which' cannot refer to separate things. Therefore those who hold
the theory that the Self is the stream of those [cognition-phases] have to accept
that [these cognitions] have a single nature.'

67 Note the similarity between the Buddhist sddhyaviparyayabddhakapramdna,

'a means of valid cognition which refutes the [possibility of the] opposite of
the property to be proven [co-occurring with the proving property, i.e. the
logical reason (hetu)]\ and the Graduate's claim that 'the proving property
[inheres in a locus that possesses] the opposite of the property to be proved',
sddhyaviparyayasddhana. In other words, the Buddhist put forth an argument
which refuted that non-momentary entities exist, while the Mimamsaka proves
that only those things exist which are non-momentary, since only permanent
things have causal efficacy which is a defining characteristic of existence.

68 The Buddhist certainly denies that perishing is an effect (see Abhidhar-

makosabhdsya p. 193, quoted in note 15). DharmakTrti also points out that the
so-called 'causes of destruction' actually produce a different entity (Pramdna-
vdrtika with svavrtti (GNOLl) p. 141,25-142,3): agnind kdstham dandena ghata
iti vinasahetavo bhdvdndm drsyante\ anvayavyatirekanuvidhanam hetutadvator
laksanam dhuh\ na\ purvasya svarasanirodhe 'nyasya visistapratyaydsrayena vi-
krtasyotpatteh\ '[Opponent:] We see that things have causes for their perishing,
for instance a log is [destroyed] by fire, a pot by a staff. The defining character­
istic of cause and effect is said to be [then:] conformity in presence and absence
[e.g. when fire is present, the log is destroyed, when fire is not present, the
log remains]. [Buddhist:] You are wrong. For when the previous [thing-phase]
perishes due to its own essence, another [thing-phase] arises which is different
because it depends on the particular causes [of its coming into being].'
Also Slokavarttika (with Nyayaratnakara) sabdanityatadhikarana 24cd-29ab (present
big the Buddhist position):
hetur yasya vindso 'pi tasya drsto 'iikurddivat\\
vindsasya vindsas tu ndsti tasmdd akrtrimah\
bhavati hy agnisambandhdt kdsthdd angdrasantatih\\
mudgarddihatdc cdpi kapdlam jdyate ghatdt]
svdbhdviko vindsas tu jdtamdtrapratisthitah\ \
suksmah sadrsasantdnavrtter anupalaksitah\
yadd vilaksano hetuh patet sadrsasantatau\ \
vilaksanena kdryena sthulo 'bhivyajyate tadd]
tendsadrsasantdno hetoh sanjdyate yatah\\
tenaivdkriyamdno 'pi ndso 'bhivyajyate sphutah\
'Something that has a cause [of its arising] is also observed to perish, just as
a sprout [having a seed as its cause]. But perishing does not perish, therefore
it is not produced. For from a log, as a result of contact with fire, a [new]
continuum of embers comes into being, and from a pot, too, hit by a hammer
for instance, shards come about. Perishing, however, is inherent, established

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as soon as [the thing] arises, subtle, [and] unnoticed because it takes place in
a uniform continuum. When a dissimilar cause affects the uniform continuum,
because of the dissimilar effect [that is produced], then [perishing] shows itself
to be gross. Thus it is a dissimilar continuum that is produced by the cause, and
for this reason perishing, although it is not being produced, is clearly manifested
by that very [cause].'

69 Possible reference to the view of the Mlmamsakas who hold that when one
pronounces the eternal sabda, it is only manifested, and not actually produced,
so it is different from other effects.
Kumarila first shows that for the Buddhist the perishing of a pot is spon­
taneous, but since it is very subtle, we notice it only when the hammer operates
upon it and produces shards (see note 68 above). Now this goes against the
objection made in Mtmdmsdsutra 1.1.6 (see Sdbarabhdsya ad loc. (SBh(Y) ad
1.1.6, p. 60): prayatndd uttarakdlam drsyate yatah, atah prayatndnantarydt tena
kriyate\ 'Since sound sabda is perceived only after the effort [of its utterance],
therefore, because it immediately follows the effort, it is produced by that [ef­
fort]'), since just as perishing is only manifested (according to the Buddhist) by
the so-called 'causes of destruction', in the same way the eternal sound (sabda) is
only manifested, not produced, by utterance (dhvani) (see Slokavdrttika (with
Nydyaratndkara) sabdanityatddhikarana 29cd-30ab). As Kumarila says (ibid.
42):
yathd ghatdder dipddir abhivyanjaka isyate\
caksuso 'nugrahdd evam dhvanih sydc chrotrasamskrteh\\
'Just as a lamp for instance is accepted as the manifesting agent of things such
as a pot through affecting the eye, in the same way utterance [manifests sabda}
through its impression upon the ear.' (See also ibid. 394 seqq. on the eternal
'actions' (kriyd, karma) which are not always perceived due to the lack of mani­
festing agents, but are nevertheless always present in perceptible objects.)
70 ex conj. Verse 38 in RAGHAVAN and THAKUR'S edition is clearly unmet-
rical, as the editors have already suspected (p. 105: '1.38 and 111.42 are pos­
sibly no verse.'). In fact it seems that when the scribe wrote down the second
vindsakdranam (after na ca ndsti), he jumped back to the first vindsakdranam
(after yasya hi ndsti), and continued with repeating dkdsdder iva bhavatv asau
nityah\ kim jdtam? na ca ndsti vindsakdranam.
71 Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyatikd) sunyavdda 71:
na cdtra karanajndnagrdhakdkdravedanam\
grdhyatvam yena buddheh sydd abhinnatve 'pi purvavat\ \
'And in this case [i.e. when a form such as blue is being cognised] there is
no ascertaining of the forms belonging to the instrument [of cognition], to the
cognition [itself], and to the grasping agent, by which [ascertaining] conscious­
ness could become the object of cognition, even though there was no difference
[among the object, the subject, and the instrument of cognition], just as in the
previous case [i.e. the case of the Self].'

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 Act One

Umbeka's comm. ad loc. (p. 258): na tv atra nildnubhave 'mlam aham' ity
dtmatayd bhdsante nilddayah, 'nilam'ity andtmataydpratibhdsandt\ (• • •) ndtra
nilddau karanajfidnagrdhakdkdravedanam asti, yena buddhir eva ntlddibhdvena
prakdseta\ dkdravedanam iti ca karanddisu pratyekam sambadhyate\ yadi nilddayo
grdhakatvendvabhdsante grdhako vd nilddigrdhyataydvabhdsate (: conj., °seta:
ed.), tadd pratibhdsabalendbhinnasyaiva prakdsyaprakdsakabhdvo bhavet\ 'But in
the case of the perception of [colours] such as blue, [these colours] such as blue
do not appear [as if] they were [cognition's] own self, in the form of 'I am blue',
because they become manifest as being different from [cognition's] own self, in
the form of '[this is] blue'. (...) The ascertaining of the forms belonging to the
instrument [of cognition], to the cognition [itself], and to the grasping agent are
not included in [the cognition of forms] such as blue, due to which [ascertaining]
consciousness alone would shine forth having the nature of [forms] such as blue.
As for 'the perception of [their] form': this is connected one by one with the
instrument [, the cognition, and the agent]. If [forms] such as blue appeared
as the agent of grasping, or the agent of grasping appeared as the object of
grasping such as 'blue', then, because of appearing [in that way], it would be an
undivided [object-subject] that would [simultaneously] have the nature of the
object that is shone on and the subject that shines on.'
Cf. Sdbarabhdsya(F) p. 28,17-30,13.
72 Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyatikd) sunyavdda 184-187ab:
vydprtam cdnyasamvittau jndnam ndtmdnam rcchati\
tena prakdsakatve 'pi bodhdydnyat pratiksate\ \
idrsam vd prakdsatvam tasydrthdnubhavdtmakam\
na cdtmdnubhavo 'sty asyety dtmano na prakdsakam] \
sati prakdsakatve 'pi vyavasthd drsyate yathd\
rupddau caksurddmdm tathdtrdpi bhavisyati\\
prakdsakatvam bdhye 'rthe saktyabhdvdt tu ndtmani\
'And when cognition is engaged in ascertaining something else [i.e. the object],
it does not reach itself. Therefore, although it is an agent which shines on [other
things], it expects another [cognition] for being cognised [itself]. Or rather, such
is its condition of being a light: it consists in the ascertaining of the object, but
there is no ascertaining of itself, so it does not shine on its own self. Just as
[sense organs] such as the faculty of sight, even though they do have the nature
of shining on [other things], are seen to be restricted to [their objects] such as
colour, it will be in the same way in this case, too [i.e. in the case of cognition]:
its condition of being the agent of illuminating [operates] upon the external ob­
ject, but not upon its own self, because it is not capable [of doing that].'
See also Umbeka's comm. ad loc. (p. 284): andtmavisayam caitasya prakdsaka­
tvam, ndtmavisayam, yato 'nilam idam' iti pratibhdsah, na punar 'nilam aham'
itity aha 'idrsam' iti\ 'Its [i.e. cognition's] condition of being the agent of illu­
minating has as its object things that are not [cognition] itself, [and] it does not
have [cognition] itself as its object [or freer: its illuminating is directed towards
what is not itself, not towards itself], since there is an appearance in the form
of 'this is blue', and not in the form of 'I am blue'; that is why [Kumarila]

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 Act One

says "[Or rather], such is...".' (See also Slokavdrttika (with Tatparyatika),
sunyavdda 65-67.)
73 Cf. Svopajnavrtti ad Vdkyapadtya 1.12 (VP(V) 1966, p. 43): iha tnni
jyotimsi trayah prakdsdh svarupapararupayor avadyotakdh\ tad yathd, yo 'yam
jdtavedd yas ca purusesv dntarah prakdso yas ca prakdsdprakdsayoh prakdsayitd
sabddkhyah prakdsah\ 'In this world there are three lustres, three lights which
illuminate their own form and the form of other things: namely, that which
is [called] jdtavedas [i.e. fire], that which is the inner light inside men [i.e.
consciousness], and that which illuminates both shining entities [that is all the
three lights] and non-shining ones [e.g. pots], and which light is called 'word'.
74 Cf. Slokavdrttika (with TdtparyatTkd} sunyavdda 74:
yadd tu grdhyam dkdram niladi pratipadyate\
na tadd grdhakdkdrd samvittir drsyate kvacit\\
'But when [consciousness] ascertains the form that is to be grasped, such as
blue, consciousness, which has the form of the grasping agent, is seen nowhere.'
75 ex conj. Similar sentence-structure in Nydyamanjari I 611.11-12: ndpy
anumdnam, anvayavyatirekdbhydm trptibhojanayor iva svargaydgayoh sddhyasd-
dhanasambandhdnavadhdrandt\ Another possible conjecture was suggested by
ISAACSON: anvayavyatirekdbhydm tasya gotvddivad abodharupatvdvadhdrandd
iti\
This argument can be compared with the following passage in the Sloka­
vdrttika (Slokavdrttika (with TdtparyatTkd) sunyavdda 130-132):
atha saty api bhinnatve grdhyam jndndntaram vadet\
jndnatve tasya kd yuktih purvoktd yadi sesyate\ \
jndnam jndnam itTttham tu na dvayor anuvartate\
vyatiriktam ca sdmdnyam tvayd ndbhyupagamyate\\
vyatireke tayos ceste (: this is the reading of three manuscripts as
Dr KATAOKA pointed out to me in an e-mail of 19.x. 2001;
Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyatikd) has grdhyagrdhakayos cestd,
while Slokavdrttika (with Kdsikd) reads vyatireke tayor jndndn)
na jndndtmakatd bhavet\
tadruparahitatve ca jndndbhdvah prasajyate] \
'If [the opponent] said that, even though [the subject and the object of cogni­
tion are] different, [still] the object is another cognition—what is the argument
for that [i.e. the object] being cognition? If [the opponent replies that it is]
the [reason] mentioned before [namely just a matter of usage], this [ground] is
accepted. But we do not have a recurrent cognition [anuvrtti] of both [object
and subject and cognition] in this way: '[this one is] cognition [and the other
one is also] cognition'; besides you do not assent to a general property which is
separate. And [if the Buddhist accepted the existence of the general property
of jndnatva, and] if he held that they [i.e. grdhya and grdhaka] are [completely]
separate [from jndnatva], then [neither of them] could have the nature of cog­
nition. And since [neither of them] has the character of [cognition], it follows

149
 Act One

that cognition does not exist [at all].' (In the following verses Kumarila refutes
various attempts of his Buddhist opponent to connect jnana with both grahya
and grahaka.)
76 As we shall see, the Graduate is going to postpone bathing again, because
he cannot help entering into a discussion with potential opponents, which also
means that he is postponing lunch, to the great regret of his pupil.

150
 Act Two

Then enters a SERVANT. 1

SERVANT. 2

One cannot drink chilled booze, neither can one make love to the (1)
servant-girls, nor is it easy to get a meat dish in this comfortless3
brahmin household.4
So what to do? A born slave has no5 recourse for himself 6 if he turns his back
on his ownmasters, 7 that's for sure. And even the errands8 my master thinks
out are such that9 one cannot eat or drink10 while [running] them. For just
now my master has given me the order: 'Hey Sooty, 11 go12 and see13 if the
monk Jinaraksita14 is hi the abode of the Jain mendicants or not.' And I've
no idea15 where that abode of the Jain mendicants can be. (He walks about,
looks at the road, and muses.) These specks of dust here seem to be speckled
by scattered16 tufts of plucked-out, awn-like hair. 17 So the abode of the Jain
mendicants must be right here in this forest. (He takes a few steps, looks ahead
[and says] joyfully.) This must be the abode of the Jain mendicants, since18
here, under a tree, in the darkness of the dense net of vines, this monk seems to
be appeasing an angry nun. (He looks for a second.) This harpy19 nun must be
furious indeed: she's gone away shaking off this young mendicant, even though
he threw himself at her feet. And this poor monk seems to have a grim visage.
Then enters a Jain MENDICANT, holding a broom made of peacock's
tail-feathers.
MENDICANT (weeping). Poor me! Because of the vain hope in [a better] after-life,
first I became a Jain monk. I have deviated from that [path of mendicancy],
and now both the present and the future [life and their pleasures] have come to
nothing for me, for this harpy nun, too, is not appeased even if I throw myself
at her feet. (He wipes his eyes.) Hey you harpy bitch, get you gone! Can't I
find another nun who is not like you?
SERVANT (pondering). Before this monk notices20 me I'll assume the appearance
of a Jain nun, and make fun of this monk. (He looks at himself.) To be sure,21
I have long ears, there are no beginnings of a beard on my face, and no-one
would expect a Jain nun to wear a ponytail on her head. So I can easily assume
the appearance of a Jain nun. (He does so and looks.) Now all I need22 is a

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 Act Two

broom of peacock feathers23 to look like a Jain nun. (He looks ahead [and says]
joyfully.} Splendid! I'll take the nun's broom which she had been holding and
then left behind,24 and go closer. (He does so.) Sir, I bow to you. I am25 very
tired now, so please tell26 me where is now the reverend monk Jinaraksita?
MENDICANT (cheering up, to himself). It seems27 my luck will not turn its back
on me now. Here we have another young nun showing up. (Openly.) O my
mendicant girl, what business do you have with the monk Jinaraksita? You
look very tired indeed. So sit down right here in this lonely, cool thicket of
vines, and rest for a spell.
SERVANT. I've always been unhappy and I'm ill-fated, how could I have a rest?
MENDICANT (with affection). You are just a child, but you already have a cause
for being unhappy?
SERVANT (with a sigh). Sir, let us not waste our breath28 for my execrable29 story.
Please tell30 me the whereabouts of the monk Jinaraksita.
MENDICANT. Little girl, this monk Jinaraksita is inside, delivering a lecture among
his disciples,31 under the Nyagrodha-tree. But32 sit down for a second and tell
me now the cause of your disillusion.
SERVANT (sits down and sighs). Sir, what point is there in relating now the piled
up33 shame34 of a girl whom life has crushed? (He cries.)
MENDICANT (wipes the SERVANT'S eyes). Tell me, my moppet. This man here is
not different from your heart, sweetie.
SERVANT. Ill-fated that I am, I turned a recluse35 when I was just a little girl.
MENDICANT. And then?
SERVANT. Then,36 as the delicate signs of my youth were becoming slightly visible,
[but] I was still not familiar with the savour of passion, some young monk
offended against my decency, entirely against my will.
MENDICANT (joyfully to himself). I've chanced upon a river of nectar! (Openly.)
C'est la vie, sweetie. And then?
SERVANT. Sir, then later on, as I had gradually become conversant with the savour
of passion, that monk dumped me and got stuck on another firm-fisted37 old
nun.
MENDICANT, f... f38 Let's do as the lame and the blind in the proverb.
He puts his arms around the SERVANT 's neck and kisses him forcibly.
The SERVANT feigns bashfulness and sits with eyes downcast.
MENDICANT. Sweetie, why don't you look at me?
SERVANT. How could I look?39 You too will dump me and go to another one.
MENDICANT. Sweetie, don't say so. I shall be your slave!40 (He puts his hand on
the SERVANT'S chest.) Your titties haven't come out yet?
SERVANT (bashfully). Poor me, what should I do?
The MENDICANT slides down his hand under the navel of the SER­
VANT, notices his genitals, and [says] with shame and anger.
MENDICANT. Dammit, you wretch, you've taken me in badly!
He wants to slap [the SERVANT/.

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 Act Two

SERVANT. Hey you ascetic lecher, if you say41 something I'll squeal on you42 to the
monk Jinaraksita!
MENDICANT (reflects for a second and throws himself at the SERVANT'S feet). You
mustn't give away this joke to anyone!
SERVANT. What about my hush money?

The MENDICANT pulls out something from the root (?) of his broom
of peacock feathers, and gives it [to the SERVANT/.

SERVANT. I've made my joke, I've got a coin,43 I've learnt the whereabouts of
the monk. So I go now and report to my master.44 (He walks about and looks
ahead.) Now you've hit the jackpot!45 Your sweetheart has arrived.
Then enters the real NUN. She perceives the SERVANT who has the
appearance of a Jain nun, [and says] full of jealousy and anger.
NUN. Hey you ascetic wench, where are you going with someone else's46 broom in
your hand?
SERVANT. Take this broom, ma'am. As for me, I've been deceived by this mendic­
ant in this thicket of creepers, entirely against my will. 47 It's not my fault.
He exits.48
NUN (goes close to the MENDICANT). Hey you wretched lecher, who hankers after
ascetic women! While I was on my way back, having returned because I'd left
behind my broom, in the meantime you, in a matter of seconds, were embracing
another nun.49 So now reap the fruit of your discipline!

She hits [him] with the stick of the broom.

MENDICANT. Do not think so, milady. Can't you see that this is a servant who
came here assuming the appearance of a woman to make fun of me. That wretch
has made you angry. This is the sober truth, I swear it.
He throws himself at the NUN 's feet.
NUN. How could the truth come out of your mouth, whose self-restraint is like
this?
MENDICANT. This wretched servant will make yet another joke, so come, my lady,
let's go somewhere else. ( With bewilderment.) I see some brahmin coming right
this way, so hurry up, my lady.
Exeunt ambo.

153
 Act Two

Then enter the GRADUATE and the BOY.

GRADUATE.
First I had a quick debate in order to damp the arrogant ardour (2)
of those red-robed fellows who fancy themselves clever. This time
I want to play with the feeble-minded naked mendicants, too, who
are little more than objects of pity.
BOY. It is fun for you, Sir, but for those poor devils it means the destruction of
everything they have.
GRADUATE (smiling). As you say, Sir. Cattle, family, house, estate, farming and
trade: they lose all they have. What then is the 'everything' of the sky-clad
Jain monks, who eat alms and live at the foot of trees?
BOY. Why, I'll tell you. Those poor devils undergo loads of severe austerities for
the sake of [a better] afterlife. Then they fall into the stream of your honour's
eloquence. So their efforts will reap no fruit at all from this religion-scrub. 50
GRADUATE. Well well! Aren't you compassionate! All right, to do you a favour I'll
test my strength mildly on them. So come. We've arrived at their hermitage.
Let's enter now.
They walk about.
GRADUATE (looking ahead). The Jain monk Jinaraksita is sitting here in the shade
of a Nyagrodha-tree, perhaps lecturing about something, while a group of several
disciples worships him.
Then enters the Jain MONK as described above.
MONK (to himself). Oh dear! It's extremely difficult to go beyond the process of
the turning of transmigration's wheel. 51
Even if you hold it back by force, it hankers after the same sense- (3)
objects, [and] it does not consider their various drawbacks in [karmic]
retribution—I don't know what to do: the mind does not take the
auspicious path. This goddess of unending Ignorance just does not
compose herself.
(reflecting) Be that as it may, one just has to discipline these miserable monks
day and night, to the best of one's ability, (openly) O monks,
Fate-hunter keeps shooting, the nooses of the transmigration-trap (4)
are dangerous. How can the soul-deer cross this burning forest of
suffering?52
Or rather,
What can the wretched Fate, even if it were enraged, do to those (5)
in whom the power of the naturally pure 'perfect' soul has arisen
through meditation on the blessed Jinaf's teaching]?53 It bullies
only those who are defenseless.

154
 Act Two

So now,
Contemplating54 the words of the Jina [and] mortifying the body (6)
with austerities and observances—that much is the entire secret of
the Teaching: put it deep into your mind. 55
DISCIPLES. As your Reverend commands. 56
GRADUATE (comes closer [and says] politely). Is Your Honour and the circle of
your disciples well?
MONK (reflecting, to himself). That graduate Sankarsana has come here, being
eager to humiliate us this time, after defeating the Buddhists. So it's better to
back away on this occasion. His valour is intolerable, his oratorical power and
his intellect are unheard-of, (openly) Welcome, Sir. Please take a seat here.
Are you well?
GRADUATE. What is the chosen topic this time?
MONK. What is worth choosing57 here, in the jungle of transmigration? Perhaps
one can get hold of some means to cut across it.
GRADUATE. Why, you've certainly got hold of the means. To explain:
No violence, no lies, no attachment to house, property,58 or clothes, (7)
no absorption 59 in any activity which has its immediate result in
[worldly] existence, and this severe asceticism, faultless [and] full of
vows and observances: what other path should be taken here to cross
over the world of transmigration?
MONK. The Lord of Creatures has fashioned a tongue for your ilk, Sir, which is
very clever to say pleasing words.
GRADUATE. Monk, tell me none the less what subject you have started to lecture
on.
MONK. Are you dying of curiosity? The Jains' Doctrine of Manysidedness is the
speciality of our house, and precisely that has been introduced as the topic on
this occasion. 60
GRADUATE. Monk, what is taught, namely—
'One thing has as its nature the nature of all things. (8)
All things have as their nature the nature of one thing. That person,
who has seen one thing as it really is, has seen all things as they
[really] are.'61
—now I ask you the following about this matter:62
If one thing has as its nature the nature of all things, what would (9)
people who have some objective employ, and with respect to what?
If things are arranged with regard to their respective effects, then
one thing cannot have as its nature the nature of all things.
Even if we see some kind of similar form that is shared among [dif- (10)
ferent] entities, nevertheless each of them does have its own, unique
essence.

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 Act Two

But if the scheme of things were in this way which we do not accept, (11)
people would never embark on any work, may it affect the afterlife63
or this life.
The MONK makes a sign to a DISCIPLE.
PUPIL (with intention). Reverend, the monks beg to inform you: 'The Reverend is
late, so the time of our present duty is running out now.'64
MONK (to the GRADUATE). Sir, the duty of the monks is being neglected. So
please decide as you think proper.
GRADUATE. Monk, do as you please.
MONK (to the DISCIPLE). Hey you, run along and tell the monks that they should
stay vigilant where they are for a second: here I come!
Exit the MONK with his DISCIPLES.
GRADUATE. Boy, you have seen the cunning of this sky-clad Jain monk.
BOY. Sir, who could stand his ground against you in the battle of debate? So he
saved himself when he escaped under this pretext.
GRADUATE. Should I have given him the stick? One has to learn the facts, and we
did learn them. But I have not taken a strong line in this matter purely out of
regard for you.
BOY.
Gentle though they may be, your words, sir, hurt the heart of those (12)
who join issue [with you];65 the fish that have been washed ashore
t-.-t66

GRADUATE. So where shall we go now, boy?

BOY. But why don't we go to bathe?
GRADUATE (smiling). Are you hungry? (looking upward) Why would it be bathing
time right now? We should rather stay a little while right here, in the thicket
of the Jain mendicants' abode.
BOY. Fine.
They stand up and walk about.
GRADUATE (looks ahead [and says] with astonishment). O, this place is so delightful
and suitable for relaxation! For,
This wood gives thick and cooling shade; there are grassy spots and (13)
there is also water here; these winds are fragrant from bunches of
flowers; the deer playfully gambol here in many ways, and the trill
of the birds is blended with the swing of many tunes.
(pondering)
If a soul devoted to Vedanta becomes in this holy forest one whose (14)
wishes have ceased and which has curbed the legion of mental activ­
ities, within just a few days it would surely reach an extraordinary,
supreme, splendid state, which has eternal bliss and in which the
haste and toils of the mundane path disappear.

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 Act Two

Behind the scenes.

One can hardly get to the bottom of Vedantic teachings; the mean- (15)
ing of the verbose details of the stories told in the three Vedas is
confused; the high-born speculate on the profound issue in them: 'Is
there a Self, or isn't there?' Far be they from me! In order to cast
off this excruciating pain of existence, let's hold on to the compact,
lucid scriptures taught by the sage Jina.67

BOY. Sir, here comes in hot haste a red-robed ascetic, jabbering something like
this—

Then enter an ASCETIC.

The ASCETIC walks about reciting 'One can hardly get to... '

BOY. These folks still adhere to the Jina's teachings?

GRADUATE. Never mind, boy, what about it? I'll ask him something else, (to
the ASCETIC) Good day to you, ascetic. Where are you going in such a frantic
flurry?
ASCETIC. You are clearly a brahmin, so how come you don't know how it feels to
be hungry?
GRADUATE. Have you set out to dine, sir?
ASCETIC. What else?
GRADUATE. Which place will you go?
ASCETIC. Why, just here, in the penance-grove of the monk Jinaraksita there is a
great feast today.
GRADUATE. What's the cause of the great feast?
ASCETIC. A certain nobleman, who had embraced the teaching of Master Jina,
gives there a dinner party today, where thousands of ascetics have gathered
together. And they are offered piles of groats, jars of sesame oil, vessels of sour
gruel, small jugs of molasses, and mountains of edibles cooked in sesame oil.
GRADUATE. Tell me, ascetic, among [all] these [dishes] you won't get any curd,
milk, ghee and the like at all?68
ASCETIC. Oho! These customs are proper to you, brahmins. We, however, ascetics
do not use69 anything coming from animals either for eating, or for drinking,
or for clothing, or for lying or sitting on, or in any other way of grooming the
body. Can't you see these sandals of mine, made of bark? So enough of this
chatter! I'll be late for the dinner.
GRADUATE. Show me, too, the way. I'll also have a look at the riches of the
ascetics.
ASCETIC. Do so, do so. Please come then.

All walk about.

GRADUATE. Tell me, ascetic, you follow the Jina's teaching, so why do you wear
red robes? Is your Jina the Sugata [i.e. the Buddha]?

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 Act Two

ASCETIC (smiling}. For us, too, the blessed Master Jina is Sugata ('one who has
fared well'). Moreover, the Sugata [i.e. the Buddha] is70 [also called] Master
Jina. 71 How fortunate are we, Arhatas,72 some [of us] sky-clad, some wearing
only bark-robes, others dressed in red clothes, 73 others in white robes. Observe!
Here come the sky-clad ones, from the root of whose hair—visible due to their
devotion to merciless plucking—scanty and small blood-drops are dripping. 74
Here come those who wear bark-rags, the border of whose garment, made of
soft bark, is smeared with f ... f. 75 Here come the brahmacdrin ascetics, the
colour of whose robes is similar to that of an earthen vessel which has been
baked and was taken out of the kiln at this very moment. 76 Here come the
white-robed ones, the lappets of whose garment, white as goose-wings, flutter
in the zephyr. So how meritorious is that nobleman whom they will favour
today!77
GRADUATE (smiling, to himself). He is called 'meritorious', and not 'noxious'.
He does not care about elephants, or horses, or swords, or the roads, (16)
or levying taxes, or the division of an army,78 or camels and the
like. Since he squanders the cream of his wealth for such a cause
and shirks the performance of his services [towards the king], I'm
sure the sovereign will confiscate his property.
(openly) How peaceful and charming is this penance-grove!
The world seems to me as if full of tranquillity, the earth appears as (17)
if practicing observances. Here the series of snares of existence [that
bind] the embodied souls truly look to me as if they were broken
into pieces.
BOY. We've seen mendicants dressed in thin air, in bark, in red garments and in
white robes. And now look at these black-blankets coming this way.
GRADUATE (looks ahead [and says] with astonishment). God bless my soul, this is
a novel kind of asceticism! A woman and a man, wrapped up in a single black
garment, amuse themselves singing some uncommonly charming song, (looking
carefully] What? There seem to be legions of them! Sure enough: the earth is
completely deluged, the three Vedas are uprooted, (to the MENDICANT) Tell
me, ascetic, are you familiar with this new, extraordinary method of asceticism?
ASCETIC. I don't know79 what's this lovely / ingenious method of religious ob­
servance. I am indeed inclined to think that some people have heard rumours
about the dinner party and they hover about simply because they are eager to
get some food. So enough said about their story! I'll join those whose conduct
is similar [to mine]. (Exits.80)
Then enter a woman and a man, wrapped up in a single black robe
and singing, or, if it can be afforded, many such couples singing [as
follows]. 81
Victory to the sage Nllambaranatha, who has relieved the disease /
obsession of keeping life within bounds.82

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 Act Two

One who follows your novel teaching, o Blessed Lord, drinks the
unique bliss83 of the elixir vitae.
In this life he revels in [making love to] women,84 in the next world
achieves deliverance.85
The body bears fruit,86 transmigration is crossed over.
Have no faith in schools other than this: the body is completely
emaciated, [and] liberation is still uncertain.
What is procured in the pursuit of training? Man is finished in
someone else's grasp. (?)87
If plenty of merits are gathered,88 they, too, will surely deprive men
of then- pleasures.
One who wraps up this union f... f<... >89
If every single couple knows thus<... >90
In what region will they whose births are not yet consummated roam
about in then- bodies and what place will they reach?91
Either this [world] is the transformation of the Supreme Self, or this
is the transformation of the Word.
Still, without the cessation of ignorance how could all this f... f<... >92
f... fhaving thus learnt that all other religions are fruitless.
Obtain happiness both here and [in the world] beyond, following93
the sage Nilambara <... >94
GRADUATE (listening to the song at some length). Boy, this is a cheap matter of
disputation, invented by somebody to abuse all the philosophical systems under
the pretext of a song. But I'm afraid of the penance, so I just cannot strike up
a conversation with these rotters.
The woman and the man sing the same [song] again.
GRADUATE. Look, boy,
There is no purity in [their] words, [their] vile body also lacks clean- (18)
ness, [their] mind always delights in inconsiderate, utterly despicable
behaviour. I do not know95 who is that man, his heart unafraid96 of
the afterlife, to whom this meritorious, wonderful penitential prac­
tice belongs. Or is there no97 disreputable human behaviour?
Moreover,
This choral singing of carcon-songs, repeated ad libitum, rings as (19)
the day is long. Shaking off all scruples, they drink sweet wine, the
sap of which is mixed with the lover's saliva. Licentious movements
are made with bodies whose steadily continued mutual arousal is
concealed by the product of the loom. Who would not observe this
extremely pleasant vow?

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 Act Two

BOY. It is just as you say, Sir.

GRADUATE. And I am inclined to think that this is a new, modern mahavrata.98 If
this [doctrine] they are singing about becomes too widespread, the established
conduct of social estates and life-periods will be ruined beyond measure. Sure
enough: the path of the three Vedas appears to me as if gone to shivers.
For as soon as they see this 'penance', which is applauded by the (20)
greenhorn, and in which all restraints are abolished, even faithful
housewives" will not sojourn long in their husbands' houses.

BOY (smiling}. Why does it bother you, Sir? You haven't married yet. As for me,
that story is still far from me.
GRADUATE. But your venerable mother is still alive, isn't she?
BOY. She is definitely immune to this disaster by now, since she is a poor old
woman, as good as dead.
GRADUATE. Stop joking. A great evil has arisen here. So think, boy, what is the
remedy for this.
BOY. Sir, I have no idea. You must know it. But the Iron Age is getting stronger
these days, so how could one counteract such disasters?
GRADUATE. Nevertheless it is not proper to sit petrified, without making any
effort, (reflecting] Right, there is a way out.
BOY. And what will that be?
GRADUATE. Surely the king himself, His Majesty Sankaradeva. For he, as the
sovereign who is the preceptor of the lawful bounds prescribed for the social
estates and life-periods, anointed to protect the three worlds, will naturally
know the remedy for this case, especially since he has the honourable Bhatta
Jayanta by his side, who has mastered all the scriptures of Siva. 100 That's right!
He is the one I shall inform. For a disaster permits no delay. Boy, as for you,
push on these singing woman and man towards the dining arena.
BOY. Hallo, mendicants, I say, it is dinner-time for you in this penance-grove, so
why should you be late?

Exeunt omnes.

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_________.________________________________Act Two

Notes to Act Two

1 The theme of the following pravesaka is not without parallels in Sanskrit

dramatic literature. Among the dramatists preceding Jayanta one might think
of two examples: Harsa's Nagdnanda and Bhavabhuti's Malatimddhava. In
Bhavabhuti's play Makaranda, in the disguise of MalatT, is wedded to Nandana,
and later he rudely repulses his impassioned 'husband' on the bridal night (Act
7). The third act of Harsa's play provides a closer parallel which may well have
served as a model for Jayanta. The drunken vita enters the garden to meet his
ladylove. Meanwhile the vidusaka puts on a red garment to disguise himself as
a woman in order to mislead the bees in the same garden. The vita naturally
mistakes him for his sweetheart, embraces the vidusaka and offers him some
chewed pan. When the unhappy vidusaka tries to get rid of his 'lover', the
vita falls at his feet to conciliate 'her'. At this moment the vita's real beloved
appears and witnesses with astonishment that her man is lying at the feet of
another woman. Then she quickly realises that that 'other woman' is actually
the vidusaka, and decides to make fun of both of them. When the unlucky
vidusaka unveils himself he is insulted by the vita's servant who even breaks
his sacred thread. And his tortures have not come to an end yet: the vita's
girlfriend demands him to bow at her feet, which the poor vidusaka, having lost
his sacred thread and not being able to recall any Vedic mantras, cannot refuse
to do on the strength of his brahmanhood.
2 The Servant speaks MagadhT, the Mendicant and the Nun speak Saurasenl.
3 ex conj. Both the reading of the manuscripts (visamcate) and RAGHAVAN
and THAKUR'S emendation (visamcaye, post correctionem) is unmetrical. (The
verse is in viyogini metre.)
4 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. The reading of the manuscripts (vam-
mhanavdsn, sing, gen./instr. fern.?) is unmetrical.
5 nasti (the reading of the manuscripts) is a correct form in MagadhT (see
PlSCHEL §310, §498, Hemacandra 4.289.)
6 ex conj. BHAT. appano occurs in Maharastrl, Ardhamagadhl, Jaina-Ma-
harastn, and Jaina-SaurasenT. The Saurasenl (and MagadhT) form should be
attano according to PlSCHEL §401 (as it is in lines 39 and 54), but appd has
already been encountered in the First Act.
7 The correct MagadhT form of Sanskrit bhattakah should be bhastake ac­
cording to Hemacandra 4.290 (see PlSCHEL §271), bhastake according to Rama-
sarman 2.2.16, and it may be bhastake according to Purusottama 12.10.

8 ana seems to be an acceptable MagadhT form of Sanskrit ajnd (cf. anavedi,

PlSCHEL §276).

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 Act Two

9
ex conj. Sanskrit ksa becomes ska in MagadhT according to Vararuci 11.8,
hka (with jihvamuliya) according to Hemacandra 4.296 (except for peskadi and
acaskadi, ibid. 4.297), ska according to Ramasarman 2.2.15 and Purusotta-
ma 12.6. Both Purusottama (12.8) and Ramasarman (2.2.15) remark that the
consonants of Sanskrit ksa are reversed in Magadhl (i.e. it becomes ska). A
parallel phenomenon which might be worthy of note is that the name of king
Huviska sometimes appears as Huvaksa or Huviksa in inscriptions (see SIRCAR
1991, No. 52, 53).
In our play the most frequent reading is ska in the Magadhl sections, which
may be explained as the transposition of the consonants of Sanskrit ksa, even
if strictly speaking it does not agree with any of the above mentioned Prakrit
grammars. On the other hand, sometimes we find kkha in the Magadhl passages,
which is the SaurasenI form of ksa.
The word esu seems to be used in the sense of atra in the Magadhl passages,
on the analogy of which I conjectured yasu > yesu in this sentence.
10 The use of pijjadi as a passive form seems to be odd (and perhaps incorrect),
especially since piwadi has already been used just a few lines above. PISCHEL
§539 mentions pijjai as a Maharastri form.
11 Instead of changing Sanskrit jja into yya in Magadhl, one might apply the
rule that in MagadhT the palatalisation of the cavarga-consonants is distinct
(Purusottama 12.13: cuh spastatalavyah; Vararuci 11.5: cavargasya spastata
tathoccaranah; Ramasarman 2.2.18cd: cavargakanam upari prayojyo yuktesu
cantahsthayakara eva).
12 Sanskrit (and SaurasenT) ccha becomes sea in MagadhT (see Purusottama
12.11, Hemacandra 4.295, Ramasarman 2.2.18). In Sarada script, cca and sea
look very similar, which may explain the gacca reading of our manuscripts.
13 pekkha is a SaurasenT form. One might consider emending to peska, the
form prescribed by Hemacandra 4.297 (the way our manuscripts write kkha is
hardly distinguishable from ska), or to peska, following the most frequent usage
of our manuscripts.
14 jinaraskidabhikkhu is a half-MagadhT half-Saurasem form. Later the Servant
will refer to the Jain abbot as jinarakkhidabhikkhu, however the word bhiskuno
(not in compound) will also occur once. Cf. STEINER 1997, pp. 16f.: '[D]ie
stillschweigend zugrunde liegende Pramisse, nach der jeder Dichter tatsachlich
in einer ganz genauen und konsistenten Weise Prakrit schrieb (oder diktierte),
[ist] problematisch. Hat es jemals ein vollkommen reguliertes Prakrit und ins-
besondere eine konsequent durchgehaltene Orthographic gegeben? Ist es nicht
vorstellbar, dafi die Prakrit sprechenden Charaktere gelegentlich verschiedene
grammatische und phonetische Formen ein und desselben Wortes gebraucht
haben?'
15 The MagadhT form of Sanskrit janami should be yanami / yanami accord-

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 Act Two

ing to the grammarians (Hemacandra 4.292, Vararuci 11.4, PISCHEL §§ 236, 454,
510)^ but in the old Nepalese manuscript of the Nagananda we find janadi in
a MagadhT passage. As Steiner remarks, 'Vermutlich beruht die Aufteilung der
Formen S. janadi und Mg. ydnddi wiederum nur auf einer Fiktion.' (STEINER
1997, p. 173.)

16 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR accept the reading of the manuscripts

(vistie), but I am not sure that the chdyd they give (vistrtd) is possible, pamsu-
kand is also suspect since, as Prof. Sanderson has pointed out, 'dust' is more
likely to be strewn with hair than 'specks of dust'.
17 Pulling out the hair in five handfuls is part of the ceremony (diksa) that
initiates the aspirant into Jain mendicancy (see JAINI p. 245). Both Buddhist
and Brahmanical authors frequently refer to this practice as the most strik­
ing example of the various 'unnecessary' austerities of the Jains. For example
Prajnakaramati glosses the expression sukhenaiva sukham pravrddham in his
commentary to Bodhicarydvatdra 1.7 as 'not with great pain, like pulling out the
hair, etc.', na siroluncanddind mahatd kastena (cf. GRANOFF 1992 p. 39, n. 3).
But already Vasubandhu comments on Abhidharmakosa 4.73ab (prdndtipdtah
sancintya parasydbhrdntimdranam, 'taking away life is to kill another deliber­
ately, not by mistake') in a slightly satirical way: 'abuddhipurvdd apt prdnivadhdt
kartur adharmah, yathd agnisamyogdd ddhah' iti nirgranthdh\ tesdm *para-
ne
stndarsanasamsparsana (v.l. paradaradarsane 'py) esa prasarigah, nirgranthasirolunca
ca kastatapodesane ca sdstuh, tadvisucikdmarane ca ddtuh\ 'The Jains teach: one
who takes away life is guilty, even if he has not resolved it beforehand, just as
one gets burnt because of contact with fire. [But in that case,] when they [un­
intentionally] see or touch the wife of another, it carries the same consequence
for them, and for [their] teacher when the Jains pull out their hair or when he
gives instructions to practise hard austerities, and for the donor when they die
of cholera (or indigestion, ajirna, according to Yasomitra) [because of the food
he gave them].'
Jayanta also found it a ridiculous idea that extreme tortures can lead to
salvation (Nydyamanjan, vol.11, p. 520.7-14):
kacaniluricanadikpatadhdrana-
ksitidhardkramanakramapurvakam\
ksapanakds tv apavargam usanty ami
hy atitardm paramdrthavidas tu te\ \
lomndm nityam asambhavdt khalatayo moksam ksandt prdpnuyuh
(nityam asambhavdt em. : nityasambhavdt ed.)
samsdroparamo digambaratayd sadyas tirascdm bhavet]
muktdh syuh girisrrigavdsina ime sasvattaddrohandt
jantundm apavargavartma nikatam kenedrsam darsitam\\
'As for these Jains, they hold that deliverance depends on the procedure of
plucking out the hair, wearing the air as garment, and climbing mountains.
Now they are indeed deeply knowledgable about the ultimate reality! The bald
would attain liberation in a flash since they can never have hair; transmigration

163
 Act Two

would immediately cease for the animals since they are sky-clad; those who live
r.
on the peaks of mountains would be liberated since they always mountainee
Who showed the creatures such a shortcut to deliverance?'
18
According to the grammarians initial ya should be retained in MagadhT
(see Hemacandra 4.292, Purusottama 12.5, Ramasarman 2.2.14, PlSCHEL §252).
The manuscripts of the Agamadambara, however, often have relative pronouns
with initial j in their MagadhT passages. Cf. note 15.
19 According to Hemacandra 4.289, Sanskrit sta should become sta in Ma­
S,
gadhl; duttha is the SaurasenT form (see PlSCHEL §303). But cf. LUDER
Bruchstiicke, p. 36, fr. 22a2: fijttha.
20 Cf. note 13.

21 According to PlSCHEL (§94), in Magadhl and SaurasenT kkhu (and not khu)
should stand after -e, -o, and short vowels. In our manuscripts, however, we find
khu both after -e and -o. Steiner points out the same phenomenon in the old
Nepalese manuscript of the Nagananda, in the fragments of Asvaghosa's plays
(see LUDERS, Bruchstucke, p. 51) and in other texts as well (STEINER 1997,
pp. 195f.), and draws the following conclusion: 'Zusammenfassend lafit sich also
sagen, dafi die Schreibung der Asvaghosa-Pragmente, der ,,Bhasa"-Mss (in der
iiberwiegenden Zahl der Falle) und des altesten Nag.-Textzeugen A (ebenso wie
die erwahnten Inschriften, und zumindest teilweise auch die MalatTm.-Mss und
die beiden Mudr.-Mss MN) die urschprungliche Orthographic der Partikel khu
wiederspiegeln diirften.' (STEINER 1997, p. 198.)
22 According to Hemacandra (4.293), Sanskrit sunya should become sunna
in MagadhT; in the fragments of Asvaghosa's plays Sanskrit ny appears as nn
in SaurasenT (LUDERS, Bruchstucke, p. 48). Cf. PlSCHEL §282, who also notes
that in the manuscripts of the plays we find only nn.
23 picchid seems to be a SaurasenT form, one might consider emending it to
the more MagadhT-looking piscia. Cf. however LUDERS, Bruchstucke, pp. 35f,
fr. 22.a.2: vicchadd...
24 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. I am uncertain both in the reading and
in the interpretation of this sentence, paliccaia seems to be an absolutive form
t
(cf. PlSCHEL §590), and the manuscripts suggest sa nu khavania, but I canno
interpret lesamdhayalidapaliccam.
25 According to PlSCHEL (§145, §498) the correct MagadhT form of asmi is
srm; mhi is in SaurasenT.
26 acakkhadu is a SaurasenT form. One may consider emending it to acaskadu,
is
the form prescribed by Hemacandra (the way our manuscripts write kkha
hardly distinguishable from ska), or acaskadu, following the most frequent usage
of our manuscripts.

164
___________________________ _____ ________Act Two

27 According to PISCHEL (§143, §336, see also Vararuci 12.24, Purusottama

9,29), 'via is the single prevailing form in Saurasem and MagadhT' for Sanskrit
iva, while MaharastrT, ArdhamagadhT, and Jaina-Maharastrl have va, vva (Pi-
SCHEL §92, §143). In Hemacandra's grammar, however, we find the following
general rule (2,182): miva piva viva ma va via ivarthe vd\
28 The MagadhT form of Sanskrit tisthati is cisthadi (v.l. cista-, citta-) ac­
cording to Vararuci 11.14, citthadi according to Purusottama 12.33, and cisthadi
(v.l. cittha-) according to Hemacandra 4.298. PISCHEL votes for cistha- (§483).
Cf. note 19.

29 ex conj. Cf. PlSCHEL §222: MaharastrT daddha, Saurasem daddha.

30 Cf. note 26.
31 According to PISCHEL §370, Saurasem and MagadhT 'except in verses, have
only the form in -anarrf as plur. gen.
32 PlSCHEL writes in §184 that in MaharastrT, Jaina-MaharastrT, Saurase-
m, and MagadhT we find una in the sense of 'now', 'however', and also after
anusvara.
33 As RAGHAVAN and THAKUR point out (p. 118), 'Pkt. lajjdnihanam sug­
gests nidhanam. nidanam gives better meaning.' Actually the MSS read °nihane,
masc. nidhanam means 'pile, hoard, mass', nidanam would mean 'cause'.
34 Cf. note 11.
35 Cf. Pischel's note ad Hemacandra 4.225: 'In der Magadhi steht 114, 7. 8
[referring to Mrcchakatika, ed. Stenzler, Bonnae 1847] pavvajide mit einfachem
j, was sich zu Pali pabbajito stellt und daher schwerlich anzufechten ist.'
36 The Servant's speech is full of Saurasem forms. I have changed s to s and r
to /, but one might consider more radical emendations to get "proper" MagadhT
forms (°vilala°, ° yovvanalaskanae, aniscamtie, asiskidamaanalasae, taluna0 ).
On the other hand, Servant may actually try to speak a kind of Saurasem in his
role of a Jain nun, and a medley of the two languages is the result.
37 I am uncertain of the meaning here, daddhamutthie suggests dagdhamus-
tyam as its chaya, which I cannot interpret, perhaps it is some obscene expres­
sion. On the other hand, drdhamusti, 'close-fisted' is a well-attested word, but
it would become dadha- in ^aurasem and MagadhT (see PISCHEL §242; in fact a
few lines below we shall read dadharn tae khalikado mhi). I am inclined to read
dadha- = drdha- with the cerebralisation of the initial da-, which is common
in MaharastrT (see PlSCHEL §222, although Pischel points out that 'in Saura­
sem [and probably in MagadhT as well] the dental remains, except in the cases
of transimposition of breath', so we should actually read daddha0 = Sanskrit
dagdha0 ).

165
________.________________________________Act Two

38 I cannot satisfactorily interpret this sentence. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR'S

chayd, 'tena hi sammukhdgatam sivam' is not entirely convincing, sammuhddo
ly
could be taken as sammukhatah, but sio remains a puzzle for me (s is actual
not allowed in Saurasem). Judging from the context, the sentence may mean
something like 'So our lucky star has risen.'
39 Cf. note 13.
40 ex em. BHAT.
41 Cf. note 26, but in this case the manuscripts actually read acask-.
42 ex conj. Other possible emendations suggested by Prof. Sanderson: pakasa-
issam, pakadikalaissam.
43 ex conj. The most plausible Magadhl form of Sanskrit karsdpanaka is
kdhdvanae or kahdvanae (see Vararuci 3.39, Hemacandra 2.71, PISCHEL §263),
but I am not certain that this is the best way to emend the reading of the
manuscripts (kasevatae).
44 Cf. PlSCHEL §366b: 'The form in -e is used in Mg. as ace. sing.'
45 Cf. note 19.
46 Another possible emendation might be pdrakeram.
47 One would expect aniscamti in Magadhl.
48 The first word (tti) of the stage direction is in Prakrit in the manuscripts,
which brings to mind the fragments of Asvaghosa's plays where, as Liiders notes,
t,
'Die Biihnenanweisung wird in der Sprache der Person, auf die sie sicht bezieh
gegeben. Dazu stimmen jedenfalls die meisten Falle, in denen eine Nachpriifung
moglich ist.' (LUDERS, Bruchstiicke, p. 34.)
49 ex conj. The verb fdjling- requires an object.
50 I made a few conjectures in the Boy's speech to have a clearer sentence-
structure.
51 Prom the Jain standpoint it seems that the monk has fallen victim to
one of the samyaktvadusanas (attitudes that spoil the correct, i.e. Jain view),
namely vicikitsd, which is defined by Hemacandra as follows ( Yogasdstra p. 188):
vicikitsd cittaviplavah\ sd ca saty api yuktydgamopapanne jinadharme 'sya maha-
tas tapahklesasya sikatdkanakavalavan nisvddasydyatydm phalasampad bhavitri,
te
atha klesamdtram evedam nirjardphalavikalam iti\ ubhayathd hi kriyd drsyan
saphald aphalds ca krswalddmdm iva\ 'Uncertainty is a confusion in the mind,
and it appears in the following form: "Even though the religion of the Jina
is well-established through reasoning and scripture, nevertheless this enormous
trouble caused by the austerities, which is tasteless like a mouthful of sand-

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grains—will it produce any result in the future, or is it just pure trouble, devoid
of the fruit of immortality?" For we see two kinds of activities: some are fruitful,
t
while others are fruitless, just as for instance [the labours] of peasants.' (Abou
the other interpretation of vicikitsa, see note 74.)
52 This verse seems to be in Maharastri.

53 I am following RAGHAVAN and THAKUR in interpreting ° sumaranoggaya0

as ° smaranodgata0 , but ° smarandvagata0 might also be a possible chdyd. The
meaning of the second half of the first line is not entirely clear to me. RAGHAVAN
and THAKUR'S conjectures (° suipunnabaldnam = ° sucipunyabaldndm and °sui-
punnapunnabaldnam = ° sucipunyapurnabaldndm) both seem to be unmetrical.
One might consider °punnaphalabaldnam ('for those who are strong as a result of
their merits, which have arisen from remembering the blessed Jina['s teaching],
and which are pure by nature'), but it is also unmetrical, and the meaning is
far from being satisfactory. Another possibility could be °punnapuggalabaldnam
(°punya/purnapudgalabaldndm), which is metrically correct, and it also refers to
the Jain concept of pudgala, and possibly to the purification of the soul through
meditating on the Jain teaching.
54 jhdijjadi is a passive form in Jaina-SaurasenT. In MaharastrT the ending
should be °ijjai, while in SaurasenT °iadi (see PISCHEL §535).
55 ginhaha is mentioned in PISCHEL §471 as a 2. plur. imperative in Jaina-
Maharastrl.
56 jam is a SaurasenT form (cf. note 15), while bhastake is in Magadhl.
57 In Sanskrit the pun is based on the double meaning of prastuta: 'praised'
and 'declared as the subject of discussion'.
0 ex con].
CO

59 ex conj. ISAACSON.
60 Anekdntavdda was perhaps the best known concept of Jain philosophy
for Brahmanical and Buddhist thinkers. It claims that every single entity
possesses innumerable characteristics or natures, even mutually incompatible
ones. The soul, for example, is eternal with respect to its qualities (which
inhere forever in their substance), but it is non-eternal with respect to the
modes of these qualities (which last only for a moment) (cf. JAINI p. 90;
UNO pp.423f.). Even existence and non-existence are present simultaneously
in the object. Says Haribhadra (Anekdntajayapatdka pp. 36f.): tatra yat tdvad
uktam 'katham ekam eva ghatddirupam vastu sac cdsac ca bhavati', tad etad
agopdldnganddiprasiddham andsankaniyam eva, yatastat svadravyaksetrakdla-
bhdvarupena sad vartate, paradravyaksetrakdlabhdvarupena cdsat, tatas ca sac
cdsac ca bhavati\ (...) tathd ca tad dravyatah pdrthivatvena sat, ndbaditvena;
tathd ksetrata ihatyatvena, na pdtaliputrakdditvena; tathd kdlato ghatakalatvena,

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 Act Two

na mrtpindddikdlatvena; tathd bhdvatah sydmatvena, na raktatvddind\ 'The first

objection that is raised against this [theory of manysidedness] is as follows: "How
can a single thing, which has the form of a pot for example, be both existent
and non-existent?" This is a well-established fact for [everyone from scholars]
to cowherds, women and the like, and it cannot be questioned in any way, since
it is existent in the form of its own substance, place, time, and condition, and
it is non-existent in the form of another [object's] substance, place, time, and
condition; and therefore it becomes both existent and non-existent. (...) To
explain, it is existent with respect to [its] substance inasmuch as it is made of
clay, not inasmuch as it is made of water, etc.; similarly, with respect to [its]
place [it exists] inasmuch as it is here, not inasmuch as it is in Pataliputra, etc.;
similarly, with respect to [its] time [it exists] inasmuch as it is characterised by
the time of the pot, not inasmuch as it is characterised by the time of the lump
of clay, etc.; similarly with respect to [its] condition [it exists] inasmuch as it
black, not inasmuch as it is red, etc.'
Put differently, the pot is existent inasmuch as it is black, which also means
that it is not red, blue, etc. On the other hand, the pot is non-existent inasmuch
as it is red, blue, etc., that is not black. This means that the pot is characterised
by all colours in a positive or a negative way, and the same can be said about
its other attributes as well. This also explains why the knowledge of a single
thing in all its aspects entails the knowledge of all things.
61 Apart from Jain texts (e.g. Yogasastra pp. 168f.), we find this verse also in
the Tattvopaplavasimha (TUS(GOS) p. 79), in the Spandapradvpikd of Bhagavadut
pala (p. 47), in Abhinavagupta's Mdlimvijayavdrttika (v. 641ab = the first two
lines of the verse, labelled as arhadvdda and quoted in an assentient way), and
also in Yogaraja's vivrtti to Abhinavagupta's Paramarthasara v. 26 (Yogaraja
attributes the verse to SrTsambhubhattaraka).
62 If we examine which philosophical schools criticised the Jain theory of
anekantavada, we find that for instance Dharmaklrti considered it an obscene
(aslila] idea that curd may be camel from a certain aspect, while from another
aspect it may not be camel (Pramdnavdrtika with svavrtti (GNOLi), p. 89,24:
sydd ustro dadhi sydn na iti). If curd does not have a characteristic nature
which clearly distinguishes it from a camel, then 'why does not somebody who
has been ordered to eat curd rush towards a camel?' (Pramdnavdrtika with
svavrtti (GNOLi), v. 182cd: codito dadhi khddeti kirn ustram ndbhidhdvati\) If
we admit that there is some special 'plus' in curd which makes it different and
directs us to recognise it, then that very 'plus' is curd itself (ibid. v. 183: athdsty
atisayah kascid yena bhedena vartate\ sa eva dadhi.. .), for 'curd is something
the inherent nature of which is characterised by the condition of being the cause
of its effect' (ibid. p. 90,10-11: tatphalopdddnabhdvalaksitasvabhdvam hi vastu
dadhi\; put differently, the inherent nature of an object is determined by its
causal efficacy, arthakriydkdritva.}
Since the Graduate is a champion of mimdmsd we might expect that we'll
find the criticism of anekantavada in mimdmsaka sources as well. Therefore

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it may seem surprising that some of Kumarila's arguments are actually quite
similar to the Jain notion of 'manysidedness'. See for example Slokavarttika
(with Nyayaratndkara) abhdva 12:
svarupapararupdbhydm nityam sadasaddtmake\
vastuni jndyate kaiscid rupam kincit kaddcana\ \
'With regard to an object, which is always both existent with its own form and
non-existent with the form of another object, certain people cognise only certain
form at a certain time.' (The cloth with its non-existent form inheres in the
pot, and produces the cognition of its non-existent form in the pot.)
Also Slokavarttika vanavdda 21-23:
vardhamdnakabhange ca rucakah kriyate yadd\
tadd purvdrthinah sokah pritis capy uttardrthinah\ \
hemdrthinas tu mddhyastham tasmdd vastu traydtmakam\
notpddasthitibhangdndm abhdve sydn matitrayam\ \
na ndsena vind soko notpddena vind sukham\
sthityd vind na mddhyasthyam tena sdmdnyanityatd\\
'When a vardhamdnaka [some kind of ornament] is melt down and then a ru-
caka [another kind of ornament] is made [out of the gold got from the vard­
hamdnaka} , someone who was interested in the former [ornament] becomes sad,
while someone who is interested in the latter [ornament] becomes pleased; that
person, however, who is interested in gold [alone] remains indifferent. Therefore
an object has a threefold nature. If arising, continuance, and perishing were
not there [simultaneously present in the same object], there would not be three
[different] mental dispositions. There is no sadness without [the] perishing [of
the object], no pleasure without [its] arising, and no indifference without [its]
continuance; therefore the common characteristic ['gold'] is permanent.' (The
Aptamzmdmsdj which was composed in the 5th century by the Digambara dcdrya
Samantabhadra, contains a verse (v. 59) the content of which is remarkably sim­
ilar: ghatamaulisuvarndrthi ndsotpddasthitisv ayam\ sokapramodamddhyastham
jano ydti sahetukam\\- see also Slokavarttika (with Nyayaratndkara) vanavdda
75 seqq.)
Tomoyuki Uno showed in his recent article that 'Rumania uses the assump­
tion of many-sidedness to defend his theory of the soul', and that 'the very same
doctrine is used by the Jaina authors to defend their theory of the soul' (UNO
p. 420). As Uno pointed out, the soul must be permanent for Kumarila because
the one who performs the ritual and the one who experiences its result must be
the same person. On the other hand, the soul cannot be exclusively permanent,
because an unchanging subject could not perform any action (see UNO p. 429).
The Jains themselves were aware of the close resemblance between anekdnta-
vdda and the mimdmsaka theory of bheddbheda; see for example Vadidevasuri's
Syddvddaratndkara (ll-12th century), p. 833: mimdmsakas tu prdyena sarvatra
jainocchistabhojr, also Gunaratna's commentary to Haribhadra's Saddarsanasa-
muccaya §385: mimdmsakas tu svayam eva prakdrdntarenaikdnekddyanekdntam
pratipadyamdnds tatpratipattaye sarvathd paryanuyogam ndrhanti]

63 ex conj. ISAACSON.

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_________________________________________Act Two

64 The pupil seems to speak a mixture of SaurasenT (bhikkhava, sampadam,

patthudakajjaveld) and MagadhT (bhastakd, cilayadi).
65 It is not clear to me why RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give vddaniyuktanam
as the chaya of vadabbhidiana.

66 I cannot decipher the second half of this line. The whole verse seems to be
in Maharastri.

67 According to Bhasarvajna (Nyayabhusana, p. 393) Jainism and other heretic

religions first spread among the low-born, but later certain slow-witted and im­
poverished brahmins also showed interest in their teachings about the cessation
of suffering (duhkhopaksaya).
68 Jains distinguished ten vikrtis (certain types of food that have changed
their nature, or, according to the traditional interpretation, 'that by which
the tongue is perverted'): ksira (milk), dadhi (curd), navanita (butter), ghrta
(ghee), taila (oil), guda (molasses), madya (alcohol), madhu (honey), marnsa
(meat), avagdhima (first three cookings of rice in a pan filled with ghee or
oil) (see WILLIAMS pp. 39f.). Four of these vikrtis are considered as abhaksyas
(not fit to be eaten): the three 'm'-s (madya, madhu, mdmsa) and butter (see
WILLIAMS p. 54, 110). Curd, milk, and ghee do not seem to have been forbidden.
69 °mha belongs to the imperative, but sometimes it is used (wrongly accord­
ing to Pischel) as an indicative ending (see PISCHEL §455).
70 According to Pischel hodi is a false SaurasenT form (PiSCHEL §476), al­
though Hemacandra teaches bhuvadi, huvadi, bhavadi, havadi, bhodi, and hodi
as possible SaurasenT forms of Sanskrit bhavati (Hemacandra 4.269).
71 These statements sound suspiciously like a parody of the Jain doctrine of
syadvada ('st/ai sugato jinaguruh sydn na, sydj jinaguruh sugatah sydn na').
72 ex conj.
73 In the Harsacarita (p. 89) kdsdya is associated with the followers of Sankhya
(kdpilam matam). Yajnavalkyasmrti 3.157, however, prescribes kasdyadharana
for ascetics in general who strive after liberation.
74 In the majority of texts written by the followers of Brahmanical religions
we find a lack of comprehension and the expression of actual disgust with regard
to Jain doctrine and practice. We have already seen how the practice of kesaloca
was mocked by non-Jain authors (see note 17). In the Mudraraksasa Canakya
is delighted to hear that a Jain monk has sided with the enemy (p. 74). In the
same play Raksasa considers it a bad omen when a ksapanaka seeks an audi­
ence with him, and he orders Priyamvadaka to do something with the disgusting
appearance of the mendicant before showing him in (p. 212). Bana's descrip­
tion of a Digambara monk is also typical (Harsacarita, p. 75): kajjalamaya iva

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bahudivasam upacitabahalamalapatalamalinitatanur abhimukham djagdma sikhi-

picchaldnchano nagndtakah\ 'A naked mendicant was coming towards him, look­
ing as if made of lamp-black, his body dirtied by the cover of plenty of dirt that
had accumulated on it during many days, holding the attribute of [his sect: a
broom made of] peacock feathers.'
The Jains were certainly aware of this repugnance and its dangerous influ­
ence on the mind of the mendicants. One of the samyaktvadusanas, 'attitudes
that spoil the correct view' is called vicikitsa, which can be interpreted as be­
coming doubtful about the effectiveness of the various self-mortifications with
regard to the final goal: deliverance (see note 51), but it can also refer to the
disgust that learned people feel towards Jain monks (vidvajjugupsd): vidvdmsah
sddhavo viditasamsdrasvabhdvdh parityaktasamastasangds tesdm jugupsd nindd,
asndndt prasvedajalaklinnamalatvdc ca durgandhivapusas tan nindati, 'ko dosah
sydd yadi prdsukavdrindngapraksdlanam kurviran bhagavantah?' iti\ 'The loath­
ing [and] rebuke of learned people, [that is] virtuous men who have become ac­
quainted with the nature of the world and who have abandoned all attachments;
one rebukes them [i.e. the Jain monks] because their body stinks since they do
not bathe and since [their body is covered with] dirt which is moistened by
sweat, saying "what sin would they commit if the reverends washed their body
with prdsukavdri (?)?"' (Siddhasenaganin's comm. ad Tattvdrthddhigamasutra
7.18, p. 99; cf. Yogasdstra pp. 188f.)
75 I cannot interpret the reading of the manuscripts (cattulavasura0 ). RAGHA-
VAN and THAKUR read vattulavasuracaccijjamta0 and give the following chdyd:
vartulavasira-(Achyra,nthis Aspera?) -carcita0 .
76 In the case of a SaurasenT speaker one would expect forms such as sonida
and uddharida instead of sonia and uddharia. On the colour of the brahma-
carm's garment see Apastamba-dharmasutra 1.1.2.41-1.1.3.1: kasdyam caike
vastram upadisanti\ mdnjistham (dyed with munjeet) rdjanyasya\
77 The mendicant describes an immense crowd of ascetics, some naked, some
wearing white, some red, others black robes (ntldmbaras), but amalgamated
into a single flock by the goal of then1 journey: the feast. There might be dif­
ferences among these heretic sects concerning their tenets, but on the mundane
level they are just part of the same ever hungry plebs—at least this is what the
brahmin Jayanta insinuates.
While 'Jains took great pains to establish and maintain an identity for them­
selves that was distinct both from Hindu society and from the Buddhists as well,'
observes Granoff (GRANOFF 1994 p. 258), 'throughout classical and medieval
times Jains and Buddhists had been closely linked together by all of their op­
ponents.' The bhiksu and the ksapanaka in the Prabodhacandrodaya prove to
be equally fickle and easily seducible when they are embraced by the attract­
ive kapdlini (impersonating the somasiddhdntin sraddhd, Prabodhacandrodaya,
pp. 198ff).
But the Jains were well aware that mundane pleasures, such as a tooth-

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some breakfast can be very seductive for ascetics who cannot afford them.
This is illustrated by a moral story hi the commentary of Devacandra Suri
(llth century) to the Mulasuddhiprakarana. The story occurs twice hi the text,
once in the context of samyaktvadusana, 'things that detract from the pure
faith', as an example of kutirthikaprasamsd, 'praising ascetics who follow a false
path' (Mulasuddhiprakarana, p. 71), and in the section dealing with the vari­
ous chindikas or 'temporary lapses' (Mulasuddhiprakarana, p. 72; see GRANOFF
1994 pp. 250ff). Jinadasa, the pious Jain layman, loses the caravan he was trav­
elling with and is unable to find food. Finally he meets a group of bhiksus who
promise him all kinds of pleasures if he joins them:
mrdvi sayyd prdtar utthdya peyd
bhaktam madhye pdnakam capardhne]
drdksdkhandam sarkard cdrdhardtre
moksas cdnte sdkyasimhena drstah\\
'Soft bed, rice-gruel after getting up in the morning, lunch at noon, drinks in
the afternoon, some grape flavoured candy and candied su^ar at midnight, and
salvation in the end was envisioned by the Lion of the Sakyas.' (The same
verse occurs in Hemacandra's Yogasastra (p. 188.) as an illustration of kanksa,
'appetite' for the pleasures provided by non-Jain religions, which belongs to the
group of samyaktvadusanas.)
manunnam bhoyanam bhoccd manunnam sayandsanam\
manunnamsi agdramsi manunnam jhdyae muni\ \
'Having had a nice meal, sitting nicely on a couch, the sage in a nice house
meditates upon nice things.'
Buddhism is presented as a religion which guarantees both sukha in this ex­
istence and moksa thereafter, an easy and therefore attractive way to attain
deliverance. Poor Jinadasa, remembering the Jain teaching that there might be
tunes of distress when one may be forced to abandon true faith, accepts food
from the bhiksus, but, alas, the unusually rich meal causes indigestion, and he
dies on the spot, full of repentance and praising the arhats. 'It is a common
theme of Jain stories,' writes Granoff (GRANOFF 1994 p. 259.), 'that Jains may
be wrongly duped into becoming Buddhists, particularly because they are at­
tracted to the lush life hi a Buddhist monastery compared to the severity of life
as a Jain monk. (...) Buddhists countered these Jain stories with their own
stories in which they justified the Buddhist monastic practices and criticised the
strict regimen of the Jain ascetic.'
78 I am uncertain in the meaning of katakdnga. kataka can mean 'bracelet,
zone, ridge of a mountain, army, camp'.
79 Cf. PISCHEL §170: '... der Wurzel jnd ... hinter na sehr oft das anlautende
ja einbiisst, in AMg. JM., wie im Inlaut, zu ya wandelt ...'
80 Cf. note 48.
81 We know from the Nydyamanjan that King Sankaravarman banned the
sect of the nildmbaras (Nydyamanjan, vol.1, p. 649.4-7):

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 Act Two

asitaikapatanivitiiviyutastr'ipurp,savihitabahuce~taml
(asitao: em. ISAACSON, ed.: amitaO;
° iiviyutao: in Pathantaras and Sodhanas, at the end of vol. II.,
ed.: ° iiniyataO, 'unrestrained')
nfliimbaravratam idarp, kila kalpitam iisft vitaily, kaiscitll
tad apiirvam iti viditvii niviirayiimiisa dharmatattvajfiaf;,1
riijii sarikaravarmii na punar jainiidimatam evamll
'Some pimps, as we are told, invented this Black Blanket Observance, in which
men and women wrapped together in a single black veil make various move-
ments. King Sailkaravarman, who was conversant with the true nature of
Dharma, suppressed this practice, because he knew that it was unpreceden-
ted, but he did not [suppress] the religions of Jains and others in the same way.'
The same sect was extirpated by King Bhoja of Dhara (1018-1060), as it
is related in the Puriitanaprabandhasarigraha (p.19, Nflapatavadhaprabandha):
sr'ibhojariijaviirake nflapatii darsanina iisanl te tu ekii strf ekaf;, pumiin nflfT[t
dotfT[t priivrtya madhye nagnfbhiiya vijahratuf;,1 ekadii dhiiriiyiiT[t priiptiis tatrii-
piirviin dr~tvii sarvaf;, ko 'pi te~iiT[t samfpe yiitil te tv itthaT[t prariipayanti-
'va yam zsvarasya tathyiif;, santiinina ardhaniirfsvaratviitl ' itas ca kautukiid bhoja-
putr'i samiigamatl kartavyaT[t pr~taml tair uktam- 'piba khiida ca ciirulocane yad
atftaT[t varagiitri tan na tel na hi bhfru gataT[t nivartate samudayamiitram idaT[t
kaleva ram II ' tayii vyiihrtam-'bhavanmatam arigfkari~yel ' nryam utkaliipayituT[t
(: em., nryaT[t mutkao: ed.) gatiil 'tiitiihaT[t nflapatiiniiT[t dharmam arigfkari~yel'
nrye\l-a iihiitiif;" pr~tiiS ca-'sukhinaf;, stha?' mukhyenoktam-'na nadyo madya-
viihinyo na ca miirp,samayii nagiif;,1 na ca niir'imayarp, visvaT[t kathaT[t nflapataf;,
sukh~ I ' nrye\l-oktam- 'yiiyaT[t kiyantaf;, stha?' 'ekonapaficiiSad yugaliinil ' nrye-
\l-oktam- 'sarviin apy iikiirayata, ahaT[t tvadbhakto bhavi~yiimil ' te sarve militiif;,1
nrye\l-a puru~iif;, sarve miiritiif;" striyas ca ni~kiisya muktiif;,1 atas te~iiT[t bijam api
niiSitaml
'In King Bhoja's time the Black-Blankets attracted attention. These people,
one woman and one man, covered themselves with a black dot'f, while under it
they were naked, and amused themselves. Once they arrived in Dhara. There
everybody gathered round them because their sight was unprecedented. And
they set forth the following teaching: 'We are truly God's issue, since we are
ArdhanarISvaras.' And, out of curiosity, Bhoja's daughter went there to meet
them. [She] asked [them about] the duties [one has to do as a member of this
sect]. They replied: 'Drink and eat, lovely-eyed girl! Things that have passed
are not yours, 0 girl with an exquisite body! For what has gone will not re-
turn, timid girl. This body is just an aggregate [of elements].' {The same verse
(with variants) appears in Haribhadra's exposition of the Lokayata doctrine in
his $aljdarsanasamuccaya, verse 81.) She said: 'I shall adopt your doctrine.'
She went to ask for the king's permission. 'Father, I shall adopt the religion of
the black-blankets.' The king sent for them, and asked them: 'Are you happy?'
Their leader said: 'The rivers do not How with booze, and the mountains are not
made of meat, and the world is not made of women: how could a black-blanket
be happy?' The king said: 'How many are you?' 'Forty-nine couples.' The king
said: 'Summon all of them, I shall be your devotee.' They all came together.

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The king executed all the men, and having expelled the women he let them go.
That's how even their seed was destroyed.'
Other sources mentioning the black-blankets are referred to in WEZLER
pp. 346f. (E.g. the Ceylonese (c. 1400) Nikayasamgrahaya writes about a de­
praved Buddhist monk of the sammitvya school who put on a blue robe, vener­
ated prostitutes, an invigorating drink, and the god of love instead of the Three
Jewels, and composed a Nilapatadarsana. King Snharsa (of Kanauj? 606-647)
studied this work, recognised how dangerous it was, and burnt it together with
most of its followers.)
Some verses attributed to a certain Nilapatta or Nilambara have found their
way to the subhasita-collections:
Saduktikarndmrta 468 (= Subhasitaratnakosa 323, MSS 2670):
ayam sa bhuvanatrayaprathitasamyamah sankaro
bibharti vapusddhund virahakdtarah kdminim\
anena kila nirjitd vayam iti priydydh karam
karena paritddayan (v.l. °Idlayan) jayati jdtahdsah smarah\\ (Ntlapattasya)
' "That Sankara, whose austerity is celebrated all over the three worlds, is now
carrying his beloved in his body, afraid of separation [from her]. They say that
we've been defeated by him!" The god of love is victorious, who with these
words gives his beloved a high five and bursts into a laugh.'
Saduktikarnamrta 2362:
sirdm pretah kascid dasati dasandgrena sarasdm
Uliksur mastiskam kalayati ca murdhdnam itarah\
karam dhutvd dhutvd jvaladanaladiptdngulisikham
citdsthdlipakvam harati kunapakravyam aparah\\ (Nildmbarasya)
'One of the ghouls bites into a juicy vein with the tip of his tooth; another
one holds a head, eager to lap up the brain. Another one carries the flesh of
a corpse, cooked in the cauldron of the pyre, shaking again and again his arm,
the fingertips of which have been lighted by the burning fire.'
In the Yasastilakacampu (p. 252) the Buddhist SugatakTrti recites approv­
ingly the following verse composed by Nilapata:
idam eva ca tattvam upalabhydldpi mlapatena—
payodharabhardlasdh smaravighurnitdrdheksandh
kvacit salayapancamoccantagita*jhankdrimh (MS. Poona : °dankdrinah ed.)|
vihdya ramamr amur aparamoksasaukhydrthindm
aho jadimadindimo viphala*bhanda(MS. Poona : °bhandi° ed.)pdkhandindm\\
'And NTlapata, too, having comprehended the same truth, said: "How loudly
those heretic buffoon loosers trumpet abroad their own stupidity who seeking
for the bliss of another kind of deliverance, abandon these lovely women lan­
guid with the weight of their breasts, their half-closed eyes rolling in love and
sometimes humming a rhythmic tune which ascends to the fifth note." '
Padmanabhamisra (16th century) also mentions the black-blankets as a
division of the digambaras (Setutikd in Paddrthadharmasangraha, Caukhamba
Sanskrit Series 61, Benares, 1924-1931, p. 107): digambarabhedd eva ksapanaka-
svetdrnbardrhatantlarnbararaktdrnbaracarmdmbarabarhdmbarddayahl In the bio­
graphy of Krsnacarya / Kanha we read about a black-robed TTrthika who vener-

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ates Mahesvara (see GRONBOLD p. 187). According to GRONBOLD the ntiamba-

ras were Christian missionaries.
82 gaho can also stand for gadhah, 'desire, consequence'.
83 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.
84 The reading of the manuscripts (ittia) suggests iyat or etavat as its chdyd,
but RAGHAVAN and THAKUR'S silent emendation to itthia0 seems to make better
sense.
85 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.
86 Both the reading and the interpretation of this verse is highly tentative.
RAGHAVAN and THAKUR silently emend sosijjai'to so sijjhai'(sa sidhyati), and
take sanradd as an ablative form. On the other hand cf. TAGARE §80 (p. 110):
"This -da of nom. sg. is a special characteristic of WAp [Western Apabhram-
sa]." 50 can be a neutr. direct singular (see TAGARE, p.225), which makes the
following chdyd possible: tat sidhyati sanram. The reading of the manuscripts,
could also be interpreted as sosyate sanram, which is parallel to the expression
parisosijjai' dehadd below. Another possibility might be to take sijjai as the
Apabhramsa form of svidyati.
87 I am following RAGHAVAN and THAKUR'S reading and interpretation.
appai\ however, suggests arpayati as its chdyd (cf. TAGARE p. 347), or one
might read it as appaim, i.e. atmand.
88 The bare stem form without any ending can be used in plur. gen. (cf.
TAGARE §86, p. 146).
89 I cannot interpret the second half of this verse. RAGHAVAN and THA­
KUR give the following chdyd: prathamah saiigah yena idrsah tadd hamsah
nirbalah sahajasvabhdvah nirdsah. Prof. Sanderson conjectured the following
chdyd and translation: parivestitah samgamo yadedrsas tadd harnso nirmalah
sahajasvabhdvo nindrsah, "When we wrap up and copulate like this [reading
eiso], [ours] is the Hamsa [the vibrating paramdtman], spotless, unequalled,
innate-and-spontaneous." The verse does not seem to be metrical, tdham could
be interpreted as tesdm (or, reading perhaps tahom, as tasya), followed by so
(sah). nivvalia (DesT) can mean jaladhauta, praviganita, viyukta. I am not
certain that the fragment nira belongs to the same verse.
90 RAGHAVAN and THAKUR suggest the following chdyd: iti yadi yuge yuge
(or, following P.L. Vaidya's suggestion, prthak prthak) vijndyate.
91 Both the reading and the interpretation of this verse are conjectural. I
took punu bhoa belonging to the previous verse.
92 I have conjectured a lacuna at this point, since nothing seems to rhyme with
vinu. satattu may be the corrupted form of the rhyming word, or rather it may

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belong to the next verse. I've made a few tentative conjectures to squeeze some
meaning out of the words. The form imu instead of imu is arguably improbable.
93 ex conj. la in the sense of "take up".

94 Again the rhyming word (possibly an imperative) seems to be missing.

95 ex conj. The reading of the manuscripts (rajdno) clearly does not make
sense. On the other hand, RAGHAVAN and THAKUR'S conjecture (re jantoh) is
not entirely convincing to me. Although one might argue that jantoh can be
contrasted with pumsam in the following line, I would expect a vocative after
the particle re. °nirbhaya° and no, are also conjectures.
Qfi
ex conj.
97 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR conjectured hi as the syllable that is
missing from this unmetrical line, but it is difficult to see what role this hi could
possibly have in the sentence.
98 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. This is probably a reference to the
kdpalika ascetic observance of the skull (kapdlavrata). On the other hand the
learned sndtaka might also allude to the ancient solemn Vedic ritual, which
involved joyful singing, music, and dance, as well as an obscene altercation
and sexual intercourse between a brahmacdrin and a prostitute. (See DEZSO,
pp. 15-41.)
99 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.
100 I follow Prof. Sanderson's suggestion in interpreting °bhava° as 'Siva'. I
am not entirely certain, however, why is it necessary to mention here Jayanta's
expertise in the Saiva scriptures. One would expect a more general statement,
and the following conjecture might be considered: asesabhuvandgamapdrage,
'master of all religious doctrines in the world'.

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 Act Three
Then enters an ADEPT. 1
ADEPT (looks around nervously). The horned moon—the Great Lord's mark2 has
set by now. The sky is empty and dark, like my3 heart.4 No time like this to
slip away. So where is my bosom friend, Crematory-Ash, with whom I shall run
off? (He walks about and looks ahead.) Here is Crematory-Ash, he seems5 to be
coming right this way.
Then enters the 2ND ADEPT.
2ND ADEPT. Here is comrade Skeleton-Banner's shelter.6 I can see it dimly even
in this darkness. So I'll go watching7 my steps. (He walks about and listens.)
I thought I heard footsteps. Good Lord, I think the city-guards8 are walking
this way! If they come upon me they'll believe that I have robbed someone9
and they'll throw me into prison, 10 or put me on the spit, or hang11 me on a
tree. Let that be! Lord Bhairava is my refuge. 12 (He looks carefully.) I thought
I heard comrade Skeleton-Banner talking. (He takes heart and goes closer.)
Comrade Skeleton-Banner, it's you I've stumbled upon! I was afraid it was the
city-guards. 13
1ST ADEPT. Hey, Crematory-Ash, is that you?14 Well done that you've come here.
So let's move on quickly. Let's slip away together while15 it is still dark.
2ND ADEPT. Are you afraid that the city-guards will take you to be a thief and
put you to death? 16
1ST ADEPT. I have no such fear. Even if I have, 17 it calms down. But another evil
has arisen.
2ND ADEPT (agitated). How come? 18
1ST ADEPT. Why certainly, there is this rumour, haven't you heard it? Nowadays
this damned kingdom19 has completely changed.
2ND ADEPT. My heart20 is going pitapat! Come on, comrade, spill it21 quick!
1ST ADEPT. King22 Sankaravarman's cruelty is public knowledge. That brahmin
his23 adviser, the wicked Jayanta is even rougher than him. They nabbed the
mendicant Nllambaras, beat them to jelly, and expelled them from the king­
dom,24 on the grounds that they were outside Vedic religion. And if any other
mendicant is caught who is outside Vedic religion, he'll be beaten up, killed
thrown in jail,25 [or] slain. And we26 can also be counted27 among these very
people. We drink28 booze, eat29 meat, have sex with women. 30 Surely we31

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observe the same religious discipline as the NTlambaras.32 So now let's hide our
Adept-dress,33 and move on with rapid steps, unnoticed in this darkness.
2ND ADEPT (alarmed). Let's do so!
They walk about.
2ND ADEPT. Comrade Skeleton-Banner, how34 has this evil cropped up?
1ST ADEPT. Listen. To begin with, there is35 that36 graduate brahmin called
Sankarsana, who saw37 countless Nllambara couples38 singing and having fun
in the grove which is the abode of monk Jinaraksita. 39
2ND ADEPT. And then?
1ST ADEPT. Then he informed40 that Jayanta. He in his turn briefed the king.
2ND ADEPT. And then?
1ST ADEPT. Then the king41 sent for that graduate brahmin Sankarsana, married
him, granted him privileges, the right of wearing a turban42 and using the title
'Right Honourable', and appointed him to the position of superintendent over
the religious matters of the whole country. He started this fire.
2ND ADEPT. You should rather say43 that the wicked Jayanta started it.
1ST ADEPT. Anyway, things are like this. So where shall we go now?44
2ND ADEPT. We must present ourselves before45 Doomsday-Fire's-Flame, the sor­
ceress. These bad times will hopefully not trouble46 us there.47
1ST ADEPT. Is she protected48 these days?
2ND ADEPT. I suppose49 that Queen50 Sugandhadevl, the chief wife51 of the king,52
who is the mistress of the whole harem, will perhaps take her under her shelter,
because she is a woman.
1ST ADEPT. Even if she is protected,53 can she protect us?54 I know! Let's go to
some faraway region bounded by forests.55
2ND ADEPT. You're right,56 comrade. So let's move on quickly before the day
begins to break.
They do so.
1ST ADEPT. Hey Crematory-Ash, you're right. But after daybreak one cannot
even walk a step in this damned kingdom.57
2ND ADEPT. Why?
1ST ADEPT. In every region, every single town, every village, everywhere the sound
of Veda-recitation grates on the ear, the smell of ghee stings the nose, the smoke
of sacrifice58 brings tears to the eyes. So we must cross this damned kingdom
strictly by night. The days, however, must be tided over in the depths of some
forest.
2ND ADEPT. Quite right. We59 must also move strictly by night for fear of
Sahkarsana.60 The days, however, must be spent unnoticed in the woods.
They walk about.
1ST ADEPT. Hey Crematory-Ash, the quarters all seem to have parted, the stars
are slowly waning. Now dawn has arrived. What shall we61 do?
Behind the scenes, after the sound of drums.

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Listen here, citizens and villagers! By the royal order of His Majesty, King Sanka-
ravarman, the Right Honourable Bhatta Sankarsana notifies all of you:
Those virtuous people who have fallen into the beginningless stream (1)
of the world and belong to various religions—they should remain as
they are, performing practices prescribed62 by then: own religious
discipline. Those criminal false ascetics, however, who devastate the
established social and religious order—if they don't leave immedi­
ately, the king will strike them like thieves.
BOTH (listening, alarmed}. Our63 walking death by the name of Sankarsana has
truly arrived. So let's move on quickly somewhere else.
Both exit.
Then enter the Right Honourable SANKARSANA, who has divested
himself of his Graduate-garments and is dressed in garments becom­
ing a married functionary of the king, and the BOY, and as many
attendants as can be afforded.
GRADUATE. Boy, do people speak ill of us because we have driven away the
NTlambaras?
BOY. Have no such fear, Sir! You have re-established the religious order of the
Three Vedas, which had been truly ruined, vanquished64 by depraved false as­
cetics. 65
GRADUATE. You should rather say that King Sankaravarman saw to it that it was
established. So aren't there other false ascetics roaming at large in the country
who, imitating the style of the NTlambaras, deserve being driven away?
BOY. Sir, some depraved ascetics who fool around calling themselves Saivas were
seen up to this time. But now, having fallen into disrepute because of your
ardour,66 they have become very few.
GRADUATE. Well spoken! I have also noticed them indeed. They are worthy of
banishment. For
What is not fit to drink for them? Surely that which is not liquid. (2)
That thing is not consumable which is bitter or which cannot be
cracked by teeth. If there is any being with breasts at all which is
not suitable to have sex with, then it must be unborn or dead. What
in the world could be an appropriate place for asceticism? Perhaps
a pub. 67

BOY. It is as you say, Sir.

GRADUATE. Boy, this is also a significant detriment for the social estates and
life-periods.
BOY. It is certainly a disgrace for those followers of Siva, too, abusing whose name
they do their business.
GRADUATE. You're quite right, boy. The king certainly acts in the proper way
when also he gives heed to their expulsion. Furthermore,

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When they proclaim the Lord's name saying 'We follow Siva's teach- (3)
ing' these wicked people are doing damage to His chaste religions.
If the king subdued them in the right way and established them on
the spotless path,68 why should his laudable protection of the earth
or his fame suffer any loss?
BOY. Exactly.
GRADUATE. Be sure, I've got the king's decree in this matter. So let these patrol­
men be ordered to search for them.
BOY. As you command, Sir. (He exits and enters again.) Sir, they have disap­
peared from the kingdom. But another excited courier has come looking for
you. So it is for you, Sir, to decide in this matter.
GRADUATE. Lead him in.
The boy calls him in with a sign.
SERVANT (enters, [says] excitedly). Glory to the Master! Those followers of Siva,
who are addicted to eating meat, drinking booze, and having sex with maidser­
vants, disappeared from the kingdom to a man as soon as the rumour about the
Nllambaras reached them.69 But other, chaste ascetics also grew alarmed and
started70 to leave. It is for you, Master, to decide in this matter.
GRADUATE. Boy, we must quickly appoint community-leaders after honouring
them to turn back the virtuous. (To the SERVANT.) Hey, you go with those
people and show the way.
SERVANT. As the Master commands. (Exits.)
BOY. Oh my, you have wavered in your resolution, Sir. 71
GRADUATE. Boy, it is improper that those who follow the chaste religions that have
come downf to us with the beginningless continuum should f
be beset by worries.
For King Sankaravarmadeva is supremely devoted to Siva, and he is merciful
to all religious schools. So come, we shall go now straight to the ashram of the
Venerable Dharmasiva in order to soothe needless worries.
BOY. As you command, Sir.
They walk about.
Behind the scenes.
Why are you worried and afraid, hermits? The king, master of all (4)
religious schools, is not hostile towards you. The Great Lord has
banished those who, screening themselves with faked observances,
had almost proved to be your ruin.

BOY. These must be the community-leaders appointed by you, Sir, passing by,
notifying the public.
GRADUATE. Well observed, boy. We shall quicken our pace. (They walk about.)
Boy, we must have arrived at the ashram72 of the Venerable Dharmasiva, for—
Their colour is grey from the smearing-ashes, they are able to inflame (5)
the fires of incense, they have just drunk the pure nectar of flowers

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used for the worship of the One Who Conquered the [Three] Forts—
whom do not enchant these blessed breezes in the Saiva ashram,
which loosen the knots in the matted hair of the ascetics, and delight
in presenting a slow[, graceful] dance73 of the mendicant-garments?
BOY. It is as you say, Sir. This penance-grove seems to me peaceful and charming.74
GRADUATE. Come now, let's enter. (They mime entering.) What! The Reverend
Abbot Dharmasiva comes forward in the very courtyard! How the splendour of
his asceticism outshines everyone! For—
His beautiful face is smiling with ashes, 75 his forehead is cleansed by (6)
the holy water of the Ganges, he is worshiped by ascetics resembling
the kind ganas, who bustle about and act as servants,76 his spot­
less soul is constantly gladdened by his bright fame which is [white]
like camphor, just as Siva is delighted by the well-praised Gaun to­
gether with the moon—he, resembling Srtkantha, truly brings about
salvation for the creatures merely by being seen.
And what's more,
Having entered the ground of the ashram, which removes the various (7)
stains of the Iron Age, I also feel, upon my word,77 as if I were in
Siva's heaven, 78 reanimated by the three eyes of Smara's smiling
enemy.
BOY. Me too, I see myself flying towards absorption into Brahman. 79
Then enters the Venerable Dharmasiva sitting on a stool, looking as
described above, and as many followers as can be afforded.
ABBOT (pensively).
The merits of this king are celebrated all over the world, and his (8)
attention80 is solely devoted to social and religious order. As for
this adviser, Jayanta, he never grows weary of strolling in the great
forest of sastra. I don't think81 they would take [any] measures
which would be contrary to their reputation. The hermits should
remain as usual. Why worry? 82 Or rather, what danger can there
be for people of our breed?
He looks ahead. What in the world! The Graduate has come right here!
Everything is clear now.
GRADUATE. Come, boy, let's bow down to the Abbot. ( They approach.) Obeisance
to the Blessed Abbot, Mahesvara manifest in front of us!
ABBOT. Welcome, Sir. Are you well? Please take this seat.
GRADUATE. There's no need of seats, I'll just sit down on the lawn. Your Holiness,
I hope the observance of religious austerities goes on free from impediments, as
it has been established. Or rather, what kind of impediment could occur here?
The Blessed Mahesvara worships himself by himself. So could Your Holiness

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please advise the ascetics that they should not be worried in the slightest degree
about this rumour among the people? The king has removed precisely the
impediments of asceticism. And the king himself is also coming close behind us
to visit Your Holiness.
ABBOT (smiling). Why should I or the ascetics be worried? As long as His Majesty
Sankaravarman righteously rules the country which has fallen to him, the king­
dom belongs to the virtuous alone, but he supports it. And it is like that not
just today; we have been experiencing the same for a long tune.
AN ASCETIC (enters with a toss of the curtain, excited). Glory to the Abbot! Some
elderly scholar has come here, showing off his arrogance, mocking at the ashram,
surrounded by several disciples, making f... f83 So it is for Your Holiness to
decide in this matter.
ABBOT (smiling). Let the poor fellow enter, I don't mind.

Then enters VRDDHAMBHI as described above.

VRDDHAMBHI. Amazing! What a great disaster-maker king Sankaravarman is,

letting the great riches of his84 kingdom be consumed without check by Vedic
priests, hermits, renouncers, celibate students, as well as by these Saivas, Pasupa-
tas, Paiicaratrikas, Jainas, Sankhyas, Buddhists and the rest. So how is he going
to live long? He now actually looks like a heavenly tree in a place where there is
nothing around it. 85 I am going to take this opportunity to do away with God,
set aside the world-to-come, demolish the validity of the Vedas, and thereby
turn this king back from this wrong path and establish him on the right track,
so that he, concentrating on worldly prosperity, can enjoy his kingship for a long
time.86
s
Now I have heard that a lot ofr self-proclaimed scholars are gathered in
this Saiva ashram. I shall make this Saiva professor a laughing-stock right in
front of them. (He takes a few steps and looks in another direction.) Here is the
Saiva professor who is an expert87 in the systems of Kanabhaksa, Aksapada and
others, and this here is Sankarsana, the great Munamsaka, and here there are
many other scholars belonging to various branches of learning. All right then,
I'll approach them. (He approaches.) Are you OK, ascetic? Hello, brahmin.
( While saying this he sits down right on the lawn with his pupils.)
ABBOT (smiling). What? Disrespect right from the beginning?88 (He looks at
Sankarsana's face [being curious how he will react].}
GRADUATE. Reverend, you're right. Well, let's see.
VRDDHAMBHI. Why do you live so miserably because of hundreds of useless tor­
ments?
[Your] asceticism is [just] a variety of tortures; [your] self-restraint (9)
is just a way to cheat yourself of pleasures;89 [while your] sacrifi­
cial rituals such as the Agnihotra seem [to me] just like children's
games. on
ABBOT. What shall we do? The Lord God impels us to perform such actions.
VRDDHAMBHI. But who is this Lord God?

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 Act Three

Here goes the son of a barren woman,91 after bathing in the water (10)
of a mirage, with a wreath of sky-flowers on his head, holding a bow
made of hare-horn.92
ABBOT. Enough abuse! For he is the Blessed creator and destroyer of the whole
world; he supervises the mass of karmas, according to their appropriate scope,
which [karmas] are active in the infinite mass of creatures and have various
effects;93 he is the eternally blissful, omniscient, compassionate Supreme Lord.
VRDDHAMBHI (laughing slightly). Behold the foolish vision of idiots, obstructed by
the blindness of devotion, sees nothing. How could it be thus? For how on earth
can people accept that he [God] is the [supreme] agent? To explain,94
It is compassion,95 it is sport,96 it is the Lord's whim, it is an im- (11)
pulse,97 it is his nature, this is the way he earns merit, or rather it is
[his] honesty98 : who knows what that ancient, passionless sage, who
has all he needs, has got into his head that he creates and destroys
the universe?

How could one who has no desire for the group of causal factors like (12)
the instrumental cause, and who is also deprived of assistant factors,
enter the state of being the cause of the maintenance, destruction,
and creation of the worlds,99 which has no particular100 benefit for
himself or others?

Moreover,

Even if he is the creator, what rule is there to ensure that he is going (13)
to create exactly in this way [as you say] and [only] three worlds,
and he does not create other and more worlds?

ABBOT. Stop exerting yourself in putting forward fault-finding arguments.

For, since fault-finding argument is pointless with regard to some- (14)
thing which lacks [the support of a] means of valid knowledge, [while
on the other hand,] with regard to what is proved by a means
of valid knowledge, it [i.e. fault-finding argument] is totally dis­
carded, [therefore] disputants should stop making noise with uttering
those [fault-finding arguments] and seek positive arguments regard­
ing [this] matter which is beyond the scope of the sense organs.
VRDDHAMBHI (smiling). If that's what you think, then please state a proof for
establishing God.
ABBOT. I say that inference [proves His existence].
VRDDHAMBHI (smiling). To say [that something is] an inference and [at the same
time] a means of valid knowledge is wish[ful thinking].
It is extremely difficult to verify things with the help of inference (15)
since their capacities differ because of differences in condition, place,
and time. 101

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 Act Three

Moreover,

One who relies on inference tumbles easily just like a blind man (16)
running by touch of hand on an uneven path. 102
Furthermore,

Even if clever logicians infer something with great effort, other, ex- (17)
tremely competent [logicians] account for [the same thing] in another
way. 103

ABBOT. Enough of verbosity! We know all too well this 'speciality of the house'
of the Barhaspatyas [i.e. materialists]. But tell me this: is sense perception the
one and only means of valid knowledge for them?
VRDDHAMBHI. The answer is yes. 104
ABBOT. Then no everyday activity is possible for them.
VRDDHAMBHI. How so?
ABBOT. If you suffer the torments of hunger, 105 my poor thing, you seek rice, not
sand. When you are thirsty you look for water, not for fire.
VRDDHAMBHI. If so, then what of it?
ABBOT.
My friend, the state of being the 'best thing' [for a particular pur- (18)
pose] surely does not fall into the scope of the sense faculties. It
is ascertained through the positive and negative concomitance of
entities.

And positive and negative concomitance are the main defining char- (19)
acteristic of the inferential mark. [As for] the condition of being the
property of the subject, that holds for any inferential mark seen in
a particular subject.

These are indeed the [very] life-breath of inference: positive and negative con­
comitance, and the condition of being the property of the subject.
VRDDHAMBHI. Surely for humans, just as for animals, this [everyday] activity,
which is based on determining what leads to pleasure and what to suffering,
will take place merely through instinct.
ABBOT. Say not so. For instinct is defined as a knowledge the specific cause of
whose [validity] is unknown. But in this case we do know the cause, [namely]
positive and negative concomitance, and [the condition of being the property of
a subject]. And one cannot deny something self-evident.
VRDDHAMBHI. Surely even if we know the cause, yet we do not really know it, since
we cannot comprehend the connection of being invariably related. Therefore this
[everyday] activity is pleasant only if we do not examine it, and this fact alone
is real: thus say those who know reality. 106
ABBOT. This is laziness, or you just don't want to yield an inch. 107 These scholars
[are here because they] are taking the opportunity to examine things.

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 Act Three

VRDDHAMBHI. Surely this examination is impossible, because there are infinite in­
dividual instances of smoke and fire, and non-smoke and non-fire, 108 and people
who have not perceived directly the multitude of all things existing in the three
worlds cannot ascertain this positive and negative concomitance. As for the
omniscient, what is the use of inference for them?
ABBOT. First of all, positive concomitance can be grasped resorting to univer-
sals. The infinitude of individual instances cannot invalidate [the inference]
since smoke-ness is one and fire-ness is also one. And following precisely the
accordance of positive universals, the accordance109 of their absence can also be
grasped. And that is exactly the negative concomitance.
The association of two things [i.e. hetu and sadhya] is taught to (20)
be positive concomitance. As for negative concomitance, it is con­
sidered to be the concurrence of their absence.
As for paksadharmata [the condition (of the inferential mark) of being the prop­
erty of the subject], that poor thing, she can easily be understood, since we
cannot ascertain the inferential mark as a property without it having any locus.
Therefore, since the cause [of validity] is easily determined in this way, even
animals, just like the wise, act only with the help of means of valid knowledge.
As the Commentator says, 'Therefore the activities of gods, human beings, and
animals are possible in this way, with the help of these means of valid knowledge,
[and] not otherwise.' 110
VRDDHAMBHI. Surely this may be all right for [inferences of] things already estab­
lished in the world, regarding which cognition has already arisen [through sense
perception], but it is impossible for things regarding which cognition is [still] to
be acquired. 111
For ordinary people, unless they are deceived by logicians, do not (21)
cognise God from effects like the earth, in the way [they cognise] fire
from smoke.
ABBOT.
Even womenfolk, even a child, even a cowherd, even you, Sir, com- (22)
prehend one thing without doubt from some other specific [i.e. in­
variably concomitant] thing.

Because of the power of invariable concomitance, one can success- (23)

fully infer a sentient agent from his effect, just as [one can infer] fire
from smoke. 112

VRDDHAMBHI.
Surely an effect like a pot, the production of which is conceivable, (24)
is one thing, and a very different thing is, for instance, a mountain,
for there is a great difference between them. 113

ABBOT.

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 Act Tiree

Indeed, this smoke having small beginnings in the kitchen is one (25)
thing, and a very different thing is that [smoke] on the mountain,
permeating the main and intermediate directions of the sky. 114
Moreover these are the leftovers of the red-robed [Buddhists] that you are eating:
'When that particular kind of compositeness etc. is established to (26)
be in positive and negative concomitance with the [existence of the]
controller,—it is fine that that [i.e. the existence of a controller] is
inferred from that [kind of compositeness].' 115

Depending upon a specific property [i.e. the linga] the process of (27)
inference does take place. Where is there ever a complete similarity
between the thing that has the property in the major term and the
one in the example?116

VRDDHAMBHI. Surely there is a real universal in other cases, but in this case the
similarity is only nominal, not real. And [to apply inference] in the case of
nominal similarity would be a fault of overextension. 117
ABBOT (smiling). How could there be real universal in the house of a Buddhist?
We see that these everyday activities of people depend upon some (28)
universal, whether arisen from the intellect, or external, real or con­
ventional.

There are many [things] which, although they are [all] effects, do not (29)
resemble each other. Therefore I don't see the point of the expression
'that particular kind'. 118

VRDDHAMBHI. But surely these 'products' such as the earth are quite special.
ABBOT. Surely, then, you should postulate a very special craftsman. 119
VRDDHAMBHI. I cannot postulate something which is unknown.
ABBOT. And I cannot bring up120 an effect that has no agent.
VRDDHAMBHI. So what can we do in such a case?
ABBOT. Which alternative shall we reject? Is it the extraordinary nature of the
agent that is troublesome or is it the effect having no agent that is troublesome?
Regarding these two, according to the general principle, 'we postulate something
unseen in order to account for something already seen, but we cannot deny
something seen', one should put up with the extraordinary nature of the agent
because the effect is also extraordinary rather than disregarding the fact that
something is an effect.
VRDDHAMBHI (draws on the ground).
ABBOT. Moreover when we infer the faculty of sight as the instrument from our
perception of colours, just as [we infer] a scythe from the action of mowing and
an axe from the action of cutting, in this case what kind of property does the
faculty of sight have in common with the scythe and the axe? 121
VRDDHAMBHI. Let that not be inferred either—why should it bother me?
ABBOT. But how could you see colour without your faculty of vision?

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 Act Three

VRDDHAMBHI. Let there be then some kind of instrument.

ABBOT. Let there be then [in the same way] some kind of agent.
VRDDHAMBHI. I cannot put up with an agent. [But] how could there be action
without an instrument?122
ABBOT. How could there be an effect without an agent? For [the word] 'effect'
is not just a name like 'Dittha', but something is an effect because it is made.
Something is both made and [made] without an agent: by whom [then]? We
do not know. So endure this immedicable headache of inferring God. 123 What
[else] can you do?
VRDDHAMBHI (draws on the ground).
ABBOT. Furthermore you must also endure the severe pain of transmigration. 124
VRDDHAMBHI. No living person will endure it.
ABBOT. Surely you will die very quickly.
VRDDHAMBHI. How so?
ABBOT. Consciousness cannot be a property of the material elements because it
does not exist for as long as the substance does and because it is aware of it­
self. 125 And if you hold the theory of the 'stream of consciousness', the activities
of remembering, desiring, etc. are not possible without a single synthetiser. 126
VRDDHAMBHI. Let there be then some such entity which is the cognising subject.
But what proves that it exists after the cremation of the body?
ABBOT. My good fellow, no other proof is needed for that.
VRDDHAMBHI. Why?
ABBOT. For the existence of the fact that the destruction of something is part
of its nature is denied. In addition we never experience either the arising, or
the perishing of the cognising subject, or any cause of these [i.e. arising and
perishing]. Nor is it the case that its destruction [though never perceived] must
be possible on the ground that it has parts, in the way that, for instance, a
cloth [is destroyed], when, for example, the contact of its threads with one
another disintegrates. 127 Therefore we perceive only the form itself of this real
entity called 'subject' but not its arising or perishing. Because of this, if the
cognising subject exists it must be eternal. 128 If it is eternal then it is the one
which transmigrates. Why do the Carvakas say, 'Because there is nothing which
transmigrates therefore there is no transmigration'? 129 And there is a further
consideration: the infant's joy, fear, sorrow, etc., and his desire for milk, etc.,
cannot be said to be either innate or accidental or produced merely by instinct.
So because of this, too, the Self is indeed inferred to be eternal. 130
VRDDHAMBHI. But what is gained by investigating transmigration in the context
of proving [the existence of] God?
ABBOT. This is what is gained: if there is transmigration then the creation of the
material world cannot but be caused by [individual] karmas. 131
VRDDHAMBHI. So what?
ABBOT. The karmas are also the causes of the creation of bodies, etc. 132
VRDDHAMBHI. And then what?133
ABBOT. Surely the karmas are unconscious. 134
VRDDHAMBHI. And even then what?

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 Act Three

ABBOT. Surely an insentient thing can only become a cause if it is presided over
by a sentient being. 135
VRDDHAMBHI. Surely the sentient agents will preside over those very karmas.
ABBOT. They cannot, since no accord is possible among those who have different
intentions.
VRDDHAMBHI. Then what about carpenters?
ABBOT. Why carpenters?
VRDDHAMBHI. Surely they build one house although they are many.
ABBOT. That's not so. They follow the will of one architect. 136
VRDDHAMBHI. Then what about the brahmins' agreement in an assembly?
ABBOT. In that case, too, the assembly adheres to the will of a single chairman
who is expert in the matter. But in this case, the body of a king or the body of
an adviser, a single thing, is the source of pleasure and suffering for thousands
of living beings through helping or harming them, so surely it is produced by
their karmas collectively. And those for whom the king's body causes suffering
do not rejoice at its production. 137 Therefore it is the Lord God alone who
must surely be accepted as the supervisor of such an immense heap of karmas
[of so many people]. And so, once one has completely established [that there
must be one overseer], the proof of God['s existence] is irrefutable. And thus
let us leave aside the great, immeasurable products like the earth, the ocean,
the mountains, etc.; 138 we can infer God following the same steps even just
from such insignificant products as, for instance, slender little bodies like mine.
And in this way even heaps of sand, for instance, on a river-bank, constructed
by insentient, unskillful bodies, or wild plants139 such as grass, creepers, and
bushes, in mountains-caves, forests, and thickets, are dependent on the karmas
of people because they cause pleasure or pain to them. 140 Therefore, since the
karmas must be presided over, the maker of these things cannot be insentient.
VRDDHAMBHI (draws on the ground}.
ABBOT. [But] let us leave aside other gross or subtle effects. These daily activities of
people like us, for instance agriculture, service, or trade, down to lying, sitting,
strolling, eating, etc., they are the cause of benefit or harm for many living
beings, so they produce pleasure or suffering. Therefore, by the above reasoning,
because these [activities] are dependent on the karmas of those [beings], and
since the karmas are insentient, and since their agents are many and mutually
opposed, and so cannot accord—they are also produced by [those] very karmas
presided over by the Blessed Lord. 141 That's why the illustrious Vyasa says:
This creature is ignorant, and not master of his own pleasure and (30)
pain; impelled by the Lord, he may go to heaven, or he may go
straight to hell. 142
VRDDHAMBHI. I will give some thought to the matter. Right now I am going.

The ascetic followers of the Abbot1*3 laugh at him [i.e. at VrddhdmbhiJ

and humiliate 1** him in many ways.

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 Act Three

ABBOT (holds them back and says to Vrddhambhi). Where are you going now?
Endure right now for a moment the suffering caused by your karma. 145 We
know the Lord also by the authority of Scripture.
VRDDHAMBHI. Scripture a means of valid knowledge! That's bold.
ABBOT, (to the Sankarsana). I am tired; will you please teach him.
GRADUATE. Just as the Abbot wishes. As for me, I don't even have to exert myself
to corroborate the validity of Scripture, since it is established by nature.
VRDDHAMBHI.

Validity [of Scripture] is established by nature? How can you say (31)
this? For the Veda is not authoritative [simply] because of its etern­
ity.
For is a permanent thing, such as space, found to be a means of valid knowledge?
Or who would argue about the validity of sense perception and the like, which
is not eternal?146
GRADUATE. My good fellow,
Indeed I do not assert that the Veda is authoritative because it is (32)
eternal; I claim rather that it is like that since it creates awareness. 147
VRDDHAMBHI.
Surely in some cases, even though the verbal expression is invalid- (33)
ated, it still creates awareness, like when somebody says, 'There is
an elephant on my finger'.
GRADUATE.
Indeed, even here [in this example], it is not the denotation of the (34)
words connected in a sentence which renders impossible the verbal
[cognition]. It is rather that the finding of any other means of valid
knowledge with respect to the sense that is conveyed is denied. 148

VRDDHAMBHI.
Surely the verbal expression operates towards objects known by (35)
other means of valid knowledge. 149 Therefore by the invalidation
of the object it itselff, too,] must be invalidated for you.

GRADUATE.
Let that [verbal expression be admitted to] be invalidated the con- (36)
tent of which is in the reach of another means of valid knowledge,
but the content of an injunction, namely a command, 150 is hardly
accessible to other [pramanas].

And since by nature it cannot be encroached upon by other means (37)

of valid knowledge, it is not touched by any help or harm caused by
them. 151

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 Act Tiree

If [verbal testimony] is helped [by other means of valid knowledge] (38)

then it is only repetition, 152 and if it is harmed it is false; but since
both are [in this case] impossible, how could [the Veda] be not au­
thoritative?

VRDDHAMBHI.
Surely a verbal expression necessarily requires the connection [of the (39)
expression and the object expressed] in order to be expressive, and
that [connection] is dependent on a person. 153 But how could this
come about in the case of something inaccessible to one?
GRADUATE.
But connection is just the word's power, 154 and that [power] is innate (40)
in it. 155 A person cannot make a convention without words that are
[already] expressive. As for learning [this connection]—it is possible
with regard to an injunction [the content of] which can be reached
only through verbal expressions, through usage, when the cause of
a person's action has become manifest in oneself in the same way.

The meaning of the expression 'he is to perform it'—[a meaning] (41)

which is not temporally bound—cannot be entered into by other
means of valid knowledge the objects of which are temporal. 156

VRDDHAMBHI. Then how is learning possible with regard to that [i.e. injunction]?
GRADUATE. Surely I've just told you, but you didn't get it. For one perceives in
oneself that action is preceded by the cognising of an instigator. Because one
observes that somebody else is also acting after hearing an optative ending, one
postulates that the cognition of an instigator has taken place [for that other
person as well] from that [optative ending]. And one perceives oneself, just as
[one perceives] the Self, of what kind this instigator is. But we cannot show it
to somebody else saying "It is like this", as [we can show something else] which
has form. Others, too, do experience it, but they cannot show it to anyone
else. Therefore learning [of the connection of word and meaning] is established
even in the case [of injunction] which cannot be known by other means of valid
knowledge. When old people were children, [they learnt] in the same way: so
the world has no beginning. 157
VRDDHAMBHI. Is that enough to prove the validity of Vedic injunction?
GRADUATE. What else are you looking for?
VRDDHAMBHI. The words [of Scripture] cannot be valid if they are deprived of the
support of other means of valid knowledge, for they are merely expressive, but
they do not provide [a guarantee] that the object is thus.
GRADUATE. [Things which are] expressive can also, in fact, create awareness. For
every means of valid knowledge just creates awareness; it does not deliver the
object of cognition like a pot, tying a rope around its neck. 158

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 Act Three

Those who claim that validity must depend on agreement with other (42)
means of valid knowledge couldn't reach the end [of the series of
pramanas] even in hundreds of aeons. 159

There are two reasons of falsity: invalidation or a fault on the part (43)
of the causes [of cognition, e.g. the sense faculties]. 160 And since
neither of them can be found at all in the Veda, [its] validity is
established.

VRDDHAMBHI draws on the ground. The followers of the GRADUATE

laugh at him. The GRADUATE holds them back.
ABBOT. Whether this way of proving the validity of the Veda that you, Sir, have
shown, should be relied on, 161 or whether it is better to follow the train of
thought that 'the sacred tradition is authoritative because it is His word', 162
and 'it is valid because the trustworthy person [who revealed it] is authoritative,
similarly to the validity of spells or texts about medicine': 163 this is a private
quarrel among ourselves. Let us leave it aside. It is first the Veda-hating
unbelievers of this ilk who must definitely be refuted by you, too.
GRADUATE. As Your Eminence commands.

Hubbub behind the scene.

ABBOT. What's that?
GRADUATE. Surely this hubbub indicates that the king is coming. So I'll go and
meet the king. As for you, please prepare for the king the respectful offerings
appropriate for his welcome.
ABBOT. All right, Sir.
GRADUATE. And, Your Eminence, you should be constantly aware of this:
We certainly do not hate the god Siva, the power of whose majesty (44)
is incomparable. He alone is the single cause of the upholding, re-
sorbing, and emitting of the worlds. He is Rudra, he is Brahma, he
is Hari, or he might be some other Person beyond them. This entire
world rests in him.
Therefore let these Saivas, Pasupatas, Kalamukhas and Mahavratins remain at
ease. 164

The knowledge handed down by your teachers also seems to dispel (45)
delusion, but let its scope be limited to that with respect to which
it is [justly] established. 165

ABBOT. Precisely, Sir.

Exeunt omnes.

191
_________________________________________Act Three

Notes to Act Three

1 'Worshippers in all these Saiva cults [i.e. the Siddhanta, the Netranatha
cult, the Svacchandabhairava cult, the Trika, and the Krama] were of one of
two kinds. This was a matter of individual choice and it determined both the
form of initiation received and the form of the subsequent ritual discipline. On
the one hand were those whose chosen goal was nothing but liberation (moksah]
from the bondage of transmigration (samsdrah). On the other hand were those
who elected to pursue supernatural powers and effects (siddhih) while they lived
and—or at least—to experience fulfilment in the enjoyment of rewards (bhogah)
in a paradisal world of their choice, either in this life through mastery of Yoga,
or after death. So worshippers were either seekers of liberation (mumuksuh) or
seekers of rewards (bubhuksuh).'' (SANDERSON 1995, p. 24.)
It is the second kind of worshippers we meet in the prelude of the Third Act.
The sadhakas, "masterers [of powers]" (SANDERSON 1995, ibid.) or "mantra-
masterers" (SANDERSON 1995, p. 79, n. 208) were characterised by antinomian
behaviour in all Saiva cults, from the Siddhanta which adapted itself to the
orthodox norms of purity in the highest degree (see SANDERSON 1985, p. 565)
to the more esoteric traditions.
As our two sadhakas appear to be worshippers of Bhairava, perhaps it is
not inappropriate to take a cursory view of the presentation of the sadhaka in
the Svacchandatantra, the authoritative text of the Mantrapitha division of the
Tantras of Bhairava, and of the Svacchandabhairava-cult, which incorporated
the Kapalika culture of the cremation grounds (SANDERSON 1988, p. 138). As
Arraj points out, 'though the older order of Saiva ascetics became largely insti­
tutionalized as a hierarchy of masters catering to different grades of initiates,
the active and ascetic option did not die out immediately but was integrated
as another optional grade of the adept (sddhakah), who still sought superhu­
man powers. And accordingly, in Svacchandatantram, the older rites have been
collected under this nominal heading as the special entitlement of the adept.'
(ARRAJ 1988, p. 73.)
The consecration of the adept is described in Svacchandatantra 4.482-505ab
(vol.1, pp. 298-310, ARRAJ 1988, pp. 165ff), and his practices are discussed
in the sixth book (Svacchandatantra, vol.11, pp. lOlff, ARRAJ 1988, p. 181ff).
He should worship Bhairava and make oblations using human flesh together
with bdellium and bathed in ghee (v. 53: nrmamsam purasamyuktam ghrtena
ca pariplutam) in order to obtain different levels of magical powers. Various
secondary rites are also described, resulting in such powers as subjugation
(vasikarana, vv. 58 seqq), scaring away one's enemies (uccdtana, w. 72 seqq),
or killing them (marana, w. 85cd seqq). Book 13 (vol.4 (part 2), pp.89ff,
tr. ARRAJ 1988, pp.457ff) also contains siddhi-oriented rites taking place in
the cremation ground and requiring such gruesome ingredients as 'the dried
head of a hero felled in battle with a sword [while he was] facing [to the] front'
(v. 9: abhimukhakhadganipatitasurasirah sositam, tr. ARRAJ 1988, p. 462), or

192
 Act Three

'the rib from a dead woman that was hanged by her left foot' (v. 12: mrtanarya
vdmapaddd udbaddhdyds tu pdmsulim, tr. ARRAJ 1988, p. 463).
In belletristic works sddhakas are usually depicted as evil magicians who
practice the black art in the cremation grounds. In Bhavabhuti's Malatimadhava
Aghoraghanta and his disciple Kapalakundala are ready to sacrifice MalatT to
the goddess Karala, but Madhava arrives just in time to save her. The hor­
rid sight of the cremation ground is depicted in vivid colours (Act Five). The
source of humour in the Agamadambara is that although the two adepts should
feel themselves at home in the smasana and be busy scaring other people, they
appear to be scared themselves, trying to sneak away from the police.
2 ex conj. ISAACSON.

3 The MagadhT form of asmdkam should be asmanam according to PiSCHEL

§419.

4 hrdayam can be used in the masculine in SaurasenT (see PiSCHEL §357:

hiao), which might support a hiae form in Magadhl. Another possibility is to
read hiaam vva, or hiaam va (cf. PiSCHEL §143, where via is prescribed as the
correct form in SaurasenT and MagadhT) .
5 lakkhiyadi is a SaurasenT form. One might consider emending it to laskiyadi,
(the way our manuscripts write kkha is hardly distinguishable from ska), or to
laskiyadi, following the most frequent usage of our manuscripts.
6 ese se (the reading of the manuscripts) seems to be in masculine (just as se
in the following sentence), while madhia is a feminine noun. One might consider
emending to esd sd or to madhie. mathikd may also mean just a hut.
7 uppekkhia is a SaurasenT form. One might consider emending to uppeskia,
the form prescribed by Hemacandra 4.297 (the way our manuscripts write kkha
is hardly distinguishable from ska), or to uppeskia, following the most frequent
usage of our manuscripts.

8 ex conj.
9 collam suggests cauryam as its chdyd, though caurah gives a better sense.

10 ex conj.

11 ex conj.

12 ex conj.
13 ex conj. mhi is a SaurasenT form, according to Pischel (§§145, 498) one
should read smi in MagadhT.

14 ex conj.

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_________________________________________ Act Three

15 ex conj. ISAACSON. bhdva is not used elsewhere by either of the Adepts.

16 ex conj. Karnakagomin in his commentary to the Pramanavarttika as­
sociates different kinds of antisocial behaviour with different Tantras (ed. R.
Samkrtyayana, p. 578, quoted in SANDERSON 2001, p. 12, n. 10): tathd kam-
bukinitantre steydcarandt siddhir uktd\, 'In the Kambukimtantras ["Tantras of
the Robber Wives"] one is said to attain magical powers through the practice
of robbery.' This certainly does not mean that Skeleton-Banner was a follower
of the Kambukimtantras, but his conduct could probably attract the attention
of the police.
Kalhana relates how Cakrabhanu ('a Guru at this time in the lineage of
the Krama, a tradition within the KaKkula', as Prof Sanderson points out hi a
letter of 10. ix. 2002, referring, among others, to Arnasimha's Mahdnayaprakdsa,
NAK 5-358, f. 119vl-5, and to Tantralokaviveka vol. 3, Ahnika 4, p. 196, 11.10-
12.) was punished by the Kashmirian king Yasaskara (939-948) for his Kaula
practices (Rajatarangini 6.108-112):
varndsramapratyaveksdbaddhakaksyah ksitwvarah]
cakrabhdnvabhidham cakramelake dvijatdpasam] \
krtdtydcdram dlokya rdjd dharmavasamvadah\
nijagrdha svapddena laldtatatam ankayan\\
tanmdtulena tadrosdd virandthena yogind\
sdndhivigrahakendtha sa svenaiva nyagrhyata\\
purvdcdryaprabhdvena svamdhdtmyddhiropanam]
prakhydpayadbhir gurubhih sraddhayeti yad ucyate\
tat khydpitaiva saptdhdt sa vipanna iti srutih}
dirghavyadhihate tasminn upapattih katham bhavet\\
' "The king [was ever] ready to exercise control over the estates and conditions
of life [among his] subjects. On discovering that at Cakramelaka a brahmin-
ascetic, Cakrabhanu by name, had departed from proper conduct, the king,
in accordance with the law, punished him by having the mark of a dog's foot
branded on his forehead. Infuriated by this, the uncle of that [Brahman], the
magician Vlranatha who was the king's own minister of foreign affairs, then
took revenge upon him." This is confidently related by certain Gurus who by
[referring to] the supernatural power of former masters would exalt their own
greatness. Through them, too, the story has been propagated that he died in
seven days. But how is this likely [in view of the fact] that he died by a lingering
disease?' (tr. STEIN)
Stein took the word cakramelaka as a local name, but, as Professor Sander-
son points out to me (in the letter cited above) 'it is much more probably the
Tantric feast known as a cakraydgah or murtiydgah which a sponsor convenes for
Vlras and YogiriTs, male and female Sakta adepts (see Tantrdloka 28.60c-61b).
In Tantrdloka 28.7 the same is referred to as a yoginzmelakah "a convening of
Yoginis". In the Viratdndavavidhi chapter of the fourth satka of the Jayad-
rathaydmala, which sets out the procedure for the celebration of an orgiastic
ritual of this kind in the KaKkula, the tradition to which Cakrabhanu belonged,
it is termed a vrrameldpah (syn. viramelakah] "a convening of Viras". (f. 206v,

194
 Act Three

v. 6-8). I have not noted the precise term cakramelakah "circle convention" in
any text of this tradition. However, it does occur in the sense I attribute to it in a
story of the supernatural in the Kashmirian Ocean of Stories (Kathasaritsdgara).
There (18.4.213ab) a band of Yoginls goes to a cakramelakah in Cakrapura and
returns from it in the last watch of the night (18.4.221).'
Branding on the forehead with the mark of a dog's foot was a punishment
for theft (see e.g. Manusmrti 9.237). Professor Sanderson proposes (in the let­
ter cited above) that 'Cakrabhanu was punished for staging a religious event in
which the Tantric participants, men and women, were given substantial sums
of money by the yajamanah who invited them. I presume that Cakrabhanu was
held responsible as the chief celebrant, the cakrandyakah /cakresvarah. I doubt
that punishment would have been inflicted for mere participation, since such
rituals were well established, however abhorrent to Vaidikas. The adepts and
Yoginls invited to the feast are given gifts and a sacrificial cash fee (daksina),
which should be not less than 4 Rupakas in the case of a Guru ( Tantrdloka
28.99-100). It was probably in this less strictly religious context that the charge
of theft (or extortion) arose.'
Cakrabhanu's uncle Vlranatha, alias Hrasvanatha, was probably his Guru
as well (see Jayaratha ad Tantraloka 4.173ab, p. 196). As Professor Sander-
son writes (in the above cited letter), 'that VTranatha was Yasaskara's Foreign
Minister (sdmdhivigrahikah) underlines the fact that such practices were not
confined to the sort of Prakrit-speaking marginals that Jayantabhatta gives us
in Smasanabhuti and Kankalaketu.' The name virandtha may also be descript­
ive. Professor Sanderson supplies (in the same letter) the following passage
from the Jayadrathaydmala (Mantraddmarikdpatala of the 3rd satka, women
come forth from Patala drawn by the sadhaka's mantra-recitation and address
him): ehy ehi virandthdsu pdtdlabhogasdgaram\ sahdsmdkam ramasvdtra ydvad
dbhumisamplavam\\ 'Come, come quickly, o Lord of Adepts, to the ocean of
pleasure in Patala, toy with us here until the earth becomes inundated.'
King Yasaskara restored order in Kashmir after the chaotic reigns of various
debauched kings following the death of Sankaravarman. Yasaskara, himself a
brahmin and elected as king by an assembly of brahmins, was a champion of
orthodoxy, and, similarly to Sankaravarman, he was not favourably disposed
towards anti-dharmic religious practices. During his reign, as Kalhana says
(Rdjatarangini 6.10-12),
na vipraguravah sdma gdyanto madirdm papuh\
na tdpasdh putraddrapasudhdnydny adhaukayan\ )
na murkhaguravo matsydpupaydgavidhdyinah\
cakrire svakrtair granthais tarkdgamapariksanam\ \
nddrsyanta ca gehinyo gurudiksotthadevatdh\
kurvdnd bhartrsTlasnnisedham murdhadhunanaih\ \
'The Brahman Gurus did not drink spirits while singing their chants. The as­
cetics did not get children, wives and crops. Ignorant Gurus did not perform
Matsyapupa sacrifice, and did not by texts of their own composition revise tra­
ditional doctrines. There were not seen house-wives figuring as divinities at
the Guru-consecration, and by shakes of their heads detracting from the distin-

195
 ________________Act Three

guished character of their husbands.' (tr. STEIN) Stem remarks (in note 11 on
p. 237, vol. I of his translation) that 'the Matsydpupaydga is a complicated sac­
rifice occurring in the Tantric ritual and still known in Kasmlr. It is mentioned
in connection with Tantric Sraddhas in the v. chapter of my MS. of the Mrtitat-
tvdnusmarana. Fish and cakes (apupa) are offered at it.' Professor Sanderson,
however, informs me (in the letter mentioned above) that he has not found any
reference to matsydpupa offerings in Kashmirian Paddhatis for the various Saiva
sraddhas, and that perhaps Kalhana condemns Saiva Tantric ritual in general,
in which fish etc. are offered to the Bhairavas and other deities.
The expression tarkdgamapanksanam is puzzling. It might be analysed as
tarkena dgamapariksanam, meaning 'examining [in order to refute] Scripture
with the help of [destructive] reasoning', but this may not be the most nat­
ural interpretation. Instead we might emend the text, as Professor Sanderson
suggests (in the above mentioned letter), to tantrdgamapariksayam, referring
to 'Gurus who were corrupting the teachings of the Tantras by propagating as
Tantras texts that they themselves had composed'. (Stein also refers to the
phenomenon of 'newly concocted Paddhatis', not unknown even in his time; see
STEIN, vol.1, p. 237, n.ll.)
Another conjecture suggested by Professor Sanderson (in the same letter) in­
stead of the unsatisfactory reading gurudiksotthadevatah is 'gurudiksoktadevatdh,
"[personifying] the goddesses taught for the Gurudlksa, i.e. initiation performed
by [Kaula] Gurus." Their head-shaking alludes to the manifestation of the symp­
toms of devatdvesah required of the participants in Kaula collective rites.'

17 ex conj. ISAACSON.
18 Another possible emendation, suggested by Dr Isaacson, is ke se.
19 According to Hemacandra 4.289, Sanskrit sta should become sta in Maga-
dhT.
20 Cf. note 4.
/
21 ex conj. su and a look very similar in Sarada script.
22 According to PlSCHEL §399, Sanskrit rdjd becomes lad in MagadhT.
s
23 ta and u look very similar in Sarada script.
24 See note 19. The change sta > ttha occurs in Sauraserii (see PlSCHEL §303).
25 ex conj. vahiadi (Skt. vadhyate] might make better sense (we would have
three successive synonyms of 'kill').

26 Cf. note 3.

27 ex conj.
28 °mha belongs to the imperative, but sometimes it is used (wrongly accord-

196
 Act Three

ing to Pischel) as an indicative ending (see PISCHEL §455).

29 Cf. note 5.

The MagadhT form of Sanskrit stn (or rather strika) should be istid ac­
cording to PISCHEL §310.
31 Cf. note 3.

32 Until we reach the last book of the Svacchandatantra the adept appears
as a solitary, celibate figure (book 13, v.4: brahmacarye vyavasthitah) , but
Book 15 (possibly interpolated and influenced by the Kaula cult, see ARRAJ
1988, pp. 367ff) shows him from another angle. Among the code-expressions
(chummakdh) listed in this book and used to conceal the adept's activity we
find words for the female partners of the adept (v. 3: bhaginyo baladarpitdh, v. 9:
duti samvdhikd, v. 13: sakhi sarvarthasddhika), semen (v. 5: sukram candrah),
penis and vagina (v. 8: lingam samtosajananam bhagah pntivivardhanah) , as
well as alcohol and meat (v. 3: madyam tu harsanam jneyam muditd tu surd
smrtd, v. 4: matsyd jalacard jneydh mdmsam ca balavardhanam) which were
the regular ingredients of Kaula ritual. Later the text enumerates several secret
gestures that a yogini (a goddess or her incarnation as a female partner) may
show to the adept (w. 24 seqq).
The cult of the YoginTs had a central role in the VidyapTtha division of
the Bhairavatantras (see SANDERSON 1988 pp. 138ff). The SiddhayogesvarT-
mata, a Tantra of the VidyapTtha, contains a detailed classification of incarnate
yoginis, teaches the adept the appropriate signs to be exchanged when they
meet these women (Chapter 29, tr. ToRZSOK 1999, p. 175ff), and refers to the
'conversation' (sambhdsana, i.e. sexual intercourse) with a special yogini who
bestows the 'perfect substance' (siddhadravya, i.e. the mingled sexual fluids
offered to the deity; see Siddhayogesvarimata 30.4, tr. TORZSOK 1999, p. 181).
33 One might consider emending sddhaka0 to the more plausibly Magadhl-
looking sdhaa0 .
34 kadham una would be a more regular form in SaurasenT and MagadhT (see
PISCHEL §184).
35 su and a look similar in Sarada script.
36 ex conj. ISAACSON. Another possible conjecture (closer to the reading of
the manuscripts, but perhaps a less natural construction) could be ddva je se.

37 Cf. note 19.

38 Pischel (§367) mentions midhund as a nom. / ace. plur. in SaurasenT.
39 Cf. note 5.

40 The MagadhT form of Sanskrit jdndti should be ydnadi / ydnddi according

197
______________________________________ Act Three

to the grammarians (Hemacandra 4.292, Vararuci 11.4, PISCHEL §§ 236, 454,

i in
510)^ but in the old Nepalese manuscript of the Ndgdnanda we find jdnad
der
a Magadhi passage. As Steiner remarks, 'Vermutlich beruht die Aufteilung
ER
Formen S. jdnadi und Mg. yanddi wiederum nur auf einer Fiktion.' (STEIN
1997, p. 173.)

The form Idena clearly shows that rdjan is treated as an a-stem noun in
this MagadhT passage.
42 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.
43 Hemacandra in 4.297 prescribes dcaska as the correct Magadhi form.
44 ex conj.
am
45 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR silently conjectured assamam, but I
not certain that one can speak about the ashram of a yogesvari.
As Judit Torzsok pointed out (ToRZSOK 1999, p.iii), 'Yogesvari meaning
word
'[female] master of Yoga' denotes the same as YoginT. (...) I think the
imes
YoginT or Yogesvari is not necessarily intended to convey that these somet
n
witch-like female spirits or goddesses have any particular relation to certai
of
classical yogic practices. Instead, the word probably refers to the similarity
supernatural effects traditional Yogins can obtain (such as being infinitely small,
]
large, strong etc.) and powers the Yoginls of this system [i.e. the Trika-Kaula
can bestow.'
The yogesvari appearing in Bhavabhuti's Mdlatimddhava belongs to the
le
more benevolent kind of witches. SaudamanT once was the favourite discip
the
of the respected Buddhist mendicant nun KamandakT. Later she took up
the
Kapalika Observance (kdvdliavvadam) , achieved miraculous powers through
e a
mastering of mantras (samdsddidaaccariamantasiddhippahdvd), and becam
­
familiar sight for other Saiva adepts and their female partners in the crema
agho-
tion grounds (rattivihdrino nddidurarannavasino sdhaassa mundadhdrino
tado
raghantandmadheassa antevdsim mahdpabbdvd kavdlakundald ndma (...)
pre­
iam paiitti, Act I, v. 15+). But from her Buddhist antecedents she had
help
served compassion towards those who suffer, and she hastened to Malatl's
the
who had been kidnapped by a revengeful kdpdlim. Then Saudamam saved
used
lives of those for whom life has lost its meaning without MalatI, and even
her transporting magic (dksepini siddhi, Act IX, v. 52) to reunite the two young
lovers.
The two adepts in Jayanta's play also think about relying on a yogesvarfs
to
protective powers, but it seems that even such powers would be insufficient
counteract the forces of justice.
Afi
w ex conj.
47 ex conj. esu, tesu, yesu seem to be used in the sense of atra, tatra, yatra
in the MagadhT passages.

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_________ _______________________________Act Three

48 RAGHAVAN and THAKUR give parayati as the chayd of paliadi, which is

not entirely convincing to me. One would expect pdledi as a causative form,
and °mdi seems to be a passive ending.

49 ex conj. sankemi seems to be MagadhT for sankayami, but the causative

sense is perhaps not appropriate here.

50 ex conj. Cf. Hemacandra 4.293, PISCHEL §276.

51 °vallahde might be a better reading.

52 Cf. note 41.

53 °ijjamti is a false SaurasenT ending according to PISCHEL §535.

54 Cf. note 3.

55 RAGHAVAN and THAKUR read °pettamte and give °pratyante as its chdyd.
56 Cf. note 43.
57 Cf. note 19.

58 According to Hemacandra 4.293, Sanskrit jna should become nna in Ma­

gadhT, but, as Pischel remarks (§276) in the manuscripts we find janna instead
of yanna.

59 Cf. note 3.
60 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.
61 Cf. note 3.
62 ex conj. ISAACSON.

63 Cf. note 3.
f
64 ex conj. One would expect abhi(ahi?)bhaviamto as a SaurasenT passive.

65 Instead of RAGHAVAN and THAKUR'S conjecture, one might emend to

durddrehi ya tdvasehi (durdcdrais ca tdpasaih).

66 ex conj.
67 In the Mattavildsa-prahasana the kapdlin compares the pub to a sacrificial
ground (v. 9+). Prof. Sanderson suggested (in a letter of IS.xii. 2003) to emend
yadi vd to yadi no in order to achieve the sense 'What in the world could be an
appropriate place for asceticism but a pub?'
68 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. One might consider completing the
otherwise unmetrical line with another word.

199
. ____________________________________ Act Three

69 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. This seems to be the most plausible

way to complete the sentence.
70 The ending ° do is characteristic of ArdhamagadhT, Maharastrt, and Jaina-
MaharastrT. According to Pischel (§367) it is wrong in SaurasenT, but a similar
ending, °dho occurs as a vocative form in MagadhT (§372).
71 1 am not certain if this is the correct interpretation of the sentence. Another
translation, suggested by Dr. Kataoka, could be: 'Your power is too strong.'
72 The inscriptions of the Saiva monasteries in the Kalacuri-Cedi country,
whose dcdryas belonged to the Mattamayura clan, provide important historical
parallels to the following description of the dsrama (for more details about this
clan see MIRASHI 1955). The Chandrehe inscription (AD 973, in MIRASHI 1955,
pp. 198ff.) gives the spiritual genealogy of Abbot Prabodhasiva, who construc­
ted the matha, and excavated a tank and a well. The serenity and peacefulness
of the monastery is described with the following charming verses (ibid. p. 201,
11.19-21):
jadataramaruc chonasydmbhahkanair ayam dsramo
mrgapatimahddhvdnai rdtrau pratidhvanitdmvarah]
sikharisikharaprdntapreiikhaddvirephapayodharo
janayati jane vidyucchaiikdm mahausadhirocisd] \
[cum]vanti vdnaragand mrgasatrupotdn
simhistanam pivati cdtra sisur mrgasya]
vairam nijam pariharanti virodhino 'nye
sarwasya sdmyati mano hi tapovanesu\\
'This ashram, where the winds are very cool with the drops of the river Sona,
where at night the sky resounds with the loud roars of lions, and the clouds,
[black] as bees, whirl around the edges of the mountain-tops—this ashram makes
people to suspect lightning with the glimmering of its excellent herbs.
Here the groups of monkeys kiss the lion-cubs, and the fawn sucks the teat of
a lioness. Other hostile [animals] set aside their natural enmity, for everyone's
heart calms down in the penance-groves.'
The fragmentary Kadwaha-inscription (10th century, edited by MlRASHl-
SHASTRI) gives us a telling picture about the relations between the rulers
and the abbots of these asramas. We are told that a certain king called
Gobhata came to the monastery with an army of elephants (ibid. p. 123,
1.12: tatrdjagdmonmadasindhurdndm valena bhupah kila gobhatdkhyah). In the
next verse somebody dies, possibly killed by the king (ibid. 1.13: [nr]pena
pardgatdsuh sahasd papdta). Abbot Dharmasiva sheds tears for the dead per­
son (ibid.: tasydvagamya sa kathdm karundvimukta*bdspah (em. MiRASHl :
°vdhpah ep.)); then he flies into a rage, with a miraculously acquired bow, re­
sembling Siva himself, defeats the enemy (ibid. 11.13-15: ksa[nam] tad anu ko-
pavipdta[ldksah] ... atha prabhdvdgatakdrmu*kena (em. MIRASHI : °kena ep.)
vdnais ca diptaih sa dhardvrsdmkah\ dtta[sva\lilas tripurdntakasya ... sakalam
api sa jitvd sdtravam sarwakalpah\), and finally ascends to heaven while ce-

200
 Act Three

lestial women shower flowers upon him (ibid.: surapatiramanmdm puspavrstyd-

vakirnah puram anupama...). The same inscription tells us about the suc­
cessor of Dharmasiva, who initiated the PratThara king Hariraja (ibid. p. 124,
1.24: dearyah sa dadau samyag diksdm kalydnakdrimm). The king offered ele­
phants in return, but, after repeated requests, the dcdrya graciously accep­
ted some villages instead (ibid. 1.27: prdrthito 'nekadd grdmdndm cakame
smitdrdravadanah sa ...).
The Malkapuram-inscription (13th century, ed. PANTULU) tells us about
Visvesvarasambhu, the dcdrya of the Golaki matha, who was the diksdguru of
the Kakatrya king Ganapatideva. The king and his daughter and heir Rudramba
granted two villages to the Abbot, who used the donation to establish an
agmhdra called Visvesvara-GolakT. The inscription gives various details about
the inhabitants of the village and the new institutions: Visvesvarasambhu foun­
ded a temple, a matha, a choultry / refectory (sattra], a maternity home
(prasutisdld) , and a hospital (drogyasdld). He settled sixty Dravida brahmin
families, eight professors to teach the three Vedas, Grammar, Mlmamsa, Nyaya,
literature, and the Agamas (p. 160,11.49-51: rgyajussdmaveddndm samyag adhydpakds
trayah\ padavdkyapramdndndm sdhityasydgamasya ca\\ panca vydkhydkrto] , a
doctor and an accountant as well (vaidyakdyasthau). Ten dancing-girls (nartakyah),
various musicians, one Kashmirian of unnamed profession (kdsmiradesiyah] , and
fourteen female singers (gdyinyah) were employed for the temple, two brahmin
cooks (pdcakau dvijanmdnau) and several attendants (paricdrakdh) for the sattra
and the matha. Ten village-guards (grdmasya raksakdh) from the Cola country
and twenty policemen (bhatdh) kept the peace, and the village was also provided
with various craftsmen. The income of some lands was used to meet the needs
of visiting Saiva ascetics, Kalamukhas, students, and Pasupatas, and to supply
s

food to all from brahmins down to the canddlas who came to Visvesvara-GolakT
(p. 160, 11. 70-73: upeyusdm saivatapodhandndm kdldnandndm sivasdsandndm\ \
vidydrthindm pdsupatavratdndm apy annavastrddisamarpandya\ drabhya viprdn
anivdritdndm canddlaparyantam updgatdndm\\ annapraddndya ca).
The Ranod-inscription (10-11th century, edited by KIELHORN) gives the
earliest genealogy of the Mattamayura clan. We learn that king Avantivarman
persuaded the sage Purandara to come to his country and to establish a matha
in his capital, Mattamayura (possibly identical with the modern Kadwaha).
Purandara initiated the king (on this initiation being Saiddhantika Saiva see
SANDERSON 2001, p.9f., n. 6), and established another matha at Aranipadra
(modern Ranod). The last dcdrya of this matha mentioned on the inscription is
Vyomasiva (or Vyomasambhu), who renovated the matha and excavated an im­
pressive tank (the beauties of which are extolled in several verses). Vyomasiva's
asceticism was exemplary (p. 358, 11.33-34):
purd yositsaiigdd anibhrtanijdksam bhagavatd
vijigye yah kdmas tripuraripundviskrtarusd\
niruddhdksah ksdntyd tarn ayam ajayat sangarahitah
sucirnndndm sydd vd kim iha tapasdm duska[ra]m iti\\33\\
'Long ago the Blessed Lord, the Enemy of the Three Forts, showed his anger
and defeated Kama by opening his [third] eye, because of the contact with a

201
 Act Three

woman: he[, Vyomasiva,] has defeated him [i.e. Kama] with eyes closed, with
forbearance, avoiding contact [with women]. Or rather, what would be difficult
for well-observed ascetic practices?'
On the other hand, the same Abbot was a great scholar, well-versed in various
philosophical doctrines (ibid. 11.36-38):
siddhdntesu mahesa esa niyatam nydye 'ksapddo munir
gambhire ca kandsinas tu kanabhuk sdstre srutau jaiminih\
sdmkhye 'nalpamatih svayam ca kapilo lokdyate sadgurur
vuddho vvuddhamate jinoktisu jinah ko vdtha nay am krtf\\36\\
'He was truly the Great Lord in [the teachings of Saivaj Siddhanta, the Sage
Aksapada in Nyaya, Kanabhuj [= Kanada] in the deep science of Kanasin [=
Kanada], Jaimini in Vedic tradition, the intelligent Kapila himself in Samkhya,
a true master of Lokayata, Buddha in Buddha's doctrine, Jina in Jina's teach­
ings. Or rather, whom was this wise person not equal to?'
(pp. 358f., 11.40-42:)
samlinam mukha eva sdkyakarindm atyurjjitam garjjitam
trdsdd yasya ca jainajamvukasatair ddurvydhrtam sarnhrtam]
sodham jdtu na jaiminiyaharinair Mdkrtam humkrtam
tasydnyad gaganesakdnanapateh kim sydt stutam prastutam\\39\\
'Out of fear from him, the Buddhist elephants' thunderous trumpeting died
away already in their mouth, and hundreds of Jaina jackals subdued their in­
articulate crying. The Mlmamsaka antelopes ^
could never endure his playful
roaring. What other deed of this lord of Siva's forest shall we praise?'
Vyomasiva apparently does not fit into the picture of the "typical" dcdrya
of the Mattamayura clan as it was drawn by Richard Davis (DAVIS, p. 135):
'Like Tolstoy's proverbial hedgehog, the Drunken Peacocks know only one thing
[i.e. Saiva Siddhanta], but they know it very well. The poets seldom praise the
Saiva sages for their mastery of other traditional Indian disciplines of knowledge
like grammar, or for knowing other genres of religious texts such as the Vedas.'
It is certainly tempting to identify this learned Saiva Abbot with the author
of the VyomavatT, a work on Vaisesika philosophy. According to Walter Slaje
(SLAJE, 'Untersuchungen...'), Jayanta and the philosopher Vyomasiva were
contemporaries, while the date of the Abbot Vyomasiva might also be settled
around 900 AD. The following verse of another inscription (now in the Archae­
ological Museum, Gwalior), praising the same dcdrya, might also support this
identification (the inscription was not at my disposal; it is described in WlLLlS,
p. 113; the verse is quoted in PATHAK, p. 39, n.4):
munisuryena nirastam tikdlokena yena lokasya]
prakatayateha paddrtham santam asac ca santamasam\\
'.. .which sun-like sage dispelled the darkness of the world with the light of
his commentary (i.e. the Vyomavatl-tlka on the Prasastapadabhasya?) which
revealed here both the existing categories and non-existence (asat - abhdva).'
(Prasastapada omits abhdva and mentions six paddrthas. Vyomasiva explains
why abhdva is subordinated to the other categories.)
In any case, we shall see that the God-proving arguments of the Saiva
dcdrya in the Agamadambara (just as similar arguments in the texts of the Saiva

202
 Act Tiree

Siddhanta) are remarkably close to those found in the Vaisesika VyomavatT (and
in several Nyaya texts as well).
73 Instead of accepting the reading of the manuscripts one might conjecture
°manthanalasya°, 'a [graceful] dance: the waving of the mendicant-garments'.
74 ex conj. Another possible way of emending the text could be: pasamtataram
ajja tavovanam imam no disadi, 'This penance-grove seems to me most peaceful
today.' The correct Saurasenl form of ramamyam should be ramanfam, and not
ramanijjam (see Pi8CHEL§138).
75 The colour of laughter is white, like the ashes smeared on the ascetic's body.
76 ex conj. ISAACSON. I cannot interpret the reading cairaveda (airaveda?,
eraveda?). The only meaningful word which resembles it is Ailavila or Aidavida,
a name of Kubera (cf. Amarakosa 2.73).
77 ex conj. The conjecture is a tentative one.
78 One could also consider reading sivapurahstham.
79 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR'S emendation, balamha, might^ also be
a Prakrit form of brahma, although one would expect baramha in a SaurasenT
passage. Another possibility, suggested by Prof. Sanderson, is to understand
the Prakrit as 'brahmabhutam1 (and perhaps emend the text to bamhabhudam)
and translate 'I imagine myself ascending, merged with Brahman'.
orj
ex conj.
81 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR, probably misreading the manuscripts,
took sankd agreeing with yathavasthita. The manuscripts however, read yathava-
sthitas, agreeing with dsraminah (which also seems to give a better meaning).
82 ex conj. One might consider emending this otherwise unmetrical line in
another way.
83 The manuscripts read uggdhanakaanakhamdhamva, which was emended by
RAGHAVAN and THAKUR to uggakhanavaanavamdham vva, for which they give
the following chdyd (with a question mark): ugraksanavacanabandham iva. Al­
though this conjecture is neither convincing nor interpretable for me, I cannot
suggest anything better.
84 ex em. ISAACSON.
85 ex conj. The expression ekavrkse often occurs in Tantric context, indicat­
ing a suitable place for performing a ritual, see e.g. Siddhayogesvanmata 6.3.
Another possible emendation, suggested by Prof. Sanderson, is 'marudese ', 'in
the desert'.

203
 Act Three

0 ex em. ISAACSON. Sarvadarsanasaiigraha (Carvakadarsana) p. 6: lokasiddho

Qf*

raja paramesvarah\ 'The [only] Supreme Lord is the king, who[se existence] is
[well-]established among the people.' (also p. 7: lokasiddho bhaved raja pareso
ndparah smrtah\) As Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me in a letter of 15. xii. 2003,
'there may be an allusion here to the convention whereby religious texts con­
strain the king to support their institutions by promising him a long reign if he
complies and a short one if he doesn't'.
87 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. The adding of a word with a similar
meaning seems to be necessary.
88 The Carvaka's behaviour is disrespectful probably because he does not wait
until he is offered a seat, or, as Prof. Sanderson pointed out to me in the above
mentioned letter, 'because he uses impertinently familiar forms of address to
both the ascetic and Samkarsana'.
89 Cf. Sarvadarsanasaiigraha (Carvakadarsana) p. 3: anganadyalinganadijanyam
sukham eva purusdrthah\ 'The only goal of man is pleasure produced by such
[activities] as embracing women and the like.' Ibid. p. 4: yadi kascid bhirur
drstam sukham tyajet tarhi sa pasuvan murkho bhavet\ tad uktam —
'tydjyam sukham visayasaiigamajanma pumsdm
duhkhopasrstam' iti murkhavicdranaisd\
vrmrn jihdsati sitottamatandulddhydn
ko ndma bhos tusakanopahitdn hitdrthi\\
'If someone cowardly gave up the pleasure he had already experienced then he
would be as stupid as a beast. It is said: "The idiots express the following opin­
ion: 'Men should give up pleasure arising from the contact with sense objects,
[since it is] accompanied by pain.' Who on earth, if he means well by himself,
would throw away rice which is rich in white grains of the best quality, just
because it is mixed with bits of husk?"'
90 Cf. Sarvadarsanasangraha (Carvakadarsana) p. 5: nanu pdralaukikasukhd-
bhdve bahuvittavyayasanrdydsasddhye 'gnihotrddau vidydvrddhdh katham pra-
vartisyante iti cet, tad api na pramdnakotim pravestum iste\ anrtavydghdtapunar-
uktadosair dusitatayd vaidikammanyair eva dhurtabakaih parasparam karmakdn-
daprdmdnyavddibhir jndnakdndasya jndnakdndaprdmdnyavddibhih karmakdnda-
sya ca pratiksiptatvena trayyd dhurtapraldpamdtratvena agnihotrdder jwikdmd-
traprayojanatvdt\ tathd cdbhdnakah—
agnihotram trayo vedds tridandam bhasmagunthanam]
buddhipaurusahmdndm jwiketi brhaspatih] \
'Objection: "If there is no happiness which belongs to the next world, then why
should those who are advanced in learning engage in [rituals] such as the Ag-
nihotra, which can [only] be performed at great expense and physical labour?"
This [objection] cannot enter the class of proofs either. For [rituals] such as
the Agnihotra are good only for making a living, since [the Veda] is defiled by
the faults of falsehood, contradiction, and superfluous repetition; and since the
shrewd hypocrites who fancy themselves Vedic experts refute each other's texts:

204
 Act Three

those who hold that [only] the ritualistic part of the Veda is valid reject its eso­
teric part, while those who hold that [only] the esoteric part is valid reject the
ritualistic part; and since the three Vedas are just the ravings of rogues. As the
[following] saying also [points out]: 'The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the triple
staff [of a renouncer], the smearing [of one's body] with ashes are the livelihood
of those who lack intelligence and manliness: thus [taught] Brhaspati.'

91 Cf. Naresvarapanksdprakdsa p. 8: ... esa vandhydsuto ydti ityddivdkyajdta-

syeva prdmdnydbhdvdt... 'since it lacks validity like such kind of statements as
"here goes the son of a barren woman".'

92 Cf. Brhaspatismrti (reconstructed by K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar, Gaek-

wad's Oriental Series LXXXV, Baroda, 1941) 2.12:
mamdnena praddtavyam sasasrngakrtam dhanuh\
asambhdvyam asddhyam tarn paksam dhur mamsinah\ \
' "He must give me a bow made of hare-horn." The wise say that this idea is
inconceivable and not accomplishable.'

93 Cf. Pardkhyatantra 1.92cd-94cd:

karmand dehasamyogo vibhor api mahesvardt\\
asaktatvdt svato ndsya sdmarthyam karmayojane\
pasutvaruddhacicchakteh svdtantryam na pasor atah\ \
karma cidrahitam tasmdd yojakam tad apeksate\
yojakah sa mahesdnah svecchayd balavdn yatah\
'The linking of the soul, though all-pervading, with a body because of action
[comes about] through the [intervention of the] Lord. Because the soul is without
power he does not of himself have the capacity for linking himself to [the con­
sequences of his] actions, and so the bound soul, whose power of consciousness is
blocked by impurity, has no autonomy. [And] action is devoid of consciousness
and therefore it depends on something that links it [to those to whom it must
accrue]. The entity that links it is the Supreme Lord, who does it by His will,
since He has might.' (tr. GOODALL)
94 The following verses could also have been said from a mimdmsaka position.
See for example Agamaprdmdnya pp.34ff. (mimdmsakapaksa):
kva vd dese tisthann anavaratatrptah kim iti vd
kadd vd nissesam janayati tad etad vimrsatu\
kvacit tisthann istam kim api phalam uddisya karanaih
kaddcid yatkincij janayati kuldlddir akhilah\ \
krtdrthatvdt kndd na ca bhavati hetur yadi khalu
svabhdvah svdtantryam prakatitam aho samprati vibhoh\
abhipretam kincid yad ayam asamiksyaiva kurute
jagajjanmasthemapravilayamahdydsam avasah\ \
anukampdprayuktena srjyamdnds ca jantavah\
sukhinah kim na srjyante tatkarmdpeksayd yadi\ \
tatah svatantratdhdnih kimca tair eva hetubhih\
upapanne 'pi vaicitrye kim tatkalpanaydnayd\\

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'Consider this: being where, when, and why does He who is constantly satisfied
create that entire [universe]? Every [person], such as a potter, creates whatever
[he creates] while being at a certain place, at a certain time, with regard to
a certain result, [and] with [certain] instruments. And since He has fulfilled a
purpose [when He created the world], [mere] sport cannot be the motive [behind
His acts]; if the motive is [His] nature: by George, now you have demonstrated
the independence of the Lord, since he helplessly makes the great effort of pro­
ducing, sustaining, and creating the world without taking into account anything
[He might have] wished for. If He produces the creatures stimulated by com­
passion, then why does he not produce them happy? If [you reply that] because
[God] takes their karmas into consideration, then [His] independence will suffer
a loss. Furthermore, if the variety [of worldly phenomena] is explainable with
the help of those causes [i.e. karmas] alone, then why postulate Him in this
way?' (Cf. Slokavdrttika sambandhdksepaparihdra v. 52 seqq.)

95 Bhasarvajna examines similar alternatives in Nydyabhusana pp. 458f.: tatha-

pi vicdryam etat, kimartham pravartate bhagavdn iti? pardnugrahdrtham ity
eke\ (...) athavd svdrtham eva pravartate\ (...) athavd ddityavat svabhdvenaiva
pravartate\ 'Nevertheless we should examine for what purpose the Lord is en­
gaged [in creation]. Some say that [he creates] in order to favour others. (...)
Or maybe he is engaged [in creation] only for his own sake. (...) Or maybe he
is engaged [in creation] just by his inherent nature, similarly to the sun [which
shines because that is its nature].'
96 Cf. Kiranatantra 1.5cd: jay a nrttamahdrambhaknddviksobhaddruna\\ 'Vic­
tory, [you who are] fearsome because of the shaking [of the world] as a result of
the vigorous playfulness of your dancing!' (tr. GOODALL)
97 The scriptures of Saiva Siddhanta often refer to prerand as a characteristic
act of God and the lords of mantras, on the different levels of creation, e.g.
Kiranatantra 3.25cd-26:
isvaro 'dhahsthavidydndm patin samprerayaty asau\ \
tena preritamdtrds te kurvate 'dhastanam jagat\
suddhe 'dhvani sivah kartd prokto 'nanto 'site prabhuh\ \
'The Lord urges the overlords of the lower mantras [to act]. As soon as they have
been urged by Him, they create the lower universe. In the pure path Siva is the
creator. Ananta is taught to be the lord in the impure [path].' (tr. GOODALL)
Ibid. 14d: yonim prerayate ksandt\\ '[Ananta] immediately stimulates the matrix
[of primal matter to generate from herself all that is material].' (tr. GOODALL)

98 It is not entirely clear to me why would God create out of 'honesty'. The
text may be corrupt here.
99 Cf. Kiranatantra 3.9cd: vaikaranydd amurtatvdt kartrtvam yujyate katham\\
'How is it possible for Him to be a creator, since He lacks the means and is
not embodied?' Bhatta Ramakantha's Kiranavrtti ad loc.: karandndm abhdvo
vaikaranyam, tasmad isvaro jagatah kartd na sambhavati] karandbhdvdd danda-

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 Act Three

cakrasutrddirahitah kumbhakdra iva kumbhe\ tad idam uktam jaimintyaih—'na

ca nihsddhanah kartd kascit srjati kincana]' (Slokavarttika^ sambandhdksepapa-
rihdra 50cd) 'He lacks instruments, and because of this it is impossible that the
Lord created the universe. Because of His lack of instruments He is like a potter
who has no stick, wheel, thread or other instrument in regard to [creating] a
pot. The same [point] is expressed by the MTmamsakas: "And no creator ever
creates anything without means to accomplish it." (tr. GOODALL) As the verse
quoted from the Slokavarttika shows, this objection could also be made from a
Mimamsaka position.

100 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR. One might consider completing the
otherwise unmetrical line with another word.

101 Vdkyapadiya 1.32, also quoted in Nydyamanjari vol. I, p. 314, Tattvasan-

graha 1459, and Syddvddaratndkara p. 262. Bhartrhari illustrates this asser­
tion in his vrtti (p. 89), e.g. grismahemantddisu kupajalddindm atyantabhinndh
sparsddayo drsyante, 'things such as water in a well feel and [look, etc.] very dif­
ferent in summer, in winter, or in other [seasons]' (an illustration of kdlabheda,
which makes it impossible to infer the exact temperature of the water). Thus,
as Vrsabhadeva notes, tatra sydd api kascid dhumo yo ndgneh, yathd sdlukdd
api sdlukah, gomaydd api, 'among [all things in the world] there might exist
such a smoke which does not arise from fire, just as some frogs are born from
frogs, others from cow-dung'.
102 Vdkyapadiya 1.42, also quoted in Nydyamanjari vol. I, p. 316. Bhartrhari
actually intended to emphasise the importance of scripture with this verse. As
he explains in his vrtti (pp. 98f.): yasya hi sthdlipuldkanydyenaikadesam drstvd
siste 'rthe pratipattih so 'ndha iva visame girimdrge caksusmantam netdram
antarena tvarayd paripatan kamcid eva mdrgaikadesam hastasparsendvagamya
samatikrdntas tatpratyaydd aparam api tathaiva pratipadyamdno yathd vindsam
labhate tadvad dgamacaksusd vind tarkdnupdti kevalendnumdnena kvacid dhita-
pratyayo drstddrstaphalesu karmasv dgamam utkramya pravartamdno niyatam
mahatd pratyavdyena samyujyate\ 'For someone who, following the maxim of
the cooking-pot and boiled rice, having seen a portion [of the whole thing]
determines the rest of the thing [since he assumes it to be the same as the
portion he has seen], just as a blind man, who runs on an uneven mountain
path without a guide who can see, covers just a small distance while feeling it
by touch of hand, and because of the knowledge (or confidence) [produced] by
that he believes the remaining [part of the road] to be the same, perishes—in
the same way that man, too, who, without the 'eye' of scripture, follows logic
and, having attained partial knowledge (or confidence about certain things) with
the help of inference alone, becomes engaged in actions that have visible and
invisible results while he disregards scripture: [such a person] will necessarily
meet great disaster.'
103 Vdkyapadiya 1.34, also quoted in Tattvasangraha 1461, Nydyamanjari
vol. I, p. 316.

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 Act Three

104 Cf. BHATTACHARYA, p. 605, III.l.

105 ex conj.

Cf. Tattvopaplavasimha, p. 125: upaplutesv eva tattvesv avicdritaramamydh

sarve vyavahdrd ghatanta iti\ 'Only when the principles have been annihilated,
all transactions take place pleasantly [as long as] they are not examined.' The
alamkarika Udbhata (who may or may not be the same as the Carvaka Udbhata
who wrote a Tattvavrtti according to Syadvadaratnakara, p. 265) classified sub­
ject matters into two groups: "well-established [even after] they have been ana­
lysed" (vicdritasusthah) jand "pleasing [only as long as] they are not analysed"
(avicdritaramamyah). Sdstras deal with the former group, while kavyas with
the latter (quoted in Kdvyamimamsd, p. 44).
107 Cf. JACOB 1909, who gives the following possible interpretations: 'unduly
extending one's claim or one's position generally' ( = bhiksupddaprasdrana-
nydya), 'to establish one's self freely and fully: to extend one's power far and
wide'. Jacob also makes the following observation: 'In the passages, however,
in which I have met with the expression, it seems to employ a dogged adherence
to a position in spite of previous failure, and when there is little prospect of fur­
ther success.' (Jacob quotes the Upamitibhavaprapancd Kathd, the Khandana-
khandakhddya, and the Nydyamanjan.)
108 ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.
109 ex conj. SANDERSON.
110 Nydyabhdsya ad Nydyasutra 1.1.7 (p. 14).
111 ex conj. The conjecture is supported by the parallel passage in the Nyaya-
manjari.
This was the view of the 'sophisticated' Carvakas (susiksitatardh, Nydya-
manjari vol. I, pp. 326f.), who are identified by Cakradhara as 'Udbhata & co.'
(udbhatddayah, Nydyamanjangranthibhanga p. 19; on p. 43 Cakradhara also tells
us that with the term 'cunning Carvaka' (cdrvdkadhurta) Jayanta also refers to
Udbhata).
KamalasTla ascribes this position to Purandara ( Tattvasangrahapanjikd, in­
troducing v. 1482): purandaras tv aha— 'lokaprasiddham anumdnam cdrvdkair
apisyata eva, yat tu kaiscil laukikam mdrgam atikramydnumdnam ucyate, tan
nisidhyate' iti\ 'Purandara, on the other hand, says: "[That kind of] inference
which is well established in everyday life is certainly accepted by the Carvakas,
too, but that [kind of] inference is rejected which some people assert going bey­
ond the everyday path [of reasoning]."'
The Syadvadaratnakara quotes Udbhata's commentary on Purandara's fol­
lowing sutra (p. 265): pramdnasydgaunatvdd (em. : pramdnasya gaunatvdd
ed.) anumdndd arthaniscayo durlabhah} 'Since a [real] means of valid know­
ledge is not indirect, it is hardly possible to ascertain things on the basis of

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inference.' (The same sutra is also quoted in Nyayamanjan vol. I, p. 312, and
in Nyayabhusana p. 210; in the latter text one should emend arthadurlabhah
to arthaniscayo durlabhah. Bhasarvajna glosses agaunatva with anupacarita-
visayatva.) Says Udbhata (Syddvddaratndkara pp. 265f.): lokaprasiddhesv api
hetusu vyabhicdrddarsanam asti, tantrasiddhesv api tena vyabhicdrddarsana-
laksanagunasddharmyatas tantrasiddhahetunam tathdbhdvo vyavasthdpyata iti
gaunatvam anumdnasya\ avyabhicdrdvagamo hi laukikahetundm anumeydvaga-
me nimittam, sa ndsti tantrasiddhesv iti na tebhyah paroksdvagamo nydyyah, ata
idam uktam anumdndd arthaniscayo durlabha iti\ 'As for [those] logical reasons
which are well established in the world, we do not see that they are erroneous;
therefore, because of the apparent [but unreal] similarity of the property [called]
"the non-perception of erroneousness" also with respect to [logical reasons] that
have been established scientific works, it is determined that logical reasons es­
tablished in scientific works are thus [i.e. non-erroneous]: this is the indirect
nature of inference. For the ground of ascertaining the inferendum is the ascer­
tainment of the non-erroneousness of ordinary logical reasons; this does not take
place in the case of [logical reasons which are] established in scientific works:
so it is not right to infer from them things that are beyond the scope of sense-
perception. That is why it has been said: "It is hardly possible to ascertain
things on the basis of inference".'

112 Cf. Kiranatantra 3.12ac:

sthulam vicitrakam kdryam ndnyathd ghatavad bhavet]
asti hetur atah kascit...
'[The universe is] gross, diverse, [and therefore] an effect, like a pot. It cannot
be otherwise. And so there exists some [instigating] cause.' (tr. GOODALL)
Commenting on this verse Ramakantha distinguishes two positions regarding
the origin of the universe. For the Samkhyas and the Buddhists, the universe
is an effect, but not for the MTmamsakas, Jainas, and Carvakas, who hold that
'the universe was never not thus' (na kaddcid anTdrsam jagad, Kiranavrtti p. 71.)
The Tantra rejects the view of the latter group and establishes that the universe
is a product. Says Ramakantha: yat sthulam tat kdryam yathd ghatddi, sthulam
caitad adrstakartrkam bhuvanddi, tatah kdryam iti\ (ibid.) 'Whatever is gross is
an effect, like such things as pots. This [universe] that consists in the worlds and
so on, and whose creator is not directly experienced, is also gross and therefore
[it too is] an effect.' (tr. GOODALL)
A few lines below Ramakantha further expands on the subject (Kiranavrtti
p. 72): yat kdryam tad visistajndnakriydyuktakartrd vind na siddhyatiti yathd
ghatddi\ kdryam caitat sarvam eva jagat\ atas tad api visistajndnakriydyuktena
kartrd vind na bhavati\ yas tatkartd sa Tsvarah siddha eva\ 'Whatever is an ef­
fect cannot exist without a creator equipped of particular powers of knowledge
and action, just as pots and such [cannot exist without such a creator]. So too
this entire universe is an effect. And therefore that too cannot come into being
without a creator equipped of particular powers of knowledge and action. And
so its creator, God, is established.' (tr. GOODALL)
Cf. Mataiigapdramesvara, vidydpdda 99cd-100ab (p. 226):

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 Act Three

nimittakdranam tv iso hy updddnam tu saktayah\\

samavdyi tathd mdyd kdryam etaj jagat sadd]
'The Lord is the instigating cause, as for [his] powers, they are the mater­
ial cause, and maya is the inseparable cause; this world is always the ef­
fect.' (Bhatta Ramakantha in his vrtti ad loc. seems to interpret updddna
as sahakdrikdrana and samavdyin as upadana.)
Cf. also Pardkhyatantra 2.2-3:
murtdh sdvayavd ye 'rthd ndndrupaparicchaddh]
sthuldvayavasistatvdd buddhimaddhetupurvakdh] )
ato 'sti buddhimdn kascid isvarah samavasthitah\
pratipannah svakdryena drstendtrdnumdnatah\\
'All things that are endowed with form, that are made up of parts, that have
various forms, because they are distinguished by having gross parts must neces­
sarily depend on a sentient cause. Therefore there exists some sentient [cause].
[And that is] proved to be the Lord. He is known, according to this system, by
the inference that we draw from His effects, which we directly experience.' (tr.
GOODALL)
Ibid. v. 12ab (Pratoda's objection):
ksiter evamvidham rupam na kaddcid anidrsam\
'The form of the earth is thus; it was never not thus. (tr. GOODALL)
Ibid. 2.29abc (from Prakasa's reply):
nimittam isvardkhyam yat tad drstam sahakdranam]
upadanam ca yat suksmam
'The instigating cause is called the 'lord'; that which is the auxiliary cause is
something seen [such as the stick, wheel, etc.]; that which is the material cause
is subtle [matter].' (tr. GOODALL)
The same arguments, establishing that composite entities like mountains
must be products (which fact also serves to prove the necessity of God's exist­
ence, since all effects require a cause, and special effects require a special cause),
can be found e.g. in the Nydyabhusana (p. 453: bhubhudharddes ca kdryatvam
sdvayavatvena pratvyate, sdvayavasya nityatvavirodhdt, khananddind caikadesa-
vindsadarsandt\ 'And we learn that the earth, mountains, etc. are products from
the fact they are composite, for something which is composite cannot be per­
manent, and since we see that parts of it get destroyed through digging, etc.'),
the Nydyavdrttika (pp. 433ff.) and also in two Isvarasiddhis (one vaisnava and
the other saiva): that of Yamunacarya (pp. 158, 164.), and that of Utpaladeva
(pp. 13ff.).
See also Vyomavatt, p. 70: prthivi karyam, avayavasannivesavisistatvat\ yad yad
avayavasannivesavisistam, tat tat kdryam drstam, yatha ghatddi] tathd cdvayava-
sannivesavisistd prthivi, tasmdt karyeti\; 'The earth is a product, because it is
characterised by the combination of [its] parts. If A is characterised by the
combination of [its] parts then A is understood to be a product, like a pot. Ac­
cordingly the earth is characterised by the arrangement of [its] parts, therefore
it is a product.'
Ibid. p. 101: ksityddmi kdrydni racandvattvdt\ yad yad racandvat, tat tat kdryam,
yatha ghatddi\ tathd racandvat ksityddi, tasmdt kdryam iti\ 'The earth and

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[mountains and similar objects] are products, because they have arrangement.
If A has arrangement then A is a product, like a pot. And the earth and
[mountains and similar objects] have arrangement, therefore they are products.'
3 Cf. Kiranavrtti ad 3.9ab: ndpi rupalabdhyddind caksurddir iva purvokta-
tanukaranabhuvanddikdrydnyathdnupapattilaksanendnumdnena tasya mahdbhu-
tebhya evotpattidrsteh\ yad dhuh saugatdh— 'yasmin sati bhavaty eva yat tato
'nyasya kalpane\ taddhetutvena sarvatra hetundm anavasthitih\\ ' (Pramdnavdr-
ttika, pramdnasiddhi 26; Pandeya's edition reads yesu satsu) 'Nor [can we infer
a creator God], in the same way as [we infer] the faculty of sight and other [sense
faculties] by their effects, such as the perception of form, by an inference on the
basis that we cannot otherwise account for [what must be the Lord's] effects,
such as the bodies, instruments and worlds mentioned above, since that [body
of effects] is known from experience to arise from the [five] elements alone. As
the Buddhists say: "If something comes into being when another thing exists
and one posits as the cause of the former some entity other than the latter, then
there is an infinite regress of causes." (tr. GOODALL)
Also Pardkhyatantra 2.4 (Pratoda's objection):
kdryakdranasambandho na grhito yatas tayoh]
tena tatkdrandbhdvdn na khydpyam kdryadarsanam\\
'Since we do not perceive that there is a relation of cause and effect between
them [viz. between God and the world we see], and [because] there is therefore
nothing [that we know] to have caused this [world], therefore you should not
proclaim that we have direct experience of [His] effects [since we do not know
them to be effects].' (tr. GOODALL)
Yamunacarya cites a similar objection in his Isvarasiddhi (pp. 163f.): mahT-
mahTdharddi kdryam na bhavati, prasiddhakdryavilaksanatvdt, gaganavat, asak-
yadarsanopdddnopakaranatvdd vd vyatirekena ghatddivat] 'The earth, mountains
and [similar objects] cannot be effects, since, like the air, they are different from
well-known effects, or, unlike in the case of such things as a pot, it is impossible
to see their material and instrumental causes.'
114 Cf. Bhatta Ramakantha's vrtti ad Matangapdramesvara, vidydpdda 6.99cd-
lOOab (p. 228) where he also refutes Dharmakirti's objection (Pramdnavdrtti-
ka, pramdnasiddhi 13-14) and then says: anyathd mahdnasavartino dhumasyd-
gnikdryatvasiddhdv api parvatddivartinas tato 'nyatvdd agnikdryatvdsiddheh, gha
tagatasya krtakatvasydnityatvasiddhdv api sabdasambandhino 'siddheh sarvatrd-
siddhatvasya sambhavdt sarvdnumdndbhdva eva\ 'Otherwise [i.e. if we accepted
the Buddhist position], even though the smoke in the kitchen is proved to be
an effect of fire, since the [smoke] on the mountain is different from the one
[in the kitchen], we could not prove that it is [also] an effect of fire; [and] even
though the artificiality of the pot is proved from its impermanence, [the artifici­
ality] connected with sound could not be established; thus the possibility of not
[being able to] draw a conclusion could occur everywhere, and so all inferences
would be completely abolished.'
Cf. also Bhatta Narayanakantha's Mrgendravrtti ad 3.6cd-7ab (p. llOff.).

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115 Cf. Pramdnavarttika (Pandey), pramanasiddhi 13: siddham yddrg adhisthd-

trbhdvdbhdvdnuvrttimat\ sannivesddi tad yuktam tasmdd yad anumtyate\\
116 Ramakantha also deals with this Buddhist objection in his Kiranavrtti
(pp. 72-73): na ca kdryatvam atra tathdbhutam no, siddham ity dsankaniyam\
yad dhuh saugatdh— (Pramdnavarttika^ pramanasiddhi 13-14)
'siddham yddrg adhisthdtrbhdvdbhdvdnuvrttimat\
sannivesddi tad yuktam tasmdd yad anumiyate\\
vastubhede prasiddhasya sabdasdmydd abhedinah\
na yuktdnumitih pdndudravydd iva hutdsane\\
iti\ kdryamdtrasya kartrmdtrena ghatddau krtakatvamdtrasydnityatvamdtreneva
vydpteh siddhatvdt\ anyathd tatrdpy anyatrdpi ca drstdntasddhyadharmabhedena
hetubhedakalpane sarvdnumdndbhdva eva\ avisesdt pdndutvasya tu bhdvdd dhu-
mdbhdve 'pi himamakkolddisu ca taddarsandd vahnyanumdpakatvam ayuktam
eva\
'And it cannot be questioned that its being an effect in the same way is proved,
as the Buddhists [do when they] say: "When that particular kind of compos-
iteness etc. is established to be in positive and negative concomitance with the
[existence of the] controller—it is fine that that [i.e. the existence of a control­
ler] is inferred from that [kind of compositeness]. (N.B. The translation of this
verse is mine.) But an inference in respect of some particular thing of something
well-known from some [logical ground] which is similar [to that in some valid
argument such as the one outlined above just] because the wording is the same is
not correct. [It is] like [inferring the presence of] fire from [the presence of some]
pale substance [simply because smoke can be called a pale substance]." [This
objection does not hold] because it is established that every effect is invariably
concomitant with an agent, as [we see] in the case of pots and such, just as being
a product is invariably concomitant with impermanence. Otherwise both there
and elsewhere, if one creates some [imaginary] differentiation of logical grounds
by differentiating between the attribute that one wishes to prove and [that of]
the example, then all inferences will be impossible. On the other hand, because
it exists even where there is no smoke and because one sees it in snow and chalk,
and the like, it would be wrong [to allow] that undifferentiated whiteness should
be the basis for the inference of fire.' (tr. GOODALL; cf. Nydyamanjan, vol. I,
pp. 493-494, Nydyabhusana pp. 480ff, Utpaladeva's Isvarasiddhi pp. 8f.)
See also Vyomavati, p. 102: atha dhumasydgnimdtrena vydpter upalambhat
yatropalambhas tatraivdgniprasddhakatvdd viruddhatdnavakdsa iti cet, ihdpi sa-
mdnam, kdryatvasya buddhimatd vydpter upalambhat pakse tatsddhakatvam iti\
'If [you object that], because we cognise that [the presence of] smoke is pervaded
by [the presence of] fire alone, where we perceive [smoke] there and only there
[smoke] proves [the presence of] fire, and thus there is no scope of erroneousness,
[the train of thoughts] is the same in this case, too: because we cognise that the
condition of being a product is pervaded by [the presence of a] rational [maker],
[the presence of product-ness] in the subject proves that [i.e. that it was made by
a rational being].' Later Vyomasiva also quotes and refutes Dharmakirti's objec­
tion (Pramdnavarttika pramanasiddhi 13-15 in Vyomavatl, pp. 106f.). He also

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makes the same remark about 'whiteness' as Ramakantha, and adds: evam ca
valmikdddv apt mrdvikdratvam na kuldlapurvakatve lirigam, vyabhicdrdt\ tasya
hi prdkdrestakddisv akuldlapurvakesv api sadbhdvdt\ 'And thus, in the case of
such things as ant-hills, too, the condition of being a modification of clay is not
a logical reason which proves that [the activity of] a potter is a precondition [of
their existence], because of the irregularity [of this logical reason], since it is also
present in such things as walls or bricks, which are dependent on [the activity
of somebody who is] not a potter.'
117 Cf. Pramdnavdrttika, pramdnasiddhi 14, quoted above.

118 Cf. Ramakantha's refutation of DharmakTrti's objection (note 116).

See also Pardkhyatantra 2.5:
sambandho na grhtto vd kdryakdranatas tv iha\
kdryam drstvd paroksam tat kdranam gamyate sphutam]
tddrgvidhena kdryena kartd kdryasya miyate\\
'You may argue that a relation [of cause and effect] is not perceived, but because
of the [connection between] effect and cause [that we directly experience] in the
world, it is clear that when we perceive [what must be] an effect, we understand
[that there must have been] a cause of it that cannot directly be perceived by
us. Through such an effect the creator of the effect is known.' (tr. GOODALL)
Cf. also Yamunacarya's Isvarasiddhi, p. 164: na cedrsa eva sannivesah kdryo
netara ity avayavasannivesapratiniyatam rupabhedam udiksdmahe] 'And we do
not expect [to find] a difference in nature determined for each [particular case
of] compositeness of constituent parts, in the form of "only this kind of com-
positeness is an effect, and not a different [kind]".'
119 Cf. Bhatta Narayanakantha's commentary to Mrgendratantra 3.2 (pp.
103ff.): tad evam kdryatvahetund jagato buddhimatkartrpurvakatvasiddhau yo
'sau tattadvaicitryasampddikecchdjndnakriydsaktiyuktah, kartd sa ity asmadddi-
kdryavilaksanaksityddikdryavisesajanakakdranavisesdvagamo yuktah\ na caitad
aprasiddham yasmdd
'vaisistyam kdryavaisistydd drstam lokasthitdv api\'
(as Dr. Goodall informed me in July 2001, this verse seems to belong to the
text of the Tantra, and it is indeed quoted as part of the mula in Trilocana's
Siddhdntdrthasamuccaya T.206 p. 62, T.284 p. 133)
lokavyavahdre 'pi visistam kdryam drstvd visistam eva kdranam anumiyate, ya-
thd vicitrabhavanddivastucitralepddikaldkaldpasydmukhyatdm madhyatvam anu-
pamasaundaryasampadam ca drstvd, tattatkartur api tadgatavailaksanydd vaisi­
styam avasiyate\ atas ca
'yad yathd yddrsam ydvat kdryam tatkdranam tathd] \ '
(...) evam jagallaksanakdryasya tattatprakdrdkdravaicitryam upalabhya tattad-
visesavisayaniratisayajndnakriydsaktiyuktam kdranam anumvyate]
'Therefore, having thus proved with the logical reason: '[the world] is an effect'
that the world is dependent on an intelligent creator, that person who is endowed
with the powers of will, knowledge, and action, which [powers] bring about the

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manifold diversity [of the world]—that person is the creator: this is the correct
ascertaining of an extraordinary cause which creates extraordinary effects such
as the earth, which are different from the effects [produced by agents] of our ilk.
And this is a well-known fact, since—
"The particular nature [of the cause] is learnt from the particular nature of the
effect in everyday life as well."
In everyday transactions, too, when we see a particular effect, we always infer a
particular cause. For example, when we see that in a collection of artifacts like
paintings depicting palaces and various other things some are inferior, others are
mediocre, yet others have unequalled beauty, we also determine the particular
qualities of each [artist] who made these [artifacts] on the basis of the differences
in [the qualities of] these [objects]. And for this reason,—
"The cause has the same aspects, qualities, and dimensions as its effect."
(...) Thus, having ascertained the manifoldness of the various forms of the
effect [in question], namely the world, we infer a cause which is endowed with
unsurpassed powers of knowledge and action, which have as their object these
various particularities [of the world].'
Cf. Nydyabhusana p. 451: yathd 'garukrtadhumavisesdparijndne 'pi trnddikr-
tadhumavisesebhyo vilaksanam dhumam upalabhamdnas trnddibhyo vilaksanam
*evendhanam (conj. : ivendhanam ed.) anumdya tatrdptdd agarusamjndm
pratyeti svayam vd samjndntaram karoti, tathdsmadddikrtakdryavisesebhyo vila­
ksanam ksityddikdryam upalabhamdno 'smadddibhyo vilaksanam kartdram anu­
maya tatrdptdd Tsvarasamjndm pratyeti svayam vd samjndntaram karotiti\ 'Just
as someone, even if he is not familiar with the particular smoke produced from
[burning] agaru-wood, perceiving a smoke which is different from the particular
smokes produced by [burning] grass etc., infers a fuel which is indeed different
from grass etc., and then learns from a reliable person that this [fuel] is called
agaru or himself gives it another name, in the same way when someone perceives
such products as the earth which are different from the particular products made
by our ilk, he infers a maker who is different from our ilk and then learns from
a reliable person that this [maker] is called the Lord, or himself gives it another
name.'
See also Vyomavati, p. 102, where Vyomasiva proves that the Creator must
be an omniscient person.
120 ex conj.

121 See Vyomavatt, p. 103: athdgnidhumayoh pratyaksena sambandhasiddher

anumdnapravrttir yuktd, naivam atreti cet, na, ihdpi kdryatvasyddhistdtrpur-
vakatvena sambandhasiddher anumdnam pravartata iti\ athdgnir anumdndd ur-
dhvam api pratyakso maivam isvara ity anumdnam katham iti cet, na, atyanta-
paroksasydpi caksurdder upalabdhyanumeyatvdt\ athdtra sdmdnyena kriydydh *ka
ranakdryatvopalabdher (conj. : kdrana0 ed.) anumdnam, tarhi kdryatvasya
sdmdnyena kartrpurvakatvopalabdher anumdnam iti\ (...) na ca sarve drstdnta-
dharmd ddrstdntike 'pi bhavanti, abhede drstdntaddrstdntikavyavahdroccheda-
prasangdt\ na hi chidikriydydh karanam kuthdrddi drstam iti rupopalabdhikri-

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ydydm api tathd bhavati\ yathd cdtrdpdstavisesena karanena kriydyd vydpta-

tvdd anumdnam, evam isvardnumdne 'pi\ 'If [you object that] we are right to
make the inference because the connection between fire and smoke is established
through sense-perception, [but] in this case [of inferring God] it is not so, [then I
reply that your objection is] not [valid], since in this instance, too, the inference
works because it is established that the condition of being an effect is connected
with the condition of being dependent on a controller [of the production]. If
[you object that] fire is also visible after the inference [has been made], [but] the
Lord is not thus, so how could we infer [His existence], [then I reply that your
objection is] not [valid], since the faculty of sight and [other sense-faculties] can
be inferred from perception, even though they are completely invisible. If [you
say that] in this case we make the inference from perceiving the fact that [any]
action in general is the effect of an instrument, then [in the case of mountains
etc.] we make the inference from perceiving the fact that an effect in general
requires an agent. (...) And not all properties of the example belong also to
the thing it illustrates, since, if they were the same, talking about example and
exemplified would become impossible. For just because such things as an axe
are observed to be the instrument of the action of cutting, it is not thus in the
case of the action of perceiving colours. And just as in this case we make the
inference from the fact that action [in general] is invariably concomitant with
an instrument devoid of any particularities, [we make the inference] in the same
way also in the case of inferring the Lord.'
Cf. note 113.
122 Cf. note 113.
123 ex conj. The feminine pronoun iyam (omitted by RAGHAVAN and THA-
KUR) suggests that the subject of the sentence is sirortih. Instead of emending
bhaisajyd to abhaisajyd, one might consider conjecturing bhisajd or bhaisajyena.
124 The universe created by God must have a function: it helps the souls to
gather the fruits of their actions through a long series of rebirths. But this the­
ory comes to nothing if no eternal Self exists attached to our perishable body.
Says Bhatta Narayanakantha's Mrgendravrtti ad 6.lab (atha visvanimittasya
prdptam laksanam dtmanah\) (p. 149): visvasya jagato nimittam pravartana-
hetur dtmd tadbhogasddhandya tanukaranabhuvanddmdm utpatteh] 'The Self is
the cause of the whole universe, [i.e. it is] the reason of its creation, since bodies,
sense faculties, and worlds come into being so that it can experience [the fruits
of its past karmas}.'
The following verses of the Tantra further clarify why the universe must have
been created for the souls (w. 6.2-3ab):
kdryam ksityddi kartesas tat kartur nopayujyate\
na svdrtham apy acidbhdvdn ndnarthyam kartrgauravdt\\
pdrisesydt pardrtham tat ksetrajnah sa paras tayoh\
'The earth etc. are the product, [their] creator is the Lord. This [product] is of
no use to the creator. Neither does it exist for itself, since it is unconscious. It

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cannot be useless because of the gravity of the creator. Since there is no other
alternative left, it must exist for the sake of another, [and] it is the knower of
the field (i.e. the Self] which is that "other" [, different] from those two [namely
the creator and his creation].'
Then the Carvaka objects the following (v. 3cd):
paro dehas tadarthatvdt pardrthdh ksmddayo nanu\ \
'Surely that "other" is the body; earth etc. exist for the sake of something else
in so far as they exist for its sake.'
Then we have the answer to this objection (v.4ab):
kayo 'py acittvdd dnydrthyam sutardm pratipadyate\
'The body, too, since it is insentient, certainly exists for the sake of something
else.'
The Carvaka then puts forth that the body itself is conscious, but the siddhantin
rejects this view (w. 4cd-5):
cetanas cet na bhogyatvdd vikdritvac ca jdtucit] \
bhogyd vikdrino drstds cidvihmdh patddayah\
yasmin sati ca sattvdd vd na saty api save citih\\
'If you say that [the body] is sentient, [then my answer is:] never, because it is
the object of experience [and not the subject], and because it changes. Things
which are the objects of experience and which are subject to change, such as
cloths, are seen to be devoid of consciousness. Or [if you say that the body is
conscious] because the one [i.e. the soul] exists as long as the other [i.e. the
body] exists, [this objection is also wrong, because] even if the corpse exists
there is no consciousness [in it].'
In the Matangapdramesvara first Matahga sets forth the Carvaka position
that there is no Self other than the body, and consciousness is just the result of
some chemical process in the body (w. 6.5cd-7ab). In his commentary Bhatta
Ramakantha mentions some details of the materialist view, the final conclusion
of which is well known from other sources as well (p. 138): ata eva ca sanravindse
drastur api vindsdt paralokino 'bhavdt paralokdsiddhir ity uktam— 'ydvajjwam
sukham jwen ndsti mrtyur agocarah\ bhasmibhutasya sdntasya punardgamanam
kutah\\ iti\ 'And for this very reason, since there is no transmigrating entity
because the experiencing agent also perishes when the body perishes, trans­
migration [itself] is [also] not established. Thus it is said: "Man should live
happily as long as he is alive. There is no one who can avoid death. How
could a dead man who has been reduced to ashes return [to life] again?'" Cf.
BHATTACHARYA, p. 610, sloka 7.
125 Cf. Kiranavrtti ad 2.25ab (p. 53): dtmd svasamvedanena svapardtmaprakd-
satayd pratipurusam siddhyati kim anyena sddhanena\ 'A soul is proved to exist
in every man by one's own experience as being manifest both to itself and
to other souls. What need is there of further proof?' (tr. GOODALL) See also
Naresvarapanksdprakdsa ad 1.5 (p. 14), and Mrgendratantra 6.5 (quoted above).

126 Cf. Naresvarapanksdprakdsa ad 1.4 (p. 9): satyam, ata evendriyddir iva
kdrydt so 'picchdtmakdd anumtyata iti naiydyikdh\ (...) icchd hi purvdnubhuta-

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sukhasddhanatvddyanusandhdnasdmarthyasiddhatatsamdnakartrtvajndnasahabhd-
vimti jndtrantarebhya iva sarvravijndndntarddibhyo 'pi kdryatvena vydvartamdnd
visistam jndtdram sthiram anumdpayatity dtmasiddhih\ 'Say the Naiyayikas:
"True [i.e. the Self is imperceptible]. For this very reason, just as such [in­
visible things] as the sense-faculties [are inferred from their effects], it [i.e. the
Self] is also inferred from an effect, namely desire." (...) For desire will [ne­
cessarily] arise together with the cognition that it has the same agent [as the
previous experience had], which [cognition] is established through the capacity
of synthesizing, for instance, the formerly experienced fact that something is
a means of accomplishing pleasure. Thus, inasmuch as it cannot be the effect
of another cognition, the body, and the like, just as [it cannot be the effect]
of other cognising subjects, [desire] induces us to infer a particular, stable cog­
nising subject: this proves the [existence of the] Self.' Alex Watson has pointed
out (WATSON, note 51, p. 63; p. 65) the close resemblance between the naiydyika
view as presented by Ramakantha and Jayanta's arguments in the Nydyamarija-
n (vol. II, pp.278f).

127 Cf. Bhatta Narayanakantha's definition of kdrya, quoted in note 136.

See also Naresvarapanksaprakdsa p. 114: yatra yatra savayavatvam tatra tatra
kdryatd yathd ghatddau\ yatra tu kdryatvam ndsti tatra savayavatvam ndsti
yathdtmddau\ 'If A is composite than A is an effect, like such things a pot.
But if A is not an effect then A is not composite, like such things as the Self.'

128 Cf. Ramakantha's commentary ad Matangapdramesvara vidydpdda 6.34-35

(p. 172): grdhyopddhibhede 'py andsvdditasvdtmabhedah, kdlatraye 'pi tiraskrta-
svagataprdgabhdvapradhvamsdbhdvo, ndndvidhapramdnddyanekacittavrttyudaya-
samvedane 'py akampitatadgrdhakasthairyavedano, vrttyantardlesv apy avilupta-
jyotih, susuptdddv apy akhanditasvasamvit, satatam evdrthdvagamakatvena bhd-
sandd dtmapadapratipddyah pratipurusam svasamvedanasiddhah *sthira eva (ed.
MSS u, r, f : sthirabhdva ed.) iti kirn, atrdnyena sddhanena? '[The grasp­
ing subject] never experiences [any] differentiation in itself, even though the
adventitious factors, i.e. the objects of cognition are different; [both possible
forms of] its own [non-existence:] non-existence prior to production and non-
existence after destruction are concealed from it in all three times; even though
it cognises the arising of many conditions of the mind due to various means
of knowledge and the like, it has an unshaken cognition of the stability of [it­
self as] the grasper of these [thoughts and feelings]; its radiance is unimpaired
even in the intervals of the [mental] activities; its self-cognition is unbroken
even in deep sleep and [similar conditions]; it is expressed by the word 'Self
because it always shines forth as the conveyor of knowledge about objects;
it is established through self-cognition for each one of us as permanent: so
what other proof is needed in its case?' The same sentence (with variations)
is found in Ramakantha's Naresvarapanksaprakdsa ad 1.5 (p. 14, see WAT­
SON, p. 127ff), and Paramoksanirdsakdrikdvrtti (p. 294 in Astaprakaranam: Tat-
tvaprakaga-Tattvasatigraha-Tattvatrayanirnaya-Ratnatraya-Bhogakdrikd-Nddakdrikd
-Moksakdrikd-Paramoksanirdsakdrikd, ed. Brajavallabha DvivedT, Yogatantra-

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granthamala 12, VaranasT, 1988).

129 CL BHATTACHARYA, p. 605, IV.2.
130 Cf. Bhatta Ramakantha's commentary (p. 18) on Kiranatantra 1.15 (pasur
... amurto): kim ca amurtatvam asya prdgvad eva murtopalaksitasparsayukta-
mahdbhutdkdrasarirdd anyatvam tadgrdhakatayd prakdsandd ity anubhavenaiva
bhutdtmanisedhah\ ata eva bhutodbhutdc cdsya vilaksanatvendnubhavdn na bhu-
tebhyah samutpattih\ pratijanma purvatarajanmdnubhavasamskdrotpannasmara-
napurvacestddarsanato 'ndditvena nityatvena siddhes ca\ 'Moreover [the state­
ment] that the soul is 'formless' means, as [has been said] before, that it is
different from the body, which has the form of the coarse elements that are
amenable to the sense of touch and that are characterised as 'having form', be­
cause it [i.e. the soul] manifests as that which perceives those [bodies and things
made up of coarse elements]. Thus [the contention that] the soul [is] composed
of the [coarse] elements is refuted by experience itself. Prom this it follows that
it does not arise from the elements, since it is experienced as different also from
all that arises from the elements and because it is established to be eternal,
because it is beginningless, since we perceive in every birth actions that are
dependent on memory arising from the mental traces of experience in previous
births.' (tr. GOODALL)
131 Cf. Nydyasutra 3.2.60: purvakrtaphaldnubandhdt tadutpattih\ 'It [i.e. the
body] comes into being due to the continuing existence of the fruits of the pre­
viously performed actions.'
Nydyabhdsya ad loc. (p. 210): purvasarire yd pravrttir vdgbuddhisarirdram-
bhalaksand tat purvakrtam karmoktam] tasya phalam tajjanitau dharmddharmau}
tatphalasydnubandha dtmasamavetasydvasthdnam] tena avasthitena prayuktebhyo
bhutebhyas tasyotpattih sarirasya, na svatantrebhyah\ 'Previously performed ac­
tion is said to be the activity [made] in the previous body, namely an effort
made with voice, intellect, or body. Its fruits are merit and demerit produced
by it. The continuing existence of its fruit [means] that [the fruit] stays inher­
ently attached to the Self. The body comes into being from the elements which
have been impelled by this staying [fruit], and not from independent[ly acting
elements].'
See also Uddyotakara's commentary ad loc. (Nydyavdrttika p. 415): purusa-
gunawsesapreritabhutapurvakam sariram purusdrthakriydsdmarthydt] yad yat
purusdrthakriydsamartham tat tat purusagunavisesapreritabhutapurvakam drs-
tam yathd rathddi purusagunena prayatnena preritair bhutair drabhyamdnam
purusdrthakriydsamartham drstam\ tathd ca sariram} 'The [creation of the] body
depends on the elements which are impelled by particular human qualities, since
[the body] is able perform actions fulfilling human purposes. Anything that is
capable to perform actions fulfilling human purposes is seen to depend on the
elements which are impelled by particular human qualities, as a chariot, which
is made of the elements impelled by effort: a human quality, is seen to be able
to perform actions fulfilling human purposes. The same is true about the body.'

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As for entities other than the body, the objection is raised that their com­
ing into being does not have any cause, since we see for example that thorns
prick without any apparent reason (Nydyasutra 4.1.22: animitto bhdvotpattih
kantakataiksnyddidarsandt\) According to Vatsyayana, the same argument that
establishes adrsta (i.e. merit and demerit caused by former actions) as the
cause of the arising of the body can be employed to refute this objection as well
(Nydyabhdsya ad loc., pp. 229ff.) Uddyotakara remarks that we see that certain
things which possess a particular kind of shape do have a cause of their coming
into being. Prom this we infer that other composite things, such as thorns or
bodies, are also produced by some cause, even if we never see them being ac­
tually produced (Nydyavdrttika p. 442). The preceding nydyasutras reject the
assumption that God alone can be the cause of the world's creation, because
'if men do not have any karma [i.e. if they do not perform any action] then no
fruit is produced' (4.1.20: purusakarmdbhdve phaldnispatteh\).
The texts of the Saiva Siddhanta also take karma to be the cause of the
variety of worldly phenomena (certainly not in itself, but under God's supervi­
sion). See Pardkhyatantra 2.8:
sambandhdgrahane karma hetutvena katham tanau]
drstvd citrasanrdni karmasattddhigamyate\\
'How [do we understand] past actions to be the cause of the body though we
do not perceive the causal connection? After perceiving various bodies the ex­
istence of [the retributive force of] past action is understood.' (tr. GOODALL)
The soul's experiences are determined by its karma, and the wordly phe­
nomena come into being in order to become the objects of these experiences.
See Svdyambhuvasutrasangraha, vidydpdda with the commentary of Sadyojotis
(pp.22f.):
bhogo 'sya vedana pumsah sukhaduhkhadilaksana]
tarn samarthitacaitanyah pumdn abhyeti karmatah\\1.12\\
vedana samvittir anubhavah\ sukhaduhkhddibhir visayair uparaktatvdt tair eva
laksyate visisyate, sukhd vedand duhkhd vedand mudhd vedaneti\ tarn ca pravrtti-
vat kaldsamarthitacaitanyah kalaydviyukta eva pumdn abhyeti prdpnoti karmata
dlambandt\ sukhaduhkhamohabhdvena parinatam karma pumsdm vedandyd dlam-
banam bhavatiti\ karmatas ca sarirdnityddi]
karmatas ca sarvrdni visaydh karandni ca\
bhogasamsiddhaye bhoktur bhavanti na bhavanti ca\\l3\\
sanrddindm ydv api bhdvdbhdvau bhogasya nimittabhutau tdv api karmato nimit-
tdd iti\ sarvathd yat kimcid bhoganimittam tat sarvam karmata iti\ tatroddhara-
nam putrdnnddibhdvah sukhabhoganimittam, ahikantakddibhdvo duhkhabhogani-
mittam iti putrdnnadyabhdvo duhkhamohabhoganimittam, ahikantakddyabhdvah
sukhabhoganimittam}
' "Experience is the soul's sensation, which is characterised by such [feelings]
as pleasure, pain, etc. The soul whose consciousness is empowered attains this
[sensation] as a result of [its] karma." Sensation [means] cognising, experiencing.
Since it is coloured by [its] objects such as pleasure and pain, it is characterised,
[i.e.] particularised by them as "pleasurable sensation", "painful sensation",
[or] "uncertain sensation". And, similarly to activity, only that soul attains it,

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[i.e.] obtains it, whose consciousness is empowered by kala (limited power of

action), [i.e.] which is not separated from kala, [and it has this experience] as
a result of its karma which is [its] cause. For karma, having transformed itself
into the [mental] states of pleasure, pain, and uncertainty, becomes the cause
of the sensation of the souls. [The next verse is] "And as a result of karma
bodies. . . " "And as a result of karma bodies, sense objects, and faculties [of
cognition and action] do or do not come into being in order to accomplish the
experience of the experiencing subject." The verse says (iti) that the existence
and non-existence of bodies and the like, which [existence or non-existence] are
the causes of experience, also depend on karma as [their instrumental] cause.
For in all circumstances everything that is the cause of experience results from
karma. For example, the existence of sons, food, etc. is the cause of experien­
cing pleasure; the existence of snakes, thorns, etc. is the cause of experiencing
pain; thus the non-existence of sons, food, etc. is the cause of experiencing pain
or uncertainty, [while] the non-existence of snakes, thorns, etc. is the cause of
experiencing pleasure.'
Also Kiranavrtti ad 3.7 (p. 66): purusanam hi sarvadd sanrabhogddivaici-
trydnyathdnupapattyd karmanah sattvam srstikdle 'pi pasumrgapaksisarisrpa-
sthdvaramanusyddijanmavaicitryasruteh] 'For karman exists at all times for
souls, since the diversity of experience [mediated] through [different] bodies and
so on could not otherwise be accounted for, for scripture tells us that even at
the time of creation there was a diversity of births as domestic and wild beasts,
as birds, creeping animals, plants, humans and so on.' (tr. GOODALL) Cf.
Matangaparamesvara 6.97cd and Ramakantha's commentary ad loc. (pp.224f),
Naresvarapanksdprakdsa ad 2.14 (pp. 139ff.), Abhidharmakosa 4.1a (karmajam
lokavaicitryam) .
132 rj-^g DO(jy js defined as follows in the Nyayasutra (1.1.11): cestendriyartha-
srayah sanram\ 'Our body is the substratum of volitions, sense-faculties, and
sense-objects.' (Cf. Nydyavdrttika ad loc. (p. 65): na hi gandhddayo 'rthdh
sanravrttayah, yat tu tesam kdryam sukhaduhkhopalabdhinimittatvam, tad ndsati
sari/re bhavati, iti sanrdsrayd ity ucyante\ 'For sense-objects such as smell are
not located in the body, but their function, namely the condition of being causes
of feeling pleasure or pain, is impossible if the body does not exist: that is why
they are taught to have the body as their substratum.') Since our pleasur­
able and painful experiences are the results of our former deeds, the creation
of our body, which is the sine qua non of these experiences, is also determ­
ined by karma (Nyayasutra 3.2.60: purvakrtaphalanubandhat tadutpattih\ 'It
[i.e. the body] arises as a consequence of the result [i.e. merit and demerit] of
former deeds'), just as the conjunction of particular souls with particular bodies
(sarirotpattinimittavat samyogotpattinimittam karma\, Nyayasutra 3.2.66).
133 Although Vrddhambhi is a carvaka, accepting the role of karma in the
creation of the body does not seem to worry him very much. We would expect
a die-hard ndstika to hold that the body arises from the elements which are
independent of karma (cf. Nydyabhasya ad Nyayasutra 3.2.61 (purvapaksa):

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karmanirapeksebhyo bhutebhyah sanram utpannam).

134 According to the Naiyayikas, the fruition of karma alone is not enough to ex­
plain the creation of the world: an intelligent creator must also take an essential
part in the process. Says Vatsyayana (Nydyabhdsya ad 4.1.21): purusakaram
isvaro 'nugrhnati\ phaldya purusasya yatamdnasyesvarah phalam sampddayatiti]
yadd na sampddayati, tadd purusakarmdphalam bhavatiti\ 'God favours human
effort, which means (iti) that God makes the result [of karma] come about for
a man who strives to attain the result. This [also] means (iti) that when [God]
does not make [it] come about then the person's karma becomes fruitless.'
Uddyotakara's commentary on the same sutra (pp. 433ff): yenaiva nydye-
nesvarasya kdranatvam sidhyati, tenaivdstitvam iti\ (...) pradhdnaparamdnu-
karmdni prdk pravrtter buddhimatkdranddhisthitdni pravartante, acetanatvdd,
vdsyddivad iti\ yathd vdsyddi buddhimatd taksnddhisthitam acetanatvdt pravart-
ate, tathd pradhdnaparamdnukarmdny acetandni pravartante] tasmdt tdny api
buddhimatkdranddhisthitdni} (...) dharmddharmau buddhimatkdranddhisthitau
purusasyopabhogam kurutah, karanatvdt, vdsyddivad iti\ dtmaivddhisthdtd dhar-
mddharmayor bhavisyatiti cet, yasya tau dharmddharmau sa evddhisthdtd bhavi­
syatiti na yuktam, prdk kdyakaranotpattes tadasambhavdt] (...) yadi ca purusah
svatantrah pravartate, na duhkham kurydt\ na hi kascid dtmano duhkham ic-
chatiti\ yas cdtmano 'ngopaghdtam siraschedddi vd karoti, so 'pi tadvaikalye
prdyane vd hitabuddhih pravartata iti\ yadi punar dharmddharmdbhydm evddhi-
sthitdh paramdnavah pravarteran, na yuktam idam, acetanatvdt\ na hi kincid
acetanam svatantram adhisthdyakam drstam iti\ 'The same argumentation which
proves that God is a cause also proves that he exists. (...) The source of the
material world, particles, and karmas become active when presided over by an
intelligent cause before becoming active, since they are insentient, like such
things as axes. Just as such things as axes become active when presided over by
an intelligent carpenter, since they are insentient, in the same way, the source
of the material world, particles, and karmas also become active [though they
are] insentient, and therefore they are also presided over by an intelligent cause.
(...) Merit and demerit bring about experience for man in as much as they
are presided over by an intelligent cause, since they are instruments, like such
things as axes. If [you object that] it is the Self alone that presides over merit
and demerit, [then the answer is that] it is not proper that the same person will
be the overseer to whom those merit and demerit belong, since this is impossible
before the body and the sense faculties come into being. (...) Furthermore, if
the soul acted at will, it would not create pain [for itself]. For nobody desires
pain for himself. When somebody injures his own body or cuts off his own head
etc., that man also acts in the belief that it is beneficial to mutilate that [body
of his], or to die. On the other hand, if the subtle particles became active when
presided over by merit and demerit alone, this would not be appropriate, since
[merit and demerit] are insentient. For no insentient thing has been seen to be
an autonomous overseer.'
See also Nydyabhusana p. 452: karmano 'py acetanatvdn na svatahpravrttir
ndpi pravartakatvam, na hy acetano *hetur acetandndm (conj. : hetus cetand-

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ndm ed.) adhisthdtd kascid avisesdd adrstatvdc ca\ adhisthdtur acetanatve ca

nirabhiprdyavydpdratvdt tadadhisthitebhyo ghunddipadavinydsavan na desddini-
yatasvabhdvam kdryam upapadyate] (...) buddhimadadhisthitebhya eva hi citra-
tekhddyupdddnopakaranebhyah sthdvarajamgamajdtivisesakrtisv avayavaracand-
visesaniyamopalabdhih\ 'Since karma is unconscious, it cannot perform any ac­
tion by itself, neither can it propel [other things], for no unconscious cause can
preside over unconscious things, because it does not differ [from them], and
because nobody has seen [such an unconscious overseer]. Furthermore, if the
overseer were unconscious, because its activity would be unintentional, no effect
whose nature is regulated through place, [time,] etc. would come into being from
things presided over by that [unconscious overseer], just as in the case when a
worm leaves its traces [in palm-leaf or wood, which may accidentally resemble
letters]. (...) For one obtains the regularity of the particular arrangement of
the constituents in the case of the shapes of particular species of animate and
inanimate things only from those materials and instruments, such as a painting,
which have been presided over by an intelligent [being].'
The authors of Saiva Siddhanta expounded similar views. Says Ramakan-
tha in his Kiranavrtti ad 3.12 (p. 74):
atra pardbhiprdyah]
karma cet (12d)
anena hi prayogavacanena bhavadbhih kartrmdtram sddhyam upaksiptam] tac
cobhayavddisiddham karmdstv iti srdvanah sabda itivat siddhasddhanatvdd ay-
uktam etat\ yad dhur jaiminiydh (Slokavdrttika sambandhdksepaparihdra 75)—
kasyacid dhetumdtrasya yady adisthdtrtesyate\
karmabhih sarvabhdvdndm tatsiddheh siddhasddhanam\\
iti\ atra siddhdntah]
na hy acetanam\\ (12d)
na siddhasddhanam yasmdt karmdcetanam iti\ ayam arthah] ndsmdbhir atra
kartrtvamdtram sddhyate 'pi tu visistajndnakriydyuktah karteti kuto 'cetanaih
karmabhih siddhasddhanam iti\
'Here [follows] an opponent's opinion:
"What if it is karman [that is the cause of the universe]?"
All that you have put forward to be proved with this syllogism [of yours] is [the
existence of] some agent. Let that [agent] be karman, which is accepted by both
sides in the dispute, and thus this [argument of the Saiddhantika] is inappro­
priate, because the syllogism would then prove what is already well-established,
just like the assertion 'sound is audible'. As the MTmamsakas assert, "If one
requires just any cause to preside [over the creation of the universe, then let this
role be performed] by [the fruits of past] actions, since they are proved to exist
for all beings. [And in that case the fault of] proving what is already established
[vitiates the argument]." In response to this [the view of] the Siddhanta is:
"No, because [karman is] insentient."
This is not [a case of] proving what is already established, because karman is
insentient. What is meant by this is that we have not sought to prove here
simply that there must be an agent, but that there is an agent equipped with
particular [powers of] knowledge and action. Why then should there be [the lo-

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gical fault of] proving what is already established because of insentient actions
[being all that is proved]?' (tr. GOODALL)
Bhatta Narayanakantha in his Mrgendravrtti (pp. 108ff.) also rejected the
possibility that either karma (quoting Slokavarttika, sambandhdksepaparihdra
75) or mdya could be the agent of creation, on the ground that both are in­
sentient. (The Vaisesika Vyomasiva also quotes and refutes Slokavarttika sam­
bandhaksepaparihara 75 in Vyomavati, pp. 103f.)
See also Parakhyatantra 2.12cd (Pratoda's objection):
tanvadeh karanam karma kalpitena matena kim\]
'The cause of bodies and such is [the retributive force of] past action. Why
trouble with some artificial theory?' (tr. Goodall)
Ibid. v. 15ab (Prakasa's reply):
asya drstasya hetur vd karmdkhyo buddhimdn bhavet]
'Or [you might be forced to maintain that] the cause of this perceived [universe]
that we call [the retributive force of] past action must be endowed with sen­
tience.' (tr. Goodall)
Yamunacarya in his Agamaprdmdnya (p. 25) also argues against the agency
of unconscious karmas: cetandnadhistitdni tdni [i.e. karmdni] na kdrydni janay-
itum utsahante, acetanatvdd vdswat] na hi cetanena taksnd 'nadhisthitd vdsi
svayam eva yupddiny dpadayitum alam\ 'Those [karmas] are not capable of pro­
ducing effects without being presided over by a sentient [agent], since they are
insentient, like an axe. For an axe is not able to bring about such things as
posts if it is not presided over by a sentient carpenter.' (Cf. Uddyotakara's
commentary ad Nydyasutra 4.1.21, quoted above.)

135 See Vyomavati, p. 103: sarvam acetanam cetanddhisthitam pravartamdnam

drstam, yathd tantvddi, tathd ca karmddi\ 'All insentient things, such as threads
etc., are seen to become active when presided over by a sentient [agent], and
the same is true about karmas.'
136 rpne Carvaka's objection may bring to our mind Mandanamisra's arguments
against a single creator God, also quoted by Ramakantha in his Kiranavrtti
(p. 73): napi dharmisvarupavipantasddhano 'yam viruddhah\ yathdha mandanah
( Vidhiviveka, pp. 219 and 224)—
sannivesddimat sarvam buddhimaddhetu yadyapi\
prasiddhasannivesdder ekakdranatd kutah\\
rathddyavayavd ndndtaksanirmdpitd api\
drsyante jagati prdya upakdryopakdrakdh] \
iti\ yato rathddyavayavdndm anekataksanirmitdndm api naikasthapatibuddhikri-
ydbhydm vinaikarathdrambhakatvam drstam\
'Nor is the [logical ground] contradicted as proving [some quality that is] the
opposite of the nature of the subject of the argument, as Mandana states: "Al­
though everything that is composite and so on must have a sentient cause, how
can one say that well-known composite things and so on have only one cause?
Although the parts of something like a chariot are constructed by various crafts­
men, generally one experiences that things in the universe which help to [bring

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something about] require [in turn] to be helped [themselves]." [The counter ar­
gument above is wrong,] because although the parts of something like a chariot
are [individually] created by various craftsmen, they are not seen to create a
chariot without the knowledge and action of a single master craftsman.' (tr.
GOODALL) See also his Matangavrtti ad 6.99cd-100ab (p. 229).
Mandanamisra's objection had already been quoted and rejected by Bhatta
Narayanakantha in his commentary (p. 103) to the following verse of the Mrgen-
dratantra (3.1): athopalabhya dehddi vastu kdryatvadharmakam\ kartdram asya
jdnimo visistam anumdnatah\ \ Narayanakantha first establishes that everything
that had been first non-existent and that was subsequently made existent is an
effect; since the body is such, it is also an effect (p. 99: abhutvd bhdvitvam eva hi
karyatvam, tac ca dehasyopalabhyata eva\). Another reason which proves that
things such as the body are products is the fact that they are composite and
impermanent (ibid.: kirn ca sannivesavisesavattvdd vinasvaratvdc ca dehddeh
karyatvam apahnotum asakyam\ yad yat sannivesavisesavad vinasvaram, tat tat
karyam yathd ghatadi\}. The next step in the argumentation is to show that
every effect is dependent on a sentient agent (ibid.: yad yat karyam tat tad
buddhimatkartrpurvakam drstam yathd rathddi\ yat tu naivamvidham, na tat
karyam yathdtmddi\). Wild plants, rice, forest trees are also part of the sub­
ject of the argument, since it has not been proved that they were not pro­
duced by an agent (p. 100: na cdyam akrstajdtaih sdlyddibhir vanadrumddibhir
vdnaikdntikah, tesu kartrabhdvasydniscaydt tesam ca paksibhutatvdt\). The Ml-
mamsakas might object that pots are made by potters, not by God (Slokavartti-
ka sambandhdksepaparihdra 79 is quoted), but then it was the Lord who made
the potters capable of making pots. Then follows Mandanamisra's objection
and its refutation.
The Naiyayika Bhasarvajna also argues against the multiplicity of creators
in his Nydyabhusana (p. 476, probably referring to Prajnakaragupta's objec­
tion: tathd bahubhir ekasya bahundm caikatah kriyd, Pramdnavdrtikdlankdra,
v. 2.234, p. 37): nanu caikasydpi kdryasyaikah kartd bahavas ca drsyante, tathd
bahundm apy eko bahavas ca\ tat katham avagamyate — 'sarvasya jagata eka
evesvarah kartd na tu bahavo 'nisvard' iti? uktam atra\ yah paridrstdni kdrandni
prayunkte, tais ca na prayujyate sa svatantrah kartety ucyate\ na cdnzsvarasya
paramdnvadrstddisu bhubhudharasanrdbhyantardvayavddisu ca paridarsanapur-
vakam prayoktrtvam sambhavati\ tatra bahavo 'nisvardh ksityddeh kartdrah prd-
sddavisesasyevdsankhydtd api stanamdhayd iti\ athesvard eva bahavah ksityddeh
kartdra isyante, tathd saty apasiddhdntas te prdpnoti\ ekanirdkarane ca bahv-
abhyupagamo 'nistaparihdre 'tikausalam khydpayati\ kim ca tesam isvardndm
kim aisvaryam sarvajnatvam anuttamd saktis cdsti na vd? yady asti, taddneke-
svarakalpanayd kim? vaiyarthydt] atha ndsti, tadd tesam niyamitd kascit pra-
bhur asti, anyatha katham avirodhena sadd jagadutpattyddisu pravarterann iti?\ '
"But surely, we see that one product has [sometimes] one, and [sometimes] many
makers, and similarly many [products can] also have one or many [makers]. So
how can one ascertain that the whole world has only one creator: the Lord,
and not many [creators] who are not gods?" We have [already] answered [this
objection]. That person who employs the causes which he thoroughly knows

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and who is not employed by them is said to be the autonomous agent. And
someone who is not God cannot employ such things as particles and adrsta (the
result of good and bad deeds), or for example the interior parts of the earth,
mountains, and bodies, which employment requires the thorough knowledge [of
these things]. To perform such a deed (tatra), the many creators of the earth,
etc., who are not gods (anisvarah), are [just] babies, like the builders of an ex­
traordinary palace who, countless as they be, are not masters (antsvarak). If
one holds that the many creators of the earth etc. are indeed gods, then, if that
is the case, you arrive at a conclusion that is opposed to your position. You
get rid of one and then accept many: this proclaims how extremely clever you
are in refuting what you do not accept. Furthermore, do those gods possess
divine faculties, omniscience, and unsurpassed power, or do they not? If they
do, then why postulate several gods? For [such a postulation] is useless. If they
don't then they have a superior (kascit) master as [their] governor. Otherwise
how could they continuously engage in the creation of the world etc. without
quarrelling?'
Cf. Vyomavatf, p. 203: na cdsmadadydtmaivadhisthdyakah, tasya tadvisaya-
jndndbhdvdt\ tathd cdsmadddydtmano na karmavisayam jndnam indriyajam,
ndpi paramdnvddivisayam\ 'And the controller cannot be the Self of our kind,
since it lacks the knowledge of that matter. And thus, on the other hand,
the knowledge that the Self of our kind has, in as much as it arises from the
senses, does not pertain either to the karmas or to such [invisible things] as the
particles.'

137 Therefore if it depended on them they would probably hinder its creation.
138 ex conj. ISAACSON. Candrananda in his commentary to Vaisesikasutra
5.2.2 points out that such phenomena as earthquakes occur in order to indicate
good and evil for the creatures (prajdndm subhdsubhasucandya), and thus they
are especially caused by their adrsta (merit and demerit).
139 ex conj. ISAACSON. The three kinds of wild plants correspond to the three
kinds of uncultivated land.
140 Cf. Nydyabhusana p. 479 (answering Prajnakaragupta's objection in Pra-
mdnavdrtikdlankdra v. 2.284cd, p. 39: chdgddindm punsdder vartulikaranena
kim\\): chdgddipunsdder vartulikarane preksdvatah kim prayojanam iti cet, cha­
gadinam tddrsenaiva punsavisesenotsargakdle sukham duhkham vd bhavatiti tan-
nimittakarmaphalasampddakatvam eva prayojanam] etena badankantakamayura-
candrikddivaicitryakarane 'pi prayojanam drastavyam] tatrdpy avasyam kasyacit
sukham duhkham va, darsanam sparsanam va bhavatity ato vicitram prdnindm
karmddhisthdya tadanurupam phalam kurvatah katham apreksdpurvakdritvam?
'If [you raise the objection:] "What purpose can a considerate [creator] have
in making round such things as the droppings of goats and other [animals]?"
[, then I give you the following reply:] goats and other [animals] feel pleasure
or pain at the time of excretion precisely because of those particular droppings
of precisely that kind, so the goal [of the creator] is nothing but to be the ac-

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complisher of the results of the karmas which are the causes of that [pleasure
or pain]. In the same way one should also see the purpose of creating diversity
[in the form of] such [things] as the thorns of the jujube tree, the eyes hi the
peacock's tail, etc. In the case of these things, too, someone will necessarily feel
pleasure or pain, [since someone will necessarily] see or touch [them]. So how
could [the creator] act without consideration when he presides over the manifold
karma of creatures, and produces a result which suits that [karma]?'
Cf. Sankara's commentary to Brahmasutra 2.1.34: atah srjyamdnaprdni-
dharmddharmdpeksd visamd srstir iti ndyam isvarasydparddhah\ 'Thus the cre­
ation is not uniform inasmuch as it is dependent on the merit and demerit of
the created beings: this is not the Lord's fault.'
141 Cf. Pardkhyatantra 2.19:
svakarmdpeksya jwdndm svapravrttih sahetukd]
so 'pi karmesvardkhyo 'smin hetuh kdryena gamyate}}
'The activity of individual souls depends on their own actions, [and] it has a
[further] cause; and that cause, who is called the Lord over action, is known
here from [His] effect[s].' (tr. GOODALL)
142 Mahabharata 3.31.27.

143 ex conj. When the Carvaka is silenced by the Snataka's arguments, the
followers of the GRADUATE (sndtakdnucardh) will mock him in the same way.
144 ex conj. ISAACSON. parikrdmanti does not give a satisfactory meaning.
145 More precisely 'cholera of your karma'. One might consider emending the
text to l karne 'pi sucim\ meaning 'Endure still a needle in your ear, too, for a
moment.'
146 ex em. Cf. Tdtparyattkd (Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyatikd), p. 38): tathd
cahur bhartnsvarddayah—kirn hi nityam pramdnam drstam? pratyaksddi vd
yad anityam tasya prdmdnye kasya vipratipattih? I thank Dr. Kei Kataoka for
this reference.
147 Cf. Sdbarabhdsya(F) ad 1.1.2 (p. 16): nanv atathdbhutam apy artham bru-
ydc codand, yathd yatkimcana laukikam vacanam 'nadyds tire phaldni santi' iti,
tat tathyam api bhavati, vitatham api bhavatiti] ucyate, vipratisiddham idam
abhidhvyate 'braviti ca vitatham ca' iti\ bravtty ity ucyate 'vabodhayati, budhya-
mdnasya nimittam bhavattti] yasmims ca nimittabhute saty avabudhyate, so
'vabodhayati\ yadi ca codandydm saty dm 'agnihotrdt svargo bhavati' ity ava-
gamyate, katham ucyate, 'na tathd bhavati' iti? atha na tatha bhavati, katham
avabudhyate? asantam artham avabudhyata iti vipratisiddham] '[Objection:]
But surely, an injunction may also say something which is untrue, just as an
everyday statement of little importance, e.g. "there are fruits on the bank of
the river", can be sometimes true, sometimes false. [Reply:] We answer [this
objection] as follows: to say that "one states [something] and [what one states

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is] false" is contradictory. "One states" means "one creates awareness, one is
the cause for a person who cognises". And if [someone] becomes aware of [some­
thing] when X is present as the cause, then X creates the awareness. And if
we learn, when there is an injunction, that paradise results from the Agniho-
tra, [then] how can you say that it is not so? If it is not so then how can one
become aware of it? To say that one becomes aware of a nonexistent thing is
contradictory.'
148 Cf. Slokavdrttika (with Kdsika) codand 52-53:
yadd svatah pramanatvam taddnyan naiva mrgyate\
nivartate hi mithydtvam dosdjndndd ayatnatah\\
tasmdd bodhdtmakatvena prdptd buddheh pramdnatd]
arthdnyathdtvahetutthadosajndndd apodyate] \
'When the validity [of a cognition] is given by itself, then no other [means of
cognition] is sought for [to prove the validity of the original cognition], for the
falsity [of the original cognition] is excluded without any effort through the non-
cognising of any defect. Therefore the validity of a [false] cognition that has been
learnt from the fact that it has the nature of [creating] awareness is annulled
due to the [subsequent] cognising of the fact that the object is otherwise, or
that some defect has arisen in the causes [of the first cognition].'
149 Cf. Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyatikd) codand 22:
pramdndntaradrstam hi sabdo 'rtham prdpayet sadd\
smrtivac ca svayam tasya prdmdnyam nopapadyate} \
[Objection:] 'For in all cases a verbal expression can convey a referent that has
[already] been ascertained through other means of valid knowledge, and, just
like memory, it cannot be valid in itself.'
150 On the concept of niyoga see Kiyotaka YOSHIMIZU, 'Der Geltungsbereich
der vedischen Weisung (niyoga) bei den Prabhakaras', in Wiener Zeitschrift fiir
die Kunde Sudasiens XXXVIII, 1994, pp. 485ff.
151 Cf. Sdbarabhdsya(F) ad 1.1.2 (pp. 16, 18): yo hi janitvd pradhvamsate
'naitad evam' iti, sa mithydpratyayah] na caisa kalantare purusantare 'vasthan-
tare desdntare vd viparyeti, tasmdd avitathah\ (...) viplavate khalv api kascit
purusakrtdd vacandt pratyayah] na tu vedavacanasya mithydtve kimcana pramd-
nam asti\ 'For that is a false cognition which, after arising, becomes invalid, [as
one establishes that] 'this is not so'. This [cognition created by the words of the
Veda], however, does not change into its opposite either at another time, or in
another person, or among other circumstances, or at another place; therefore
it is not false. (...) Though certainly there are some cognitions [arising] from
man-made statements that become invalid, but there is no proof at all with
regard to the falsity of a Vedic statement.'
152 Cf. Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyatikd) codand 72:
tenetaraih pramdnair yd codandndm asangatih\
tayaiva sydt pramanatvam anuvddatvam anyathd\ \

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'Therefore Vedic injunctions are valid precisely because they have no association
with other means of valid knowledge. Otherwise they would [only] be repeti­
tions.'
In fact all means of valid knowledge operate independently when they pro­
duce cognition. Says Kumarila (Slokavarttika (with Tdtparyatika) codand 47-
48):
svatah sarvapramdndndm prdmdnyam iti grhyatdm (v.l. gamyatdm}\
na hi svato 'sati saktih kartum anyena sakyate} \
dtmaldbhe hi bhdvdndm kdrandpeksitd bhavet\
labdhdtmandm svakdryesu pravrttih svayam eva tu\ \
'One should understand that all means of cognition are valid by themselves, for
a capacity which is not inherently present [in a thing such as a pramdna} cannot
be brought about by another [thing such as another pramdna]. For things may
depend on some cause for their coming into being, but once they have come into
being they operate independently with respect to [the production of] their own
effects.'
153 Cf. Slokavarttika (with Tdtparyatika} citrdksepa 60-61:
purusddhmavijndnas tebhyah prdg anirupitah\
yah samjndsamjnisambandhah sa cestas ced dhruvam krtah\ \
bhinnadesddyadhisthdndd yathd rajjughatddisu]
samam nasty anayoh kincit tendsaiigatatd svatah\\
'The connection between the sign / name and the signified / named [object], the
ascertainment of which depends on men [and which] has not been seen [to exist]
before those [men]—if you accept that [connection], it must be artificial [and
not inherent]. These two [i.e. the sign and the signified object] have nothing in
common, just as a rope and a jar for example, since they occupy different places
and [time periods]; therefore they are not joined by themselves.'
See also Sdbarabhdsya(¥) pp. 36-38.
154 Cf. Slokavarttika (with Nydyaratndkara) sambandhdksepaparihdra 28a:
saktir eva hi sambandho.
155 Cf. Mimdmsdsutra 1.1.5: autpattikas tu sabdasydrthena sambandhas tasya
jndnam upadeso 'vyatirekas cdrthe anupalabdhe, tat pramdnam bddardyanasya,
anapeksatvdt\ 'Rather it is the innate connection of the word with its refer-
ent which is [the means of] its [i.e. dharma's] cognising, [in as much as] it is
instruction and not error, with regard to an object which is not ascertained
[with the help of other pramdnas]; it is a means of valid cognition according to
Badarayana, since it is independent.'
Sdbarabhdsya(¥) ad loc. (p.24): autpattika iti nityam brumah\ (...) autpat-
tikah sabdasydrthena sambandhas tasya agnihotrddilaksanasya dharmasya ni-
mittam pratyaksddibhir anavagatasya\ katham? upadeso hi bhavati\ upadesa iti
visistasya sabdasya uccdranam\ avyatirekas ca bhavati tasya jndnasya\ na hi
tad utpannam jndnam viparyeti[ yac ca ndma jndnam utpannam na viparyeti,
na tac choky ate vaktum 'naitad evam' iti, 'yathd vijndyate, na tathd bhavati;

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yathaitan na vijndyate, tathaitad' iti\ any ad asya hrdaye any ad vdci sydt\ evam
vadato viruddham idam avagamyate 'asti ndsti ca' iti\ tasmdt tat pramdnam,
anapeksatvdt\ na hy evam sati pratyaydntaram apeksitavyam purusdntaram vd\
svayampratyayo hy asau\ 'With [the word] "innate" we mean eternal. (...)
The innate connection of the word with its referent is the cause of dharma
characterised as agnihotra and the like, which [dharma} is not known through
sense perception and other [means of cognition]. Why? Since it is instruction.
"Instruction" means uttering a particular word. And that cognition cannot go
wrong, since that cognition, when arisen, does not change into its opposite. And
indeed one cannot say about a cognition which, having arisen, does not change
into its opposite that "this is not thus", [or] "this is not thus as it is cognised",
[or] "this is thus as it is not cognised". [If one were to speak in this way then]
he would have one thing in his heart and speak something else. We find that
the person who speaks thus makes this contradictory [statement]: "it is and it
is not". Therefore it is a means of valid cognition, since it is independent. For
in this case one should not wait for another cognition or another person, since
it is a [valid] cognition in itself.'
Cf. also Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyatika) citrdksepa 19cd-20ab
sambandho 'sti ca nityas cety uktam autpattikddind\\
mithydtvasya nirdsdrtham tat parair nesyate dvayam\
'There is a connection [between the word and its referent], and [this connection]
is eternal: this is taught in [the sutra] beginning with "autpattikas... ", in order
to refute the falsity [of sabda]. Others do not accept either of these two [facts].'
156 Mandanamisra in his Vidhiviveka (p. 35) gives a summary of the Prabhaka-
ra view on the nature of vidhi, 'Vedic injunction', which is remarkably similar
to the Graduate's position: pramdndntardgocarah sabdamatrdlambano 'niyukto
'smi' iti pratydtmavedanlyah sukhddivad apardmrstakdlatrayo linddmdm artho
vidhir' iti\ 'Vedic injunction is not accessible to any other means of cognition;
it depends only on the Word [of the Vedas]; everyone experiences it in its own
self, [realising that] "I have been enjoined", just as [one feels] pleasure and the
like; it is not connected with any of the three times; and it is the referent of the
optative and other [verbal suffixes, e.g. the imperative].'
157 Cf. Vacaspati Misra's Nydyakanika on the Prabhakara theory of niyoga as
presented in the Vidhivikeka: (p. 35) yato linddiyuktavdkyasravanasamananta-
ram svargakdmddind niyojyena 'niyukto 'smi' iti pratydtmavedamyah sukhddivat\
yathd hi santdpadunas candandnulepandnantaram dntaram api manomdtrapra-
vedamyam dmilitalocanah sukhabhedam ananyapramdnakam anubhavati, evam
niyogam api linddivdkyasravandnantaram ity arthah\ (...) (p. 38) kdrydbhidhd-
yitd tdval linddindm avagatdcdryavdkyesu 'mdnavaka, samidham dhara ' ityddisu}
tathd hy etadvdkyasravandnantaram pravartamdnam samiddharane mdnavakam
upalabhya pdrsvastho vyutpitsur evam avadhdrayati—'buddhipurveyam asyapra-
vrttih, svatantrapravrttitvdt, madiyapravrttivat] yac cdham buddhvd pravrttas
tad evdyam madavisesdt\ aham ca na kriydmdtrdvagamdn ndpi phalamdtrdva-
qamdn ndpi phalasddhanatvdvagamdt, kintu kdryatdvagamdt\ na khalv antato

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'rbhakah stanapdnddikdm api kriydm kdryatayd ydvan ndvagatavdn *asti (conj.

: asrni ed.) na tdvat tasydm api pravrttih\ (...) atah phalasddhanatdtiriktakdrya-
tdbodhdt pravrttir mameti mdnavako 'pi tadavabodhdd eva pravrtta' iti niscinoti}
tadavabodhas cdsydcdryavacandnantaram upajdyamdnas tannibandhana eveti kd-
rydbhidhdyitdm sabdasya kalpayati[ 'Since immediately after hearing a sentence
which contains a verbal suffix such as the optative, everyone who, for example,
desires heaven and who is to be enjoined can feel [vidhi] in himself [realising]:
"I have been enjoined [to perform the sacrifice]", just as [one feels] pleasure and
the like. For just as someone who is afflicted by heat, immediately after smear­
ing sandal-paste [on his or her own body], also experiences, with eyes closed,
a kind of internal pleasure, which can only be felt by [one's own] mind, and
for which there is no other means of valid cognition [to ascertain it]—[one] also
[experiences] the enjoinment in the same way, immediately after hearing a sen­
tence [containing] a verbal suffix such as the optative: this is the meaning [of
Mandana's words]. (...) First of all one understands that such verbal suffixes
as the optative express duty in such sentences of the teacher as "Boy, fetch the
firewood". To explain, having seen that the boy becomes engaged in fetching
the firewood immediately after hearing this sentence, the observer, who wants
to learn, reasons in the following way: "This engagement of his is intentional,
because he has acted at will, in the same way as I act. And he must have
cognised the same thing that I cognise before I engage in something, since he
is not different from me. And I [set about doing something] neither because
I understand the action alone, nor because I understand the result alone, nor
because I understand that [the action] is the means of accomplishing the result,
but because I understand that it is something that must be done. Clearly, until
the infant finally understands that even such actions as sucking are things that
must be done, it will not set about doing even that. (...) Therefore, since I set
about [doing something] because I know that it must be done, which is different
from [knowing] that it is a means of accomplishing the result, the boy has also
become engaged precisely because he had understood that [i.e. kdryatd}" —
this is the conclusion [that the observer] reaches. And inasmuch as his [i.e. the
boy's] understanding of that [kdryatd] arises immediately after the speaking of
the teacher, it is caused by that [i.e. by the words of the teacher] alone: there­
fore he [i.e. the observer] postulates that the word has the function of expressing
duty.'
On the two possible functions of niyoga, namely prerana (instigating) and
bodhana (creating awareness) see the article of YOSHIMIZU (cited in note 150),
who also deals with the interpretation of these two functions in Prabhakara and
Bhatta literature.
158 Cf. Sdbarabhdsya(F) (p. 38) and Slokavdrttika (with Tdtparyatikd) citrdksepa
60-61, where fastening a rope on a pot is mentioned as an example of an artificial
(krtaka) connection of two separate entities.
159 Cf. Slokavdrttika (with Kdsikd) codand 49-51:
jdte 'pi yadi vijndne tdvan ndrtho 'vadhdryate\

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ydvat kdranasuddhatvam na pramdndntardd bhavet\\

tatra jndndntarotpddah pratiksyah kdrandntardt]
ydvad dhi na paricchinnd suddhis tdvad asatsamd\ \
tasydpi kdrane suddhe tajjndne sydt pramdnatd]
(The reading of Slokavarttika (with Tdtparyatikd) is
tasydpi kdrane 'suddhe tajjndnasydpramdnatd)
tasydpy evam itittham tu na kincid vyavatisthate\\
'If an object is not ascertained, even if [its] cognition has arisen, until the cor­
rectness of the cause [of this cognition] is [established] from another cognition
then, with respect to [the correctness of this cause] one should wait for the
arising of another cognition from another cause. For correctness is as good as
non-existent as long as it is not well established. And that [second cognition
of the correctness of the cause of the first cognition] can be valid [only] if [its
own] cause is correct [and] if there is a cognition of that [i.e. of the correctness
of the cause of the second cognition], (cf. Kdsikd ad loc.: tasydh suddher apar-
icchinndyd asatsamatvdt tasydpi suddhijndnasya kdranasuddhau satydm tasydh
suddher jndne ca sati pramdnatd bhavati[ The reading of Slokavarttika (with
Tdtparyatikd) might be interpreted as follows: 'And that [cognition] will also
be invalid if the cause of its cognition is not pure.') And the same [can be said
about the validity] of that [third cognition], so in this way one could never reach
the end [of subsequent cognitions].'

160 Cf. Sdbarabhdsya(F) (quoting the Vrttikara) ad 1.1.4a (p. 26): yasya ca
dustam karanam yatra ca mithyeti pratyayah, sa eva asamicinah pratyayo nanya
iti\ 'That, and only that cognition is erroneous the instrumental cause of which
is defective, or with regard to which [another] cognition [has arisen which es­
tablishes that] "it is false".' See also Slokavarttika (with Tdtparyatika) codand
53 seqq.
161 ex conj. GOODALL. Another possible conjecture, suggested by Dr. Isaacson,
is saiva jyesthd.
162 Vaisesikasutra 1.1.3. Candrananda's commentary ad loc.: tad iti hiranya-
garbhapardmarsah, hiranyam reto 'syeti krtvd bhagavdn mahesvara evocyate]
dptenoktatvasya satyatdvydptatvdd ihdptena hiranyagarbhenoktatvdd dmndyasya
prdmdnyam sddhyate\ isvaras ca sddhitas tanubhuvanddmdm kdryatayd ghatd-
divad buddhimatkartrkatvdnumdnena\ '[The word] "His" relates to Hiranyagar-
bha. Interpreting it as "his seed is golden" it is the blessed Siva who is being
referred to. Since [a statement] must invariably be true if it has been said by
a trustworthy person, the validity of scripture becomes established since it was
enunciated by Hiranyagarbha. As for the Lord, he has been proved [to exist]
from the fact that such things as bodies and worlds are products, like pots and
the like, with the help of inferring the fact that they have an intelligent maker.'
The sutra is repeated as 10.21; Candrananda's commentary ad loc.: ta-
nubhuvanddikdryatayd vijndto bhagavdn isvarah, tatpranayandc cdmndyasya si-
ddham prdmdnyam\ '[The existence of] God has been realised due to the fact

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that such things as bodies and worlds are products; and the authoritativeness
of scripture is established because He composed it.'
163 Nyayasutra 2.1.68.
164 As Prof. Sanderson pointed out ("Hinduism", Handout 3, 22.ii. 1999) the
same fourfold division of saivas (Pasupatas / Paficarthikas, Lakulas / Kalamu-
khas, Somasiddhantins / Kapalikas / Mahavratins, Saivas) also appears in
Yamuna's Agamapramanya (p. 46.), in the Snbhdsya (ad 2.2.35), in the Bhaira-
vamangalakalpa (fol. 4v3-5), and in the Karanagama (I, 26.58c-59).
165 ex conj. A similar idea occurs at the end of the play, when the Graduate
warns against the confusion of various religious traditions.

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 Act Four

Then enter the Vedic OFFICIANT and the Vedic INSTRUCTOR.

OFFICIANT (agitated). What an awful blow! I had one thing in my mind and a
completely different thing has happened. When all those religions outside the
Veda are suspended, we'll have the opportunity to enjoy the whole country: this
is what I had in mind. The heterodox religions are still just as widespread as
they were before: this is what has happened. For,
s
Saivas, Pasupatas, Pancaratrikas, Sankhyas, Buddhists, Sky-Clad (1)
Jains and other [heretics]: all of them have remained as they were.
Shame on the useless learning of the Graduate!
INSTRUCTOR. But, my friend, he has now become the king's man. And the king
is supremely devoted to Siva, so Samkarsana has to be completely focussed on
propitiating Him. For,
In a monarch's vicinity [his] men keep repeating his words, but, eager (2)
for their own advantage, they do not distinguish between good or
bad, like echoes.
OFFICIANT. Right you are, my friend. Who would disregard his own interests and
impartially focus his attention on Dharma alone? But how should we spend
the time, whose profession—officiating at sacrifices, teaching, and the like—is
concerned exclusively with the Veda?
INSTRUCTOR. My friend, we shall spend the future just as we have spent the past:
content merely with something to eat and wear. For,
Without merit one cannot find assemblies exempt from villains' talk, (3)
lovers immune from sulkiness, and treasure not claimed by another.
OFFICIANT. Quite right. 1 What to do? But this other thing annoys me more.
INSTRUCTOR. What is it?
OFFICIANT. That these Pancaratrika Bhagavatas adopt Brahmanical manners. 2
They mix with brahmins and have no scruples about using the form of greeting
that only we may use to our equals. They recite the Pancaratra scriptures with
a special pattern of accented syllables, as if they were taking the text of Veda as
their example. 3 'We are brahmins': this is how they speak of themselves, and

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demand that others speak of them in the same way. Take the Saivas and their
ilk: they are not part of the system of the four social estates, they give up the
life-periods determined by the Veda (sruti) and the Smrtis and they segregate
by adopting a different doctrine.4 But these fellows say that 'We have been
truly brahmins ever since our birth, for a long succession of ancestors',5 and in
the same way they imitate the system of the four life-periods: this is a great
torment.
INSTRUCTOR. How great is this torment, my friend?
In officiating, teaching, matrimonial relation, or in any other context, (4)
brahmins learned in the Veda give the Pancaratrikas a wide berth.6
As for the fact that they label themselves as 'brahmins': this is merely the usage
of their own sect. 7
OFFICIANT. Is this a small nuisance?
INSTRUCTOR. Why, how big is it? They will never get to study the Veda, the
Smrtis, or MTmamsa, or to perform solemn or domestic rituals.8 And if they
marry some brahmin woman who has strayed from the path of decorum, they
will be given a reputation for having married 'against the grain'.9 No need to
get upset that they will not be banned from some places, even if they learn
just a few of the Vedic ancillary sciences to some small extent. Let's drop the
subject. But this is what I've heard.
OFFICIANT. What is it?
INSTRUCTOR. Today indeed the Honourable Samkarsana went to the sanctuary of
the Vaisnavas, which is crowded with hundreds and thousands of Bhagavatas,
with the very purpose of scrutinising the religion of the Bhagavatas. And thou­
sands of brahmin scholars have assembled in BrahmadvTpa. 10 There must be a
great conference there. So come, we shall go right there.
OFFICIANT. We've seen Samkarsana's ardour, for he is an advocate of the theory
that all religions are authoritative. On the other hand the Queen, Her Majesty
SugandhadevT, is reported to sympathise with these people of all. Rumour has
it that there is a royal functionary who also supports the Satvatas.
INSTRUCTOR. Don't always fear the worst. They couldn't even bend a blade of
grass if this was beyond the established customs. So come, let's go right there to
see the manifold and desperate floundering of the heterodox religions as they are
ducked again and again in the ocean of the MTmamsaka's streaming eloquence.

Exeunt ambo.
Then enters the Honourable SAMKARSANA, the BOY, and as many
attendants as affordable.
GRADUATE. Boy, I've got into a tight corner, for
Those who follow the teaching of the Blessed Narayana, whose mind (5)
is absorbed in the play of accomplishing the revolution of the states
of the universe: [that is its] continuance, emission, and resorption—
how shall I say with this tongue of mine that their world view is

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false? But if I don't, how shall I be able to stand before the learned
whose intellect is completely occupied by the Three Vedas?
BOY. There is this [dilemma] indeed, Sir. Nevertheless11 the customs that were set
up long ago are being preserved as they are. Why are you uneasy about this
matter, Sir? So now please take a look at this place which is thronged12 with
hundreds13 and thousands of Pancaratrikas and other great scholars.
GRADUATE (walks about, looks ahead, amazed). Good Lord! How big is this confer­
ence of scholars! It fills the quarters with a great row of dispute and disagreement
spreading as a result of mutual emulation. For in this [assembly],
Here are those [Mimamsakas] who have reflected on the ways of the (6)
various meanings in sentences; there are the grammarians who have
scrutinised the roots of nouns and verbs; there are the experts in
logic, whose minds are sharp in ascertaining the concomitance of
the logical reason [with the major term (sadhya)}; and these here
are the senior masters of the Smrtis, Polity, Puranas, and the like.
How wonderful! Now the kingdom looks exactly like Brahma's heaven—the
kingdom of His Majesty Yasovarmadeva of holy fame, whose heart is with the
Destroyer of the Cities [of the demons, i.e. Siva], an ocean of enviable virtues,
who adorns his ear by listening to the valuable [advice] of the learned, and fulfils
the wishes of every virtuous man. (He muses for a moment, [and says] aside.)
I wonder how should I behave among these people who adhere to the guidance
and instructions of manifold scholarly works teaching mutually contradictory
things.
What shall I do on a path which is rough because it opposes the (7)
Veda, [and] on which even an expert could not arrive at a decision?
I know! My refuge is the God who Holds a Bow, a Discus and a
Conch-Shell [i.e. Visnu].
So be it! First I take refuge immediately with the Blessed Lord himself. (Aloud.)
Boy, the Blessed Lord's temple is close by. So I'll enter there, do obeisance to
the Blessed [Visnu] Ranasvamm, 14 who is the refuge of everyone, and then I
shall occupy my seat in the assembly.
BOY. As you command.
They walk about.
GRADUATE (mimes entering and kneels down on the ground).
Homage to Visnu, who is the abode of the diverse triple world which (8)
he stepped over with his steps, in the fragment of one part of the
corner of whose belly the universe rests absorbed.
Homage to Cakrin, in whose palms a conch-shell and a discus15 rest, (9)
who shows the true path of liberation and illuminates16 spotless
beatitude. 17
Homage to Rathangin, who is the cause of final extinction <... > 18 (10)

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([He listens and says] joyfully] Prom this auspicious sound of a conch-shell I
assume <... >
MANJTRA. <... > this is a great opposition to the social estates and life-periods. So
the Queen, solicited by the chief minister Brahma<... >ksa, has been induced
to summon these respected brahmins. After returning [from the meeting] she
said to him: 19 ' "Bhatta Sahata, this great Naiyayika, also known by the name
of Dhairyarasi, is accepted by all as an umpire in this debate between those who
are learned in the Three Vedas and the religious preceptors of other religions:
please make him the arbitrator hi the affair of this debate."—this is how they
requested me <...>' So please do not leave,20 Sir. It is in this debate that I
would like Your Honour to be present in the assembly without adducing your
view. 21 <... >
GRADUATE. My friend ManjTra, come then, we shall enter the assembly together.
They walk about. Behind the scenes.

In a distinguished family of well-known dignity <... > remarkably (11)

fortunate, who relieves those with mutually opposed views from all22
doubts, and thus the vision of scholars becomes uniform with regard
to what is the most salutary.
A true ornament of the world was born called the Honourable Sahata, (12)
nearly equal to the Highest Lord, whom people do not confront since
no small virtues have made him superior.

GRADUATE. This is the laudation of the approaching Dhairyarasi. Indeed, people

side with Dhairyarasi! And their sympathy is not inappropriate. He is exactly
like that. ManjTra, my friend, thanks to Your Honour's favour23 I've got out of
a bad fix, since I'll stay away from such matters.
MANJIRA. How could any difficulty arise for you, Sir, whose great undertaking is
to benefit mankind while you live, when the Supreme Lord who is not subject
to old age and death is there [by your side]?
BOY. Today there is this seat for you, Sir, in the assembly, so please enter.
GRADUATE. My colleague, ManjTra, please enter first and announce the king's
order to the members of the assembly.
MANJTRA. All right. (He walks about.) Scholars, who have been seated in the
proper way, may I have your attention!
The sharp-witted speaker, highly esteemed by the virtuous, the (13)
ocean of the rivers of sciences, who has achieved great reputation
in the society of scholars as the greatest pandit: upon the request of
religious leaders, he became today the arbitrator in this matter by
the king's order. May all the people be at ease, may they give up
their differences, and rejoice!
Then enters DHAIRYARASI as described above, and as large a gath­
ering of disputants as can be afforded.

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 Act Four

DHAIRYARASI (amazed). What a confluence of sciences! Amazing! At this very

place, on the continent of Jambu and in Bharata's country I see the City of the
Supreme Being! For,
Here the fourteen branches of knowledge have set foot; various prac- (14)
tices are present here; this way there are manifold observances, and
here the naturally pure austerities are unhindered and at peace. As
for the king, he is indeed Brahma before our eyes: what can be more
than this?
(He looks ahead.) Well, well! The Honourable Samkarsana, the equal of le­
gendary sages, is right here. All right, I greet him. (He does so.)
GRADUATE (embraces him closely). I enjoy now an easily obtained ablution by all
the holy waters.

All sit down.

GRADUATE. Respectable Theologians, all the knots of your apprehensions are now
as good as cut. For, by the king's order, the living Aksapada so to say, the
Prajapati of Philosophy is present among us: Dhairyarasi!
DISPUTANTS. Upon the request of the religious leaders rather than upon the king's
solicitation.
GRADUATE (to Dhairyarasi). Ornament among Logicians, you must know the facts
of the matter that is presently under discussion. So please begin your talk as
you find proper, following your inspiration. 24
DHAIRYARASI. Sir, I know this much: the disputants here disagree whether such
scriptures as the Pancaratra are valid or not. But when Your Honour is present,
what sort of authority do people like me have to speak? If only you grant us
your permission we are allowed to say something, like a child of Your Honour,
so to say.
GRADUATE. Why do you say so? Your honour is the one who grants [the course
of the discussion, who calls the tune]. And every disputant has placed his
confidence in you alone. So please speak.
DHAIRYARASI (addressing the disputants). Respected gentlemen, I have heard and
understood the arguments put forth by you concerning both positions, and they
require nothing [else to be complete]. Therefore please do not interject anything
while I am delivering a continuous speech.
DISPUTANTS. All right, Sir. We shall not interject anything without being asked,
interrupting your speech.
DHAIRYARASI. So now listen carefully.
DISPUTANTS. We hang upon your lips.
DHAIRYARASI.
To begin with, 25 the Mlmamsakas say that the Veda is a means (15)
of valid cognition by itself, since it creates awareness. The darbha
grass26 of beginninglessness has swept away its author and the dust-
fall of both challenges to its validity.27

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They say accordingly—

All cognitions we have are valid by themselves because they give (16)
information about their appropriate object. [But they are] not [valid]
if a refutation [in the form of a subsequent cognition] occurs, or
if we realise that the instrument [of the cognition, e.g. the sense
organs in the case of sense perception] is defective. In the case of
the eternal Veda, both blames are out of place, and the fact that it
creates awareness is established. Or rather, there is even less room
for refutation in the context of something to be accomplished which
is an imperceptible object28 [i.e. heaven].
For people can ascertain about an object which is within the scope of (17)
sense perception that it is or is not thus [as the first perception has
shown it]. What means do they have in the case of an imperceptible
[object]?
Therefore the Veda is a source of valid cognition by itself alone because it creates
awareness and because neither of the blames [of validity] occurs.
I have the following to say in this matter. This path concerning its (18)
[i.e. the Veda's] validity is indeed straight and easy. Nevertheless it
does not win my heart. Where can we see a non-human arrangement
in the case of words and [their] meaning?29 The recitation of the
Veda also started from somewhere on the first occasion.
If [you ask] what this "first occasion" of the Veda is, you'd better (19)
imagine it. For this arrangement of [the Veda] which is eternal in
its components cannot be [itself] eternal. You may say that sounds
are permanent, yet you cannot see this [permanent, eternal] nature
of structures: they surely depend on a maker in our world.30
[You may object:] "We do not remember an author in this case, as (20)
[we remember] Vyasa and others [in the case of the Mahabharata
etc.]."Come now! This fault is not dangerous. For this maker is im­
perceptible because of his extraordinary nature. We have memories
about [something or somebody that can be] an object perceptible
by [ordinary] people like me.
Furthermore, since ancient times people have always said that Hi- (21)
ranyagarbha was the author in the case of the rich compositions of
Vedic words.31 [If you say:] "This tradition is a product of explan­
atory exegesis": you cannot adduce even a morsel of proof for the
ascertainment of this distinction.32
Furthermore,
Just as you say that Vedic texts are always to be inferred as the (22)
bases of such Smrtis as [the one dealing with] the Astaka [ritual],33
in the same way let there be an author in the case of the Veda who

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is always to be inferred, or else the difference [between the above

mentioned two inferences] must be stated.
"But what fails without that [author] which is to be inferred?" What (23)
fails without the inference of Vedic sentences?
If [you say that the] memory [i.e. Smrti, of the prescribed ritual] (24)
would be an impossibility, [rny answer is that] a composition will be
an impossibility [without an author]. If [you say that] memory [i.e.
Smrti] has the nature of an effect, [then] a composition is also of
that kind.
"But Manu's sentences would surely be false without a Vedic text (25)
as their basis." Why you determine a source of valid knowledge
according to [your] purpose?
Or rather,

Let Manu's propositions be false, but we cannot infer a Vedic text (26)
which is nowhere, not in the mouth of even one of those who have
studied hundreds of Vedic recensions. If [you say that] out of re­
spect for those who are learned in the Veda [and who follow Manu's
Lawbook], a Vedic text should be postulated as its basis, likewise
we should postulate an author as a consequence of such structures
as the sequence of Vedic words.
'The [regular] study of the Veda presupposes [its regular] study from (27)
[one's] teacher, since it is referred to by [the expression] "the study
of the Veda" ':34 this logical reason is indecisive.
[You your] self say35 that such [logical reasons] are not effective, and (28)
in the same time [you your]self use them—what is this fraudulence?
In the case of an ancient composition that has become well-known (29)
due to a transmission the source of which is not error,36 [even though]
the memory of its author has not been retained, there is indeed an
author at [its] origin.
For, given that the Veda is the work of a person, how is it indeed (30)
that virtuous people who have no recollection of that person perform
its rituals, which can [only] be accomplished with a lot of money?
The effort of the wise [exhibited in performing Vedic rituals] is very (31)
much appropriate in that case, too, if the author [of the Veda] is
inferred, just as your [effort to perform] such rituals as the Astaka
ceremony enjoined in the Smrtis [is suitable] on the basis of inferring
a Vedic text [as the ground of that Smrti].
And for the following reasons, too, the Veda does have an author, who is always
to be inferred.

In the case of the Visvajit sacrifice,37 a particular fruit [i.e. heaven], (32)

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[though] not stated [explicitly] in the Veda, is rightly postulated be­

cause of the expectation generated by the ritual injunction. In that
case who could be the one who expects that [fruit]? The signified
[sense] and the signifying [word] are surely not conscious.
If [you say that] this is a characteristic of comprehension [to expect (33)
an appropriate result]: then whose comprehension [are you talking
about]? [For] it is not autonomous. If [you say that it is] ours, [then]
it will follow that the Veda's meaning arises from human beings.
Since whenever we understand [the meaning of an injunction], we (34)
become aware of the intention of the author [of that injunction], inas­
much as he is the one who knows [and communicates that meaning].
Whose is the intention here? Not the word's or the meaning's.
On the strength38 of whose expectation an ancillary or a result for a (35)
given [ritual] is postulated,39 there is that person who created that
[ritual injunction]. Whose expectation other than his could it be?
Therefore there is an author of the Veda, even if he must always be (36)
inferred, for without him no activity [connected with the Veda] is
possible.40
And as for the statement that no author is remembered, we examine this matter
in the following way:
Those authors who reach the path of recollection in this world, such (37)
as Vyasa and Valmlki, all have a limited body and so walk about in
the range of sight of people like me. Maybe space alone is his body,
or he might occupy various forms, or he may have no body at all: [in
any case] how on earth could God, the author of the Veda, become
an object of memories?
That is exactly why the wise have various fanciful ideas about this (38)
author. In reality He is only one, able to secure the welfare of the
three worlds.
One cannot postulate a plurality of gods who [all] have the same (39)
intention. [On the other hand,] since opposed intentions cannot be
[simultaneously] accomplished, some of them would clearly be non-
gods.
Therefore there is only one omniscient person. But if there were (40)
many supervisors of the world, it could not be created [at all], or
being [somehow] produced it would not last long, like a misgoverned
kingdom. The construction of a building is accomplished by many
because they follow the instructions of one architect: so the world
must have been created by one person.
For many people bustling about could not create this world even in (41)
hundreds of aeons. But one pure-minded person whose intentions
are [always] realised brings it about in no time: this is the right
view.

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And it is taught:
'Because of his association with the elements of his task, namely cre­
ation, maintenance, and dissolution, the unique, wonderful, unborn, (42)
supremely powerful Person, who is the cause of the emission of the
whole world, is known as Brahma, Visrm, [and] Rudra.'41
And just as this Self of the universe is the creator of all worlds, in the (43)
same way He, the pure-minded one is indeed the author of the Vedas,
too. Just as the condition of these three worlds is interdependent,
in the same way the Vedas also proclaim interrelated injunctions.
Since the arrangement which is perceived in interconnected topics (44)
or words would not be possible [otherwise], thus we postulate the
following:
The only creator of the Vedas, which show us the path to unequalled (45)
happiness and which are scattered in several recensions, is a pure-
minded sage, a wonderful, ancient god. Likewise let the Blessed Lord
be the one and only author of all scriptures, for, as it has already
been stated, a plurality of authors is not easy to account for.
'Oho!
Surely all scriptures without exception are mutually contradictory, (46)
for we do not see any common subject-matter in them. How could
we accept that they were created by one man? Or how could they
be authoritative when they annul each other?'
First you will be examined about what you assert, namely: 'How can there be
validity if there is mutual contradiction?'
How do you prevent mutual contradiction in the case of the Veda? If (47)
[you say that] it is eternal: oho, you got stuck in your family tales. If
the contradiction is averted resorting to some kind of differentiation
in Vedic texts, the procedure is the same with regard to the texts of
other scriptures.
In the Veda, blackberry-oblation is prescribed for a man who wishes (48)
for a long life,42 and, as we learn, the Sarvasvara ritual is recited
for someone who wants to die.43 If you obviate the contradiction
in this [Vedic text] through the differentiation of the object of in­
junction, the course of action must be the same here, regarding the
propositions of other religions.
Thus, pro primo, there is no fault44 in the instructions of other sacred texts,
just as in Vedic injunctions, even if they are mutually contradictory. Or rather,
With regard to the highest human goal, there is no contradiction (49)
among scriptures, since the very same reward: deliverance is taught
by all.

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Various kinds of salvific paths are taught, however, which conform (50)
to the intellect of the beings to be favoured. 45
This omniscient Lord taught various kinds of approaches when he (51)
saw: 'As for these people, they can be helped to reach beatitude in
the way they prefer on this path'.
Just as some people from a crowd that wants to enter a single fort or (52)
a big house also enter through another door, liberation-seekers also
[enter] the highest abode in the same way.
The following wise saying of Jayanta, the child genius, who has (53)
mastered the essence of all sciences, who knows reality, and who
has shaken off error, refers to the same thing:
'The many means taught by various scriptural approaches converge (54)
in the single summum bonum, as the currents of the Ganges [meet]
in the ocean.'46
As for the objection 'how can contradictory scriptures have one and the same
author', this has also been dealt with:
The Vedas are authoritative not by themselves, but because they (55)
were pronounced by God. And, on the other hand, there is no
argument for the plurality of gods.
As for the reference to different authors, it is established in another way.
Though He is one, inasmuch as he assumes various bodies fashioned (56)
by his will and teaches all kinds of scriptures for the benefit of all
beings, he bears all those diverse names which are celebrated in all
the worlds.
Siva, Pasupati, Kapila and Visnu, Samkarsana, the Sage Jina, the (57)
Buddha, or Manu are one, only these designations differ, and maybe
[their] bodies as well, but there is no plurality in the undifferentiated
Supreme Self.
Even if he is different [from God], an extraordinary, eminent man (58)
clearly47 bears the Lord's lustre. For thus taught Krsna:
'Whenever a being is powerful, thriving, or mighty, know that it has (59)
arisen from a particle of my lustre.'48
Or let there be many illustrious sages, like Jina, who are devoted (60)
to propagate different religions: they, too, will recognise the means
leading to beatitude inasmuch as they have a pure, imperishable
vision acquired through devoted meditation on the the All-holy.49
For only this much differentiates the yogins from the Supreme Lord: (61)
His knowledge is inherent, [while] the yogins' is [acquired] through
the practice of meditation.
At all events, those who believe that the Veda was composed by (62)

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a trustworthy person assert its authority hi this way. The course

of reasoning is the same with regard to the validity of every single
scripture, such as the Pancaratra.
Their author may either be one, [namely] the Lord, or various trust- (63)
worthy persons who know different approaches. In either case these
texts composed by Him or them do not lose50 then- validity, any
more than the Veda does.51
Or let us suppose instead that the Vedas have no beginning and that (64)
they become authoritative by themselves alone: very well, these in­
junctions of the Pancaratra and [other scriptures may become valid]
in the same way.52
We have no clear memory of an author in this case either. As for (65)
Samkarsana and others, they are the propagators of these [proposi­
tions] , like Katha and others [who propagated different Vedic recen­
sions].53
"But surely—one might object—these Vedas are well known54 among (66)
the people to be only four. As for the Itihasas and Puranas, in their
case this name [i.e. the name 'Veda' is used] in a figurative sense.
'This is the Veda, this is a brahmin, this is water, this is fire, this is (67)
earth': in this clear understanding of a word's meaning the elders,
whose minds are well-focused, are the source of authoritative know­
ledge. So who, even a child, will recklessly apply the word 'Veda'
to this Pancaratra? Or who will call the follower of that doctrine a
brahmin, even if that person resembles a sage?" 55
I do not say either that there are five or six Vedas here,56 for then- (68)
number is well known to be limited: there are only four of them. But
they diversely branch into many recensions, so let this [Pancaratra]
be one of their particular recensions. 57
[Someone may] object:
"But surely those who know the Vedic ordinances speak about a (69)
single duty that is learnt from all recensions, [namely] sacrifice, such
as the Somaf-offering] or [the immolation of] animals. Tell me, if
you have ever seen anywhere any Vedic ritual that was connected
with the Pancaratra."
We reply:
Those sentences which teach a single ritual action furnished with sev- (70)
eral components, though many, have a common applicability. Cer­
tain rules of [this] extended ritual action are, as we learn, prescribed
in certain recensions: let precisely this [fact] be [their] connected
nature.
A doctrinal work with a determined object cannot be questioned by (71)

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another doctrinal work. 58 We do see this state of affairs in the case

of the Veda, too, in which there are diverging ordinances. For here
the prescription of [using] beer-cups is specified to the SautramaI).I
[sacrifice];59 it is certainly not connected with other rites.
As for other pious acts taught 60 in the Vedas and the Sm:rtis which (72)
pertain to separate life-periods: are they mixed up with each other?
On the other hand, people have always praised piety common to (73)
all sacred traditions, which consists of non-violence, sincerity, con-
tentment, purity, self-control, munificence, compassion, and the like.
This is also the point where these [traditions] are concordant with
the Vedas and the Sm:rtiS.61
As for the designation 'Veda' that people apply to the texts of the (74)
Pancaratra, it is [used] as referring to something else. 62 And [in any
case] the matter cannot be settled on the basis of vulgar usage.
Or rather, why bother with the designation, be it true or false? (75)
Surely we also see it in such [names] as '.Ayurveda', or 'Dhanurveda'.
People refer to the follower of this teaching63 in general terms as (76)
a brahmin, [even though] he has a more specific designation64 [i.e.
Bhagavata] derived from a different [i.e. non-Vedic] ritual devoted to
Bhagavat, just as [people refer to] wandering mendicants [in general
terms as brahmins].65
And the fact that they are designated with the word 'brahmin' is (77)
common knowledge in the world. People use general and specific
names as they please.
The learned disagree about such caste universals as 'brahminness', (78)
[some] saying that the system of the four estates is arranged on the
bases of words alone.
"Are such caste universals as 'brahminhood' perceptible in the same (79)
way as the genus universal 'cowness', or in another way?" 66 : this
deliberation of the true state of affairs is beside the point, it makes
no difference. The status quo, which is established in all doctrines
and for everyone, should not be speculated about in any way.
So let us not worry about the existence or non-existence of castes. I shall
continue with the present subject.
Thus let all these sacred scriptures have no beginning, like the Veda, (80)
or in fact let them be just products, the pious should not bad mouth
them. And if they were reviled, however slightly, it would be the
same as abusing the Veda. Those fools who are given to finding
fault with them are guilty of a sin.
Or rather one should say that the sentences of such [sacred texts] as (81)
the Pancaratra, similarly to the words of Manu and [other Sm:rtis],67
are valid because they are based on the Veda. 68

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An effect determines in each case the cause of its accomplishment, as (82)

smoke [determines] fire: one should postulate this cause, for without
the perception of an object no memory [smrtil] has been seen or
heard of to arise about anything.
Neither greed and delusion, nor deceiving people, nor a series of hu- (83)
man utterances lacking any substance become the basis of an uncon-
troverted matter. And in this case there is no controverting factor,
since competent people accept [the authority of the Pancaratra].
Those who profess that the Veda has no beginning could not stand (84)
the idea that [the validity of scripture] is based on yogic perception.
Then the Veda is left [as the basis] for its [i.e. the Pancaratra's]
words.
"But surely, [one might say,] we do not perceive here any identity (85)
among the performers69 [of the pious acts enjoined in the Veda on
the one hand, and in the Pancaratra on the other], and without that
the inference of a Vedic text70 [as the basis of Pancaratra] is not
correct in this case."
We reply:
Fine, the practice [of Vedic and Pancaratra religion] may not be (86)
similar, inasmuch as [Vedic and Pancaratra rites] have different per­
formers, but an effect is undoubtedly fit for assuming an adequate
cause.
[Someone may] object:
'The association [of a sacred text, e.g. the Manusmrti] with the Veda (87)
can be assumed inasmuch as it is [theoretically] possible [and thus
acceptable] for the members of the first three social estates. On the
other hand, the source of an duty is just [any] cause,71 [and] in this
case [i.e. the case of the Pancaratra] it could have arisen for any
reason whatsoever.'72
We reply:
With respect to piety, the Veda alone is the means of valid know- (88)
ledge, nothing else: that's why it has been said that the Veda is
the source in this case, not on the strength of the identity of the
performers. And the theory of yogic perception is not needed either
for the same reason.
So the performers may or may not be identical in this case. At any (89)
rate it is the Veda alone which is the source of this effect which has
the nature of piety.
Here [among scriptures] if neither yogic perception nor even the Veda (90)
were the basis of all these teachings such as that of the Jina, Kapila,

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or the Buddha, how could delusion be the cause of their unlimited

pullulation, acknowledged by many Aryas? What's more, at some
places it even meets their full accord.
For [these teachings] might last for a few days due to delusion, [but] (91)
that would be a fantastic thing [to say that] that delusion persists
for eons.
"Who knows if there were Buddhists in former times, too?" Who (92)
knows if there were brahmins learned in the Veda in former times,
too?
Or if you say that greed and the like are the visible source in this (93)
case, 73 the heterodox will retort that the Veda is also74 a means of
livelihood. 75
On the other hand, if the series of abuses jabbered by someone who (94)
follows the teaching of Brhaspati [i.e. Lokayata] is averted in the
case of the Veda because it is accepted by exemplary persons, it can
be beaten off with regard to the teachings of other scriptures in the
same way: we are told that these, too, are accepted by intelligent
people. 76
However many arguments of whatever kind you put forth in order (95)
to establish the authority of the Veda, they are equal in value with
respect to other religious doctrines as well.77
Your contention, namely that the world has always been as it is now, (96)
is also said by others in the same way. Those religions, too, have
always existed. 78
But let's cut the matter short. People who talk too much incur (97)
odium, so I put a curb now on the excessive jabbering of my tongue.
Religious scriptures are authoritative because they have been enun- (98)
ciated by a truthful, trustworthy person, or by themselves, like the
Veda, inasmuch as they have no beginning, or because they are in
harmony with Vedic tradition, like Manu's teachings. All [scriptures]
are authoritative: thus speak the political scientists.
[Someone may] object:
"But surely in this way, because of the logical fault of unwarrant- (99)
able extension [of the category 'valid scripture'] socio-religious order
would be utterly ruined on earth. Tell me a case when one could
not say this about any proposition in the same manner, however
worthless it may be?"
This [objection] has been answered [in the following way]:
If it takes an uninterrupted course acknowledged by all, if the Aryas (100-101)
are not averse to becoming familiar with and discussing it, if its
accepted practice is neither antisocial nor dangerous, if its character

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does not appear to be newly arisen, if its basis does not seem to be
the fact that it was proclaimed by a madman, or that it is unusual,
or greed and the like: this path of validity is for such scriptures
[alone], and not for any instance. 79
We can say only in their case that they have been enunciated by (102)
trustworthy persons, or that they have no beginning, [or] that they
are based on Vedic tradition, but not in any instance whatsoever.
But these masters among disputants will definitely not allow this (103)
claim of validity for any scriptures in which any contemptible duty80
is taught, such as making love to women one must not have sex with,
or eating impure things.
Having spoken thus he remains silent for a second, and then [turns]
to SAMKARSANA.
Sir, I have said this much to the best of my intellectual capabilities. So now
please ask these estimable disputants according to seating if our speech has
captured then- heart or not.
SAMKARSANA (delighted). Honourable Dhairyarasi, be sure that, in a manner of
speaking, we have been revived, beatified, purified, nourished, made to experi­
ence the goal of this worldly existence by this novel river of erudition which has
risen from Your Honour. How wonderful!
What a subtle intellect! What a fluent speech! What a skill in the (104)
sdstrasl What a mind, exempt from such faults as envy! Or is there
any virtue81 that has not reached its highest limit in this person?
People have always been saying that truly no man has been born
who is a match for Sahata.
These professors are also very much capable of appreciation, so how could Your
Honour not win them over? Shall I ask them? (He turns towards the DIS­
PUTANTS.) Respected Professors, has your heart been won over by Dhairyarasi's
speech?
DISPUTANTS. Sir, this [erudition] is truly superhuman.
SAMKARSANA. Besides your intellect will always be pure, like that of brahmin
sages,82 thanks to these words of the Honourable Dhairyarasi, which shower
inexhaustible streams of political wisdom, which are uniquely fluent,83 and
immune from malice. Nevertheless you are reminded again and again of the
following: there are two things that you, gentlemen, must by all means observe.
DISPUTANTS. What are they?
SAMKARSANA. These religious traditions, as we are told, are not mixed up with
each other, inasmuch as each of them has its respective scope, existing in the
way they have been set up. So you, gentlemen, must always pay attention to
prevent their intermixing.
DISPUTANTS. Sir, what can we say concerning all the universal piety taught by
Manu,84 such as non-violence, which is handed down here in everyone's own
doctrine? Apart from that, however, we avoid the mixing of the specifically

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taught, particular ritual sections, since we are afraid of acting against what is
said in our own scriptures. Thus the first point has been settled. But what is
the second one?
SAMKARSANA. You must not admit into your religions those who take your name in
their mouth and then overthrow both scripture and Dharma with their wicked
behaviour.
DISPUTANTS. This is also carried out for sure. But this matter does not depend
on us. It can be accomplished by you, Sir, and by the officers of the king.
SAMKARSANA. You are right. His Majesty, the instructor in the established rules
of social estates and life-periods, surely grasps the opportunity in this matter.
As for you, you must separate yourselves from such people. Don't sympathise
with them.
DISPUTANTS. As you say, Sir.
SAMKARSANA. So now let us get up and go about our business. Let everyone
adhere to his own religion according to the established customs. Honourable
Dhairyarasi, come now, we shall report to our master the events as they have
happened.

Exeunt omnes.

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Notes to Act Four

1 ex em. ISAACSON. evam evam usually occurs after stage directions such
as karne and stands for 'whisper whisper'.

Cf. Agamaprdmdnya p. 11: nanu tatrdpi srutismrtiprdptasikhdyajnopa-

wtddi dhdrayadbhir bhdgavatabrdhmanair aharaharanusthzyamdndrthatvena co-
dandmulatve sambhdvyamdne katham iva prdmdnyapratyanikabhutd bhramavi-
pralambhddayah smaranakdranatayd kalpyante? 'But surely, when Vedic in­
junction is considered as the source of that [i.e. the Paiicaratra], too, due to the
fact that Bhagavata brahmins, who wear the lock of hair, the sacred thread, and
other [attributes of brahmins] prescribed in the Veda and the Smrtis, perform
daily the rituals [enjoined in the scriptures of the Pancaratra], how, I ask, can
you postulate error, deception and the like, the enemies of validity, as the cause
of [this] Smrti [i.e. Paiicaratra]?'
The Mimamsaka's answer (ibid.): sikhdyajnopavitddayas tu brdhmanddmdm
vidhvyamdnd na tadbhdvam dpddayitum ksamante, ndpy avagamayanti, dustasu-
drddisu vyabhicdradarsandt\ 'The lock of hair, the sacred thread and other [such
attributes] that are prescribed for brahmins and others are unable to bring about
the condition of that [brahmin, etc.], nor do they help us recognising it, since
we see that delinquent Sudras transgress [the rules concerning these attributes].'
(Cf. Tantravdrttika ad Mimdmsdsutra 1.2.2.)
In his reply Yamuna argues against the negative discrimination of the
Bhagavata brahmins (Agamaprdmdnya p. 141): iha vd kim aharaharadhiyamd-
navdjasaneyaikdyanasdkhdn vilasadupavvtottanyasikhdsdlino 'dhydpayatah, yd-
jayatah, pratigrhnato vidusah pasyanto brdhmand iti ndvayanti? atha ydjanapra-
vacanapdldsadandddmdm dustasudrddisu vyabhicdrasambhavdd brdhmanyasiddha
vatkdrena pravrttes ca na tebhyo brdhmanyanirnayah, tad bhdgavatetaraviprd-
ndm api samdnam\ 'And in this case, when people see learned people who recite
daily the Vajasaneya and the Ekayana recensions [of the Yajurveda], wear clearly
visible sacred threads, upper garments, and locks of hair, teach, officiate at sac­
rifices, and receive [fees due to priests]—don't they consider them as brahmins?
If you say that since the trangressive occurrence of officiating, teaching, [carry­
ing] a staff made of paldsa-wood, etc. is possible among delinquent Sudras and
other [criminals], and since [these attributes and activities] are displayed as if
the brahmin status [of those who display them] were as good as proved, one's
Brahman status cannot be determined on their basis—then the same applies to
priests other than the Bhagavatas, too.'
3 This might be a reference to the (now "lost") Ekdyanasdkhd (belonging
allegedly to the White Yajurveda) which was regarded by the Pancaratrikas as
the Vedic foundation of their religion, and which they found mentioned in the
following passage of the Chdndogya-upanisad (7.1.2): rgvedam bhagavo 'dhyemi
yajurvedam sdmavedam dtharvanam caturtham itihdsapurdnam pancamam vedd-
ndm vedam pitryam rdsim daivam nidhim vdkovdkyam ekdyanam ... 'I have

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studied the Rgveda, sir, as also the Yajurveda, the Samaveda, the Atharvana
as the fourth, the corpus of histories and ancient tales as the fifth Veda among
the Vedas, ancestral rites, mathematics, soothsaying, the art of locating treas­
ures, the dialogues, the monologues ...' (tr. OLIVELLE). As Olivelle points out
(p. 563), '[t]he original meaning of some of these entries is clearly uncertain, and
the interpretations of later commentators are often anachronistic. (...) The
meaning of ekdyana (lit., "point of convergence," see C[handogya] U[panisad]
7.5.2) is uncertain. (Horsch [P.] 1966 [Die vedische Gatha- und Sloka-Literatur.
Bern: Francke Verlag.], 37). The commentator Samkara's interpretation as
"statecraft" (nitisdstro) is clearly anachronistic. I follow Faddegon [B.] (["The
catalogue of Sciences in the Chandogya-Upanisad." Ada Orientalia 4] 1926,
52) in taking the term as the opposite of vdkovdkya ("speech and reply" or
"dialogue"); it would then mean an uninterrupted speech.'

4 Yamuna emphasises that one should not judge Saiva and Vaisnava tantras
by the same standard, just because they happen to share the name "tantra"
(likewise we do not put an equals sign between killing a brahmin and per­
forming a Horse Sacrifice just because both are "actions" (see Agamapramanya
p. 101). The Saiva scriptures—and on this point Yamuna shares the view of the
MTmamsakas—are indeed heretical (Agamapramanya p. 91):
na ca tantrdntaresv esa nydyah prasaram arhati\
yatas tattannibandhrndm vibhramddy apt sambhavi\\ (...)
yathd mdhesvare tantre viruddham bahu jalpitam\
'But this argument [about validity] cannot extend to other tantras, since error
and other [defects] are possible with regard to then: respective authors. (...)
For instance, lots of contradictory prattles are found in the Saiva Tantras.
(... p. 96)
kirn ca saivadayo vedasiddhavarnasramad bahih\
kalpayanty dsramddmi tato 'pi srutibdhyatd\\
'Furthermore, the Saivas and [Kapalikas, Pasupatas, etc.] posit life-periods and
other [constituents of Dharma] outside the system of social estates and life-
periods established in the Veda, and for this reason, too, they are excluded
from Vedic religion.'
(... p. 97)
pramado 'pi na catyantam rudradisu na sambhavi\\
yad vd mohasdstrapranetrtaydvagatatvdd vydmohayitum apidrsasdstrapranaya-
nam upapadyata iti ndvasyam pramdda evdsrayitavyah\ 'The possibility of in­
advertence, too, cannot be completely precluded in the case of Rudra, etc.
Alternatively, from the fact that [Rudra, etc.] are known to be the authors of
delusory scriptures, it is also possible that they composed such scriptures [i.e.
Saiva Tantras] in order to delude people. Thus it is not necessary to chose
inadvertence of all [factors].'
5 Cf. Agamapramanya p. 142: atha matam—"anyesdm brdhmanyam tad-
asddhdranagotrasmarandd" iti, tad bhdgavatdndm api samdnam\ smaranti hi
bhdgavatdh—"vayam bhdradvdjdh, vayam kdsyapdh, vayam gautamdh, vayam

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aupagavdh" iti\ na cedam gotrasmaranam nirmulam sdmayikam vd, sarvagotra-

smarandndm tathdbhdvaprasangdt]
sambhdvyamdnadosatvdd vamsdndm yadi samsayah\
tadbrdhmanye, tato lokam sarvam vydkulayed ayam\ \
jananijdrasandehajdtacanddlasamsayah\
nirvisankah katham veddn adhise sddhusattama\\
tena bhdgavatdndm api avicchinnaparampardprdptavicitragotrasmaranaparyava-
sthdpitam brdhmanyam anapoditam dsta iti na bhdgavatdndm anyesdm ca brd-
hmanye kascid visesah\ yadi param, te paramapurusam evdsritd ekdntinah, anye
ksudradaivatakdh sddhdrand iti\
'If you hold that others are brahmins since they remember their specific gotras,
the same applies to the Bhagavatas as well. For the Bhagavatas remember that
they belong to the Bharadvaja gotra, or to the Kasyapa, or to the Gautama,
or to the Aupagava. And this recollection of the gotras is neither without any
basis nor is it based on convention [alone], since then everybody's recollection
of his own gotra would follow to be in the same way. If you had doubts in their
brahmin status because it may be presumed that defects occur in the lineages,
then this [sceptical view] would confuse the whole world. How can you study the
Vedas without scruples, o best of the pious, when the uncertainty whether your
mother had a lover or not raises the suspicion that you might be an outcast?
Therefore the brahmin status of the Bhagavatas, which is firmly established by
the recollection of the various gotras received through an unbroken tradition,
also remains undisputed, and thus there is no difference between the brahmin
status of the Bhagavatas and of others, unless the fact that they are devoted to
a single [deity] only inasmuch as they worship the Supreme Person, while others
are ordinary [brahmins] inasmuch as they have their own petty godlings.'
6 Cf. Agamaprdmdnya p. 15 (mimdmsakapaksa): api ca yadavalokandddv api
visistds cdndrdyanddiprdyascittdni vidadhati, katham tatparigrahah srutimula-
tvam avagamayatiti sambhdvaydmah? smaranti hi devalakdvalokane prdyascit-
tam\ devalakds cdmi—'devakosopajwitvdd vrttyartham devapujandt\' 'Further­
more, when the elite perform such expiatory rituals as the cdndrdyana even
when they set eyes on them etc., how could we assume that the [Paiicaratra's]
acceptance by such people gives us to understand that it is based on the Veda?
For the Smrtis prescribe expiation if one catches sight of a devalaka. And these
[Pancaratrikas] are devalakas, "since they live on the wealth of God['s temple]
and since they worship God in order to earn a livelihood".'
7 Cf. Agamaprdmdnya p. 12 (mimdmsakapaksa): na ca bhdgavatesu brdhma-
napadam avisankam laukikdh prayunjate\ bhavati ca bhedena vyapadesah— 'ito
brdhmand ito bhdgavatd' iti\ 'And common people do not apply the word "brd-
hmana" to the Bhagavatas without hesitation. And naming takes place with a
differentiation: "these are brahmins, those are Bhagavatas".'

8 Cf. Agamaprdmdnya p. 14f. (mimdmsakapaksa]:

api cdcdratas tesdm abrdhmanyam pratiyate\

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 Act Four

vrttito devatdpujd diksd naivedyabhaksanam\\

garbhddhdnddiddhdntasamskdrdntarasevanam}
srautakriydnanusthdnam dvijais sambandhavarjanam\
ityddibhir andcdrair abrdhmanyam sunirnayam\ \
smaranti hi vrttito devapujdyd brahmakarmasv anadhikdrahetutvam, yathd—
'yesdm vamsakramdd eva devdrcd vrttito bhavet\
tesdm adhyayane yajne ydjane ndsti yogyatd\ \' iti\
(... p. 16.)
'vrttyartham pujayed devam trmi varsdni yo dvijah\
sa vai devalako ndma sarvakarmasu garhitah\ \'
'Furthermore, we also know from their conduct that they are not brahmins.
Worshiping God to make a living, [Tantric] consecration, eating from the offer­
ing presented to the deity, observing abnormal sacraments from the rite before
conception to cremation, neglecting the performance of solemn Vedic rituals,
avoiding contact with the twice-born: with the help such and similar aberrant
customs we can easily determine that they are not brahmins. For the Smrtis
teach that worshiping the deity in order to earn a livelihood is a cause of dis­
qualification for Vedic rituals. For example, "Those who have been worshiping a
deity to make a living for several generations are not entitled to study the Veda
or to sacrifice for themselves or for others." (...) "A twice-born who worships
a deity for three years is truly a devalaka, excluded from all [Vedic] rituals." '
9 I.e. having married a woman from a higher caste. Cf. Agamaprdmdnya
p. 11 (mimdmsakapaksa): tesdm traivarnikatvam eva ndsti, dure brdhmanabhd-
vah\ (... p. 13.) santi ca sdttvatd ndma upanayanddisamskdrahlnd vaisyavrdtydn-
vayinah avarajanmdnah kecit\ yathdha manuh—
'vaisydt tu jay ate vrdtydt sudhanvdcdrya eva ca\
bhdrusas ca nijangas ca maitras sdttvata eva ca\\' iti\ (Manusmrti 10.23)
'They do not even belong to any of the three higher estates, and far less to the
brahmins. (...) And there are certain people called Sattvatas, devoid of such
sacraments as the upanayana, descendants of Vaisya vratyas, of the lowest birth.
As Manu teaches: "From a vrdtya [of the] Vaisya [estate] are born a Sudhanvan,
an Acarya, a Bharusa, a Nijanga, a Maitra, and a Sattvata." '
10 As Kalhana relates (RdjataranginT 3.439ff.) the Ranasvamin-temple was
built by king Ranaditya. According to a legend the queen made a certain siddha
called Brahman consecrate the images of the Ranasvamin and the Ranesvara
temples. Having consecrated the linga, Brahman placed himself on the pttha
of the Ranasvamin temple (Rdjatarangini 3.458: so svayam pitham avdtarat).
In honour of this siddha the queen built the splendid Brahmamandapa (ibid.
3.459), which might be connected with the Brahmadvipa mentioned in our text.

11 According to PISCHEL §113, the SaurasenT form of Sanskrit tathd, yathd

should be tadhd, jadhd, while taha, jaha are the corresponding forms in Maha-
rastrT, Ardhamagadhl, and Jaina-MaharastrT.

12 ex conj.

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13
According to PISCHEL §448, the Saurasem form of Sanskrit fata should be
^ while saa or say a are the corresponding forms in MaharastrT, Ardhama-
gadhi, and Jaina-Maharastrl.

14 See note 10.

15 ex conj. SANDERSON.
16 ex conj.
17 ex conj. SANDERSON.
18 ex conj. It seems likely that padas cd of this verse have been lost (they
might have begun with rahu°).

19 ex conj.
on
ex conj.
21 ex conj.
ex conj.
OO

23 ex conj. SANDERSON.
24 ex conj. SANDERSON.
25 ex conj. KATAOKA.
26 ex conj. Cf. Baudhdyana-dharmasutra 1.13.30 (prescribing purification
with darbha grass and water, darbhair adbhih praksdlanam, at the Agnihotra
and other rituals); also Satapatha-brdhmana 5.5.4.22.

27 ex conj. ISAACSON. Another possible interpretation has been suggested

by Dr. Kataoka: 'The darbha grass of beginninglessness has swept away the
dust-fall of both its author and its invalidation by another pramdna.^

28 ex conj.
29 Vaisesikasutra 6.1.1: buddhipurva vdkyakrtir vede\ 'The composition of sen­
tences in the Veda is preceded by cognition.'
Candrananda's commentary ad loc.: 'agnihotram juhuyat svargakama' ity evam-
bhutd racana bhagavato mahesvarasya buddhipurva, sd tatah pramanam, dpta-
pramtatvasya satyatdvydpteh\ 'The Blessed Great Lord's knowledge is a pre­
requisite of an arrangement [of words in] such [sentences] as "one who desires
heaven should perform the Agnihotra sacrifice". That is why it is a means of
valid cognition, since if A has been composed by a trustworthy person then A
is invariably true.'
Vadihdra's commentary ad loc.: vdkyakrtir vdkyaracandkrama iti ydvat\ buddhi­
purva purusabuddhijanyd\ vedavdkyakramah purusabuddhijanyah, vdkyakrama-

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tvdt, kdliddsavdkyakramavat\ ' "A composition of sentences" is as much as [to

say] "a sequence of composing of sentences". "Preceded by cognition" [means]
produced from the cognition of a soul. [Expressed as a formal syllogism, the
point made by the sutra is that] the sequence of sentences in the Veda is one
which was produced from the cognition of a soul, because it is a sequence of
sentences [and all orders of sentences are produced from the cognition of souls],
like the sequence(s) of sentences [produced by] Kalidasa.' (tr. ISAACSON)
Vaisesikasutra 6.1.2: na cdsmadbuddhibhyo lingam rseh\ 'And [the compos­
ition of sentences in the Veda can] not [have been produced] from the cognitions
of [ordinary] people like us; [this fact is] the inferential mark of the rsi."1
Candrananda's commentary ad loc.: lingyate 'nendrtha iti lingam vijndnam\ na
hi yddrsam asmadvijndnam vartamdndvyavahitasambaddhdrthavisayam tddrsam
eva bhagavato vijridnam\ atah sambhavati bhagavato 'tmdriydrthavisayam vijnd-
nam\ ' "Mark" [means] "the object is marked by it", [i.e.] "cognition". For the
Lord's cognition is not simply like our cognition which has as its objects exist­
ing, not hidden, and related things. Thus the Lord can have a cognition which
has as its objects things that are beyond sense perception.'
VadTndra's commentary ad loc.: asmadddibuddhivdkyajanakatvasya bddhitatvdt
tadatiriktapurusabuddhau vedavdkyam (lingam\ sa ca) bhagavdn rsir isvarah\
'Since it is denied that cognitions of [ordinary] people [like us] can have pro­
duced the sentences [of the Veda] the sentences of the Veda are an inferential
mark for [the existence of] a cognition belonging to a person different from [and
superior to] such [ordinary people like us]. And this [different person] is the
blessed rsi [who in this case must be taken to be] God.' (tr. ISAACSON)
Prasastapddabhdsya p. 519ff: srutismrtilaksano 'py dmndyo vaktrprdmdnyd-
peksah, 'tadvacandd dmndyaprdmdnyam', 'lingdc cdnityah', 'buddhipurvd vdkya-
krtir vede', 'buddhipurvo daddtih' ityuktatvdt\ ' [The validity of] scriptures called
Sruti and Smrti also depends on the authority of the person who enunciated
[them], since it has been taught that "the validity of scriptures is [established]
because they are His [i.e. God's] words" (Vaisesikasutra 1.1.3, 10.21), "from
logical reason [we know that] it [i.e. scripture] is not eternal" (Vaisesikasutra
2.2.37), "the composition of sentences in the Veda is preceded by cognition"
(Vaisesikasutra 6.1.1), "[the word] "gives" is preceded by cognition' ( Vaisesika­
sutra 6.1.3)."
Vyomavattad loc. (p. 168): atha sabdasydnityatve saty dptoktatvena prdmd-
nyam sydt, tat tu ndstity dsankydha, 'lingdc cdnityah '* iti\ param pratyaksenoc-
cdrandt prdg urdhvam cdnupalambhdd anityah sabda iti pratiyate, lingdc ceti,
tat tu vaksydmah sabdapanksdydm\ veddndm cdnityatve 'numdnam, anitydni
vedavdkydni vdkyatvdd ubhaydbhimatavdkyavat\ tathd 'buddhipurvd vdkyakrtir'
vdkyaracand 'vede'^ vdkyaracandtvdd ubhaydbhimatavdkyaracandvat] (...) evam
vede^ 'buddhipurvo daddtih'^ daddtisabdah daddtityuktatvdd ubhaydbhimatada-
ddtitisabdavat\
* ed. adds [sabdah]
t ed. adds [buddhipurvd]
* ed. (vede?)

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^ ed. adds [vede buddhipurvo (sic)

' "Now, if the Veda (Sabda} were not eternal, it would be authoritative
because it has been pronounced by a trustworthy person; this, however, does
not hold true"—anticipating this objection [the Sutrakara] says: "from logical
reason [we know that] it [i.e. scripture] is not eternal". It is plainly recognised
by sense perception that words (sabda) are not eternal, since we do not perceive
them before and after their pronunciation, and [the same can] also [be proved] by
means of a logical reason, but that we shall explain in the examination of sabda.
Concering the non-eternity of the Vedas [we set forth the following] inference:
"the propositions of the Veda are not eternal, since they are propositions, just
as propositions which both [disputants] hold [to be propositions and to be non-
eternal]." Likewise "the composition of sentences", [i.e.] the construction of
sentences, "in the Veda is preceded by cognition", since it is a construction
of sentences, just as those constructions of sentences which both [disputants]
hold [to be sentences and to be non-eternal]. (...) Thus in the Veda "gives",
[i.e.] the word "gives", "is preceded by cognition", since it is a statement saying
"gives", just as the word "gives" [in ordinary contexts], which is accepted by
both [disputants to be such].'

30 Rumania's answer (Tantravdrttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.12, TV(A) p. 237,

TVp p.469):
vedesu hi tdvad eva padavdkyasamghdtdtmakatvddihetvdbhdsaih krtakatvabhrdn-
tir bhavati, *ydvad (msB : yd tad eds.) bahiravasthanad vedarupam na drsyate\
rksdmddisvarupe tu drste bhrdntir nivartate\ \
ddimdtram api srutvd veddndm pauruseyata\
na sakyddhyavasdtum hi mandg api sacetanaih] \
drstdrthavyavahdresu vdkyair lokdnusdribhih\
padais ca tadvidhair eva nardh kdvydni kurvate\ \
prapdthakacatuhsastiniyatasvarakaih padaih\
lokesv apy asrutaprdyair rgvedam kah karisyati\ \
'For, it is only as long as one does not realise the true nature of the Veda because
of being an outsider that one erroneously regards the Vedas as products, due
to such false logical reasons as the fact that they consist in the combination of
words and sentences. But when the nature of Rgvedic verses, Samavedic hymns,
and other [Vedic texts] has been realised, the [above mentioned] mistake ceases.
No sensible person can believe in the slightest degree that the Vedas have an
author as soon as he has listened just to their beginning. When people make
poems about transactions with visible goals they only employ sentences that
follow ordinary usage and words of the same kind. Who could make a Rgveda
with words which have practically never been heard among ordinary people and
whose accents are prescribed in sixty-four prapathakasT
31 Cf. NydyakandalT, p. 522: yac cedam 'asmaryamdnakartrkatvdd' iti, tad
asiddham, 'prajdpatir vd idam eka asm ndhar asm na rdtrir asit, sa tapo 'tap-
yata, tasmdt tapasas catvdro vedd ajdyanta' ity amnayenaiva kartrsmarandt\ 'As

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for this [argument] saying "[the Veda is eternal] because no author of it is being
held in our memory", it is not established, since the Veda itself mentions the
author in such passages as "This [universe] was Prajapati alone, there was no
day, there was no night. He practiced austerities, from those austerities the four
Vedas were born." '

32 ex conj. The tradition that Vyasa was the author of the Mahdbhdrata
might also have been created by arthavdda.

33 For ajdescription of the Astaka (a domestic ritual honouring the ancestors),

see e.g. Asvaldyana-grhyasutra 2.4, cf. Manusmrti 4.119, 4.150. Sabara and
Kumarila in their commentary to Mimamsasutra 1.3.1 refer to the Astaka as an
example of a ritual which is prescribed in Smrti texts but which is not enjoined in
the Vedas themselves. According to the view of Prabhakara Mimamsa, the Vedic
texts from which such prescriptions derive had never actually been perceptible to
the compilers of these Smrti texts, but only always inferable (nitydnumeya) on
the basis of the acceptance of these Smrtis by the moral majority (mahdjana; see
POLLOCK 1997, pp. 409f, quoting the Prakaranapancikd). Kumarila disagrees
and points out that if a Vedic injunction had never been pronounced then it
would be impossible to ascertain its existence since no one could ever perceive it,
and therefore Manu's recollection (smrti) of the Astaka would be as mistaken
as a barren woman talking about her grandson (the missing son or daughter
corresponding to the missing cognition of the Vedic proposition; see TVP , p. 265,
TV^, p. 164).

34 Slokavarttika, vdkyddhikarana 366.

35 Cf. Slokavarttika, anumdna 13cd ff.
36 ex conj.
37 The Visvajit is a one-day Soma-sacrifice (ekdha), which requires the sac-
rificer to pay extensive fees to the officiants (see MYLIUS, Glossar s.v., ibid,
pp. 301, 357). As the name of this sacrifice suggests, it is performed 'in order to
conquer everything' (Taittinya-samhitd 7.1.10.4: sarvasydbhijityai).

38 ex em. ISAACSON.

oa
^Q
ex conj.
40 ex conj. ISAACSON.
41 Quoting Nydyamanjan vol. I, p. 636.8-11 (v.l. pratttih for prasiddhih).
42 Cf. Kdthaka-samhitd 11.4: prdjdpatyam carum nirvapec chatakrsnalam
ghrta dyuskdmah\; Maitrdyani-samhita 2.2.2: prdjdpatyam ghrte carum nirvapec
satakrsnalam dyuskdmah\
43 Cf. Tdndyamahdbrdhmana 17.12.1: trivrdagnistomah sa sarvasvdro, yah

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kdmayetdndmayatdmum lokam iydm iti sa etena yajeta\ (commentary ad loc.:

andmayatd dmayarahitenaiva dehena vyddhyddirdhityena); Sdnkhdyana-srauta-
sutra 15.10.1: sarvasvdro ndmaikdhah\ sa sarvagdyatro maranakdmasya yaja-
mdnasya bhavati\ prayogdntare ca svargakdmasya\
44 ex em. SANDERSON.
45 ex em. ISAACSON.
46 Quoting Nydyamanjan vol. I, p. 640.17-18, cf. Mahdbhdrata 12.336.77.
47 ex conj. SANDERSON.
48 Bhagavadgttd 10.41.

49 See Yogasutra 1.23, 1.28-29, 2.1, 2.32, 2.45.

50 ex conj. ISAACSON.
51 According to the MTmamsaka position, when the heterodox proclaim that
their scriptures have authors they necessarily admit that these scriptures cannot
be authoritative. Says Kumarila (Tantravdrttika ad Mtmdmsdsutra 1.3.4, TVP ,
p. 329; TV"4 , p. 195): pdratantryam tdvad esdm smaryamdnapurusavisesapram-
tatvdt tair eva pratipannam, sabdakrtakatvddipratipddanddardc ca pdrsvasthair
apijndyate\ (...) svadharmdtikramena ca yena ksatriyena satd pravaktrtvaprati-
grahau pratipannau, sa dharmam aviplutam upadeksyatiti kah samdsvdsah\ 'First
of all, the fact that these [scriptures] are not autonomous [i.e. that their valid­
ity depends on their author] because they were composed by particular persons
whose memory is alive is admitted by [their followers] themselves, and it is also
learnt by those who get close to them from the acceptance of the proving of such
[theories] as the artificial nature of words. (...) And how could we believe that
someone [i.e. the Buddha] who has transgressed the duties of his own estate
and thus, while being a ksatriya, vindicated the role of a teacher and the right
of receiving gifts, is going to teach the undefiled Dharma?'
52 ex conj. SANDERS_ON. See Tantravdrttika ad Mimdmsdsutra 1.3.11 (purvapa
ksa, TVP , p. 459; TV^, p. 234f):
yenaivdkrtakatvam hi vedasya pratipddyate\
nydyena tena sdkyddigranthasydpi bhavisyati\\
bodhakatvdt pramdnatvam svatas tasydpi labhyate\
na ca samdihyate buddhir na viparyayate kvacit\ \
akartrkatayd ndpi kartrdosena dusyati\
vedavad buddhavdkyddikartrsmaranavarjandt\ \
buddhavdkyasamdkhydpi pravaktrtvanibandhand\
taddrstatvanimittd vd kdthakdngirasddivat\ \
'With the help of the same argumentation which proves that the Veda is not a
product [the same nature] of Buddhist and other scriptures can also be [estab­
lished]. They are also found to be means of valid knowledge by themselves due

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to the fact that they create awareness, and the cognition [they create] is neither
questioned nor ever refuted. Furthermore, inasmuch as they have no author,
they are not impaired by the faults of the author either, since, similarly to the
Veda, the memory of the author of the Buddha's propositions and other [sacred
texts] has been excluded. The origin of the label 'the Buddha's proposition' is
the fact that [the Buddha was] the teacher [of these scriptures], or it is based on
the fact that [these scriptures] were seen by him, by analogy with such [Vedic
texts] as the Kdthaka and the Angirasa [which were taught / seen by Katha
and Angiras].'
Rumania's reply (Tantravdrttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.12, TVP p.467ff,
TV(A)p.235ff):
parena saha kesdmcid vdkovdkydni jalpatdm\
yuktayah prdtibhdsikyo jdyante paravdkyatah\\
(yuktayah TVApc : uktayah TVAacTVp msB )
svasamvedyam ca siddhdntam dtmiyam api jdnatdm\
chdydm tathdpi raksanto jalpanti pratisabdakaih\ \
yathd mimdmsakatrastdh sdkyavaisesikddayah]
nitya evdgamo 'smdkam ity dhuh sunyacetasah\\
(°cetasahmsB : °cetanam eds.)
pradvesdd vedapurvatvam anicchantah kathamcana\
tanmdtre 'pi ca bhuyisthdm icchantah satyavdditdm}}
bhuyasdm vedabdhyatvdd buddhddivacasdm ami\
ahimsddy apy atatpurvam ity dhus tarkamdninah\\
tolas ca pauruseyatvdd aprdmdnyam atmdriye]
prdguktair vedanityatvavdgdbhdsair irimohyate] \
(°nityatva° TVAmsB : °nityatvamTVp )
yddrsatddrsamvmdmsakair apy atmdriyavisayapurusavacanaprdmdnyanirdkara-
nddapauruseyatvddhyavasdyanirdkrtakdranadosd*sanka(eds. : °sankd° msB )nir-
apavddaprdmdnyasiddhim pratihantum asakyam manyamana niruttanbhutd bd-
Idnukaranavdkyasadrsaih svavdkyair vyava*liya(c.Gn.]. : °likhya° eds. : °lipsa°
msBac : °listha° msBpc )mdnahrdaydh santo 'pi praksmakuhetuvacanajdlah kanyd-
varandrthdgatamurkhavaragotraprasnottaravat]
yad eva bhavatdm gotram tad asmdkam apitivat\
dhuh svdgamanityatvam paravdkydnukdrinah\ \
asmadiyam idam vdkyam bhavatdm iti coditdh]
jalpanty asmdkam evaitac chrutvd mimdmsakair hrtam\\
tyaktalajjam bruvdno hi vdcoyuktim anarthikdm\
kurvan pardtisandhdnam asrdntah ko 'vasidati\ \
tatra sdkyaih prasiddhdpi sarvaksanikavdditd]
tyajyate vedasiddhdntdj jalpadbhir nityam dgamam\ \
(...) *sarva(mss : sarvadd eds.)paddrthasambandhdnityatvapratipddandt tad-
vipantam dgamanityatvam abhyupagamyamdnam lokopahdsdspadamdtram eva
bhavet}
'For some people, when they are having a debate with someone else, "reflex
arguments" are born from the assertions of the opponent, and they prattle with
echoed words while nevertheless they also keep up the appearance of someone

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who considers his own doctrine as self-evident. As, for example, the Buddhists,
Vaisesikas (?) and others, afraid of the Mlmamsakas, mindlessly say: "Our
scripture is in fact eternal", admitting in no way, because of hatred, the pre­
cedence of the Veda, and holding that, even if that much is the case, [their
scripture] still has the greatest truthfulness. Conceited with reasoning they say
that, since most of the Buddha's propositions are outside the Veda, even non­
violence and other [precepts] are not dependent upon it. And thus the fact that
[non-Vedic scriptures] are not authoritative with regard to imperceptible mat­
ters since they have authors is effaced with the above mentioned replicas of the
statements about the Veda's eternity. Since even an average Mimamsaka can re­
fute the validity of human assertions with regard to imperceptible matters, [the
heterodox] think that it is impossible to counteract the establishing of validity if
it is unobjectionable inasmuch as it has been freed from the suspicion of faults
in the causes [which produce the cognition] through the determination of its
independence from any person, and, dumbfounded, with then: own assertions
that resemble the imitative talk of children and using a tattered net of reasoning
though their hearts sink with fear, they claim, imitating the statements of then-
opponents, that their own scripture is eternal, just as a foolish suitor, who has
come to ask the girl's hand, answers the question about his gotra like this: "My
gotra is the same as yours" [which actually makes the marriage impossible]. And
when they are told: "This statement of yours is [in fact] ours", they prattle:
"It is ours alone! The Mlmamsakas have overheard and then stolen it." For
why would someone give way who shamelessly speaks meaningless sophistries
and spares no effort to deceive others? At that stage the Buddhists give up
even their well-known adherence to the doctrine of the momentariness of all
things when they prattle that their scripture is [also] eternal on the basis of the
established truth of the Vedaf's eternal nature]. (...) Since [the Buddhist] have
demonstrated the non-permanent nature of the connection of all words with
their referents, the world would only laugh if they were to accept the eternal
nature of scripture, which is contrary to that [doctrine of momentariness].'
When the language of non-Vedic scriptures is itself debased, how could their
content be eternal and authoritative? Says Kumarila (Tantravdrttika, ibid.):
asddhusabdabhuyisthdh sdkyajaindgamddayah\
asannibandhanatvdc ca sdstratvam na pratiyate\\ (...)
tatas cdsatyasabdesu kutas tesv arthasatyatd\
drstdpabhrastarupesu katham vd sydd andditd\\ (...)
(TVP p. 238f, TVA p. 470f.) sdkyddigranthesu punar yad api kimcit sddhusab-
ddbhiprdyendvinastabuddhyd prayuktam, tatrdpi prajnapti*vijnapti(eds. : om.
ms-8 ) *pasyatd(eds. : °pasya° msBpc : °pasyand° msBac)*tisthatddi(eds. :
°tisthamddi° msB )prdyaprayogdt kimcid evdviplutam labhyate\ kim uta ydni pra-
siddhdpabhrastadesabhdsdbhyo 'py apabhrastatardni bhikkhave ity evamddmi, dm
tvydbahuvacanasthdne hy *ekdrdntam (TV^ms5 : ekdrd tarn TVP ) prdkrtam
padam drstam, na prathamdbahuvacane sambodhane 'pi\ samskrtasabdasthdne
ca kakdradvayasamyogah, anusvdralopah, rvarndkdrdpattimdtram eva prdkrtdpa-
bhramsesu drstam, na dakdrdpattir api\ so 'yam samskrtd dharmd ity asya sar-
vakdlam svayam eva pratisiddho *'pi (eds. : om. mss ) vindsah krtah\ (??)

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'The Buddhist, Jaina and other [non-Vedic] scriptures mostly consist of sol-
ecistical words, and, since they are bad compositions, their sdstric nature is not
recognised. (...) And thus how could their subject be correct / real when then-
words are incorrect / unreal? Or how could they be beginningless when their
form is visibly corrupt? (...) In the works of Buddhists and other [heterodox
people], however, whenever something is used with the intention of [using] cor­
rect words and with a clear mind, even in that case we hardly find anything that
is not spoiled due to such frequent usages as "prajnapti", "vijnapti", "posyaid"
(read "pasyana" or vipasyanal), "tisthatd" (?, read tisihantikat), etc. What
shall we say about those [expressions] which are even more corrupt than the
well-known corrupt vernaculars, such as "bhikkhave"? For a Prakrit word end­
ing in e is seen to stand for the Accusative Plural, [but] not for the Nominative
Plural, even in the case of a Vocative. And in the place of the word "samskrta"
we see the application of a double k, the elision of the Anusvara, and only the
change of r into a in Prakrit and Apabhramsa languages [i.e. samskrta becomes
sakkaa / sakkada], but not the change [of t] into d as well. Thus [the Buddhists]
themselves constantly destroy this [statement]: "samskrta dharmdh" [i.e. by the
incorrect and therefore non-existent grammatical form: "sakkada"], even if they
deny its destruction [by asserting the eternity of the Buddha's propositions].'
53 Kumarila sets up strict criteria on the basis of which someone can be re­
garded as a real propagator of Dharma ( Tantravarttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.6,
TVP , p. 360; TV*, p. 202):
vedenaivdbhyanujndtd yesdm eva pravaktrtd]
nitydndm abhidheydndm manvantarayugddisu\\
tesdm viparivartesu kurvatdm dharmasamhitdh\
vacandni pramdndni ndnyesdm iti niscayah\ \
'Whose [Veda-] propagator status is acknowledged by the Veda itself, and who
are always to be named in the Manvantaras, Yugas and other [aeons]: the state­
ments of these people alone, who compose compendiums on Dharma whenever
they are reborn, and not of others, are authoritative: this is the settled view.'

54 ex conj. SANDERSON.
55 Cf. Agamaprdmdnya p. 12, quoted in note 7.

56 ex em. SANDERSON.
57 Cf. Rumania's argument concerning the Vedic basis of Smrti texts contain­
ing apparently non-Vedic regulations ( Tantravarttika ad Miradmsdsutra 1.3.2,
TVP , p. 265; TV"4 , p. 164): yad vd vidyamdnasdkhdgatasrutimulatvam evdstu\
katham anupalabdhir iti cet, ucyate—
sdkhdndm viprakTrnatvdt purusdndm pramddatah]
ndndprakaranasthatvdt smrter mulam na drsyate\\
'Or rather let [their] source be nothing but a Vedic passage in the available
recensions [of the Veda]. If you ask why don't we find [this Vedic passage], my
answer is as follows: The [Vedic] source of the Smrti passage is not found since

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the recensions [of the Veda] are scattered, since people are negligent, and since
it is contained in separate sections [of the Veda].'
^ Using the above argument Dhairyarasi could claim that the source of the
Pancaratra is a Vedic text which is hidden from us in the countless branches
of the Veda. Actually he goes one step further and asserts that the Pancaratra
itself is one of these Vedic recensions.
Kumarila also points out that, once the Smrti status of the heterodox scrip­
tures has been refuted, the nastika dares to claim the same status for their own
scriptures as the Veda has. The disastrous consequences are easy to foresee
(Tantravarttika ad Mimdmsdsutra 1.3.11; TVP , p.455; TVA , p.230):
yad vd sdkyddisdstrdndm smrtisdstratvavdrandt\
vedasdkhdsamdnatvam dsarikyeha nivdryate\\
(..0
tatas ca vedavan nityas te 'pi ced agama matah\
codandlaksano dharmas tadukto 'pi prasajyate\ \
kdmam na pravised grdmam vdrito dandapdnibhih\
spastam mahdpathenaiva samprati praviviksati\ \
'Or rather, having refuted that Buddhist and other [heterodox scriptures] are
Smrti texts, in this [part of the Mimamsasutra} the [possible claim of their]
equality to the recensions of the Veda is anticipated and set aside. (...) There­
fore if those [heterodox] scriptures are also accepted to be eternal like the Veda,
it will follow that the Dharma taught by them will also have scriptural pro­
position as its denning characteristic [similarly to Vedic Dharma]. Though [the
heterodox scriptures] cannot enter the village [of authoritativeness] because the
[Mlmamsaka] policemen have kept them off [by rejecting their Smrti status],
now they want to enter openly on the High Street [of Vedic status].'
Cf. also note 3.
58 Similarly, as Yamuna argues, just because the Pancaratrikas follow the pre­
scriptions of a different, but equally valid Vedic school, i.e. the Ekayanasakha, it
does not follow that they are not brahmins at all. See Agamaprdmdnya p. 169:
ye punah sdvitryanuvacanaprabhrtitraytdharmatydgena ekdyanasrutivihitdn eva
catvdrimsat samskdrdn kurvate, te 'pi svasdkhdgrhyoktam artham yathdvad anuti-
sthamdnd na sdkhdntanyakarmdnanusthdndd brdhmanydt pracyavante, anyesdm
api parasdkhdvihitakarmdnanusthdnanimittdbrdhmanyaprasangdt\ 'Those who ob­
serve only the forty sacraments laid down in the Ekayana Sruti while giving up
the sacred duties found in the Three Vedas, such as the recitation of the GayatrT
mantra etc., they too, inasmuch as they properly observe the rituals taught in
the grhyasutras of their own recension, do not become excluded from the brah­
min status, since it would follow that others too would become non-brahmin
because they neglect the observance of rituals laid down in other people's re­
censions.'
Ibid. p. 170: vilaksands ca traywihitasvargaputrddivisayopabhogasddhanaindrd-
gneyddikarmddhikdribhyo dvijebhyah trayyantaikdyanasrutivihitavijndndbhigama-
fiopdddnejydprabhrtibhagavatprdptyekopdyakarmddhikdrino mumuksavo brdhma-
nd iti nobhayesdm apy anyonyasdkhdvihitakarmdnanusthdnam abrdhmanyam

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dpddayati\ yathd caikdyanasdkhdyd apauruseyatvam, tathd kdsmirdgamaprdmd-

nya eva prapancitam iti neha prastuyate\ 'And there are liberation-seeking brah­
mins who are entitled to rituals laid down in the the crowning of the Three
Vedas: the Ekayana Sruti, which rituals—[acquiring] knowledge [about God],
cleansing [the way leading to the image of the deity], preparation [of flowers
etc.], making offerings, etc.—are the only means of attaining the Lord. These
brahmins are different from the priests who are entitled to rituals laid down in
the Three Vedas (e.g. the aindrdgneya) which are the instruments of enjoying
heaven or a son, or similar sensual objects. On this ground, the fact that they
do not observe the rituals laid down in each other's [Vedic] recensions does not
produce non-brahmin status for either of these two groups. And I have already
expounded in [my work entitled] "The Validity of the Kashmirian Scripture(s)"
in what way the Ekayana recension [of the Veda] is not the work of a person,
so I do not go into details now.'

59 The SautramanT is an expiatory sacrifice that involves a sura-offering. (See

MYLIUS, Glossar s.v., ibid. p. 144; Satapatha-brdhmana 5.5.4.)

60 ex conj. ISAACSON.

61 This might be true, says Kumarila, but in all other respects they are at vari­
ance with Vedic tradition (Tantravarttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.4; TVP , p. 329;
TV"4 , p. 195): smrtivdkyam ekam ekena srutivacanena viruddhyeta\ sdkyddivaca-
ndni tu katipayadamaddnddivacanavarjam sarvdny eva samastacaturdasavidyd-
sthdnaviruddhdni, trayimdrgavyutthitaviruddhdcaranais ca buddhddibhih pramtd-
ni, trayibdhyebhyas caturthavarnaniravasitaprdyebhyo vydmudhebhyah samarpi-
tdniti (eds. : samarthitdniti msB ) na vedamulatvena sambhdvyante\ 'One sen­
tence in a Smrti text might contradict one Vedic proposition. Every single one
of Buddhist and other [heterodox] propositions, however, except for a few state­
ments about self-control, munificence and the like, contradict all the fourteen
sciences, and they were composed by the Buddha and others whose conduct
deviates from and contradicts the doctrine of the Three Vedas, [and] they have
been taught to deluded people most of whom are excluded from the fourth estate
[i.e. to outcasts]: thus their source cannot be the Veda.'
62 ex conj. SANDERSON.
63 ex conj. SANDERSON.
64 ex conj. SANDERSON.
65 Cf. Agamaprdmdnya p. 12: brdhmanesv eva kutascid gunayogdt sdttva-
tabhdgavatddivyapadeso, yathd tesv eva parivrdjakddisabdd iti\ 'Such names as
sdttvata, bhdgavata, etc. refer precisely to brahmins in some way, through the
application of the secondary sense, just as words such as parivrdjaka refer to
the very same people [i.e. to brahmins].
Ibid. p. 154: yat punar uktam, 'samdne brdhmanye kimiti sdttvatabhdgavataikdn-

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tikasabdair eva etesdm niyamena vyapadesa' iti, tat parivrdjakanigadddivad ity

adosah] yathaiva hi samdne brdhmanye *yajustve (corr., ed.: yayustve) ca kecid
eva brdhmandh kdnicid eva yajumsi parivrdjakanigadasabddbhydm adhiyante,
tisthantu brdhmandh, parivrdjakd dniyantdm', 'yajumsi vartante na nigaddh,
nigadd vartante na yajumsi' iti ca, tathehdpi bhavisyati\ 'As for the objection,
"Why are these people standardly named with the words sdttvata and bhdgavata
alone, provided that their brahmin status is the same", there is nothing wrong
in this matter, just as [names like] parivrdjaka and nigada [are unproblem-
atic]. For just as some brahmins and some mantras of the Yajurveda are called
parivrdjakas and nigadas [respectively] even though they are equally brahmins
and Yajurvedic mantras, in such expressions as "The brahmins should stay, the
parivrdjakas should be fetched", and "The Yajurvedic mantras apply, not the
nigadas", or "The nigadas apply, not the Yajurvedic mantras", the same goes
for this case, too.'

66 See HALBFASS 1991, p. 363ff., referring to the discussion of this problem in

the Tantravdrttika (ad Mimdmsdsutra 1.1.2) and the Nydyamanjari.

67 ex em. ISAACSON.
68 Jayanta observes in the Nydyamanjari (vol. I, p. 645) that all of Rumania's
arguments proving that Smrti texts are based on the Veda can be applied to
other scriptures as well. Cf. Tantravdrttika ad Mimdmsdsutra 1.3.2 (TVP ,
p. 264f; TVA , p. 163f): manvddmdm cdpratyaksatvdt tadvijndnamulam adrstam
kimcid avasyam kalpaniyam\ tatra ca—
bhrdnter anubhavdd vdpi pumvdkydd vipralambhandt\
drstdnugunyasddhyatvdc codanaiva laghiyasi\ \
sarvatraiva cddrstakalpandydm *tddrsam adrstam (msB : tddrsam eds.) kal-
payitavyam, yad drstam na virunaddhi na *cd(msB : vd° eds.)drstdntaram
dsanjayati\ tatra bhrdntau tdvat samyannibaddhasdstradarsanavirodhdpattih, sar-
valokdbhyupagatadrdhaprdmdnya*bddhas (TVA , msB : °vddas TVP ) ca\ *ta-
dd(msB : idd° eds.)mmtanais ca purusair api bhrdntir manvddmdm anuvartitd,
tatparihdropanydsas ca manvddmdm ity *anekd(TVA , msB : ekd° TV^)drs-
takalpand\ (...) purusavdkya*parampardpy (TVP , msB : °pardpy TV"4 ) an-
dhaparamparayd nirdkrtd, na hi nispratisthapramdndtmaldbho drsyate\ tathd
vipralambhe 'pi tatkalpand, vipralipsd prayojanam, lokasya ca tatra bhrdntih,
tasyds ceyantam kdlam anuvrttir ityddy dsrayaniyam\ utpannasya ca drdhasya
pratyayasya prdmdnyanird*karandd drsta(eds. : karanddrsta0 rosB }virgdhah\
tasmdt sarvebhyas codandkalpanaiva jydyasi, tatra hi *tanmdtrddrstd(TVA , msB
: tanmdtradrstd0 TVp )bhyupagamah, sesds tu mahdjanaparigrahddayah sarve
'nuvidhiyante\
'Since we cannot contact Manu and other [authors of Smrti texts], we must
necessarily postulate something imperceptible as the basis of their knowledge.
And among [the various possible bases] it is the Veda which is simpler [to postu­
late] than error, or even experience, [other] people's assertions, [or] the intention
to deceive, since it can be established in accordance with what we see. And in

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all cases when we postulate something unseen, we must postulate such an un­
seen thing which does not contradict the observed [facts] and which does not
entail another unseen thing. Among [the above mentioned assumptions], first,
if [we supposed that] error [was the basis], this would contradict the fact that
we see [that the Smrtis are] properly composed texts, and [their] firm author­
ity, which everyone accepts, would also be set aside. We should also postulate
many unseen facts, namely that people of that age also followed Manu's and
other [Smrti authors'] error, and that a refutations of that [error] of Manu and
other [Smrti authors] have been put forth. (...) [The supposition that Smrti
texts are based on] a series of human assertions has also been refuted with the
help of [the analogy to] a series of blind men, since we do not see that valid cog­
nition arises without any foundation [i.e. humans cannot transmit knowledge
about Dharma without relying on the Veda, just as blind men cannot hand
down information about colour without the help of a sighted person]. Likewise
in the case of deception we must resort to the following: the postulation of that
[deception], the intention to deceive as purpose, people's mistake about that,
the continuation of that [mistake] for such a long time, etc. And since it would
annul the validity of a firm belief, it would contradict the visible [facts]. There­
fore the postulation of Vedic propositions [as the basis of Smrti] is better than
all the other [assumptions], since in this case we admit that unseen thing alone.
As for such facts as the acceptance [of Smrti] by the moral majority, they are
all in harmony [with this postulation].'
Kumarila thinks that heretics are unlikely to lay a claim to the support of
the Veda (Tantravarttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.4, TVP , p.329, TVA , p. 195):
vedamulatvam punas te tulyakaksamulatvdksamayaiva lajjayd ca mdtdpitrdvesi-
dustaputravan nabhyupagacchanti\ 'On the other hand, since they cannot stand
having [a scripture] of the same rank as basis, and because they feel ashamed,
they do not acknowledge that then- source is the Veda, just as depraved sons
who hate their parents.' But even if they tried to establish a Vedic foundation,
the heterodox scriptures are so inconsistent with the Vedas that their claim
would be clearly nonsensical (see note 61).
69 Mimdmsdsutra 1.3.2: api va kartrsamanyat pramdnam anumdnam sydt\
'Or rather, since the agents [who perform works prescribed in the Veda on the
one hand and in Smrti texts on the other] are the same, the inference [of now
unavailable Vedic texts being the basis of Smrti regulations that do not directly
correspond to Vedic injunctions] is a means of valid cognition.' (On the inter­
pretation of this sutra see POLLOCK 1997, pp. 404ff.)
Cf. also Sabara ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.2 (TVP , p. 258): granthas tv anumtye-
ta, kartrsamanyat smrtivaidikapaddrthayoh] tenopapanno vedasamyogas traivar-
nikdndm\ 'But a [Vedic] text [which is the basis of a ritual that is prescribed
only in a Smrti text but not in the Veda itself] can be inferred [though it cannot
actually be perceived] on the ground that the performers of a ritual act [laid
down] in a Smrti text and [of another one laid down] in a Vedic text are the
same. Therefore it is appropriate that those who belong to the three higher
estates associate a Vedic text [with a purely Smrti-based ritual].'

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Cf. also Agamapramanya p. 10 (purvapaksa): na caivam dcamanopanayand-

dm iva srutivihitdgnihotrddipaddrthdnusthdyinah tdntrikdcdrdn upacaratah pa-
syamah\
pratyutaitdn vigarhante kurvdndn vedavddinah]
tasmad yat 'kartrsdmdnydt prdmdnyam' smrtisuditam\\
naiva tat pancardtrddibdhyasmaranam arhati\
na hi traivarnikds sistdh taduktdrthdn updsate\\
'And we do not see that those who perform the Agnihotra and other rituals laid
down in Sruti texts observe Tantric customs in the way they observe acamana,
upanayana, and other [orthodox customs]. On the contrary, the adherents of
the Veda despise those who follow these [Tantric customs]. Therefore what is
taught with respect to the Smrtis, namely "Because of the identity of the per­
formers [they have] validity", does not apply to such heterodox Smrtis as the
Pancaratra, for the educated members of the three higher estates do not recog­
nise their teachings.'
The Pancaratrika certainly holds that the postulation of a Vedic basis is
appropriate since the performers of these Tantric rituals are also brahmins.
On the other hand, a MTmamsaka would certainly never acknowledge even the
twice-born status of the Bhagavatas (see Agamapramanya p. llff).
70 ex em. ISAACSON.
71 ex conj. ISAACSON.
72 As Kumarila points out, although such Smrti passages as the one pre­
scribing the Astaka ritual can be inferred to be based on lost Vedic texts,
this fact does not mean that any scripture can be nominated for having a
Vedic basis. See Tantravdrttika ad Mimdmsdsutra 1.3.2 (TVP , p.265; TV"4 ,
p. 164): na caivam sati yatkimcit pramdnam dpatsyate, sistatraivarnikadrdha-
smarandnyathdnupapattilabhyatvdc chrutyanumdnasya\ 'And it is not the case
that at this state of affairs anything can be a source of authoritative knowledge,
since a Vedic text can [only] be inferred [as the basis of some other scripture] if
the unbroken recollection of learned members of the three higher estates remains
otherwise inexplicable.'
Though some heretic scriptures might contain Vedic elements, neverthe­
less their obvious anti-Vedic character must be emphatically declared. Says
Kumarila (Tantravdrttika ad Mimdmsdsutra 1.3.4, TVP , p.328, TV"4 , p. 194):
ydny etdni traywidbhir na parigrhitdni, kimcittanmisradharmakancukacchdydpa-
titdni lokopasamgrahaldbhapujdkhydtiprayojanapardni traywiparitdsambaddhadrs-
tasobhddipratyaksdnumdnopamdndrthdpattiprdyayuktimulopanibaddhdni sdmkhya-
yoqapdncardtrapdsupatasdkyagranthaparigrhitadharrnddharnianibandhandni visa-
cikitsdvasikaranoccdtanonrnddanddisamarthakatipayamantrausadhikdddcitkasiddhi
nidarsanabalendhimsdsatyavacanadamaddnadayddisrutismrtisamvddistokdrthagan-
dhavdsitajwikdprdydrthdntaropa*desmi (eds. : °desdni msB ) ydni ca bdhyata-
rdni mlecchdcdramisrakabhojandcarananibandhandni., tesdm evaitac chrutiviro-
dhahetudarsandbhydm anapeksamyatvam pratipddyate\ na caitat kva cid adhi-

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karandntare nirupitam, na cdvaktavyam eva, gdvyddisabdavdcakatvabuddhivad

atiprasiddhatvat]
yadi hy anddarenaisdm na *kathyetd(msB : kalpyetd0 eds.)pramdnatd\
asakyaiveti matvdnye bhaveyuh samadrstayah\\
sobhdsaukaryahetuktikalikdlavasena vd]
yajnoktapasuhimsdditydgabhrdntim avdpnuyuh\ \
'This [sutra, i.e. Mvmdmsdsutra 1.3.4] teaches that the following [texts] should
be discarded since they are opposed to the Veda and because we see [other]
causes [of their coming into being]:
— texts on piety and impiety contained in Sankhya, Yoga, Paiicaratra, Pasupata,
and Buddhist scriptures: they are not accepted by those who are learned in the
Three Vedas, [though] they are placed in the shade of the gown of piety which
is slightly blended with the [teaching of the Vedas], [but] then: main concern is
how to please the plebs, make profit, gain adoration and fame; they were put
together on grounds that are contradictory to and unconnected with the Veda:
sense perception such as visible splendour, and arguments consisting for the
most part in inference, analogy, and presumption; and, while perfumed with
the scent of a few things that are in accordance with Sruti and Smrti, such
as non-violence, truthfullness, self-control, munificence, and compassion, they
teach other subjects which are mainly connected with making a living, using as
corroboration the evidence of the random success of a few mantras and medical
herbs that are able to cure poisoning, induce enchantment, ruin one's enemy,
causing madness, and the like;
— those completely alien texts which deal with the conduct of the barbarians,
[such as?] dining in the company of others [who belong to the lower castes].
And this has not been taught in any other section [of the Mvmdmsdsutra],
while it cannot be left unmentioned [just] because [the Invalidity of such hetero­
dox texts] is public knowledge, just as the [correct] view about the expressivity
of such [ungrammatical] words as gam [should also be pronounced, even if it
is well known]. For if they were disregarded and thus their invalidity was not
asserted, thinking that [this assertion] cannot be made people would consider
[these texts] equal [to the Manu- and other Smrtis], or, because of the beauty,
feasibility, or the argumentation [found in these texts], or due to the influence
of the Iron Age, they would arrive at the erroneous conclusion that such acts as
the killing of animals, which is taught in the context of Vedic sacrifice, should
be given up.'
Kumarila also reckons with the possibility that any freshly established re­
ligion could derive itself from lost Vedic texts (Tantravdrttika ad Mimdmsd-
sutra 1.3.4, TVP , p. 329, TV"4 , p. 194f): yais ca mdnavddismrtmdm *apy (eds.
: adhy° msB ) utsannavedasdkhdmulatvam abhyupagatam, tan prati sutardm
sdkyddibhir api sakyam tanmulatvam eva vaktum\ ko hi saknuydd utsanndndm
vdkyavisayeyattdniyamam kartum\ tolas ca yavat kirn cit kiyantam api kdlam
kais cid ddriyamdnam prasiddhirn gatam tat pratyaksasdkhdvisamvdde 'py ut-
sannasdkhdmulatvdvasthdnam anubhavatulyakaksatayd pratibhdydt] ata aha—
'virodhe tv anapeksam sydd' (Mimdmsdsutra 1.3.3) iti\ 'And those who hold
that the Smrti texts of Manu and other [authors] are based on lost recensions

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 Act Four

of the Veda can easily be told by the Buddhist and other [heterodox people]
that [the Buddhist and other heretic scriptures] also have the very same basis.
For who could impose a restriction on the limit of sentences and topics in lost
[texts]? And thus anything whatsoever that has been cultivated by any people
for any time and has become well-known, even if it were inconsistent with the
available [Vedic] recensions, would appear as having a stable status inasmuch
as it is based on a lost recension, since it would be looked upon in the same
way [as the orthodox Smrtis]. Therefore [the author of the Mimamsasutra} says:
"When there is a contradiction, [the text that contradicts the Veda] must be
discarded." (Mimamsasutra 1.3.3)'

73 As Kumarila himself says (Tantravdrttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.4, TVF ,

p. 330, TVA , p.!95f):
lobhddikdranam cdtra bahv evdnyat pratiyate\
yasmin samnihite drste ndsti mulantardnumd\\
sdkyddayas ca sarvatra kurvdnd dharmadesandm\
hetujdlavinirmuktdm na kaddcana kurvate\\
na ca tair vedamulatvam ucyate gautamddivat\
hetavas cdbhidiyante ye dharmdd duratah sthitdh\ \
(dharmdd: conj., dharme: TVApc ,
dharmd: TVP , TV^ ac , msB (or dharmad1?))
eta eva ca te yesdm vdnmdtrendpi ndrcanam\
pdkhandino vikarmasthd *haitu(eds. : hetu° msB )kds caita eva hi\\
'In this case [i.e. in the case of heterodox scriptures] we recognise many other
causes [of their creation], such as greed and the like, and when we see that these
are present there is no [need for] inferring another source. And the Buddhists
and other [heretics], whenever they give instructions about Dharma, they never
give it without a network of motivations. On the other hand, those who stand
fax removed from Dharma do not say, unlike Gautama and other [authors of
Smrti texts], that [their scriptures] are based on the Veda, and they put forth
arguments. It is they to whom one should not pay reverence even by mere
words, for it is no-one but they who are [referred to as] heretics, sinners, and
sophists.'
74 ex em.

75 Cf. Yamuna's answer to the same charge (Agamaprdmdnya pp. 155f.):

na hi bhdgavatais sarvaih vrttaye 'bhyarcyate harih\
drstd hi bahavah svdrtham pujayanto 'pi sdttvatdh\ \
kecid yadi param santah sdttvatd vrttikarsitdh\
pujayanti mahdbhdgd vaisnavd vrttikdrandt\ \
na tdvataisdm brdhmanyam sakyam ndstiti bhdsitum\
na khalv ddhvaryavam kurvan jyotistome patisyati\ \
yadi na pratigrhniyuh pujaiva viphald bhavet\
pujdsddgunyasiddhyartham atas te pratigrhnate\ \
'arcandnte hiranyam ca tasmai deyam svasaktitah\

267
 Act Four

anyathd pujakasyaiva tatra pujdphalam bhavet\\' (Paramasamhitd 17.46-47)

'hanty alpadaksino yajna' (Manusmrti 11.40) ityddismrtidarsandt\
rtvija^ dravyalubdhena svayam ydcndpurassaram\\
yad drtvijyam krtam karma tad eva hi nisidhvatel
(...)
sraddhaputadaksinaddnam tubhayor api sreyaskaram eva\
'Not all Bhagavatas worship Hari to make a living, for many Sattvatas are seen
who also perform puja for their own sake. Even if some virtuous Sattvatas,
attracted to earn a livelihood, [but otherwise] being distinguished Vaisnavas,
perform puja because they want to make money, one cannot assert on the basis
of this fact alone that they are not brahmins. [Likewise a priest] who acts as
an adhvaryu at a jyotistoma sacrifice will certainly not be degraded. If they
did not accept fees the puja itself would be fruitless: that is why they accept
fees, so that the puja may be correct and [thus] successful. "And at the and
of the worship one should give him gold to the best of one's ability. Otherwise
the priest who performs the puja may get the fruit of the puja", since the
Smrti says among others: "[The organs of sense and action, honour, bliss in
heaven, longevity, fame, offspring, and cattle] are destroyed by a sacrifice at
which [too] small sacrificial fees are given." (tr. BUHLER) That officiating work
alone is prohibited prior to which an officiant himself makes demands because
of avarice. (...) A donation of fee, however, which is purified by reverence is
certainly beneficial for both [the priest and the sacrificer].'

76 Kumarila points out that every anti-Vedic scripture must be explicitly

rejected. It is not enough to show that the adherents of Vedic religion have
always been the learned and the respectable, since the heretics can assert the
same about their own followers (Tantravarttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.4 TVP ,
p. 329, TV^, p. 194):
mahdjanagrhitatvam pitrddyanugamddi *ca (eds. : va mss ) |
te 'pi dmpdntardpeksam vadanty eva svadarsane\\
tatra sraddhdmdtram evaikam vyavasthdnimittam sarvesam svapitr*pitd(e6s. :
mata? msB )mahddicaritdnuydyitvdt\
'[The followers of heterodox scriptures] also say, referring to other continents,
that their own doctrines are accepted by honorable people and have been fol­
lowed and [handed down] by their fathers and [forefathers]. In this matter faith
alone is the only basis of the settled order since everyone is disposed to follow
the deeds of his own father, forefathers, and other [ancestors].'
According to the Vaisesika commentator Sridhara, consentient acceptance
by those who exercise correct judgement is a feature that sets apart the Veda
from heterodox scriptures (Nyayakandali, p. 520): atha purusavisesapramto veda
iti kuta esd pratitir iti, sarvair varndsramibhir avigdnena tadarthaparigrahdt\
yatkimcanapurusapramtatve tu vedasya buddhddivdkyavan na sarvesam pan-
ksakdndm avigdnena tadarthdnusthdnam sydt, kasyacid aprdmdnydvabodhena
visamvddaprattter api sambhavdt\ 'If [you ask] how we know that the Veda was
composed by an extraordinary person, [the answer is that we know it] because its
contents are unanimously accepted by all, belonging to any social estate or life-

268
 Act Four

period. On the other hand, if the Veda had been composed by just any ordinary
person, then not everybody who examines things carefully would unanimously
put its contents into practice, as [not every discriminating person follows] the
Buddha's and other [heterodox teachers'] propositions, because someone might
realise that it is not authoritative and therefore adopt a dissenting view.'
77 As the purvapaksin says in Tantravarttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.11 (TVP ,
p.459;TVA , p.235):
yavad evoditam kimcid vedapramdnyasiddhaye\
tat sarvam buddhavakyandm atidesena gamyate] \
'Whatever has been put forth in order to prove the authority of the Veda, all of
that can be applied by analogy to the Buddha's propositions.'
78 ex conj. ISAACSON.

79 This would certainly be an unacceptably generous view for Kumarila, in

whose interpretation Mimamsasutra 1.3.5-6 excludes such a liberal position
(Tantravarttika ad Mimamsasutra 1.3.5-6, TVP , p.360-362, TV^, p.201-203):
yat tarhi vedavihitam na badhate, sistan va vedavido na kopayati, vihararama-
mandalakaranavairagyadhydndbhyasdhimsdsatyavacanadamadanadayddi, tadbu-
ddhadibhasitam *pramanatvena(cor^. : pramanenaeds., pramanatvana msB )vi-
ruddham iti cet, 'na\ sastraparimanatvat\' parimitany eva hi caturdas*dsta(eds.
: °astastd° msB )dasa va vidyasthanani dharmapramanatvena sistaih parigrhitani,
V \s\M\S IS \M I/ VUSUS* fW '-'I-' *«* f W IjW*-' t/WWU'C' \4/Wf VWf » * VWWVf I Vf VVV\MfS \JUI \MI V\M*J\M*J VI \MU VIVWU\M\MI V\M\M I VWW\*/I t VI I W

ni\ na ca tesam madhye bauddharhatadigranthah smrtah *pratigrhita (em.

pratigrhita msB : grhita eds.) va\
pratikancukarupena purvasastrarthagocaram\
yad any at kriyate tasya dharmam praty apramdnatd] |
(...)
tasmad yany eva sastrani vedamulanatikramat\
avasthitani tair eva jnato dharmah phalapradah\ \
yathaivanydyavijnatad vedal lekhyadipurvakat\
sudrenddhigatdd vdpi dharmajnanam na sammatam\\
tathdtikrantavedoktamaryadavyavaharinam\
samvadisv api vakyesu nesyate dharmahetuta\\
smaryante ca puranesu dharmaviplavahetavah\
kalau sakyadayas tesam ko vakyam srotum arhati\\
yatha krtakakarpurasuvarnadisu diyate\
yad bijam tad api vyaktam agrahyatvat *praliyate\\
(TVP , TV^ ac , msB : pratiyate TVApc )
tena karmanurupyasamanyatodrstarthapatti*balat (eds. : ° vya/dyattvdt msB )
tadabhiprayakalpitadharmabhasamadhyapatitam sanmulam *apy ahimsadi (eds.
: atha himsadi msB ) svadrtiniksiptaksiravad anupa*yogya(eds. : bhogya0 msB )vi-
srambhaniyam ca\ tanmatropalabdham bhavatity avasyam yavat pariganitadhar-
masastrebhyo nopalabhyate, tavad agrahyam bhavati]
yada sdstrantarenaiva so 'rthah spasto 'vadharyate\

269
 Act Four

tada tenaiva siddhatvad *itarat sydd (eds. : itarasyad msB ) anarthakam\\

'One may have the following view: "Then those things mentioned by the Buddha
and other [heterodox teachers] which are not at variance with what is enjoined
in the Veda and do not incense the educated [brahmins] who are versed in
the Veda—the construction of monasteries, gardens, and mandalas, dispassion,
meditation, exercise, non-violence, truthfulness, self-control, munificence, com­
passion and the like—are not at variance with authoritativeness." [The answer
of the Mimdmsdsutra (1.3.6) to this view is as follows:] "No, since the number
of [authoritative] scriptures is limited." For the only a limited number (14 or
18) of sciences is accepted by educated people as a source of valid knowledge
about Dharma, namely the Vedas, the Upavedas [Ayurveda (Medicine), Dha-
nurveda (Military Science), Gandharvaveda (Music)], the [Veda-]Angas [Siksa
(Pronunciation) in the general sense, Chandas (Prosody), Vyakarana (Gram­
mar), Nirukta (Etymology), Jyotisa (Astronomy), Kalpa (Ritual)], the Upangas
[Mlmamsa and Nyaya], the eighteen Dharmasamhitas, the Puranasastras, Siksa
[with a special subject, e.g. the one written by Katyayana], and Dandamti
[= Arthasastra].* And Buddhist, Jain or other [heterodox] works are neither
mentioned among them nor admitted [to this group]. If they do something
different [from their real teachings] which belongs to the sphere of the above
mentioned sciences, using it as a kind of armour / disguise [against the attacks
of the orthodox], it does not have any validity with respect to Dharma. (...)
Therefore only that Dharma yields fruit which has been mastered from scrip­
tures which are well-established because they do not transgress their basis: the
Veda. Just as knowledge about Dharma is not sanctioned if it derives from a
Vedic text which has been mastered in an unauthorised way, which has previ­
ously been committed to writing and the like, or has been learnt by a Sudra,
likewise the propositions—may they be in accordance with [the Veda]—of those
whose behaviour has transgressed the limits of propriety taught in the Vedas
are not accepted as means of [learning] Dharma. And the Buddhists and other
[heretics] are mentioned in the Puranas as those who bring about the ruin of
Dharma in the Iron Age. Who could possibly listen to what they say? Just as a
drop [of real camphor, gold, etc.], if put into fake camphor, gold, etc., will also
dissolve, since it cannot be clearly grasped, thus such [virtuous principles] as
non-violence, even though their basis is positive, are like milk put in the skin of
a dog and being such they should not be neither adopted nor relied on, inasmuch
as they have fallen into the middle of counterfeit Dharma that had been cooked
up according to their [i.e. the heretics'] intentions by means of [analogy based
on] the conformity of actions ["the fruit of a sacrificial action that causes pain
to the victim will be pain for the sacrificer himself"], inference from a common
property ["Vedic violence, just as everyday violence, is against Dharma"], and
presumption ["since the experience of suffering is the result of sins formerly com­
mitted, the experience of various kinds of suffering brings about the destruction
of sins"].* These [principles] are known only from those [Buddhist and other
such scriptures], so they will necessarily be unadaptable as long as they are not
known from recognised works on Dharma. If the matter was clearly learnt from
another doctrinal work alone, then, since it would be established by that alone,

270
 Act Four

this other one [i.e. the Buddhist etc. scripture] would be useless.'
* I follow the Nyayasudhtfs interpretation (TVP p. 379f.).
80
ex conj. KATAOKA.
on
ex conj.
82
ex conj. RAGHAVAN and THAKUR.
83 ex conj. SANDERSON.
ex conj. Cf. Manusmrti 10.63: ahimsa satyam asteyam saucam indriyani-
grahah\ etam samasikam dharmam caturvarnye 'bravm manuh\\

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