Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

Politics, Parties and Personalities

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
Politics, Parties and Personalities

Surinder Kumar Sharma

Yaqoob ul Hassan
Ashok Behuria

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENCE STUDIES & ANALYSES

NEW DELHI

PENTAGON PRESS LLP

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
Surinder Kumar Sharma, Yaqoob ul Hassan and Ashok Behuria

First Published in 2019

Copyright © Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

ISBN 978-93-86618-67-2

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 Contents

Foreword ix
Acknowledgements xi
Abbreviations xiii
About the Authors xv
Introduction xvii
1. ‘AJK’ and Pakistan: A Relationship of Disenchantment 1
Politics of ‘AJK’: The Early Phase 2
The 1970s 7
Interim Constitution Act, 1974 9
Government and Politics in ‘AJK’: Post-1974 12
Politics of Representation 14
Economy and Hydro-Energy 25
Dissenting Voices 27

2. Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 33

All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC) 34
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 48
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League (JKLL) 52
Jammu and Kashmir People’s Muslim League (JKPML) 59
United Kashmir People’s National Party (UKPNP) 61
Jammu and Kashmir National Awami Party (JKNAP) 65
All-Parties National Alliance (APNA) 66
AJK Pakistan People’s Party (AJKPPP) 70
AJK Pakistan People’s Party Shaheed Bhutto (AJKPPPSB) 76
AJK Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (AJKPML-N) 77
AJK Muttahida Quami Movement (AJKMQM) 84
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) 93
Jamaat-e-Islami AJK (JIAJK) 98
Kashmir Voice International (KVI) 104

3. Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 116

Introduction 116
Area and Population 116
vi Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Demography and Religion 116

Economic Conditions 118
Karakoram Highway 120
Tourism Industry 121
Political History 122
Political Structure of GBESGO 130
November 2009 Elections after the Promulgation of GBESGO 131
Legislative Assembly Elections June 2015 132
Reactions to GBESGO, 2009 135
India’s Response 136
Political Developments 137
Local Government Act 2014 139
Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan 139
The Diamer Bhasha Dam 141
Challenges 144
Land Scam 145
Threat to Buddhist Heritage 146

4. Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 153

Pakistan People’s Party Gilgit-Baltistan (PPP-GB) 153
Pakistan People’s Party Shaheed Bhutto 156
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz-GB (PMLN-GB) 156
Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam-GB (PMLQ-GB) 160
All-Pakistan Muslim League-GB (APML-GB) 161
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf-GB (PTI-GB) 162
Islami Tehreek Pakistan (ITP) 164
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazlur Rehman-GB (JUIF-GB) 164
Jamaat-e-Islami-GB (JI-GB) 165
Muttahida Quami Movement-GB (MQM-GB) 166
Majlis-e-Wahadat Muslimeen Gilgit Baltistan (MWM-GB) 166
Tanzeem Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (TASWJ) 167

Nationalist/Pressure Groups 168

Balawaristan National Front (BNF) 168
Balawaristan Students’ National Organisation (BSNO) 171
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) 173
Karakorum National Movement (KNM) 174
Gilgit-Baltistan Democratic Alliance (GBDA) 175
Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) 176
Gilgit-Baltistan United Alliance (GBUA) 177
Gilgit-Baltistan National Alliance (GBNA) 178
Awami Workers Party (AWP) 178
Gilgit-Baltistan National Movement (GBNM) 180
Gilgit-Baltistan National Congress (GBNC) 180
Gilgit-Baltistan Thinker’s Forum (GBTF) 181
Gilgit-Baltistan Bar Council (GBBC) 182
Gharib Qaumi Movement (GQM) 184
 Contents vii

5. Demand for Provincial Status in Gilgit-Baltistan: Dilemmas of

the Pakistan State 190
Earlier debates on inclusion of ‘AJK’ 190
The demand for representation in G-B 191
Self-Governance Act of 2009 192
The Debate (2009-2017) 194
GB Reforms Order 2018 197

6. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gilgit-Baltistan 202

CPEC and Kashmir Issue 207

7. Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 211

(A) Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ 211
(B) Prominent Leaders of Gilgit-Baltistan 222
(C) Some other Leaders and the current Cabinet of Gilgit-Baltistan 227

Conclusion 230
Chronology of Developments in PoK with Special Focus on
Gilgit-Baltistan Since July 1947 237
Appendices
I. The Boundary Agreement Between China and Pakistan, 1963 255
II. Karachi Agreement 259
III. Simla Agreement, July 2, 1972 263
IV. ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 266
V. List of Political Parties in ‘AJK’ and Names of the Party Heads and
General Secretaries 288
VI. Presidents/Prime Ministers of ‘AJK’ 295
VII. Members ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly 2016 297
VIII. The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994
(With Amendments) 299
IX. Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 325
X. Balawaristan National Front 373
XI. Registered Political Parties of Gilgit-Baltistan with Election Symbols 376
XII. Electoral Rolls of Gilgit-Baltistan Election 2015 378
XIII. Members of Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly 379
XIV Letters Exchanged Between Yasin Malik and Nawaz Sharif 381
XV Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on January 17, 2019 385
Map 466
Bibliography 467
Index 472
 Foreword

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), which includes both the so-called “Azad
Jammu and Kashmir (AJK)” and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), was legally a part of
the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which acceded to India in
October 1947. The entire state legitimately belongs to India and its disputed
status has been reiterated by India for the last 70 years. The PoK is kept under
tight control of the Government of Pakistan through the Ministry of Kashmir
and Gilgit-Baltistan Affairs, while at the local level in both the units, notional
representative systems have been allowed to deal with local resentments. The
internal affairs of these two areas do not receive too much of media attention,
and therefore, there is very little in the public domain in India on the evolution
of politics in this terrain, as well as on the parties, pressure groups and
personalities that struggle to voice their concerns about their neglected status
over the years.
The scholars at IDSA follow the events and political processes in these
two regions regularly and there is a project devoted to this job in the Institute,
which has been running for the last 10 years. This book is a result of research
undertaken on the subject by the scholars associated with this project. It seeks
to provide facts and analyses on the genesis and evolution of various political
parties, interest groups, and the background and role of different personalities
operating in both parts of PoK. The main aim of the publication is to help the
scholars, analysts, and policy-makers to understand the dynamics of the political
systems in PoK, the complex interaction of these systems with the government
in Islamabad and the responses of the local leadership to their subservient status
over the last 70 years.
This study is a welcome effort by the three authors, Shri S.K. Sharma, Dr.
Yaqoob ul Hassan and Dr Ashok Behuria, who have consulted a variety of
primary and secondary sources like government documents, books and articles
published in the newspapers and journals, especially those in the vernaculars,
x Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the reports of a number of international institutions, and the websites of various

political parties to gather facts pertaining to the subject.
I commend the efforts undertaken by the authors who, in spite of scarcity
of material available on the theme, have been able to bring out a publication
that will be useful for wider academic and strategic purposes. I take this
opportunity to thank the two anonymous referees who added value to the
publication by their comments and suggestions. I hope this publication will
draw the attention it deserves from the strategic community in India.

September 18, 2018 Jayant Prasad

Director General, IDSA
 Acknowledgements

We have been associated with this book project for quite some time. We have
received help from a number of individuals for successful completion of this
book. We owe a debt of gratitude to those individuals without whose help and
contribution this book could not have been completed.
First and foremost, we record our debt to Shri Jayant Prasad, former
Director General, IDSA and Deputy Director Maj Gen. Alok Deb (Retd.) for
their valuable support. We are also greatly indebted Dr. Arvind Gupta for
conceiving the idea of this project, when he was the Director General of the
Institute.
This book would not have been the same without critical and constructive
comments and suggestions from the anonymous referees. We thank the referees
for their critical analysis and reviews.
The library staff of IDSA, have been very helpful. We would like to thank
all the library staff for the help they extended.
Our special gratitude for Mr. Vivek Kaushik, Associate Editor, IDSA, for
taking care of the editing and production process of the book. We also thank
the copy editor for editing the manuscript.
Our families were steadfast in their support as always, and without their
encouragement and support this project could not have been successfully
completed.
Surinder Kumar Sharma
Yaqoob ul Hassan
Ashok Behuria
 Abbreviations

AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir

AJKEC Azad Jammu and Kashmir Election Commission
AJKMC Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference
AJKNC All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference
AJKPML-N Azad Jammu & Kashmir Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
APHC All-Parties Hurriyat Conference
APML All-Pakistan Muslim League
APNA All-Party National Alliance
ASSP Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan
AWP Awami Workers Party
BLP Boloristan Labour Party
BNF Balawaristan National Front
BNF-H Balawaristan National Front-Hameed
BRF Balor Research Forum
BSNO Balawaristan Students’ National Organisation
FCR Frontier Crimes Regulation
GB Gilgit-Baltistan
GBC Gilgit-Baltistan Council
GBDA Gilgit-Baltistan Democratic Alliance
GBESGO Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order
GBLA Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly
GBLDM Gilgit-Baltistan Ladakh Democratic Movement
GBNC Gilgit-Baltistan National Congress
GBUM Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement
ICG International Crisis Group
ISI Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence
xiv Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

ITP Islami Tehreek Pakistan

J&K Jammu and Kashmir
JI Jamaat-e-Islami
JKLF Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front
JKLL Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League
JKNSF Jammu and Kashmir National Students Federation
JUI Jamiat Ulmah Islam
JKPML Jammu and Kashmir People’s Muslim League
JUI-F Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl
KANA Kashmir and Northern Areas
KNM Karakorum National Movement
KSO Karakorum Students Organisation
LoC Line of Control
MC Muslim Conference
MKA Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MRD Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
MWM-GB Majlis-e-Wahadat Muslimeen Gilgit-Baltistan
NALC Northern Areas Legislative Council
PML-N Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam
PoK Pakistan Occupied Kashmir
PPPAJK Pakistan Peoples Party Azad Jammu & Kashmir
PPPGB Pakistan People’s Party Gilgit-Baltistan
PTI Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf
PYF Progressive Youth Front
TASWJ Tanzeem Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat
TF Thinkers Forum
UN-GBCIP United Nations Gilgit Baltistan Commission for India and
Pakistan
UNPO Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
UKPNP United Kashmir Peoples’ National Party
 About the Authors

Mr. Surinder Kumar Sharma has been attached to the Institute for Defence
Studies and Analyses (IDSA) as a Consultant. He has a ring-side view on the
rise of global terrorism specially surrounding India with special focus on Pakistan
and Jammu and Kashmir. Besides writing regularly in the national and
international newspapers, he is a co-author of the book (with Anshuman Behera)
Militant Groups in South Asia (2014). He has held a number of important
positions in the Indian security establishment, i.e. Cabinet Secretariat and the
National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), and has been decorated
with the ‘Outstanding Performance Award’ by the National Security Adviser.

Dr Yaqoob ul Hassan is a research analyst at IDSA. He was an SAV Visiting

Fellow in 2018 at the Stimson Center, Washington DC. He received his PhD
from Jamia Millia Islamia in New Delhi, India and his thesis was on United
States-Pakistan relations after 9/11. He was also a Post-doctoral Fellow in the
Department of Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul
University, Turkey. His research interests include politics and security of Pakistan
and Afghanistan, Kashmir and Political Islam.

Dr Ashok Behuria is a Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the South Asia Centre
at IDSA. He is a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi,
India. He has worked as Assistant Director at the International Centre for Peace
Studies (ICPS), New Delhi and has also been Editor of International Studies,
the prestigious research journal published from JNU. He is on the Editorial
Boards of Journal of Peace Studies and IDSA’s flagship journal, Strategic Analysis.
He is a recipient of the ‘K Subrahmanyam Award for Excellence in Strategic
Studies’ for his work on Pakistan in 2009. He has published many articles on
strategic issues related to Pakistan, India-Pakistan relations, Sri Lanka, Nepal
xvi Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

and the South Asian security environment in Indian and foreign journals. He
has edited books on South Asia and continues with his research on Pakistan,
evolving strategic scenario in the Af-Pak region, radicalisation of religious
discourse in the region, India’s engagement with the neighbourhood, regional
security, and inter-state cooperation.
 Introduction

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) comprises both the so-called ‘Azad Jammu
and Kashmir’ (‘AJK’) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), which Pakistan called ‘Northern
Areas’ till 2009. The entire PoK area occupied by Pakistan in 1947 formed the
part of erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. This region is not
officially regarded as Pakistani territory. As per the figures provided by the
governments of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan, the total area of the region is 90,972
square kilometres, out of which ‘AJK’ and Gilgit Baltistan account for 13,297
and 72,495 sq. kms respectively while the Trans-Karakoram Tract in the
Shaksham valley, ceded by Pakistan to China on March 2, 1962 accounts for
5180 square kilometres.1 The PoK’s financial dependence and the unbridled
interference of Pakistan in the administrative matters, through various
promulgated ordinances and acts, without the people’s consent define the nature
of relationship between PoK (‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan) and the state of
Pakistan. Over the years, the token representative civilian administrations in
‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan have been vested with little power, and they are
continually under the mercy of the governments in Islamabad. According to
local media reports, PoK’s civilian leadership kowtows to the army and are
often summoned by military to the army headquarters and prompted to conduct
their affairs in a manner that conforms to the army’s interests. Without any
freedom of speech and expression in the region, the demand for autonomy,
and even separatism, is simmering in both parts of PoK – ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-
Baltistan.
Political parties pledging their loyalty to Pakistan, i.e., favouring accession
of PoK to Pakistan, are allowed to operate in both ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan.
Those advocating autonomy are tolerated, while those demanding independence
or genuine autonomy are barred from contesting elections. More often, they
are not allowed to engage in any kind of political activism in the region. Given
these limitations, local units of major Pakistan-based political parties that
promote Pakistan’s objectives on Kashmir (rather than representing the
xviii Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

aspirations of the people of the area) have usually fared well in the local elections.
In Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan-based parties have done well, while in ‘AJK’, both
local and Pakistan-based political parties compete with one another for power.
There are groups which represent those people who question Pakistan’s
occupation of Kashmir and hence advocate freedom from Pakistan. They are
opposed to the signing of any agreement that acknowledges Kashmir’s final
accession to Pakistan. Parties representing such a nationalistic outlook have
been reduced to political non-entities by the Pakistani state.
Initially, Pakistan supported the Muslim Conference’s rise to power in a
significant part of the princely State of Jammu and Kashmir it had occupied
through its invasion in 1947 and called it ‘Azad’ Kashmir or ‘Azad Jammu and
Kashmir (‘AJK’). It had full faith in the loyalty of the Muslim Conference,
which went on to name itself as All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference
(AJKMC) whose leaders uphold Pakistan’s claim to Kashmir because of the
Party’s allegiance to the ideology of the Muslim League. In Gilgit-Baltistan,
which until 2009 was officially known as the Northern Areas, political activities
were considered criminal under the special law, enacted and implemented by
the British, called the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), widely known as
the black law. When Pakistan unlawfully assumed control of this region, it
retained the FCR and other cruel British measures against the locals. After
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to power, this law was abolished and political activities
were allowed in limited form. In 1994, then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s
reforms allowed political party-based elections to the Northern Areas Council.
That opened the flood gates for Pakistan-based political and Islamic parties to
rush into Gilgit-Baltistan. They have reduced the significance of the local parties,
which were firmly rooted in the nationalistic aspirations of the people, and
have made deep inroads into local politics. As a consequence the mainstream
political parties in Pakistan are in power today in both parts of PoK (‘AJK’ and
Gilgit-Baltistan).
The Muslim Conference was installed in ‘AJK’ not because it represented
a significant segment of the Kashmir opinion but because it gained the trust of
the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah for having split away from
the Sheikh Abdullah-led All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference
(henceforth the National Conference) and added the prefix “Muslim” to the
Party’s name (which was earlier dropped by Sheikh Abdullah in June 1939).
The renaming of the Muslim Conference as the National Conference with
a view to opening it to non-Muslims was an antithesis of the Muslim League’s
two-nation theory and hence unacceptable to a cross section of leadership in
 Introduction xix

the state who advocated communal politics. Jinnah had wanted Sheikh Abdullah
to rename the National Conference as Muslim Conference. But he turned it
down saying Jammu and Kashmir, being overwhelmingly a Muslim-majority
State, did not suffer from a minority complex, which was the basis of Jinnah’s
two-nation theory. Jinnah was planning to use the Muslim Conference as a
subsidiary of the Muslim League in Kashmir. A hint of this scheme was given
by Jinnah himself when he said at a reception given in his honour by the
National Conference in Srinagar that the reception was accorded to him as the
leader of the Muslim League, much to the annoyance of some of the National
Conference leaders, who walked out of the gathering.2
Interestingly, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, who went on to become the
supreme leader of the Muslim Conference, resisted the entry of the Muslim
League into ‘AJK’ for many years on the plea that in the presence of the Muslim
Conference, there was no need of the Muslim League in ‘AJK’ . Qayyum’s party
acted as a well-paid proxy of Pakistan whenever Pakistan needed its service.
Muslim Conference’s monopoly began to crack in 1975 when the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) captured power in ‘AJK’ in the first elections held under
the 1974 Interim Constitution. The PPP government was thrown out when
General Zia-ul-Haq staged a military coup in Pakistan in July 1977. Eventually,
the Muslim Conference as a proxy of Muslim League and the PPP became
two main political parties which alternately ‘won’ elections in ‘AJK’ depending
on who was ruling in Islamabad. When the military or the Muslim League
ruled in Islamabad, the Muslim Conference won the elections in ‘AJK’. When
the PPP ruled in Islamabad, the PPP’s ‘Azad Kashmir’ chapter won in ‘AJK’.
Thus, the people of the area seemed to gravitate towards the political parties
that were ruling in Islamabad either to ensure better allocation of resources for
development at the local level, or fell prey to their mobilisation tactic through
use of money and administrative machinery – the trend that continues to this
day.
The fact remains that neither of the mainstream national parties have cared
for local needs and grievances. A clear example of this indifference was the
approach of the authorities in Islamabad to the massive earthquake which struck
‘AJK’ on October 5, 2005, killing thousands of people and rendering a large
segment of the population homeless. Foreign relief workers loaded with relief
goods descended upon ‘AJK’ while winter was setting in, but the politicians
from Pakistan did not show up for quite some time. When things returned to
normal, they did not even feel the need to apologise to the people for their
callousness.
xx Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The ‘AJK’ Muslim Conference is near extinction now. In the July 2016
elections it could win only three of the 41 seats. Its supreme leader, Sardar
Abdul Qayyum, is no more. His son, Attique Ahmed Khan is struggling to
lead the party that is burdened with allegations of corruption and malpractices.
The second major party, the ‘AJK’ chapter of the PPP, which was in power
during the elections, was hurt by a massive wave of anti-incumbency sentiment
and was routed in the polls, securing just two seats. In the 2013 Pakistan general
elections the party became a near non-entity – except in Sindh. In tune with
the political trend in Pakistan, the June 2015 Legislative Assembly elections in
Gilgit-Baltistan saw the decimation of the erstwhile ruling party, the PPP, which
won only one seat. The party then ruling in Islamabad – the PML-N – came
to power in Gilgit-Baltistan in June 2015 and in ‘AJK’ in July 2016. After
2018 general elections that saw Imran Khan led Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)
coming into power at centre. Therefore, it is more likely that the PTI’s ‘AJK’
and Gilgit-Baltistan chapter may also win next elections in both the regions of
PoK, provided, PTI completes its tenure at centre.
Both the Muslim Conference and the AJKPPP have never bothered to clear
themselves of the charges of massive corruption during long years of their rules.
Like the Muslim Conference, the AJKPPP too is burdened with allegations of
corruption, particularly under Benazir Bhutto’s and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari’s
leadership. Moreover, the couple’s son and its present co-Chairman of the party,
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, is regarded as politically immature. Apart from the
absence of the strong leadership at the local level, the PPP is also facing an
ideological vacuum. The absence of any socio-economic vision that meets the
contemporary requirements of the bulk of the young electorate in Pakistan has
reduced to it a regional party confined to a rural vote bank of the Sindh.
The elections in ‘AJK’ in July 2016 posed a huge existential challenge for
the AJKPPP. Nawaz Sharif ’s Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz (PML-N), which
then ruled Pakistan, won the elections in spectacular fashion bagging 31 out
of the total 41 seats and five out of eight seats based on proportionate votes
polled. The main reason for its win was not only that the people chose a party
that was ruling in Islamabad, but also that being in power it was in the best
position to control the resources for the elections. The regional PPP-led
government, quite predictably, blamed Nawaz Sharif for using funds to rig the
polls. On March 25, 2016, the then ‘AJK’ cabinet headed by then Prime
Minister, Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, issued a statement in which it strongly
condemned the ‘AJK’ Council for direct release of developmental funds on the
basis of political affiliation to influence the voters in the elections. The cabinet
declared it as pre-poll rigging.3
 Introduction xxi

All ‘AJK’-based top political parties have an uncertain future. Parties like
Jamaat-i-Islami and Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) are electoral light-
weights. Imran Khan’s PTI, which emerged as the largest party in 2018 general
elections, is a new entrant in local politics. Its candidate, Barrister Sultan
Mahmood Chaudhry, formerly with AJKPPP, opened the ‘AJK’ chapter of the
PTI by winning a by-election in Mirpur in March 2015. Enthused by his
victory, Imran Khan hoped that the PTI would sweep the Assembly elections
in 2016 and form the government. However, as the turn of events proved later,
Mahmood owed his victory to his own influence in Mirpur, which has been
his stronghold for long. Ironically, he lost his seat in the 2016 elections following
his association with PTIAJK and Imran Khan. Moreover, PTIAJK had an
electoral understanding with the ‘AJK’ Muslim Conference. The elections were
held under the supervision of army and rangers and PML-N swept the elections
signalling an electoral shift towards the party in power in Islamabad.
As far as the future of political parties in Gilgit-Baltistan is concerned, the
trend there is not very different from that of ‘AJK’. As outlined above, in Gilgit-
Baltistan (GB) too, the regional chapters of PPP and PML-N are now the main
political parties, patronised by their mother parties in Pakistan. The local AJKPPP
rose to power when its mother party ruled at the centre. As the ruler of Gilgit-
Baltistan, the PPP allegedly indulged in corruption with no holds barred. Even
when elections were coming closer, it made no efforts to mend its ways. But the
AJKPPP’s defeat at the hands of the PML-N in Gilgit-Baltistan cannot be blamed
on its corruption alone: even without the allegation of corruption, its defeat was
a foregone conclusion because the tide had turned in Islamabad and the PML-N
had come to power in Pakistan. This trend is not in the interest of local politics
in both the regions of PoK, because it is not the intention of the Pakistan
establishment to let a viable political party system grow in these two parts of
occupied Kashmir. Viable independent locally-based parties are seen as a threat
to Pakistan’s control. For this reason, Pakistani patrons are not seen encouraging
local leadership in either ‘AJK’ or GB.
With the change in the geo-politics of the region post 9/11 and Pakistan’s
unabated internal crises, the military dispensation led by Gen. Musharraf, then
ruling in Islamabad, had been forced to revisit old policies vis-à-vis India and
Kashmir. There had been ostensibly a shift in Pakistan’s approach towards
Kashmir after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US, when the world at
large refused to buy Pakistan’s theory that there was a distinction between
terrorism and freedom struggle. Such change at the global level had forced
Pakistan to relax its approach towards PoK and there were talks of introducing
more representative administration in both parts of PoK, as intra-Kashmir
xxii Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

connectivity and trade were promoted under persuasion from India during
2004-2007.
Moreover, with the advent of social media, the people of the region were
seen to be asserting themselves politically during this period. However, the trend
of politics both within Pakistan and the region since 2008 – especially after the
26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai (on November 26, 2008) – is far from
encouraging. There is a clear disinclination in Islamabad to proceed with the
dialogue process initiated during the rule of Gen. Musharraf and recent terror
attacks on India during 2014-2018 show that there is an effort to restart
insurgency and terrorism in Kashmir. This is likely to have negative impact on
the political situation in both parts of PoK, while the military is likely to have
an upper hand in managing the local political and security affairs in the region.

NOTES
1. See Appendix I.
2. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Atish-e-Chinar, Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2008, p. 222.
3. Rao Atiq ul Amin Khan, “AJK Cabinet for Increase in Hydro Power Royalty”, Pakistan Observer,
March 19, 2016, at http://pakobserver.net/2016/03/19/ajk-cabinet-for-increase-in-hydro-
power-royalty/
 1
‘AJK’ and Pakistan:
A Relationship of Disenchantment

The whole of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) remains in a state of limbo

ever since it was illegally brought under the control of Pakistani security forces
in October 1947. On April 28, 1949, Pakistan bifurcated the territory under
its occupation into two different political entities. One of these, more populous
but consisting of about 15 per cent of the occupied territory, was called ‘Azad
Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK), and given the notional status of an ‘azad’ or
independent state but in reality, it was administered de facto by a minister in
charge of Kashmir and Northern Areas (KANA) in Islamabad till 1974, and
by an executive council headed by Prime Minister of Pakistan. The other part,
less populous but accounting for about 85 per cent of the territory occupied
by Pakistan – consisting of Gilgit Agency and Baltistan, the vassal units of the
erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir princely state – was separated from AJK and
called ‘Northern Areas’. The latter was made to operate as a stateless entity,
under the direction of the Pakistani state with the continued application of
the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) the infamous colonial law invented by
the British to keep the border areas on a tight leash.
During the last about 70 years, a variety of administrative reforms has been
introduced in both these areas to make the dispensation more representative.
But overall control remained with the government of Pakistan. Between both
parts of PoK, ‘AJK’ is better off than Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). Moreover, common
to both regions is their political-economic subjugation by the Pakistani state;
a process has been institutionalised over the decades. The state apparatus in
Islamabad has been used coercively to keep the region under strict control.
Pakistan has dealt with PoK in a manner that is contrary to the provisions
2 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

mentioned in its own constitution, which do not authorise Pakistan to

administer PoK under Article 257, which clearly states, “When the people of
the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship
between Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the
wishes of the people of that State.”1 The history of Pakistan’s dealings with
both parts of PoK, and various interim set-ups introduced with or without the
consent of the people of the area reveals that ‘AJK’ is not even autonomous, let
alone ‘Azad’ (which means independence or freedom), by any stretch of
imagination. As elucidated by one observer from the area: “One can vaguely
deduce the status of ‘AJK’ from the statement that Azad Kashmir is neither a
sovereign state nor a province of Pakistan but rather a ‘local authority’ with
responsibility over the areas assigned to it under the ceasefire agreement.”2 As
regards Gilgit-Baltistan its status is even worse than that of the ‘AJK’. It has no
legal standing and is being ruled as a de-facto colony of Pakistan.
The political and legal aspects of PoK, are far from settled. The territory
that is occupied by Pakistan legitimately belonged to the princely state of Jammu
and Kashmir, and to India, after accession of the state by the King to the Indian
Union, on October 26, 1947. In Pakistan, there is a view that control over
these areas was entrusted to Pakistan by the UN. For example, Justice Manzoor
Gillani (Retd.) holds that “the administration of AJ&K and Gilgit-Baltistan
was entrusted to Pakistan under UN Security Council resolutions. They have
since been treated in many respects as administrative units of Pakistan and are
subject to most of the liabilities and obligations of a province under the Pakistan
constitution”; He recognises the fact, however, that “they do not have any of
the constitutional rights and powers enjoyed by the provinces”.3 Therefore, it
is pertinent to go back to history and trace the developments in the region
that define Pakistan’s relationship with PoK.

Politics of ‘AJK’: The Early Phase

The paradoxical nature of PoK’s status vis-à-vis Pakistan goes back to 1947-
48. During that period, three important developments, according to
Christopher Snedden, divided that part of Jammu and Kashmir State, occupied
by Pakistan, which is now called PoK, but also confirmed that “the princely
state was not deliverable in its entirety to [either] India or Pakistan”.4 The first
was the anti-Maharaja uprising in Poonch around the time of partition in July-
August 1947. The second was the anti-Muslim violence in Jammu. The third
was the creation of the Provisional ‘Azad Kashmir’ Government (A.K.
Government, as it was originally called) in areas occupied by Pakistan on
October 24, 1947. Thereafter, two separate Karachi agreements changed the
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 3

state of politics in PoK forever. On April 28, 1949, the then president of ‘AJK’,
Muhammad (but the document spelt it as Mohummad) Ibrahim, and the
President of All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC), Ghulam
Abbas, signed away their rights over Gilgit and Baltistan in an agreement with
a minister without portfolio, Government of Pakistan, M.A. Gurmani. This
was months before the ceasefire agreement was signed between the military
representatives of India and Pakistan on July 27, 1949, settling the line of
military disengagement. This changed the complexion of politics over Jammu
and Kashmir forever.5
After the ceasefire agreement, Pakistan, quite smartly, demobilised the so-
called ‘Azad Kashmir’ soldiers by applying the Pakistan Army Act over ‘AJK’,
which was notionally ‘independent’. Thus, Pakistan succeeded in controlling
the occupied part of the Jammu and Kashmir state without any resistance.
Initially, the ‘AJK’ government, under Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim, who
Pakistan installed as the first President, tried to be assertive in demanding
recognition of the ‘Provisional “Azad” Government’ from Pakistan and the
United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) officials.6 But
this assertiveness was short-lived. Neither the UNCIP, nor Pakistan was
interested in recognising the ‘Provisional “Azad” Government’ as a legitimate
and independent government. The ‘AJK’ government was soon reduced to the
position of a mere municipal authority without substantial power. All power
was vested in a ministry called Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (MKA)—later, it
became Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Affairs (KANA)— in Islamabad
to rule over the occupied territory. There was opening for the ‘AJK’ government
to raise its voice independently in any forum. Mushtaq Ahmad Gurmani, who
signed on the Karachi Agreement of April 1949 as a minister without portfolio,
was made the first to head the MKA. His shrewd politics of divide and rule
helped him to establish strong control over the affairs of ‘AJK’. By driving a
wedge between the Muslim Conference President, Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas,
and Sardar Ibrahim, the President of ‘AJK’, he ensured his tight hold over’
‘AJK’. While analysing the role played by the MKA in imposing Pakistan’s writ
on the region, Snedden sums up:
MKA manipulation meant that it went ‘without saying’ that no Azad Kashmir
president could ‘sanely, think of keeping himself in [the] saddle if and when
the Government of Pakistan wants him to quit’. They stayed in office, or
left, on MKA orders ... this Pakistani bureaucrat and his colleagues ensured
that Pakistan’s writ applied throughout Azad Kashmir. They also treated the
Azad Kashmir president and senior Azad Kashmir Government officials as
second-class citizens. It was ‘quite normal’ that Azad Kashmir ‘chief executives’
4 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

should wait outside the office of the joint secretary, who theoretically was
subordinate to the Azad Kashmiris, before they were ‘called in’ at his pleasure.
Azad Kashmiris had to accept such belittling treatment. Their region lacked
international recognition and it was dependent on Pakistan for many things,
including financial, military and physical support, such as food grains and
basic staples.7
According to the terms of the 1949 Karachi Agreement, the ‘AJK’ government
became an adjunct of the Pakistan state. The agreement divided the functions
among the three signatories – the Government of Pakistan, Azad Kashmir
Government, and Muslim Conference.8

Matters within the Purview of Pakistan

(i) Defence (including control over Azad Kashmir Forces)
(ii) Negotiations with UNCIP
(iii) Foreign Policy of Azad Kashmir Government
(iv) Publicity in Pakistan and Foreign Countries
(v) Coordination of arrangements for relief and rehabilitation of refugees
(vi) Coordination of publicity and all arrangements in connection with
the plebiscite
(vii) All activities within Pakistan itself with regard to Kashmir such as
procurement of food and civil supplies transport, running of refugee
camps, medical arrangements, etc.
(viii) All affairs of the Gilgit and Ladakh areas under the control of the
Political Agent at Gilgit
Matters within the purview of the Azad Kashmir Government
(i) Policy with regard to administration in Azad Kashmir
(ii) General supervision of Administration in Azad Kashmir
(iii) Publicity with regard to activities of the Azad Kashmir Government
and its administration
(iv) Advise to H.M. (Honourable Minister) without portfolio [who went
on to become Minister MKA] with regard to negotiations with
UNCIP
(v) Development of economic resources of Azad Kashmir Area
Matters within the Purview of the Muslim Conference
(i) Publicity with regard to plebiscite in Azad Kashmir area
(ii) Field work and publicity in the Indian occupied area of the state
(iii) Organisation of political activities in the Azad Kashmir area and the
Indian occupied areas of the state
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 5

(iv) Preliminary arrangements in connection with plebiscite

(v) Organisation for contesting the plebiscite
(vi) Political work and publicity among Kashmir refugees in Pakistan
(vii) General guidance of Azad Kashmir Government
(viii) Advice to H.M without portfolio with regard to negotiations with
UNCIP
This agreement defined ‘AJK’’s relationship with Pakistan. The leaders of Muslim
Conference were made to lose their control over ‘Gilgit and Ladakh areas’ as
mentioned in the agreement which was to be administered by a political agent
to be appointed by the government of Pakistan. In the very beginning, instead
of giving importance to representative government or democracy, priority was
given to raising an army.9 But soon after that Islamabad felt compelled to form
a government in order to run the day-to-day affairs of the land occupied after
the July 1949 ceasefire agreement with India.
The April 1949 Karachi agreement was, to a large extent, modelled after
the rules of business enunciated to run the affairs of the provisional Azad
Kashmir government. It was formed with Pakistani blessings on October 24,
1947, sans legal and constitutional framework. This government declared itself
as a “War Council” with the single objective of “liberating” the parts of J&K
which remained under Indian control.10 This War Council had formalised the
Rules of Business for running the administration of the region. The President
was vested with both executive and legislative powers, and nominated under
the Rules of Business by the pleasure of the General Council of the Muslim
Conference. But both were under the control of the Chief Advisor appointed
by the Government of Pakistan.11 To run the judicial system, courts were created
and laws codified, “some laws of Punjab were adopted for the state while a
good body of the former Jammu and Kashmir State Code was retained”.12
But things went wrong with the release of Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas in
March 1948 by Sheikh Abdullah who became the Chief Emergency
Administrator after the Maharaja acceded to India and agreed to put in place
a popular administrative machinery in the state. Abbas became the supreme
head of the Muslim Conference in 1949. The Working Committee of the
Muslim Conference adopted a resolution on March 2, 1949 to give significant
powers to the supreme head. These powers included to appoint the President
and other members of the council. The Government of Pakistan did not show
any hesitation in recognising the supremacy of Ghulam Abbas. Rather they
found it easier to do business with Abbas than with Sardar Ibrahim.
Very soon, there was a clash of personality; Abbas and Ibrahim fell out
6 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

with each other. They discovered that they differed in their political beliefs.
Abbas not only dismissed Ibrahim’s government in 1950 but was also
vehemently against any democratic set-up in the region. According to Ershad
Mahmud, “He was not in favour of establishing a democratic set-up as he
thought that electoral politics would take leaders, parties and the people away
from the cause of liberation. Above all, the ‘AJK’ politics revolved around the
clan system, and Chaudhary Abbas, being from the other side of the J&K state,
had no roots in the area.”13 Three distinguished personalities started controlling
the politics of ‘AJK’. There were three different Muslim Conferences fighting
among themselves for influence, led by Ghulam Abbas, Sardar Ibrahim and
Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah who was from an influential religious family in Srinagar
and uncle of Mirwaiz Umar Farooq of Srinagar and leader of his faction of
Hurriyat Conference in the valley today.
Taking advantage of this struggle for power in ‘AJK’, among different
personalised factions of Muslim Conference, the Rules of Business were revised
in 1952, and instead of aiming at creating a balance of power between the
‘AJK’ government and the Muslim Conference and empowering the people to
elect their leader, the new Rules vested all powers with the MKA. Now the
President was elected according to the wishes of the MKA. The revisions
“weakened the grip of the Muslim Conference on state affairs”.14 It was signed
by the President, Colonel Sher Ahmad Khan, who hailed from Sudhan Biradari–
a powerful tribe in ‘AJK’– and was politically inept. The new Rules reduced
Azad Kashmir to the stature of a municipality. The MKA not only abolished
the office of the Supreme Head (read President of the Muslim Conference),
but under the Rules the MKA was to be consulted on almost all matters
undertaken by the Azad Kashmir Government and it also had supervisory power
over the Executive. The MKA was thus vested with supreme legal authority to
deal with the affairs of Azad Kashmir and a Joint Secretary in the Ministry
wielded disproportionate power. Snedden writes that “four years after being a
belligerent anti-Indian fighting force, the Azad Kashmir movement was
emasculated. It now was a supplicant, not a surrogate.”15
The ‘Rules of Business’ were revised again for the third time in 1958. Under
the new Rules, a Chief Advisor was introduced who replaced the Joint Secretary.
Ironically, the Chief Advisor was to be selected by the Minister in charge of
Kashmir Affairs (MKA), not by the Government of Azad Kashmir. This
Ministry later changed its name to Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern
Areas (MKANA). Interestingly, even if the same Ministry continues till date
with yet another change in nomenclature after 2009 as Ministry of Kashmir
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 7

Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan, the Ministry retains ‘KANA’ in its internet web
address (http://www.kana.gov.pk/).
After the revisions in 1958, all functions of the ‘AJK’government were
exercised in the name of the president, while real power was exercised by
MKANA officials. The ‘AJK’ government was not even allowed to create any
post which had a monthly salary of over Rs. 150, and was not allowed to spend
over Rs. 100,000 without the permission of MKANA.16 Thus, the Pakistani
Government, through various institutions and constitutional acts, not only
strengthened its hands at the cost of the ‘AJK’ government, but also ensured
that it was in full control of ‘AJK’’s internal political affairs. Successive
governments in ‘AJK’ were removed and appointed at will on the whims of the
government in Islamabad. During 1947-1959, over a period of 12 years, there
were eight presidents (one of them was selected twice) and the Pakistani state’s
suspicion regarding the political agenda of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muslim
Conference (AJKMC), often led to such frequent change of leadership in ‘AJK’.
Under the presidential system, during 1958-1970, the political and
administrative rights granted to the ‘AJK’ Government were minimal.

The 1970s
After taking over power in Pakistan in October 1958 in a bloodless coup,
General Ayub Khan introduced ‘Basic Democracy’ on the basis of party-less
elections. He banned all political parties and activities in Pakistan. Initially,
Ayub did not introduce ‘Basic Democracy’ in ‘AJK’, and appointed K.H.
Khurshid, one time private secretary to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as the President
of ‘AJK’ on May 1, 1959. Ayub Khan held elections in ‘AJK’ in 1961. Khurshid
won the elections to become the first elected president and later formed a party
called Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League (JKLL) because of his differences
with AJKMC. He remained in that post till 1964, when he developed differences
with the establishment and had to quit.
Right from the beginning of his tenure, Khurshid was not received well by
the MKA. He was branded as uncooperative and difficult to work with.
Moreover, his strained relationship with AJKMC leadership, particularly with
Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas, was also another issue that led to a power struggle,
in which Khurshid’s opponents – the MKA and AJKMC– got the better of
him and the news of his resignation, “on personal grounds” was announced by
the government in Islamabad on August 5, 1964. Some accounts say that a
mid-level police official forced him to resign and months later he was kept in
detention in Palandari and Dalai camp for some months. What hastened his
8 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

removal was a strong rumour in Pakistan that he had warmed up to Sheikh

Abdullah during the latter’s trip (May 24-27, 1964) to ‘AJK’ and was planning
for an independent Kashmir.
After his resignation, Khurshid struggled to keep himself and his party
politically relevant, but without much success. Later, he died a pauper in a
road accident on March 11, 1988, while travelling in a public transport vehicle
with Rs 37/- in his pocket (Dawn, March 11, 2011). Ironically, Khurshid was
appointed President of ‘AJK’ by the military and was also removed by it when
he sought to move towards independence from Pakistan’s control. Khurshid
was replaced by Khan Abdul Hamid Khan, former Chief Justice of ‘AJK’ High
Court, and brother of Sardar Qayyum Khan who had become President of
‘AJK’ for less than a year from September 8, 1956 – Apr 13, 1957. Khan Abdul
Hamid Khan remained president for more than five years allowing himself to
be brazenly guided and controlled by the Pakistan government and security
forces. Like Khurshid, he ruled without any cabinet and tried to consolidate
his position in ‘AJK’.
The period following Khurshid’s ouster witnessed continued marginalisation
of the people, which led to a wave of agitations launched by leading ‘AJK’-
based political parties against the MKA. Sardar Ibrahim, and Sardar
Muhammad Abdul Qayyum Khan, the successor of Ghulam Abbas, joined
hands to weaken the MKA’s hold on ‘AJK’. They demanded elected and
responsible government – an elected president and a legislature with full powers
of legislation, including the budget approving power.17
When Ayub’s regime was replaced by Gen. Yahya Khan in March 1969,
‘AJK’ was given some nominal degree of political autonomy. Yahya Khan
appointed a retired army general, Abdul Rahman Khan, his own man, as the
minister of the MKA. After consulting all the stakeholders of ‘AJK’, he
announced that democratic rule would be introduced soon in the region. Finally,
a democratic set-up was introduced in ‘AJK’ through the 1970 Act. Under this
Act, adult franchise was introduced in ‘AJK’ and the President of ‘AJK’ was to
be elected on the basis of one person-one vote. Apart from adult electorates
from ‘AJK’, the refugees from Jammu and Kashmir settled in other areas of
Pakistan were also eligible to cast their votes.
The 1970 Act introduced a directly elected ‘AJK’Assembly’ with 24 elected
members and one nominated lady member. The assembly was granted some
legislative powers while defence, foreign affairs and currency remained the
preserve of the government of Pakistan.18 It had even the power to remove the
president by two-third majority. The state subject law – that bars non-Kashmiris
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 9

from getting state citizenship – also became part of this act in deference to
local opinion.

Interim Constitution Act, 1974

Pakistan’s first elections on the basis of one-man-one-vote were organised by
Gen. Yahya Khan in December 1970. These elections witnessed emergence of
East Pakistan based Awami League as the majority party. However, establishment
in West Pakistan was not willing to recognise these results. This led to violence
in East Pakistan. The subsequent use of brutal force by the Pakistan army to
suppress the Bengali-speaking population of East Pakistan leading to large-scale
influx of refugees into India compelling India to get involved in a war that saw
defeat and surrender of Pakistani forces on December 16, 1971. After the
breakup of Pakistan in 1971, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became the Chief Martial
Law Administrator of a truncated Pakistan and witnessed the strengthening of
the civilian forces in West Pakistan for some years. The outcome of the 1971
War, although it was not fought over the issue of Kashmir, affected the politics
of the region in a significant manner. The following factors played an important
role in ‘AJK’politics after 1971:
(i) There was a growing demand in ‘AJK’ for a parliamentary system of
government from the local chapter of Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP)
when Zulfiqar Bhutto got a new constitution drafted which put in
place a parliamentary form of government in Pakistan. The local
chapter of PPP Azad Kashmir (AJKPPP) lobbied Bhutto for a similar
system in ‘AJK’. Therefore, presidential system of government, which
had worked for about 4 years, was replaced by a parliamentary system
introduced under the “AJK interim Constitution Act, 1974”. This so
called ‘Interim’ act has had a long run for more than four decades
and undergone about 13 amendments till 2018. the Assembly
consisted of 40 members, elected on the basis of adult franchise and
two co-opted lady members. Today, the Assembly consists of 41 elected
Members (29 from ‘AJK’ proper and 12 from among the refugees)
and 8 co-opted members – 5 women, one member from Ullema-e-
Din/Mushaikh, one from among the ‘AJK’ technocrats and other
professionals, and one from amongst ‘AJK’ nationals residing abroad.
(ii) According to many scholars, Zulfiqar Bhutto and then Prime Minister
of India, Indira Gandhi, had reached an understanding about settling
the issue around the status quo – recognising the Line of Control
(LoC) as the international border. Under the Simla Agreement in
1972, both sides decided to settle all outstanding issues including
10 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Kashmir, bilaterally.19 Confirmation of LoC as border would turn

Azad Kashmir to a full-fledged province of Pakistan, “something
Bhutto possibly initiated when he came to power.”20 Few even believe
that Bhutto had offered to make ‘AJK’ a province of Pakistan.21
(iii) The administrative changes Bhutto brought about in Northern Areas,
which is now better known as Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B or GB), almost
turned the latter into the de facto fifth province of Pakistan. New
administrative changes further integrated Gilgit-Baltistan into
Pakistan.
(iv) People of the region as well as the Pakistani authorities had perhaps
realised that annexing Kashmir by force was now impossible owing
to India’s size of military strength.
The ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution Act of 1974, introduced parliamentary system
with a Prime Minister as the executive head and an indirectly elected President.
As the executive head of ‘AJK’, the Prime Minister wielded restricted power
because the real power was vested in a new body called ‘AJK’ Council chaired
by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The ‘AJK’ Council is vested with both
legislative and executive powers.22 Headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan,
it consists of 11 members, six of whom are elected by the ‘AJK’ Assembly and
five are nominated by the Pakistani Prime Minister. The 1974 constitution
thus took away most of the powers accorded to the ‘AJK’ assembly by 1970
Act and vested these in the ‘AJK’ Council. These included the power to appoint
High Court and Supreme Court judges. The major sources of income for the
‘AJK’ Government, like income tax, were given away to the ‘AJK’ Council.
The ‘AJK’ Government’s power to appoint the Chief Election Commissioner
and the Auditor General was also taken away.
The following subjects were under the ‘AJK’ Council:
(a) Electricity and Hydro Power Generation
(b) Tourism
(c) Population planning
(d) Banking
(e) Insurance
(f ) Stock exchange
(g) Future markets, trading corporations, telecommunication
(h) Planning for economic coordination,
(i) Highways, minerals, oil and gas
(j) Development of industries, etc.
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 11

A critical analysis of the Interim Constitution Act, 1974 indicates that the Act
has not only allowed the Kashmir Council to function as a parallel government
but has also led to problems in governance.23 In an email dated May 4, 2018,
in response to a query from one of the authors, Jalaluddin Mughal, a senior
journalist from Pakistan commented that Kashmir Council enjoyed “ambiguous
status since it was established, and it was not a representative body of ‘AJK’
people because majority of its members were not elected by ‘AJK’ people. He
held that the Council drew its authority not from the Interim Constitution
Act of 1974, but rather from the 1949 Karachi Agreement, “which gives all
powers to Pakistan government”. He also pointed out that “neither the Act of
1974 nor the Karachi agreement was drafted, signed and ratified by any elected
representative of the ‘AJK’ people”. and even “now the AJK Assembly does not
have the power to amend the 1974 Act without prior approval of the federal
government”. That is why, he concluded, “the elected leadership of ‘AJK’ has
been demanding [review] of all the agreements with Pakistan and to amend
[the 1974 constitution] to empower the local elected government rather than
operate through the ‘AJK’ Council, [which is not entirely representative of the
will of the people of ‘AJK’]”. While the ‘AJK’ Government remains accountable
both to the Council and the Assembly, the Council is not accountable to either
the ‘AJK’ Government or Accountability Bureau. According to Tanveer Ahmad,
a PoK-based social activist, “‘AJK’ is a legal anomaly and the current governance
structure in ‘AJK’ is most certainly not a structure, which accommodates
accountability and transparency of any kind.”24 Even those matters that come
under the purview of the ‘AJK’ Government are in effect run by the bureaucrats,
the government in Islamabad controls their appointment. Senior civil servants
– Chief Secretary, Additional Chief Secretary, IG Police, Finance Secretary,
Health Secretary, Auditor General and Accountant General – are appointed
by the Pakistan government.25 While commenting on the loopholes of the
Interim Act, a Pildat report maintains:
This generates grievance among AJ&K services group who feel their powers
having been curtailed in operation of even routine affairs. Known as ‘Lent
Officers’, and not being under the AJ&K Government’s control in matters
of discipline or posting, the posted officers are a strong check on the exercise
of powers by the President and Cabinet of AJ&K. This system of ‘Lent
Officers’ is a permanent feature, and has never been changed. The Government
of Pakistan, therefore, always retained an extremely strong influence in AJ&K
affairs.26
The Interim Constitution Act 1974 left the ‘AJK’ Government with very little
power. The Act not only denied the political rights of the people by empowering
12 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the Kashmir Council more than the ‘AJK’ Assembly, but also marginalised the
‘AJK’ Government’s power over the areas under its control.
On June 1, 2018, the President of ‘AJK’ assented to the 13th amendment
passed by the joint sitting of Joint Session of ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly and
‘AJK’ Council. This amendment seeks to transfer executive and legislative powers
from ‘AJK’ Council to ‘AJK’ government, and create four more constituencies
on the basis of the increased population. (For details see Appendix IV)

Government and Politics in ‘AJK’: Post-1974

The controlled ‘democratic’ system in ‘AJK’ was resented by local leaders, even
by those who supported Kashmir’s final accession to Pakistan. It has denied
political rights to the people by making the Kashmir Council more powerful
than the legislative assembly. Pakistan found it easy to deal with these pro-
Pakistan Muslim Conference leaders and therefore, it felt itself under no pressure
to allow the people the right to decision making. There has never been a serious
effort to install a political system where people would have their say in policy
making. On various occasions leaders of the Muslim Conference have criticised
Pakistan’s carrot and stick policy to woo or punish them. However, Pakistan
has succeeded in patronising these leaders who advocate merging of entire
Kashmir with Pakistan. However, a vocal constituency wedded to the idea of
independence of entire Kashmir has also made its presence felt all along even
if it has not been allowed to participate in the elections in ‘AJK’.
Such policies have “stifled the development of indigenous institutions” as
Pakistan is obsessed with the idea of control of ‘AJK’ people and disallowed
the local leadership to evolve any responsive system on their own lest they would
veer towards independence. Therefore, the people have always been asked to
wait for the promised plebiscite to resolve things. With the mainstream political
parties in Pakistan making successful entry into the political scenario in ‘AJK’,
there has been regular emphasis on strengthening Pakistan’s hold on AJK. This
has shut the door on political dissent in ‘AJK’ and “meant that [AJK] did not
develop any positive political alternatives, democratic or otherwise, to those
on offer in Indian J&K”.27
Other factors that played an equally important role in setting the dismal
record of democracy in ‘AJK’ included the endemic factionalism within the
Muslim Conference (for details, see the chapter on the Muslim Conference)
and the role of the biradari (clan) system which divided politicians. Apart from
its socio-political significance, the biradari system in ‘AJK’ is also important in
that different clans have different views on what it means to be a Kashmiri.
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 13

This innate instinct of people of ‘AJK’ to maintain a separate identity has

determined the power relationships among politicians and parties/groups.28
Historically, the Sudhans, who are mostly concentrated in Bagh and Rawalakot,
in the Poonch district, have been politically very influential. The other influential
group includes people from the Rajput biradari. Leaders from these two
biradaris have ruled ‘AJK’ ever since it came into being as a controversial political
unit.29 Along with these two clans, the Jats of Mirpur, although numerically
less in number, have also emerged as yet another important group in ‘AJK’’s
politics, especially since the boom in migrant economy in the region. According
to Human Rights Watch Report 2012, “Mirpur economic clout has paid
political dividends, helping propel barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry to
power as the first Mirpur leader of Azad Kashmir in 1996.” 30 While
commenting on the rise of the Mirpur biradari in ‘AJK’ politics, Alexander
Evans aptly states:
The Mirpur Jats, looked down upon by Rajputs and Sudhans, gained power
in the 1990s largely because of their wealth ... Valley Kashmiris view Mirpuris
with much the same condescension as their Punjabi counterparts, but they
also consider Mirpuris part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir.
They remain Kashmir state subjects – even if not ethnically Kashmiri as
Valley Kashmiris would understand it.... On the Pakistani side, the south-
east (Sudhan heartland) and south (Mirpur) dominate, while the north (both
Muzaffarabad and the Neelum) is less influential ... but Rajputs and Sudhans
remain important brokers in local politics – not least as Gujjars tend to follow
the lead of local Rajput and Sudhan leaders.31
It is to be noted that both the Sudhans and the Mirpur Jats perceive the Kashmir
conflict differently. The Sudhans still take pride in being the first ones to take
up arms against Maharaja Hari Singh’s forces, “aiming, as they still do, to bring
the whole Kashmir into wider Pakistan – their slogan is ‘Kashmir banega
Pakistan’ [Kashmir will become Pakistan]”.32 On the other hand, Mirpuris stress
on their “Kashmiri entity which would be entirely independent of both India
and Pakistan – their slogan is ‘Kashmir Azad banega’ [Kashmir will be free]”.33
According to Roger Ballard, this position adopted by the Mirpuris in contrast
to that of the Sudhans is not only due to their cultural distinctiveness but also
because of their sense of alienation and disillusionment about the way in which
Islamabad has treated them.34 For further understanding the biradari’s role in
‘AJK’’s body politic, two political developments should be kept in mind. The
first one is the famous revolt of May 1950 by the Sudhans of Poonch when
Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas sacked Sardar Ibrahim, who belonged to the Sudhan
biradari. The Sudhans took it as an insult, and rose in rebellion against Pakistan.
14 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

They also set up a parallel government during the revolt.35 The rebellion was,
however, crushed by the Pakistan Army. Nonetheless, Pakistan succeeded in
pacifying the Sudhans later by factoring in biradari system in its interventions
in ‘AJK’. Col. (Retd.) Sher Ahmad, another Sudhan, was appointed as a cabinet
minister with important portfolios of defence, education and health. It was a
masterstroke by Pakistani authorities to placate the Sudhans and at the same
time weaken Sardar Ibrahim’s leadership.36 The other development took place
when Ayub Khan decided to conduct party-less elections in 1961 under the
system of ‘Basic Democracy’. The people defeated the purpose of a party-less
election by voting openly for those who belonged to their own tribe and clan.37
The biradari system is also used from time to time by mainstream parties
of Pakistan to manipulate electoral politics in ‘AJK’. According to Shams
Rehman, the pro-accession-to-Pakistan, political forces have again been
polarized on biradari lines into two main political parties of Pakistan – the
local branches of Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP). The former has become predominantly a party of the Rajas and
the latter a party of the Jats. The Muslim Conference, which used to be backed
by the Pakistani military establishment once upon a time, remains the only
local party of “any electoral significance in the race.”38 Underscoring the
importance of biradari politics, Javid Hayat states that at the internal level,
ethnicity or cross-cutting cleavages based on tribes/clans (biradri) and region
(based on Districts and Divisions) play a significant role in shaping and
reshaping local politics in ‘AJK’. Traditionally, politicians have encouraged such
divide for their own vested interests, and thus, racial identity appears to be “an
increasingly growing phenomenon for internal power-sharing and political
allegiances in future.”39

Politics of Representation
There are 49 seats in the ‘AJK’ Assembly at the moment (four more were to be
added if 13th amendment of June 2018 was to be implemented). Forty-one of
these are elected through direct elections – 29 from constituencies based in
‘AJK’, and 12 seats allocated to the Kashmiri refugees (six for the people
migrated from Jammu and the other six are elected by the refugees of Kashmir).
Five out of the eight reserved seats are for women and one each for
representatives from overseas Kashmiris, technocrats and religious leaders.
Over the years, there has been a growing concern in various segments of
the people about the significance of having reserved seats for the refugees. In
2014, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court for the cancellation of the
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 15

refugee seats. The petitioner claimed that having reserved seats for the refugees
is nothing but a symbolic gesture and is in utter disregard of the fundamental
rights of the people of ‘AJK’.40 It is also alleged that the Kashmiri refugees are
over-represented, whereas those from Jammu are underrepresented.41 ‘AJK’’s
first free-and-fair elections were held on October 30, 1970, when the president
of ‘AJK’ was directly elected by the people for the first time under universal
suffrage. The presidential candidates were: Sardar Ibrahim (Azad Muslim
Conference), K.H. Khurshid (AJK Liberation League), Sardar Qayyum (AJK
Muslim Conference) and Muhammad Sharif Tariq (J&K Plebiscite Front).
Sardar Qayyum of AJKMC won the elections. Most of these parties were based
in ‘AJK’. But after the enactment of the 1974 Interim Constitution, the
mainstream political parties of Pakistan started setting up their offices in ‘AJK’
and through alliances with local parties as well as manipulation of political
processes tried to consolidate their position there.

Electoral Politics During 1975-1996

When the first elections for Legislative Assembly under the interim constitution
were held on May 18, 1975, the Pakistan People’s Party founded by Bhutto
raised its local affiliate in ‘AJK’ and announced a United Front Alliance against
the AJK Muslim Conference (AJKMC) along with three other prominent local
parties, i.e., AJK Liberation League (AJKLL), the Azad Muslim Conference
(AMC) and a breakaway faction of the Muslim Conference led by Sardar
Ibrahim – who was announced by the AJKPPP as the joint presidential
candidate. The four-party alliance launched an aggressive campaign against
Sardar Qayyum-led AJKMC that the party decided to boycott the elections.
The then leader of PPP, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto used the service of his confidante
Hayat Muhammad Khan Tamman to secure maximum seats for the AJKPPP.
Interestingly out of the 12 refugee seats, Hayat delivered as many as nine to
AJKPPP.42 The results were shock to Qayyum who expressed his anguish over
the police and the military intimidating him and his party workers before and
after the elections. While addressing the media, he said that the elections were
a fraud, and the results had already been rigged by the Pakistan Government.
He also alleged that the government had sent 20,000 police and armed civilians
into ‘AJK’ to intimidate him and his supporters. He was even barred from
entering ‘AJK’ and most of his key party workers were arrested.43 The United
Front Alliance jointly contested for all the 29 local seats. For the remaining
seats, the alliance members were free to fight on their own. Out of the 34
seats, which the alliance finally secured, the AJKPPP won 22, the Liberation
League (AJKLL) five, the Muslim Conference (Ibrahim) four, and the Azad
16 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Muslim Conference (AMC) three. After the elections, the AJKPPP formed its
own government ignoring its alliance partners. Sardar Ibrahim was elected
President, and Khan Abdul Hamid Khan Prime Minister. Bhutto’s political
advisor, Hayat Muhammad Khan Tamman, played an important role in
ensuring that the “correct people were elected. Basically, the elections were
rigged”.44
However, the AJKPPP’s rule was short-lived. The Pakistan army chief Gen.
Zia ul Haq’s imposed martial law on July 5, 1977 and brought the occupied
territory under military control by dismissing the AJKPPP government. He
installed a serving military officer, Brigadier Mohammad Hayat Khan, as the
president. He suspended the 1974 Constitution, and both ‘AJK’ Council and
political parties found themselves in wilderness. Sardar Ibrahim dissolved the
Legislative Assembly on August 11, 1977 and issued an order for conducting
fresh elections. Major General Abdul Rehman Khan – who was earlier picked
by the military government headed by Yahya Khan as president during 1969-
1970 – was appointed by Ibrahim as the Chief Executive. On October 31,
1978, Zia dismissed Ibrahim invoking Article 56 of the interim constitution
and appointed Brigadier Muhammad Hayat Khan, a Sudhan, as both President
and Chief Executive of ‘AJK’, who was supposed to work towards holding
elections in ‘AJK’. But Zia ul Haq did not allow elections to be held as he first
wanted politicians to be made more accountable. Hayat decided to form an
Advisory Council, whose members would be cherry-picked by Zia. The
infamous Political Parties Ordinance was promulgated in September 1979 to
regulate political parties. Under this Ordinance, political parties were registered
on the following conditions: A party had to: (a) publish its foundation
document or constitution; (b) have periodic elections of principal officers; and
(c) subscribe to the ideology of Pakistan and J&K’s accession to Pakistan.45
The AJKPPP refused to get registered, whereas Jamaat-i-Islami did register but
later did not take part in elections.
After much dismay and harassment, the political leaders of ‘AJK’ started
protesting against the delay in elections and the setting up of the Advisory
Council. Hayat Khan, who continued as President till February1983, became
very unpopular and to fend off further accumulation of local resistance against
him. The military brought in Abdul Rehman Khan for the second time as
President. Abdul Rehman Khan continued till 1985 elections. When elections
were finally announced on May 16, 1985, seven political parties entered into
alliance against the AJKMC. The alliance was led by K.H. Khurshid of the
Liberation League, and other parties included Tehrik-i-Amal led by Brigadier
Hayat Khan, Islami-Jamhoori Party, Democratic Front, Jamaat-i-Islami AJK,
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 17

Inqilabi Mahaz and Azad Jamhoori Mahaz. Later Jamaat-i-Islami boycotted

elections in protest against alleging Zia government’s preferential treatment to
the Muslim Conference.46 That scepticism proved correct when election results
were declared on May 16, 1985. Muslim Conference got 19 seats, Tehrik-i-
Amal eight, Liberation League four, Azad Muslim Conference two and seven
seats went to independent candidates, who were regarded as pro-AJKPPP, which
had not registered as a political party and hence did not participate in the
elections officially. Zia’s favourites emerged as President and Prime Minister of
‘AJK’. AJKMC leader Sardar Qayyum Khan was elected as President and Sardar
Sikandar Hayat Khan became the Prime Minister.
After Zia died in a plane crash on October 17, 1988, Benazir Bhutto’s
PPP came to power in Pakistan. The four-party alliance in ‘AJK’ – AJKPPP,
AJKLL, Tehrik-i-Amal and other parties demanded the removal of Qayyum’s
government. But Qayyum had, in the meantime, become close to then Punjab
Chief Minister, Nawaz Sharif. This bonhomie between the Muslim Conference
and Pakistan Muslim League helped Qayyum to complete his tenure.
The next elections for the 40 directly elected seats of the fourth ‘AJK’
Legislative Assembly were held on May 21, 1990. The main contest was between
the AJKPPP and the AJKMC. The election results saw the AJKPPP the AJKMC
both getting 16 seats each – the AJKMC’s 8 of the 16 seats came from the
refugee quota. The AJKMC got three, the Tehrik-e-Amal and the Liberation
league one each. The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) could not
contest elections because it refused to pledge mandatory support to J&K’s
accession to Pakistan. It stood for independence of Kashmir. Finally, Raja
Mumtaz Rathore of AJKPPP won the post of prime minister by defeating the
Muslim Conference candidate, Sikander Hayat Khan, by 29 votes to 15. Sardar
Qayyum, as the president, refused to swear in Rathore and his 17 members
calling the PPP an “anti-national and anti-Islam party”.47 However, after pressure
from Islamabad, which was then ruled by PPP, the Speaker of the Assembly
administered the oath of office to Rathore.
Rathore’s government soon faced the heat from Sardar Qayyum who
launched a campaign for his removal after then Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto was dismissed by then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan on charges of
corruption in August 1990. After the victory of PML-N in the subsequent
elections, both Nawaz Sharif and the president of Pakistan assured Rathore
that his government would not be destabilised. But still, Rathore felt unsafe
and tried to muster help from the Pakistan army. During this time, out of
frustration, he came out with statements which were critical of Pakistan. For
18 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

example, he alleged that the “Pakistani rulers use the Kashmir issue for capturing
and retaining power”. Such pungent rhetoric from ‘AJK’ Prime Minister
embarrassed the Pakistani leadership.48 His relationship with Islamabad, and
especially the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (MKA) soured leading finally to the
fall of Rathore government.
The trouble started after the June 29, 1991 mid-term elections, when
Rathore’s AJKPPP lost badly. Rathore called the elections a massive fraud and
declared them null and void. He accused Islamabad of massive rigging and
argued that “senior bureaucrats, in connivance with Islamabad, had ensured
his defeat”.49 It is believed that Nawaz Sharif, who was at the time ruling at the
centre, played it down in the beginning on the suggestions from the foreign
office. But things became murkier after Rathore upped the ante by ordering
fresh elections and announced that July 6 would be observed as a protest day
throughout ‘AJK’.50 As a consequence, an army operation led by a Brigadier
arrested the Prime Minister Rathore and took him to Islamabad where he was
detained at the Simla Rest House for 30 days under the Maintenance of Public
Order Ordinance. Condemning his arrest, Barrister Sultan Mahmood
Chaudhry, then leader of AJKPPP, said at a press conference: “What is the
difference between ‘Occupied Kashmir’ [he meant Indian state of Jammu and
Kashmir] and the ‘liberated’ territory [the so called Azad Kashmir]? There, the
Indian army is launching aggression against the Kashmiri freedom fighters
demanding the right to vote. And here in the liberated territory, the army is
arresting the prime minister.”51 Section 56 of the Interim Constitution 1974
was used by Pakistan to justify removal of Rathore.52 The text says:
Nothing in this Act shall derogate from the responsibilities of the government
of Pakistan in relation to the matters specified in sub-section 31(3) or prevent
the government of Pakistan from taking such action as it may consider
necessary or expedience for the effective discharge of those responsibilities.
Section 31 (3) states:
Neither the council nor the assembly shall have the power to make any law
concerning: (a) the responsibilities of the Government of Pakistan under the
U.N. resolutions, (b) the defence and security of Azad Jammu and Kashmir,
(c) the current coin or the issue of any bills, notes or other paper of currency
or (d) the external affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, including foreign
trade and foreign aid”.
It was not his accusation of rigging but his announcement of marking July 6
as a protest day that upset the Pakistan government. It indicated the beginning
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 19

of a struggle that would open the Pandora’s Box of regular interference by

successive federal governments and the army in ‘AJK’ politics. Astonishingly,
the AJKPPP’s mother organisation, led by Benazir Bhutto did not support
Rathore. Benazir avoided getting into the mess Rathore had created.
The June 1991 elections were held under Rathore but the AJKMC won
28 out of the 34 seats for which results were declared. The Rathore-led AJKPPP
could secure only two seats. The ‘AJK’ Jamhoori Ittehad got four seats. Sardar
Abdul Qayyum, who until elections was the President, resigned. Sensing victory,
before and during elections, he decided to run for the position of prime minister.
Sahibzada Ishaq Zafar of AJKPPP was made the interim president. His tenure
was short-lived spanning only nine days. He was sacked after his outburst against
unabated interference of Pakistan in the internal affairs of the ‘AJK’. He accused
Nawaz Sharif of interfering in the internal matters and attempting to foist a
one-party system upon the state.53 Underscoring the events during the 1990s
in ‘AJK’, Askari sums it up:
If the developments in Azad Jammu and Kashmir proved anything at all it
was that the top leadership in the state can be unbelievably childish and also
that no set up in the state can hope to function once it falls into disharmony with
those who happen to be in power in Islamabad (italics by the editors). That is
how it was under the PPP government in 1972-77, when the AJK Interim
Constitution was promulgated; and that is how it is now, when the IJI and
Nawaz Sharif are in power.54
The next five years (1991-95), AJKMC was in office. Sardar Qayyum Khan
became Prime Minister after relinquishing the office of President and Sardar
Sikandar Hayat Khan became President in August 1991. Nawaz Sharif, who
came to power in Pakistan in November 1990, was made to quit office in July
1993. The subsequent elections in 1993 returned AJKPPP to power. Benazir
Bhutto became the Prime Minister in Islamabad; but her government was
dismissed by President Farooq Leghari in November 1996. Nawaz Sharif’s party
succeeded her and returned to power in February 1997.

The Elections of 1996 and 2001

In the June 30, 1996 elections, the AJKPPP captured power by winning 26
out of 40 seats. AJKMC could secure only eight seats. It was almost a repetition
of the 1991 elections. Benazir Bhutto was in power in Islamabad during both
these elections. The voters chose the party which ruled Islamabad, probably
hoping for better financial benefits for the region, and this has almost become
a trend in ‘AJK’ since a token representative system was introduced since the
20 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

1970s. The AJKPPP government completed its term in spite of Nawaz Sharif
returning to power in Islamabad in February 1997. It was partly because of a
divided AJKMC and also because of the fact that Nawaz government lost its
popularity soon as it got enmeshed in a power struggle with the army following
the army’s Kargil misadventure and was overthrown in October 1999. The
military government under Musharraf chose it better not to ruffle the feathers
in ‘AJK’ in a hurry and allowed the AJKPPP government led by Barrister Sultan
Mahmood Chaudhry – the first Mirpuri to be prime minister of ‘AJK’– to
continue and complete its term.
The July 2001 elections in ‘AJK’ witnessed dramatic developments. The
AJKMC, known for its good relations with Nawaz Sharif ’s party, PML-N,
secured 21 seats, while the AJKPPP won 15 seats. Pakistan was under military
rule and given Musharraf ’s disliking for PML-N, his government was not willing
to have Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qayyum Khan as the prime minister.
Moreover, Qayyum’s open praise of the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee for involving Hurriyat Conference in Indo-Pak talks and his criticism
of the Pakistan military had offended Gen Musharraf.
Ironically, until then, the army and AJKMC had always maintained a good
understanding. Moreover, AJKMC, Pakistan Muslim League and the Army
had close relationship among themselves during the 1990s. However, with
Qayyum favouring Nawaz and opposing the army takeover, the relationship
between him and the army had deteriorated beyond repair. Thus, sensing the
displeasure of the military, AJKMC chose to field Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan
as prime minister and Sardar Attique, Sardar Qayyum’s son, to run for the
president’s post. But the Army imposed Major General Sardar Muhammad
Anwar Khan as the president of ‘AJK’ instead. Anwar was asked to resign from
the army and was rushed to Muzaffarabad, where the Assembly elected him as
president on August 25, 2001. This was in violation of Section 5(2)(ix) of the
‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly (Elections) Ordinance, 1970, according to which
the General should have retired two years before being considered for the post
of president.
The incident of 9/11 which occurred days after Anwar’s assumption of
presidency set off a new political dynamic in Pakistan and kept Musharraf busy
reshaping his government’s policy towards terrorism and Kashmir. Sardar
Sikandar Hayat Khan of AJKMC continued as prime minister till the next
elections in July 2006.
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 21

The Elections of 2006, 2011 and 2016

The elections for the eighth (2006) and ninth (2011) Legislative Assemblies
were not much different from the earlier ones. In 2006 elections (July 11),
AJKMC bagged 22 seats while AJKPPP had to be content with six. Musharraf
backed People’s Muslim League and Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM)
secured two seats each – the latter winning two refugee seats from Karachi.
After elections, aware of the need to keep the military government in good
humour, the AJKMC leaders were seen to be warming up to Musharraf and
since Sardar Qayyum was not acceptable to Musharraf for his pro-Nawaz Sharif
leaning, his son Sardar Attique Khan was chosen as prime ministerial candidate
in July 2006. Raja Zulqarnain Khan– who claimed royal ancestry as Raja of
Chhib (Bhimber), earlier a confidante of K.H. Khurshid and General Secretary
of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League during the 1960s, had joined
AJKMC later and served as minister on several occasions – was projected as
presidential candidate and was elected president of ‘AJK’, in August 2006.
Backed by Musharraf, Sardar Attique’s government pulled on till 2009 when
it was confronted with a no-confidence motion moved by the opposition
AJKPPP. In fact, Musharraf ’s fortunes had declined since the beginning of 2007
and in March 2008, PPP came to power in Islamabad. Under the force of
circumstances, Musharraf had to resign in September 2008. It is widely believed
that the PPP government in Islamabad conspired to remove the existing
government blessed by Gen Musharraf and install a favourable government in
place in ‘AJK’. In the subsequent days, ‘AJK’ witnessed tremendous political
instability with four prime ministers assuming office in three years.
In January 2009, a no-trust vote moved by Raja Farooq Haider, a fellow
AJKMC legislator who had chosen to form a separate camp (Forward Block)
within the party, allegedly with the support of another veteran ‘AJK’ leader,
Sardar Sikander Hayat Khan, who had a bitter relationship with Attique and
his father within the AJKMC for a long time. Sikander’s hand, if it was there
at all, was a hidden one. Farooq Haider alleged that the government led by
Sardar Attique was corrupt, and he indulged in nepotism and deviated from
the ideology of Muslim Conference. The motion was passed with 31 members
voting in favour and 14 against with two abstentions. Exercising his
constitutional prerogative, Sardar Attique chose Sardar Yaqoob Muhammad
Khan – who had been denied a ticket by Attique’s father to contest in the 2006
elections and had won as an independent candidate – as the prime ministerial
candidate. Sardar Yaqoob, a businessman, originally from Poonch but raised
in Karachi, had dabbled in politics in Sind during his student days as a member
22 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

of Punjabi Pakhtun Ittehad party and was later associated with ‘Tehreek-e-Amal’,
a party based in ‘AJK’, before joining AJKMC. Yaqoob was supported by
AJKMC splinter group as well as other opposition parties.
Yaqoob’s government continued till October 2009, when a no-confidence
motion was tabled in the assembly against his government by various factions
of the AJKMC reunited under the leadership of Raja Farooq Haider and
nominated Haider as the alternate prime ministerial candidate. Yaqoob resigned
before the motion was to be passed in the assembly, yet contested the prime
ministerial election supported by a four party alliance which included the local
branch of the PPP. However, Haider secured 29 votes while Yaqoob could only
muster 19 votes in his favour.
Raja Farooq Haider became the prime minister while Sardar Attique
continued as AJKMC party president. Haider held the post from October 23,
2009 till July 2010, when he too had to resign to avoid the humiliation of
facing a trust vote. This time, the no-trust motion was moved on July 22, 2010,
by two legislators, one of whom was Chaudhry Abdul Majeed Khan who had
won his seat as an independent but had his sympathies for the AJKPPP. Seeing
the writing on the wall, Haider resigned on July 25, one day before the motion
was to be subjected to vote in the assembly.
Sardar Attique Khan, President of AJKMC who was nominated in the
motion as the prime minister went on to win 39 votes in his favour – 21 from
his own party, seven from AJKPPP, six from the ‘Friends Group,’ three from
the Peoples Muslim League (PML-Q) (a de facto branch of pro-Musharraf
PML-Quaid led by Barrister Sultan Mahmood) and two from MQM. Attique
could manage to hold on to his position till the end of the tenure of the assembly
in July 2011.
Interestingly, before resigning as prime minister, Haider had raised the issue
of an assertive judiciary in ‘AJK’, under Chief Justice Riaz Akhtar Chaudhury,
who had passed a ‘controversial’ judgment on March 15, 2010, challenging
the jurisdiction of Pakistan Supreme Court on ‘AJK’, as it was an independent
entity and by doing so Haider tried to warm up to the military establishment
of Pakistan.55 Moreover, the PML-N had taken note of the political roulette in
‘AJK’ and started siding with Haider, who was seemingly being targeted by the
PPP government in cahoots with local operators, during this period.
In June 2011, the results of the elections in ‘AJK’, was ‘unsurprising’56 and
the PPP, then in power in Islamabad, registered an easy win. Out of 41 elected
constituencies, AJKPPP secured 22. The PML-N won in nine while AJKMC
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 23

could secure only four. The AJKPPP found it easy to win because of the decision
of the recently formed AJKPML-N, largely composed of dissenters from
AJKMC, not to enter into any alliance with AJKMC and go it alone in the
polls. This resulted in AJKMC splitting the votes in many constituencies making
it easier for the AJKPPP to win with narrow margins. The AJKPML-N fared
better (eight seats) than local AJKMC (four seats).
The AJKPPP government was headed by Chaudhry Abdul Majeed Khan,
a Jat politician from Mirpur – second prime minister from Mirpur after Barrister
Sultan Mahmood, and leader of opposition in ‘AJK’ assembly since 2006.
Majeed was also president of AJKPPP during the elections and was chosen by
PPP President Asif Ali Zardari as the PM candidate. He contested and won an
intra-party election where his rival, Barrister Sultan Mahmood, finally voted
in his favour. Chaudhry Abdul Majeed secured 35 votes while Raja Farooq
Haider of AJKPML-N managed only 11 votes.
Raja Zulqarnain, then president of ‘AJK’, was replaced subsequently by
Sardar Muhammad Yaqoob Khan, who had sensed the political wind blowing
in favour of AJKPPP and joined the party ahead of the elections. On 29 July
2011, Yaqoob was elected as the president securing 40 votes while his rival
Khan Bahadur Khan of the AJKPML-N obtained only 11 votes.
Majeed’s government pulled on through allegations of widespread
corruption and nepotism till there was a change of government in Islamabad
with assumption of power by PML-N led by Nawaz Sharif on June 5, 2013.
A month and a half later, on July 22, 2013, there was a revolt within AJKPPP
leading to two party members tabling a no-trust motion against his government.
They alleged that Chaudhry Abdul Majeed Khan’s government was involved
in massive corruption in developmental projects like Mirpur Greater Water
Scheme, Jinnah Model Town Housing Scheme, Mirpur University of
Engineering and Technology, Mirpur Development Authority and the
construction of two medical colleges in the state, and it had also failed to
highlight the case of Kashmir at the international fora.
The dissidents were apparently led by Barrister Sultan Mahmood who
reportedly claimed57 that he had the support of 32 candidates including the
support of AJKPML-N legislators. However, three days later it was reported
that, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif “directed his party representatives in the
legislature not to take part in any move to topple the AJK prime minister”58
and the whole drama fizzled out. Barrister Mahmood nourished a grudge against
both PML-N and the AJKPPP and subsequently joined Imran Khan’s Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).
24 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

By July 2016, when the elections were held, AJKPPP was riven with internal
feud and there was a strong anti-incumbency wave sweeping ‘AJK’. AJKMC was
also facing revolt within as many of its erstwhile strong supporters had either
joined AJKPML-N or AJKPPP. In this context, the decision of the central
leadership of PPP to bank on anti-India and anti-Nawaz rhetoric backfired.
When the elections were held under tight military security, the AJKPML-N won
a landslide, its first-ever electoral sweep, securing 31 out of 41 directly elected
seats. Both AJKMC and AJKPPP could only get three seats each, while local
branch of Imran Khan’s PTI led by Barrister Sultan Mahmood, who himself lost
the election, could bag only two seats. Raja Farooq Haider who had been courted
by Nawaz Sharif since July 2010, when the no confidence motion was tabled
against him, led the local branch of PML-N to victory and was chosen as the
prime minister of ‘AJK’. He assumed office after being duly elected by the ‘AJK’
Assembly on July 30, 2016, securing 38 of the 48 votes cast, while two other
contestants Chaudhry Muhammad Yaseen of AJK PPP and Ghulam Mohiuddin
Dewan, jointly fielded by AJKPTI and AJKMC, received five votes each.
The new Prime Minister announced a nine member cabinet comprises two
ministers each from Muzaffarabad, Bagh and Kotli districts, one each from
Haveli, Sudhanoti and Bhimber district. On December 12, 2016, Farooq
Haider inducted three more ministers into his cabinet raising its strength to
12. While one was from Mirpur, other two were from Pakistan-based refugee
areas. Days later, the PML-N parachuted Ambassador Masood Khan, then
Director General of Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI), as
presidential candidate, who defeated AJKPPP’s Chaudhry Latif Akbar with 42
votes to six on August 16, 2016, to replace outgoing president of ‘AJK’, Yaqoob
Muhammad Khan, on August 25, 2016. Masood Khan, a former diplomat,
was nominated in violation of every electoral and legal norm of the state.
According to media reports, Masood Khan is originally from Rawalakot,
Poonch; but he did not hold the ‘state subject’ certificate (that he was a resident
of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) and his name was inducted in the electoral
rolls recently under pressure from the government. The ‘AJK’ High Court was
moved to challenge his qualification and an interim verdict was given in Khan’s
favour to legitimize his position as president of ‘AJK’.
These elections show that there has been a gradual erosion of support base
for the local political parties, whose influence at the local level is diminishing
very fast. At another level, local political outfits have been affected by personality
clashes and petty and selfish interests have weakened their position as well.
The national political parties – PPP, PML-N and PTI – are expected to hold
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 25

their sway over the regional political parties in ‘AJK’. Thus, the writ and hold
of Pakistan have now become stronger than ever. In the past, it was the Pakistan
Army and the MKA that kept the dissident politics in ‘AJK’ in check; now the
national parties through their affiliates are expected to do the same.

Economy and Hydro-Energy

A landlocked territory of insignificant size and cultivable mountainous terrain
‘AJK’ is dependent on Pakistan for its economy. Its northern districts (Neelum,
Muzaffarabad, Hattian, Bagh, Haveli, Poonch and Sudhanoti) are mountainous,
characterised by deep ravines, rugged and undulating terrain, while southern
districts (Kotli, Mirpur and Bhimber) are relatively plain. ‘AJK’ has only 13
percent of its land cultiviable for agricultural purposes. Due to rudimentary
irrigation system of the olden days, which has not been improved over the
years, the land has very limited productivity.59
There is very little information available about the details of economy of
‘AJK’. At the time of partition, the economy of ‘AJK’ was at the subsistence
level, mostly dependent on the trade along the Jhelum Valley road. Once this
road was closed after the de facto partition of the state along the ceasefire line
(CFL)/Line of Control (LoC), the lifeline of the region came to an abrupt
end. Through this road, large quantity of timber was transported to other parts
of the state. Today, ‘AJK’ is an economically disadvantaged region, mainly
because of its unproductive terrain. It also lacks communication infrastructure
– roads, railways – to boost its economy. Moreover, Pakistan has not contributed
enough to help improve the economy of ‘AJK’, and rather institutionalised its
economic over-dependence on Islamabad in order to strengthen its hold on
the territory.
However, there have been extraneous changes leading to some amelioration
of the economic condition of the people of ‘AJK’. In the 1960s and 1970s there
was mass emigration of ‘AJK’ population to the UK and other western countries.
Many Mirpuris migrated to the UK because their land had been either submerged
or taken over for the construction of Mangla Dam. They complained that they
were given neither financial compensation nor jobs in return. This emigration
brought about huge remittances that significantly changed ‘AJK’’s old economic
and social base, particularly in Mirpur and Poonch.60
The standard of living of the people changed accordingly. According to a
socio-economic study of ‘AJK’, about 35 per cent of the migrants were sending
to their families remittances up to PKR (Pakistani Rupees) 70,000 per year;
46.4 per cent Rs. 40,001 to Rs. 90,000 per year; 23 per cent Rs. 65,000 to
26 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Rs. 150,000 per year; and 6 per cent above 100,000 per year.61 It is believed
that deposits from ‘AJK’ in Pakistani banks amounted to Rs. 2.4 trillion, which
was “960 times the size of [AJK’s] 1987-88 budget of Rs. 2.5 billion”.62
Ironically, the people of ‘AJK’ are not allowed easy access to this money, let
alone invest it. Presumably, even if they could access it, there is no avenue to
make a profitable investment of it. They cannot build roads and bridges. For
any investment, the most essential prerequisite is the presence of efficient and
effective communications network and electricity. Therefore, with no
infrastructure back home to invest in, people are spending money on house
constructions, hotels, sports shops, cloth markets and branches of various
branded Pakistan-based outlets. Travel agencies, currency exchange, private
education and healthcare are now thriving concerns in ‘AJK’.63 With UK leaving
the European Union and the looming uncertainty over the post-Brexit economic
situation, the remittances have fallen by 10 percent since the Brexit Referendum
in June 2016.64
The other issue that has led to reduction in the remittances coming from
the UK is the erosion of ties with their kinsmen. The young generation of
immigrants do not prefer to spend their time and money in ‘AJK’. There is no
sense of belonging among the young generation of the Mirpuris in UK towards
their ancestor’s land.65
In the absence of a strong legal status, ‘AJK’ is not in a position to negotiate
with foreign donors and investors. It is Pakistan which negotiates on ‘AJK’’s
behalf and also acts as a guarantor when international consortiums invest in
infrastructure development or hydroelectric power generation projects in ‘AJK’.66
An official from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) reportedly told the
Brussels based International Crisis Group: “Our relationship with AJK is not
very different from the one we have with other provinces in Pakistan. The federal
government takes the loan and transfers the money to ‘AJK’ as a grant, making
‘AJK’ dependent on Islamabad for its development budget.”67 Talking about
‘AJK’’s dependence on Pakistan, a senior civil servant from Muzaffarabad in an
interview to the International Crisis Group stated, “Islamabad controls us
through our finances, because it is well aware that we cannot survive without
its financial support.”68
Furthermore, ‘AJK’’s water resources are crucial for Pakistan’s irrigation and
electricity supply. However, this hydroelectric potential is severely under-utilised;
though having a potential of 17000 megawatts, only 34 megawatts are
produced. In effect, according to the Director General of the electricity
department, “we have to buy 92 per cent of our energy from Pakistan”.69 The
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 27

Pakistan Government, on its part, has identified a number of hydroelectric

energy projects (see Table 1).
Table 1: Upcoming Independent Power Producers (IPPs) – Hydropower Projects
(as on June 16, 2015)
Project Sponsor/Company Location Capacity Completion
Name (MW) time
Patrind Hydropower Star Hydropower Kunhar River 147 2017
Project Limited KPK/AJK
Gulpur Project Mira Power Ltd Poonch River/ 100 2019
Gulpur AJK
Sehra Hydropower Farab Energy & Poonch River, AJK 130 2019
Project Water Project, Iran
Azad Pattan Alamgir Power Pvt Jehlum River/
Hydropower Project Ltd Sudhanoti, AJK 640 2022
Chakothi-Hattian Suhail Jute Mills Ltd Muzaffarabad, AJK 500 2022
Kohala China International Water Jehlum River/ 1100 2023
& Electricity Company Kohala, AJK
Source: Private Power & Infrastructure Board Government of Pakistan Ministry of Water & Power70

If the ownership of all these projects is handed over to the ‘AJK’

Government, it will lessen its economic over-dependence on Pakistan. Even
the royalty received from already existing projects such as the Mangla Dam is
very minimal. According to Snedden:
Traditionally, Pakistan has taken 70 per cent of royalties; Azad Kashmir has
received the rest (although these amounts did not appear in budgetary
documents until recently). Even if Azad Kashmir had received all royalties,
these would not have made the region financially self-sufficient, although
they would have reduced its dependency on Pakistan.71

Dissenting Voices
The right to vote, sans the right to rule, kills the very essence of democracy.
Ever since ‘AJK’ came under Pakistani control in 1947, the right to dissent of
‘AJK’ people was taken as an anti-national act by Pakistan. Even mere talking
about restructuring the relationship between Islamabad and Muzaffarabad does
not go down well in the power corridors of Islamabad. Pakistan does not allow
political parties that do not support J&K’s accession to Pakistan to contest the
elections. Kashmiris who talk about Pakistan’s highhandedness are thrown into
jails; they are also threatened, denied travel documents and tortured.72 The
growing poverty, alienation and resentment vis-à-vis Pakistan has given birth
28 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

to demands for social liberation within ‘AJK’. A proto-nationalist movement

is now emerging in ‘AJK’:
The issue of social liberation has come to the fore within the nationalist
movement. The revolutionary currents developing amongst the youth through
the Jammu and Kashmir National Students Federation (JKNSF) in [AJK]
are worrying the rulers in Islamabad.73
Voices are being raised in various quarters in ‘AJK’ demanding redefining of
the contours of the current relationship with Pakistan based on the 1974 Act.
The only issue they are facing is in terms of the strategy and the ways and
means of channelising the voices of dissent.74 Upward political mobilisation
and awareness has given a fillip to the demand for autonomy. After the 18th
and 19th constitutional amendments of the Pakistan Constitution which
devolved the powers from federal to the provinces and to some extent reduced
the central’s government’s role in provinces, this demand has gathered strength
within ‘AJK’ as well.75
According to Javid Hayat:
In this last decade, issues pertaining to the status of AJK, ownership of natural
resources, and empowerment of the people in a truly democratic mechanism
have been discussed among political parties, civil society and media. This has
led to some academic intervention, conferences and panel group discussions
in AJK. They found the structure unjust which left insufficient space for
self-governance in this region. In addition, this has failed to address the
national question including sovereign rights and fragility of governance. There
is consensus amongst the political parties of AJK on redefining the current
relationship with the government of Pakistan based on Act 1974. The only
difference appears to be on strategy.76
Although there is a consensus within ‘AJK’ on revisiting the 1974 Act, there
are divergent views on what exactly should they strive for. Most of the prominent
members of the civil society (e.g. Majeed Malik, former Chief Justice of the
‘AJK’ High Court; Tanveer Ahmed; Sardar Aftab Ahmad Khan, a UK-based
political and social activist; and other nationalist forces) are in favour of going
back to the October 24, 1947 declaration restoring sovereignty with the ‘AJK’
Government. There are others who would want to restore the 1970 Act with
a parliamentary form of government. There are still others (e.g. Manzoor
Gillani, a retired Jurist) who want ‘AJK’ to be made something close to a
province but without declaring it as a province.77
To further stifle the nationalist sentiments, the ‘AJK’ Government in March
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 29

2016, banned 16 pro-independence books on Kashmir. Two of them were

written by JKLF founder Mohammad Maqbool Bhat.78 On expected lines,
separatist group and civil society on both sides of Kashmir slammed the decision.
The JKLF leader Yasin Malik termed the decision of banning pro-freedom books
by the Pakistan authority as the denial of the right to expression. He further
said, “Whether you like the views of these writers or not, common people should
be allowed to read them. It is undemocratic to ban books”.79 Therefore, Pakistan
continues to maintain zero tolerance for any ideology that questions its control
over ‘AJK’. “It is just a matter of time that the present generation or next one
may get swayed by the ideology that could start demanding actual Azadi.”80
With contentious issues flaring up rather than being resolved, the
resentment level is at an all-time high. Moreover, unending marginalisation of
the people of ‘AJK’ suggests that “Pakistan is fast losing traditional sympathetic
constituencies owing to indifferent core-periphery attitude”.81 Against this
backdrop, the 13th amendment to the Interim Constitution of 1974 in June
2018, enabled by the outgoing PML-N government led by a lame-duck prime
minister, Khaqan Abbasi, assumes significance.
The amendment passed by joint sitting of ‘AJK’ legislative assembly and
legislative council and assented by the ‘AJK’ President aims at granting greater
financial and administrative autonomy to the ‘AJK’ government to address
chronic developmental issues like the supply of electricity, water usage charge
and resource sharing. It empowers the legislative assembly to frame laws on
issues of local importance and seeks to enhance the capacity and efficiency of
the ‘AJK’ administration. With the failure of the PML-N to return to power
in July 25, 2018 elections, however, the fate of this amendment remains
uncertain. Moreover, the amendment does not abolish the Council which
continues to retain its veto over any issue having implications for security, foreign
policy and currency related issues. This connotes continued interference by
Islamabad on local governance and it is likely to be resented by the ‘AJK’ people
once the amendment gets operationalised.

NOTES
1. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, at na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/
1333523681_951.pdf, p. 151.
2. Ershad Mahmud, “Status of AJK in Political Milieu”, Policy Perspective, 3 (2), at http://
www.ips.org.pk/education/1115-status-of-ajk-in-political-milieu.html.
3. “Proposed Constitutional Amendments in The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan
1973, for Empowerment of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan”, Discussion Paper,
Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), May 2011, p.10,
30 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

at http://www.pildat.org/Publications/Publication/constitution/ProposedConstitutional
Amendments-AJK-GB-DiscussionPaperMay2011.pdf.
4. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, Hurst & Company,
London, 2012, p. 37.
5. Ibid., p. 87.
6. Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, Pearson Longman, USA, 2007, p. 172.
7. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 90.
8. See “Appendix II”, Karachi Agreement.
9. Ershad Mahmud, “Status of AJK in Political Milieu”.
10. Ibid.
11. Samuel Baid, “Azad Kashmir”, Jasjit Singh (ed.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under the Jackboot,
Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1995, p. 87.
12. Ershad Mahmud, “Status of AJK in Political Milieu”.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 93.
16. Ershad Mahmud, “Status of AJK in Political Milieu”.
17. Ibid.
18. For details, see: “An Appraisal of Constitutional, Financial and Administrative Arrangements
between the Governments of Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir”, Centre for Peace,
Development and Reforms (CPDR) Azad Jammu and Kashmir, June 2011.
19. See Simla Agreement at Appendix III.
20. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 101.
21. Ershad Mahmud, “Status of AJK in Political Milieu”,
22. The Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, Amended up to date and Modified
up to September 2005, Azad Govt. of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, at
www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/ajkinterimconstituionact1974.pdf.
23. Javid Hayat, “Shadow Governance: Right to Vote and Rule in Azad Jammu & Kashmir-
Analysis”, Eurasiareview, July 23, 2012, at http://www.eurasiareview.com/23072012-shadow-
governance-right-to-vote-and-rule-in-azad-jammu-kashmir-analysis.
24. Ibid.
25. PILDAT, “Pakistan-Azad Jammu & Kashmir Politico-Legal Conflict”, PILDAT, September
2011, p. 16, at www.pildat.org.
26. Ibid.
27. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 117.
28. Roger Ballard, “The Kashmir Crisis: A View from Mirpur”, Economic & Political Weekly, 1991,
p. 514.
29. “‘With Friends Like These ...’: Human Rights Violations in Azad Kashmir”, Human Rights
Watch, 18 (12), September 2006, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/pakistan0906/
3.htm#_Toc14592374.
30. Ibid.
31. Alexander Evans, “Kashmir: A Tale of Two Valleys”, Asian Affairs, XXXVI (1), March 2005.
32. Roger Ballard, “The Kashmir Crisis: A View from Mirpur”, p. 2.
33. Ibid., p. 514.
34. Ibid., pp. 513-517.
35. Parvez Dewan, “A History of POK - Pakistan Occupied Kashmir”, in Virendra Gupta and
Alok Bansal (eds.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story, Manas Publications, New
Delhi, 2007, p. 110.
36. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 122.
 ‘AJK’ and Pakistan 31

37. Ibid., p. 132.

38. Shams Rehman, “Azad Kashmir: A Brief Introduction”, at http://dadyal.com.pk/azad-kashmir-
a-brief-introduction-by-shams-rehman/.
39. Javid Hayat, “Shadow Governance: Right to Vote and Rule in Azad Jammu & Kashmir-
Analysis”.
40. Mazhar Iqbal, “Fundamental Rights and the Kashmiri Refugee Vote”, Foreign Policy Journal,
September 29, 2014, at www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2014/09/29/fundemental-rights-and-
the-kashmiri-refugee-vote/.
41. Ibid.
42. Farooq Suleria, “Provincialising AJK”, The News, September 07, 2016, at https://
www.thenews.com.pk/print/148366-Provincialising-AJK
43. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, Jasjit Singh (ed.) Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under
the Jackboot, Cosmo Publications, New Delhi, 1995, p. 112.
44. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 190
45. Ibid., p. 192
46. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p. 116.
47. Ibid., p. 119.
48. Ibid., p. 120.
49. Nasir Mallick, “Trouble in Paradise”, The Herald, July 1991, p. 84.
50. Ibid., p. 85.
51. Ibid., p. 83.
52. See The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, at http://www.ajk
assembly.gok.pk/AJK_Interim_Constitution_Act_1974.pdf
53. M.H. Askari, “Kashmir Through the Looking Glass”, The Herald, July 1991, p. 85.
54. Ibid., p. 86.
55. Justice Riaz Akhtar Chaudhry was appointed as judge of the AJK Supreme Court on Sept 24,
2006 and then as its Chief Justice within 25 days of his appointment. He had superseded the
senior-most judge of AJK Supreme Court Justice Manzoor Hussain Gillani on October 24,
2006 by the military controlled dispensation in Islamabad. Gilani was senior to him by six
years in judicial service, and two years his senior in the Supreme Court. Riaz had also functioned
as a junior judge under Gillani in the high court earlier. Justice Gillani had then knocked the
doors of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to seek justice. However, a three-member bench
headed by Chief Justice Riaz Akhtar Chaudhury passed a judgment on March 15, 2010 that
the Supreme Court of Pakistan could not go beyond the territories defined in Article 1 of the
Constitution of Pakistan and that it had no jurisdiction to entertain any petition regarding
appointment of judges of superior courts of AJK. Prime Minister of Pakistan from passing
any notification regarding Chief Justice of AJK. The order also restrained Law, Justice and
Parliamentary Affairs Department from issuing any fresh notification and the President of
the AJK from administering oath to any judge for the office of the AJK CJ. See details “AJK
SC challenges Pakistan SC in new row”, at http://www.kalpoint.com/national-news/-ajk-sc-
challenges-pakistan-sc-in-new-row.html
56. Farooq Tirmizi, The Express Tribune, June 27, 2011, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/197253/
ajk-elections-an-unsurprising-result/
57. “Pent-up resentment: AJK premier faces revolt in house”, The Express Tribune, July 23, 2013,
at http://tribune.com.pk/story/580698/pent-up-resentment-ajk-premier-faces-revolt-in-house/
and also http://tribune.com.pk/story/581062/ajk-prime-minister-pml-n-supports-no-
confidence-motion/
58. “Resolution withdrawn: AJK premier gets ‘tainted’ trust vote”, The Express Tribune, July 28,
32 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

2013, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/582922/resolution-withdrawnajk-premier-gets-tainted-
trust-vote/
59. For details, see: “Azad Jammu and Kashmir, at a Glance, 2013”, Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Planning & Development Department, Muzaffarabad.
60. For details of country-wise workers’ remittances, see: State Bank of Pakistan, Statistics & DWH
Department, at www.sbp.org/ecodata/Homeremit.pdf.
61. Humayun Khan et al., “Impact of Remittances on the Socio-Economic Conditions of Rural
Families in District Poonch of Azad Jammu and Kashmir”, Sarhad J. Agric, 27 (4), 2011, at
www.aup.edu.pk/sj_pdf/IMPACT%200F%20REMITANCES%20THE%20SOCIO-
ECONOMIC%20CONDITIONS%200F%20RURAL.PDF.
62. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 183.
63. Shams Rehman, “Azad Kashmir: A Brief Introduction”.
64. “Brexit hastens Azad Kashmir’s economic break with UK”, Dawn, October 30, 2016, at,
http://www.dawn.com/news/1367221
65. Ibid.
66. International Crisis Group, “Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris First”, Asia Briefing No.
106, June 3, 2010, p. 9.
67. Quoted in Ibid., p. 9.
68. Ibid., p. 9.
69. Ibid., p. 10.
70. Private Power & Infrastructure Board Government of Pakistan Ministry of Water & Power,
at www.ppib.gov.pk/N_upcoming_hydel.htm.
71. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 181.
72. “International Crisis Group, “Steps Towards Peace: Putting Kashmiris First”, p. 8.
73. PILDAT, “Pakistan-Azad Jammu & Kashmir Politico-Legal Conflict”, p. 17.
74. Javid Hayat, “Shadow Governance: Right to Vote and Rule in Azad Jammu & Kashmir-
Analysis”.
75. PILDAT, “Pakistan-Azad Jammu & Kashmir Politico-Legal Conflict”, p. 16.
76. Javid Hayat, “Shadow Governance: Right to Vote and Rule in Azad Jammu & Kashmir-
Analysis”.
77. Ibid.
78. “AJK govt bans 16 books”, Dawn, March 8, 2016, at http:// www.dawn.com/news/1244261
79. Ban on Pro-Azadi Books in Pak, Kashmir Observer, March 14, 2016, at http://
kashmirobserver.net/2016/editorial/ban-pro-azadi-books-pak-4328
80. Nilofar Qurashi, No azadi in Azad Kashmir, Kashmir Images, March 27, 2016, at
http:dailykashmirimages.comDetails/10528/no-azadi-in-azad-kashmir
81. PILDAT, “Pakistan-Azad Jammu & Kashmir Politico-Legal Conflict”, p. 18.
 2
Political Parties in ‘AJK’

The ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir Election Commission (AJKEC)’ lists 44

political parties who are registered with it before the election of July 2016.1
For the July 21, 2016 elections, 727 candidates had filed their nomination
papers for 41 seats of the state legislative assembly representing over 4.3 million
people – 29 seats from ‘AJK’ and 12 seats from all over Pakistan consisting of
Kashmiri refugees. The total number of electorates is 2,674,586 (1,483,747
males and 1,190,839 females; 2,235,702 from ‘AJK’ and 438,884 from different
areas of Pakistan).2 Out of the 727 nominations only 427 from 25 parties (after
check of eligibility and withdrawals, 299 from ‘AJK’ and 128 from different
areas of Pakistan) finally contested the elections.3 Apart from 41 seats for which
direct elections are held, eight seats are allocated to political parties on the
basis of proportional representation.
The 2016 elections indicated rising levels of political participation and
growing appetite for representative politics as well. However, the trajectory of
‘AJK’ politics shows that there is a steady incursion of mainstream political
parties from Pakistan into local politics and gradual decimation of traditionally
local parties. The grand old political party like Azad Jammu Kashmir Muslim
Conference (AJKMC) and other important parties like Jammu Kashmir
Liberation League (JKLL), Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which
have not been allowed to participate in the elections because of pro-
independence stance, and some others have gradually lost their appeal and reach
over the years. The nationalist parties who would not subscribe to the ideology
of accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, are kept out of the elections. Therefore,
there has been an effort to study major political parties in the following sections.
34 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

ALL-JAMMU AND KASHMIR MUSLIM CONFERENCE

(AJKMC)
Genesis and Development
The history of the ‘AJK’ in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) is incomplete
without the mention of All-Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC)
also referred to as the Muslim Conference. It was established in 1932 by Sheikh
Abdullah to provide a political direction to the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir
when the entire state was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh. There were two
important developments that paved the way for the formation of the Muslim
Conference. The immediate provocation for the formation of the party was
the Glancy Commission report on popular rising against Hari Singh. In the
backdrop of the 1931 uprising, Maharaja Hari Singh announced the
appointment of a commission under the chairmanship of Sir B.J. Glancy to
look into the grievances of the people, particularly the Muslims. The Kashmiri
pundits however resented the establishment of the Commission. The
Commission recommended constitutional reforms and also talked about
providing due weightage to the educated Muslim youth. 4 The second
development was the birth of a Jammu-based political organisation known as
the Dogra Sabha in 1904. The Kashmiris witnessed the Jammu-based caste
nationalism as communal nationalism, which was regarded as the “manifestation
of the kind of sub-nationalism in one region of the state [which] eventually
produced a counterpoise in the formation of Muslim Conference by Kashmiri
leaders in 1932.”5

Secularisation and Factionalism of the Party

In an atmosphere infected with the communal virus, Sheikh Abdullah took a
pragmatic stand. He talked about religious harmony. In 1935, he appealed to
all the communities for harmony, observing that his “fight [was] for the
emancipation of [his] own country”. He urged the people: “Let us all rise above
petty communal bickering and work jointly for welfare of the masses. I appeal
to all Hindu brethren not to entertain imaginary fears and doubts. Let us assure
them that their rights shall not be jeopardised if they join hands with the
Mussalmans.”6
During the early phase of the Muslim Conference, both Sheikh Abdullah
the leader of Muslim Conference and Mirwaiz Mohmmad Yousaf Shah, who
belonged to the family of the prominent spiritual leader from the valley with
lineage traced back to 16th century preacher from Hamadan, Iran, took recourse
to religion to mobilise the Muslim masses. They used the Quranic verses literally
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 35

to appeal to the masses as if they were leading a Muslim movement. Sheikh

Abdullah, however, soon developed a view that the emancipation of the masses
was possible only if all communities came together under one forum. This was
in direct contrast to the stand taken by an influential section within Muslim
Conference who continued to subscribe to a communal viewpoint and
emphasised on the emancipation of the majority Muslims in the principality.
Nevertheless, Sheikh Abdullah succeeded in influencing the majority in the
party to subscribe to his view and even proposed a change in nomenclature of
the party to signify a secular change in the party’s outlook. On June 28, 1938,
the working committee of the Muslim Conference met to review the
nomenclature of the party. The committee passed the following resolution:
Whereas in the opinion of the working committee the time has come when
all the progressive forces in the country should be rallied under one banner
to fight for the achievement of Responsible Government, the working
committee recommends to the General Council that in the forthcoming
annual session, the name and the Constitution of the organisation be so
altered and amended that all people who wish to participate in the political
struggle are enabled to become members of the Conference irrespective of
their caste, creed or religion.7
By June 1939, Muslim Conference changed its name to National Conference.
It then joined the All India States Peoples Conference, a conglomerate of popular
movements taking place in princely states of India which came together in 1927,
and was finally affiliated to the Congress in 1939.
The process of secularisation of Kashmiri politics helped the Muslim
Conference to garner support from the Indian National Congress at its October
1939 session. The Muslim Conference, known as National Conference since
1939, not only endorsed the Congress’s policy towards the Second World War
but Sheikh Abdullah also followed the leadership of the Congress.
All this had inevitable impact on Muslim politics in Jammu and Kashmir.
Right since the beginning, it was very difficult to bring the two opposite world-
views of Sheikh Abdullah and Mirwaiz Mohammed Yousaf Shah together. There
was a deep variance between the two in terms of political ideology. Sheikh
Abdullah was greatly influenced by the Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru’s secular
credentials, while Mirwaiz Yousaf Shah was ideologically close to the Muslim
League’s call for a separate homeland for the Muslims and was also at odds
with Sheikh Abdullah about the status of the Ahmedis.8 The differences came
out in the open when Mirwaiz accused Sheikh Abdullah in a public gathering
of being an agent of the Qadianis and propagating their cause.9
36 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Sheikh Abdullah renamed the party as the All Jammu and Kashmir National
Conference (AJKNC) to make the party secular and open it to non-Muslims.
In his autobiography, Aatish-e-Chinar, Sheikh Abdullah writes that renaming
the Muslim Conference as National Conference was a painful act in the face
of strong opposition within the party.10 His secular ideology inclined him
towards a party that is professing inclusive, secular, and democratic values.
Perhaps, he wished to carve out an independent Kashmir having close ties with
India. Moreover, Abdullah considered renaming the party as a prerequisite to
get support from Indian National Congress in the struggle against the Maharaja.
This secularisation of the Kashmir politics under AJKNC further widened the
gulf between Mirwaiz and Sheikh Abdullah. Their differences were not only
ideological but also personal.
The opponents of Sheikh Abdullah’s political philosophy and secularisation
of politics revived the Muslim Conference on June 13, 1941. There was a clear
division not only at the ideological level within the state of Jammu and Kashmir
but also within the support bases of the two parties. In the late 1940s it became
almost impossible to thwart the communal strife striking the societal cord of
the state. As Snedden writes: “[T]he support of the Hindu communal groups
was unstintingly rendered to the ruling Prince and the support of the Muslim
communal groups extended to those who would not accept the secular approach
of the National Conference.”11 This interplay of communal politics was well
marked in the Jammu region. The Muslim Conference’s support base was in
the Jammu region, whereas the National Conference was popular in the Kashmir
valley. The Muslim Conference found much support in Jammu because of the
communal divide, and therefore, exploitation of religion became a handy tool
to get political dividends. In contrast, the presence of secular credentials within
the society in the valley did not yield any space to politically motivated religious
slogans. Christopher Snedden outlines the differences by saying that, “certainly,
Kashmirness and the ‘secular thinking’ of Kashmiris were significant reasons
why the Kashmir Valley experienced almost no communal violence during 1947.
Kashmiris were more tolerant, their practice of Islam and Hinduism more
liberal, and their inter-communal relationships more involved and harmonious
than those in other parts of the princely state”.12 This can be further gauged
from the reception Mohammad Ali Jinnah received during his visit to Kashmir
on May 8, 1944. From Suchetgarh to Ramban Jinnah was greeted by the
supporters of the Muslim Conference, and from Bannihal onwards it was Sheikh
Abdullah’s National Conference that managed the show.
The ideological barrier further widened when Jinnah-Abdullah conflict
emerged on the political horizon of Kashmir. The reason was Jinnah’s speech
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 37

in which he praised the Muslim Conference and claimed that it was the sole
representative of the Kashmiri Muslims, “99 per cent of the Muslims who met
me are of the opinion that Muslim Conference alone is the representative
organisation of the State Muslims.”13 An irked Sheikh Abdullah took it as an
insult to him. He expressed his anger vis-à-vis Jinnah in his autobiography,
Aatish-e-Chinar. He wrote: “At that time, Mr. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was
intoxicated by power. He thought it beneath his dignity to talk to a poor and
resourceless nation. When this equation of power went against him, he woke
up in panic from his dream. But by this time, the snake had escaped; only its
line remained.”14 Right from the beginning, the Muslim Conference was
favourably disposed to changing sides, from espousing independence to joining
Pakistan. However, to guard against the fears and suspicion of the minorities,
it cautioned Hari Singh not to accede to India but to declare independence.15
Finally on July 19, 1947, the Muslim Conference declared accession of Jammu
and Kashmir to Pakistan as the core objective of the Kashmiris.

After the Tribal Invasion: Autocratic Leadership

The state lay divided after Pakistan occupied a large part of Jammu and Kashmir
through an incursion in 1947-48. The Muslim Conference became the sole
representative of the people of the Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir who
were anti-Maharaja, pro-Islam, and pro-Pakistan in their outlook. In
anticipation of the plebiscite, the Muslim Conference did not feel it necessary
to establish a participatory political system. Therefore, its only concern was,
“[w]hich individual would control the party and subsequently control [the so
called] Azad Kashmir”.16 The Muslim Conference being the only political party
in the so called ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ (AJK) as also its pro-Pakistan stance
made it easy for Pakistan to control the affairs of the region through this party.17
According to Snedden, not holding the plebiscite was not the only impediment
in establishing a vibrant political system; the role played by the Muslim
Conference leader, Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was equally disruptive, “as he
was the Supreme Head of the Azad Kashmir Movement, a position higher than
the AJK President, power flowed downwards from the dictatorial Abbas”.18 The
bitter rivalry between Sardar Ibrahim and Chaudhry Abbas greatly afflicted
the Muslim Conference for years to come. Abbas also controlled the selection
of various important positions, including the president of ‘AJK’. This dictatorial
tendency was followed by his successors, Sardar Ibrahim, K.H. Khurshid and
Khan Abdul Hamid Khan.19
This autocratic tradition was not the only reason of less, rather no,
democracy within the Muslim Conference; the “buy off ” policy Pakistan
38 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

adopted vis-à-vis ‘Azad Kashmiris’ was also a significant factor: “Pakistan

basically bought off Muslim Conference politicians by offering them senior
positions, or by getting the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad to pay
allowances that made them dependent on Pakistan.”20 The other issue which
impeded the Muslim Conference from becoming a democratic party was
internal factionalism. The seeds of rivalry were sown when on July 19, 1947,
a resolution on independence was discussed by the leaders of the Muslim
Conference, sent by Chaudhry Abbas from his prison cell. The independence
resolution was opposed, rather rejected, by Sardar Ibrahim.21 Those who wanted
to see Kashmir independent felt disheartened, and Abbas never reconciled with
Sardar Ibrahim. However, for this gesture, Pakistan rewarded Sardar Ibrahim
by making him the first president of the ‘AJK’ on October 24, 1947.22
After Abbas was released by Sheikh Abdullah in 1948, he became the
President of the Muslim Conference, and sacked Sardar Ibrahim.23 Under the
Rules of Business, the President of ‘Azad Kashmir’ could stay in power as long
as he enjoyed the support from the General Council of the Muslim Conference.
But ‘AJK’ President Sardar Ibrahim was not taken well by the senior leaders
within the Muslim Conference. Moreover, Ghulam Abbas could not tolerate
his junior, Sardar Ibrahim, presiding over the occupied regions.24 The rivalry
between Ghulam Abbas and Sardar Ibrahim became very tense due to the latter’s
rise in prestige and popularity.25 Later Sardar Ibrahim was not liked by Pakistan
after he tried to establish direct access with United Nations (UN) officials,
sidelining-Pakistan. Then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan, was
also annoyed with arrogant behaviour of Sardar Ibrahim and “wanted to
eliminate or at least disgrace him”.26 The differences between Abbas and Ibrahim
were exploited by Sardar Qayyum to his advantage and it gave an opportunity
to begin his political career. Qayyum, patronised by Abbas, opposed Ibrahim.
The Muslim Conference got divided into two factions; the new faction headed
by Sardar Ibrahim was called the Azad Muslim Conference. The following
period only saw the frequent installation and removal of ‘AJK’ presidents at
Pakistan’s behest.

Post-1970 Politics of Limited Democratisation

The overall political development in ‘AJK’ has much to do with Pakistan’s
troubled experience with democracy. Pakistan had its first election on one-man,
one-vote basis in December 1970. Gen. Yahya Khan ordered those elections
under intense domestic pressure. In ‘AJK’, retired army Brigadier, Abdul
Rehman Khan, who had been made president, was tasked to give “politically”
everything that ‘AJK’ wanted.27 Therefore, for the first time, ‘AJK’ was given
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 39

internal autonomy with limited Pakistani control under the 1970 Government
Act. The Act provided for a President and a 25-member Council to be elected
through adult franchise. Elections held in 1970 were a watershed moment in
‘AJK’, breaking the jinx of Pakistan’s extensive interference in elections. For
the first time, the president of ‘AJK’ was elected directly by the people, who
tasted the experience of universal suffrage. Sardar Qayyum’s Muslim Conference
won the Presidential elections. The breakaway faction, led by Sardar Ibrahim,
lost badly. He could have lost probably also because he was seen with disdain
in Islamabad as well.28 After his defeat, Sardar Ibrahim returned to the Qayyum-
led Muslim Conference. But this patch-up did not last long. Soon the differences
between Qayyum and Ibrahim emerged again, first over cabinet formation and
later when the centre-led Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) put pressure on the
‘AJK’ government to oust Qayyum after the promulgation of the 1974 Interim
Constitution.29 Sardar Ibrahim moved to the PPP, and subsequently became
‘AJK’’s president.
Thus the stint of internal autonomy in ‘AJK’ was short lived. Pakistan’s
then Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, introduced the prime ministerial
system via “Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act 1974” in order
to ensure Pakistan’s grip over the internal politics of ‘AJK’.30 This period saw
the most tumultuous years in AJK’s embryonic democratic set-up. The elections
held in 1975 under this Constitution Act were boycotted by the Muslim
Conference. Qayyum opposed the entry of the PPP in ‘AJK’ arguing that this
trend would defeat the very ideology of the Kashmir Movement.31 The party
complained that it was not allowed to campaign freely and situation was created
by the government in Islamabad to ensure the victory of the PPP Azad Kashmir
(AJKPPP)-led United Front Alliance.32 Abdul Hamid Khan became the Prime
Minister and the head of a five-member cabinet. Forty assembly members were
elected directly. Sardar Ibrahim was elected President unanimously by the
United Front. Sardar Ibrahim initially was in favour of a coalition government
of the United Front. However, when AJKPPP got a clear majority, it decided
to form the government on its own. This was taken as a breach of trust by
other two allies – the AJK Liberation League and Azad Muslim Conference –
Ibrahim. K.H. Khurshid, the leader of the Liberation League, felt disheartened,
saying that “he had made the biggest mistake of his political career by entering
into such an alliance”, and that “he had not realised that the alliance would
provide yet another ‘cover for the perpetuation of the Punjabi bureaucrats’ rule
with the help of the security forces’.”33
When Zia-ul-Haq came to power in a military coup, he said that all
politicians would have to undergo the process of accountability. Qayyum felt
40 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

threatened because there were lots of charges of corruption against him. He

thought Zia’s order was aimed at him. He, therefore, decided to become part
of the anti-martial law campaign in Pakistan. This anti-Zia campaign was
formed with PPP’s Begum Nusrat Bhutto in the lead. However, when in March
1981, a Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) plane from Karachi en route to
Peshawar was hijacked and made to land first in Kabul and then flown to
Damascus by Al Zulfiqar group (formed in 1979 after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s
execution and led by his son Murtaza Bhutto), Sardar Qayyum blamed the
PPP and India for this hijacking and disbanded the MRD. That made him the
army’s blue-eyed boy.
Furthermore, the period of parliamentary system in ‘AJK’ was cut short by
the military takeover in Pakistan. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq dismissed the ‘AJK’
government and brought back the presidential system in ‘AJK’. In the next
elections in ‘AJK’, on May 16, 1985, Zia-ul-Haq promulgated a rule that
banned unregistered political parties from taking part in the elections. Thus,
the PPP was kept out of the elections. That left the field open for the Muslim
Conference which won the highest number of seats (16), followed by Tehrik-
e-Amal party (8), the Liberation League (5), Azad Muslim Conference (Ibrahim)
(2) and independents (7). The Muslim Conference secured 67.3 per cent of
the total votes. Sardar Qayyum became the president and Sardar Sikander Hayat
Khan was elected the prime minister. By this time, Qayyum enjoyed tremendous
support from Islamabad and showed great proximity with the Pakistani Army.
When in the 1990s the anti-India insurgency was at its peak in the Kashmir
Valley, there was a larger consensus both in Muzaffarabad and Islamabad to
support the insurgents. Seemingly, the only big challenge for political parties
in ‘AJK’ was how to use this anti-India sentiment for political gains.34 This
period also saw the emergence of other parties, which in later years changed
the political map of ‘AJK’. Anti-Qayyum parties tried hard to pursue Benazir
Bhutto to topple Qayyum’s government. They did not succeed because of
Qayyum’s relationship with both the army and the Pakistan Muslim League
led by Nawaz Sharif ’s family. Qayyum had also developed a good rapport with
the Punjab government. Qayyum thus managed to complete his tenure. When
elections were held for the fourth ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly on May 21, 1990,
Benazir Bhutto’s government was only about three months away from its
removal (by then President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who ousted her government
in August 1990 on charges of corruption). Election results were as follows: the
AJKPPP secured 16 seats; Sardar Ibrahim’s Azad Muslim Conference got two
seats, Maj Gen. (retd.) Hayat Khan’s Tehrik-e-Amal Party and K.H. Khurshid’s
Liberation League got two seats each. Two seats were bagged by independent
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 41

candidates. The pro-independence parties including the Jammu and Kashmir

Liberation Front (JKLF) and Jammu and Kashmir People’s National Party
(PNP) were not allowed to take part in the elections because they refused to
comply with the mandatory commitment from their side to Kashmir’s accession
to Pakistan.35 The AJKPPP’s Mumtaz Rathore became the prime minister by
defeating Muslim Conference’s Sardar Sikander Hayat Khan by 21 votes to
15. Qayyum, as president administered the oath of office to Rathore, after
initially refusing to do so on “the specious plea that this was anti-national and
anti-Islam party”.36
The mid-term June 1991 (fifth legislative assembly) elections called by Raja
Mumtaz Rathore again saw the Muslim Conference coming back to power.
This time, it swept the poll by securing 31 out of 40 seats. Later, the party
bagged several reserved seats as well. Rathore was sacked because he refused to
accept the election results. The move was welcomed by Sardar Abdul Qayyum
who resigned from office to run for the post of prime minister. Qayyum went
on to compete his tenure as prime minister in July 1996. Sardar Sikandar Hayat
Khan became the president during this period (August 1991-May 1996).
The sixth Legislative Assembly elections were held on June 30, 1996, three
years after Benazir Bhutto returned to power in 1993, and close to her second
dismissal (President Farooq Leghari dismissed Bhutto’s government in
November 1996 on charges of corruption). The AJKPPP had a clean sweep
and secured 37 out of 48 seats, the Muslim Conference nine, the Pakistan
Muslim League (Junejo) one and Jamaat-e-Islami one.37 The AJKPPP ousted
Sardar Sikander just before the elections, and after the elections selected the
PPP old guard, Sardar Ibrahim, as the president who continued in office from
August 1996 till August 2001.
The defeat of the Muslim Conference in the 1996 assembly elections again
proved that Islamabad had a great say in installing or toppling a government
in ‘AJK’. With Islamabad’s support, Prime Minister Barrister Sultan Mahmood
Chaudhry initially did not face any problem except that Mumtaz Rathore, who
had re-emerged as the leader of the AJKPPP, wanted to become the Prime
Minister. Finally, his party membership was cancelled. The change in the
government in Islamabad did not affect Mahmood. He was also considered
harmless by the then ruling Nawaz Sharif government and carried on even
after Nawaz Sharif was thrown out in a coup in October 1999. The military
rule under General Musharraf allowed the government to complete its tenure
in July 2001.
The next election in 2001 was quite predictably manipulated by Musharraf
42 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

administration and AJKPPP lost to AJKMC led by Sardar Abdul Qayyum

Khan. About 32 candidates fielded by pro-freedom parties such as All Party
National Alliance (APNA) and Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) were
disallowed to contest invoking the Art. 7(2) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Interim Constitution Act, 1974, which states: “No person or political party in
Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate against or take part
in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of the State’s accession
to Pakistan.”
The election and formation of the government followed a high voltage
drama in which the army played a leading role. Qayyum Khan was the leader
of the Muslim Conference, but the army intervened and persuaded the party
to choose Sardar Sikander Hayat Khan for the post of prime minister. Qayyum
was taken aback, as he wanted his son, Sardar Attique Ahmad Khan, to become
the prime minister. As such, Qayyum declined to stand for the post of the
president,38 and that was exactly what the army perhaps wanted. Major General
Anwar Khan, who had served the army for 35 years was made to resign hurriedly
from the Pakistan Army just four days before his election as president on August
1, 2001. Interestingly, he was made to retire under an ordinance issued by then
President Musharraf who waived the restriction on government servants (that
they could not accept any political post for a minimum of two years after their
retirement). He was rushed to Muzaffarabad where Muslim Conference’s
Assembly members quite obligingly elected him as president. During its tenure,
this Assembly also made the 11th Constitutional Amendment to provide for
one more seat to raise its total strength to 49,39 including the 41 directly elected
[29 seats in ‘AJK’ and 12 seats for Refugees settled in various parts of Pakistan]
and eight reserved or co-opted members (five seats for women and one each
for Ulama/Mushaikh, Overseas Kashmiris, and Technocrat).
The internal power politics paved the way for the entry of the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) into ‘AJK’ politics. Attique and his father,
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, supported the coup by General Pervaiz Musharraf
and this political opportunism affected AJKMC’s traditional ties with the Sharif
family and his faction of the Muslim League.40 General Anwar Khan and Sardar
Sikandar completed their tenures as president and prime minister respectively
through the eventful days after 9/11 and massive earthquake in October 2005.
The elections for the eighth Assembly were held on July 11, 2006, at a time
when Musharraf was firmly in saddle. He was quite favourably disposed towards
changing the leadership in ‘AJK’ by then. Quite like the elections in 2001, the
July 2006 elections barred about sixty pro-independence candidates belonging
to the JKLF, APNA and other smaller groups who had filed their nominations
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 43

without the required affidavit to pledge their commitment to final accession of

‘AJK’ to Pakistan. Contrary to expectations, despite the role played by some
religious groups in providing relief works, the performance of the infamous
religious conglomerate, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) – derisively called
Mullah Military Alliance because of its linkages with the agencies – was miserable.
All of its 33 candidates failed in the polls, with some losing their deposits.
However, quite predictably, the main political party backed by Islamabad,
AJKMC, secured 31 out of 49 seats despite pervasive spread of anti-incumbency
sentiments because of poor implementation of post-earthquake rehabilitation
and reconstruction policies by the ruling AJKMC dispensation led by Sardar
Sikandar Hayat. This was opportunity for Musharraf to unseat Sikandar and
bring in Sardar Attique Khan as prime minister, who was in race during 2001
as well. Raja Zulqarnain of Bhimber – a lawyer-politician, from the lineage of
Chib rajas of Bhimber. He was earlier associated with K.H. Khurshid’s
Liberation League. Zulqarnain was introduced by Musharraf administration
as a loyalist of his military rule. However, Musharraf had no control over internal
political dynamic within the AJKMC which came to the fore soon afterwards.
This period witnessed a whirlwind of political turmoil, in which four prime
ministers were changed, shifting their loyalties from one group to another. The
politics in ‘AJK’ took a dramatic turn when one rebel faction of the AJKMC
led by Raja Farooq Haider defeated Sardar Attique Khan in a no-confidence
motion on January 6, 2009 with support from the AJKPPP and the federal
government, which was a democratic one led by Peoples’ Party of Pakistan (PPP)
which assumed office after the fall of Musharraf’s military regime in early 2008.
There was a strong allegation against Sardar Attique that he spent more time
outside ‘AJK’ during the time he was in power. He was in office for 2 years 5
months and 13 days, out of which spent only 155 days in in the capital at
Muzaffarabad. He spent 121 days abroad and in Islamabad, and 615 days in
other places in Pakistan.41
On January 7, 2009, Sardar Mohmmad Yaqoob Khan was made prime
minister by consensus. But once again Sardar Attique and Farooq Haider came
together to throw him out on October 22, 2009. However, this development
could not bridge the gap between Sardar Attique and Farooq Haider, and
eventually, they came apart again. This badly hit the political development of
‘AJK’. As one political analyst puts it, “In this political wrangling members of
the assembly got badly discredited in the eyes of masses as they had become a
selling commodity since they had ditched three prime ministers and then voted
for the fourth one. How can one guarantee that they would not change their
allegiance in the coming days provided they get better offer?”42 In order to get
44 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

rid of Farooq Haider, two arch-rivals, with opposing ideologies – the Muslim
Conference and the AJKPPP – joined hands together, which paved the way
for Sardar Attique Ahmad Khan to again become the prime minister on July
29, 2010 until July 26, 2011.

Elections in 2011: AJKMC Marginalised

The elections to the ninth Assembly were held on June 26, 2011. These elections
were a big challenge for the AJKMC as it was facing the PML-N for the first
time as an opponent along with the AJKPPP. For the AJKMC, that had ruled
the region for much of its history, the results were very disappointing, bagging
only four seats. Its leader, Sardar Attique Khan, won his seat but his son was
defeated. The PML-N, which had hitherto supported the AJKMC but later
abandoned the alliance, won nine seats, four of which were those representing
the Kashmiri refugees in Punjab, where it was the ruling party. The AJKPPP
played its cards smartly. The division of right-wing votes between the AJKMC
and the PML-N helped the AJKPPP to secure 19 out of 36 seats,43 which led
to Chaudhry Majeed’s election as the prime minister and Sardar Muhammad
Yaqoob Khan the president. Sardar Yaqoob Khan had joined AJKPPP in
December 2010 and endeared himself to the top PPP leadership and he was
rewarded for this when he was offered presidency after the elections. He
continued till the end of his tenure in August 2016, when retired diplomat
from Poonch, Masood Khan was sent in from Islamabad to replace him as
President.

Election of July 2016: Decline and Fall of AJKMC

AJKMC’s hold over local politics declined further in the election of July 2016.
As a party with a strong historical background and preponderant base in local
politics, AJKMC found it difficult to maintain its importance, especially with
the onset of democratic politics in the post-Musharraf period. Many of its
leaders have, over the years, defected regularly to local branches of Pakistani
political parties and found it politically profitable to operate through them. In
these elections the anti-incumbency sentiments against local branch of the PPP,
were tapped well by the AJKPML-N which was also led effectively by Raja
Farooq Haider since he left AJKMC in 2010 and opened the ‘AJK’ chapter of
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N).
In the election AJKPML-N under Farooq Haider’s leadership bagged 31
seats, followed by three each by the AJKPPP and the AJKMC, two by the
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) and one by the Jammu Kashmir Peoples Party
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 45

(JKPP). The AJKPML-N won 22 out of 29 seats in ‘AJK’ and nine out of the
12 constituencies located in various parts of Pakistan. AJKMC secured all its
three seats from ‘AJK’ only. All the seven seats in the Muzaffarabad division,
which once used to be dominated by AJKMC went to AJKPML-N this time.44
These elections were held under the supervision of more than 17,000 army
personnel and 15,200 para-military personnel with the coordination of local
civilian law enforcement agencies including the ‘AJK’ police, the Punjab and
KP police and the Frontier Constabulary.

Changing Trend Post-2001

Positive vibes came after Gen. Musharraf ostensibly banned anti-India militant
organisations under the US pressure after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on America.
Sardar Qayyum, while addressing the second Intra-Jammu and Kashmir ‘Heart-
to-Heart’ talks in Delhi said that there was need to strengthen the India-Pakistan
peace process and turning the region into a “danger-free area”.45 He further
said, “Terrorism should not be allowed to become an excuse for stalling the
process.”46 This was the time when talks were going on between India and
Pakistan. Sardar Qayyum, who was once persona non grata because of his
political and pro-Pakistan ideology, was now well-received in India. There are
various reasons for the change in the Muslim Conference’s attitude vis-à-vis
Kashmir. Firstly, epiphany within the Pakistani establishment that it was
impossible to resolve Kashmir by force. The international community was no
longer buying the Pakistani argument for supporting militancy in Kashmir.
Secondly, his interaction with Kashmiri separatists and their appreciation for
Musharraf ’s ‘Four Point Formula’ on Kashmir. Qayyum also expressed
reservations about his party’s policy by questioning the armed struggle in
Kashmir: “There is no Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir. Terrorists are tools in the
hands of vested interests. Jihad is waged to protect destitute and the
downtrodden and not to kill women and children. The purpose of Jihad in
Jammu and Kashmir has been defeated.”47 He further added, “Guns have no
place in Jammu and Kashmir. And the blood of innocent people must not be
spilled.”48 This was a huge shift not only at the party level but also on a personal
level. The Muslim Conference might have realised that it was not the sole
spokesperson of Kashmir. The rise of other political parties in ‘AJK’ has
decentralised the power politics and the Muslim Conference can no longer
determine the power dynamics in the region.
The death of Sardar Qayyum on July 11, 2015 at a local hospital in
Rawalpindi has spelled doom for the party. His son, Sardar Attique Ahmad
46 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Khan whom he was promoting to take his place has proved a failure. He lacks
political acumen.
Sardar Attique rejected PML-N’s offer to a have political alliance for the
July 21, 2016 elections. However, the party entered into an alliance with PTI.
The leadership of both AJKMC and PTI agreed on seat adjustment for the
July 2016 elections in ‘AJK’.49 However, such political tactics did not work,
the party seems to have suffered a major electoral shock.

Aims and Objectives

From its inception as a political party, the main objective of the AJKMC was
its ideological focus on accession of Kashmir with Pakistan. Article 4 of the
Constitution of the AJKMC deals in detail about the aims and objectives.
Following are some of its objectives:
(a) Organising a freedom movement throughout the state and also to
seek assistance and help from Pakistan.
(b) The State of Pakistan should be made strong and transparent so that
the marooned Muslim subjects under enemy’s occupation get a sigh
of relief in Pakistan.
(c) The scope of party should be extended so that the Muslims all over
the world can get united for further struggle so that the helpless
Muslims under occupation can escape from slavery.
(d) On a strong and mental plane we should have strong religious, moral
values and also raise resources so that our Islamic state stands foremost
amongst the Muslim world.
Elaborating further on the socio-economic aspects, the AJKMC aspires:
(1) To separately maintain the existence of Muslims in state and protect
their rights. And also to protect the rights of other communities in
state. Also maintain right kind of rapport with those communities.
(2) To strongly maintain the relations with Muslims inside and outside
the state and make it stable and strong.
(3) Betterment and welfare of the workers, labours, skilled workers,
farmers, women, students and weak persons so that the class differences
can be reduced.
(4) Protection of old Islamic schools, other religious centres and revival
of education institutions.
(5) Eradication of bias among Kashmiris related to language, region, sect,
position and towards non-Muslims.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 47

(6) Improving living standard, economic conditions of the people residing

in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Encouragement to the skilled
labour, measures to widen the scope of education facilities; encourage
home industries, trade and commerce, economic development and
betterment and to channelise all state/provincial resources for bringing
happiness and prosperity to our Kashmiri brethren.
(7) Protection of religion, civilisation, language (Kashmiri, Pahari, Gojri,
Sheena, Dogri, Punjabi, Ladakhi, Tibetan, Kishtewade, Khward,
Broshteski and Pushtu), apart from it, the protection of Urdu, which
is a common language of all the Muslims of the state have to be
preserved as an asset from our ancestors. All these languages to be
protected and measures will be taken for the development and
propagation in the state.
(8) All possible assistance and help to deserving downtrodden, strife-
torn victims and tormented for their uplift.
(9) All reforms wherein there is no opposition to Islamic values, state
identity, and inter-religious solidarity should be complete with other
religious and political organisations.

Leadership
President – Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan
Senior Vice President – Malik Muhammad Nawaz
Secretary General – Madam Mehrun-Nissa
Additional Secretary General – Fida Kiani
Deputy Secretary General – Tahir Tabassum – Sardar Khizar Hayat
Secretary Information – Sardar Saghir Chughati
Deputy Secretary Information – Wajid Bin Arif
Secretary Finance – Sardar Abdul Qayyum Niazi
Chairman Finance – Sardar Altaf Khan.

Current Status
After Sardar Qayyum took over, the Muslim Conference became a dynastic
party. But Sardar Qayyum did not train his son Sardar Attique in politics and
running the party affairs. When Sardar Qayyum handed over the party affairs
to his son, he was immature. After Sardar Attique took over the reins of the
party, its performance has been disappointing. It appears that party has no
future.
48 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

JAMMU AND KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT (JKLF)

The Plebiscite Front50 (Britain) was renamed as Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF) by its Working Committee in Birmingham on May 29, 1977.
According to Amanullah Khan, this change was made at his suggestion, but he
could not become its member for nine months because of some restrictions.51
The JKLF started launching its activities from ‘AJK’ in 1982 under the overall
leadership of Amanullah Khan. With active support from the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) and the Pakistan Government, the JKLF trained thousands
of Kashmiri youths from the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. In an
interview to the Daily Jang in 1992, Amanullah admitted that the JKLF kicked
off insurgency in Srinagar in 1988 at the behest of Pakistan intelligence agencies,
but they replaced JKLF by jihadi groups soon afterwards. Amanullah does not
mention this in his autobiography, Jehad-e-Musalsal, although it was published
in February 1992.
The JKLF carried out major terrorist incidents in the Kashmir Valley
between 1990 and 1992.52 In the late 1990s, the party experienced an internal
split when Yasin Malik renounced violence and decided to follow the
constitutional path in his struggle for independence of Jammu and Kashmir.
The JKLF flourished as an organisation with initial support from the Pakistani
security forces. But despite such cooperation between Pakistani security agencies
and the JKLF, each side harboured deep-rooted suspicions against each other.
The JKLF’s demand for an independent state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K)
clashed with Pakistan’s goal of merging the entire state of J&K with it. Gradually
the Pakistani Government reduced dependence on JKLF in ‘AJK’ for spreading
militancy in J&K and began encouraging militant groups like Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Taiba for conducting anti-India operations in J&K.
The JKLF itself underwent several changes and faced enormous challenges to
survive as a political entity but nevertheless it retained its limited but committed
support base within entire ‘AJK’. Pakistan has also not completely withdrawn
its support and considers JKLF as a useful tool to highlight the Kashmir cause
at international forums. It should be remembered here that Amanullah Khan,
who was born in Gilgit kept emphasising independence of entire ‘AJK’ including
Gilgit and Baltistan. The party’s “aims and objectives clearly state that “[p]ending
the final settlement”, the JKLF would “aim to merge Gilgit/Baltistan territories
with Azad-Kashmir” and “to establish therein a democratic representative
government with full powers to serve as a base-camp in accordance with the
objectives of the Provisional Azad (Free) Government established on 4th
October 1947”.53
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 49

Leadership and Organisational Structure

As stated earlier, the initial leadership for the JKLF in ‘AJK’ was provided by
Amanullah Khan. Under his guidance, the party expanded its presence in
different parts of PoK. In the late 1980s and 1990s, there occurred ideological
splits within the JKLF. The main bone of contention within the JKLF was its
insistence to promote the independence of Kashmir as the primary cause of
the party. This line of thought did not go down well with the ISI who had
materially and financially supported JKLF in ‘AJK’. The ISI engineered a split
breaking the JKLF in ‘AJK’ into Amanullah and Farooq Haider factions. But,
in due course of time, the former faction prevailed, and thus Amanullah
continued to lead the party as its Patron-in-Chief in AJK. The JKLF split again
when Rauf Kashmiri formed another faction, but Amanullah-led faction
remained the most talked-about and most-followed outfit that Kashmir watchers
consider the original JKLF.
Currently, Advocate Sardar Saghir is the Chairman of the JKLF in ‘AJK’.54
He is followed by Dr Toqeer Gilani and Zia-ul-Haq Zia who acts as the Vice
President of the party in ‘AJK’. The Gilgit-Baltistan zone is being headed by
Zia-ul-Haq Zia. The JKLF has a well laid out organisational structure. It consists
of the ‘Policy and Planning Committee’, which is the supreme advisory body.55
The Central Executive Committee remains the primary body responsible for
making important decisions in the organisation.56 Below the Central Committee
is the Executive Committee consisting of 15 members. The Working
Committee, consisting of different representatives from all districts of ‘AJK’, is
the body responsible for policy implementation at the local level.57
The leadership of the JKLF in ‘AJK’ consists of Patron in Chief, President,
Senior Vice President, General Secretary, Chief Organiser, several Vice
Presidents, Deputy Chief Organiser, Secretary of Information, Finance and
several Zonal Working Committees.58 Despite having specific committees for
different tasks, the primary decision-making power rested with Amanullah Khan
in ‘AJK’, till his death in April 2016.59 The JKLF also has a student’s wing
called the Jammu and Kashmir Students’ Liberation Front (JKSLF).

Ideology, Aims and Objectives of JKLF

Like its counterpart in Kashmir, the JKLF in ‘AJK’ propounds a separatist
ideology. The primary aims and objectives of the organisation are as follows:60
(a) The JKLF in ‘AJK’ seeks the complete reunification of the entire
state and complete independence from India and Pakistan.
(b) The ‘AJK’ wing of the JKLF calls vehemently for the merger of Gilgit-
50 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Baltistan areas into Azad Kashmir and creation of a ‘democratic

representative government’ which would then serve as the base camp
for future political activities.61
(c) In the present circumstances, the party’s aim vis-à-vis the Pakistani
Government is “to struggle for getting political and constitutional
rights for the people of entire state especially for Gilgit Baltistan”.
(d) The JKLF also calls for setting up a democratic, federal and secular
government in the reunified Kashmir which will maintain cordial
relations with both India and Pakistan.62
(e) It advocates a secular agenda and wants the inclusion of Ladakhis,
Buddhists, and Kashmiri Pandits in any future independent state of
J&K.
Therefore, adherence to such a secular agenda has often brought JKLF ‘AJK’
into conflict with Pakistan. For example, the party bitterly opposed Gen.
Musharraf ’s four-point formula for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute and
the conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into a de facto permanent border.63

Activities in ‘AJK’
The JKLF advocates a three-front struggle to achieve its objectives, i.e. political,
diplomatic and armed struggle. At the political front, the party and its cadres
resort to demonstrations, dissemination of information through pamphlets and
magazines, holding of seminars/conferences and public awareness campaigns
on political issues. The party’s top leadership often resorts to tactics like courting
arrests to highlight their political grievances. The party also opposed the Gilgit-
Baltistan Empowerment and Self-governance Order 2009, introduced by the
Zardari-led government.64 When it was rumoured in 2009 that the Pakistan
Government was formulating a plan to grant a province-like status to Gilgit-
Baltistan, the JKLF vociferously opposed such a move, and the party even staged
a long march to Islamabad with 18,000-20,000 supporters.65 At the political
level, the party has tried to contest the local elections in ‘AJK’ time and again,
but has been denied permission as JKLF candidates refused to sign any
undertaking pledging support to Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. On the
diplomatic front, the party has representatives across different countries to place
its demands at the international level.
The JKLF has utilised the services of its Kashmiri diaspora in countries
like the UK, US and United Arab Emirates (UAE) to highlight the Kashmir
cause. For example, Lord Ahmed, a prominent Kashmiri raised the issue of
annexation of Gilgit-Baltistan and rejection of JKLF candidates’ nomination
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 51

papers in the ‘AJK’ assembly elections in the British Parliament.66 Similarly,

the diplomatic wing of the party also raised the issue of illegality of Gilgit-
Baltistan’s possible merger with Pakistan at the UK Foreign and Commonwealth
Office in London.67
Apart from these activities, the JKLF also believes in armed struggle to
achieve its objectives. The party initially received financial and military support
from Pakistani security forces. With this support, the JKLF unleashed
widespread violence and terrorist activities in the Kashmir Valley. For nearly
two decades, Kashmiri youths were trained and indoctrinated in camps run by
the JKLF in ‘AJK’. But by the middle of the 1990s,68 the JKLF shunned violence,
as other groups with a pro-Pakistan agenda secured greater state support from
Pakistan. However, it needs to be noted that the JKLF never resorted to violent
activities against Pakistani security forces in ‘AJK’ and elsewhere. Despite
ideological differences, the JKLF never confronted the Pakistani security forces.
Instead, the JKLF now opposes the use of radical forces like the Taliban, Jamaat-
ud-Dawa and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. The JKLF and its leaders contest that use
of such elements have spoiled the secular image of the Kashmiri movement.69

Presence in ‘AJK’
The JKLF has a presence in all the districts and tehsils in both parts of PoK.70
From open source data one can decipher that the cadre strength of the JKLF
in ‘AJK’ could be somewhere near 20,000-22,000.71 The party’s portrayal of a
secular agenda and the setting up of a federally structured government in the
event of independence enables it to network with other local parties in both
parts of PoK. Together with these parties, JKLF has tried to present a collective
front vis-à-vis Pakistan on the issue of independence of Kashmir. The party
also networked with other political parties in ‘AJK’ on the issue of Diamer
Bhasha Dam controversy and argued in favour of the rights of Gilgit-Baltistan
to its resources.

Funding Sources
The party received funding primarily from two sources in the past. Firstly, it
derived major part of its financial help from the ISI and the Pakistani Government
in the initial years and later from the Kashmiri diaspora abroad.72 Due to
ideological differences with Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, it can be assumed
that this source of funding has gradually reduced if not dried up entirely.73 A
large number of Kashmiri expatriates have contributed financial help over time
bit more so during the last decade. The party draws large share of financial
52 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

contributions from the Mirpur community from ‘AJK’, settled abroad.74 The
party has a significant presence in the UK, UAE, and US. Hence, it can be safely
assumed that the Kashmiri expatriates settled in these countries are making
active monetary contributions to the JKLF. One report has emphatically suggested
that the UK has been one of the major sources of funding for the JKLF. It is
also suspected that sometime ago Didar Singh, who was associated with the
World Sikh Organisation, helped the JKLF in raising funds.75

Networks and Alliances with Other Organisations

The JKLF AJK has formed alliances and contacts with different political parties,
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and think-tanks within Pakistan
and abroad. A report from the Canadian Information Service states that the
JKLF has contacts with organisations like the Kashmir American Council,
World Kashmiri Freedom Federation,76 World Kashmir Freedom Movement,
Jammu Kashmir Council For Human Rights, Kashmir Welfare Association
(Kashmir Relief Fund), Council for Human Rights in Kashmir, Kashmir Study
Group (KSG), Kashmir Canadian Council, Pakistan-based Kashmir Action
Committee, Karachi-based Jammu Kashmir Welfare Association, UK-based
Tehreek-e-Kashmir, Kashmir Council for Human Rights and Kashmir Watch.77
The party is also connected with local political parties in ‘AJK’. At the
height of militancy in J&K in the late 1980s, the JKLF had become an alliance
partner of the Kashmir Liberation Alliance (KLA).78 Surprisingly, JKLF
(Amanullah faction) has not joined the All Party National Alliance (APNA),
which is a conglomeration of ‘AJK’-based political parties.79 However, JKLF
(Yasin Malik faction) is a member of the APNA. The JKLF is also loosely
connected with local parties in Gilgit-Baltistan on an ad hoc basis on certain
common and pressing issues concerning ‘AJK’. For example, it maintains
connections with the Gilgit-Baltistan Democratic Alliance which comprises the
Balawaristan National Front, Karakorum National Movement, Gilgit-Baltistan
National Movement, Gilgit-Baltistan Thinkers Forum, Baloristan Labour Party,
Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement, Bolor Research Forum and Gilgit-Baltistan
National Conference.80 After the death of Amanullah Khan, the main branch
of JKLF operating from PoK has not been seen to be as active as the Yasin
Malik faction in Jammu and Kashmir.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR LIBERATION LEAGUE (JKLL)

Introduction
The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League (JKLL) was formed in 1962 by
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 53

K.H. Khurshid after he left the All Jammu & and Kashmir Muslim Conference
(hereafter AJKMC or Muslim Conference) in 1960 following a split in the
party. Khurshid became the first elected President of the ‘AJK’, having defeated
Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan in the presidential election in October 1961.
Khurshid was born in Srinagar in 1924. After completing his graduation,
he launched the Kashmir Students’ Federation to increase political awareness
among Kashmiri youth. Later, he became the personal secretary of Mohammad
Ali Jinnah, who found him intelligent and articulate. He became a close
confidant of Jinnah who is quoted to have said that “creation of Pakistan was
made by him, his typewriter and his private secretary”.81 Khurshid had a good
support base among the masses, particularly the Kashmiri refugees. With their
support, the Liberation League emerged as the second-largest party in ‘AJK’ in
1970. It won five of the 25 seats in the Legislative Assembly elections in 1970.
These five seats included one from ‘AJK’ and four from 12 seats allotted to the
Kashmiri Refugees spread throughout Pakistan.82 These elections were held
under a new Constitution introduced by the then military ruler, General Yahya
Khan, in September 1970. This Constitution provided for a president and a
25-member council to be elected on the basis of adult franchise. The JKLL
President, Khurshid, was one of the four contestants along with Sardar Abdul
Qayyum Khan of the AJKMC, Sardar Ibrahim of the Azad Muslim Conference,
an offshoot of AJKMC, and another candidate from Plebiscite Front. Sardar
Qayyum, whose party also bagged the majority of the 25 council seats, won
the contest and became the president of ‘AJK’.83
The elections in ‘AJK’, under the interim constitution of 1974, were held
on May 18, 1975. A four-party alliance, comprising the AJKPPP, JKLL,
AJKMC (Ibrahim) and Azad Muslim Conference, was formed with the aim of
defeating the Muslim Conference. The alliance won 34 seats, with the JKLL
winning five seats. The AJKPPP, which won an absolute majority by winning
22 seats and formed the government alone by ignoring the alliance partners.
The alliance thus ended. Upset over the AJKPPP’s decision to keep its electoral
allies out of the government, the JKLL President admitted that by joining the
alliance, he had committed the biggest mistake, and that he had not realised
this alliance would provide another “cover for the perpetuation of Punjabi
bureaucrats’ rule with the help of the security forces”. 84 The AJKPPP
government had to go on July 5, 1977 when General Zia ul Haq overthrew
the Bhutto government in Islamabad and sent him to jail. Martial Law was
not imposed in ‘AJK’ but it was practically put under the military rule. The
AJKPPP government was overthrown and a serving Brigadier was appointed
as the President of ‘AJK’. The move was criticised by the ‘AJK’ political parties.
54 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The JKLL Chief, K.H. Khurshid said since there was no Martial Law in ‘Azad
Kashmir’, there was no justification for creating a constitutional vacuum there.85
Khurshid was again in the limelight when under his leadership a seven-
party front was formed to oppose the Muslim Conference during the May 16,
1985 elections. But Khurshid’s party could get only five seats. The party could
not recover from this setback. It could win only one seat in the May 1990
elections. Its worst showing was in the elections held in 1996, 2006 and 2011,
when it failed to even open its account. The JKLL did not participate in the
2001 elections. It allied with the Jammu and Kashmir Pakistan Muslim League
(JKPML) for the 2006 polls. Launching the alliance manifesto in Islamabad
on June 29, 2006, Convenor of the JKPML and former ‘AJK’ prime minister,
Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry termed Kashmir Liberation Movement as the
topmost priority of the alliance and said that “all possible steps would be taken
in consultation with All-Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), militant
organisations and other institutions which could help lead the movement to
its logical conclusion”.86

Ideology/Objectives
The JKLL stands for the freedom of the people of Jammu and Kashmir state
and Kashmiris’ right to self-determination to choose their own future. Although
the party is committed to not compromise on this principle, it is generally not
vocal against Pakistan like the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
At the time of its formation on August 11, 1962, the party announced the
following as its main objectives:87
(a) To prepare the people of the State for the decisive moment and the
final struggle for freedom and self-determination.
(b) To strive for the recognition of the Azad Government of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir as the lawful government of the entire State.
(c) To strengthen and stabilise the representative system of government
in Azad Kashmir with a view to protecting and defending the
democratic, civic and traditional Islamic value as well as promoting
close ties with Pakistan.
(d) For this purpose, to re-unify the state and organise public opinion
under the banner of the party.
According to Kashmir Information Centre, the main ideology of the JKLL is:
The government of Azad Kashmir should be accepted as an independent
government and representative of the whole state. In addition to this, their
motto is that the people of Kashmir should be given their basic right to
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 55

decide their future accordingly to their own choice in free and fair atmosphere.
It is the choice of the people what they want, whether they want to accede
with Pakistan or India or remain independent.88
The main and most controversial plank of the party’s programme demanded
Pakistan’s recognition of the ‘AJK’ Government as the legitimate authority
representing the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir.89 The JKLL is of the view
that “till the time of plebiscite or final settlement of the future of the State, the
‘AJK’ Government may enter into a Stand-still Agreement with the Government
of Pakistan and settle that the Government of Pakistan may control the
responsibilities of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Communication, Currency and
Coinage of Jammu Kashmir State”.90 In order to retain coordination between
Pakistan and state of Kashmir, the party proposed to constitute an Advisory
Council consisting of Prime Minister of Pakistan, the President and Prime
Minister of ‘AJK’, whose functions may be to determine policy, vis-à-vis Kashmir
issue and matters of national importance.
The JKLL said that the 1974 Interim Constitution did not promote the
objective of the freedom movement for which millions of people sacrificed their
lives. The JKLL President Justice(retd.) Abdul Majid Malik said that 1974
Interim Constitution Act 1974 was an insult to the word constitution which
“is always framed by constituent assembly and the AJK has never had a
constituent assembly”.
It is in this context that the JKLL proposes that “the Constitution should
be federal and democratic conferring fundamental rights and civil liberties on
the citizens and prescribing responsibility of the citizens towards the State and
towards accomplishment of freedom of all the people living in three parts of
the world”.91
The JKLL proposed that the Parliament should consist of two Houses –
People’s House and Upper House – which would be constituted by
representatives, elected directly on the principle of proportionate representation
and size of area and population. In the proposed People’s House, 60 seats will
be allotted to AJK, 30 to Gilgit-Baltistan, 10 to refugees by co-option, while
100 seats will be kept vacant for Jammu & Kashmir. Similarly, in the Upper
House, 15 seats have been earmarked for ‘AJK’, 15 for Gilgit-Baltistan, 15 for
refugees, while 15 seats will be kept vacant for Jammu & Kashmir.92
It is notable here that the JKLL treated Gilgit-Baltistan as a part of ‘AJK’
or for that matter of whole state of Jammu and Kashmir. Commenting on the
resolution adopted by the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly in 2014 asking Pakistan
to give provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan, Misfar Hassan, Convenor of the
56 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

JKLL, UK, said that any change in its status would neither be in accordance
with the principled and historical stand of Pakistan on Kashmir in the United
Nations (UN) nor be acceptable to the people of Jammu and Kashmir.93

Organisational Structure and Leadership

The organisational structure of the JKLL includes a Central Executive
Committee (CEC) consisting of Central President, Senior Vice President,
Additional Vice President, Central General Secretary, Finance Secretary, Foreign
Secretary, Information Secretary, four Senior Executive Members and Convenors
for Europe, America and Gulf Zones. The CEC is the main decision-making
body of the party. The headquarters, known as Central Wing of the Party is
located at House No. 38, Sector B/2 Murree, ‘AJK’. The central office bearers
of the JKLL are as follows:94
Central President – Justice (retd.) Abdul Majid Malik
Sr. Vice President – Chaudhary Muhammad Suleman
Vice President – Chaudhry Shaukat Ali
Addl. Vice President – Mir Abdul Latif
Central General Secretary – Sardar Imtiaz Akbar
Finance Secretary – Sardar Imtiaz Iqbal
Foreign Secretary – Chaudhary Latif Sani Advocate
Secretary Information – Khawaja Muhammad Khalil Advocate
Senior Executive Member & President Preliminary Board – Khawaja Manzoor
Qadir
Senior Executive Member & District President – Muhammad Kaleed Ul Fateh
Senior Executive Member & District President Mirpur – Shahid Majeed Mallick
Executive Member & District President Muzaffarabad – Gulshan Ahmed Butt
Executive Member – Raja Khurshid Ahmed
Executive Member & Additional Information Secretary – Muhammad Tariq
Mughal
Chairman Organisation Board – Raja Muhammad Khurshid
Chairman Information Board & Executive Member – Abdul Aziz Kate
Chairman Agricultural Board – Shaikh Noor Muhammad
Convenor for US – Qazi Javed Iqbal
Convenor for UK/Europe Zone – Dr. Misfar Hassan
Convenor for Gulf Zone – Khawaja Muhammad Ramzan Butt

Cadre Strength and Funding

The exact strength of the party cadre is not known although it is active
throughout ‘AJK’. The membership is open to anyone, by filling a membership
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 57

form. The party is, however, on the look-out for enrolling new members
especially those who are in a position to raise funds for the party at the
international level.95 Most of the funding comes from donors and expatriates
based in the Gulf countries, the US and Europe. In this connection, the party
President regularly visits these countries.

Network and Area of Influence

The JKLL has set up political, international, educational, development, and
student wings to spread its network.96 It has opened its offices in all the districts
of ‘AJK’ and other provinces where the Kashmiri refugees are settled. In addition
to that the party has opened offices in the US, Europe and Gulf countries.

Links and Alliances with other Political Parties and Militant

Groups
JKLL’s President, K.H. Khurshid, during the initial years, joined hands with
AJKPPP to topple Sardar Abdul Qayyum’s government, in an attempt to
become President of ‘AJK’ again. The JKLL was also part of a four-party alliance
in the May 1975 elections to defeat the Muslim Conference which had complete
control in ‘AJK’. The JKLL also headed the seven-party front with Tehrik-i-
Amal Party, Islami Jamhoori Party, Democratic Front, Jamaat-i-Islami, Inqilabi
Mahaz and Azad Jamhoori Mahaz to oppose the Muslim Conference in the
May 1985 elections.
On April 29, 1991 the JKLL and the AJKPPP announced that they had
formed a four-party electoral alliance called the Jammu and Kashmir
Democratic Alliance. Other two parties who joined the alliance were the Muslim
League and People’s National Party (PNP).97
The JKLL also joined a rally organised by 11 pro-Kashmiri parties in Lahore
on October 26, 2003. The protestors raised anti-India slogans and alleged that
atrocities are being committed against the Kashmiris. According to media
reports, law enforcement agencies clamped down on the rally and did not allow
them to read out the joint declaration.98
In protest against the decision taken by the military regime to bar political
groups in ‘AJK’ not professing allegiance to Islamabad from contesting the July
2001 Assembly polls, the JKLL and other groups joined a “chakka jam”
movement in July 2001. The call was given by the JKLF Chairman, Amanullah
Khan.99 The JKLL had also participated in a series of demonstrations over several
days in October 1992, including an attempt to cross the ceasefire line. In its
58 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

efforts to block similar attempts by the JKLF and other groups, Pakistan and
‘AJK’ authorities used force which resulted in killing of 10 people.100
The JKLL also joined another anti-India rally at Muzaffarabad on January
26, 2005 under the aegis of the Kashmir Liberation Cell. The rally ended at
the office of the UN Military Observers near Domel, where a memorandum
addressed to then UN Secretary General was delivered. The memorandum called
upon the UN chief to exert pressure on India to stop unabated killings and
other inhuman atrocities in Kashmir. It also urged him “to use his good offices
in granting right to self-determination to Kashmiris which had been pledged
to them more than five decades ago by the world body through several Security
Council resolutions”.101
Its international wing has also been organising similar rallies abroad. On
February 8, 2015, the US chapter of the JKLL joined other ‘AJK’ parties and
Kashmiri groups to observe the Kashmir Solidarity Day in North Virginia.
This day is observed all over Pakistan and ‘AJK’ on February 5 every year. The
function was chaired by Dr. Ghulam Nabi Fai, President of Kashmir American
Council.102 It also sent an appeal to the UN Secretary General on January 5,
2013 urging to resolve the Kashmir dispute according to the UN resolutions
and allow the Kashmiris ‘their birth right of self-determination’.103 It may be
mentioned that founder President of the JKLL had attended the Non-Aligned
Summit in Harare in September 1986 where he met heads of the various
delegations and also distributed ‘An appeal to Members of Non-aligned
Movement’ on behalf of 16 million people of Jammu and Kashmir, who it
alleged “continue to suffer”.104 Although the founder of the JKLL hailed from
Srinagar, it has no presence in Kashmir.

Current Status
The JKLL which emerged as the second-largest party by winning five seats in
the first elections held in ‘AJK’ in 1970, lost its support base with the death of
its founder K.H. Khurshid in 1988. It failed to win even a single seat in the
last three elections held in 2006, 2011 and 2016. Interestingly, it was seen
making adjustments with AJKPML-N on some seats in the last elections but
finally it could not win any seat.
Its present President is Chief Justice (retd.) Abdul Majid Malik who as the
Chief Justice of the ‘AJK’ High Court had delivered the famous judgement in
1993 directing the Pakistan Government to hand over control of the Northern
Areas to the ‘AJK’ Government. Justice Abdul Majid Malik has not able to
build a strong base for his party. The party has formed a number of committees
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 59

to spread its ideology. But it has not been able to consolidate its own party
cadre, nor build any strong relationships with other political groups. Its students’
wing is also largely ineffective, primarily due to lack of financial resources.
To keep alive the Kashmir issue, Justice Malik had said in May 1999 that
Kashmiris would never allow the division of Kashmir and they expected pressure
from Pakistan and the international community on India for the removal of
Indian forces from Kashmir. Speaking at a press conference in Rawalpindi, he
said that Pakistan should not indicate deviation from its principled stand on
Kashmir. In December 2005, he urged India to accept then President
Musharraf ’s proposal of demilitarisation and self-rule in Kashmir, which, he
said would help to resolve the Kashmir dispute.105
Justice Abdul Majid Malik visited India in December 2014 where he
categorically stated that people in his territory were peace-loving and never
supported any sort of terrorism or violence in Jammu and Kashmir. He stressed
the need to immediately bring an end to the status quo on the relations between
the divided parts of Jammu and Kashmir by allowing free movement of people
from both sides of the LoC for strengthening trust and mutual confidence.
When his attention was drawn towards the continued support of Pakistan to
the terrorists and the Mumbai massacre in 2008, Justice Abdul Majid Malik
said, “I condemn such incidents. But why the people of undivided Jammu
and Kashmir are made to suffer because of such inhuman acts. We cannot be
pushed to the walls because of blasts in Mumbai or Karachi. Why cannot we
be allowed to decide our fate, make good use of our available resources and
strive for progress.”106
In spite of all this, Justice Abdul Majid Malik himself has not proved equal
to K.H. Khurshid, the founder of the party. Thus the party obviously needs an
effective leadership.

JAMMU AND KASHMIR PEOPLE’S MUSLIM

LEAGUE (JKPML)
Introduction
The Jammu and Kashmir People’s Muslim League (JKPML) was formed on
April 20, 2006 by former Prime Minister and the then Leader of the Opposition
in the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly, Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry,
following serious differences with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) high
command for ignoring his contribution and appointing Sahibzada Ishaq Zaffar
as the president of AJKPPP. Launching the JKPML, Sultan Chaudhry said that
60 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

he had the support of 12 members of the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly and one
member of the ‘AJK’ Council. He further added that the new party would end
the two-party system in ‘AJK’ which had given nothing to the people of the
state. He promised to give 30 per cent representation to women in the ‘AJK’
Legislative Assembly, ‘AJK’ Council and local bodies. Terming overseas
Kashmiris as the backbone of the country’s economy, he said a Ministry of
Overseas Kashmiris would be created after his party comes to power. He also
assured that his party would woo investment and promote industrialisation in
the state to end unemployment. On the Kashmir question, he said that India
should withdraw “her occupation troops” from major cities of Kashmir, if it
was serious about finding out a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute.
Besides, India should “repeal all draconian laws including POTA [Prevention
of Terrorism Act] and TADA [Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
Act] to help create a conducive atmosphere for settlement of the long standing
Kashmir tangle”.107

Ideology/Manifesto/Alliance with other Political Parties

In view of the 2006 elections in ‘AJK’, the Jammu and Kashmir People’s League,
Jammu Kashmir Muslim League, led by Major General (retd.) Muhammad
Hayat Khan, and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League, headed by Chief
Justice (retd.) Abdul Majid Malik, formed an alliance – the Jammu and Kashmir
Pakistan Muslim League (JKPML). On June 29, 2006, Alliance convenor Sultan
Chaudhry launched the election manifesto promising various relief measures
for the affected people of the quake hit areas in ‘AJK’. Salient features of the
manifesto were as follows:108
(a) The residents of affected areas would be exempted from the payment
of six-month utility bills. In addition, government loans payable
against the people in quake-hit areas would be written off.
(b) Necessary legislation would be made to ensure the quality of
reconstruction of hospitals, educational institutions and government
buildings in line with the building codes developed in accordance
with the seismic survey reports. Legal action would be taken against
the people involved during the reconstruction process.
(c) The suspended local bodies system in the state would be reactivated,
the number of seats in ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly and ‘AJK’ Legislative
Council including those reserved for women would be increased.
(d) A new Master Plan for the development of ‘AJK’ would be developed
and administrative reforms would be introduced to improve
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 61

performance of different government departments. Rules of Business

would also be amended to improve government’s performance.
(e) Kashmir Liberation Movement will be considered as the top most
priority of the alliance. In this connection all possible steps would be
taken in consultation with the APHC, militant organisations and
other institutions which could help lead the movement to its logical
conclusion.
(f ) Establishment of Ministry of Overseas Kashmiris which would fully
benefit from the capabilities of the Kashmiri expatriates. Steps would
also be taken to provide an opportunity to the Kashmiri expatriates
to cast votes in the countries they are residing.
(g) All bottlenecks in the way of setting up a TV station in ‘AJK’ would
be removed. Steps would also be taken to benefit the Kashmiri people
living on the divide to benefit from the FM radio stations in ‘AJK’.
(h) Construction of new airports in Mirpur and Kotli while the existing
airports in Muzaffarabad and Rawalakot.
(i) Impediments in the way of setting up the dry port announced by
President Musharraf would be removed.

Current Status
Inspite of the alliance, in the 2006 elections, the JKPML could win only four
seats, three in the ‘AJK’ and one in Pakistan (refugee). The ruling Muslim
Conference clinched 22 seats including seven refugee seats.109 The AJKPPP
won seven seats in ‘AJK’ and drew a blank in the refugee seats in Pakistan while
its ally Jammu Kashmir Peoples Party grabbed one seat in Poonch.110
The party has no future as the founder of JKPML, Barrister Sultan
Mahmood Chaudhry, joined the local branch of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf on 6
February 2015 ahead of the 2016 elections. He lost his seat for the first time
after 25 years in politics on 21 July 2016.

UNITED KASHMIR PEOPLE’S NATIONAL PARTY (UKPNP)

Introduction
The United Kashmir People’s National Party (UKPNP) is a nationalist party.
It was founded as People’s National Party on April 10, 1985 and renamed the
UKPNP in 1994. The name, according to the party, was changed to better
support the idea of creating a state independent of India and Pakistan which
would be called ‘United States of Kashmir’. It was founded by Shaukat Ali
Kashmiri, who is the chairman of the party. Its former Vice Chairman was
62 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Sharif Kakad, who was arrested by local authorities in Gilgit Baltistan in 2014.
The party has condemned his arrest and has appealed to all human rights
organisations for his release. The UKPNP’s main objective is to change the
already existing narratives of the Kashmir conflict coined by Pakistan and
India.111 The party aims to struggle for an Independent Kashmir, free from
India, China and Pakistan control where Kashmiri people can live in peace.
In the initial years of its formation, the UKPNP found it hard to propagate
its stand because its cadres and leadership had been bearing the brunt of state
repression. However, over the years, the party has succeeded to a great extent
in strengthening its roots among the revolutionary sections of the Kashmiri
society. The UKPNP has succeeded in garnering the attention of the general
public because of its stand on socio-economic plight of the people of the region.
The other important factor that helped in nurturing and shaping the political
ideology of the party was the unabated exploitation of human and natural
resources of the ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan by Islamabad.112 The alienation and
resentment because of “political and economic marginalisation of Pakistan-
controlled areas gave birth of new ideology seeking equal rights, political
ownership and economic empowerment of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir.” In
broader Kashmir conflict UKPNP’s aim has been to provide a parallel inclusive
narrative that “represent all regions, its people, culture, faiths, languages and
ethnicity-not only valley centric-and be equal stakeholders in shaping up its
future”.113 The party is keen to establish an independent democratic society on
the basis of just intra-community relations. It envisages that besides the Kashmiri
nation, seven other communities (the Dogras, Ladakhis, Baltis, Gilgitis,
Poonchis, Brushaski and Kishtwaris) settled in the United States of Kashmir
shall have equal share in the new political set up (independent or sovereign
Kashmir).

Party Structure, Leadership and Activities

Party structure consists of National Council, Centre Committee, Central
Cabinet, regional organisations, and overseas zones. Its Chairman is Shaukat
Ali Kashmiri. He is living in exile in Switzerland since 1999; Senior Chairperson
is Naila Khaneen, Sayed Tahir Shah Gardezi, Secretary General Sardar Altaf,
Deputy Secretary General, Professor Rafiqul Bhatti, Chief organizer and Nasir
Aziz Khan, Central Spokesman of the party. The UKPNP in its party manifesto
maintains that it is a progressive, secular and democratic organisation. The
UKPNP accuses Islamabad of using the Kashmir conflict to avoid people-centric
approach and also maintaining status quo by encouraging a territorial centric
approach to resolve the conflict.114 The Central committee of the party at its
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 63

meeting on 30th September 2016 at Rawalpindi asked Pakistan and India to

deescalate ongoing tension between the two countries on the LoC and
demanded Kashmir issue be resolved through dialogue and peaceful means as
per wishes and aspirations of Kashmiri people. UKPNP has expressed its deep
concern over the recent announcement made by the ‘AJK’ government that it
has decided to hand over large area of disputed Kashmir to China. It warned
that party will not tolerate and allow any country to colonize “our territory
and national resources.”
However, the UKPNP like other nationalist parties is barred from taking
part in elections in the ‘AJK’ because the “Interim Constitution Act 74” as
well as Gilgit Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order of 2009
require every political party and candidates to sign an affidavit pledging their
commitment to Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. Therefore, all
nationalist parties and leaders are not allowed to contest elections. Not letting
the UKPNP to take part in the political process of the region has not stopped
it from mobilising the public opinion. It regularly holds conferences, issues
press releases and hold demonstrations against Pakistan. It claims it has
succeeded to a great extent in raising awareness about the plight of the people
of PoK at various international forums.115 On April 23, 2009, Shaukat Ali
Kashmiri addressed a press conference in Geneva where he strongly urged the
world community to ask the Pakistan government to guarantee the freedom of
speech, assembly and freedom of thought and that all political parties should
be allowed to take part in the elections and the democratic process. He also
demanded that the Pakistan government should be asked to take stern action
against those who are involved in the killings of political leaders and civil society
activists in the region. He urged the Pakistani rulers to establish a fact-finding
mission to administer social-economic, cultural, constitutional, educational,
and developmental situations in ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan.116 He asked Pakistan
to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in ‘AJK’. According to Shaukat Ali
Kashmiri, these terrorist organisations are thriving because of the blessings of
Pakistani state and its intelligence agencies. He also requested the world
community to force Pakistan to stop the construction of Bhasha Dam and also
halt the plundering of the natural resources of the region.117 In an interview
with the Indian Express on July 11, 2016, Central Spokesman of the party Nasir
Aziz Khan advised Kashmiris not to pick up guns rather to join hands with
secular and democratic forces of the state. He further said that “the Kashmiris
should keep in mind that Pakistan has no love with Kashmiris and she is
exploiting religious sentiments of the Kashmiris and is plundering their natural
resources”.
64 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

UKPNP has spread its network both in Europe and North America. It has
an overseas committee to look after the interests of the party headed by Sardar
Zahid Khan in Canada, Aftab Hasan Khan in UK, Akhlaq Baslar in USA,
Mohammad Zee Mustafa in Switzerland, Sajid Abbasi in Belgium and Iftiqar
Ahmad in Italy. Amjad Yousaf is the president of its network in Europe. Its
branch in Canada was earlier headed by Mumtaz Khan who is living in exile
since 1998. The other branch is in Switzerland where it regularly attends the
biannual session of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva. A
resolution adopted by the party held under the chairmanship of Shaukat
Kashmiri demanded that, “elements that propagate violence as a solution to
the Kashmir problem be banned wherever they exist”.118 While talking to media,
the UKPNP Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Khalid Perwaize stated that UKPNP
is “fighting for a completely independent Kashmir”. Khalid Perwaize who lives
in Scotland further said that the “New State will be secular rather than a Muslim
State.”119
In March 2016, a number of exiled leaders from ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan
organised a protest on the sidelines of the 31st session of the UN Human Rights
Council where they condemned Pakistan for its oppressive policies and human
rights violations in ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan.
On the eve of 2016 elections, UKPNP organised a multiparty conference
titled ‘Azad Jammu Kashmir elections under ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution and
Violation of Right of Self Determination and Freedom of Expression’ in
Islamabad. All nationalist parties present there passed a resolution demanding
immediate removal of section 4[7(2)] of ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution Act 1974
and allow all nationalist political parties and individuals to contest incoming
elections; abolition of Kashmir Affairs ministry and Kashmir Council; call back
all officers appointed by Pakistan, establish market at the local level for trade,
through local traders only, between both parts of Kashmir in India and Pakistan,
“consider reservations and get representation of people of Kashmir and Gilgit
Baltistan on Pak-China CPEC before its implementation” and free Awami
Watan Party (AWP) leader Baba Jan, Iftikhar Hussain and other political leaders
from prison and withdraw all fake cases against them. Representatives from
nationalist and other likeminded mainstream parties like JKLL, JK National
Awami Party, JKLF, JK National Party, Balawaristan National Front, Gilgit
Baltistan Action Committee, JK Peoples Party, PPP Jammu Kashmir, All Parties
National Alliance, Balawaristan National Movement and other human rights
organisations participated in the conference. According to media reports the
leaders of the nationalist parties also denounced what they called undue
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 65

interference by Islamabad in matters of the state through the ‘AJK’ Council

and the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs.120

JAMMU AND KASHMIR NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (JKNAP)

Introduction
The Jammu and Kashmir National Awami Party (JKNAP) was founded in
1996. It was carved out from the Jammu and Kashmir National Students
Federation (JKNSF) formed earlier in September 1966. JKNAP is a left-wing
party advocating a secular and united Kashmir. The JKNAP believes in peaceful
methods to achieve political objectives. It rejects violence in any form in the
political struggle. Since its inception, party has strengthened its base in ‘AJK’.
Rawalakot, Kotli, Bagh and Muzaffarabad are its strongholds. It has its
headquarters in Muzaffarabad. Its student wing JKNSF is a largest progressive
student organisation in ‘AJK’. The JKNSF was the leading force in resisting
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s attempt to turn ‘AJK’ into the fifth province of Pakistan.
Since then JKNSF has aligned too much towards left-wing politics and despite
its earlier advocacy of complete merger with Pakistan it has always come under
attack from the Pakistani intelligence agencies.121
JKNAP and its student wing JKNSF have not only been under attack from
the intelligence agencies but also from Jihadis in ‘AJK’. In 2009 JKNAP
protested against establishing militant camps in Muzaffarabad. After the Swat
military operation in 2009, Pakistani establishment relocated Jihadis to some
locations in ‘AJK’. The JKNAP leadership felt threatened that these jihadists
would be used against the nationalists in ‘AJK’. The purpose of settling Afghan
Jihadis in ‘AJK’ according to JKNAP had two reasons:
(a) To pressurise India to accept Pakistani version of Kashmir solution
(b) These Jihadis would be used to suppress local progressive left groups
who have got more influence in the region.122
Another reason why JKNAP is intimidated by the Pakistani intelligence agencies
is that it exposed local pro-Pakistan Kashmiri leadership, its collaboration with
Pakistan and implementing anti-people policies in ‘AJK’.
The JKNAP had also reservations on the Interim Constitution, 1974.
According to JKNAP, the Interim Constitution Act was a colonial design of
Pakistan to prolong its occupation and it was meant to deny the people of the
region their fundamental rights and their legitimate rights over their resources.
The main objective of the Act according to JKNAP is to “control the indigenous
thoughts and struggle which represent the real interests of the people for their
66 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

demand of national independence from Pakistan.”123 The Act does not empower
‘AJK’ Judiciary and the legislature. For JKNAP, the Act does not propose
amendments which can empower and protect the fundamental rights of the
state subject holders of the occupied territory.
The JKNAP has established close ties with Jammu and Kashmir National
Independence Alliance (JKNIA) shortly after its establishment in 1996. The
alliance is headed by Mahmood Kashmiri, who participated in the Kashmir
Solidarity day in London on February 5, 2019, but he was asked by Pakistani
organisers to leave the place because he and his party were considered a security
risk. JKNIA is an amalgam of seven nationalist political parties which are
working for the peaceful resolution of the Kashmir issue through a negotiated
settlement for complete ‘independence’ and unification of Kashmir. The
following are the member parties of JKNIA:124
(1) Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Conference (JKNLC-EU)
(2) Jammu Kashmir National Awami Party (JKNAP)
(3) Jammu Kashmir Freedom Movement (KFM)
(4) Association of British Kashmiris (ABK)
(5) Kashmir Liberation Organisation (KLO)
(6) Jammu Kashmir Plebiscite Front (JKPF)
(7) Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).
The JKNAP is also affiliated with the All-Party National Alliance (APNA) of
‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan. These parties organized many protest rallies against
the atrocities and brutalities committed against the people of the region. In
consequence, hundreds of party workers have been arrested by security agencies.
This was also highlighted in a report prepared by the Canada immigration
and Refugee Board of Canada, on February 16, 2004.
Most of its leadership is living in exile in Europe. Those who stay back are
often harassed and tortured by Pakistan security agencies. Its prominent leaders
are Sadiq Subhani, Liaquat Hayat Khan; Prof. Mark Khalique, and Mehmood
Baig. The party has also opened its branches in UK and Canada. The UK
branch is headed by Sajad Raza, and Azad Raza, who is its chief organiser.

ALL-PARTIES NATIONAL ALLIANCE (APNA)

Introduction
The All-Parties National Alliance (APNA) is a conglomerate of 14 nationalist
political parties and groups operating in ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan. These
include Jammu Kashmir National Awami Party (JKNAP), United Kashmir
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 67

Peoples National Party (UKPNP), Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

(JKLF), Balawaristan National Front (BNF), Karakoram National Movement
(KNM), Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement (GBUM). The group advocates
closer ties between the peoples of these two regions.
APNA was formed in January 2001. Its main objective is to liberate Kashmir
from both Pakistan and India. It wants independence and unification of the
erstwhile princely state. Besides politicians, its cadre includes academicians and
people from the civil society. The alliance criticises Pakistan’s Kashmir policy
and blames it for deliberately prolonging and complicating the Kashmir issue
by proposing new formulas, such as the Chenab formula.125 According to APNA’s
leader, Mirza Wajahat Hasan, “Chenab formula is not the solution of the Kashmir
issue. We reject all such formulas that are against our motherland’s integrity and
sovereignty. Only Kashmiri nation reserves the right to decide about their
motherland without complying with international pressure.”126 APNA also rejects
Pakistan’s claim that the tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947 was orchestrated
to liberate Kashmiri Muslims. APNA’s leader, Late Arif Shahid said:
Our brave tribal brothers attacked. It was said that we sent tribals to help
Muslims of Kashmir. My brothers, my elders and my friends, in the Kashmir
valley, in Muzaffarabad there are 90 to 95 per cent Muslims. Please tell me,
what wrong five per cent of non-Muslims could have done to 95 per cent
Muslims? What harm they could have caused? What atrocities they could
have inflicted? In Jammu, 80 per cent of non-Muslims reside, in Ladakh 80
per cent of non-Muslims reside, no tribal was sent there. It is completely
wrong that they helped Kashmiris, that they helped Muslims. They have not
done anything like that. Then, they were trying to serve their own interests
to get Srinagar then, and even now they are doing the same.127

Network and Influence

APNA wanted to contest elections but was barred because it did not commit
itself to accession to Pakistan. During elections, its candidates, after filing their
nomination papers, were not allowed by the Election Commission to contest.
But one good thing that came out of their efforts was that they brought
international attention to Pakistani highhandedness towards the people of ‘AJK’
and also popular resistance against Pakistan.128
APNA joined hands with the Gilgit-Baltistan Democratic Alliance (GBDA)
– the nationalist alliance of Gilgit-Baltistan. According to Shaukat Kashmiri
both APNA-GBDA have been holding press conferences, seminars, rallies and
address foreign observers, to inform people about their fundamental rights.
68 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

These parties often hold protests against illegal arrests of their members.
Together, they also periodically protest against the elections held in ‘AJK’.
Apart from independence and unification of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir, as it existed in 1947, these parties also call for the lifting of restrictions
on trade and people-to-people contact across the Line of Control (LoC).129
The other demands are, asking both India and Pakistan to withdraw troops
from the ‘occupied’ land of J&K, stop cross border shelling and killing innocent
people. In one of its one day conferences organised on January 11, 2010 at
National Press Club, Islamabad, APNA resolved that India and Pakistan should
withdraw their armies from all the three units including Gilgit-Baltistan. The
nationalist leaders also condemned the “criminal negligence” of the Government
of Pakistan towards Attabad, Hunza, land slide victims. The land slide led to
the formation of the giant Attabad lake that submerged land and other
belonging of poor people. They demanded all out support for the victims. The
conference also resolved that Gilgit-Baltistan, shall be given an ‘AJK’ like
government, instead of a provincial setup.130 APNA observes April 29 – the
day on which Karachi Agreement was signed – as black day.
Arif Shahid, prominent leader of APNA, was allegedly killed because of
his nationalistic ideas. He wrote many books on Kashmir’s independence, and
his growing influence in the region got him in trouble with the Pakistani
authorities. His name was put into the exit control list. Few months before his
assassination, he was arrested and tortured in Mirpur along with two political
leaders from Jammu and Kashmir who had gone to ‘AJK’ on a valid visa.131
M.A. Khalique, APNA’s spokesman accused the Pakistani intelligence agencies
and told the media that Shahid was “the victim of targeted killing by some
state actors”.132
APNA has condemned the killing of Sardar Arif Shahid, its former
chairman, allegedly by the Pakistani intelligence agency on May 13, 2013.
Following this, there were large-scale demonstrations in ‘AJK’ where the
protesters demanded that the Pakistani authorities should constitute a judicial
enquiry into the murder of Arif Shahid, arrest and punish all those involved in
the conspiracy and murder. They also demanded that authorities should stop
harassing and intimidating the people. People of both the regions should be
allowed to enjoy their fundamental human rights.133
The current chairman of APNA, Mirza Wajahat Hasan, along with his
brother, Mirza Nadir Hasan, was expelled from Gilgit-Baltistan for two months
after their arrest on October 31, 2009. They were charged for celebrating the
day on November 1 on which they claim to have liberated Gilgit-Baltistan
from the Dogra rule on November 1, 1947.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 69

Both APNA and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) fielded
their candidates in the 2001 and 2006 elections in ‘AJK’. In 2001, they fielded
32 candidates; however, they were barred from contesting elections because
they refused to support Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. According to Part 7(2)
of the ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ Interim Constitution Act 1974: “No person
or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be permitted to propagate
against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology of
the State’s.”134 In the 2006 elections, the Election Commission of ‘AJK’ again
rejected the nomination papers of JKLF and APNA candidates for similar
reasons. When the party leaders questioned the decision, the candidates were
detained, harassed and tortured by the security agencies.135
According to Shabir Choudhry, Arif Shahid was the man of integrity and
intellect. It was because of that he could easily recognize and make distinction
between real and fake nationalists. He used to call fake nationalists as a ‘B
team’ of Pakistan. Arif took it upon himself to expose those fake nationalists
so that they cannot fool people further. In his book, Dagh Dagh Ujala, he
asserts that all Kashmiri nationalists of Azad Kashmir and Pakistan (minus JKLF
Amanullah Khan, which feels comfortable making alliances with pro Pakistan
parties) were part of All Parties National Alliance and Yasin Malik was
represented by late Dr Farooq Haider.136
But Arif was always suspicious about the conspiracy hatched against the
APNA. His suspicions proved right. Few days after Islamabad public meeting
Dr Farooq Haider invited Arif Shahid to his residence and told him that he
had instructions from the JKLF Chairman Yasin Malik to leave the APNA,
and they cannot work together’.137 Although Arif tried his best to persuade
Haider about the importance of this alliance, APNA, and asserted that it was
imperative to make APNA effective to advance the cause of united and
independent Jammu and Kashmir. Haider agreed with Arif Shahid, but
expressed his helplessness as he could not defy the instructions of Yasin Malik.
Realising his predicament, Arif Shahid requested Dr Farooq Haider not to
issue a public statement about leaving the alliance, as it would harm the cause
of an independent Jammu and Kashmir. Dr Farooq Haider kindly agreed to
that. Arif Shahid highly appreciated the services of Dr Farooq Haider. However,
he did not have praiseworthy words for Yasin Malik and Amanullah Khan.
This is meticulously expounded by Arif Shahid himself in his book:
A few years after JKLF Yasin Malik’s departure from the APNA, Yasin Malik
visited Rawalpindi, and Dr Farooq Haider invited all Kashmiri nationalists
at his residence. During the meeting Yasin Malik suggested that nationalists
70 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

of Azad Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan should make an alliance. It was

astonishing to hear this from Yasin Malik, as it was he who stabbed APNA in
the back by ordering Dr Farooq Haider to leave the alliance.
In his reply to Yasin Malik, Arif Shahid said that:
There was no need of a new alliance as APNA is already there, and it has
representation from all the regions. Yasin Malik expressed his ignorance about
APNA, to which he (Arif Shahid) said, if you had no knowledge of APNA
then why you instructed Dr Farooq Haider to leave APNA. Yasin Malik had
no reply to this and was embarrassed. Arif Shahid said you come to Pakistan,
visit Pakistani cities from Rawalpindi to Karachi, but you have no time to
visit Gilgit-Baltistan. The discussion continued till 1am. Yasin Malik was
assigned a target to destroy APNA, and formulate a compliant alliance. He
failed in that. This was a second attack from Yasin Malik, and by grace of
Allah both attacks failed. Our crime was that we were fighting against
Islamabad’s Kashmir policy. We were not fighting a war against them. Yasin
Malik is fighting for Pakistani interests in Srinagar; we are voicing against
Pakistani injustice and oppression in Azad Kashmir and in Gilgit-Baltistan.
This is why Pakistan and their agents are against us, but they all failed. We
have shown the world the ugly face of Pakistan.138

AJK PAKISTAN PEOPLE’S PARTY (AJKPPP)

Introduction
AJKPPP is a local branch of PPP, one of the important mainstream political
parties in Pakistan, which was launched on November 30, 1967 at a convention,
held in Lahore. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was its first elected Chairman. The main
aim for which the party was formed included, inter alia, the establishment of
an “egalitarian democracy” and the “application of socialistic ideas to realise
economic and social justice”. A more immediate task was to fight against
General Ayub Khan’s dictatorship. Ayub was at the height of his power and
Z.A. Bhutto, his one time confidante, had fallen out with him, when the PPP
was formed.139
As per its official website, the party’s four guiding principles are: “Islam (is
our Faith); Democracy (is our politics); Socialism (is our Economy); and all
power to the people.”140 The party also promised elimination of feudalism in
accordance with established principles of socialism to protect and advance the
interests of the underprivileged and especially the peasantry of Pakistan. Under
the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the party had been very active and won
majority of seats in the December 1970 elections in West Pakistan on the
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 71

socialist mandate of Roti, Kapda aur Makaan (‘bread, clothes and shelter’).141
Following the loss of East Pakistan (which became Bangladesh) in 1971, Bhutto
was sworn in as President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of truncated
Pakistan. As promised in PPP’s socialist mandate, Bhutto’s government
introduced significant social and economic reforms, which considerably
improved the life of Pakistan’s impoverished masses and also gave the country
the 1973 Constitution.142 The measures included nationalisation of large-scale
industries, insurance companies and commercial banks. Besides, Bhutto also
set up a number of public corporations to expand the role of the government
in areas related to commerce, construction and transportation.143 In the 1977
elections, the PPP once again came to power by winning 155 seats out of 200,
as against 36 seats secured by the Pakistan National Alliance, a coalition of
nine political parties. The opposition accused the PPP of large-scale rigging
and violence erupted on the streets resulting in the imposition of martial law
in the country by General Zia-ul-Haq on July 5, 1977.
Bhutto, who was charged with murder was sentenced to death by hanging
on April 4, 1979. His daughter, Benazir Bhutto, was elected Prime Minister
twice in 1988 and 1993, but her government was dismissed both times on
corruption charges. Following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December
27, 2007, her husband and party’s co-Chairman, Asif Ali Zardari, was elected
the President of Pakistan in September 2008. He held the position till 2013
when the party lost elections to Nawaz Sharif ’s Muslim League.
The PPP opened its ‘AJK’ chapter, AJKPPP in 1970 and came to power
after the May 1975 elections by forming a ‘United Front’ alliance, comprising
the AJKPPP, AJK Liberation League and Azad Muslim Conference.144 But the
AJKPPP government could last only for two years as Pakistan was once again
put under Martial Law on July 5, 1977. Pakistan’s Army Chief General, Zia ul
Haq, staged a military coup, sacked and jailed Bhutto, dissolved the National
Assembly, suspended the operation of the constitution and outlawed political
activities.145 ‘AJK’ was not put under Martial Law, but General Zia dismissed
the AJKPPP government and installed a serving army officer, Brigadier Hayat
Khan as President and Chief Executive of ‘AJK’.146 In protest against the
undeclared military rule in ‘AJK’, a campaign was launched by four parties’
alliance comprising the AJKPPP, AJK Muslim Conference, Azad Muslim
Conference and Plebiscite Front. The intensity of the protests was so high that
the military government decided to hold elections in May 1985. However, the
AJKPPP could not participate as it was not registered as a political party, as
was required by the Political Parties Ordinance issued in September 1979.147
72 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Although both the AJKPPP and AJK Muslim Conference won 16 seats
each in the May 1990 elections, the AJKPPP nominee, Raja Mumtaz Hussain
Rathore, was elected as Prime Minister by defeating AJK Muslim Conference
candidate Sikandar Hayat Khan by 29 votes to 15.148 This was not at all well-
received by Sardar Qayyum, who after the dismissal of the Benazir government
in August 1990, started a campaign for the removal of the Rathore government.
This led to the June 29, 1991 elections in which the AJK Muslim Conference
won 31 seats as against three by the AJKPPP. The results were a rude shock to
Rathore who charged Islamabad with rigging and demanded the elections
should be annulled.149
The AJKPPP received a boost by winning the 1996 elections, in which it
trounced the AJKMC by winning 37 seats. The AJKMC came second by
winning nine seats, the ‘AJK’ branches of Pakistan Muslim League-Junejo (PML-
Junejo) and the Jamaat-e-Islami one each. Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry
was elected Prime Minister, and Sardar Ibrahim Khan was elected President.
The Assembly approved 44 bills and passed many resolutions about the Kashmir
issue and matters concerning the public.
The seventh Assembly elections were held on July 5, 2001 where the
AJKMC secured 31 seats and the AJKPPP 17. Sardar Hayat Khan was elected
as Prime Minister and Major General (retd) Muhammad Anwar Khan as
President. The ruling AJKMC retained power in the eighth Assembly elections
held in July 2006. It elected Sardar Attique Ahmad Khan as Prime Minister
and Raja Zulqarnain Khan as President. But the period from January 2009 to
the next Assembly elections in 2011, was full of intrigue and conspiracies.
During the short period of two years, ‘AJK’ saw three Prime Ministers – Sardar
Muhammad Khan, Raja Muhammad Farooq Haider Khan and Sardar Attique
Khan. The AJKPPP swept the ninth Assembly elections in June 2011, and
elected Chaudhry Abdul Majeed as Prime Minister and Sardar Muhammad
Yakub Khan as President. Commenting on the results and the victory of
AJKPPP, Ershad Mahmud, an Islamabad-based commentator on ‘AJK’, says:
The people of AJK had had enough of the rule of the Muslim Conference
which could not deliver anything during its ten years stint in power. Its
members were frequently switching their loyalties from one camp to another
only to advance their own vested interests. Just in five years in AJK saw four
prime ministers which had practically paralysed the entire administration in
Muzaffarabad and eventually made the Muslim Conference a non-entity.150

Ideology/Objectives
The AJKPPP’s ideology and objectives remain the same as that of the PPP.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 73

According to its manifesto, the party aimed at introducing “real democracy”

for which the first condition was the abolition of privileges and the transfer of
power to the people. It believed that political privileges were inseparably related
to economic privileges and inequalities. In calling for a socialistic solution to
the country’s problems, the PPP manifesto proclaimed that the only correct
way to deal with them was to change (a) the exploitative capitalist structure,
and (b) Pakistan’s situation as an underdeveloped country within the neo-
colonialist power sphere. The ultimate objective of the party’s policy was the
attainment of classless society which it thought was possible only through
socialism.151 By 1972 Bhutto had consolidated his power, but thereafter, as
eminent Pakistani economist Dr. Akmal Hussain says, Bhutto began to shift
the balance of class forces within the PPP in favour of the landlord group.
Elaborating his point, Dr. Akmal Hussain says:
After the election, Bhutto realised that if the socialist rhetoric of the left wing
of the PPP was to be implemented, it could not be done through the existing
State apparatus. It would involve institutionalising party links with the
working class and the peasantry by building grass-roots organisations. This
would soon generate a working-class leadership which would not only threaten
his own position within the party but would also unleash a momentum of
class conflict that would place the PPP on a collision course with the military
and the bureaucracy. Given Bhutto’s commitment to seek democratic reforms
within the framework of the State as constituted at that time, he was unwilling
to take a path that would lead to a confrontation with the State apparatus.
Consequently, the socialist rhetoric of the PPP had to be toned down, its
radical petit bourgeoisie elements quietened or purged from the party, the
rudimentary organisational links with the working class and poor peasants
broken and the landlord elements of the PPP firmly established as the
dominant element within the party.152
This resulted the PPP workers who believed in its left-wing ideological stance
leaving the party.. At the Lahore Convention held on November 30, 1967, the
participants took a strong line on Kashmir issue and on relations with India.
The Convention demanded that the resolution of the Kashmir issue, on the
basis of the relevant United Nations (UN) resolutions, recognising the right of
self-determination, should be given the top priority for normalisation of
relations with India.153 However, in its 2013 Manifesto, the party listed the
normalisation of trade relations with India among some of the important
achievements of its government over the last five years in integrating regional
trade and commerce. But the manifesto supported the rights of the Kashmiri
people and a dialogue process with India on all key issues, including Kashmir.
74 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Adding further, “Without prejudice to UN Security Council resolutions, we

support open and safe borders at the Line of Control to socially unite the
Kashmiri people. We note that India and China have a border dispute and yet
enjoy tension-free relations.” While commenting on the June 2011 ‘AJK’
Assembly elections, AJKPPP chief, Chaudhry Abdul Majeed said:154
(i) Coming elections will be of exceptional importance in view of the
existing global scenario which was seeking early peaceful settlement
of the Kashmir problem;
(ii) Sanctity of the territory of ‘AJK’ being the base camp of the Kashmir
freedom struggle will be maintained in all circumstances;
(iii) India was denying Kashmiris their birth right to self-determination
by staging so-called elections drama in Jammu & Kashmir.
Similarly, the Secretary General of the AJKPPP, Chaudhry Latif Akbar, said in
Muzaffarabad on May 23, 2011 that the foundation of the PPP was laid to
resolve the Kashmir issue, and supporting the independence movement was
the part and parcel of its manifesto.155

Organisation, Structure and Leadership

The PPP has a well-formed organisational structure in Pakistan, ‘AJK’ and
Gilgit-Baltistan. The highest body of the party is the Central Executive
Committee (CEC), which is the decision-making body. The CEC consists of
a Chairman, a Co-Chairman and Presidents and Vice-Chairmen. It coordinates
activities between the Federal Council and Provisional Presidium and Secretary
Generals. Below are the Federal Council and Provincial Presidents and General
Secretaries. The 48-member Federal Council is headed by the Co-Chairman
of the Party. There is also a women’s wing called the PPP Central President
Women’s Organisation, and a youth wing – the PPP Youth Organisation and
People’s Student Federation. Both these wings are headed by Faryal Talpur, a
member of the National Assembly. The Party has also set up chapters in Europe,
the US, Canada and many other countries which are supervised by the Overseas
Central Committee.156
The Party is led by Asif Ali Zardari and his son, Bilawal Zardari Bhutto
who is the Co-Chairman of the Party. Its Secretary General is Sardar
Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Central Information Secretary is Qamar Zaman
Kaira and Amjad Ikhlaq is the Secretary Finance. The office bearers of its ‘AJK’
chapter are as follows:
Chaudhry Latif Akbar – President
Chaudhry Pervez Ashraf – Senior Vice-President
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 75

Raja Faisal Mumtaz Rathore – General Secretary

Javed Ayub – Information Secretary
Ms Shaheen Qausar Dar – Deputy Information Secretary
Zia Qamar – Youth President
Chaudhry Latif Akbar has replaced Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, the ex-prime
minister of ‘AJK’ in the outgoing PPP-led coalition government in the region.
Chaudhry Majeed was removed from the office of the AJKPPP president by
the party’s top leadership after its humiliating defeat in the 2016 election.

Cadre Strength and Funding

Since its entry into ‘AJK’ in 1970, the AJKPPP has been a major political player.
While the exact cadre strength of the party is not available, the party has its
members in almost all the districts of ‘AJK’. Anyone who follows the party’s
ideology can become a member of the PPP. The party raises funds from
members and donors. The funds are also collected by the party offices from
Pakistanis living abroad. The party has never faced shortage of funds after its
doors were open to industrialists and members of the landed elite who became
members after the AJKPPP downplayed the word socialism from its manifesto
for the 1970 elections.157

Network and Area of Influence

Since its formation, the PPP has established an effective network by capturing
power in 1977, 1988, 1993 and 2008. In the 2008 elections, the PPP was the
leading party of the ruling coalition at the centre with two other parties, the
Awami National Party (ANP) and the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM).
It was also the first Pakistani civilian government which completed its full term
in office.
The AJKPPP had swept the elections to the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly
held in June 2011. It secured 21 seats, the PML-N winning nine and the Muslim
Conference just four. Two seats were bagged by independent candidates.158 The
credit for this victory goes to the AJKPPP leadership who had formed a
comprehensive strategy by creating “a factional rift within the Muslim
Conference which caused a vertical split in the party”.159 According to Ershad
Mahmud, the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Manzoor Ahmad Wattoo
played his cards well to win over the former ‘AJK’ premiers Barrister Sultan
Mahmood Chaudhry and Sardar Yaqoob Khan which gave a boost to the party.
Later, the Muslim Conference tally rose to five and MQM opened its account
by securing two refugee seats. The AJKPPP invited both the factions of the
76 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Muslim Conference to join the government under the philosophy of “political

reconciliation” espoused by the PPP.160 The move was criticised by the PML-N
which said that the alliances had been formed “to deny it victory in the [2013]
general election”.161
During election campaign in ‘AJK’, Bilawal Bhutto raked up the Kashmir
issue and assured the people that he would take back the entire Kashmir from
India but at the same time the party suffered a big setback as three of its ministers
joined the PTI.

Current Status
In the 2013 election in Pakistan, the PML-N came to power but the AJKPPP
government elected in 2011 was allowed to complete its term. But there were
efforts by local branch of the PML-N to consolidate its position with leaders
who had defected from AJKMC, while preparing for the next elections. Its
efforts paid off in the July 2016 elections by raising up anti-incumbency
sentiments in the region. The AJKPPP was routed, it got only three seats. This
may not, however, be the end of AJKPPP, because the electoral politics of the
region is heavily influenced by politics in Pakistan, and PPP remains a major
political party with the potential to return to power in Islamabad in future. In
his efforts to spread party network, PPP co-chairman, Bilawal Bhutto has
appointed office bearers in all the districts of ‘AJK’.
When most of analysts were predicting bleak future of the party and were
terming it as a regional party confined to a one province only, the 2018 general
elections in Pakistan dismissed all those notions. It got 43 National Assembly
seats and 74 in Sindh Assembly. Most noticeable were the seats it secured in
Punjab where it was thought that PPP has lost its support base.

AJK PAKISTAN PEOPLE’S PARTY SHAHEED BHUTTO

(AJKPPPSB)
Introduction
Pakistan People’s Party Shaheed Bhutto (PPPSB) is a breakaway faction of the
PPP. After returning from exile, Murtaza Bhutto wanted to revive the PPP
according to its founding principles. However, he faced opposition within the
party particularly from his sister Benazir Bhutto. The subsequent events forced
Murtaza to hand over leadership to Benazir. In September 1996, Murtaza was
killed in an encounter with police. Benazir was then the prime minister of
Pakistan. After her government was dismissed on the charges of corruption in
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 77

November 1996, Zardari was detained briefly for his role in Murtaza’s
assassination. Thereafter, in 1997, Ghinwa Bhutto, wife of Murtaza Bhutto,
formed PPPSB claiming it to be the real successor of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s
PPP.162 However, the party has not fared well politically even in Sindh province,
home to the Bhuttos. Its only politically heavyweight is Ghinwa Bhutto. After
the dismal performance of the PPP in 2013 elections, PPPSB wanted to take
advantage by reorganising the party before the arrival of its new leader, Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto Junior – the son of Murtaza Bhutto. It was decided that Junior
Bhutto would take charge of the party, while his sister, Fatima Bhutto, would
be the candidate for prime ministership in the general elections of 2018 and
she would contest elections from her ancestral constituency, Larkana, from
where her grandfather Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, her aunt Benazir Bhutto and her
grandmother Nusrat Bhutto were elected in the past.163 PPPSB chalked out
the strategy to open its offices throughout the country. However, in the elections
on July 25, 2018, Fatima did not contest from Larkana and Bilawal Bhutto,
son of Benazir won it with a comfortable margin of 34,000 votes, of course,
certainly lower than what his mother and grandfather could poll earlier. Fatima’s
PPPSB candidate lost his deposit with just 1,652 votes.
The party has opened a chapter in ‘AJK’ where its president is Munir Hussain
Chaudhry. The AJKPPPSB decided to field its candidates in all the constituencies
of ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly elections in July, 2016 elections. Munir Hussain
Chaudhry underlined the meritorious services of the Bhutto family for the
Kashmir cause – especially Kashmiris’ right to self-determination. He said that
time has come to contribute due share by the PPPSB to give an impetus to
Kashmiris’ indigenous struggle for freedom of the motherland from Indian
control. The party, however, could not open its account in 2016 elections.164

AJK PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE-NAWAZ (AJKPML-N)

Introduction
The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) is the most dominant of all
the successor factions of the Muslim League that had led the movement for a
separate state for the Muslims of the subcontinent which culminated in the
formation of Pakistan. Right since the establishment of the AJK Muslim
Conference (AJKMC) as a political outfit in ‘AJK’, Muslim League was allied
with it and partly shaped its pro-Pakistan political agenda. In fact, immediately
after its formation, AJKMC passed a resolution to work towards merging entire
Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan. Ideologically, AJKMC embraced the
Muslim League’s two-nation theory.
78 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Factionalism Within the Muslim League

At the time of partition, the All-India Muslim League claimed to be the sole
representative of the Muslims of undivided India. It was founded at Dhaka
(now in Bangladesh) on December 30, 1906 to safeguard the rights of the
Muslims in British India. A number of factors played an important role in
Muslim League’s emergence: impact of the 1857 Mutiny on Muslims, relations
with the British, and the introduction of the representative political system by
the British. Initially, the Muslim League adopted a policy of loyalty towards
the British, but soon after partition of Bengal in 1905, two main groups
emerged: one called “conservatives” led by Sir Mohammad Shafi and the other
“progressives” led by Jinnah, which criticised the conservatives’ unconditional
loyalty to the British.165
After Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947, the All-India Muslim
League came to be known as only Muslim League. It witnessed many ups and
downs as a national political party. In its first party convention held in February
1948, Chaudhry Khaleequzzaman was elected chief organiser and assigned the
job of reorganising the party.166 In the process of making the party stronger,
Khaleequzzaman made government officials subservient to the office bearers of
the party.167 That resulted in dual leadership with both sides wanting to get the
upper hand. This was the beginning of the factionalism within the Muslim
League. Moreover, factors such as the language controversy, provincialism and
indecision on the part of the then Pakistani Prime Minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin,
to solve the controversial issues not only complicated the affairs at hand but also
sowed the seeds of dissent within the Muslim League in the provinces.168 Most
of the top leaders left the party after death of Jinnah on September 11, 1948.
They either formed a new party or joined anti-Punjab Muslim League fronts.
For example, H.S. Suhrawardy formed a new party known as the All Pakistan
Awami Muslim League in February 1950, and Nawab of Mamdot formed the
Jinnah Muslim League in 1949. Both these factions merged in 1950 and formed
Jinnah Awami Muslim League which dropped ‘Muslim’ from its name and
became Jinnah Awami League in 1953. After winning the provincial elections
in East Pakistan, it shed ‘Jinnah’ from its name and emerged as a Bengali
nationalist party named Awami League by 1956. In 1949, the left wing leaders
in Muslim League walked away from the party and formed Azad Pakistan Party.
It merged with some other left-leaning political groups to form National Awami
Party in 1957. There were provincial Muslims Leagues too.
General Ayub Khan, after assuming power in 1958 in a coup, thought of
uniting some factions of Muslim League, and in 1962, he formed Pakistan
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 79

Muslim League (PML) which later became PML-Convention. Some of the

old Leaguers opposed to Ayub formed PML-Council in 1965 and fielded
Jinnah’s sister Ms Fatima Jinnah as their presidential candidate against Ayub
Khan. By November 1967, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who was a member of PML-
Convention, left the party – both because he developed his differences with
Ayub Khan and also because latter’s political prospects were in decline – and
formed Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). Following PPP’s spectacular win in the
1970 elections in West Pakistan (81 seats), complete routing of PML-
Convention (7 seats) and PML-Council (2 seats), and loss of East Pakistan in
1971, these two prominent League factions came together to form PML-
Functional (PML-F) under the initiative of Pir Pagaro in 1973. When PML-
F welcomed Zia-ul-Haq’s coup in 1977, this faction witnessed further divisions.
Zia-ul-Haq lifted martial law in 1985 and under his patronage PML-F allied
itself with other minor factions of the League to become ‘united’ PML in 1985.
There was a leadership issue within PML after it won the 1990 elections. It
elected Nawaz as prime minister. Those in the party who opposed Nawaz walked
away from the party in 1993. The faction of the party under Nawaz’s leadership
was renamed as PML-Nawaz. During Musharraf ’s rule (1999-2008), several
league factions were merged to form PML-Quaid which functioned as a secular
political party loyal to the military dictator.

The League under Military Junta

Under military rulers in Pakistan, political parties are either banned or made
use to get their rule legitimised. After Ayub Khan assumed power in 1958, he
took drastic steps to keep political parties under control. He issued Election
Bodies Disqualification Ordinance (EBDO) under which politicians were
disqualified; introduced the Political Parties Act (PPA) to revive political parties
but did not allow the politicians, banned under EBDO, to contest elections
held under his Basic Democracy. After facing pressure from the National
Democratic Front, Ayub formed his own political party known as the
Convention Muslim League to contest the presidential elections, which he
subsequently won. All those Muslim Leaguers who did not join Ayub’s
Convention Muslim League formed their own organisation, called the Council
Muslim League.
In the 1970 elections, both Convention and Council Muslim Leagues were
routed by the Awami League in East Pakistan. Soon after the elections, the
Council Muslim League disintegrated when Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan broke
away and formed his own party known as PML (Qayyum). With Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) emerging on the political horizon of
80 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Pakistan, Ayub’s Convention Muslim League went to abyss. Following Ayub

Khan, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq and Gen. Pervez Musharraf, too, got pro-military
politicians together under the nomenclature “Muslim League”.
General Zia-ul-Haq encouraged different factions of the Muslim League
to dissolve themselves under Mohammad Khan Junejo. Junejo was made Prime
Minister and Nawaz Sharif became the President of the party.169 Differences
soon emerged between Zia and Junejo which finally culminated in the dismissal
of the Junejo government. Nawaz wittingly didn’t condemn Zia, and for that
gesture he was awarded the caretaker Chief Ministership of Punjab.170
After Zia’s death, many groups emerged from the Muslim League: Pir
Pagaro named his group as PML-Functional, Malik Mohmmad Qasim as PML-
Qasim, PML-Liaquat and PML-Jinnah. Hamid Nasser Chatha, who was
Secretary of the PML-Junejo, formed his own group known as PML-Chatha.
As part of the Islami-Jamhoori-Ittehad (IJI), the Muslim League did well
in Punjab. Nawaz Sharif became the Chief Minister of the largest province.
He remained part of the IJI till 1993 when his government at the centre was
dismissed by then President Ghulam Ishaq. After Junejo was dismissed by Zia,
Nawaz Sharif quit the PML and established his own party, the PML-N.171 After
developing differences with Nawaz Sharif, Zia’s son Ijazul Haq broke away from
Sharif and formed the PML-Zia. When Musharraf came to power, a pro-
establishment leader from Lahore, Mian Azhar founded the PML (Quaid-i-
Azam), or PML (Q), with Syeda Abida Hussain, Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri
and Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain as its founding members. The party as supporter
of President-cum Army Chief Gen. Pervaiz Musharraf became the ruling party
after the 2000 general elections. In five years of its rule it changed five prime
ministers. PML-Q saw another faction known as the Like Minded, although
its members have yet to form political party. The unified PML seems to be
impossible for years to come.
PML-Quaid suffered a big set-back in 2008 elections and PML-N
reappeared on the political horizon again as a party of consequence, even if it
conceded space to PPP, the party with largest number of seats, to form
government in Pakistan. It showed political maturity by not indulging in
conspiracies to topple the PPP government which lasted its entire term and
became the first government to do so in Pakistan in recent years. The PML-N
won handsomely in 2013 elections and has been in power in Pakistan ever
since. Its branch in ‘AJK’ swept the local elections defeating the incumbent
AJKPPP in July 2016.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 81

Aims and Objectives of PML-N172

(1) Protect territorial integrity and uphold the ideology of Pakistan.
(2) Uphold and protect the constitution.
(3) Enable the Muslims of Pakistan to live in accordance with the teachings
and requirements of Islam as set out in the Quran and the Sunnah.
(4) Establish friendly relations with other nations and to strengthen
fraternal relations and solidarity with other Muslim States.
(5) Ensure tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam are fully
observed and enforced in Pakistan.

PML-N in ‘AJK’ Politics

In the political spectrum of ‘AJK’, Islamabad always found it easy to deal with
the AJKMC because of its anti-India posture and right-wing politics. Over the
years, various incarnations of PML perceived the AJKMC as their natural
partner because of their ideology and stand on the overall Kashmir issue. Thus
AJKMC always received support from the PML and the army.
The PML made its presence felt in ‘AJK’ in 1991, when a rather new
political party, Tehrik-i-Amal, founded by Maj. Gen. (retd.) Muhammad Hayat
Khan in 1983 converted itself into the AJK Muslim League on April 2, 1991.173
In the 1985 elections Tehrik-i-Amal had secured eight seats with 19 per cent
of the total votes cast. In the 1990 elections it secured only one seat. The PML
always maintained a close relationship with the Muslim Conference. When
Hayat Khan joined the IJI alliance along with the AJK Liberation League and
the AJKPPP, Nawaz Sharif did not appreciate Hayat’s stand and instead
reiterated support for AJKMC. In a statement he even said that, “we consider
Muslim Conference as Muslim League in Azad Kashmir. We supported you in
the past, in future also will maintain this tradition”.174 However, the PML-N
finally thought of participating more actively in ‘AJK’ politics in 1996 when
the PML (Junejo) participated in the elections and won one seat. The PML-
N’s ‘AJK’ chapter was formally launched on December 26, 2010 by its leader
Nawaz Sharif.175
Sharif family’s bonhomie with AJKMC came to an end when the latter
extended support to the military dictator Gen. Musharraf after he toppled
Nawaz government in a military coup in October 1999. This was obvious from
the fact when PML-N supported Raja Farooq Haider in the ‘AJK’ local elections
against the alliance of the AJKPPP and Muslim Conference. PML-N did not
take part in the elections held under Musharraf ’s regime. It was only in the
2011 elections when the PML-N fought on the Muslim Conference’s turf. It
82 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

entered into an alliance with the Jamaat-e-Islami Azad Jammu and Kashmir
(JIAJK). While cautioning federal government against interfering in elections
of ‘AJK’, Nawaz Sharif announced that PML-N would participate in the
elections with the JIAJK.176 This alliance couldn’t do well in the elections but
gave a clear signal to the Muslim Conference that the PML-N had got their
new ally. The Emir of JIAJK termed this unity as a natural alliance and said
that both shared common interests and same vision for the future.177 Although
PML-N and its ‘AJK’ chapter were able to mobilise the huge public rallies, but
they only secured eight seats. The AJKPPP won 21.178 The 2015 by-elections
in ‘AJK’ saw these erstwhile opponents come together. The by-election for the
seat, LA-3, Mirpur-III, had fallen vacant after Barrister Sultan Mahmood
resigned from the ‘AJK’ Assembly and joined the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI).
The PPP and PML-N came together against the PTI. The PPP nominated
Chaudhry Mohammad Ashraf as its candidate and requested PML-N to
withdraw its candidate and vote for Mohammad Ashraf; the PML-N obliged.
But Barrister Sultan Mahmood won convincingly, bagging 15,485 votes to the
PPP’s 12,811 votes.179
In the election held in July 2016, the PML-N initially decided to contest
all the seats without entering into an alliance after it failed to woo Sardar Attique
of the Muslim Conference. Attique refused to enter into an electoral alliance
with the PML-N because the latter wanted to field in the areas which are
regarded as Muslim Conference strongholds. The PML-N finally entered into
a seat sharing arranged with Jamaat-e-Islami Azad Kashmir (JIAJK). Both the
parties decided to keep open four seats from Rawalakot, two from Kotli and
one form Mirpur, whereas, the PML-N agreed not to field its candidate against
JIAJK’s Noorul Bari in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Valley-VI constituency, where
Kashmiri refugees are settled. PML-N also agreed to give a special seat to the
JIAJK’s Turabi as he withdrew in favour of PML-N’s Mushtaq Minhas. The
top leadership of the PML-N under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif constituted an 18-member parliamentary board to kick off its election
campaign.
When elections were held for the 49-memeber ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly
on July 21, 2016, the PML-N swept the polls by winning 31 seats. The winning
of PML-N in ‘AJK’ reaffirmed the trend that ruling party at centre in Pakistan
always wins elections in the region. The PML-N nominated Raja Farooq Haider
as Prime Minister of ‘AJK’. Although, there were reports that journalist turned
Raja Mushtaq Minhas could be the choice for prime ministership as he is seen
very close to the Pakistan military establishment.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 83

Organisation and Party Leadership

The organisational structure of the party consists of President, Senior Vice
Presidents, Vice Presidents, Secretary General, Assistant Secretary Generals,
Finance Secretary, Information Secretary, Overseas Organisation Secretary and
Joint Secretaries. All these office bearers according to the party constitution
are elected by PML-N Council. The party is supposed to hold intra-party
elections at all levels after the expiry of 4 years’ term from the date of previous
elections at Central/Provincial/Local levels through secret ballot.
Raja Farooq Haider Khan is the president of the PML-N chapter in ‘AJK’.
Central Secretary General is Shah Ghulam Qadir (former speaker of the ‘AJK’
Assembly) and Raja Zafar ul Haq.

Cadre Strength and Funding

The PML-N is a cadre-based political party. Punjab provides most of its cadre
strength. It’s very difficult to know the exact strength of the party in ‘AJK’.
However, it does have a following within the conservative section of the society.
Funding of the party has never been an issue. The PML-N at the centre is a
pro-business entity. Most of its top leadership belongs to industrialists. On
various occasions the PML-N has been accused of spending money to rig
elections. In 2011, then Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Mian Manzoor Ahmad
Wattoo, warned Nawaz Sharif that he should not use the resources of the Punjab
government during the ‘AJK’ elections.180

PML-N’s Take on Kashmir Issue

Like other political parties in Pakistan, the PML-N, too, stands for resolving
the Kashmir issue through dialogue. After becoming Prime Minister of Pakistan
in 2013, Nawaz Sharif initially maintained a positive posture vis-à-vis India.
He signalled that he would not allow sanctuaries to anti-India extremist groups.
He even said that he would allow transit facilities to Indian trucks. However,
according to perceptions created by Pakistani media reports, the Pakistani Army
did not allow Nawaz to move in that direction. The final bolt came when India
cancelled the Foreign Secretary level talks with Pakistan. resenting Pakistani
High Commissioner in India, Abdul Basit’s meeting with separatist leaders,
despite India’s expression of displeasure over it.181
Nawaz Sharif did raise the Kashmir issue at every forum. While addressing
the 69th session of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on September
26, 2014, Nawaz emphasised on the Kashmir issue more vociferously than in
the previous years. Being vocal on Kashmir at the UN General Assembly had
84 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

much to do with India’s cancellation of talks. On October 13, 2014 he again

raised the Kashmir issue with a delegation of US Senators. Sharif told them
that the “UN resolutions must form the basis for any solution for Kashmir
and people of Kashmir be made part of it”.182
He did not stop there, when the then US President Barack Obama was
supposed to travel to India in January 2015, Nawaz Sharif requested him on
telephone to raise the Kashmir issue with the Indian leadership. The Prime
Minister’s Office made this conversation public. It said, ‘The Prime Minister
also urged President Obama to take up the cause of Kashmir with the Indian
leadership, as its early resolution would bring enduring peace, stability and
economic cooperation to Asia.”183
The above-mentioned statements give the impression that the Nawaz Sharif-
led PML-N had again gone back to its position vis-à-vis Kashmir,
internationalising it at every forum. However, it could have been a political
gimmick to keep the right-wing forces and establishment happy. Although even
Kashmir could not save Nawaz Sharif. He was finally deposed by army on
corruption charges by using judiciary.

AJK MUTTAHIDA QUAMI MOVEMENT (AJKMQM)

Introduction
Politics in ‘AJK’ took a dramatic turn on June 10, 2006 when the Muttahida
Quami Movement (MQM) announced that the party would participate in the
elections for the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly in July 2006. It then issued the list
of its candidates for 26 out of the 41 constituencies. The decision to participate
was announced by MQM’s Parliamentary Leader in the then National Assembly,
Dr. Farooq Sattar, and then Minister for Housing and Works, Syed Safwanullah,
at a news conference in Islamabad. Explaining the reasons for entering the
election fray in ‘AJK’, Sattar said that the MQM was becoming a national-
level party and, therefore, it had decided to take part in the elections in ‘AJK’
for the first time. Before making the announcement, the party had already
done the ground work in ‘AJK’ by launching relief measures in the areas which
were hit during the October 5, 2005 earthquake.
According to Dr. Sattar, the MQM supremo, Altaf Hussain, had personally
donated Rs five million for relief work. In addition, the party provided goods
and aid worth Rs 3.5 billion to the earthquake-affected areas. The relief goods
were distributed by teams led by MQM ministers, advisers, MNAs, MPAs and
Senators in the affected areas.184 The MQM was, however, able to win only
two refugee seats in Karachi where other contestants had boycotted polling
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 85

following alleged rigging.185 Most of the political parties alleged that the
Musharraf government had rigged the polls in favour of the AJKMC. The
MQM candidates, Malik Abdul Manan and Sardar Abdul Aziz, levelled similar
allegations and demanded re-election in the refugee constituencies in Sindh.186
According to Christopher Snedden, it is likely that President Pervez Musharraf,
who himself is a Muhajir, might have helped MQM to win the two seats it
had secured in its maiden attempt in ‘AJK’.187
The MQM had participated in the June 2011 elections in ‘AJK’. Addressing
a big election meeting in Muzaffarabad on June 19, 2011 by telephone from
London, Altaf Hussain said that future of ‘AJK’ and Kashmir belonged to the
MQM. He said that the time was not far when there would be an MQM
government in Kashmir and the Kashmir dispute lying on the backburner for the
past 63 years would also be settled. He asked the Indian Government to stop
military action and desist from using state power in Kashmir. He added that the
Indian Army should be stopped from killing innocent Kashmiri people and
from violating the Kashmiri women, and demanded that the Kashmiri people
should be given the right of self-determination according to the resolutions of
the United Nations. He claimed that no one could understand the sufferings of
the Kashmiri people better than the MQM, adding, “We remained steadfast in
the face of hardships and unending vitriolic propaganda unleashed against us. It
was because of our patience that MQM had reached Kashmir.”188
Earlier, while talking to Kashmiri workers at the International Secretariat
in London on May 23, 2011, Altaf Hussain assured that if the MQM got a
chance to come to power in Kashmir, it would not only resolve the Kashmir
dispute but also get the people of Kashmir their legitimate rights.189 In this
election also, the MQM was able to win only two Kashmiri refugee seats of
Jammu (LA-30) and Kashmir Valley-1 (LA-36) where its candidates,
Muhammad Tahir Khokhar and Muhammad Salim Bhat, got elected. In all,
12 candidates contested from LA-30, while 11 contested from LA-36.

MQM, the Parent Organisation

The MQM was formed in 1984 by Altaf Hussain as Muhajir Quami
Movement. It claimed to represent the interests of Muhajirs – the Urdu-speaking
people who left India, after the Partition in 1947. The decision to form the
party was taken after Altaf Hussain felt in the early 1980s that the Muhajirs
were being discriminated against in every field by the Pakistani State and, like
other nationalities in the country, should enjoy equivalent rights. For example,
the Muhajir students were refused admission for higher education in various
colleges and the universities of Sindh.
86 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Keeping this in mind, Altaf Hussain formed the All-Pakistan Muhajir

Students’ Organisation (APMSO) at the University of Karachi on June 11,
1978, “which could help them, recognise their existence as a separate ethnic
group as well as gain their legitimate rights”.190 It subsequently led to the
formation of the Muhajir Quami Movement. At the time of its formation, the
MQM represented only the Muhajir community but changed its name to
Mutttahida (United) Quami Movement in July 1997 to attract all ethnic groups
into its fold, “since the MQM was not against any nationality or institution
but against the ‘exploitative forces’ which comprised feudal lords, waderas,
corrupt government officials and bureaucrats and some corrupt generals”.191
Within a short time, its political base expanded in Sindh where it trounced
other parties in the 1987 local party elections, with several of its candidates
elected as mayors, and made its debut in Parliament and Sindh Assembly in
1988.192 Since then, it has been contesting the polls as a key partner to keep its
influence in every government in Pakistan.

Ideology/Objectives/Manifesto
The cherished goals of MQM are: eradication of political authoritarianism,
abolition of feudal system, promotion of cultural pluralism, devolution of power
to the grass-roots level and to achieve full provincial autonomy and a completely
devolved local government system. The MQM believes in the induction of
common man in the power structure to provide opportunity to economically
and socially deprived people, “empowerment for all” for a better and safer life
for today and tomorrow.193
Explaining his party’s ideology, Altaf Hussain reiterated in 2011 that the
MQM was not a party of the feudal lords, adding that it was the only political
party working in the interests of the poor and middle-class people. He
emphasised that MQM did not want to change the borders of the country but
only wanted to change the decayed political system and empower the poor
and middle-class people.194 Elaborating his point, the party’s website says:
Ideologically speaking, MQM is not a proponent of Socialism, Communism
or unbridled Capitalism. It only believes in Realism and Pragmatism. By
adopting this philosophy it desires to establish an economic system based on
principles of free market in accordance with the spirit of democracy. MQM
seeks drastic reforms in all sectors including agriculture, industry, commerce,
education, health, defence, finance judiciary. These are considered essential
for the solidarity, security, progress and prosperity of the country as well as
for the welfare of the common man. MQM wants to see the total elimination
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 87

of corruption, bribery, injustices, tyranny, exploitation, illiteracy,

unemployment, poverty, drug trafficking and other such social evils. It aims
to introduce a comprehensive program to make Pakistan prosperous and
stable, and create a just society in which opportunity to progress and prosper
is available to all, without discrimination.195
On foreign affairs, it states:
MQM wants an independent foreign policy for Pakistan and wants to promote
close, friendly and honourably relations with all the countries, especially with
the neighbouring countries. MQM believes in the policy of coexistence, or
in simple words, live and let live. MQM believes that all the disputes and
conflicts be resolved through dialogue and peaceful means. MQM wants to
solve the Kashmir issue through meaningful, sincere and honourable dialogue
according to the wishes of the Kashmiri people. MQM encourages confidence
building measures (CBMs) and dialogue process with India and desires peace
and close cooperation between the countries of South Asia, especially in
economic fields so as to provide peace, progress and prosperity to one-fifth
population of the world living in the region.196

MQM in ‘AJK’ Politics

Besides good governance and freedom of expression in ‘AJK’, the MQM
promises to stand by the Kashmiri people in their struggle for ‘self-
determination’ and their ‘legitimate rights’. The salient points of the MQM’s
manifesto for ‘AJK’ elections 2011, released by Dr Farooq Sattar, Federal
Minister and Deputy Convenor of MQM coordination committee, on May
20, 2011, are as follows:197
(i) Kashmir dispute should be resolved according to the wishes and
aspirations of the people of Kashmir.
(ii) The MQM stands by the people of Kashmir in their struggle for self-
determination and legitimate rights.
(iii) Able leadership for poor and middle class will be introduced and a
corruption-free society will be established in Kashmir.
(iv) Two-fold education system will be abolished and free education will
be given up to matriculation level.
(v) ‘AJK’ will get its due share in the royalty of Mangla Dam like
Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
(vi) Hospitals and basic health centres will be established in the districts
and villages of Kashmir for providing healthcare facilities to the poor
people.
88 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(vii) Hydroelectric power projects will be started with the help of private
sector.
(viii) Cottage industries will be protected. A department will be established
for promoting exports of marble products, fruits and garments.
(ix) Scholarships will be given to the poor Kashmiri students to higher
education.
(x) Black laws against women will be abolished and they will be given 33
per cent representation in all public institutions.
(xi) Full and transparent audit of funds collected for the reconstruction
of areas hit by earthquake will be done.
(xii) Kashmiri emigrants will be given the right to vote and practical steps
will be taken for the solution of Kashmiri migrants.
(xiii) Income generated from development of natural resources will be used
for the uplift of Kashmiri people.
(xiv) Human rights and freedom of speech will be protected.
(xv) Good governance and system of merit will be implemented in
Kashmir.
Further, in 2011, Altaf Hussain assured that the people affected by the Mangla
Dam Raising Project would be given alternative land. Besides, residential
colonies would be built for Kashmiri migrants, who would also be given an
allowance of Rs 1,500-2,000 per month. Special attention would be given to
the construction of roads, which are presently in bad shape.198 Moreover, on
its website, the MQM acknowledges the role played by the minorities of
Pakistan in nation-building, the sacrifices rendered by them, and the problems
and issues, faced by them. It further claims that the MQM members join the
Hindus and Christians to celebrate festivals like Holi, Diwali and Christmas
in Pakistan.199

Organisation, Structure and Leadership

The party is led by Altaf Hussain, who heads the Rabita Committee, also known
as the Central Coordination Committee. The 34-member Rabita Committee
(24 from Pakistan and 10 from London) formulates the party’s political
programme. On November 20, 2011, the MQM set up a 42-member Central
Executive Council (CEC) drawn from Sindh, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,
Balochistan, ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan, with representation of people from all
nationalities including the minorities. The CEC was formed to assist the
Coordination Committee in structuring the party’s organisation, policy issues,
propagation of party policies and in the preparation of party manifesto and in
holding of party programmes.200 While making this announcement, Deputy
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 89

Convenor, Dr. Farooq Sattar said the CEC shall hold a meeting on quarterly
basis under the Coordination Committee and play an active role in abolishing
feudal system, corrupt political culture and elimination of dynastic politics in
the light of the political philosophy espoused by the MQM Chief, and also
work for creating awareness among the public for the empowerment of poor
and middle-class people of the country.201
It is in this context that the MQM seeks drastic reforms in all sectors,
including agriculture, industry, commerce, education, health, defence, finance
and judiciary, which the party feels are considered essential for the solidarity,
security, progress and prosperity of the country as well as for the welfare of the
common man.202 While talking to members of CEC on March 24, 2015, Altaf
Hussain said that the CEC was a parliament and policy-making body of the
MQM and its members were responsible of making the party’s constitution.203
The party structure is further divided into wings, zones, chapters and sector
bodies to streamline the functioning of the party. The credit of MQM’s
achieving success in the urban areas of Sindh goes to the charismatic leadership
of Altaf Hussain who went from being called “Altaf Bhai” to “the Quaid-e-
Tehreek and later as Pir Sahib”.204
The MQM had two members in the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly elected in
2011. They were Salim Butt, Minister for Youth Affairs, and Muhammad Tahir
Khokhar, Transport Minister in the ‘AJK’ Government. Tahir Khokhar was also
member of the 42-member central body the CEC which was formed in 2011.205
He also headed the ‘AJK’ unit in the July 2016 elections, which did not return
even a single candidate to the assembly.

Cadre Strength and Funding

The exact cadre strength of Party’s members in ‘AJK’ is not known. However,
it mainly has representation in Sindh and has made some headway in Punjab,
Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan. To increase the party
strength, the MQM started a week-long campaign in November 2014 all over
Pakistan and abroad appealing people to join the MQM. Anyone by filling a
form, which costs Rs 10, can become a member. Despite a grenade attack at
a camp set up for the new membership drive, hundreds of people enrolled
themselves to become members. The Taliban claimed the responsibility for the
grenade attack at Orangi Town in Karachi in which one person was killed and
50 injured including three members of the Sindh Assembly.206
The MQM funds come from members’ donations. It is, however, alleged
that it also raises funds through extortion, narcotics smuggling and other criminal
90 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

activities.207 The funds are also collected by overseas branches from various
charitable institutions. The MQM had also introduced the bhatha system (forced
extraction) to collect party funds from shopkeepers, businessmen and
industrialists. Refusal to pay bhatha could “result in torture, loss of property and
even loss of life”.208 The party was also allegedly responsible for a factory fire
in the Baldia area of Karachi after failing to extort US$ 1.9 million from the
factory owner. The fire killed 258 people. The allegation has, however, been
denied by the MQM.209 The party is also accused of money-laundering activities.

Network and Area of Influence

The party continues to enjoy prominence in local politics due to muhajir vote
bank. Its headquarter is in Karachi, and it has an International Secretariat located
in London. Initially, the party maintained a low profile but after two years of
its formation the party used street power to control Sindh. The MQM
leadership dealt harshly with its opponents both within and outside the party,
and did not tolerate criticism. Many journalists were threatened for writing
against the MQM. During Operation ‘Clean Up in the early 1990’s’, the Army
discovered cells in Karachi that were allegedly used by the MQM “to torture
and at times kill dissident members and activists from rival groups”.210 Its
Supremo, Altaf Hussain, is living in exile in London after he fled Karachi in
1992 to escape arrest on charges of kidnapping and torturing an army officer.
The MQM’s network covers all the urban towns of Sindh, and it has been
able to show its presence by winning seats in Mirpur Khas, Sukkur, Gilgit-
Baltistan, ‘AJK’, and two local government seats in Balochistan. The MQM
has opened branches in the US, Canada, South Africa, Japan and several
European nations. Its international secretariat at London regularly brings out
bulletins, press releases of speeches of Altaf Hussain, activities of the party and
alleged atrocities being committed by Pakistan security agencies on MQM
workers. To help the poor and needy, the MQM has set up a welfare wing
called the Khidmat-e-Khalq Foundation. This wing also started an ambulance
service in Karachi on June 15, 2011.

Links and Alliances with other Political Parties and Militant

Groups
MQM’s relations with other Muhajir parties are not cordial. Its sworn enemy
is the MQM (Haqiqi), which was allegedly created by the Pakistan Army/Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI) to break MQM’s increasing influence. Other Muhajir
groups – Muhajir Ittehad Tehriq (MIT) and Mohajir Rabita Command (MRC)
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 91

– do not approve of its violent tactics. For this reason both the parties have
kept their distance from the MQM.211 Both MIT and MRC were formed in
the mid-80s, and are led by Dr Salim Haider and Maulana Wasi Mazhar Nadim,
respectively.
The MQM has also been involved in frequent clashes with Pashtuns who
dominate the transport business in Karachi and are prosperous.212 The US think
tank, the National Memorial Institute for Preventing Terrorism (MIPT)
considers the MQM as a terrorist outfit and has bracketed it with Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi, Balochistan Liberation Army, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-i-Taiba,
Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and others.213
MQM’s relations with the PPP can be traced to the Sindhi-Muhajir ethnic
tussle which started soon after the creation of Pakistan in 1947 when Muhajirs
started arriving in Karachi, Hyderabad and other parts urban parts of Sindh.
They soon dominated Pakistan’s political scene “with their [Muhajirs’] high
levels of literacy, political and business acumen and solidarity they effected
fundamental changes in the polity, economy, society and culture of Sindh”.214
The Sindhis, who had begun to feel like outcasts in their own province, found
voice in the PPP which was set up in 1967 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a Sindhi
wadera. Sindhis consider the PPP their bulwark against Muhajir domination.
In 1984, Muhajirs too had their own political party, the MQM. Soon after,
bloody clashes started between the PPP and MQM. The PPP Chairperson,
Benazir Bhutto called the MQM a terrorist organisation. After Bhutto’s death
in December 2007, her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, who became the joint
Chairperson of the PPP, tried to normalise relations with the MQM. When
Zardari was elected the President of Pakistan in 2008, the Sindh Assembly gave
him 100 per cent vote.215 He brought the MQM on board by taking its
nominees into the PPP government formed after the 2008 elections. However,
the PPP workers were not happy with this stand, especially in the light of
MQM’s demand to divide Sindh into two administrative parts.
Before the MQM came into being, the Muhajirs in Karachi and Hyderabad
voted for the Jamaat-e-Islami en bloc. Later, Muhajirs voted for the MQM,
and the Jamaat-e-Islami almost disappeared politically from these two cities.216
This and the MQM’s secular credentials made the Jamaat hostile to it.
MQM’s problems with the Awami National Party (ANP) started in the
wake influx of refugees from Afghanistan and FATA. The Afghan refugees and
Pakhtuns captured public transport business in Karachi as “most bus routes
were allocated to Pashtuns transporters in the aftermath of 1965 election by
Ayub Khan as a reward for the support of his ethnic brethren in the presidential
92 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

race”.217 They were also accused of gunrunning and drug smuggling. The first
violent clash took place between the Pashtuns of Sorab Goth and Muhajirs in
Karachi in 1985 when a Muhajir girl, Bushra Zaidi, was run over by a Pashtun
minibus driver. This led to the violent riots between the Muhajirs and Pashtuns
which left 65 dead and 165 injured.218 The second influx of Pashtuns into
Karachi began after the 9/11 attacks (September 11, 2001) when Pakistan joined
the US-led war against global terrorism and launched operations in tribal areas.
Now Pashtuns established a number of settlements in Karachi. The Pashtun-
based ANP took advantage of it and opened its Karachi branch. Many Pashtuns
joined it on ethnic considerations, adding an ethnic-politicised conflict between
the Muhajirs and Pashtuns in addition to the post-1947 Muhajir-Sindhi war.
This has led to occasional bloody clashes between the MQM-ANP. Interestingly,
both follow similar ideologies and have together supported the PPP governments
in Islamabad and Karachi.

Current Status
Ever since its formation, the party has maintained a firm grip over Karachi.
The party has also raised an illegal armed wing which is allegedly involved in
Karachi’s criminal economy of drugs, extortion and land theft.219 The MQM
however is generally opposed to the growth of extremist Islamist politics in
Pakistan. It also supports the US-led war on al Qaeda.
The future of MQM in ‘AJK’ appears to be bleak. The military operation
led by Pakistan rangers broke MQM’s power strength in Karachi. It lost power
and influence due to further factionalism within MQM. It got divided further
into MQM-Pakistan (MQM-P) and MQM-London(MQM-L). The former
is led by Dr Sattar and the later led by Altaf Hussain. The party could not win
two of its seats in the July 2016 elections held in ‘AJK’ which it had bagged in
the 2011 elections. In the general elections held in 2018, the MQM did not
secure much seats. It got only six National Assembly and 16 Provincial Assembly
seats. Although it entered into an alliance with PTI in centre but nevertheless
it lost most of its base to the PTI in Karachi.
The recent defection from the party and allegations by senior MQM leader,
Mustafa Kamal that the party is funded by the Indian Intelligence Agency, the
Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has further eroded its standing. Such
allegations are not new to MQM, but this time it will surely divide the MQM
vote bank.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 93

PAKISTAN TEHREEK-I-INSAF (PTIAJK)

Introduction
Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) meaning by the “Movement for Justice”, is a
political party in Pakistan founded on April 25, 1996, in Lahore by ex-cricketer
Imran Khan. The main objective to form the party was “to make Pakistan an
egalitarian, modern, Islamic democratic welfare state which upholds the
fundamental rights of the people in which all citizens, regardless of gender,
caste, creed or religion can live in peace, harmony and happiness”.220
Initially, the party was not able to make a mark in Pakistani politics: in the
1997 general elections, PTI lost all the seven constituencies it contested across
Pakistan. In the October 2002 elections, the PTI Chairman won only one seat
from Mianwali. The party boycotted the February 2008 general elections but
in the elections held in May 2013, it emerged as a close third in the National
Assembly, the largest in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly and second-largest in
the Punjab Assembly. The PTI also trounced the bastion of its rival, MQM,
by emerging as the second-largest political force in Karachi.221 The PTI won
34 out of 99 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial Assembly seats, and formed
a coalition government in the province with Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Qaumi
Watan Party of Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao.222 However, in the 2018 general
elections PTI was able to form a coalition government at the Centre. This may
help PTI to strengthen its base in PoK politics.

PTI in ‘AJK’ Politics

The PTI launched its ‘AJK’ chapter, PTI Azad Jammu and Kashmir (PTIAJK),
with former Prime Minister of ‘AJK’, Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry as
its President in 2015. The party fielded him as its candidate for the by-election
to the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly from Mirpur (LA-III) on March 29, 2015.
The PTI Chairman, Imran Khan, visited Mirpur to address election rally with
his eye on the general elections in ‘AJK’ in 2016. His speech highlighted some
of his party’s objectives in ‘AJK’, which were not different from what the party
promised in Pakistan:223
(i) Entrusting power to the representatives of the masses at the grass-
roots level
(ii) Advocating jihad against corruption
(iii) Providing clean administration to the people
(iv) Empowering all people – no gender bias
(v) Proposing ‘AJK’ as “Naya Azad Kashmir”, with his party’s broad-
based programme of turning the country into a “Naya Pakistan”
(vi) No mention of the Kashmir dispute
94 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The Mirpur seat had fallen vacant when Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry
quit the PPPAJK and resigned from the Legislative Assembly a day before
joining the PTI on February 5, 2015 as its regional chief. He defeated Chaudhry
Mohammad Ashraf of the AJKPPP by about 3,000 votes. The AJKPML-N
candidate had withdrawn from the contest in favour of the AJKPPP
candidate.224

Ideology/Objectives
The PTI is of the view that the creation of Pakistan was the result of relentless
struggle of Muslims in India under the inspiring leadership of Quaid-e-Azam
Mohammad Ali Jinnah to establish a homeland for Muslims where they could
freely practise their beliefs and ideals.
However, the party deplores that his dream has not been fulfilled. Rather,
it is convinced that Pakistan stands at the threshold of an “economic disaster,
breakdown of institutions, collapse of governance, social disorder, desperation
and disillusionment”. Even, Jammu and Kashmir has remained an incomplete
agenda of the Pakistan Movement. As per the party’s ideology, this has happened
because Pakistan fell into the hands of a ruling elite consisting of inept, corrupt
and selfish politicians, civil and military bureaucrats, feudal mindset and a host
of vested interests that plundered Pakistan and brought it to the brink of
disaster.225 Thus, the PTI was launched to mobilise people, extricate Pakistan
from its present state of despair and set it on the path of attaining unity,
solidarity, social justice and prosperity.226
PTI’s ideology is essentially derived from Jinnah’s vision of a modern Islamic
republic that advocates tolerance, moderation and freedom to practice the
religion of one’s choice. According to the party’s manifesto, the PTI is not merely
a political party: it is a broad-based political movement that embraces the
interests of all Pakistanis. While establishing the rule of law and ensuring
protection of human rights through independent and honest judiciary, its
mission is to strive for the social development and economic prosperity of
citizens, especially the poor and unprivileged masses.227 The following are the
goals of the PTI, as highlighted in its manifesto:
(i) Establish Pakistan as a truly independent and sovereign state that
becomes the source of pride for the people.
(ii) Strengthen state institutions to promote democracy and complete
political, economic and religious freedom for the people.
(iii) Provide an accountable and efficient government that ensures the
protection of life and prosperity of its citizens.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 95

(iv) Launch an Education Revolution to promote universal literacy and

raise the standard of education in our schools, colleges and universities.
(v) Ensure the availability of adequate healthcare services for all citizens.
(vi) Give the highest priority to poverty alleviation through policies aimed
at creating more job opportunities and enabling ownership of assets
to the poor.
(vii) Evolve a merit-based system that provides equal opportunity for
employment and upward social mobility for all, especially the working
classes.
(viii) Create an environment which encourages the private sector to grow
and create greater wealth and employment opportunities.
(ix) End the VIP culture by setting an example in simple living and austere
lifestyle.
(x) Eliminate draconian laws that give unchecked power to the Police
and Agencies or which limit the rights of citizens.
(xi) Evolve a self-reliant economy which is free of dependence on foreign
aid.
(xii) Promote regional peace and strengthen the relationship with friendly
countries.228
The PTI’s 2016 manifesto for ‘AJK’ elections maintained that the PTIAJK if
comes in power will declare ‘AJK’ self-reliant through 74th constitutional reforms
act. Education, health and industrial sector and establishing a gas company in
‘AJK’ was also mentioned in its manifesto.229 Its constitution maintains that
the agenda for Kashmir is “to strive for the right of self-determination for the
people of the State of Jammu & Kashmir”.230

Organisation, Structure and Leadership

The organisational structure of the PTI comprises the National Council, Central
Executive Committee (CEC), Provincial Council, Regional Organisations,
District Organisations, Primary Organisations, Union Council and Tehsil/
Taluka/Town Organisations. The National Council is the supreme body of the
party which reviews the progress of the party from time to time, and formulates
programmes and policies suitable to the needs and demands of the time. The
National Council consists of:231
(i) Office bearers of the Provincial Organisations
(ii) Presidents of the Regional Organisations
(iii) Presidents of District Organisations
(iv) 35 members, five each from the women, youth, students, labour,
96 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

farmers, minorities, lawyers and overseas organisations to be

nominated by their respective organisations
(v) Technocrats and professionals in the country to be nominated by the
Chairman who shall not exceed one-fourth of the total number of
the members belonging to cases (i) to (iv) above
Further, the CEC is PTI’s main central council. Its responsibility is to assist
the Chairman to carry out day-to-day functions of the National Council, lay
down the party policy, guide the party at national level and act as executive
authority at the national level. The CEC consists of the Central Office bearers
and 30 members nominated by the Chairman from amongst the members of
the National Council, which include one member each from Christian, Hindu
and Sikh, Parsi and other communities. The Presidents of Provinces are the
ex-officio members of the CEC. The term of office for all the organisations at
all levels is four years.
Prominent leaders of the PTI National Council are: Imran Khan,
Chairman; Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Vice Chairman; Jahangir Tareen, General
Secretary; Dr. Shirin Mazari, Secretary Information; Ibraul Haq, Secretary of
Foreign Affairs; Naeemu Haq, Chief-of-Staff of Chairman; Zafar Anwar, Chief
Organiser; and Dr. Swaran Singh, Secretary of Minorities. As mentioned earlier,
Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry is the President of the PTIAJK. Raja Musadiq is
the Regional Organiser of the PTIAJK chapter. Other leaders from ‘AJK’ include
Sardar Tahir Akbar, Babar Tahir, Chaudhry Aslam, Habib Ullah Butt, Sardar
Nasreen, Rashid Mughol, Asad Saleem and Azhar Rasheed Advocate.232

Cadre Strength and Funding

In August 2012, PTI had claimed that that its membership had exceeded 10
million members, making it the largest political party in Pakistan. But later it
was found that the party had only 350,000 members who were eligible to vote
in intra-party elections in November-December, 2012.233 Its current strength
in ‘AJK’ is not known. However with the taking over reins of party by Sultan
Mahmood Chaudhry, a number of party members from the PML-N have joined
the PTIAJK.234
According to the PTI Constitution, the party has permitted the Provincial
Organisations to retain the membership fee collected from members. Moreover,
the Central and Provincial Executive Committees are authorised to organise
fund-raising activities to meet the financial targets, and the Chairman and
Provincial Presidents form fund-raising committees for the Centre and
Provinces, respectively.235 There are reports that the party is involved in money
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 97

laundering, as donations worth about over two million US dollars were received
by the party from the US, allegedly from “illegal and prohibited” sources. In
this connection, a petition filed before the Election Commission of Pakistan
(ECP) by Akbar S. Babbar, a founding member and former information
secretary of the PTI, accused the party of “committing and financial corruption
and violating laws relating to collection of donations and managing them”. In
addition, the ECP was also requested to make PTI accountable for millions of
dollars raised personally by Imran Khan during numerous fund-raising events
in the US, Canada and Europe.236

Links and Alliances with Other Political Parties

The PTI has always questioned anti-terrorism campaigns, particularly against
the Taliban. It believes that dialogue is the only way to broker peace with the
Taliban. Other parties though have reservations. However, when the military
operation, Zarb-i-Azb started against terrorists in North Waziristan on June
15, 2014, both the PTI and its old rival, the PML-N welcomed it, knowing
very well that the target of the operation was the Taliban.
Imran Khan’s dharna in Islamabad in August 2014 to protest against the
alleged rigging of the 2013 elections in favour of the Nawaz Sharif ’s PML-N
was opposed by many ‘AJK’ political leaders. The AJK-PML-N Chairman,
Farook Haider Khan, said that Imran Khan’s call for civil disobedience was
not only illegal but also tantamount to treason which the government should
take seriously. Similar call was made by the JI’s ‘AJK’ former Chief, Abdur
Rashid Turabi. It may be mentioned that JI is part of the PTI-led coalition
government in Khyber-Pakhtoonkhwa province. However, former ‘AJK’ Prime
Minister and Chief of AJKMC, Sardar Attique Ahmad Khan backed the
Inquilab and Azadi marches, saying, “Every Pakistani and Kashmiri should
support Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri who are fighting to end hereditary
politics in Pakistan.”237

Current Status
The party’s slogan for ‘AJK’ is “Naya Azad Kashmir”. But the party’s Chairman,
Imran Khan, did not explain what it exactly means. He has also not elaborated
on what is going to be his party’s relationship with jihadi groups who want
Kashmir to be ceded to Pakistan. His new Kashmir policy also does not say
how it will accommodate the army and Inter-Services Intelligence policies
towards Kashmir. With so much of its unexplained agenda PTI failed to impress
the voters with just a slogan at the elections in ‘AJK’ in July 2016. Imran Khan
98 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

kicked off the election campaign in ‘AJK’ during his visit on February 04, 2015
where he opened the PTI Secretariat and also constituted a four-member
committee tasked with awarding tickets to candidates for the July 2016
elections.238 In spite of its best efforts in the elections, however, the party, led
by Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry, lost heavily and could only secure
two seats. Sultan Chaudhry lost the election for the first time. The central leader
of the party, Imran Khan, accepted defeat; however, Sultan Chaudhry alleged
widespread rigging and refused to accept AJKPML-N’s massive win (31 out of
41 seats) in the elections.
With the forming of PTI government in Islamabad, it is unlikely that the
Imran led government will topple the government in ‘AJK’. It seems PTI will
allow the PML-N government in ‘AJK’ to complete its tenure. But it will make
every effort to strengthen its base in the region.

JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI AJK (JIAJK)

Introduction
Jamaat-e-Islami Azad Kashmir (JIAJK) has had great significance on the political
landscape of ‘AJK’. Whether it is its clandestine or explicit support to the various
militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir or social work – educational
institutions, hospitals and social welfare programmes – the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI)
AJK has emerged an important element within ‘AJK’’s political arena. JIAJK’s
stand on Kashmir is not different from its parental organisation, the JI Pakistan.
JI’s approach towards the Kashmir conflict has largely depended on its
relationship with the military/Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in Pakistan.

Early Phase
During the 1930s when the concept and creation of a nation state was the
buzz word, JI, in opposition to Congress’s secular state and Muslim League’s
Muslim nationalism, came up with the concept of ‘Sharia state’.239 JI was
established in Lahore on August 26, 1941 as a conservative societal set-up. Its
founding father, Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, was the brain behind the
organisation which was based on the revolutionary concept of Islamic ideology.
Maududi was against Muslim nationalism, rather he concentrated on the
Muslim Ummah at large. Once Pakistan came into being in August 1947,
Maududi migrated to Pakistan and took it as an opportunity to realise his dream
of an Islamic state. He wanted to make Pakistan a truly Islamic state and prove
to the world that Islamic laws could coexist in the modern age. For Maududi,
sovereignty belonged only to God. His argument revolved around the “Divine
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 99

Sovereignty”. For him, any government in Pakistan was administering the

country as His (God’s) agent. In the beginning, the JI confined its role to reform
the society, but the widespread anti-Ahmadi movement in 1952 gave it the
impetus of transforming Pakistan by wrangling in politics.
After rejecting Pakistani military’s request to declare war on Kashmir as
‘jihad’, Maududi was imprisoned along with other leaders, who opposed Ayub’s
military rule. After his release from jail, Maududi decided that in order to keep
the corrupt out of parliament, holding power was the only solution. Therefore,
the JI decided to take part in the next 1970 national elections in Pakistan.
However, it didn’t do well in the elections, bagging only four out of 300 seats.
Consequently, JI decided to return to its original mission of purifying the
community. After Zia-ul-Haq, a sympathiser of JI’s philosophy, came to power
in a military coup in July 1977, the JI got a free hand in the state-controlled
process of Islamisation in the country. Since then, it has always aligned itself
with the military. The latter has exploited its street power to topple governments,
and used governments as proxies in Afghanistan and Kashmir.
After partition, Jamaat was organised into two distinct units, JI Pakistan
and JI Hind. Moreover, the JI Jammu and Kashmir too considers itself
independent and distinct from the two JI units in India and Pakistan.240
However, its counterpart in ‘AJK’, the JIAJK, is in essence a branch of JI
Pakistan. Although it was launched in ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan in July 1974
with an independent setup having no administrative control of JI Pakistan.
The JIAJK in the beginning did not work as a political entity; it operated only
as a revivalist movement. The JIAJK believes that complete Islamisation of the
region will automatically lead to its unification with Pakistan.241
Electorally, like its mother organisation, it has not done too well in the
region. There are various reasons why it has not emerged as a viable political
party in ‘AJK’. The JIAJK, unlike other political parties, lacked any systematic
plan to develop economy, and deal with political crises and people’s problems.
It sees all the problems and their solutions through the prism of religion. Biradari
system, feudalism and business tycoons play an important role in the overall
political system in Pakistan. Votes are either bought or forced. On the other
hand, the JIAJK’s candidates are mostly from the middle-class background,
give less importance to the biradari system and overemphasise Islam’s message
to attract votes.
The JIAJK and AJKPPP boycotted the 1985 elections. The JIAJK did not
take part in the elections in protest against official favouritism of the ‘AJK’
Muslim Conference. It did not contest elections again in 1990. It “instead,
100 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

demanded formation of a revolutionary government”.242 It participated in the

1996 elections, but performed poorly, getting only one seat. The AJKPPP won
in 26 seats and the AJKMC eight. In the 2001 elections, which were held under
army supervision, the total voter turnout was only 49 per cent, and the ‘AJK’
Muslim Conference got majority of the seats. However, the JIAJK fielded 33
candidates, but could not get even a single seat. It was accused by then AJKMC
President, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, of spending crores of rupees during
elections.243
Again in the 2006 elections the JIAJK was part of the Muttahidda Majlis-
e-Ammal (MMA), a coalition of various religious parties. The MMA was
expecting a good result because of its prominent role in reconstruction and
rehabilitation work after the 2005 earthquake. The MMA fielded 33 candidates,
but drew a blank. Dejected with the election results, it organised a multi-party
conference. Sardar Ijaz Khan, the MMA-AJK president not only denounced
the results but also accused Islamabad’s ruling class of rigging the elections.244
While commenting on the results, Islamabad-based analyst, Ershad Mahmud,
with a distinct tilt towards JI stated, “These seats have become, simply, a tool
of manipulation in the hands of the ruling government in Islamabad, and
particularly Punjab, which has eight and half seats in its territorial jurisdiction.
There is no doubt that successive federal governments have been gifting these
seats to their allies. The ruling parties always use their leverage to ensure their
allies’ victory. Additionally ... a huge number of non-Kashmiris are registered
as voters.”245 The then JI leader, Qazi Hussain also termed the elections as a
“trailer of upcoming engineered elections” to be held in Pakistan.246 In the 2011
elections, the JIAJK again failed to open its account. Same was the case in the
elections in 2016.

Ideology and Objectives

The goals and objectives outlined by the party are similar to its parent
organisation. The following are the three main goals outlined by the party:
(1) To invite all people, particularly those who are already Muslim, to be
obedient to Allah.
(2) To free people from lives of hypocrisy, contradiction and the
dichotomy of word and action – one should be true to one’s claim
and thus live like a true Muslim.
(3) To end the influence of the proponents of falsehood, the sinful and
non-practising Muslims, from the prevalent system of life, and in
place, transfer the leadership, from both theoretical and practical points
of view, to those who are true believers and pious ones.247
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 101

Manifesto
The manifesto of JIAJK is analogous to that of JI Pakistan. It talks about ending
slavery, overdependence on the US and reliance on the International Monetary
Fund. The party claims to work for the restoration of Pakistan’s independence
and sovereignty. Other relevant issues included are ending load-shedding,
curbing corruption, building five major dams within 10 years of coming into
power, working towards an interest-free economy and dissolving all jagirs (feudal
land grants).248

JIAJK’s Take on Kashmir Issue

The JIAJK categorically believes that plebiscite as per the United Nations (UN)
resolutions is the only solution of the Kashmir dispute. In this regard, the JIAJK’s
former Chief, Abdul Rashid Turabi has stated that an all-party coordination
committee of Kashmiri leaders had conveyed its concerns to the Pakistani leaders
and hoped for a clear-cut policy vis-à-vis Kashmir. He added that the
coordination committee would also contact Islamabad-based foreign diplomats
to apprise them of the prevailing political situation in the region.249
Following points highlight the JIAJK’s Kashmir policy:250
(1) The whole nation and world should be made aware of the state of
affairs of Kashmir’s Azadi movement – the risks and dangers. All these
issues should be brought into notice by Kashmiris and their concerned
organisations.
(2) Kashmir Azadi Week should be celebrated from January 28 to
February 5 annually.
(3) The UN Secretary General should be informed by letters and emails
on February 5.
(4) A vigorous and full-fledged campaign should be started through print
and electronic media for seeking cooperation from intelligentsia,
particularly scholars and writers.
(5) The support of the general public must be sought for waging a
continuous struggle in order to make the governments of both Azad
Kashmir and Pakistan dutiful to the national interest.
(6) A district-wise meeting will be held in every six months for
commemorating the martyrs.

Composition and Leadership of the JIAJK

The Jamaat is a well-organised cadre-based party led by an Emir (Leader), who is
elected by the Majlis-e-Shura (Consultative Assembly) and the members of the
102 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

party. A member should be a pious person. He should be able to read Quran.

He must memorise the last 10 chapters of Quran along with its translation. He
should know the 40 Hadiths (teachings of the Prophet), and read Islamic literature.251
The non-members are divided into different groups, depending on their
degree of closeness with Jamaat’s ideology. The highest in the hierarchy are
called the Hamdard (sympathisers); the next as the Mutahtir (who recognise
Jamaat’s mission as a positive influence); the lowest ranking are termed the
Mutaarif (who are just introduced to the objectives of the Jamaat, and have
not been influenced or become sympathisers yet).252 No one in the organisation
can present himself or manoeuvre for the party’s leadership. The party elects
the 30 member Shura (Arakeen). It is the Shura which selects a panel before
the General council and gets their opinion through a secret ballot. The members
of the Shura are free to cast their individuals votes to anyone they liked, if they
were not contesting the election themselves.
Siraj-ul-Haq is the current Emir of JI; Liyaqat Baloch is the Secretary; and
Prof. Khurshid Ahmad, Hafiz Muhammad Idrees, Rashid Naseem, Assadullah
Bhutto and Mian Mohmmad Aslam are the Deputy Presidents.253

Leadership of JIAJK
The JIAJK Emir is Dr Khalid Mahmood. He was elected in June 2017 as the
fifth Emir of the JIAJK. Sheikh Aqeel Rehman, Dr Mushtaq Advocate, Noor
ul Bhari, Mahmood ul Hassan Chowdhry, Dr. Khalid Mahmood Khan are
Vice Presidents. Arshid Nadeem Advocate is a Secretary. Nisar Shaiq, Shamshir
Khan, Ismael Shariah Yaar, Dr. Reyaz, Aftab Alam are Deputy Secretaries.
Secretary for Information and Broadcasting is Raja Zakir Khan, and the
Secretary for Finance is Abdul Waheed Abbasi. The previous Emir’s included
Maulana Abdul Bari, Col. (retd) Abdul Rashid Abbasi, Engr. Sardar Ejaz Afzal
Khan and Abdul Rashid Turabi.

Relationship with Other Organisations

JIAJK’s relationship with other organisations or parties is not necessarily out
of its ideological consonance, rather out of its proximity in order to achieve
short-term objectives. Its relationship with the Pakistan Army can be seen in
the same vein. JI’s support or opposition to incompetent governments depends
on how much leeway is allowed for its activities. According to Frederic Grare,
“Conversely, the Jamaat’s criterion for support of opposition to the authorities
depends on whether the government support to the causes that are most
ideologically important to the Jamaat in matters of external policy is whole
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 103

hearted or half-hearted.”254 The Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan PML-N was close

to Jamaat, but on various occasions both have been at loggerheads, too. Nawaz
Sharif ’s government had also financed Jamaat’s activities in Kashmir.255
Jamaat’s militant wing is the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM). HM replaced
Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in Jammu and Kashmir, which
was more or less an independent militant outfit fighting for independence.
Formed in 1989, the HM considers jihad a duty and focuses on enemies and
collaborators.256 Its main objectives are making Muslims aware about jihad and
providing funds and training.257 Jamaat’s student wing, the Islami Jamiat-e-
Tulaba has provided the cannon fodder to the outfit. Thousands of Jamaat’s
cadres have received jihadi training. According to Muhammad Amir Rana,
scores of Jamaat’s student cadres have fought in Afghanistan and Kashmir and
provide manpower to HM.258 Subtly, it endorses whatever HM does in Kashmir.

Funding
Most of the funding comes from charities, donations collected in mosques
throughout Pakistan. Money and gold collected in the form of Zakat, Usher
and remittances from overseas Pakistani and Kashmiri help the JI to fund HM’s
activities in Kashmir. JI allies with other political organisations and parties in
the Muslim world, particularly the Islamist outfits, has helped the party to get
financial support, for example, during the Afghan Jihad.

Current Status
Over the years, even when there has been a slight change in the perception of
other political parties of Pakistan about India, the Jamaat’s has maintained its
rigid stance: no dialogue with India on any other issues unless the Kashmir
dispute is settled. It is very critical of mending fences with India. For example,
when Pakistan was toying with the idea of granting the Most Favoured Nation
status (MFN) to India, the JIAJK’s ex-Emir, Abdul Rashid Turabi, said that
granting the MFN status to India was betrayal of the blood of Kashmiris martyrs
and would put the solidarity of the country at stake.259 He further said that
“Kashmir people are determined to continue their struggle till achievement of
their right of self-determination adding they do not accept any solution with
the constitutional administration of India”.260 Therefore, any possibility of
Jamaat changing or revamping itself along modern lines is bleak; in other words,
there is no chance of Jamaat shunning its traditional ideology and accepting
the new dynamics of the region.
104 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

KASHMIR VOICE INTERNATIONAL (KVI)

Introduction
A new international Kashmiri organisation named as Kashmir Voice
International (KVI) was formed in London on 22 January 2017. The
organisation was formed by a group of Academics, writers and professionals
belonging to Kashmiri Diaspora in the U.K. with the aim to bring together
prominent and liberal voices on Kashmir from both India and Pakistan in the
U.K. to find a “dignified and honourable” solution to the issue.261
A meeting was held at Birkbeck University in this connection in London
on 22 January 2017. An executive committee was formed under the
chairmanship of Prof. Mohammad Abdullah Raina with Irshad Ahmad Malik
as Vice Chairman and Javid Kakroo as the Secretary. The other six members in
the committee are Gulam Nabi Falehi, Syed Abdullah Sherazi, Advocate
Mohammad Saleem, Abdul Majed Bandey, Ulfat Hussain Zargar and Prof.
Shahid Iqbal.262

Aims and Objectives

The main aim of the KVI is to reach out to the politicians in India and Pakistan,
people of the valley, the real sufferers and political figures in both parts, and
raise the voice of Kashmiris internationally. Elaborating about the objectives
of the conference, a press conference was addressed by Prof. Raina and Javid
Kakroo. The salient points of the conference were:263
(i) According to U.N. resolution adopted 70 years ago, Pakistan has to
withdraw all its forces from Kashmir in order to get the U.N.
resolutions implemented. But Pakistan has not given any indication
of doing that.
(ii) There is a lack of trust between two countries because neither is willing
to move from its stated position.
(iii) The Kashmiri diaspora is concerned that the real picture on the ground
is not being projected. In this connection, KVI is intended to bring
together prominent and liberal voices from Kashmir, from both India
and Pakistan, in U.K. The members of this newly formed body will
visit both the countries to interact with people from all walks of life
including minorities and build opinion for an achievable and
acceptable solution
(iv) The gun culture has promoted terrorism and defamed the freedom
movement. As such, the KVI urges that guns from all sides should be
silent and the movement be allowed to continue violence free.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 105

(v) The KVI will raise the issues of human rights violations in ‘AJK’ and
Gilgit-Baltistan with the Pakistan High Commission, London.
A political analyst on Kashmir affairs, R.C. Ganjoo says that the initiative to
form KVI has come from eminent intellectuals who will work hard to find a
lasting solution to the Kashmir issue.264

ENDNOTES
1. For the names of the registered political parties see http://ajkec.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/
03/List-of-Political-Parties-Aug2016.pdf, and for their symbols see http://ajkec.pk/wp-content/
uploads/2016/03/LIST-OF-ELECTION-SYMBOLS.pdf. These lists are also provided as
Appendices V, VI, VII at the end of the book.
2. For details see AJKEC website at http://ajkec.pk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Voters-Detail-
Election-2016.pdf
3. See the detailed report “AJK elections: 427 in the run for 41 seats”, The Express Tribune, June
13, 2016, at https://tribune.com.pk/story/187667/ajk-elections-427-in-the-run-for-41-seats/
4. The Maharaja accepted all the recommendations of the Glancy Commission.
5. Gull Mohd. Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects, Ashish Publishing House, New
Delhi, 1993, p. 26.
6. Quoted in Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House,
New Delhi, 1967, p. 52.
7. Quoted in P.N. Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom, Kashmir Publishing Co., New
Delhi, 1954, p. 169.
8. See full text of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, at http://archive.org/stream/
AllJammuAndKashmirMuslimConference.
9. Ibid.
10. Sheikh Abdullah, Aatish-e-Chinar, Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2008, pp. 163-172.
11. Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, p. 57.
12. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, Hurst & Company,
London, 2012, p. 20.
13. Quoted in P.N. Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom p. 210.
14. Quoted in Gull Mohd. Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects, p. 32
15. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, in Jasjit Singh, (ed.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir:
Under the Jackboot, Siddhi Books, New Delhi, 1995, p. 67.
16. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 114
17. Ibid., p. 114
18. Ibid., p. 114
19. Ibid., p. 115.
20. Ibid., p. 116.
21. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p. 71.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., p. 72.
24. Parvez Dewan, “A History of PoK – ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’”, in Virendra Gupta and
Alok Bansal, (eds.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story, Manas Publications New
Delhi, 2007, p. 107.
25. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”,, p. 99.
26. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 118.
106 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

27. Ibid., p. 137.

28. Ibid., p. 190.
29. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p. 99.
30. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 137.
31. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p. 102.
32. The United Front Alliance comprised the PPPAJK, Liberation League and Azad Muslim
Conference – Ibrahim.
33. Quoted in Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p. 112.
34. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir.
35. Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, 2006,
p. 196.
36. Quoted in Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p. 119.
37. “Pakistan: Results of the 30 June 1996 elections in Azad Kashmir”, Refworld, at
www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6abc19c.html.
38. “All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC)”, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/
military/world/pakistan/ajkmc.
39. http://ajkassembly.gok.pk/parliamentaryhistory.htm.
40. Ershad Mahmud, “Trouble Again: Azad Kashmir Experiences Instability – Once Again”,
Greater Kashmir, August 1, 2010, at http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2010/aug/1/trouble-
again-2.asp.
41. “Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan”, pakistantimes.com, at https://www.pakistantimes.com/topics/
sardar-attique-ahmed-khan/
42. Ibid.
43. Farooq Tirmizi, “AJK Elections: An Unsurprising Result”, The Express Tribune, June 27, 2011,
at tribune.com.pk/story/197253/ajk-elections-an-unsurprising-result/
44. “PML-N grabs 31 seats in AJK elections”, Dawn, July 23, 2016, at http://www.dawn.com/
news/1272615
45. “Sardar Qayyum Calls for Making Jammu-Kashmir ‘Danger-Free Area’”, Greater Kashmir,
April 27, 2007, at www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2007/Apr/28/sardar-qayyum-calls-for-
making-jammu-kashmir-danger-free-71.asp.
46. Ibid.
47. Quoted in Shabir Choudhry, “Is There a Change of Heart in Kashmiri Politics”, The South
Asia Tribune, September 27, 2005 at http://satribune.wordpress.com/kashmir-peace-round-
the-corner-but-jihad-also-escalating/is-there-a-change-of-heart-in-kashmiri-politics
48. Ibid.
49. Abdul Rasheed Azad, “AJK general elections: PTI, MC make seat adjustments,” The Business
Recorder, June 14, 2016, at http://www.brecorder.com/general-news/172/56441/t
50. A political group named as Plebiscite Front was first founded in August 1955 and formally
launched in 1958 in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. It was led by Mirza Muhammad
Afzal Beg, a close confidante of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. It was formed following the
removal of Sheikh Abdullah government in 1953. The party remained loyal to Sheikh Abdullah
but toed the line that there should be a “popular plebiscite” to decide if the state would
remain part of India, accede to Pakistan or become independent. Amanullah Khan established
a party of the same name in AJK(PoK) in 1965. It was also known as Mahaz-i-Raisumari, as
the name was translated in Urdu. It had an underground militant front named National
Liberation Front, which was involved in the hijacking of Indian Airlines plane named Ganga
on January 30, 1971. This Plebiscite Front had a chapter in Britain which later renamed
itself as Jammu and Kashmir liberation Front in 1977.
51. Amanuallh Khan, Jehad-e-Musalsal, Rawalpindi, 1992, pp. 133-134.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 107

52. Sumantra Bose, “JKLF and JKHM: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Jammu and
Kashmir Hizbul-Mujahideen”, in Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary and John Tirman (eds.),
Terror, Insurgency, and the State: Ending Protracted Conflicts, University of Pennsylvania Press,
USA, 2007.
53. See the Aims and Objectives of JKLF, at http://jklfworld.blogspot.in/p/jklf-aims-
objectives.html
54. “Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan)”, COI Compilation,
Report prepared by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin & Asylum Research and
Documentation (ACCORD), May 07, 2012.
55. Amir Mir, “JKLF Not for Pak Control in PoK”, DNA Analysis, April 25, 2006, at
www.dnaindia.com/world/reprt-jklf-not-for-pak-control-in-pok-1026112.
56. S.K. Sharma and A. Behera, Militant Groups in South Asia, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2014.
57. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Information on the Structure of the Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and the Means of Identification Used by Any Subgroups;
on Any Humanitarian or Peaceful JKLF Factions and Their Leaders, and on the Names of
Leaders of Militant JKLF Factions and Whether There Are Several Leaders within Different
JKLF Factions”, European Country of Origin Information Network, September 29, 1994, at
https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/190564/308796_de.html.
58. See http://jklfajkgbzone.org/index.php/2012-11-23-13-21-14.
59. Shabir Choudhry, “Unity of JKLF groups and ISI”, Kashmir Watch, August 23, 2011, at http:/
/kashmirwatch.com/news/print.php/2011/08/23/unity-of-jklf-groups-and-isi.phtml.
60. See http://www.jklfajkgbzone.org/index.php/2012-11-23-13-24-14/2012-12-02-19-08-34/
our-aims-and-objectives.
61. Ibid.
62. JKLF blog, at http://jklfworld.blogspot.in/p/jklf-aims-objectives.html.
63. Muralidhar Reddy, “JKLF Chief Assails Musharraf Move on LoC”, The Hindu, January 19,
2003, at http://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2003/01/19/stories/2003011902830900.htm.
64. “JKLF Protests against Gilgit, Baltistan Package”, The Dawn, September 12, 2009, at http:/
/www.dawn.com/news/490223/jklf-protests-aganist-gilgit-baltistan-package.
65. Alan Gray, “JKLF Marches up to 20,000 Protestors towards Islamabad”, News Blaze, November
5, 2009.
66. “JKLF Launches Campaign for Return of Maqbool Butt’s Mortal Remains”, The Greater
Kashmir, November 03, 2012, at https://www.greaterkashmir.com/=/jklf-launches-campign-
for-return-of-maqbool-bhat-s-mortak-remains/132407=
67. JKLF blog, at http://jklfworld.blogspot.in/2009_08_31_archive.html.
68. Sumantra Bose, “JKLF and JKHM: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front and Jammu and
Kashmir Hizbul-Mujahideen”.
69. Mohd. Sadiq, “Elections in Pakistan occupied Kashmir: A Farce”, J & K Insights, July 13,
2006, at www.jammu-kashmir.com/insight/20060713.ahtml
70. “Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front”, Hindustan Times, October 02, 2002.
71. Muralidhar Reddy, “JKLF Chief Assails Musharraf Move on LoC”.
72. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “Information on the Jammu and Kashmir People’s
National Party (JKPNP) and the Differences in Ideology with the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front (JKLF)”, European Country of Origin Information Network, April 4, 1995,
at https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/190507/294039_en.html.
73. Radha Vinod Raju, “Ghulam Nabi Fai and the ISI”, Institute for Peace Studies and Conflict,
#3523, December 18, 2011.
74. “Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front”, South Asian Terrorism Portal, at http://www.satp.org/
108 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/terrorist_outfits/jammu_&_kashmir_liberation_
front.htm.
75. Amir Mir, “JKLF Not for Pak Control in PoK”.
76. Madhu Gurung and Ramtanu Maitra, “Pakistan, Northwest India insurgencies”, EIR, 22 (41),
October 13, 1995.
77. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, “The Kashmir Welfare Association of Lahore,
Including When It Was Founded and by Whom, Its President in October/November 1998
and Its Position on Kashmir”, European Country of Origin Information Network, March
30, 2000, at https://www.ecoi.net/local_link/190081/293602_en.html.
78. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Pakistan: The Jammu Kashmir Liberation League
(JKLL), Including Its Structure, Mandate and Activities, Leaders, Current Status, and Treatment
of Its Members by the Azad Kashmiri and Pakistani Authorities (1994 to September 1999),
September 24, 1999, at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6ad6e90.html.
79. Sushant Sareen, “Inside PoK: The Gilgit Grumble”, Analyzing Pakistan (Blog), August 05,
2005, at http://sushantsareen.blogspot.in/2005/08/inside-pok-gilgit-grumble.html.
80. Information available at http://orkut.google.com/c6981110-tba305e1accb9d38d.html.
81. “Srinagar Boy Who Kept His Faith for Kashmir and Pakistan”, Pakistan Defence, October 7,
2013, at http://defence.pk/threads/srinagar-boy-who-kept-his-faith-for-kashmir-and-
pakistan.281914/.
82. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p.190.
83. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p. 102.
84. Ibid., p 112.
85. Ibid., p. 113.
86. “Package for Affected Areas Promised: JK PML Manifesto Launched”, The Dawn, June 30,
2006, at http://www.dawn.com/news/199323/package-for-affected-areas-promised-jk-pml-
manifesto-launched.
87. “The Jammu Kashmir Liberation League”, at http://www.jkonline.org/abour-us/.
88. Kashmir Information Centre, Islamabad, cited in Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, Research
Response Number: PAK 31088, January 29, 2007, at www.refworld.org/pdfid/4b6fe2d80.pdf.
89. Haruhiro Fukui, Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific, Greenwood Press, London, 1985, pp.
804-5.
90. “Our Constitution”, at http://www.jkonline.org/our-constitution/
91. Ibid. Also see “Nationalist Parties Reject Ideology of the State’s Accession to Pakistan, Demand
Independent Constitution”, Pakistan Views, May 16, 2016, at htp://wp.pakistanviews.org/
pakistan-news/kashmir-news/nationalist-parties-reject-ideology-of-the-states-s-accession-to-
pakistan-demand-independent-constitution/
92. Op cit. note 90.
93. “Gilgit, Baltistan Is Part of State of J&K: Dr. Hassan”, The Asians, December 21, 2014, at
http://www.theasians.co.uk/print/20141221_misfar_kashmir.
94. “Pakistan: Follow-up to Pak32735.E of 24 September 1999 on the JKLL”, at http://
www.reworld.org/docid/3ae6ad7268.html; “K H Khurshid Paid Tribute on Death
Anniversary”, The Nation, March 12, 2013, at http://nation.com.pk/national/12-Mar-2013/
kh-khurshid-paid-tribute-on-death-anniversary; “Gilgit, Baltistan Is Part of State of J&K: Dr.
Hassan”, No. 13.
95. Refugee Review Tribunal, Australia, Research Response Number: PAK 31088, January 29,
2007.
96. “Our Constitution”, http://www.jkonline.org/our-constitution/.
97. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p 124.
98. “Politics – Pak-Police Denounced for Hampering Pro-Kashmiri Rally”, Pakistan Press
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 109

International, October 28, 2003, cited in the Research Response Number, PAK31088, January
2007.
99. “Military Clampdown on PoK Parties Not Professing Allegiance to Pakistan”, Daily Excelsior,
July 4, 2001, cited in the Research Response Number, PAK31088, January 29, 2007.
100. “Police Seize Kashmir Leaders to Stop New March”, Reuters, October 26, 1992, cited in
Research Response Number, PAK31088, January 29, 2007.
101. “Demand for Plebiscite in Rallies across AJK”, Dawn, January 27, 2005, at http://
www.dawn.com/news/381250/demand-for-plebscite-in-rallies-across-AJK.
102. “Kashmir Solidarity Day Observed in Washington”, Kashmir Watch, February 9, 2015, at
http://kashmirwatch.com/news/print.php/2015/02/09/kashmir-solidarity-day-celebrated-in-
washington.phtml.
103. United Nations Military Observers group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) letter from
Liberation League with civil societies on January 5, 2013, at http://www.jkllonline.org/
unmogip-letter-from-liberation-league-with-civil-societies-on-5-january-2013/.
104. “An Appeal to the Members of the Non-Aligned Movement”, at http://www.jkllonline.org/
/an-appeal-to-the-members-of-the-non-aligned-movement/.
105. Cited in “Pakistan Open to Idea of New Kashmir: Musharraf ” CBS News, December 5,
2006, at http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/12/05/pakistan-kashmir.html?ref=rss.
106. Mohinder Verma, “We Never Supported Terrorism, Violence against J&K: Former CJ Told
PoK HC”, Daily Excelsior, December 2014, at http://www.printfriendly.com/print?url=http:/
/www.dailyexcelsior.com.
107. “Sultan Leaves PPP to Form People’s ML”, The Dawn, April 21, 2006, at http://
www.dawn.com/news/188735/sultan-leaves-ppp-to-form-people.
108. “Package for Affected Areas Promised: JK PML Manifesto Launched”, The Dawn, June 30,
2006, at http://www.dawn.com/news/199323/package-for-affected-areas-promised.
109. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 211.
110. “Ruling MC Secures 20 Seats, AJKPP 7: Manipulation of Results Alleged”, The Dawn, July
13, 2006, at http://www.dawn.com/news/201154/ruling-mc-secures-20-seats-ajkpp-7-
manipulation-of-results-alleged.
111. For a detailed introduction, see: “United Kashmir Peoples National Party”, at http://
www.ukpnp.net
112. “United Kashmir Peoples National Party: A Brief History”, at http://www.ukpnp.net/about-
us/.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. “Exiled leaders from PoK, Gilgit-Baltistan Blame Pak for Human Rights Violations”, at http:
//www.aninews.in/newsdetail4/story207925/exiled-leaders-from-gilgit-baltistan-blame-pak.
116. Shaukat Ali Kashmiri, “Pakistan Administered Kashmir and Gilgit Baltistan: Solidarity with
the Persecuted”, Asian Affairs, June 2009, at http://asianaffairs.in/june2009/pakistan-
administered.html.
117. Ibid.
118. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, February 3, 2003, at http://www.ecoi.net/
local_link/189822/293320_en.html.
119. Ibid.
120. “Multi-Party Conference urges to make amendments in AJK Interim Act 1974 for independent,
fair & transparent elections”, Sabah News, May 15, 2016, at http://www.sabahnews.net/61656,
and The Express Tribune, May 16, 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1103962/kashmir-
elections-nationalists-demand-right-to-contest-polls/
121. Jammu and Kashmir National Students Federation, at, http://jknsf.yolasite.com
110 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

122. http://kashooo.wordpress.com/2009/08/23/jammu-kashmir-national-awami-party-jknap-
leaders-are-being-punished-opposing-jihadi-camps-in-pakistan-occupied-kashmirpok/
123. Naeem, ‘AJK Interim Act 1974 and Human Rights’, July 6, 2013, at http://kashooo.wordpress.
com/category/news-and-politics/
124. Jammu Kashmir National Independence Alliance (JKNIA), at, http://kashooo.wordpress.com/
tag/jammu-kashmir-national-independence
125. “New All-Party Alliance in PoK”, Hindustan Times, June 22, 2003, at www.jammu-
kashmir.com/archives/archives2003/kashmir20030622d.html.
126. Ibid.
127. “All Party National Alliance to Observe Oct. 22 as “Black Day” from Next Year”, ANI, October
26, 2010, at http://in.news.yahoo.com/party-national-alliance-observe-oct-22-black-day.html.
128. Samuel Baid, “Pak Polity and Politicians”, Kashmir Images, March 24, 2014, at http://
www.dailykashmirimages.com/news-pak-polity-and-politicians-57197.aspx.
129. Senge H. Sering, “Political Dynamics of Culture and Identity in Baltistan”, in K Warikoo
(ed.), The Other Kashmir: Society, Culture and Politics in the Karakoram Himalayas, p. 84.
130. Noor, “APNA Brings Kashmiri Leaders and GB Nationalists Together in Islamabad”, Pamir
Times, January 11, 2010, at http://pamirtimes.net/2010/01/11/event-account-apna-brings-
kashmiri-leaders-and-gb-nationalista-together-in-islamabad.
131. Zulfiqar Ali, “Kashmiris Protest at Killing of Sardar Arif Shahid”, BBC News, May 16, 2013,
at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-22559730.
132. Ibid.
133. http://idp.world-citizenship.org-wp-archive-1069.
134. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, at http://www.ajkassembly.gok.pk/
ajkinterimconstitutionact1974.html.
135. “With Friends Like These: Human Rights Violations in Azad Kashmir”, Human Rights Watch
Report 2006, at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/pakistan0906/6.html.
136. Quoted in Shabir Choudhry, “Kashmiri leader Arif Shahid and his vision”, WAAGA CUSUB
Media, May 19, 2014, at http://waagacusub.net/articles/393/Kashmiri-leader-Arif-Shahid-
and-his-vision
137. Ibid.
138 Ibid.
139. “Pakistan People’s Party”, at http://www.dailymotion.com/PPPOfficial
140. Official website of the PPP, at http://www.ppp.org.pk/history.html.
141. “Pakistan People’s Party”, The Dawn, January 17, 2012, at http//www.dawn.com/news/
688790/Pakistan-peoples-party
142. Fakhar Zaman, “Pakistan People’s Party – 1967–2000”, at http://www.ppp.org.pk.history.
html.
143. “People’s Party of Pakistan”, GlobalSecurity.org, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
world/pakistan/ppp.htm
144. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 190.
145. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, pp. 112-13.
146. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p 191
147. Ibid., p. 192.
148. Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, p. 118.
149. Ibid., p. 124.
150. Ershad Mahmud, “AJK Polls: What Next ?”, Greater Kashmir, July 3, 2011, at http://
www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2011/ajk-polls-what-next.
151. Shamim-ur-Rahman, “Pakistan People’s Party”, in A.B.S. Jafri (ed.), The Political Parties of
Pakistan, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2002, pp. 103-10.
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 111

152. Akmal Hussain, “The Crisis of State Power in Pakistan”, in Ponna Wignaraja and Akmal
Hussain (eds.), The Challenge in South Asia: Development, Democracy and Regional Cooperation,
Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1989, pp. 226-227.
153. Ibid.
154. “Party to Emerge Victorious in Polls”, The Nation, May 24, 2011, at http://nation.com.pk/
national/24-May-2011/Party-to-emerge-victorious-in-polls.
155. “Pak PM to Address Workers’ Convention at Muzaffarabad on 23 May”, Kashmir Watch, May
1, 2011, at http://kashmirwatch.com/news/print.php/2011/05/01/pak-pm-to-address.
156. Official Website of Pakistan People’s Party.
157. Nadeem F. Paracha, “Political parties in Pakistan: Roots, fruit & Juice”, The Dawn, May 2,
2013, at http://www.dawn.com/news/1026015/political-parties-in-pakistan-roots-fruit-juice.
158. “AJK Elections: PPP Sweeps AJK Polls Amid Rigging Charges”, June 30, 2011, at
http:www.elections.com.pk/newsemail.php?id=840.
159. Ershad Mahmud, “The Dynamics of AJK’s Upcoming Assembly Elections”, Greater Kashmir,
June 20, 2011. at http://www.greaterkashmir.com/print/the-dynamics-of-ajk-s-upcoming/
97132.html
160. Tom Hussain, “ Pakistan People’s Party Offers Coalition Deal after Easy Win in Kashmir
Election”, The National, June 28, 2011, at http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/south-asia/
pakistan-peoples-party-offers-coalition-deal-after-easy-win.
161. Ibid.
162. For further detail see http://pppsb-kp.pk/history/
163. PPP (Shaheed Bhutto) prepping to make a comeback, Daily Times, March 7, 2016, at http:/
/www.dailytimes.com.pk/national/07-Mar-2016/ppp-shaheed-bhutto-prepping-to-make-a-
comeback
164. PPP (SB) announces contesting AJK polls, The Nation, March 16, 2016, at http://
nation.com.pk/national/16-Mar-2016/ppp-sb-announces-contesting-polls
165. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Muslim League: Decline of a National Party”, in Subrata K.
Mitra, Mike Enskat, Clemens Spieb (eds.), Political Parties in South Asia, Praeger Publishers,
London, 2004, p. 132.
166. For further details, see official website of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), at
www.pmln.org.
167. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, “The Muslim League: Decline of a National Party”, p. 136.
168. For details, see: Ibid., pp. 137-38.
169. www.http://Pml.org.pk
170. Ashraf Mumtaz, “Pakistan Muslim League”, in A B S Jafri (ed.), The Political Parties of Pakistan,
Royal Book Company, Karachi, 2002, p. 89.
171. www.revolvy.com/main/index.php?s=Pakistan%20Muslim%20League%20(J).
172. http://www.pmln.co.uk/consitution.html.
173. Samuel Baid, “Kashmir that Pakistan Occupies and Calls ‘Azad’”, Kashmir Information &
Research Centre, New Delhi, 2001.
174. Quoted in Samuel Baid, “Politics in ‘Azad Kashmir’”, New Delhi, 1995, p. 124.
175. “PML-N Launched in AJK; Nawaz Comes Hard at Supporters of Dictators”, The Pakistan
Times, December 27, 2010, at http://www.pakistantimes.net/pt/detail.php?newsid=17594
176. “PML-N & JI to Contest Elections Jointly: Nawaz”, Sana News, May 12, 2011, at http://
www.sananews.net/english/2011/05/12/plm-n-ji-to-contest-ajk-elections-jointly-nawaz/
177. Assadullah Malik, “A Shift in AJK Politics”, Weekly Pulse, July 01, 2011, at http://
weeklypulse.org/details.aspx?contentID=900&storylist=1
178. “PPP Sweeps AJK Polls amid Rigging Charges”, The News, June 27, 2011, at http://
www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=7023&Cat=13&dt=6/27/2011
112 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

179. Tariq Naqash, “PTI’s Sultan Mahmood Victorious in AJK by-Poll: Unofficial Result”, Dawn,
March 29, 2015, at www.dawn.com/news/1172637
180. “Nawaz Sharif Should Not Utilize Punjab Govt Resources during AJK Election: Watto”, at
http://www.onlinenews.com.pk/details.php?id=180725
181. Mateen Haider, “India Calls off Foreign Secretary Level Talks with Pakistan”, Dawn, August
18, 2014, at www.dawn.com/news/1126123
182. “Nawaz Sharif Raises Kashmir Issue with US Senators”, The Times of India, October 13, 2014,
at timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/Pakistan/Nawaz-Sharif-raises-Kashmir-issue-with-US-
Senators/articleshow/44804562.cms
183. “Nawaz Sharif Asks Obama to Raise Kashmir during India Visit”, The Hindu, November 22,
2014, at www.thehindu.com/news/international/south-asia/nawaz-sharif-asks-obama-to-raise-
kashmir-during-india-visit/article6624359.ece
184. “MQM to Take Part in AJK Elections”, The World Affairs, June 10, 2006, at http://
www.worldaffairsboard.com/international-politics/12759-mqm-t.
185. “Ruling MC Secures 20 Seats, AJKPP 7: Manipulation of Results Alleged”, The Dawn, July
13, 2006, at http://www.dawn.com/news/201154/ruling-mc-secures-20-seats-ajkpp-7-
manipulation-of-results-alleged.
186. Mohd Sadiq, “Elections in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir: A Farce” Kashmir Insights, July 13,
2006, at http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/insights/insight20060713a.html.
187. Christopher Snedden, The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir, p. 210.
188. “Altaf Hussain Asks Kashmiris to Reject Oft-Tested Political Parties”, June 19, 2011, at http:/
/www.mqm.org/English-News/Jun-2011/ah-110619.htm
189. “The MQM Will Resolve the Kashmir Dispute”, May 23, 2011, at http://www.mqm.org/
English-News/May-2011/news110523.htm
190. Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan, Routlege, London, 2012, p. 100.
191. Ibid., p. 106.
192. Syed Iftekhar Mir, “MQM and Altaf: Two Bodies but One Soul”, April 22, 2014, at http:/
/tastepakistan.pk/mqm-and-altaf-two-bodies-but-one-soul/
193. “Empowering People – MQM Manifesto 2013”, at http://www.mqm.org/manifesto2013
194. “The MQM Will Resolve the Kashmir Dispute”, May 23, 2011, at http://www.mqm.org/
English-News/May-2011/news110523.htm
195. “About Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)”, at http:www.mqm.org/About MQM.
196. “Empowering People – MQM Manifesto 2013”.
197. “Azad Kashmir Election 2011: MQM Announce Manifesto”, May 20, 2011, at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKoq1ptXuGM.
198. “Altaf Hussain Asks Kashmiris to Reject Oft-Tested Political Parties”.
199. “Muttahida Qaumi Movement”, http://mqminmyopinion.blogspot.in.
200. Nisar Mehdi, “MQM Names Newly Formed CEC”, The Nation, November 21, 2011, at
http://nation.com.pk/national/21-Nov-2011/MQM-names-newlyformed-CEC.
201. Ibid.
202. “About Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)”.
203. “MQM to Elect Office-Bearers through Democratic Way: Altaf Hussain”, March 24, 2015,
at http://www.mqm.org/englishnews/19677/mqm-to-elect-office-bearers-through-democratic-
way-altaf-hussain.
204. Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan, No. 7, pp. 104-5.
205. Farsahat Mohiuddin, “MQM Names 42 Members of Executive Council”, The News, November
21, 2011, at http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-4-78581-MQM-names-42-members-
of-executive-council
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 113

206. “Taliban Claim Responsibility for Attack on MQM Camp”, The Express Tribune, November
22, 2014, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/795328/taliban-claim-karachi-attack-on-mqm-camp/
207. “Pakistan: Information on Mohajir/Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Altaf (MQM-A)”, Resource
Information Centre, USA Document No. PAK04002.OGC, February 9, 2004, at http://
www.refworld.org/docid/414fe5aa4.html4
208. A. Khan, Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and State in Pakistan, Sage Publications, New
Delhi, 2005, p. 152.
209. Assad Hashim, “Raid launched on Pakistan’s MQM party offices”, Al Jazeera, March 11, 2015,
available at: http:www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2015/03/police-raids-pakistan-mqm
210. “Pakistan: Information on Mohajir/Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Altaf (MQM-A)”, No. 24.
211. Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan, p. 104.
212. Yaroslav Trofimov, “Refugee Crisis Inflames Ethnic Strife in Pakistan “, The Wall Street Journal,
May 30, 2009, at http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124363974401367773t
213. The MIPT exclusively works on terrorism and is funded by the US Homeland Security
Department. See: “US Think-Tank Lists MQM as Militant Outfit”, June 11, 2007, at http:/
/free-minds.org/forum/index.php?topic=14502.o
214. Vikhar Ahmad Sayeed, “The Muhajirs in the Promised Land”, at Infichangeindia.org/agenda/
migration-a-displacement/themuhajirs-in-the-promised-land-html
215. “Zardari Wins 100 Percent Votes from Sindh Assembly”, Geo TV, September 8, 2008, at
www.geo.tv/9-8-2008/24381.htm.
216. “Election Watch: Election Acid Test for MQM, Haqiqi, MMA”, Daily Times, October 4,
2002, at Archives.dailytimes.com.pk/national/04-oct-2002/election-watch-election-acid-test-
for-mqm.
217. Laurent Gayer, Karachi: Ordered Disorder and Struggle for City, Oxford University Press, New
York, 2014.
218. Nafisa Hoodbhoy, Abroad the Democracy Train: A Journey through Pakistan’s Last Decade of
Democracy, Anthem Press, London and New York, 2011.
219. Jon Boone, “Imran Khan Blames MQM Leader Hussain for Killing of Activist”, The Guardian,
May 20, 2013, at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/19/imran-khan-pakistan-
hussain-shahid-killing
220. Constitution of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, p. 2.
221. Hafeez Tunio, “ECP Results Show PTI Second Largest in Karachi”, The Express Tribune, May
14, 2013, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/548862/ecp-results-show-pti-second-largest
222. Hassan Ali, “PTI, JI and QWP Agree to work on One Agenda in K-P”, The Express Tribune,
May 17, 2013, at http://www.tribune.com.pk/story/550372/pti-ji-and-qwp-agree-to-work-
on-o.
223. Altaf Hamid Rao, “AJK to be Made ‘Naya Azad Kashmir’: Imran”, The Nation, March 26,
2015, at http://nation.com.pk/national/26-Mar-2015/ajk-to-be-made-naya-azad-kashmir-
imran.
224. Tariq Naqsh, “PTI’s Sultan Mahmood Defeats N-backed PPP Candidate”, The Dawn, March
30, 2015, at http://www.dawn.com/news/1172733/ptis-sultan-mahmood-defeats-n-backed-
ppp-candidate.
225. Constitution of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf, pp. 1-32.
226. Ibid.
227. “The Manifesto of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf ”, at http://www.siasat.pk/forum/
showthread.php?80340-The-Manifesto-of.
228. Ibid.
229. PTIAJK chapter announced its manifesto-Daily Messenger, May 25, 2016, at http://
dailymessenger.com.pk/2016/05/25/pti-ajk-chapter-announced-its-manifesto/
114 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

230. Constitution of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, pp. 1-32.

231. Besides four Provincial Organisations – one each for Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa, a separate organisation each will be formed for the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas, Gilgit Baltistan, Azad Jammu & Kashmir and for the overseas Pakistanis.
232. “PML-N Supporters Join PTI”, The Nation, April 8, 2015, at http://nation.com.pk/national/
08-april-2005/pml-n-supporters-join-pti-in-ajk
233. Asad Kharal, “PTI Members Who Are Eligible to Vote Number 350,000”, The Express Tribune,
October 31, 2012, at http://epaper.tribunr.com.pk/DisplayDetails.aspx?ENI_ID=112012103
234. “PML-N Supporters Join PTI in AJK”, The Nation, April 8, 2015, at http://nation.com.pk/
national/08-Apr-2015/pml-n-supporters-join-pti-in-ajk
235. Constitution of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, pp. 1-32.
236. Syed Irfan Raza, “ECP Seeks PTI Foreign Funding Details”, The Dawn, April 2, 2015, at
http://www.dawn.com/news/1173398.
237. “Azadi, Inqilab Sit-Ins: AJK’s Political Leaders Oppose PTI, PAT Demands”, The Express
Tribune, August 20, 2014, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/750895/azadi-inqilab-sits-ins-ajks-
political
238. “We Stand with People of Kashmir: Imran Khan”, The Nation, February 04, 2015, at http:/
/nation.com.pk/national/04-Feb-2016/we-stand-with-people-of-kashmir-imran-khan
239. Irfan Ahmad, “Genealogy of the Islamic state: Reflections on Maududi’s Political thought
and Islamism”, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 15, N.S., 2009, p. 152.
240. Frederic Grare, Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islaami, Monohar
Publications, New Delhi, 2002, p. 75.
241. Ibid., p. 76.
242. Samuel Baid, Kashmir That Pakistan Occupies and Calls “Azad”, p. 38.
243. Ibid., p. 43.
244. Raja Asghar, “AJK Opposition Plans Protest Campaign”, Dawn, July 20, 2006.
245. Quoted in Nirupama Subramanian, “What the Elections in PoK Mean”, The Hindu, August
15, 2006, at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/what-the-elections-in-pok-
mean/article3090448.ece
246. http://www.jamaat.org/news/2006S/jul/15/1001.html.
247. http://www.JIAJ&K.org/urdu/indux.php/2012-01-03-13-31-25/2012-01-03-14-48-30.
248. https://jamaat.org/ur/dastoorOrManshoor.php?cat_id=14.
249. Nisar Ahmed Thokar, “Kashmir Figures Prominently in Pak Elections”, Greater Kashmir, April
16, 2013, at http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2013/Apr/16/kashmir-figure-prominantly.
250. www.JIAJ&K.org/urdu/index.php/2012-01-03-13-31-25/2012-04-25-12-28-48/2012-04-25-
13-45-35.
251. Ibid.
252. Jackson Roy, Mawlana Mawdudi & Political Islam, Routledge, New York, 2011, p. 76.
253. https://jamaat.org/ur/central_leadership.php.
254. Frederic Grare, Political Islam in the Indian Subcontinent: The Jamaat-i-Islaami, p. 82.
255. Ibid.
256. Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan, trans. Saba Ansari, Mashal
Books, Lahore, 2004, p. 439.
257. Ibid., p. 440
258. Ibid., p. 448.
259. “Political Parties Should Put Kashmir on Top of Election Manifesto: JI”, Pakistan Observer,
December 31, 2012, at http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=189528.
260. Ibid.
261. “Kashmir Voice International launched to give platform to Kashmiris in UK”, The New Nation,
 Political Parties in ‘AJK’ 115

January 22, 2017 at http://www.newnation.in/world-news/kashmir-voice-international-

launched-to-give-platform-to-kashmiris-in-uk/
262. R.C. Ganjoo, “Pakistan must withdraw from PoK”, Power Politics, Vol.10, Issue 1, February
2017, p. 41
263. Ibid, “kashmiris in UK come together to find solution to Kashmir issue”, Hindustan Times,
January 23, 2017 at http://hindustantimes.com/india-news/kashmiris-in-uk-come-together-
to-find-solution-to-kashmir-issue/ ; R.C. Ganju, “A New Voice from London”., Northlines,
January 2017 at http://thenorthlines.com/new-voice-london/
264. Interview with R.C. Ganjoo on telephone, January 30, 2017.
 3
Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective

Introduction
Gilgit-Baltistan was officially referred to as the Northern Areas since its
occupation by Pakistan in 1947, although the name was in popular use in the
region before that. It was given its present name when the Pakistan People’s
Party (PPP) government in Islamabad promulgated the ‘Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-Governance Order (GBESGO)’ in 2009.1 In May 2018,
just before demitting office, the outgoing Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
(PML-N) government headed by Shahid Khaqan Abbasi repealed the order of
2009 and came out with a fresh “Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order, 2018”
which promised to offer more power to the elected legislature in matter
concerning local governance, but in reality, the central government in Islamabad
retained its absolute control over decision making in all spheres of governance.

Area and Population

The Gilgit-Baltistan region has a geographical area of 72,496 sq. km (as per
Pakistani projections). Under an agreement reached between Pakistan and China
on March 2, 1963, Pakistan handed over 5,180 square km of territory to China.
Gilgit-Baltistan is administratively divided into three divisions2 which in turn
are divided into 10 districts, including Gilgit, Skardu, Diamer, Ghizer, Hunza,
Nagar, Ghanche, Astore, Kharmang and Shigar.3 The main centres of political
activity are the towns of Gilgit, Ghizer and Skardu. Skardu is also the
headquarters of Pakistan Army’s Northern Light Infantry regiment.

Demography and Religion

According to 1998 census, the population of Gilgit-Baltistan was 870,347, while
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 117

estimated population in 2013 was 1.3 million with an annual growth rate of
about 2.56 percent.4 But several articles and books would put the population
figure at 2 million in 2016-17. Approximately 81 percent population is rural
and 19 percent urban.
In Gilgit-Baltistan, nearly 100 percent of population is Muslim. It is also
the home of diverse languages, ethnicity, sectarian and tribal identities. There
are eight major ethnic groups, namely Baltis, Shinas, Yashkuns, Moghals,
Kashmiris, Pathans, Ladakhis and Turkis. They speak the dialects of Balti,
Brushaski, Khawer, Wakhi, Turki, Tibeti, Pashto, Urdu and Persian.5
Four different sects of Islam are prevalent in Gilgit-Baltistan – Sunni, Shia,
Ismail and Noorbakshi.6 Although Shias constitute a clear majority in the region,
except in Diamer and Astore districts, a study carried out by Prof. Omar Farooq
Zain, shows a clear-cut variation on language, sect and ethnic lines.7
Ismailis comprise about 87 per cent of the Ghizer population. They belong
to the Brusho tribe and speak Shina, Khowar and Brushashki languages. Gilgit
and Hunza have a diverse population mix,the majority being Shias (about 54
per cent), and speak Shina, Brushashki and Wakhi languages. Gilgit also has a
sizeable population of Ismailis (27 per cent) and Sunnis 19 (per cent). In Diamer
and Astore, Sunnis constitute 90 per cent of the population, with only 10 per
cent Shias. They mainly speak Shina. In Skardu, about 87 per cent of the
population are Shias,10 per cent Noorbakshis and 3 per cent Sunnis, with Balti
as their major language. Noorbakshis constitute 96 per cent of the population
in Ghangche and mainly speak Balti. There are also a small number of
Kashmiris, Kohistanis, Gujars, Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Hazaras and Afghanis who
are mostly migrants and labourers.
With the influx of Sunni businessmen and others from Punjab and Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa since late 1980s, the demographic character of the terrain has
been changing. Elaborating further, Samuel Baid says:
The influx of outsiders has created two problems, depletion of employment
opportunities for the locals and brutalisation of sectarian tension. Along with
this there has come along a gun culture and gradual replacement of spiritual
values by class materialism of the new middle class. The outsiders grab land
and government jobs. It is not only the jobs that the outsiders grab, but also
plunder their forest and natural resources. The funds allocated for the
development of Gilgit and Baltistan are spent on the Army deployed there.8
The Pakistan Government has not done much to improve the economic
condition of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan which is considered as the most
backward in South Asia. Except tourism, no other industry has been set up in
118 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Gilgit-Baltistan. It lacks basic amenities like education, roads, health care, and
electricity. According to a report by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies,
Islamabad, the region has a very low literacy, 14 per cent for men and 3.5 per
cent for women.9 However, data prepared by the Planning and Economic
Development Department of Government of Gilgit-Baltistan in 2013 claimed
that in 1998, literacy rate was 37.85 per cent (male 52.62 per cent, female
21.65 per cent) which was projected in 2013 as 60 per cent (male 70 per cent
and female 50 per cent).
Further, according to this data, there were only 1,492 primary schools (both
boys and girls) in the year 2011-12, where 105,869 students were enrolled.
Total teaching staff in these primary schools was 36,554. Similarly, there were
418 middle schools for 63,897 students which had 2,787 teachers. For 60,713
students enrolled in 261 high schools, there were only 3,616 teachers. The
condition of most of the public sector schools is pathetic, as almost 1,044
schools have no electricity, 954 schools lack drinking water and 913 schools
are without any latrine facility.10 In the whole of Gilgit-Baltistan, there were
only 15 degree colleges in the year 2011-12, where only 182 teachers were
employed to teach 6,438 students, both boys and girls.11 The girls’ schools have
drawn the ire of Islamists in recent times. In 2018, for example, according to
media reports in Dawn on August 3, Unidentified assailants burned down at
least 12 schools in various places in Diamer district.
It may be noted that the Pakistan Government has not bothered to open
medical or engineering colleges in the region, forcing many students to study
in professional colleges in Karachi and other towns of Pakistan.However, the
role of the Agha Khan Educational Services (AKES) is quite commendable in
uplifting the educational standard of the people. The AKES operates 192 schools
that educate over 36,000 students and employ over 1,600 teachers.12 It provides
education in the rural areas of Gilgit-Baltistan, and hence, supplements the
efforts of the government.13
For such a vast region, there are just 33 hospitals with 986 beds. There is
just one doctor for six thousand inhabitants although official data claim that
there is one doctor for every 3,804 people and one hospital bed for 1,220 people.14

Economic Conditions
Gilgit-Baltistan is the most neglected, backward and poorest area in entire South
Asia where 85 per cent of the people makes its living on subsistence farming,15
but the state data shows only 23 per cent of the population living in poverty.16
In this connection, a multi-party conference was organised in Gilgit on June 6,
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 119

2017 by Astore Supreme Council where the speakers held Islamabad responsible
for keeping the people of Gilgit-Baltistan economically backward for the last
seven decades. Moreover, heavy taxes have been imposed time and again through
ordinances without providing basic fundamental rights, such as constitutional
status to the region. Against the imposition of illegal taxation massive anti-
government protests were held in Gilgit-Baltistan. That brought the socio-
economic activities to a standstill as the traders observed strike for two months.
The protest call was given jointly by G-B Markazi Anjuman-i-Tajran, lawyers
and trade bodies, contractors, hotel and Petrol Pump Association and GB
Chamber of Commerce and Industry who declared the imposition of new taxes
as illegal and tantamount to “murder of traders”.17
The Pakistan government was finally forced to withdraw the newly imposed
taxation policy. But the Awami Action Committee maintained that it was less
than convinced about the government’s claim of withdrawing the tax as it
wanted all taxes imposed over the years to be withdrawn.
The first direct taxation policy on Gilgit-Baltistan was introduced by the
Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP) in 2012. Before that, people of Gilgit-Baltistan
were paying indirect taxes. This direct taxation policy by PPP was imposed
through an act called the Gilgit-Baltistan Council Income Tax (Adaptation)
Act, 2012. According to local analysts, after forming governments at the centre
and in the region, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) was “inclined
to levy more taxes on the people in an attempt to derive maximum benefits
out of the investments that are likely to make its way once the China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) is functional.”18
There has been increasing frequency of suicide incidents in the region. In
Ghizer district alone over 300 youth both boys and girls committed suicides
since 2000 (The Nation May 21, 2017). One major reason for committing the
suicides is unemployment. Those who are educated either join the government
services or Northern Light Infantry.19 Moreover, there is discrimination in the
pay structure as well. The natives who join the civil services are paid 25 per
cent less than those in deputation from Punjab.20
Over 90 percent of the region’s population is engaged in agriculture,21 which
is used for growing wheat, barley, maize, millet, potato, peas, vegetables and
fruits such as pear, cherries, peach, apple, plum and mulberry. Gilgit-Baltistan
had 640,000 hectares of forest area which has fallen to 295,000 hectares i.e.
more than 50 percent in the last 20 years due to callous cutting of trees and
illegal smuggling.22
The region earns most of its revenue from tourism and minerals. Major
120 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

deposits include nickel, cobalt, copper, lead, tin, bismuth, mica, quartz, zircon,
coal, actinolite, gold, silver, iron, zinc, marble, uranium, spinel tourmaline,
sulphur, pyrite and feldspar.23 Based on a survey report carried out by Australian
Agency for International Development (AUAID) and Pakistan Mineral
Development Corporation (PMDC) in 1995, it was estimated that there are
1,480 gold mines in this area out of which 123 contain superior quality to the
gold mines in South Africa.24 But the mining industry has not flourished.
According to the Gilgit-Baltistan Metals Minerals and Gem Association
(GBMMGA), this could be because the companies who were issued mining
leases and exploration licenses have become powerful mafia intent on “keeping
the sector backward for their ulterior motive”.25 These licenses were issued to
20 multinational mining companies during Musharraf ’s regime.26 There are
also reports that the Gem Association has protested the new mining rules
announced by the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The Chairman of the
Association, Shahbaz Khan has warned that it will deprive the locals of their
natural wealth and “will fuel an uprising against the colonial policies” of
Pakistan. The precious items covered under the new rules include mining,
among other mineral resources, ruby, emerald, aquamarine, sapphire and
tourmaline. Moreover, Pakistan has allowed China to exploit its mineral wealth.
Apparently, 35 tonnes of certain mineral deposits from uranium-rich Karkalti
village of Ghizer district in Yasin Valley were smuggled to China.27 The locals
have, however, resisted the entry of foreign companies. Senge Hasnan Sering
writes in the Economic Times:
In 2008, for instance, a local person was killed when the residents of uranium-
rich Gindai valley (Yasin valley) in Ghizer district clashed with Chinese miners.
A Pakistani company called Mohmand Minerals met the same fate in 2010
in Nasirabad valley of Hunza district where the Progressive Youth Front
spearheads the resistance against the Pakistani and Chinese expansionism.
Today, more than a 100 local right defenders are locked up in Pakistani jails
and face sedition charges for denying space to the Chinese and Pakistani
mining companies in their valleys.28

Karakoram Highway
The Karakoram Highway (KKH) links Pakistan with China and is beneficial
for trade between the two countries, which runs into billions of dollars. The
857-km-long KKH constructed by Chinese engineers in 1978 was opened to
the public in 1986. The importance of this road link was realised after Pakistan
ceded 5180 square km of Shaksgam Valley to China in 1963 without consulting
the local people.It is believed that the entire cost of the construction was met
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 121

by China. Besides normal trade, the KKH is also used by Pakistan for bringing
military equipment from China. To achieve further strategic military edge, KKH
is being converted by China into a four-lane highway with three times more
capacity to accommodate heavy-laden trucks in extreme weather conditions.29
China and Pakistan are also planning to link the KKH to the southern Gwadar
port of Balochistan through the Chinese aided the construction of Gwadar-
Dalbandin railway, which extends up to Rawalpindi.30

Tourism Industry
One of the most beautiful places in the world, Gilgit-Baltistan is very popular
among tourists both from Pakistan and abroad. Surrounded by the world’s
largest mountain ranges – Hindukush to the Karakoram in the northeast with
western Himalayas in the south and Pamir in the extreme north – Gilgit-
Baltistan borders the Chinese province of Xinjiang to the north, Jammu and
Kashmir to the east, ‘AJK’ to the south, Afghanistan and Central Asia, through
the Wakhan Corridor to the northwest and Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to
the west. The region covers 32 snow-clad peaks and narrow valleys – 18,000
to 26,000 feet high – including the world’s second-highest peak, K-2 or Chigori
and the third-highest peak, Nanga Parbat.
Gilgit-Baltistan is home to snow-clad mountains, mighty glaciers, lush green
valleys and freshwater lakes. The 80 per cent of foreign tourists coming to
Pakistan visit Gilgit-Baltistan. However, the tourism industry, which was the
only major source of employment, has suffered badly in recent years, particularly
after Pakistan witnessed the rise in sectarian and militant violence that got
exasperated after 9/11 terror attacks, earthquakes and floods that have ravaged
the area and the brutal killing of nine foreign tourists (five Ukrainians, three
Chinese, one Russian and a local guide) by militants at Nanga Parbat on June
23, 2013. In the immediate aftermath, the inflow of foreign tourists came down
more than half, as only 4,524 foreign tourists visited Gilgit-Baltistan in 2013
as against 10,338 in 2007.31 From the next year onwards, with improvement in
security situation in Gilgit-Baltistan, the tourism industry witnessed an upward
trend. According to Mubashir Ayub, Assistant Director, Gilgit-Baltistan Tourism
Department, in 2017, around 1.72 million tourists visited G-B. The revival of
tourism industry brought revenue worth PKR 300 million to the local economy
and it had a potential to generate local business worth PKR one billion according
to media reports.32 As much of it would depend on the security situation in the
region, the G-B government has decided to put curbs on public demonstrations
and protests.33 However, such highhandedness may backfire in future because
it deprives people of the right to peaceful protests and holding rallies.
122 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Political History
The region was originally known as Balwaristan or Boloristan. A number of
small tribes, who were at odds with each other, ruled Gilgit-Baltistan until the
beginning of the 19th century. According to some scholars, Gilgit was also known
as Dardistan i.e. the land of Dards or Dardic people. However, F.M. Khan,
the author of The Story of Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral, refused to accept this
description, saying, “There are no race such as Dards and no country as
Dardistan in the entire region.”34 According to him, the Yashkuns were the
predominant race before the first century and also in 1947. Baltistan was
administered directly by the Kashmir Government as part of District Ladakh
with headquarters at Leh. Not much is known about the political developments
in Gilgit-Baltistan during the ancient period. It is believed that Gilgit was the
home of Palola or Patola who practised Buddhism.
Between seventh century and early 19th century, parts of Gilgit-Baltistan
were ruled by various dynasties including: Tarkhans of Gilgit, the Maghlots of
Nagar, the Ayasho of Hunza, the Burshai of Punyal, the Maqpoons of Skardu,
the Anchans of Shigar and the Yabgos of Khaplu. Sri Badat was the last ruler
who patronised Buddhism and built many Viharas in Gilgit, Punial and Yasin.
Sri Badat was killed by Shamsher around 1120 AD. It was during his rule that
Islam was introduced in Gilgit. His first target was the poor sections of society,
namely the Dooms, Kamins and Yashkuns.35 In 1335 AD, forces of Taj Mughol,
the King of Badakshan, invaded Chitral and captured the entire region from
Gilgit to Hunza and introduced the Shia Imami Ismaili version of Islam. His
followers now comprise the Noorbakshi sect.36
The later Mughal rulers also took interest in this region. After annexing
Kashmir, Akbar captured some parts of Baltistan and Ladakh. However, the
area remained largely independent. It was Mughal emperor Shahjahan who
after capturing Ladakh, Baltistan and Kishtwar in 1634 AD merged these areas
with Kashmir.37 By 1842, the Sikh rule had been extended to Gilgit after Raja
Karim Khan of Nagar went to meet the Sikh ruler of Punjab and invited him
to occupy Gilgit. He even accompanied Dogra commander Colonel Nathe
Shah with forces to capture Gilgit.38 This was followed by Treaty of Amritsar
of 1846. According to this treaty, the British transferred control of the territory
to the Dogra rulers of Jammu and Kashmir. In 1848, the local tribal leaders
led by Raja Gohar Aman rebelled and ousted the Maharaja’s forces after
defeating the Dogra forces led by General Bhup Singh. The region was, however
recaptured by Maharaja Ranbir Singh in 1860 who annexed it to the state of
Jammu and Kashmir39 and established a Wazarat in Gilgit in 1866.40
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 123

The control of the Kashmir State over the territories north of Gilgit and
west of Skardu were always contested. The entire region was perpetually in
turmoil both because of local intrigues among influential consanguine families
eyeing local seats of power and ability of local adventurers to mobilise support
from local chieftains against Dogra/British control. The state forces of Kashmir
assisted by the British did attempt to hold on to the terrain in view of its strategic
significance. However, they found it worrisome to quell episodic assaults from
the tribal adventurers and deposed/defeated chieftains all the time. By the mid-
1870s, the effects of the so-called ‘great-game’ on the thinking of the British
colonial decision makers were evident. The British were suspicious of the Russian
intent, despite its commitment vide the April 1875 treaty that it would not
expand its footprints in Central Asia. The British decision makers at the top
believed that the “very word Cashmerer (read Kashmir) exercise[d] a powerful
charm over the Muscovite imagination” (Lord Lytton’s communication with
Salisbury at India Office before he became Viceroy of India) and by mid 1876,
there was a dominant view in India office that “Gilgit [was] the best road from
India to Central Asia” and that the British Indian government “should have an
agent in that district”.
In November 1876, Lord Lytton met Raja Ranbir Singh and urged him to
exercise more effective control of the northern reaches of his kingdom and
expressed his desire to station a British officer in Gilgit. Ranbir had no other
option but to oblige the British. The Maharaja of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir was authorised to extend his control over the states of Chitral and
Yasin by a treaty in 1876-77. By the end of year 1877, a British political officer
was posted as an ‘officer on special duty’ (OSD), as a defacto Political Agent,
with the mandate to collect intelligence about events beyond the bounds of
the Kashmir state and establish friendly relations with them, with the aim of
bringing them gradually under the control of the Kashmir State. In Hunza,
despite the stationing of an officer and a wazir (governor) appointed by the
Maharaja of Kashmir, the local resistance continued to gather strength during
this time and the Dogra-British controlled fortress of Chaprot situated at the
tri-junction of Hunza, Nagar and Kashmir was a target of frequent attacks from
the local rebels.
It was around this time that Russia sought to impose its mission on
Afghanistan, and the Mirs of Hunza and Nagar were found to ingratiate themselves
to the Chinese authorities in Sinkiang, so much so that the British ambassador
to Peking had to emphasise the point that it was an act of impropriety by the
chieftain of Hunza despite the fact that he was receiving an annual pension from
as well as paying tribute to the Maharaja of Kashmir as a feudatory.
124 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-1880) led to change in the British

approach, and by 1881, the British Agency was withdrawn from Gilgit. In the
following days, however, fresh evidence of Russian interest in Afghanistan and
the Russo-Afghan armed engagement during 1884-1885 led to a rethink of
the British position on Gilgit, in view of its strategic import. Later in 1887,
when the British Indian government sent a military contingent to the frontiers
of Gilgit, it found evidence of Russian forays into Hunza through the gap
between the Pamirs and Sinkiang. Hence, restoration of Gilgit Agency was
considered necessary to strengthen British control over the strategic passes of
the Hindu Kush and “to prevent at any cost, the establishment within this
outlying country of the political preponderance of any other power” (as Lytton
wrote in February 1879).
By 1889, four years into the rule by Pratap Singh, who was deemed weak
compared to his predecessor Raja Ranbir Singh, the Gilgit Agency was restored.
Two years later, the Kashmir forces stationed in the strategic forts of Chalt and
Chaprot along the passes were threatened by a combined force of Hunza and
Nagar. The rulers of these two states also insulted the emissary of the British
agent leading to an armed engagement which resulted in a conclusive defeat
for both the local chieftains. The subsequent instalment of loyal members of
the local royal families, in the presence of two Chinese envoys, led to relative
peace in the subsequent years. However, the British quietly encouraged the
Mir of Hunza to cultivate tracts in the districts of Raksam and Taghdumbash,
north of the Hindukush watershed jointly claimed by the rulers of Hunza and
the Chinese administration in Kashgar. The British hold on these territories
under the suzerainty of Maharaja of Kashmir continued. West of the terrain,
following the uprising in Chitral in 1895, which the British put down with
force, the control of the state was taken away from the Gilgit Agency which
came under the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Kashmir and put under the
control of the newly formed Malakand Agency by 1896.
After Pratap Singh died in 1925, his nephew, Hari Singh became the
Maharaja of Kashmir. Political activities and political parties in Gilgit-Baltistan
were controlled through a tough law called the Frontier Crime Regulation
(FCR), which the British rulers had designed to keep the locals under complete
control. Those found violating the orders were given harsh punishments. By
1935, thanks to the turns and twists in the geopolitics of Europe, the British
concerns about Russian intent grew further. On March 26, that year, the British
pressurised the Maharaja and obtained control of the sensitive terrain under a
60-year lease agreement which recognised suzerainty of the Maharaja and the
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 125

Art. II of the Agreement said that the “flag of His Highness will be flown at
the official headquarters throughout the year”. However, for all practical
purposes the British took charge of the terrain until they decided through the
doctrine of lapse of paramountcy to return it to the Maharaja restoring his
suzerainty and control over it.
The British authorities took this step fearing threat to the northern frontier
of India from Russian expansionist moves following the October 1917 revolution.
Commenting on the strategic importance of Gilgit and Russian fears, eminent
historian, E.F. Knight wrote: “It is necessary for the safeguarding of our Empire
that we should at any rate hold our side of the mountain gates but unless we
locked it in, Russia would soon have both sides under her control.”41 Similarly,
the agreement gave the Viceroy the right to assume civil and military
administration of the Wazarat while the territory continued to be part of
Maharaja’s dominion.42 However, during this period the state flag remained
hoisted over residency along with the Union Jack. The lease was, however,
terminated with the announcement of the Partition of India in July 1947.
With the termination of the 1935 lease and lapse of the paramountcy in
1947, the British handed over the administrative control of all the areas included
in the Gilgit agency to the Maharaja.43 Maharaja Hari Singh sent Brigadier
Ghansara Singh to take charge of Gilgit as its Governor. On October 31, 1947,
Gilgit Scouts troops led by Major Brown surrounded the house of the Governor
under a conspiracy and forced him to surrender. The rebels then headed towards
Baltistan and after capturing it announced the formation of a provisional
government. The provisional government was formed by Major Brown and
other officers and was headed by one local Raja Shah Rais Khan.
The Provisional Government lasted only for a fortnight as it did not have
the support of the common people. It appears that the provisional government
did not sign a formal Instrument of Accession with Pakistan. Major Brown
sent frantic wireless messages to Peshawar informing that Pakistan had taken
over Gilgit44 and asked them to send a civil administrator to rule over this
region.45 The Pakistan Government responded by sending Sardar Muhammad
Alam, a tehsildar in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) government
at that time, who assumed the post of Political Agent on November 16, 1947.
Because of his strong leaning towards Pakistan, Major Brown played his cards
by exploiting the “religious sentiments of the Muslims soldiers in Maharaja’s
army and Gilgit Scouts to incite them to revolt and detach Northern Areas
from rest of Kashmir”.46 Presumably, for this act, he was appointed adviser to
the provisional government.47 Later he served in the Frontier Constabulary of
126 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the NWFP, now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. He and his family finally left
Pakistan for their hometown in the UK in 1959.48
After appointing Sardar Mohammad Alam, a Sunni Pathan, as the agent
of the region, Pakistan brought in the notorious Frontier Crimes Regulation
(FCR) and retained all the anti-people laws included in the FCR. It used the
FCR to ban political activities, rallies and processions. Under the FCR, people
had no right to appeal, to legal representation or to present reasoned evidence.
A group of judges and advocates started a movement for the people’s rights
and abolition of the FCR. They were sent to jail.
On April 28, 1949, Pakistan made this transfer formal by signing the Karachi
Agreement with the President of “Azad Kashmir” and the Muslim Conference.49
Under this agreement, the administrative control of Gilgit and Baltistan was
temporarily transferred to the Government of Pakistan vide sub-clause 8 of
Section-3 of the Agreement50 and also gave the federal government responsibility
for defence and foreign policy of PoK and negotiation with United Nations
Commission for India and Pakistan.51 It may be noted that the 1949 agreement
was signed without the knowledge and consultation of the local people.
A former President of Northern Areas Bar Association Asadullah Khan, in
an interview with Brussels based International Crisis Group called Karachi
Agreement as “nothing more than a sale of human beings, in which Pakistan
and Azad Kashmir were customers and we were the commodity on sale”.52 By
virtue of this agreement the affairs of the Gilgit-Baltistan were brought under
the control of a Political Agent appointed by the Government of Pakistan.
Northern Areas have never figured in any of the Pakistan Constitution. Also,
Pakistan describes Northern Areas as a disputed territory. In various Court cases
Pakistan said that Northern Areas were not its part.
It was in 1970’s that Pakistan undertook certain changes in the laws of
governance of the region. In 1972, Chief Martial Law Administrator and
President of truncated Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto visited the area and
promptly announced the abolition of all princely states and Gilgit-Baltistan
was transformed into districts. In 1974, Bhutto abolished the Frontier Crime
Regulation (FCR) and introduced a Northern Areas Council (NAC) which
replaced the NAAC. The members of NAC were elected directly on the basis
of universal adult franchise.53 During the Martial Law Regime under General
Zia-ul-Haq, Gilgit-Baltistan was governed as a separate Martial Law Zone.54
In 1982, the Zia government granted observer status to the Gilgit-Baltistan
members in the Majlis-i-Shura (the body he had established in the absence of
a parliament). This was General Zia’s attempt “to placate those who wanted
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 127

Gilgit-Baltistan to be made Pakistan’s fifth province or merge it with NWFP”.55

The move was strongly opposed by ‘AJK’, nationalist Kashmiris and India. As
a result General Zia dropped this idea. In fact, in 1972 the ‘AJK’ Legislative
Assembly had passed a resolution demanding the return of Northern Areas,
which had been taken over by Pakistan under the Karachi Agreement, according
to a Pakistani analyst Khalid Hussain, a demand Pakistan has chosen to ignore.56
In 1993, ‘AJK’ High Court accepted a petition filed by Malik Mohammad
Maskeen and Haji Amir Jan, both residents of Gilgit-Baltistan, and Sheikh
Abdul Aziz, an advocate from Muzaffarabad, challenging Pakistan’s authority
to administer the Northern Areas. It ruled that Islamabad had “no legitimate
cause to keep the Northern Areas and their residents (Jammu and Kashmir
state subjects) detached from Azad Jammu and Kashmir”. The High Court
stressed that it was contradictory to claim that the Northern Areas were neither
part of ‘AJK’ nor Pakistan. It accordingly directed the ‘AJK’ government to
immediately assume the administrative control of the Northern Areas and annex
it with the administration of ‘AJK’. It also directed the government of Pakistan
to provide adequate assistance and facility to the ‘Azad Kashmir’ government
in attainment of the said objective.57 Thereafter, the Pakistan Government filed
an appeal in the ‘AJK’ Supreme Court which announced its decision on
September 14, 1994. It said, “No doubt, that Northern Areas are part of the
state of Jammu and Kashmir – but not of Azad Kashmir. Therefore, the
government need not take administrative control of these areas.”58
It was in 1994 that Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in her second term
approved a reform package. The package was known as the Northern Areas
Legal Framework Order (LFO), 1994. It gave these areas a certain amount of
representation by turning the Northern Area’s Council into Northern Areas
Legislative Council (NALC) comprising 24 members of whom six each shall
be elected from Gilgit, Diamer and Baltistan districts, three each from Ghizir
and Ghanche districts and five seats reserved for the women. Its other salient
points were as follows:
(i) NALC shall be headed by the Chief Executive of the Northern Areas,
who shall be the Federal Minister of Kashmir Affairs, Northern Areas,
State and Frontier Region.
(ii) The Chief Executive shall appoint Deputy Chief from amongst the
members of the council and Deputy Chief Executive, who shall be
elected by the members of the council on the basis of majority votes.
Person applied for the post will have a status of a minister.
(iii) Chief Executive will also appoint three advisors who will be given the
status of Provincial Minister.
128 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(iv) It was through this order that the certain Areas rules were enunciated.
Under the new Judicial System, the areas will have courts mainly,
courts of appeal, the Chief Court, Subordinate Judiciary and any
other court, specially set up for any other purpose.
(v) NALC has been given power to legislate in 49 subjects listed in
Schedule-II of the order.59
However, the NALC is empowered to legislate on 49 subjects and has been
given a limited advisory functions but it still needs assent from the KANA
minister’s approval to pass a bill.60
Alarmed over the lack of political representation and denial of basic rights,
the Supreme Court in its significant judgement in 1999 directed Islamabad to
extend fundamental rights to the region’s residents within six months:
People of Northern Areas are citizens of Pakistan, for all intents and purposes
and like other citizens have the right to invoke any of the fundamental rights
and liable to pay taxes and other levies competently imposed. Said people are
also entitled to participate in the governance of their area and to have an
independent judiciary to enforce, inter alia, the fundamental rights. Supreme
court directed the Federation of Pakistan to initiate appropriate administrative/
legislative measures, with a period of six months from 28-5-1999 to make
necessary enactments in the Constitution relevant statute /statutes/orders/
rules/notifications, to ensure that the people of Northern Areas enjoy their
fundamental rights, namely, to be governed through their chosen
representatives and to have access to justice through an independent judiciary,
inter alia, for the enforcement of their fundamental rights guaranteed under
the Constitution. It is not understandable on what basis the people of
Northern Areas can be denied the fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.61
Accordingly, the Pakistan Government took the following decisions after
delegating further administrative and financial powers to NALC:
(i) Separate divisions were created for Gilgit-Baltistan and ‘AJK’;
(ii) Some limited powers were given to the deputy chief executive regarding
postings and transfers; and
(iii) Chief Secretary of Gilgit-Baltistan was to be treated at par with the
chief secretaries of other provinces of Pakistan.62
Meanwhile, pressure was building up on the Pakistan Government both at home
and abroad to take all necessary measures to grant fundamental rights to the
people of Gilgit-Baltistan who had been living in a constitutional vacuum for
over 68 years. Particularly because the international human rights organisations
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 129

had reported extensively on the denial of human rights to the people of ‘AJK’
and Gilgit-Baltistan. One such report by the Human Rights Watch entitled,
“With Friends Like These: Human Rights Violation in Azad Kashmir”,
elucidated:
The controls on freedom of expression have been a hallmark of the Pakistani
government’s policy in Azad Kashmir and are also documented in this report.
This control is highly selective. Pakistani-backed militant organizations
promoting the incorporation of Jammu and Kashmir State into Pakistan
have had free reign – particularly from 1989 when the insurgency began to
2001 – to propagate views and disseminate literature; by contrast, groups
promoting an independent Kashmir find promoting their views sharply
curtailed. But frequent official repression of freedom of expression and
assembly is not limited to controls and censorship specific to Kashmiri
nationalists, journalists and election cycles. This repression can also be violent
and very publicly so.63
Another report which criticised the Pakistan Government over the absence of
the basic rights to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan is the report by European
Parliament that maintained:
Deplores documented human rights violations by Pakistan including in Gilgit
and Baltistan, where allegedly violent riots took place in 2004 and all too
frequent incidents of terror and violence perpetrated by armed militant groups;
urges Pakistan to revisit its concepts of the fundamental rights of freedom of
expression, freedom association and freedom of religious practice in AJK and
Gilgit and Baltistan, and notes with concern allegations by human rights
associations such as Amnesty International of torture and detention without
due process; strongly urges all parties involved to do all they can to address
these violations.64
Further, the report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) blames the Pakistan
military for not addressing the political problem in Gilgit-Baltistan. According
to the ICG, the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA) headed by a major
general stationed in Gilgit exercises enormous influence in the internal affairs
of the region. The FCNA controls both security and administrative affairs of
the area. Even transfers and postings need the approval of the FCNA. While
talking to the ICG, one analyst who did not want to be named, said that the
army oversees the “recruitment and appointments and even approve government
contracts and tenders”.65
Despite the 1999 Supreme Court ruling, the people of Gilgit Baltistan
were denied their basic rights and privileges. The Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
130 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

and Northern Areas under the Federal Rules of Business of 1973 was still
authorised to legislate for the Northern Areas.66 Even the Pakistan Government
did not trust the local bureaucracy, and instead senior officers were sent on
deputation. In the 2007 reform package announced by General Musharraf
upgraded the NALC into a Legislative Assembly and the deputy chief was made
its chief executive.67 In August 2009, the PPP government promulgated the
Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order-2009 (GBESGO),
brought some political reforms under which the region was not given the status
of another province, but provided with legislative assembly with some powers
and a nomenclature of a chief minister and governor. The new order which
had 15 major parts replaced Northern Areas Governance Order 1994. Its salient
features were:
(i) Name of the area changed from Northern Areas to Gilgit-Baltistan.
(ii) Offices of Governor, the Chief Minister are created.
(iii) On the pattern of ‘AJK’ Council, the Gilgit-Baltistan Council was
formed. The Council was to be headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
(iv) The Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly was given powers to approve budget.
It also introduced concept of Consolidated Fund and increased the
legislative powers of the Assembly from 49 to 61 subjects along with
powers to legislate on all other subjects not in the domain of Gilgit-
Baltistan Council.
(v) Gilgit-Baltistan Council was given the power to legislate on 55
subjects;
(vi) The Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly was empowered to formulate its own
Rules of Procedures while legislation on various subjects pertinent to
governance were to be done by the Council and Assembly in their
respective jurisdiction.
(vii) Gilgit-Baltistan was entitled to have its own Public Service
Commission, a Chief Election Commissioner and an Auditor General.
(viii) Auditor General was to be appointed by the Governor on the advice
of the Council as the case in ‘AJK’.
(ix) The Chief Judge and Judges of the Chief Court were to be appointed
by the Chairman of the Council on the advice of the Governor on
the same pattern as it was practised in ‘AJK’. The number of judges
increased from 3 to 5.68

Political Structure of GBESGO

Gilgit-Baltistan was still under the control of federal Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
and Gilgit-Baltistan, and had a bicameral legislature:
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 131

Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA): The GBLA consisted of 33

members (the number remains the same even after the G-B Order of May
2018) of which:
(a) Twenty-four members are to be elected directly on the basis of adult
franchise;
(b) Six women members are to be elected in accordance with the system
of reserved seats in Pakistan. One additional seat (total 7) was allotted
to the newly created district of Hunza Nagar.
(c) Three technocrats and professional members are to be elected on the
lines of reserved seats in Pakistan.
Gilgit-Baltistan Council (GBC): The GBC consisted of the following members:
(a) The Prime Minister of Pakistan;
(b) The Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan, appointed by the President of
Pakistan on the advice of Prime Minister;
(c) Six members nominated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan from time
to time from amongst Federal Ministers and members of Parliament,
provided that the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-
Baltistan shall be an ex officio member and Minister in-charge of the
Council;
(d) The Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(e) Six members to be elected by the Assembly in accordance with the
system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable
vote.
(f ) The Prime Minister of Pakistan was the Chairman of the GBC whereas
the Governor was to be the Vice-Chairman of the GBC and the
Minister of State for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan was to be
an ex-officio nonvoting member of GBC.

November 2009 Elections after the Promulgation of GBESGO

The first elections to the GBLA were held on November 14, 2009. The elections
for the 24 assembly seats were contested by 256 candidates from 10 political
parties. The total registered voters were over 714,000, the votes polled were
328,103, and the turnout was 46 per cent.69 The PPP-GB won 14 seats of the
24 for which elections were held on November 12, 2009. In all, it got a total
of 21 seats by winning four of the women seats and all the three reserved for
technocrats. While the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-GB (JUI-GB) won 3 seats,
Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam-GB (PMLQ-GB), Pakistan Muslim
League-Nawaz-GB (PMLN-GB) and independents shared two seats each; the
132 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Karachi-based Muttahida Quami Movement-GB (MQM-GB) won one seat.70

Table 1 shows the political parties and seats they won in 2009 GBLA elections.

Table 1: Party Positions in 2009 Elections71

Party General Seats Women Technocrats Total
PPP-GB 14 4 3 21
PMLQ-GB 2 1 3
PMLN-GB 2 2
JUI-GB 3 1 4
MQM-GB 1 1
Independent 2 2
Total 24 6 3 33

The PPP-GB leader, Syed Mehdi Shah, became the first Chief Minister.
Although the PPP had won absolute majority, the JUI-GB and PMLQ-GB
were accommodated in the government.72 The PMLN-GB which had won only
two seats improved its tally to four when it won the by-elections held in
Ghanche and Skardu constituencies in 2013.73
The party got a further boost just before the June 2015 elections when a
senior leader of the PPP and some leaders of other political parties switched
over their loyalties, including Haji Qurban, Agha Foker and Yahya Shah (all
PPP-GB); Abdul Latif and Mahmoodal Hasan (both Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
[PTI-GB]); Aurangzeb Khan (Awami Party); and Raja Azam (MQM-GB).74
Following completion of five years in office, the PPP government led by Syed
Mehdi Shah stepped down. On December 13, 2014, a caretaker government
was formed to conduct free and fair elections.

Legislative Assembly Elections June 2015

The second election under the GBESGO 2009 was held on June 8, 2015 under
army supervision. Immediately after the announcement of elections, the then
PML-(N) government in Islamabad appointed Chaudhry Birjees Tahir as
Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan. Interestingly, Tahir was then holding the post of
Minister of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan. Thus, the appointment of
Tahir as Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan was considered as an attempt to rig the
elections.75
In all, 271 candidates from 17 political parties contested the elections. The
breakdown of the political parties and the total number of constituencies (within
brackets) where they fielded their candidates is as follows: PMLN-GB (24);
PPP-GB (22); PTI-GB (21); Majlis-e-Wahadat-i-Muslimeen-GB (MWM-GB)
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 133

(15); All Pakistan Muslim League (APML-GB) (13); JUIF-GB (10); Pakistan
Awami Tehreek-GB (PAT-GB) (7); Jamaat-e-Islami-GB (JI-GB) (6); and
Tehreek-i-Islami (12). Besides, the MQM-GB, Sunni Ittehad Council-GB (SIC-
GB) and independents were also part of the fray. While the Shia Ulema Council
entered the scene under the banner of Islami-i-Tehreek Pakistan, the Quaid
Muslim League boycotted the elections after all its three legislators in the last
Assembly switched over to PMLN-GB. The revised NADRA voters’ list reduced
the number of registered voters from 750,000 in the 2009 Gilgit-Baltistan
Assembly elections to 615,000 this time. The voter turnout was 60 percent.76
According to media reports, about 6,000 army personnel were deployed
in 1143 polling booths to supervise the polling. While the women in the Diamer
valley cast their ballots, the women in the Tangir valley followed the dictat of
local Jirga declaring voting by women against cultural and religious norms.
There were two women candidates from MQM-GB and PTI-GB parties but
both of them lost. The PMLN-GB captured power by winning 15 seats out of
24 elected seats. Subsequently, an independent member, Fida Khan, elected
from Ghizer joined the PMLN-GB, increasing its number to 16.
Out of GBLA’s six seats reserved for women, and three for technocrats,
the PMLN-GB grabbed four and two seats, respectively. By winning a
technocrats’ seat and a women’s seat, Islami Tehreek Pakistan emerged as the
main opposition party with four seats.77 The MWM also got one women’s seat.
With winning majority of seats, the PML-N formed Government and
elected Hafeezur Rehman as new G-B Chief Minister. The then PML-N
government at centre appointed Mir Ghazanfar Ali Khan as the new Governor.
He was replaced by Raja Jalal Hussain Maqpoon. Mir Ghazanfar Ali Khan
who resigned from the post after a controversy triggered by an alleged leaked
video which was carried by the local daily news paper in which the former
Governor was believed to making CPEC a controversial issue.
It may be mentioned that in August 2016, Mir Saleem, son of former G-B
Governor, Mir Ghazanfar Ali Khan, was elected in a by-election from Hunza.
The seat had fallen vacant after the appointment of his father as Governor of
Gilgit-Baltistan. But on April 10, 2018, the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court disqualified him on the grounds that he was a defaulter of the National
Bank of Pakistan.
Table 2 shows the political parties and the seats they won in the 2015
elections:
134 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Table 2: Results of 2015 Elections

Party General seats Women Technocrats Total
PMLN-GB 16 04 02 22
Majlis Wahadatul Muslimeen 02 01 — 03
Islami Tehreek Pakistan 02 01 01 04
PPP-GB 01 01
PTI-GB 01 01
JUIF-GB 01 01
Balwaristan National Front 01 01
Total 24 06 03 33
For further details see Appendixes XI, XII and XIII

The MQM, All Pakistan Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami could not
win a single seat. However, the victory of Nawaz Khan Naji of the Balawaristan
National Front was a boost to nationalists. About 10 candidates from pro-
independence groups contested the elections. Naji won the seat from GBLA-
19 (Ghizer-1) constituency. It may be noted that no pro-independence candidate
won seats in the 2009 GBLA elections, although they had fielded 14 candidates.
Out of 14, eight candidates pulled out of contest in protest against the abduction
of the APNA chairman, Mirza Wajahat Hasan Khan and his younger brother
by the law enforcement agencies on October 30. The following day, they were
externed from Gilgit-Baltistan for 60 days.78 Shabir Choudhry, the London-
based Director of the Institute of Kashmir Affairs, alleged that local nationalist
parties in Gilgit-Baltistan were marginalised and treated unfairly. According to
him, this was because these nationalist parties did not have enough funds to
compete with major Pakistan political parties. Moreover, they did not get the
support from the “Pakistani imposed government and administration”.79
Although the Chief Minister was an elected representative of the people,
the 15-member Gilgit-Baltistan Council virtually wielded all authority and
power over the affairs of the region. Not only this, the GBESGO gave extensive
powers to the “Chairman of the Council” who was in fact the Prime Minister
of Pakistan.80 Ali Ashraf Khan of Karachi wrote in Pakistan Today:
Until today Gilgit-Baltistan is neither represented in the National Assembly
of Pakistan nor in the Senate and the GB Council that is the de facto
government of GB have only one symbolic representation of the people of
Gilgit-Baltistan. Refugees of Kargil and Ladakh living in Gilgit-Baltistan and
other parts of Pakistan have no representation whereas refugees of Jammu
and Kashmir have twelve seats reserved for them in AJK Assembly where till
1964 Kargil/Laddakh refugees also had one reserved seat: that is why it is
considered as an instrument in the hands of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 135

and GB affairs. Thus the election to the 24 seat legislative assembly is a

symbolic act at best and a fraud otherwise because elections will be rigged as
they have been in KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] and the rest of Pakistan and
then the assembly will be a fig leaf of democracy.81

Reactions to GBESGO, 2009

The reactions to the GBESGO were mixed. While most of the political parties
welcomed the order but the nationalist leaders and human rights bodies called
it an “eye wash”. They declared that they were not taken into confidence by
the Pakistan Government, adding that by issuing this order India would get
an upper hand “as it wants the existing line of control to be accepted as
international border”.82 The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front termed the
Gilgit-Baltistan reforms as a “conspiracy against the people of Kashmir”.83 Its
President Syed Faisal Nazki said that, “the Kashmiris considered the Gilgit-
Baltistan package as an attempt to divide the motherland”.84 Former JKLF
supremo Amanullah Khan also rejected the package. He said that it appeared
to be aimed at merging the disputed areas into Pakistan. The President of
Jammu and Kashmir National Awami Party, Liaquat Hayat said that the
GBESGO is “nothing but a little joke to the people of the region and the state
of Jammu and Kashmir”.85 The APNA Chapter of Gilgit-Baltistan called it as
“illegal and unconstitutional.”86 In a letter addressed to the former prime
minister of Pakistan, Yousaf Gilani, the Gilgit-Baltistan National Alliance
(GBNA) Chairperson Malika Baltistani described the package as a “provincial
status, a political system without political empowerment, a constitutional
package without constitutional rights, a constitutional draft for Gilgit-Baltistan
without the input or suggestions by Gilgitis and Baltis, and last but not the
least, your government “awards” us a presence in the main-stream economic
strata without representation in National Finance Commission (NFC) awards.”
Strongly criticizing the package, Manzoor Parwana Chairman of Gilgit-Baltistan
United Movement demanded ‘AJK’ like independent assembly till the resolution
of Kashmir issue.87 In the same vein, Christopher Snedden elucidates:
While the 2009 political system was long overdue advancement for people
in GB, the Gilgit-Baltistan (empowerment and self-governance) Order 2009
appeared to assume that this region is already a part of Pakistan. This becomes
clear when comparing the political systems of GB and Azad Kashmir. While
similar in the sense that both regions have a Council that links them to
Pakistan, the two regions political systems vary in some significant ways.
First and foremost Islamabad used the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and
Northern Areas to impose the ‘order’ on GB. Conversely the Azad Kashmir
136 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Legislative Assembly formerly passed the Azad Kashmir Interim Constitution

in 1974, albeit after Islamabad ‘authorised’ its introduction into the Azad
Kashmir Legislative Assembly for consideration and passage. Second like Azad
Kashmiris, G-Baltistanis are G-Bians, as they call themselves are not permitted
to propagate against or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to
the ideology of Pakistan. However, unlike Azad Kashmiris, legislators in GB
do not have to swear allegiance to J&K joining Pakistan. Rather, they must
swear that they ‘will remain loyal to Pakistan’, and oath that (incorrectly)
seems to infer that their regions status (as part of Pakistan) has already been
resolved.88
Writing in The Nation, Brigadier (Retired) Samson Simon Sharaf, an expert
on ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan affairs, said that successive governments have done
little to address the separatist and sub nationalist sentiments which are on the
rise and warned, “With time, alienation will breed forces of secession and then
it will be too late.”89
Despite these backlashes, the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern
Areas continued to play its cards. Commenting on the new changes made in
the GBESGO, Pakistan-based commentators on ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan put
it succinctly:
For the people of GB, it was clear that the ministry of Kashmir Affairs and
Northern Areas would not provide any advice that would compromise its
hold over power in GB. The ministry has been used directly or indirectly to
curtail people’s rights in GB; the status quo did not change despite Gilani’s
new laws. GB still cannot claim a share in the National Finance Commission
(NFC) award, for example.90
There are also flaws in the GBESGO 2009. Gilgit-Baltistan Council member
Amjad Hussain of the PPP pointed out discrimination against the region saying
that the regional elected assembly cannot make laws on the council subjects
such as tourism, minerals, power generation, forest and trade with foreign
countries. Moreover, Amjad Hussain said that the region has not been given a
share in the National Finance Commission. This is inspite of the fact that the
federal government earns Rs. 40 billion annually from Gilgit-Baltistan resources.
However, in return, Gilgit-Baltistan gets only Rs. 26 billion.91

India’s Response
India made it clear that the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, which includes
the regions of Gilgit and Baltistan, is an integral part of India. The Indian
Government took serious note to the GBESGO. It summoned the Deputy
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 137

High Commissioner of Pakistan, Riffat Masood, and registered a strong protest

against the order. An Indian Government spokesman described the GBESGO
as yet another cosmetic exercise intended to camouflage Pakistan’s illegal
occupation of the region.India also raised strong objections to Pakistan’s plan
of holding elections in Gilgit-Baltistan in June 2015. In a strong statement on
June 2, 2015, the External Affairs spokesperson, Vikas Swarup, said the
proposed election in Gilgit and Baltistan under the so-called ‘GBESGO’ is an
attempt by Pakistan to camouflage its forcible and illegal occupation of the
regions.92
However, during the back-channel discussions on Kashmir, Pakistan
accepted Gilgit-Baltistan as part of Jammu and Kashmir. In his book titled,
Neither a Hawk or a Dove, former Pakistani Foreign Minister Khurshid
Mahmud Kasuri writes:
During the back channel negotiations also, the Indians made it abundantly
clear that they could only accept an agreement regarding J&K, if the Northern
Areas were also included in the entire scheme. We confronted a dilemma....
We therefore reached an agreement after many arguments and negotiations
that there would be two units for the purpose of the agreement...comprising
the areas respectively controlled by India and Pakistan.93

Political Developments
The efforts to establish a viable political system in Gilgit-Baltistan have been
stunted by rich and influential Pakistan-based political parties. In the run up
to the June 8, 2015 Assembly elections, it was clear that a section of the locals
resented the presence of Pakistan-based political parties; however, a few others
saw it as an opportunity for Gilgit-Baltistan because of these parties’ links to
the powers that be in Islamabad. Further, the ban on political activities under
the FCR made sure that the indigenous political parties did not emerge in
Gilgit-Baltistan. Locals’ support to various protest movements, nonetheless, is
a signal that locals can establish their own political identity, even though the
colonised identity of Gilgit-Baltistan puts a damper on these signs.
The first attempt to form a political party in this region was made by
Colonel Mirza Hasan Khan, a local man. He writes in his book, Shamsher se
ZanjirTak (“From Sword to Chains”), “I came to Gilgit and formed the political
party (Gilgit League) in 1956. The objective was to bring this desolate region
on a political map but God and the government did not like it. Two years later
(1958), General Ayub Khan imposed Martial Law in Pakistan and outlawed
politicians and their political activities. Although, there was no Martial Law in
AJK, it enforced the same restrictions there, as did in Pakistan.”94
138 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The Muslim Conference, which had been installed into power in ‘AJK’ in
1947 opened its branch in Gilgit in 1951, but was at once told to wind it up.
The Gilgit League was the first political party established in the region, but
was not registered under the Pakistani rules. During the 1960s an organisation
called “Gilgit and Baltistan Jamhoori Mahaz” (Democratic Front) emerged,
but became defunct in 1972. It made efforts to educate the local people to
fight for their constitutional and democratic rights. In this connection, the
party staged rallies and demonstrations against the policies of the Pakistan
government. This organisation was able to persuade the ‘AJK’ Assembly to adopt
a resolution to demand that Northern Areas be joined with ‘AJK’.95 Leader of
the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Amanullah Khan in his
autobiography, Jehad-e-Musalsal (“Continuous Struggle”) had given a brief
account of the political parties which were formed in Gilgit-Baltistan after 1951,
when the Muslim Conference had to wind its Gilgit chapter up. Apart from
the Gilgit and Baltistan Jamhoori Mahaz, he mentioned that in 1963, Gilgit
and Baltistan Students’ Central Organisation was started by the students of
this region studying in Karachi. Later, similar bodies were formed in ‘AJK’ and
some other cities in Pakistan. This led to the formation of a central body in
the name of Gilgit-Baltistan Students Central Organisation in 1968. It was
disbanded in 1976.96
In 1971, a local leader Johar Ali Khan formed the Tanzeem Milli Party in
Gilgit. It demanded the abolition of the princely states and a provincial status
to the Northern Areas.97 But this party soon merged with the PPP. Formation
of a political party, which enjoys locals’ full support, has become difficult after
1988 when the region was split on sectarian lines in the wake of military action
to quell locals’ agitations for civil rights. Consequently, intelligence agencies
and jihadis swarmed the region.
It was in 1994 that the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto,
introduced political reforms for Gilgit-Baltistan and allowed party-based
elections. As mentioned earlier, her government approved the Northern Areas
Council Legal Framework Order (LFO) 1994 through the Northern Areas Rules
of Business. As per the LFO, the first party-based elections to a 24-member
NALC were held in October 1994. But the NALC did not enjoy legislative
authority. As per the reforms, it had only limited advisory functions and no
control over the executive.98 The real power remained with the Ministry of
Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas headed by Joint Secretary who operated
from Islamabad and yielded unlimited powers.
Unlike in ‘AJK’, there are no established regional parties in Gilgit-Baltistan.
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 139

There are small electorally ineffective local parties. People do not vote for the
nationalist parties and cast their lot with the Pakistan-based parties. Among
them, the PPP was the first to open a branch here in 1972. As is evidenced in
the discussion above, besides, the PML-N, PML-Q, Tehreek-e-Insaf, JUI (F)
and MQM have also opened their chapters in Gilgit-Baltistan.

Local Government Act 2014

In its efforts to empower the citizens to have a say in the region’s development,
the GBLA on August 18, 2014 unanimously passed the Local Government
Act 2014. The Act promises to maximise benefits of self-governance to citizens
at lowest tier and introduce local participatory and democratic decision-making
processes by holding local government elections on the party basis and under
a single ward electoral system. Moreover, it aims to encourage women’s
participations in local governments and ensure the effective transfer of power
from the regional to the local government.99
Before this legislation, Gilgit-Baltistan was operating under the Punjab Local
Government Ordinance of 1979. Its local governance system was based on two
tiers: District Councils and Union Councils/Municipal Committees below
them. The middle tier of Tehsil council was not included.100 Under this new
Act, urban areas such as Gilgit and Skardu have been named city metropolitan
corporations to be headed by a mayor and deputy mayor, while district councils
will be formed in all districts headed by a chairman and vice-chairman.
According to the new law, a Gilgit-Baltistan Finance Council will be formed
to supervise financial matters of local bodies. The council’s representatives will
be nominated by the leader of the opposition in the assembly, finance minister
and local government minister.101
On April 18, 2016, elections for the GBC were held after five years. The
council was established in May 2009 under Article 33 of the Empowerment
and Self-Governance 2009 Order. According to the 2009 Order, the GBC is
represented by six members each from the Gilgit-Baltistan and the federal
governments. Out of six candidates, PML-N got four seats. Islami Tehreek
Pakistan got one and one seat was grabbed by an independent candidate. The
PML-N members in the GBC are, Ashraf Sada, Wazir Ikhlaq, Sultan Ali Khan
and Arman Shah. Agha Syed Abbas Rizvi from Islami Tehreek was also elected.
Syed Afzal from Diamer made it as an independent candidate.102

Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan
Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan has deep roots in history with religious, political
140 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

and geo-strategic connotations. Two developments played an important role

in the emergence of sectarianism in Pakistan. One was the 1979 Iranian
Revolution and the other was the Islamisation project of Zia-ul-Haq. In order
to stem the Iranian influence in the region, Saudi Arabia funded the anti-Shia
madrassas, outfits and regimes. Pakistan became the battle ground for the Sunni-
Shia proxy war played by Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Shia revolution in Iran
spurred the Shias in Pakistan, and Gilgit-Baltistan in particular. Shias in Gilgit-
Baltistan started demanding the curriculum – primarily seeking exemptions
on the basis of their sectarian identity. They demanded curriculum and text-
books similar to that of Iran; started going to Iran in large numbers for
pilgrimage and also joined madrassas.
The sectarian feud started with religious leaders criticising and demonising
the other sects in Friday sermons and other religious gatherings. Initially, the
sectarian violence was limited only to the Gilgit district. The first clash erupted
in 1983, over a dispute on the sighting of the moon. The Shia community
ended fasting and started celebrating Eid on the declaration of moon sighting
by their religious leaders. On the other hand, Sunnis did not end fasting. This
was a major breach as Muslims are not allowed to fast on the day of Eid.
Tensions quickly erupted and resulted in a bloody skirmish between the two
groups.
Sectarianism again erupted in May 1988 when the Shias in Gilgit protested
against the Sunni-dominated administration for being lenient towards Sunni
extremists. In retaliation, a religious militia from outside, in connivance with
the state, massacred the Shias. The offensive was apparently triggered by rumours
of a Sunnis massacre in Gilgit by Shias, “deliberately spread to provide an excuse
for Sunni militants to conduct the attacks”.103 An eyewitness in an interview to
the International Crisis Group (ICG) revealed, “The laskhar consisted of
thousands of people from Mansehra, Chilas, Kohistan and other areas in NWFP.
They had travelled a long distance to reach Gilgit, but the government did not
stop them. No government force intervened even as killings and rapes were
going on. Instead, the government put the blame on RAW [Research and
Analysis Wing, India’s intelligence agency], Iran and CIA [Central Intelligence
Agency].”104 This carnage against the Shias marked a watershed moment in
the history of Gilgit-Baltistan. After this mayhem, Shias in Gilgit-Baltistan
realised how vulnerable they were against well-organized and well-equipped
Sunni militant groups. They started looking for help and Iran was a natural
ally that could provide financial and material help.105
Further, on August 17, 1993, 20 people were killed in riots in Gilgit on
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 141

the occasion of Zia’s death anniversary, as Shias, who are in a majority there,
felt threatened by the large influx of Sunnis from other provinces, particularly
from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. On June 3, 2004, another sectarian
clash ensued on curriculum grounds. Shias objected to the Islamiyat (Islamic
Studies) syllabus, as they felt that the texts and images were presented in a
strictly Sunni way.106 When the controversy was not resolved, sectarian clashes
erupted in Skardu.
Whenever the situation in the region gets out of hand, army is called in to
control the situation. But clearly military intervention is not a long-term
solution, and sectarian killings have not come to an end. From 1988 to 2010,
117 sectarian-related murder cases were recorded; 44 were recorded in 2011
alone.107 Further, in 2012, just to mention three incidents: 18 Shias were killed
on February 28 on the KKH in Kohistan district while returning from Iran;
20 people were killed in Chilas on April 3; and 100 people were killed in August
while commuting between Islamabad and Gilgit.108 However, since 2013, the
region has seen some respite in sectarian and terrorist violence.
Analysing the impact of sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan, Izhar Hunzai aptly
states, “The development over the past three decades have left underlying
sectarian tensions in Gilgit-Baltistan to simmer and grow. People increasingly
think in sectarian terms and perceive the so-called other as problematic.”109

The Diamer Bhasha Dam

The decision to build Bhasha Dam was taken after Pakistan government had
to abandon the construction of Kalabagh Dam in Punjab following opposition
from Sind, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provinces. The decision was
taken as Pakistan has been facing acute water and power shortage.

The Project: Basic Features

• Maximum Height: 272 m
• Type: Roller compacted concrete (RCC)
• Diversion System: Tunnels: 02, Canals: 01
• Cofferdam: Upstream and Downstream
• Main Spillway: Gates: 09
• Size: 16.5×15.0 m
• Reservoir Level: 1160 m
• Min Operation Level Elevation: 1060 m
• Gross Capacity: 7,300,000 acre feet (9.0 km3)
• Live Capacity: 6,400,000 acre feet (7.9 km3)
• Outlets: Intermediate Level: 8
142 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

• Low Level: 4
• Powerhouses: No. of Powerhouses: 2
• Total Installed Capacity: 4,500 MW
• Location of Powerhouses: one each on right and left side
• No. of Generator Units: 8
• Capacity/Unit: 560 MW
Estimated Cost: US$ 14 Billion (2013 Estimate)
Dam Purpose: Water storage, irrigation and power generation
Environmental impact
1. Villages affected: 31
2. Houses affected: 4,100
3. Population affected: 35,000
4. Agricultural land submerged: 1,500 acres
5. Area under reservoir: 25,000 acres (100 km)
Pakistan has been talking about constructing the Diamer-Bhasha Dam, also
known as the Bhasha Dam, on the Indus River for over five decades. The project
has seen little progress despite two ceremonies for laying the foundation stone.
Instead it has been mired in one controversy after another.
The concept of Bhasha Dam has much to do with an advisory of the World
Bank (WB) on how Pakistan could overcome its recurring energy crunch. The
Bank even identified a site in 1967 to build a run-of-water project, located at
Bhasha, about 165 km from Gilgit, and hence the name.
Technically, Bhasha Dam is proposed to be built in Gilgit-Baltistan, but it
falls within a 10 km stretch of land in Diamer Valley, which is claimed by
both Gilgit-Baltistan and Kohistan region of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province.
The row remains unresolved till date, though the disputed stretch is demarcated
for dam acquisition.
In the 1980s, the Pakistan Government decided to go beyond the WB brief
and build the Bhasha Dam with an irrigation component. The decision was
prompted by energy crunch and the inability to build the Kalabagh Dam, which
was proposed as the lifeline of Punjab.
A Canadian firm, Monenco, completed the first feasibility study in 1984.
An international consortium of hydropower consultants comprising a US firm,
MWH, among others, took a relook at the technical, economic, financial and
environmental aspects in 2004. Lahmeyer International of Germany, the world’s
top-ranked hydropower firm, carried out a review of earlier reports in 2008,
and prepared a detailed engineering design and bidding documents.
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 143

Accordingly, the Bhasha Dam is to be built as a gravity dam.110 It will be

the highest RCC structure in the world. Built to a height of about 272 m (892
ft), the dam with 14 gates (each of 11.5 m × 16.24 m) will impound 15 per
cent of the annual flow of the Indus. The reservoir will be spread over 25,000
acres. It could provide irrigation for 4 million acres. Two underground power
houses will be built, one on either side of the main dam with six turbines on
each side, and a total installed capacity of 4500 MW.
Furthermore, the dam will result in the submergence of 30 villages, affecting
35,000 people. Also to be submerged is 100 km stretch of the Karakoram
Highway that connects Pakistan and China, and forms a key component of
the China-Pakistan Energy Corridor (CPEC).
The foundation stone for the project has been laid twice – in 2006 by
then President Pervez Musharraf, and in 2011 by then Prime Minister Yousaf
Raza Gilani of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP). The Nawaz Sharif government,
which came to power in 2013, too, energetically pursued the Bhasha Dam.
The initial cost of the project was estimated at around $ 6.5 bn. By 2016,
the cost increased to $ 14 bn. The Asian Development Bank (ADB), WB and
US had evinced interest, but went back on their promise of funding the venture.
The WB’s reluctance to fund Bhasha Dam is primarily on account of Gilgit-
Baltistan being a disputed area between Pakistan and India. The Bank insisted
on a No Objection Certificate (NOC)111 from India. India on its part has also
been questioning the project’s legality, saying that it is being built on a disputed
territory. Moreover, India has raised objections on building such a massive dam
with an irrigation component.
The WB’s assistance to Pakistan for the period 2015-2019, approved in
May 2014 makes no mention of the Bhasha Dam.112 As mentioned earlier, the
ADB and the US, too, after raising hopes have so far decided not to fund the
project either directly or indirectly
Pakistan has also turned to China, its all-weather friend, to make Bhasha
Dam a part of the US$ 60 billion CPEC project. The core focus of the CPEC
is energy and laying of oil and gas pipelines from Gwadar on the Balochistan
coast to Xinjiang in western China. Bringing Bhasha Dam under the CPEC
ambit would be a natural and logical step. However, Beijing has not taken the
call yet.
In August 2008, media reports in Pakistan suggested that China would
not only pay for the construction costs,113 but also send thousands of workers
from its Three Gorges Dam site to Pakistan to construct, if not to replicate
144 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

‘Three Gorges’, then at least the largest hydropower project ever built on
Pakistani soil. However, on a visit to Islamabad in 2015, the Chinese President
Xi Jinping agreed to fund and build a $ 1.65 billion, 720-megawatt hydropower
plant in Karot in ‘AJK’, “as the first project for his $40 billion Silk Road fund
to build infrastructure in Asia”. He made no mention of the Bhasha project.114
It was a clear signal that China’s push to finance infrastructure in Pakistan is
not a blank cheque, as Bloomberg reported on April 23, 2015.115
The then PML-N government projected Bhasha Dam as a vital project, as
vital as its Nuclear Plan, and has decided to build the dam at any cost, according
to Minister for Planning and Development Ahsan Iqbal. Not building the dam
will have negative consequences for entire South Asia and beyond as it will
threaten Pakistan’s food security, he told an audience of US scholars and
researchers at the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in
Washington on November 5, 2016.116
The National Economic Council (ECNEC) of Pakistan, the apex body on
economic policy, had fixed 2016 as the deadline for completion of Bhasha Dam.
It also sanctioned Rs 60 billion for land acquisition. The deadline has not been
met, and the land acquisition has ended up in a stinking scandal.117

Challenges
Not one but several factors have contributed to the stalling of the Bhasha Dam.
Its height is certainly an issue. Moreover, several leading Pakistani geologists
are worried that the project site is an earthquake-prone area. The Director
General of the Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP), Dr. Imran Ahmad Khan
told the Senate Standing Committee on Petroleum and Natural Resources in
March 2013 that the dam should not be built on the present site. According
to him, as many as eight severe earthquakes have hit this area, therefore, major
reservoirs should not be constructed there. He cautioned that construction of
water reservoirs like Bhasha Dam may result in another severe incident like
the Attabad Lake case.118
According to a noted architect, Sameeta Ahmed, who was part of team
that studied the project details in 2008, the dam structure is not capable of
controlling large floods. In Ahmed’s assessment, the dam is located in the
seismically riskiest zone. An earthquake and consequent flooding might forever
damage the Indus River bed at this precious location. Ahmed cautioned, “When
such an incident will occur, we will not be able to count in dollars the losses
incurred by the devastation.”119
A former Chief Technical Advisor to the United Nations (UN) and WB,
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 145

Engineer Bashir A. Malik has echoed Sameeta Ahmed’s reservations. In an

appeal to the Chief Justice of Pakistan (on January 17, 2012), he pointed out
that there is no RCC dam anywhere higher than 620 feet. RCC is relatively
soft and vulnerable to cracks and leakage compared to conventional concrete
structures.120 Moreover, the dam site falls in an earthquake-prone area:121 An
earthquake of 7.6 magnitude shook the area on October 8, 2005. More recently,
a powerful 7.1 magnitude quake with its epicentre in the Hindukush Mountains
jolted many parts of Pakistan including ‘AJK’ on April 11, 2016.122
Bhasha Dam area is also known for massive avalanches and landslides. But
according to experts, the Bhasha project report does not address the risk of
reservoir-induced seismicity, which is primarily due to immense weight of water
stored in a dam. It can trigger tremors, and can prove to be very disastrous.
China realised this the hard way in 2008 when it was hit by a 7.8 magnitude
earthquake. Geologists attribute the quake to 320 million tons of water stored
behind the 511-feet high Zipingpu Dam near the city of Dujiangyan, Sichuan
Province in southwest China. The risk from Bhasha will be much more than
Zipingpu, as it is located in a very active seismic zone.

Land Scam
The process of acquiring land for Bhasha Dam started in 2010 after the
government signed an agreement with the landowners. It was to be completed
by December 31, 2013, but it was stalled due to delay in payment of
compensation within the agreed time frame, according to the Gilgit-Baltistan
Chief Secretary, Tahir Hussain.123 The PML-N government, then in power,
claimed in March 2016 that it had acquired 70 to 80 per cent of land required
for the project.
According to reports, massive irregularities of over Rs 500 million have
been allegedly committed by the bureaucracy, in connivance with revenue
officials, during the distribution of land compensation for the Diamer-Bhasha
Dam project.124 Barren land was shown as being cultivable in Gilgit-Baltistan.
Instead of benefiting the dam-affected people, the category of land was altered
to benefit bureaucrats and political elites– from local tehsildar to top office
holders in the federal ministry in Islamabad. An officer of the rank of Assistant
Commissioner unearthed the scandal, put the loss to the exchequer at Rs 572.66
million, and reported this to his seniors on October 8, 2015. Instead of taking
action against those responsible, the Assistant Commissioner was removed from
his office. The scam has heightened the demand for heftier payout for the lands
already taken over.125
146 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Threat to Buddhist Heritage

Bhasha dam site is a treasure trove of Buddhist relics.126 It is spread over 135
km of the reservoir, according to archaeologists. At least 1,000-1,500 different
kinds of rock carvings, sculptures and statues have been found during the
technical work, and the archaeology department expects huge consignment
when full-fledged reservoir building is started.127
The dam also has been a victim of a long-standing discord between Thore
Valley of Diamer district in Gilgit-Baltistan and Kohistan region of Khyber-
Pakhtunkhwa province. On March 13, 2014, the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly
unanimously passed a resolution against Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa for encroaching
on its land (the disputed 10 km stretch). The House called for the immediate
settlement of the boundary dispute with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa through a
boundary commission. This has not happened, and regular flare-ups are
continually reported.128
The people in Thore Valley forcibly stopped the work on December 10,
2015, to protest encroachment by Kohistan on their land. The move was in
retaliation to a similar protest by the people of Harban in Kohistan, who had
stopped the realignment of the Karakoram Highway at Shatial, near Chilas,
Gilgit-Baltistan. A similar flare-up in 2014 ended in the death of seven persons.
By 2014, it became clear that the then Nawaz Sharif government had begun
looking for alternatives to Bhasha Dam to tide over power shortage in Pakistan.
This new quest brought the Dasu hydropower project to the fore. Dasu is in
the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, and the project will tap the Indus waters.
The former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif laid the foundation stone for
the 4,320 MW venture on June 25, 2016.129 It is a run-of-river hydropower
project with a small reservoir. The 242 m (794 ft) tall dam is being funded by
the WB (US$ 700 million), the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
(US$ 1.5 billion), Deutsche Bank (US$ one billion) and Agha Khan
Development Network (US$ 500 Million). The first stage will cost US$ 4.278
billion, and is expected to be ready by March 2019.

ENDNOTES
1. For further detail regarding GBESGO 2009 see Appendix IX.
2. “Gilgit-Baltistan Divided into Three Divisions”, The Express Tribune, February 1, 2012, at
http://tribune.com.pk/story/330126/gilgit-baltistan-divided-into-three-divisions.
3. The notification of the creation of three new districts was made by the Ministry of Kashmir
Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan on July 24, 2015. Hunza-Nagar was bifurcated into two separate
districts – Hunza and Nagar – besides the two new districts, Kharmang and Shigar. Shabir
Mir, “Dividing Governance: Three New Districts Notified in G-B”, The Express Tribune, July
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 147

26, 2015, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/926380/dividing-governance-new-districts-notified-

in.
4. Projected in the 1998 Census for 2013. See: “Gilgit-Baltistan at a Glance 2013”, issued by
the Statistical Cell, Planning and Development Department, Government of Gilgit-Baltistan,
at www.gilgitbaltistan.gov.pk/DownloadFiles/GBFinancilCurve.pdf.
5. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, Pakistan
Institute for Peace Studies, Lahore, 2007, p. 8.
6. Ismailism, is an offshoot of Shiism. The Ismailis are also known as Sevener Shias, as opposed
to the orthodox Twelver Shias. While Twelver Shias believe that the line of Imams ended
with the 12th, Ismailis have, from Ismail onwards, been led by an uninterrupted chain of
hereditary Imams, with the current Agha Khan, Prince Karim, the spiritual leader of the
world’s Ismailis, the 49th in that chain. The Noorbakshi movement originated in the 15th
century in Iran and Central Asia as a mystical, messianic order founded by Muhammad
Noorbaksh, and Noorbakshis are presently found in parts of India and Pakistan. See:
International Crisis Group (ICG), Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia Report No. 131,
Islamabad/Brussels,April 2, 2007.
7. Omar Farooq Zain, “A Socio-Political Study of Gilgit-Baltistan Province”, Pakistan Journal of
Social Sciences, 30 (1), September 2010, pp. 181-190, atwww.bzu.edu.pk/pjss/vol30no12010/
final_pjss-3116.pdf.
8. Samuel Baid, “Suppression of Gilgit-Baltistan”, in Virendra Gupta and AlokBansal (eds.),
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: The Untold Story, Manas Publications, New Delhi, 2007, p. 151.
9. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p. 7.
10. Syed Waqas Ali and Taqi Akhunzada, “Unheard Voices: engaging youth of Gilgit-Baltistan”,
Conciliating Resources, London, January 2015, pp. 16-17, at www.c-r.org.download/cr%2020
Unheard/2020Voices%.20from%20Himalyas.pdf,
11. “Gilgit-Baltistan at a Glance 2013”.
12. Syed Waqas Ali and Taqi Akhunzada, “Unheard Voices: engaging youth of Gilgit-Baltistan”,
p. 17.
13. Ibid.
14. “Gilgit-Baltistan at a Glance 2013”.
15. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, Pakistan,
p. 56.
16. “Gilgit-Baltistan at a Glance 2013”.
17. Shabbir Mir, “Unfair Tax Imposition in G-B”, The Express Tribune, January 2, 2018, at http:/
/tribune.com.pk/story/1598123/6-unfair-tax-imposition-g-b/)
18. Ibid.
19. The Northern Light Infantry, which was picked up for the task of intrusion of heights of
Kargil, comprises special troops, trained in anti-heliborne, commando operations and snow
warfare. Some of these soldiers are sent on deputation to the Special Service Group (SSG).
See: Indian Defence Review, 14 (3), July-September 1999.
20. Shafqat Inqalabi, “Economic exploitation of Gilgit-Baltistan”, in Virendra Gupta and Alok
Bansal (eds.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir : The Untold Story, p. 192
21 “Pakistan: Economic Transformation Initiative-Gilgit-Baltistan”, IFAD,EB 2015/114/r.14/
rEV.1, April, 2015, at http://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/114/docs/EB-2015-114-R-14-Rev-
1pdf.
22 Shahzad Anwar, “Logging; G-B Stripped of More than 50% Forest Cover”, The Express Tribune,
January 25, 2015, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/827168/logging-g-b-stripped-of-more-than-
50-forest-cover.
23. Omar Farooq Zain, “A Socio-Political Study of Gilgit-Baltistan Province” pp. 181-190,
148 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

24. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p. 57
25 Raees Kamil, “Real Threat to Mineral Industry in Gilgit-Baltistan”, Gilgit-Baltistan Times,
July 10, 2011, at http://gbtimes.wordpress.com/2011/07/20/opinion-real-threat-to-mineral-
industry-in-gilgit-baltistan/.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Senge Hasnan Sering, Chinese Mining Companies make Inroads into Gilgit’s Mineral-rich
Region, The Economic Times, June 30, 2011, at http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/
indl-goods/svs/metals-mining/chinese-mining-comapnies-make-inroads-into-gilgit-mineral-
rich-region/
29. “Memo signed to initiate China-Pakistan Highway Renovation”, CHINA.ORG.CN July 9,
2006 at http://www.china.org.en/english/2006/jul/174098.htm
30. “China, Pakistan to renovate Karakoram Highway”, The Hindu, July 11.2006 at http://
www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp/international/china-pakistan-to-ren
31. “Gilgit-Baltistan at a Glance 2013” at www.gilgitbaltistan.gov.pk
32. “Record 1.72 million tourists visit Gilgit-Baltistan in past 11 months”, Pamir Times, November
29, 2017, at http://http://pamirtimes.net/2017/11/29/1-72-million-tourists-visit-gilgit-
baltistan/)
33. “Gilgit-Baltistan government to boost tourism”, The Nation, April 28, 2017, at http://
nation.com.pk/28-apr-2017/gilgit-baltistan-government-to boost-tourism)
34. F.M. Khan, The Story of Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral: A Short History of Two Millenniums AD
7-1999, Eejaz, Gilgit, 2002, p. 7. The word “Dard” was first used by Dr. G.W. Leitner in his
book, The Language and Races of Dardistan, in 1887 citing evidence from Western classical
sources. However, F. M Khan rejected his claim which he said was without the support of
historical facts.
35. F.M. Khan, The Story of Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral: A Short History of Two Millenniums AD
7-1999,p. 28.
36. P. Stobdan, “North-West under the Maharaja”, in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir: Under the Jackboot, Siddhi Books, New Delhi, 1995,p. 30.
37. Alok Bansal, “Gilgit-Baltistan: An Appraisal”, Manekshaw Paper No. 37, 2013, cited in
Mushtaquar Rahman, Divided Kashmir: Old Problems, New Opportunities for India, Pakistan
and the Kashmiri People, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., London, 1996, p. 10.
38. F.M. Hassnain, Gilgit: The Northern Gate of India, Sterling Publishers, India, p.150
39. International Crisis Group, “Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas”, Asia Report No 31, April
2007, p. 3, at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.
40. F.M. Khan, The Story of Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral: A Short History of Two Millenniums AD
7-1999, pp. 41-43.
41. N.N. Raina, Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Manoeuvres 1846-1980, Patriot Publishers, New
Delhi, 1988, p. 29.
42. Ahmad Hasan Dani, History of the Northern Areas of Pakistan, Sang-e-Meel Publication, Lahore,
2001,p.294). Accordingly the Wazarat of the Gilgit Province was also put under the charge
of Viceroy and Governor General of India.
43. F.M. Hassnain, Gilgit: The Northern Gate of India, p.150
44. Ibid., p. 157.
45. Ahmad Hasan Dani, History of Northern Areas of Pakistan, Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2001,
pp 348-349.
46. P. Stobdan, “Gilgit and Baltistan: The Historical Dimension”, p. 44.
47. Ahmad Hasan Dani, History of Northern Areas of Pakistan, 2001, pp. 348-349.
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 149

48. “The Gilgit Rebellion 1947”, Hunza Development Forum, February 7, 2011, at http://
hisamullahbeg.blogspot.com/2010/12/gilgit-rebellion-1947-by-william-brown.html.
49. The signatories of the Karachi Agreement were Sardar Mohammad Ibrahim Khan, the PoK
President, Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, Minister without Portfolio in the Pakistan Government
who was former Prime Minister of the State of Bahawalpur; and Choudhry Ghulam Abbas,
a representative from the Muslim Conference.
50. Text of the Karachi Agreement of April 1949 is given in Appendix II.
51. K Warikoo, Himalayan Frontiers of India: Historical, Geo-Political and Strategic Perspectives,
Routledge, 2009, p. 73.
52. International Crisis Group, Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, p.5
53. Ibid., p.5
54. Ibid., p.6
55. Samuel Baid, “Suppression of Gilgit-Baltistan”, p. 145.
56. Khalid Hussain, “Northern Areas Demystified”, The Friday Times, April 25 -May 1, 2003
57. Excerpts of High Court Judgement, cited in Samuel Baid, “Northern Areas”, in Jasjit Singh
(ed.), Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Under the Jackboot, pp. 147-67.
58. “History & Dispute”, Gilgit-Baltistan Tribune, at http://gbtribune.blogspot.in/p/history-
dispute.html.
59. The Northern Areas Council Framework Order-1994 at Appendix VIII.
60. International Crisis Group, Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, p. 12.
61. “Al-Jehad Trust vs Federation of Pakistan”, Supreme Court Monthly Review, 1999, p. 1380,
athttp://cmsdata.iucn.org.
62. Syed Waqas Ali and Taqi Akhunza, “Unheard Voices: Engaging Youth of Gilgit-Baltistan”,
p. 7.
63. “With Friends Like These: Human Rights Violations in Azad Kashmir”, Human Rights Watch,
18(12)(C), September 2006, p. 7, at www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/pakistan0906
webwcover_0.pdf
64. “On Kashmir Present Situation and Future Prospects”, European Parliament Report 2004-
2009, April 25, 2007, p. 11, at www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//
NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2007-0158+0+DOC+PDF+VO//EN.
65. International Crisis Group, Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, p. 11.
66. Ibid., p. 12.
67. Syed Waqas Ali and Taqi Akhunza, “Unheard Voices: Engaging Youth of Gilgit-Baltistan”,
pp. 1-24.
68. See text of the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self–Governance Order 2009. See Appendix
IX.
69. See Chief Election Commission of Secretariat - Gilgit-Baltistan, at http://ecgb.gov.pk/
elec09.htm
70. Altaf Hussain, The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms 2009, Forum of Federations Project, Pakistan,
funded by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 2009 pp. 1-19, at http://
gbpolicyinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Gilgit-Baltistan%20Reforms%20 AHussain%20
FinalDec09.pdf
71. Ibid.
72. Samuel Baid, “Debating Gilgit-Baltistan elections”.
73. Ershad Mahmud, “The Battle for Gilgit-Baltistan”, Outpost, June 7, 2015, at http://outpost.pk/
gilgit-baltistan/452-the battle-for-gilgit-baltistan.html
74. S.K. Sharma, “Gilgit-Baltistan Goes to Polls on June 8 under Pak Army Care”, Business
Standard, June 7, 2015, at www.business-standard.com/article/printer-friendly-
version?article_id=115060700705_1
150 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

75. Amir Wasim, “Minister made GB governor ahead of crucial polls”, The Dawn,February 15,
2015, at http://www.dawn.com/news/1163731/minister-made-gb-governor-ahead-of-crucial-
polls
76. Comments of Islamabad-based expert on ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan, Ershad Mahmud to
authors query on June 15, 2015. Some reports put as 618,364 registered voters in the region
with 329,475 men and 288,889 women
77. Shabbir Mir, “33 Members of G-B Assembly Take Oath”, The Express Tribune, June 25, 2015,
at http://tribune.com.pk/story/909186/maiden-session-33-members-of-g-b-assembly-take-
oath/
78. “Nationalists protest ‘mock polls’ in Gilgit-Baltistan, Dawn, November 13, 2009, at http://
www.dawn.com/news/943158/nationalists-protest-mock-polls-in-Gilgit-Baltistan
79. Shabir Choudhry, “Sham Elections in Gilgit-Baltistan”, Kashmir Images, June 8, 2015, at
http://www.dailykashmirimages.com/news-sham- elections-in-gilgit-baltistan/
80. Section 33(2) of the 2009 Order
81. “The Case of Gilgit-Baltistan”, Pakistan Today, June 8, 2015, at http://www.pakistantoday.
com.pk/2015/06/08/comment/the-case-of-gilgit-baltistan
82. Altaf Hussain, The Gilgit-Baltistan Reforms 2009, pp. 1-19.
83. “JKLF protests against Gilgit Baltistan package”, September 12, 2009 at http://www.dawn.com/
news/490223/jklf-protests-against-gilgit-baltistan-package/
84. Ibid
85. “Pakistan’s Ordinance Giving Internal Political Autonomy to Northern Jammu Kashmir Means
Little”, Huffington Post, at www.huffingtonpost.com/northern.region/pakistans-ordiance-given-
to-279953.ht
86. “APNA rejects Gilgit-Baltistan reforms package”, at, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
APNA+rejects+Gilgit+Baltistan+reforms+package
87. “Identity, Diversity and Kashmiriyat in South Asia”, September 7, 2009 at http://
www.greaterkashmir.com/news/gk-magazine/identity-diversity-andkashmiriyat-in-south-asia
88. Christopher Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, Hurst & Company, London:
2015, pp. 221-22.
89. Samson Simon Sharaf, “Gilgit-Baltistan”, The Nation, February 14, 2015, at http://
nation.com.pk/columns/14-Feb-2015/gilgit-baltistan.
90. Zulfiqar Ali, Tariq Naqash and Jamil Nagri, “‘Almost’ Pakistan: Gilgit-Baltistan in a
constitutional Limbo”, The Dawn, August 9, 2015, at http://www.dawn.com/news/1198967/
almost-pakistan-gilgit-baltistan-in-constituional-limbo.
91. Jamil Nagri, “The GB Council failed to play its due role”, The Dawn, December 9, 2014,
http://www.www.dawn.com/news/1149680/sound-bytes-the-gb-council-failed-to-play-due-
role
92. “Official Spokesperson’s response to a media question on elections which are to be held in
Gilgit-Baltistan on June 8, 2015”, Ministry of External Affairs, June 02, 2015, at http://
www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/25307/Official_Spokespersons_ response_ to_ a_
media_question_on_election_on_elections_which-are-to_be_held_in-June.
93. Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, Neither a Hawk nor a Dove, Penguin, India, 2015, pp. 339-41.
94. Colonel Mirza Hasan Khan, Shamsher se Janjir Tak, Romi Tral, Rawalpindi, 2002, p. 386.
95. “Northern Areas of Pakistan – Facts, Problems and Recommendations”, Policy Perspectives, 1
(1), Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad. at, www.ips.org.pk/northern-areas-of-pakistan-facts-
problems-and-recommendations
96. Samuel Baid, “Northern Areas”, Jasjit Singh (ed.), Pakistan occupied Kashmir under the Jackboot,
Siddhi Books, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 135-137.
 Gilgit-Baltistan: A Historical Perspective 151

97. Quoted in “What Is Wrong in the Northern Areas”, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan –
Newsletter, Quarterly January, 1994.
98. International Crisis Group, Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, p. 9
99. For details, see: “Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly Passes Local Government Act 2014”,
United Nations Development Programme, August 18, 2014, at http://www.pk.undp.org/
content/pakistan/en/home/presscentre/articles
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. “Gilgit-Baltistan Council: PML-N Bags Four Seats”, The Express Tribune, April 19, 2016, at
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1087330/gilgit-baltistan-council-pml-n-bags-four-seats.
103. Izhar Hunzai, Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan, United States Institute of Peace, Special
Report 321, January 2013, p. 5.
104. International Crisis Group, The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, Asia Report No. 95, April
18, 2005, p. 19. at, http://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28410/095_the_state-of-sectarianism_in-
pakistan.pdf
105. Ibid., p. 6.
106. Georg Stober, “Religious Identities Provoked: The Gilgit ‘Textbook Controversy’ and its
Conflictual Context”, International Schulbuchforschung, 29, 2007, p. 390.
107. “At Least 20 Shias pulled off Bus, Shot Dead in Northern Pakistan”, Dawn, August 16, 2012,
at www.dawn.com/2012/08/16/several-forced-off-buses-killed-in-northern-pakistan.
108. “Pakistan Shias Killed in Gilgit Sectarian Attack”, BBC, August 2012, at www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-19280339.
109. Izhar Hunzai, Conflict Dynamics in Gilgit-Baltistan, p. 7.
110. Diamer-Bhasha Dam in Pakistan: Report from a Field Trip, Prepared by Sustainable
Development Policy Institute for International Rivers, October 5, 2008, at https://
www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-files/bhasha_fact_finding_october_2008_final.pdf.
111. Zafar Bhutta, “Uncertainty Prevails: Lenders Seek Guarantees before Funding Bhasha Dam”,
The Express Tribune, Islamabad, July 5, 2013, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/572609/
uncertainty-prevails-lenders-seek-guarantees-before-funding-bhasha-dam/; Imran Ali Kundi,
“No World Bank Funds for Bhasha Dam Project”, The Nation, Islamabad, May 3, 2014, at
http://nation.com.pk/editors-picks/03-May-2014/no-world-bank-funds-for-bhasha-dam-
project, Munawar Hasan, “Bhasha Dam Delayed till 2037”, The News, Lahore, July 9, 2014,
at http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-31478-Bhasha-Dam-delayed-till-2037.
112. Khaleeq Kiani, “World Bank Approves $12bn Loans”, The Dawn, Islamabad, May 3, 2014,
at http://www.dawn.com/news/1103851/world-bank-approves-12bn-loans.
113. Kamran Haider and Natalie Obiko Pearson, “Even China Won’t Finance This Dam as Water
Fight Looms”, Bloomberg, April 23, 2015, at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
04-22/even-china-won-t-finance-this-pakistan-dam-as-water-fight-looms, “Diamer-Bhasha
Dam”, International Rivers, at http://www.internationalrivers.org/campaigns/diamer-bhasha-
dam
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Anwar Iqbal, “Bhasha Dam as Vital as N-plan: Minister”, The Dawn, Washington, November
6, 2013, at http://www.dawn.com/news/1054454
117. Peer Muhammad, “Diamer-Bhasha Land Compensation: Irregularities Worth over Rs 500m
Allegedly Committed”, The Express Tribune, Islamabad, January 14, 2016, at http://
tribune.com.pk/story/1027079/diamer-bhasha-land-compensation-irregularities-worth-over-
rs500m-allegedly-committed/, Javed Mahmood, “Mega Dam & Mega Scam-Bhasha Dam”,
152 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Weekly Corporate Ambassador, Islamabad, September 13, 2015, at https://weeklycorporate

ambassador.wordpress.com/2015/09/13/mega-dam-mega-scam-_-bhasha-dam-2/
118. Alize Ahmed, “Geological Survey: Bhasha Dam Is in Dangerous Condition”, Aaj TV, March
27, 2013, at http://aaj.tv/2013/03/geological-survey-bhasha-dam-is-in-dangerous-condition/
119. Sameeta Ahmed, “Diamer-Bhasha Dam: A Perspective”, The Dawn, October 27, 2011, at
http://www.dawn.com/news/669137/diamer-bhasha-dam-a-perspective
120. Diamer Dam Site Prone to Seismic Hazards’: WB Chief Technical Advisor”, Pamir Times,
Islamabad, January 21, 2012, at http://pamirtimes.net/2012/01/21/diamer-dam-site-prone-
to-seismic-hazards-wb-chief-technical-advisor/
121. Zafar Bhutta, “Diamer Bhasha Dam, Gwadar Port in Quake-Prone Zone”, The Express Tribune,
Islamabad, March 27, 2013, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/526826/diamer-bhasha-dam-
gwadar-port-in-quake-prone-zone/.
122. “Earthquake in Pakistan: 6 Killed as Strong 7.1 Temblor Hits Islamabad, Khyber, Punjab; at
least 28 Injured”, The Financial Express, Islamabad, April 11, 2016, at http://
www.financialexpress.com/article/world-news/earthquake-in-pakistan-6-killed-as-powerful-7-
1-quake-rocks-islamabad-khyber-punjab-gilgit-baltistan/234869/
123. Shahzad Anwar, “Diamer-Bhasha Dam: 70-80% of Land Acquired, Remaining to be Bought
Soon”, at The Express Tribune, Islamabad, February 11, 2016, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/
1044177/diamer-bhasha-dam-70-80-of-land-acquired-remaining-to-be-bought-soon/
124. Peer Muhammad, “Diamer-Bhasha Land Compensation: Irregularities Worth over Rs 500m
Allegedly Committed”.
125. Peer Muhammad, “Diamer-Bhasha Project: Heftier Payouts Offered to Residents Displaced
by Dam”, The Express Tribune, Islamabad, February 23, 2015, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/
842669/diamer-bhasha-project-heftier-payouts-offered-to-residents-displaced-by-dam/
126. Murtaza Razvi, “Bhasha Dam and Heritage Sites”, Dawn, November 1, 2011, at http://
www.dawn.com/news/670721/bhasha-dam-and-heritage-sites, “Buddha Relics Found at
Bhasha Dam Site”, Pak Tribune Islamabad, April 4, 2008, at http://paktribune.com/news/
Buddha-relics-found-at-Bhasha-dam-site-199138.html
127. Zafar Bhutta, “Diamer-Bhasha Project: Rock Carvings at Dam Site to be Preserved”, The
Express Tribune, Islamabad, August 23, 2013, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/594107/diamer-
bhasha-project-rock-carvings-at-dam-site-to-be-preserved/.
128. Shabbir Mir, “Over 10 Feet of Land: Locals in Thore Valley Stop Construction on Bhasha
Dam”, The Express Tribune, Gilgit, December 11, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/1007876/
over-10-feet-of-land-locals-in-thore-valley-stop-construction-on-bhasha-dam/
129. “PM Lays Foundation Stone of Dasu Project”, Radio Pakistan, at http://www.radio.gov.pk/
25-Jun-2014/pm-lays-foundation-stone-of-dasu-power-project
 4
Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan

There are 14 registered parties in Gilgit-Baltistan (see Appendix XI). In addition,

there are many unregistered parties/groups which cannot take part in elections
but they can put pressure on the government. Details of these parties/groups
have also been given in this chapter.

PAKISTAN PEOPLE’S PARTY GILGIT-BALTISTAN (PPP-GB)

Introduction
The Pakistan People’s Party Gilgit-Baltistan (PPP-GB) was formed in 1972.
Its first President was Sheikh Ghulam Muhammad from Skardu. However, it
was during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s time that the PPP was able to establish its
stronghold in the region. In 1974, Bhutto introduced some welfare projects in
the region by announcing an administrative and judicial reforms package, which
included abolishing the Frontier Crime Regulation (FCR). A 14-member
advisory council for Gilgit-Baltistan was set up for the governance of the area.1
Later, Benazir Bhutto ensured the creation of the Northern Areas Legislative
Council in 1994. Consequently, The PPP-GB participated in the first ever party-
based elections in 1994, and later contested the 1999 and 2004 elections, too.
In 2009, when the PPP was again in power in Pakistan, the Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-Governance Order (GBESGO 2009) was passed. Under
this order, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan could elect their Legislative Assembly
and Council. After winning the Legislative Assembly elections in November
2009, under the new Order, the PPP-GB elected Mehdi Shah as Chief Minister.
(The party had fielded 23 candidates, of which it won 14 seats.) It formed a
coalition government with the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam
154 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(PML-Q), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), and the Muttahida Qaumi

Movement (MQM). According to an International Crisis Group (ICG) report,
“PPP has strong support partly because of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s reforms but
also because the region’s Shias and Ismailis view the centre-left party as more
sympathetic to minority concerns than other mainstream Pakistani parties.”2

Ideology/Objectives
The PPP has been a popular party in Gilgit-Baltistan, and has enjoyed a good
representation in the Northern Areas Council. Its principal stand has two
aspects: (i) the government can restore the rights of the people without damaging
the cause of Kashmir, and (ii) it should act according to the spirit of the 1999
Supreme Court decision, which directed the Government of Pakistan to ensure
the provision of equal rights to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan within six months.3
The party promised to achieve the following objectives in its election manifesto
for the June 8, 2015 elections:4
(1) To further enhance the autonomy and ensure the constitutional rights
of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(2) To further strengthen the local structure in order to enhance the
people’s participation in governance at the grass-roots level. In this
connection, the Gilgit-Baltistan Government has already passed a
Local Government Act in 2014 during the PPP regime.
(3) To facilitate fiscal and political devaluation allowing the people greater
command over financial resources and ownership in local governance.
In this connection, the party will set up a Gilgit Baltistan Tax
Commission.
(4) To devise a medium-term development plan in the region: a planning
and development department will be set up.
(5) To ensure fiscal autonomy by giving the people of Gilgit-Baltistan
greater control over revenues generated within the area. The share of
Gilgit-Baltistan from the federal revenue of Pakistan will be increased.
The party will make Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan to be the Vice
Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council. Presently, the Gilgit-
Baltistan Council is headed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan.
(6) To increase and strengthen the special police force.
(7) To provide employment opportunities for youth under a special
development package for Gilgit-Baltistan.
(8) To set up a ministry of youth affairs on the lines of other provinces.
(9) To set up a medical college each in Gilgit and Skardu, besides setting
up an information technology university.
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 155

(10) To set up special economic zones and export processing zones with
substantial incentives for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan in the vicinity
of the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor in order to boost local
production and enhance the export of local products to China and
Central Asia.
(11) To set up a special Gilgit-Baltistan-Xinjiang trade authority with
bilateral participation and the representation of the private sector in
order to promote border trade.

Organisation, Structure and Leadership

A committee headed by Amjad Hussain Advocate as the Provincial President
looks after the party affairs. Other office bearers of the party are Engineer
Mohammad Ismail (Provincial General Secretary), Jamil Ahmad (Provincial
Senior Vice President), Imran Nadeem (Vice President) Zafar Iqbal (Vice
President) Bashit Ahmad (Vice President) Attique Ahmad (Deputy General
Secretary), Sania Danish (Secretary Information) and Sayed Jafar Shah as the
Central Executive Member of the Central Executive Committee of the PPP.5

Cadre Strength and Funding

The post-1970s reforms allowed the party to establish strong bases in all districts.
The party did not face a shortage of funds as it was in power both at the centre
and the Gilgit-Baltistan region.

Network and Area of Influence

The party traditionally had a strong vote bank in Gilgit-Baltistan. However,
because of its poor performance, it was convincingly voted out of power in the
elections in June 2015.

Links and Alliances with other Political Parties

As mentioned earlier, the PPP-GB won a two-thirds majority in the 2009
elections, but still forged an alliance with the PML-Q, JUI-F and MQM. Even
though part of the government, the PML-Q did not miss a chance to criticize
the functioning of the government. During the 35th session of the GB Assembly,
PML-Q lawmaker, Mirza Hussain termed the PPP-GB government and its
ministers “corrupt”, saying they “plundered national wealth during their years
in power”.6 Upset by these remarks, the Chief Minister, Mehdi Shah, terminated
PPP-GB’s alliance with the PML-Q, calling the Muslim League’s members
“snakes in the grass”.7 However, the differences between the two alliances were
sorted out.
156 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Current Status
There is no doubt that most of the administrative reforms were made by the
PPP in 1974, 1988, 1994 and 2009 when the party was in power. The PPP
has deep roots in local politics as it is sole champion of problems of the locals.
The local wing of PPP fielded 22 candidates in the June 2015 Assembly polls,
but received a big jolt as it won only one seat. Even the former Chief Minister,
Syed Mehdi Shah, his five ministers and former Deputy Speaker, Jamil Ahmed,
were defeated. The defeat was ascribed to the anti-incumbency factor, internal
party feuds and poor performance in the 2013 national elections. Ershad
Mahmud, an Islamabad-based expert on region, puts the blame on the PPP
local leadership that never cared for the party: “Mehdi Shah spent most of his
time in the luxurious Gilgit-Baltistan House in Islamabad on the tax payers’
money.”8 Moreover, he and his government cheated the people by selling
government jobs.9 Mehdi Shah washed his hands from of any responsibility by
blaming the top leadership at the centre for not consulting them in making
the decisions about the region. According to Ershad Mahmud, the PPP
“introduced constitutional and administrative reforms but kept several major
flaws in the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order 2009
which still haunt the people of this region”.10 Similar views were expressed by
civil society and human right organisations who opined that some more concrete
steps like changing and amendments in the constitution of Pakistan to include
the area as its constitutional part was needed.11

PAKISTAN PEOPLE’S PARTY SHAHEED BHUTTO

Introduction
Pakistan People’s Party Shaheed Bhutto, which was formed by Z.A. Bhutto’s
daughter-in-law, Ghinwa in 1997, one of PPP’s breakaway factions, the PPP
Shaheed Bhutto, led Murtaza Bhutto’s widow, Ghinwa Bhutto, opened its
chapter in Gilgit-Baltistan. It is however not popular among the local
population. Its leaders are: Muhammad Abbas Safeer Advocate, President;
Muhammad Faheem Wazir Advocate, General Secretary; Mustafa Abbas
Akhondi, Information Secretary; and Azhar Ali Advocate, Financial Secretary.12

PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE-NAWAZ-GB (PMLN-GB)

Introduction
The PML-N opened its chapter in Gilgit Baltistan in 1994 with Saifur Rehman
as its first President. It has played an active role in the electoral politics of Gilgit
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 157

Baltistan. The party contested the Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC)
elections in 1994, but was not able to secure any seat. It, however, won two
seats in the NALC elections held in 2004. The PMLN-GB contested 15 seats
in the Legislative Assembly elections held under the Gilgit Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009 in November 2009 but won
only two seats. It increased its tally to four after winning the two by-elections
held in Ghanche and Skardu constituencies in 2013. In the elections held in
June 2015, it emerged as largest party, winning 16 out of the 24 seats.

Ideology/Objectives
The PMLN-GB has welcomed the approval of self-governance for Gilgit-
Baltistan saying the party would support every step which aims at bringing the
people of this area into the mainstream. The party wants that the people of
this area should be given resources to improve infrastructure and the social
sector, and that a university should be set up for students to get higher
education.13
Releasing the party Manifesto for the June 2015 elections, PMLN-GB
regional head, Hafiz Hafeezur Rehman, said that the creation of employment
opportunities, improving infrastructure and governance and putting an end to
corruption were some of the key priorities of his party. In addition, the party
will give greater attention to tourism which is the mainstay of the region’s
economy.14 Anticipating a PMLN-GB victory, a dozen senior leaders of the
PPP-GB, PTI-GB and other parties switched over their loyalties.

Organisation, Structure and Leadership

On the lines of setting up Provincial Councils (PCs) in all the provinces, the
PMLN-GB has set up a council of 100 members for the Gilgit-Baltistan region
as well.15 The PC is headed by Hafiz Hafeezur Rehman, who was elected as
Chief Minister of GB in 2015. He is the brother of Saifur Rehman, the first
President, who was assassinated outside his home in Gilgit city in 2003. Hafiz
Hafeezur Rehman has been closely associated with Nawaz Sharif to whom he
remained loyal when majority of the party leaders deserted him and joined the
PMLQ-GB which was formed with the blessing of the then military dictator,
Gen. Musharraf, who had over thrown Sharif ’s government and forced him
into exile in 2000. According to Ershad Mahmud, the PMLN-GB had never
been a ruling party in Gilgit-Baltistan before the 2015 elections but made
inroads due to dynamic leadership of its regional president Hafeezur Rehman
who did not betray his party inspite of the pressure put by the former president
158 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Gen. Musharraf. Another reason went in its favour was the support of G-B
students by increasing their quota in institutions in Punjab.
Other office bearers include Haji Muhammad Akbar Taban (Provincial
General Secretary), Ghulam Muhammad (Provincial Senior Vice President),
Hayat Baig (Provincial Senior Vice President), Jafarullah Khan (Deputy General
Secretary), Ibrahim Sanai (Provincial Senior Vice President), Col. (Retd.) Karim
Shah (Provincial Vice President), Attiqa Gazanfer Ali Khan (Provincial Vice
President), Haji Haider Khan (Provincial Vice President), Shafiq-ud-Din
(Provincial Vice President), Shams Mir (Provincial Political Advisor), Dr.
Muhammad Iqbal (Provincial Vice President), Tahir Ayub (Provincial Vice
President) and Farooq Mir (Provincial Secretary Information).16

Network and Area of Influence

The party has been able to extend its influence in all the 10 districts of Gilgit-
Baltistan. It has made a clean sweep by winning all the Assembly seats in the
three districts of Gilgit, Astore and Ghanche. Earlier its influence was limited
to Gilgit and Diamer.

PML-N’s Election Manifesto for Gilgit-Baltistan

The PML-N’s Gilgit-Baltistan manifesto guarantees magnificent development
and prosperity of the region. The following are some of the highlighted points:17
(1) PMLN-GB has formulated an exemplary unique constitutional
structure for Gilgit-Baltistan which would in an exemplary way reflect
political, social and economic development in the region.
(2) Developing infrastructure in Gilgit-Baltistan has the top priority.
(3) PMLN-GB resolves to embrace reforms and plans to develop areas of
administration in social and economic fields.
(4) PMLN-GB intends to complete the power projects in Gilgit-Baltistan
under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.
(5) Diamer Bhasha Dam would on completion provide thousands of
jobs for the people, bringing prosperity to the people.
(6) PMLN-GB intended to complete the Karakoram Highway, Babusar
Highway Gilgit-Skardu Road, Shonter Pass and Gilgit-Tashander
Express, and also upgrade them as motorways.
(7) Under the Prime Minister Youth Loan Scheme, the PMLN-GB sought
to provide better employment opportunities.
(8) PMLN-GB planned to have revolutionary projects to provide water
and electricity to every person.
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 159

(9) PMLN-GB would accord the highest priority to enforcing the rule
of law in Gilgit-Baltistan.
(10) Steps would be taken to safeguard and develop all local languages.
(11) PMLN-GB intended to bring a complete end to mal-administration
and corruption.
(12) The party will strive hard to develop the tourist industry, mineral
mining, herbal and other natural resources.
(13) PMLN-GB planned to establish a Bank of Gilgit-Baltistan for the
residents.
The PML-N federal government in joint collaboration with its local chapter
announced that some “unprecedented” measures for the development of the
region had already been taken:
(1) First time in the history of Gilgit-Baltistan, a Federal Committee was
constituted to accord constitutional status to the region.
(2) Approval for the construction of Gilgit-Skardu road.
(3) Approval for the formation of four new districts: Hunza, Nagar, Khar
Mang, Shigar.
(4) Construction of Attabad tunnel.
(5) Approval of Hanzel, Skarkoi and Jilmish hydropower projects.
(6) Accumulating development projects and non-development projects.
(7) Rs 1400 crore to be utilised under the IFAD (International Fund for
Agricultural Development) projects to irrigate barren land.
(8) Measures were taken to facilitate the business of precious stones and
gems.
(9) Continuing wheat subsidies for Gilgit-Baltistan farmers. New price
of Rs 11 to be fixed for cultivators.
(10) Approval of funds of Rs 10 crore for procurement of water in Jotiyal
(Gilgit).
(11) Constitution of a boundary commission to settle disputes between
Khyber Pakhtunkhawa and Gilgit-Baltistan, which played a crucial
role in defusing tension between tribal sardars.
(12) Approval of National Action Plan to bring an end to terrorism,
extremism in Gilgit-Baltistan.
(13) Approval for the construction of 14 MW hydel power projects Naltar
(Gilgit)

Current Status
The then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif during his election rally in Gilgit had
announced a PKR 47 billion package for the construction of two dams, a
160 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

specialised hospital, a university in Baltistan; setting up three new districts;

and construction of road between Thakot and Raikot on the Karakoram
Highway.18 Earlier, under the pressure of the demands to declare Gilgit-Baltistan
a province of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif announced just before the June 2015
elections, the formation of a committee on the constitutional status of Gilgit-
Baltistan. Local parties saw these promises as another ploy by the PMLN-GB
“to win the upcoming (2015) elections”.19
On July 8, 2015, a six-member cabinet of the ruling PMLN-GB took oath
in Gilgit-Baltistan. The cabinet headed by Hafeezur Rehman included Farman
Ali from Astore district, Mohammad Vakil Sobia Moqaddam and Janbaaz Khan
from Diamer district, Ibrahim Sanai from Ghanche district and Dr. Mohammad
Iqbal from Gilgit district. Haji Akbar Taban, General Secretary of PMLN-GB,
who won the Skardu-1 constituency refused to take oath in protest against not
being appointed as the region’s governor.20
On June 1, 2018, just before the completion of five-year term , the PML-N
government issued Gilgit Baltistan order 2018 replacing the GBSESGO 2009.
Under the new order, all powers exercised by the GB Council including passing
legislation regarding mineral, hydro-power and tourism have been transferred
to GB Assembly. The order was opposed by the people who protested as they
were not given any constitutional rights that they had expected.

PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE QUAID-I-AZAM-GB

(PMLQ-GB)
Introduction
The Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) was formed by the
leaders of the Pakistan Muslim League who had defected from the PML-N
during Musharraf ’s regime just before the general elections in 2002. A few
leaders of the now defunct Tehreek-e-Jafaria, a Shia outfit, also joined it after
it was banned. The Gilgit-Baltistan chapter of the PMLQ-GB was set up soon
after the formation of the PML-Q in 1999. Tracing its history, Muhammad
Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore state:
The PML-Q contested Elections-1999 but could not make any visible success.
Before elections-2004, a couple of federal ministers stayed in Northern Areas
for two months and reorganised the party. But, the PML-Q could win only
five seats for Legislative Council out of 24. Later 10 independent winners
joined the PML-Q after which it formed its government in the Legislative
Council. The PML-Q also won 12 women and technocrat seats.21
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 161

According to another report, PMLQ-GB could win only four out of 24 seats
and another 11 joined after they were promised adviser positions. The military
government made it clear that there should be no political opposition. Thus
Musharraf-backed PML-Q was able to manipulate the elections. Mir Ghazanfar
Ali Khan was elected as DCE while Malik Muskeen became the Speaker.22 it is
worth mentioning that all the top leaders of PMLQ-GB including Mir
Ghazanfar Ali Khan of Hunza and Malik Maskeen of Diamer quit the PMLN-
GB. (The Harald, April 2006).

Current Status
In the November 2009 Assembly elections, the party fielded 14 candidates but
could win only two seats – increasing its tally to three after bagging a reserved
seat for women.23 With three members it joined the coalition government of
Chief Minister Mehdi Shah. Other coalition partners were the JUIF-GB and
MQM-GB. The party boycotted the June 2015 Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly
elections, primarily because many of its senior party leaders defected to the
PTI-GB and PPP-GB. They included former minister Bashir Ahmad who
defected to the PPP-GB and Amina Ansari and Mirza Hussain who joined the
PTI-GB.24

ALL PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE-GB (APML-GB)

Introduction and Aims and Objectives
All Pakistan Muslim League (APML), which is headed by former President
retired General Pervez Musharraf has a chapter in Gilgit-Baltistan. APML has
sought a creation of separate province for Gilgit-Baltistan. In this connection
the, chief coordinator of APML Ahmad Raza Kasuri has filed a petition in the
Islamabad High Court seeking a constitutional amendment for turning Gilgit-
Baltistan into the fifth province of the country. The petition was filed a few
days before June, 2015 elections. In his petition Kasuri recalled that the Supreme
Court had directed the Pakistan Government on May 28, 1999 to evolve a
mechanism for protecting fundamental rights of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.
He said that the federal government under the direction was bound to give the
people of Gilgit the right of self-governance. The petition claimed that in
August, 2009, the PPP government instead of amending the Pakistan
Constitution issued a Presidential Order titled ‘The Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self Governance Order, 2009’, which granted self-rule to
the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. According to the petition, the order could not
serve as a mechanism for creating the Gilgit-Baltistan Province.25 The President
162 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

of APML G-B, is Karim Khan popularly known KK. For June 2015 elections,
it fielded candidates in 13 constituencies but failed to win any seat.

PAKISTAN TEHREEK-I-INSAF-GB (PTI-GB)

Introduction
The Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) opened its Gilgit-Baltistan chapter in 2011.
It appointed Abdul Latif and Mahmudal Ahsan as President and Vice President,
respectively. However, both these leaders resigned and joined the PMLN-GB
in May 2015. These leaders resented the central party leadership’s decision to
give party tickets for the June 2015 elections to rank newcomers.

Network
Although, the party has dedicated workers, it has not been able to spread its
network in the region. The party contested the 2015 elections for 21 seats.
The Party Chief, Imran Khan, extensively toured various parts of the region
and addressed big election rallies. In these rallies, Imran Khan accused then
PML-N federal government of pre-poll rigging by allocating huge funds for
the development of the region. He also criticised the appointment of Federal
Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan as a stopgap Gilgit-Baltistan
governor.26 The PTI’s political agenda stands for an upgraded Gilgit-Baltistan
Assembly with the right to vote in general elections and representation in the
National Assembly and Senate. The PTI aims to abolish the Gilgit-Baltistan
Council and transfer those powers to the concerned federal ministries, and seeks
to apply the 1999 Supreme Court ruling to Gilgit-Baltistan.

Manifesto
The local leadership also released the party manifesto for the June 2015
elections. The salient features of the manifesto were as follows:27
(i) Ultimate integration of Gilgit-Baltistan with the Federation of Pakistan
as a Constitutional Province, or a Constitutionally protected
Autonomous Region, with full rights of a province, addressing the
longstanding demand of the people of the region.
(ii) In the interim, this integration shall be considered as ‘provisional’ to
accommodate Pakistan’s internal and international stances on disputed
territories; the precedence is Pak-China Border Agreement of 1962.
(iii) Empower and decentralise institutions of governance and economic
management to local people, and restore political, economic, religious
and cultural rights and freedoms of people.
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 163

(iv) Reform and establish a modern and equitable social sector, including
the provision and promotion of high-quality services in health,
education, sanitation, as well as well-being and social protection of
the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the society.
(v) Develop and sustainably manage natural resources of the region, giving
the highest priority to private sector-led development, promoting clean
industries, creating jobs and ensuring local ownership of economic
assets and participation in investment opportunities.
(vi) Encourage a merit-based system that provides equal opportunity for
employment and upward social mobility for all, especially the working
classes, youth and women.
(vii) Ensure an accountable and responsible system of governance, law
and order, and promote regional peace and reconciliation.
(viii) Strive for cultural freedom, develop indigenous languages and promote
traditional festivals and art.
(ix) Raise revenue from exploiting natural resources on our own and have
20 per cent share in the transit levies on the Economic Corridor, as
well its due share in the national GST revenue.
In spite of Imran Khan’s extensive election tour of Gilgit -Baltistan where he
vowed to grant more regional autonomy and undertake more development
work, the PTI-GB could win only one seat in the 2015 Assembly elections.
The party alleged that then ruling PMLN-GB had resorted to massive rigging,
and that it would challenge before the tribunals concerned the results of the
various constituencies.28 However, M Ismail Khan, a political analyst gives the
following reason for the defeat of the PTI-GB:
(1) The PTI-GB failed to clarify its position on important matters;
(2) Imran Khan remained silent on major issues like Gilgit Baltistan’s
constitutional rights, its representation in Pakistan Parliament and
other decision-making forums;
(3) He made no commitment to resolve Gilgit-Baltistan’s boundary, power
and water-related disputes with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where PTI is
in power;
(4) He didn’t offer an increase in the number of seats in medical and
engineering colleges for Gilgit-Baltistan’s students in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa; and
(5) There was no impact of Imran’s anti-Nawaz speeches on the common
people of Gilgit-Baltistan.29
164 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Current Status
The dismal performance of the party in 2015 Legislative Assembly elections
forced central leadership for overhauling party leadership of the GB chapter.
Its top leadership was changed and replaced by the new ones. Raja Jalal was
chosen as the President, Shah Nasir as Vice-President and Fatehullah as General
Secretary. Raja Jalal replaced Hashmatullah Khan who as a convener of the
party, was the de-facto president and was also one of the founding leader of
the party in GB. The decision has shocked the party workers as Hashmatullah
Khan has not been given any role in the party leadership. The supporters of
Hashmatullah Khan have slammed the central leadership for bypassing him
and installing a newcomer as the regional chief. The cadres refused to cooperate
with the new leadership. Therefore, the decision has given rise to discontent
among the older cadre of the party in the region. It may be noted that Raja
Jalal joined PTI-GB after the quitting the PPP on the eve of 2015 elections.
However, Raja Jalal lost the election to PMLN-GB Akbar Taban. Fatehullah
the new General Secretary of the party has joined the PTI after defecting from
the PMLN around the same time.30

ISLAMI TEHREEK PAKISTAN (ITP)

Introduction, Aims and Objectives and Leadership
Shia Islami Council (SUC) contested the June 2015 Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly
elections under the banner of ITP as the SUC has been registered with the
Election Commission of Gilgit-Baltistan as ITP.31 The main objective of the
SUC is to protect the rights of Shia Muslims of Pakistan and give them voice
in the Pakistan Parliament. The party has maintained cordial relations with
Sunni organisations including Sunni Ittehad Council. The SUC had also formed
an alliance with PPP to contest the National Assembly elections in 2013.32
ITP won two seats in the June 2015 Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly
elections. And by winning one seat each in the women’s and technocrat reserved
seats, ITP emerged as the main opposition party with four seats. While Allama
Sajid Naqvi is chief of SUC Pakistan, its Gilgit Baltistan Chapter is headed by
Shaikh Shahadat Hashmi. Other prominent leaders of SUC are Shaikh Sultan
Sabri, Ali Hussain, Shaikh Shabir Hakeemi and Shaikh Gulam Shakri.33

JAMIAT ULEMA-E-ISLAM-FAZLUR REHMAN-GB (JUIF-GB)

Introduction
The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazlur Rehman (JUI-F) established its branch in
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 165

Gilgit-Baltistan in 1987 by four Islamic leaders: Qazi Inayatullah, Haji

Muhammad Azeem, Qari Abul Hakeem and Maulana Haq Nawaz. Initially,
the party concentrated on local issues like electricity and water. After
consolidating its position, it focused on law and order problems and
constitutional rights. The main demand of the party is to merge Gilgit-Baltistan
with ‘AJK’.34 Most of its cadre strength comes from Sunni Muslims. It roped
in Jamaat-i-Islami and Tehrik-e-Jafaria, to launch a movement against
obscenity.35
The JUIF-GB had won three seats, including a seat reserved for women,
in the 2009 elections to the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly. It joined the coalition
led by PPP-GB government headed by Mehdi Shah. For the June 2015
elections, it fielded 10 candidates, but secured only one seat. Its candidate,
Haji Shah Baig won the sole seat from Diamer (GBLA-12) constituency. Baig
was also elected as leader of the opposition in the Legislative Assembly. A major
reason for its poor performance in the 2015 elections could be that its party
chief, Fazlur Rehman, did not visit the region to campaign for the party’s
candidates.36

Manifesto
The JUIF-GB chapter follows the central manifesto of the party which demands
the implementation of Islamic judicial system in Pakistan. The party is in favour
of accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.37

Leadership
The organisational structure of the party is controlled by a committee whose
office-bearers are Qari Inayatulla (President), Attaulla Shahab (General
Secretary), and Maulana Luqman Hakeem. Other important leaders include
Maulana Syed Mohammad, Maulana Haq Nawaz, Jamil Ahmad, Haji Gulberg,
Qazi Imtiaz Ahmad Mir and Minahjuddin.38

JAMAAT-E-ISLAMI-GB (JI-GB)
Introduction
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) had set up a chapter in Gilgit Baltistan in July 1974 but
with a small following.39 The JI favours merging of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan
to form “one unit”. It believes that Kashmir will soon be free, and if therefore,
both the regions were to merge into one unit, it would strengthen the freedom
movement, and also create more difficulties for India.40 Commenting on the
reforms package introduced through the Presidential Order on August 28, 2009,
166 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

JI pointed out that simple constitutional and administrative reforms would

not suffice to solve the problems of the area. It suggested a need to bring a
change at the leadership level in the country at large, in order to establish a
government and society based on justice.41 It did not field any candidates in
the Assembly elections in November 2009. In the June 2015 Assembly elections,
it gave tickets to six candidates but all of them lost.

Leadership
Office-bearers of the JI-GB are: Dr Khalid Mahmood (Emir), Maulana Abdus
Sami (General Secretary), Mushtaq Ahmad (Vice President), who also happens
to hold the post for the ‘AJK’ chapter, and advocate Noorul Bari.42 Dr Mahmood
replaced Abdul Rashid Turabi on June 30, 2017 who served party as an Emir
for both the region of PoK for 22 years. The previous Emirs included Maulana
Abdul Bari, Col. (retd.) Abdul Rashid Abbasi and Engr. Aziz Afzal Khan.

MUTTAHIDA QUAMI MOVEMENT-GB (MQM-GB)

Introduction
The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) strives for its own administration
in Gilgit-Baltistan without interference by the Pakistan bureaucracy. It opened
its Gilgit-Baltistan chapter during the first Legislative Assembly elections in
November 2009. It fielded 20 candidates, but could win only one seat.43 The
party was supported by the people of Gilgit-Baltistan settled in Karachi,
especially the youth who were sent by the party to Gilgit-Baltistan for
campaigning. Also, for many voters, the MQM “is known for religious harmony
in Karachi and it has given a voice to the middle class”.44 The party, however,
could not secure any seat in June 2015 Assembly elections. In addition, the
party’s lone legislator, Raja Azam, quit the MQM-GB to join PML-N in April
2015. Raja Azam who was elected from Shigar area of Baltistan region in
November 2009 became minister for planning in the PPP-led government.
His loss completely demoralised the party cadre as Raja Azam was the sole
member of the MQM Central Executive Committee in the region.45

MAJLIS-E-WAHADAT MUSLIMEEN GILGIT BALTISTAN

(MWM-GB)
Introduction
Majlis-e-Wahadat Muslimeen (MWM) is a party formed by a group of Shias
in Pakistan. It has branches in all the regions of Pakistan. Its Gilgit Baltistan
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 167

chapter did not contest the November 2009 elections to the Legislative
Assembly, although it has a strong following among the Shias in the region. In
the June 2015 Assembly elections, 15 of its candidates contested, and two of
them won. They include Rizwan Ali elected from GBLA-5 (Hunza-Nagar–II)
and Imtiaz Haider Khan elected from GBLA-8 (Skardu-II) constituencies.

Leadership
Prominent leaders of the MWM Gilgit Baltistan are General Secretary Allama
Sheikh Nayyar Abbas, Allam Raja Nasir Abbas Jafari, Head of MWM Baltistan
Region; Allama Sheikh Nayyar Abbas, Provincial General Secretary; Allama
Agha Ali Rizvi, General Secretary; Arif Qanbari, Provincial leader; Ghulam
Abbas, Provincial Secretary Political Affairs Gilgit-Baltistan; and Mohammad
Ali, Secretary Political Affairs Baltistan Division.
In April 2015, nine political activists of MWM were arrested for protesting
against the Pakistan Government’s decision to support Saudi Government’s
stance on its war in Yemen. The move was criticised by then Supreme Court
Bar Association President, Late Asma Jahangir. She demanded release of the
40 political and human right activists who had been charged with sedition in
the past six months simply for their peaceful protest against the denial of their
political rights.46
In February 2016, the MWM Gilgit-Baltistan General Secretary, Allama
Sheikh Nayyar Abbas, was sent to prison on judicial remand in a treason case
by an anti-terrorist court. He had been at large for almost 10 months, and was
declared a proclaimed offender by the court.

TANZEEM AHL-E-SUNNAT WAL JAMAAT (TASWJ)

Introduction
Tanzeem Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (TASWJ) is the main Sunni party of Gilgit-
Baltistan. It was formed as a welfare organisation in the early 1980s to run
mosques, madrassas, and orphanages. The organisation intensified its activities
following the 1988 sectarian clashes. Being a staunch Sunni organisation, the
TASWJ is closely associated with Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP), a
radical sectarian outfit.47
168 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

NATIONALIST/PRESSURE GROUPS
BALAWARISTAN NATIONAL FRONT (BNF)
Introduction
The Balawaristan National Front (BNF) was formed by Nawaz Khan Naji in
Gilgit on July 30, 1992. The main aim of the BNF was to fight for a sovereign
and independent republic of Balawaristan. According to its official website, it
considers Pakistan to be a ‘usurper’ whose control over the region is ‘illegal’ as
per the international law.48 The party has been voicing the grievances of the
people by organising rallies, protests and conferences. One such conference
was held on April 3, 1993 which was attended by different political, religious
and national parties of Pakistan. This was followed by a protest meeting on
March 24, 1994 and a huge public meeting at Shahi Polo ground in Gilgit in
April 1994. The BNF observed “Black Jubilee” when Pakistan was celebrating
its Golden Jubilee on August 14, 1997. The security forces arrested a number
of its leaders and activists including Abdul Hamid Khan, who were charged
with sedition and sent to jail and tortured.49
On the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the Unrepresented Nations and
Peoples Organisation (UNPO), Abdul Hamid Khan in a speech in The Hague
on February 11, 2011 stated:
In Balawaristan, arbitrary arrest, torture, detention and forcibly exile is the
daily routine of the occupying regime of Pakistan, because of no higher and
independent judicial system. Neither the people of this region have
representation of their own nor have representation anywhere in the world.
Human Rights organisations and independent media are out of question in
this area. Hundreds and hundreds of local indigenous people were put behind
bars for their religious and political differences and many political leaders
including Mr. Wajahat Hassan, Ex Member of NAs Council and Col. (Retd)
Nadir Hassan and others were arrested and were forcibly sent to exile to
Pakistan from their home in Gilgit on 1st [November 1,] 2009, when they
tried to hold peaceful public gathering during election campaign. Indigenous
people are given death sentence without giving them right to justice in any
High Court or Supreme Court.50
Earlier, in November 2004, in an open letter to the Prime Ministers of India
and Pakistan, Abdul Hamid Khan appealed for early resolution of the mounting
problems of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. On April 28, 2017, BNF chairman
said, “If referendum happens people will vote for India, they never committed
atrocities on us.” While praising India, he said, “Pakistan imposed war on us,
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 169

India never occupied our land. Pakistan’s coward army gave Siachen to India.”
Commenting on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), he said,
“People are aware Gilgit-Baltistan is disputed, by arresting few, you (Pak) think
CPEC will be built, 42 million (dollars) will be in your pocket, it’s a dream.51
In January 2017, Pakistan security agencies arrested a dozen activists of BNF
accusing them of sabotage against CPEC at the behest of Indian intelligence
agencies. The founder of the party, Nawaz Khan Naji contested against the
religious and spiritual leader of the Ismail sect in 2004 Northern Areas
Legislative Council elections but was defeated. The BNF was the only nationalist
party which had fielded four candidates, but failed to win any seat in the
November 2009 Assembly elections.
However, Nawaz Khan Naji surprised everyone by winning Ghizer
constituency in the by-election held to the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly
in 2011. According to Sohaib Bodla, the victory gave a big boost to the
nationalist movement as earlier nationalist leaders in the area generally remained
aloof from electoral politics.52 Nawaz Khan Naji being the most influential
nationalist leader has a large following among the youth. He won the Gilgit-
Baltistan Legislative Assembly elections by a big margin twice, in 2011 and
2015. However, soon after the elections, differences emerged within the BNF
regarding the future strategy of attaining the political objectives. Abdul Hamid
Khan was expelled by Naji. This led the division of BNF into two groups: one
led by Naji and the other by Abdul Hamid Khan. Khan’s group (BNF-H)
operates from Brussels where he is living in exile. However, Naji’s adventure in
mainstream politics has not gone well within the Nationalist circles. Although
living in exile, Abdul Hamid Khan has established a good rapport with other
nationalist groups. He is also in touch with international human right
organisations, the UN and European Parliament, and on regular basis briefs
them about the prevailing situation in Gilgit-Baltistan. In a letter addressed to
the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon on March 14, 2016, Khan wrote:
There is no legal, constitutional, judicial mechanism in place in Pakistan
occupied Gilgit-Baltistan to protect people from human rights violations,
except the UN and civilized world. Many political and religious people have
been prosecuted in Gilgit-Baltistan jails without giving them access to legal,
constitutional redress options or high court and Supreme Court. Local
population working in administration, Police, Education and Security Forces
are not promoted for the top jobs and are always put under the final control
of Pakistani citizens. Indigenous people in government service have been
insulted, degraded and never trusted.53
170 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Ideology/Objectives
The BNF considers Gilgit-Baltistan a separate territory with a separate nation.
According to the BNF, these areas were not a legitimate part of Jammu and
Kashmir; rather, Kashmir was controlling them by military power in
collaboration with the British Crown. The BNF has three slogans –
independence, democracy and justice:
The BNF calls for an independent state named Balawaristan, comprising the
areas of GB plus districts of Kohistan and Chitral which are today part of
Pakistan’s Province Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: and it also includes Indian
controlled Ladakh. The movement believes in a peaceful struggle for the
ultimate cause of a separate homeland for the inhabitants of these areas..
Furthermore, the BNF has also struggled to highlight the demand that the
people of GB should be given the right of determining their future in light of
the long awaited plebiscite under the UN. Further the BNF wants to be a
fourth party in the Kashmir dispute; India, Pakistan and Kashmir being the
other parties. In the current set up, the people of GB do not have
representation in the national legislature of Pakistan. Using electoral politics,
the BNF is attempting to mobilise the local people to make sense of their
own identity in a situation where they are surrounded by India, Kashmir and
Pakistan’s quest to take or to perpetuate control of the area.54
Besides the above-mentioned area which is under the control of India and
Pakistan, the BNF also wants to include Gojal, which is under Chinese control,
“in the proposed state on the basis of cultural affinity”.55 Explaining the
nationalists’ position, Nawaz Khan Naji said, “We are neither Pakistani nor
part of Kashmir. After the Kashmir issue is resolved, we will decide whether
our state, Balawaristan, will become an independent country or confederate
with Pakistan.” Till then, he said, he was ready to settle for autonomy within
Pakistan, adding, “We should be allowed to have our president and prime
minister.”56
Pakistan earns an annual income Rs. 20 billion from Gilgit-Baltistan’s
natural and economic resources. However, the BNF alleged that it presents an
annual budget of only Rs. 1.2 billion.57 Even for the financial year 2017-18,
the G-B Council has approved a budget with the total outlay of about PKR
2.4 billion. The party is against setting up mega projects as the area is still
disputed. This issue came up for discussion in the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative
Assembly on January 11, 2014 after MLA Mirza Hussain presented an
adjournment motion, asking the Assembly to deliberate on the construction
of Railway Track and other mega projects in the region. Nawaz Khan Naji, too
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 171

has opposed the construction of mega projects before determining the status
of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Organisation, Structure, Leadership and Funding

The BNF is headed by a committee which has a Patron-in Chief, Chairman,
President and General Secretary. Nawaz Khan Naji is the Patron-in-Chief of
the party. Other office-bearers are Abdul Hamid Khan, Chairman; Muhammad
Rafiq, President; Ali Madad Bai, General Secretary; Engineer Shafqat Inqilabi,
Spokesman; and Shujat Ali and Engineer Akhtar Jan, both active members.
The main hub of the political activity of the party is at Ghizer district where
nationalists have been contesting elections for local bodies since 2004. The
party’s headquarters is, however, based at Majni Mahila, Gilgit.

BALAWARISTAN STUDENTS’ NATIONAL ORGANISATION

(BSNO)
Balawaristan Students’ National Organisation (BSNO) is youth wing of BNF.
Majority of its members come from the middle class. In addition, there are
students who have returned from Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar after
completing their studies and formed the Balawaristan Students’ National
Organisation (BSNO). Its main objective is to seek independence from
Pakistan’s colonial rule. The BSNO is headed by Faizullah Faruq. According
to a senior leader of the BSNO, the main demands of the people of Gilgit-
Baltistan are as follows:58
(a) For the UN Security Council to ensure genuine political, judicial,
economic and cultural autonomy in Gilgit-Baltistan as obligated under
the UN resolution of January 5, 1949.
(b) Given that Pakistan has failed to ensure security in Gilgit-Baltistan,
the UN should station peace-keeping troops in the disputed region.
(c) Pakistan must be asked to open traditional routes leading towards
India and Tajikistan which can help sustain the local economy and
provide safe alternate safe routes to travel, as, currently, travel on the
Karakoram Highway is too dangerous.
(d) The UN should ask Pakistan to respect UN resolutions and remove
its citizens who have damaged the social fabric by spreading religious
sectarianism in the region.
(e) The UN should ask Pakistan to withdraw the fake sedition cases and
release all political prisoners.
(f ) A UN commission must be sent to Gilgit-Baltistan to assess gross
human rights violations, killings and torture of political workers.
172 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The major funding of the party comes from its members and donors.

Network and Area of Influence

Major network of the Balawaristan movement is in Ghizer district, “which has
now become synonymous with the Balawaristan struggle in entire Gilgit-
Baltistan, according to Sohaib Bodla, leader of BSNO, who says: “The road
from Gilgit to Ghizer is replete with slogans in favor of Balawaristan and its
leadership.”59
The BNF has voiced concern over the militant activities in ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-
Baltistan in an article in the Asia Times. Salient points are as follows:
(i) In the past, the Ghizer valley had seen much militant activities. Post
US military operation in Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda and Taliban
leaders found safe haven in Pakistan’s tribal areas. Most of the militants
also took refuge in densely forests of Ghizer. Many anti-India militant
organisations opened their camps in remote hilly areas of Hazara,
Darel Yashote, Tangir, Astore, Skardu city and Gilgit.
(ii) There were also reports of the existence of a militant camp of Harkat
ul Mujahedeen in Tangir in Diamar district. In addition, some camps
were also located in Ghowadi village in Skardu, Juglote and Konodas
near Gilgit.
(iii) About 1,000 al-Qaeda fighters crossed over to Pakistan after the US
invasion of Afghanistan. Out of them, 600 escaped to Gilgit-Baltistan
and another 200 pushed into the upper reaches of the Pir Panjal
region in Kashmir.60

Current Status
The party is very active as more and more people are joining the BNF. The
social media has become an important tool to spread the party’s ideology,
speeches of nationalist leaders and other happenings.
The BNF has opposed the so-called Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and
Self-governance Order 2009 which it says is a ploy to occupy Gilgit Baltistan
under the garb of an order. In a letter addressed to the President of the European
Parliament, BNF Chairman, Abdul Hamid Khan, pointed out that the
arrangement was an unconcerned attempt to (i) control the elected
representatives of Gilgit-Baltistan and use the new political set up as a rubber
stamp to get approval for the construction of six mega dams including Diamar/
Bhasha Bonji; and (ii) to merge Gilgit-Baltistan with Pakistan by ignoring the
will of the two million people as well as the United Nations Commission on
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 173

India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions.61 Khan said that the resolution of
the Kashmir dispute has been made even more difficult due to the intrusion of
radical religious groups sponsored by the Pakistan State. In an interview with
India-based security analyst, Yoginder Sikand, Khan said that “a viable solution
to the Kashmir issue can emerge only after consulting all the many ethnic,
religious, cultural and political groups which inhibit this land”.62
Similarly, the BNF believes that China-Pakistan Corridor project is a ploy
to strengthen the hold of outsiders in Gilgit-Baltistan and keep the indigenous
people in perpetual slavery. In a statement, the BNF Chairman said that his
party not only rejects the project but also condemns Pakistan for envisaging it,
adding the people of the region would never accept the mega project.63

JAMMU AND KASHMIR LIBERATION FRONT (JKLF)

Introduction
The Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) was founded in Birmingham
(UK) in May 1977 by Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Bhat. It advocates
independent Jammu and Kashmir comprising all Kashmir territory that is
presently under the control of India, Pakistan and China. Moreover, according
to the JKLF, Gilgit-Baltistan is a part of Jammu and Kashmir region, and should
be completely independent.64
It has termed the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order
2009 as a ‘colonial-type’ package which the Kashmiris consider “as an attempt
to divide Kashmiris”. Criticising the package, the JKLF Pakistan chapter
President, Syed Faisal Nazki, said that power would not be vested in the people
of the region but in the Gilgit Baltistan Council.65 He rejected the package
saying it that it appeared to be aimed at merging the disputed areas into
Pakistan. 66 The JKLF has also stressed that making Gilgit-Baltistan a
constitutional part of Pakistan “would be catastrophic for the country”. In an
interview with the Pakistan daily, The Express Tribune, Amanullah Khan said,
“If GB does become part of Pakistan; it will be synonymous to committing
suicide {....} I will not let this happen till I am alive, no one can separate G-B
from Kashmir.”67
Before his death, Amanullah visited Gilgit to dissuade people from
demanding a constitutional status for Gilgit-Baltistan. However, he has no
reservations on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; rather, he supported
Gilgit-Baltistan’s demand for a larger share in the Corridor.68 The party office
was inaugurated by Amanullah Khan at Dar Plaza, Gilgit, in February 2016.
174 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The function was also attended by JKLF’s zonal president Dr Tawqeer Geelani,
and its convener in Gilgit-Baltistan Saif ud Din Bhat.69

KARAKORUM NATIONAL MOVEMENT (KNM)

History
In 1986, a youth body in the name of Karakorum Students Organisation (KSO)
was formed in Quetta, Balochistan, by Muhammad Qasim Sheraliyat and
Dr Sharif. The movement was later extended to the other areas of Pakistan as
well. In Gilgit-Baltistan, the KSO appointed Afsar Jan as its first Chairman.
The youth body further decided to form a political party, called the Karakorum
National Movement (KNM) with Qasim Sheraliyat as its chairman. As a part
of its objective, the KNM has been struggling for the freedom of Karakorum
(Gilgit-Baltistan). After shifting its office to Gilgit, it fanned out its leaders to
Sindh and North-West Frontier Province (NWFP; now called Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa) to meet college and university students in order to seek their
support in struggle for the constitutional rights of the people of Gilgit-
Baltistan. 70 The KNM along with other nationalist groups such as the
Progressive Youth Front, Balor Forum and Gilgit Baltistan Democratic Alliance
have been organising seminars and meetings on the issue of basic constitutional,
social, economic and political rights. At a meeting in Hunza in August 2008,
the speakers demanded that the Pakistan Government define the constitutional
status of Gilgit-Baltistan and the region be given self-rule.71

Ideology
The KNM believes that Gilgit-Baltistan is not a territory of Pakistan as its
future is yet to be decided in accordance with the United Nations resolutions.
According to a KNM statement, quoted by the weekly, Bang-e-Sahar:
When we don’t want to join Pakistan, why are we being forced to do so? We
have been saying that our constitutional status should be determined. We
want an autonomous Gilgit-Baltistan but Pakistan’s rulers have enslaved the
people of Gilgit Baltistan for more than the last six decades without giving
them their birth right of self-determination to decide about their future.72
To suppress the nationalist activists, Pakistani intelligence agencies have used
state-sponsored terrorists to attack and weaken their cause. Over the years, a
number of nationalist activists have been killed, namely Aflatoon, Gazi Anwer,
Zakir Hussain, Ashiq Mir and Zubair Ali. KNM leaders like Muhammad Javed,
Shah Zaman, Manzoor Parwana, Shabir Ali Shah, Syed Haider Shah Razvi,
Iftikhar Husain and Amir Ali have faced rigorous torture and jail terms for
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 175

demanding political rights for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Iftikhar Husain

and Amir Ali were arrested when they were protesting against extra-judicial
murders of two innocent citizens of Hunza Nagar. The demands of the KNM
include end to terrorism, military and police-led torture, detentions and freedom
of speech and expression.73

Leadership
The KNM which was until recently keeping low profile is one of the largest
group among the nationalist groups. But of late it has been facing leadership
crisis. It is believed that the KNM has now only about 500 members in the
region.74
Some of the important leaders of KNM are Mohammad Iqbal Advocate
(Chairman) and Amjad Changezi (Vice Chairman), and Mohammad Javed
(President). Other leaders include Habib Yunuis, Comrade Naeemullah Baig,
Mumtaz Nagri, Karim Hasan Sher Gazt and Faqir Hussain Chandio.

GILGIT BALTISTAN DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE (GBDA)

Introduction
The Gilgit Baltistan Democratic Alliance (GBDA) is a leading conglomerate
of eight nationalist parties of Gilgit-Baltistan. It demands complete freedom
from occupation of Pakistan and an independent democratic government for
the local indigenous people.75 The coalition was initially formed in October
2009 by two major nationalist parties, the BNF and KNM.76 The other alliance
partners are the Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM), Balor Research
Forum (BRF), Gilgit Baltistan Ladakh Democratic Movement (GBLDM),
Progressive Youth Front (PYF), Boloristan77 Labour Party (BLP) and Thinkers
Forum (TF). The GBDA is closely associated with All Parties National Alliance
(an amalgam of nationalist parties of both the regions of PoK). The GBDA
jointly organises meetings, seminars rallies and conferences to create awareness
about the fundamental rights of the people. Gilgit-Baltistan is represented at
the UNPO by the GBDA.78 The GBDA contested the November 2009 elections
with 16 candidates on the issue of independence and autonomy. However, no
candidate was able to win a seat.79 Pakistani authorities were accused by the local
nationalist leaders of not allowing their parties to hold election meetings, and
of favouring pro-Pakistan political parties with funding and other kinds of
support.80 The GBDA has also criticised the Gilgit-Baltistan National Alliance
(GBNA) for working against the nationalist cause and following the
establishment’s line.81
176 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Leadership
The Chairman of the party is Ghulam Shehzad Agha and Senior Vice President
is Advocate Ehsan Ali. Dr. Amjad Chengazi is Vice chairman, Burhanullah is
General Secretary, Baba Jan Hunzai is Joint Secretary and Engineer Akbar Khan
is Press Secretary. Other major leaders of the alliance include Convenor
Muhammad Rafique, Engineer Amanullah Khan and Manzoor Hussain Parwana.

GILGIT BALTISTAN UNITED MOVEMENT (GBUM)

Introduction
Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM) is a prominent local political
movement that is supported by local politicians. Based in Skardu, it demands
a fully autonomous state comprising Gilgit and Baltistan.82 GBUM believes
that the people of Gilgit Baltistan didn’t opt for Pakistan at the time of partition.
The GBUM demanded that the ‘Northern Areas’ Legislative Council should
be given the status of Legislative Assembly and given similar rights granted to
the existing ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly.83
The Chairman of the GBUM, Manzoor Hussain Parwana has strongly
criticised Pakistan Government’s proposal to make Gilgit-Baltistan a provisional
province and its constitutional packages for the region as unlawful. In a press
release, Parwana made it clear that Gilgit-Baltistan was not a part of Pakistan
under the 1973 Constitution: “Pakistan had taken over the administrative
control of the GB region in the wake of dubious ‘Karachi pact’ signed on April
28, 1949 in which GB was represented by no one.”84 Commenting further on
the proposed provisional status, Parwana stated, “GB is the only area which
neither has representation in the National Assembly and Senate of Pakistan
nor does it have its own assembly to formulate the laws. So the proposed de-
facto Provisional Province will be cause of insecurity and scarcity for the people
of Gilgit-Baltistan.”85
On July 28, 2010 Manzoor Parwana was detained by the Pakistani security
forces after his address to the BSNO in Gilgit. He was later shifted to an
unknown place by the intelligence agencies for interrogation. He was arrested
for expressing support to the Ladakhi refugees who were demanding the opening
of Kargil-Skardu road. During his address Parwana raised the following issues:86
(i) The implementation of State Subject Rule, which Maharaja Hari
Singh has promulgated in the region.
(ii) Withdrawal of Pakistani security forces from the region.
(iii) Denial of human rights to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 177

In an open letter addressed to then President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari

and Asian Human Rights Commission, the Chairman of the BNF, Abdul
Hamid Khan appealed to them for immediate release of Manzoor Hussain
Parwana and withdrawal of all charges against him.87 Parwana was implicated
in a false sedition case after his magazine Kargil International criticized Pakistan
Army and General Musharraf for launching the Kargil misadventure. The
magazine demanded the setting up of an independent commission to identify
those officers responsible for launching Kargil war. The magazine alleged that
hundreds of soldiers of Northern Light Infantry disguised as Mujahideen were
killed. Consequently, Kargil International was banned by the Musharraf regime
and all its copies were confiscated.88 On November 4, 2004, the police arrested
its publisher Ghulam Shehzad Agha. Agha who is also the Central President of
GBUM, was however released after large scale protests by the party workers.
Further, in September 2013 Parwana also demanded that the Pakistan
government should reveal the reasons behind the presence of Chinese in the
region. Alarmed about the presence of foreign troops in the area, the GBUM
Chairman stated, “Pakistan and China’s unwarranted activities in Gilgit Baltistan
are causing instability and may as well threaten the safety of natives in the long
run. If terrorists attack passenger buses and foreign tourists near KKH, this is
the conspiracy against the friendship between China and Pakistan and will be
a constant threat to Gilgit Baltistan.”89

GILGIT BALTISTAN UNITED ALLIANCE (GBUA)

Introduction, Aims and Objectives
The leftist parties established an alliance, Gilgit Baltistan United Alliance
(GBUA), at a meeting attended by the representatives of the parties in January
2007 with the objective to:
(i) struggle against the bureaucratic colonial rule;
(ii) demand withdrawal of Pak troops from Gilgit-Baltistan and Indian
troops from Ladakh and Kargil; and
(iii) demand establishment of two autonomous regions across the Line of
Control (LoC).
The convenor of the Alliance is Ghulam Shehzad Agha. It comprises the
Boloristan Labour Party, GBUM, KNM, BNF and Baltistan Students
Federation.
The meeting was also attended by Manzoor Hussain Parwana, Chairman
of the GBUM who stressed the need for greater understanding and unity among
178 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the nationalist and progressive parties.90 This Alliance has been observing
November 16 as day of repentance, marking it as the day when the freedom of
Gilgit and Baltistan was seized in the name of Islam, Pakistan and Kashmir.91
In one of the conferences held in Gilgit, the people openly raised slogans in
support of independence from the colonial control of Pakistan.

GILGIT BALTISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE (GBNA)

Introduction
Formed in 2001, the Gilgit Baltistan National Alliance (GBNA) is an umbrella
organisation of 14 political and religious parties of Gilgit-Baltistan. These parties
include the PPP-GB, JI-GB, PMLN-GB, PMLQ-GB, JUI-GB, TeJ Pakistan,
MQM-GB, BNF, KNM, JKLM, Awami Tehreek, National Rights Front,
Thinkers’ Forum and Gharib Qaumi Movement. The Alliance, which has
practically split due to the differences within, aimed at a struggle for solution
to the problems of Gilgit-Baltistan.92 The Chairperson of the GBNA is Malika
Baltistani. She became the founder President of Ladakh Baltistan United Front
which was formed in 1963. She joined a protest march against the killings of
Shias and minorities in front of Pakistan Embassy in Washington on April 14,
2012. The GBNA out rightly rejected the GBESGO 2009 and called it as
deceptive.93 But of late it has been noticed that GBNA has started cultivating
its relationship with the Pakistan establishment.

AWAMI WORKERS PARTY (AWP)

Aims and Objectives
Awami Workers Party (AWP) was formed in 2012 with the merger of three
leftist parties – Labour Party Pakistan, Workers’ Party and Awami Party.
According to its official website, the party was formed with the objective to:
(i) take the primary responsibility of organising and planning the
country’s economy;
(ii) nationalise major industries, including those run by the military and
place them under the control of democratic state;
(iii) resist imperialist aggression against the people in all manifestations,
be they drone strikes, multinational capital or austerity measures
imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank;
(iv) stop privatisation policy – re-nationalise all private industries and
re-instate the sacked employees;
(v) permit workers to form trade unions;
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 179

(vi) implement radical land reforms and redistribute land among the
peasantry in order to break the political and social power of big
landlords; and
(vii) fundamentally change the state’s hostile policy towards neighbouring
countries.94

Leadership
AWP’s leadership comprises Fanous Gujjar (Central Chairman); Farooq Tariq
(General Secretary, earlier the spokesman of the Labour Party Pakistan); Baba
Jan (Vice President, also the Chairperson of Progressive Youth Front of Gilgit
Baltistan) and Farzana Bari (Secretary, women’s wing).
It’s vice president Baba Jan is currently serving 40 year jail term along with
11 other activists. He was arrested in 2011 and remained in jail for nearly two
years. After a massive national and international campaign by various human
rights organisations, he was released on bail on June 27, 2013. He was again
arrested when an anti-terrorism court sentenced him to life imprisonment in
September 2014 for raising his voice against police brutality and for demanding
compensation to the affectees of Attabad Lake disaster. Baba Jan contested the
June 2015 Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly elections from jail from the
GBLA-6 (Hunza) constituency on an appeal by the Committee for the Release
of Political Prisoners. He was defeated. Meanwhile, an International Solidarity
Campaign for Baba Jan and four of his party activists facing life sentence has
been re-launched by Pierre Rousset, member of the leadership of the Fourth
International and member of the New Anti-capitalist Party (NPA) in France.
Pierre Rousset has also appealed to people for donation to help the families of
Baba Jan and four others who are serving life sentence in jail.95
On November 20, 2014, the AWP held a country-wide protest to demand
the release of its leaders including Baba Jan and to stop harassing people using
the anti-terrorist laws. One such protest was held at Abpara Chowk (Islamabad).
The protest meeting was also attended by the leaders of United Kashmir People’s
National Party (UKPNP) and National Students Federation Gilgit-Baltistan.96
A delegation of the AWP met the visiting Fact Finding Mission of Human
Rights Commission in Gilgit in August 2016 and shared their concern about
the constitutional status of the region and the way it affected the legislative
and judicial system of Gilgit-Baltistan.
180 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

GILGIT-BALTISTAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT (GBNM)

Introduction, Aim and Objectives
Gilgit-Baltistan National Movement (GBNM) is another nationalist group
active in Gilgit-Baltistan. The party considers Gilgit-Baltistan a disputed area
and maintains that until its status is decided in accordance with the UN
resolutions, the area should be given an ‘AJK’-like system of governance. Its
chairman is Dr. Ghulam Abbas. Explaining the goal of his party, Abbas said,
“We want a united state of Gilgit-Baltistan and Jammu and Kashmir and after
achieving that goal if the people of GB wanted to separate themselves from
the united country they should be given the option.”97 He criticised the 2009
Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order, which according
to him has no legal or constitutional status. In this connection, he filed a petition
in the Gilgit-Baltistan Appellate Court. It was accepted by the court which
directed the federal government and Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern
Areas to submit a report on the objections raised in the petition.98 He also
alleged that China considers Gilgit-Baltistan, Ladakh, Kargil and Aksai Chin
as its integral part and is slowly and quietly occupying the whole region. He
suspects that China is investing a considerable amount on the expansion of
the Karakoram Highway and other projects as a part of its strategy.

GILGIT-BALTISTAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (GBNC)

Introduction
The Gilgit-Baltistan National Congress (GBNC) was formed in Washington
to highlight the need of political, constitutional, economic, social and human
rights for the people of both ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan. It is headed by Imtiaz
Hussain and Senge Hasnain Sering is its director. The group is supported by
the GBDA and All Party National Alliance (APNA).
In one of its statements, GBNC stated:
Pakistani forces have transformed this peaceful and picturesque region into a
military garrison and commit rights violations with absolute impunity. In a
memorandum submitted to UN observer in Islamabad on October 4, 2015,
the organisation had demanded effective political and administrative system
for PoK and GB which it alleged are being overtly and covertly dictated and
governed by Pakistan through its bureaucracy military and its secret agencies
in connivance with the so called peoples representative.99

Activities
The GBNC organised a conference titled, “Water Resource Exploitation,
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 181

Environment Pollution and Flashfloods in Pakistani Occupied Gilgit-Baltistan”,

at the United Nations Human Rights Council, Geneva, on September 24, 2010.
The Member of European Parliament and the Chairperson of Friends of Gilgit-
Baltistan Caucus in European Parliament, Jurgen Creutzmann, appealed to the
Pakistan Government to improve its environment record which could help to
reduce the damage caused by the flash floods in the future. In his support to
the people of G-B, Creutzmann highlighted the following points:
• First, the extremist elements including the Taliban could benefit from
the current situation in gaining sympathy from poverty-stricken flood
victims.
• Second, Pakistan’s policy of using Gilgit-Baltistan as a launching pad to
advance militancy in Kashmir and Afghanistan exacerbates the security
crisis of the region.
• Third, he expressed concern over Pakistan’s tactics of exploiting river
water dispute with India to advance militancy in Kashmir. Elaborating
this point Creutzmann said, “Pakistan is largely interested in acquiring
control over the rivers of Kashmir. Kashmir and water dispute with
India have become tools to advance military and strategic interest, which
destabilizes the region.”
• Fourth, Creutzmann supported the demand of the people of Gilgit-
Baltistan to regain control over their natural resources. He criticised
Islamabad for exploiting these natural resources with impunity which
has led to environmental degradation and glacier melting.100
In the same vein, Sange Hasnain Sering also highlighted the plight of the people
who are constantly living under the shade of fear. According to Sering:
Thousands of workers, soldiers and para-military with their equipment,
explosives and vehicles are present on the soil of Gilgit-Baltistan. Further,
several tunnels are being built adjacent to glacial moraines leading to their
melting at alarming rate. In addition to environmental degradation, foreign
workers compete with natives for jobs and services. In the name of
development and infrastructural building, foreigners are encouraged to settle
in the region and help change demography. Such policies will only damage
the social fabric and add to ethnic violence.101

GILGIT-BALTISTAN THINKER’S FORUM (GBTF)

Introduction, Aims and Objectives
The Gilgit-Baltistan Thinker’s Forum (GBTF) stands for the two-state formula
in the region. The formation of these two independent states is based on ethnic
182 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

and cultural lines. The first state would comprise two parts of Kashmir excluding
Ladakh and the second state would include Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh areas.102
The Chairman of the GBTF is Col (retd.) Wajahat Hasan Mirza, who is
living in exile, has been very active in highlighting the demand for complete
independence from Pakistan at every forum. In a statement on September 10,
2000, Wajahat Mirza said, “Pakistan rule cannot be spread over Gilgit and
Baltistan and these areas ought to be treated as a foreign country.”103 In March
2016, when the nationalist leaders protested at the UN Human Rights Council,
Geneva, Mirza said, “In Gilgit-Baltistan all black laws are being enforced, the
anti-terrorist courts and military courts are acting against the political activists
and leaders.”104 Wajahat Hassan accused Islamabad of allowing foreign countries
particularly China to exploit the resources of the region. Wajahat along with
his brother Col. (retd.) Nadir Hasan suffered brutality at the hands of Pakistani
security forces. Wajahat was kidnapped in Dubai in November 2010 and
brought to Islamabad where he was handed over to the ISI. The entire operation
was conducted under the supervision of Lt. Colonel Shoaib of the counter
intelligence department of ISI in Islamabad.105
According to Nadir Hasan, depriving the people of Gilgit-Baltistan a right
to self-rule by Pakistan is deliberate because it does not want a Shia state. The
civilian and political administration according to Nadir is in the hands of
Sunnis. Even the composition of Frontier Corps is Sunni-dominated, and they
are being used to intimidate the Shias under the pretext of maintaining law
and order.
The GBTF Convenor, Dr. G. Abbas has accused Pakistan of double talk.
He said that on the one hand Pakistan claims that there is no dispute over the
future status of Gilgit-Baltistan, but on the other hand, when a demand for
self-rule is made, Pakistan declines it on the pretext that the area is part of the
disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.106
Nationalist leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan to the great dismay of
Pakistan do not recognise the Kashmiri separatists. Most of them are of the
view that no one from the region has designated the Hurriyat or any other
group in the region to represent them. In this context, Mirza Wajahat stated,
“Neither we, nor the Hurriyat are elected by the common people. So, how can
we claim to be their representative?”107

GILGIT-BALTISTAN BAR COUNCIL (GBBC)

Introduction
The lawyers of Gilgit-Baltistan have also joined the campaign to fight for basic
rights for the people and to determine the constitutional status of Gilgit-
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 183

Baltistan. In this connection, lawyers belonging to different political parties

have formed the Gilgit-Baltistan Bar Council. In one of its meetings, the Bar
Council adopted an unanimous resolution raising three demands: i) Gilgit-
Baltistan be declared the fifth province of the country; ii) there should be local
government on the “pattern” of “Azad Kashmir”; and iii) if the two proposals
are considered impractical, “Azad Kashmir” and Gilgit and Baltistan be declared
one unit.108 The Vice President of Gilgit-Baltistan Bar Council, Shehbaz Khan,
said in Gilgit on January 8, 2015 that the federal government should either
bring the region within the purview of Pakistan’s Constitution or provide it
with a separate constitution. He made it clear that the Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-governance Order 2009 will not be accepted anymore,
adding that “instead of introducing ceremonial changes in the order, the federal
government should make arrangements to conduct elections for a constituent
assembly”.109

Network
The GBBC formed a committee of both the region of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan
in January 2015. It issued a joint declaration in which the coordination
committee demanded the abolition of Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-
Baltistan as it poses a major stumbling block to constitutional rights.110 The
main aim to form the coordination committee was to launch a collective struggle
for autonomy and eliminate misunderstandings between both regions. The
declaration was signed by various lawyers of both the regions including Shehbaz
Khan and the ‘AJK’ Bar Council advocate, Raja Khalid Mehmood.
In a letter addressed to the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif
and the then Chairman Committee for Constitutional Status for GB Mr Sartaj
Aziz, Shehbaz Khan wrote that refusal to allow fundamental rights to the two
million people of Gilgit-Baltistan was a deliberate disobedience of the 1999
judgement of the Supreme Court of Pakistan as well wherein the federation of
Pakistan has been directed to ensure fundamental rights to the people of Gilgit-
Baltistan within six months to govern themselves through their chosen
representatives and access to an independent judiciary guaranteed under the
constitution. Further he invited the attention of these leaders that in both parts
of the Kashmir, people are entitled to enjoy democratic, legal and constitutional
rights but the people of GB are continued to be denied their constitutional
rights since independence.111
184 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

GHARIB QAUMI MOVEMENT (GQM)

Introduction
The Gharib Qaumi Movement is basically a one-man party formed by Inayat-
ullah Shumali, who is also its President. Shumali who hails from Chilas in
Diamir district is also Chairman of the Gilgit Baltistan National Alliance. The
party had earlier advocated the formation of a separate province on the lines
of demands put forth by nationalists. However, it now demands that the Gilgit
Baltistan Government be set up on the pattern of ‘AJK’.112 Meanwhile a reforms
committee headed by the Advisor to the Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs,
Sartaj Aziz has reportedly finalised recommendations to devolve more powers
to the Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly. However, recommendations of the committee
have not yet been revealed.113

CONCLUSION
The Pakistan Government leaves no stone unturned to silence the voice of the
nationalsits in the region. There is discontent among the masses, as no concrete
steps have been taken to ensure the people of Gilgit-Baltistan their basic
democratic rights. Nationalist parties/groups complain of harassment of their
workers including implicating hundreds in false sedition cases by the Pakistan
security agencies. Number of their leaders and workers are living in exile abroad
for fear of their life. They include Abdul Hamid Khan, Chairman of
Balawaristan National Front (living in exile in Belgium since 1980s), Sardar
Shaukat Ali Kashmiri, Chairman UKPNP (in exile in Switzerland since 1999),
Col. Wajahat Hasan Mirza of Bolor Thinkers’ Forum (in exile in Austria for
the last 3 years) and Mumtaz Khan of UKPNP (in exile in Canada since 1998).
The 1988 onslaught is still fresh in the memories of people and nationalists
when thousands of Sunni tribesmen, predominantly from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
attacked Shiite villages of Gilgit. The entire operation was conducted under
the supervision of General Musharraf who was then a Brigadier commanding
the Special Services Group (SSG). According to Pakistani commentator, Sohaib
Bodla, “Shiite villages were burnt down, Sunni tribesmen continued killings
for days and went unhindered by the Pakistani Army that was deployed not
far away from the villages under attack.”114 Moreover, with the abolition of
state subject law, hundreds of the people from the adjoining states like Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) have migrated to Gilgit-Baltistan where they have purchased
properties and engaged in unlawful activities. The Kargil conflict in 1999 further
aggravated the feelings of alienation as Pakistan government did not
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 185

acknowledge the sacrifices of Northern Light Infantry (NLI) troops which

suffered heavy casualties as Shia and Ismail soldiers were pushed into suicidal
missions by Pakistani Sunni officers.115 Not only this, Pakistan refused to receive
the bodies of NLI soldiers. The worst was that their families were given only
a meagre compensation. An editorial in The Dawn warned that a provocative
sense of nationalism is getting stronger in Gilgit-Baltistan, “The same people
who have unflinching loyalty towards the state of Pakistan and were considering
themselves as Pakistanis are now talking about separation, freedom and a
separate nation of Gilgit-Baltistan.”116

ENDNOTES
1. Omar Farooq Zain, “A Socio-Political Study of Gilgit-Baltistan Province”, Pakistan Journal of
Social Sciences, 30 (1), September 2010, pp. 181-190, at www.bzu.edu.pk/pjss/vol30no12010/
final_pjss-3116.pdf.
2. International Crisis Group (ICG), Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas, Asia Report No. 131,
April 2, 2007, p. 13. at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index
3. “History & Dispute”, Gilgit Baltistan Tribune, at http://gbtribune.blogspot.in/p/history-
dispute.html.
4. Manifesto of PPP for Gilgit-Baltistan 2015, at www.gbvotes.pk/english/WP-content/uploads/
2015/03/PPP-final.pdf.
5. “PPP Announces Gilgit-Baltistan Office Bearers”, Mountain TV Net, December 9, 2015, at
http://www.mountaintv.net/ppp-announces-gilgit-baltistan-office-bearers.
6. Shabbir Mir, “Crisis Averted: PML-Q to stay in G-B Govt following Chief Minister’s U-
turn”, The Express Tribune, May 8, 2014, at https://www.google.co.in/webhp?sourceid=chrome-
instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=Crosis+averted%3APML-Q+to+stay+in+G-
B+govt+following+chief+minister’s+u-turn.
7. “G-B Chief Minister Ends Alliance with PML-Q”, The Express Tribune, May 6, 2014, at
http://www.tribune.com.pk/story/704830/g-b-chief-minister-ends-alliance-with-pml-q/
8. Ershad Mahmud, “The Battle for Gilgit-Baltistan”, The News, June, 7, 2015, at http://
tns.thenews.com.pk/the-battle-for-gilgit-baltistan/#.VcL8h_OqpHw.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid
11. Altaf Hussain, “Gilgit Baltistan Empowerment and Self-governance Order 2009”, The Gilgit-
Baltistan Reforms, December 2009, at, http://www.forumfd.org/en/pubs/pakistan/gilgit-
baltistan%20AHussain%20FinalDec09.doc p. 8
12. http://pppSB-kp.pk/gilgitbaltistan-cabinet.
13. “PML-N Welcomes Approval of Self Governance Order: Ahsan”, August 29, 2009, Balochistan
Times, at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/PML-N+wecomes+approval+of+self+governance+ for
+NA+3A+AT.
14. Shabbir Mir, -”PML-N Announces Manifesto for G-B Polls”, The Express Tribune, May 28,
2015, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/893330/full-speed-ahead-pml-n-announces-manifesto-
for-g-b-polls.
15. http://pmln-constitution/theprovincial-organisation/.
16. “PMLN Leaders for Gilgit Baltistan Announced, Hafeez Gets the Top Slot”, Pamir Times, at
http://pamirtimesblog.tumblr.com/post/110256894016/pmln-leaders-for-gilgit-baltistan-
announced.
186 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

17. Election Manifesto of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) Gilgit-Baltistan.

18. Ahmad Hassan, “Formation of GB Govt Likely by June-end”, The News, June 15, 2013, at
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-323753-Formation-of-GB-govt-likely-by-june-
end.
19. “Déjà vu: Committee on G-B Status Dubbed a Poll Ploy”, The Express Tribune, May 4, 2015;
http://tribune.com.pk/story/880453/deja-vu-committee-on-g-gb-status-dubbed-a-poll-ploy/
20. “Six-member GB Cabinet Takes Oath amid Controversy”, Dawn, July 8, 2015, at http://
www.dawn.com/news/1193113-six-member-gb-cabinet-takes-oath-amid-controversy.
21. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, Pakistan
Institute for Peace Studies, Lahore, 2007, p 29.
22. International Crisis Group, “Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas”, pp.12-13
23. Altaf Hussain, “Gilgit Baltistan Empowerment and Self-governance Order 2009”, p. 12.
24. Shabbir Mir, “PML-N Announces Manifesto for G-B Polls”.
25. “APML seeks creation of GB province”, Dawn, June 5, 2015, http://www.dawn,com/news/
1186238/apml-seeks-creation-of-gb-province
26. Tariq Butt, “GB Polls: Major Parties Pin High Hopes”, The News, June 8, 2015, at http://
www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-322393-GB-polls-Major-parties-pin-high-hopes.
27. The Manifesto of PTI for Gilgit-Baltistan, March 2015, at www.gbvotes.pk/english/WP-content/
uploads/2015/03/pti-final.pdf.
28. “PTI Cries Foul over GB Polls”, Dawn, June 21, 2015, at http://www.dawn.com/news/
1189443/pti-cries-foul-over-gb-polls.
29. M. Ismail Khan, “G B Elections: What Next?” The News, June 24, 2015, at http://
www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-9-325253-GB-elections-what-next.
30. Shabbir Mir, “Loyalty unrewarded: PTI appoints Raja Jalal new G-B head”, The Express Tribune,
January 30 2017, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1310903/loyalty-unrewarded-pti-appoints-
raja-jalal-new-g-b-hed/
31. PPP and Shia Ulema Council forms Electoral Alliance, Shiite News, 18 April, 2013, http:/
/www.shiitenews.org/index.php/component/k.2/item/2187-ppp-and-shia-ulema-council-
forms-electoral-alliance/
32. Ibid.
33. “Allama Sajid Naqvi asks Shia Ulema Council’s leaders to activate Party in Gilgit-Baltistan”,
Shiite News, May 13,2014, http://www.shiitenews.org/index.php/component/k2/item/8119-
allama-
34. Samuel Baid, “Northern Areas”, Jasjit Singh (ed.), Pakistan occupied Kashmir under the Jackboot,
Siddhi Books, New Delhi, 1995, p. 137.
35. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p. 3.
36. Ahmad Hassan, “PTI Rallies in GB Not to Effect PML-N’s Position”, The News, June 11,
2015, at http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-323079-PTI-rallies-in-G.
37. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects pp. 31-33.
38. Ibid.
39. Ahmad Hassan “Formation of GB Govt Likely by June-end”, The News, June 15, 2013.
40. “History & Dispute”, Gilgit Baltistan Tribune.
41. Ibid.
42. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, pp. 33-
34.
43. Altaf Hussain, “Gilgit Baltistan Empowerment and Self-governance Order 2009”, p. 12.
44. Moosa Kaleem, “Tactical Shift”, The Herald, December 2009, p. 37.
45. “Gilgit-Baltistan Elections: PML-N Ranks Swell as Raja Azam Quits MQM”, Out post, April
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 187

23, 2015, at http://pk/national/364-gilgit-baltistan-elections-pml-n-ranks-swell-as-raja-azam-

quits-mqm.htm.
46. “Asma against ‘State Oppression’ in GB”, Dawn, April 5, 2015, at http://www.dawn.com/
news/1174044/asma-aganist-state-oppression-in-gb.
47. Kamran Arif, “What Is Wrong in the Northern Areas”, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
– News Letter, January 1994, pp. 21-24.
48. Official website of the Balawaristan National Front, at http://www.balawaristan.net/.
49. Official website of Balawaristan, at http://www.balawaristan.com/about-us/.
50. Speech of Abdul Hamid Khan, Chairman, Balawaristan National Front (BNF) in The Hague,
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), February 11, 2011, at
www.unpo.org/downloads/156.pdf. See also Appendix X.
51. “Pakistan imposed war on us, India never occupied our land: Gilgit-Baltistan leader Abdul
Hamid Khan,” Financial Express, April 29, 2017 at http://www.financial express.com/india-
news/if-referendum-happens-people-will-vote-for-india/
52. Sohaib Bodla, “Making a Nation in High Mountains: Balawars and Balwaristan Nationalism
in Ghizer Districts of Gilgit Baltistan”, Ethno Scripts, 1 (1), 2014, pp. 125-134.
53. “BNF Chief Asks UN to Save GB People from Vanishing”, Brooshaal Times, n.d., at http://
brooshaaltimes.com/bnf-chief-asks-save-gb-people-vanishing.
54. Ibid.
55. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p. 50.
56. Moosa Kaleem, “Revolution out of Reach”, The Herald, December 2009, pp. 36-37.
57. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p. 50.
58. “Gilgit Baltistan: Activist Calls for End to Pakistani Occupation”, UNPO, June 18, 2013, at
http://www.unpo.org/article/16079.
59. Sohaib Bodla, “Making a Nation in High Mountains: Balawars and Balwaristan Nationalism
in Ghizer Districts of Gilgit Baltistan”, p 135
60. Abdul Hamid Khan, “Pakistan’s Heart of Darkness”, Asia Times, August 2, 2002, at http://
www.a.times.com/a.times/South_asia/DH22Df03.html.
61. “‘Package a Ploy to Occupy Gilgit Baltistan’, Says BNF Chief ”, Weekly Bang Karachi, 2 (34),
October 20-26, 2009, at http://weeklybaang.blogspot.in/2009/11/weekly-baang-karachi-
volume-02-issue-34_27.html 34. (For details see Appendix X)
62. Yoginder Sikand, “‘Treated by Pakistan as Virtual Slaves’: An Interview with Abdul Hamid
Khan”, Outlook, June 28, 2002, at http://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/treated-by-
pakistan-as-virtual-slaves/216236.
63. “‘Corridor Project a Ploy to Enslave People of GB’, Says BNF Chief ”, Brooshal Times, at
http://brooshaltimes.com/corridor-corridor-project-ploy-enslave-people-gb-bnf/.
64. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p. 44.
65. Pankaj Mathur, “‘Pak’s Gilgit-Baltistan reforms, Attempt to Divide Kashmiris’: JKLF”,
TopNews.in, Lahore, November 4, 2009, at http://www.topnews.in/pak-s-gilgitbaltistan-
reforms-attempt-divide-kashmiris-jklf-2232265.
66. “JKLF Rejects Gilgit-Baltistan Package”, Dawn, September 7, 2009, at http://www.dawn.com/
news/944451/jklf-rejects-gilgit-baltistan-package.
67. Shabbir Mir, “JKLF Leader Censures Giving GB Constitutional Status”, The Express Tribune,
February 29, 2016, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1056106/jklf-leader-censures-giving-g-b-
constituional-status/.
68. Ibid.
69. JKLF opens office in Gilgit-Baltistan, Greater Kashmir, February 3, 2016, at, http://
www.greaterkashmir.com/news/pak-administered-kashmir/jklf-opnes-office-in-gilgit-baltistan
188 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

70. Mohammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, pp. 39-
40.
71. “‘Annul All Illegal Mining Leases Issued in Disputed Gilgit-Baltistan’, Nationalists Demand
in Hunza Valley”, Hunza, July 21, 2008, cited in the Official website of Karakorum National
Movement, August 21, 2008, at http://my/karakorum.blogspot.in/
72. Cited in Samuel Baid, “Gilgit-Baltistan’s Elusive Self-Governance”, The Democracy Forum,
December 1, 2014, at http://thedemocracyforumltd.com/gilgit-baltistans-elusive-self-
governance/
73. “Aims, Struggle and sacrifices of Karakuram National Movement (KNM)”, Pamir Times,
December 29, 2014, at http://pamirtimes.net/2014/12/29/aims-struggle-and-sacrifices-of-
karakuram-nationa-movement
74. Shafaqat Inqalabi and Sange Sering, interview with the authors.
75. Paul Beersman, cited in K. Warikoo (ed.), The Other Kashmir: Society, Culture and Politics in
the Karakoram Himalayas, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2014, p. 164.
76. Moosa Kaleem, “Revolution out of Reach”.
77. Boloristan is an old name of Gilgit-Baltistanm.
78. See “Gilgit Baltistan”, UNPO, at http://unpo.org/members/8727.
79. Moosa Kaleem, “Revolution out of Reach”, Altaf Hussain, “Gilgit Baltistan Empowerment
and Self-governance Order 2009”, Pakistan-administered Kashmir (Azad Kashmir and Gilgit
– Baltistan): COI Compilation, Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research
and Documentation (ACCORD), Vienna, May 7, 2012, at http://www.refworld.org/docid/
4fba0d042.html, “The Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan Dispute”, Pakistan Defence, March 30,
2013, at http://defence.pk/threads/the-kashmir-and-gilgit-baltistan-dispute.242976/.
80. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2011: The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil
Liberty, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Washington, p. 783.
81. Mohammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p. 46.
82. Official website of the Gilgit Baltistan United Movement, at http://skardu.blogspot.com
83. http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/gilgit_baltistan_united_movement.
84. “Dispute and Politic(k)s: ‘Provisional Province is a Joke with GB’”, The Express Tribune, July
12, 2015, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/919154/dispute-and-politicks-provisional-status-a-
joke-with-gb.
85. “Provisional Province is a Joke with the People of Gilgit-Baltistan: Manzoor Parwana”, Skardu
Blogs, July 12, 2015, available at, http://skardu.blogspot.in/2015/07/provisional-province-
is-joke-with-the-people-of-gilgit-baltistan
86. Senge Sering, “Gilgit Baltistan: Detainment of Manzoor Parwana is the Latest of Political
Activists”, UNPO, August 1, 2011, at http://www.unpo.org/article/12973.
87. http://www.humanrights.asia/news/forwarded-news/AHRC-FOL-009-2011.
88. “Book Musharraf as a Criminal”, Press Release issued by Chairman Gilgit Baltistan United
Movement (GBUM), Skardu, August 20, 2008.
89. “Gilgit-Baltistan: Chinese Presence Causes Concern”, UNPO, September 23, 2013, at http:/
/unpo.org/article/16406.
90. “Skardu: Call for Self-Rule in Gilgit, Baltistan”, The Dawn, January 16, 2007, at http://
www.dawn.com/news/228130/skardu-call-fi=or-self-rule-im-gilgit-baltistan.
91. “Day of Repentance Observed in Gilgit-Baltistan, Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement”,
December 13, 2007, at http://skardu.blogspot.in/2007/12/day-of-repentance-observed-in-
gilgit-baltistan
92. Muhammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p.44.
93. “Identity, Diversity and Kashmiriyat in South Asia,”, Greater Kashmir, September 7, 2009, at
http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/gk-magazine/identity-diversity-and-kashmiriyat-in-south-asia
 Political Parties in Gilgit-Baltistan 189

94. Website of Awami Workers Party (AWP), at http://gbelects.com.party/11/

Awami+workers+party+(AWP).
95. “International Solidarity Campaign for Baba Jan Re-launched”, International Viewpoint, May
27, 2015, at http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article4051.
96. “Stop the Abuse of Anti-Terror Laws against Political Activists – Release Jailed Workers”,
International Viewpoint, November 29, 2014, at http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/
spip.php?page=imprimer_article.
97. “China Trying to Occupy Gilgit-Baltistan: GBNM Chief ”, Brooshaal Times, at http://
brooshaaltimes.com/china-trying-to-occupy-gilgit-baltistan-gnbchief.
98. “SC Directs Government, KANA to File Replies, Awaz TV, February 23, 2012, at http://
www.awaztoday.tv/News_SC-directs-govt-KANA-to-file-replies
99. R.C. Ganjoo, “European Parliament Supports Gilgit-Baltistan”, Boloji.com, November 1,
2012, at http://www.boloji.com/index.cfm?md=Content&sd=Articles&ArticleID=13318.
100. “Pakistani Interventions in Gilgit-Baltistan Damage Fragile Ecosystem”, PR Newswire, October
20, 2010, at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/pakistani-interventions-in.gil.bal.
101. Ibid.
102. M Ilyas Khan, “Disagree and Be Damned”, The Herald, Karachi, December 2000, p. 43-45.
103. “PoK Forum Demands Freedom for Gilgit, Baltistan”, The Hindu, September 11, 2000, at,
http://www.thehindu.com/2000/09/11/stories/0211000h.html.
104. “Pakistan Providing Safe Heavens to Terrorists, Claim PoK and Gilgit-Baltistan Leaders”, India
TV, March 12, 2016, at http://www.indiatvnews.com/print/news/india-pakistan-providing-
safe-heavens-to-terrorisits.
105. “Pakistan Army and ISI is Kidnapping and Killing People of Gilgit-Baltistan”, One India.Com,
December 18, 2010, at http://www.oneindia.com/2010/12/18/pakistanarmy-and-isi-is-
kidnapping-and-killing-people-of-gilgit-baltistan.
106. Sushant Sareen, “Inside PoK: The Gilgit Grumble”, Analyzing Pakistan, August 5, 2005, at
http://sushantsareen.blogspot.in/2005/08/inside-pok-gilgit-grumble.html.
107. Naveen Kapoor, “We Do Not Recognize Hurriyat, Say Gilgit Leaders”, The Tribune India,
May 21, 2006, at http://www.tribuneindia.com/2006/20060521/world.html.
108. Samuel Baid, “Northern Areas”, p. 137, see also “History & Dispute”, Gilgit Baltistan Tribune.
109. Shabbir Mir, “Lawyers Urge Government to End G-B’s Constitutional Limbo”, The Express
Tribune, January 8, 2015, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/818361/now-or-never-lawyers-urge-
government-to-end-g-bs-constituional-limbo.
110. Shabbir Mir, “Lawyers Demand Abolition of Ministry of Kashmir and G-B”, The Express
Tribune, February 2, 2015, at http://tribune.compk/story/831324/now-or-never-lawyers-
demand-abolition-of-ministry-of-kashmir-and-g-b/.
111. Demands of Gilgit Baltistan Lawyers-Courting the Law, Gilgit-Baltistan Bar Council, November
26, 2015, at http://coutingthelaw.com/2015/11/26/updates/demands-of-gilgit-baltistan-
lawyers/
112. Mohammad Amir Rana and Mujtaba Rathore, Northern Areas: Crisis and Prospects, p. 43.
113. Shabbir Mir, “Gilgit, Kashmir and the Identity Crisis”, The Express Tribune, February 24,
2016, at www.tribune.com.pk/story/1052901/gilgit-kashmir-and-the-identityy-crisis/.
114. Sohaib Bodla, “Making a Nation in High Mountains: Balawars and Balwaristan Nationalism
in Ghizer Districts of Gilgit Baltistan”, pp. 125-134.
115. Paul Beersman, cited in K. Warikoo (ed.), The Other Kashmir: Society, Culture and Politics in
the Karakoram Himalayas, Pentagon Press, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 166-167
116. “Political Unrest in Gilgit-Baltistan”, Dawn, July 26, 2009, at http://www.dawn.com/news/
881186/political-unrest-in-gilgit-baltistan
 5
Demand for Provincial Status in Gilgit-
Baltistan: Dilemmas of the Pakistan State

In September 2012, the legislative assembly of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) passed a

resolution demanding provincial status for the region within Pakistan. All the
mainstream political parties operating in the region supported this demand.
After the elections of June 2015, in which PMLN-GB won a comfortable
majority, there were regular demonstrations demanding inclusion of G-B as
the fifth province of Pakistan. These demonstrations were well-attended and
backed by the then ruling party at the ground level, leading the PML-N
government in Islamabad to establish a committee headed by Sartaj Aziz, advisor
to the prime minister on foreign affairs, to look into the demand carefully.
There was a vigorous debate on this issue in Pakistan in general, and Pakistan
occupied Kashmir (PoK) in particular, about the pros and cons of such a
decision. Those opposing the demand seemed to influence government’s
decision with their argument that any decision to absorb G-B as a province of
Pakistan would weaken Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir vis-a-vis India. In this
context, it is necessary to discuss the issue in detail.

Earlier debates on inclusion of ‘AJK’

This is not the first time that such a debate has surfaced in Pakistan. In the
early 1970s, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, then President and first civilian Chief
Martial Administrator of Pakistan, wanted to absorb “Azad Jammu and
Kashmir” (AJK) as a province of Pakistan, he met lot of opposition from leaders
of ‘AJK’ and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in Pakistan. Bhutto had said, “Pakistan’s.
boundaries cannot be contracted anymore, they would be expanded”. His
statement came after reports appeared in the media that an alleged secret
 Demand for Provincial Status in Gilgit-Baltistan 191

agreement had been reached at Simla to convert Line of Control (LoC) into
international boundary. This was confirmed by former Indian Foreign Secretary
J.N. Dixit who said, “At Simla, proposal to convert LoC to making it an
international boundary was discussed where in Bhutto said, “I have no problem,
I will do it, but please don’t put it in the agreement formally.”1 Bhutto’s
statement on ‘AJK’ was taken as a suggestion that Pakistan would have five
provinces again after the loss of East Pakistan. The debate over inclusion of
‘AJK’ into Pakistan died down after 1974, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had
become the prime minister of ‘AJK’ was gifted with an interim constitution,
which remains truly “interim” to this day. With Bhutto’s political fortunes
plummeting by then, the issue was soon forgotten. It was never revisited
afterwards by the succeeding leadership in Pakistan. During his visit to ‘AJK’
in the first week of November 1973, Bhutto said at a public meeting in
Muzaffarabad, “How long will you hang between the two mountains?” He
described the U.N. resolutions on Kashmir as mere scraps of paper if the people
of Kashmir chose to ignore them. He said, he had invited the Kashmiri leaders
to chalk out an agreed and workable proposal for an immediate solution to
the Kashmir problem. At this meeting, he made three proposals; (i) ‘AJK’ can
remain as it is; (ii) it could be a full-fledged province of Pakistan; or (iii) it
would be accorded autonomous status. This led to immediate reactions from
the student community of ‘AJK’. They said, “We will die but not allow Kashmir
to become a province of Pakistan”, according to Lahore Weekly Lail-o-Nihar.2
Later, commenting on the 1974 Act, the Nawa-i-Waqt wrote on February 2,
1975, that by virtue of the Kashmir Council which makes the Pakistan Prime
Minister its Chairman, the 1974 Act has virtually rendered ‘AJK’ into a province
of Pakistan.

The demand for representation in G-B

At that time, Gilgit-Baltistan which was then known as ‘Northern Areas’, did
not feature in this discourse. However, in the same year (1974), Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto, who had become prime minister by then, abolished the notorious
colonial era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) under which it was ruled since
1947, and introduced the Northern Areas Council Legal Framework Order
1974–75. This order did introduce token administrative and judicial reforms,
but did not fulfill the basic demands of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan for
representative and responsible governance. Bhutto was soon displaced in a
military coup, convicted in a case of murder and hanged. During General Zia-
ul-Haq’s dictatorship, some members of the Northern Areas Legislative Council
(NALC) were selected to be members of Majlis-e-Shura (Zia’s substitute for
192 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

parliament); however, this was criticized by the political leadership of ‘AJK’

and nationalists in Northern Areas. The move was withdrawn following protests
in both in ‘AJK’ and ‘Northern Areas’.
This ad hoc system of a nominal council continued till 1994, when Benazir
Bhutto’s government, during her second stint as prime minister, introduced
the Northern Areas Legal Framework Order (NA-LFO). The administrative
system recommended by this order vested all executive powers with the Federal
Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas, who became the chief
executive of NALC. He was accorded powers to amend the LFO at will without
consulting the Council. He had the discretion to pick up his deputy from among
the 24 members of the legislative council (six members each from Gilgit, Diamer
and Baltistan and three each from Ghizar and Ghanche, plus five members,
selected by the 24 elected members in the seats reserved for the women). The
deputy chief executive served as a nominal administrative head and was assisted
by all other members of NALC. In 1999, Pakistan’s Supreme Court directed
Islamabad to extend fundamental freedoms to the Northern Areas within six
months. By this time, there was popular pressure from within Gilgit-Baltistan
for change. The government of Pakistan was forced to delegate some of the
administrative and financial powers to NALC. The chief secretary of Gilgit-
Baltistan was treated at par with the chief secretaries of other provinces of
Pakistan. In reform package, which followed in 2007, the NALC was replaced
by a Legislative Assembly, and the position of deputy chief executive was
renamed as chief executive. All powers continued to remain concentrated in
the hands of the Minister for Kashmir Affairs who became the chairman of
the new Legislative Assembly. However, at the local level, the demand for further
delegation of powers to the local legislature continued.

Self-Governance Act of 2009

The debate on the future of Gilgit-Baltistan gathered further momentum after
Yousuf Raza Gilani, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, issued Gilgit Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-governance Order in August 2009.
On 29 August 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-
governance Order was passed by the Pakistan cabinet. The Order was an attempt
to appease the local people as by creating among others things, an elected Gilgit
Baltistan Legislative Assembly and its Council, a Governor and a Chief Minister
with a six-member council of ministers. The council headed by the Prime
Minister, exercises virtual power in important spheres of governance. Besides,
it will also have supreme appellate court, headed by a chief judge, a public
service commission, a chief election commissioner and an auditor-general.
 Demand for Provincial Status in Gilgit-Baltistan 193

Although the 2009 order conferred the region with a province like status, the
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan while rejecting the order said that it
fell short of people’s expectations who had expected that “the region would
either be made the fifth province of Pakistan or get an autonomous status or
an interim constitutional set-up on the pattern of Azad Jammu and Kashmir”.
Pakistan commentator Ershad Mahmud writes:
The people of Gilgit-Baltistan and their leadership are anxiously weighing
the proposal to become a formal province of Pakistan. Gilgit-Baltistan
Assembly has clearly demonstrated people’s will through various resolutions.
The people of Gilgit-Baltistan want representation in the National Assembly,
Senate, and other policy making institutions, parallel and separate socio-
political development has taken root in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir.
Both the regions have not been able to develop shared interests and common
democratic institutions which unite people and leadership. Gradually, Gilgit-
Baltistan has developed more stakes in the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
(KPK) instead of Azad Kashmir due to proximity and direct access through
KKH. State Subject Law, which bars non-locals right to the acquisitions of
lands ensuring demographic balance, was abolished in mid 1970s. It paved
way to mass migration from across the country. Now over 50,000 Pashtuns
and Punjabis own land properties and are running huge business in Gilgit-
Baltistan. Their number is constantly growing.3
India’ reaction was clear. The External Affairs Ministry summoned Pakistan
Deputy High Commissioner Rifat Mahsud on 11 September 2009 and lodged
its protest over its package for Northern Areas. India said that, “entire State of
Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India by virtue of its accession in
1947. The so-called “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-governance Order
2009” is yet another cosmetic exercise intended to camouflage Pakistan’s illegal
occupation.” India also said that Pakistan had for the last six decades denied
basic democratic rights to the people in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).4
Pakistan Foreign Office on the same day summoned an official from the Indian
High Commission in Islamabad to tell him that New Delhi has no “locus
standi” in the matter.5 Again on March 16, 2017, India said that any ‘unilateral
step’ by Pakistan to declare Gilgit-Baltistan as its fifth province and alter the
boundary is completely unacceptable to it. Reacting to reports that a committee
headed by Adviser to Pakistan Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs has proposed
status of a province to Gilgit-Baltistan, Ministry of External Affairs spokesman,
Gopal Baglay, said that any such step would not be able to hide the illegality
of Pakistan’s occupation of parts of Jammu and Kashmir, which it should vacate
immediately.6
194 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The Debate (2009-2017)

The debate on the future political status of G-B reflected three broad opinions
at the popular level:
(i) Gilgit Baltistan should become another province of Pakistan;
(ii) Administration of Gilgit Baltistan should be returned to the
government of ‘AJK’, and
(iii) Pakistan should vacate Gilgit Baltistan and allow it independence.
Of these three, first option is the most publicized one because it enjoys the
support of Pakistan-based political parties in Gilgit-Baltistan. The second one
is not so well-publicized because holders of this view are not powerful in the
region and they do not have strong links with the leaders of ‘AJK’, even though
the ‘AJK’ High Court in 1993 had upheld a petition to this effect. The third
option is held by the nationalists whose views and activities are hardly covered
by the Pakistani media. As Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
disclosed in its fact-finding report on Gilgit-Baltistan on March 3, 2017, local
journalists and nationalist politicians face crackdown by security forces.7 It is
well-known that the nationalists are strongly opposed to provincial or quasi-
provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan as this would undermine the local people’s
right to independence. Because of media insensitivity to their opinion, this
view is not so well known as those who are demanding provincial status.
Without proper empirical assessment of the strength of this constituency, it
would not be correct to say what the people of this region actually want.
Whatever is being said is based on Pakistani newspapers reports and the local
people influenced by Pakistan-based politicians.
Kashmiri leaders on both sides of Line of Control (LoC) have slammed
the empowerment package as also move to declare Gilgit-Baltistan as the fifth
province of Pakistan. Several Kashmiri separatist leaders including Tehriq-i-
Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Gilani, Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq
and JKLF chief Yasin Malik opposed the merger of Gilgit-Baltistan into Pakistan
and maintained that such move will provide a justification to India to revoke
the special status of Jammu and Kashmir and further consolidate the process
of integration of the state into the Indian Union.8 Yasin Malik, on a visit to
Pakistan at the time the empowerment order was proclaimed, had criticized
the package and termed it “as an arrow that has been shot into the hearts of
Kashmiris.”9 An old veteran of JKLF, Late Amanullah Khan, also denounced
the move as a ploy to absorb the territory into Pakistan. He said that “it was
on account of Pakistan’s “wavering stand” on the Kashmir issue that it had lost
the support of the Security Council, and now it was squandering any goodwill
left for it by “merging” Gilgit-Baltistan with Pakistan.”10
 Demand for Provincial Status in Gilgit-Baltistan 195

As stated above, after the legislative election of June 2015, there was a fresh
round of popular protest in favour of inclusion as fifth province of Pakistan.
The demonstrations to this effect were orchestrated by the local branch of PML-N
and supported by other Pakistan-based political parties, civil society
organisations and trade unions. Complete shutter down and wheel jam strikes
were observed across G-B, protest rallies were held in Gilgit, Diamer, Hunza,
Skardu, Ghizer, Astore, and Nagar since August 2015 and continued till the
first half of 2016. The Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly has already adopted a
unanimous resolution on August 11, 2015 demanding inclusion of Gilgit-
Baltistan as a constitutional province within Pakistan. The resolution also
demanded that the Gilgit-Baltistan be given representation in the National
Assembly and Senate till the solution of the Kashmir issue in the light of UN
resolutions. On January 24, 2016, youths from all over Gilgit-Baltistan
organised a demonstration at Gilgit Press Club demanding constitutional rights
for the region, declaring Gilgit-Baltistan the fifth province of Pakistan and
raising their voice for due and equal share in the CPEC. Similar protests were
held by people from the region at the press clubs in Islamabad, Karachi and
other cities. According to the Express Tribune (January 25, 2016), it was the
first time in the history of the region that youth from all walks of life gathered
for a common cause. Although Gilgit Baltistan has adopted a resolution to
declare Gilgit-Baltistan as a constitutional province, there are different opinions
among the political parties as to what type of status be given to Gilgit-Baltistan.
The reactions from ‘AJK’ leaders to such demands have been on expected
lines. The ‘AJK’ government warned the Pakistan government against any move
to convert Gilgit-Baltistan into a province of Pakistan. Addressing a press
conference in Muzaffarabad, the then ‘AJK’ Prime Minister Chaudhry Abdul
Majeed made it clear that, “Gilgit-Baltistan is a part and parcel of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir. Any attempt to merge it into Pakistan will deal a fatal
blow to our stand in the light of UN resolutions envisaging right to self-
determination for the Kashmiris.” A former Prime Minister of ‘AJK’ Sardar
Attique Khan also warned Pakistan for taking any such decision. He maintained
that such a move would be tantamount to the division of Jammu and Kashmir
and unacceptable. He further said, “Kashmiris living on either side of the Line
of Control (LoC) as well as in Ladakh, Aksai Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan are
party to the Kashmir issue along with Pakistan and India”.11 Sardar Ibrahim
also jumped into the fray and said that annexing Gilgit-Baltistan without
plebiscite was not possible. According to Ibrahim by this “the PML-N regime
is strengthening India’s case on Kashmir. This is tantamount to division of
Kashmir which we would never allow. We strongly oppose any such move”.12
Ershad Mahmud writes in The News, January 24, 2016:
196 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

It is a hard reality that government of Pakistan has discouraged social and

political linkages between the two regions gradually [allowing the gap between
the communities to], turn into trust deficit and finally generated deep seated
mutual suspicion and hatred leading to wrangling at public forums. The
ongoing debate about the future of Gilgit-Baltistan has further deepened the
gulf between the two regions.
Since there is no clarity to what should be the future status of Gilgit-Baltistan,
it is useful to study a survey, which was conducted by Centre for Peace,
Development and Reforms (CPDR), Islamabad under the aegis of Conciliation
Resources, London in 2012-13. The survey was based on the interviews,
discussions with the youth of the region. Its findings are:
(I) Majority of the youth want Gilgit-Baltistan fully integrated as a fifth
province of Pakistan.
(II) Some young people belonging to nationalist parties are strongly against
giving provincial or quasi-provincial status to Gilgit-Baltistan.
(III) ‘AJK’ is an obstacle in bringing reforms in this region. Most of the
young people were of the opinion that there is a lack of trust between
the people of both sides due to lack of communication channels.
Some of the youth suggested that people of both regions should launch
a joint struggle for their common socio economic political rights. To
establish regular contact, many feel there is need to reopen the old
road link between the two regions.
(IV) There was a common view that from the Pakistani side, there was a
sustained denial of constitutional and political rights under the pretext
of the Kashmir conflict and its treatment of the people of the region
was unacceptable.
(V) Although majority of the participants called Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self Governance Order 2009 ‘a positive step”
which has given them their ‘identity” and “might” usher a new era of
empowerment and self -rule, many of them criticised it as it has failed
to give the region a political status and representation at the national
level within Pakistan.
Another survey was conducted by Colonel Imtiaz ul Haque for his Master’s
thesis titled “Determining the Political Status of Gilgit-Baltistan: Future
Perspective”, submitted in the National University of Modern Languages,
Islamabad in 2012. The responses in Imtiaz ul Haque’s survey were very
thought-provoking. When respondents were asked whether they suffered from
any identity crisis, more than 85 percent answered in the affirmative. On Gilgit-
Baltistan’s historical link with erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir State, members
 Demand for Provincial Status in Gilgit-Baltistan 197

of the GB legislative Assembly and students dismissed any such notion.

Interestingly, when respondents were asked whether Gilgit-Baltistan was a part
of Pakistan ‘liberated’ in 1947, more than 80 percent said ‘yes’, and only 12
percent answered in the negative. On future status of the region as an
independent and an autonomous entity, 45 per cent said ‘yes’ while 32 per
cent said ‘no’, and 22 per cent remained neutral. To a question whether
Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009, addressed political and
administrative and governance issues of the region, 40 percent of the respondents
said ‘yes’, while a number of the respondents said ‘no’. Not surprisingly, 76 per
cent of the respondents demanded representation in the National Assembly of
Pakistan and more than 68 per cent opposed the idea of merger with ‘AJK’,
while only 28 per cent shared that opinion.13

GB Reforms Order 2018

In view of the persisting demands for absorption of the region as the fifth
province of Pakistan, the then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced his
decision to form a committee on the constitutional status of Gilgit-Baltistan,
just before June 2015 legislative elections. The committee headed by Sartaj
Aziz was formed on October 29, 2015.
Pakistan raised the hopes to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan by indirectly
assuring them to change the political status of the region by turning it into a
province of Pakistan. However, the leadership knew that it could not possibly
do that, especially when Pakistan continually emphasised on the disputed nature
of the Kashmir issue and demanded its early resolution according to the UN
resolutions. In this context, if provincial status were to be given to Gilgit-
Baltistan, it would be violating these very resolutions that it wanted India to
honour and this will weaken its stance on Kashmir.
Secondly, it is going to deepen the sense of alienation among the people of
PoK (both ‘AJK’ and G-B), and lose credibility and trust among the people of
Jammu and Kashmir. To avoid this dilemma, a well-known analyst from ‘AJK’,
Ershad Mahmud, has suggested a setup on the lines of AJK, which may address
aspirations of people of Gilgit-Baltistan for empowerment. In comparison,
Colonel Imtiaz-ul-Haque, whose research work on the subject has been cited
above, has suggested “interim provisional status to Gilgit-Baltistan, with right
to vote and representation in Parliament of Pakistan” as the best possible
alternative. But this can only be done by necessary legislation and amendment
in the Pakistani Constitution of 1973.
It was proposed that each district of Gilgit-Baltistan would have
198 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

representation by sending one member to the National Assembly and

representation in the Senate as in the case of other states. Colonel Haque
admitted there would be protests from India and the Kashmiri leadership, “but
the action can be justified and legalized adding only one word “interim” or
“provisional”, which is covered under Karachi Agreement 1949”. In this
connection, he also referred to the Supreme Court of Pakistan‘s directive to
Government of Pakistan in 1999, to initiate and legalise steps, through necessary
amendments in the Constitution and statutes, to ensure that the people of
Gilgit-Baltistan enjoy fundamental rights. He added that with the enforcement
of the 2009 Order, a portion of the Supreme Court judgment had been fulfilled.
But to ensure better integration of Gilgit-Baltistan, there was a need to establish
a forum where the elected representatives from Gilgit-Baltistan could participate
and give their suggestions. This is not possible in the Gilgit-Baltistan Council
where only regional subjects could be discussed.
Gilgit-Baltistan remained focus of so much attention that a committee
headed by Adviser to Pakistan Prime Minister Sartaj Aziz looked into the
popular demand for granting provincial status to the region. According to
political observers, the government in Islamabad took the issue seriously which
might have been necessitated by the US$ 46 billion (now raised to US$ 60
billion) China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being implemented jointly
by China and Pakistan. Reports from Pakistan held that the decision to
incorporate Gilgit-Baltistan as a new province was taken following pressure
from China to bring clarity to the legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan, especially
because India called it a disputed territory and objected to any investment in
this region.
With PML-N, then the ruling party, dragging its feet over the demand for
grant of separate province status to GB, Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI)
committed internal autonomy to the region if voted to power. The All Pakistan
Muslim League (APML) headed by former President General (retd.) Pervez
Musharraf filed a petition in the Islamabad High Court, seeking constitutional
amendment for turning Gilgit-Baltistan into the fifth province of Pakistan.
Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazlur Rahman (JUI-F) favoured
merging of Gilgit with ‘AJK’. The Majlis Wahadat Muslimeen (MWM) also
fully supported complete merger of Gilgit-Baltistan with Pakistan. According
to Spokesman of the MWM Ilyas Siddiqui, there were forces who deliberately
created hurdles in the way of basic rights of people of Gilgit-Baltistan by making
this region controversial,14 and he would even say that people of the region
fought against Dogra ruler for independence and after that ceded to Pakistan
 Demand for Provincial Status in Gilgit-Baltistan 199

“under the love of Islam and Pakistan. Pakistan should have declared this region
as its part to respond the selfless love and dedication.”15
The nationalist groups, including Balawaristan National Front, Karakoram
National Movement, Gilgit Baltistan Democratic Alliance, Gilgit Baltistan
United Movement, G-B Thinkers’ Forum etc have been fighting with the
government either for autonomy or independence and thus were lukewarm to
the demands for inclusion of GB as the fifth province of Pakistan. Amid such
divergent views, the people of the region noticed Pakistan’s ambivalence over
the issue of incorporating Gilgit-Baltistan into the constitution as the fifth
province of Pakistan.
On January 3, 2018, the nine-member parliamentary committee headed
by Sartaj Aziz submitted its report to the federal government as per a report in
Dawn on February 8, 2018. The recommendations of the Ministry of Kashmir
Affairs based on the report were submitted to the prime minister on January
3, and to the federal cabinet on February 7, 2018. As per the Dawn report:
The committee recommended de-facto integration of GB with Pakistan but
not a de-jure change since that will affect Pakistan’s principle position on
Kashmir. It recommended delegating further legislative, administrative and
financial powers to GB to enhance the people’s sense of participation and to
improve service delivery. The committee [also] recommended that to bring
GB Legislative Assembly on a par with other the provincial assemblies, all
legislative subjects, other than those enumerated in article 142 of constitution
of Pakistan and its fourth schedule may be devolved from the GB Council to
GBLA.
Another report in the same newspaper on February 17, 2018, suggested that
the government had decided to remove GB Council and the Powers exercised
by the council were to be shifted to the elected GB Legislative Assembly.
However, pending government’s announcement of the reforms, there were
protests by opposition parties rejecting the draft package. There was a fear that
even after abolishing the unrepresentative GB Council, the new framework
would weaken GB government even further by taking away whatever autonomy
was given to its assembly in the previous arrangement. They objected to the
approach of the government in Islamabad to frame policies towards GB without
consulting the local representatives. On May 18, the opposition members in
GB Legislative Assembly boycotted an in-camera session convened especially
to take lawmakers into confidence about the draft political and administrative
reforms in GB.
The Government of Gilgit Baltistan Reforms Order 2018 was promulgated
200 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

by local Legislative Assembly dominated by PMLN-GB on May 22, 2018,

after the formal approval by the federal cabinet and endorsement by the National
Security Council. This “Order’’ was notified following the approval by the
president on June 1, 2018. (For details see Appendix XV)
According to the Order, the prime minister of Pakistan had been given the
authority to legislate over 68 subjects. As the chief executive of the region, he
had also been invested with the power to overrule any law passed by the GB
Assembly. Despite the claims from the ruling party that the Order was more
comprehensive, wide-ranging and all-inclusive compared to 2009 empowerment
act, because it would permit GB Assembly to legislate over mineral, hydropower
and tourism, the local opposition was overly critical of the move arguing that
it did not even grant GB the powers that were made available to the ‘AJK’ vide
the Interim Constitution of 1974.
On May 25, 2018, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)
criticised the reforms package and said:
In claiming to grant the people of GB their fundamental freedoms, the GB
Order has clipped their right to freedom of association and expression. It has
denied any Gilgit-Baltistani the right to become a chief judge of the Supreme
Appellate Court or to have any say in internal security. Above all, it has
disregarded people’s needs despite continual public pressure in GB to address
their problems fairly and in accordance with local aspirations. The continuing
imprisonment of Baba Jan and his comrades for having stood up for their
fundamental rights is a sore case in point. There is nothing in the GB Order
to protect others like Baba Jan in the future.16
The issue took an interesting turn when the GB Supreme Appellate Court,
which had stayed the order pending its hearing of a petition on the legality of
such an order, came out with a verdict to suspend the GB Reforms order on
June 20, 2018. The Supreme Court of Pakistan responding to a petition from
the government restored the order on August 7, 2018. The issue of devolution
of more powers to GB and according greater autonomy to the region at par
with other provinces of Pakistan continues to agitate the minds of the local
populace. With the new PTI government in power in Islamabad with its promise
to bring province-like status to GB, the popular demand for greater autonomy
continued in the following days. The prevailing uncertainty gave rise to
nationalist feelings which alarmed the government in Islamabad prompting it
to adopt restrictive measures on the local media. As per the fact-finding report
brought out by HRCP in August 201817, Pakistan government put restrictions
on the local press in GB and specifically warned them not to give coverage to
 Demand for Provincial Status in Gilgit-Baltistan 201

nationalists and report negatively about state institutions and government

departments. Even advertisers were instructed by the ministry of information
not to place advertisements in the newspapers publishing nationalist materials.
Many journalists were rounded up and their newspapers were banned leading
to widespread disaffection. Such harsh actions by the Pakistan government
indicated its extreme sensitivity to growing nationalist feelings among the people
in the region, which is likely to intensify if the government fails to meet local
aspirations on the one hand and resorts to coercive measures on the other.

ENDNOTES
1. “The Errors of Simla”, Interview with Jyotindra Nath ‘Mani’ Dixit by Sheela Bhat, Rediff.com.
July 15, 2001, at https://www.rediff.com/news/2001/jul/15spec.htm
2. Cited in Samuel Baid, “Politics in Azad Kashmir”, in Jasjit Singh (ed.) Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir under the Jackboot, Siddhi Books, New Delhi, 1995, pp. 105-106.
3. Ershad Mahmud, “Gilgit-Baltistan: A Province or not”, The News, January 24, 2016, http:/
/tns.thenews.com.pk/gilgit-baltistan-province/#comments
4. India Objects to Pakistan Package for PoK, The Hindu, September 12, 2009, http//
www.thehindu.com/news/national/India-objects-to-Pakistan-package-for-PoK
5. Nirupama Subramanian, “Pakistan Rejects India’s Protests”, The Hindu, September 12, 2009,
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/Pakistan-rejects-Indias-protess
6. Vineeta Pandey, India Flays Pak’s Move to Declare Gilgit-Baltistan as 5th Province, The Pioneer,
March 17, 2017, http://www.dailypioneer.com/print.php?printFOR=storydetail&story_u
7. BBC Urdu Service 20:30 hrs March 3, 2017. The detailed report titled, “Gilgit-Baltistan:
Aspirations for identity, integration & autonomy”, can be accessed at http://hrcp-web.org/
publication/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Gilgit-Baltistan-report-Aspirations-for-identity-
integration-autonomy.pdf (accessed on January 18, 2019)
8. Both Yasin Malik and Nawaz Sharif exchanged letters, see details at Appendix XIV.
9. Nirupama Subramanian, “Measures for Gilgit-Baltistan generate suspicion”, The Hindu,
September 1, 2009, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-international/Measures-for-
Gilgit-Baltistan-generate-suspicion/article16506357.ece
10. Ibid.
11. Ghulam Abbas, ‘‘Constitutional’ reforms finalized: GB likely to have place in Senate, NA
shortly, Pakistan Today, February 13, 2017, www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/02/12/police-
arrest-two-over-anti-state-activities-in-gb/
12. Ibid.
13. Colonel Imtiaz-ul-Haque, “Determining the Political Status of Gilgit-Baltistan: Future
Perspective” Unpublished Master’s Thesis, submitted in the National University of Modern
Languages, Islamabad 2012.
14. Majlis Wahdat Muslimeen fully support the peaceful struggle of youth of Gilgit-Baltistan in
the region:Ilyas Siddiqui, at, http://english.mwmpak.org/index.php/explore/gilgit-baltistan-
news/ite
15. Ibid.
16. As reported by daily Dawn, May 25, 2018, available at https://www.dawn.com/news/1409777
17. See the report titled “Curbs on freedom of expression in Pakistan”, fact-finding report, HRCP,
August 2018, available at http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
HRCP_Report-on-curbs-on-freedom-of-expression_2018-EN.pdf (accessed January 19, 2019)
 6
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
and Gilgit-Baltistan

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), if it fully materialises, is

believed to be a game changer for Pakistan’s economy. The CPEC is part of the
ambitious Chinese Silk Road initiative, more widely known as ‘One Belt One
Road (OBOR)’ or ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’, connecting Kashgar in
Xinjiang with Gwadar Port in Pakistan. The relationship between Communist
China and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a fine example of intricate interplay
of geo-strategic and geo-economic aspirations of two countries in the region.
It is against this backdrop that the implications and importance of CPEC and
handing over of Gwadar port to China on lease for 40 years must be understood.1
Apart from its economic and trade benefits, Gwadar will enable China to monitor
the sea lines of communication through which, according to the US Department
of Defence, 82 per cent of all Chinese crude oil and 30 per cent of natural gas
imports transit.2 Gwadar will help China to bypass the Strait of Malacca and
will lessen the leverage the US enjoys in the South China Sea.
The bilateral relations between China and Pakistan go back to 1963 when
both signed the trade and border agreement. The trade relationships between
the two were strengthened under the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed on
November 24, 2006 and February 21, 2009. According to the Pakistan Economic
Survey 2014-15, Pakistan’s trade with China has increased 10 per cent in 2013-
14 and 9 per cent in 2014-15. In 2012-13, Pakistan’s total exports to China
were worth Rs. 252.5 billion. In 2013-14, there was a slight decrease in Pakistan’s
exports to China, the total share was 10 per cent. But in Fiscal Year 2014-15,
the trade volume in terms of Pakistan’s exports to China has seen further
reduction; it stands for Rs. 169.9 billion that constitutes a share of 9 per cent
 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gilgit-Baltistan 203

of Pakistan’s overall exports to other countries.3 China’s non-financial investment

in Pakistan reached one billion dollar in 2014, a dramatic increase from the
previous year. 4 China’s major investment fields in Pakistan include
telecommunications, chemical industry, electricity, oil and gas, among others.
The relationship between Pakistan and China has much to do with the
leverage that the two sides gain in their rivalries with India. The animosity vis-à-
vis India has underpinned the Pak-China security cooperation, too. Both countries
have also benefited from each other by sharing military and nuclear technology;
over the years, China has invested heavily in Pakistan’s energy sector as well.
Moreover, China has shown great interest in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir
particularly in Gilgit-Baltistan. The range of infrastructure projects it has
undertaken in these areas in the recent past highlights their importance to China.
The area provides China a strategic edge both in economic and security realms.
China has invested a massive amount of money and manpower in improving and
expanding the Karakoram Highway (KKH) – the highest motorway in the world.
On September 14, 2015, Pakistan’s then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
inaugurated the seven-km-long five tunnels, which are the part of the 24-km-
long portion of the KKH. These tunnels are known as the Pakistan-China
Friendship Tunnels, constructed by China over Attabad Lake in Gilgit-Baltistan’s
Hunza valley.5 The KKH’s almost 1,300 km stretch runs from China’s Kashgar
area to Islamabad. China is also involved in the construction of a 750 km railway
– from Havelian to the 4,730 m high Khunjerab Pass in Gilgit-Baltistan.6 Other
Chinese investments include a range of projects, particularly in the energy sector,
the construction of a hydro-power station in Bunji, the construction of a dry
port at Sost, water diversion channels and telecommunication facilities.
The $ 46 billion (now gone up to around $60 billion), CPEC provides
the opportunity to kick off major projects in Pakistan. It also envisages
establishing various Special Economic Zones (SEZs) along the corridor.7 The
Planning Commission of Pakistan has stated that $ 11 billion will be allocated
for infrastructure development and the remaining money will be set aside for
energy projects.8 China is very committed to the CPEC, and wants to pursue
the project despite all odds – the topography of the region, unrest in Baluchistan
and security of its engineers and workers. Underscoring the importance of the
CPEC, Shannon Tiezzi states, “For China, meanwhile, the project is a must if
the broader Silk Road Economic Belt, with its attendant benefits for China’s
domestic economy, geopolitical clout, and regional stability, is to get off the
ground ... China also sees the CPEC in particular as a way to diversify its energy
supply, lessening reliance on easily disrupted maritime trade routes.”9
204 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

The launch of a major investment drive under the CPEC has helped Gilgit-
Baltistan to acquire the status of a gateway to Central Asia. Although it would
be premature to predict how much the CPEC benefits Gilgit-Baltistan;
nonetheless, the region might gain some infrastructure in terms of roads and rail
services. However, not much is being expected by the people of the region partly
because the federal government hasn’t announced any SEZs in the region. All
other provinces through which the Corridor is passing are getting SEZs, except
Gilgit-Baltistan.10 An editorial in a leading daily of Gilgit-Baltistan concludes
thus, “Any confrontation by Gilgit-Baltistan would snap the trade ties between
the two countries. The tragedy is that Pakistan has always been keen on signing
agreements with China but it has deliberately kept Gilgit-Baltistan ignorant of
all these developments! In accomplishing mega economic projects, Pak-China
highway, and other projects, road goes through Gilgit-Baltistan.”11
The leadership of Gilgit-Baltistan has never been consulted on CPEC. That
is not the case even with the restive provinces of Pakistan that are part of the
Corridor, who have at least some say in its policy development. For example,
when the federal government wanted to change the route of the Corridor, the
leaders from Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan protested and forced
the government to initiate work on the western route. The route from Gwadar
to Kashghar was initially planned to pass through Bisima, Khuzdar, Kalat and
Quetta, Zhob, Dera Ismail Khan, Hassan Abdal and onwards to Kashghar.
However, the route was reportedly changed from Bisima, through Ratodero
towards Punjab bypassing the risk-prone Baloch and Pakhtun areas. This high-
handed approach of the Punjab-dominated federal government could simmer
the already existing alienation against the Punjab province and affect the
CPEC.12 Nonetheless, after months of wrangling, the then PML-N government
called an All Parties Conference (APC) in order to address the grievances of
KP and Balochistan regarding the corridor. A consensus was reached, and the
political leaders from KP and Balochistan were successful in persuading the
Nawaz Sharif government to show flexibility and give in to the demands of
other parties.13
However, such a case is not possible for the leadership of Gilgit-Baltistan:
first, they do not have representation in the National Assembly; second,
Islamabad does not take them seriously. As an editorial in a Gilgit-Baltistan
daily puts it:
At the end of the APC, all the political leaders went home happily as their
reservations had been met by the federal government. But unfortunately no
one even bothered to ask the people of Gilgit-Baltistan if they had any
 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gilgit-Baltistan 205

reservations about the CPEC as it would pass through over 400 kilometres
land in their area. The government did not bother to take the people of the
region on board about the project. It also showed that the people having no
representation in power corridors and deprived of their basic rights have no
avenue to go to when they are discriminated against. Same has been done
with the people of Gilgit-Baltistan for seven decades.14
It is also believed that with the extension of the KKH, the Pakistani Government
has decided to shift the dry port which was to be built up in Sost in Gilgit-
Baltistan to Havelian in Hazara division of KP, which would have rendered
thousands of people from Gilgit-Baltistan jobless.15 Reacting on the relocating
of the dry port, former president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
Javed Hussaini, said, “Livelihood of thousands of families of Gilgit-Baltistan is
linked with the Sost dry port and it would be an economic disaster for them
if existing activities are shifted to the newly proposed dry port at Havelian.”16
In the same vein, the former speaker of Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly,
Wazir Baig said, “We are not clear about the benefits of the CPEC we will get,
but we are much certain about the adverse effects due to relocation of the dry
port.”17
The Federal government has verbally assured Gilgit-Baltistan of establishing
two SEZs to compensate the people of the region, but nothing concrete has
emerged in writing. The mainstream political parties of Gilgit-Baltistan have
ostensibly supported the Corridor, but at the same time, expressed their
reservations about the progress and benefits for the region. Jhanzaib Yaseen, a
leader of the Gilgit-Baltistan chapter of the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), said
that if economic zones are not established in the region, the CPEC is
meaningless for the people of the Gilgit-Baltistan, adding that the CPEC will
only benefit Punjab, and Gilgit-Baltistan will only get cheap labour and dust.18
The nationalist parties, particularly the Balawaristan National Front (BNF),
are very vocal in their criticism of the CPEC project. The Brussels-based
Chairman of BNF asserts, “Under the CPEC project, Islamabad has virtually
handed over the disputed territory to China clandestinely ... China has not
only been taking away gold and copper from Gilgit-Baltistan but was also
looting the wildlife of the region.”19 Nationalists although are not against the
Corridor per se, but they have the reservations over its ownership. While
commenting on the CPEC, the Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM)
Chief, Manzoor Hussain Parwana, revealed his stance on the CPEC. He said
that Gilgit-Baltistan should be one of the three major parties to the project,
and therefore, should be given an equal share: “As the area has its own distinct
cultural and historical identity, without including it in the CPEC project as a
206 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

partner, none of the two countries – China and Pakistan – can construct and
operate the CPEC route through Gilgit-Baltistan.”20 He also demanded that
economic zones should be set up in Gilgit, Skardu and Chilas under the CPEC.
While commenting on the growing presence of China in Gilgit-Baltistan,
Senge Hasnan Sering, who heads the Institute of Gilgit-Baltistan Studies in
Washington and is a vocal advocate of Gilgit-Baltistan’s independence, claimed,
“All the mining sites in the region were given to Chinese companies who are
strengthening their bases there.”21 He further argued that constitutionally Gilgit-
Baltistan is not a part of Pakistan, however, “it (Pakistan) just exploits our
resources and wants to continue with its political hegemony. Even the latest
empowerment package is a farce as the power centre continues to be in
Pakistan”.22
On the other hand, Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing underscored
the importance of Gilgit-Baltistan for the CPEC and assured the people of the
region that they would get maximum benefit from the project. While meeting
a delegation of the Gilgit-Baltistan Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(GBCCI) in Islamabad on March 31, 2018, he would assure that the project
would contribute to the “development of the residents through trade activities
between GB and neighbouring Xinjiang province”.23
In a pre-emptive strategy to thwart any discontent emerging from the
region, China granted five billion Pakistani rupees to develop infrastructure in
G-B,24 prioritising education, health and road connectivity. However, these
funds were to be released to G-B through the federal government. Moreover,
China is also reportedly planning to create a regional forum, consisting of G-B,
Tajikistan and Afghanistan for border development. The purpose of this forum
is to link these bordering regions to CPEC.25
However, the resentment is growing among the people regarding land
acquisition. The provincial government of Gilgit-Baltistan’s land acquisition
drive for the SEZ at Maqpun Das in Gilgit, created controversy. The Gilgit-
Baltistan government took forcefully the land without due compensation for
the community.26 According to Amjad Hussain, the president of the Pakistan
People’s Party-Gilgit-Baltistan (PPP-GB), “A compensation of Rs two billion
is yet to be provided by the government for land used for extension in KKH
2007. So, that being the case, public concerns are rising and [the people remain]
sceptical of government promises of compensation for the land taken for
CPEC”.27 Amjad further emphasised that, “The government must acquire the
land for CPEC through the Land Acquisition Act of Gilgit-Baltistan and it
shall introduce a Shamilat-e-Deh Act like other provinces. If the government
 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gilgit-Baltistan 207

fails to provide compensation, CPEC will become an international controversy

and it will be huge failure on Pakistan’s account”.28
The PPP-GB along with other political activists and oppositions leaders
held many protests on the land grabbing by the Gilgit-Baltistan government.
One thing that stands clear is that if economic development, that too without
consent of the local people, proceeds over political development of the region,
the CPEC will get in to controversy and the already existing resentment among
the people regarding constitutional crisis will flare up.

CPEC and Kashmir Issue

The positive and negative impact of the CPEC is a broad subject with different
and partly interrelated dimensions. As mentioned earlier, the Corridor passes
through the disputed area of Gilgit-Baltistan, which is a part of the erstwhile
state of Jammu and Kashmir. The region does not enjoy any constitutional
status and was, until 2018, governed by the controversial Self Governance Order
of 2009. The people from Gilgit-Baltistan find themselves in a constitutional
limbo: on the one hand, being considered a part of the larger issue of Kashmir,
and on the other, fully ‘controlled’ by Pakistan sans any constitutional identity.
According to a recent survey conducted by the Conciliation Resources, the
majority of the people from Gilgit-Baltistan want to associate themselves with
the larger political and constitutional structure of Pakistan. Around 82 per cent,
according to the survey, prefer to call themselves Pakistanis and disassociate
themselves from the larger Kashmiri identity.29 However, at the same time, the
Nationalist parties strongly oppose any integration or quasi-provincial status
for Gilgit-Baltistan. They believe that any such attempt will undermine the
“organic unity of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir”.30
Before and during the last held elections, the ruling party of Gilgit-Baltistan,
PML-N promised that if voted in power, they would give constitutional status
to the region. In this regard, Nawaz Sharif constituted a committee headed by
Sartaj Aziz that would invite suggestions and proposals from legal and
constitutional experts to determine the constitutional status for Gilgit-
Baltistan.31But ever since the announcement of the committee, a deliberate
ambiguity has been created regarding its members, mandate and the time
period. Nothing specific has been deliberated. At the same time, there have
been protests from ‘AJK’ leadership and other power corridors from Pakistan
regarding the same.
Interestingly, it is China that was pushing the then government of Nawaz
Sharif to grant a constitutional status to Gilgit-Baltistan. According to media
208 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

sources, China’s dream project, the Silk Road passes through the disputed land,
where the Chinese are investing billions of dollars; therefore, naturally, it wants
Pakistan to legally solve this issue so that the Corridor does not face any
hindrances. China has apparently made clear to Pakistan that the work on CPEC
will not start until Gilgit-Baltistan is made a province of Pakistan.32 The CPEC
project is a bilateral treaty between Pakistan and China, but the latter does not
consider Gilgit-Baltistan as a part of Pakistan. Moreover, China knows that
India has reservations on Chinese investment in the region.
Further, the completion of the US$ 60 billion Corridor will further
strengthen the Chinese control of the territory. The huge investment and
presence in the region will provide China a leverage to become a de facto
member of the dispute. Thus, the Corridor has all the “ingredients to exacerbate
the complexities of the Kashmir issue threaten peace and cement China’s stake
in Jammu & Kashmir”.33 Moreover, as in the past, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan
will not have any say on the decision-making when it comes to the handing
over of natural resources to the Chinese companies. Apart from the political
ramifications, the corridor will also have a deleterious impact on the ecology
of the region. According to M Ismail Khan, Gilgit-Baltistan, which is home to
5,000 big and small glaciers, is facing a “myriad of sustainability challenges
including climate change which now threatens faster melting of glaciers”.34
There is also a fear that if SEZs are established in the region, the outsiders
from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa would get maximum jobs due to lack
of human resource in Gilgit-Baltistan, which in turn would further imbalance
the ethnic demography in favour of Sunni sect.35 Expressing opinions on CPEC
and its impact on region does not go well with the security agencies. According
to the International Crisis Group report, “Instead of addressing such concerns,
authorities have regularly invoked the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act and the 2016
cybercrimes law against political party and human rights activists. Intelligence
officials have warned local journalists in Gilgit-Baltistan against criticising
CPEC”.36

ENDNOTES
1. “Gwadar port leased to Chinese company for 40 years, Senate told”, The Nation, April 20,
2017, at https://nation.com.pk/20-Apr-2017/gwadar-port-leased-to-chinese-company-for-40-
years-senate-told
2. Ibid.
3. For details, see: Ministry of Finance, “Chapter 8”, Pakistan Economic Survey 2014-15,
Government of Pakistan, at www.finance.gov.pk/survey_1415.html.
4. Ambassador Sun Weidong’s Remarks at The Round Table Conference on “Pakistan-Paradise
Investment”, September 14, 2015, at http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t1296377.htm.
 China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and Gilgit-Baltistan 209

5. “PM Nawaz Inaugurates Pak-China Friendship Tunnels over Attabad Lake”, Dawn, September
14, 2015, at www.dawn.com/news/1206911.
6. Hasnain Kazim, “The Karakoram Highway: China’s Asphalt Powerplay in Pakistan”, Der
Spiegel, July 17, 2012, at www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-expands-karakoram-
highway-to-pakistan-a-844282.html.
7. For details, see: Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform, CPEC, at www.pc.gov.pk/
?page_id=2731.
8. Ibid.
9. Shannon Tiezzi, “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Gets Even More Ambitious”, The
Diplomat, August 12, 2015, at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-china-pakistan-economic-
corridor-gets-even-more-ambitious/.
10. For details on SEZ, see: Ministry of Planning Commission of Pakistan’s report, China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor: Investment & Business Prospects, August 2015, at http://
202.83.172.247:8080/Complaints/China%20Pakistan%20Economic%Corridor%20%28
English %20Booklet%29.pdf.
11. “Nawaz Sharif ’s Visit to China and Gilgit-Baltistan”, Daily Bang-e-Sehar, March 11, 2014, at
http://www.bangsehar.net//popoup.php?date=11-03-2014.
12. “Economic Corridor: ANP Denounces Change in Route, Calls APC”, Dawn, May 1, 2015,
at www.dawn.com/news/1179361.
13. “APC Consensus: Parties Settle on Corridor Route”, The Express Tribune, May 29, 2015, at
http://www.tribune.com.pk/story/894068/apc-consensus-parties-settle-on-corridor-route/.
14. “CPEC, Where Does Gilgit-Baltistan Stand?”, Daily Bang-e-Sahar, June 3, 2015, at http://
www.bangesahar.net/popup.php?lang=en&r_date=06-03-2015&story=06-03-2015page-1-5.
15. “CPEC to Cause Unemployment in Gilgit-Baltistan”, The Express Tribune, November 16,
2015, at http://tribune.com.pk/story/992728/anticipating-effects-cpec-to-cause-enemplyment-
in-gilgit-baltistan/.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. “CPEC Will Benefit Punjab and Gilgit-Baltistan Will Only Get Labour and Dust, Jhanzaib”,
Bang-e-Sahar, November 30, 2015, at www.bangesahar.net/popup.php?r_date=11-30-
2015&img=11-30-2015page-1-2.
19. “CPEC Equal to Handing over GB to China, Says BNF Chief ”, Bang-e-Sahar, November
18, 2015, at http:// www.bangesahar.net/popup.php?r_date=11-18-2015&story=11-18-
2015page-1-1.
20. “Gilgit-Baltistan: The Problem of CPEC Strikes Again”, Unrepresented Nations and Peoples
Organisation (UNPO), February 26, 2016, at http://unpo.org/article/18956.
21. Hakeem Irfan, “Kashmiri Activists Seek India’s Support to ‘Save’ PoK’ from China’s Increasing
Strength”, Mail Online India, February 23, 2012, at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/
indianews/article-2105531.
22. Ibid.
23. Jamil Nagri, CPEC to benefit Gilgit-Baltistan the most: Chinese envoy, Dawn, April 1, 2018,
at, http://www.dawn.com/news/1398814/cpec-to-benefit-gilgit-baltistan-the-most-chinese-
envoy
24. China has granted 5 billion for Gilgit-Baltistan, Daily K2, February 25, 2018, at http://
epaper.dailyK2.com/index.php?eid=1&nid=1&date=1519516800
25. Ibid.
26. Afzal Ali Shigri, Land Ownership Rights, Dawn, April 15, 2017, at http://www.dawn.com/
news/1327031
210 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

27. Khadija Zahid, Fate of Gilgit-Baltistan under CPEC, Pakistan Today, April 2, 2017, at, http:/
/www.pakistantoday.com/pk/2017/04/02/fate-of-gilgit-baltistan-under-cpec/
28. Ibid.
29. Syed Waqas Ali and Taqi Akhunzada, “Unheard Voices: Engaging Youth of Gilgit-Baltistan”,
Conciliation Resources: Working together for Peace, January 2015.
30. Ibid., p. 3.
31. “PM Announces Several Dev. Projects for Gilgit-Baltistan”, Pakistan Observer, April 15, 2015,
at http://www.pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=262015.
32. Shabir Hussain, “Rahdari Mansoobay Gilgit-Baltistan ko Sooba Banany say Mashroot Karnay
ka Inkishaaf ”, Daily Express News, December 14, 2015, at http://www.express.pk/story/
415338.
33. Junaid Qureshi, “China Pakistan Economic Corridor and Jammu and Kashmir”, Kashmir
Images, November 15, 2015, at http://dailykashmirimages.com/Details/96364/china-pakistan-
economic-corridor-and-jammu-kashmir. For further details on the implications of the CPEC
on Kashmir, see: Fahad Shah, “A Costly Corridor: How China and Pakistan Could Remake
Asia”, Foreign Affairs, December 3, 2015, at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2015-
12-03/cotsly-corridor.
34. For further details, see: M Ismail Khan, “Gilgit-Baltistan: Melting Water Towers of the Indus”,
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), IPCS Discussion papers on Indus Water, 2014,
at www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/1412-indusPapers-Ismailkhan.pdf.
35. ‘China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Opportunities and Risks’, International Crisis Group,
Asia Report No. 297, June 29, 2018, p. 15.
36. Ibid., p. 15
 7
Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’
and Gilgit-Baltistan

(A) PROMINENT LEADERS OF ‘AJK’

Amanullah Khan (1934-2016)
One of the founders of pro-independence party, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation
Front (JKLF), Amanullah Khan was born in Astore district of the Gilgit region
on August 24, 1934. He had his early education in the Kashmir valley. He
migrated to Pakistan in 1952, where he studied law from Karachi University
and became a co-founder of the Kashmir Independent Committee in 1963.
Two years later, in 1965, he was elected as the Secretary General of the Jammu
and Kashmir Plebiscite Front (JKPF). He co-founded the Jammu and Kashmir
National Liberation Front (JKNLF) with Maqbool Bhat. Khan was charged
with being an Indian agent, and consequently, spent 15 months in Gilgit prison
in 1970-72. Moreover, he was also tried in absentia in Srinagar, allegedly for
being an agent of Pakistan. In 1976, he went to England where he formed the
JKLF by renaming the England branch of the JKNLF. He was arrested in
England in September 1985, and was acquitted only after being deported to
Pakistan in December 1986. Once in Pakistan, he became the chief architect
of the armed struggle in 1988 in Jammu and Kashmir. Amanullah Khan’s only
daughter, Asma, married Sajjad Ghani Lone, the son of Late Abdul Ghani Lone,
Chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference (JKPC) in
November 2000. She is based in Srinagar and writes about different aspects of
Kashmir and the regional geo-political issues. Amanullah Khan died in
Rawalpindi on 26 April, 2016.
212 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan

Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan is the son of Sardar Mohammad Abdul Qayyum
Khan (April 4, 1924-July 10, 2015), a renowned political figure and founder-
member of the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. He was born in
Ghaziabad in ‘AJK’ on January 21, 1955. A post-graduate in international
relations, he studied Arabic at the Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia.
He became the Prime Minister of ‘AJK’ twice on July 24, 2006 to 6 January
2009 and between 29 July 2010 till 26 July 2011. He is the President of the
‘AJK’ Muslim Conference (AJKMC). He has led many political and diplomatic
missions to several international organisations and countries alike, namely the
United Nations (UN), Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the US.

Raja Zulqarnain Khan

Elected as President of ‘AJK’ in July 2006 by an Electoral College, comprising
of the members of ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly and the Kashmir Council, Raja
Zulqarnain Khan had a distinguished career. He was born on March 15, 1936
in Gujrat. His father, Khan Bahadur Raja Muhammad Afzal Khan, who was
also a member of the Indian Civil Service (ICS), served as the Home, Education
and Revenue Minister in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir during 1930-
1941, and he was a close confidant of Maharaja Hari Singh. After falling out
with the Maharaja he went back to the ICS cadre and after the establishment
of Pakistan served as Commissioner of Lahore.1 Raja Zulqarnain Khan studied
in Srinagar, New Delhi and Lahore, and graduated in French language. He
started his formal political career in 1960 by associating himself with K H
Khurshid and founding the Jammu Kashmir Liberation League in 1962 and
serving as its first General Secretary. He served in the Local government System
in ‘AJK’ during the phase of Basic Democracy (BD) by Ayub Khan government,
and was inducted as a minister in 1969 by then ‘AJK’ President Major General
(Retd) Abdul Rehman. In 1975, Raja Zulqarnain Khan was elected to the AJK
Legislative Assembly from Samani constituency (then in Mirpur, now in
Bhimber district). He was in line for the Prime Minister’s post but made way
for Khan Abdul Hameed Khan. In Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan’s government
he served as a Minister for Finance. In 1985, he was elected as lawmaker and
became Minister for Finance, Planning & Development, Health and Revenue
in the government of Prime Minister Sikander Hayat. He also won as a member
of legislative assembly in the 1991 elections. In 1996, he was elected as member
of the Jammu and Kashmir Council and held the office for five years. During
this period, he also acted as Advisor to the Chairman of ‘AJK’ Council.
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 213

Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan

Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan is the son of Sardar Fateh Muhammad Khan
Karelvi, who is remembered to this day in Gilgit-Baltistan for raising the banner
of revolt against the Dogra rule in the 1930s. He was born on June 1, 1934,
and received his early schooling in his native village of Karela in tehsil Fatehpur
Thakiala (now in District Kotli) and in Poonch city. He graduated from the
famous Gordon College (Rawalpindi) in 1956 and took a law degree from the
University Law College in Lahore in 1958. His political baptism took place in
the elections to the Kotli municipality. In 1970, he was elected to the ‘AJK’
Legislative Assembly and became Revenue Minister two years later. He served
as the acting President of the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference
(AJKMC) in the 1976-78, and was elected President in 1978, a position he
held for a decade. He served as the Prime Minister and President of ‘AJK’ twice,
and was also the longest serving Prime Minister. In 1985, he was elected Prime
Minister of AJK(PoK) and retained the office for the next five years. He
remained leader of the opposition in the Assembly during the next two years,
before he was elected President of ‘AJK’ for a five-year term in 1991. On July
25, 2001, he was sworn in as Prime Minister of ‘AJK’ for the second time; he
retired from active politics in July 2006 after completing his second term. Later
he played a major role in introducing Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-
N) in ‘AJK’, for which he was given the position of Senior Vice President of
PML-N in 2011. His son, Farooq Sikandar, was elected in the July 2016 local
elections as a member of the legislative assembly.

Sardar Shaukat Ali Kashmiri

Sardar Shaukat Ali Kashmiri heads the United Kashmir Peoples’ National Party
(UKPNP). He was born on May 25, 1958 in Papanar, near Trarkhal, in ‘AJK’.
He had his education in his native Tarkhan and in Karachi. During his Karachi
days, he struggled for the educational and democratic rights of the students
and organised many demonstrations and strikes. He has spent considerable
time in jail, in both Pakistan and ‘AJK’. He was also abducted by the Inter-
Services intelligence (ISI) in 1994 and 1998. He was released only after UKPNP
and other like-minded parties and groups demonstrated against his illegal
confinement and detention throughout AJK(PoK) and Pakistan.
In 1980, he founded the Kashmir Nationalist Students’ Federation in
Karachi, and became its Chairman. From 1985 to 1997, he practiced law in
different courts of ‘AJK’. In 1994, he became the founding Chairman of the
UKPNP. Between 1980 and 1997 he organised seminars in different cities of
‘AJK’ on human rights violations and right to self-determination of the people
214 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

of Kashmir, Gilgit-Baltistan and demanded the withdrawal of Pakistan Army

from ‘AJK’. He organised many demonstrations against theo-fascism and
Pakistan’s proxy war with India. In 1993, he represented the UKPNP in the
European Parliament Round Table Conference held in Brussels, Belgium. From
1999 to 2004, he addressed the United Nations Human Rights Commission
(UNHRC) and Sub Commission on Human Rights in Geneva, on the subject
of human rights violations and the Kashmiris’ right to self-determination for
the establishment of an independent Kashmir. Since 2002, he is Secretary
General, International Kashmir Alliance (IKA), which consists of secular
political parties struggling for the independence of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.
The Amnesty International declared him as a prisoner of conscience. He is
living in exile in Switzerland since April 25, 1999.

Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qayyum Khan

Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qayyum, who passed away at the old age of 91 in
July 2015, was a doctor by profession. He is considered as one of the founders
of the Kashmir Liberation Movement and the supreme leader of the Muslim
Conference, which is the oldest political party in the ‘AJK’ region. Abdul
Qayyum became President of ‘AJK’ for the first time in September 1956 and
ended his last presidency in July 1991, and was then Prime Minister until 1996.
In 1971, the day Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over as Pakistan’s President, Sardar
Qayyum, too, was elected President of ‘AJK’. He held ideological difference
with Bhutto, but always secured the support of the Pakistani generals. He was
also known as Mujahid-e-Awal (“the first holy warrior”), believed to have fired
the first bullet in the 1947 War of Liberation to establish ‘AJK’. He was a
supporter of the campaign aimed at bringing an Islamic system in ‘AJK’.

Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry

A former Prime Minister of ‘AJK’, Barrister Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry as a
member of AJKMC, joined AJKPPP in 2011, and later Imran Khan’s Pakistan
Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in February 2015. He belongs to a highly influential
and distinguished political family from Mirpur in ‘AJK’. His father Chaudhry
Noor Hussain was a prominent Kashmiri Leader. This Mirpur-born barrister
had created history in 1996 by becoming the first Mirpuri Prime Minister of
‘AJK’. The Chaudhry family has ‘a long history of playing an active role in
trying to bring the Kashmir issue in to the limelight by continuously raising
the issue on an international level’.2 Barrister Chaudhry lost his assembly seat
(to a AJKPML-N candidate) for the first time in his political career in July
2016 elections as a member of the AJKPTI.
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 215

Sardar Arif Shahid

Sardar Arif Shahid was a prominent nationalist leader of ‘AJK’. He was the
Chairman of All Party National Alliance (APNA). He was assassinated near
his residence in Rawalpindi on May, 2013. He wanted to have a united and
independent Jammu and Kashmir with liberal, democratic and secular ideas.
Arif Shahid was a man of vision and wanted to promote democratic values
and fundamental human rights for all citizens of the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. He believed that religion was a personal matter of individuals sand
religion must be kept out of politics. He was the Chairman of the APNA whose
main objective is to liberate Kashmir from both India and Pakistan. APNA
was developed in parallel with the All Parties Hurriyat Conference of J&K
which was patronized by Pakistan government. He was a vocal critic of Pakistan’s
alleged role in sending militants to fight proxy war in J&K. He also criticized
Pakistan policy of treating Kashmir and opposed Pakistan’s occupation of ‘AJK’
and Gilgit Baltistan.
Arif Shahid was also an author of a number of books pertaining to freedom
struggle in Kashmir. He was an outspoken person who held sentiments of
freedom for ‘AJK’ and Gilgit Baltistan. He was jailed when he stood for the
restoration of K-2 Newspaper which was banned by Pakistan authorities. He
was also taken into custody and deported from Gilgit before holding a public
meeting to condemn Karachi Agreement. Three months before his killing, police
in Rawalpindi registered a case against him. Pakistan Government banned him
for travelling abroad in 2009 and later confiscated his passport and other
identification documents. It was later returned after a court battle. He was
warned by the Pakistan intelligence agencies to stop anti-Pakistan activities.
He refused to surrender and was silenced. It was widely believed that he was
killed by the secret agencies of Pakistan because he exposed their nefarious
designs on Kashmir.

Chaudhry Abdul Majid

A politician from Mirpur, Chaudhry Abdul Majid was elected Prime Minister
of ‘AJK’ on 26th July, 2011. He first became a member of the ‘AJK’ Assembly
in 1985. He is B.A. LL.B. He is a member of the AJKPPP and remained its
president for a long period till he resigned following his party’s loss in July
2016 elections. He was elected sixth time as member of the ‘AJK’ legislative
Assembly. Prior to this position, he had served as Minister for Revenue and
Agriculture of ‘AJK’ government and Speaker of ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly
from 1998 to 2001.
216 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Sardar Muhammad Yaqoob Khan

Sardar Muhammad Yaqoob Khan was President of ‘AJK’ during 2011-2016.
He was also Prime Minister during 2009-2011. He was born in 1953 in Ali
Sojal, Rawalakot. He started his political career as a Central Office bearer of
Punjabi Pakhtoon Ittehad in Karachi. Later, he became a Senior Vice President
of the Tehreek-e-Amal Party’s ‘AJK’ chapter. He stood first for the Sindh
Legislative Assembly and later on for ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly. He was a minister
in the ‘AJK’ Government from 2001-2006 and in 2009, and held different
portfolios. He became the ‘AJK’ Prime Minister on January 6, 2009. Two years
later, in 2011, he was elected as the President of ‘AJK’. He is also a noted businessman.

Dr. Shabir Choudhry

Dr Shabir Choudhry is the London-based founder member of the JKLF. He
became its Secretary General in 1985, and President of the JKLF’s Europe unit
in 1999. Born in Nakker Shamali (near Panjeri) in Bhimber district of ‘AJK’,
he went to the UK in 1966, and holds a dual nationality. A regular contributor
to various newspapers and author of more than 25 books, he has done extensive
research on the Kashmir issue, as also on India-Pakistan relations. He regularly
takes part in the proceedings of UN Human Rights Council and has attended
various International conferences on Kashmir. His blog3, has a good following
for the alternative view it provides on the Kashmir dispute and politics of South
Asia. He is now the spokesman of International Kashmir Alliance and Kashmir
National Party and Director Institute of Kashmir Affairs, London. He is also
president of the foreign affairs committee of the United Kashmir Peoples
National Party (UKPNP).

Raja Farooq Haider Khan

Currently Prime Minister of ‘AJK’ after leading his party AJKPML-N to a
spectacular victory in July 2016 elections, Raja Farooq Haider Khan was prime
minister earlier too during October 2009-July 2010. A senior leader of
AJKPML-N, Raja Farooq Haider Khan belongs to a well-known political family.
He was born on February 14, 1955 at Muzaffarabad, and studied at the
Abbottabad Public School, one of the historic educational institutions in north-
west Pakistan. He graduated from Government College, Lahore. His father,
Raja Muhammad Haider Khan, was President of the AJKMC in 1960 and
1963. His mother, Mohterma Saeeda Khan, was the first female Member of
the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly. His uncle, Raja Muhammad Latif Khan, was
elected to the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly in 1970, and his sister, Naureen Haider,
was an ‘AJK’ lawmaker from 1991 to 1996.
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 217

Raja Haider Khan headed the Muslim Conference’s Muzaffarabad chapter

from 1986 to 1990, and in 1989 was elected Chairman of the party’s ‘AJK’
Central Parliamentary Board for two years. He held several organisational posts
in the ‘AJK’ party chapter. In 1985, and 1991, he was elected to AJK Assembly
and served as Minister. From 2003 to 2006, he remained Special Assistant to
Prime Minister of ‘AJK’. In 2006, he was again elected as a lawmaker and was
made Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of the Assembly,
which ensures accountability for public spending. After joining PML-N in 2010,
he worked sincerely towards strengthening its reach in ‘AJK’. The success of
AJKPML-N in July 2016 elections, was largely credited to him by analysts in
Pakistan.

Syed Ghulam Raza Naqvi

Founder-Chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Democratic Party
(JKIDP), Syed Ghulam Raza Naqvi is one of the few ‘AJK’ politicians who are
recognised internationally. He was born in Sehnsa in ‘AJK’ and had his education
in ‘AJK’ and Karachi. He belongs to the Naqvi Albukhari family. He was
baptised into politics by becoming the mayor of Sehnsa. A great orator and
passionate believer in peaceful coexistence, he advocates basic human rights,
and has been threatened many times by state and non-state organisations during
his student life and early political career. He has been a member of Jammu
and Kashmir Council and Chairman of the PAC.

Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas (1904-1967)

Lawyer-politician Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas was born in a middle-class Rajput
family of Chaudhry Nawab Khan on February 4, 1904 at Jammu. After he
started his career as a lawyer in Jammu, he was offered the post of a sub-judge;
however, he declined to serve the then Dogra ruler. He became an associate of
Kashmir’s prominent leader, Sheikh Abdullah, when the All Jammu and
Kashmir National Conference was established, and became its secretary general.
However, Ghulam Abbas parted company with Sheikh Abdullah when the latter
moved closer to the Congress and Jawaharlal Nehru. As the idea of Pakistan
gained ground, he revived the Muslim Conference, and headed it in the princely
state of Jammu and Kashmir. As he hailed from Jammu, he did not know the
Kashmiri language and had distinct problem of communicating with the people
of the valley. His friend turned political foe, Sheikh Abdullah, who hailed from
the valley had larger political appeal. After his migration to ‘AJK’, he became
the Supreme Head of the ‘AJK’ Government, was known as Quaid-e-Kashmir.
In 1951, he resigned from the headship of the ‘AJK’ government and quit active
politics. He died of cancer in Rawalpindi on December 18, 1967.
218 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Khawaja Abdul Ghaffar (1926-2014)4

Acknowledged as one of the most influential personalities in ‘AJK’, Khawaja
Abdul Ghaffar migrated from Wazapora, Mahraj Gunj (old Srinagar), where
he was born in 1926, to ‘AJK’ in 1948, when he was still in the college. On
migration to ‘AJK’, in September 1948, he was offered the position of
Information Officer in Pakistan Government, and later, the post of a lecturer.
But after three years, he quit government service, and started his own business.
He had a personal rapport with leading Pakistani figures, namely Faiz Ahmed
Faiz and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. An old ideologue of the Muslim Conference, an
ardent admirer of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and a veteran Kashmiri leader,
Khawaja Abdul Ghaffar was a kingmaker in ‘AJK’ politics, though he distanced
himself from the power politics. He passed away at the age of 88 in June 2014.

Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan (1915-2003)

Ibrahim Khan was born on April 19, 1915 in Kot Mattay Khan, a village near
Rawalakot. He received his BA degree from Islamia College Lahore, and later
the Bar-at-Law from Lincoln’s Inn. He practised law in Srinagar for a while
and joined the State Legal Service, serving as state prosecutor in Mirpur in
1943, and later, at the State Advocate General office in Srinagar. In 1946, he
resigned from government service, and successfully contested for the J&K State
Assembly (Rajya Sabha) in the same year. The Azad Muslim Conference
platform and his demand for accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State to
Pakistan pitted him against the Dogra rulers. In 1947, he led Kashmiri rebels
against the Maharaja of Kashmir. In October 1947, he became the first President
of ‘AJK’. He was used by Pakistan to spread propaganda regarding Kashmir at
the international level in the United Nations in subsequent years. It was due
to his untiring efforts that the Pakistan Government finally allowed the creation
of the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly during the Yahya Khan regime. He was elected
to the Assembly thrice, the last being in 1975. A close lieutenant of Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, Ibrahim Khan refused to betray his leader in 1977 despite mounting
pressure from the then military dictator, Gen. Zia-ul-Haq. He paid the price
for it and was dismissed as President of ‘AJK’. He was re-elected again as the
President of ‘AJK’ in August 1996 and remained in that position until August
2001. He died in 2003 at his son’s home in Islamabad.

Khurshid Hasan Khurshid (1924-1988)5

Born in a modest middle-class family of Srinagar in 1924. Khurshid was active
in politics from his student days. He started the Kashmir Muslim Student’s
Federation to ‘educate’ people on mass uprising against the British colonial
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 219

masters. In 1942, as General Secretary of the Federation, he met Muhammad

Ali Jinnah for the first time in Jallandhar. That interaction brought him close
to Jinnah, and he worked for him over the next several years. When Jinnah
died, he decided to quit politics and launched a weekly magazine. His magazine
venture did not do well, and he went to Karachi where he started working
with Jinnah’s sister, Fatima. On her advice, he enrolled in Lincoln’s Inn and
became a barrister in 1954. His contemporaries were Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and
Margaret Thatcher. In 1956 he was appointed the Foreign Publicity Advisor
by the ‘AJK’ Government. Three years later, in May 1959, Khurshid was
appointed by Ayub Khan as the President of ‘AJK’ and simultaneously,
established his own party, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation League. Under his
leadership the first ever ‘Basic Democracy’ elections were held in ‘AJK’ in 1962,
and he was re-elected as the President. Later, he developed serious differences
with the military-led government and resigned in August 1964. Subsequently,
his party did not perform well in the elections though he remained politically
active until his death. He died on March 11, 1988 in a road accident while
travelling from Gujarat to Lahore.

Sardar Ghulam Sadiq Khan

Born to Subedar Bagga Khan, Sardar Ghulam Sadiq Khan was elected Speaker
of the Legislative Assembly of ‘AJK’ on July 25, 2011. He is a member of the
AJKPPP, and has been elected as a ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly three times. He
also served in the past as Advisor to prime minister of Pakistan, Syed Yousaf
Raza Gillani, and was a member of the Public Accounts Committee ‘AJK’. He
was disqualified from contesting the July 2016 elections, by the ‘AJK’ High
Court for misusing power and embezzling government funds, drawing salary
on two accounts, both as ‘adviser’ to the ‘AJK’ Council chairman (prime minister
of Pakistan) and assembly member for more than 31 months. He was even
made to deposit PKR 2.09 million in the government treasury.6

Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore

During his student days, Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore founded the Jammu
and Kashmir National Student Federation. In 1970, on AJKMC ticket, he
contested the Legislative Assembly elections and won. Later, he joined the
AJKPPP and also served as a senior minister, holding finance, forest and revenue
ministry portfolios. He was elected as the Prime Minister of ‘AJK’ and served
in that position from June 1990 to July 1991. Rathore was ousted from office
and then arrested after refusing to accept defeat in the assembly elections. He
was heading a coalition government. After his arrest, he was flown by helicopter
220 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

from Muzaffarabad to Rawalpindi. The then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto

made a statement in London saying that the government had made “a historic
error” in arresting Rathore. He also served as Acting President, Speaker, Senior
Minister of ‘AJK’. He died of heart attack on June 16, 1999 in Hevali.

Maj. Gen. Sardar Muhammad Anwar Khan

Major General (Retd) Sardar Muhammad Anwar Khan was born on May 9,
1945 in Tain, Poonch District, ‘AJK’ and served as the President of ‘AJK’ from
2001 to 2006. Sardar Anwar Khan received his early education in the Tain
village. In 1966, he joined the Pakistan Army and was commissioned in the
Azad Kashmir Regiment. He is a graduate of the Command and Staff College,
Quetta; Pakistan Navy Staff College, Karachi; and National Defence College,
Rawalpindi. He also attended the US Army War College in Pennsylvania and
received a master’s degree in War Studies. During his distinguished Army career
span of 35 years, he held various important commands of staff and instructional
appointments. As a young officer he also actively participated in 1971 War in
the Kashmir Sector. He made significant contribution to the leadership
development within the Pakistan Army as an Instructor at the Pakistan Military
Academy, School of Infantry and Tactics, Command and Staff College, Quetta
and as the Chief Instructor at National Defence College, Islamabad from
December 1996 to December 1998. He retired from the army as Vice Chief
of General Staff (VCGS) in July 2001. He also served as the colonel
commandant of the Azad Kashmir Regiment till April 2003.

Chaudhry Latif Akbar

Chaudhry Latif Akbar was appointed President of the AJKPPP in early 2017.
He has a distinguished career in the party following his lifelong affiliation with
party and Bhutto’s since the emergence of the PPP. He has replaced Chaudhry
Abdul Majeed, the ex-prime minister of ‘AJK’ in the last PPP led coalition
government in ‘AJK’. Chaudhry Latif hails from Muzaffarabad district. He has
also been holding office of the Secretary General of the party. He was a minister
in the various PPP led government including in the Chaudhry Majeed led
government as finance minister besides holding many other portfolios in the
Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore and Barrister Sultan Mehmood governments.

Faisal Mumtaz Rathore

Faisal Mumtaz Rathore is the Secretary General of the AJKPPP. He is son of
former ‘AJK’ prime minister late Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore. Rathore is
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 221

from Haveili district of Poonch division. He is considered to be a seasoned

and sincere worker of the party. He has also been minister in the cabinet of
Chaudhry Abdul Majeed’s PPP government which lost the 2016 elections.

Dr. Khalid Mahmood

Dr. Khalid Mahmood is the current Emir of Jamaat-i-Islami ‘Azad Jammu &
Kashmir’ (AJK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). He was elected for a three-year term
on June 30, 2017. He replaced Abdul Rashid Turabi, who remained the chief
for 22 years after the party that was launched in these two regions in July 1974
with an independent set-up having no administrative control by JI Pakistan.
Turabi is, however, member of the ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly, against a special
seat reserved for the technocrats. Dr. Mahmood, who has been practicing
medicine in Rawalakot, was chosen for the slot by the party’s General Council,
comprising around 1,500 members from ‘AJK’, GB and Pakistan-based
Kashmiris refugees, from among the panel of three candidates who included
the incumbent emir.
Dr. Mahmood was born in Rihara village of district Poonch in 1956. He
completed his MBBS degree from Larkana in Sindh where he became member
of Islami Jamiat Tulaba (IJT) and later its Nazim for the Chandika Medical
College as well as member of provincial shoora of Sindh. After serving for five
years in government health department, he shifted to Rawalakot where besides
practice, he also carried on his organizational activities, holding the office of JI
city and later district president in Poonch. He also contested ‘AJK’ Assembly
elections from Rawalakot but was defeated.

Raja Muhammad Mushtaq Minhas

The journalist turned politician, Raja Muhammad Mushtaq Minhas was born
on 12 June 1965 in Bagh, ‘AJK’ where he had early education. He had higher
studies in Lahore where he did his B.A. in Political Science and Journalism
and later Masters in Mass Communication from Punjab University in 1992.
Pakistan government had awarded him ‘Best Reporter Award’ for his
outstanding and quality reporting during earthquake in ‘AJK’ in 2005. He is
founder of National Press Club, Islamabad and is associated with number of
journalist unions of Pakistan and socially very active.
Mushtaq Minhas who belongs to Malalayal clan joined PML-N in March
2016. He contested from Bagh-II constituency and won the seat by defeating
Khurshid Ahmad of PTI in July 2016 elections. According to media reports,
he was also one of the prominent faces during Nawaz Sharif visit to AJK’ before
222 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the July 2016 elections and the latter always gave importance to Minhas’s
suggestions on the political developments in ‘AJK’. There were also reports of
Mushtaq Minhas would also be in the race of ‘AJK’ Premiership as he
maintained strong relations with PML-N top leadership and had played active
role in formation of PML-N chapter in ‘AJK’. Mushtaq Minhas was appointed
Minister for Information, Tourism and Information Technology in the Farooq
Haider’s cabinet. At a function in Muzaffarabad on April 21, 2017, he said
that it was bureaucracy that was ruling the roost in ‘AJK’.

(B) PROMINENT LEADERS OF GILGIT-BALTISTAN

Hafiz Hafeezur Rehman
A dynamic politician, Hafiz ur Rehman is known as a moderate. He has been
a pillar of strength to the Pakistan Muslim League – Nawaz in Gilgit-Baltistan
(G-B). He bravely faced the wrath of the military ruler General Parvez
Musharraf but did not betray his party, which rewarded him with the
stewardship of the PML–N, G-B chapter. Earlier, he was made the party’s chief
organiser for G-B. He inherited the mantle from his brother, Saif ur Rehman,
who was assassinated outside his home in their native Kashrote (Gilgit city) in
2003. He was elected to the G-B Legislative Assembly (GBLA) from GBLA-
2 constituency in the June 2015 elections; and became the unanimous choice
for the post of Chief Minister. A moderate and champion of sectarian harmony
and peace, he had a brief but loose association with the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-
Fazl (JuI-F). Hafiz ur Rehman favours strong ties between G-B and the Punjab
province but does not advocate close relations with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP),
which, he alleges, has flooded Gilgit Baltistan with weapons. Strained
relationship between G-B and KP dates back to 1988, the year when then Army
ruler General Zia ul Haq had sent Sunnis from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to loot
and butcher Shias.

Mir Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Gilgit-Baltistan

Mir Ghazanfar is the son of last Mir of Hunza, Muhammad Jamal Khan who
died in 1976. A close friend of Nawaz Sharif, he was appointed Governor of
Gilgit-Baltistan in November, 2015. His wife Rani Atiqa is also a lawmaker in
the Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly. Ghazanfar had represented Hunza,
his home constituency, in various representative bodies of Gilgit-Baltistan. He
also served as the Deputy Chief Executive and Chief Executive of the then
Northern Areas Legislative Council from 2004 to 2009 during the regime of
president Gen. Musharraf. He resigned from his post on September 15, 2018.
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 223

Manzoor Hussain Parwana

A rights activist, poet, environmentalist, and freelance journalist, Manzoor
Parwana is a chemical engineer by profession. His political career started in
1990 when he was a secondary level student. Fifteen years later in 2005, he
entered national political scene, when he floated the Gilgit Baltistan United
Movement (GBUM), a pro-independence organisation in Gilgit-Baltistan. It
was an off-shoot of Balwaristan Students Federation, (BSF) of which he was
Information Secretary. Manzoor Parwana belongs to a middle class farmer
family. He was born on April 2, 1975 in Thowar village of Skardu district. He
faced persecution for his political views and his writings, and went to jail several
times. Monthly magazine, Kargil International of which he is the chief editor
has been banned. He was arrested for an article published in the magazine.
The trial lasted five-years. His first book, titled Sach Likhna Jurm Hai (Writing
Truth is a crime) was published in 2005. Musharraf ’s government banned the
book. He was arrested on sedition charges in July 2011 as he spoke about the
illegal activities of Pakistan forces and their intelligence agencies in G-B at a
convention of Balawaristan National Students Organisation (BNSO). He was
sent to prison several times for championing the cause of basic rights and
freedom of the people of Gilgit Baltistan.

Shafqat Inqalabi
Shafqat Inqalabi shot into fame when he challenged “the Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009” in the ‘AJK’ Supreme Court
on March 4, 2010. This legal recourse earned for him the wrath of the
government which had been subjecting him to harassment. He was also forced
to stop his construction business putting him to grave financial loss. The Interior
Ministry has put his name on the Exit Control List, impounded his passport
and Identity Card thus putting a blanket ban on his foreign travels. Inqalabi
hails from Bubur in Puniyal tehsil of Ghizer district in Gilgit-Baltistan. He is
a qualified Civil Engineer. He had established a district level political party,
‘Ghizar National Movement’ in 1997. After its merger with Karakoram National
Movement” in 2000, Inqalabi headed the Karakoram Students Organisation
(KSO) and from 2000 to 2003 served as its President and from 2003 to 2005,
as its Central Chairman. He joined Balwaristan National Front (BNF) in 2005
and has been its spokesperson since then. He regularly writes for local
newspapers and magazines.

Syed Jaffar Shah

Syed Jaffar Shah hails from Jalalabad, Gilgit. He entered politics in 1983 after
a seven-year stint as a lawyer in Karachi. He has won Legislative Council
224 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

elections thrice in 1983, 1987 and 1999. He was, however defeated in the 1994
elections. Shah also served as President of the Gilgit High Court Bar Association
and Chairman of the legal committee of the Council. He is the president of
G-B chapter of PPP.

Bashir Ahmed
Bashir Ahmed had his political baptism with the PML-N. He had a stint in
the PML-Q, which was floated during the Musharraf era as the King’s party.
He defected to PPP before the 2015 Assembly election.

Qazi Inayatullah
A founding member of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur) he runs his own
seminary. He is also President of the Gilgit Baltistan chapter of JUI (F)–. An
affiliate of Tableeghi Jammat, he is widely travelled across the world. Inayatullah
who hails from Goharabad, Diamer, entered politics after a stint as a teacher
at a Madrassa.

Sobia Moqaddam
A lone female minister in the G-B government, the 33-year-old Sobia
Moqaddam hails from the Diamer Valley where the literacy rate for women
remains abysmally low and cultural barriers prevent women from voting. She
moved to Diamer from her native Jhelum after her marriage in 2007.
Overcoming local prejudices and various other obstacles, she successfully
contested in the 2015 elections and became one of the six women members in
the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly.

Haji Fida Muhammad Nashad

A politician and a writer, Haji Fida Muhammad Nashad belongs to the
illustrious Maqpon family (royal family of Gilgit-Baltistan). His father, Kacho
Amir Baig, a renowned poet (of Balti language) was amongst the few of
Baltistan’s elite who rose against the Dogras to “liberate” the area. Born on
February 27, 1945, he graduated from the Punjab University. In 1983, he was
elected to the Baltistan District Council. Soon afterwards he became Chairman
of the Council. In 1994, he was elected to the then Northern Areas Council
from NA-9 Skardu constituency. Five years later, in 1999, he won his second
term, unopposed, and became the Deputy Chief Executive. During his third
term, from 2004, the Northern Areas Legislative Council was upgraded as the
Northern Areas Legislative Assembly. After the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 225

Assembly was created, he won the by-election held in October 2013. After the
PML-N won the 2015 elections, he was elected as the Speaker of the Gilgit-
Baltistan Legislative Assembly. Before entering politics, Nashad served in the
Northern Areas Administration in various capacities, including as Public
Relations Officer (1963-1978). He also worked for Pakistan’s news agency, APP
for two years. He balances his political activism and his profession as a journalist,
writing for both the local newspapers as well as the leading Pakistani dailies
like Daily Jang, Nawa-e-Waqt, Muslim and Pakistan Times.

Haji Jaffar Ullah Khan

A senior PML-N leader, Haji Jaffar Ullah Khan was born on April 12, 1966
in Gilgit. In 2015, he was elected from the GBLA-1 constituency in a multi-
corner contest by a comfortable margin, and later elected the Deputy Speaker
of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly.

Haji Shah Baig

Haji Shah Baig is the lone member of the JUI-F in the current Gilgit-Baltistan
Legislative Assembly. Baig was elected from Diamer Valley in the 2015 elections,
and became the Leader of the Opposition in the Assembly when PPP, PTI,
and Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), besides the JUI-F, agreed to try their
luck for the post through a draw.

Haji Akbar Taban

Known as a strong pillar of PML-N in Skardu, Haji Akbar Taban has become
a dissident after the 2015 Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly elections. As
general secretary of the party, he expected to become either Speaker or Deputy
Speaker after his election from Skardu-1 constituency. Instead he was asked to
join the cabinet, that too, without a key portfolio. In protest, he did not turn
up at the swearing in ceremony. Taban then angled for the post of Governor
saying that since the Chief Minister is from the Gilgit region, the Governor
should be from the Baltistan region. However, the PML-N leadership rejected
his demand.

Baba Jan
Baba Jan, the Vice President of Awami Workers Party (AWP) created history
by contesting the 2015 elections to the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly
from behind bars. He stood for the GBLA-6 seat in Gilgit, but lost in a four-
corner contest, facing PML-N’s Mir Ghazanfar, PPP’s Zafar Iqbal and PTI’s
Izhar Hunzai.
226 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Jan was sentenced to life term by an anti-terrorism court in 2014 on charges

of ransacking police stations and torching government property in Hunza during
a protest in August 2011 by families affected by the formation of Attabad Lake.
Soon afterwards Baba Jan became a local hero.
A Labour Party of Pakistan Press Release carried by media stated that Baba
Jan was treated brutally in jail and tortured badly. “Baba Jan was subjected to
torture for three to four hours at a stretch, beaten with sticks and his feet crushed
under heavy boots for three days in a row. He was denied treatment for his
many injuries despite the orders of the Court.”
According to International View Point, Baba Jan and his comrades are not
activists who took up arms against state. They simply raised their voices for
the fate of thousands of people of the Hunza Valley who were displaced as a
result of a climate disaster in January 2010 and protested against corruption
and against the violent repression that had been unleashed against the victims
demonstrating in August 2011.

Syed Mehdi Shah

Syed Mehdi Shah, a PPP veteran, is the first Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan.
He lost the 2015 elections to a PTI candidate. His defeat was one of the biggest
surprises of the elections. He is native of Baltistan educated in local school and
completed Secondary School Certificate course. He joined college studies but
did not complete his Intermediate course. Before joining PPP, he was teaching
in one of the schools in Baltistan.

Agha Rahat Hussain Al-Hussaini

Agha Rahat Hussain Al-Hussaini is a Shia cleric from Gilgit. He is an Imam
at Gilgit’s Central Imamia Mosque. In the run-up to the 2015 elections, he
managed to broker a deal between Islami Tehreek Pakistan and Majlis-e-
Wahdatul Muslimeen.

Nawaz Khan Naji

53-year old, Nawaz Khan Naji is the founder chairman of the Balawaristan
National Front (BNF). He is a graduate and has been a political activist since
his student days. The BNF calls for an independent state named Balawaristan,
comprising the areas of G-B plus districts of Kohistan and Chitral. Naji
contested the first Gilgit Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA) elections held
in November 2009 but was defeated. But he surprised everyone by winning
by-election held in April 2011. In the June 2015 elections, he was again elected
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 227

to the second GBLA. He is the only legislator representing nationalist parties

in the GBLA. BNF does not accept the Karachi Agreement of 28 April 1949
and believes that the agreement deprived the people of Balawaristan of their
basic fundamental rights.

Abdul Hamid Khan

Abdul Hamid Khan is a Chairman of the Balawaristan National Front. He is
living in exile in Belgium. He was born in a small village of Yasin in Ghizer
district on July 10, 1953. Abdul Hamid Khan is in regular touch with
international human rights organisations, UN and European Parliament and
briefing them about prevailing situation in Gilgit-Baltistan.

Dr. Ghulam Abbas

Dr. Ghulam Abbas is a Convenor of Astore Supreme Council. It organized a
multi-party conference in Gilgit on June 11, 2017 where speakers from all
walks of life held Pakistan government responsible of Gilgit-Baltistan
economically backward and sufferings of the people who have been struggling
for their fundamental rights for the last seven decades.

Raja Jalal Hussain Maqpoon

Raja Jalal Hussain Maqpoon was appointed as the new Governor of Gilgit-
Baltistan by the PTI on September 30, 2018. He took over after Mir Ghazanfar
Ali Khan resigned from the post. Raja Jalal hails from Skardu, from Maqpoon
family which ruled the area before the Sikh and Dogra rule. He was defeated
by PMLN candidate Akbar Khan Taban in the G-B Assembly election from
Skardu constituency in 2015.

(C) SOME OTHER LEADERS AND CURRENT CABINET

OF GILGIT-BALTISTAN
Following are some other prominent leaders of Gilgit-Baltistan:
1. Syed Raziuddin Rizvi (PPP)
2. Fida Muhammad Nashad (PML-N)
3. Syed Pir Karam Ali Shah (PPP)
4. Engineer Muhammad Ismail (PPP)
5. Hashmatullah (President – PTI)
6. Amjad Hussain Advocate (PPP)
228 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

7. Sultan Madad (PML-N)

8. Ghulam Muhammad (PML-N)
9. Izhar Hunzai (PTI)
10. Muhammad Zaman (PTI)
11. Muhammad Jafar (PPP)
12. Agha Muhammad Ali (PML-N)
13. Malik Miskeen (PML-N)
14. Haji Janbaz Khan (PML-N)
15. Zafar Iqbal (PPP)
16. Muhammad Ali Akhtar (PPP)
17. Mirza Hussain (PTI)
18. Amina Ansari (PTI)
19. Sadia Danish (PPP)
20. Muhammad Ayub Shah (PPP)
21. Muhammad Naseer (PPP)
22. Karim Khan (aka) KK (President – APML)
23. Mehboob Ali Advocate (BNF)
24. Ali Ghulam (BNF)
25. Afaq Blor (BNF)
26. Maulana Abdul Sami (Jamaat-e-Islami)
27. Sayeda Danish (Information Secretary – PPP)
28. Raja Jehnzaib (PTI)

Following are the Cabinet Members of the Present Gilgit

Baltistan Government
• Chief Minister: Hafeez-ur-Rehman
• Minister for Education and Information: Muhammad Ebrahim Sanaei (Ghanche)
• Minister for Food, Agriculture, Livestock & Fisheries: Haji Janbaz Khan
(Diamer)
• Minister for Works: Dr Muhammad Iqbal (Gilgit)
• Minister for Excise & Taxation & Local Bodies: Farman Ali (Astore)
• Minister for Forests & Environment: Muhammad Wakil (Diamer)
• Minister for Women’s development & Youth Affairs: Sobia Jabeen
Muqaddam (Diamer)

The Cabinet has no representation from Skardu, Hunza-Nagar and Ghizer districts.
 Profiles of Prominent Leaders of ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan 229

Members of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council Nominated and Elected

Nominated Members
(1) Capt. (retd.) Muhammad Safdar
(2) Mr. Khalid Hussain Magsi
(3) Dr. Darshan
(4) Syed Ittikhar ul Hassan
(5) Mr. Isphanyar M. Bhandara
(6) Dr Tariq Fazal Chaudhary

Elected Members
(1) Arman Shah (PMLN)
(2) Sultan Ali Khan (PMLN)
(3) Muhammad Ashraf (PMLN)
(4) Wazir Ikahlaq Hussain (PMLN)
(5) Syed Muhammad Abbas Rizvi (ITP)
(6) Syed Afzal (Independent)

ENDNOTES
1. See his profile at http://rajazulqarnain.blogspot.in/2006/08/ajk-president-raja-zulqarnain-
khan.html (Last accessed March 10, 2017)
2. See his profile on https://www.pakistantimes.com/topics/barrister-sultan-mahmood-chaudhry/
(Last accessed on March 10, 2017).
3. See http://drshabirchoudhry.blogspot.in/ (Last accessed on March 10, 2017)
4. See for details his short obituary at http://www.kashmirlife.net/khawaja-abdul-ghaffar-issue17-
vol06-61305/ & http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/news/kashmiri-leader-khawaja-abdul-
ghaffar-passes-away/172901.html
5. See Nisar Thokar, “Kh Khursheed – the Kashmiri who fought along jinnah”, Greater Kashmir,
March 12, 2008, at http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/news/kh-khursheed-the-kashmiri-
who-fought-along-jinnah/30418.html, also see “K. H. Khurshid’s death anniversary today”,
Dawn, March 11, 2011, at https://www.dawn.com/news/612297/k-h-khurshids-death-
anniversary-today
6. See M.A. Mir, “AJK Court disqualifies assembly speaker from contesting upcoming polls”,
Express Tribune, July 18, 2016, at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1144220/ajk-court-disqualifies-
assembly-speaker-contesting-upcoming-polls/
 Conclusion

Local politics in both the regions of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) –

consisting of both ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) – is firmly under the control
of the central government in Pakistan. Local political parties have been
progressively overtaken by mainstream political parties in Pakistan, who have
set up their local branches and engineered defection from local parties to
strengthen their political hold in these areas. The problem with the growth of
local political parties in PoK is associated with the freedom granted to Pakistan-
based parties by the establishment. Over the years, the government in Islamabad
has suppressed freedom of opinion in PoK and political parties and groups
questioning Pakistan’s control over the terrain have been dealt with force and
absolute scorn. Some of them have not been allowed to participate in the
elections while many others have been placed under tight control by the army
units operating at the local level.
Pakistan’s move to grant Gilgit-Baltistan a constitutional status generated
a debate within the region about the future course of the relationship between
Islamabad and the region and also between Gilgit-Baltistan and ‘AJK’ since
the middle of 2015. A committee headed by Sartaj Aziz was established in
October 2015, to look into various proposals related to Gilgit-Baltistan’s future
political and constitutional status. These proposals included granting Gilgit-
Baltistan a “provisional” provincial status, introduction of an ‘AJK’ type
administrative structure, and complete integration of Gilgit-Baltistan into
Pakistan, by bringing about necessary amendment in the constitution and
making it Pakistan’s fifth province. Yet another proposal was to bifurcate Gilgit-
Baltistan into two parts, separating Gilgit from Baltistan. The last proposal
was handed over to the committee spearheading the constitutional crisis of
Gilgit-Baltistan by the local Jamaat-e-Islami leader, Maulana Abdul Sami.
According to this, proposal only those areas which were directly under the
control of Maharaja Hari Singh would be treated as ‘disputed’, while the
remaining areas would be merged with Pakistan.
 Conclusion 231

Going by this argument, six districts from Gilgit and four from Baltistan,
including Astore district remain disputed, whereas four districts that of Ghizer,
Hunza, Nagar and Diamer were proposed to be merged with Pakistan.1
However, this peculiar formula drew flak from various circles in Gilgit-Baltistan
including both mainstream and nationalist political parties. Therefore, it might
not be plausible for Pakistan to divide the region on these grounds. Moreover,
these districts were very much under the suzerainty of the Maharaja of Jammu
and Kashmir at the time of partition. It is being argued that this would mean
dividing the region on sectarian grounds which would have a deleterious impact
not only on the society, but also hinder economic development of the region,
further jeopardising the CPEC project. Nevertheless, it is not the first time a
committee had been established in this regard. In the past, three such
committees were formed, and they all failed to deliver. The first such committee
was formed in 1975 by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the second by Gen. Zia-ul-Haq
and the third by Asif Ali Zardari.
The present leadership of Gilgit-Baltistan is facing two challenges: one is
about the CPEC and the other concerns Gilgit-Baltistan’s constitutional status,
as outlined above. On CPEC, almost all the stakeholders, whether they are
mainstream political parties or nationalist groups, excepting a few, share the
common perception: They all want more shares in the CPEC. Mainstream
parties want written documents from Islamabad assuring them establishment
of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in the region. And the nationalist groups
are demanding that Gilgit-Baltistan be made the third partner in the project
along with China and Pakistan and given more space in the decision-making
concerning CPEC.2 It is obvious that these stakeholders are not opposing the
CPEC, but want to use it as a tool for scoring political points over each other.
Even cutting across sectarian divide, there is a tentative consensus that CPEC
will bring tremendous fortune to the region and its people if it were
implemented well.
Regarding the region’s constitutional status, the nationalist leaders of Gilgit-
Baltistan as well as the leaders of ‘AJK’ have condemned Pakistan’s move to
fully integrate Gilgit-Baltistan as a province. The Pakistani leadership is caught
between the devil and the deep sea: on the one hand is the over US $60 billion.
Corridor that Islamabad cannot afford to jeopardise by ignoring the demand
and adding to internal security challenges by provoking yet another wave of
popular demonstrations in favour of full political representation in Pakistan
legislative bodies; and on the other hand, it would not like to annoy the
leadership in ‘AJK’ and the Kashmiri separatists by integrating Gilgit-Baltistan
pending resolution of the Kashmir dispute.
232 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

There is a strong view in Pakistan that the proposed move to grant Gilgit-
Baltistan full provincial status will erode the credibility of Pakistan’s stand on
Kashmir, and with that it may lose whatever political constituency it has in
whole of PoK and Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. Nonetheless, some
commentators apprehend that the military establishment acting under pressure,
possibly from China, may prevail upon the civilian leadership to change the
demographic and political status of the region. In the Gilgit Baltistan Order
2018, which was based on the final report by the Sartaj Aziz Committee and
promulgated on May 21, 2018, the existing structure of relationship between
Pakistan and Gilgit-Baltistan was largely maintained with minor modifications
to assuage the feelings of the people of the region. Following this, several petition
(more than 30 in number) were filed in the Supreme Court challenging this
order and inquiring into various dimensions of the constitutional status of the
relationship between GB and Pakistan, since August 2018.
It may be noted that the then Chief Justice of Pakistani Supreme Court,
Mian Saqib Nisar, after his visit to GB in July 2018, took keen interest in the
issue and assured the people of GB to “deal with their issues on an urgent
basis”.3 In October 2018, a three-judge bench headed by then Chief Justice
Saqib Nisar appointed senior lawyers Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan and Khawaja Haris
as amicus curiae (friend of the court) in the case of appointment of judges in
the courts of the Gilgit-Baltistan. The petitioner had argued that the GB
Council had been given extraordinary powers to appoint all the judges including
the chief judge of the GB Supreme Appellate Court, which violated the principle
of independence of the judiciary.
It needs to be mentioned here that after winning the elections on July 27,
2018, and assuming office in August, the new government in Pakistan with
Imran Khan as Prime Minister, took up the case and informed the Supreme
Court on November 16, 2018 that his government had appointed yet another
high-level committee to examine the constitutional, administrative and
governance reforms for Gilgit-Baltistan. The Committee consisted of the federal
minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan as its convener and the federal
law minister, the Attorney General, GB governor, the GB law minister, the
secretaries for defence, foreign affairs and Kashmir and GB Affairs, the GB
chief secretary, and the joint secretary (finance) of GB Council, as members.
The committee was tasked with the review of reforms in the light of the GB
Order of May 2018, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Al Jihad Trust
case in 1999, recommendations of the attorney general, the status of GB in
the light of UN resolutions on Kashmir and the stand taken by the government
at the international level. The committee came out with a recommendation to
 Conclusion 233

grant interim/provisional provincial status to GB pending the final resolution

of the Kashmir issue, which reportedly enjoyed the approval of Imran Khan
himself.4
Soon afterwards, amid reports5 that Imran Khan’s cabinet refused to accept
the recommendations of the high-level committee to accord special provisional
status to GB, the Supreme Court heard the case on December 7, 2018. As per
the court’s orders, a fresh committee was constituted to look into the case,
with Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan, the amicus curiae in another case pertaining to
GB, as a member. The other members were GB Bar Council vice chairman
Javed Ahmed, petitioner’s counsel Salman Akram Raja, Secretary of the Ministry
of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan Chaudhry Afrasiab and GB Law
Minister Aurengzeb Khan.6
On January 7, 2019, a seven-judge bench headed by the chief justice was
informed by Attorney General of Pakistan that the government had drawn up
a draft constitutional amendment bill, which intended to hand over the
authority over law enforcement and administrative matters to the GB
government in line with the Pakistani Constitution. It also reportedly
recommended granting of all the fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Pakistani constitution from Article 6 to 25 to the GB citizens. The other
provisions in the bill reportedly included grant of policy-making powers to
the GB government over all subjects which had been devolved to the provinces
under the 18 th Amendment. Aitzaz Ahsan, however, argued that the
recommendations of the Sartaj Aziz committee should also be incorporated
into the draft bill. Three days before his retirement, Justice Saqib Nisar, known
for his ‘populist grandstanding’ as “an unelected individual wading into the
political realm”,7 heading the same seven-judge bench came out with the order
that was deferred earlier, on January 14, 2019.
Quite expectedly, India summoned the deputy high commissioner of
Pakistan in New Delhi on January 18, and lodged a strong protest saying that
this order was an interference in its internal affairs. It held that Pakistan
Government or judiciary had “no locus standi on territories illegally and forcibly
occupied by it” and “any action to alter the status of these occupied territories
by Pakistan” had no legal basis whatsoever. It rejected such attempts by Pakistan
“to bring material change in the occupied territories” and “to immediately vacate
all areas under its illegal occupation”.8
The order issued by the Supreme Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over
GB and it looked into the “historical and constitutional issues involving the
status, authority and powers” of GB including that of its judiciary and the
234 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

rights available to its people. After dwelling at length on the history of the
problem, it looked into a series of administrative structures and laws that were
applied to GB since 1947. It concurred with the conclusions of the Sartaj Aziz
Committee that “further reforms were required to enhance the sense of
participation of the people of GB and to upgrade the standard of governance
and public service delivery”, however, “the reforms proposed should not
prejudice Pakistan’s principled position in the context of UN resolutions on
Kashmir”. It opined that “there should be no discrepancy in the fundamental
rights available to those in GB relative to Pakistani citizens anywhere in the
country”, and “the right to self-government through an empowered GB
Assembly as well as a robust system of local bodies is entirely uncontroversial
and must be enforced as early as possible”.
Notably, it held that the jurisdiction of the supreme appellate court or the
chief court of GB was “territorially bound” and would not extend to any matter
beyond GB. It could, therefore, interpret and implement the 2018 order of
the government; and while it can strike down any law made by the GB
legislature, it cannot judge the validity of the 2018 Order, from which it derived
its authority.
Turning to the apex court’s ruling in 1999 in the Al Jehad Trust case, the
order said that even if the court had articulated “the basic position as regards
the status and rights of the people of GB in the case...two decades ago, the
actual realization by the Executive of that expression has remained fitful at best”,
which was “not acceptable”. It recognised the proposed modifications of the
government order of 2018, by the committee under the PTI government and
instructed the President to promulgate the order with the aid of the federal
government within a fortnight.
Not just “to provide judicial imprimatur to the order” but “to give it
permanence”, the court said that the proposed order would neither be amended
after due promulgation “except in terms of the procedure provided in Article
124” of the order, “nor shall it be repealed or substituted”, without placing it
“before [the Supreme Court] by the Federation through an application that
will be treated as a petition under Article 184(3)” of the Pakistani Constitution.
The proposed order annexed to the judgment in its preambular section clearly
acknowledged the limitations of the government even if it “intends to give
Gilgit-Baltistan the status of a provisional Province, subject to the decision of
the Plebiscite to be conducted under the UN Resolutions”. It recognized that
“a proper Constitutional Amendment needs to be made in the Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan” which would need two thirds majority in
the Parliament and would take time”.
 Conclusion 235

Therefore, the order was only to be treated as “an interim measure”, to

give people of GB such fundamental rights as given to the people in other
provinces and to “provide for greater empowerment” to GB to bring it “at par
with other provinces”.9 The proposed order has 128 (instead of 122 articles in
the previous order of 2018) and it is a modified version of it. In an appendix,
the court order amended few articles of the proposed order and asked the
government to comply with it.
It is believed that the incumbent government will abide by the judgment
of the court and soon promulgate an order, which is intended to fulfill the
local aspirations. However, the uncertainty over evolution of a policy acceptable
to the people of GB continued to prevail at the time of publication of this
book. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of the apex court’s verdict, members
of various political parties, students’ organisations and civil society bodies
organised a strong protest in Gilgit, Skardu, Islamabad and even Karachi against
the verdict and launched a movement for permanent settlement of the status
of GB.10 Shabir Choudhry, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of
UKPNP, London termed the judgment ‘controversial’ and said it indicated the
‘imperial designs of Pakistani rulers’, “obsessed with occupying the territory of
Jammu and Kashmir, which does not belong to Pakistan”.11
Clearly, Islamabad has never taken either Gilgit-Baltistan or ‘AJK’ leadership
on board before deciding on such critical issues concerning the region. The
leaders of Gilgit-Baltistan like their cousins in ‘AJK’ have traditionally been
kept out of the consultative processes on issues of critical importance – whether
it is on the CPEC or while deciding the future political status of Gilgit-Baltistan.
The Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly has passed many resolutions – from seeking
representation in the National Assembly and other decision-making institutions
to weighing the proposal for becoming the fifth province of Pakistan. In contrast,
the ‘AJK’ Assembly passed a resolution against the proposed provincial status
for Gilgit-Baltistan, as it believed that such status would affect Pakistan’s position
on Kashmir. Thus, this stance taken by ‘AJK’ Assembly had earlier irked the
Gilgit-Baltistan leadership.
The mistrust between ‘AJK’ and Gilgit-Baltistan is not new. It has a long
history which goes back to the period when the Karachi Agreement was signed
by leaders from ‘AJK’ without consulting the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. In fact,
throughout most of its history, the people of Gilgit-Baltistan were never
consulted by the ‘AJK’ leadership on the Kashmir issue, even if G-B was very
much a party to the dispute. It is a hard reality that the government of Pakistan
has also actively discouraged social and political linkages between the two
236 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

regions.12 Thus, the two regions have developed separate geo-cultural identities
even if they form part of the Jammu and Kashmir state. With very little
interaction among the political leadership of the two regions as well as local
political parties, the two regions have developed separate political dynamics,
unrelated to each other. This situation is likely to continue in future.

ENDNOTES
1. Abdul Jabar Nasir, “The Formula of Division, Is it True?”, Daily Bang-e-Sahar, January 14,
2016, at http://www.bangesahar.net/popup.php?r_date=01-14-2016&img=01-14-2016page-
2-5
2. For details, see: “Pakistan and China Should Accept Gilgit-Baltistan as Third Partner, BNF
and BSO”, Daily Bang-e-Sahar, March 14, 2016, at http://www.bangesahar.net/
popup.php?r_date=03-14-2016&img=03-14-2016page-1-2
3. “CJP Justice Nisar sways to traditional music during Gilgit-Baltistan tour”, The News, July28,
2018, at https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/342867-cjp-justice-nisar-sways-to-
traditionalmusic-during-gilgit-baltistan-tour
4. Ghulam Abbas, “Cabinet refuses to give provisional province status to GB”, Pakistan Today,
December 6, 2018, at https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2018/12/06/cabinet-refuses-to-
giveprovisional-province-status-to-gb/
5. “PM approves interim province status for G-B”, The Tribune, November 28, 2018, at https:/
/tribune.com.pk/story/1855919/1-pm-imran-approves-interim-province-status-g-b/
6. Mentioned in “SC reserves ruling on cases about rights of GB people”, Dawn, January 8,2019,
at https://www.dawn.com/news/1456187
7. “CJP Nisar’s legacy”, Editorial, Dawn, January 18, 2019, at https://www.dawn.com/news/
1458280
8. “India protests to Pakistan against recent order by Supreme Court of Pakistan on so-called
“Gilgit-Baltistan’’”, January 18, 2019, at https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/30919/India
_protests_ to_Pakistan_against_recent_order_by_Supreme_Court_of_Pakistan_on_socalled_
GilgitBaltistan
9. The whole order can be downloaded from http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/
File/Const.P._50_2018.pdf
10. Jamil Nagri, “Protesters vow to start movement over GB’s political status”, The Dawn, January
21, 2019 https://www.dawn.com/news/1458793
11. Shabir Choudhry, “Gilgit Baltistan and Pakistani game plan”, Daily Excelsior, February 2,2019,
at http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/gilgit-baltistan-and-pakistani-game-plan/ )
12. Ershad Mahmud, “Gilgit-Baltistan: A Province or Not”, The News, January 24, 2016, at http:/
/tns.thenews.com.pk/gilgit-baltistan-province/#.VqYEBpp97Gg
 Chronology of Developments in PoK
with special focus on Gilgit Baltistan

July 1947: British Indian Government terminates the lease for Gilgit-Baltistan
granted to it by the Maharaja.
Late July, Maharaja appoints Brig Ghansara Singh as Governor of Gilgit, who
flies in on July 30, 1947. Takes over power from Lt. Col. Bacon, the then
British Political Agent, on 01 August 1947.
Early August 1947: The Mirs of Hunza and Nagar remain defiant; so does the
Gilgit Scouts formed by the British, dominated by recruits from Hunza and
Nagar. Subedar Major Babar Khan, the uncle of the Mir of Nagar and married
to the sister of the Mir of Hunza leads the rebellious section within the Scouts.
The civil bureaucracy is also non-cooperative and demands special pay and
perks. These elements are provoked by two British officers of the Gilgit Scouts,
whose services had been retained by the State, namely Major W.A. Brown and
Captain Matheson.
October 22, 1947: As tribal lashkar marches towards Srinagar, the Muslim
component of Maharaja’s soldiery starts showing its disaffection. Major Brown
orchestrates a revolt in the ranks of the Scouts. A local commander of the Scouts,
Col. Mirza Hassan Khan, leads a successful rebellion against Ghansara Singh’s
forces and easily deposes his government.
November 1, 1947: A government is formed in Gilgit and the Independent
state of Gilgit is announced. Shah Raees Khan becomes the president of this
republic and goes on to become the chief of the Gilgit Scouts later.
November 16, 1947: On the basis of an orchestrated request from the new
government in Gilgit to join Pakistan, Jinnah decides to take over administration
of Gilgit. A political agent named Sardar Alam Khan is sent in, while the
Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) is imposed as the law of the land. Even
though the princely states stay intact, Pakistan takes over administrative control
of Gilgit. However, Pakistan does not officially annex it, in view of the overall
238 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

controversy over Kashmir since the case was referred to the United Nations
(UN). The UN Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Resolution
adopted on 13 August 1948. (Document No. 1100, Para. 75, dated the 9th
November, 1948), which looks for a plebiscite-oriented solution states clearly
that Pakistani troops would have to evacuate the territory occupied by them
first and states later:
PART II, TRUCE AGREEMENT
(3) Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan
troops will be administered by the local authorities under the
surveillance of the Commission.
December 22, 1949: Proposal in respect of Jammu and Kashmir made by
General A.G.L. McNaughton, President of the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), pursuant to the decision of the Council taken at its 457th
meeting, on 22 December, 1949, also makes a case for withdrawal of Pakistani
forces.
DEMILITARISATION PREPARATORY TO THE PLEBISCITE
The programme of demilitarisation should include the withdrawal
from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the regular forces of
Pakistan; and the withdrawal of the regular forces of India not required
for purposes of security or for the maintenance of local law and order
on the Indian side of the Cease-Fire Line;
The “Northern Area” should also be included in the above programme
of demilitarisation, and its administration should, subject to United
Nations supervision, be continued by the existing local authorities.
April 28, 1949: Karachi Agreement is signed between the Government of
Pakistan and leaders of ‘A.K.’ (‘Azad Kashmir’ as it was known then) – more
precisely, the signatories were Nawab Mushtaq Gurmani, a Pakistani Minister
without Portfolio, and President of ‘Azad Kaashmir’ Sardar Ibrahim Khan and
Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, who were leaders of Muslim Conference, widely
seen as mouth piece of Pakistan. The signing parties agree to allow Pakistan to
administer the area known then as ‘Gilgit-Ladakh’. No leader from the region
is invited to the discussions. Pakistan sets up a Ministry of Kashmir Affairs,
which is entrusted with the responsibility to govern the area through its agents.
It is later (in 1970) termed ‘Northern Areas (NA)’ by Pakistan and the Ministry
is called Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas (KANA).
1949-1970: The NA is under exclusive control of Pakistan. The princely states
in NA continue to operate under the overall control of the agent. Restrictions
on outsiders settling down in the area are gradually removed. Sunni Wahabi
 Chronology of Developments in PoK 239

migration into the region, otherwise Shia-dominated, starts, which later peaks
during the 1980s.
March 2, 1963:Pakistan and China sign a Boundary Agreement whereby
Pakistan concedes large tracts of land (around 5,180 square kilometres) to China
along the Shaksgam Valley.
Article 6 of the agreement states:
The two Parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir
dispute between Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned
will reopen negotiations with the Government of the People’s Republic
of China, on the boundary as described in Article Two of the present
Agreement, so as to sign a formal Boundary Treaty to replace the
present agreement:
Provided that in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan,
the provisions of this agreement and the aforesaid Protocol shall be
maintained in the formal Boundary Treaty to be signed between the
Peoples Republic of China and Pakistan.
Responding to Indian protest in the UN on March 16, 1963, Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, then foreign minister of Pakistan notes:
“My Government is bound by its duty to declare in the Security
Council that, pending determination of the future of Kashmir,
through the will of the people impartially ascertained, no position
taken or adjustments made by either of the parties to the present
controversy between India and China or any similar controversy in
the future shall be valid or affect the status of the territory of Jammu
and Kashmir or the imperatives or demilitarization and self-
determination of the state of Jammu and Kashmir laid down in the
resolution of 21 April 1948, 30 March 1951, 24 January 1957, and
in resolutions of the United Nations Commissions for India and
Pakistan, dated 13 August 1948, and 5 January 1949, which have
been jointly accepted by both India and Pakistan..”
1970: A single administrative unit comprising Gilgit Agency, the Baltistan
region, and the former princely states of Hunza and Nagar is formed. It is
officially called ‘Northern Areas’.
July-August 1972: Bhutto visits Northern Areas and announces abolition of
princely states. The first ever representative body in NA is formed, – named
Northern Areas Advisory Council (18 members are directly elected, functions
under a commissioner).
1973: The Constitution of Pakistan and PoK states that Pakistan’s territories
include “such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan,
240 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

whether by accession or otherwise”. Article 257 of the constitution further

elaborates that “when the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to
accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and that State shall be
determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State.”
The Constitutions for ‘AJK’:
1970: The first formal Constitution for ‘AJK’ is drafted, referred to as Act of
1970. Presidential and Legislative Assembly elections are held for the first time
on the basis of adult franchise. Executive and legislative powers are vested,
respectively, in the President and the Legislative Assembly except in respect of
defence and security, currency and the external affairs. The Assembly is also
empowered to amend the Act.
1971: The ‘AJK’ Assembly amends the Act, without having to seek prior
permission of the Pakistan government, and gives fundamental rights to the
people, writ-jurisdiction to the High Court and establishes an Apex (appellate)
Court. The President of ‘AJK’ is given powers to appoint judges to the superior
courts. The subjects of foreign trade and foreign aid were also in the domain
of the ‘AJK’ government, raising the profile of its internal autonomy.
1974: Interim Constitution Act is introduced. It allows a parliamentary form
of government, but drastically curtails the powers of the vested in the ‘AJK’
government reversing the trend towards autonomy for the region. A new
institution is established – the ‘AJK’ Council – with Prime Minister of Pakistan
as chairman, and the Minister KANA as members. The Council is given wide
ranging power including power to appoint ‘AJK’ high and supreme courts judges
and the chief election commissioner.
1977: Zia-ul-Haq extends martial law to the region (Zone E), promises
representation in Majlis-e-Shoora. He regards Northern Areas as an integral
part of Pakistan even if it had been part of the Kashmir State once upon a time.
April 1982: Three members are nominated by Zia as observers in the ‘AJK’
Council.
July 1982: Zia says publicly that Northern regions of Gilgit, Hunza and Skardu
were integral parts of Pakistan. Under pressure from ‘AJK’ leadership, Zia later
revises his position and becomes less vocal about the status of Northern Areas
thereafter.
1984: The importance of NA shoots up at the domestic level with the opening
of the Karakoram Highway.
May 1988: Anti-Shia violence takes place in NA. The collusion of Pakistan
military is suspected. There is a demand for separate provincial status in certain
quarters.
 Chronology of Developments in PoK 241

December 1988-1990: Benazir Bhutto government forms a new body to suggest

political reforms.
1994: Benazir Bhutto introduces the Legal Framework Order (LFO)-1994,
which turned the Northern Areas Council into the Northern Areas Legislative
Council. The leader of the house of this body is the deputy chief executive,
while the minister of KANA serves as the chief executive. Northern Areas Rules
of Business are framed, Chief Secretary and Civil Secretariats are established
and judicial reforms are introduced.
1993: AJK High Court ruling on the legal status of Northern Areas
March 18, 1993: Responding to a petition filed by Mohammad Miskeen and
Haji Bashir Khan of Gilgit, and Shaikh Abdul Aziz Advocate of Muzaffarabad,
to establish the constitutional future of the Northern Areas, the full bench of
the ‘AJK’ High Court held that
“Northern Areas (Gilgit and Baltistan) are part of Azad Kashmir,
historically and constitutionally; the Azad Kashmir government
should establish administrative and legal institutions in these areas;
Under the Provisional Constitutional Act, 1974, the (A.K.) High
Court has the right to hear all petitions concerning Azad Kashmir;
and (the Court) also has right to hear cases in all matters pertaining
to Northern Areas.
‘AJK’ Supreme Court’s ruling on Northern Areas-1994
‘‘AJK’’ Govt appeals against the 1993 verdict of the AJK High Court
in ‘AJK’ Supreme Court
September 14, 1994: The ‘AJK’ SC in its verdict states: “No doubt, that
Northern Areas are part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir – but not of Azad
Kashmir. Therefore, the government need not take administrative control of
these areas.”
Pakistan Supreme Court ruling on Northern Areas
May 28 1999: In 1994, A petition on AJK HC’s decision is brought before
the Supreme Court of Pakistan by Habib Wahab al-Khairi (founder of Al-Jihad
Trust, Rawalpindi), making Secretary, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and N.A.
defendant to the lawsuit. The Supreme Court of Pakistan came out with a 42-
page verdict on May 28, 19991 that:
...“that Northern Areas were constitutional part of the state of Jammu
and Kashmir... that the people of the Northern Areas are citizens of
Pakistan for all intent and purposes”.
The government of Pakistan should ensure that basic human rights
and other political and administrative institutions are provided in
242 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the areas within six months. However, the action should not adversely
affect Pakistan’s stand concerning the Kashmir dispute.
“...the geographical location of the Northern Areas is very sensitive
because it is bordering India, China, Tibet and USSR, and as the
above areas in the past have also been treated differently, this Court
cannot decide what type of Government should be provided to ensure
the compliance with the above mandate of the Constitution. Nor we
can direct that the people of Northern Areas should be given
representation in the Parliament as, at this stage it may not be in the
larger interest of the country because of the fact that a plebiscite under
the auspices of the United Nations is to be held. The above questions
are to be decided by the Parliament and the Executive. This Court at
the most can direct that the proper administrative and legislative steps
should be taken to ensure that the people of Northern Areas enjoy
their above rights under the Constitution.”
1999: The LFO of 1994 is amended delegating more powers to the Northern
Areas Legislative Council (NALC). NALC is empowered to legislate on 49
subjects as envisaged in schedule –II of the LFO.
July 7, 2000: Musharraf reconstitutes NALC. It has 29 members with 5 seats
reserved for women. His government authorizes NALC to legislate on 40 items.
He granted NA Legislative Assembly the right to amend the LFO.
2007: The Northern Areas Legal Framework Order 1994 renamed as Northern
Areas Governance Order 1994 and amended, similarly NALC is renamed as
Northern Areas Legislative Assembly.
September 8, 2009: “Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Government
Order (GBESGO)-2009” is introduced by PPP government.
The term “Northern Areas” is replaced with “Gilgit-Baltistan.”
The GB Council comprised 15 members, six of whom were elected
from the GB Legislative Assembly while the rest were elected members
from Pakistani assemblies.
The Council has greater powers than the GB Legislative Assembly
and most important decisions are to be taken by them.
Art 92. Order not to prejudice stance – The provision of this Order
shall not derogate form, or in any manner prejudice, the declared
stand of the Government of Pakistan regarding the right of self-
determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance
with the United Nations Resolutions.
Developments in GB since 2009
Demand for Provincial Status in GB
 Chronology of Developments in PoK 243

September 2012: GB Legislative Assembly passes a resolution demanding

provincial status within Pakistan. Sets off a debate on the issue. Apart from the
nationalists, most of the mainstream political parties support the demand.
Some political groups opposed the resolution, calling it an effort to divide
the “undivided state of Jammu and Kashmir”. They said that giving GB
a provincial status will provide precedence for India to annex the parts of
Kashmir under its control.
In 2012, a retired Colonel named Imtiaz ul Haque, whose father
had served in the Gilgit Scouts, which rebelled against the Maharaja
in October-November 1947, came out with a dissertation titled:
“Determining Political Status of Gilgit Baltistan – Future Prospects”.
Col Imtiaz was one of the members of a committee formed by GB
Government to make recommendations for the constitutional status
of Gilgit-Baltistan.
His main recommendations were:
[I]t may not be possible for Government of Pakistan, to take a U
turn on its principle[d] stance on the subject and integrate Gilgit
Baltistan in its constitutionally defined territories, due to its
commitments with people of Jammu and Kashmir, United Nations,
India and international community.....
However, provision of interim provincial status, right of vote and due
representation in the Constituent Assemblies of Pakistan, is the best
viable option to address the issue of identity of crisis and sense of
political deprivation, thereby ensuring better future integration of
Gilgit Baltistan with Pakistan.
April 2014: Standing Committee of Senate on Human Rights took notice of
Human Rights violation in GB with special reference to constitutional
deprivation of the people of Gilgit Baltistan for the past several decades.
July 2014: The sub-committee of the Senate Functional committee on human
rights led by Senator Raja Rabbani told by G-B government “(then Chief
Minister Mehdi Shah) that neither the UN resolution on Kashmir nor the
Establishment is [an obstacle] in providing constitutional rights to the people
of G-B. But there is a need for [political will by the leaders], in this regard”.
G-B must be given its due share in the National Finance Commission (NFC)
awards, and allowed to collect GST and custom duty.
September 2014: Extra-ordinary Meeting of Gilgit Baltistan Bar Council was
held at Gilgit presided by Vice Chairman Advocate Shehbaz Khan. The meeting
thoroughly discussed various issues and unanimously resolved on each point
separately including the issue of “Constitutional Status of Gilgit Baltistan”.
244 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Gilgit Baltistan is no doubt a Jugular Vein for Pakistan because of its

geographical, strategic & economic importance, but the rulers of
Pakistan have not bothered to realize this fact and they have not been
treating the people and the region accordingly by bringing G-B at
par with other provinces, ‘AJK’ or even ‘Indian Occupied J&K’ in
terms of constitutional & political rights.
The G-B Council, in which GB is only symbolically represented, is
based in Islamabad and it is a meaningless institution, working under
the Ministry of Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan Affairs, safeguarding
and catering to the interests of the Ministry, not the people of GB”.
G-B has been made a sacrificial goat in the name of the so-called
Kashmir Dispute with a malafide intention of keeping the area and
the people under the clutches of (the Pakistani) bureaucratic system,
depriving the people of their basic fundamental rights.
‘‘AJK’’, which was liberated by the Pak Army with the help of Tribal
Lashkar, is comparatively in a better position compared to GB, having
an “Act” based governing system at least since 1969 & 1974 although
not having a constitutional status.
The people of ‘Indian occupied Jammu & Kashmir’, have also got
special constitutional status and full representation in the Central
Government under Article 370 of Indian Constitution since 1948,
in addition to having their own Jammu & Kashmir Constitution 1957
passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1957.
The people of Gilgit Baltistan are very much concerned and aware
of the historical existence of the Pakistan China Agreement made in
1963 wherein 2000 Sq Km of their land has been given to China in
exchange of just 700 km. They have a right to question legitimacy of
this pact concerning the territories of GB, if it is a disputed territory.
They are justified to ask whether giving away such a huge tract of
land affected Pakistan stance on the Kashmir Dispute??? If not, how
will it then affect their stance on Kashmir if the people of Gilgit
Baltistan were to be given their fundamental rights to govern
themselves through their chosen representatives guaranteed under a
“constitution” under the domain of Local Authority as committed
by GOP with UNCIP??
Denial of political rights to the people of Gilgit Baltistan will not be
in the larger interest of Pakistan having crucial strategic & economic
interests in this sensitive region. The dream of making Pakistan an
Economical Tiger of Asia through Economic Corridor crossing 600
Km of GB will not become a reality until and unless the two million
 Chronology of Developments in PoK 245

people of GB are given their due constitutional, political, social and

economic rights.
The [pattern] of political governing system in ‘Indian Occupied
Jammu Kashmir’ prevailing since 1948 & 1957 is the most suitable
and viable in this regard as the same will not only cater to the
[strategic] interest of Pakistan in this region but also redress the
prolong[ed] sense of deprivation of people of GB as well without
harming the princip[led] stan[ce] of Pakistan on Kashmir Issue if the
following steps are taken:
Declare the next general elections in GB for holding “Constituent
Assembly” and thereafter to draft, table and pass Constitution of GB
accordingly.
Making amendments in the Constitution of Pakistan by the Pakistani
Parliament giving the GB a “Special Status” & representation in the
constitutional institutions of the Federation “provisionally”.
Conversion of GB Governance Order 2009 into an “ACT” after
amendments
October 29, 2015: A nine-member parliamentary committee headed by Sartaj
Aziz is established to recommend steps to bring about reforms in GB to cater
to the growing demands from the people of GB for absorption into Pakistan
as its fifth province. The mandate of the committee includes: (a) review of the
current constitutional and administrative arrangements in Gilgit Baltistan and
analyse any shortcomings in relation to aspirations of the people;(b) after
studying the historic record and relevant treaties, examine whether the existing
eternal boundaries of the territories that constitute Gilgit-Baltistan overlap with
territories that formed part of the state Jammu and Kashmir and if so, make
recommendations for corrective measures; and (c) recommend constitutional
and administrative reforms for GB, keeping in view the implications of these
recommendations vis-a-vis the UN resolutions on Kashmir.
December 2015: The committee formed by Gilgit-Baltistan’s Chief Secretary
to prepare a document on the history of GB, boundaries and treaties signed so
far, and future constitutional status submitted its final report. The committee
comprised of Brig (r) Hissamullah Baig, Professor Usman Ali, Sherbaz Barcha,
AIG (r) Dilpazir, Col (r) Imtiaz SI(M), Qasim Naseem and Israruddin Israr.
The committee [sic] recommended:
“Interim or provisional status to Gilgit-Baltistan with right of vote
and representation in Parliament of Pakistan” as best possible option.
For this purpose, necessary legislation and amendment in 1973
Constitution can be made, as permissible vide para 1 (2) (d) of the
Constitution of Pakistan 1973.
246 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Since representation in the National Assembly is based on population

ratio, conveniently three elected representatives, one each for three
divisions, i.e. Gilgit, Baltistan and Diamer respectively. While one
woman seat can be kept for Gilgit Baltistan.
For representation in the Senate of Pakistan, Gilgit-Baltistan may be
considered as an interim federating unit with due recognition and
representation as in case of other federating units. Pakistan can justify
its stance, as India has already extended its constitutional jurisdiction
to the part of Jammu and Kashmir under its administrative control,
including Laddakh region. Moreover, Kashmir issue also remains
unhurt due to interim nature of the provision.
Other recommendations are:
1) Extension of bench of Supreme Court of Pakistan, bringing GB
under wider judicial umbrella.
2) Establishment of institutions like office of Provincial Public Service
Commission, Provincial Ombudsman, office of Provincial
Consolidated Fund, etc, as permissible under the Constitution of
Pakistan 1973.
3) Due representation of GB in NFC award and other national level
forums, having representation of federating units.
4) Determination of due share / royalty of projects of national
magnitude, like Diamer Basha Dam, Bunji hydel project and mineral,
tourism and water resources.
5) Safeguarding economic interests of GB in Pak-China Economic
Corridor project.
January 7, 2016: Sajjadul Haq, spokesperson for the chief minister of G-B,
Hafiz Hafeez ur Rehman, told AFP: “A high level committee formed by the
prime minister is working on the issue, you will hear good news soon.” The
committee under the leadership of Sartaj Aziz met thrice till February 3, 2016.
January 12, 2016: On 12 January, Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
leader Yasin Malik wrote a letter to Nawaz Sharif urging him not to change
the status of the occupied J&K territory as it would adversely affect the nature
of Kashmir dispute. “If your government incorporates Gilgit-Baltistan into
Pakistan, and if as a consequence, India consolidates its hold in Kashmir, this
would amount to bartering of people’s aspirations...Kashmir is not about
territory. It is about rights of people. Bartering these rights for land means
killing the aspirations of the people”.
Hurriyat(G) chairman Syed Ali Shah Geelani said Islamabad had
no “constitutional or moral justification” to merge Gilgit Baltistan
 Chronology of Developments in PoK 247

and that such a move would be betrayal of Kashmiris... “It is also

clear violation of the UN resolutions on Kashmir”.
January 13, 2016: AJK’ Legislative Assembly unanimously passed two
resolutions against the proposed move. “Making Gilgit-Baltistan a fifth province
will weaken Pakistan’s national stand on J&K at the international level,” one
of the resolutions said.
“Gilgit-Baltistan was part of the state of J&K and whenever a
plebiscite is conducted the people of Gilgit-Baltistan will also have
the right to decide their future with the people of other parts of the
state of J&K”.... The move to give G-B a provincial status will not
only serve the interests of India but also negate the stand of Pakistan
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army chief General Raheel Sharif
on Kashmir dispute.....”It is time to work for internal autonomy,
political and constitutional rights than taking an initiative that would
lead us towards the division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir”.
The resolutions were presented by Finance Minister Latif Akber and
All J&K Muslim Conference (‘AJK’MC) member Sayab Khalid.
Besides the treasury members, the opposition Pakistan Muslim League
Nawaz PML (N), ‘‘AJK’’ chapter unexpectedly supported the
resolution. Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) and All J&K
Muslim Conference (‘AJK’MC) also supported the resolutions while
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI) member Barrister Sultan Mahmood
did not attend the session.
‘‘AJK’” rehabilitation minister, Abdul Majid Khan said that it was
“our collective responsibility to stand against every move that paves
the way for the division of the state of J&K”.
Sardar Abid Hussain Abid, ‘AJK’ Minister for Information while
talking to the press.
“Any prudent and visionary person cannot take this step which I
believe in all fairness and honesty is bound to harm the Kashmir issue
beyond retrieve.” The alleged Chinese insistence was a ‘lame excuse’.
“China is making investment worth billions in our territory which
too is not part of the federation of Pakistan. Therefore, this logic does
not hold ground,” he said. He pointed out that the GB and ‘AJK’
practically enjoyed the status of de facto provinces of Pakistan, but if
the same status was given official approval, it could cause more damage
than the perceived benefits.... Even if there are some momentary
benefits, for Pakistan, the losses in the long run are far greater.”...
“Nevertheless, if some people want to do it, they should firstly issue
a declaration that the Kashmir issue stands closed from today and
Pakistan doesn’t have any interest in its resolution...
248 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

We have a better status than GB but even then we are not satisfied
with it and have unanimously passed recommendations for
constitutional reforms. And in the same spirit, we support more
constitutional powers for our brethren in Gilgit-Baltistan Even more
than us.... But the federal government should avoid annexing the
territory as a province, lest India may use it a justification to annex
the territories of Jammu and Kashmir under its control”.
On January 24, 2016: Hundreds of people from different political and religious
parties attended the gathering in Islamabad in front of National Press Club,
organised by the Youth of Gilgit-Baltistan, a non-political platform representing
the youth of the area.
They protested what they called “Pakistan’s sidelining of Gilgit-
Baltistan” while launching the CPEC project and imposing taxes in
the area. “CPEC will pass through 600 kilometres area of GB but it
is unfortunate that we are not getting even a single industrial zone
or any project for the development of the area,” Chairman of the GB
Youth’s coordination committee, Hasnain Kazmi .
January 2016: A resolution passed in the G-B legislative assembly demanded
that there should be three hubs of CPEC in GB but only one station is being
given to us for loading and unloading of goods. Moreover, no industrial zone
is being set up in GB.
People of the GB could not get their basic rights even after over 68 years.
Against any division of G-B. Rumours of Gilgit being merged into K-P.
Demand for internet facility. A fibre optic cable is being laid from
China to Pakistan but GB to get internet cable from Rawalpindi
instead of the main line passing through the area from China.
Demand for subsidy on wheat supply. During the previous PPP
government, two million bags of wheat was allocated for GB on 50
per cent subsidised rates, but the new PML-N government initially
decreased the rate of subsidy and later due to public protest, reduced
the number to 1.1 million bags.
February 2, 2016: President Mammon Hussain meets members of GBLA and
said that the government could not afford any compromise on its long-standing
policy on the issue of Kashmir. However, the government, he added, was
sincerely working on different proposals to give the people of Gilgit-Baltistan
more powers in accordance with their expectations. Governor Gilgit-Baltistan
Mir Ghazanfar Ali Khan, Chief Minister Hafiz Hafizur Rehman, federal
minister for Kashmir affairs Birjees Tahir and others were also present during
the meeting.
 Chronology of Developments in PoK 249

March 10, 2017: The Sartaj Aziz committee submits its first Report to the
government. It recommends: (a) de-facto integration of GB with Pakistan but
not a de-jure change since that will affect Pakistan’s principle position on
Kashmir. It recommended delegating further legislative, administrative and
financial powers to GB to enhance the people’s sense of participation and to
improve service delivery. (b) The GB Legislative Assembly be brought on a par
with other the provincial assemblies, with all legislative subjects, other than
those enumerated in article 142 of constitution of Pakistan and its fourth
schedule be devolved from the GB Council to the GB Legislative assembly; (c)
The GB government may be given representation in constitutional bodies like
National Economic Council (NEC), Executive Committee of the National
Economic Council (ECNEC), the National Financial Commission (NFC), and
Indus River System Authority (IRSA) as an observer; (d) One or more SEZs
be set up in GB under CPEC to provide larger employment opportunities for
GB people; and (e) People of Gilgit Baltistan be given special representation
in the parliament.
July 3, 2017: The Sartaj Aziz committee is reconstituted to include the Ministers
of Finance, Lawand Kashmir Affairs.
September 26, 2017:The Committee submits a Supplementary Report making
additional recommendations which include:(a) Provision of funds through an
agreed formula to cover the revenue deficit in GB budget; (b) Transfer of
development funds directly to Gilgit-Baltistan Government rather than through
the ministry of Kashmir Affairs; (c) Shifting of budget of Gilgit Baltistan
Supreme Appellate Court and Chief Court to Gilgit Baltistan Council; (d)
The Ministry of Kashmir Affairs to consult the Government of Gilgit Baltistan.
before extending any federal government notification to Gilgit Baltistan; (e)
Gilgit Baltistan to be accorded ‘Observer’ status in the Executive Committee
of the National Economic Council (ECNEC), the National Economic Council
(NEC), the Indus River System Authority (IRSA)and the Council of Common
Interests (CCI) which was formed under the 1973 Constitution and presently
consists of the Prime Minister of Pakistan and all four provincial Chief
Ministers. The CCI is mandated under the Constitution to meet at least once
in 90 days.
January 3, 2018: The committee headed by Sartaj Aziz submits its report to
then Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi.
February 17, 2018: The federal government decides to remove GB Council
and the powers exercised by the Council are to be shifted to the elected GB
Legislative Assembly.
May 18, 2018: An in-camera session is convened especially to take lawmakers
250 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

into confidence about the draft political and administrative reforms in GB.
The opposition members in GB Legislative Assembly boycott the session.
May 26, 2018: The Government of Gilgit Baltistan Reforms Order 2018 is
promulgated by the local Legislative Assembly dominated by PML-N, 2018,
after the formal approval by the federal cabinet and endorsement by the National
Security Council.
June 1, 2018: The Government of Gilgit Baltistan Reforms Order 2018 is
notified following the approval by the president.
June 20, 2018: Hearing a petition on the legality of the GB Order 2018, the
GB Supreme Appellate Court comes out with a verdict to suspend the GB
Reforms order.
August 7, 2018: The Supreme Court of Pakistan responding to a petition from
the government restores the GB Order on August 7, 2018.
August 2018-October 2018: Several petitions filed in the Supreme Court of
Pakistan challenging various aspects of GB Order of May 2018.
October 17, 2018: A three-judge bench headed by then Chief Justice Saqib
Nisar appointed senior lawyers Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan and Khawaja Haris as
amicus curiae (friend of the court) in the case of appointment of judges in the
courts of the Gilgit-Baltistan. The petitioner argues that the GB Council had
been given extraordinary powers to appoint all the judges including the chief
judge of the GB Supreme Appellate Court, which violated the principle of
independence of the judiciary.
November 16, 2018: The federal government informs the seven-judge Supreme
Court bench, headed by then Chief Justice Mian Saqib Nisar that it has
appointed a high-level committee to examine the constitutional, administrative
and governance reforms for Gilgit-Baltistan. The Committee consists of the
federal minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan as its convener and
the federal law minister, the Attorney General, GB governor, the GB law
minister, the secretaries for defence, foreign affairs and Kashmir and GB Affairs,
the GB chief secretary, and the joint secretary (finance) of GB Council, as its
members.
December 7, 2018: After hearing the case, the Supreme Court orders formation
of a fresh committee to look into the case, with Barrister Aitzaz Ahsan, as a
member. The other members were GB Bar Council vice chairman Javed Ahmed,
petitioner’s counsel Salman Akram Raja, Secretary of the Ministry of Kashmir
Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan Chaudhry Afrasiab and GB Law Minister Aurengzeb
Khan.
 Chronology of Developments in PoK 251

January 7, 2019: A seven-judge bench headed by the chief justice is informed

by Attorney General of Pakistan that the government had drawn up a draft
constitutional amendment bill, which intended to hand over the authority over
law enforcement and administrative matters to the GB government in line with
the Pakistani Constitution. It also reportedly recommended granting of all the
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Pakistani constitution from Article 6
to 25 to the GB citizens.
January 14, 2019: The same seven-judge bench came out with the order which
concurred with the conclusions of the Sartaj Aziz Committee that “further
reforms were required to enhance the sense of participation of the people of
GB and to upgrade the standard of governance and public service delivery”,
however, “the reforms proposed should not prejudice Pakistan’s principled
position in the context of UN resolutions on Kashmir”. It opined that “there
should be no discrepancy in the fundamental rights available to those in GB
relative to Pakistani citizens anywhere in the country”, and “the right to self-
government through an empowered GB Assembly as well as a robust system
of local bodies is entirely uncontroversial and must be enforced as early as
possible”.

ENDNOTES
1. The whole judgment is available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/
Const.P._72_2015.pdf
APPENDICES
 APPENDIX I

The Boundary Agreement Between

China and Pakistan, 1963

The Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of

Pakistan;
Having agreed, with a view to ensuring to prevailing peace and tranquility on the
border, to formally delimit and demarcate the boundary between China’s Sinkiang
and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of
Pakistan, in a spirit of fairness, reasonableness, mutual understanding and mutual
accommodation, and on the basis of the ten principles as enunciated in the Bandung
conference;
Being convinced that this would not only give full expression to the desire of the
peoples of China and Pakistan for the development of good neighbourly and
friendly relations, but also help safeguard Asian and world peace.
Have resolved for this purpose to conclude the present agreement and have
appointed as their respective plenipotentiaries the following:
For the Government of the People’s Republic of China; Chen Yi, Minister of
Foreign Affairs;
For the Government of Pakistan; Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of External
Affairs;
Who, having mutually examined their full powers and found them to be in good
and due form, have agreed upon the following:

Article 1
In view of the fact that the boundary between China’s Sinkiang and contiguous
areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan has never been
formally delimited, two parties agree to delimit it on the basis of the traditional
customary boundary line including natural features and in a spirit of equality,
mutual benefit and friendly co-operation.
256 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Article 2
(One) In accordance with the principle expounded in Article 1 of the present
agreement, the two parties have fixed, as follows the alignment of the entire
boundary line between China’s Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of
which is under the actual control of Pakistan:
(1) Commencing from its north-western extremity at height 5630 metres (a
peak, the reference co-ordinates of which are approximately longitude 74 degrees
34 minutes east and latitude 37 degrees 03 minutes north), the boundary line runs
generally eastward and then southeastward strictly along the main watershed
between the tributaries of the Tashkurgan river of the Tarim river system on the
one hand and tributaries of the Hunza river of the Indus river system on the other
hand, passing through the Kalik Daban (Dawan), the Mintake Daban (pass), the
Kharchanai Daban (named on the Chinese map only), the Mutsjilga Daban (named
on the Chinese map only), and the Parpik Pass (named on the Pakistan map only),
and reaches the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (Pass).
(2) After passing through the Khunjerab (Yutr) Daban (pass), the boundary
line runs generally southward along the above mentioned main watershed up to a
mountain-top south of this Daban (pass), where it leaves the main watershed to
follow the crest of a spur lying generally in a southeasterly direction, which is the
watershed between the Akijilga river (a nameless corresponding river on the Pakistan
map) on the one hand, and the Taghumbash (Oprang) river and the Koliman Su
(Oprang Jilga) on the other hand.
According to the map of the Chinese side, the boundary line, after leaving the
southeastern extremity of this spur, runs along a small section of the middle line of
the bed of the Keliman Su to reach its confluence with the Kelechin river. According
to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary line, after leaving the southeastern
extremity of the spur, reaches the sharp bend of the Shaksgam or Muztagh River.
(3) From the aforesaid point, the boundary line runs up the Kelechin river
(Shaksgam or Mistagh river) along the middle line of its bed to its confluence
(reference co-ordinates approximately longitude 76 degrees 02 minutes east and
latitude 36 degrees 26 minutes north) with the Snorbulak Daria (shimshal river or
Braldu river).
(4) From the confluence of the aforesaid two rivers, the boundary line,
according to the map of the Chinese side, ascends the crest of a spur and runs
along it to join the Karokoram range main watershed at a mountain-top (reference
co-ordinates approximately longitude 75 degrees 54 minutes east and latitude 36
degrees 15 minutes north) which on this map is shown as belonging to the
Shorgulak mountain. According to the map of the Pakistan side, the boundary
line from the confluence of the above-mentioned two rivers ascends the crest of a
 The Boundary Agreement Between China and Pakistan, 1963 257

corresponding spur and runs along it, passing through height 6520 metres (21,390
feet) till it joins the Karakoram range main watershed at a peak (reference co-
ordinates approximately longitude 75 degrees 57 minutes east and latitude 36
degrees 03 minutes north).
(5) Thence, the boundary line, running generally southward and then eastward,
strictly follows the Karakoram range main watershed which separates the Tarim
river drainage system from the Indus river drainage system, passing through the
east Mustagh pass (Mustagh pass), the top of the Chogri peak (K-2), the top of
the broad peak, the top of the Gasherbrum mountain 8068, the Indirakoli pass
(names on the Chinese maps only) and the top of the Teram Kankri peak, and
reaches its southeastern extremity at the Karakoram pass.
(Two) The alignment of the entire boundary line as described in section one
of this article, has been drawn on the one million scale map of the Chinese side in
Chinese and the one million scale map of the Pakistan side in English which are
signed and attached to the present agreement. (Not attached in this book)
(Three) In view of the fact that the maps of the two sides are not fully identical
in their representation of the topographical features the two parties have agreed
that the actual features on the ground shall prevail, so far as the location and
alignment of the boundary described in Section one is concerned, and that they
will be determined as far as possible by joint survey on the ground.

Article 3
The two parties have agreed that:
Wherever the boundary follows a river, the middle line of the river, the middle
line of the river bed shall be the boundary line; and that
Wherever the boundary passes through Daban (pass), the water-parting line
thereof shall be the boundary line.

Article 4
I. The two parties have agreed to set up, as soon as possible, a joint boundary
demarcation commission. Each side will appoint a chairman, one or more members
and a certain number of advisers and technical staff. The joint boundary
demarcation commission is charged with the responsibility, in accordance with
the provisions of the present agreement, to hold concrete discussions on and carry
out the following tasks jointly:
(1) To conduct necessary surveys of the boundary area on the ground, as stated
in Article 2 of the present agreement, so as to set up boundary markers at places
considered to the appropriate by the two parties and to delineate the boundary
line of the jointly prepared accurate maps.
258 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(2) To draft a protocol setting forth in detail the alignment of the entire
boundary line and the location of all the boundary markers and prepare and get
printed detailed maps, to be attached to the protocol, with the boundary line and
the location of the boundary markers shown on them.
II. The aforesaid protocol, upon being signed by the representatives of the
Government of the two countries, shall become an annex to the present agreement,
and the detailed maps shall replace the maps attached to the present agreement.
III. Upon the conclusion of the above-mentioned protocol, the tasks of the joint
boundary demarcation commission shall be terminated.

Article 5
The two Parties have agreed that any dispute concerning the boundary, which may
arise after the delimitation of the boundary line actually existing between the two
countries shall be settled peacefully by the two parties through friendly
consultations.

Article 6
The two Parties have agreed that after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute between
Pakistan and India, the sovereign authority concerned will reopen negotiations
with the Government of the People’s Republic of China, on the boundary as
described in Article Two of the present Agreement, so as to sign a formal Boundary
Treaty to replace the present agreement:
Provided that in the event of that sovereign authority being Pakistan, the
provisions of this agreement and the aforesaid Protocol shall be maintained in the
formal Boundary Treaty to be signed between the Peoples Republic of China and
Pakistan.

Ariticle 7
The present agreement shall come into force on the date of its signature.
Done in duplicate in Peking on the second day of March, 1963, in the Chinese
and English language, both texts being eqully authentic.

Marshal Chen Yi, Zulfikar Ali Bhutoo,

Plenipotentiary of the Plenipotentiary of the
Government of the Government of Pakistan
People’s Republic of China
 APPENDIX II

Karachi Agreement

Heads of agreement between Hon’ble Minister without Portfolio.The

President of All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference and the President
of the Azad Kashmir Government.

Civil Administration and Azad Kashmir Areas

(i) The Azad Kashmir Cabinet shall formulate policy and generally supervise
administration in Azad Kashmir area. Day to day administration hall
however, be entrusted to executive officers viz. the Heads of Departments
who shall also be secretaries to government for their respective
Departments.
(ii) Besides the Heads of Departments the Azad Kashmir Government will
have only the following two secretaries:
1. Secretary, Finance Department, and
2. Cabinet Secretary.
The Cabinet Secretary besides maintaining records of Cabinet
proceedings will be directly responsible to keep the Cabinet well-posted
with all matters connected with the plebiscite and for all correspondence
with the Plebiscite Administrator.
(iii) The details of the set up will be as follows:

Subjects Head of Deptt.-cum-Secretary Minister Incharge

1. Law and Order Commissioner-cum-Chief Hon’ble president
Including Jails Secretary
and Police
2. Food and Civil Director of Food and Civil Minister for Civil
Supplies Supplies and Secretary to Supplies
Government Civil Supplies
Deptt.
260 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
3. Revenues (include- Commissioner-cum-Chief Revenue & Finance
ing Forests, Chief Secretary. Minister
Customs) and
Public Works.
4. Finance Minister Finance Secretary Revenue & Finance
5. Rehabilitation & Director of Rehabilitation Minister for
Secretary Rehabilitation Rehabilitation
Deptt.
6. Medical & Health Director of Health Services & Minister for Health and
Secretary Health Services Education
7. Education Secretary Director of Education & Ministry of Health and
Education Education
8. Cabinet & Cabinet Secretary Hon’ble President
Plebiscite Works

(iv) No one below the rank of Head of Department/Secretary shall have

access to the Ministers and orders to lower staff shall always be
communicated through the head of Department/Secretary
(v) Heads of Department/Secretaries shall submit all important cases to their
Ministers and shall generally keep them fully informed of developments
in their respective Departments.
(vi) Heads of Department/Secretaries who are at present located outside Azad
Kashmir area may continue to be so located. But they would meet their
Ministers once or twice a week and put up cases on which orders of
Ministers have to be obtained.
(vii) Whenever a Head of Department feels that an order passed by an Hon’ble
Minister needs revision, he would bring the case to the notice of the
Commissioner who in capacity as Chief Secretary to the Azad Kashmir
Government, will endeavour to have the matter satisfactory settled, if
necessary, in consultation with the Chief Plebiscite Adviser to the Pakistan
Government, who will also be notified by the Azad Kashmir Government
as their Chief Advisor.
(viii) Officers loaned to Azad Kashmir Government will formally appointed
as Officers-on-Specific Duty with the Chief Plebiscite Adviser and their
services will informally be placed at the disposal of Azad Kashmir
Government who would formally appoint them to office by notification
in their own Gazette. All correspondence of the Azad Kashmir
Government with the Secretariat of the Minister without Portfolio,
Government of Pakistan, will be through the Chief Plebiscite Advisor.
(ix) Pending the appointment of a Public Service Commission for Azad
Kashmir an ad hoc Committee consisting of the following may be
 Karachi Agreement 261

appointed to recommend future recruitment and promotions in services

in Azad Kashmir Government.
1. Commissioner (Chairman).
2. Judge of Azad Kashmir High Court.
3. The Head of the Department concerned.
4. Cabinet Secretary as Member-Secretary.

II. Financial Arrangements

(i) Monies advanced to the A.K. Government for specific purposes shall be
spent for those purposes and no other. The Pakistan Government shall
satisfy themselves that they have been properly spent.
(ii) Moneys advanced to the A.K. Government as general grants-in-aid shall
be given only after the A.K. Government has produced a budget statement
for the Government as a whole. In the case of these funds, the Government
of Pakistan shall satisfy themselves that A.K. Government spend according
to the budget proposals. For this purpose, they may ask for periodical
statement of account from that Government.
(iii) The Pakistan Government shall loan the services of an Accounts Officer
for employment as Accountant General of the Azad Kashmir
Government.

III. Division of functions between the Government of Pakistan, The Azad

Kashmir Government and the Muslim Conference.
A. Matters within the Purview of Pakistan Government
(i) Defence, (Complete Control over A.K. Government).
(ii) Negotiations with U.N.C.I.P.
(iii) Foreign Policy of A.K. Government.
(iv) Publicity in Pakistan and Foreign Countries.
(v) Coordination of arrangements for relief and rehabilitation of refugees.
(vi) All activities within Pakistan itself with regard to Kashmir such as
procurement of food and civil supplies transport, running of refugee
camps, medical arrangements etc.
(vii) All affairs of the Gilgit and Ladakh areas under the control of Political
Agent at Gilgit.
B. Matters within the Purview of A.K. Government
(i) Policy with regard to administration in Azad Kashmir.
(ii) General Supervision of administration in Azad Kashmir.
(iii) Publicity with regard to activities of the A.K. Government and its
administration.
262 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(iv) Advise to H.M. without portfolio with regard to negotiations with

U.N.C.I.P.
(v) Development of economic resources of A.K. area.

C. Matters within the Purview of Muslim Conference

(i) Publicity with regard to plebiscite in A.K. Government.
(ii) Field work and publicity in the Indian occupied area of the State.
(iii) Organisation of political activities in the A.K. and the Indian occupied
areas of the State.
(iv) Preliminary arrangements in connection with plebiscite.
(v) Organisation for contesting the plebiscite.
(vi) Political work and publicity among Kashmir refugees in Pakistan.
(vii) General guidance of the A.K. Government.
(viii) Advice to H.M. without portfolio with regard to negotiations with
U.N.C.I.P.

Sd/- Sd/- Sd/-

(Mohammad Ibrahim) (Ghulam Abbas) (M.A. Gurmani)
President Azad Kashmir Govt. President All Jammu and Minister without
Muslim Conference Portfolio, Govt. of
Pakistan.
28/4/49 28/4
 APPENDIX III

Simla Agreement, July 2, 1972

The Simla Agreement signed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan on 2nd July 1972 was much more than a peace
treaty seeking to reverse the consequences of the 1971 war (i.e. to bring about
withdrawals of troops and an exchange of PoWs). It was a comprehensive blue
print for good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan. Under the Simla
Agreement both countries undertook to abjure conflict and confrontation which
had marred relations in the past, and to work towards the establishment of durable
peace, friendship and cooperation.
The Simla Agreement contains a set of guiding principles, mutually agreed to
by India and Pakistan, which both sides would adhere to while managing relations
with each other. These emphasize: respect for each other’s territorial integrity and
sovereignty; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; respect for each others
unity, political independence; sovereign equality; and abjuring hostile propaganda.
The following principles of the Agreement are, however, particularly noteworthy:
• A mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through
direct bilateral approaches.
• To build the foundations of a cooperative relationship with special focus
on people to people contacts.
• To uphold the inviolability of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir,
which is a most important CBM between India and Pakistan, and a key to
durable peace.
India has faithfully observed the Simla Agreement in the conduct of its relations
with Pakistan.

SIMLA AGREEMENT
Agreement on Bilateral Relations Between The Government of India and The
Government of Pakistan:
1. The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are resolved that
264 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have
hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and
harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the sub-
continent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources and
energies to the pressing talk of advancing the welfare of their peoples.
2. In order to achieve this objective, the Government of India and the
Government of Pakistan have agreed as follows:
o That the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations
shall govern the relations between the two countries;
o That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful
means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means
mutually agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any
of the problems between the two countries, neither side shall unilaterally
alter the situation and both shall prevent the organization, assistance or
encouragement of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and
harmonious relations;
o That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and durable
peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to peaceful
co-existence, respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, on the basis of equality
and mutual benefit;
o That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have bedevilled the
relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved
by peaceful means;
o That they shall always respect each other’s national unity, territorial integrity,
political independence and sovereign equality;
o That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will refrain
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of each other.
3. Both Governments will take all steps within their power to prevent hostile
propaganda directed against each other. Both countries will encourage the
dissemination of such information as would promote the development of
friendly relations between them.
4. In order progressively to restore and normalize relations between the two
countries step by step, it was agreed that;
o Steps shall be taken to resume communications, postal, telegraphic, sea,
land including border posts, and air links including overflights.
o Appropriate steps shall be taken to promote travel facilities for the nationals
of the other country.
 Simla Agreement 265

o Trade and co-operation in economic and other agreed fields will be resumed
as far as possible.
o Exchange in the fields of science and culture will be promoted.
In this connection delegations from the two countires will meet from time to
time to work out the necessary details.
5. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of durable peace, both the
Governments agree that:
o Indian and Pakistani forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the
international border.
o In Jammu and Kashmir, the line of control resulting from the cease-fire of
December 17, 1971 shall be respected by both sides without prejudice to
the recognized position of either side. Neither side shall seek to alter it
unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations.
Both sides further undertake to refrain from the threat or the use of force
in violation of this Line.
o The withdrawals shall commence upon entry into force of this Agreement
and shall be completed within a period of 30 days thereof.
6. This Agreement will be subject to ratification by both countries in accordance
with their respective constitutional procedures, and will come into force with
effect from the date on which the Instruments of Ratification are exchanged.
7. Both Governments agree that their respective Heads will meet again at a
mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, the
representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further the modalities and
arrangements for the establishment of durable peace and normalization of
relations, including the questions of repatriation of prisoners of war and civilian
internees, a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir and the resumption of
diplomatic relations.

Sd/- Sd/-
(Indira Gandhi) (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)
Prime Minister President
Republic of India Islamic Republic of Pakistan
 APPENDIX IV

‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment)

Act, 2018

“Muzaffarabad”
Dated: The 2nd day of June, 2018
No.LD/Legis-Act/37-52/2018. The following Act of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir,
passed by the Joint Sitting and assented by the President on the 1st day of June,
2018, is hereby published for general information:
[Act III of 2018]
An Act
further to amend the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974
WHEREAS it is expedient further to amend the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim
Constitution Act, 1974 (VIII of 1974), for the purposes hereinafter appearing;
It is hereby enacted as follows:-
1. Short title and commencement. - (1) This Act may be called the Azad Jammu
and Kashmir Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018.
(2) It shall come into force at once.
2. Amendment in the Preamble of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim
Constitution Act, 1974. - In the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution
Act, 1974 (VIII of 1974), hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in the Preamble,
between third and fourth paragraphs, the following new paragraphs shall be inserted:-
“AND WHEREAS the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the
individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements
of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah;
AND WHEREAS, it is necessary to cause further empowerment of the
Legislative Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Azad Government of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir as being chosen representative of the people of Azad
Jammu and Kashmir to exhaustively exercise their legislative powers and executive
authority, as the case may be, for the better governance, socio-economic
development and in particular for general welfare of people of Azad Jammu and
Kashmir in the sustained manner and other matters ancillary thereto beside
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 267

pursuing and fostering our cause of securing self-determination under the UN

Charter and according to the UNCIP Resolutions through the democratic method
of free and fair plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations;”
3. General amendment in the Constitution. - In the Constitution, -
(i) for the words “this Act” wherever occurring, the words “the
Constitution” shall be substituted and referred as such;
(ii) for the words “Section” and “sub-section”, wherever occurring, the
words “Article” and “sub-Article” shall be substituted and referred as
such respectively.
4. Amendment of Article 1 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, sub-Article
(1) of Article 1 shall be substituted as under, -
“(1) This Constitution shall henceforth be known as the Azad Jammu and
Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974.”
5. Amendment of Article 2 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
2, in sub-Article (1),-
(i) the definition of term ‘Joint Sitting’ shall be omitted;
(ii) in the definition of term ‘Judge’, between the words “an” and
“additional”, the words “ad-hoc Judge of the Supreme Court and”
shall be inserted.
(iii) in the definition of term ‘Service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ the
words “or Advisor appointed under Article 21” shall be omitted.
(iv) for sub-Article (2), the following shall be substituted:-
“(2) In the Constitution, Act of the Assembly, shall include an
Ordinance promulgated under sub-Article (1) of Article 41.”
6. Addition of new Article 3-A to 3-J of the Constitution. - In the Constitution,
after Article 3, the following new Article 3-A, 3-B, 3-C, 3-D, 3-E, 3-F, 3-G, 3-H,
3-I, and 3-J shall be added, namely. -
“3-A. Principles of Policy. - (1) The Principles set out in Article 3-A, 3-
B, 3-C, 3-D, 3-E, 3-F, 3-G, 3-H, 3-I and 3-J shall be known as the
Principles of Policy, and it is the responsibility of each organ and authority
of the State, and of each person performing functions on behalf of an
organ or authority of the State, to act in accordance with these Principles
in so far as they relate to the functions of the organ or authority.
(2) In so far as the observance of any particular Principle of Policy may be
dependent upon resources being available for the purpose, the Principle
shall be regarded as being subject to the availability of resources.
(3) In respect of each year, the President shall cause to be prepared and
laid before the Assembly, a report on the observance and implementation
of the Principles of Policy and provision shall be made in the rules of
procedure of the Assembly for discussion on such report.
268 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

3-B. Responsibility with respect to Principles of Policy. - (1) The

responsibility of deciding whether any action of an organ or authority of
the State, or of a person performing functions on behalf of an organ or
authority of the State, is in accordance with the Principles of Policy is
that of the organ or authority of the State, or of the person, concerned.
(2) The validity of an action or of a law shall not be called in question on
the ground that it is not in accordance with the Principles of Policy, and
no action shall lie against the State or any organ or authority of the State
or any person on such ground.
3-C. Islamic way of life. - (1) Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslim
State Subjects, individually and collectively, to order their lives in
accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam
and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the
meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
(2) The state shall endeavor, as respects the Muslims of State:-
(a) to make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to
encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic language and to secure
correct and exact printing and publishing of the Holy Quran;
(b) to promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral standards;
and
(c) to secure the proper organization of zakat, usher, auqaf and mosques.
3-D. Promotion of local Government institutions. - The State shall
encourage local Government institutions composed of elected
representatives of the areas concerned and in such institutions special
representation will be given to peasants, workers and women.
3-E. Parochial and other similar prejudices to be discouraged. - The State
shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal and sectarian prejudices among
the State Subjects.
3-F. Full participation of women in life. - Steps shall be taken to ensure
full participation of women in all spheres of life.
3-G. Protection of family, etc. - The State shall protect the marriage, the
family, the mother and the child.
3-H. Protection of minorities. - The State shall safeguard the legitimate
rights and interests of minorities including their due representation in the
Service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
3-I. Promotion of social justice and eradication of social evils. - The
State shall,-
(a) promote, with special care, the educational and economic interests of
backward classes or areas;
(b) remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education
within minimum possible period;
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 269

(c) make technical and professional education generally available and

higher education equally accessible to all on the basis of merit;
(d) ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice;
(e) make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work,
ensuring that children and women are not employed in vocations
unsuited to their age or sex, and for maternity benefits for women in
employment;
(f ) enable the people of different areas, through education, training,
agricultural and industrial development and other methods, to
participate fully in all forms of national activities, including
employment in the service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir;
(g) prevent prostitution, gambling and taking of injurious drugs, printing,
publication, circulation and display of obscene literature and
advertisements;
(h) prevent the consumption of alcoholic liquor otherwise than for
medicinal and, in the case of non-Muslims, religious purposes; and
(i) decentralise the Government administration so as to facilitate
expeditious disposal of its business to meet the convenience and
requirements of the public.
3-J. Promotion of social and economic well-being of the people. - The
State shall, -
(a) secure the well-being of the people, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or
race, by raising their standard of living, by preventing the concentration
of wealth and means of production and distribution in the hands of a
few to the detriment of general interest and by ensuring equitable
adjustment of rights between employers and employees, and landlords
and tenants;
(b) provide for all citizens, within the available resources of the State,
facilities for work and adequate livelihood with reasonable rest and
leisure;
(c) provide for all persons employed in the service or otherwise, social
security by compulsory social insurance or other means;
(d) reduce disparity in the income and earnings of individuals, including
persons in the various classes of the service; and
(e) eliminate riba as early as possible.
7. Amendment of Article 4 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in sub-
Article (4) of Article 4, in paragraphs relating to fundamental rights,-
(i) in paragraph 1, between the words “of” and “liberty” the words “life
or” shall be inserted;
(ii) in paragraph 2, for the sub- paragraph (4) and (5), the following shall
be substituted, namely:-
270 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

“(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall be made except

to deal with persons acting in a manner prejudicial to the integrity,
security or defense of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Pakistan or any
part thereof, or public order, or the maintenance of supplies or services,
and no such law shall authorize the detention of a person for a period
exceeding three months unless the Review Board has, after affording
him an opportunity of being heard in person, reviewed his case and
reported, before the expiration of the said period, that there is, in its
opinion, sufficient cause for such detention, and, if the detention is
continued after the said period of three months, unless the Review
Board has reviewed his case and reported, before the expiration of
each period of three months, that there is, in its opinion, sufficient
cause for such detention.
Explanation-I: In this clause, “the Review Board” means a Board
appointed by the Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir consisting
of a Chairman and two other persons, each of whom is or has been a
Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court.
Explanation-II: The opinion of the Review Board shall be expressed
in terms of the views of the majority of its members.
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under
any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the
order shall, within fifteen days from such detention, communicate to
such person the grounds on which the order has been made, and shall
afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against
the order:
Provided that the authority making any such order may refuse to
disclose facts which such authority considers it to be against the public
interest to disclose.
(6) The authority making the order shall furnish to the Review Board
all documents relevant to the case unless a certificate, signed by a
Secretary to the Government concerned, to the effect that it is not in
the public interest to furnish any documents, is produced.
(7) Within a period of twenty four months commencing on the day of
his first detention in pursuance of an order made under a law providing
for preventive detention, no person shall be detained in pursuance of any
such order for more than a total period of eight months in the case of a
person detained for acting in a manner prejudicial to public order and
twelve months in any other case:
Provided that this clause shall not apply to any person who is employed
by, or works for, or acts on instructions received from, the enemy, or who
is acting or attempting to act in a manner prejudicial to the integrity,
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 271

security or defense of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Pakistan or any part

thereof or who commits or attempts to commit any act which amounts
to an anti-national activity as defined in a law or is a member of any
association which has for its objects, or which indulges in, any such anti-
national activity.
(8) The Review Board shall determine the place of detention of the person
detained and for a reasonable subsistence allowance for his family.
(9) Nothing in this clause shall apply to any person who for the time being
is an enemy alien.
(iii) In paragraph 3,-
(a) in sub-paragraph (2), between the words “labour” and “are” the
words “and traffic in human beings” shall be inserted and
thereafter the following new sub-paragraph (2-a) shall be added;
“(2-a) No child below the age of fourteen years shall be engaged
in any factory or mine or any other hazardous employment.”
(b) the full stop at the end of clause (b) of sub-paragraph (3) shall be
substituted by a colon and thereafter the following proviso shall
be added:
“Provided that no compulsory service shall be of a cruel nature or
incompatible with human dignity.”
(iv) for paragraph 7, the following shall be substituted, namely:-
“7. Freedom of association. - (1) Every State Subject shall have the right
to form association or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions
imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and
Azad Jammu and Kashmir, morality or public order.
(2 ) Every State Subject, not being in the Service of Azad Jammu and
Kashmir, shall have the right to form or be a member of a political party,
subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of
the sovereignty or integrity of the State and such law shall provide that
where the Government declares that any political party has been formed
or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of
the State, the Government shall, within fifteen days of such declaration,
refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference
shall be final.
(3) No person or political party in Azad Jammu and Kashmir shall be
permitted to propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or
detrimental to, the ideology of the State’s accession to Pakistan.
(4) Every political party shall account for the source of its funds in
accordance with law.”
(v) in paragraph 8, in clause (c),-
(a) the words “or Council” appearing between the words
272 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

“Government” and “or” shall be omitted; and

(b) the words and comma “or the Council,” appearing between the
words “Government” and “of ” shall be omitted.
(vi) In the paragraph 14,-
(a) in sub-paragraph (3), in clause (b), after the words “under any
law” , at the end, the words and brackets, “(not being property
which has ceased to be evacuee property under any law)” shall
be added; and
(b) after sub-paragraph (3), the following new sub-paragraph (4) shall
be added,-
“(4) The adequacy or otherwise of any compensation provided for by any
such law as is referred to in this Article, or determined in pursuance thereof,
shall not be called in question in any court.”
(vii) For paragraph 15, the following shall be substituted, namely. -
“15. Equality of State Subjects. - (1) All State Subjects are equal before
law and are entitled to equal protection of law.
(2) There shall be no discrimination against any State Subject on the basis
of sex.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the state from making any special
provision for the protection of women and children.
(viii) The paragraph 16 shall be renumbered into sub-paragraph (1)
and thereafter the following new sub-paragraph (2) shall be added,
namely,-
“(2) Nothing in sub-Article (1) shall prevent the state from making any
special provision for women and children.”
(ix) For paragraph 17, the following shall be substituted namely:-
“17. Safeguard against discrimination in services. - No State Subject
otherwise qualified for appointment in the service of Azad Jammu and
Kashmir shall be discriminated against in respect of any such appointment
on the ground only of race, religion, caste, residence, sex or place of birth:
Provided that in the interest of the said service, specified posts or services
may be reserved for members of either sex if such posts or services entail
the performance of duties and functions which cannot be adequately
performed by members of the other sex:
Provided further that under-representation of any class or area in the service
of State may be redressed in such manner as may be determined by an
Act of Assembly.
(x) After paragraph 18, the following new paragraphs 19, 20, 21, 22,
23 and 24 shall be added, namely:-
“19. Right to fair trial. - For the determination of his civil rights and
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 273

obligations or in any criminal charge against him, a person shall be entitled

to a fair trial and due process.
20. Protection against double punishment and self- incrimination. - No
person shall,-
(i) be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once;
or
(ii) when accused of an offence, be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
21. Inviolability of dignity of man, etc. -
(i) The dignity of man and, subject to law, the privacy of home, shall
be inviolable.
(ii) No person shall be subjected to torture for the purpose of
extracting evidence.
22. Right to information. - Every State Subject shall have the right to
have access to information in all matters of public importance subject to
regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law.
23. Right to education. - The State shall provide free and compulsory
education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner
as may be determined by law.
24. Preservation of language, script and culture. - Without prejudice to
the national language of Azad Jammu and Kashmir as may be declared by
the Government, any section of society having a distinct language, script
or culture shall have the right to preserve and promote the same and subject
to law, establish institutions for that purpose.”
8. Amendment of Article 5 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
5, in sub-Article (1), for the words “Joint Sitting”, appearing twice, the word
“Assembly” shall be substituted.
9. Amendment of Article 6 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
6, for the words “Joint Sitting”, wherever appearing, the word “Assembly” shall be
substituted.
10. Amendment of Article 12 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
12, the words and comma “Subject to this Act,” shall be omitted.
11. Amendment of Article 14 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
14, in sub-Article (1), the proviso, shall be substituted as under:-
“Provided that from next term of Assembly, total strength of Ministers in the
cabinet shall not exceed thirty percent of the total membership of the Assembly.”
12. Substitution of Article 14-A of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
Article 14-A the following shall be substituted, namely:-
“14-A. Appointment of Advisors, Special Assistants and Parliamentary
274 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Secretaries. - (1) The Prime Minister may appoint Advisors and Special
Assistants to Government, of whom total strength in each case shall not
exceed two, for the performance of such duties and functions as may be
prescribed by law.
(2) The Prime Minister may also appoint Parliamentary Secretaries, not
exceeding five from amongst the members of the Assembly to perform such
functions as may be prescribed by law.
(3) The Advisor, Special Assistant or Parliamentary Secretary, as the case may
be, by writing under his hand addressed to the Prime Minister, may resign from
his office or may be removed from his office by the Prime Minister.”
13. Amendment of Article 17 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in sub-
Article (3) of Article 17, for the comma and words “, for any reason, the Prime
Minister is unable to perform his functions” the words “the Prime Minister is
unable to perform his functions due to physical incapacitation or sickness” shall
be substituted.
14. Amendment of Article 18 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for sub-
Article (1) of Article 18, the following shall be substituted, namely,-
“(1) A resolution for a vote of no-confidence (hereinafter in this Article
referred to as the resolution) moved by not less than twenty five per centum
of the total membership of the Assembly may be passed against the Prime
Minister by the Assembly.”
15. Substitution of Article 19 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
Article 19, the following shall be substituted, namely:-
“19. Extent of executive authority of Government. - (1) The executive
authority of the Government shall extend to the matters with respect to
which the Assembly has power to make laws including Part-B of Third
Schedule and shall be so exercised as,-
(a) not to impede or prejudice the responsibilities of Government of
Pakistan in relation to the matters specified in sub-Article (3) of
Article 31; and
(b) to secure compliance with the laws made in relation to matters
specified in Third Schedule as set out under sub-Article (3) of
Article 31.
(2) The Government, if deems necessary or expedient in the public interest
and to secure paramount purpose of social and economic wellbeing of the people
of the State, may with the consent of the Government of Pakistan, entrust, either
conditionally or unconditionally, to the Government of Pakistan or to any of its
subordinate authority including a ministry, division, organization or statutory body
or entity of Pakistan, to perform any of such functions within territory of the State
as may be prescribed by law.
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 275

(3) The Government of Pakistan may also entrust, either conditionally or

unconditionally, any of its functions to the Government in relation to any matter
specified in Part-B of the ‘Third Schedule’ as set out under sub-Article (3).
(4) The relationship between Government of Pakistan with the Government
shall be such as manifested in sub-Article (3) of Article 31 and the Cabinet Division
D.O. No. 8/9/70-Cord-1 dated the 11th May, 1971 of the Government of Pakistan
with respect to peculiar political status of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and shall be
the guiding principles to maintain direct working relationship of Government with
the Government of Pakistan.”.
16. Amendment of Article 21 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
21,-
(i) sub-Articles (7), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13) shall be omitted;
and
(ii) sub-Article (14) shall be renumbered as sub-Article (7) thereof and
thereafter the following new sub-Article (8) shall be added, namely:-
“(8) The Council shall have an advisory role in respect of matters and
subjects, referred to in sub-Article (3) of Article 31 and in respect of
the responsibilities of Government of Pakistan under the UNCIP
Resolutions.”.
17. Amendment of Article 22 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
22,-
(i) in sub-Article (1), for the words “forty nine” the words “fifty three”
shall be substituted;
(ii) for clause (a) of sub-Article (1), the following shall be substituted,
namely;-
“(a) forty five shall be elected directly on the basis of adult franchise,
out of whom,-
(i) thirty three members to be elected by the State Subjects residing
in the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as
defined in Article 2:
Provided that this amendment shall take effect from the next term
of the Assembly;
(ii) six members to be elected from amongst themselves by the refugees
from the occupied areas of districts of Muzaffarabad, Anantnag
(Islamabad) and Baramula as these existed on the 14th day of
August, 1947, who are now residing in any of the province of
Pakistan;
(iii) six members to be elected from amongst themselves by such of
the State Subjects from occupied areas of districts of Jammu,
Kathua, Reasi, Udhampur, Poonch State and Mirpur as existed
276 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

on the 14th day of August, 1947 and Mangla Dam affectees who
are now residing in any of the province of Pakistan:
Provided that the members represented under sub-clauses (ii) and
(iii), hereinabove, shall be deemed to have been elected and shall
always to have been validly represented and elected under this
Article.
18. Amendment of Article 27 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for sub-
Article (3) of Article 27, the following shall be substituted, namely:-
“(3) The Assembly shall meet for not less than sixty working days in each
year.”.
19. Amendment of Article 30-A of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in
Article 30-A, the words “or the Council or the joint sitting” shall be omitted.
20. Substitution of Article 31 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
Article 31, the following shall be substituted, namely:-
“31. Legislative Power. - (1) Subject to sub-Article (3) the Assembly shall
have the power to make laws,-
(a) for the territories of Azad Jammu and Kashmir;
(b) for all state subjects, wherever they may be; and
(c) for all persons in the Service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, wherever
they may be.
(2) The Assembly shall have exclusive power to make laws on any matter not
enumerated in Part-A of the Third Schedule.
(3) The Government of Pakistan shall have exclusive power to make laws with
respect to any matter enumerated in ‘Part-A’ of the Third Schedule.
(4) The Assembly shall, with the consent of Government of Pakistan, make
laws with respect to any matters enumerated in ‘Part-B’ of the Third Schedule.
(5) All taxes including the income tax shall be levied for the purposes of the
territories of Azad Jammu and Kashmir by or under the authority of an Act of the
Assembly.
(6) No law shall be repugnant to the teachings and requirements of Islam as
set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah and all existing laws shall be brought in
conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
Explanation.—In the application of this sub-Article to the personal law of
any Muslim sect, the expression “Quran and Sunnah” shall mean the Quran and
Sunnah as interpreted by that sect.”.
21. Substitution of Article 32 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, Article
32 shall be substituted as under,-
“32. Council of Islamic Ideology. - (1) There shall be a Council of Islamic
Ideology, hereinafter referred to as the Islamic Council.
(2) The Islamic Council shall consist of such members, being not less than
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 277

five nor more than ten, as the President may appoint, on the advice of the Prime
Minister, from amongst persons having knowledge of principles and philosophy
of Islam as enunciated in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, or understanding of the
economic, political, legal or administrative problems of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
(3) While appointing members of Islamic Council, the President shall ensure
that,-
(a) so far as practicable, various school of thought are represented in the
Islamic Council
(b) not less than one of the members are persons each of whom is or has
been a judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court; and
(c) not less than one third of the members are persons each of whom has
been engaged for a period of not less than fifteen years, in Islamic
research or instruction.
(4) The President shall appoint one of the members of Islamic Council to be
Chairman of Islamic Council.
(5) If one-third members of the total strength of the Assembly so requires, the
Assembly may refer to Islamic Council or Islamic Ideology Council of Pakistan
constituted under Article 228 of the Constitution of Pakistan, for solicitation of
advice as to whether a proposed law is or is not repugnant to the injunctions of
Islam:
Provided that the Government may also make such reference for advice of
Islamic Council or Islamic Ideology Council of Pakistan, if deems expedient in
the public interest.
(6) When a proposed law or a question is referred under sub-Article (6), the
Islamic Council, or the Islamic Ideology Council of Pakistan, as the case may be,
shall, within fifteen days, inform the Assembly or the Government of the period
within which the council expects to be able to furnish that advice:
Provided that the Islamic Council may refer the question so received, with or
without its opinion, to the Council of Islamic Ideology of Pakistan for advice.
(7) Where the Assembly considers that in the public interest, the making of
the proposed law in relation to which the question arose should not be postponed
until the advice of the Islamic Council or Islamic Ideology Council of Pakistan is
furnished, the law may be made before the advice is furnished;
Provided that, where a law is referred for advice under sub-Article (7) and it
is advised that the law is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, the Assembly shall
reconsider the law so made.
(8) A member of Islamic Council shall hold office for a period of three years.
(9) A Member may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President,
resign his office or maybe removed by the President upon the passing of a resolution
for his removal by a majority of the total membership of the Islamic Council.
(10) The proceedings of the Islamic Council shall be regulated by rules of
278 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

procedure to be made by the Council with the approval of the Government.

22. Substitution of Article 33 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
Article 33 the following shall be substituted, namely,-
“33. Amendment of the Act. - (1) The provisions of the Constitution
may be amended in accordance with the following provisions.
(2) No amendment shall be made in Articles 31, 33 and 56, without the prior
approval of the Government of Pakistan.
(3) A bill to amend the Constitution, shall be originated in the Assembly and
when the bill has been passed with or without amendment by the votes of not less
than two-third of total membership of the Assembly, the bill shall be presented to
the President for assent.”.
23. Omission of Article 33-A of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, Article
33-A shall be omitted.
24. Substitution of Article 34 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
Article 34, the following shall be substituted, namely:-
“34. Validity of Proceedings of the Assembly. - (1) The validity of any
proceedings in the Assembly shall not be questioned in any court.
(2) An officer or member or an authority to whom powers are vested for the
regulation of proceedings, conduct of business, maintenance of order in the
Assembly shall not, in relation to the exercise of any of those powers, be subject to
the jurisdiction of any court.
(3) A member of, or a person entitled to speak in the Assembly shall not be
liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said by him or any
vote given by him in the Assembly or in any committee thereof.
(4) A person shall not be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of
publication by or under the authority of the Assembly, of any report, paper, vote
or proceedings.
(5) No process issued by a court or other authority shall, except with the leave
of the Speaker be served or executed within the precincts of the place where a
meeting of the Assembly is being held.
(6) Subject to this Article, the privileges of the Assembly, the committees and
members of the Assembly and of the persons entitled to speak in the Assembly
may be determined by law.”
25. Omission of Article 35 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, Article 35
shall be omitted.
26. Amendment of Article 36 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
36, in sub-Article (1), the words ‘or a Joint Sitting” shall be omitted.
27. Omission of Article 37 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, Article 37
shall be omitted.
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 279

28. Amendment of Article 37-A of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in

Article 37-A,-
(i) in sub-Article (1), between the words “revenue” and “received” the
words “taxes including income tax” shall be inserted; and
(ii) in sub-Article (2), in clause (b), between the words “the” and “High
Court” the words “Supreme Court and the” shall be inserted.
29. Amendment of Article 41 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
41,-
(i) in sub-Article (2), in the clause (a), the semi-colon at the end shall be
substituted by a colon and the word “and” at the end shall be omitted
and thereafter following proviso shall be added:
“Provided that the Assembly may by a resolution extend the Ordinance
for a further period of four months and it shall stand repealed at the
expiration of the extended period.” and
(ii) sub-Article (4) shall be omitted.
30. Amendment of Article 42-A of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in
Article 42-A, in sub-Article (4), for the words “Council” the words “Government”
shall be substituted.
31. Amendment of Article 42-D of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in
Article 42-D, the words “or the Council” shall be omitted.
32. Amendment of Article 43 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
43, after sub-Article (1-A), the following new sub-Article (1-B), (1-C) and (1-D)
shall be added, namely,-
“(1-B) There shall be a Shariat Appellate Bench of the High Court as
constituted by an Act of the Assembly consisting of Chief Justice of High
Court, all the Muslim Judges of the High Court and an Aalim Judge, to
perform such functions and exercise such jurisdiction as may be conferred
upon it by an Act of the Assembly.
(1-C) The Aalim Judge shall be appointed by the President on the advice
of the Prime Minister and after consultation with the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of High Court, from amongst the
persons having such qualification and experience and on such terms and
conditions, as may be, prescribed by an Act of the Assembly.
(1-D) The Shari’at Appellate Bench of the High Court, existing at the
time of enforcement of this Amendment Act, 2018 shall be deemed to
have been constituted under this Article.
33. Amendment of Article 47 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
47, -
(i) In sub-Article (1), the words “Council in respect of matters to which
its executive authority extends and” shall be omitted.
280 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(ii) in clause (b) of sub-Article (1), the words “the Council or” shall be
omitted.
34. Substitution of Article 48 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
Article 48, the following shall be substituted:-
“48. Public Service Commission. - (1) There shall be a Public Service
Commission consisting of a Chairman and such number of members who
shall be having such qualification as may be prescribed by an Act of the
Assembly.
(2) The appointment of the Chairman Public Service Commission and
members shall be made by the President on advice of the Prime Minister on such
terms and conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of the Assembly:
Provided that in respect of appointment of Chairman, the Prime Minister,
may solicit the opinion of Leader of Opposition in the Assembly before making
advice to the President for such appointment.
(3) The Chairman and members of Public Service Commission appointed
immediately before the commencement of this amending Act, 2018 shall be deemed
to have been appointed under this Article subject to terms and conditions already
determined and notified at the time of their appointment.”
35. Substitution of Article 50 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
Article 50 the following shall be substituted, namely:-
“50. Election Commission. - (1) There shall be an Election Commission
for Azad Jammu and Kashmir, hereinafter referred to as “the Commission”.
(2) The Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commissioner, who
shall act as the Chairman and two Members.
(3) The Chief Election Commissioner, hereinafter referred to as the
Commissioner, shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Chairman
of the Council.
(4) The Prime Minister after consultation with the Leader of Opposition in
the Assembly shall finalize the nominees for the appointment as Commissioner.
(5) No person shall be appointed as the Commissioner unless he has been a
Judge of the Supreme Court or High Court or has been a civil servant of BPS-21
and above, in the service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
(6) The members of the Commission possessing the qualification as mentioned
for Commissioner in sub-Article (5) above, shall be appointed by the President on
the advice of the Prime Minister.
(7) It shall be duty of the Commission to organize and conduct the election
for the office of the President, the Assembly, the Council and local government
bodies and to make such arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election
is conducted honestly, justly, fairly and in accordance with the law.
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 281

(8) The Commission shall have such powers and perform such functions as
are conferred on it under the Constitution and Act of the Assembly.
(9) At any time when the office of Commissioner is vacant or the
Commissioner is absent or unable to perform the functions of his office due to
any cause, the senior member of Commission duly designated at the time of
appointment shall act as Commissioner for a period not exceeding six months.
(10) Before entering upon office, the Commissioner shall make oath before
the Chief Justice of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the members before the
Commissioner in the form set out in the First Schedule.
(11) Subject to this Article, the Commissioner and each member, as the case
may be, shall hold office for a term of five years from the day he enters upon his
office:
Provided that the Chief Election Commissioner appointed before the
commencement of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution (Thirteenth
Amendment) Act, 2018 shall be deemed to have been appointed under this Article
for remaining period of his term.
(12) The Commissioner and members shall not be removed from their office
except in the manner prescribed in Article 42-E.
(13) The Commissioner or the member may, by writing under his hand
addressed to the President, resign from his office.
(14) The terms and conditions, other than mentioned hereinabove, for the
office of the Commissioner and member shall be such as may be prescribed by an
Act of Assembly.
(15) The Commissioner or a member shall not,-
(a) hold any other office of profit in the Service of Azad Jammu and
Kashmir or Pakistan; or
(b) occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the
rendering of such services.
(16) A person who has held office as Commissioner or the member shall not
hold any office of profit in the Service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or Pakistan
before the expiration of two years after he has ceased to hold that office.
(17) The Commission shall perform such functions as may be determined by
Act of Assembly.
(18) It shall be the duty of all executive authorities in the state to assist the
Commission in the discharge of its functions.
(19) Until Assembly by law otherwise provides, the Commission may, on the
advice of the Prime Minister and with the approval of the President, make rules
providing for the appointment of officers and servants to be employed in connection
with the functions of the Commission and for their terms and conditions of
employment.”.
36. Amendment of Article 50-A of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in
282 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Article 50-A, in sub-Article (1), for the word ‘Council’, the words “Chairman of
the Council” shall be substituted.
37. Amendment of Article 51 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
51, the existing provision shall be renumbered to as sub-Article (1) and thereafter
the following new sub-Article (2) shall be added, namely: -
“(2) Subject to the Constitution, all laws of Azad Jammu and Kashmir which,
from time to time, made by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council and in force
immediately before the commencement of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim
Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018, shall continue to be in force
until amended or altered or repealed by the Act of the Assembly or by the order,
notification etc., of the Government of Pakistan or, as the case may be, by the
Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir:
Provided that the reference of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council made in
the existing laws, on the commencement of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim
Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018, shall, as far as practicable, be
construed and referred to as the Assembly, or as the case may be, Government of
Pakistan or the Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.”.
38. Insertion of new Article 51-A of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, after
Article 51, the following new Article 51-A shall be inserted, namely:-
“51-A.Transfer of Employees, Assets and Liabilities. - (1) On the
commencement of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution
(Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018, all moveable and immovable
properties and assets, moneys or funds received by and deposited in the
Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council Consolidated Fund or made part of
Public Finance, all savings or fixed deposits of the Council in all bank
accounts and also such liabilities which were incurred under any law, shall
immediately be transferred or invested with Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Consolidated Fund or, as the case may be, to the Government.
(2) All existing employees in the service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council
who immediately before the commencement of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 were serving on regular
basis under superintendence and control of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Council
for any department, secretariat or any statutory body or institution or organizations
duly constituted or setup under any law or through its executive authority shall
stand transferred or shifted to the Government forthwith on commencement of
this amending Act, 2018.
(3) The rights of the persons under existing laws of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
who were, immediately before the commencement of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018, serving under the Azad
Jammu and Kashmir Council shall be protected and officers and servants on
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 283

deputation from the Federal Government or any province shall be entitled for
repatriation to their parent organizations.
(4) The persons serving on contractual or temporary basis shall not be entitled
to claim any right to continue their employment and they shall be dealt in
accordance with prevailing service rules of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and terms
of their appointments.
(5) Subject to Article 51, the perks, privileges and allowances to the elected
members of the Council and also salary, allowances and pensionary benefits of the
employees of the Council in the Service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, as admissible
to them under the law, shall be borne by the Government, for which budgetary
requirements shall be made out of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Consolidated
Fund.”
39. Substitution of Article 52-A of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
Article 52-A, the following shall be substituted, namely:-
“52-A. Power to acquire property and to make contracts, etc. - (1) The
executive authority of the Government shall extend, subject to an Act of
the Assembly, to the grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any property
vested in, and to the purchase or acquisition of property on behalf of the
Government and to the making of contracts.
(2) All property acquired for the purpose of the Government shall vest in the
President.
(3) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of the
Government shall be expressed to be made in the name of the President and all
such contracts and all assurances of property made in the exercise of that authority
shall be executed on behalf of the President by such persons and in such manner
as the President may direct or authorize.
(4) The President shall not be personally liable in respect of any contract or
assurance made or executed in the exercise of the executive authority of the
Government and no person making or executing any such contract or assurance
on his behalf shall be personally liable in respect thereof.
(5) Transfer of land or property by the Government shall be regulated by law.”
40. Addition of Articles 52-B and 52-C in the Constitution. - In the Constitution,
after Article 52-A, following Articles 52-B and 52-C shall be added:-
“52-B. Ownerless property. - Any property which has no rightful owner,
if located within Azad Jammu and Kashmir, shall vest in the Government.
52-C. Natural Resource endowment. - (1) The natural resource of Azad
Jammu and Kashmir which having a potential of economic value and
providing for the sustenance of life for future generations shall be preserved
and regulated by an Act of the Assembly.
(2) Without prejudice to sub-Article (1), the natural resource of Azad Jammu
284 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

and Kashmir may be utilized under the law, in the economic and efficient manner,
by the Government and also may be authorized under an Act of Assembly to utilize
any resource of the State by any person, entity or authority of Pakistan in
consideration of valuable economic benefits for the public interest such as net-
hydel profit or royalty or any other acceptable form or benefit but without affecting
the pristine environmental value of the inherent endowment of the State.”
41. Amendment of Article 53 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
53,-
(i) in sub-Article (2), for the words “a joint sitting” the words “the
Assembly” shall be substituted.
(ii) in sub-Article (2-A), the words “unless it has earlier been approved
by a resolution of the Council” shall be omitted.
42. Amendment of Article 54 of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, in Article
54, in sub-Article (1), full stop at the end shall be substituted by a colon and
thereafter the following proviso shall be added:
“Provided that the Assembly shall, in no case be dissolved on account of
issuance or pendency of the proclamation under the Constitution.”
43. Amendment of Article 58 of the Constitution. - In Article 58, between the
words “may” and “make”, the commas and words “on the advice of Prime Minister,”
shall be substituted.
44. Amendment of the First Schedule of the Constitution. - In the Constitution,
in First Schedule,-
(i) form of “Oath of Advisor” shall be omitted; and
(ii) form of oath for office of Chief Election Commissioner and Member
of the Election Commission shall be added as under,-
“CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER OR A MEMBER OF THE
ELECTION COMMISSION
[See Article 50]
I, ____________, do solemnly swear that as Chief Election Commissioner or
member of the Election Commission, I shall discharge my duties, and perform
my functions honestly, to the best of my ability, faithfully in accordance with the
Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 and the law, and without
fear or favor, affection or ill will, and that I shall not allow my personal interest to
influence my official conduct or my official decisions.
May Allah Almighty help and guide me (A’meen).”
45. Substitution of Third Schedule of the Constitution. - In the Constitution, for
the Third Schedule the following shall be substituted, namely,-
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 285

“THIRD SCHEDULE
[See Article 31 (3) and (4)]
‘Part-A’
1. The responsibilities of the Government of Pakistan under the UNCIP
Resolutions.
2. Defense and security of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
3. The current coin or the issue of bills, notes or other paper currency.
4. The External affairs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir including foreign trade
and foreign aid.
5. Post and Telegraphs, including Telephones, Wireless, Broad- Casting and
other like forms of communications; post office saving Bank.
6. Nuclear energy, including:
(a) mineral resources necessary for the generation of nuclear energy;
(b) the production of nuclear fuels and the generation and use of nuclear
energy; and
(c) ionizing radiations.
7. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulation and
organization of air traffic and of aerodromes.
8. Beacons and other provisions for safety of aircraft.
9. Carriage of passengers and goods by air.
10. Copyright, inventions, designs, trademarks and merchandise marks.
11. Opium so far as regards sale for export.
12. State Bank of Pakistan; banking, that is to say, the conduct of banking business
by corporations other than corporations owned or controlled by Azad Jammu
and Kashmir and carrying on business only within the Azad Jammu and
Kashmir.
13. The law of insurance, except as respects insurance undertaken by Azad Jammu
and Kashmir and the regulation of the conduct of insurance business, except
as respects business undertaken by Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
14. Stock exchanges and future markets with objects and business not confined
to Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
15. Corporations, that is to say, the incorporation, regulation and winding-up
of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial
corporations, but not including corporations owned or controlled by Azad
Jammu and Kashmir or cooperative societies, and of corporations, whether
trading or not, with objects not confined to Azad Jammu and Kashmir, but
not including universities.
16. Planning for economic coordination including planning and coordination
of scientific and technological research.
17. Highways, continuing beyond the territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
286 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

and also roads declared by the Government of Pakistan to be of strategic

importance.
18. External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements, including
educational and cultural pacts and agreements, with other countries;
extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to
Governments outside Pakistan.
19. Foreign exchange; cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes and other
like instruments.
20. Administrative Courts and Tribunals for subjects under this Part.
21. Libraries, museums, and similar institutions controlled or financed by the
Government of Pakistan.
22. Government of Pakistan agencies and institutes for the following purposes,
that is to say, for research, for professional or technical training, or for the
promotion of special studies.
23. Education as respects Azad Jammu and Kashmir students in foreign countries
and foreign students in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
24. Import and export across customs frontiers as defined by the Government
of Pakistan.
25. International treaties, conventions, agreements and International arbitration.
26. Surveys including geological surveys and meteorological organizations.
27. Establishment of standards of weights and measures.
28. Duties of customs, including export duties.
29. Taxes on corporations.
30. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this Part.
31. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters in this Part.
32. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in this Part.
‘Part-B’
1. Railways.
2. Mineral oil and natural gas; liquids and substances declared by Government
of Pakistan to be dangerously inflammable.
3. National planning and national economic coordination, including planning
and coordination of scientific and technological research.
4. Supervision and management of public debt.
5. Boilers
6. Census.
7. State Property until transfer to the Government of AJK.
8. Electricity except the power generation planned and made by Government
of AJK.
 ‘AJK’ Interim Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 2018 287

9. Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway or air, taxes on their

fares and freights.
10. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force
belonging to Azad Jammu and Kashmir, or any Province of Pakistan to any
area in such province or the Azad Jammu and Kashmir but not so as to enable
the police of Azad Jammu and Kashmir or such province to exercise power
and jurisdiction in such province or Azad Jammu and Kashmir and without
the consent of the Government of that province or the Azad Jammu and
Kashmir.
11. Measures to combat certain offences committed in connection with matters
concerning the subjects included in this list.
12. Removal of prisoners and accused persons from Azad Jammu and Kashmir
to Pakistan or from Pakistan to Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
13. Prevention of the extension from Azad Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or
from Pakistan to Azad Jammu and Kashmir of infections of contagious
diseases or pests affecting men; animals or plants.
14. Curriculum, syllabus, planning, policy, centers of excellence and standards
of education.
15. Medical and other professions excluding legal profession.
16. Standards in institutions for higher education and research, scientific and
technical institutions.
17. Matters concerning coordination between Azad Jammu and Kashmir and
other Provinces of Pakistan.
18. The salaries, allowance and privileges of the members and including salaries
and pension payable to employees of the council.
19. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in this list.
20. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters in this Part.
21. Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the matters in this Part.
22. Matters incidental or ancillary to any matter enumerated in this Part.”

sd/-
(Irshad Ahmed Qureshi)
Secretary Law
 APPENDIX V 288

List of Political Parties in ‘AJK’

Alongwith Names of the Party Heads & General Secretaries
S.No. Name of Party Party Head Contact Number General Secretary
Name & No.
1 All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim Conference Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan, 111-456789 Ms. Mahr-un-Nisa
(President) 0345-5091948, 0344-5473-489
Mujahid Munzil 83-A/1, 0300-9896578 (Wajid)
Satellite Town, Rawalpindi. 0321-5025678
(Personal Attique Sb)
0322-9403776 (Rizwan),
0300-5050854 (Khalid),
051-4852136
(Fax Mujahid Manzil)
2 Pakistan People’s Party Azad Kashmir Choudary Abdul Majeed, 0300-5191384 Ch. Latif Akbar
(President), House No. 167, 0300-9856966
Sector F-2, Mirpur.
3 Pakistan Muslim League (N), Raja Farooq Haider Khan, Shah Ghulam Qadir
Azad Kashmir (Chief Organizer) Shoukat Line 0333-5138112,
Muzaffarabad. 0355-760-6842
4 Pakistan Muslim League Sardar Mansha Jamal Advocate, 0302-4802516 Malik Aftab
Jammu & Kashmir (President), Kotli Bar Azad Kashmir.
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

5 Jammu & Kashmir Liberation League Justice (R.) Abdul Majeed Malik, 05827-443711 (Office) Ghulam Akbar Advocate
(President), House No. 38, 05827-446434 (Res) Kh. Manzoor Qadir
Sector B-2, Allama Iqbal Road, 0333-5889228 0301-5713-129920092
Mirpur, AJK.
S.No. Name of Party Party Head Contact Number General Secretary
Name & No.
6 Jammu & Kashmir People’s Party. Sardar Khalid Ibrahim Khan, 0301-5555360 Zahid Akram Advocate
(President) 35 Park Road F8/1, 0300-5188709
Islamabad.
7 Jamiat-ul-Ullema AJ&K. Sahibzada Attique-ur-Rehman Faizpuri, 0344-8802829 Moulana Muhammad Imtiaz
(President) 122-A-F/2, Ahmed Siddique
Sector Faiz Pur Shareef House, 0333-9415637
Mirpur, AJ&K.
8 Jamat-e-Islami AJ&K Abdul Rasheed Trabi, 0300-850-5298 Mahmood-ul-Hassan
(Ameer) 415 Poonch House Complex 051-5511417 Chaudhry
Sadar Rawalpindi. 051-5565531 0344-5558050
051-5510197 (Fax)
9 All Jammu & Kashmir Justice Party. Professor Maqsood Jaffri,
(Chairman) NW-706/A, Saidpur Road
Rawalpindi.
10 Swad-i-Azam Ahlay Sunnat Mollana Mufti Mahmood-ul-Hassan 05822-446080
Wa Al Jamat AK. Shah Masoodi, (Ameer) 0321-9555921
Jamaia Abu Hurrara Muhallah Sadiq 0300-2187329
List of Political Parties in ‘AJK’

Abad Ranjata Muzaffarabad. (Gen Secretary)

11 Jammu & Kashmir Awami Tehreek. Sardar Mansoor Khan,
(President) Silver Line School System
Opp. Ayub Park GT Road Rawalpindi.
12 Kashmir Freedom Movement, Choudary Khaliq Hussain Advocate, 0355-6502003
(President) Muslim Bazar Bhimber, AK. 05828-444033
13 Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, Sardar Sagheer, (Chairman) 0333-5713450 Sardar Shamas Kashmiri
District Courts, Rawalakot.
289
S.No. Name of Party Party Head Contact Number General Secretary 290
Name & No.
14 Jammu Kashmir National Liberation Shoukat Maqbool Butt, (President)
Front C/O Minhas General Store,
Ghari Pan Chowk, Muzaffarabad AJ&K.
15 Jammu Kashmir Islamic Democratic Syed Ghulam Raza Naqvi, (President) 0300-5139840
Party, AJ&K. Tehsil Sehnsa, District Kotli.
16 Kashmir Freedom Front. Mufti Sana-ul-Haq Bukhari, 0345-5532450 Farooq Wani
(President) Mufti Kashmir House, 0355-8133150
Muree. 0301-5382272
17 Pakistan People’s Party Munir Hussain Choudary, 05827-444137 Professor Muhammad Hanif
(Shaheed Bhutto) AJ&K. (President) House No. 14 0300-4838882 Khawaja
Sanwala Sector F/2, Mirpur.
18 Nazaam-e-Mustafa Conference Sahibzada Syed Muhammad 0321-9884575 Yasir Mughal
Nadeem Ahmed Gillani, (President) 0300-9738347
Jamia Gosia Rizivia Sethi Bagh, 0312-9001014
Muzaffarabad.
19 Pakistan Jamiat Ullema-e-Islam J&K. Mufti Muhammad Younas Choudary,
(Markazi Ameer) Akbar Road B-5,
Mirpur, Azad Kashmir
20 Suni Tehreek AJ&K Sardar Abdul Shakoor Ladhalvi, 05827-479552
(Convener) Devisional Office Sunni
Tehreek, Tehsil Nakyal, District Kotli.
21 MQM Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Muhammad Tahir Khokhar, 0345-8553390
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(Parlimani Leader) 5-C Sunset Line-3,

Phase ii DHA, EXT, Karachi.
S.No. Name of Party Party Head Contact Number General Secretary
Name & No.
22 Jamiat Ullema-e-Islam J&K. Moulana Saeed Yousaf, (Ameer) 0300-5556863 Maulana Imtiaz Abbasi
Darul Aloom Taleem-ul-Quran, Naib Ameer Abdul Haye 0346-5161105
Palandri, J&K 0300-5250635 0314-516-1105
23 Jammu & Kashmir Milli Tehreek Syed Muhammad Ali Raza Bukhari,
(Chairman) 137 Faisal Colony Near Airport
Rawalpindi.
24 Markazi Jamiat-e-Ahllay Hadees AJ&K. Mollana Muhammad Anwar Ruknudin,
(Ameer) Allama Iqbal Colony, Bagh City.
25 UN Parh Party AJ&K. Muhammad Ismail Chohan, 0322-9403389
(Chairman) Ward #9 Tariq Abad
Near Water Supply Pump
Muzaffarabad AJ&K.
26 All Jammu & Kashmir Muslim League Muhammad Sajjad Advocate, 0300-9709404
(Markazi President) Old Secretariat
Muzaffarabad A.K.
27 Jamat-e-Falah-e-Insaniat AJ&K Muhammad Mudassar Afzil Choudary, 0342-6110000
(Chairman) Tehsil Dodyal, Mirpur, 05827-466000
List of Political Parties in ‘AJK’

Azad Jammu & Kashmir

28 Peopls National Party, United Kashmir Syed Waqar Hussain Kazmi, 0322-9422434
(PNP,UK) (Chairman) 0301-5374678
Bar Council Muzaffarabad, A.K.
29 Jammu & Kashmir Public Rights Party Shehzad khursheed rathore, 051-2266277,
(Chairman) 0332-5131559
House # 36-A, Sector F-8/3, Islamabad
291
S.No. Name of Party Party Head Contact Number General Secretary 292
Name & No.
30 Jaffaria Supreme Council AJ&K Syed Shabir Hussain Bukhari, 05822-442134 Raja Anwar-ul-Saqlain
(Chairman), Imam Bargah Takiya 0300-9855724 Advocate Murpur
Bari Imam Shoukat Line Muzaffarabad 0301-5823181
0344-5133769
31 Pak Kashmir National League Nisar Ahmed, (Chairman) 0300-5158856
Office No. 7, Usman Ghani First Flour
District Kachehri, Rawalpindi
32 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Kashmir Barister Sultan Mahmood Chaudry 051-2277-226 0300-855-7892
(President), 22, Main Margala Road, 0300-855-3466
F-3/6, Islamabad.
33 Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen Pakistan Syed Tasawar Hussain Jafri, 05822-202848 Syed Abdul Rehman
Secretary General (Head), 0315-5121471 Shah Kazmi
Near Boys High School Narul, 0345-6452318 Deputy Secretary General
Domail Syedan Muzaffarabad.
34 Al Jammu & Kashmir Jamiat Ulma Islama Mahmood-ul-Hassan Ashraf, 05822-432502 Markazi Nazam
(Markazi General Secretary) 0300-2187-329 Prof. Abdul Malik Advocate
Jamaia Daraul Aloom-ul-Islamia 0344-1914-810 0345-5082-806
Muzaffarabad. 0321-5631-389
35 Rah-e-Haq Party AJK Hafiz Aftab Ahmed Kashir 0302-8988-929 Muhammad Afraz Khan
(President) Bangoin Khas Post Office General Secretary
Paniola, Tehsil Rawlakot, 0321-2330-409
Disrtict Poonch.
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

36 Al-Jammu & Kashmir Sunni Abdul Khaliq Naqshbandi 0300-5043-088 Fiaz Hussain Mustafai
Itihad Council (President) 0315-5043-088 General Secretary
Near Jammia Taleem-ul-Quran, 0345-4476-502
Naqshbandia, Pallak Post Office 0302-5196-825
Tehsil & District Mirpur
S.No. Name of Party Party Head Contact Number General Secretary
Name & No.
37 Qoumi Itihad Party (QIP) Shahzad Hussain Khan 0316-5061-267 Israr Farooq
(Chairman) General Secretary
Khora Mangiryout Neriyan 0341-4733-131
Post Office Khas Tehsil Trarkhal
District Sudhnoti
38 Meri Apni Party (MAP) Mirza Abdul Qadeer Farooqi 0347-655-4037 Muhammad Usman
(Founder & President) General Secretary
PO & Tehsil Samahni, 0346-5130-192
Village Sohlnan District Bhimber
39 All Pakistan Aam Admi Party Muhammad Bashir Raja 0333-511-4535 Nazma Shafiq
(President) 0315-511-4535
H# 309-B, Valley Road
opposite Maryam Memorial Hospital
Peshawar Road Rawalpindi
40 Jammu & Kashmir Qoumi Movement Raja Khursheed Khan 0302-5634-686 Raja Muhammad Arif Kiani
Nick Name Kala Bawa (President) 0343-8511-881
R/O Chella Bandi near Nisar Camp
District Tehsil & Muzaffarabad
List of Political Parties in ‘AJK’

41 Front National Azad Jammu & Kashmir Amir Sohail Hina Manzoor
(President) 305/9, Street 19, 0303-566-1822
Westridge, Peshawar Road, Rawalpindi
42 Muslim League Functional Azad Kashmir Saeed Mahboob Hussain Shah Bukhari 0346-500-9215 Syed Makhdoom Hussain Shah
(Founder and Chief Organizer) 0342-8136-196
R/O Moil Post Office Kot Jamel Tehsil Barnala
District Bhimber
293
S.No. Name of Party Party Head Contact Number General Secretary 294
Name & No.
43 All Pakistan Muslim League Javed Ahmed Mughal 0347-5637-950 Syed Naseer Hussain Kazmi
State of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (Chief Organizer) 0344-8892-355
R/O Mohalla Tagara Eid Gah Road 0355760-1606
Muzaffarabad
44 Aam Admi Party Azad Jammu & Kashmir Muhammad Khurram Mushtaq 0345-5127-301 Nawaz Sajjad
(President) Secretariat 0335-7123-457
Near Jan Milk Shop,
Police Lines, Naluchi, Muzaffarabad
Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
 APPENDIX VI

Presidents/Prime Ministers of ‘AJK’

A. Presidents of ‘AJK’
S.No. Name From To
1 Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan 24 Oct, 1947 12 May 1950
2 Col. (R) Syed Alhi Ahmed Shah 13 May, 1950 04 Dec, 1951
3 Mir Waiz Molana Muhammad Yousf Shah 05 Dec, 1951 20 Jun, 1952
4 Colonel (R) Sher Ahmed Khan 21 Jun, 1952 30 May, 1956
5 Mir Waiz Molana Muhammad Yousf Shah 31 May, 1956 07 Sep, 1956
6 Sardar Muhammad Abdul-Qayyum Khan 08 Sep, 1956 12 Apr, 1957
7 Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan 13 Apr, 1957 30 Apr, 1959
8 Mr. K.H. Khursheed 01 May, 1959 06 Aug, 1964
9 Khan Abdul Hameed Khan 07 Aug, 1964 07 Oct, 1968
10 Brig. (later Maj. Gen) Abdur-Rehman 08 Oct, 1968 11 Nov, 1970
11 Sardar Muhammad Abdul-Qayyum Khan 12 Nov, 1970 15 Apr, 1975
12 Sheikh Manzar Masaud (Acting President) 16 Apr, 1975 04 June, 1975
13 Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan 05 Jun, 1975 30 Oct, 1978
14 Brig. (R) Muhammad Hayat Khan 01 Nov, 1978 31 Jan, 1983
15 Major General (R) Abdur Rehman 01 Feb, 1983 29 Sep, 1985
16 Sardar Muhammad Abdul-Qayyum Khan 30 Sep, 1985 19 Jul , 1991
17 Sahibzada Muhammad Ishaq Zafar
(Acting President) 20 Jul, 1991 28 July, 1991
18 Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi
(Acting President) 29 Jul 1991 11 August 1991
19 Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan 12 Aug, 1991 11 May, 1996
20 Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi
(Acting President) 12 May, 1996 22 May, 1996
296 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

S.No. Name From To

21 Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan 23 May, 1996 11 Aug, 1996
22 Raja Mumtaz Hussain Rathore 12 Aug, 1996 24 Aug, 2001
23 Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan 25 Aug 1996 24 Aug, 2001
24 Major General (R) Sardar
Muhammad Anwar Khan 25 Aug, 2001 24 Aug, 2006
25 Raja Zulqurnain Khan 25 Aug 2006 24 Aug, 2011
26 Sardar Muhammad Yaqoob Khan 25 Aug, 2011 24 Aug, 2016
27 Sardar Masood Khan 25 Aug 2016 Continued

B. Prime Ministers of ‘AJK’

S.No. Name From To
1 Khan Abdul Hameed Khan 05 Jun, 1975 11 Aug, 1977
2 Sardar Siksndar Hayat Khan 17 Jun, 1985 28 Jun, 1990
3 Mumtaz Hussain Rathore 29 Jun, 1990 05 Jul, 1991
4 Sardar Muhammad Abdul-Qayyum Khan 29 Jul, 1991 29 Jul, 1996
5 Barrister Sultan Mehmood Chaudry 30 Jul, 1996 24 Jul, 2001
6 Sardar Siksndar Hayat Khan 25 Jul, 2001 23 Jul, 2006
7 Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan 24 Jul, 2006 06 Jan, 2009
8 Sardar Muhmmad Yaqoob Khan 07 Jan, 2009 21 Oct, 2009
9 Raja Farooq Haider Khan 22 Oct, 2009 28 Jul, 2010
10 Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan 29 Jul, 2010 25 Jul, 2011
11 Chaudry Abdul Majid 26 Jul, 2011 30 Jul, 2016
12 Raja Farooq Haider Khan 31 Jul, 2016 Continued
 APPENDIX VII

Members ‘AJK’ Legislative Assembly 2016

S.No. Name Position

1 Ch. Masood Khalid MLA
2 Chaudhry Abdul Majeed MLA
3 Ch. Muhammad Saeed Minister
4 Rukhsar Ahmed MLA
5 Waqar Ahmed Noor MLA
6 Ali Shan Chaudhry MLA
7 Ch. Tariq Farooq Senior Minister for, Physical Planning &
housing, Agriculture & Live Stock
8 Malik Muhammad Nawaz Khan MLA
9 Farooq Sikandar Khan Minister Revenue and Rehabilitation
10 Raja Naseer Ahmad Khan MLA
11 Choudhary Muhammad Yasin Opposition Leader
12 Raja Nisar Ahmed Khan Minister Law, Parliamentarian affairs, Justice
and Human Rights, Electricity
13 Sardar Attique Ahmed Khan MLA
14 Mushtaq Ahmed Minhas Minister Information, Tourism and
Information Technology
15 Sardar Mir Akbar Khan Minister Forests, Wild Life and Fisheries
16 Ch. Muhammad Aziz Minister Public Works and
Communications
17 Ch. Muhammad Yasin Gulshan MLA
18 Sardar Khan Bahadur Khan MLA
19 Khalid Ibrahim Khan MLA
20 Muhammad Saghir Khan MLA
21 Dr. Muhammad Najeeb Naqvi Khan Minister Treasury, Planning & Development
and Public Health
22 Sardar Farooq Ahmed Tahir Deputy Speaker Legislative Assembly Azad
Jammu and Kashmir
298 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

S.No. Name Position

23 Shah Ghulam Qadir Speaker Legislative Assembly Azad Jammu
and Kashmir
24 Noreen Arif Minister Industries, Labor, Mineral
Resources, Social Welfare and Women
Development
25 Chaudhry Shazad Mehmood MLA
26 Syed Iftekhar Ali Gillani Minister Higher Education, Elementary &
Secondary Education, Muzaffarabad City
Development Project
27 Raja Abdul Qayyum Khan MLA
28 Raja Muhammad Farooq Haider Khan Prime Minister, Azad Jammu & Kashmir
29 Mustafa Bashir Abbasi MLA
30 Nasir Hussain Dar Minister
31 Chaudhry Muhammad Ismail MLA
32 Muhammad Ishaq MLA
33 Mian Muhammad Yasir Rasheed MLA
34 Chaudhry Javed Akhtar MLA
35 Raja Muhammad Siddique MLA
36 Amir Abdul Ghaffar MLA
37 Ghulam Mohi ud Din Dewan MLA
38 Syed Shoukat Ali Shah Minister
39 Asad Aleem Shah MLA
40 Muhammad Ahmed Raza Qadri MLA
41 Abdul Majid Khan MLA
42 Mrs. Riffat Aziz MLA
43 Mrs. Sehrish Qamar MLA
44 Mrs. Shazia Akbar Ch. MLA
45 Mrs. Faiza Imtiaz MLA
46 Mrs. Naseema Khatoon MLA
47 Syed Muhammad Ali Raza Bukhari MLA
48 Javed Iqbal MLA
49 Abdul Rashid Turabi MLA
Source: Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly.
 APPENDIX VIII

The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work

Order, 1994
(With Amendments)

NO. 12(34)/93-NA-I
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
KASHMIR AFFAIRS & NORTHERN AFFAIRS
DIVISION ISLAMABAD
Islamabad, the 12th June, 1994.
WHEREAS the Northern Areas Electoral Rolls Act, 1975 provides for the
preparation of electoral rolls for the purpose of election of representatives to the
Council for Northern Areas on the basis of adult franchise;
AND WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the Constitution of the Council
for Northern Areas and to introduce the people of this area to democratic institution
and to give them a sense of participation in their affairs;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Government of Pakistan is pleased to make the
following order:
1. Short title, extent and commencement. – (1) This Order may be called the
Northern Areas Council, Legal Frame Work Order, 1994.
(2) It extends to the whole of the Northern Areas.
(3) It shall come into force at once.
2. Definition. – In this order, unless there is any thing repugnant in the subject or
context:

Compiled by Hafiz-Ur-Rahman, B.A., LL.B., Secretary, Northern Areas Legislative Council Gilgit,
1st November, 2001.
300 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(a) “Adviser” means a person appointed under section-5;

1
[(b) “ **********];
(c) “Chief Executive” means the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs,
Northern Areas, state & Frontier Regions Division.
(d) “Commissioner” means the Election Commissioner appointed under
the Northern Areas Electoral Rolls Act, 1975;
(e) “Council” means the 2[Northern Areas Legislative Council] constituted
under section-6;
(f ) “Deputy Chief Executive” means a person elected as such by the Council
under section-4;
(ff ) “Deputy Speaker” means the Deputy Speaker of the Council NACLF
(Amendment) Order 2002, No. 1 (11)/93-NA. II, dated 19 Nov. 2002.
(g) “Electoral Rolls” means the electoral rolls prepared under the Northern
Areas Electoral Rolls Act, 1975;
(h) “Member” means member of the Council;
(i) “Northern Areas” has the same meaning as in Northern Areas Electoral
Rolls Act, 1975;
(j) “Provincial Government” means the Chief Executive, the Deputy Chief
Executive and the Chief Secretary, Northern Areas;
(k) “Rules of Business” means the Northern Areas Rules of Business, 1994;
(l) “Rules of Procedure” means rules framed by the Northern Areas Council
for the conduct of its business;
(m) “Secretary of the Council” means the officer so designated by the 3[Chief
Executive]; and
(n) 4[“Speaker” means the Speaker of the Council]
3. Chief Executive. – (1) There shall be. a Chief Executive of Northern Areas who
shall be the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Northern Areas, Stale and Frontier
Regions.
(2) The Chief Executive shall exercise powers specified in sub-rule (1) of rule
5 of the Rules of Business.
5
[(3) The Chief Executive shall address the opening and closing sessions of
the Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC) in every financial year wherein
he shall detail his policy for the Northern Areas and review the working of Northern
1. Omitted by Amendment Order dated 1st July 2000.
2. Substituted by Amendment Order dated 28th October 1999.
3. Substituted by Amendment Order, dated 1st July, 2000.
4. Substituted by Amendment Order ibid.
5. Added by Amendment Order ibid.
 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 301

Areas Government in that year respectively. He may also address the Council at
his discretion and for that purpose may require the attendance of the members].
(4) The Chief Executive shall work towards continued empowerment of the
elected representatives and power of the Northern Areas.
4. Deputy Chief Executive. – The Chief Executive shall appoint, from amongst
the members of the Council, a Deputy Chief Executive who shall:
(a) be elected by the members of the Council on the basis of majority votes;
1
[(b) *****************************];
(c) be a person with the status of a Minister of State;
(d) exercise such powers as may be delegated to him by the Chief Executive
under clause (I) of rule-6 of Rules of Business; and
(e) perform such functions as are assigned to him under clauses (II) and (iii)
of rule-6 of the Rules of Business.
2
[4-A. Speaker. – The Council shall elect from amongst its members a Speaker
who shall conduct the business of the Council in accordance with Rules of
Procedure of the Council. The Speaker shall be entitled to the status of Provincial
Minister.
4AA. The Council shall elect from amongst its members a Deputy Speaker who
shall conduct the business of the Council in accordance with the Rule of Procedure
of the Council in the absence of Speaker. The Deputy Speaker shall be entitled to
the status of Provincial Minister.
4-B. Panel of Presiding Officers. – At the commencement of each Session, the
Speaker shall nominate, In order of precedence, from amongst the members, a
panel of not more than three presiding officers and, in the absence of the Speaker
the member having precedence amongst those present shall preside over the
meeting.]
5. Advisers. – (1) The Chief Executive shall, in consultation with the Deputy Chief
Executive, appoint, from amongst the members of the Council, not less than 3|three]
find not more then 4[five] advisors 5[****] The advisers appointed under sub-section
(1) shall be entitled to the status of a Provincial Minster.

1. Omitted by Amendment Order ibid.

2. Section 4-A and 4-B inserted by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.
3. Substituted by Amendment Order ibid.
4. Substituted by Amendment Order ibid.
5. Columns words omitted by Substituted by Amendment Order dated 28th Oct 1999.
302 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
1
[(2) An Advisor shrill hold office during the pleasure of the Chief Executive].
2
[(3) Thee Advisers shall monitor the functioning of the departments assigned
to them.]
6. Composition of the Council for Northern Areas. – (1) The Council shall consist
of:
(a) 3[****] The Chief Executive for Northern Areas appointed under section-
3;
4
[(b) ******]
(c) twenty four members, 5[*****], of whom six each shall be elected from
Gilgit, Diamer and Baltistan Districts and three each from Ghizer and
Ghanche Districts; and
(d) 6[Five] women 7[*****] members to be elected in the manner as provided
in sub-section 1 A);].
8
|(1A) Of the members referred to in clause (d) of sub-section (1), one woman
9
[******] shall be elected from each District by the members referred to in clause
(C) of sub-section (1)] 10[******]
(2) The 11[Chief Executive Northern Areas] may associate any person, whether
official or non-official, for the proceedings of the Council;
7. Delimitation of constituencies. – (1) For the purpose of election to the Council,
the Commissioner shall divide each district into as many separate territorial
constituencies as the number of seats allocated to that district under sectioh-6.
(2) All constituencies for the seats in the Council shall be so delimited, having
regard to administrative convenience, so that each constituency is a compact area
and in doing so due regard shall be had, as far as practicable to the distribution of
population.

1. Sub-section 2 added by Amendment Order ibid.

2. Sub-section 3 added by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.
3. Omitted by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.
4. Omitted by Amendment Order ibid.
5. Omitted by Amendment Order ibid.
6. Word two substituted by Amendment Order dated 28th October, 1999.
7. Omitted by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.
8. Sub-Section I-A inserted by Amendment Order deled 28st October, 1999.
9. Omitted by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.
10. Omitted by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.
11. Substituted by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.
 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 303

(3) The Commissioner shall, after making such inquiries and examining such,
records as it may deem necessary and considering such representations as may be
received by him, publish a preliminary list of territorial constituencies specifying
the areas proposed to be included in each such constituency together with a notice
inviting objections and suggestions within a period specified in such a notice.
(4) The Commissioner shall, after bearing and considering the objections and
suggestions, if any, received by him, make such amendments, alterations or
modifications in the preliminary list published under sub-section (3), as he may
deem fit or necessary and shall publish the final list of territorial constituencies
showing the areas including in each such constituency.
8. Validity of Act of Commissioner not questionable. – The validity of the
delimitation or formation of any constituency, or of any proceedings taken or
anything done by, or under the authority of, the commissioner under this Order
shall not be called in question in any Court.
9. Term of office. – (1) The term of Office of the Council shall be five years
commencing on the day of its first session;
Provided that it may be dissolved earlier if a resolution to that effect is passed
by the Council by a majority of two-third of its members;
Provide further that if the government of Pakistan is of the opinion that the
Council has failed to perform its functions in accordance with this Order, it may
dissolve the Council earlier than the five years.
(2) The members shall assume office on such date and place as may be
appointed by the government of Pakistan.
Provided that the period intervening between the declaration of the official
result of the election to the Council and the date for assumption of office of member
shall not exceed thirty days.
(3) On the expiry of the term of office of the Council, or on its dissolution
earlier under the first or second proviso to sub-section (1), if there be any delay in
the assumption of office by the next Council the powers and functions of (fie
Council shall be exercised and performed by such person as the Chief Executive
may appoint in this behalf in accordance with such directions as the Chief Executive
may issue from time to time.
10. Notice for the first session. – (1) The first Session of the council shall be held
on the date and place appointed by the Chief Executive for the assumption of
office of its members;
304 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
1
[(2) After first Session of the Council it shall meet at such times and places
as provided by the Rules of Procedure of the Council];
Provided that the interval between two sessions shall not exceed ninety days;
Provided further that the session of the council next following its first session
shall be held before the day of expiration of seven days following the first session.]
2
[(3) *******]
3
[(4) The session of the Council shall be presided over by the Speaker, and, in
his absence, by a member nominated by the Speaker in the manner specified in
section 4-8.]
11. Assumption of office and taking of oath. – (1) At the first session of the
Council, the 4[Chief Executive] shall take oath before the Chairman, Chief Court,
in Form “A” and thereafter 5[Speaker administer oath to the members present in
Form “B” as provided in Schedule-I].
(2) If any member of the Council is for any reason not present at the first
session of the Council, the 6[Chief Executive] shall, at the next following session
of the Council, administer oath of office to such member and on his taking the
oath of office he shall be deemed to have assumed his office.
7
[(3) The Deputy Chief Executive, the Speaker and Advisers shall make oath
before the Chief Executive of Northern Areas as specified in Forms ‘C’, ‘D’ and
‘E’ respectively.
12. Qualification and disqualification of member. – (1) A person shall, subject
to the provisions of sub-section (2), be qualified to be elected as a member if:
(a) he is bona fide resident of the Northern Areas;
(b) he has attained the age of twenty five year; and
(c) his name appears on the electoral roll for any constituency in the district
from which he seeks election.
(2) A person shall be disqualified from being elected as, and from being a
member if:

1. Sub-Section 2 is substituted by Amendment Order dated 1 July, 2000.

2. Sub-Section 3 omitted by Amendment Order ibid.
3. Sub-Section A is substituted by Amendment Order ibid.
4. Substituted by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.
5. Substituted by Amendment Order ibid.
6. Substituted by Amendment Order ibid.
7. Sub-Section 3 is added by Amendment Order ibid.
 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 305

(a) he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court, or

(b) he is an un-discharged insolvent, unless a period of ten years has elapsed
since his being adjudged and insolvent; or
(c) he has been, on conviction of any offence, sentenced to imprisonment
for a term of not less than two years, Unless a period of five years, or
such less period as the Government of Pakistan may allow in any particular
case, has elapsed since his release;
(d) he holds any office in the service of the Northern Areas or service of
Pakistan other than an office which is not a whole time office remunerated
either by salary or by fee; or
(e) he has been dismissed for misconduct from the service of the Northern
Areas or of Pakistan, unless a period of five years, or such less period as
the Government of Pakistan may allow in any particular case, has elapsed
since his dismissal; or
(f ) he, whether by himself or by any person or body of persons in trust for
him or for his benefit or on his account, has any share or interest in a
contract, not being a contract between a cooperative society and the
Government of Pakistan, for the supply of goods to or for the execution
of any contract or the performance of any services undertaken by, the
Provincial Government or Government of Pakistan.
Provided that the disqualification under clause (f ) shall not apply to a
person:
(i) where the share of interest in the contract devolves oh him by
inheritance or succession or as i a legatee, executor or administrator,
until the expiration of six months after it has so devolved on him
or such longer period as the Government of Pakistan, may in any
particular case, allow, or
(ii) where the contract has been entered into by a public company as
defined in the Companies Ordinance, 1904 (XLVII of 1984), of
which he is a share holder but is neither a director of the said
company or a person holding an office of profit under the company
nor a Managing Agent.
(3) If any question arises whether a member has, after his election, become
subject to any disqualification, the Commissioner shall place the question before
the Chief Execute, and if the opinion of the Chief Executive be that the member
has been so subjected to disqualification his seal shall become vacant:
Provided that no member shall be disqualified unless he is afforded an
opportunity of being heard:
306 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

13. Resignation and removal. – (1) A member may resign his member-ship of the
Council by notice in writing addressed to the Chairman.
(2) If a member is absent without leave of the Chairman, from three consecutive
sessions of the Council, his seat shall become vacant.
(3) If a member fails to lake and subscribe an oath in accordance with section-
11, his seat shall become vacant.
(4) A member shall render himself liable to removal from membership if he
incurs any of the following disqualification, namely:
(a) it he becomes a whole-time or part-time salaried official in the service of
the Government of Pakistan or service of Northern Areas, or of a public
statutory corporation, a local body or other local authority;
(b) if he is under contract for work to be done or goods to be supplied to the
Council or has otherwise any peculiar interest in its affairs;
(c) if he has been convicted of any offence for corrupt or illegal practice
relating to election or has been found guilty of any such offence or
practices in any proceedings questioning the validity or regularity of an
election, unless, four years or such less period as the Government of
Pakistan may by notification determine specially in his behalf, has elapsed
from the date of the order, or from the date of expiry of the sentence, if
any;
(d) if he is guilty of an abuse of power or of, any misconduct in the discharge
of his duties as a member or has been responsible for any loss or
misappropriation of any money or property of the Government of
Pakistan or Northern Areas or of any local body or local authority.
(e) If a vote of no-confidence is passed against him by not less than two
third of the members in a session held on a written requisition signed by
at least one-half of them calling upon the Chairman to convene a special
meeting of the council lo consider the no-confidence motion; or
(f ) If he is engaged or is reasonably suspected of being engaged in subversive
activities, or is reasonably suspected of being associated with others
engaged in subversive activities.
Explanation. – In this sub-section the term “misconduct” includes bribery,
corruption, nepotism or any attempt at, or abutment of, such misconduct or failure
to perform the functions of office.
(5) A person who renders himself liable to removal from membership under
sub-section (4) may be removed from membership by an order of the Chairman
 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 307

and shall not be eligible for election to the Council for such a period not exceeding
five years as the Chairman may determine.
14. Bar against double membership. – No person shall, at the same lime, be
member in respect of more than one constituency or member of a Local Council
as defined in the explanation to section 19-A of the Northern Areas Local
government Order, 1979.
15. Casual vacancy. – If the seal of a member becomes vacant during the term of
the office of the Council, it shall be filled by election and such member shall hold
office for the residue of the term of his predecessor.
16. Allowances and privileges of members. – The members shall be entitled to
such honorarium, allowance and privileges as may be prescribed by rules.
1
[17. Power to make laws. – (1) Subject to such limitations as the Government of
Pakistan may, from time to time, impose, the Council may make laws with respect
to any matter enumerated in schedule-II to this order.
(2) The Council shall not make any law, which is repugnant to the injunctions
of Islam as laid down in Holy Quran and Sunnah or adversely affecting personal
law rights of any Muslim sect].
2
[17A. Chief Executive assent to bills. – (1) Subject to this Order, when a Bill has
been passed by the Council, it shall be presented to the Chief Executive for assent.
(2) When a Bill is presented to the Chief Executive for assent, the Chief
Executive shall within fifteen days:
(a) assent to the Bill or
(b) return the Bill to the Council with a message requesting that the Bill or
any specified provision thereof, be reconsidered and that any amendment
specified in the message may be reconsidered.
(3) When the Chief Executive has assented to a Bill, it shall become law and
be called an Act of Council].
3
[17B. Legislative powers of the Government of Pakistan. – The Government of
Pakistan may, by an Order make laws with respect to matters not enumerated in
schedule-II to this Order].

1. Substituted by Amendment Order dated 28th October, 1999.

2. Inserted by Amendment Order ibid.
3. Inserted by Amendment Order ibid.
308 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
1
[17C. Inconsistency between Law made by Government of Pakistan and Council.
– If any provision of a law made by the Council is repugnant to the law made by the
Government of Pakistan the law made by the Government of Pakistan, whether made
before or after the law made by the Council, shall prevail].
2
[17D. Budget. – Annual budget allocated shall be presented before the Council
in the form of a statement].
18. Rules of procedure and quorum. – (1) The procedure of the Council shall be
regulated by rules of procedure to be framed by the Council at its first session.
(2) If, at any time during a session of the Council, the attention is drawn to
the fact that the number of members present is less than one-third of the total
number of members, the person presiding shall either suspend the session until
number of members present is not less than one-third or adjourn the session.
(3) The proceedings of the Council shall be conducted in Urdu and the minutes
of the session of the Council shall be drawn up and recorded by the Secretary of
the Council.
3
[19. Development Forums. – The Chief Executive shall, by Order in writing,
constitute recommending, approving and monitoring fora for development schemes
in accordance with guidelines issued by the Planning Commission of Pakistan].
4
[19A. Fundamental Rights. – (1) The people of the Northern Areas shall have
the Fundamental Rights specified in Chapter-I of Part-II of the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
(2) The Chief Court may, if it is satisfied that no adequate remedy is provided
by law, on the application of any aggrieved person, make an order giving such
direction to any person or authority exercising any power or performing any functions
in, or in relation to, any territory within the jurisdiction of that Court as may be
appropriate for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights].
5
[19B. Liability to Pay Tax. – The people of Northern Areas shall be liable to pay
taxes arid other levies competently imposed under an Act of the Council or under
any law made by the Government of Pakistan].

1. Inserted by Amendment Order dated 20th October, 1999.

2. Inserted by Amendment Order ibid.
3. Substituted by Amendment Order ibid.
4. Inserted by Amendment Order ibid.
5. Inserted by Amendment Order of 1999.
 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 309
1
[19C. Judicial System. – (1) Judicial system in the Northern Areas shall consist
of the following Courts, namely:
(i) the Court of Appeals;
(ii) the Chief Court;
(iii) Subordinate Judiciary; and
(iv) Any other court specially set-up for any other purpose.
(2) The composition of, and the jurisdiction exercisable by, each court shall
be such as has been, or may be, determined by law.
(3) The Courts existing immediately before the commencement of the
Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work (Amendment) Order, 1999, shall
continue and the Court of appeals shall be established as soon as possible].
20. Bar of Jurisdiction. – No Court shall have jurisdiction to enquire into or
question the validity of any act done, or any order or resolution passed, Under
this Order.
21. Power of Government to make rules. – The Government of Pakistan may
make Rules for carrying out the purposes of this Order.
22. Repeal. – The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1975 is hereby
repealed.

1. Inserted by Amendment Order of 1999.

310 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

SCHEDULE-1
FORM “A”
OATH OF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
NORTHERN AREAS
(See Section 11)

I,.............................................. being the Chief Executive of the Northern

Areas, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and
uphold the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan.
That, as Chief Executive of the Northern Areas, I will be faithful to the
declaration of the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad All Jinnah,
that Pakistan would be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of Social
Justice;
That I will perform my functions honestly and faithfully;
That I shall strive to preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis for the
emotion of Pakistan;
That I shall strive to preserve and to maintain religious/sectarian harmony in
the Northern Areas and shall not indulge in any activity prejudicial to the cause,
and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which may come to my knowledge as Chief Executive of the Northern
Areas Council.

Signature of Chief Executive

Place .........................
Date .........................

Signature of Chairman Chief Court

 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 311

FORM “B”
OATH OF OFFICE OF THE MEMBER NORTHERN AREAS
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
(See Section 11)

I,........................................., have been elected as a Member of the Northern

Areas Legislative Council, do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance
to Pakistan and uphold the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan.
That, as Member of the Northern Areas Legislative Council, I will be faithful
to the declaration of the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad All
Jinnah, that Pakistan would be a democratic State based on Islamic principles of
social justice.
That I will perform my functions honestly and faithfully.
That I shall strive to preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis for the
creation of Pakistan;
That I shall strive to preserve and to maintain religious/sectarian harmony in
the Northern Areas and shall not indulge in any activity prejudicial to this cause,
and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which may come to my knowledge as Member of the Northern Areas
Legislative Council.

Signature of Member
Place .........................
Date .........................

Signature of Speaker Northern Areas Council

312 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
1
[FORM “C”
OATH OF OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF EXECUTIVE
NORTHERN AREAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
[Section 11(3)]

I, ........................................................being the Deputy Chief Executive of the

Northern Areas Legislative Council, do solemnly swear that I will bear faith and
allegiance lo Pakistan and uphold the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan.
That as Deputy Chief Executive of the Northern Areas Legislative Council, I
will be faithful to the declaration of the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-e-Azam
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, that Pakistan would be democratic State based on Islamic
principles of social justice;
That I will perform my functions honestly and faithfully;
That I shall strive to preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis for the
creation of Pakistan
That I shall strive to preserve and lo maintain religious/sectarian harmony in
the Northern Areas and shall not indulge in any activity prejudicial to this cause;
and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which may come to my knowledge as Deputy Chief Executive of
the Northern Areas Legislative Council.

Signature of Deputy Executive, Northern Areas

Place .........................
Date .........................

Signature of Chief Executive]

1. Form “C” added by Amendment Order dated 1 July, 2000.

 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 313
1
[FORM “D”
OATH OF OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER
NORTHERN AREAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
(Section 11(3)]

I.........................................................being the Speaker of the Northern Areas

Legislative Council, do solemnly swear that I will bear faith and allegiance to
Pakistan and uphold the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan.
That as Speaker of the Northern Areas Legislative Council, i will be faithful
to the declaration of the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-I-Azam Muhammad All
Jinnah, that Pakistan would be democratic State based on Islamic principles of
social Justice;
That I will perform my functions honestly and faithfully;
That I shall strive to preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis for the
creation of Pakistan;
That I shall strive to preserve and to maintain religious/sectarian harmony in
the Northern Areas and shall not indulge in any activity prejudicial to this cause;
and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which may come to my knowledge as Speaker of the Northern Areas
Legislative Council.

Signature of Speaker Northern Areas

Place .........................
Date .........................

Signature of Chief Executive Northern Areas]

1. Form “D” added by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.

314 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
1
[FORM “E”
OATH OF OFFICE OF THE ADVISOR
NORTHERN AREAS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
[Section 11(3)]
I, ............................................................................................being the Advisor
of the Northern
Areas Legislative Council, do solemnly swear that I will bear faith and allegiance
to Pakistan and uphold the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan.
That as Advisor of the Northern Areas Legislative Council, I will be faithful
to the declaration of the Founder of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali
Jinnah, that Pakistan would be democratic State based on Islamic principles of
social Justice;
That I will perform my functions honestly and faithfully;
That I shall strive to preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis for the
creation of Pakistan
That I shall strive to preserve and to maintain religious/sectarian harmony in
the Northern Areas and shall not indulge in any activity prejudicial to this cause;
and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which may come to my knowledge as Advisor of the Northern Areas
Legislative Council.

Signature of Advisor, Northern Areas

Place ...................
Date ..................

Signature of Chief Executive Northern Areas]

1. Form “E” added by Amendment Order dated 1st July, 2000.

 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 315

SCHEDULE-II
(See Section-17)

1. Public order (but not including the use of Naval, Military, Air Force, or any
other aimed forces of the Federation in aid of the civil power).
2. Preventive detention for reasons in connection with the maintenance of
public order; persons subjected to such detention.
3. Prisons, reformatories, borstal institution and other institutions of a like
nature and persons detained therein, arrangements with other provinces for
the use of prisons and other institutions.
4. I and, that is to say, rights in or over land; land tenures, including the relation
of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents: transfer, alienation and
devolution of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans;
colonization.
5. Land revenue; including the assessment and collection of revenue, the
maintenance of land records, survey for revenue purpose and records of lights
and alienation of revenues.
6. Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the Northern
Areas Administration.
7. Compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property.
8. Agriculture, including agricultural education and research protection against
posts and prevention of plant diseases.
9. Local Government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal
corporations, improvement trusts, district councils settlement authorities and
other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village
administration.
10. Preservation, protection and improvement of stock, and prevention of animal
diseases; veterinary training and practice.
11. Pounds and the prevention of cattle trespass.
12. Water, including water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and
embankments, water storage and water power; flood control.
13. Libraries, museums and ancient and historical monuments.
14. Bolanical, zoological and anthropological surveys.
15. Theaters: cinemas; sports; entertainments and amusement.
16. Public health and sanitation; hospitals and dispensaries.
17. Registration of births and deaths.
18. Burials and burial grounds; cremations and cremation grounds.
19. Relief of the disabled and un-employed.
20. Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession,
transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors and other narcotic drugs.
316 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

21. Boilers.
22. Markets and fairs.
23. Money lending and moneylenders; relief of indebtedness.
24 Protection of wild animals and birds.
25. Prevention of cruelty to animals.
26. Adulteration of foodstuff and other goods.
27. Retting and gambling.
28. Fisheries.
29. Professions.
30. Inns and in-keepers.
31. Orphanages and poor houses.
32. Taxes on agricultural income and on the value of agricultural land.
33. Lunacy and mental deficiency including places for reception of treatment
of lunatics and mental deficient.
34. Duties in respect of succession to agricultural land.
35. Estate Duly in respect of agricultural land.
36. Taxes on lands and buildings.
37. Taxes on advertisement.
30. Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways.
39. I fixes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use
on a road; on boats, launches and streamers on inland water; on tram cars.
40. I axes on animals and boats.
41. Tolls.
42. Capitation taxes
43. I fixes on luxuries, including taxes on entertainment and amusements.
44. Taxes on profession, trades, callings and employment.
45. Relief of poor; un-employment.
46. Offences against laws with respect of any of the matters in this list.
47. Inquiries and statistics for the purpose of any of the matters in this list.
40. Cases on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale
therein.
49. Duns on passengers and goods carried on roads or inland waterways.
 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 317

CHAPTER-I
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
[See Section 19-A]

Note: Fundamental Rights specified in Chapter 1 of part II of the Constitution of the

Islamic Republic of Pakistan (See Section 19A)

ARTICLE
8. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights to be void. –
(1) Any law, or any custom or usage having the force of laws in so far as it is
inconsistent with the rights conferred by this Chapter, shall, to the extent of such
inconsistency, be void.
(2) The State shall not make any law, which takes away or abridges the rights
so conferred and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent
of such contravention, be void.
(3) The provisions of this Article shall not apply to,-
(a) any law relating to members of the Armed Forces, or of the police or of
such other forces as are changed with the maintenance of public order,
for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of their duties of the
maintenance of discipline among them; or
1
[(b) any of the
(i) laws specified in the First Schedule as in force immediately before
the commencing day or as amended by any of the law specified in
that Schedule;
(ii) other laws specified in Part I of the First Schedule:] and no such
law nor any provision thereof shall be void on the ground that
such law or provision is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any
provision of this Chapter.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph (b) of clause (3), within
a period of two years from the commencing day, the appropriate Legislature shall
bring the laws specified in 2[part II of the first Schedule] into conformity with the
rights conferred by this Chapter.
Provided that the appropriate legislature may by resolution extend the said
period of two years by a period not exceeding six months.
1. By Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1974 (33 of 1974), in “day” the words or as amended
by any of the laws specified in that schedule were added. This amended paragraph (b) was then
substituted by the present one through the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 (71 of
1975).
2. Substituted by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 (71 of 1975), tor the words
“the First Schedule, not being a law which relates to, or is connected with, economic reforms”.
318 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Explanation. If in respect of any law [Majlish-E-Shoora (Parliament)] is the

appropriate legislature, such resolution shall be a resolution of the national
Assembly.
(5) The rights conferred by this Chapter shall not be suspended except as
expressly provided by the Constitution.
9. Security of person. – No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in
accordance with law.
10. Safeguards as to arrest and detention. – (1) No person who is arrested shall
be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds
for such arrest, not shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a
legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested arid detained in custody shall be produced
before a magistrate within a period of twenty four. hours of such arrest, excluding
the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the nearest
magistrate, and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period
without the authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clause (1) and (2) shall apply to any person who is arrested or
detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall be made except to deal
with persons acting in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security or defence of
Pakistan or any part thereof, or external affairs of Pakistan, or public order, or the
maintenance of supplies or services, and ho such law shall authorize the detention
of a person for a period exceeding 1[three months] Unless the appropriate Review
Board has, after affording him an opportunity of being heard in person, reviewed
his case and reported, before the expiration of the said period, that there is, in its
opinion, sufficient cause for such detention, and, if the detention is continued
after the said period of 2[three months], unless the appropriate Review Board has
reviewed his case and reported, before the expiration of each period of three months,
that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention.
Explanation-I. In this Article, “the appropriate Review Board” means:
(i) in the case of a person detained under a Federal Law, a Board appointed
by the Chief Justice of Pakistan arid consisting of a Chairman arid two
other persons, each of whom is or has been a Judge of the Supreme
Court or a High Court; and
(ii) in the case of a person detained under a Provincial Law, a board appointed
by the Chief Justice of the High Court concerned and consisting of

1. Substituted by the Constitution (third Amendment) Act, 1975 for the words one month.
2. Substituted by the Constitution (third Amendment) Act, 1975 for the words one month.
 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 319

Chairman and two other persons, each of whom is or has been a Judge
of a High court.
Explanation-II. The opinion of a Review Board shall be expressed in terms of the
views of the majority of its members.
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any
law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall,
1
[within fifteen days] from such detention, communicate to such person the grounds
on which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity
of making a representation against the order;
Provided that the authority making any such order may refuse to disclose facts
which such authority considers it to be against the public interest to disclose.
(6) The authority making the order shall furnish to the appropriate Review
Board all documents relevant to the case unless a certificate, signed by a Secretary
to the Government concerned, to the effect that it is not in the public interest to
furnish any documents, is produced.
(7) Within a period of twenty-four months commencing on the day of his
first detention in pursuance of an order made under a law providing for preventive
detention, ho person shall be detained in pursuance of any such order for more
than a total period of eight months in the case of. a person detained for acting in
manner prejudicial to public order and twelve months in any other case;
Provided that this clause shall not apply to any person who is employed by, or
works for, or acts on instruction received from the enemy 2[or who is acting or
attempting to act in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security or defence of
Pakistan or any part thereof or who commits or attempts to commit any act which
amounts to an anti-national activity as defined in a Federal law or is a member of
any association which has for its objects, or which indulges, in, any such anti-
national activity].
(8) The appropriate Review Board shall determine the place of detention of
the person detained and fix a reasonable subsistence allowance for his family.
(9) Nothing in this Article shall apply to any person who for the time being
is an enemy alien.
11. Slavery, forced labour, etc. prohibited. – (1) Slavery is non-existent and
forbidden and no law shall permit or facilitate its introduction into Pakistan in
any form.
(2) All firms of forced labour and traffic in human beings are prohibited.

1. Substituted by the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1975.

2. Added by Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1975.
320 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(3) No child below the age of fourteen years shall be engaged in any factory
or mine or any other hazardous employment.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to affect compulsory service:
(a) by any person undergoing punishment for an offence against any law; or
(b) required by any law for public purpose:
Provided that no compulsory service shall be of a cruel nature or
incompatible with human dignity.
12. Protection against retrospective punishment. – (1) No law shall authorize
the punishment of a person:
(a) for an act or omission that was not punishable by law at the time of the
act or omission; or
(b) for an offence by a penalty greater then, or of a kind different from, the
penalty, prescribed by law for that offence at the time the offence was
committed.
(2) Nothing in clause (I) or in Article 270 shall apply to any law making acts
of abrogation or subversion of a Constitution in force in Pakistan at any time since
the twenty third day of March, one thousand nine hundred and fifty six, an offence.
13. Protection against double punishment and self-incrimination. – No person:
(a) shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once; or
(b) shall, when accused of an offence, be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
14. Inviolability of dignity of man, etc. – (1) The dignity of man and, subject to
law, the privacy of home, shall be inviolable.
(2) No person shall be subjected to torture for the purpose of extracting
evidence.
15. Freedom of movement, etc. – Every Citizen shall have the right to remain, in
and, subject to any reasonable restriction imposed by law in the public interest,
enter and move freely throughout Pakistan and to reside and settle in any part
thereof.
16. Freedom of assembly. – Every citizen shall have the right to assemble peacefully
and without arms, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the
interest of public order.
17. Freedom of association. – (1) Every citizen shall have the right to form
associations or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in
the interest of 1[sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality].

1. Substituted by the Constitution (fourth Amendment) Act, 1975.

 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 321
1
[(2) Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to
form or be a member of a political party subject to any reasonable restrictions
imposed by law in the interest of the Sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and such
law shall provide that where the Federal Government declares that any political
party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the Sovereignty
or integrity of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall, within fifteen days of such
declaration, refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference
shall be final.
(3) Every political party shall account for the source of its funds in accordance
with law.]
18. Freedom of trade, business or profession. – Subject to such qualifications, if
any, as may be prescribed by law, every citizen shall have the right to enter upon
any lawful profession or occupation, and to conduct any lawful trade or business:
Provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent:
(a) the regulation of any trade or profession by licensing system; or
(b) the regulation of trade, commerce or industry in the interest of free
competition therein; or
(c) the carrying on, by the Federal Government or a Provincial Government,
or by a corporation controlled by any such Government, of any trade,
business, industry or service, to the exclusion, complete or partial, of
other persons.
19. Freedom of speech, etc. – Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of
speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any
reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the
integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with
foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of
court, 2[commission of ] or incitement to an offence.
20. Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions. – Subject
to law, public order and morality:
(a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practice and propagate his
religion; and
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right
to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.
1. Clause (20 and (3) substituted by the Constitution (first Amendment) Act, 1974 for clause (2)
which read as under:
“(2) Every citizen not being in the service of Pakistan shall have the right to form or be a
member of a political party. Every political party shall account for the source of its funds in
accordance with law”.
2. Substituted by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 for the word “definition”.
322 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

21. Safeguard against taxation for purposes of any particular religion. – No person
shall be compelled to pay any special tax the proceeds of which are to be spent on
the propagation, or maintenance of any religion other than his own.
22. Safeguards as to educational institutions in respect of religion, etc. – (1) No
person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious
instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if
such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.
(2) In respect of any religious institution, there shall be no discrimination
against any community in the granting of exemption or concession in relation to
taxation.
(3) Subject to law,
(a) no religious community or denomination shall be prevented from
providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or
denomination in any educational institution maintained wholly by that
community or denomination; and
(b) no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution
receiving aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion,
caste or place of birth.
(4) Nothing in this Article shall prevent any public authority from making
provisions for the advancement of any socially or educationally backward class of
citizens.
23. Provision as to property. – Every citizen shall have the right to acquire, hold
and dispose of property in any part of Pakistan, subject to the Constitution and
any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest.
24. Protection of property rights. – (1) No person shall be compulsorily deprived
of his property save in accordance with law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for
a public purpose, and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation
therefore and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles
on and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall affect the validity of:
(a) any law permitting the compulsory acquisition or taking possession of
any property for preventing danger to life, property or public health; or
(b) any law permitting the taking over of any property which has been
acquired by, or come into the possession of, any person by any unfair
means, or in any manner, contrary to law; or
(c) any law relating to the acquisition, administration or disposal of any
 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work Order, 1994 323

property which is or is deemed to be enemy property or evacuee property

under any law (not being property which has ceased to be evacuee
property under any law); or
(d) any law providing for taking over of the management of any property by
the State for a limited period, either in the public interest or in order to
secure the proper management of the property, or for the benefit of its
owner, or
(e) any law providing for the acquisition of any class of property for the
purpose of:
(i) providing education and medical aid to all or any specified class of
citizens; or
(ii) providing housing and public facilities and services such as roads,
water supply, sewerage, gas and electric power to all or any specified
class of citizens; or
(iii) providing maintenance to those who on account of unemployment,
sickness, infirmity or old age are unable to maintain themselves or
(f ) any existing law or any law made in pursuance of Article 253.
(4) The adequacy or otherwise of any compensation provided for by any such
law as is referred to in this Article, or determined in pursuance thereof, shall not
be called in question in any court.
25. Equality of citizens. – (1) All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to
equal protection of law.
(2) There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any special
provision for the protection of women and children.
26. Non-discrimination in respect of access to public places. – (1) In respect of
access to places of public entertainment or resort, hot intended for religious purpose
only there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the ground only of
race religion, caste sex residence or place of birth.
(2) Nothing in clause (I) shall prevent the Stale from making any special
provision for women and children
27. Safeguard against discrimination in services. – (1) No citizen otherwise
qualified for appointment in the service of Pakistan shall be discriminated against
in respect of any such appointment on the ground only of race, religion, caste sex
residence or place of birth,
Provided that, for a period not exceeding 1[twenty] years from the commencing

1. Substituted by P.O. No. 14 of 1985 for word “ten”.

324 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

day, posts may be reserved for persons belonging to any class or area to secure
their adequate, representation in the service of Pakistan;
Provided further that, in the interest of the said service, specified posts or
services may be reserved for members of either sex if such posts of services entail
the performance of duties and functions which cannot be adequately performed
by members of the other sex.
(2) Nothing in clause (I) shall prevent any Provincial Government, or any
local or other authority in a Province, from prescribing, in relation to any post or
class of service under that Government or authority, conditions as to residence in
the Province, for a period not exceeding three years, prior to appointment under
that Government or authority.
28. Preservation of language, script and culture. – Subject to Article 251, any
section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right
lo preserve and promote the same and subject to law, establish institutions for that
purpose.
 APPENDIX IX

Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance)

Order, 2009

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
MINISTRY OF KASHMIR AFFAIRS AND
NORTHERN AREAS
****
Islamabad, the 9th September, 2009
AN
ORDER
to provide greater political empowerment and better governance to the people of Gilgit-
Baltistan;
WHEREAS it is expedient to undertake necessary legislative, executive and judicial
reforms for granting self-governance to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and for matters
connected therewith or incidental thereto;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Government of Pakistan is pleased to make the
following Order:-
1. Short title, extent and commencement. – (1) This Order may be called the
Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009.
(2) It extends to the whole of areas Gilgit-Baltistan.
(3) It shall come into force on at once.
PART I - PRELIMINARY
2. Definitions. – (1) In this Order, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or context:
(a) “Assembly” means the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly;
(b) “Citizen” unless otherwise expressed in this Order “citizen” means a
person who has a domicile of Gilgit-Baltistan;
326 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(c) “Council” means the Gilgit-Baltistan Council constituted under this

Order;
(d) “Chairman” means the Chairman of the Council who shall be the Prime
Minister of Pakistan;
(e) “Financial year” means the year commencing on the first day of July
and ending on the thirtieth day of June;
(f ) “Gilgit-Baltistan” means the areas comprising districts of Astore, Diamer,
Ghanche, Ghizer, Gilgit, Hunza-Nagar, Skardu and such other districts
as may be created from time to time;
(g) “Governor” means the Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan and includes a person
for the time being acting as, or performing the functions of the Governor;
(h) “Government” means the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(i) “Joint Sitting” means a joint sitting of the Assembly, the Federal Minister
in-charge of the Council Secretariat and the members of the Council;
(j) “Judge” in relation to the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court or
the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court, includes the Chief Judge of the Gilgit-
Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court and the Chief Court;
(k) “Person” includes any body politic or corporate;
(l) “Prescribed” means prescribed by law or rules made thereunder;
(m) “Property” includes any right, title or interest in property, movable or
immovable, and any means and instruments of production;
(n) “remuneration” includes salary and pension;
(o) “Service of Gilgit-Baltistan” means any service, post or office in
connection with the affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan including the Council,
but does not include service as Chairman of the Council, Governor,
Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chief Minister, Minister, Federal Minister in-
charge of the Council Secretariat or Advisor, Parliamentary Secretary,
Advisor to the Minister or a member of the Assembly or member of the
Council; and
(p) “Speaker” means Speaker of the Assembly and includes any person acting
as the Speaker of the Assembly.
(q) “Vice Chairman of the Council” means the Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan.
PART II - FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
3. Security of person. – No person shall be deprived of liberty save in accordance
with law.
4. Safeguard as to arrest and detention. – (1) No person who is arrested shall be
detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds
for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a
legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 327

before the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest
excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court
of the Magistrate, and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the
said period without the authority of a Magistrate.
(3) Nothing in Clauses (1) and (2) shall apply to any person-
(a) who for the time being is an enemy alien, or
(b) who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive
detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention
of a person for a period exceeding three months unless the review board set up by
the Government has reported before the expiration of the said period of three
months that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention.
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any
law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall as
soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has
been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation
against the order:
Provided that the authority making any such order may refuse to disclose facts
which such authority considers it to be against the public interest to disclose.
5. Slavery and forced labour prohibited. – (1) No person shall be held in slavery,
and no law shall permit or in any way facilitate the introduction into Gilgit-Baltistan
of slavery in any form.
(2) All forms of forced labour are prohibited.
(3) Nothing in this clause shall be deemed to affect compulsory service-
(a) by persons undergoing punishment for offences under any law; or
(b) required by any law for a public purpose.
6. Protection against retrospective punishment. – No law shall authorize the
punishment of a person –
(a) for an act or omission that was not punishable by law at the time of
the act or omission; or
(b) for an offence by a penalty greater than, or of a kind different form,
the penalty prescribed by law for that offence at the time the offence
was committed.
7. Freedom of movement. – Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by
law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout
the Gilgit-Baltistan and to reside and settle in any part thereof.
8. Freedom of assembly. – Every citizen shall have the right to assemble peacefully
and without arms, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the
interest of morality or public order.
328 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

9. Freedom of association. – (1) Subject to this Order, every citizen shall have
the right to form association or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions
imposed by law in the interest of morality or public order.
(2) No person or political party in the area comprising Gilgit-Baltistan shall
propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology
of Pakistan.
10. Freedom of trade, business or profession. – Every citizen possessing such
qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law in relation to his profession or
occupation shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation,
and to conduct any lawful trade or business:
Provided that nothing in this Article shall prevent –
(a) the regulation of any trade or profession by a licensing system; or
(b) the regulation of trade, commerce or industry in the interest of free
competition therein; or
(c) the carrying on, by Government or the Council, or by a corporation
controlled by Government or the Council, of any trade, business,
industry or service, to the exclusion, complete or partial, or other
persons.
11. Freedom of speech. – Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech
and expression, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest
of the security of area Gilgit-Baltistan, public order, decency or morality, or in
relation to contempt of Court, commission of, or incitement to an offence.
12. Freedom of religion. – Subject to law, public order and morality-
(a) every citizen has the right to profess and practice his religion; and
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof has the right to
establish, maintain and manage its places of worship.
13. Safeguard against taxation for purposes of any particular religion. – No person
shall be compelled to pay any special tax the proceeds of which are to be spent on
the propagation or maintenance of any religion other than his own.
14. Safeguard as to educational institutions in respect of religion etc. – (1) No
person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious
instructions or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if
such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.
(2) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from
providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in
any educational institution maintained wholly by that community or
denomination.
(3) No citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution
receiving aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion, caste or
place of birth.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 329

(4) In respect of any religious institution, there shall be no discrimination

against any community in the granting of exemption or concession in relation to
taxation.
(5) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent any public authority from making
provision for the advancement of any society or educationally backward class.
15. Provisions as to property. – Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed
by law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to acquire, hold and
dispose of property.
16. Protection of property. – (1) No person shall be deprived of his property
save in accordance with law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save
for a public purpose, and save by the authority of law which provides for
compensation therefor and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies
the principles on which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined
and given.
(3) Nothing in this clause shall, affect the validity of –
(a) any law permitting the compulsory acquisition or taking possession
of any property for preventing danger to life, property or public health;
or
(b) any law relating to the acquisition, administration or disposal of any
property which is or is deemed to be evacuee property under any law;
or
(c) any law permitting the taking over of any property which has been
acquired by, or come into the possession of, any person by any unfair
means, or in any manner, contrary to law ; or
(d) any law providing for the taking over of the management of any
property by the Government for a limited period, either in the public
interest or in order to secure the proper management of the property,
or for the benefit of its owner; or
(e) any law providing for the acquisition of any class of property for the
purpose of –
(i) providing education and medical aid to all or any specified class of
citizen; or
(ii) providing housing and public facilities and services such as roads,
water supply, sewerage, gas and electric power to all or any specified
class of citizen; or
(iii) providing maintenance to those who, on account of
unemployment, sickness, infirmity or old age, are unable to
maintain themselves; or
330 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(f ) any law in force immediately before the coming into force of this
Order.
Explanation. – In clauses (2) and (3), the expression ‘property’ means immovable
property, or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in any
undertaking.
17. Equality of citizens. – All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to
equal protection of law.
18. Non-discrimination in respect of access to public places. – In respect of access
to places of public entertainment or resort, not intended for religious purposes
only, there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the ground only of
race, religion, caste, sex or place of birth, but nothing herein shall be deemed to
prevent the making of any special provision for women.
19. Safeguard against discrimination in services. – No citizen otherwise qualified
for appointment in the services of areas comprising Gilgit-Baltistan shall be
discriminated against in respect of any such appointment on the ground only of
race, religion, caste or sex:
Provided that, in the interest of the said service, specified posts or services
may be reserved for members of either sex.

PART III - GOVERNOR

20. The Governor. – (1) There shall be a Governor of the Gilgit-Baltistan who
shall be appointed by the President of Pakistan on the advice of the Prime Minister
of Pakistan:
(a) Notwithstanding any thing contained in this Order, the Federal
Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan shall act as the
Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan till the appointment of the first Governor.
(b) provided that after the first election under this Order, in the absence
of Governor, the Speaker of Legislative Assembly shall act as acting
Governor.
(3) A person shall not be appointed as Governor unless he is qualified to be
elected as a member of the Assembly or the National Assembly of Pakistan and is
not less than thirty five years of age.
(4) The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President and
shall be entitled to such salary, allowances and privileges as the President may
determine.
(5) The Governor may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President,
resign his office.
(6) The President may make such provision as he thinks fit for the discharge
of the functions of the Governor in any contingency not provided for in this Order.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 331

(7) Before entering upon office, the Governor shall make before the Chief
Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court an oath in the form set out
in the First Schedule.
(8) The Governor shall not hold any office of profit in the service of Gilgit-
Baltistan or of Pakistan nor occupy any other position carrying the right to
remuneration for the rendering of services.
(9) The Governor shall not be a candidate for election as a member of the
Assembly, and, if a member of the Assembly is appointed as Governor, his seat in
the Assembly shall become vacant on the day he enters upon his office.
21. Governor to act on advice, etc. – (1) Subject to this Order in the performance
of his functions, the Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet
or the Chief Minister:
Provided that the Governor may require the Cabinet or, as the case may be,
the Chief Minister to reconsider such advice, whether generally or otherwise, and
the Governor shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such
reconsideration.
(2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered to the
Governor by the Chief Minister or the Cabinet shall not be inquired into in, or
by, any court, tribunal or other authority.
PART IV - THE GOVERNMENT
22. The Government. – (1) Subject to this Order, the executive authority of Gilgit-
Baltistan shall be exercised in the name of the Governor by the Government through
Cabinet consisting of the Chief Minister and the Ministers, which shall act through
the Chief Minister who shall be the Chief Executive.
(2) In the performance of his functions under this Order, the Chief Minister
may act either directly or through the Ministers.
(3) The Chief Minister and the Ministers shall be collectively responsible to
the Assembly.
(4) Orders and other instructions made and executed in the name of the
Governor shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be
made by the Government, and the validity of an order or instruction which is so
authenticated shall not be questioned in any court on the ground that it is not an
order or instruction made or executed by the Governor.
(5) The Governor, in consultation with Chairman of the Council, may regulate
the allocation and transaction of its business and may for the convenient transaction
of that business delegate any of its functions to officers or authorities subordinate
to it.
23. The Chief Minister. – (1) The Assembly shall meet on the thirtieth day
following the day on which a general election to the Assembly is held, unless sooner
332 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

summoned by the Governor.

(2) After the election of the Speaker, and the Deputy Speaker, the Assembly
shall, to the exclusion of any other business, proceed to elect, without debate, one
of its members to be the Chief Minister.
(3) The Chief Minister shall be elected by the votes of the majority of the
total membership of the Assembly;
Provided that, if no member secures such majority in the first poll, a second
poll shall be held between the members who secure the two highest numbers of
votes in the first poll and the member who secures a majority of votes of the
members present and voting shall be declared to have been elected as Chief Minister:
Provided further that, if the number of votes secured by two members securing
the highest number of votes is equal, further poll shall be held between them until
one of them secures a majority of the members present and voting.
(4) The member elected under clause (3) shall be invited by the Governor to
assume the office of Chief Minister and he shall, before entering upon the office
make before the Governor oath in the form set out in the First Schedule.
24. Ministers. – (1) The Governor shall appoint Ministers from amongst the
members of the Assembly on the advice of Chief Minister.
(2) Before entering upon office, a Minister shall make before the Governor
oath in the form set out in the First Schedule.
(3) A Minister may, by writing under his hand addressed to the Chief Minister,
resign his office or may be removed from office by the Chief Minister.
25. Advisors to Chief Minister. – The Governor may, on the advice of Chief
Minister, appoint not more then two Advisors on such term and conditions, as he
may determine.
26. Parliamentary Secretaries. – (1) The Chief Minister may appoint
Parliamentary Secretaries from amongst the members of the Assembly to perform
such functions as may be prescribed.
(2) A Parliamentary Secretary may, by writing under his hand addressed to
the Chief Minister, resign his office or may be removed from office by the Chief
Minister.
27. Resignation of Chief Minister. – (1) Subject to clause (2) the Chief Minister
may, by writing under his hand addressed to the Governor, resign his office and,
when the Chief Minister resigns, the Ministers shall cease to hold office.
(2) If the Assembly is in session at the time when the Chief Minister resigns
his office, the Assembly shall forthwith proceed to elect a Chief Minister, and if
the Assembly is not in session the Governor shall for that purpose summon it to
meet within fourteen days of the resignation.
28. Vote of no-Confidence against Chief Minister. – (1) A resolution for a vote
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 333

of no-confidence moved by not less than twenty percent of the total membership
of the Assembly may be passed against the Chief Minister by the Assembly.
(2) A resolution shall not be moved in the Assembly unless by the same
resolution the name of another member of the Assembly is put forward as the
successor.
(3) A resolution shall not be moved in the Assembly while the Assembly is
considering demands for grants submitted to it in the Annual Budget.
(4) A resolution shall not be voted upon before the expiration of three days,
or later than seven days, form the date on which it is moved in the Assembly.
(5) If the resolution is passed by majority of the total membership of the
Assembly, the Chief Minister and the Ministers appointed by him shall cease to
hold office.
(6) If a resolution is not passed another such resolution shall not be moved
until a period of six months has elapsed.
29. Chief Minister Continuing in Office. – The Governor may ask the Chief
Minister to continue to hold office until his successor enters upon the office of
the Chief Minister.
30. Minister performing functions of Chief Minister. – (1) In the event of the
death of the Chief Minister or the office of the Chief Minister becoming vacant
by reason of his ceasing to be member of the Assembly or he resigns his office, the
most senior Minister for the time being shall be called upon by the Governor to
perform the functions of that office and the Minister shall continue in office until
a new Chief Minister has been elected and has entered upon his office.
(2) If the Assembly is in session at the time when the Chief Minister dies or
the office of the Chief Minster becomes vacant, the Assembly shall forthwith
proceed to elect a Chief Minister, and if the Assembly is not in session the Governor
shall for that purpose summon it to meet within fourteen days of the death of the
Chief Minister or, as the case may be, of the office becoming vacant.
(3) When, for any reason, the Chief Minister is unable to perform his functions,
the most senior Minister for the time being shall perform functions of Chief
Minister until the Chief Minister resumes his functions.
(4) In this Article ‘most senior Minister’ means the Minister for the time being
designated as such by the Chief Minister by notification in the official Gazette.
31. Extent of Executive Authority of Government. – (1) Subject to this Order,
the executive authority of the Government shall extend to the matters with respect
to which the Assembly has power to make laws.
(2) The executive authority of the Government shall be so exercised as to secure
compliance with the laws made by the Council and Pakistan laws.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Order, the Government may
with the consent of the Council, entrust, either conditionally or unconditionally,
334 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

to the Council, or to its officers functions in relation to any matter which the
executive authority of the Government extends.
32. Advocate General. – (1) The Governor shall appoint a citizen, being a person
qualified to be appointed as Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court, to be the
Advocate General for Gilgit-Baltistan.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate General to give advice to Government
upon such legal matter, and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as
may be referred or assigned to him by the Government.
(3) The Advocate General shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor.
(4) The Advocate General may, by writing under his hand addressed to the
Governor resign his office.
(5) The person holding the office as Advocate General immediately before the
commencement of this Order shall be deemed to be the Advocate General,
appointed under this Order.

PART V - GILGIT-BALTISTAN COUNCIL

33. Gilgit-Baltistan Council. – (1) There shall be a Gilgit-Baltistan Council
consisting of –
(a) the Prime Minister of Pakistan;
(b) the Governor;
(c) six members nominated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan from time
to time from amongst Federal Ministers and members of
Parliament:Provided that the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and
Gilgit-Baltistan shall be an ex officio member and Minister Incharge of
the Council:
(d) the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(e) six members to be elected by the Assembly in accordance with the
system of proportional representation by means of a single transferable
vote.
(2) The Prime Minister of Pakistan shall be the Chairman of the Council.
(3) The Governor shall be the Vice-Chairman of the Council.
(4) The Minister of State for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan shall be an
ex officio non voting member of the Council.
(5) The qualifications and disqualifications for being elected, as, and for being,
a member of the Council shall, in the case of a member referred to in sub-clause
(e) of clause (1), be the same as those for being elected as, and for being a member
of the Assembly.
(6) The seat of a member of the Council elected by the Assembly, hereinafter
referred to as an elected member, shall become vacant,-
(a) if he resigns his seat by notice in writing under his hand addressed to
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 335

the Chairman or, in his absence, to the Secretary of the Council;

(b) if he is absent, without the leave of the Chairman, from ten consecutive
sittings of the Council;
(c) if he fails to make the oath referred to in clause (11) within a period of
ninety days after the date of his election, unless the Chairman, for
good cause shown, extends the period; or
(d) if he ceases to be qualified for being a member under any provision of
this Order or any other law for the time being in force.
(7) If any question arises whether a member has, after his election, become
disqualified from being a member of the Council, the Chairman shall refer the
question to the Chief Election Commissioner and, if the Chief Election
Commissioner is of the opinion that the member has become disqualified, the
member shall cease to be member and his seat shall become vacant.
(8) An election to fill a vacancy in the office of an elected member shall be
held not later than thirty days from the occurrence of the vacancy or, if the election
cannot be held within that period because the Assembly is dissolved, within thirty
days of the general election to the Assembly.
(9) The manner of election of elected members and filling of a casual vacancy
in the office of an elected member shall be such as may be prescribed.
(10) An elected member shall hold office during term of the Council.
(11) An elected member shall, before entering upon office, make before the
Chairman or the Vice Chairman oath in the form set out in the First Schedule.
(12) The executive authority of the Council shall extend to all matters with
respect to which the Council has power to make laws and shall be exercised, in the
name of the Council, by the Chairman who may act either directly or through the
Secretariat of the Council of which Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-
Baltistan shall be incharge.
Provided that the Council may direct that, in respect of such matters it may
specify, its authority shall be exercisable by the Vice-Chairman of the Council,
subject to such conditions, if any, as the Council may specify.
(13) The Chairman may from among the elected members of the Council
appoint not more than three Advisors on such terms and conditions as he may
determine.
(14) An advisor shall, before entering upon office, make before the Chairman
oath in form set out in the First Schedule.
(15) An Advisor who is a member of the Assembly shall have the right to speak
in, and otherwise take part in the proceedings of the Council, but shall not by
virtue of this clause be entitled to vote.
(16) The Council may make rules for regulating its procedure and the conduct
of its business, and shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the
membership thereof, and any proceedings of the Council shall not be invalid on
336 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the ground that a person who was not entitled to do so sat, voted or otherwise
took part in the proceedings.
(17) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the
Council shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be
made by the Council and the validity of an order or instrument which is so
authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order
or instrument made or executed by the Council.
(18) The Chairman may regulate the allocation and transaction of the business
of the Council and may, for the convenient transaction of that business, delegate
any of its functions to officers and authorities subordinate to it.
Explanation: In this Article the expression ‘Chairman’ means Chairman of the
Council.
34. Chairman of Council power to pardon and reprieve. – The Chairman shall
have power to grant pardons, reprieves and respites and to remit, suspend or
commute any sentence passed by any court, tribunal or other authority.

PART VI - THE LEGISLATURE

35. Legislative Assembly. – (1) The Legislative Assembly shall consist of thirty
three members of whom-
(a) twenty four members shall be elected directly on the basis of adult
franchise;
(b) six women members shall be elected on the pattern as in case of reserved
seat in Pakistan.
(c) three technocrats and other professional members shall be elected on
the pattern as in case of reserved seat in Pakistan.
Explanation. – In sub-clause (c), the expression “technocrat or other professional”
includes a person who is in possession of such qualification or experience as may
be prescribed.
(2) The manner of election of the members of the Assembly and the manner
of filling casual vacancies shall be such as may be prescribed.
(3) The Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from
the date appointed for their first meeting.
(4) A general election to the Assembly shall be held within a period of sixty
days immediately proceeding the day on which the term of the Assembly is due to
expire, unless the Assembly has been sooner dissolved, and result of the election
shall be declared not later than fourteen days before that day.
36. Oath of members of the Assembly. – (1) A person elected as a member of the
Assembly shall not take his seat in the Assembly until he makes before such person
as is prescribed by rules of the Assembly an oath in the form set out in the First
Schedule.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 337

(2) The oath may be made when the Assembly is in session.

(3) If any person sits or votes in the Assembly knowing that he is not qualified
to be, or is disqualified from being a member of the Assembly he shall be liable in
respect of every day on which he so sits or votes; shall be guilty of an offence
punishable for a term which shall not be less than seven years and a fine which
shall not be less than two hundred thousand rupees.
37. Qualifications of members of the Assembly. – (1) A person shall be qualified
to be elected as, and to be, a member of the Assembly if –
(a) he is a citizen;
(b) he is not less than twenty-five years of age; and
(c) his name appears on the electoral roll of any constituency in Gilgit-
Baltistan.
(2) A person shall be disqualified from being so elected if –
(a) he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or
(b) he is an undischarged insolvent unless a period of ten years has elapsed
since his being adjudged as insolvent; or
(c) he has been on conviction for any offence sentenced to transportation
for any term or imprisonment for a term of not less than two years
unless a period of five years has elapsed since his release; or
(d) he holds any office of profit in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan or in the
service of Pakistan other than a office which is not a whole time office
remunerated either by salary or by fee other than an office specified in
the Second Schedule; or
(e) he has been in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan, Pakistan and AJ&K or of
any statutory body or any body which is owned or controlled by the
Government of Pakistan, AJ&K and Gilgit-Baltistan or in which the
Government has a controlling share or interest, unless a period of two
years has elapsed since he ceased to be in such service; or
(f ) he has been dismissed for misconduct from the service of Gilgit-
Baltistan or the service of Pakistan unless a period of five years has
elapsed since his dismissal; or
(g) he is otherwise disqualified from being a member of the Assembly by
this Order or by any other law.
38. Seat in Assembly becomes vacant under certain circumstances. – (1) The
seat of a member of the Assembly shall become vacant if –
(a) he resigns his seat by notice in writing under his hand addressed to the
Speaker, in his absence, to the Secretary of the Assembly; or
(b) he is absent from the Assembly without the leave of the Assembly for
thirty consecutive sitting days of the Assembly; or
(c) he fails to make the oath referred to in Article 36 within a period of
338 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

ninety days after the date of his election unless the Speaker for good
cause shown extends the period; or
(d) he is elected as member of the Council; or
(e) he ceases to be qualified for being a member under any provision of
this Order or any other law.
(2) If the member of the Assembly is elected to more than one seat, he shall
within a period of thirty days after the declaration of result for the last such seat,
resign all but one of his seats, and if he does not so resign, all the seats to which
he has been elected shall become vacant at the expiration of the said period of
thirty days except the seat to which he has been last elected or, if he has been
elected to more than one seat on the same day, the seat for election to which his
nomination was filed last.
(3) If any question arises whether a member of the Assembly has, after his
election become disqualified from being a member of the Assembly, the Speaker
shall refer the question to the Chief Election Commissioner and, if the Chief
Election Commissioner is of the opinion that the member has become disqualified
the member shall cease to be a member and his seat shall become vacant.
(4) When except by dissolution of the Assembly, a seat in the Assembly has
become vacant not later than one hundred and twenty days before the term of the
Assembly is due to expire, an election to fill the seat shall be held within sixty days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
39. Right of Governor to address the Assembly. – (1) The Governor may address
the Assembly and may for that purpose require the attendance of the members.
(2) The Advocate General shall have the right to speak and otherwise take
part in the proceedings of the Assembly or any Committee thereof of which he
may be named a member, but shall not by virtue of this Article be entitled to vote.
40. Meetings of the Assembly. – (1) The Assembly shall assemble at such times
and at such places as the Governor may appoint, and the Governor may prorogue
a session of the Assembly except when the Assembly has been summoned by the
Speaker.
(2) Any meeting of the Assembly may be adjourned by the Speaker or other
person presiding thereat.
(3) There shall be at least three sessions of the Assembly every year, and not
more than one hundred and twenty days shall intervene between the last sitting of
the Assembly in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next
session.
Provided that the Assembly shall meet for not less than one hundred and thirty
working days in each parliamentary year.
(4) On a requisition signed by not less than one-third of the total membership
of the Assembly, the Speaker shall summon the Assembly to meet, at such time
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 339

and place as he thinks fit, within fourteen days of the receipt of the requisition,
and when the Speaker has summoned the Assembly, only he may prorogue it.

41. Dissolution of the Assembly. – (1) The Governor shall dissolve the Assembly
if so advised by the Chief Minister, and the Assembly shall, unless sooner dissolved,
stands dissolved at the expiration of the forty-eight hours after the Chief Minister
has so advised.
Explanation. – Reference in this Article to Chief Minister shall not be construed
to include reference to a Chief Minister against whom a resolution for a vote of no-
confidence has been moved in the Assembly but has not been voted upon or against
whom such a resolution has been passed or who is continuing in office after his
resignation or after the dissolution of the Assembly or a Minister performing the
functions of Chief Minister under clause (I) or clause (3) of Article 30.
(2) When the Assembly is dissolved a general election to the Assembly shall
be held within a period of ninety days after the dissolution, and the result of the
election shall be declared not later than fourteen days after the conclusion of the
polls.
42. Speaker of the Assembly. – (1) After a general election, the Assembly shall, at
its first meeting and to the exclusion of any other business, elect from amongst its
members a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker of the Assembly.
Provided that the period intervening between the declaration of the official
result of the election to the Assembly and the date for assumption of office of
members shall not exceed thirty days.
(2) Before entering upon office, a member of the Assembly elected as Speaker
or Deputy Speaker shall make before the Assembly an oath in the form set out in
the First Schedule.
(3) All the proceedings of the Assembly shall be conducted in accordance with
rules of procedures made by the Assembly and approved by the Governor.
(4) The Speaker shall preside the meetings of the Assembly except when a
resolution for his removal from the office is being considered and, when the office
of the Speaker is vacant, or the Speaker is absent, or is unable to perform his
functions due to any cause, the Deputy Speaker shall act as Speaker and if at that
time, the Deputy Speaker is also absent or is unable to act as Speaker due to any
cause, such member of the Assembly present as may be determined by the Rules
of Procedure of the Assembly shall preside at the meeting of the Assembly.
(5) Soon after as the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker becomes vacant, the
Assembly shall elect one of its members to fill the office.
(6) The Speaker may resign from his office by writing under his hand addressed
to the Governor.
(7) The Deputy Speaker may resign his office by writing under his hand
addressed to the Speaker.
340 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(8) The office of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker shall become vacant if-
(a) except as provided in clause (9) he ceases to be a member of the
Assembly; or
(b) he is removed from office by a resolution of the Assembly, of which
not less than seven days’ notice by not less than one-fourth of the total
membership of the Assembly has been given and which is passed by a
majority of total membership of the Assembly.
(9) When the Assembly is dissolved, the Speaker shall continue in his office till
the person elected to fill the office by the next Assembly enters upon his office.
43. Voting in Assembly and quorum. – (1) Subject to this Order, -
(a) a decision in the Assembly shall be taken by a majority of the votes of
the members present and voting but the Speaker or the person presiding
in his absence shall not vote except when there is an equality of votes
in which case he shall exercise his casting vote;
(b) the Assembly may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership;
and
(c) any proceedings in the Assembly shall not be invalid on the ground
that some person who was not entitled to do so sit, voted or otherwise
took part in the proceedings.
(2) If at any time during the meeting of the Assembly the attention of the
person presiding at the meeting is drawn to the fact that number of the members
is less than one-third of the total membership of the Assembly, it shall be the duty
of the person presiding either to adjourn the meeting or to suspend the meeting
till such number of members are present.
44. Restriction on discussion in Assembly, etc. – No discussion shall take place
in the Assembly or the Council or the joint sitting with respect to matters relating
to Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Security and Fiscal Plans of Government of
Pakistan and the conduct of the any Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court or the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court in the discharge of his duties.
45. Finance Committee. – (1) The expenditure of the Assembly within authorized
appropriation shall be controlled by the Assembly acting on the advice of the
Finance Committee.
(2) The Finance Committee shall consist of the Speaker, the Finance Minister
and such other members as may be elected thereto by the Assembly.
46. Secretariat of the Assembly. – (1) The Assembly shall have a separate Secretariat.
(2) The Assembly may by law regulate the recruitment and conditions of service
of persons appointed to the Secretariat Staff of the Assembly.
(3) Until provision is made by the Assembly under clause (2) the persons
appointed to the Secretariat Staff of the Assembly shall continue to be governed
by conditions of service for the time being applicable to them.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 341

PART VII - DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS

47. Legislative Powers. – (1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this Article,
both the Council and the Assembly shall have the power to make laws,-
(a) for the territories of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(b) for all citizens of Gilgit-Baltistan; and
(c) for the officers of the Council or as the case may be, the Government,
wherever they may be.
(2) Subject to clause (3):
(a) the Council shall have exclusive power to make laws with respect to
any matter in the Council Legislative List set out in the Third Schedule,
hereinafter referred to as the Council Legislative List; and
(b) the Assembly shall, and the Council shall not, have power to make
laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the Fourth Schedule
referred to as the Assembly Legislative List.
(c) The Council shall have the powers to adopt any amendment in the
existing Laws or any new Law in force in Pakistan.
(3) The Government of Pakistan shall have exclusive power to make laws in
respect of any matter not enumerated in the Council Legislative List or the Assembly
Legislative List by Order notified in the official Gazette.
48. Tax to be levied by laws only. – No tax shall be levied for the purposes of the
territories of Gilgit-Baltistan except by or under the authority of an Act of the
Council or the Assembly and all taxes and levies competently imposed under an
Act of the Assembly or the Council or under any law made by the Government of
Pakistan shall remain in force..

PART VIII - ISLAMIC PROVISIONS

49. No laws against Islamic Injunctions, etc. – No law shall be repugnant to the
teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah
and all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Holy Quran and
Sunnah.
50. Reference to Council of Islamic Ideology. – (1) If one-third of the total
number of the members of the Assembly or, as the case may, the Council so requires,
the Assembly or the Council shall refer to the Council of Islamic Ideology
constituted under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter
referred to as the Islamic Council) for advice on any question as to whether a
proposed law is or is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.
(2) When a question is referred by the Assembly or the Council, as the case
may be, the Council of Islamic Ideology shall, within fifteen days thereof, inform
the Assembly or the Council, as the case may be, of the period within which the
Council of Islamic Ideology expects to be able to furnish that advice.
342 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(3) Where the Assembly or, as the case may be, the Council considers that in
the public interest, the making of the proposed law in relation to which the question
arose should not be postponed until the advice of the Council of Islamic Ideology
is furnished, the law may be made before the advice is furnished.
Provided that, where a law is referred for advice to the Council of Islamic
Ideology and the Council advises that the law is repugnant to the injunctions of
Islam, the Assembly or, as the case may be, the Council shall reconsider the law so
made.
51. General provisions regarding Council, etc. – (1) The validity of any
proceedings in the Council or the Assembly shall not be questioned in any Court.
(2) An officer or member or an authority in whom powers are vested for
regulation of proceedings, conduct of business, maintain order in the Council or
the Assembly shall not, in relation to exercise by him of any of those powers, be
subject to the jurisdiction of any Court.
(3) A member of, or a person entitled to speak in, the Council or the Assembly,
shall not be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of anything said by
him or any vote given by him in the Council or the Assembly or in any Committee
thereof.
(4) A person shall not be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of
publication by or under the authority of the Council or the Assembly, of any report,
paper, vote or proceedings.
(5) No process issued by a Court or other authority shall except with the leave
of the Chairman of the Council or the Speaker be served or executed within the
precincts of the place where a meeting of the Council or, as the case may be, the
Assembly is being held.
(6) Subject to this Article, the privileges of the Council, the Assembly, the
Committees and members of the Council, or the Assembly and of the persons
entitled to speak in the Council, or the Assembly, may be determined by law.
52. Authentication of Bills Passed by the Council. – A Bill passed by the Council
shall not require the assent of the Governor and shall, upon its authentication by
the Chairman of the Council, become law and be called an Act of the Council.
53. Governor’s assent to Bills. – (1) Subject to this Order, when a Bill has been
passed by the Assembly it shall be presented to the Governor for assent.
(2) When a Bill is presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall,
within thirty days,-
(a) assent to the Bill; or
(b) in the case of a Bill other then a Money Bill, return the Bill to the
Assembly with a massage requesting that the Bill, or any specified
provision thereof, be reconsidered and that any amendment specified
in the message be considered.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 343

(3) When the Governor has returned a Bill to the Assembly, it shall be
reconsidered by the Assembly and, if it is again passed, with or without amendment,
by the Assembly, by the votes of the majority of the members of the Assembly
present and voting, and in accordance with the provision of this Order and in not
in any manner prejudicial to the security, integrity, solidarity and strategic interest
of Pakistan, it shall be again presented to the Governor and Governor shall not
withhold assent thereform.
(4) When the Governor has assented to a Bill, it shall become law and be
called an Act of Assembly.

PART IX - FINANCIAL PROCEDURE

54. Council Consolidated Fund. – (1) All revenues received by the Council, all
loans raised by the Council and all moneys received by it in payment of any loan
shall form a part of Consolidated Fund, to be known as the Council Consolidated
Fund.
(2) All other moneys –
(a) received by or on behalf of the Council; or
(b) received by or deposited with the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court or any other Court established under the authority of this Order
shall be credited to the Public Account of the Council.
(3) The Custody of the Council Consolidated Fund, the payment of money
into that Fund, the withdrawal of money there from, the custody of other moneys
received by or on behalf of the Council, their payment into, and withdrawal from
the Public Account of the Council, and all matters connected with or ancillary to
the matters aforesaid, shall be regulated by the Act of the Council or, until provision
in that behalf is so made, by rules made by the Chairman of the Council.
(4) The Council shall, in respect of every financial year, cause to be prepared,
and approve, a statement of estimated receipts and expenditure of the Council for
that year.
(5) The Chairman of the Council shall authenticate by his signature the
statement approved by the Council under clause (4), and no expenditure from the
Council Consolidated Fund shall be deemed to be duly authorized unless it is
specified in the statement so authenticated.
(6) If in respect of any financial year it is found:
(a) that the amount authorized to be expended for a particular service for
the current financial year is insufficient, or that a need has arisen for
expenditure upon some new service not included in the statement
referred to in clause (4) for that year; or
(b) that any money has been spend on any service during a financial year
in excess of the amount granted for that year, the Chairman of the
Council shall have the power to authorize expenditure from the Council
344 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Consolidated Fund and shall cause to be laid before the Council a

supplementary statement or, as the case may be, an excess statement,
setting out the amount of that expenditure, and the provision of clause
(3) and (4) shall apply to theses statements as they apply to the statement
referred to in clause (3).
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this
Article, the Council shall have power to make any grant in advance in respect of
the estimated expenditure for a part of any financial year, not exceeding four
months, pending completion of the procedure prescribed in clause (3) and (4).
55. Gilgit-Baltistan Consolidated Fund. – (1) All revenues received by the
Government, all loans raised by the Government with the approval of Government
of Pakistan and all moneys received by it in payment of any loan shall form a part
of Consolidated Fund, to be known as the Gilgit-Baltistan Consolidated Fund.
(2) All other moneys –
(a) received by or on behalf of the Government; or
(b) received by or deposited with any other Court established under the
authority of the Government, shall be credited to the Public Account
of the Government.
(3) The custody of the Gilgit-Baltistan Consolidated Fund, the payment of
money into that Fund, the withdrawal of money therefrom, the custody of other
moneys received by or on behalf of the Government, their payment into, and
withdrawal from the Public Account of the Government, and all matters connected
with or ancillary to the matters aforesaid, shall be regulated by the Act of the
Assembly or, until provision in that behalf is so made, by rules made by the
Governor.
56. Budget. – (1) The Government shall, in respect of every financial year, cause
to be laid before the Assembly a statement of estimated receipts and expenditure
for that year, to be called the Annual Budget.
(2) The Annual Budget shall be submitted to the Assembly in the form of
demands for grant and the Assembly shall have power to assent to, or to refuse to
assent to any demand, or to assent to any demand subject to a reduction of the
amount specified therein.
(3) No demand for a grant shall be made except on the recommendation of
the Government.
(4) The Annual Budget as passed by the Assembly shall be placed before the
Governor who shall authenticate it by his signature.
(5) If in respect of any financial year it is found:
(a) that the amount authorized to be expended for a particular service for
the current financial year is insufficient, or that a need has arisen for
expenditure upon some new service not included in the Annual Budget
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 345

for that year; or

(b) that any money has been spend on any service during a financial year
in excess of the amount granted for that year, the Government shall
have the power to authorize expenditure from the Gilgit-Baltistan
Consolidated Fund and shall cause to be laid before the Assembly a
Budget or, as the case may be, an excess Budget, setting out the amount
of that expenditure, and the provisions of this Article shall apply to
those Budgets as they apply to the Annual Budget.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this
section, the Assembly shall have power to make any grant in advance in respect of
the estimated expenditure for a part of any financial year, not exceeding four
months, pending completion of the procedure prescribed in clause (2) for the voting
of such grant and the authentication of the Budget as passed by the Assembly in
accordance with the provisions of clause (4) in relation to the expenditure.
57. Special provisions regarding Budget, etc. – (1) Where the Annual Budget for
any financial year cannot be passed by the Assembly by reason of its having been
dissolved, the Chief Minister shall cause to be prepared an Annual Budget for that
year and, by his signature, authenticate the Budget.
(2) The Annual Budget for any financial year authenticated by the Chief
Minister under clause (1) shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to have
been passed by the Assembly.
58. Restriction on expenditure. – No expenditure shall be incurred by the
Government except authorized by the Annual or Supplementary Budget as passed
or deemed to have been passed by the Assembly.
PART X - ORDINANCE
59. Power to make Ordinance. – (1) The Governor may, except when the Assembly
is in session, if satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take
immediate action, make and promulgate an Ordinance as the circumstances may
require.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force
and effect as an Act of the Assembly and shall be subject to like restrictions as the
power of the Assembly to make law, but every such Ordinance;
(a) shall be laid before the Assembly and shall stand repealed at the
expiration of four months from its promulgation or, if before the
expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the
Assembly, upon the passing of that resolution; and
(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of clause (2) an Ordinance laid before
the Assembly or the Council shall be deemed to be a Bill introduced in the Assembly
or the Council, as the case may be.
346 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(4) The Governor shall likewise, except when the Council is in session, if so
advised by the Chairman of the Council, make, promulgate and withdraw an
Ordinance as the circumstances may require, and the provisions of clause (2) and
clause (3) shall apply to an Ordinance so made as if references therein to ‘Act of the
Assembly and, Assembly were references respectively to’ Act of the Council and
Council.
PART XI - THE JUDICATURE
60. Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court. – (1) There shall be constituted a
Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court, referred to as the Supreme Appellate
Court to be the highest Court of Appeal.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Supreme Appellate Court shall
have such jurisdiction as is or may be conferred on it by this Order or by under
any law.
(3) The Supreme Appellate Court shall consist of a Chief Judge to be known
as Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan and two other Judges:
Provided that the Government of Pakistan may from time to time increase
the number of judges.
(4) The person holding office as Chief Judge or other Judge of the Supreme
Appellate Court immediately before the commencement of this Order shall be
deemed to be the Chief Judge or other Judge as the case may be appointed under
this Order.
(5) The Chief Judge of Supreme Appellate Court shall be appointed by the
Chairman of the Council on the advice of the Governor and other Judges shall be
appointed by the Chairman on the advice of Governor after seeking views of the
Chief Judge.
(6) A person shall not be appointed as the Chief Judge or Judge of the Supreme
Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan unless he:
(a) has been a judge of Supreme Court of Pakistan or is qualified to be a
judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan; or
(b) has for a period of, or for periods aggregating, not less than five years
been a Judge of a Chief Court; or
(c) for a period of or for periods aggregating, not less than fifteen years
has been an advocate of a High Court.
Explanation. – In this sub-clause, the expression ‘High Court’ includes,-
(a) the Chief Court of Gilgit-Baltistan, or an equivalent Court that existed
in Gilgit-Baltistan before the 1st day of August, 2009; and
(b) a High Court in Pakistan including a High Court that existed in
Pakistan at any time before the 1st day of July, 2009.
(7) Before entering upon office, the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan shall make
before the Governor and any other Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 347

Baltistan shall make before the Chief Judge, oath in the form set out in the First
Schedule.
(8) The Chief Judge and judges of the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-
Baltistan shall be appointed for a term not exceeding three years and may be
appointed for such further term as the Government of Pakistan may determine,
unless they sooner resign or are removed from office in accordance with law.
(9) At any time when the office of Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan is vacant, or
the Chief Judge, is absent or unable to perform the functions of his office due to
any other cause, the next senior Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court to act as
Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(10) The remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of the Chief
Judge and of a Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court shall be
such as are admissible to the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Judges of the Supreme
Court of Pakistan.
(11) Subject to the succeeding provision of this Article, the Supreme Court of
Gilgit-Baltistan shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from
judgments, decrees, final orders or sentences of the Chief Court of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(12) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Appellate Court of the Gilgit-Baltistan
from any judgment, decree, final order or sentence of the Chief Court of Gilgit-
Baltistan, –
(a) if the Chief Court has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an
accused person and sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life; or,
on revision, has enhanced a sentence to a sentence as aforesaid; or.
(b) if the Chief Court has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from
any court subordinate to it and has in such trial convicted the accused
person and sentenced him as aforesaid; or
(c) if the Chief Court has imposed any punishment on any person for
contempt of the Chief Court; or
(d) if the amount or value of the subject matter of the dispute in the court
of first instance was, and also in dispute in appeal is, not less than fifty
thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf
by Act of the Council and judgment, decree or final order appealed
from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the
court immediately below; or
(e) if the judgment, decree or final order involved directly or indirectly
some claim or question respecting property or the like amount or
value and the judgment, decree or final order appealed from has varied
or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the court immediately
below; or
(f ) if the Chief Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of this Order.
348 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(13) An appeal to the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court of from a

judgment, decree, order or sentence of the Chief Court in a case to which clause
(11) does not apply shall lie only if the Supreme Appellate Court of grants leave
to appeal.
(14) (a) an appeal to Gilgit-Baltistan the Supreme Appellate Court shall be
heard by a Bench consisting of not less than two judges to be
constituted or reconstituted by the Chief Judge;
(b) if the Judges hearing a petition or an appeal are divided in opinion,
the opinion of majority shall prevail;
(c) if there is no such majority as aforesaid the petition or appeal, as
the case may be, shall be placed for hearing and disposal before
another Judge to be nominated by the Chief Judge:
Provided that in case of difference of opinion as aforesaid, the decision of the
Supreme Appellate Court shall be expressed in term of opinion of the senior of
the two Judges.
(15) The person holding office as Chief Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme
Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan immediately before the commencement of this
Order shall as from such commencement hold office as Chief Judge of Supreme
Appellate Court under this Order on terms and conditions prescribed in this Order
provided these are not inferior to the terms an conditions applicable to him
immediately before such commencement.
(16) All legal proceedings pending in the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court, immediately before the commencement of this Order, shall on such
commencement, stand transferred to, and be deemed to be pending before the
Supreme Appellate Court for determination and any judgment or order of the
Supreme Appellate Court delivered or made before such commencement shall have
the same force and effect as if it had been delivered or made by the Supreme
Appellate Court.
61. Original Jurisdiction. – (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article-
71, the Supreme Appellate Court, on an application of any aggrieved party, shall
if it considers that a question of general public importance with reference to the
enforcement of any of the fundamental right conferred by Part II of this Order is
involved, have the power to make declaratory order of the nature mentioned in
the said Article.
(2) An application made under clause (1) shall be heard by a Bench comprising
not less than two Judges to be constituted by the Chief Judge.
62. Issue and execution of processes of Supreme Appellate Court. – (1) The
Supreme Appellate Court shall have powers to issue such directions, orders or
decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending
before it including an order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 349

person or the discovery or production of any document.

(2) Any such direction, order or decree shall be enforceable throughout Gilgit-
Baltistan as if it has been issued by the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court.
(3) All executive and judicial authorities throughout Gilgit-Baltistan shall act
in aid of the Supreme Appellate Court.
(4) Subject to this Order and Law, the Supreme Appellate Court may, in
consultation with the Council, make rules regulating the practice and procedure
of the Court:
Provided that till the new rules are framed, the rules framed by the Supreme
Appellate Court shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Order and any
other law, deemed to have been made by the Supreme Appellate Court until altered
or amended and references to the Supreme Appellate Court in these rules shall be
construed to be referred to the Supreme Appellate Court.
63. Decisions of Supreme Appellate Court binding on other Courts. – Any
decision of the Supreme Appellate Court shall, to the extent that it decides a
question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on
all other Courts in the Gilgit-Baltistan.
64. Seat of the Supreme Appellate Court. – (1) The Seat of the Supreme Appellate
Court shall be at Gilgit.
(2) The Supreme Appellate Court may sit at such other place or places as the
Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan, with the approval of the Governor, may appoint.
65. Review of judgment or order by the Supreme Appellate Court. – The Supreme
Appellate Court shall have powers, subject to the provisions of an Act of the Assembly
or the Council and of any rules made by the Supreme Appellate Court, to review
any judgment pronounced or any order made by it.
66. Supreme Judicial Council. – (1) There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council
of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(2) The Supreme Judicial Council shall consist of,_
(a) the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan who shall be its Chairman.
(b) the Senior Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court; and
(c) the Chief Judge of the Chief Court .
(3) A Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court or of the Chief Court shall not
be removed from office except as provided by this Article.
Explanation: The expression “Judge” includes the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan
and the Chief Judge of Chief Court of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(4) If on information received from the Supreme Judicial Council or from
any other source, the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council or the Governor
is of the opinion that a Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court or of the Chief
Court,
(a) may be incapable of properly performing the duties of his office by
350 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

reason of physical or mental incapacity; or

(b) may have been guilty of misconduct, the Chairman or the Governor,
as the case may be, shall direct the Supreme Judicial Council to inquire
into the matter.
(5) If, upon any matter inquired into by the Supreme Judicial Council, there
is a difference of opinion amongst its members, the opinion of the majority shall
prevail, and the report of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be expressed in terms
of the view of the majority.
(6) If, after inquiring into the matter, the Supreme Judicial Council reports
to the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council that it is of the opinion.
(a) that the Judge is incapable of performing the duties of his office or has
been guilty of misconduct; and
(b) that he should be removed from office, the Chairman shall advise the
Governor to remove the Judge from his office and the Governor shall
pass orders accordingly.
(7) The Supreme Judicial Council shall issue a Code of conduct to be observed
by Judges of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court, and of the Gilgit-
Baltistan Chief Court.
(8) If at any time the Supreme Judicial Council is inquiring the conduct of a
Judge who is a member of the Supreme Judicial Council, or a member of the
Supreme Judicial Council is absent or is unable to act due to illness or any other
cause, than;
(a) If such member is the Chief Judge or the Judge of the Supreme Appellate
Court the Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court who is next in
seniority;
(b) If such member is the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan Court, the most
senior most of the other Judges of the Chief Court, shall, act as a
member of the Supreme Judicial Council in his place.
(9) If, upon any matter inquired into by the Supreme Judicial Council, there
is a difference of opinion amongst its member, the opinion of the Supreme Judicial
Council shall be expressed in terms of the view of the majority.
67. Power of Supreme Judicial Council to enforce attendance of persons, etc. –
(1) for the purpose of inquiring into any matter, the Supreme Judicial Council
shall have the same powers as has the Supreme Appellate Court, to issue directions
or order for securing the attendance of any person or the discovery or the production
of any document and any such direction or order shall be enforceable as if it has
been issued by the Supreme Appellate Court.
(2) The provisions of Article 60, shall, mutatis mutandis apply to the Supreme
Judicial Council as they apply to the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court
and the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 351

68. Bar of Jurisdiction. – The proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council, and the
removal of a Judge under Article 66, shall not be called in question in any Court.
69. Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court. – (1) There shall be a Gilgit-Baltistan Chief
Court, hereinafter called the Chief Court, which shall consist of a Chief Judge
and four other judges of whom 60% will be appointed from lawyers community
and 40% from subordinate judiciary:
Provided that the Government of Pakistan may from time to time increase
the number of judges.
(2) The function of the Chief Court may be performed by a Single Bench, a
Division Bench or a Full Bench:, but the Chief Judge may recall a case pending
before a Bench and make it over to another Bench or constitute a larger Bench for
the purpose.
(3) In case of difference of opinion in a Full Bench, the opinion of the majority
shall prevail;
(4) In case of difference of opinion in a Division Bench, the matter shall be
referred to a third judge and the decision of the Chief Court shall be expressed in
terms of judgment of the majority.
(5) The person holding office as Chief Judge or other Judge of the Chief Court
Immediately before the commencement of this Order shall be deemed to be the
Chief Judge or other Judge as the case may be appointed under this Order.
(6) The Chief Judge and Judges of the Chief Court shall be appointed by the
Chairman of the Council on the advice of the Governor.
(7) A person shall not be appointed as a Judge of the Chief Court unless–
(a) he has for a period, or for periods aggregating, not less than ten years,
been an Advocate of the Chief Court or a High Court in Pakistan.
Provided that the expression “High Court” herein shall include a High
Court or an equivalent Court that existed at any time before the 1st
day of August, 2009; or
(b) he has for a period of not less than ten years held a judicial office out
of which not less than three years shall have been as District and Sessions
Judge.
(8) Before he enters upon his office, the Chief Judge of the Chief Court shall
make before the Governor, and judge of the Chief Court shall make before the
Chief Judge, an oath in the form set out in the First Schedule.
(9) The Chief Judge or a Judge of the Chief Court shall hold office until he
attains the age of sixty two years, unless he sooner resigns or is removed from office
in accordance with law:
Provided that the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council may appoint a
retired Judge of any High Court of Pakistan to be the Chief Judge or a Judge of
the Chief Court for a period not exceeding three years and such person shall hold
office till he attains the age of sixty-five years.
352 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(10) If at any time any Judge of the Chief Court is absent or is unable to
perform his functions due to illness or some other cause, the Chairman of the
Gilgit- Baltistan Council may appoint a person qualified for appointment as a
Judge of the Chief Court to be an Additional Judge for the period for which the
Judge is absent or unable to perform his functions.
(11) A Judge of the Chief Court shall not, –
(a) hold any other office of profit in the service of the Gilgit-Baltistan if
his remuneration is thereby increased; or
(b) occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the
rendering of services, but this clause shall not be construed as preventing
a Judge from holding or managing private property.
(12) A person who has held office as Judge of the Chief Court shall not hold
any office of profit in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan not being a Judicial or quasi-
Judicial office or the office of Chief Election Commissioner or of Chairman or
member of the Public Service Commission, before the expiration of two years after
he ceased to hold that office.
(13) The remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of the Chief
Judge and Judges of Chief Court shall be such as admissible the Chief Justice and
the Judges of the High Courts of Pakistan.
70. Acting Chief Judge. – At any time when –
(a) the Office of Chief Judge of Chief Court is vacant;
(b) the Chief Judge of Chief Court is absent or is unable to perform the
functions of his office due to any other cause, the Governor shall
appoint the most senior Judge of the Chief Court to act as Chief Judge.
71. Jurisdiction of Chief Court. – (1) The Chief Court shall have such jurisdiction
as is conferred on it by this Order or by any other law.
(2) Subject to this Order, the Chief Court may if it is satisfied that no other
adequate remedy is provided by law, –
(a) the Government, exercising any power or performing any function in,
or in relation to, Gilgit-Baltistan as may be appropriate for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by this Order.
on the application of any aggrieved party, make an order, –
(i) directing a person performing functions in connection with the
affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan or local authority to refrain from doing
that which he is not permitted by law to do, or to do that which
he is required by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken by a person
performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Gilgit-
Baltistan or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful
authority, and is of no legal effect; or
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 353

(b) on the application of any person, make an order, –

(i) directing that a person in custody in Gilgit-Baltistan be brought
before the Chief Court so that the Court may satisfy itself that he
is not being held in custody without lawful authority or in an
unlawful manner; or
(ii) requiring a person holding or purporting to hold a public office
in connection with the affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan to show under
what authority of law he claims to hold that office; or
(c) on the application of any aggrieved person, make an order giving such
directions to the person or authority, including the Council.
(3) An order shall not be made under clause (2) on application made by or in
relation to a person in the Armed Forces of Pakistan in respect of his terms and
conditions of service, in respect of any matter arising out of his service or in respect
of any action in relation to him as a member of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.
(4) Where, –
(a) an application is made to the Chief Court for an order under sub-
clause (a) or sub-clause (c) of clause (2); and
(b) the Court has reason to believe that the making of an interim order
would have the effect of prejudicing or interfering with the carrying
out of a public work or otherwise being harmful to the public interest,
the Court shall not make an interim order unless the Advocate-General
has been given notice of the application and the Court, after the
Advocate-General or any officer authorized by him in this behalf has
been given an opportunity of being heard, is satisfied that the making
of the interim order would not have the effect referred to in sub-clause
(b) of this clause.
(5) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires, the expression “person”
includes any body politic or corporate, any authority of or under control of the
Council or the Government and any court or tribunal other than the Gilgit-
Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court, the Chief court or a Court or tribunal establish
under a law relating to the Armed Forces of Pakistan.
72. Rules of procedure. – Subject to this Order and law the Chief Court may in
consultation with the Government, make rules regulating practice and procedure
of the Court or of any Court subordinate to it.
73. Decision of Chief Court binding on subordinate Courts. – Subject to Article
47, any decision of Chief Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of
law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all Courts
subordinate to it.
74. Seat of the Chief Court. – (1) The permanent seat of the Chief Court shall
be at Gilgit.
354 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(2) The Chief Court may, from time to time, sit at such other place as the
Chief Judge of the Chief Court, with the approval of the Governor, may appoint.
75. Contempt of Court. – (1) In this Article the expression “Court” means the
Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court or the Chief Court.
(2) A Court shall have power to punish any person who –
(a) abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any
way or disobeys any order of the Court;
(b) scandalizes the Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring
the Court or a judge of the Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt;
(c) does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter
pending before the Court; or
(d) does any other thing which, by law, constitutes contempt of the Court.
(3) The exercise of the power conferred on a Court by this Article may be
regulated by law and, subject to law, by rules made by the Court.
76. The Chief Court to superintend and control all courts subordinate to it,
etc. – (1) The Chief Court shall superintend and control all other courts that are
subordinate to it.
(2) A Court so established shall have such jurisdiction as conferred on it by
law.
(3) No Court shall have any jurisdiction which is not conferred on it by this
Order or by or under any other law.
77. Advisory jurisdiction. – (1) If, at any time, the Chairman of the Council or
the Governor desires to obtain the opinion of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court on any question of law which he considers of public importance, he may
refer the question to the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan for
consideration.
(2) The Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court shall consider a question
so referred and report its opinion on the question to the Chairman of the Council
or as the case may be, the Governor.
78. Administrative Courts and Tribunals. – (1) Notwithstanding any thing herein
before contained, the Council in respect of matters to which its executive authority
extends, and the Assembly in respect of matters to which the executive authority
of the Government extends may by Act provide for the establishment of one or
more Administrative Courts or Tribunals to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect
of, –
(a) matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons who are or
have been in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan including disciplinary
matters;
(b) matters relating to claims arising from tortuous acts of the Council or
the Government or any person in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan or of
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 355

any local or other authority empowered by law to levy any tax or cess
and any servant or such authority acting in the discharge of his duties
as such servant; or
(c) matters relating to acquisition, administration and disposal of any
property which is deemed to be enemy property under any law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything herein before contained, where any
Administrative Court of Tribunal is established under clause (1), no other Court
shall grant an injunction, maker any order or entertain any proceedings in respect
of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court or Tribunal
extends and all proceedings in respect of any such matter which may be pending
before such other court immediately before the establishment of the Administrative
Court or Tribunal shall abate on such establishment.
(3) An appeal to the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court from a
judgment, decree, order or sentence of an Administrative Court or Tribunal shall
lie only if the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan being satisfied, that the
case involves a substantial question of law of public importance, grants leave to
appeal.
79. Employees of Court. – The Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court and
the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court, with the approval of the Governor, may make
rules providing for the appointment of employees of the Court and for their terms
and conditions of employment.
PART XII - SERVICES
80. Public Service Commission. – There shall be a Public Service Commission
for Gilgit-Baltistan which shall consist of such number of members, including a
Chairman to be appointed by the Chairman of the Council on the advice of
Governor, and perform such functions as may be prescribed on such terms and
conditions as may be determined by the Governor.
81. Services. – (1) Subject to this Order, the appointment of persons to, and the
terms and conditions of service of persons in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan may
be regulated by law.
(2) Until an Act of the Council in respect of persons in the service of Gilgit-
Baltistan employed in connection with the affairs of the Council, or an Act of the
Assembly in respect of such persons employed in connection with the affairs of
the Government, makes provision for the matters referred to in clause (1), all rules
and orders in force immediately before the commencement of this Order, shall
continue to be in force and may be amended from time to time by the Council or,
as the case may be, the Government.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) or (2) the position or
vacancy sharing formula between the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan and the
Government of Pakistan, i.e. Gilgit-Baltistan Civil Service and All Pakistan Unified
356 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Grades or District Management Group, shall be as specified in the Fifth Schedule.

82. Chief Election Commissioner. – There shall be a Chief Election Commissioner
to be appointed by the Chairman of the Council on the advice of Governor on
such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.
83. Auditor-General. – (1) There shall be an Auditor General of Gilgit- Baltistan
who shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Council.
(2) Before entering upon office, the Auditor General shall make before the
Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan oath in the form set out in the Schedule
(3) The terms and conditions of service, including the terms of office, of the
Auditor-General shall be determined by Act of the Council and, until so
determined, by rules made by the Council.
(4) The Auditor-General shall, in relation to –
(a) the accounts of the Council and any authority or body established by
the Council; and
(b) the accounts of the Government and any authority or body established
by the Government, perform such functions and exercise such powers
as may be determined, by or under Act of the Council and, until so
determined, by rules made by the Council.
(5) The accounts of the Council and of the Government shall be kept in such
form and in accordance with such principles and methods as may be determined
by the Auditor-General with the approval of the Council.
(6) The reports of the Auditor-General relating to the accounts of the Council
shall be submitted to the Chairman of the Council; who shall cause them to be
laid before the Council; and the reports of the Auditor-General relating to the
accounts of the Government shall be submitted to the Governor who shall cause
them to be laid before the Assembly.
PART XIII - GENERAL
84. Continuance of existing laws. – Subject to the provisions of this Order, all
laws which immediately before the commencement of this Order, were in force in
Gilgit-Baltistan shall continue to be in force until altered, repealed or amended by
an Act, of the appropriate authority.
Explanation. – In this Article, –
(a) The expression ‘laws includes Ordinance, Orders, rules, bye-laws,
regulations and any notification and other legal instruments having the
force of law, and
(b) The expression ‘in force’ in relation to any law, means having effect as
law whether or not the law has been brought into operation.
85. General provision regarding Governor and Ministers. – (1) The Governor,
the Chief Minister, a Minister or an Advisor shall not, –
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 357

(a) hold any other office of profit in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan or any
other country; or
(b) occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the
rendering of services; but this action shall not be construed as preventing
the Governor, the Chief Minister, a Minister or an Advisor from holding
or managing his private property.
(2) No criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against
the Governor or the Chairman of the Council while he is in office.
(3) No civil proceedings in which relief is claimed against the Governor or
the Chairman of the Council shall be instituted while he is in office in respect of
anything done or not done, or purporting to have been done or not done, by him
in his personal capacity, whether before or after he enters upon his office unless at
least sixty days before the proceedings are instituted, notice in writing has been
delivered to him, or sent to him, stating the nature of the proceedings, the cause
of the action, the name, description and place of residence of the party by whom
the proceedings are to be instituted and the relief which he claims.
(4) Except in relation to proceedings referred to in clause (3) no process
whatsoever shall be issued from any court or tribunal against the Governor or the
Chairman of the Council, whether in a personal capacity or otherwise, while he is
in office.
(5) Subject to this Order, the Governor, the Chief Minister, the Chairman of
the Council, the Federal Minister who is a member of the Council, a Minister or
an Advisor shall not except in respect of anything done or not done by him in
contravention of law , be answerable to any court or Tribunal in the exercise of the
powers, or the performance of the duties, of his office or for any act done or
purporting to be done by him in the exercise of those powers or in the performance
of those duties:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall be construed as restricting the right
of any person to bring appropriate proceedings against the Council or as the case
may be, the Government.
86. Power to acquire property and to make contracts, etc. – (1) The executive
authority of the Government and of the Council shall extend, subject to any Act
of the appropriate authority to the grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any
property vested in, and to the purchase or acquisition of property on behalf of,
the Government or as the case may be, the Council, and to the making of contracts.
(2) All property acquired for the purpose of the Government or of the Council
shall vest in the Government or, as the case may be, in the Council.
(3) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of the
Government or of the Council shall be expressed to be made in the name of the
Governor, or as the case may be, the Council and all such contracts and all
assurances of property made in the exercise of that authority shall be executed on
358 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

behalf of the Governor or the Council by such persons and in such manner as the
Governor, or as the case m ay be, the Council may direct or authorize.
(4) Neither the Governor, nor the Chairman of the Council, shall be personally
liable in respect of any contract or assurance made or executed in the exercise of
the executive authority of the Government or, as the case may be the Council, nor
shall any person making or executing any such contract or assurance on behalf of
any of them be personally liable in respect thereof.
(5) Transfer of land by the Government or the Council shall be regulated by
law.
PART XIV - EMERGENCY PROVISIONS
87. Power to issue proclamation. – (1) If the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan
Council ,on receipt of a report from Governor of Gilgit- Baltistan or otherwise, is
satisfied that a grave emergency exists in which the security of Gilgit-Baltistan is
threatened by war or external aggression or by internal disturbances, in which the
Government of the Gilgit-Baltistan cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of this Order, Chairman of the Council shall issue Proclamation of
Emergency, hereinafter referred to as the Proclamation.
(2) Assume to himself, or direct the Governor of the Gilgit-Baltistan to assume
on behalf of the Chairman of the Council , all or any of the functions of the
Government of the Gilgit-Baltistan, and all or any of the powers vested in, or
exercisable by, any body or authority in the Gilgit-Baltistan, other than the
Assembly;
(3) A Proclamation shall be laid before a Joint Sitting of the Council and the
Assembly which shall be summoned by the Chairman of the Council on the advice
of Governor to meet within thirty days of the Proclamation being issued and –
(a) shall, cease to be in force at the expiration of two months unless before
the expiration of that period it has been approved by a resolution of
the Joint Sitting; and
(b) shall, subject to the provisions of sub-clause (a), cease to be in force
upon a resolution disapproving the resolution being passed by the
votes of the majority of the total membership of the Joint Sitting.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2), if .the Assembly stands
dissolved at the time when the Proclamation is issued, the Proclamation shall
continue in force for a period of four months but, if a general election to the
Assembly is not held before the expiration of that period, it shall cease to be in
force at the expiration of that period unless it has earlier been approved by a
resolution of the Council.
(5) A Proclamation may be made before the actual occurrence of war or
external aggression if the Governor is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof.
88. Power to suspend fundamental rights. – (1) While a Proclamation is in
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 359

operation, the Governor may, by order, declare that right to move any Court for
the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Chapter as may be specified in
the order, and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the
rights so specified, shall remain suspended for the period during which the
Proclamation is in force.
(2) Every order made under clause (1), shall, as soon as may be, laid before
the Assembly.
89. Power to vary or rescind proclamation. – (1) A Proclamation issued under
Article 87 may be varied or revoked by a subsequent Proclamation.
(2) The validity of any Proclamation issued or order made under Article 87
or Article 88 shall not be questioned in any Court.
90. Failure to comply with requirement as to time does not render an act invalid.
– When any act or thing is required by this Order to be done within a particular
period and it is not done within that period, the doing of the act or thing shall
not be invalid or otherwise ineffective by reason only that it was not done within
that period.
PART XV - MISCELLANEOUS
91. Oath of office. – (1) An oath required to be made by person under this Order
shall be made in a language that is understood by that person.
(2) Where, under this Order, an oath is required to be made before a specified
person and for any reason, it is impracticable for the oath to be made before that
person, it may be made before such other person as may be nominated by that
person.
(3) Where, under this Order, a person is required to make an oath before he
enters upon an office, he shall be deemed to have entered upon the office on the
day on which he makes the oath.
92. Order not to prejudice stance. – The provision of this Order shall not derogate
form, or in any manner prejudice, the declared stand of the Government of Pakistan
regarding the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir in
accordance with the United Nations Resolutions.
93. Power to amend. – The Government of Pakistan may, by notified Order,
amend the provisions of this Order.
94. Power to make rules. – The Governor or as the case may be, the Chairman
of the Council, may make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Order.
95. Order to override other laws, etc. – (1) The provision of this Order shall
have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of any law for
the time being in force except that in case of conflict between the laws of Pakistan
and the laws framed under this Order, the laws of Pakistan shall prevail.
(2) No Court, including the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court and
360 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court, shall call into question or permit to be called
into question, the validity of this Order or an Act to amend it.
96. Repeal and saving. – (1) The Northern Areas Governance Order, 1994
hereinafter referred to as the said Order, together with the Orders amending it,
and the rules made there-under are hereby repealed.
(2) On the commencement of this Order –
(a) the Legislative Assembly in existence shall stand dissolved and General
Election shall be held within one hundred and twenty days of such
commencement; and
(b) in all documents, proceedings and references, a reference to the
expression “Northern Areas” shall mean and be construed as reference
to “Gilgit-Baltistan.”
97. Effect of repeal. – Where a law is repealed, or is deemed to have been repealed,
by, under, or by virtue of this Order, the repeal shall not, except as otherwise
provided in this Order:
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal
takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of the law or anything duly done or
suffered under the law;
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under the law;
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect of
any offence committed against the law; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any
such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment; and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy
may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty,
forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the law had not been
repealed.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 361

FIRST SCHEDULE
OATH OF OFFICE GOVERNOR
[See Article 20(7)]
I,…………………………….do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That, as Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan, I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Governor honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Governor.
So help me Allah.
Signature of Governor
Place: .................
Date: .................

Signature of Chief Judge

Supreme Appellate Court, Gilgit-Baltistan

CHIEF MINISTER
[See Article 23(4)]
I,…………………………….do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That, as Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan, I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Chief Minister honestly and faithfully;
and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Chief Minister;
So help me Allah.
Signature of Chief Minister
Place: .................
Date: .................
Signature of Governor
Gilgit-Baltistan
362 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

MINISTER
[See Article 24(2)]
I,…………………………….do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That, as Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan, I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Minister honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Minister;
So help me Allah.
Signature of Minister
Place: .................
Date: .................
Signature of Governor
Gilgit-Baltistan

SPEAKER OR DEPUTY SPEAKER OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

[See Article 42(2)]
I,…………………………….having been elected as Speaker or Deputy Speaker
of Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly do hereby solemnly swear in the name of
Allah;
That I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Speaker or Deputy Speaker
of the Assembly;
So help me Allah.
Signature of Speaker/Deputy Speaker
Place: .................
Date: .................
Signature of Outgoing Squeaker /Sitting Speaker
Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 363

MEMBER OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

[See Article 36]
I,…………………………….having been elected as Member of Gilgit- Baltistan
Legislative Assembly do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Member of the Legislative Assembly
honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Member of the Legislative
Assembly;
So help me Allah.
Signature of Member
Place: .................
Date: .................
Signature of Speaker
Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly

MEMBER OF GILGIT-BALTISTAN COUNCIL

[See Article 33(11)]
I,…………………………….having been elected as Member of Gilgit- Baltistan
Council do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Member of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council
honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Member of the Council;
So help me Allah.
Signature of Member
Place: .................
Date: .................
Signature of Chairman/Vice Chairman
Gilgit-Baltistan Council
364 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

CHIEF JUDGE/JUDGE OF GILGIT – BALTISTAN

SUPREME APPELLATE COURT
[See Article 60(6)]
I,..............................................having been appointed Chief Judge of Gilgit -
Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court do solemnly swear and I will bear true faith
and allegiance to Pakistan and that I will faithfully perform the duties of my office
to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment and will administer justice
according to the law in force Gilgit- Baltistan, without fear or favour, affection or
ill-will.
Signature of Chief Judge/Judge
Place: .................
Date: .................
Signature of Governor/Chief Judge
Gilgit-Baltistan

OATH OF CHIEF JUDGE/JUDGE OF

GILGIT-BALTISTAN CHIEF COURT
[See Article 69(8)]
I,..............................................having been appointed Chief Judge of Gilgit-
Baltistan Chief Court do solemnly swear that I owe allegiance to Allah and that I
will faithfully perform the duties of my office to the best of my ability, knowledge
and judgment and will administer justice according to the law in force in the Areas
comprising Gilgit-Baltistan, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.
Signature of Chief Judge/Judge
Place: .................
Date: .................
Signature of Governor/Chief Judge
Gilgit-Baltistan

OATH OF ADVISOR
[See Article 33 (14)]
I,……………………………. do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 365

That I will perform my functions as Advisor honestly and faithfully; and

That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Advisor;
So help me Allah.
Signature of Advisor
Place: .................
Date: .................

Signature of Chairman of Council

Gilgit-Baltistan

AUDITOR-GENERAL
[See Article 83]
I,…………………….do hereby solemnly swear and bear true faith and allegiance
to Pakistan.
That, as Auditor-General of the Areas comprising Gilgit- Baltistan, I will
perform my functions honestly, faithfully, in accordance with the Gilgit-Baltistan
(Empowerment and Self-Government) Order, 2009, and the law and to the best
of my knowledge, ability and judgment, without fear or favour, affection or ill-
will.
Signature of Auditor General
Place: .................
Date: .................
Signature of Chief Judge of Supreme Appellate Court
Gilgit-Baltistan

CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER

[See Article 82]
I,…………………….do hereby solemnly swear and bear true faith and allegiance
to Pakistan.
That, as Chief Election Commissioner of the Areas comprising Gilgit-
Baltistan, I will perform my functions honestly, faithfully, in accordance with the
366 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Government) Order, 2009, and the law

and to the best of my knowledge, ability and judgment, without fear or favour,
affection or ill-will.

Signature of Auditor General

Place: .................
Date: .................

Signature of Chief Judge of Supreme Appellate Court

Gilgit-Baltistan

SECOND SCHEDULE
[See Article 37(2)(d)]
1. An office, which is not a whole time office remunerated either by salary or by
fee.
2. The office of Lamberdar, Inamdar, Sufedposh and Zaildar, whether called by
this or any other title.
3. The office of the Chairman of any elective body constituted under any law
relating to the Local Government.
4. Reserve of the Armed Forces.
5. Any other office which is declared by an Act of the Assembly not to disqualify
its holder from being elected as, or from being a member of the Assembly.

THIRD SCHEDULE
COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE LIST
[See Article 47(2)(a)]

1. Post and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broad-casting and other

like forms of communications; Post Office Saving Bank.
2. Public debt of the Council, including the borrowing of money on the security
of the Council Consolidated Fund.
4. Council public services and Council Public Service Commission.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 367

5. Council pensions, that is to say, pensions payable by the Council or out of

the Council Consolidated Fund.
6. Administrative courts for Council subjects.
7. Council agencies and institutions for the following purpose, that is to say,
for research, for professional or technical training, or for the promotion of
special studies.
8. Nuclear energy, including:
(a) mineral resources necessary for the generation of nuclear energy;
(b) the production of nuclear fuels and the generation and use of nuclear
energy; and
(c) ionizing radiations.
9. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulations and
organization of air traffic and of aerodrome.
10. Beacons and other provisions for safety of aircraft.
11. Carriage of passengers and goods by air.
12. Copyright, inventions, designs, trade marks and merchandise marks.
13. Opium so far as regards sale for export.
14. Banking, that is to say, the co-ordination with the Government of Pakistan
of the conduct of banking business.
15. The law for insurance and the regulation of the conduct of insurance business.
16. Stock-exchange and future markets with object and business not confined
to the areas comprising Gilgit-Baltistan. .
17. Corporations, that is to say, the incorporation regulation and winding up of
trading corporations including banking, insurance and financial corporations,
but not including corporations owned or controlled by the Provincial
Government of Gilgit-Baltistan and carrying on business, co-operative
societies, and of corporations, whether trading or not, with object not
confined to the Gilgit-Baltistan, but not including universities.
18. Planning for economic coordination, including planning and coordination
of scientific and technological research.
19. Highways, continuing beyond the territory of the Gilgit-Baltistan excluding
roads declared by the Government of Pakistan to be strategic importance.
20. Council surveys including geological surveys and Council meteorological
organizations.
21. Works, lands and buildings vested in, or in the possession of the Council,
for the purpose of the Council (not being Military, Naval or Air Force works),
but as regards property situated in the Gilgit-Baltistan, subject always to law
made by the Legislative Assembly, save in so far as law made by the Council
otherwise provides.
22. Census.
368 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

23. Establishment of standards of weights and measures.

24. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force
belonging to the Gilgit-Baltistan or any Province of Pakistan to any area in
such Province or the Gilgit-Baltistan, but not so as to enable the police of
the Gilgit-Baltistan or such province to exercise powers and jurisdiction in
such Province or the Gilgit-Baltistan without the consent of the Government
of that Province or the Gilgit-Baltistan; extension of the powers and
jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging the Gilgit-Baltistan or a
Province of Pakistan to railway areas outside the Gilgit-Baltistan or that
Province.
25. Election to the Council.
26. The salaries, allowances and privileges of the members of the Council and
Advisors.
27. Railways.
28. Mineral oil natural gas; liquids substances declared by law made by the
Council to be dangerously inflammable.
29. Development of industries, where development under Council control is
declared by law made by Council to be expedient in the public interest.
30. Removal of prisoners and accused persons from the Gilgit-Baltistan to
Pakistan or from Pakistan to the Gilgit-Baltistan.
31. Measures to combat certain offences committed in connection with matters
concerning the Council and the Government and the establishment of police
force for that purpose or the extension to the Gilgit-Baltistan of the
jurisdiction of police force established in Pakistan for the investigation of
offences committed in connection, with matters concerning the Government
of Pakistan.
32. Prevention of the extension from the Gilgit-Baltistan to Pakistan or from
Pakistan to the Gilgit-Baltistan of infections or contagious diseases or pests
affecting men, animals or plants.
33. Boilers.
34. Electricity and bulk water storage.
35. Newspapers, books and printing presses.
36. Works, lands and buildings vested, or in the possession of Government for
the purpose of Gilgit-Baltistan Council (not being air force, military or navel
works) save in so far as the Council Act otherwise provides.
37. Curriculum, syllabus, planning, policy, centers of excellence and standards
of education.
38. Sanctioning of cinematography films for exhibition.
39. Tourism.
40 Forest.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 369

41 Minerals and Mineral Wealth.

42. Duties of customs, including export duties.
43. Duties of excise, including duties on salt but not including duties on alcoholic
liquors, opium and other narcotics.
44. Taxes on income other than agricultural income.
45. Taxes on corporations.
46. Taxes on the sale and purchases of goods and services imported, exported,
produced, manufactured or consumed.
47. Taxes on the capital value of the assets, not including taxes on capital gains
on immovable property.
48. Taxes and duties on the production capacity of any plant, machinery, under
taking, establishment or installation in lieu of the taxes and duties specified
in entries 42 and 43 or in lieu of either or both of them.
49. Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway or air, taxes on their
fares and freights.
50. Fees in respect of any of the matters enumerated in this list, but not including
fees taken in any court.
51. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in this list.
52. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in this
list.
53. Inquires and statistics for the purpose of any of the matters enumerated in
this list.
54. Matters which under the Act are within the legislative competence of the
Council or relates to the Council.
55. Matter incidental or ancillary to any of the matters enumerated in this list.
370 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

FOURTH SCHEDULE
ASSEMBLY LEGISLATIVE LIST
[See Article 47 (2) (b)]

1. Public order (but not including the use of Naval, Military, Air Force, or any
other armed forces of the Federation in aid of the civil power).
2. Preventive detention for reasons in connection with the maintenance of public
order; persons subjected to such detention.
3. Prisons, reformatories, borstal institution and other institutions of a like
nature and persons detained therein, arrangements with other provinces for
the use of prisons and other institutions.
4. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land; land tenures, including the relation
of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer, alienation and
devolution of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans;
colonization.
5. Land revenue, including the assessment and collection of revenue, the
maintenance of land records, survey for revenue purpose and records of rights
and alienation of revenues.
6. Works, lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the Gilgit-
Baltistan Administration.
7. Compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property.
8. Agriculture, including agricultural education and research protection against
pests and prevention of plant diseases.
9. Local Government, that is to say, the constitution and powers of municipal
corporations, improvement trusts, district councils settlement authorities and
other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village
administration.
10. Preservation, protection and improvement of stock, and prevention of animal
diseases; veterinary training and practice.
11. Pounds and the prevention of cattle trespass.
12. Drinking water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments;
flood control.
13. Libraries, museums and ancient and historical monuments.
14. Botanical, zoological and anthropological surveys.
15. Theaters; cinemas; sports; entertainments and amusements.
16. Public health and sanitation; hospitals and dispensaries.
17. Registration of births and deaths.
18. Burials and burial grounds; cremations and cremation grounds.
19. Relief of the disabled and un-employed.
 Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 371

20. Intoxicating liquors, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession,

transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors and other narcotic drugs.
21. Markets and fairs.
22. Money lending and moneylenders; relief of indebtedness.
23. Protection of wild animals and birds.
24. Prevention of cruelty to animals.
25. Adulteration of food-stuff and other goods.
26. Betting and gambling.
27. Fisheries.
28. Professions.
29. Inns and in-keepers.
30. Orphanages and poor houses.
31. Taxes on agricultural income and on the value of agricultural land.
32. Lunacy and mental deficiency including places for reception of treatment of
lunatics and mental deficient.
33. Duties in respect of succession to agricultural land.
34. Estate Duty in respect of agricultural land.
35. Taxes on lands and buildings.
36. Taxes on advertisement.
37. Taxes on goods and passengers carried by road or on inland waterways.
38. Taxes on vehicles, whether mechanically propelled or not, suitable for use
on a road; on boats, launches and steamers on inland water; on tram cars.
39. Taxes on animals and boats.
40. Tolls.
41. Capitation taxes.
42. Taxes on luxuries, including entertainments and amusements. Taxes.
43. Taxes on profession, trades, callings and employment.
44. Relief of poor; un-employment.
45. Offences against laws with respect of any of the matters in this list.
46. Inquiries and statistics for the purpose of any of the matters in this list.
47. Cesses on the entry of goods into a local area for consumption, use or sale
therein.
48. The salaries, allowances and privileges of the Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chief
Minister, Ministers and Members of the Assembly.
49. Dues on passengers and goods carried on roads or inland water-ways.
50. Management of Gilgit – Baltistan Consolidated Fund.
51. Environmental pollution and ecology.
52. Population planning and social welfare.
53. The setting up and carrying on of labour exchanges, employment information
bureaus and training establishments.
372 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

54. Regulation of labour and safety in mines and factories.

55. Trade unions; industrial and labour disputes.
56. Gilgit–Baltistan public services and Public Service Commission.
57. Gilgit–Baltistan pensions, that is to say, pension payable out of Gilgit–
Baltistan Consolidated Fund.
58. Administrative Courts for subjects within purview of Gilgit – Baltistan
Legislative Assembly.
59. Gilgit–Baltistan agencies and institutions for the following purpose, that is
to say, for research, for professional or technical training, or for the promotion
of special studies.
60. Fees in respect of any of the matters enumerated in this list, but not including
fees taken in any court.
61. Jurisdiction and powers of all Courts with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in this list.

FIFTH SCHEDULE
SERVICES
[See Article 81]

Position or Vacancy Sharing Formula Between the Government of Pakistan

and the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan
Government of APUG/DMG/APS BS-17 BS-18 BS-19 BS-20 BS-21
Gilgit-Baltistan
25% 40% 50% 60% 65%
N.B.: Percentage showing the share earmarked for APUG/DMG/APS, out of total number of vacancies
in Gilgit-Baltistan (on the pattern of Federal Government and Provinces of Pakistan).
No. F. 3 (i)/2009 NA-I

(Muhammad Ikram)
Deputy Secretary (NA)
 APPENDIX X

BALAWARISTAN NATIONAL FRONT

HEAD OFFICE: MAJINI MOHALLA, GILGIT, BALAWARISTAN

(Pakistan Occupied Gilgit Baltistan)
Date 22nd Dec. 2009
Ref.......................
Mr. Jerzy BUZEK
President
European Parliament
Rue Wiertz PHS 11B011
B-1047 Brussels

Sub: Xmas Greetings

I represent Balawaristan National Front (BNF) being exile here in Brussels
because of the ISI threat to my life and I am also representative of a lonely nationalist
alliance of Balawaristan (China and Pakistan Occupied Gilgit Baltistan) namely
GBDA (Gilgit Baltistan Democratic Alliance) of an alliance consists of 6 indigenous
parties, which demand for freedom and independence from the occupation of both
Pakistan and China. I wish you all the best on the auspicious occasion of Holy
Christmas on behalf of 2 million slave people of this world.
It’s my pleasure as well as an honour for the 2 million people of Balawaristan
(Pakistan and China Occupied Gilgit Baltistan), because European Union and its
Parliament has shown its interest in this most deprived and neglected part of the
world, who even have no right of representation and no access to Justice and
Pakistani regime both Military and Civilians have been violating all kind of human
political, economical, educational and fundamental rights since 16th Nov 1947 by
violating UNCIP resolutions. This is the only part of the world where people have
no place to go against human rights violation. The 2 million people of Gilgit
Baltistan are very thankful of European Parliament resolution of 24th May 2007
by taking the issue of this part of the world seriously. EU resolution states that:
374 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

“19. Very much regrets the continuing ambivalence of the current Government
of Pakistan with regard to the ethnic identity of Gilgit and Baltistan, whereby
statements made by the President are contradicted by official government
communications; strongly recommends that the Government of Pakistan endorse
and Implement the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan of 28 May 1999
which validates the Kashmiri heritage of the people of Court of Pakistan of 28
May 1999 which validates the Kashmiri heritage of the people of Gilgit and
Baitistan and states that the Government should implement their fundamental
human rights, democratic freedoms and access to justice;
20: the people of digit and Baitistan are under the direct rule of the military
and enjoy no democracy.”
The people of this disputed region are offering their gratitude to all the
members of EP for the declaration passed Strasburg session before this Holy
Christmas in Strasburg Session in which it raised serious concerns over Pakistan’s
proxy rule in Gilgit Baitistan.
We pray for prosperity and good health for you and your family.

Yours Sincerely,

Abdul Hamid Khan

Chairman
Balawaristan National Front (BNF)
Head Office: Majini Mania, Gilgit, Balawaristan (Pakistan Occupied Gilgit
Baitistan)
Website: www.balawaristan.net
Email: Balawaristan@gmail.com, Balawaristan(£),hotmail.com
Present Add:
Avenue d’Auderghem 57/18
1040 Brussels
Tele/Fax: 022311750
Cell: 0488409035

Website: www.balawaristan.net
Email: balawaristan@usa.com balawaristan@gmail.com
Contact: Tel/Fax. 0032 22 311 750
Balawaristan National Front 375
 APPENDIX XI

Registered Political Parties of Gilgit-Baltistan with

Election Symbols

S.No. Name of Registered Political Party Symbol Allotted Symbol Name

01 All Pakistan Aam Admi Party Star

02 All Pakistan Muslim League Eagle

03 Gilgit-Baltistan Qoumi Movement Gilgit ... Not mentioned

by EC

04 Islami Tehreek Pakistan Key with Lock

05 Jammat Islami Pakistan Scale

06 Jamiat Ulmae Islam Pakistan Book

07 Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen Pakistan Tent

08 Muttahida Qoumi Movement Kite

 Registered Political Parties of Gilgit-Baltistan with Election Symbols 377

S.No. Name of Registered Political Party Symbol Allotted Symbol Name

09 Pakistan Awami Tehreek Crescent

10 Pakistan Muslim League (N) Tiger

11 Pakistan People’s Party Arrow

12 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Bat

13 Qaumi Watan Party Pakistan Chiragh/Lamp

14 Sunni Ittehad Council Pakistan Horse

Source: http://ecgb.gov.pk/symbolalloted.htm
 APPENDIX XII

Electoral Rolls of Gilgit-Baltistan Election 2015

Final Electoral Rolls Voter State

Districts Male Voters Male Voters Female Voters
Gilgit GBLA-1 16,849 13,548
Gilgit GBLA-2 18,734 15,491
Gilgit GBLA-3 18,226 16,187
Total 53,809 45,226
Hunza Nagar GBLA-4 10,024 8,794
Hunza Nagar GBLA-5 6,353 5,639
Hunza Nagar GBLA-6 18,931 17,486
Total 35,308 31,919
Skardu GBLA-7 8,871 7,613
Skardu GBLA-8 18,461 15,820
Skardu GBLA-9 11,070 9,510
Skardu GBLA-10 11,316 10,490
Skardu GBLA-11 11,766 10,192
Skardu GBLA-12 15,806 14,607
Total 77,290 68,232
Astore GBLA-13 15,016 12,683
Astore GBLA-14 12,916 11,536
Total 27,932 24,219
Diamer GBLA-15 13,238 13,842
Diamer GBLA-16 15,439 12,498
Diamer GBLA-17 13,063 12,559
Diamer GBLA-18 8,936 6,764
Total 50,676 45,663
Ghizer GBLA-19 16,547 14,709
Ghizer GBLA-20 18,695 15,705
Ghizer GBLA-21 14,986 12,591
Total 50228 43005
Ghanche GBLA-22 13,079 11,642
Ghanche GBLA-23 12,416 10,870
Ghanche GBLA-24 8,737 8,113
Total 34,232 30,625
Grand Total 329,475 288,889
©2015 Chief Election Commissioner Secretariate Gilgit-Baltistan.
http://ecgb.gov.pk/elecroll.htm.
 APPENDIX XIII

Members of Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly

Members of Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly. Names of all elected members

and their party affiliation of GilgitBaltistan Assembly 2015.
GBLA-01 Jaffarullah Khan PMl-N
GBLA-02 Hafiz HafeezurRahman PML-N
GBLA-03 Doctor Muhammad Iqbal PML-N
GBLA-04 Doctor Muhammad Ali Haidar ITP
GBLA-05 Rizwan Ali MWM
GBLA-06 Shah Saleem Khan PML-N
GBLA-07 Haji Akbar Khan Taban PML-N
GBLA-08 KachoImtiazHaidar Khan MWM
GBLA-09 Haji Fida Muhammad Nashad PML-N
GBLA-10 Caption (R) Muhammad Sikandar ITP
GBLA-11 Iqbal Hassan PML-N
GBLA-12 Imran Nadeem PPP
GBLA-13 Farman Ali PML-N
GBLA-14 Barkat Jamil Siffat PML-N
GBLA-15 Haji Shah Baig JUI-F
GBLA-16 Janbaz Khan PML-N
GBLA-17 Haidar Khan PML-N
GBLA-18 Muhammad Wakeel PML-N
GBLA-19 Nawaz Khan Naji BNF
GBLA-20 Fida Khan Independent
GBLA-21 Raja Jahanzaib PTI
GBLA-22 Muhammad Ibrahim Sanai PML-N
GBLA-23 GhulamHussain Advocate PML-N
GBLA-24 MuhamamdShafiq PML-N
380 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Women Seats
1 Sherian Akhtar PML-N
2 Nasreen Bano PML-N
3 Rani Atiqa PML-N
4 Sobia Jabein PML-N
5 Rehana Abbadi ITP
6 Bibi Saleema MWM

Technocrat Seats
1 Aurungzaib Khan Advocate PML-N
2 Major (R) Muhammad Amin PML-N
3 Caption (R) Muhammad Shafi ITP
Source: 2010-2016 www.pakinformation.com
 APPENDIX XIV
Letters Exchanged Between Yasin Malik and Nawaz Sharif

Date: January 12, 2016

His Excellency
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif
Prime minister of Islamic republic of Pakistan

Assalam u AlaikumWarahmatullah
I take this opportunity to offer my good will and good faith to you. I am
writing because media reports say that you are holding a meeting to discuss
the future constitutional status of Gilgit Baltistan. I will pour my heart out
with the hope you will see and appreciate the sentiment behind it.
Respected Prime Minister: reports say that on the 14th of January, your
government is holding a meeting where the future of Gilgit Baltistan is going
to be deliberated upon. Apprehensions have been raised in various quarters
that your government may reach a consensus to merge Gilgit Baltistan with
Pakistan. This will have implications on the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.
If Pakistan imposes its sovereign writ over Gilgit Baltistan, India will then have
a political and moral right to integrate Kashmir with it. With one stroke,
Pakistan will be helping India to consolidate its writ on Kashmir.
Respected Prime Minster: I, as someone who represents the aspirations
and sentiments of the people of Jammu and Kashmir urge and appeal to you
to stay away from such a course of action. It is not only political wisdom that
makes me make this appeal but also respect for the sentiments, sacrifices and
aspirations of Kashmiri people. From 1947 people of Jammu Kashmir have
been striving for their birth right and lakhs of people have given their lives for
this struggle in Kashmir, people have lost their near and dear ones, homes and
yet people of Kashmir hold the struggle dear to their heart. If your government
incorporates Gilgit Baltistan into Pakistan, and if as a consequence, India
382 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

consolidates its hold in Kashmir, this would amount to a bartering of people’s

aspirations. Kashmir is not about territory. It is about rights of people. Bartering
these rights for land means killing the aspirations of people.
Respected prime Minister: Media has reported that China Pakistan corridor
is making you change the constitutional status of Gilgit Baltistan. Economic
development is good but you have no moral right to make policy that will
adversely affect the future of millions of Kashmiris. I know that Pakistan is in
a phase of history that is delicate. But this does not mean trading people’s rights.
I know you in personal capacity. When you met me in Lahore, in 2009, you
made some promises to me. I want to remind you of these promises. You clearly
vindicated Kashmiri position on Gilgit Baltistan and opposed any proposal
that will change its legal or constitutional status. I will also add that history is
not made by small bargaining and territorial exchanges but by respecting the
will of the people. The will of people in Kashmir is what everyone including
your good self knows. History, morality and ethics dictate that will of people
prevail. History also judges people in light of greatness and great achievements
they make. So I urge you to take a long view of history and not short term
interest.
I appeal you to think of the legacy you will leave if you become party to
depriving people of their historical, political and moral rights for which they
have given their lives. Bartering away territory for economic growth does not
make you statesman. It is opportunity for you to become a statesman by not
bowing to economic pressures. Become a statesman and resist short term
temptations.
Thank you
Yours brotherly,
Muhammad Yasin Malik
Chairman
Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF)
 Yasin Malik’s Letter to Nawaz Sharif 383

Copy of Yasin Malik’s Letter in Urdu

12 January 2016

(Available at https://www.facebook.com/YasinMalikJKLF/photos/yasin-malik-writes-letter-to-nawaz-
shareef-on-gilgit-baltistanhis-excellency-muh/1169014663126717/)
384 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
 APPENDIX XV

Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on

17 January 2019
(Available at http://www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/
Const.P._50_2018.pdf )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN

(ORIGINAL JURISDICTION)
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ MR. JUSTICE SH.
AZMAT SAEED
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL MR. JUSTICE FAISAL ARAB
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN MR. JUSTICE SAJJAD ALI SHAH
MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR
CONST. PETITIONS NO.50/2018, 51/2018 & 63/2011, CIVIL MISC.
APPLICATIONS NO.4922, 5382/2011, 695/2012 & 724/2017 IN CONST. PETITION
NO.63/2011, CONST. PETITIONS NO.6/2012, 16/2015 & 20/2015, CIVIL MISC.
APPLICATION NO.6966/2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 20/2015, CONST.
PETITION NO.3/2016, CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION NO.6800/2017 IN CONST.
PETITION NO.3/2016, CONST. PETITION NO.13/2016, 32/2016, 34/2016, CIVIL
MISC. APPEAL NO.184/2016 IN CONST. PETITION NO.NIL/2016, CIVIL MISC.
APPLICATION 7367/2016 IN CONST. PETITION NO.2/2017, 30/2017, 41/2018,
CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.202/2016 IN CONST. PETITION NO.NIL/2016, CONST.
PETITION NO.49/2018, 55/2018, 30/2015, 31/2015 32/2015, 36/2015, 64/2015, 6/
2017 IN CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.31/2017, CONST. PETITION NO.61/2017 IN
CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.243/2017, CONST. PETITION NO.18/2018 AND CIVIL
MISC. APPLICATION NO.10872/2018 IN CONST. PETITION NO.16/2015
Const.P.50/2018: Civil Aviation Authority Vs. Supreme Appellate Court
Gilgit Baltistan etc.
Const.P.51/2018: Prince Saleem Khan Vs. Registrar Supreme Appellate
Court Gilgit Baltistan etc.
Const.P.63/2011: Dr. Ghulam Abbas Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc.
386 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

C.M.A.4922/2011: Application for impleadment by Supreme Appellate

in Const.P.63/2011 Court Bar Association Gilgit-Baltistan
C.M.A.5382/2011: Application for Impleadment Dolat Jan
in Const.P.63/2011
C.M.A.695/2012: Application for Impleadment by Wazir Farman Ali
in Const.P.63/2011
C.M.A.724/2017: Application for Impleadment by Taqdir Ali Khan Vs.
in Const.P.63/2011 Federation of Pakistan and others
Const.P.6/2012: Gilgit Baltistan Chief Court Bar Association through its
Vice President Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc.
Const.P.16/2015: Gilgit Baltistan, Bar Council through its Vice Chairman
Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc.
Const.P.20/2015: Gilgit Baltistan, Supreme Appellate Court Bar
C.M.A.6966/2017: Association Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc.
in Const.P.20/2015 Gilgit Baltistan, Supreme Appellate Court Bar
Const.P.3/2016: Association Vs. Federation of Pakistan & others
C.M.A.6800/2017: Shaheen Air International Ltd., Karachi Vs. The
in Const.P.3/2016 Registrar, Supreme Appellate Court, Gilgit-Baltistan etc.
Shaheen Air International Ltd. Karachi Vs. The Registrar,
Supreme Appellate Court, Gilgit-Baltistan & others
Const.P.13/2016: Zafar Ali Khan Maqpoon Vs. Government of Pakistan
etc.
Const.P.32/2016: Muhammad Ibrahim Vs. Fed. of Pakistan etc.
Const.P.34/2016: Pak Agricultural Research Council Vs. Govt. of GB
through Chief Secretary, Gilgit Baltistan etc.
C.M.Appeal.184/2016: Pak Agricultural Research Council Vs. Govt. of GB
in Const.P.Nil/2016 through Chief Secretary, Gilgit Baltistan & others
C.M.A.7367/2016: Pak Agricultural Research Council Vs. Govt. of GB
in Const.P.34/2016 through Chief Secretary, Gilgit Baltistan & others
Const.P.2/2017: Federal Board of Intermediate & Secondary Educations
through its Chairman & another Vs. Federations of
Pakistan through M/o Kashmir Affair & Northern Areas etc.
Const.P.30/2017: Chairman F.B.R., Islamabad Vs. Registrar Supreme
Appellate Court, Gilgit Baltistan
Const.P.41/2018: Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of
Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan, Islamabad Vs.
Registrar Supreme Appellate Court, Gilgit-Baltistan & another
C.M.Appeal.202/2016: Air Blue Company Ltd. Vs. The Registrar S.C. Appellate
in Const.P.Nil/2016 Court Gilgit-Baltistan
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 387

Const.P.49/2018: Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of

Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan, Islamabad &
another Vs. The Registrar Supreme Appellate Court,
Gilgit-Baltistan etc.
Const.P.55/2018: Gilgit Baltistan Bar Council & another Vs. Federation
of Pakistan etc.
Const.P.30/2015: Amna Ansari & another Vs. Chairman Gilgit-Baltistan
Council etc.
Const.P.31/2015: Amna Ansari & another Vs. Chairman Gilgit-Baltistan
Council etc.
Const.P.32/2015: Amna Ansari & another Vs. Chairman Gilgit-Baltistan
Council etc.
Const.P.36/2015: Ameer Khan Vs. Federation of Pakistan etc.
Const.P.64/2015: Prof. Abdul Rasheed Mian etc. Vs. Federation of Pakistan
through Secretary M/o Health Services Regulations and
Coordination, Islamabad etc.
Const.P.6/2017: Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation Vs.
Registrar Supreme Appellate Court & another
Const.P.61/2017: Hotels and Restaurants Association of Gilgit-Baltistan &
another Vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secy. Cabinet
Division, Islamabad etc.
Const.P.18/2018: Abdul Qayyum Khan Vs. Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
& Gilgit-Baltistan through its Secretary, Islamabad etc.
C.M.Appeal.10872/ Impleadment application by Lt. Co. (R) Syed Iqbal
2018 in Const.P.16/2015: Hashmi

For the petitioner(s): Mr. Salam Akram Raja, ASC

Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR
(In Const.P.6/2012, 20/2015 & 55 of 2018 & 64/2015)
Mian Shafaqat Jan, ASC
Syed Rafaqat Hussain Shah, AOR
(In Const.P.50/2016 & Const.P.18 of 2018)
Barrister Masroor Shah, ASC
(In Const.P.51/2011)
Mr. Ikram Chaudhry, ASC
(In Const.P.63/2011)
Rai M. Nawaz Kharal, ASC
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR
(In Const.Ps.16/2015 & 61/2017 & C.M.A.6966/2017)
388 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Mr. Bhajandas Tejwani, ASC Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR

(In Const.P.3/2016)
Syed Qalb-i-Hassan, ASC
(In Const.P.13/2016)
Mian Shafaqat Jan, ASC
(In Const.P.32/2016)
Nemo
(In Const.P.34/2016)
Mr. Mir Afzal Malik, ASC Mr. Tariq Aziz, AOR
(In Const.P.2/2017)
Mr. Ghulam Shoaib Jally, ASC
(In Const.P.30/2017)
Mr. Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Addl. A.G.P.
(In Const.Ps.41 & 49/2018)
Mr. Asif Fasih ud Din Vardag, ASC Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR
(In Const.Ps.30 & 32/2015)
Mr. M. Munir Peracha, ASC Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR
(In Const.P.6/2017)
Nemo
(In Const.P.36/2015)
Mr. M. Ikhlaque Awan, ASC
(In C.M.A.5382/2011 & C.M.Appeal 202/2018)
On Court’s notice: Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, A.G.P. Amicus Curiae:
Ch. Aitzaz Ahsan, Sr. ASC
For the respondent(s): Mr. Saeed Iqbal, Dy. A.G. Gilgit-Baltistan
Mr. Aurangzeb Khan, Minister of Law & Parliamentary
Affairs, Gilgit Baltistan
Mr. Dil Muhammad Khan Alizai, ASC Ch. Afrasiab Khan, ASC
(For respondent No.2 in Const.P.49/2018)
Mr. M. Iqbal Hashmi, Advocate in person
(in C.M.A.10872/2018)
Mr. Waseem Sajjad, Sr. ASC
(For respondent in Const.P.63/11)
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR
(For the Federation)
Mr. Abdullah Baig
(Respondent in person)
Date of hearing: 7.01.2019
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 389

ORDER
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, CJ. – Succinctly, the instant matters pertain to a very
important historical and constitutional issue involving the status, authority and
powers of Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) including the judiciary and the rights available
to its people. Although similar issues emanate from the various constitution
petitions filed before this Court, it would be pertinent to briefly discuss the
factual background of each case before proceeding further, –
i. In Constitution Petition No.63/2011, the petitioner who is a political
and social activist, seeks the enforcement of the independence of the
judiciary in GB and thus challenges the vires of the Gilgit-Baltistan
Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009 (2009 Order) (and the
Gilgit Baltistan Order, 2018 (2018 Order) by amendment of the petition
through a C.M.A.) in light of Article 175 and 203 of the Constitution of
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution);
ii. In Constitution Petition No.6/2012, the GB Chief Court Bar Association
claims that the 2009 Order did not make sufficient provisions for the
appointment of judges to the GB Supreme Appellate Court and this
oversight threatens the establishment of an independent judiciary in GB
and thus the vires of the relevant provisions [Articles 60(5), (6) and (8) of
the 2009 Order] have been challenged.
iii. In Constitution Petition No.16 and 20/2015, the petitioner, GB Bar
Council (in both the petitions) seeks appropriate directions to the
respondents to arrange for issuance of an order contemplated by Article
258 of the Constitution read with Article 1(2)(d) thereof, to provide for
good governance for GB in compliance with the direction already issued
by this Court in paragraph No.28 of the judgment reported as Al-Jehad
Trust through Habibul Wahab Al-Khairi, Advocate and 9 others Vs.
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs,
Islamabad and 3 others (1999 SCMR 1379) to enforce fundamental
rights;
iv. In Constitution Petitions No.30, 31, 32 and 36/2015 the petitioner
challenged the appointments of the Chief Election Commissioner GB,
Governor of GB and the Chief Minister of GB made under the 2009
Order and sought a declaration to the effect that the said Order was
ultra vires and the fundamental rights extended to the people of GB be
enforced;
v. Petitioners No.1 and 2 in Constitutional Petition No.64/2015 are faculty
members of various medical colleges and petitioners No.1, 3 and 4 are
also members of the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PMDC).
Through the instant petition they claim that Section 2 of the PMDC
390 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(Amendment) Ordinance, 2015 on account of being discriminatory to

the people of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and GB be declared ultra vires
of Article 25 of the Constitution, fresh elections be announced for
members of council of PMDC and Regulation No.9(2) of the PMDC
Regulations 2015 be declared unreasonable, arbitrary and of no legal
effect;
vi. In Constitutional Petition No.2/2016 the judgments against the Federal
Board of Intermediate & Secondary Education by the lower fora were
upheld by the GB Supreme Appellate Court. Through the instant
petition, the impugned judgment was sought to be declared as beyond
the jurisdiction of the said Court and the declaration that no civil
proceedings may be initiated against it in the territory of GB and any
such proceedings should have no legal effect;
vii. In Constitutional Petition No.3/2016, the petitioner Shaheen Airline
Limited was issued directions in Suo Moto Case No.2/2009 by the
Supreme Appellate Court to operate flights to Gilgit Baltistan despite it
not being commercially feasible for the petitioner. Through this petition,
the petitioner seeks that the said suo moto proceedings and all the orders
issued therein be declared unconstitutional, ultra vires of the Constitution
and void ab initio;
viii. In Constitutional Petition No.13/2016, the petitioner, inter alia, seeks
the implementation of the judgment passed in Al-Jehad Trust’s case
(supra) as well as the declaration that the 2009 Order is ultra vires of the
Constitution and has no legal value unless the Constitution is amended;
ix. In Constitutional Petition No.34/2016, the Pakistan Agriculture Research
Council seeks reversal of the transfer of 24 kanals and 3 marlas to Pakistan
State Oil under the mistaken belief that the said land was owned by the
Government of GB whereas according to the petitioner the said land
was owned by the Government of Pakistan and could not be unilaterally
so transferred. The said matter was sub judice when it was taken up in
suo moto proceedings by the GB Supreme Appellate Court in S.M.C.
No.8 of 2016 and directions have been issued to facilitate said transfer.
The petitioner seeks, inter alia, that the jurisdiction of the said Court be
outlined in light of the Constitution of Pakistan and the said transfer of
land be declared void and without lawful authority.
x. In Constitutional Petition No.3/2016, the petitioner, inter alia, seeks
implementation of the Al-Jehad Trust’s case (supra) as well as the
declaration that Order 2009 is ultra vires of the Constitution and has no
legal value unless the Constitution is amended and therefore should be
declared ultra vires;
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 391

xi. In Constitutional Petition No.6/2017, there was a dispute regarding

shamlat land measuring 30 kanals in Satpara Lake which the Pakistan
Tourism and Development Corporation (PTDC) wanted to acquire. Vide
impugned order dated 19.11.2015 in S.M.C. No.3/2009, this Court
issued directions to PTDC to bring its work at the Satpara Lake in
conformity with the environmental standards it laid out which directions
the PTDC states that it has complied with. Subsequently, through suo
moto case No. 2/2016, the GB Supreme Appellate Court passed a series
of adverse orders against PTDC. The petitioner seeks, inter alia, that the
proceedings be declared illegal, unconstitutional and coram non judice
and be quashed.
xii. In Constitutional Petition No.30/2017, the Federal Board of Revenue,
Islamabad, Pakistan (petitioner) seeks a declaration by this Court that
the GB Supreme Appellate Court exceeded its jurisdiction when in suo
moto case No.11/2010 it passed orders issuing notices and orders to and
against the petitioner, declaring the same to be unconstitutional, coram
non judice and consequently quash the same;
xiii. In Constitutional Petition No.61/2017, the petitioner is a representative
body of Hotels and Restaurants in GB which seeks the implementation
of the Al-Jehad Trust case (supra) which, inter alia, provides for the
right of access to justice and independence of judiciary to the people of
GB. Thus directions are sought from this Court to implement the same
in letter and spirit;
xiv. In Constitutional Petition No.49/2018, the Supreme Appellate Court
of GB after taking cognizance of the matter vide judgment dated
13.7.2018 set aside the 2018 Order. The Federation of Pakistan through
the instant petition seeks that the said judgment be set aside and such
action of the said Court be declared unconstitutional and beyond its
jurisdiction;
xv. In Constitutional Petition No.51/2018, the petitioner seeks the
quashment of the impugned judgment wherein the GB Supreme
Appellate Court declared the by-election held in petitioner’s constituency
to be void, illegal and without any legal authority, thus it was set aside
seeking inter alia that: (1) the GB Supreme Appellate Court exceeded its
jurisdiction by taking suo motu notice under Article 61 read with Article
95 of the 2009 Order; (2) suo motu notice was taken of a fact not pleaded
in the lis; (3) the impugned judgement is per incuriam for having been
rendered in derogation of the express words used in Article 61 of the
2009 Order;
xvi. In Constitutional Petition No.55/2018, the petitioner, GB Bar Council,
392 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

inter alia, seek that the 2018 Order be declared illegal, void ab initio and
without legal authority;
xvii. In Constitutional Petition No.50/2018, the Petitioners, Civil Aviation
Authority seek that the declaration that the jurisdiction of the Chief
Court in terms of article 71 of the 2009 Order is only to the extent of
the Government of GB therefore the latter does not have the jurisdiction
to issue writs/directions to the former;
xviii. In Constitutional Petition No.18/2018 the petitioner is a citizen of
Pakistan after remaining in the permanent and pensionable service of
the Armed Forces Medical College Rawalpindi. This is mainly a service
dispute and the petitioner seeks implementation of the judgment of the
Federal Service Tribunal against the Principal Public School & College,
Jutial, Gilgit. The petitioner seeks quashment of the judgment passed in
Writ Petition No.108/2017 filed by the respondents to be declared
without lawful authority, coram non judice and not maintainable; and
xix. In Constitutional Petition No.41/2018, the Federation of Pakistan
through Secretary Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit Baltistan
Islamabad seeks quashment of the impugned judgment wherein the GB
Supreme Appellate Court vide order dated 20.06.2018 stayed the
operation of the 2018 Order and its implementation process was
suspended till the decision of the suo moto taken by the said Court.
2. The following common but key questions stem from the foregoing factual
background:
i. Would granting fundamental rights and a status, role and recognition to
the people of GB within the constitutional scheme of Pakistan prejudice
Pakistan’s cause for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute by such
appropriate means as may be acceptable to Pakistan (which could, for
example, be a United Nations sanctioned and supervised plebiscite)?
ii. What rights can be granted to the people of GB?
iii. Is the GB Supreme Appellate Court a constitutional court?
To answer the foregoing questions, it is pertinent to examine some of the
commitments made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Their importance is
enhanced by some special provisions in the constitutions of both Pakistan and
India. These constitutional provisions are not only a continuing reminder of
those commitments but especially from Pakistan’s side most definitely and
certainly reiterate its commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute
in accordance with International Law and the aspirations of the people of
Kashmir.
3. The Kashmir issue, starting as it did in the dying days of the British Raj and
erupting and escalating into a dispute (and indeed armed conflict) shortly
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 393

thereafter, became one of Partition’s defining moments. A process that could

have produced two empowered, independent countries — countries with a
shared history and hopes of a productive and cooperative future—instead
embroiled Pakistan in strife that it did not want and was not of its making. The
origins of the dispute lay in the contrived (some might even say coerced) accession
of Kashmir to India by the Hindu ruler of a Muslim majority state, which was
contrary to the expectations of the population and to the basis professed to be
preferred by the British for accession by Princely States. The resultant heroic
uprising and resistance by the majority was but inevitable. Subsequent United
Nations (UN) intervention recommended, and Pakistan and India accepted, a
de-escalatory approach leading up to calls for a plebiscite to determine the
wishes of the people of the region. Successive Security Council Resolutions
asked the UN to facilitate a “free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the
State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan.”
4. What does require clarification is that the commitment to a plebiscite was, at
least ostensibly, echoed also from Indian side, perhaps in an attempt to calm
the uproar around the obvious injustice of Maharaja Hari Singh’s alleged
declaration of accession to India. Thus, the then Prime Minister of India, Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru unambiguously committed himself to the plebiscite
arrangement. His telegrams to the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and the United
Kingdom (UK) sought to create the impression that any Indian recognition of
the Maharaja’s accession to India was only provisional and that the question of
the future of Jammu and Kashmir (i.e., whether as part of Pakistan or India)
would be determined by its own people after the restoration of law and order.
What, after all, could (at least facially) be more unambiguous than Mr. Nehru’s
telegram to the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee where, in paragraph
No.3, he committed that “I would like to make it clear that the question of aiding
Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to
accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question
of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance
with the wishes of people and we adhere to this view.”1
[Emphasis supplied] This commitment of the Prime Minister of India was
repeated and forwarded by the Prime Minister of Britain to the Prime Minister
of Pakistan on 27th October, 1947 by stating that “He adds that he would like
to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed
in any way to influence the State to accede to India.”2

1 Reproduced in Modern History of Jammu and Kashmir: Ancient times to Shimla Agreement by
J. C. Aggarwal, S. P. Agrawal (originally published in 1995, page 35, paragraph 3).
2 Kashmir: The Case for Freedom By Tariq Ali, Arundhati Roy, Pankaj Mishra, Hilal Bhatt, Angana
P. Chatterji (originally published in 2011, page 125).
394 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

5. Mr. Nehru continued his protestations of supporting the right of the Kashmiri
people to so decide their future in direct communications with Pakistan’s leaders.
Thus in his telegram of 28th October, 1947 to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Mr.
Nehru reiterated that:
“In regard to accession also it has been made clear that this is subject to reference to
people of State and their decision. The Government of India have no desire to
impose any decision and will abide by people’s wishes.”3
Similarly, in his telegram of 31st October, 1947 to the Prime Minister of
Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India reasserted as follows:
“Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace
and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the future of this State to
people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government but also to the people
of Kashmir and to the world.”4
Mr. Nehru’s claims of sincerity in empowering the people of Kashmir to so
decide their future continued unabated. In his telegram of 4th November, 1947
to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Nehru declared, yet again that:
“I wish to draw your attention to broadcast on Kashmir which I made last evening.
I have stated our Government’s policy and made it clear that we have no desire to
impose our will on Kashmir but to leave final decision to people of Kashmir. I
further stated that we have agreed on impartial international agency like United
Nations supervising any referendum. This principle we are prepared to apply to any
state where there is a dispute about accession.”5
Mr. Nehru’s claims of fealty to the rights to the Kashmiris were echoed by his
government’s representatives. The Indian representative to the UN, Mr.
Gopalaswami Ayyangar, made a policy statement in the UN Security Council
on 15th January, 1948 where he claimed that India desired “only to see peace
restored in Kashmir and to ensure that the people of Kashmir are left free to decide
in an orderly and peaceful manner the future of their State. We have no further
interest, and we have agreed that a plebiscite in Kashmir might take place under
international auspices after peace and order have been established.”
6. It was on the basis of such assurances that the UN Security Council passed
resolutions on 17th and 20th January, 1948 establishing the UN Commission
for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The UNCIP was directed to investigate the
facts and to report its advice. On 6th February, 1948, the Security Council
3 Modern History of Jammu and Kashmir: Ancient times to Shimla Agreement By J. C. Aggarwal,
S. P. Agrawal (originally published in 1995, page 41).
4 Regional and Ethnic Conflicts: Perspectives from the Front Lines By Judy Carter, George Irani,
Vamik D Volkan (originally published in 2009, page 44).
5 Quoted in “Unravelling the Kashmir Knot” by Aman M. Hingorani (originally published in May
2016).
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 395

made an appeal to both parties to agree on a just settlement of the Kashmir

problem, to put an end to violence and hostilities and to withdraw all regular
and irregular forces who had entered the State from outside. These resolutions
were supplemented by a comprehensive resolution passed on 21st April, 1948
and the UNCIP’s resolutions of 13th August, 1948 and 5th January, 1949.
Truce was declared on 1st January, 1949. However, rather than adopting the
process of demilitarization as envisaged in the aforesaid resolutions India has
made the area that it holds in Kashmir as one of the most militarized areas in
the world.
7. We have taken the liberty of citing at length from the statements of the Indian
leadership because it is important to understand that the concept of the
international nature of the Kashmir dispute was not a demand put forth merely
by Pakistan. To the contrary, the repeated statements of Mr. Nehru make clear
that the right of self-determination of the Kashmiri people was a right
acknowledged, promoted and committed to by the Government of India as
well as the Government of Pakistan and embraced and sanctified by the
international community through the UN.
8. Commitments of this nature ought to be inviolable. Pakistan has certainly not
resiled from its commitments—whether to the people of Kashmir or the
international community. However, and this is a sad but hard reality, despite
the passage of seven decades the promised plebiscite has yet to be held and the
territory of Kashmir continues to remain divided—Jammu and Kashmir under
the Indian Constitution, increasingly subsumed into India (hereinafter referred
to as “Indian Occupied Kashmir” or “IOK”) on the one hand, and the State of
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (hereinafter referred to as “AJK”) and the territory of
GB on the other.
9. Over the decades the trajectories of the divided region have diverged. The part
under Pakistan’s administrative control (i.e., GB)—subject to the writ of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution)—
and that aligned with Pakistan (i.e., AJK) have progressed (though perhaps not
as swiftly or as much as Pakistanis would have desired) and remained largely at
peace, while the portion of Kashmir under Indian control has been convulsed
with resistance and rebellion—expressions of popular sentiment that have been
met with ever worsening repression and suppression.
10. The situation at present in IOK is dire. To reach such conclusion we need not
turn to any official document or statement from Pakistan. Reliance can be
placed upon the most recent report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued in the summer of 2018 which pulls no
punches and is damning. It notes widespread allegations of “human rights
violations [that] include torture and custodial deaths, rape, enforced disappearances
and extrajudicial killings.” With some 500,000 to 700,000 troops in the territory,
396 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the OHCHR report noted that “Indian Kashmir” is “one of the most militarized
zones in the world.” “Impunity for human rights violations and a lack of access to
justice” are just a few of the human rights challenges in IOK. This impunity is
sanctioned and promoted by such draconian laws as the Armed Forces (Jammu
and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990 (AFSPA) that grants broad powers to
the security forces and effectively bestows immunity from prosecution in civilian
courts for their conduct by requiring the central government to sanction all
prospective prosecutions prior to being launched. As per the OHCHR, the
law “gives virtual immunity against prosecution for any human rights violation. In
the nearly 28 years that the law has been in force in Jammu and Kashmir, there has
not been a single prosecution of armed forces personnel granted by the central
government.” The provisions of AFSPA fly in the face of the most basic
international norms and conventions. For example, section 4 thereof allows
any personnel operating under the law to use lethal force not only in cases of
self-defence but also against any person contravening laws or orders “prohibiting
the assembly of five or more persons.” The use of pellet guns is regarded as directly
responsible for the blinding, and thus incapacitation, of hundreds of Kashmiri
youth. Others have been bound, in some of the most bizarre sights of the
modern era, in front of military vehicles, self-evidently as so- called “human
shields” against stones lobbed by unarmed youth facing the terrible might of
one of the world’s largest and most well-equipped armies.
11. In contrast, circumstances on the Pakistan side of the Line of Control (LOC)
are markedly better. Tellingly, the OHCHR Report devotes most of itself to
the situation in Indian-held Kashmir. There is of course an obvious and
understandable reason for this. In all of the seven decades since Independence
even when Pakistan itself was caught in, and convulsed by, turmoil of the most
tragic nature, there was always an obvious and popular acceptance of, and for,
Pakistan by the people, both in AJK and GB. On the Indian side however state
sanctioned violence seems to go on and on.
12. As acknowledged by the OHCHR Report, AJK is neither a police state, nor
are military laws or rules in place. Basic rights are available to the population
and most elements of due process exist. Relative to IOK, the region is
empowered, peaceful and prosperous. But a relative improvement as compared
with the dire situation across the border is not the standard that Pakistan should
ever be satisfied with. Nor is this Court prepared to tolerate or condone any
violation of human rights on this side of the prevailing divide even though
those breaches involve no violence as reported from the other side. We should
seek to hold ourselves to the highest standards of conduct in relation to the
territories for which Pakistan bears responsibility. In this context, there is always
more work to be done.
13. As noted, Pakistan has responsibilities in relation to two regions: AJK and GB.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 397

In 1948, UNCIP recognized the existence of local authorities (as distinct from
the Government of Pakistan) for the territories. We are of course here concerned
with GB alone. The region has not been incorporated into Pakistan as it is
considered to be a part of the disputed State of Jammu and Kashmir. However,
it has always remained completely under Pakistan’s administrative control.
14. For the governance of the region, a series of administrative structures and laws
have been applied to GB since 1947. These have included the following (up to
1999):
Year Legal instrument Description
1947 Frontier Crimes Regulations First law to be enforced was a continuation of
(FCR) implemented the colonial law of FCR. Under this British law
for the tribal areas and GB, a civil bureaucracy
exercised all judicial and administrative power.
1949 Karachi Agreement On 28th April, 1949, officials of the Pakistan
Government metwith those of the AJK
Government to ink the Karachi Agreement.
Under this accord, it was agreed that the affairs
of Gilgit would be run by the Pakistan
Government. It appears that no leader from Gilgit
was included in this agreement.6
1950 Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Affairs of Northern Areas handed over to the
Northern Areas created Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas
(KANA). Joint Secretary of the Ministry of
Kashmir Affairs has been performing duties of
Resident in the Northern Areas with all
administrative and judicial authority since 1952.7
1952 Political Resident Appointed Joint Secretary of the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs
who headed the local administration and
judiciary; was responsible for enforcement of the
FCR and was also the financial and revenue
commissioner. The Resident also exercised
legislative powers in the Northern Areas in
consultation with the Federal Government.8
1967 Political Agents appointed KANA transferred powers of the High Court and
Revenue Commissioner to the Resident and
appointed two Political Agents, one each for
Gilgit and Baltistan.9
6 Information retrieved from http://gbla.gov.pk/page/history#advocuncil.
7 AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan, Journal of Contemporary Studies, Vol. V, No. 1, Summer 2016, at
page 80, paragraph 2, available at: https://ndu.edu.pk/fcs/Publications/fcsjournal/
JCS_2016_summer/5.AJK-and-Gilgit- Baltistan.pdf.
8 Ibid at paragraph 2.
9 Supra.
398 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

1970 Advisory Council for Northern Between Pakistan and the Azad Kashmir
Areas Council Constitutional Government. 21 elected and non-elected
Order members headed by the then Resident for GB as
Chairman under KANA Division O.M. No.NA-
1(6)/70 dated 18th November, 1970. 16
members of Northern Areas Advisory Council
(NAAC) were elected in 1970.10
1975 Northern Areas Council Legal Major administrative, judicial and political
Framework Order 1975FCR reforms were introduced. The jagirdari nizam was
Abolished abolished. GB was transformed into districts like
those in Pakistan. The FCR was abolished, and
the civil and criminal law was extended to the
Northern Areas. The Advisory Council for
Northern Areas was replaced by Northern Areas
Council (NAC).11
1994 Northern Areas Council Legal Administrative instrument devised by KANA,
Framework Order (LFO) of 1994 supplemented by the Northern Areas Rules of
Business (NARoB) (also of 1994) serving as a sort
of basic law but with only limited advisory
functions devolved on the council.12
1999 Al Jehad Trust judgment This Court declared it could not prescribe a form
(1999 SCMR 1379) of government for the region, nor could it direct
that the region be represented in the Parliament
since that could undermine Pakistan’s stand on
Kashmir. It left such issues to the Federal
Government and the Parliament. However, it
directed the Government to take “proper
administrative and legislative steps” to ensure that
the people of the Northern Areas enjoyed their r
ights under Pakistan’sConstitution.13
1999 Northern Areas Council Legal The Northern Areas Council was renamed as the
Framework (Amendment) Order, Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC)
1999 which was given the powers to legislate on 49
subjects. The post of Speaker and three women
seats were also created.14

15. As of today, the situation ultimately to emerge both for AJK and GB, as also of
course for the rest of the erstwhile State, is enshrined in the aspiration expressed

10 Information retrieved from http://gbla.gov.pk/page/history#advcouncil.

11 Information retrieved from http://gbla.gov.pk/page/history#advcouncil.
12 Volume 7, page 108, paragraph 35.
13 Volume 7, Pg 108, Paragraph 36.
14 Information retrieved from http://gbla.gov.pk/page/history.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 399

in Article 257 of the Constitution, which provides that “When the people of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between
Pakistan and that State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the
people of that State.”
16. Be that as it may, in 1999, this Court in the seminal judgment reported as Al-
Jehad Trust through Habibul Wahab Al-Khairi, Advocate and 9 others Vs.
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Kashmir Affairs,
Islamabad and 3 others 1999 SCMR 1379 directed the Pakistan Government
to extend fundamental freedoms to the Northern Areas (now of course referred
to as GB) within six months. The judgment declared that Pakistan exercised
both de facto and de jure administrative control over the Northern Areas. This
Court ruled that the people of the region were “citizens of Pakistan for all intents
and purposes...and could invoke constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights.”
(at page 1393) The ruling emphasized that the people of the Northern Areas
were “entitled to participate in the governance of their area and to have an
independent judiciary to enforce...Fundamental Rights.” (at page 1396).
17. This Court has thus been sensitive for a long time to the fundamental rights of
the people of GB. At the same time it was recognized that in the prevailing
circumstances the Northern Areas’ Legislative Council could not simply be
equated with a Provincial Government. The problem clearly required a
resolution. However, there was no immediate follow-up to the judgment passed
in the Al-Jehad Trust case (supra) as the executive procrastinated. But after the
lapse of a decade, the Federal Government promulgated the 2009 Order which,
it argued, would establish a system of full internal governance in GB. The
2009 Order was a step towards the empowerment of the people of GB, but was
not a complete solution. Thus, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
(HRCP) emphasized, in a 2016 report based on a fact-finding mission, that
the 2009 Order “falls short of providing a democratic system in which the people of
Gilgit-Baltistan could enjoy the rights available to other Pakistan citizens.” Other
deficiencies noted in the report included, in part, that it (the 2009 Order) did
not guarantee the right to protection against double punishment nor a right to
information and the right to education. According to the report, discrimination
on the basis of sex was not prohibited nor was the State obliged to take affirmative
action in favour of women and children. This situation appears to be most
unsatisfactory to this Court. Even though some rights are indeed available in
GB, albeit under laws such as the Pakistan Penal Code and the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (CrPC), and are given effect by the respective courts, these are
not protected under any overarching framework of a constitutional nature.
This therefore remains unsatisfactory. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 2009 Order
failed to fully address the aspirations of the people of GB for full empowerment
and representation. Reflecting this discontent, the GB Legislative Assembly
400 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

passed a unanimous resolution in August 2015 demanding that the region be

included in Pakistan as a constitutional Province with representation in
Parliament. The desire of the people of GB to participate fully in the national
life of Pakistan is palpable. The HRCP mission had noted that “a large number
of people living in Gilgit-Baltistan aspire to have full rights as citizens of Pakistan.
They argue that whenever it suits the federal government they are viewed as Pakistanis
but when they ask for equal rights they are reminded of their controversial
constitutional status.” [Emphasis supplied]
18. The division of Kashmir has dragged on for more than seven decades. Given
continued Indian policy to deny a plebiscite, it is possible that it may persist
for a considerable further period. Under these circumstances, it is surely a
denial of fundamental rights to have the people of GB linger on in legal limbo—
deprived of rights simply because they await a future event that may not
practically occur within their individual lifetimes. Quite obviously, the question
of fundamental rights cannot be addressed in isolation. Such rights do not
hang in the air. In order to have meaningful life and force, they must be
embedded in (thereby drawing support and sustenance from, and in turn, fertilizing
and enhancing) a properly articulated system of governance of a constitutional
nature. These two—fundamental rights and a system of governance—of
necessity go hand in hand. The former without the latter is not possible and
only desirable, and the latter without the former, though possible, is not
desirable. To attempt to put in place one but not the other would be a lopsided
exercise, lacking the proper balance that must exist. Fortunately, a path forward
is already available in the recommendations of the Committee on Constitutional
and Administrative Reforms in GB (Committee) constituted by the Prime
Minster in 2015. The Committee, which submitted its report in March 2017,
was tasked with reviewing the constitutional and administrative arrangements
in GB and recommending reforms, as well as reviewing the existing internal
arrangements of the region. The Committee was led by the veteran civil servant
and former Foreign Minister Mr. Sartaj Aziz. The report of the Committee
concluded that further reforms were required to enhance the sense of
participation of the people of GB and to upgrade the standard of governance
and public service delivery. At the same time, the Committee noted that the
reforms proposed should not prejudice Pakistan’s principled position in the
context of UN resolutions on Kashmir.
19. We are in agreement with the conclusions of the Committee on both the above
noted counts: (i) that there is a need for further substantive reforms to enhance
the participation of GB’s citizenry in governance; and (ii) that in no way and at
no point should the proposed reforms prejudice Pakistan’s principled position
regarding the status of Kashmir. Indeed, the latter point is of crucial importance
and must guide and inform any and all recommendations regarding reforms in
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 401

GB. It is within the context of the above framework that we must examine the
recommendations of the Committee. The Committee recommended, in part,
that, –
i. GB be accorded a “provisional” and special status of a Province pending
final settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute;
ii. The region be given representation in the National Assembly and the
Senate of Pakistan through amendments to Articles 51 and 57 of the
Constitution, rather than an amendment to Article 1 thereof;
iii. All legislative subjects other than those enumerated in Article 142 of the
Constitution and its Fourth Schedule be assigned to the GB Assembly;
iv. GB be given representation in all constitutional bodies; and
v. A robust local bodies system be introduced.
The Committee also suggested broad reforms in other key areas including
infrastructure development, socio-economic uplift and the civil service.
20. We are cognizant of the fact that nothing this Court recommends or orders
should affect the nature and status of the Kashmir issue. It is within this light
that we have reflected upon the recommendations of the Committee with great
care. We also recognize that some of the recommendations may require Acts of
Parliament and even amendments to the Constitution. At the same time, we
have also been comforted by the fact that the Committee itself was acutely
aware of the sensitivities of the issue before it, and provided its recommendations
only after considering their implications, if any, on the status of the Kashmir
dispute. It must be emphasized that all the above measures must be predicated
by the caveat that these are subject to the result of the plebiscite, which is duly
recognized in Article 257 already alluded to above. The Committee’s
recommendations have been considered in the backdrop of Pakistan’s
international commitments and their constitutional endorsement. As a
responsible member of the comity of nations Pakistan remains aware of its
obligations in such terms. As and when the promised plebiscite is organized by
the parties to the dispute, it will be up to the people of all of Jammu and
Kashmir, and of GB, to make their choice. Till then, it is surely incumbent
upon both India as well as Pakistan to ensure that the people of this region
enjoy maximum rights for areas within each country’s control. Therefore, till
such time that the plebiscite is held, a proper arrangement must be provided
for by Pakistan for the people of GB for purposes of governance within a
framework of a constitutional nature, including most importantly the enjoyment
of fundamental rights.
21. This Court has already held in the case of Al-Jehad Trust (supra) that the
people of GB are “citizens of Pakistan for all intents and purposes...and could
invoke constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights” and emphasized that they
were “entitled to participate in the governance of their area and to have an
402 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

independent judiciary to enforce...Fundamental Rights.” (at page 1393) This

Court’s observations in the noted case find expression in the Committee’s report
which distinguishes between the (yet to be finally resolved) status of GB, and the
legitimate aspirations of the people of the region to participate in national life.
It is clear that granting full rights to them does not in any way prejudice the
eventual determination of the status of Jammu and Kashmir. A state of vacuum
cannot be created for the people of GB. They, after all, are as entitled to all the
fundamental rights as are enjoyed by others. Therefore there can be no prejudice
to Pakistan’s position on the plebiscite issue if the men, women and children
living in GB are guaranteed basic human rights and a role in their own
governance within a framework of a constitutional nature. Indeed, full rights
for the people of GB can only bolster Pakistan’s case for the right of self-
determination for all the people of Kashmir. Pakistan has the principled position
that the people of Kashmir deserve to exercise all fundamental rights including
the right of self-determination in terms of the plebiscite, the promise of
which remains yet to be actuated.
22. Regrettably, this latter right is not solely within Pakistan’s own prerogative to
proffer. It is a right that can only be exercised with the participation of India
and the international community through the UN. However, Pakistan does
have the ability to itself empower the people of GB with all those fundamental
rights that Pakistanis enjoy, without the involvement of India or the international
community, and without prejudice to the right of self-determination through
a plebiscite of all the people of Jammu and Kashmir. These rights for GB
residents would include the right to representation as well as all other rights
enjoyed by the citizens of Pakistan. In conferring these rights Pakistan is not
only discharging its obligations to the people in the territory that it controls
and administers, it is also making a loud and clear statement in favour of
providing all rights to all the people of Kashmir. As such, its actions can only
strengthen the case for self-determination of Kashmir in accordance with the
commitment to ensure exercise of all fundamental rights. It may be mentioned
clearly, and without any ambiguity, that the most fundamental and basic right,
the right of self-determination is for all the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and
it remains a matter of satisfaction that their right to choose through a plebiscite
remains a solemn commitment. That is why we hold that the Committee’s
recommendations relating to the provision and enforcement of fundamental
rights provided by the Constitution must be implemented immediately and
with full force and effect. As a matter of law as well as morality, there should be
no discrepancy in the fundamental rights available to those in GB relative to
Pakistani citizens anywhere in the country. As for a framework for governance,
of a constitutional and political nature, for GB we are of the view that the right
to self-government through an empowered GB Assembly as well as a robust
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 403

system of local bodies is entirely uncontroversial and must be enforced as early

as possible.
23. We hold the above while yet again emphasizing our considered view that these
changes do not in any way prejudice or affect Pakistan’s principled stance on
Kashmir. As such, these reforms are by definition provisional until the time
when the people of Kashmir exercise their right of self-determination under
the plebiscite. They have been deprived of this choice for far too long and at far
too great a cost. Our judgment today merely states and upholds the obvious—
that the parties to the Kashmir issue have an obligation to hasten the final
resolution of this dispute and until that takes place, we must do everything in
our power to minimize the suffering that this region has had to bear on account
of its prolonged division.
24. Another question before this Court is whether the GB Supreme Appellate Court
lacks the judicial power and jurisdiction to suspend, set aside or vary an Order
promulgated by the President of Pakistan for the governance of GB, i.e., the
2018 Order or any Order amending, substituting or replacing the same. Now,
given the present status of GB, i.e., as a region that is fully within the
administrative control of Pakistan, and where Pakistan functionally exercises
all aspects of sovereignty, it is clear that the Federation (i.e., Parliament and the
Federal Government) is fully empowered to make arrangements for the
governance of the region. This power extends to enacting and putting into
place, whether on the executive side by means of an Order promulgated by the
President or on the legislative side by an Act of Parliament, a framework and
system of governance that is of a constitutional nature. The 2018 Order was
issued in exercise of these powers, and the courts in GB were created under the
same. The question now being considered can be put in more general terms:
what would be the position (i.e., status, powers and jurisdiction) of the judicial,
legislative and executive organs established by an instrument of the nature of
the 2018 Order? In accordance with well-established principles of law, the GB
legislature would only have such powers as are conferred upon it by the
Federation through the Proposed Order. The courts created by such Order
shall have the power to judicially review the laws enacted by such legislature.
Of course, the organs created by the 2018 Order, and especially any legislative
body, would be bound not merely by the Order, but also by the Constitution
(under which the Order itself came into existence). For the present purposes, the
more immediate point is that a court created by the 2018 Order, such as the
GB Supreme Appellate Court or the Chief Court, can examine whether the
GB Assembly has exceeded the remit of its competence as conferred by the
Order (when, e.g., enacting a law), and can declare it to be ultra vires the same.
However, this jurisdiction is of necessity territorially bound. It can only apply
and operate in relation to GB, and to things done or purported to be done
404 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

under the 2018 Order. It cannot extend to any matter beyond or outside GB,
or the vires or validity of the 2018 Order itself. The jurisdiction of a GB court
of the sort being considered in the present context is confined to the territory
of GB. Therefore, it may be concluded that the intention was to give the GB
Supreme Appellate Court and the Chief Court the status of a “constitutional”
court within the ambit of GB and the 2018 Order, but confining the scope to
interpreting and implementing the said Order and conducting judicial review
within the territory of GB in this regard. It is thus a “constitutional” court
inasmuch as it has the jurisdiction to strike down any law made by a GB
legislature on the recognized concept of ultra vires. But it would not be in a
position to question, in any manner and on any ground whatsoever, the very
law that created it. This view is bolstered by the fact that an ouster clause has
been inserted as Article 118 of the 2018 Order, whereby the GB courts have
been restrained from calling into question the validity of the 2018 Order. The
said Article reads as under:
“118. Order to override other laws, etc.– (1) The provision of this Order shall
have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of any law for the
time being in force except that in case of conflict between the laws of Pakistan and
the law framed under this Order, the laws of Pakistan shall prevail.
(2) No Court, including the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court and the
Gilgit-Baltistan High Court, shall call into question or permit to be called into
question, the validity of this Order.”
25. Therefore it may be concluded that the GB Court does not sit as a court having
the power of judicial review in respect of the territory of Pakistan, nor can it
declare Orders made or legislation passed by the President or the Parliament as
ultra vires, nor can it initiate judicial review of departments working outside of
GB. Instead, the 2018 Order can be challenged by, inter alia, the people of GB,
but only before this Court, either under Article 184 of the Constitution or in
the manner herein after provided.
26. We now turn to a question of importance, which is crucial for the success of
the project of creating a framework of governance for GB of a constitutional
nature. Any framework of such a nature necessarily implies, and indeed it could
be said demands, a degree of continuity in the manner provided in the Proposed
Order (hereinafter referred to). Otherwise, what good is it? Of what value are
the fundamental rights enshrined in such a framework, and how independent
can a judiciary created thereby be, if the structure is impermanent, and even
ephemeral? This is all the more so where the framework is put in place in
exercise of executive authority, by means of an Order promulgated by the
President. Such an Order can be put in place, as it were, with a stroke of the
pen, but likewise instantly cast into oblivion. Indeed, the manner in which the
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 405

2009 Order was replaced by the 2018 Order is a telling illustration of the
point now under consideration. During the course of the hearing of these
petitions, and in light of the submissions by various learned counsel and the
observations of the Court, the Federal Government constituted a committee
shepherded by the learned Attorney General, to review the entire matter, and
place before the Court a draft of a fresh Order for the governance of GB. This
was duly done, and the draft so placed was examined by the Court in light of
the submissions made before it. In our view, that draft, as modified in the
manner hereinafter stated, does provide a suitable framework in the hue of
constitutional nature for the governance of GB. The Federal Government stands
committed to promulgating the same (hereinafter referred to as the “Proposed
Order”), in substitution of the 2018 Order. However, the question of
permanence remains. It is this point that must now be considered.
27. As noted above, the matters before us have been instituted under Article 184(3)
of the Constitution. The jurisdiction thereby conferred upon this Court has
been considered in a number of decisions, which have settled a well-known
jurisprudence that requires no elaborate rehearsal. There is also Article 187 of
the Constitution, which confers a special jurisdiction on this Court. As the
text of Article 184(3) supra indicates, this Court can give “such directions to any
person or authority including any Government… as may be appropriate for the
enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter 1 of Part II” of
the Constitution. It is now well settled that this constitutional power, within
the scope of the grant, is not just plenary; it is also dynamic and flexible. Indeed,
if we may adapt (in a somewhat modified manner) for present purposes a famous
metaphor used by the Privy Council in relation to the Canadian constitution,
in granting fundamental rights the Constitution has planted a “living tree capable
of growth and expansion”. Understandings of both the nature of fundamental
rights, and what must be done to ensure their meaningful enjoyment in full,
have developed and evolved over the decades and will undoubtedly continue
to do so in times to come. Thus, to take but one example, the meaning of the
right to life conferred by Article 9 of the Constitution has developed in a manner
that would, perhaps, be breathtaking for previous generations. The categories
and varieties of cases involving or raising issues of fundamental rights of public
importance can never be closed. They are shaped by the human condition and
the vagaries of the human experience, which by its very nature is limitless. This
is not to say that the scope of the constitutional power is, as a matter of law,
boundless, but only to stress that any artificial straitjacketing, based on
preconceived notions or whatever passes for orthodoxy or received wisdom in
a particular age, is to be avoided. Now, precedent is too often perceived as a
limitation. Certainly, at least in the common law tradition, it is a defining
characteristic of judicial power. It should however, perhaps also be given greater
406 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

recognition as a useful tool in the judicial arsenal. It must never be forgotten

that while we are certainly tied to the past we are not shackled by it. And this is
perhaps all the more so when the jurisdiction is of the nature as conferred by
Article 184(3) supra. To this must be added the power conferred on this Court
under Article 187 supra, to “issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be
necessary to do complete justice” in any pending case or matter. Keeping these
provisions in mind, and the special nature of the issue before us—the settling
of a framework, of a constitutional nature, for the governance of GB—we are
of the view that our jurisdiction extends to the giving of suitable directions to
the Federation, both to promulgate the Proposed Order and also for ensuring
its continuity. It is only in this way that fundamental rights can be granted to
the people of GB in the meaningful and realistic manner envisaged by this
Court in the case of Al-Jehad Trust (supra). At the same time, as indeed was
accepted on behalf of the federation, the directions that we can give extend to
making certain modifications in the Proposed Order, again in order to properly
effectuate the objective sought to be achieved. It is in the foregoing terms that
we have, indeed, made certain modifications to the Proposed Order, which
have been incorporated therein, and have also for convenience been gathered
in the appendix to this judgment.
28. Before concluding, we would like to make one last point. It is a matter of some
concern that although this Court had articulated the basic position as regards
the status and rights of the people of GB in the case of Al-Jehad Trust (supra)
two decades ago, the actual realization by the Executive of that expression has
remained fitful at best. This is not acceptable. This Court has not hesitated in
the past to give legal recognition to the aspirations of people who have
unhesitatingly, enthusiastically (and if we may out it like that, joyously) cast
their lot with Pakistan right from the beginning. We do not hesitate now to
take the matter further. Therefore, we do not just provide judicial imprimatur
to the proposed framework: we also give it permanence, so that the people of
GB have unassailable confidence that their rights, and the enjoyment thereof,
is not subject to the whims and caprice of every passing majority, but are firmly
grounded in the Constitution itself. And let it be clearly understood: we will
not hesitate in future, should the need and occasion arise, to take, within our
constitutional mandate, all such steps as may be required. The human rights
jurisprudence of this Court has served, and will continue to serve, as the sheet-
anchor of the liberties and rights of all the people. Those of Gilgit-Baltistan are
no exception.
29. Accordingly, we hereby direct and order as follows:
i. The Proposed Order, which (modified as noted above) is annexed to this
judgment, shall be forthwith promulgated by the President on the advice
of the Federal Government, and in any case within a fortnight hereof;
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 407

ii. No amendment shall be made to the Order as so promulgated except in

terms of the procedure provided in Article 124 of the same, nor shall it
be repealed or substituted, without the instrument amending, repealing
or substituting (as the case may be) the same being placed before this
Court by the Federation through an application that will be treated as a
petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Nothing in this
judgment shall be construed to limit the jurisdiction conferred on this
Court by the Proposed Order itself; and
iii. If the Order so promulgated is repealed or substituted by an Act of
Parliament the validity thereof, if challenged, shall be
30. examined on the touchstone of the Constitution.In light of the foregoing,
the instant matters are disposed of accordingly, save those petitions in which a
specific order or judgment, of either the GB Supreme Appellate Court or the
Chief Court, has been challenged. Such petitions (being only Constitution
Petitions No.2/2016, 3/2016, 34/2016, 6/2017, 30/2017, 18/2018, 50/2018
and 51/2018) shall be deemed pending and be treated and disposed of as the
leave petitions envisaged under Article 103 of the Proposed Order, when
promulgated. Such petitions shall be listed in the normal course before an
appropriate Bench.

CHIEF JUSTICE

JUDGE

JUDGE

JUDGE

JUDGE

JUDGE
Announced in open Court
on 17.01.2019 at Islamabad
Approved for Reporting
M. Azhar Malik JUDGE
408 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

No.F.13 (2)/2018-Admn(GBC)
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN MINISTRY OF KASHMIR AFFAIRS
AND GILGIT-BALTISTAN
********
Islamabad, the January, 2019
AN ORDER
to provide for further political empowerment and good governance in Gilgit-Baltistan
WHEREAS the Federal Government intends to give Gilgit-Baltistan the status of a
provisional Province, subject to the decision of the Plebiscite to be conducted under the
UN Resolutions, with all privileges provided by the Constitution, however, a proper
Constitutional Amendment needs to be made in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan. This needs two thirds majority in the Parliament and would take time.
However, as an interim measure the Federal Government intends to give such
Fundamental Right as given to the other Province.
WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for greater empowerment so as to bring Gilgit-
Baltistan at par with other provinces and to initiate necessary legislative, executive and
judicial reforms for the aforesaid purposes;
NOW, THEREFORE, the President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan is pleased to
make the following Order:
1. Short title, extent and commencement. – (1) This Order may be called the
Gilgit-Baltistan Governance Reforms, 2019.
(2) It extends to whole of the Gilgit-Baltistan.
(3) It shall come into force on at once.
PART I: PRELIMINARY
2. Definitions. – (1) In this Order, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject
or context. –
(a) “Assembly” means the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly;
(b) “Citizen” means a person who has a domicile or resident of Gilgit-
Baltistan;
(c) “Council” means the Gilgit-Baltistan Council constituted under this
Order;
(d) “Chairman” means the Chairman of the Council who shall be the Prime
Minister of Pakistan;
(e) “Federation” means the Federal Government of Islamic Republic of
Pakistan;
(f ) “Financial year” means the year commencing on the first day of July
and ending on the thirtieth day of June;
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 409

(g) “Gilgit-Baltistan” means the areas comprising districts of Astore, Diamer,

Ghanche, Ghizer, Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Skardu, Shigar, Kharmang and
such other districts as may be created from time to time;
(h) “Governor” means the Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan and includes a person
for the time being acting as Governor;
(i) “Government” means the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(j) “Joint Sitting” means a joint sitting of the Assembly, the Federal Minister
in-charge of the Council Secretariat and the members of the Council;
(k) “Judge” in relation to the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court or
the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court, includes the Chief Judge of the Gilgit-
Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court and the Chief Court;
(l) “person” includes any body politic or corporate;
(m) “prescribed” means prescribed by law or rules made there under;
(n) “President” means the President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan;
(o) “Property” includes any right, title or interest in property, movable or
immovable, and any means and instruments of production;
(p) “remuneration” includes salary and pension;
(q) “Service” means the Service of Pakistan, Service of Gilgit-Baltistan and
Service of Azad Jammu and Kashmir;
(r) “Service of Gilgit-Baltistan” means any service, post or office in
connection with the affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan, but does not include service
of Council, service as Governor, Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chief Minister,
Minister or Advisor, Parliamentary Secretary, Advisor to the Minister or
a member of the Assembly;
(s) “Service of Council” means any service, post or office in connection
with the affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan Council which shall be the service of
Pakistan, but does not include service as the Chairman of the Council,
Advisor to Chairman, Member of the Council, Chairman of the Council’s
Committees;
(t) “Speaker” means Speaker of the Assembly and includes any person acting
as the Speaker of the Assembly;
(u) “Supreme Court of Pakistan” means the Supreme Court as defined by
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973; and
(v) “Vice Chairman of the Council” means the Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan.
3. Elimination of exploitation. – The Government shall ensure the elimination of
all forms of exploitation and the gradual fulfillment of the fundamental principle,
from each according to his ability to each according to his work.
4. Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law, etc. – (1) To
enjoy equal protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law is the
inalienable right of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for
the time being in Gilgit-Baltistan.
410 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(2) In particular—
(a) no action detrimental to the life, liberty, body, reputation or property
of any person shall be taken except in accordance with law;
(b) no person shall be prevented from or be hindered in doing that which
is not prohibited by law; and
(c) no person shall be compelled to do that which the law does not require
him to do.
5. Obedience to this Order. – Obedience to this Order and law is the inviolable
obligation of every citizen, wherever he may be, and of every other person for the
time being within Gilgit-Baltistan.
PART II: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
6. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of Fundamental Rights to be void. –
(1) Any law, or any custom or usage having the force of law, in so far as it is
inconsistent with the rights conferred by this part, shall, to the extent of such
inconsistency, be void.
(2) The Government shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the
rights so conferred by this Order and any law made in contravention of this clause
shall, to the extent of such contravention, be void.
(3) The Provisions of this Article shall not apply to any law relating to members
of the Armed Forces, or of the Police or of such other forces as are charged with the
maintenance of public order, for the purpose of ensuring the proper discharge of
their duties or the maintenance of discipline among them and no such law nor any
provision thereof shall be void on the ground that such law or provision is
inconsistent with, or repugnant to, any provision of this Part.
(4) The rights conferred by this Part shall not be suspended except as expressly
provided by this Order.
7. Security of person. – No person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in
accordance with law.
8. Safeguard as to arrest and detention. – (1) No person who is arrested shall be
detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for
such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal
practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced
before the nearest Magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest
excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of
the Magistrate, and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said
period without the authority of a Magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clause (1) and (2) shall apply to any person who is arrested or
detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 411

(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall be made except to deal
with persons acting in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security or defence of
Pakistan or any part thereof, or external affairs of Pakistan, or public order, or the
maintenance of supplies or services, and no such law shall authorize the detention
of a person for a period exceeding three months unless the Review Board has, after
affording him an opportunity of being heard in person, reviewed his case and
reported, before the expiration of the said period, that there is, in its opinion,
sufficient cause for such detention, and, if the detention is continued after the said
period of three months, unless the Review Board has reviewed his case and reported,
before the expiration of each period of three months, that there is, in its opinion,
sufficient cause for such detention.
Explanation I.— In this article, “the Review Board” means, a Board appointed by
the Chief Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan consisting of a
Chairman, the Secretary of the Department concerned with Home Affairs and a
person, who is or has been a Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court or the Chief
Court.
Explanation II.—The opinion of the Review Board shall be expressed in terms of
the views of the majority of its members.
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any
law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, within
fifteen days from such detention, communicate to such person the grounds on
which the order has been made, and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of
making a representation against the order:
Provided that the authority making any such order may refuse to disclose facts
which such authority considers it to be against the public interest to disclose.
(6) The authority making the order shall furnish to the Review Board all
documents relevant to the case unless a certificate, signed by a Secretary to the
Government, to the effect that it is not in the public interest to furnish any
documents, is produced.
(7) Within a period of twenty-four months commencing on the day of his
first detention in pursuance of an order made under a law providing for preventive
detention, no person shall be detained in pursuance of any such order for more
than a total period of eight months in the case of a person detained for acting in a
manner prejudicial to public order and twelve months in any other case:
Provided that this clause shall not apply to any person who is employed by, or
works for, or acts on instructions received from, the enemy, or who is acting or
attempting to act in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security or defence of
Pakistan or any part thereof or who commits or attempts to commit any act which
amounts to an anti-national activity as defined in any law or is a member of any
association which has for its objects, or which indulges in, any such anti-national
activity.
412 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(8) The Review Board shall determine the place of detention of the person
detained and fix a reasonable subsistence allowance for his family.
(9) Nothing in this article shall apply to any person who for the time being is
an enemy alien.
9. Right to fair trial. – For the determination of his civil rights and obligations or
in any criminal charge against him a person shall be entitled to a fair trial and due
process.
10. Slavery and forced labour prohibited. – (1) No person shall be held in slavery,
and no law shall permit or in any way facilitate the introduction into Gilgit-Baltistan
of slavery in any form.
(2) All forms of forced labour and traffic in human beings is prohibited.
(3) No child below the age of fourteen years shall be engaged in any factory or
mine or any other hazardous employment.
(4) Nothing in this clause shall be deemed to affect compulsory service-
(a) by persons undergoing punishment for offences under any law; or
(b) required by any law for a public purpose.
11. Protection against retrospective punishment. – No law shall authorize the
punishment of a person –
(a) for an act or omission that was not punishable by law at the time of the
act or omission; or
(b) for an offence by a penalty greater than, or of a kind different from, the
penalty prescribed by law for that offence at the time the offence was
committed.
12. Protection against double punishment and self-incrimination. – No person—
(a) shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once; or
(b) shall, when accused of an offence, be compelled to be a witness against
himself.
13. Inviolability of dignity of man, etc. (1) The dignity of man and, subject to
law, the privacy of home, shall be inviolable.
(2) No person shall be subjected to torture for the purpose of extracting evidence.
14. Freedom of movement. – Every citizen shall have the right to remain in, and,
subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, enter
and move freely throughout Gilgit-Baltistan and to reside and settle in any part
thereof.
15. Freedom of assembly. – Every citizen shall have the right to assemble peacefully
and without arms, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the
interest of morality or public order.
16. Freedom of association. – (1) Subject to this Order, every citizen shall have
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 413

the right to form association or unions, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed
by law in the interest of morality or public order.
(2) No person or political party in the area comprising Gilgit-Baltistan shall
propagate against, or take part in activities prejudicial or detrimental to the ideology
of Pakistan.
(3) Every citizen, not being in the Service, shall have the right to form or be a
member of a political party, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law
in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan or any part thereof and
such law shall provide that where the Government declares that any political party
has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity
of Pakistan or any part thereof, the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan shall, within
fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the Supreme Appellate Court
whose decision on such reference shall be final.
(4) Every political party shall account for the source of its funds in accordance
with law.
17. Freedom of trade, business or profession. – Every citizen possessing such
qualifications, if any, as may be prescribed by law in relation to his profession or
occupation shall have the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation,
and to conduct any lawful trade or business:
Provided that nothing in this article shall prevent –
(a) the regulation of any trade or profession by a licensing system; or
(b) the regulation of trade, commerce or industry in the interest of free
competition therein; or
(c) the carrying on, by Government or by a corporation controlled by
Government, of any trade, business, industry or service, to the exclusion,
complete or partial, or other persons.
18. Freedom of speech. – Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech
and expression, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest
of the security, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of
Court, commission of, or incitement to an offence.
19. Right to information. –Every citizen shall have the right to have access to
information in all matters of public importance subject to regulation and reasonable
restrictions imposed by law.
20. Freedom to profess religion and manage religious institutions. – Subject to
law, public order and morality, –
(a) every citizen has the right to profess and practice his religion; and
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof has the right to
establish, maintain and manage its places of worship.
21. Safeguard against taxation for purposes of any particular religion. – No person
414 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

shall be compelled to pay any special tax the proceeds of which are to be spent on
the propagation or maintenance of any religion other than his own.
22. Safeguard as to educational institutions in respect of religion etc. – (1) No
person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious
instructions or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if
such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.
(2) No religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing
religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any
educational institution maintained wholly by that community or denomination.
(3) No citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution receiving
aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion, caste or place of
birth.
(4) In respect of any religious institution, there shall be no discrimination
against any community in the granting of exemption or concession in relation to
taxation.
(5) Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent any public authority from making
provision for the advancement of any society or educationally backward class.
23. Provisions as to property. – Subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by
law in the public interest, every citizen shall have the right to acquire, hold and
dispose of property.
24. Protection of property. – (1) No person shall be deprived of his property save
in accordance with law.
(2) No property shall be compulsorily acquired or taken possession of save for
a public purpose, and save by the authority of law which provides for compensation
thereof and either fixes the amount of compensation or specifies the principles on
which and the manner in which compensation is to be determined and given.
(3) Nothing in this clause shall, affect the validity of –
(a) any law permitting the compulsory acquisition or taking possession of
any property for preventing danger to life, property or public health;
or
(b) any law relating to the acquisition, administration or disposal of any
property which is or is deemed to be evacuee property under any law;
or
(c) any law permitting the taking over of any property which has been
acquired by, or come into the possession of, any person by any unfair
means, or in any manner, contrary to law ; or
(d) any law providing for the taking over of the management of any property
by the Government for a limited period, either in the public interest or
in order to secure the proper management of the property, or for the
benefit of its owner; or
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 415

(e) any law providing for the acquisition of any class of property for the
purpose of –
(i) providing education and medical aid to all or any specified class of
citizen; or
(ii) providing housing and public facilities and services such as roads,
water supply, sewerage, gas and electric power to all or any specified
class of citizen; or
(iii) providing maintenance to those who, on account of unemployment,
sickness, infirmity or old age, are unable to maintain themselves; or
(f ) any law in force immediately before the coming into force of this Order:
Explanation. – In clause (2) and (3), the expression ‘property’ means immovable
property, or any commercial or industrial undertaking, or any interest in any
undertaking.
(4) The adequacy or otherwise of any compensation provided for by any such
law as is referred to in this Article, or determined in pursuance thereof, shall not be
called in question in any court.
25. Equality of citizens. – (1) All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to
equal protection of law.
(2) There shall be no discrimination on the basis of gender.
(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the Government from making any
special provision for the protection of women and children.
26. Right to education. – The Government shall provide free and compulsory
education to all children of the age of five to sixteen years in such manner as may be
determined by law.
27. Non-discrimination in respect of access to public places. – In respect of access
to places of public entertainment or resort, not intended for religious purposes
only, there shall be no discrimination against any citizen on the ground only of
race, religion, caste, gender or place of birth, but nothing herein shall be deemed to
prevent the making of any special provision for women.
28. Safeguard against discrimination in services. – No citizen otherwise qualified
for appointment in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan, shall be discriminated against in
respect of any such appointment on the ground only of race, religion, caste or
gender:
Provided that, in the interest of the said service, specified posts or services may
be reserved for members of either sex.
29. Preservation of language, script and culture. – Subject to Article 117 any
section of citizens having a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right
to preserve and promote the same and subject to law, establish institutions for that
purpose.
416 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

PART III: PRINCIPLES OF POLICY

30. Principles of Policy. – (1) The Principles set out in this Part shall be known as
the Principles of Policy, and it is the responsibility of each organ and authority of
the Government, and of each person performing functions on behalf of an organ
or authority of the Government, to act in accordance with those Principles in so far
as they relate to the functions of the organ or authority.
(2) In so far as the observance of any particular Principle of Policy may be
dependent upon resources being available for the purpose, the Principle shall be
regarded as being subject to the availability of resources In respect of each year, the
Governor shall cause to be prepared and laid before the Assembly, a report on the
observance and implementation of the Principles of Policy, and provision shall be
made in the rules of procedure of the Assembly, for discussion on such report.
31. Responsibility with respect to Principles of Policy. – (1) The responsibility of
deciding whether any action of an organ or authority of the Government, or of a
person performing functions on behalf of an organ or authority of the Government,
is in accordance with the Principles of Policy is that of the organ or authority of the
Government, or of the person, concerned.
(2) The validity of an action or of a law shall not be called in question on the
ground that it is not in accordance with the Principles of Policy, and no action shall
lie against the Government or any organ or authority of the Government or any
person on such ground.
32. Islamic way of life. (1) Steps shall be taken to enable the Muslims of Gilgit-
Baltistan, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the
fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby
they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy
Quran and Sunnah.
(2) The Government shall endeavor:
(a) to make the teaching of the Holy Quran and Islamiat compulsory, to
encourage and facilitate the learning of Arabic language and to secure
correct and exact printing and publishing of the Holy Quran;
(b) to promote unity and the observance of the Islamic moral standards;
and
(c) to secure the proper organization of zakat, ushr, auqaf and mosques.
33. Promotion of local Government institutions. – The Government shall
encourage local Government institutions composed of elected representatives of
the areas concerned and in such institutions special representation will be given to
peasants, workers and women.
34. Parochial and other similar prejudices to be discouraged. – The Government
shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal and sectarian prejudices among the citizens.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 417

35. Full participation of women in national life. – Steps shall be taken to ensure
full participation of women in all spheres of national life.
36. Protection of family, etc. – The Government shall protect the marriage, the
family, the mother and the child.
37. Protection of minorities. –The Government shall safeguard the legitimate
rights and interests of minorities, including their due representation in the service
of Gilgit-Baltistan.
38. Promotion of social justice and eradication of social evils. – The Government
shall:
(a) promote, with special care, the educational and economic interests of
backward classes or areas;
(b) remove illiteracy and provide free and compulsory secondary education
within minimum possible period;
(c) make technical and professional education generally available and higher
education equally accessible to all on the basis of merit;
(d) ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice
(e) make provision for securing just and humane conditions of work,
ensuring that children and women are not employed in vocations unsuited
to their age or sex, and for maternity benefits for women in employment;
(f ) enable the people of different areas, through education, training,
agricultural and industrial development and other methods, to participate
fully in all forms of national activities, including employment in the
service of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(g) prevent prostitution, gambling and taking of injurious drugs,printing,
publication, circulation and display o obscene literature and
advertisements;
(h) prevent the consumption of alcoholic liquor otherwise than for medicinal
and, in the case of non-Muslims, religious purposes; and
(i) decentralize the Government administration so as to facilitate expeditious
disposal of its business to meet the convenience and requirements of the
public.
39. Promotion of social and economic well-being of the people. – The Government
shall:
(a) secure the well-being of the people, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or
race, by raising their standard of living, by preventing the concentration
of wealth and means of production and distribution in the hands of a
few to the detriment of general interest and by ensuring equitable
adjustment of rights between employers and employees, and landlords
and tenants;
418 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(b) provide for all citizens, within the available resources of the Gilgit-
Baltistan, facilities for work and adequate livelihood with reasonable
rest and leisure;
(c) provide for all persons employed in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan or
otherwise, social security by compulsory social insurance or other means;
(d) provide basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing. housing, education
and medical relief, for all such citizens, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or
race, as are permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood
on account of infirmity, sickness or unemployment;
(e) reduce disparity in the income and earnings of individuals, including
persons in the various classes of the service of Gilgit-Baltistan; and
(f ) eliminate riba as early as possible.
40. Participation of people in Armed Forces. – The Government shall enable
people from all parts of Gilgit-Baltistan to participate in the Armed Forces of
Pakistan.
PART IV: GOVERNOR
41. The Governor. – (1) There shall be a Governor of the Gilgit-Baltistan who
shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister.
(2) When the Governor, by reason of absence from Gilgit-Baltistan or for any
other cause, is unable to perform his functions, the Speaker of the Assembly and in
his absence any other person as the President may nominate shall perform the
functions of Governor until the Governor returns to Gilgit-Baltistan or, as the case
may be, resumes his functions.
(3) A person shall not be appointed a Governor unless he is qualified to be
elected as a member of the Assembly and is not less than thirty-five years of age and
is a registered voter and resident of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(4) The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President and
shall be entitled to such salary, allowances and privileges as the President may
determine.
(5) The Governor may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President,
resign his office.
(6) The President may make such provision as he thinks fit for the discharge
of the functions of the Governor in any contingency not provided for in this Order.
(7) Before entering upon office, the Governor shall make before the Chief
Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court an oath in the form set out
in the First Schedule.
(8) The Governor shall not hold any office of profit in the Service nor occupy
any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the rendering of services.
(9) The Governor shall not be a candidate for election as a member of the
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 419

Assembly, and, if a member of the Assembly is appointed as Governor, his seat in

the Assembly shall become vacant on the day he enters upon his office.
42. Governor to act on advice, etc. – (1) Subject to this Order in the performance
of his functions, the Governor shall act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet
or the Chief Minister:
Provided that the Governor may require the Cabinet or, as the case may be, the
Chief Minister to reconsider such advice, whether generally or otherwise, and the
Governor shall act in accordance with the advice tendered after such reconsideration.
(2) The question whether any, and if so what, advice was tendered to the
Governor by the Chief Minister or the Cabinet shall not be inquired into or by, any
court, tribunal or other authority.
PART V: THE GOVERNMENT
43. The Government. – (1) Subject to this Order, the executive authority of Gilgit-
Baltistan shall be exercised in the name of the Governor by the Government,
consisting of the Chief Minister and the relevant Minister(s), which shall act through
the Chief Minister, who shall be the Chief Executive.
(2) In the performance of his functions under this Order, the Chief Minister
may act either directly, through the Ministers or through their subordinate Officers.
44. The Cabinet. – (1) There shall be a Cabinet of Ministers, with the Chief
Minister at its head, to aid and advise the Governor in the exercise of his functions.
(2) The Assembly shall meet on the twenty-first day following the day on
which a general election to the Assembly is held, unless sooner summoned by the
Governor.
(3) After the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, the Assembly
shall, to the exclusion of any other business, proceed to elect without debate one of
its members to be the Chief Minister.
(4) The Chief Minister shall be elected by the votes of the majority of the total
membership of the Assembly:
Provided that, if no member secures such majority in the first poll, a second
poll shall be held between the members who secures the two highest numbers of
votes in the first poll and the member who secures a majority of votes of the members
present and voting shall be declared to have been elected as Chief Minister:
Provided further that, if the number of votes secured by two or more members
securing the highest number of votes is equal, further polls shall be held between
them until one of them secures a majority of votes of the members present and
voting.
(5) The member elected under clause (4) shall be called upon by the Governor
to assume the office of Chief Minister and he shall, before entering upon the office,
make before the Governor oath in the form set out in the First Schedule:
420 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(6) The Cabinet shall be collectively responsible to the Assembly and the total
strength of the Cabinet shall not exceed twelve members or eleven percent of the
total membership of the Assembly, whichever is higher:
Provided that the aforesaid limit shall be effective after the next general elections.
(7) The Chief Minister shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor,
but the Governor shall not exercise his powers under this clause unless he is satisfied
that the Chief Minister does not command the confidence of the majority of the
members of the Assembly, in which case he shall summon the Assembly and require
the Chief Minister to obtain a vote of confidence from the Assembly.
(8) The Chief Minister may, by writing under his hand addressed to the
Governor, resign his office.
(9) A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member
of the Assembly shall, at the expiration of that period, cease to be a Minister and
shall not before the dissolution of that Assembly be again appointed a Minister
unless he is elected a member of that Assembly.
(10) Nothing contained in this Article shall be construed as disqualifying the
Chief Minister or any other Minister for continuing in office during any period
during which the Assembly stands dissolved, or as preventing the appointment of
any person as Chief Minister or other Minister during any such period.
(11) The Chief Minister shall not appoint more than two Advisers.
45. Governor to be kept informed. – The Chief Minister shall keep the Governor
informed on matters relating to administration and on all legislative proposals the
Government intends to bring before the Assembly.
46. Ministers. – (1) Subject to clause (9) and (10) of Article 44, the Governor
shall appoint Ministers from amongst members of the Assembly on the advice of
the Chief Minister.
(2) Before entering upon office, a Minister shall make before the Governor
oath in the form set out in the First Schedule.
(3) A Minister may, by writing under his hand addressed to the Governor,
resign his office or may be removed from office by the Governor on the advice of
the Chief Minister.
47. Vote of no-confidence against Chief Minister. – (1) A resolution for a vote of
no-confidence moved by not less than twenty per centum of the total membership
of the Assembly may be passed against the Chief Minister by the Assembly.
(2) A resolution referred to in clause (1) shall not be voted upon before the
expiration of three days, or later than seven days, from the day on which such
resolution is moved in the Assembly.
(3) If the resolution referred to in clause (1) is passed by a majority of the total
membership of the Assembly, the Chief Minister shall cease to hold office.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 421

48. Chief Minister continuing in office. – The Governor may ask the Chief
Minister to continue to hold office until his successor enters upon the office of
Chief Minister, in case of a vote of no confidence.
49. Extent of executive authority of Government. – Subject to this Order, the
executive authority of the Government shall extend to the matters with respect to
which the Assembly has power to make laws:
Provided that, in any matter with respect to which both Council and the
Assembly has power to make laws, the executive authority of the Government shall
be subject to, and limited by law made by the Council
50. Conferring of functions on subordinate authorities. – On the recommendation
of the Government, the Assembly may by law confer functions upon officers or
authorities subordinate to the Government.
51. Conduct of business of Government. – (1) All executive actions of the
Government shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor.
(2) The Government shall by rules specify the manner in which orders and
other instruments made and executed in the name of Governor shall be
authenticated, and the validity of any order or instrument so authenticated shall
not be questioned in any court on the ground that it was not made or executed by
the Governor.
(3) The Government shall also make rules for regulation, allocation and
transaction of its business and may for the convenient transaction of that business
delegate any of its functions to the officers or authority subordinate to it.
52. Parliamentary Secretaries. – (1) The Chief Minister may appoint Parliamentary
Secretaries from amongst the members of the Assembly to perform such functions
as may be prescribed.
(2) A Parliamentary Secretary may, by writing under his hand addressed to the
Chief Minister, resign his office or may be removed from office by the Chief Minister.
53. Advocate-General. – (1) The Governor, shall appoint a citizen, being a person
qualified to be appointed as Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court, to be the
Advocate-General for Gilgit-Baltistan.
(2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General to give advice to Government
upon such legal matters, and to perform such other duties of a legal character, as
may be referred or assigned to him by the Government.
(3) The Advocate-General shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor
and shall not engage in private practice so long as he holds the office of the Advocate
General.
(4) The Advocate-General may, by writing under his hand addressed to the
Governor resign his office.
(5) The person holding the office as Advocate-General immediately before
422 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the commencement of this Order shall be deemed to be the Advocate-General,

appointed under this Order.
PART VI: GILGIT-BALTISTAN COUNCIL
54. Gilgit-Baltistan Council. – (1) There shall be a Gilgit-Baltistan Council
consisting of, –
(a) the Prime Minister of Pakistan;
(b) the Governor;
(c) six members nominated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan from time to
time from amongst Federal Ministers and members of Parliament:
Provided that the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-
Baltistan shall be an ex officio member and Minister-in-Charge of the
Council:
(d) the Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(e) six members to be elected by the Assembly in accordance with single
non-transferable majority vote.
(2) The Prime Minister of Pakistan shall be the Chairman of the Council.
(3) The Governor shall be the Vice-Chairman of the Council.
(4) The Minister of State for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan shall be an
ex officio non-voting member of the Council.
(5) The qualifications and disqualifications for being elected, as, and for being,
a member of the Council shall, in the case of a member referred to in sub-clause (e)
of clause (1), be the same as those for being elected as, and for being a member of
the Assembly.
(6) The seat of a member of the Council elected by the Assembly, hereinafter
referred to as an elected member, shall become vacant, –
(a) if he resigns his seat by notice in writing under his hand addressed to
the Chairman or, in his absence, to the Secretary of the Council;
(b) if he is absent, without the leave of the Chairman, from ten consecutive
sittings of the Council;
(c) if he fails to make the oath referred to in clause (11) within a period of
ninety days after the date of his election, unless the Chairman, for good
cause shown, extends the period; or
(d) if he ceases to be qualified for being a member under any provision of
this Order or any other law for the time being in force.
(7) If any question arises whether a member has, after his election, become
disqualified from being a member of the Council, the Chairman shall refer the
question to the Chief Election Commissioner and, if the Chief Election
Commissioner is of the opinion that the member has become disqualified, the
member shall cease to be member and his seat shall become vacant.
(8) An election to fill a vacancy in the office of an elected member shall be
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 423

held not later than thirty days from the occurrence of the vacancy or, if the election
cannot be held within that period because the Assembly is dissolved, within thirty
days of the general election to the Assembly.
(9) The manner of election of elected members and filling of a casual vacancy
in the office of an elected member shall be such as may be prescribed.
(10) An elected member shall hold office for a term of five years from the day
he enters upon his office.
(11) An elected member shall, before entering upon office, make before the
Chairman or the Vice Chairman oath in the form set out in the First Schedule.
(12) The executive authority of the Council shall extend to all matters with
respect to which the Council has power to make laws and shall be exercised, in the
name of the Council, by the Chairman who may act either directly or through the
Secretariat of the Council of which Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-
Baltistan shall be incharge.
Provided that the Council may direct that, in respect of such matters it may
specify, its authority shall be exercisable by the Vice-Chairman of the Council,
subject to such conditions, if any, as the Council may specify.
(13) The Chairman may from among the elected members of the Council
appoint not more than three Advisors on such terms and conditions as he may
determine.
(14) An advisor shall, before entering upon office, make before the Chairman
oath in form set out in the First Schedule.
(15) An Advisor who is a member of the Assembly shall have the right to
speak in, and otherwise take part in the proceedings of the Council, but shall not
by virtue of this clause be entitled to vote.
(16) The Council may make rules for regulating its procedure and the conduct
of its business, and shall have power to act notwithstanding any vacancy in the
membership thereof, and any proceedings of the Council shall not be invalid on
the ground that a person who was not entitled to do so sat, voted or otherwise took
part in the proceedings.
(17) Orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the
Council shall be authenticated in such manner as may be specified in rules to be
made by the Council and the validity of an order or instrument which is so
authenticated shall not be called in question on the ground that it is not an order or
instrument made or executed by the Council.
(18) The Chairman may regulate the allocation and transaction of the business
of the Council and may, for the convenient transaction of that business, delegate
any of its functions to officers and authorities subordinate to it.
55. Chairman of Council power to pardon and reprieve. – The Chairman shall
have power to grant pardons, reprieves and respites and to remit, suspend or
commute any sentence passed by any court, tribunal or other authority.
424 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

PART VII: THE LEGISLATURE

56. Legislative Assembly. – (1) The Legislative Assembly shall consist of thirty
three members of whom –
(a) twenty four members shall be elected directly on the basis of adult
franchise;
(b) six women members shall be elected on the pattern as in case of reserved
seat in Pakistan.
(c) three technocrats and other professional members shall be elected on
the pattern as in case of reserved seat in Pakistan.
Explanation. – In sub-clause (c), the expression “technocrat or other professional”
includes a person who is in possession of such qualification or experience as may be
prescribed.
(2) The manner of election of the members of the Assembly and the manner
of filling casual vacancies shall be such as may be prescribed.
(3) The Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue for five years from
the date appointed for their first meeting.
(4) A general election to the Assembly shall be held within a period of sixty
days immediately preceding the day on which the term of the Assembly is due to
expire, unless the Assembly has been sooner dissolved, and result of the election
shall be declared not later than fourteen days before that day.
(5) On dissolution of Assembly on completion of its term, or in case it is
dissolved under Article 62, the Chairman of the Council shall appoint a care- taker
Cabinet:
Provided that the care-taker Chief Minister shall be selected by the Chairman
of the Council in consultation with the Chief Minister, the leader of the Opposition
in the outgoing Assembly and the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan:
Provided further that the members of the care-taker Cabinet shall be appointed
on the advice of the care-taker Chief Minister:
Provided also that if the Chief Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the
outgoing Assembly and the Minister for Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan do
not agree on any person to be appointed as care-taker Chief Minister, the Chairman
of the Council may appoint, in his discretion, a care-taker Chief Minister.
57. Oath of members of the Assembly. – (1) A person elected as a member of the
Assembly shall not take his seat in the Assembly until he makes before such person
as is prescribed by rules of the Assembly an oath in the form set out in the First
Schedule.
(2) The oath may be made when the Assembly is in session.
(3) If any person sits or votes in the Assembly knowing that he is not qualified
to be, or is disqualified from being a member of the Assembly he shall be liable in
respect of every day on which he so sits or votes; shall be guilty of an offence
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 425

punishable for a term which shall not be less than seven years and a fine which shall
not be less than two hundred thousand rupees.
58. Qualifications of members of the Assembly. – (1) A person shall be qualified
to be elected as, and to be, a member of the Assembly if –
(a) he is a citizen;
(b) he is not less than twenty-five years of age;
(c) his name appears on the electoral roll of any constituency in Gilgit-
Baltistan; and
(d) he is not a dual national.
(2) A person shall be disqualified from being so elected if-
(a) he is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or
(b) he is an un-discharged insolvent unless a period of ten years has elapsed
since his being adjudged as insolvent; or
(c) he has been on conviction for any offence sentenced to transportation
for any term or imprisonment for a term of not less than two years
unless a period of five years has elapsed since his release; or
(d) he holds any office of profit in the Service of Gilgit-Baltistan or Azad
Jammu and Kashmir or Pakistan other than an office which is not a
whole time office remunerated either by salary or by fee other than an
office specified in the Second Schedule; or
(e) he has been in the Service or of any statutory body or anybody which is
owned or controlled by the Government of Pakistan or Gilgit-Baltistan
or Azad Jammu and Kashmir or in which such Government has a
controlling share or interest, unless a period of two years has elapsed
since he ceased to be in such service; or
(f ) he has been dismissed for misconduct from the Service unless a period
of five years has elapsed since his dismissal; or
(g) he is otherwise disqualified from being a member of the Assembly by
this Order or by any other law.
59. Seat in Assembly becomes vacant under certain circumstances. – (1) The
seat of a member of the Assembly shall become vacant if –
(a) he/she resigns his seat by notice in writing under his hand addressed to
the Speaker, in his absence, to the Secretary of the Assembly; or
(b) he/she is absent from the Assembly without the leave of the Assembly
for thirty consecutive sitting days of the Assembly; or
(c) he/she fails to make the oath referred to in Article 57 within a period of
ninety days after the date of his election unless the Speaker for good
cause shown extends the period; or
(d) he/she is elected as member of the Council; or
(e) he/she ceases to be qualified for being a member under any provision of
426 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

this Order or any other law.

(2) If the member of the Assembly is elected to more than one seat, he shall
within a period of thirty days after the declaration of result for the last such seat,
resign all but one of his seats, and if he does not so resign, all the seats to which he
has been elected shall become vacant at the expiration of the said period of thirty
days except the seat to which he has been last elected or, if he has been elected to
more than one seat on the same day, the seat for election to which his nomination
was filed last.
(3) If any question arises whether a member of the Assembly has, after his
election become disqualified from being a member of the Assembly, the Speaker
shall refer the question to the Chief Election Commissioner and, if the Chief Election
Commissioner is of the opinion that the member has become disqualified the
member shall cease to be a member and his seat shall become vacant.
(4) When except by dissolution of the Assembly, a seat in the Assembly has
become vacant not later than one hundred and twenty days before the term of the
Assembly is due to expire, an election to fill the seat shall be held within sixty days
from the occurrence of the vacancy.
60. Right of Governor to address the Assembly. – (1) The Governor may address
the Assembly and may for that purpose require the attendance of the members.
(2) The Advocate General shall have the right to speak and otherwise take
part in the proceedings of the Assembly or any Committee thereof of which he may
be named a member, but shall not by virtue of this Article be entitled to vote.
61. Meetings of the Assembly. – (1) The Assembly shall assemble at such times
and at such places as the Governor may appoint, and the Governor may prorogue
a session of the Assembly except when the Assembly has been summoned by the
Speaker.
(2) Any meeting of the Assembly may be adjourned by the Speaker or other
person presiding thereat.
(3) There shall be at least three sessions of the Assembly every year, and not
more than one hundred and twenty days shall intervene between the last sitting of
the Assembly in one session and the date appointed for its first sitting in the next
session.
Provided that the Assembly shall meet for not less than one hundred and thirty
working days in each parliamentary year.
(4) On a requisition signed by not less than one-third of the total membership
of the Assembly, the Speaker shall summon the Assembly to meet, at such time and
place as he thinks fit, within fourteen days of the receipt of the requisition, and
when the Speaker has summoned the Assembly, only he may prorogue it.
62. Dissolution of the Assembly. – (1) The Governor shall dissolve the Assembly
if so advised by the Chief Minister, and the Assembly shall, unless sooner dissolved,
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 427

stands dissolved at the expiration of the forty-eight hours after the Chief Minister
has so advised.
Explanation. – Reference in this Article to Chief Minister shall not be construed to
include reference to a Chief Minister against whom a resolution for a vote of no-
confidence has been moved in the Assembly but has not been voted upon or against
whom such a resolution has been passed or who is continuing in office after his
resignation or after the dissolution of the Assembly.
(2) When the Assembly is dissolved a general election to the Assembly shall be
held within a period of ninety days after the dissolution, and the result of the
election shall be declared not later than fourteen days after the conclusion of the
polls.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in the Order, if at any time it is not possible for
any reason to hold general election to the Assembly, the Chairman of the Council
may postpone the election for a period not exceeding ninety days at a time.
63. Speaker of the Assembly. – (1) After a general election, the Assembly shall, at
its first meeting and to the exclusion of any other business, elect from amongst its
members a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker of the Assembly.
Provided that the period intervening between the declaration of the official
result of the election to the Assembly and the date for assumption of office of
members shall not exceed thirty days.
(2) Before entering upon office, a member of the Assembly elected as Speaker
or Deputy Speaker shall make before the Assembly an oath in the form set out in
the First Schedule.
(3) All the proceedings of the Assembly shall be conducted in accordance with
rules of procedure made by the Assembly and approved by the Governor.
(4) The Speaker shall preside the meetings of the Assembly except when a
resolution for his removal from the office is being considered and, when the office
of the Speaker is vacant, or the Speaker is absent, or is unable to perform his functions
due to any cause, the Deputy Speaker shall act as Speaker and if at that time, the
Deputy Speaker is also absent or is unable to act as Speaker due to any cause, such
member of the Assembly present as may be determined by the Rules of Procedure
of the Assembly shall preside at the meeting of the Assembly.
(5) Soon after as the office of Speaker or Deputy Speaker becomes vacant, the
Assembly shall elect one of its members to fill the office.
(6) The Speaker may resign from his office by writing under his hand addressed
to the Governor.
(7) The Deputy Speaker may resign his office by writing under his hand
addressed to the Speaker.
(8) The office of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker shall become vacant if-
(a) except as provided in clause (9) he ceases to be a member of the Assembly;
or
428 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(b) he is removed from office by a resolution of the Assembly, of which not

less than seven days’ notice by not less than one- fourth of the total
membership of the Assembly has been given and which is passed by a
majority of total membership of the Assembly.
(9) When the Assembly is dissolved, the Speaker shall continue in his office
till the person elected to fill the office by the next Assembly enters upon his office.
64. Voting in Assembly and quorum. – (1) Subject to this Order, –
(a) a decision in the Assembly shall be taken by a majority of the votes of
the members present and voting but the Speaker or the person presiding
in his absence shall not vote except when there is an equality of votes in
which case he shall exercise his casting vote;
(b) the Assembly may act notwithstanding any vacancy in its membership;
and
(c) any proceedings in the Assembly shall not be invalid on the ground
that some person who was not entitled to do so sit, voted or otherwise
took part in the proceedings.
(2) If at any time during the meeting of the Assembly the attention of the
person presiding at the meeting is drawn to the fact that number of the members is
less than one-third of the total membership of the Assembly, it shall be the duty of
the person presiding either to adjourn the meeting or to suspend the meeting till
such number of members are present.
65. Restriction on discussion in Assembly, etc. – No discussion shall take place in
the Assembly or the Council or the joint sitting with respect to matters relating to
Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Security and Fiscal Plans of Government of
Pakistan and the conduct of the any Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court or the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court in the discharge of his duties.
66. Finance Committee. – (1) The expenditure of the Assembly within authorized
appropriation shall be controlled by the Assembly acting on the advice of the Finance
Committee.
(2) The Finance Committee shall consist of the Speaker, the Finance Minister
and such other members as may be elected thereto by the Assembly.
67. Secretariat of the Assembly. – (1) The Assembly shall have a separate Secretariat.
(2) The Assembly may by law regulate the recruitment and conditions of service
of persons appointed to the Secretariat Staff of the Assembly.
(3) Until provision is made by the Assembly under clause (2) the persons
appointed to the Secretariat Staff of the Assembly shall continue to be governed by
conditions of service for the time being applicable to them.
PART VIII: DISTRIBUTION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS
68. Legislative Powers. – (1) Subject to the succeeding provisions of this Article,
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 429

both the Council and the Assembly shall have the power to make laws, –
(a) for the territories of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(b) for all citizens of Gilgit-Baltistan; and
(c) for the officers of the Council or as the case may be, the Government,
wherever they may be.
(2) Subject to clause (3) –
(a) the Council shall have exclusive power to make laws with respect to
any matter in the Legislative List set out in the Third Schedule,
hereinafter referred to as the Legislative List; and
(b) subject to clause 2 (a), the assembly shall and the Council shall not,
have power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in
the Legislative List.
(c) The Council shall have the powers to adopt any amendment in the
existing Laws or any new Law in force in Pakistan.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Order, the Government of
Pakistan shall have exclusive powers and the Council and the Assembly shall not
have powers to make any law in respect of the following matters. –
(a) the defence and external security of Gilgit-Baltistan;
(b) the current coin of the issue of any bills, notes or other paper currency;
or
(c) the external affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan including foreign trade and foreign
aid; or
(d) such other matters as the President may specify by Order.
69. Tax to be levied by laws only. – No tax shall be levied for the purposes of the
territories of Gilgit-Baltistan except by or under the authority of an Act of the
Council or the Assembly and all taxes and levies competently imposed under an
Act of the Assembly or the Council or under any law made by the Government of
Pakistan shall remain in force.
PART IX: ISLAMIC PROVISIONS
70. No laws against Islamic Injunctions, etc. – No law shall be repugnant to the
teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah and
all existing laws shall be brought in conformity with the Holy Quran and Sunnah.
71. Reference to Council of Islamic Ideology. – (1) If one-third of the total number
of the members of the Assembly or, as the case may, the Council so requires, the
Assembly or the Council shall refer to the Council of Islamic Ideology constituted
under the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter referred to as
the Islamic Council) for advice on any question as to whether a proposed law is or
is not repugnant to the injunctions of Islam.
(2) When a question is referred by the Assembly or the Council, as the case
430 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

may be, the Council of Islamic Ideology shall, within fifteen days thereof, inform
the Assembly or the Council, as the case may be, of the period within which the
Council of Islamic Ideology expects to be able to furnish that advice.
(3) Where the Assembly or, as the case may be, the Council considers that in
the public interest, the making of the proposed law in relation to which the question
arose should not be postponed until the advice of the Council of Islamic Ideology
is furnished, the law may be made before the advice is furnished.
Provided that, where a law is referred for advice to the Council of Islamic
Ideology and the Council advises that the law is repugnant to the injunctions of
Islam, the Assembly or, as the case may be, the Council shall reconsider the law so
made.
72. General provisions regarding Council, etc. – (1) The validity of any proceedings
in the Council or the Assembly shall not be questioned in any Court.
(2) An officer or member or an authority in whom powers are vested for
regulation of proceedings, conduct of business, maintain order in the Council or
the Assembly shall not, in relation to exercise by him of any of those powers, be
subject to the jurisdiction of any Court.
(3) A member of, or a person entitled to speak in, the Council or the Assembly,
shall not be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of anything said by
him or any vote given by him in the Council or the Assembly or in any Committee
thereof.
(4) A person shall not be liable to any proceedings in any Court in respect of
publication by or under the authority of the Council or the Assembly, of any report,
paper, vote or proceedings.
(5) No process issued by a Court or other authority shall except with the leave
of the Chairman of the Council or the Speaker be served or executed within the
precincts of the place where a meeting of the Council or, as the case may be, the
Assembly is being held.
(6) Subject to this Article, the privileges of the Council, the Assembly, the
Committees and members of the Council, or the Assembly and of the persons
entitled to speak in the Council, or the Assembly, may be determined by law.
73. Authentication of Bills Passed by the Council. – A Bill passed by the Council
shall not require the assent of the Governor and shall, upon its authentication by
the Chairman of the Council, become law and be called an Act of the Council.
74. Governor’s assent to Bills. – (1) Subject to this Order, when a Bill has been
passed by the Assembly it shall be presented to the Governor for assent.
(2) When a Bill is presented to the Governor for assent, the Governor shall,
within thirty days, –
(a) assent to the Bill; or
(b) in the case of a Bill other than a Money Bill, return the Bill to the
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 431

Assembly with a message requesting that the Bill, or any specified

provision thereof, be reconsidered and that any amendment specified
in the message be considered.
(3) When the Governor has returned a Bill to the Assembly, it shall be
reconsidered by the Assembly and, if it is again passed, with or without amendment,
by the Assembly, by the votes of the majority of the members of the Assembly
present and voting, and in accordance with the provision of this Order and in not
in any manner prejudicial to the security, integrity, solidarity and strategic interest
of Pakistan, it shall be again presented to the Governor and Governor shall not
withhold assent thereform.
(4) When the Governor has assented to a Bill, it shall become law and be
called an Act of Assembly.
PART X: FINANCIAL PROCEDURE
75. Council Consolidated Fund. – (1) All revenues received by the Council, all
loans raised by the Council and all moneys received by it in payment of any loan
shall form a part of Consolidated Fund, to be known as the Council Consolidated
Fund.
(2) All other moneys –
(a) received by or on behalf of the Council; or
(b) received by or deposited with the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court or any other Court established under the authority of this Order
shall be credited to the Public Account of the Council.
(3) The Custody of the Council Consolidated Fund, the payment of money
into that Fund, the withdrawal of money there from, the custody of other moneys
received by or on behalf of the Council, their payment into, and withdrawal from
the Public Account of the Council, and all matters connected with or ancillary to
the matters aforesaid, shall be regulated by the Act of the Council or, until provision
in that behalf is so made, by rules made by the Chairman of the Council.
(4) The Council shall, in respect of every financial year, cause to be prepared,
and approve, a statement of estimated receipts and expenditure of the Council for
that year.
Provided that the Government of Pakistan shall provide grant in aid to the
Council to meet its revenue deficit.
(5) The Chairman of the Council shall authenticate by his signature the
statement approved by the Council under clause (4), and no expenditure from the
Council Consolidated Fund shall be deemed to be duly authorized unless it is
specified in the statement so authenticated.
(6) If in respect of any financial year it is found:
(a) that the amount authorized to be expended for a particular service for
the current financial year is insufficient, or that a need has arisen for
432 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

expenditure upon some new service not included in the statement

referred to in clause (4) for that year; or
(b) that any money has been spend on any service during a financial year
in excess of the amount granted for that year, the Chairman of the
Council shall have the power to authorize expenditure from the Council
Consolidated Fund and shall cause to be laid before the Council a
supplementary statement or, as the case may be, an excess statement,
setting out the amount of that expenditure, and the provision of clause
(3) and (4) shall apply to these statements as they apply to the statement
referred to in clause (3).
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this
Article, the Council shall have power to make any grant in advance in respect of the
estimated expenditure for a part of any financial year, not exceeding four months,
pending completion of the procedure prescribed in clause (3) and (4).
76. Gilgit-Baltistan Consolidated Fund. – (1) All revenues received by the
Government, all loans raised by the Government with the approval of Government
of Pakistan and all moneys received by it in payment of any loan shall form a part
of Consolidated Fund, to be known as the Gilgit-Baltistan Consolidated Fund.
(2) All other moneys –
(a) received by or on behalf of the Government; or
(b) received by or deposited with any other Court established under the
authority of the Government, shall be credited to the Public Account
of the Government.
(3) The custody of the Gilgit-Baltistan Consolidated Fund, the payment of
money into that Fund, the withdrawal of money therefrom, the custody of other
moneys received by or on behalf of the Government, their payment into, and
withdrawal from the Public Account of the Government, and all matters connected
with or ancillary to the matters aforesaid, shall be regulated by the Act of the Assembly
or, until provision in that behalf is so made, by rules made by the Governor.
77. Budget. – (1) The Government shall, in respect of every financial year, cause
to be laid before the Assembly a statement of estimated receipts and expenditure
for that year, to be called the Annual Budget.
(2) The Annual Budget shall be submitted to the Assembly in the form of
demands for grant and the Assembly shall have power to assent to, or to refuse to
assent to any demand, or to assent to any demand subject to a reduction of the
amount specified therein.
(3) No demand for a grant shall be made except on the recommendation of
the Government.
(4) The Annual Budget as passed by the Assembly shall be placed before the
Governor who shall authenticate it by his signature.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 433

(5) If in respect of any financial year it is found_

(a) that the amount authorized to be expended for a particular service for
the current financial year is insufficient, or that a need has arisen for
expenditure upon some new service not included in the Annual Budget
for that year; or
(b) that any money has been spend on any service during a financial year
in excess of the amount granted for that year, the Government shall
have the power to authorize expenditure from the Gilgit-Baltistan
Consolidated Fund and shall cause to be laid before the Assembly a
Budget or, as the case may be, an excess Budget, setting out the amount
of that expenditure, and the provisions of this Article shall apply to
those Budgets as they apply to the Annual Budget.
(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this
Article, the Assembly shall have power to make any grant in advance in respect of
the estimated expenditure for a part of any financial year, not exceeding four months,
pending completion of the procedure prescribed in clause (2) for the voting of such
grant and the authentication of the Budget as passed by the Assembly in accordance
with the provisions of clause (4) in relation to the expenditure.
78. Special provisions regarding Budget, etc. – (1) Where the Annual Budget for
any financial year cannot be passed by the Assembly by reason of its having been
dissolved, the Chief Minister shall cause to be prepared an Annual Budget for that
year and, by his signature, authenticate the Budget.
(2) The Annual Budget for any financial year authenticated by the Chief
Minister under clause (1) shall, for the purpose of this Order, be deemed to have
been passed by the Assembly.
79. Restriction on expenditure. – No expenditure shall be incurred by the
Government except authorized by the Annual or Supplementary Budget as passed
or deemed to have been passed by the Assembly.
PART XI: ORDINANCE
80. Power to make Ordinance. – (1) The Governor may, except when the Assembly
is in session, if satisfied that circumstances exist which render it necessary to take
immediate action, make and promulgate an Ordinance as the circumstances may
require.
(2) An Ordinance promulgated under this Article shall have the same force
and effect as an Act of the Assembly and shall be subject to like restrictions as the
power of the Assembly to make law, but every such Ordinance;
(a) shall be laid before the Assembly and shall stand repealed at the
expiration of four months from its promulgation or, if before the
expiration of that period a resolution disapproving it is passed by the
434 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Assembly, upon the passing of that resolution; and

(b) may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor.
(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of clause (2) an Ordinance laid before
the Assembly or the Council shall be deemed to be a Bill introduced in the Assembly
or the Council, as the case may be.
(4) The Governor shall likewise, except when the Council is in session, if so
advised by the Chairman of the Council, make, promulgate and withdraw an
Ordinance as the circumstances may require, and the provisions of clause (2) and
clause (3) shall apply to an Ordinance so made as if references therein to ‘Act of the
Assembly and, Assembly were references respectively to’ Act of the Council and
Council.
PART XII: THE JUDICATURE
81. Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Appellate Court and Chief Court,
Gilgit-Baltistan. – (1) There shall be a Judicial Commission of Gilgit-Baltistan,
hereinafter in this Article referred to as the Commission, for appointment of Judges
of the Supreme Appellate Court and Chief Court as hereinafter provided.
(2) For appointment of Judges of the Supreme Appellate Court, the
Commission shall consist of –
i. Chief Judge, Supreme Appellate Court; Chairman
ii. Secretary Kashmir Affairs & Gilgit-Baltistan Member
iii. One most senior Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court; Member
iv. One former Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan to be
nominated by the Chief Justice of Pakistan for a terms of
two years Member
v. Minister for Law, Govt. of Gilgit-Baltistan; Member
vi. Chief Secretary, Gilgit-Baltistan; and Member
vii. A Senior Advocate of the Supreme Appellate Court of
Gilgit-Baltistan nominated by the Bar Council for a term
of two years. Member
viii. Joint Secretary, Gilgit-Baltistan Council Secretary
(3) On recommendation of the Commission, the Gilgit-Baltistan Council shall
move a summary to the Chairman Gilgit-Baltistan Council for approval of the
appointment of Judge, Supreme Appellate Court;
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), clause (2) or clause (3),
the Chief Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court shall be appointed by the above
Commission. However, the Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan shall
replace the Chairmanship of Commission.
(5) The Commission may make rules regulating its procedure.
(6) For appointment of Judges of the Chief Court, Gilgit-Baltistan the
Commission shall in clause (2) shall also include the following, namely:
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 435

i. Chief Judge, Chief Court; Member

ii. One most senior Judge of the Chief Court; Member
iii. iii. A Senior Advocate of the Chief Court of Gilgit-Baltistan
nominated by the concerned Bar Council for a term of
two years Member
Provided that for appointment of the Chief Judge of the Chief Court, the most
Senior Judge mentioned in paragraph (ii) shall not be member of the commission.
82. Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court. – (1) There shall be a Gilgit-
Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court, referred to as the Supreme Appellate Court to
be the highest Court of Appeal.
(2) Subject to the provisions of this Order, the Supreme Appellate Court shall
have such jurisdiction as is or may be conferred on it by this Order or by under any
law.
(3) The Supreme Appellate Court shall consist of a Chief Judge to be known
as Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan and two other Judges:
Provided that the Government of Pakistan may from time to time increase the
number of judges.
(4) The person holding office as Chief Judge or other Judge of the Supreme
Appellate Court immediately before the commencement of this Order shall be
deemed to be the Chief Judge or other Judge as the case may be appointed under
this Order.
(5) A person shall not be appointed as the Chief Judge or Judge of the Supreme
Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan unless he –
(a) has been, or is qualified to be, a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan;
or
(b) has for a period of, or for periods aggregating, not less than five years
been a Judge of a Chief Court; or
(c) for a period of or for periods aggregating, not less than fifteen years has
been an advocate of a High Court.
Explanation. – In this sub-clause, the expression ‘High Court’ includes, –
(a) the Chief Court of Gilgit-Baltistan, or an equivalent Court that existed
in Gilgit-Baltistan before this order; and
(b) a High Court in Pakistan including a High Court that existed in Pakistan
at any time before this order.
(6) Before entering upon office, the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan shall make
before the Governor and any other Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-
Baltistan shall make before the Chief Judge of Supreme Appellate Court, oath in
the form set out in the First Schedule.
(7) The Chief Judge and judges of the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-
Baltistan shall be appointed by the Chairman on recommendation of the
436 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Commission and shall hold office until he/she attains the age of 65 years, or unless
he/she sooner resigns or is removed from office in accordance with law:
Provided that if the Chief Judge or a Judge is a person who has been a Judge of
the Supreme Court of Pakistan, he/she shall hold office until he/she attains the age
of 70 years, or unless he/she sooner resigns or is removed from office in accordance
with law.
(8) At any time when the office of Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan is vacant, or
the Chief Judge, is absent or unable to perform the functions of his office due to
any other cause, the Chairman shall appoint the senior most Judge of the Supreme
Appellate Court to act as Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(9) The remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of the Chief
Judge and of a Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court shall be such
as are admissible to the Chief Justice of Pakistan and Judges of the Supreme Court
of Pakistan.
Provided that Council will provide funds to Supreme Appellate Court Gilgit-
Baltistan.
83. Original Jurisdiction. – (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Article-94,
the Supreme Appellate Court, on an application of any aggrieved party, shall if it
considers that a question of general public importance with reference to the
enforcement of any of the fundamental right conferred by Part II of this Order is
involved, have the power to make declaratory order of the nature mentioned in the
said Article.
(2) An application made under clause (1) shall be heard by a Bench comprising
not less than two Judges to be constituted by the Chief Judge.
84. Appellate Jurisdiction. – (1) Subject to the succeeding provision of this Article,
the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan shall have jurisdiction to hear and
determine appeals from judgments, decrees, final orders or sentences of the Chief
Court of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(2) An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Appellate Court of the Gilgit-Baltistan
from any judgment, decree, final order or sentence of the Chief Court of Gilgit-
Baltistan, –
(a) if the Chief Court has on appeal reversed an order of acquittal of an
accused person and sentenced to death or to imprisonment for life; or,
on revision, has enhanced a sentence to a sentence as aforesaid; or.
(b) if the Chief Court has withdrawn for trial before itself any case from
any court subordinate to it and has in such trial convicted the accused
person and sentenced him as aforesaid; or
(c) if the Chief Court has imposed any punishment on any person for
contempt of the Chief Court; or
(d) if the amount or value of the subject matter of the dispute in the court
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 437

of first instance was, and also in dispute in appeal is, not less than fifty
thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf
by Act of the Council and judgment, decree or final order appealed
from has varied or set aside the judgment, decree or final order of the
court immediately below; or
(e) if the judgment, decree or final order involved directly or indirectly
some claim or question respecting property or the like amount or value
and the judgment, decree or final order appealed from has varied or set
aside the judgment, decree or final order of the court immediately below;
or
(f ) if the Chief Court certifies that the case involves a substantial question
of law as to the interpretation of this Order.
(3) An appeal to the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court of from a
judgment, decree, order or sentence of the Chief Court in a case to which clause
(11) does not apply shall lie only if the Supreme Appellate Court grants leave to
appeal.
(4) (a) an appeal to Gilgit-Baltistan the Supreme Appellate Court shall be
heard by a Bench consisting of not less than two judges to be constituted or
reconstituted by the Chief Judge; (b) if the Judges hearing a petition or an appeal
are divided in opinion, the opinion of majority shall prevail; (c) if there is no such
majority as aforesaid the petition or appeal, as the case may be, shall be placed for
hearing and disposal before another Judge to be nominated by the ChiefJudge:
Provided that in case of difference of opinion as aforesaid, the decision of the
Supreme Appellate Court shall be expressed in term of opinion of the senior of the
two Judges.
(5) The person holding office as Chief Judge of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme
Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan immediately before the commencement of this
Order shall as from such commencement hold office as Chief Judge of Supreme
Appellate Court under this Order on terms and conditions prescribed in this Order
provided these are not inferior to the terms and conditions applicable to him
immediately before such commencement.
(6) All legal proceedings pending in the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court, immediately before the commencement of this Order, shall on such
commencement, stand transferred to, and be deemed to be pending before the
Supreme Appellate Court for determination and any judgment or order of the
Supreme Appellate Court delivered or made before such commencement shall have
the same force and effect as if it had been delivered or made by the Supreme Appellate
Court.
85. Issue and execution of processes of Supreme Appellate Court. – (1) The
Supreme Appellate Court shall have powers to issue such directions, orders or decrees
438 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before
it including an order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person or
the discovery or production of any document.
(2) Any such direction, order or decree shall be enforceable throughout Gilgit-
Baltistan as if it has been issued by the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court.
(3) All executive and judicial authorities throughout Gilgit-Baltistan shall act
in aid of the Supreme Appellate Court.
(4) Subject to this Order and Law, the Supreme Appellate Court may, in
consultation with the Council, make rules regulating the practice and procedure of
the Court:
Provided that till the new rules are framed, the rules framed by the Supreme
Appellate Court shall, so far as they are not inconsistent with this Order and any
other law, deemed to have been made by the Supreme Appellate Court until altered
or amended and references to the Supreme Appellate Court in these rules shall be
construed to be referred to the Supreme Appellate Court.
86. Decisions of Supreme Appellate Court binding on other Courts. – Any
decision of the Supreme Appellate Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question
of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all other
Courts in the Gilgit-Baltistan.
87. Seat of the Supreme Appellate Court. – (1) The Seat of the Supreme Appellate
Court shall be at Gilgit.
(2) The Supreme Appellate Court may sit at such other place or places as the
Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan, with the approval of the Governor, may appoint.
88. Review of judgment or order by the Supreme Appellate Court. – The Supreme
Appellate Court shall have powers, subject to the provisions of an Act of the Assembly
or the Council and of any rules made by the Supreme Appellate Court, to review
any judgment pronounced or any order made by it.
89. Supreme Judicial Council. – (1) There shall be a Supreme Judicial Council of
Gilgit-Baltistan.
(2) The Supreme Judicial Council shall consist of, –
(a) the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan who shall be its Chairman.
(b) the Senior Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court; and
(c) the Chief Judge of the Chief Court .
(3) A Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court or of the Chief Court shall not be
removed from office except as provided by this Article.
Explanation: The expression “Judge” includes the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan
and the Chief Judge of Chief Court of Gilgit-Baltistan.
(4) If on information received from the Supreme Judicial Council or from
any other source, the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council or the Governor is
of the opinion that a Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court or of the Chief Court,_
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 439

(a) may be incapable of properly performing the duties of his office by

reason of physical or mental incapacity; or
(b) may have been guilty of misconduct, the Chairman or the Governor,
as the case may be, shall direct the Supreme Judicial Council to inquire
into the matter.
(5) If, upon any matter inquired into by the Supreme Judicial Council, there
is a difference of opinion amongst its members, the opinion of the majority shall
prevail, and the report of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be expressed in terms
of the view of the majority.
(6) If, after inquiring into the matter, the Supreme Judicial Council reports to
the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council that it is of the opinion.
(a) that the Judge is incapable of performing the duties of his office or has
been guilty of misconduct; and
(b) that he should be removed from office, the Chairman shall advise the
Governor to remove the Judge from his office and the Governor shall
pass orders accordingly.
(7) The Supreme Judicial Council shall issue a Code of conduct to be observed
by Judges of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court, and of the Gilgit-Baltistan
Chief Court.
(8) If at any time the Supreme Judicial Council is inquiring the conduct of a
Judge who is a member of the Supreme Judicial Council, or a member of the
Supreme Judicial Council is absent or is unable to act due to illness or any other
cause, than:
(a) If such member is the Chief Judge or the Judge of the Supreme Appellate
Court the Judge of the Supreme Appellate Court who is next in seniority;
(b) If such member is the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan Court, the most
senior most of the other Judges of the Chief Court, shall, act as a member
of the Supreme Judicial Council in his place.
(9) If, upon any matter inquired into by the Supreme Judicial Council, there
is a difference of opinion amongst its member, the opinion of the Supreme Judicial
Council shall be expressed in terms of the view of the majority.
90. Power of Supreme Judicial Council to enforce attendance of persons, etc. –
(1) for the purpose of inquiring into any matter, the Supreme Judicial Council
shall have the same powers as has the Supreme Appellate Court, to issue directions
or order for securing the attendance of any person or the discovery or the production
of any document and any such direction or order shall be enforceable as if it has
been issued by the Supreme Appellate Court.
(2) The provisions of Article 81, shall, mutatis mutandis apply to the Supreme
Judicial Council as they apply to the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court and
the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court.
440 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

91. Bar of Jurisdiction. – The proceedings before the Supreme Judicial Council,
and the removal of a Judge under Article 87, shall not be called in question in any
Court.
92. Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court. – (1) There shall be a Gilgit-Baltistan Chief
Court, hereinafter called the Chief Court, which shall consist of a Chief Judge and
six other judges, of whom 60% will be appointed from lawyers community and
40% from subordinate judiciary:
Provided that the Government of Pakistan may from time to time increase the
number of judges.
(2) The function of the Chief Court may be performed by a Single Bench, a
Division Bench or a Full Bench:, but the Chief Judge may recall a case pending
before a Bench and make it over to another Bench or constitute a larger Bench for
the purpose.
(3) In case of difference of opinion in a Full Bench, the opinion of the majority
shall prevail;
(4) In case of difference of opinion in a Division Bench, the matter shall be
referred to a third judge and the decision of the Chief Court shall be expressed in
terms of judgment of the majority.
(5) The person holding office as Chief Judge or other Judge of the Chief Court
Immediately before the commencement of this Order shall be deemed to be the
Chief Judge or other Judge as the case may be appointed under this Order.
(6) A person shall not be appointed as a Judge of the Chief Court unless he is
45 years of age and:
(a) he has for a period, or for periods aggregating, not less than ten years,
been an Advocate of the Chief Court or a High Court in Pakistan.
Provided that the expression “High Court” herein shall include a High
Court or an equivalent Court; or
(b) he has for a period of not less than ten years held a judicial office out of
which not less than three years shall have been as District and Sessions
Judge.
(7) Before he enters upon his office, the Chief Judge of the Chief Court shall
make before the Governor, and judge of the Chief Court shall make before the
Chief Judge, an oath in the form set out in the First Schedule.
(8) The Chief Judge or a Judge of the Chief Court shall hold office until he
attains the age of sixty two years, unless he sooner resigns or is removed from office
in accordance with law.
(9) If at any time any Judge of the Chief Court is absent or is unable to perform
his functions due to illness or some other cause, the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan
Council may appoint a person qualified for appointment as a Judge of the Chief
Court to be an Additional Judge for the period for which the Judge is absent or
unable to perform his functions.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 441

(10) A Judge of the Chief Court shall not, –

(a) hold any other office of profit in the service of the Gilgit-Baltistan if
his remuneration is thereby increased; or
(b) occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the
rendering of services, but this clause shall not be construed as preventing
a Judge from holding or managing private property.
(11) A person who has held office as Judge of the Chief Court shall not hold
any office of profit in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan not being a Judicial or quasi-
Judicial office or the office of Chief Election Commissioner or of Chairman or
member of the Public Service Commission, before the expiration of two years after
he ceased to hold that office.
(12) The remuneration and other terms and conditions of service of the Chief
Judge and Judges of Chief Court shall be such as admissible the Chief Justice and
the Judges of the High Courts of Pakistan.
93. Acting Chief Judge. – At any time when –
(a) the Office of Chief Judge of Chief Court is vacant;
(b) the Chief Judge of Chief Court is absent or is unable to perform the
functions of his office due to any other cause, the Chairman shall appoint the
most senior Judge of the Chief Court to act as Chief Judge.
94. Jurisdiction of Chief Court. – (1) The Chief Court shall have such jurisdiction
as is conferred on it by this Order or by any other law.
(2) Subject to this Order, the Chief Court may if it is satisfied that no other
adequate remedy is provided by law, –
(a) the Government, exercising any power or performing any function in,
or in relation to, Gilgit-Baltistan as may be appropriate for the
enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by this Order.
on the application of any aggrieved party, make an order,—
(i) directing a person performing functions in connection with the
affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan or local authority to refrain from doing
that which he is not permitted by law to do, or to do that which he
is required by law to do; or
(ii) declaring that any act done or proceeding taken by a person
performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Gilgit-
Baltistan or a local authority has been done or taken without lawful
authority, and is of no legal effect; or
(b) on the application of any person, make an order, –
(i) directing that a person in custody in Gilgit-Baltistan be brought
before the Chief Court so that the Court may satisfy itself that he is
not being held in custody without lawful authority or in an unlawful
manner; or
442 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(ii) requiring a person holding or purporting to hold a public office in

connection with the affairs of Gilgit-Baltistan to show under what
authority of law he claims to hold that office; or
(c) on the application of any aggrieved person, make an order giving such
directions to the person or authority, including the Council.
(3) An order shall not be made under clause (2) on application made by or in
relation to a person in the Armed Forces of Pakistan in respect of his terms and
conditions of service, in respect of any matter arising out of his service or in respect
of any action in relation to him as a member of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.
(4) Where, –
(a) an application is made to the Chief Court for an order under sub-
clause (a) or sub-clause (c) of clause (2); and
(b) the Court has reason to believe that the making of an interim order
would have the effect of prejudicing or interfering with the carrying
out of a public work or otherwise being harmful to the public interest,
the Court shall not make an interim order unless the Advocate-General
has been given notice of the application and the Court, after the
Advocate-General or any officer authorized by him in this behalf has
been given an opportunity of being heard, is satisfied that the making
of the interim order would not have the effect referred to in sub-clause
(b) of this clause.
(5) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires, the expression “person”
includes any body politic or corporate, any authority of or under control of the
Council or the Government and any court or tribunal other than the Gilgit-Baltistan
Supreme Appellate Court, the Chief court or a Court or tribunal establish under a
law relating to the Armed Forces of Pakistan.
95. Rules of procedure. – Subject to this Order and law the Chief Court may in
consultation with the Government, make rules regulating practice and procedure
of the Court or of any Court subordinate to it.
96. Decision of Chief Court binding on subordinate Courts. – Subject to Article
86, any decision of Chief Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law
or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all Courts subordinate
to it.
97. Seat of the Chief Court. – (1) The permanent seat of the Chief Court shall be
at Gilgit.
(2) The Chief Court may, from time to time, sit at such other place as the
Chief Judge of the Chief Court, with the approval of the Governor, may appoint.
98. Contempt of Court. – (1) In this Article the expression “Court” means the
Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court or the Chief Court.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 443

(2) A Court shall have power to punish any person who –

(a) abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any way
or disobeys any order of the Court;
(b) scandalizes the Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring
the Court or a judge of the Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt;
(c) does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter
pending before the Court; or
(d) does any other thing which, by law, constitutes contempt of the Court.
(3) The exercise of the power conferred on a Court by this Article may be
regulated by law and, subject to law, by rules made by the Court.
99. The Chief Court to superintend and control all courts subordinate to it, etc.
– (1) The Chief Court shall superintend and control all other courts that are
subordinate to it.
(2) A Court so established shall have such jurisdiction as conferred on it by
law.
(3) No Court shall have any jurisdiction which is not conferred on it by this
Order or by or under any other law.
100. Advisory jurisdiction. – (1) If, at any time, the Chairman of the Council or
the Governor desires to obtain the opinion of the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate
Court on any question of law which he considers of public importance, he may
refer the question to the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan for
consideration.
(2) The Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court shall consider a question so
referred and report its opinion on the question to the Chairman of the Council or
as the case may be, the Governor.
101. Administrative Courts and Tribunals. – (1) Notwithstanding anything herein
before contained, the Council in respect of matters to which its executive authority
extends, and the Assembly in respect of matters to which the executive authority of
the Government extends may by Act provide for the establishment of one or more
Administrative Courts or Tribunals to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of, -
(a) matters relating to the terms and conditions of persons who are or have
been in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan including disciplinary matters;
(b) matters relating to claims arising from tortuous acts of the Council or
the Government or any person in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan or of
any local or other authority empowered by law to levy any tax or cess
and any servant or such authority acting in the discharge of his duties
as such servant; or
(c) matters relating to acquisition, administration and disposal of any
property which is deemed to be enemy property under any law.
(2) Notwithstanding anything herein before contained, where any
444 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Administrative Court or Tribunal is established under clause (1), no other Court

shall grant an injunction, make any order or entertain any proceedings in respect of
any matter to which the jurisdiction of such Administrative Court or Tribunal
extends and all proceedings in respect of any such matter which may be pending
before such other court immediately before the establishment of the Administrative
Court or Tribunal shall abate on such establishment.
(3) An appeal to the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court from a
judgment, decree, order or sentence of an Administrative Court or Tribunal shall
lie only if the Supreme Appellate Court of Gilgit-Baltistan being satisfied, that the
case involves a substantial question of law of public importance, grants leave to
appeal.
Provided that Council will provide funds to Administrative Courts and Tribunals
of Gilgit-Baltistan fall under Council legislative list.
102. Employees of Court. – The Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court and
the Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court, with the approval of the Chairman and Governor
respectively, may make rules providing for the appointment of employees of the
Court and for their terms and conditions of employment.
103. Supreme Court of Pakistan. – (1) The Supreme Court shall, to the exclusion
of every other court including the Supreme Appellate Court and the Chief Court,
have original jurisdiction in respect of:
(i) any dispute between the Government, the Federation or the
Government of a Province of Pakistan;
(ii) any challenge to, or dispute raising any issue regarding, the vires or
validity of this Order or any amendment hereto or modification herein,
including an Order repealing, replacing or substituting this Order, and
clause (2) of Article 126 hereof shall apply accordingly.
(2) Any aggrieved person may, subject to clause (3), appeal to the Supreme
Court against any judgment, order or decree of the Supreme Appellate Court or
the Chief Court made in any proceedings where the subject matter of the dispute
or the matter in issue is not exclusively in relation to or under this Order or any law
made hereunder or Gilgit-Baltistan.
(3) An appeal under clause (2) shall lie only if the Supreme Court grants leave
to appeal.
(4) A decision of the Supreme Court, whether made under any of the foregoing
clauses or otherwise, shall be as binding on all courts established by or under this
Order as it is in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution on all courts in Pakistan,
and Article 86 and Article 96 hereof shall apply accordingly.
PART XIII: SERVICES
104. Public Service Commission. – There shall be a Public Service Commission
for Gilgit-Baltistan which shall consist of such number of members, including a
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 445

Chairman to be appointed by the Chairman of the Council on the advice of

Governor, and perform such functions as may be prescribed on such terms and
conditions as may be determined by the Governor.
Provided that till the establishment of the Gilgit-Baltistan Public Service
Commission, the Federal Public Service Commission shall continue recruitment
functions on behalf of Gilgit-Baltistan Government.
105. Services. – (1) Subject to this Order, the appointment of persons to, and the
terms and conditions of service of persons in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan and
Council shall be regulated by law.
(2) Until an Act of the Council in respect of persons employed in connection
with the affairs of the Council, or an Act of the Assembly in respect of such persons
employed in connection with the affairs of the Government, makes provision for
the matters referred to in clause (1), all rules and orders in force immediately before
the commencement of this Order, shall continue to be in force and may be amended
from time to time by the Council or, as the case may be, the Government.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) or (2) the position or
vacancy sharing formula between the Government of Gilgit-Baltistan and the
Government of Pakistan, i.e. Gilgit-Baltistan Civil Service and Pakistan
Administrative Service (PAS), Police Service of Pakistan (PSP), or all Pakistan Service
(APS) shall be as specified in the Fourth Schedule.
(4) Gilgit-Baltistan shall be given representation in Federal Services in
accordance with provisions made for the purpose thereof for the provinces. Necessary,
civil service reforms, including up gradation of posts, commensurate with the
increased delegation of powers and in line with other provinces shall be carried out
in Gilgit-Baltistan.
PART XIV: ELECTIONS
106. Chief Election Commissioner. – (1) There shall be a Chief Election
Commissioner to be appointed by the Chairman of the Council on the advice of
Governor on such terms and conditions as may be prescribed.
(2) Before entering upon office, the Chief Election Commissioner shall make
before the Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan oath in the form set out in the First
Schedule.
PART XV: AUDITOR GENERAL
107. Auditor-General. – (1) There shall be an Auditor General of Gilgit-Baltistan
who shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Council.
Provided that till the appointment of Auditor-General of Gilgit-Baltistan, the
Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council may ask Auditor- General of Pakistan to
work as Auditor-General of Gilgit-Baltistan also.
(2) Before entering upon office, the Auditor General shall make before the
446 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Chief Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan oath in the form set out in the first Schedule
(3) The terms and conditions of service, including the terms of office, of the
Auditor-General shall be determined by Act of the Council and, until so determined,
by rules made by the Council.
(4) The Auditor-General shall, in relation to –
(a) the accounts of the Council and any authority or body established by
the Council; and
(b) the accounts of the Government and any authority or body established
by the Government, perform such functions and exercise such powers
as may be determined, by or under Act of the Council and, until so
determined, by rules made by the Council.
(5) The accounts of the Council and of the Government shall be kept in such
form and in accordance with such principles and methods as may be determined
by the Auditor-General with the approval of the Council.
(6) The reports of the Auditor-General relating to the accounts of the Council
shall be submitted to the Chairman of the Council; who shall cause them to be laid
before the Council; and the reports of the Auditor-General relating to the accounts
of the Government shall be submitted to the Governor who shall cause them to be
laid before the Assembly.
PART XVI: GENERAL
108. Continuance of existing laws. – Subject to the provisions of this Order, all
laws which immediately before the commencement of this Order, were in force in
Gilgit-Baltistan shall continue to be in force until altered, repealed or amended by
an Act, of the appropriate authority.
Explanation. – In this Article. –
(a) The expression ‘laws includes Ordinance, Orders, rules, bye- laws,
regulations and any notification and other legal instruments having
the force of law, and
(b) The expression ‘in force’ in relation to any law, means having effect as
law whether or not the law has been brought into operation.
109. General provision regarding Governor and Ministers. – (1) The Governor,
the Chief Minister, a Minister or an Advisor shall not, –
(a) hold any other office of profit in the service of Gilgit-Baltistan or any
other country; or
(b) occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for the
rendering of services; but this action shall not be construed as preventing
the Governor, the Chief Minister, a Minister or an Advisor from holding
or managing his private property.
(2) No criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against
the Governor or the Chairman of the Council while he is in office.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 447

(3) No civil proceedings in which relief is claimed against the Governor or the
Chairman of the Council shall be instituted while he is in office in respect of
anything done or not done, or purporting to have been done or not done, by him
in his personal capacity, whether before or after he enters upon his office unless at
least sixty days before the proceedings are instituted, notice in writing has been
delivered to him, or sent to him, stating the nature of the proceedings, the cause of
the action, the name, description and place of residence of the party by whom the
proceedings are to be instituted and the relief which he claims.
(4) Except in relation to proceedings referred to in clause (3) no process
whatsoever shall be issued from any court or tribunal against the Governor or the
Chairman of the Council, whether in a personal capacity or otherwise, while he is
in office.
(5) Subject to this Order, the Governor, the Chief Minister, the Chairman of
the Council, the Federal Minister who is a member of the Council, a Minister or
an Advisor shall not except in respect of anything done or not done by him in
contravention of law , be answerable to any court or Tribunal in the exercise of the
powers, or the performance of the duties, of his office or for any act done or
purporting to be done by him in the exercise of those powers or in the performance
of those duties:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall be construed as restricting the right
of any person to bring appropriate proceedings against the Council or as the case
may be, the Government.
110. Power to acquire property and to make contracts, etc. – (1) The executive
authority of the Government and of the Council shall extend, subject to any Act of
the appropriate authority to the grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any property
vested in, and to the purchase or acquisition of property on behalf of, the
Government or as the case may be, the Council, and to the making of contracts.
(2) All property acquired for the purpose of the Government or of the Council
shall vest in the Government or, as the case may be, in the Council.
(3) All contracts made in the exercise of the executive authority of the
Government or of the Council shall be expressed to be made in the name of the
Governor, or as the case may be, the Council and all such contracts and all assurances
of property made in the exercise of that authority shall be executed on behalf of the
Governor or the Council by such persons and in such manner as the Governor, or
as the case may be, the Council may direct or authorize.
(4) Neither the Governor, nor the Chairman of the Council, shall be personally
liable in respect of any contract or assurance made or executed in the exercise of the
executive authority of the Government or, as the case may be the Council, nor shall
any person making or executing any such contract or assurance on behalf of any of
them be personally liable in respect thereof.
448 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

(5) Transfer of land by the Government or the Council shall be regulated by

law.
PART XVII: EMERGENCY PROVISIONS
111. Power to issue proclamation. – (1) If the Chairman of the Gilgit-Baltistan
Council ,on receipt of a report from Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan or otherwise, is
satisfied that a grave emergency exists in which the security of Gilgit-Baltistan is
threatened by war or external aggression or by internal disturbances, in which the
Government of the Gilgit-Baltistan cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of this Order, Chairman of the Council shall issue Proclamation of
Emergency, hereinafter referred to as the Proclamation.
(2) Assume to himself, or direct the Governor of the Gilgit-Baltistan to assume
on behalf of the Chairman of the Council , all or any of the functions of the
Government of the Gilgit-Baltistan, and all or any of the powers vested in, or
exercisable by, anybody or authority in the Gilgit-Baltistan, other than the Assembly;
(3) A Proclamation shall be laid before a Joint Sitting of the Council and the
Assembly which shall be summoned by the Chairman of the Council on the advice
of Governor to meet within thirty days of the Proclamation being issued and-
(a) shall, cease to be in force at the expiration of two months unless before
the expiration of that period it has been approved by a resolution of the
Joint Sitting; and
(b) shall, subject to the provisions of sub-clause (a), cease to be in force
upon a resolution disapproving the resolution being passed by the votes
of the majority of the total membership of the Joint Sitting.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2), if the Assembly stands
dissolved at the time when the Proclamation is issued, the Proclamation shall
continue in force for a period of four months but, if a general election to the
Assembly is not held before the expiration of that period, it shall cease to be in
force at the expiration of that period unless it has earlier been approved by a resolution
of the Council.
(5) A Proclamation may be made before the actual occurrence of war or external
aggression if the Governor is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof.
112. Power to suspend fundamental rights. – (1) While a Proclamation is in
operation, the Governor may, by order, declare that right to move any Court for
the enforcement of such of the rights conferred by Part as may be specified in the
order, and all proceedings pending in any Court for the enforcement of the rights
so specified, shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation
is in force.
(2) Every order made under clause (1), shall, as soon as may be, laid before the
Assembly.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 449

113. Power to vary or rescind proclamation. – (1) A Proclamation issued under

Article 108 may be varied or revoked by a subsequent Proclamation.
(2) The validity of any Proclamation issued or order made under Article 108 or
Article 109 shall not be questioned in any Court.
114. Failure to comply with requirement as to time does not render an act
invalid. – When any act or thing is required by this Order to be done within a
particular period and it is not done within that period, the doing of the act or thing
shall not be invalid or otherwise ineffective by reason only that it was not done
within that period.
PART XVIII: MISCELLANEOUS
115. Oath of office. – (1) An oath required to be made by person under this
Order shall be made in a language that is understood by that person.
(2) Where, under this Order, an oath is required to be made before a specified
person and for any reason, it is impracticable for the oath to be made before that
person, it may be made before such other person as may be nominated by that
person.
(3) Where, under this Order, a person is required to make an oath before he
enters upon an office, he shall be deemed to have entered upon the office on the
day on which he makes the oath.
116. Chairman may make laws of indemnity, etc. – Nothing in the Order shall
prevent the Chairman from making any law indemnifying any person in the service
of Gilgit-Baltistan, or any other person, in respect of any act done in connection
with the maintenance or restoration of order in any area in Gilgit-Baltistan.
117. Protection to Chairman, Governor, Minister, etc. – (1) The Chairman, the
Governor, the Chief Minister, and Ministers shall not be answerable to any court
for the exercise of powers and performance of functions of their respective offices
or for any act done or purported to be done in the exercise of those powers and
performance of those functions:
Provided that nothing in this clause shall be construed as restricting the right
of any person to bring appropriate proceedings against the Government.
(2) No criminal proceedings whatsoever shall be instituted or continued against
the President, Chairman or Governor in any court during his term of office.
(3) No process for the arrest or imprisonment of the President, Chairman or a
Governor shall issue from any court during his term of office.
(4) No civil proceedings in which relief is claimed against the Chairman or
Governor shall be instituted during his term of office in respect of anything done
or not done by him in his personal capacity whether before or after he enters upon
his office unless, at least sixty days before the proceedings are instituted, notice in
writing has been delivered to him, or sent to him in the manner prescribed by law,
450 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

stating the nature of the proceedings, the cause of action, the name, description
and place of residence of the party by whom the proceedings are to be instituted
and the relief which the party claims.
118. Legal proceedings. – Any legal proceedings which, but for this Order,
could have been brought by or against the Government in respect of a matter
which, immediately before the commencing day, was the responsibility of the
Council and has, under the Order, become the responsibility of the Assembly, shall
be brought by or against the Government and if any such legal proceedings were
pending in any court immediately before the commencing day then, in those
proceedings, for the aforesaid Council the Government shall, as from that day, be
deemed to have been substituted.
119. Failure to comply with requirement as to time does not render an act invalid.
– When any act or thing is required by this Order to be done within a particular
period and it is not done within that period, the doing of the act or thing shall not
be invalid or otherwise ineffective by reason only that it was not done within that
period.
120. Official language. – (1) The official language of Gilgit-Baltistan is Urdu.
(2) Subject to clause (1), the English language may be used for official purposes
until arrangements are made for its replacement by Urdu.
(3) Without prejudice to the status of the National language, the Assembly
may by law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of any other
language in addition to the National language.
121. Private armies forbidden. – (1) No private organization capable of functioning
as a military organization shall be formed, and any such organization shall be illegal.
(2) The Chairman shall, by law, provide for the punishment of persons found
guilty of the offence under this Article and such law may also provide for
establishment of special courts for trial of such offence.
122. Local Government. – (1) The Government shall, by law, establish a local
government system and devolve political, administrative and financial responsibility
and authority to the elected representatives of the local governments.
(2) Elections to the local governments shall be held by the Election Commission.
123. Order not to prejudice stance. – The provision of this Order shall not derogate
form, or in any manner prejudice, the declared stand of the Government of Pakistan
regarding the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir in
accordance with the United Nations Resolutions.
124. Power to amend. – (1) The President on advice of the Federal Government
may, by notified Order, amend the provisions of this Order:
Provided that no amendment shall be made or take effect unless it has been
placed before the Supreme Court under application moved by the Federal
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 451

Government, which shall be treated as a petition under clause (3) of Article 184 of
the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has not disapproved of the amendment.
(2) For the purposes of this Article, any Order proposing or seeking to repeal
or replace this Order shall be deemed to be a measure to amend it.
125. Power to make rules. – The Governor or as the case may be, the Chairman of
the Council, may make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Order.
126. Order to override other laws, etc. – (1) The provision of this Order shall
have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of any law for the
time being in force except that in case of conflict between the laws of Pakistan and
the laws framed under this Order, the laws of Pakistan shall prevail.
(2) No Court, including the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court and the
Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court, shall call into question or permit to be called into
question, the validity of this Order or an Act to amend it.
127. Repeal and saving. – (1) The Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order, 2018,
hereinafter in this Article referred to as “the Repealed Order” together with the
Orders amending it, is hereby repealed.
(2) Any rules made under the Repealed Order is so far as they are not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Order shall continue to be in force unless altered amended
or repealed by the competent authority.
128. Effect of repeal. – Where a law is repealed, or is deemed to have been repealed,
by, under, or by virtue of this Order, the repeal shall not, except as otherwise provided
in this Order: –
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal
takes effect;
(b) affect the previous operation of the law or anything duly done or suffered
under the law;
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or
incurred under the law;
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect of any
offence committed against the law; or
(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any
such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or
punishment; and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy
may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty,
forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the law had not been
repealed.
***************
452 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

FIRST SCHEDULE
OATH OF OFFICE OF- GOVERNOR
[See Article 41(7)]
I, ……………………………. do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That, as Governor of Gilgit-Baltistan, I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Governor honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Governor.
So help me Allah.
Place Signature of Governor
Date
Signature of Chief Judge
Supreme Appellate Court, Gilgit-Baltistan

CHIEF MINISTER
[See Article 44(5)]
I, ……………………………. do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That, as Chief Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan, I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Chief Minister honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Chief Minister;
So help me Allah.
Place Signature of Chief Minister
Date
Signature of Governor
Gilgit-Baltistan

MINISTER
[See Article 46(2)]
I, ……………………………. do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That, as Minister of Gilgit-Baltistan, I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Minister honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Minister;
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 453

So help me Allah.
Place Signature of Minister
Date

Signature of Governor
Gilgit-Baltistan

SPEAKER OR DEPUTY SPEAKER OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

[See Article 63(2)]
I, ……………………………. having been elected as Speaker or Deputy Speaker
of Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly do hereby solemnly swear in the name of
Allah;
That I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Legislative
Assembly honestly and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of
the Assembly;
So help me Allah.
Place Signature of Speaker/Deputy Speaker
Date

Signature of Outgoing Squeaker /Sitting Speaker

Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly

MEMBER OF LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

[See Article 57(1)]
I, ……………………………. having been elected as Member of Gilgit-Baltistan
Legislative Assembly do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Member of the Legislative Assembly honestly
and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Member of the Legislative
Assembly;
454 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

So help me Allah.
Place Signature of Member
Date
Signature of Speaker
Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly

MEMBER OF GILGIT-BALTISTAN COUNCIL

[See Article 54(11)]
I, ……………………………. having been elected as Member of Gilgit-Baltistan
Council do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That I will remain loyal to Pakistan;
That I will perform my functions as Member of the Gilgit-Baltistan Council honestly
and faithfully; and
That I will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any
official secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Member of the Council;
So help me Allah.
Place Signature of Member
Date
Signature of Chairman/Vice Chairman
Gilgit-Baltistan Council

CHIEF JUDGE/JUDGE OF GILGIT-BALTISTAN

SUPREME APPELLATE COURT
[See Article 82(6)]
I, …………………… having been appointed Chief Judge/Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan
Supreme Appellate Court do solemnly swear and I will bear true faith and allegiance
to Pakistan and that I will faithfully perform the duties of my office to the best of
my ability, knowledge and judgment and will administer justice according to the
law in force Gilgit-Baltistan, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.

Place Signature of Chief Judge/Judge

Date
Signature of Governor/Chief Judge
Gilgit-Baltistan
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 455

OATH OF CHIEF JUDGE/JUDGE OF

GILGIT-BALTISTAN CHIEF COURT
[See Article 92(7)]
I, ……………………. having been appointed Chief Judge/Judge of Gilgit-Baltistan
Chief Court do solemnly swear that I owe allegiance to Allah and that I will faithfully
perform the duties of my office to the best of my ability, knowledge and judgment
and will administer justice according to the law in force in the Areas comprising
Gilgit-Baltistan, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.
Place Signature of Chief Judge/Judge
Date
Signature of Governor/Chief Judge
Gilgit-Baltistan

OATH OF ADVISOR
[See Article 54(14)]
I, ……………………………. do hereby solemnly swear in the name of Allah;
That I will remain loyal to Pakistan.
That I will perform my functions as Advisor honestly and faithfully; and That I
will not directly or indirectly communicate or reveal to any person any official
secret which, may, come to my knowledge as Advisor; So help me Allah.
Place Signature of Advisor
Date
Signature of Chairman of Council
Gilgit-Baltistan

AUDITOR-GENERAL
[See Article 107(2)]
I, ……………………. do hereby solemnly swear and bear true faith and allegiance
to Pakistan.
That, as Auditor-General of the Areas comprising Gilgit-Baltistan, I will perform
my functions honestly, faithfully, in accordance with the Gilgit-Baltistan
(Empowerment and Self-Government) Order, 2009, and the law and to the best of
my knowledge, ability and judgment, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.
Place Signature of Auditor-General
Date
Signature of Chief Judge of Supreme Appellate Court
Gilgit-Baltistan
456 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSIONER

[See Article 106(2)]
I, ……………………. do hereby solemnly swear and bear true faith and allegiance
to Pakistan.
That, as Chief Election Commissioner of the Areas comprising Gilgit-Baltistan, I
will perform my functions honestly, faithfully, in accordance with the Gilgit-Baltistan
(Empowerment and Self-Government) Order, 2009, and the law and to the best of
my knowledge, ability and judgment, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will.

Place Signature of Chief Election Commissioner

Date
Signature of Chief Judge of Supreme Appellate Court
Gilgit-Baltistan
********
SECOND SCHEDULE
[See Article 58(2)(d)]
1. An office, which is not a whole time office remunerated either by salary or by
fee.
2. The office of Lamberdar, Inamdar, Sufedposh and Zaildar, whether called by
this or any other title.
3. The office of the Chairman of any elective body constituted under any law
relating to the Local Government.
4. Reserve of the Armed Forces.
5. Any other office which is declared by an Act of the Assembly not to disqualify
its holder from being elected as, or from being a member of the Assembly.
********
THIRD SCHEDULE
COUNCIL LEGISLATIVE LIST
[See Article 68 (2) (a)]
1. Nationality, citizenship and naturalization.
2. Migration from or into, or settlement in Gilgit-Baltistan.
3. Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from Gilgit-Baltistan, including
in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in Gilgit-Baltistan of persons
not domiciled in Gilgit-Baltistan; pilgrimages to places beyond Pakistan.
4. Post and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting and other
like forms of communications; Post Office Saving Bank.
5. Foreign Exchange; cheques, bills of exchange, promissory notes and foreign
aid.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 457

6. Public debt, including the borrowing of money on the security of the Gilgit-
Baltistan Council Consolidated Fund.
7. Public debt of the Federation, including the borrowings of money on the security
of the Federal Consolidated Fund; foreign loan and foreign aid.
8. Council [of ] public services.
9. Pensions, that is to say, pensions payable by the Council out of the Council
Consolidated Fund.
10. Ombudsman.
11. Administrative courts for the subjects in legislative list.
12. Libraries, museums, and similar institutions controlled by the Council.
13. Federal agencies and institutions for the following purpose, that is to say, for
research, for professional or technical training, or for the promotion of special
studies.
14. Education as respects students of Gilgit-Baltistan in foreign countries and foreign
students in Gilgit-Baltistan.
15. Nuclear energy, including. –
(a) mineral resources necessary for the generation of nuclear energy;
(b) the production of nuclear fuels and the generation and use of nuclear energy;
and
(c) ionizing radiations.
(d) boilers
16. Ports quarantine, seamens and marine hospitals and hospitals concerned with
port quarantine.
17. Maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and navigation on tidal
waters, Admiralty jurisdiction.
18. Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulations and
organization of air traffic and of aerodrome.
19. Light Houses, including lightships, beacons and other provisions for safety of
aircraft.
20. Carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air.
21. Copyright, inventions, designs, trademarks and merchandise marks.
22. Opium so far as regards sale for export.
23. Import and exports across customs frontiers as defined by the Federal
Government, inter-provincial trade and commerce with foreign countries;
standards of goods to be exported out of Pakistan.
24. State Bank of Pakistan; banking, that is to say, the co-ordination with the
Government of Pakistan of the conduct of banking business by corporations
other than corporations owned or controlled by Gilgit-Baltistan and carrying
out business only within Gilgit-Baltistan.
25. The law for insurance, except as respects insurance undertaken by Government
of Gilgit-Baltistan, and the regulation of the conduct of insurance business,
458 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

except as respect to business under taken by Government of Gilgit-Baltistan,

Government insurance, except so far as undertaken by the Government of
Gilgit-Baltistan by virtue of any matter within the legislative competence of
the Assembly.
26. Stock-exchange and future markets with object and business not confined to
the areas comprising Gilgit-Baltistan.
27. Corporations, that is to say, the incorporation regulation and winding up of
trading corporations including banking, insurance and financial corporations,
but not including corporations owned or controlled by the Provincial
Government of Gilgit-Baltistan and carrying on business, cooperative societies,
and of corporations, whether trading or not, with object not confined to the
Gilgit-Baltistan, but not including universities.
28. International treaties conventions and agreements and international arbitration
29. National Highways, strategic roads, and highways continuing beyond the
territory of the Gilgit-Baltistan.
30. Federal surveys including geological surveys and Federal meteorological
organizations.
31. Fishing and fisheries beyond territorial waters
32. Works, lands and buildings vested in, or in the possession of the Government
or Federal Government, for the purpose of the Federation (not being Military,
Naval or Air Force works), but as regards property situate in the Gilgit-Baltistan,
subject always to law made by the Assembly, save in so far as Federal law
otherwise provides.
33. Census.
34. Establishment of standards of weights and measures.
35. Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging
to the Gilgit-Baltistan or any Province of Pakistan to any area in such Province
or the Gilgit-Baltistan, but not so as to enable the police of the Gilgit-Baltistan
or such province to exercise powers and jurisdiction in such Province or the
Gilgit-Baltistan without the consent of the Government of that Province or
the Gilgit-Baltistan; extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of a
police force belonging the Gilgit-Baltistan or a Province of Pakistan to railway
areas outside the Gilgit-Baltistan or that Province.
36. Duties of Customs, including export duties.
37. Duties of excise, including duties on salt but not including duties on alcoholic
liquors, opium and other narcotics.
38. Railways.
39. Mineral oil natural gas; liquids substances declared by Federal law to be
dangerously inflammable.
40. Development of industries, where development under Federal control is declared
by Federal law to be expedient in the public interest; institutions, establishments,
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 459

bodies and corporations administered or managed by the Federal Government

immediately before the commencing day of this Order
41. Electricity and bulk water storage.
42. Major ports, that is to say the declaration and delimitation of such ports, and
the constitution and powers of port authorities therein
43. All regulatory authorities established under Federal laws.
44. Supervision and management of public debt.
45. Legal, medical and other professions.
46. Standards in institutions for higher education and research, scientific and
technical institutions.
47. Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway or air, taxes on their
fares and freights.
48. Fees in respect of any of the matter enumerated in this list.
49. Fees in respect of any of the matters enumerated in this list, but not including
fees taken in any court.
50. National Planning and national economic coordination including planning
and coordination of scientific and technological research.
51. Inter-provincial matters and co-ordination
52. Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to any of the matters
enumerated in this list.
53. Offences against laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in this list.
54. Inquiries and statistics for the purpose of any of the matters enumerated in this
list.
55. Matters which under the law are within the legislative competence of the Council
or relates to the Chairman of the Council.
56. Taxes on income other than agricultural income.
57. Taxes on corporations.
58. Taxes on the sale and purchases of goods and services imported, exported,
produced, manufactured or consumed.
59. Taxes on the capital value of the assets, not including taxes on capital gains on
immovable property.
60. Taxes and duties on the production capacity of any plant, machinery, under
taking, establishment or installation in lieu of the taxes and duties specified in
entries 56 and 57 or in lieu of either or both of them.
61. Election to the Council
62. The salaries, allowances and privileges of the Members of the Council and
Advisors.
63. Matter incidental or ancillary to any of the matters enumerated in this list.
********
460 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

FOURTH SCHEDULE SERVICES

[See Article 93(3)]
POSITION OR VACANCY SHARING FORMULA BETWEEN THE
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN AND THE GOVERNMENT OF
GILGIT-BALTISTAN.
Government of Gilgit-Baltistan PAS/PSP/ BS-17 BS-18 BS-19 BS-20 BS-21
APS
25% 40% 50% 60% 65%
N.B.: Percentage showing the share earmarked for PAS/PSP/APS, out of total number of vacancies in
Gilgit-Baltistan (on the pattern of Federal Government and Provinces of Pakistan).

F.No. 13 (2)/2018-Admn (GBC)

(Hamid Mahmood Rana)
Deputy Secretary
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 461

APPENDIX
A. In the proposed Article 82:
(i) In clause (5), for sub-clause (a), substitute the following:
(a) has been, or is qualified to be, a judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan;
or
(ii) In clause (7), replace the full stop with a colon, and add the following
proviso at the end:
Provided that if the Chief Judge or a Judge is a person who has been a
Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, he/she shall hold office until he/
she attains the age of 70 years, or unless he/she sooner resigns or is removed
from office in accordance with law.
B. For the proposed Article 103, substitute the following:
103. Supreme Court of Pakistan. –
(1) The Supreme Court of Pakistan shall, to the exclusion of every other
court including the Supreme Appellate Court and the Chief Court,
have original jurisdiction in respect of:
(i) any dispute between the Government, the Federation or the
Government of a Province of Pakistan;
(ii) any challenge to, or dispute raising any issue regarding, the vires or
validity of this Order or any amendment hereto or modification
herein, including an Order repealing, replacing or substituting this
Order, and clause (2) of Article 126 hereof shall apply accordingly.
(2) Any aggrieved person may, subject to clause (3), appeal to the Supreme
Court of Pakistan against any judgment, order or decree of the Supreme
Appellate Court or the Chief Court made in any proceedings where
the subject matter of the dispute or the matter in issue is not exclusively
in relation to or under this Order or any law made hereunder or Gilgit-
Baltistan.
(3) An appeal under clause (2) shall lie only if the Supreme Court of Pakistan
grants leave to appeal.
(4) A decision of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, whether made under any
of the foregoing clauses or otherwise, shall be as binding on all courts
established by or under this Order as it is in terms of Article 189 of the
Constitution on all courts in Pakistan, and Article 86 and Article 96
hereof shall apply accordingly.
C. For the proposed Article 124, substitute the following:
124. Power to amend. – (1) The President on advice of the Federal Government
may, by notified Order, amend the provisions of this Order:
Provided that no amendment shall be made or take effect unless it has been
placed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan under application moved by the
462 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

Federal Government, which shall be treated as a petition under clause (3) of

Article 184 of the Constitution, and the Supreme Court has not disapproved
of the amendment.
(2) For purposes of this Article, any Order proposing or seeking to repeal or
replace this Order shall be deemed to be a measure to amend it.
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 463

PRESS SUMMARY
17th January 2019
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY VS. SUPREME APPELLATE COURT GILGIT
BALTISTAN, ETC. (CONSTITUTION PETITION NO.50/2018, ETC.)
JUSTICES
Chief Justice Mian Saqib Nisar, Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed, Justice Umar Ata Bandial,
Justice Faisal Arab, Justice Ijaz Ul Ahsan, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah and Justice Munib
Akhtar
BACKGROUND
The instant matters pertain to an important historical and constitutional issue
involving the status, authority and powers for Gilgit-Baltistan, including the judiciary
and the rights available to its people. The following issues were presented in the
various petitions and considered by the Court:
i. Would granting fundamental rights and a status, role and recognition of
Gilgit-Baltistan in the constitutional scheme of Pakistan prejudice
Pakistan’s cause for the resolution of the Kashmir dispute by such
appropriate means as may be acceptable to Pakistan (which could, for
example, be a United Nations sanctioned and supervised plebiscite)?
ii. What rights can be granted to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan?
iii. Is the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court a constitutional court?
JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court disposes of the matters according to the details contained in
the judgment, save those petitions in which a specific order or judgment, of either
the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme Appellate Court or the Chief Court, has been
challenged. Such petitions shall be deemed pending and be treated and disposed of
as the leave petitions envisaged under Article 103 of the Proposed Order (as described
in the judgment), when promulgated.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Nothing this Court recommends or orders should affect the nature and status of
464 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities

the Kashmir issue. It must be emphasized that all the measures and directions taken
and given must be predicated by the caveat that these are subject to the result of the
plebiscite, which is duly recognized in Article 257 of the Constitution of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (“Constitution”). As a responsible member of the comity
of nations Pakistan remains aware of its obligations in such terms. As and when the
promised plebiscite is organized by the parties to the dispute, it will be up to the
people of all of Jammu and Kashmir, and of Gilgit-Baltistan, to make their choice.
Till then, it is surely incumbent upon both India as well as Pakistan to ensure that
the people of this region enjoy maximum rights for areas within each country’s
control. Therefore, till such time that the plebiscite is held, a proper arrangement
must be provided for by Pakistan for the people of Gilgit-Baltistan for purposes of
governance within a framework of a constitutional nature, including most
importantly the enjoyment of fundamental rights. (See paragraph 20 of the
judgment)
In 1999, this Court in the case of Al-Jehad Trust (1999 SCMR 1379) directed
the Pakistan Government to extend fundamental freedoms to the Northern Areas
(now referred to as Gilgit-Baltistan) within six months. The judgment declared
that Pakistan exercised both de facto and de jure administrative control over the
Northern Areas. This Court ruled in the Al-Jehad Trust case that the people of the
region were “citizens of Pakistan for all intents and purposes...and could invoke
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights.” It also emphasized that the people
of the Northern Areas were “entitled to participate in the governance of their area and
to have an independent judiciary to enforce...Fundamental Rights.” (See paragraph 16
of the judgment)
In the judgment, the Court has considered what would be the position (i.e.,
status, powers and jurisdiction) of the judicial, legislative and executive organs
established by an instrument of the nature of the Gilgit Baltistan Order, 2018. In
accordance with well-established principles of law, the Gilgit-Baltistan legislature
would only have such powers as are conferred upon it by the Federation through
the Proposed Order. The courts created by such Order shall have the power to
judicially review the laws enacted by such legislature. Of course, the organs created
by the Proposed Order (or any previous or subsequent such Order), and especially
any legislative body, would be bound not merely by the Order, but also by the
Constitution. The jurisdiction of a Gilgit-Baltistan court established by or under
the Proposed Order is confined to the territory of Gilgit-Baltistan. Therefore, it is
concluded that the intention was, and is, to give the Gilgit-Baltistan Supreme
Appellate Court and the Chief Court the status of a “constitutional” court within
the ambit of Gilgit-Baltistan and the Proposed Order. The Gilgit-Baltistan Courts
do not, and will not, sit as courts having the power of judicial review in respect of
the territory of Pakistan, nor can they declare Orders made or legislation passed by
 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit Baltistan on 17 January 2019 465

the President or the Parliament as ultra vires, nor can they initiate judicial review of
departments working outside of Gilgit-Baltistan. Instead, the Proposed Order (or
any previous or subsequent such Order) can be challenged by, inter alia, the people
of Gilgit-Baltistan, but only before this Court, either under Article 184 of the
Constitution or in the manner herein after provided. (See paragraphs 24 and 25 of
the judgment)
DIRECTIONS
Accordingly, by the judgment, this Court directs and orders as follows:
i. The Proposed Order (modified in the manner as noted in the judgment),
and annexed to the judgment, shall be forthwith promulgated by the
President on the advice of the Federal Government, and in any case
within a fortnight hereof;
ii. No amendment shall be made to the Order as so promulgated except in
terms of the procedure provided in Article 124 of the same, nor shall it
be repealed or substituted, without the instrument amending, repealing
or substituting (as the case may be) the same being placed before this
Court by the Federation through an application that will be treated as a
petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution. Nothing in the
judgment shall be construed to limit the jurisdiction conferred on this
Court by the Proposed Order itself; and
iii. If the Order so promulgated is repealed or substituted by an Act of
Parliament the validity thereof, if challenged, shall be examined on the
touchstone of the Constitution.
(See paragraph 29 of the judgment)

NOTE: This summary is provided to assist in understanding the Court’s decision. It does
not form part of the reasons for the decision. The full judgment of the Court is the only
authoritative document. The judgment is a public document and available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov.pk.
Map
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 Index

Abbas, Chaudhry Ghulam, 3, 5-8, 13, 37-38, Ansari, Amina, 161, 228
167, 217, 238 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 26, 143
Abdullah, Sheikh Asif Ali Zardari, 23, 71, 74, 91, 177, 231
Aatish-e-Chinar, 36-37 Assembly, means, 325, 408
Abpara Chowk, 179 Astore Supreme Council, 119
Adviser, means, 300 Australian Agency for International Development
Advocate, Amjad Hussain, 136, 155, 206, 227 (AUAID), 120
Afghanistan, 123 Awami Watan Party, 64
Agha Khan Development Network, 146 Awami Workers Party (AWP), 178-79, 225
Agha Khan Educational Services (AKES), 118 Azad Jammu & Kashmir Pakistan Muslim
Ahmed, Bashir, 224 League-Nawaz (AJKPML-N), 23-24, 44-45,
AJK Muttahida Quami Movement (AJKMQM), 58, 77, 94, 214, 216-17
84 Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), 1-29, 33, 37-
AJK Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (AJKPML- 46, 48-69, 71-72, 74-77, 81-85, 87-90, 92-
N), 77 93, 95-100, 121, 127-30, 136, 138, 165,
AJK Pakistan People’s Party (AJKPPP), 70 183, 190-92, 194-98, 211-23, 230-31, 235,
AJK Pakistan People’s Party Shaheed Bhutto 240-41, 247
(AJKPPPSB), 76 Interim Constitution (13th Amendment)
Akbar, Chaudhry Latif, 24, 74-75, 220 Act, 2018, 266-87
Akhtar, Muhammad Ali, 228 Members Legislative Assembly 2016, 297-
al Qaeda, 92, 172 98
Al-Hussaini, Agha Rahat Hussain, 226 Political Parties in, 288-94
Ali, Agha Muhammad, 228 Presidents/Prime Ministers of, 295-96
All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference Azad Jammu and Kashmir Election Commission
(AJKMC), 34 (AJKEC), 33
All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference Azad Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference
(AJKNC), 36 (AJKMC), 3, 7, 15-17, 19-24, 33-34, 42-
All Pakistan Muslim League (APML), 161, 198 46, 53, 72, 76, 77, 81, 85, 97, 100, 212-
All Parties Conference (APC), 204 14, 216, 219
All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), 54, 61 Azad Kashmiris, 38
All Parties National Alliance (APNA), 66
All Party National Alliance (APNA), 42, 52, 66- Baba Jan, 64, 176, 179, 225-26
70, 180, 215 Baid, Samuel, 117
Altaf Bhai, 89 Baig, Haji Shah, 165, 225
Anglo-Afghan war, 124 Balawaristan National Front (BNF), 67, 168-73,
Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (ASSP), 167 177-78, 199, 205, 223, 226-27, 373-74
 Index 473
Balawaristan National Front, 373-75 Deputy Speaker, means, 300
Balawaristan Students’ National Organisation Deutsche Bank, 146
(BSNO), 171-72, 176 Dignified and Honourable, 104
Balochistan Liberation Army, 91 Dixit, J.N., 191
Balor Research Forum (BRF), 175 Dogra Sabha, 34
Ban Ki Moon, 169
Bang-e-Sahar, 174 East Pakistan, 9, 71, 78-79, 191
Belgium, 64 Economic Times, 120
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 203 Election Bodies Disqualification Ordinance
Bhasha Dam, 51, 63, 141-46 (EBDO), 79
Bhutto, Begum Nusrat, 40 Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), 97
Bhutto, Benazir, 17, 19, 40-41, 71, 77, 91, 127, Electoral Rolls, means, 300
138, 220 Emir, 101
Bhutto, Bilawal Zardari, 74, 76 Empowerment for All, 86
Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 9, 15-16, 39-40, 65, 70, Europe, 97
77, 79, 91, 126, 153-54, 190-91, 214, 218- Express Tribune, 195
19, 231
Birmingham (UK), 173 Federation, means, 408
Blor, Afaq, 228 Financial year, means, 326, 408
Boloristan Labour Party (BLP), 175, 177 Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA), 129
Brig. Samson Simon Sharaf (Retd.), 136 Four Point Formula, 45
France, 179
Canada, 64, 74, 97 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), 204
Ceasefire Line (CFL), 25 Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), 1, 124, 126,
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 140 137, 153, 191, 237, 397-98
Centre for Peace, Development and Reforms
(CPDR), 196 Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, 16-17, 39-40, 71, 79-80, 99,
Chairman, means, 326, 408 126, 140, 218, 222, 231, 240
Chaudhry, Sultan Mahmood, 13, 18, 20, 41, Geological Survey of Pakistan (GSP), 144
54, 59, 61, 72, 75, 93-94, 96, 98, 214 Ghaffar, Khawaja Abdul, 218
Chenab formula, 67 Gharib Qaumi Movement (GQM), 184
Chief Executive, means, 300 Ghulam Muhammad, 158, 228
China, 62, 74, 116, 120-21, 143, 145, 173, 177, Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), 1-2, 7, 10, 49-52, 55, 62-
180,182, 198, 202-8, 231-32 64, 66, 68, 74, 88-90, 99, 116-19, 121-22,
China and Pakistan, Boundary Agreement 126-27, 129-43, 145-46, 153-85, 190-208,
Between, 1963, 255-58 213-14, 221-27, 229-35, 326
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), 64, Area, 116
119, 133, 143, 169, 173, 198, 202-8, 231, Challenges, 144
235, 249 Demography, 116
Choudhry, Dr. Shabir, 69, 134, 216, 235 Economic Conditions, 118
Citizen means, 330, 408 Electoral Rolls, Election 2015, 378
Col. Imtiaz-ul-Haque, 197 India’s Response, 136
Commissioner, means, 300 Karakoram Highway, 120
Council for Human Rights in Kashmir, 52 Land Scam, 145
Council, means, 300, 326, 408 Legislative Assembly Elections, 132
Creutzmann, Jurgen, 181 Local Government Act 2014, 139
Members of Assembly, 379-80
Daily Jang, 48 Political Developments, 137
Dawn, 118, 199 Political History, 122
Deputy Chief Executive, means, 300 Population, 116
474 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
Registered Political Parties, Election Symbols, Hydroelectric Power Generation Projects, 26-27,
376-77 88, 144
Religion 116
Sectarianism in, 139 Inayatullah, Qazi, 165, 224
Threat to Buddhist Heritage, 146 Indian Express, 63
Tourism Industry, 121 Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, 146
Gilgit Baltistan Democratic Alliance (GBDA), 67, Inqalabi, Shafqat, 223
175, 199, 373 Interim Constitution Act 1974, 9, 11, 63
Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly (GBLA), International Crisis Group (ICG), 129, 140, 154
131-32, 134, 139, 222, 226-27, 248 International Food Policy Research Institute
Gilgit Baltistan National Alliance (GBNA), 178 (IFPRI), 144
Gilgit Baltistan United Alliance (GBUA), 177 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 101, 178
Gilgit Baltistan United Movement (GBUM), Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), 48-49, 51, 90,
175-76, 199 98, 182, 213, 373
Gilgit-Baltistan Bar Council (GBBC), 182 Iqbal, Zafar, 155, 225, 228
Gilgit-Baltistan Council (GBC), 131, 139 Islami Tehreek Pakistan (ITP), 164
Gilgit-Baltistan Council Income Tax (Adaptation) Islami-Jamhoori-Ittehad (IJI), 80
Act, 2012, 119 Islamiyat, 141
Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self- Ismail, 117, 122, 154, 169, 185
Governance Order (GBESGO), 116, 130- Ismail, Engineer Muhammad, 227
32, 134-37, 153, 178, 242 Italy, 64
Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-
Governance) Order, 2009, 325-72 Jafar, Muhammad, 228
Gilgit-Baltistan Ladakh Democratic Movement Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), 93, 97-103, 165, 190, 221
(GBLDM), 175 Jamaat-e-Islami AJK (JIAJK), 98
Gilgit-Baltistan Metals Minerals and Gem Jamaat-ud-Dawa, 51
Association (GBMMGA), 220 Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), 154-55, 164,
Gilgit-Baltistan National Congress (GBNC), 180- 198, 225
81 Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), 1, 3, 5-6, 12, 48,
Gilgit-Baltistan National Movement (GBNM), 215, 218, 247
180 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF),
Gilgit-Baltistan Thinker’s Forum (GBTF), 181 17, 29, 33, 41-42, 48-52, 54, 64, 67, 69,
Gilgit-Baltistan United Movement (GBUM), 67, 103, 138, 173, 194, 211, 246
175-77, 205, 223 Jammu and Kashmir Liberation League (JKLL),
Gilgit-Baltistan, means, 326, 409 7, 33, 52-58, 64
Glancy Commission report, 34 Jammu and Kashmir National Awami Party
Government of Gilgit-Baltistan Order, 2018, 116 (JKNAP), 65
Government, means, 326, 409 Jammu and Kashmir National Students
Governor, means, 326, 409 Federation (JKNSF), 28, 65
Grare, Frederic, 102 Jammu and Kashmir People’s Muslim League
(JKPML), 59-61
Hashmatullah, 227 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 7, 36-37, 53, 94, 219
Hayat, Javid, 28 Jammu Kashmir Council For Human Rights, 52
Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), 51, 103 Jehnzaib, Raja, 228
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Jinnah Model Town Housing Scheme, 23
194, 200 Jinnah-Abdullah conflict, 36
Human Rights Watch Report 2012, 13, 129 Joint Sitting, means, 326, 409
Hunzai, Izhar, 141, 225, 228 Judge, 326, 409
Hussain, Dr. Akmal, 73
Hussain, Mirza, 155, 161, 170, 228 K-2, 121
 Index 475
Karachi Agreement, 4, 259-62 Khan, Sardar Muhammad Abdul Qayyum, 8,
Karachi-based Jammu Kashmir Welfare 20, 42, 53, 100, 214, 295-96
Association, 52 Khan, Sardar Muhammad Yaqoob, 23, 44, 216,
Karakoram Highway (KKH), 120-21, 203, 205 296
Karakorum National Movement (KNM), 67, Khan, Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim, 218, 295-96
174-75, 177-78, 199 Khan, Sardar Sikandar Hayat, 17, 19-20, 41,
Karakorum Students Organisation (KSO), 174, 213, 295-96
223 Khidmat-e-Khalq Foundation, 90
Kargil International, magazine, 177 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), 126, 174, 184, 204
Karim Khan (aka) KK, 228 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly, 93
Kashmir American Council, 52 Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Valley, 82
Kashmir and Northern Areas (KANA), 1, 238, Khurshid, K.H., 7-8, 15-16, 21, 37, 39-40, 43,
297 53-54, 57-59, 212, 218-19
Kashmir Azad banega, 13 Knight, E.F., 125
Kashmir Canadian Council, 52
Kashmir Council for Human Rights, 52 Lail-o-Nihar, Lahore Weekly 191
Kashmir Liberation Cell, 58 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, 91
Kashmir Voice International (KVI), 104 Lashkar-i-Taiba, 91
Kashmir Watch, 52 Legal Framework Order (LFO), 127
Kashmir Welfare Association (Kashmir Relief Liaquat Ali Khan, 38
Fund), 52 Line of Control (LoC), 9-10, 25, 50, 59, 63, 68,
Kashmiri, Sardar Shaukat Ali, 184, 213-14 177, 191, 194-95
Kasuri, Khurshid Mahmud Lord Lytton, 123
Neither a Hawk or a Dove, 137
Khan, Abdul Hamid, 39, 168-69, 172-73, 177, Mahmood, Dr. Khalid, 102, 166, 221
184, 227 Mahmud, Ershad, 6, 72, 75, 100, 156-57, 193,
Khan, Ali Ashraf, 134 195, 197
Khan, Amanullah, 48-49, 57, 69, 135, 173, 211 Majid, Chaudhry Abdul, 74, 195, 215
Jehad-e-Musalsal, 48, 138 Majlis-e-Shura, 102, 126, 191
Khan, Col. Mirza Hasan Majlis-e-Wahadat Muslimeen Gilgit-Baltistan
Shamsher se ZanjirTak, 137 (MWM-GB), 132-33, 166-67, 198, 225
Khan, Dr. Imran Ahmad, 144 Malik, Bashir A., 145
Khan, F.M., Malik, Justice Abdul Majid, 59
The Story of Gilgit, Baltistan and Chitral, 122 Malik, Yasin, 29, 48, 69-70, 194, 246
Khan, Gen. Ayub, 7, 14, 70, 78-79, 137 Mangla Dam Raising Project, 88
Khan, Gen. Yahya, 8-9, 53 Maqpoon, Raja Jalal Hussain, 133, 227
Khan, Haji Jaffar Ullah, 225 Martial Law Zone, 126
Khan, Haji Janbaz, 228 Member, means, 300
Khan, Imran, 23-24, 93, 96-98, 162-63, 214, Minhas, Raja Muhammad Mushtaq, 82, 221-22
232-33 Ministry of Kashmir Affairs (MKA), 3-4, 6-8,
Khan, M Ismail, 208 18, 25
Khan, Maj. Gen. Sardar Muhammad Anwar, 220, Mirpur Development Authority, 23
296 Mirpur Greater Water Scheme, 23
Khan, Mir Ghazanfar Ali, 133, 161, 222, 248 Mirpur University of Engineering and
Khan, Raja Farooq Haider, 72, 83, 216-17, 288, Technology, 23
296, 298 Mirza Wajahat Hasan, 67
Khan, Raja Zulqarnain, 21, 72, 212 Miskeen, Malik, 228
Khan, Sardar Attique Ahmed, 47, 212, 288, 296- Mohajir Rabita Command (MRC), 90
97 Moqaddam, Sobia, 160, 224
Khan, Sardar Ghulam Sadiq, 219 Most Favoured Nation status (MFN), 103
476 Pakistan Occupied Kashmir: Politics, Parties and Personalities
Movement for Justice, 93 Pakistan Economic Survey 2014-15, 204
Movement for the Restoration of Democracy Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), 40
(MRD), 40 Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation
MQM-London (MQM-L), 92 (PMDC), 120
MQM-Pakistan (MQM-P), 92 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), 14,
Muhajir Ittehad Tehriq (MIT), 90 17, 20, 22-24, 29, 42, 44, 46, 75-77, 80-
Murder of Traders, 119 84, 96-98, 103, 116, 119, 133, 139, 144,
Musharraf, Gen. Pervez, 41-45, 50, 59, 61, 80- 156, 159-60, 162, 166, 190, 198, 204, 207,
81, 85, 130, 143, 157-58, 161, 177, 184, 213,217, 221-22, 224-25, 250
198, 222 Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam (PML-
Muslim Conference, 4-6, 12, 14, 17, 21, 34- Q), 154-55, 160-61
42, 45, 47, 53-54, 57, 61, 75, 81-82, 126, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), 1-3, 34, 49,
138, 214, 217-18 51-52, 63, 93, 126, 190, 193, 197, 213, 230,
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), 43, 100 232
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), 21-22, Pakistan People’s Party Azad Jammu & Kashmir
75, 84-93, 154-55, 166, 247 (PPPAJK), 94
Pakistan People’s Party Gilgit-Baltistan (PPP-GB),
Naji, Nawaz Khan, 134, 168-71, 226, 379 131, 153, 155, 157, 161, 165, 178, 206-7
Nanga Parbat, 121 Pakistan People’s Party Shaheed Bhutto (PPPSB),
Naqvi, Syed Ghulam Raza, 217, 290 156
Naseer, Muhammad, 228 Pakistan Supreme Court Order on Gilgit
Nashad, Haji Fida Muhammad, 224-25, 227 Baltistan, 385-465
National Economic Council (ECNEC) of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), 23-24, 44, 46, 76,
Pakistan, 144 82, 92-98, 162-64, 198, 200, 205, 214, 221,
National Press Club, 68 225, 227, 234, 247
Nawa-i-Waqt, 191 Pakistan Today, 134
Naya Azad Kashmir, 97 Pakistan-based Kashmir Action Committee, 52
Naya Pakistan, 93 Parwana, Manzoor Hussain, 176-77, 205, 223
New Anti-capitalist Party (NPA), 179 Person, means, 326, 409
No Objection Certificate (NOC), 143 Pir Sahib, 90
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), 52 Plebiscite Front, 48
Noorbakshi, 117, 122 Political Parties Act (PPA), 79
Northern Areas Council (NAC), 126 Prescribed, means, 326, 409
Legal Framework Order (LFO), 138 President, means, 409
Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC), Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), 60
127-28, 130, 138, 157, 191-92, 242, 300, Progressive Youth Front (PYF), 175
398 Property, means, 326, 409
Northern Areas Rules of Business, 138 Provincial Government, means, 300
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), 125-26,
140, 174 Raja Zulqarnain, 23
Rathore, Faisal Mumtaz, 17, 41, 220-21
Obama, Barack, 84 Rathore, Raja Mumtaz Hussain, 72, 219-20, 296
One Belt One Road (OBOR), 202 Rehman, Hafiz Hafeezur, 133, 157, 160, 222
Remuneration, means, 326, 409
Pakistan, 1-5, 7-29, 33-34, 37-38, 40-48, 50- Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), 92
52, 54-55, 58-59, 61-72, 76-83, 86-88, 90- Rizvi, Syed Raziuddin, 227
94, 96-104, 116, 118-21, 125-42, 144-46, Rules of Business, means, 6, 300
153-54, 160, 164, 166, 168-78, 182-83, Rules of Procedure, means, 300
190-200, 202-4, 206-8, 215, 218, 220-21,
232-35 Sami, Maulana Abdul, 228
 Index 477
Secretary of the Council, means, 300 The Northern Areas Council Legal Frame Work
Secular thinking, 36 Order, 1994, 299-324
Sering, Sange Hasnain, 181 Thinkers Forum (TF), 175, 199
Service of Council, means, 409 Three Gorges, 144
Service of Gilgit-Baltistan, means, 326, 409 Tiezzi, Shannon, 203
Service, means, 409
Shah, Muhammad Ayub, 228 UK, 52, 64, 126
Shah, Syed Jaffar, 223-24 UK-based Tehreek-e-Kashmir, 52
Shah, Syed Mehdi, 132, 156, 226 UN Security Council, 171
Shah, Syed Pir Karam Ali, 227 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 50, 52
Shahid, Sardar Arif, 68, 70, 215 United Kashmir Peoples’ National Party
Shamilat-e-Deh Act, 206 (UKPNP), 61-64, 67, 179, 213-14, 216
Sharia state, 98 United Nations (UN), 38, 73, 85, 101, 144
Sharif, Nawaz, 17-21, 23-24, 40-41, 71, 80-84, United Nations Commission for India and
97, 157, 16, 183, 197, 203-4, 207, 221-22 Pakistan (UNCIP), 3, 126, 173, 394
Sheikh Abdullah, 5, 8, 34-37, 217 United Nations General Assembly, 83
Shia, 117, 140, 164 United Nations Human Rights Council, 181
Silk Road Economic Belt, 203 United States of Kashmir, 61
Simla Agreement, 263-65 Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation
Singh, Maharaja Hari, 13, 34, 124-25 (UNPO), 168, 175
Singh, Pratap, 124 US, 52, 64, 74, 97, 143
Singh, Raja Ranbir, 123
Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, 91 Vice Chairman of the Council, means, 326, 409
Snedden, Christopher, 36, 135
South Africa, 120 Wajahat Mirza, 182
Speaker, means, 300, 326, 409 War Council, 5
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), 203-5 Wazarat, 122, 125
Sultan Madad, 228 West Pakistan, 9, 79
Sunni, 117, 165 World Bank (WB), 142-44, 146, 178
Supreme Court of Pakistan, means, 409 World Kashmir Freedom Movement, 52
Switzerland, 64 World Kashmiri Freedom Federation, 52

Taban, Haji Akbar, 158, 160, 225 Xi Jinping, 144

Taliban, 51, 97 Xinjiang, 143
Tanzeem Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamaat, 167
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Yasin Malik and Nawaz Sharif
Act (TADA), 60 Letters Exchanged Between, 381-84
The Express Tribune, 173
The Nation, 119, 136 Zaman, Muhammad, 228
The News, 195 Zarb-i-Azb, 97