A.C. No.

10697, March 25, 2019

LARRY C. SEVILLA, COMPLAINANT, v. ATTY. MARCELO C. MILLO, RESPONDENT.

Doctrines:

Canon 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law
of and legal processes.

Rule 1.04- A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will admit of a
fair settlement.

Facts:

Larry Sevilla a publisher of the Pampango Foorprints issued a statement of account to SPS Avelino and
Melindra Manalo as fee for the publication of the notice of auction sale relate to the foreclosure of
the mortgage. It was published 3 consecutive times.

Atty. Marcelo Millo as the counsel of the the Manalo’s refused to settle the account as it found the
charge “exorbitant and. The SPS. Manalo agreed to a 50% discount however counsel intervened on such
negotiation; when the complainant called the Atty. Millo, he shouted at the complainant Due to this,
Larry had filed an administrative case against Atty. Millo.

The administrative case was referred to the IBP which later on sanctioned him with 1-month suspension.

Issue:

W/N Atty. Morillo have violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held:

Yes. Atty Morillo has violated Canons 1 and Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and was sanctioned with One Month Suspension. Further to the decision was a note that says “A lawyer
is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or private
capacity.

Any transgression of this duty on his part would not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would
also erode the public's faith in the legal profession as a whole”

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo C. Millo (respondent) is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) month, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue versus La Flor Isabela Cultural Corporation

G.R. No. 211289, January 14, 2019

Second Division, Reyes, J. JR., J.

Facts:

La Flor Isabela (La Flor) is a registered corporation who filed its monthly returns for the Expanded
Withholding Tax (EWT) and Withholding Tax on Compensation (WTC) for calendar year 2005. On yr
2008, Fa Flor executed a waiver of the Statute of Limitations later another, with its internal revenue
liabilities for yr 2005. The following year, La flor received a Formal Letter of Demand and Final
Assessment Notices (FANs) covering deficiency taxes for year 2005. La Flor filed its Letter of Protest
contesting the assessment notices, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) issued a Final Decision
on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) involving the alleged deficiency withholding taxes in aggregate amount
of around 7MPhp. La Flor filed a petition for review before the CTA Division, which granted the same
and cancelled the subject assessments; posited that the assessment was barred by prescription, and the
waivers did not extend the period of assessment, for lack of evidence, and the latter waiver of the two
failed to comply with the Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No.20-90 for not stating the nature and
amount of the tax to be assessed. The CTA En banc affirmed the division, the motion for reconsideration
filed, denied. Now, CIR files for certiorari under rule 45 to the Supreme Court.

Issue(s):

(1) Whether the prescriptive period under Section 203 of the NIR Capplies to EWT and WTC
Assessments; and (2) Whether La Flor’s EWT and WTC assessments for 2005 were barred by
prescription.

Decision:

Yes. Petition Denied, CTA En Banc decision Affirmed. La Flor argues that the CIR’s failure to include the
date of issue of MCLE compliance number of its counsel in a pleading is a ground for dismissal, No:
People v. Arrojado held that it doesn’t, yet subjects the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary
action. Withholding taxes are internal revenue taxes covered by Section 203 of the NIRC. Said Code
only provides for the ordinary 3-year and extraordinary10-year prescriptive period for assessment, the
former for NIRC taxes, latter for fraudulent, false returns and failure to file return. the Court does
not agree with the CIR that withholding tax assessments are merely an imposition of a penalty on the
withholding agent, and thus, outside the coverage of Section 203 of the NIRC: should the withholding
agent fail to deduct the required amount from its payment to the payee, it is liable for deficiency taxes
and applicable penalties. The terms “liable for tax” and “subject to tax” both connote legal obligation or
duty to pay a tax. Thus, EWTs and WTCs contemplate deficiency internal revenue taxes. Their aim is to
collect unpaid income taxes and not merely to impose a penalty on the withholding agent for its failure
to comply with its statutory duty. RMO 20-90 are mandatory requirements which must be strictly
followed. Here, the waivers presented failed to indicate the specific tax involved and the amount of tax
to be assessed; absent such details, there is no agreement to speak of. With no valid waiver, the
assessments had prescribed.
1. Withholding tax assessments are not mere impositions of a penalty on the withholding agent, and
thus, outside the coverage of Section 203 of the NIRC. In National Development Company v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Court did not equate withholding tax assessments to the
imposition of civil penalties imposed on tax deficiencies. The word "penalty" was used to underscore the
dynamics in the withholding tax system that it is the income of the payee being subjected to tax and not
of the withholding agent. It was never meant to mean that withholding taxes do not fall within the
definition of internal revenue taxes, especially considering that income taxes are the ones withheld by
the withholding agent. Withholding taxes do not cease to become income taxes just because it is
collected and paid by the withholding agent.

2. Waivers extending the prescriptive period of tax assessments must be compliant with RMO No. 20-90
and must indicate the nature and amount of the tax due. The September 3, 2008, February 16, 2009 and
December 2, 2009 waivers did not indicate the specific tax involved and the exact amount of the tax to
be assessed or collected — material data without which, there can be no true and valid agreement
between the taxpayer and the CIR. Being invalid, the waivers did not extend the prescriptive period
under Section 203. The Decision and Resolution of the CTA En Banc are affirmed.
A.C. No. 10303 April 22, 2015

JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent

FACTS:

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint with the IBP's Commission on
Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1)usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use
of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust. In her complaint,
Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29,
2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.

On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory conference.
Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable
for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using abusive and
insulting language in his pleadings.

He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules when he
maintained several active notarial registers in different offices. These provisions respectively require a
notary public to "keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official
register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep
only one active notarial register at any given time.

Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate, offensive, and abusive
language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in one of his pleadings

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Zaide violated Section 1(a) and 1(b), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules and the
CPR.

HELD:

YES. The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one (1) active notarial
register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The “one active notarial register”
rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to different offices
manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf

Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarialcommission. His flagrant
violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules is not merely a simple and excusable
negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of Canon 1of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides that "a lawyer [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes." The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language
in a lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other person, is based on
the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not,
in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper

As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno
a "notorious extortionist." And in another case, Gimeno observed
that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting hiscomment
against his opposing counsel. Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND
HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in particular, where the tax
payers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a prosecutor...This is a clear
manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious mental incompetence as regard her mandate as
an Assistant City Prosecutor .

This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words – a conduct
unbecoming of an officer of the court. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusias mdoes not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds
with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and
illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to
abstain from any offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer's language even in
his pleadings, must be dignified
De Karaan v Atty. Aguinaldo – Rule 12.02
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/sep2015/gr_182151_2015.html

Petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents before RTC of Quezon City. In her Complaint,
4

petitioner sought payment of damages for the alleged destruction of the cottages and other
structures inside Fine Sand Beach Resort, which she owned and operated. She alleged that
respondents destroyed the structures inside her property using a bulldozer in the guise of enforcing
a Writ of Demolition issued by the RTC of Balanga. She maintained, however, that the demolition of
improvements inside her resort was illegal, since she was not a party to the two civil cases, and her
name was not even mentioned in the writ.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of forum shopping. They
9

asserted that petitioner failed to disclose the other actions she had filed against them in her
Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping; in particular, the cases she had initiated before
the Office of the Ombudsman and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). The RTC denied
respondents' Motion to Dismiss.
Respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss seeking the dismissal of the case on the
following grounds: (a) forum shopping; (b) lack of jurisdiction over the person of deceased; and (c)
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
The RTC denied the motion of respondents noting that their arguments had already been passed
upon by the court in their first motion to dismiss. Their Motion for reconsideration was likewise
20

denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
whether the filing of Civil Case No. 7345 constituted forum shopping on the part of petitioner.

RULING:
Forum shopping is committed when multiple suits involving the same parties and the same causes
of action are filed, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment through means other than appeal or certiorari.

In this case, the CA found petitioner guilty of forum shopping and ordered the dismissal of her
Complaint on the basis of litis pendentia. It ruled that the parties and the claims raised in this case
are identical with those in Civil Case

As there is no basis for the CA's finding of forum shopping, the Court finds the dismissal of
petitioner's Complaint for damages improper. Accordingly, resolve to reinstate Civil Case No. Q-99-
38762 and to remand it to the RTC for continuation of trial and resolution on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The CA Decision are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Azul v Export Union Bank – Rule 12.02
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/mar2017/gr_213020_2017.html

Petitioner Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is the owner and developer of the Puerto Azul Complex in
Ternate, Cavite. To finance its operations and the development of Puerto Azul into a satellite city
with residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers with recreational areas, PALI
obtained loans from various creditors.

PALI's business problems started when the Philippine Stock Exchange rejected the listing of its
shares in its initial public offering, which drove away potential investors and real estate buyers from
the business venture. PALI failed to keep up with the payments of its debts and obligations.

Export and Industry Bank, Inc. (EJB), which was later merged with UBI, filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage constituted on TUI's properties covered to satisfy
PALI's outstanding obligations.

PALI filed a Petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation with the RTC of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Executive Judge gravely abused her discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, when she issued the Order, releasing in favor of PBB-Trust the entire bid

RULING:

Settled is the rule that forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several
judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the
same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another

The elements of forum shopping are: (a) identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration.

Here, the second and third elements of forum shopping are absent. The rights asserted and the
reliefs prayed for in the petition for declaratory relief are not identical with those raised in the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Omar Ali v Atty. Bubong – Canon 6 CPR
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/ac_4018_2005.html

This is a verified petition for disbarment filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found
guilty of grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
Complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate
of Title and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are relatives
of respondent.

As a result of this finding, the Secretary recommended respondent’s dismissal from service which
conclusion and recommendation was adopted in toto by the Office of the President, and eventually
affirmed by the Supreme Court.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant instituted the present petition for
the disbarment of respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while he was in
the employ of the government.

RULING:

Yes, respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct committed while being a government
employee. Canon 6 of the CPR governing the conduct of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government
service in the discharge of their official apply. Further, Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 states that a lawyer in the
government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor
allow the latter to interfere with his public duties. In this case, respondent’s grave misconduct deals with
his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City
and employing his knowledge of the rules and governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives,
respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant
but also to retain his membership in the bar.
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge
of deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of
disciplinary proceedings.

In the case at bar, respondent's grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and
subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of
his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules
governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his
unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar.

Respondent's conduct manifestly undermined the people's confidence in the public office he used to
occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his
knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to
practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
Bautista v Atty. Ferrer – Rule 6.02
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2019/jul2019/ac_9057_2019.html

Bautista alleged that she had recently accused Ferrer, Assistant Regional State Prosecutor, Office of
the Prosecutor, Region 1, San Fernando City, La Union, with grave coercion, grave threats, grave
oral defamation, unlawful arrest, violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438, theft, and attempted
homicide. As borne by the records, Bautista suggests that she once owed Ferrer ₱200,000.00, but
the latter is now claiming that the amount is already ₱440,000.00.

Bautista was questioned at the police station from2:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., or almost 5 hours. But
despite this, Ferrer did not file any complaint against Bautista, insisting that she merely wanted
to talk to Bautista in front of the police authorities.

It was clearly established, and in fact

admitted by
These police authorities searched Bautista's belongings looking for any clue as to the
whereabouts of Ferrer's money as well as the debtors who borrowed the same. Thus, even
assuming that Ferrer did not really kick, punch, or repeatedly slap Bautista's head, the fact that
Bautista surrendered her cellphone and allowed herself to be brought by Ferrer from one place to
another, from early morning until the evening, shows how Ferrer succeeded in using her high and
powerful position in the government to intimidate Bautista, a mere manicurist and lessee of her
property.

Rule 6.02, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer in government from
using his/her public position or influence to promote or advance his/her private interests.

It was clearly established, and in fact admitted by Ferrer, that she uttered the derogatory remarks in
the confines of her own office. This fact, standing alone, already violates Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the
CPR which prohibits a lawyer from using language which is abusive, offensive, or otherwise
improper.
Atty. Pasok, complainant v Atty. Zapatos, respondent – Rule 6.03
https://chanrobles.com/cralaw/2016octoberdecisions.php?id=882

RULING:

The Court ruled in the affirmative.

Rule 6.03 -A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment
in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC, presided over the case before eventually
inhibiting himself from further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted intervention. It does not
consider the degree or length of the intervention in the particular case or matter. The fact is he
accepted an engagement or employment on a matter in which he had previously intervened.
Further, the restriction extends beyond his tenure as a judge. Accordingly, the fact that he was
already retired and engaged in private practice were immaterial, because he still violated Rule 6.03
due to such engagement.

Samson v Era – Rule 15.03

Hilado v David

FACTS: Petitioner alleged that she and the counsel for the defendant had an attorney-client
relationship with her when, before the trial of the case, she went to defendant’s counsel, gave
him the papers of the case and other information relevant thereto, although she was not able to
pay him legal fees. “That respondent’s law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his
signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of papers she
had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilado's purpose in submitting those papers was to secure
Attorney Francisco's professional services.” Atty. Francisco appeared as counsel for defendant
and plaintiff did not object to it until (4) months after. Then, plaintiff moved to dismiss the case
between her and defendant.

Issue: Was there an attorney-client relationship between plaintiff and Atty. Francisco?
Held: YES. In order to constitute the relation a professional one and not merely one of principal
and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give advice upon a legal point, to
prosecute or defend an action in court of justice, or to prepare and draft, in legal form such
papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like. To constitute professional employment it is not
essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous
occasion. It is not necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for;
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about
which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any
kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such
consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. “An attorney
is employed-that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a lawyer or counselor-when
he is listening to his client's preliminary statement of his case, or when he is giving advice
thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his client's pleadings, or advocating his client's
cause in open court. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his
acting in behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter.”

That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney Agrava and that,
this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by the plaintiff, would not vary
the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilado's statement that other papers, personal and
private in character, were turned in by her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that
the mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the
opposite party's retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by
him from his first client. An attorney, on terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as
counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former
client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the
subsequent adverse employment "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or
counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is
intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the
opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the payment of
such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor
received in payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation
of the client to pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."
Blandina Hilado vs Jose Gutierrez David

FACTS

Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. Attorney
Delgado Dizon represented Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. Atty. Vicente
Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad . Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to
have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that Hilado approached Atty.
Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado
a legal opinion letter. Atty. Francisco opposed the motion for his disqualification. In his opposition, he
said that no material information was relayed to him by Hilado; that in fact, upon hearing Hilado’s story,
Atty. Francisco advised her that her case will not win in court; but that later, Hilado returned with a copy
of the Complaint prepared by Atty. Dizon; that however, when Hilado returned, Atty. Francisco was not
around but an associate in his firm was there (a certain Atty. Federico Agrava); that Atty. Agrava
attended to Hilado; that after Hilado left, leaving behind the legal documents, Atty. Agrava then
prepared a legal opinion letter where it was stated that Hilado has no cause of action to file suit; that
Atty. Agrava had Atty. Francisco sign the letter; that Atty. Francisco did not read the letter as Atty.
Agrava said that it was merely a letter explaining why the firm cannot take on Hilado’s case. Atty.
Francisco also pointed out that he was not paid for his advice; that no confidential information was
relayed because all Hilado brought was a copy of the Complaint which was already filed in court; and
that, if any, Hilado already waived her right to disqualify Atty. Francisco because he was already
representing Assad in court for four months in the said case.

Judge Jose Gutierrez David ruled in favor of Atty. Francisco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.

HELD:

Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence,
Atty. Francisco cannot act as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent. As ruled by the
Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer should
have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the
view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in
such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as established. Section 19 (e) of
Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty “to maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client.” Communications between attorney and client are, in a
great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret
and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between an
attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the
trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant’s cause. We conclude therefore
that the motion for disqualification should be allowed.
Rabanal v Atty Tugade
Diongzon v. Mirano – Rule 15.03

FACTS

The complainant was a businessman engaged in the fishing industry in Bacolod City. In 1979, he retained
the respondent as his legal counsel to represent him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 10679. In November
1981, the complainant again retained the respondent as his lawyer in relation to the execution of two
deeds of sale covering the boats the former was selling to Spouses Gonzalez. In January 1982, the
parties herein signed a retainer contract for legal services that covered legal representation in cases and
transactions involving the fishing business of the complainant. In February 1982, the Gonzaleses sued
the complainant for replevin and damages, and sought the annulment of the aforementioned deeds of
sale. They were represented by Atty. Romeo Flora, the associate of the respondent in his law office. The
bond they filed to justify the manual delivery of the boats had been notarially acknowledged before the
respondent without the knowledge and prior consent of the complainant.

Therefore, the complainant initiated this administrative complaint for disbarment against the
respondent

ISSUE

Was the respondent guilty of representing conflict of interest? YES

RULING

Both parties signed their retainer contract. Contrary to the assertion of the respondent, the retainer
agreement did not contain a suspensive condition that affected its effectivity as of the date of its
execution. It simply stipulated that the respondent would represent the interests of the complainant in
all matters pertaining to his fishing business, thereby formalizing their lawyer-client relationship.

Specifically, Canon 15.03 demands that:"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts." A conflict of interest exists
when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two opposing parties, like when the lawyer performs
an act that will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represented him, or when the
lawyer uses any knowledge he previously acquired from his first client against the latter.

When he appeared in court for the benefit of the Gonzaleses to try the case against the complainant,
the respondent unquestionably incurred a conflict of interest. Having become privy to the terms of the
sale subject of the civil case, the conflict of interest became unmitigated because the complainant had
not expressly consented in writing to his appearing in behalf of the Gonzaleses.
ACCORDINGLY,SUSPENDS Mirano from the practice of law for ONE YEAR
TEODORO B. CRUZ v. GONZAGA, AC. No. 9090, 2016-08-31

Facts:

The present case arose out of a petition for disbarment filed by Atty.
Teodoro B. Cruz, Jr. (complainant) charging respondent Atty. John G.
Reyes (respondent) with intentional misrepresentation, knowingly
handling a case involving conflict of interest, falsification, knowingly
alleging untruths in pleadings and unethical conduct, based on the
following incidents:

Complainant alleged that respondent entered his appearance as counsel

for Mayor Rosito Velarde (Mayor Velarde) of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, in
an election protest case that... was on appeal before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). The case, entitled "Racquel 'BIBI' Reyes de
Guzman, Protestant, versus Mayor Rosito Velarde, Protestee," originated
from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calabanga, Branch 63, Camarines

Complainant alleged that respondent entered his appearance as counsel

for Mayor Rosito Velarde (Mayor Velarde) of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, in
an election protest case that was on appeal before the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC)

Sur. According to the petition for disbarment, "an incident occurred" in

the course of the trial which forced Mayor Velarde to bring an incident up
to the COMELEC on certiorari.[3]

According to the petition for disbarment, "an incident occurred" in the

course of the trial which forced Mayor Velarde to bring an incident up to
the COMELEC on certiorari.[3]

While the case was being tried at the RTC level,... protestant Raquel
Reyes De Guzman (De Guzman) was represented by the Sales Law Office
of Naga City, although Atty. Roque Bello (Atty. Bello), who indicated in the
pleadings that his address is in Cainta, Rizal, was the chief counsel.
Mayor Velarde, on the other hand, was represented by Atty. Gualberto
Manlagnit (Atty. Manlagnit) from Naga City. Atty. Manlagnit prepared the
pleadings in connection with the appeal to the COMELEC but, according
to complainant, unknown... to Atty. Manlagnit, another pleading was filed
before the COMELEC, which pleading was apparently prepared in Cainta,
Rizal but was signed by respondent whose given address is in Quezon
City.[4]

Thus, complainant concluded, Atty. Bello found the expedient of passing

the case to his clandestine partner, respondent Atty. Reyes, making the
latter guilty of representing conflicting interests,[9] in violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

On or before 15 December 2003, former Speaker Fuentebella filed his

Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Congressman of the 3rd District of
Camarines Sur. Complainant also filed a COC for the same position.
Subsequently, a certain Ebeta P. Cruz (Ebeta) and a certain Marita
Montefalcon Cruz-Gulles (Marita) likewise filed their respective COCs for
the aforementioned position. The... former is an indigent laundry woman
from San Jose, Camarines Sur, while the latter was a former casual
laborer of the municipal government of Tigaon, Camarines Sur.[10]
Clearly, both Ebeta Marita had no real intention of running for the position
for which they filed their COC, but were merely instigated to do so in
order to confuse the electorate of the district,... to the disadvantage of
complainant. Consequently, complainant filed a petition to declare Ebeta
and Marita as nuisance candidates.[11]... found respondent guilty of the
charges against him and recommended that he be meted the penalty of
suspension for one (1) month.

We find respondent's motion for reconsideration partially meritorious.

Issues:

respondent argues, such negligence is not the negligence "of

contumacious proportions" warranting the imposition of the penalty of
suspension.

Ruling:

We find respondent's motion for reconsideration partially meritorious

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is

PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court dated 22 August 2012
is hereby modified in that respondent Atty, John G. Reyes is
REPRIMANDED for his failure to exercise the necessary prudence
required... in the practice of the legal profession. He is further WARNED
that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
Junio vs Atty Grupo
Aquino vs Barcelona