People v. Purisima G.R. No. L-42050-66 Nov.
20, 1978
26 petitions for review were filed in 3 separate courts by the People of the Philippines
represented by the Offices of the City Fiscal of Manila, Provincial Fiscal of Samar and the
Solicitor General, involving one basic question of law.
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges issued in the respective cases filed before them — the
details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations,
on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense
penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the
crime.
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City
Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the
questioned orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under
consideration is that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts need not
be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum
penalized for reasons of public policy.
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the
accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in
connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality
in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is
also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons"
is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of Act No.
1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any
bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be
punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period
not exceeding six months, or both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are
deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision,
and repeal by implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with
regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non- observance shall not be excused
by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.
In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree
is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is
the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city
ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant.
When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and interpret the true meaning and
scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle that penal statutes are to be construed and
applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these
cases — the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per
Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and
this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs
which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the
statute."
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty
which otherwise does not exist."
'(L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not
of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction.
For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from
the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with
which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited application if
read together with other provisions.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied.
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a
construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences
Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of
the rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of
forbidden acts.
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms
who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made
clearly so by the statute. The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an
additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws.
Philippine Judges Asso. v. Prado G.R. No. 105371 Nov. 11, 1993
FACTS:
The main target of this petition is **Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354. These measures withdraw the
franking privilege from the SC,CA, RTC, MTC and the Land Registration Commission and its
Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.The petitioners are members of
the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
above-named measures.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:
WON RA No.7354 is unconstitutional based on the following grounds:1) its *title embraces more
than one subject and does not express its purposes;(2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed
among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the
independence of theJudiciary.
HELD:
1. The petitioners' contention is untenable. The title of the bill is not required to be an index
to the body of the act, or to be a comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and
reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
requirement. In the case at bar, the repealing clause which includes the withdrawal of
franking privileges is merely the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the
subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.
2. This argument is unacceptable. While a conference committee is the mechanism for
compromising differences between theSenate and the House, it is not limited in its
jurisdiction to this question. It may propose an entirely new provision. The court also
added that said the bill in question was duly approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives. It was enrolled with its certification by Senate President and Speaker of
the House of Representatives. It was then presented to and approved by President the
President. Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond
the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. An
enrolled bill is conclusive upon the Judiciary. The court therefore declined to look into the
petitioners' charges. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted. The court is bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government
3. Yes, the clause denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all
persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is
not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary
and the grantees of the franking privilege. If the problem of the respondents is the loss of
revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need
it.
Fariñas v. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 147387 Dec. 10, 2003
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it
expressly repeals Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus ElectionCode) which
provides:SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any elective official, whether national or
local,running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity,
except forPresident and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. ActNo.
9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is
unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution,requiring
every law to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of theOmnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of
unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in
a permanent capacity by considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing
of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of Section67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the OmnibusElection Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. – Any person holding a
public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines,and officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By
the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is
holding is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the other hand,Section 66 has been retained; thus, the
limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned from
their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14
thereof,should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that
“[t]hisAct shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of
theConstitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a goodlaw;
hence, should not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Courtin Dimaporo
v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional
mandate on the “Accountability of Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency,act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House
ofRepresentatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members of the House who ran for a seat in theSenate
during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon thefiling of their
respective certificates of candidacy
Issues:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a
violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require
publication of the law before it becomes effective
Ruling:
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that–
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The
Requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable
and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably
to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of that object.
Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be abstract or index of the Act.The title of
Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly,Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006
are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus ElectionCode
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code Be expressed
in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding,to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media
for election propaganda, does not violate the “one subject-one title” rule.This Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title,may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of
harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed.
Theexecutive department found cause with Congress when the President of the Philippines
Signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of society and in government may believe
that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within
the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. It is not for this Court to
look into the wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed,whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory,whether it is the
best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the legislative
discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner
are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of
opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range of judicial cognizance.
Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the ruling of theCourt in Dimaporo v.
Mitra upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement in the same
case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time,Congress may find it imperative to
repeal the law on its belief that the election process
is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws – the fair, honest and orderly
election of truly deserving members of Congress – is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials.The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office
for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.
On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by
an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and
are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it“shall take
effect immediately upon its approval,” is defective. However, the same does not render the
entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:
.. the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other
date without its previous publication
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its
discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. ActNo. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in
constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or
wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government.
When the validity of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds,the sole function of
the court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the limits of
legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this case
