Indian National Congress

This book presents a systematic analysis of the rise and decline of the Indian
National Congress since 1980s, using the frame dominance to hibernation. The
Indian National Congress (INC or Congress Party) originated in the national
movement for India’s freedom and has since been the centrepiece of post-
independence multi-party system for nearly four decades. However, the Congress
has been experiencing a phase of serious decline since the 2014 and 2019 general
elections.
Analysing years of political history and contemporary developments, this
volume brings to the fore important issues and key themes such as

• Evolution of the party system in India, the contemporary dynamics and

movements;
• Indian National Congress under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi;
• Ideological and policy reorientation of the party in the 1990s under P.V.
Narasimha Rao;
• Revival of mass membership and organizational elections in the party;
• Indian National Congress in the 2000s, under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi
and Rahul Gandhi;
• The 2019 debacle and change in the leadership.

A comprehensive work on the history of the Congress Party in India, this volume
will be an essential read for scholars and researchers of political science, party
politics, Indian politics, sociology, modern Indian history, political sociology,
public administration, public policy, South Asian studies, and governance studies.

M.P. Singh, M.A. (Patna), Ph.D. (Alberta), is a former Professor and Head of the
Department of Political Science at the University of Delhi and a former Editor of
the Indian Journal of Public Administration (IIPA/SAGE Publications) and pres-
ently a National Fellow of the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, working
on a two-year research project on Indian Federalism in a Comparative Perspective
with Special Reference to Judicial Federalism. He is also co-editor of the IIAS’s
biannual journal Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences. He was the country
coordinator for India for the Global Dialogue on Federal Systems commissioned by
the Forum of Federations, Ottawa, leading to a book Intergovernmental Relations
in Federal Systems: Comparative Structures Dynamics edited by Johanne Poirier,
Cheryl Saunders, and John Kincaid already published by the Oxford University
Press, New York, 2016. Professor Singh is a leading Indian scholar in the fields of
party systems and governmental institutions with special reference to federalism
and judicial behaviour in India. His latest publications include chapters on Indian
Federalism and the Supreme Court of India in the Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, New York, 2017, 2018.

Rekha Saxena has been a full Professor in the Department of Political Science,
University of Delhi, for more than 12 years. She is the honorary Vice-Chairperson
of the Centre for Multilevel Federalism in New Delhi that is a member of The
International Association of Centers for Federal Studies (IACFS). She is also the
Honorary Senior Advisor to the Forum of Federations, Canada. She was awarded
a doctoral fellowship by Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute where she was affiliated
with Queen’s University Canada (1999–2000). She was also the recipient of the
Shastri Indo-Canadian Institute’s Faculty Research (2003), and Faculty Enrichment
(2011) Awards to visit Canada, where she was affiliated with the Department of
Political Studies and IIGR at Queens University, the University of Toronto, and
McGill University. Rekha Saxena has published over a dozen books. Her recent
publications include New Dimensions in Federal Discourse in India, Routledge
(2021, edited), The Value of Comparative Federalism, Routledge (2021, coedited),
Varieties of Federal Governance: Major Contemporary Models, Foundation:
Cambridge University Press, India (2010), The 2019 Parliamentary Elections in
India (2022), Indian Judiciary: The changing Landscape (2014), and The Indian
Judiciary: The Changing Landscape (2007, co-edited).
Indian National Congress
From Dominance to Decline or Hibernation?

M. P. Singh and Rekha Saxena

First published 2024
by Routledge
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© 2024 M. P. Singh and Rekha Saxena
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this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
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without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-0-367-67448-9 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-18466-1 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-25467-6 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003254676
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by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
Contents

List of tables vi
Prefacevii
Acknowledgementsviii

1 The party system in India 1

2 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 28

3 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 59

4 The Indian National Congress since 2000 79

Conclusion 92

Bibliography101
Index107


Tables

2.1 Social and political background of Congress MPs in the 1980s 34

2.2 Social and political background of Congress MPs in the 1980s 50
3.1 AICC delegates by States at Tirupati, 1992 72
3.2 Ten CWC members elected by AICC at Tirupati, 1992 76
4.1 Congress Performance in 2004 general elections 81
4.2 UPA alliances performances in 2004 general election 82
4.3 Congress performance in 2009 general election 83
4.4 UPA alliances performances in 2009 general election 84
4.5 Congress performance in 2014 general election 86
4.6 Congress performance in 2019 general election 88
4.7 INC (Congress) performance over the last two decades (2004–2009) 89


Preface

Despite its origins in the national movement for India’s freedom and serving as
the centrepiece of the post-independence one-party dominant system for nearly
four decades (with brief breaks in the late 1960s and 1970s), the Indian National
Congress (INC or Congress Party or simply Congress) has been in serious decline
since the 2014 and 2019 general elections. Since the 1989 general elections and the
emergence of federal coalition administrations, national and state party structures
have been separated and different when they formerly overlapped significantly.
Today, the contours of the Indian party system must be examined in terms of the
following dimensions: (i) the national party system, (ii) the state party systems, (iii)
analytical foci on the two major national parties—the Bharatiya Janata Party and
the Indian National Congress, (iv) the cluster of regional parties, and (v) the inter-
relationships between all of these elements in the bicameral parliamentary arena
and the legislative arenas in various states. Despite the fact that the Congress party
is widely perceived to be in terminal decline, the BJP is on the rise, challenging the
Congress’s traditional dominance.
Since 1989, three national parties have led multi-party federal coalitional gov-
ernments: the Janata Dal-led National Front or United Front, the BJP-led National
Democratic Alliance, and the INC-led United Progressive Alliance. One of the
three largest national parties, Janata Dal, has been fatally divided into regional or
one-state parties. The BJP and the INC are the two remaining national parties in
the campaign. By the way, the INC in 2009 and the BJP in 2019 are the only reign-
ing parties to have been re-elected since 1989. Even while the former is currently
in serious decline, we believe it is appropriate to describe it as a party in slumber
rather than in terminal decline or disintegration. This is due to two factors. For one
thing, its heritage, wealth, and political presence are far too significant to dismiss.
Second, it is the only alternative national party to the BJP that emerges by default
if the current party loses power. And, because we believe that, despite its flaws,
Indian democracy is still a working thing, despite certain doomsayers, the only
other national party in opposition must be researched and analysed.


Acknowledgements

The idea to produce this volume originated in our mutual discussions on the Indian
party politics over several decades when the Indian National Congress (INC) domi-
nated the national scene. M.P. Singh’s Ph.D. thesis was on the 1969 Congress Split,
and since then he has been constantly writing on the party system and federalism in
India. Rekha Saxena’s M.Phil. dissertation was also on the changing nature of the
party system, and she has also been researching on party politics and federalism.
The INC is the oldest national party, but there was a dearth of scholarly literature
on it. However, it has taken us quite some time to prepare this volume for publica-
tion. It has been partly delayed due to our engagements in other academic activities
and partly due to COVID-19.
We have been students and colleagues of Rajni Kothari and have been intrigued
by his works on the INC. We are grateful to some party leaders, academicians,
and journalists who spared time for sharing their valuable insights with us. We
are thankful to Alisha Dhingra, Divyangna Sharma, Sumit Kumar, Raushan
Thakur, Akshay Bhambhari and Utsav Kr. Singh for helping us in various ways
in putting together this volume. Thanks are due to our family, friends, colleagues,
and students who have always been a motivating force behind every endeavour.
We understand the exceptional patience and understanding of our publishers,
Routledge, in particular of Shashank Sinha, Antara Ray Choudhary, and Brinda
Sen who were enthusiastic about the Book from the very beginning. We hope it
is an engaging experience for our readership who have been a major driving force
for our project.
M P Singh and Rekha Saxena


1 The party system in India

The origins
The term ‘party’ in India has often been used loosely and sometimes even applied
to the Mughal and early British periods of Indian history.1 However, for these rudi-
mentary manifestations of the phenomena vaguely reminiscent of political parties,
it may well be conceptually preferable to use terms such as ‘factions,’ ‘interests,’
‘groups,’ ‘cliques,’ and ‘cabals’, in place of parties as we know them today. For,
as Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (1966, p. 3) aptly observe: ‘The politi-
cal party is a creature of modern and modernizing political systems.’ As a tradi-
tional society moves from a political system predominantly based on status to one
based on contract2 to one predominantly based on ‘coercive state apparatus to one
based on ‘ideological state apparatus,’ political parties in one form or the other are
required as instruments of representative and responsible government.
The institutional context of the British Raj and the sociological context of the
transition of the Indian feudal social order into the democratic and capitalist one
provided the impetus for the origins of the first Indian political parties.3 Two fea-
tures of this dual environment accounted for the slow and halting growth of party
politics in the colony, and their legacies to this day in some ways explain why
Indian parties are often found to be organizationally and ideologically inadequately
developed. The imperial and colonial imperatives of British rule dictated a govern-
ment of bureaucratic despotism, and the semi-feudal social structure of the colony
retarded the fuller growth of associational activities with modern purposes and
organizations. The self-serving greater emphasis of the British rulers on the expan-
sion of education than on industrial development in India resulted in the pattern of
modernity in which professional middle classes proliferated much more rapidly
than commercial and industrial classes. The semi-feudal structures and classes also
for this reason underwent a slower change in India than in the West. This engen-
dered the tendency of ‘ideologism’ in the intellectual classes and issueless fac-
tionalism and opportunism in the less modernized sections of society—a tendency
that persists. Party organizations were even slower in making their appearance and
developing in the princely states under the direct rule of the British Crown than in
the British Indian provinces.
The first organizations loosely resembling modern political parties emerged in
India in the conjuncture of a series of interrelated changes such as constitutional

DOI: 10.4324/9781003254676-1
2 The party system in India

reforms appending appointed ‘legislative councils’ consisting of British offi-

cials and Indians at central and provincial levels under the Indian Councils Act
of 1861, the setting up of local self-governing bodies in cities/towns and rural
areas, the introduction of English education, and the emergence of print media
and networks of transportation and communication. The formation of the Indian
National Congress in 1885 was indeed preceded by the mushrooming of landed
associations and middle-class urban organizations (Misra, 1961, Ch. 1). The Indian
National Congress and the Liberal Party that functioned inside it until 1918—when
it became an independent party to be soon eclipsed by a revitalized Congress under
strands of more mass-oriented leaderships—were in some limited sense com-
parable to Maurice Duverger’s (1954) ‘internally’ created parties in European
Parliaments. The subsequent phases of party formation in India are correlated with
the extension of the franchise and deepening of politicization of castes and com-
munities, and the growing tempo of the nationalist movement in colonial India and
of electoral politics after independence. Social, cultural, economic, and regional
cleavages of the Indian society provided the rationale for these party formations.
Most of the non-Congress parties were formed either in the 1920s–1930s or after
the onset of full-fledged electoral politics based on universal adult franchise fol-
lowing independence: Communist Party in India in 1920, Congress Social Party
in 1934 and its successors Socialist Party in 1948 and its offshoots Praja Socialist
Party in 1952 and Sanyukta Socialist Party in 1965; Muslim League 1906; Justice
Party of Madras in 1917 and its successors Dravida Kazhagam in 1944, Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam in 1948, and All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in 1972;
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in and its political arm Hindu Mahasabha in 1915;
Akali Dal in 1920s; National Conference in 1938; Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1951;
Swatantra Party in 1959; a number of parties in Northeast in the 1970s and later;
Janata Party in 1977 and its successor(s) Janata Dal(s) in the 1980s–1990s; Telugu
Desam Party in 1983; Asom Gan Parishad in 1985; Sikkim Sangram Parishad in
1983; Sikkim Democratic Front in 1994; and so on. The parties formed during
the nationalist movement are comparable to Duverger’s (1954) ‘externally’ cre-
ated parties of European countries whose mainsprings lay in the socio-political
forces largely mobilized during the national movement. The parties that came to be
formed after the independence were primarily motivated by the objective of elec-
toral mobilization of universal adulthood suffrage for parliamentary and regional
power.
The ideological, and quite often organizational, antecedents of almost all major
contemporary Indian political parties may well be traced back to the British Raj.
‘Broadly speaking,’ writes the historian B.B. Misra (1961, p. 10), ‘Indian politics
moved forward with the Congress in the Centre flanked by the Left on one side and
the Right on the other, the latter including both Hindu and Muslim communalists.’
With only a slight modification, this historical picture continued to be broadly typi-
cal of the post-independence party system for most of the time from the 1950s to
the present. The new parties to emerge after 1947 like, for example, the Bharatiya
Jan Sangh (1951) and Swatantra Party (1959) as well as the myriad splinters of
Congress, Janata, Communist, and Sangh (RSS) parivars (families) can be most
 The party system in India 3

often directly, and occasionally indirectly, linked to party pedigrees going back
to the colonial period. Even some of the regional parties (e.g. Dravidian parties
of the Tamil region, Akali Dal of Punjab, and the National Conference of Jammu
and Kashmir) originated as far back as the 1920s and the 1930s, essentially on the
Sikh Right and Muslim left, respectively, if with populist pretensions. Most of the
new regional parties are, however, a post-independence development linked to the
processes of modernization and politicization reaching out to the peripheries (e.g.
the Northeast) and assertion of regional interests and identities in some areas previ-
ously under Congress dominance (e.g. Telugu Desam Party, Asom Gana Parishad).
They reflect the growing pitch of regionalism in the country and the federalization
of the political system.
Besides the rather long history of Indian political parties, another characteristic
of them is that almost all parties to emerge in the colonial period were confeder-
ated into a nationalist platform, forming a broad anti-colonial movement under the
hegemony of the Indian National Congress. Founded in 1885, the Congress ini-
tially demanded no more than increased participation of Indians in the bureaucratic
state established by the British rulers on the ruins of the feudal states and patri-
monial bureaucracies that prevailed in pre-colonial India. By the 1920s, however,
Congress turned into a nationalist movement for Indian independence. It contained
some of the political organizations of the period (e.g. Congress Socialist Party,
Swaraj Party) as subgroups within itself or established cooperative or confederal
linkages with most of the parties outside it (e.g. Communist Party of India, Hindu
Mahasabha, Akali Dal, Scheduled Castes Federation, Praja Parishads and Mandals
in Indian princely states). Only the Muslim League, Unionist Party in Punjab,
and Justice Party in Madras mainly remained beyond the pale of Congress orbit.
Illustrative of the attitude of the non-Congress parties in alliance with the Congress
towards it is the stance of the CPI. To quote Shashi Joshi (1992, pp. 20–21):
The Communists in India maintained for long periods of time that the Indian
National Congress (INC) was a party of the bourgeoisie, and that it did not and
could not represent the masses. Yet, in 1936, the Dutt-Bradley thesis on the ‘Anti-
Imperialist People’s Front in India’ felt compelled to acknowledge that the INC
was already the united front of the Indian people in the national struggle, because it
had carried out the gigantic task of uniting the diverse forces of the Indian people,
and it remained the principal mass organization seeking national liberation.
After the Soviet Union entered into the Second World War there was, however,
the communist volte face such that the ‘imperialist war’ turned overnight into a
“peoples” war.’
The persistence of Congress’s dominance at the national level, with only
brief deviations, from the colonial period to the late 1980s encompassed lim-
ited franchise elections as well as those based on a universal franchise under the
1950 Constitution. The first breaches in Congress dominance at the State level
occurred in 1967, a decade earlier than the first rout of the Congress at the Centre
in 1977. The dismissal of Sardar Patel’s place in the post-Patel Congress and the
denial of a ticket to his son, and the intra-party feud between the dynasts and the
syndicate eventually resulted in the party split and the creation of Congress (O).
4 The party system in India

The party’s split into two opposition camps of old established leaders known as
syndicate, led by Deputy Prime Minister Morarji Desai and consecutive Congress
Party Presidents K. Kamaraj and S. Nijalingappa, on one side, and Indira and her
supporters on the other, kept intra-party pulls at a high pitch for quite some time.
The ideological divergences were crystallized by the syndicate’s pursuit of a lib-
eral agenda, which Congress had to follow around two centuries later, and Indira
and her allies’ leanings, which included socialists and the left as well, towards
increasing state control and nationalization policies. All of this culminated in some
key constitutional revisions and the implementation of policies that provided fresh
direction to the Indian state.
During this long period, Congress held power in colonial councils and legisla-
tures with limited legislative and executive powers as well as within the Constituent
Assembly-cum-provisional Parliament, which in turn was followed by the national
Parliament first elected in 1952. The same goes for provincial State legislatures.
Moreover, Congress also witnessed the transition in its leadership such that its
predominantly urban, English-educated, middle-class, upper-caste profile was
replaced by a predominantly rural, vernacular-educated middle-class, middle-caste
leadership as the post-independence decades rolled by. Further, in regional terms,
the earlier Congress dominance was built on the political mobilization of coastal
regions of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. By the 1920s the centre of political grav-
ity in the Congress movement had shifted to the Hindi heartland.
Political parties in India today are largely a part of the conventions of the consti-
tutions rather than the written constitution and the laws of the land which mention
parties incidentally rather than lay down elaborately the rules for party forma-
tion and working. Usually, all one needs to form a party is an announcement to
the press, putting up a signboard somewhere, and registration with the Election
Commission of India under the Representation of People Act, 1951. This explains
the ‘phenomenon of an incredibly large number of political parties in the country’.
The absence of detailed laws governing the organization of parties allows flexibil-
ity in the operation of a complex parliamentary-federal system. However, much of
the malfunctioning of the parties is now being increasingly attributed to the present
lack of legal prescriptions governing party organizations, finances, and objectives
and poor implementation of whatever laws there are. The Indian political system
has been only gradually responding to this malaise by prescribing some rules and
moral codes of conduct, but these are not enough.
An aspect of the constitutional-legal framework significantly affecting the
nature of the party system is the representation and voting system. India has opted
for the plurality or first-past-the-post electoral system with voting in single-mem-
ber constituencies, as in Britain, Canada, the United States, etc. The result is a
zero-sum electoral game in which any party or candidate getting the largest number
of votes—not necessarily a majority of votes especially if contenders are more
than two—wins, taking credit for all the votes. The system often leads to a wide
discrepancy between the proportions of votes and seats won by the party. The non-
Congress parties that had been in the opposition most of the time since independ-
ence had been very bitter about their lot under the plurality system which favoured
 The party system in India 5

the Congress as the largest party and worked to the disadvantage of smaller and
upcoming parties. Regional parties with a regional concentration of their strength
in particular States of the country are to some extent immune to the tendency of
this electoral system to reward major parties to the disadvantage of smaller parties.
Thus federal features of Indian polity and society reward smaller, regional parties.
But smaller parties in opposition with wide dispersal of their votes throughout the
country become particularly vulnerable to the vagaries of the plurality system. In
the era of Congress predominance, both academic and journalistic commentary and
opposition parties were very critical of this electoral system. But in recent years
the political ire against it has receded with the decline of Congress dominance and
the emergence of a multi-party system. This may explain the decreasing concern
with this theme in academic writings, party discourses, and packages of electoral
reforms put forward by governmental and non-governmental committees.4

The evolution
Since the first general elections in 1952, one can delineate at least six phases in
the evolution of the party system in India.5 The first phase conceptualized as the
‘Congress system’ (Rajni Kothari, 1964, 1970, ch. 5; 1974) and ‘one party domi-
nant system’ (W.H. Morris-Jones, 1987, ch. 5; 1998, Parts 2 & 3) may be dated from
1952 to 1969. This was the phase of one-party dominance, as only the Congress, a
party with internal organizational elections and considerable local autonomies, was
voted time and again with overwhelming parliamentary majorities by a plurality
(not a majority) of votes in democratically contested elections. It coincided with
the Nehru and Shastri premierships and the pre-1969 premiership of Indira Gandhi.
The style of electoral politics and mobilization typical in this phase may be
called the ‘locality-oriented pluralist network model.’ This model displayed com-
plex multi-layered factional and party-political structures that were locally artic-
ulated along caste, community, and factional lines in villages and districts and
aggregated at the State level by reasonably autonomous sets of party elites in vari-
ous States. These intermediary power structures were overlaid with a nationally
aggregating supra-regional coalition of national leaders led by Jawaharlal Nehru
during his long premiership. Nehru’s premiership style may be called a ‘pluralist
parliamentary’ one in contrast to the ‘neo-patrimonial’ premiership style of Indira
Gandhi and the ‘federal’ premiership style of the post-1989 Prime Ministers.6 This
was the period of ‘consociational’ dominance of the Congress Party ruling with
overwhelming majorities in the Parliament and almost all State legislatures. At
the frosty Himalayan heights of the Congress power structure sat Nehru, ingen-
iously redesigning the structure of the new, mixed economy with the dominant
public sector. Especially after Patel’s demise in December 1950, the ‘Nehru-Patel
drumvirate’ (Michael Brecher, 1959) yielded place to Nehru’s unquestioned demo-
cratic dominance in the party and the government. In the words of Sarvepalli Gopal
(1979, Vol. 2, p. 196), Nehru’s authoritative biographer:
To Nehru democratic government was a fine art, the achievement of cooperation
within a series of widening circles which gave a sense of participation to everyone
6 The party system in India

involved. He exploited his dominance to secure, as he hoped, its destruction. It was

a magnificent effort that did not quite come off.
Gopal offers instances of autonomy and the free exchange of views between the
Prime Minister and opposition party leaders and State government functionaries.
As Prime Minister, Nehru used to write fortnightly letters to the Chief Ministers
on various problems facing the governments of the day. Illustrative of his role as
the Prime Minister and nation-builder is the following excerpt from such a letter
of 5 June 1952:
Since I wrote to you last, we have had prolonged discussions in Parliament
on the President’s address. We are now having discussions on the budget. As the
strength of the Opposition in Parliament has increased and there are representa-
tives there of different schools of thought, the debates are a little more lively than
they used to be. I think we should welcome this. Indeed an effective Opposition is
desirable from many points of view. It may, and it does, delay the disposal of mat-
ters. It may, occasionally prove somewhat irritating. Nevertheless, it tends to keep
Government and the majority party wide awake. Also, it brings a certain reality in
our debates and thus helps in the political education of the country. (Nehru, 1987,
Vol. 3, p. 1)
However, despite his predominance in the government and party and his immense
popularity in the country at large, Nehru often appeared tilting at the windmills of
the semi-feudal society through only partially successful land reforms and rural
community development measures. The lower levers of power were operated by the
conservative urban and rural middle-class leadership well-versed in mobilizing the
masses and moderating the Nehruvian rhetoric and reforms. These were stalled in
State legislatures and their administrative implementation. In electoral campaigns
during this phase, Nehru trod the land like a colossus, but only occasionally and
only partly digging into the multi-layered village and district factional alliances; a
more pervasive reach to the grassroots was yet to come. He was deputized in his
endeavours by a largely autonomous but generally deferential Congress leadership
in the States. Towards the fag end of his pluralist-parliamentary premiership there
developed in the party a syndicate of powerful regional leaders that played a crucial
role in influencing Lal Bahadur Shastri’s succession to Nehru in 1964 and Indira
Gandhi’s succession to Shastri in 1966 (Michael Brecher, 1966).
The second phase of the post-independence party system was a brief spell of
multi-partisan configuration following the 1969 Congress split between the Indira
and the Syndicate factions, giving rise to the ruling Congress and the Opposition
Congress. The Congress(O)—O, for Organization, suggestive of a split broadly
between the parliamentary and organizational wings of the party—became the first
official opposition in the Parliament. Earlier, the weak presence of the opposition
parties never enabled any party to cross the threshold of the requisite percentage
of seats (i.e. percent) to claim the status of the official opposition. The Congress
led by Indira Gandhi remained the largest single party in the Parliament, but its
Government was reduced to minority status. It survived with the support of nearly
half a dozen leftist and regional parties, which did not formally join the govern-
ment, however. Besides, the Congress governments and State party organizations
 The party system in India 7

in Gujarat, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and metropolitan Bombay (where the Congress
organization enjoyed the status of a ‘Pradesh’ unit) did not align with Indira
Gandhi’s Congress (M.P. Singh, 1981, ch. 4).
The third phase of the party system evolution since independence may be called
the one-party dominant system under the restored Indian National Congress led by
Indira Gandhi. It may be dated from 1971 to 1977. This new system of Congress
predominance that subsequently came to pass was different from the Congress sys-
tem of the Nehru era in as much as it was centrally controlled by Indira Gandhi.
She stamped out much of the autonomy of the State party organizations and gov-
ernments. Her administration also later came under increasing pressure from extra-
parliamentary mass movements led by Morarji Desai and Jayaprakash Narayan,
opposition parties and State governments, and judicial organs of the aggregate
state.
This phase of the party system was characterized by a style of electoral mobiliza-
tion which may be called the ‘nationally oriented personalized mass appeal model’
in which politics in India became highly centralized. In addition, two features of
the Nehru era—autonomous State Congress leaderships and locality orientation of
the electorate—came to be seriously undermined by a personalized mass appeal of
the national leader, bypassing the intermediary structures of power and seeking to
‘nationalize’ political issues by the populist slogans of garibi hatao (eradicate pov-
erty) and political stability in the 1971 Lok Sabha elections and by bids to national
power when firmly returned to government. During the crisis in the Congress
around the 1969 party split federalizing tendencies briefly appeared on the scene,
as Mrs. Gandhi sought cooperation in her conflict with the old guard leadership
from a new generation of national and regional leadership in her party and from
the opposition parties (M.P. Singh, 1981m chs. 4 and 5). However, once she was
electorally restored to an unassailable position, forces of centralization prevailed
over those of decentralization. There came a period of centralized dominance by
the Congress party under Indira Gandhi involving a new style of executive leader-
ship which, for want of a better term, may be called ‘neo-patrimonial’ premiership.
Mrs. Gandhi developed it bit by bit by giving the call for a ‘committed’ civil ser-
vice and judiciary, dispensing with internal democracy within her party and federal
autonomy of State governments, and making a direct mass appeal to the electorate
without the intermediation of middle-level elites. Her drive for personal power and
appropriation of the state apparatus also pitched her in a running battle with big
business, princes, landed interests producing, and traders marketing surplus grains.
The fourth phase of the party system evolution displayed a brief but strong bi-
partisan tendency. For the first time in India, a two-party system appeared which
was in existence from 1977 to mid-1979 (or 1980) when two parties—Janata and
Congress—account for 80 percent of seats and 77.5 percent of votes. In some ways,
this was precursive of a freer play of regional and federal forces. However, a fuller
development in this direction proved to be abortive. This was not only because of
the premature fall of the Janata Party government but also because organizational
lineages and geographical bases of the party (broadly coinciding with the Hindi
heartland and contiguous States) made it an essentially centrist and nationally
8 The party system in India

oriented political formation. The expectations of the emergence of a responsible

two-party system were also belied. For the five constituents of the Janata Party—
Congress(O), Bharatiya Lok Dal, Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Socialist, and Congress for
Democracy deserters during and after the Emergency—never fully integrated into
a single party, their formal merger notwithstanding. Intense factional feuds proved
to be the nemesis of this surrogate Congress.
The fifth phase of the party system, dating from 1980 to 1989, may be called
the Indira Gandhi and the Rajiv Gandhi phase of Congress restoration. It meant, at
least in part, a reversal of the federalizing trend of the Janata phase, although it was
more characteristic of the mother’s regime than that of the son, which displayed a
somewhat greater receptivity to regionalism and federalism, signing or witnessing
comprehensive accords or agreements with Akali Dal, Asom Gana Parishad, Mizo
National Front, and Tripura National Volunteers. The 1980s witnessed a diver-
gence between political trends at the Centre and those in the States. The Congress
restoration in 1980 and re-election in 1984 at the Centre coincided with its defeat
in the State Assembly elections in Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Sikkim in 1983.
In Karnataka there appeared the interesting phenomenon of the electorate voting
the Janata Party to power in the State in 1983 but sending a larger Congress contin-
gent to the Lok Sabha in 1984.
The inter-party dynamics that developed in the 1980s showed the Congress in
power at the Centre and in the majority of States (including the major ones) flanked
by several regional and nominally national parties in power in some States, on the
one hand, and several formally all-India but practically regional opposition par-
ties, on the other. Two major clusters of non-Congress configurations appeared
in the 1980s. First, a series of conclaves of non-Congress parties mainly from
the outer circles of the non-Hindi Southern Chief Ministers’ council convened at
the initiative of Ramakrishna Hegde, the Janata Chief Minister of Karnataka, and
attended by all the non-Congress Chief Ministers of the South (Congress Chief
Minister of Kerala heading the United Democratic Front coalition government was
invited but chose to stay away) (the council has not met subsequently); second, the
Vijayavada conference of non-Congress Chief Ministers and parties hosted by N.T.
Rama Rao, the Telugu Desam Chief Minister of Andhra, the Srinagar meet called
by Dr. Farooq Abdullah, the National Conference Chief Minister of Jammu and
Kashmir, and the Calcutta Conference convened by Jyoti Basu, the CPI(M) Chief
Minister of West Bengal. These occasions were used mainly to voice the common
apprehensions from the demands upon the Congress-controlled Centre aimed at
warding off central interference and interventions in their States and restructuring
the federal arrangement by allocating greater power and revenue resources to the
States, among others.
The second major cluster of opposition parties was that of non-Congress, non-
Communist all-India parties in the Hindi-speaking States and neighbouring Orissa,
Gujarat, and Maharashtra. The 1980s witnessed two alliances of such parties:
(1) the National Democratic Alliance forged by BJP and Lok Dal, after the lat-
ter’s brief flirtations with Jagjivan Ram’s Janata (J) (subsequently Congress-J);
and (2) the United Front consisting of Janata Party, Congress (Sharad), H.N.
 The party system in India 9

Bahuguna’s Socialist Democratic Party, Ratubhai Adanis Rashtriya Congress,

Maneka Gandhi’s Sanjay Manch, and Chandrajit Yadav’s Janvadi Party. The
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) sought to realign the predominantly rural
Lok and predominantly urban BJP—the two factional constituents in the Janata
Party earlier whose collision had set off the chain reaction leading to the collapse
of the ruling Janata Party in 1979. The BJP’s drawing closer to the Lok Dal was
dictated by electoral calculations; it reflected the ideological moderation of the BJP
as evidenced by its willingness to rub shoulders with the former Congressmen and
Socialists in the Lok Dal. The Janata Dal-led United Front was an odd assortment
of essentially ‘Congress-culture’ parties—all narrowly regional and even personal
in following, including the leading party albeit less so than others. The leadership
of this train-compartment-like company mainly comprised former Congressmen
in some Hindi-speaking and adjacent States who broke away from the Congress,
much like the periodically shed antlers of a barasingha, at various points in the
1970s and 1980s. Only Janata Party had a modicum of a wider base, including a
State Government (Karnataka) in collaboration with Karnataka Kranti Ranga (a
Congress-Indira splinter), BJP, and the two communist parties (supporting without
joining the Government). The ruling Karnataka unit of the Janata Party, however,
appeared to be somewhat at odds with its national-level party in the political wil-
derness.7 (The Janata Party became the Janata Dal in 1988.)
The major communist parties kept aloof from the foregoing groupings of non-
Congress parties. The CPI and CPI(M) continued to maintain their separate identi-
ties, unity among whom remained as illusive as Socialist unity had been during
much of the 1950s and 1960s. They differed in their assessment of the Congress—
always a major factor in the formulation of the party lines by them. The CPI(M)
pursued a rather mutually contradictory two-pronged strategy, one arm of which
was a broad ‘anti-authoritarian front’ (which in effect, meant an anti-Congress
front), and the other arm a ‘left democratic front’; the former could include even the
rightist BJP which the latter excluded. The CPI’s formulation, on the other hand,
made an ingenious distinction between the sound foreign policy of the Congress
Government at the Centre and their anti-working class domestic policies, the corol-
lary being, of course, that CPI would support the former but oppose the latter.
The sixth phase of the party system may be dated from the 1989 Lok Sabha
elections.8 Indian elections have always been multi-party elections. But the nature
of the party system acquired a multi-partisan character in terms of the systemic
relevance of more than only one or two parties for governance for the first time
since 1989. It had a bumpy, unstable start and a very precarious existence for about
a year and a half under two minority governments formed first by the National
Front (consisting of Janata Dal, Telugu Desam, DMK, Asom Gana Parishad, and
Congress-Socialist) and later by the Samajvadi Janata Party. The former was led
by V.P. Singh and supported from the parliamentary floor by the leftist parties and
BJP, and the latter led by Chandra Shekhar was propped up by Congress(I). The
mid-term elections in May–June 1991 again brought about a ‘hung’ Parliament and
a minority government, this time formed by the veteran P.V. Narasimha Rao and
supported from the floor by a wide spectrum of parties. About a couple of years
10 The party system in India

later Rao was able to cobble together a working majority through splits and merg-
ers involving some collateral parties, mainly Janata Dal led by Ajit Singh and its
sprinters within the Parliament. The Rao Congress Government was followed after
the 1996 Lok Sabha election by the Deve Gowda and Gujarat-led United Front
Governments, both brought down by the withdrawal of Congress support to the
minority Governments from the parliamentary floor. The 1998 Lok Sabha polls
brought the BJP-led alliance to power, which too was prematurely brought down
by the rebellion of its Tamil Nadu ally AIADMK. After yet another mid-term poll
in 1991, the BJP-led alliance, National Democratic Alliance, formed yet another
coalition government in October 1999.
The new party system has generated a dynamics in which three major parties—
Congress(I), Janata Dal, and BJP—and nearly half a dozen smaller leftwing and
regional parties have become systemically relevant for governance both at the
Centre and in the States where a wide spectrum of parties and coalitions have
come to power. Even a cursory glance yields more than half a dozen major coa-
litional configurations among parties: (1) Congress(I) and its allies, e.g. National
Conference, some parties in the Northeast, and until about a couple of years back
AIADMK. To these must be added the shifting Parliamentary support managed
by the government at the Centre for its package of legislation and constitutional
amendments; (2) the National Front-Left Front alliance since the late 1980s, sub-
sequently yielding place to the BJP-led alliance since 1998; (3) Left Fronts in
West Bengal and Kerala led by CPI(M); (4) Left Democratic Front in Kerala led
by Congress(I); (5) BJP-Shiv Sena alliance in Maharashtra; (6) Samajvadi Party
Bahujan Samaj Party minority government in U.P. supported from outside by
Janata Dal and Congress(I) later replaced by BJP-BSP coalition government which
in turn was replaced by BJP-led coalition Government; (7) Janata Dal minority
governments in Bihar and its legislative allies CPI, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha, and
Indian People’s Front and latter RJD-Congress coalition government in the State;
(8) some governing and opposition coalitions in the Northeast; (9) a governing
coalition led by Congress in Goa, where the Congress being the largest single party
in the Assembly after the 1994 elections was given a month’s time to prove its
majority, and so on and so forth.
The seventh phase began in 1999 and concluded in 2014. It resulted in a multi-
party system with a federal coalition/minority government at the federal level. The
previous decade’s (the 1980s) trend of regionalization of politics had an impact on
New Delhi by the 1990s, when broad power-sharing with stronger regional parties
became necessary on the part of three major national parties—Janata Dal (JD),
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and Indian National Congress (INC)—that alternately
ruled at the helm of the United Front (UF), National Democratic Alliance (NDA),
and United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The BJP’s meteoric rise from third to
first place among national parties, after the Congress and the Janata Dal, marked
this period of party system development. The BJP’s rise to power as the coali-
tion’s leader is linked to the assertion of Hindu identity through the Ayodhya Ram
Mandir Movement, which is backed by electoral mobilization. The states where
the BJP had some sway were classified as ‘primary,’ ‘secondary,’ and ‘tertiary’
 The party system in India 11

by Oliver Heath. In the 1950s and 1960s, Jana Sangh emerged as a viable opposi-
tion party in the primary states (e.g. Rajasthan, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Delhi,
UP, and Himachal Pradesh). Before the 1989 boom, secondary states were those
where the Jana Sangh and, later, the BJP established themselves (e.g. Karnataka,
Bihar, Goa, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Assam, Punjab, and Haryana).
Following 1989, the BJP expanded in the tertiary states (e.g. Kerala, Tamil Nadu,
West Bengal, and Northeastern States).
To quote Heath:

In each successive step that the BJP makes away from its home-land of the
primary States, the groups that have expanded the most also move a step
down the ladder of the party’s traditional support base. Thus in the primary
States, which represent the core of the party’s stronghold, its core source of
social support, that of the upper castes, has remained intact. The only other
community that has been significantly mobilized in this region is that of the
Scheduled Tribes.

The 2004 Lok Sabha elections resulted in the formation of a new coalition at the
Centre. This coalition was led by the Indian National Congress, with the Left par-
ties led by the CPI providing the most parliamentary support (M). This coalition is
an alliance of left-wing parties and Congress. The Congress has shifted to the right
on economic issues since the Rao Congress government accelerated neoliberal eco-
nomic reforms in 1991. The left parties attempted to build bridges with Congress
throughout the NDA regime, but the latter remained largely apathetic. Following
the failure of the BJP-led NDA’s rise to power, the Congress allied with the Left,
resulting in the largest-ever contingent of leftwing MPs in the Lok Sabha, with
63 elected. Indeed, the realignment of voters in favour of Congress and its pre-
election allies indicated a strategic electoral shift in favour of the Congress in the
rural sector, as well as among Muslims and Scheduled Castes who had previously
voted against the Congress.
The post-election Common Minimum Programme of the United Progressive
Alliance, led by Congress, interpreted the poll results in terms of the people vot-
ing for ‘secular, progressive forces, for parties wedded to the welfare of farmers,
agricultural labor, weavers, workers, and weaker sections of society, for parties
irrevocably committed to the well-being of the common man across the country.’
Reporting on a national probability sample survey of the 2004 Lok Sabha polls,
Yogendra Yadav observed:

Some distinctive patterns of caste and community support are evident for
various coalitions and parties. For example, the NDA registered a marked
lead of more than twenty percentage points over the UPA among the upper
Hindu castes. In lower caste clusters, there was a gradual decline in sup-
port for the NDA, though it continued to have an edge over the UPA. On
the other hand, the UPA decisively scored over the NDA among Dalits,
Adivasis, Muslims, and Christians. The UPA’s lead amounted to more than
12 The party system in India

forty percentage points among the Muslims and Christians followed by fif-
teen percent among the Dalits and slightly less than ten percent among the
Adivasis. The Left support was more concentrated in a few States than in
most others. The BSP [Bahujan Samaj Party of the ‘reservation aristocracy’
of the Scheduled Castes] got about one-fifth of the Dalit vote nationwide
as compared to the Samajwadi Party which secured about one-sixth of the
Muslim vote. The Samajwadi Party also had strong support among Yadav.20

In the 2009 elections, the previous pattern of party fragmentation persisted, though
the situation improved slightly for the Congress-led UPA coalition, which formed
the government once more. It grew significantly in size from 215 seats in 2004 to
261 seats in 2009. The Congress increased its seat count from 145 to 201, making
it less vulnerable to coalition partners’ internal blackmail. The BJP-led NDA’s
representation was reduced from 186 to 159 seats. The BJP’s total dropped from
138 to 121 seats. Parties’ seats outside of these two major coalitions fell from
136 in 2004 to 124 in 2009. The left-wing parties’ seats were reduced from 59 to
24. Attempts to bring together third-force parties other than the UPA and NDA
into a new, third front were futile. The left and some regional parties, including the
BSP, Biju Janata Dal, AIADMK, Telugu Desam, Janata Dal(S), and others, won
79 seats in the third front. Indeed, the fourth front of nine parties emerged, led by
the Samajwadi Party of Uttar Pradesh and the Rashtriya Janata Dal of Bihar, win-
ning 27 seats. The UPA (37.22 percent) and NDA (24.63 percent) combined for
61.85 percent of the vote. The two national parties leading these alliances received
28.55 percent of the vote for Congress and 18.80 percent for the BJP.
In addition to the above-mentioned ups and downs in political party fortunes
during the 2009 election, the following factors contributed to the success of the
Congress-led UPA in 2009: The stable and secular government provided by the
UPA-I government elected in 2004, the good teamwork maintained by Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh and Congress President and UPA Chairperson, Sonia
Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi’s bold initiative to revive the Congress in U.P. and Bihar,
the government’s social sector initiatives such as the Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Guarantee Act, bank loan waivers to farmers, Sixth Pay Commission salary
revisions for Central government employees, and the government’s social sector
initiatives such as the MNREGA. Other positive factors included the 2005 Right to
Information Act and the 2006 Forest Rights Act, which recognized tribal commu-
nities and other traditional forest dwellers’ traditional rights to use forest resources
for a living. Another significant factor was the shift in Muslim voters away from
the RJD in Bihar and towards the SP and BSP in U.P. and the Hindi heartland in
general.
Based on the policies and performance of the UPA-I and UPA-II administra-
tions (for example, the Right to Secondary Education Act of 2010, the Food Safety
and Security Act of 2006, and so on), the Congress leadership attempted to strike
a balance between India’s growing integration with global capitalism, on the one
hand, and the promotion of welfare measures with an eye towards electoral poli-
tics, on the other. To quote M.K. Venu: ‘Both Sonia Gandhi and Nextgen Congress
 The party system in India 13

leadership led by Rahul Gandhi have a strong bias for redistributive intervention
even while letting the government pursue its market-based economic reforms
agenda. Now, there is bound to be creative tension between these two opposing
ideological strains and that is part of a new dialectic that Indian politics is currently
witnessing.’21
With the BJP’s historic performance in the 2014 general elections, the post-
UPA-I and post-UPA-II eras of Indian politics began. Religion-based polarization
was even more prominent than in previous NDA electoral victories, according to
the NES survey, which was conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing
Societies (CSDS). In the 2014 elections, the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) won 336 seats, while the BJP alone won 282 of the 428 Lok Sabha seats.
It was the largest party in the 2014 election. The Congress, on the other hand,
has shrunk to a new low of 44 seats. Other national parties, such as the Bahujan
Samaj Party, received no seats, whereas left-wing parties like the Communist
Party of India and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) received one and nine
seats, respectively. The BJP received the greatest number of votes, 31.34 percent.
The NDA received 38.3 percent of the total number of votes cast. The United
Progressive Alliance received 23 percent of the vote, while Congress received
19.3 percent. In addition, the NDA received more than 50 percent of the vote in
137 seats and nearly 40 percent of the vote in 132 seats.
The ‘New BJP’ (in terms of the Modi factor and new electoral strategy) wave
has gained massive support not only in its traditional North-Indian cadre but also
in non-traditional cadre states like Jammu and Kashmir, Assam, Jharkhand, and
West Bengal. In two-party competition states like Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand,
Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and Chhattisgarh, it received 50 percent
of the total vote share. The results of the 2014 elections suggested that the BJP
had written a new chapter in Indian politics, heralding the re-emergence of the
Dominant Party System, in which the opposition appeared to be extinction-level.
In the 2019 general elections, the BJP improved on its electoral victory in 2014.
It broke its previous electoral record of 303 Lok Sabha seats set in 2014. The
Indian National Congress remained on the electoral outskirts with 52 seats. The
All India Trinamool Congress came in third place, with 22 seats out of a total of
62 contested. The Bahujan Samaj Party increased its seats from zero in 2014 to
ten in 2019. With two and three seats, respectively, the Communist Party of India
and the Communist Party of India (Marxist) performed nearly identically to their
2014 electoral performance. In the 2019 elections, the Congress party was com-
pletely wiped out in 18 states. The BJP now has a 50 percent vote share in 13 states
and union territories.
Since the rise of the BJP under Narendra Modi as the single national party with
a majority in the Lok Sabha in 2014 and again in 2019, which no party had done
since the Indian National Congress under Rajiv Gandhi in 1984, India has been
moving towards the type of one-party dominant system that existed from the 1950s
to the 1980s under the aegis of the Indian National Congress under Jawaharlal
Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and Rajiv Gandhi. The BJP has also established a sizable
number of state governments. The Congress party, the country’s second-largest, has
14 The party system in India

recently suffered a precipitous decline. Regional parties have a strong presence in

the South, East, Northwest, and Northeast. These regional parties, however, tend to
operate in splendid isolation. According to current estimates, there are no opposi-
tion coalitional fronts in the works. If the BJP falters in the coming years, this may
complicate the formation and maintenance of governments at the Centre. In Punjab
in 2017, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Telangana, and Karnataka in
2018, and Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Haryana in 2019, the BJP did not fare
well. These are in support of Congress or a coalition of regional parties. Despite the
Congress’ electoral resurgence, the party’s national organization is in disarray as a
result of dynastic and undemocratic control. Given the preceding trends, India may
be on a path similar to Belgium, where the challenge of forming a government after
an election becomes a federal democratic quicksand for the political system to cross.
The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) emerged from India Against Corruption, a civil
society anti-corruption movement led by Anna Hazare and coincided with the so-
called Arab Democratic Spring in 2011. It quickly entered electoral politics under
the leadership of Arvind Kejriwal, breaking away from Hazare’s India Against
Corruption, which wanted it to remain a non-party civil society movement. It
claimed to be a ‘party with a difference,’ heralding an alternative politics to India’s
mainstream parties’ High Command brand. The broom (jhadu), its electoral sym-
bol, purports to represent the mission of eradicating corruption and bad govern-
ance. It attracted a large number of young people and public intellectuals from
various backgrounds. Swaraj (self-rule) and the passage of Jan Lokpal legislation
are among its political tenets. The AAP made its debut in the Union Territory
Assembly elections in Delhi in 2013, finishing second with 28 out of 70 seats and
a vote share of 29.49, while the BJP won the plurality as the first party and the
Congress was relegated to third place. With the assistance of Congress, the AAP
formed a minority government. The AAP resigned after 49 days in power after
Congress withdrew its support after it introduced a Lokpal bill in the Assembly.
The BJP annihilated it in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections in Delhi UT. However,
the AAP won 67 out of 70 seats in the subsequent Delhi Assembly elections in
2015, re-forming the government. The BJP received three seats and the Congress
received none. However, AAP has been unable to expand its efforts to other states
or nationally. With the Congress party in steep decline, the AAP is seen as an alter-
native national party to the BJP, owing to its national capital location, a platform of
alternative politics and reformist agenda, and the zeal of its leaders.

The contemporary dynamics

The Congress predominance was gradually eroded under the dual processes of
(1) the disappearance of a more democratic method of internal conflict resolution
by duly elected party organizations at various levels; and (2) the exacerbation of
sharp regional, caste, communal, and class cleavages and conflicts in the society.
These developments reduced the relevance of multi-ethnic, multi-caste, and multi-
regional strategies of political mobilization evolved by the Congress party in the
past.
 The party system in India 15

With the decline of the Congress’s predominance, a national confederation of

non-Congress parties in a National Front-Left Front alliance came into being in
the run-up to the 1989 Lok Sabha elections. It consisted of the Janata Dal and a
number of major regional parties as well as the two major communist parties. The
NF-LF alliance had some measure of seat adjustments against Congress even with
the BJP. Following the elections, the National Front formed a minority coalition
government with the support of the Left Front and BJP on the Parliamentary floor.
Driven by a factional fight with his Deputy Prime Minister Devilal, the Janata Dal
Prime Minister V.P. Singh heading the National Front government sought to build
a phalanx of OBC vote bloc by seeking to unilaterally implement, without due
consultation in the coordination committee and cabinet, the controversial Mandal
Commission Report favouring 27 percent reservation for OBCs (in addition to
22 percent for SCs/STs), which had practically been shelved by all other parties
for over a decade during the Congress rule at the Centre. Once this was done, even
the communist parties who had nothing to do with this report in their 1989 election
manifestos rushed to ride the Mandal bandwagon. Thus even the established com-
munist parties fell for the ‘Mandal mass,’ with radical class appeal blunted by
the flight of the working classes to bourgeois, communal, and regional parties.
The communists sought to ride the National Front piggyback in a desperate bid
to extend their influence beyond their strongholds in West Bengal and Kerala and
Tripura. This strategy, however, suffered a serious setback with the Janata Party
splitting off into multiple groupings by 1993 and the refusal of its major U.P. splin-
ter, Samajvadi Party led by Mulayam Singh Yadav, to respond to the overtures
from either the main Janata Dal at the national level or the Left Front. Samajvadi
Party instead entered into an electoral alliance with Bahujan Samaj Party led by
Kanshi Ram, the abrasive leader of the Scheduled Castes Reservation Aristocracy,
and formed a minority coalition government in U.P. after the 1993 Assembly elec-
tions with the unsolicited legislative support extended by the discomfited Janata
Dal and Congress. The experiment flopped on account of Yadav-Dalit’s contradic-
tions. In the last quarter of 1993, the Janata Dal ruling unit in Bihar led by Laloo
Prasad Yadav suffered a major split, leading to the formation of the Samata Party
led by Nitish Kumar in Bihar and George Fernandes at the national level. This
greatly affected the desirability of the Janata Dal as the major ally of the com-
munists. By the 1994 year-end the CPI(M) was reappraising its alliance with the
National Front. It was favourably inclined towards the Samajvadi Party in U.P. but
found the ‘casteist’ appeal of BSP unpalatable, which Samajvadi Party was then
unwilling to ditch.
Besides the above attempt at Mandalization with OBC overtones, BJP sought to
mobilize a revivalist Hindu communal vote by its Somanath to Ayodhya rathyatra
(chariot drive) in the autumn and winter of 1990–91 with the ostensible objective
of building a Ram temple on the disputed Babri masjid-Ram janmabhumi site in
Ayodhya. Continuing the mass pressure of kar sevaks in Ayodhya in successive
years, the BJP and its allied mass organizations (e.g. RSS, Vishwa Hindu Parishad,
Bajrang Dal) were instrumental in the demolition of the disputed medieval struc-
ture on 6 December 1992. This promptly caused the Congress(I) Government at the
16 The party system in India

Centre to dismiss the BJP Government in U.P.,9 Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and
Himachal Pradesh and ban some Hindu and Muslim communal and fundamentalist
organizations. However, in subsequent judicial verdicts, the Jabalpur bench of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court departed from past judicial reticence in looking into
the Presidential proclamation of constitutional emergency in a State and opined
that the dismissal of the Madhya Pradesh government was unwarranted, and the
P.K. Bahri Tribunal ruled that the ban on the RSS was invalid, though it upheld
the ban on Vishwa Hindu Parishad. In the spring of 1994, the Constitution bench
of the Supreme Court ruled the Presidential dismissal of the BJP Governments
in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Himachal Pradesh as constitutionally valid,
declaring secularism as part of the basic structure of the constitution (and therefore
inviolable and unamendable). It also clarified that subversion of secularism by a
State government can be construed to have given rise to a situation in which con-
stitutional government in a State becomes impossible in terms of Article 356 of the
Constitution.
The judicial verdicts, the amendments to the Constitution and the Representation
of the People Act proposed (subsequently shelved) by the Narasimha Rao
Government, and more strict enforcement of the code of conduct for political par-
ties by the Election Commission in recent years have all put the BJP and other
communal parties and organizations on the defensive. The BJP has been under-
going an identity crisis as a communal party operating in a secular-democratic
constitutional setup. Its dilemma on the issue of secularism was evident in the
ambivalence of its predecessor Bharatiya Jan Sangh from the opposition parties’
alliances of the early 1970s, such examples as the Grand Alliance of non-Congress,
non-Communist parties in the 1971 mid-term Lok Sabha elections. The late 1960s
and the 1970s were the periods when the Congress freely coalesced with parties
of all hues in unstable non-Congress, catch-all coalition Governments in North
Indian States in the aftermath of the 1967 general elections, and when it merged
with several other non-Congress, non-Communist parties in the wake of the inter-
nal Emergency (1975–77) to form the Janata Party in 1977. Rajni Kothari (1982,
p. 23) perceptively opines that ‘the real challenge before Janata was to bring the
Jana Sangh within the democratic framework just as the communists had been
under Nehru.’ However, the major factors responsible for the fall of the Janata
Government in New Delhi in 1979 turned out to be the ideological clashes between
the BLD and Jana Sangh constituents of the Janata Party, and personality clashes
between Prime Minister Morarji Desai of the Congress(O) constituent and Deputy
Prime Minister Charan Singh of the BLD constituent, Jan Sangh’s participation in
the JP movement (1973–75). The emergency resistance movement (1975–77) and
the Janata Party Government (1977–79) were certainly not without their marks
on their ideology and leadership. When it revived itself as BJP in 1980, it did not
really look back to its original ideological moorings. It swore to the JP’s vision of
a glorious India and affirmed its commitment to nationalism, democracy, ‘positive’
secularism, Gandhian socialism, and value-based politics (Geeta Pun, 1989, pp.
28–29). The revival of its communal roots with a vengeance came in the wake of
the surge of religious fundamentalism in Punjab and Kashmir and the precipitous
 The party system in India 17

fall in its Lok Sabha seats to a mere two in 1984. In the trial of these develop-
ments, its ‘parliamentary’ leadership symbolized by Atal Behari Vajpayee came
to be overshadowed by the ‘organizational’ leadership with hardcore RSS-VHP
identifications which worked overtime to ‘Islamize’ Hinduism.
In the background of these developments, the Indian National Congress is faced
with an existential crisis and a dilemma. Around the turn of the century, it finds
itself in a context when the old ways of adapting its environment are strained to
the limits of its endurance. Internally, its strategy of multi-class, multi-ethnic, and
multi-regional electoral mobilization is threatened by strategies of Mandalization,
communalization, and the fanning of regional pride and prejudices followed by
various non-Congress parties. Externally, its strategy of building a self-reliant
national economy premised on growth and distributive justice came under the
clouds by the 1980s due to the inefficiency and profligacy of the public sector
which was designed by Nehru to scale the ‘commanding heights of the economy
through planning’. The party is now committed to economic liberalization and glo-
balization, although the extent to which it is prepared to go in this direction has
been somewhat uncertain. This caution is dictated by India’s national interests and
compulsions of electoral politics in an economy where the majority of the people
still live below the poverty line. Even though India has in the current phase opted
for the market forces in preference to the state, it would be disastrous to write off
the state or completely subordinate it to the market forces, as the state is a better
protector of the interests of a less developed economy and of the poor citizens
who are still unintegrated with the organized market mechanism. This dilemma is
clearly reflected in Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s nostalgia for the ‘middle path’
which has been shrinking under the impact of the very policies accelerated by him
since 1991.
Simultaneously, however, the party has been at pains to emphasize its contin-
uing commitment to the Nehruvian model at least in some measure, especially
its espousal of an ideological package seeking to appeal at the same time to big
business—national and multi-national—as well as the sizeable middle classes ori-
ented to consumerism and the vast array of the poor masses that live below the
poverty line. As already suggested above, the sharp class and ethnic and regional
disparities and politicization of these cleavages and contradictions are the undo-
ings of this kind of strategy of mass appeal. It is true that for the Congress such
sharp patterns of ethnic, regional, and class cleavages have been emerging through
the 1980s onwards and putting a strain on its electoral base. However, for some
time now the emerging modern sectors of the economy have been the mainstay
of the stable Congress anchoring, with the floating mass electoral support vari-
ously mobilized by it in different States and various elections. Expanding frontiers
of modernization, especially capitalist developments in industry and agriculture,
may give a new lease of life to the party which has a chequered history of over
a century. A shift from mass to moderate class appeal may well be in the offing.
Party’s debacle in U.P. in 1993 and especially in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka
in 1994 witnessed the clamour in the party for a more ‘pro-poor’ image. But Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh stood firm for
18 The party system in India

economic reforms, reaffirming the continuity of the policy of liberalization. Yet

despite the rhetorics, the Government slowed down the pace of reforms. Can it,
then, be a pointer to the stabilization of Congress as the main force of conservatism
ranged against the congeries of the earthy centrism of Janata, social democracy of
communists, and populism of regional parties?
Contemporary party systems are mechanisms to resolve at least two contradic-
tions of the political systems in which they operate: class and ethnicity. The cen-
trist, middle-of-the-road, tenor of Indian politics has come under serious strains due
more to communal militancy than class radicalism. To be sure, the constitutionali-
zation of the established, major communist parties have not gone unchallenged by
the new, more militant communist parties, usually claiming to be Marxist-Leninist
and popularly called Naxalites. But these are fringe phenomena both in terms of
size and areas of operation. Originating in West Bengal and Kerala in the 1960s
and 1970s, they are now limited to Bihar and Andhra Pradesh. Besides, Naxalite
groups like Indian People’s Front with its base mainly in Bihar, and some other
Naxalite groups there in the preceding decades, have also tended to abandon the
strategy of ‘annihilation of class enemies and joined the electoral fray. Democratic
experience has been more successful in liberalizing communist parties than com-
munal parties.10 Indeed even the so-called secular parties also indulge in politics of
covert communalism. A soft stance to minority communalism by the ruling party
in the 1950s and 1960s brought about, at least intensified, powerful reactive major-
ity communalism. Communal polarization, rather multi-polarization, has posed a
threat to the Indian political ethos of pluralism and parliamentary and federal gov-
ernment. A liberal political regime often allows communal parties to compete, but
it cannot allow the liberal regime itself and the constitutional values on which it is
founded to be undermined. Secularization in Indian politics may be a long drawn-
out process through constitutionalism, education, and electoral and democratic
class struggle.

Parties and pressure groups

Relationships between party and class, interest groups, and other social categories
are more complex in India than in Western democracies. Both modern and tra-
ditional categories of industrial and pre-industrial components of Indian society
interact and intermesh with the party system and present complex dialectics of
transformation. All political parties are middle-class-dominated political forma-
tions. Direct recruitment of leadership from the working class, especially the indus-
trial working class, is rare, if at all present, even in the communist parties. Even
trade unions, for that matter, are led by middle-class professional trade unionists/
politicians. Reservation of legislative seats for Scheduled Castes/Tribes has, on the
other hand, brought about the induction into politics of representatives with work-
ing, including in at least some cases working class, background in almost all major
parties by now. Initially, such representatives were heavily concentrated in the
centrist parties like Congress and Janata. By the late 1980s, the cumulative impact
of reservations in education, public employment, and legislatures had created a
 The party system in India 19

sizeable new middle class among the Scheduled Castes. Its political fallout was
seen in the formation of the Bahujan Samaj Party by Kanshi Ram which emerged
as a new political force in the early 1990s in the North and made responsive echoes
in the West and the South as well. Following the Assembly elections in five States
in the North in the early 1990s, BSP joined the minority government of Samajvadi
Party in U.P., and its leaders Kanshi Ram and Mayavati emerged as the most pow-
erful politicians next only to the Chief Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav. The duo
raised eyebrows with their aggressive pronouncements and abrasive political style.
However, the coalition failed.
The class structure in India comprises relatively larger components of peasants
and professional middle classes and relatively smaller classes of capitalists and
workers. However, strong currents of regionalism in the politics of the country
have fragmented the peasantry and the industrial and agricultural working classes.
Like the industrial workers and their trade unions, even the capitalists are organ-
ized in several competing chambers of commerce and industry. The conventional
wisdom about party pressure group relationships in India has been that there has
been a close connection between the two with the party being dominant. This pat-
tern, supposed to have prevailed during the colonial period, is said to have con-
tinued after the independence as well. This pattern may be explained because of
the colonial nature of the economy till 1947 and the still rather limited extent of
industrial development since independence. This would also seem to be consistent
with India’s strong feudal tradition and authoritarian family structure.
Although party finances are an area of darkness, it is widely assumed that dona-
tions by business houses/companies to parties and important leaders from by far
the most important source of party funds. Stanley Kochanak (1974, pp. 230–239)
argues that these donations serve to strengthen some parties as bulwarks against
communist parties, create pro-business orientations among the political elites, and
help businessmen to obtain permits, licenses, quotas, etc., in the bureaucratically
regulated economy (before the onset of the policy of economic liberalization).
Some data on contributions to party funds by business houses during 1962–68 pro-
vided by S.N. Sadashivan (19:602–18) reveals that the largest recipients happened
to be the Congress, Swatantra, and Jan Sangh, and the largess mainly flowed from
Birlas, Tatas, Kirloskars, Sahu-Jains, Singhanias, and Goenakas. Even communist
and socialist parties also received relatively smaller donations. Companies’ dona-
tions were banned by Indira Gandhi following the Congress split in 1969, but the
ban was subsequently lifted by Rajiv Gandhi in 1985. But it can be safely assumed
that the ban was far from effective, indeed designed to ensure the clandestine flow
mainly to the Congress party. Incomplete but more current data show that the two
major recipients of company donations today are Congress and BJP (M.P. Singh,
1990). The peasants and farmers have emerged as the most influential voting blocs
in Indian politics today, but the business continues to be the most important indi-
rect influence on the government and the opposition by dint of holding the strings
of party funds. Indeed, with economic liberalization since the mid-1980s, the polit-
ical leverage of business has understandably been on the ascendance even though
there is now lesser compulsion to pay.
20 The party system in India

In contrast to party-dominated peasant organizations—Kisan Sabhas/

Panchayats—of the past and the present, the new peasant movements surfaced
in the 1980s onwards in Western U.P., Haryana, Punjab, Maharashtra, Gujarat,
Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and some other areas of Green Revolution display some
new features. Among these new trends are the organizations of more prosper-
ous farmers and peasants—tractor and bullock capitalists according to Lloyd and
Susanne Rudolph (2001)—Shetkari Sangathan led by Sharad Joshi in Maharashtra,
Bharatiya Kisan union led by Mahendra Singh Tikait, Karnataka Rajya Ryet Sangh
led by M.D. Nanjunda Swamy, etc., and their inclination not to directly align with
any political party. But they are hardly apolitical, only more conscious to retain
their autonomy from parties and the ability to strike bargains with parties of their
preference. Their rhetorics tend to blur the internal economic contradictions of the
rural class disparities by projecting rural-urban divide (‘Bharat’ versus ‘India’),
demanding heavy governmental subsidies by way of agricultural inputs, and giv-
ing vent to anti-statist sentiments when it comes to regulation of the market and the
civil society. D.N. Dhanagare (1988) thus sketches the context of these movements:
The green revolution leading to the paradox of growth in productivity but a
decline in profitability, disparities in the incomes of different strata of society, and
growing imbalances between the city and the countryside thus constitute the back-
ground of the emergence of the farmers’ movements in the 1980s including the
BKU movement in Western Uttar Pradesh.
A contributing factor to the efficacy of these movements is that the leaderships
of almost all parties are now predominantly of rural/agriculturist background, and
the parliament itself which was once largely filled by those with legal background
is now preponderantly filled by those belonging to the occupational category of
agriculturalists. The percentage of representatives with this background jumped
from 22.40 in the Parliament of 1952–57 to 40 in the Parliament of 1980–85
(Pravin Seth, 1984). But these organizations of farmers are hampered by differ-
ences on some issues (e.g. Joshi favoured India’s signing of the GATT agreement
but Tikait opposed it), and attempts at forging them into a national federation have
proved abortive.
Now, coming to the trade unions, their two features are particularly noteworthy.
First, as in the case of the party system, the trade union system, too, has gradually
moved from a predominantly union system to a system of multiple plurality. Indeed,
the union system became plural in structure even before the party system did. The
party system acquired a multi-partisan character at the national level only by the
1989 Lok Sabha elections. The trade union system, counting unions with sizeable
strength, has been plural in structure at least since 1951 (Pathy, 1988, Table 5.5:
126). The data reported in the above source suggest the situation remained largely
unchanged from 1951 to 1978. The table in this paper presents data on the structure
of the trade union system in the 1980s. With a little calculation, it can be seen that
counting only the national federations of unions with a membership of more than
300,000, at least six central organizations divide among themselves at least five
percent or above of the total unionized working class: INTUC 36.5 percent, BMB
19.8 percent, HMS 12.5 percent, UTUC (LS) 10.1 percent, and CITU 5.4 percent.
 The party system in India 21

The second remarkable feature of trade unionism in India is the trend of union
autonomy from party domination. True, the dominant pattern still happens to be
one of the close connections between major parties and major unions (Table). The
two largest national federations of unions—INTUC and BMS—are affiliated with
Congress and BJP. The support of the centrist Congress party and the right-wing
Hindu communal BJP by the vast majority of unionized workers, leaving the com-
munist, socialist parties, and more leftist unions in the cold with relatively smaller
memberships, is divergent from the pattern in Western European democracies
where unions electorally contribute in a big way to the socialist and communist
parties. In any case, there has emerged in India since the 1980s a slow and feeble
trend of growing union autonomy from party control.
This trend is sustained by several interrelated developments, some of these older
and others more recent. In addition to some unions being professedly non-party
(e.g. NFITU), some developments in the party system have tended to free some
unions from the tutelage of the parties they had earlier been aligned with. For
example, with the virtual disappearance of the socialist parties from the Indian
political scene by the 1970s, we are left with some socialist trade union leaders
(e.g. George Fernandes variously affiliated with Janata Party/Dal, Lok Dal, Samata
Party, Janata Dal (United) rather than any socialist party per se providing any tute-
lage to HMS. The NLO led by Gujarat Gandhians may also be put in the category
of independent unions. Besides, a notably new kind of unionism has appeared on
the scene in recent decades. Their emergence seems to be related to two features of
the conventional working-class movement in the country: (1) oligarchical bossism
and corruption of the established trade unions and their nexus with parties; and (2)
adventurist working-class radicalism that proved to be abortive. The new unions
emerged in the vacuum thus created concentrating on essentially sectional and
local issues of the workers in an industry, a plant, or a region. They are led by a new
aggressive breed of union leaders, often maintaining a respectable distance from
political parties. Some of them may also be ideologically oriented, but others may
be coldly pragmatic. Union leaders like A.K. Roy, Datta Samant, Sankar Neogy
(the latter two since murdered), and others are examples. They thrive on wide-
spread discontent and spontaneous resistance of workers in an industry or a region
and have virtually displaced the established unions and parties in their limited areas
of operation. However, their unions appear to be vulnerable in at least three ways:
(1) being confined to a section of the working class in a region, their radicalism is
unfortified by a wider working class solidarity against repression by the state; (2)
such new unions also appear to be overly dependent on some individual cult figures
rather than yet institutionalized organizations; and (3) the striking power of these
new militant unions seems to be buoyed by the transient phenomenon of a working
class which is yet to be fully depeasantized.
Trade unions in India thus face two major dilemmas that are not very easy to
overcome. First, they must align with political parties to gain political leverage in
a society that is highly inegalitarian and authoritarian. And yet a very close identi-
fication of a union with a political party is not in the ultimate interest of either. If a
union becomes too closely linked with a political party, especially when the latter
22 The party system in India

happens to be the ruling party, the union’s leeway to articulate the interests of its
clientele is circumscribed. Conversely, if a party becomes too closely identified
with workers, its ability to appeal to other segments of voters is reduced. Second,
unions must contend with the dilemma between ‘economism’ (concern with the
limited, immediate economic needs of workers) and the broader objective of the
working class to transform the capitalist system.

Parties and social movements

There has emerged a great deal of rhetorical discourse on the ‘new social move-
ments’ in India and elsewhere. Not all the movements are all that new, however.
There is a considerable degree of continuity, though it is true that certain tenden-
cies nascent earlier have now become more salient. As well as more tolerated and
even encouraged by the responsiveness of the state. There is also a revival of some
old tendencies and movements. By and large, two kinds of social movements in
India in the 1980s onwards have posed the question of their relationship with par-
ties and the party system. Among the examples of the first category are the con-
ventional movements of communal revivalism that have appeared in practically
all religious communities. In some border States like Jammu and Kashmir and
Punjab they have taken a fundamentalist and secessionist turn among Muslims and
Sikhs. The established regional parties like National Conference and the Akali Dal
have been largely either put on the defensive, or marginalized, or they have grown
somewhat ambivalent. Hindu revivalist movements like RSS, VHP, Bajrang Dal,
etc., have mushroomed, and the BJP, which had become appreciably liberalized
under the presidentship of Atal Behari Vajpayee in earlier decades, later joined
hands with these communal movements to gamer the Hindu vote. The autonomy
of the parliamentary wing of the BJP which had been steadily growing later come
to be compromised to these movements and to its external, mass membership party
organization. A BJP-led coalition came to power in 1998 and then again in 1999 on
the basis of a common agenda that dropped contentious issues in the 1998 election
manifesto of the BJP like the construction of the Ram temple at the disputed site
in Ayodhya, a common civil code, and Article 370 of the Constitution relating to
Jammu and Kashmir. All these problems are not yet fully resolved and develop-
ments can pose a serious threat not only to the unity of the Indian nation, which,
by its very nature, has to be of a composite and secular character but also to parlia-
mentary democracy.
Another category of social movements has become phenomenally more sali-
ent over the last decade and is growing in importance in the 1990s. These are
movements of women and a whole variety of grassroots movements by agricul-
tural workers often led by communist parties (Marxist-Leninist) or the so-called
Naxalite groups, tribals, anti-big dam movements, and so on. The Naxalite groups
keep a distance from established communist parties as well as from parliamentary
politics, though some of the Bhojpur Naxalites in Bihar earlier joined the elec-
toral Process (Partha Mukherjee, 1983); subsequently, the Indian People’s Front
in Bihar, too, in the late 1980s joined the electoral fray. Commenting especially on
 The party system in India 23

women’s forest people and anti-big dam movements in various parts of the coun-
try, an observer remarks:
As a counterdiscourse, new social movements seek and promote personal and
collective identity. That is why high value is placed on particular, small social
spaces, decentralized forms of interaction, and non-differentiated public spheres.
To borrow Habermas’s phrase, these are in the seam between the system and life-
world. They are a reaction to the ‘colonization’ of the life-world by economic and
politico-administrative systems. (Pramod Parajuli, 1991, p. 186)11
The dehumanizing aspects of the ‘systems’ in India have in recent years given
rise to a series of responses at various levels. Excessive bureaucratization often
requires intervention by charismatic leadership not only to remove the rigidities of
formal procedures but also to make openings for new initiatives and alternatives.
It is in this light that charismatic leaders of the past like Gandhi and Nehru and
their roles in Indian politics can be understood. In the context of the party sys-
tem, Gandhi startled everyone by proposing the dissolution of the Indian National
Congress and its replacement by a Sarva Seva Sangh on the attainment of Swaraj.
That may have allowed a more innovative political experiment besides quicken-
ing the process of transformation of the movement syndrome of the Indian party
system into ideologically crystallized parties constituting this system. Nehru, on
the other hand, acted in a diametrically opposite fashion by investing his personal
charisma into Congress and thus gave a new lease of life to the predominant party
system.12 Indira Gandhi used her charisma to restore the sagging predominance
of the Congress in the early 1970s but then deinstitutionalized the party by an
over-reliance on personal power to the detriment of the historic Indian National
Congress. On her assassination, Rajiv Gandhi showed a flash of charisma but again
failed to make a new beginning in institutionalizing things. There is only one way
of the meaningful use of political charisma can put itself to: to self-destruct and lay
the foundation for a new routinization and institutionalization. The nexus between
films and politics in Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh is also an example of the
charisma-hungry political sphere to grab at any straws it can spot. The protest poli-
tics of the Kazhagams in Tamil Nadu grew in a close symbiotic relationship with
the Tamil film industry. However, the political use of the Telugu film hero NTR
is a relatively new phenomenon and therefore more vulnerable to political novish-
ness. Moreover, more recently the search for charisma has not been limited to the
political sphere. It is manifested variously in judicial activism and the appearance
on the scene of some whistle-blowing civil servants and cops who have become
idolized by the masses (the mid-1980s onwards).
A development not unrelated to the foregoing is the politics of mass rallies
whose salience and frequency in Indian politics have been on the ascendance. Mass
rallies are hardly a new phenomenon. Such rallies and sustained mass movements
were parts and parcel of the Gandhian era of the nationalist movement.
Their frequency has especially increased phenomenally since the 1970s. The
1969 split in the Indian National Congress may be regarded as a turning point in this
connection. The nature of elections also following the Congress split underwent a
change. It was the beginning of ‘one-issue’ elections overriding other, especially
24 The party system in India

local, issues: in 1971 it was Indira Gandhi’s ‘garibi hatao’ crusade against her
conservative party colleagues debunked as ‘bosses’; in 1977 it was a clear man-
date against the Emergency authoritarianism, of Mrs. Gandhi; in 1980 it was Mrs.
Gandhi’s promise of a ‘government that works’ in place of Janata Government’s
frittering away of their mandate by infighting and inaction; and in 1984 it was Rajiv
Gandhi’s call for national unity and integrity in the backdrop of Mrs. Gandhi’s
assassination and religious fundamentalism and separatism in Punjab. A factor
contributing to the emergence of such ‘wave elections’ was the first ever ‘delinked’
elections in 1971 when a different cycle of elections for Lok Sabha and State
Assemblies was initiated by Indira Gandhi in that year. Since then elections for the
two levels have never entirely coincided. This has made possible a fuller play of
national issues in Lok Sabha elections untrammeled by local issues and vice versa.
The towering personality of Indira Gandhi and the dynastic factor as well as the
negative impact of the Emergency juggernaut and the positive contribution of the
personality of Jayaprakash Narayan in congregating the anti-Emergency vote also
played a part in these wave elections. The phenomena of such widespread national
waves in elections ceased with the 1989 Lok Sabha polls. However, the politics of
massive rallies aimed at demonstrating public support for a party or a leader have,
if anything, increased in more recent years both at the national and state levels.
One can expect such rallies not only around elections but any time and anywhere at
the slightest provocation in factional or inter-party feuds. The phenomena of wave
elections and mass rallies are related to a new aspect of Indian politics, which fol-
lowing Max Weber (1946) may be called ‘plebiscitarian democracy.’13
Weber has presented a classic formulation of plebiscitarian trends in Western
democracies. Linking this development to the ‘machine’ party politics, especially
in the U.S.A., he writes, ‘creation of such machines signifies the advent of plebi-
scitarian democracy’ (Weber, 1946, p. 103). To quote Weber (1946, p. 102) more
extensively:
Now then, the most modern forms of party organizations stand in sharp con-
trast to this idyllic state in which circles of notables and, above all, members of
parliament rule. These modern forms are the children of democracy, of the mass
franchise, of the necessity to woo and organize the masses and develop the utmost
unity of direction and the strictest discipline. The rule of notables and guidance of
members of parliament ceases ‘professional’ politicians outside the parliaments to
take the organization in hand. They do so either as ‘entrepreneurs’—the American
boss and the English election agent are, in fact, such entrepreneurs—or as [party
officials with a fixed salary. (emphases in this and above quotes from Weber in the
original)
These developments in the West first manifested themselves in the 19th century:
around the 1840s in the U.S.A. and after 1868 in England. Civil service reforms and
party electoral reforms gradually put an end to crude and blatant forms of machine
politics, but the plebiscitarian trends via ‘nationalizing’ features of Presidential and
Prime Ministerial nominations and elections continued ‘through the instrumentali-
ties of caucus and conventions of national leaders and delegates’.
 The party system in India 25

Plebiscitarian trends in India differ from such trends in Western democracies

in at least three ways. First, plebiscitarian use of rallies, leadership images, and
party labels are mostly made by leaders in the Parliament and State legislatures,
rather than professional party bosses outside. Organizational leadership outside
the Parliament/Legislatures is seldom allowed to grow by parliamentary leaders
in most Indian parties. Party bureaucracies are also very weak and small. ‘Non-
governmental mass leaders like Gandhi or Jayaprakash Narayan are mostly saintly
leaders of movements rather than parties, often with declining interest in party
politics and no inclination to sit in legislatures.’ Second, mass party leaders in India
have seldom, if at all, used their wide popularity to build a party organization, espe-
cially in the post-Nehru era. Their mass appeal and rallies are mostly used as instru-
ments of personal power. Third, in contrast to the West, party and electoral reforms
are still awaited to put an end to personalized power and widespread political cor-
ruption in Indian politics. The Election Commission under T.N. Seshan in the early
1990s just began to hit the tips of the icebergs of electoral corruption. A package of
the electoral party and governmental reforms is called for. This is essential for the
healthy development of parties and party systems, which, according to Samuel P.
Huntington (1968, p. 398), are ‘the principal institutional means for organizing the
expansion of political participation.’ A party, to him, ‘is strong to the extent that it
has institutionalized mass support’ (408). He goes on to say:

The vacuum of power and authority which exists in so many modernizing

countries may be filled temporarily by charismatic leadership or by military
force. But it can be filled permanently only by political organization. (461)

Party reforms
One notices a growing concern with electoral reforms in India since the 1970s. A
series of non-governmental and governmental initiatives have followed in rather
quick succession. The net result so far, however, is not appreciable. Notable ini-
tiatives in this direction are the reports of three ad hoc parliamentary committees
appointed in 1972, 1990, and 1999 headed by Jagannath Rao, Dinesh Goswami,
and Indrajit Gupta, respectively; a comprehensive proposal made by the Election
Commission in 1992; and two reports made in 1975 and 1994 by two citizens’
committees headed respectively by Justice (Rtd.) V.M. Tarkunde and Justice (Rtd.)
V.R. Krishna Iyer.14 These reports together present a comprehensive package of
half-hearted reforms aimed at improving the administration of elections, curbing
the use of official position, media, and governmental resources by the party in
power, the use of violence, excessive money, and corrupt practices by all parties,
other electoral malpractices by individuals and groups, the delay in disposal of
electoral disputes, and defections. However, where the vision of these reformers
has been lacking in teeth, nay, even the willingness to see the evil, is the question
of party reforms. The Goswami committee report merely touches on the tip of the
iceberg of the problem relating to party reforms; it does not really propose anything
26 The party system in India

beyond cosmetic measures. Its recommendation for a model code of conduct for
political parties with statutory sanction may become, as T.N. Seshan has shown,
a stick to chastise errant ministers who misuse their official position. But the code
does not expect political parties to follow even as basic elementaries as observing
their own constitutions and rendering annual returns of their accounts. The Indrajit
Gupta Committee has recommended a system of state funding of elections from
a pool created by the aggregate state. This is necessary for the growing depend-
ence of political parties on big business, and the underworld is a great threat to
Indian democracy. The Election Commission’s proposals have gone beyond the
parliamentary committees in some ways in this regard in recommending the annual
publication of accounts by all registered parties and their audit by agencies named
by the Commission. The Commission also recommends more stringent punishment
for violation of the model code of conduct for parties, i.e. voiding of the offender’s
elections and disqualification for six years. Only the Iyer committee goes as far as
recommending legal requirement of internal, organizational elections and democ-
racy within every party and maintenance of regular accounts of funds and dona-
tions received by all of them. Besides, the Iyer committee also recommends that a
party bearing a religious or caste name and exclusive membership and promoting
communalism and casteism before, during, and after elections should not be regis-
tered as a political party under the stipulation of the Representation of the People
Act.
While at least some items of electoral reforms recommended by the above com-
mittees have been implemented, a lot of ground still remains to be covered. A
modest package of electoral reforms seeking some amendments to the Constitution
and to the Representation of the People Act by the Rao minority Government in
1993 was subsequently withdrawn.15 On party reforms especially practically no
progress has been made on account of the lack of political will on the part of all
political parties. This is more urgent. The case for the indispensable role of political
parties in a representative democracy was first made by Edmund Burke. Since then
almost all political scientists have recognized the party system as a vital mecha-
nism of representative democracy. The anti-party sentiments expressed by George
Washington, Lord Bolingbroke, Mahatma Gandhi, and Jayaprakash Narayan are
essentially romantic nostalgia for the passing away of the primeval organic unity of
the traditional society. The prescription for voluntary organizations and non-party
political processes since Organski to Rajni Kothari’s is a great idea of enriching
the civil society and ensuring participatory democracy. However, it seems impos-
sible to carry out a complex representative government/state without an organized
party system.16

Notes
1 See Satish Chandra (1979) for the Mughal period and B.B. Misra (1961) for the British
period. In the context of polarization between ‘Moderates’ and ‘Extremists’ in the Indian
National Congress in 1907, the Hindu terms ‘Naram Dal’ and ‘Garam Dal’ are in vogue.
Early Congress factions can indeed more appropriately be characterized as pressure
 The party system in India 27

groups rather than parties as they primarily wanted only increased participation in the
colonial administration.
2 The transition from custom description to contract/achievement is a recurrent theme in
sociologies of law and social and political change. For classic formulations see Maine
(1890); Parsons (1951); and Huntington (1971).
3 The earliest such parties emerged in the local self-governing institutions such as district
boards and municipal Councils in the last quarter of the 19th century. A political anthro-
pologist has called such earliest parties (e.g.. ‘Kayastha party,’ etc.) by the conceptual
term ‘micro-parties’. The term is not very apt, as even these parties included elements
other than the castes they were labeled with and were very different from the traditional
caste categories, they were still a far cry from modern political parties properly so called.
They are better called preparty factions or cliques. In that sense such organizations
existed even in Pre-British times, e.g., liberal and orthodox factions in the Maurya and
the Mughal courts. See Thapar (1997); Satish Chandra (1979); Talcott Parsons (1951);
and Samuel P. Huntington (1971).
4 With the continuing fragmentation of the party system, India is showing the effects of
proportional electoral system even under the plurality electoral system.
5 These phases of party system evolution were first conceptualized by me in M.P. Singh
(1990).
6 The model of Prime Ministerial leadership was first constructed by me in M.P. Singh
(1990).
7 For a more detailed discussion of this phase of the party system, see my papers in Urmila
Phadnis et al. (eds.) (1986) and Richard Sisson and Ramashray Roy (eds.) (1990).
8 For early discussions of this phase of the party system, see M.P. Singh (1990).
9 The BJP government in U.P. headed by Kalyan Singh in fact resigned, and the other
three State governments of the party were dismissed.
10 For a more extended discussion of political parties and communalism in India, see M.P.
Singh (1994).
11 For my earlier and more extended analysis of the experience of reserved representation
for SCs/STs, see M.P. Singh (1979).
12 To these contrasting approaches to party-building by Nehru and Gandhi, attention is
drawn by Rajni Kothari (1970) pp. 55–56.
13 See also Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph (2001:) and M.P. Singh (19:).
14 On the ‘saintly idiom’ in Indian politics, in addition to the more widely prevalent ‘tradi-
tional’ and ‘modern’ idioms, see W.H. Morris-Jones (19).
15 Lok Sabha Secretariat (1994).
16 M. Ostrogorski (1903), 2 Vols.; and Rajni Kothari (1988).
2 The Indian National Congress in
the 1980s

The Nehru era in Congress politics in some relative sense represented the age of
innocence in government. The party had, of course, majored in a mass movement
of national liberation from colonial shackles. Its leaders—the second rung ones—
had also tasted limited governmental power at the provincial level as reluctant
ruling apprentices. However, the ruling elites and mass public experienced the full-
fledged transfer of power for the first time in the euphoria of Independence. There
was a nip in the air. The atmosphere was suffused with something akin to adoles-
cent idealism and experimental vigour. It was the moment of national arrival. It
was a period of democratic and economic reconstruction. Foundations were laid
of the parliamentary-federal constitution and a mixed economy with planning or
self-reliance.
The Indira Gandhi era, in contrast, was the age of the loss of political inno-
cence. Inheriting a party in decline from Lal Bahadur Shastri (briefly basking
in the glory of India’s respectable showing in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war after
humiliations in the China war in 1962), she was rudely jolted by the electoral
debacles of 1967 when Congress lost half of the States and won in the rest and
in New Delhi with reduced majorities. Her response was fast and dramatic.
Even though she was not as deeply steeped in leftwing ideology as Nehru,
she was pragmatically propelled into pushing the party to the left of the centre
and, in the process, forcing the right-leaning old guards out in the momentous
1969 split. The 1971 mid-term parliamentary polls and 1972 State Assembly
elections proved to be her finest hour. She was able to bring the party back to
its predominance. But it was a predominance with a difference. Faced with an
internal challenge, she brought about a greater centralization in the party and
government than Nehru, and what was even more consequential, she dispensed
with the façade of internal organizational elections in the party constituting it
entirely by ad hoc nominations from the top down. She was also faced fairly
soon with mounting mass movements of protest on the issues of corruption in
high places and inflation in the west and north that rapidly spilled out of the
institutional space of the party system. It virtually forced Jayaprakash Narayan
out from political retirement to lead the agitated students, the traditional and
professional middle classes, leaders of opposition parties, and the rural and urban
poor. These developments eventually led to the authoritarian intervention of the
government in the form of an internal emergency and the first ever widespread

DOI: 10.4324/9781003254676-2
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 29

arrest of non-communist opposition leaders as well as Congress factional leaders

opposed to Mrs. Gandhi. Authoritarian abuse of power during nearly two years
of the Emergency led directly to the first ever unseating of the Congress in New
Delhi in 1977 and its virtual wiping out in the north Indian States where emer-
gency excesses were largely concentrated. However, the electoral rehabilitation
of the Congress in the wake of the fall of the Janata Party Government in New
Delhi in 1979 and the elections that followed in 1980 came about sooner than
expected. The Janata State governments were also unceremoniously dismissed
by the newly elected Congress Government at the Centre on the specious, unfed-
eral plea that the Congress mandate in the Lok Sabha election had made their
continuance untenable!

Organizational crisis and change

It is a truism to say that the most remarkable thing about the Congress in its first
century has been its highly institutionalized character which is measurable in terms
of its effective adaptation to the changing times and contexts, its structural and
functional complexity, and its autonomous and coherent performance despite fac-
tionalism and social pressures (Session, 1982). This has often been regarded as the
most important factor contributing to political stability in India, a phenomenon rare
in post-colonial countries (Huntington, 1968, p. 6, ch. 7). Even though Congress
predominance was gone in the 1990s, it continued to be the largest single party in
the system in 1989 and in power in New Delhi between 1991 and 1996 and in sev-
eral States to-date. But the universal consensus on the institutionalized character of
the Congress in the 1950s and 1960s gave way to the widely shared agreement on
its deinstitutionalization since the 1970s (Singh, 1981; Session, 1982; Rudolphs,
1987; Kothari, 1988). To quote Kothari (1980, pp. 23–24):
Now it is clear that almost the entire institutional order … (not just the Congress
system) has very nearly broken down. The system has undergone a series of
changes: (i) the displacement of a cabinet system by a Prime Ministerial system
of governance, (ii) the abrogation of parliamentary supremacy over the executive.
(iii) the erosion of the federal framework by recourse to … practices engineered
from the very apex of the system, (iv) the undermining of judicial independence
and probity by executive manipulation of the concept of parliamentary supremacy,
(v) the uncalled for use of Presidential power … (vi) above all, the systemic ero-
sion of the party system, the real arena of the democratic political process and its
gradual displacement by personalized caucuses, buffeted by corrupt bureaucrats
who have been coerced into giving up the norms of a nonpartisan and law-abiding
administration.
A central issue in this ongoing and expansive debate has been the continuity
or discontinuity in the Indian party system at two nodal points in time: (a) the
1969 Congress split and parliamentary and Assembly elections that followed it in
1971 and 1972, and (b) the Emergency (1975–77) and subsequent recovery of plu-
ralist politics. A widely prevalent view, shared in some ways by both liberals and
Marxists, holds that these two events mark a watershed in Indian politics inasmuch
30 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

as they destroyed the Congress system, which, in turn, created a void hospitable
to the populist and personalized politics that has fostered a ‘lumpenised’ version
of ‘developmentalism’ and ‘welfarism’ on the part of the Congress and cynical
destructive ‘opposition’ on the part of the non-Congress parties.
In my view, much of this academic folklore of a supposed divide in the nature
of politics in India is exaggerated, if not entirely off the mark. To begin with, to
get a realistic evaluation of political institutions in India, we need to shift our focus
from the Indianist to the comparative perspective. In recent years, there have been
at least three occasions on which mild to deep misgivings and foreboding were
expressed about India slipping into a variant of Third World authoritarianism on
account of disquieting trends or setbacks in its party system: in 1967 when the first
major breach in the Congress system appeared; in 1975 when Mrs. Gandhi declared
the internal Emergency; and in 1979 when the Janata experiment in erecting a
surrogate Congress system collapsed. However, on each of these occasions, the
Indian political system demonstrated remarkable resilience and was, sooner than
expected, back to a new dynamic democratic equilibrium. Among the seasoned
observers of the Indian political scene, Weiner (1983, p. 49) remained among the
very few who continued to be cautiously sanguine about the state of political insti-
tutions in the country:
Nearly 35 years ago the British relinquished power in India, leaving behind
a parliament, a federal structure, an independent judiciary, electoral procedures,
a free press, and independent political parties. Today, these institutions and pro-
cedures of governance remain intact—bruised and modified, but intact. Many of
these institutions were assailed and temporarily suspended during the Emergency,
but once again they are functioning.
This is a sound cautionary note against any premature conclusion about a com-
plete rupture between the Nehruvian golden age and the subsequent phases. Roy’s
(1966) study of the Bihar Pradesh Congress in the 1950s and 1960s shows that the
state of the party was far from the idealized version of the celebrated ‘Congress
system’ (Kothari, 1964, 1974). Additionally, some observers have already warned
us against being taken for a ride by the argument advanced by many observers that
the 1971–72 elections marked the replacement of clientelist voting by civic voting.
2 Moreover, the hypothesis of the decline of political institutions would bear a little
more specific scrutiny than it has so far been subjected to. In fact, it has been com-
monly so uncritically accepted (thanks to the myth of the Nehruvian golden age so
successfully created by Kothari and Morris Jones) that it may appear rather freak
to argue that despite significant changes there are considerable continuities in the
post-independence patterns of politics in India.1, 2
To go on arguing about the decline of the party system in the 1980s is to over-
emphasize fortuitous smooth sail under Nehru to the extent of confusing going
through rough weather later with shipwreck; it flies in the face of two parallel
developments: (a) the massive electoral mandates for the Congress in the 1980s and
1984–85 (especially in the North) after its debacle in 1977; and (b) the emergence
of stable non-Congress ruling parties or coalitions, in sharp contrast to the instabil-
ity of 1967–71 and the Janata experiment, in the erstwhile Congress-ruled states of
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 31

Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Assam, and to some extent in Kerala. These electoral
turnovers have been premised on issues of State autonomy, misgovernment, and
internal party democracy. These issues have initiated a process of reappraisal in
Congress, and the parties who voted to power themselves would, of course, have
to measure up to these standards. Electoral malpractices and violence have surely
mounted in comparison to the previous decades, but the determination of the media
and Election Commission, and civic organizations have not been lacking.
Obviously, the parameters of politics now have discernibly changed from the
early post-independence decades, but it is too much to argue that populism and
lumpen developmentarian stance sprang like a non-institutional Alladin from
nowhere under Indira Gandhi. What has really happened is that tendencies already
present, even inherent in India’s development strategy, have recently become more
acute. The constitutional design as well as the strategy of economic development
tended to centralize political and economic powers. This eventually posed threats
both to the survival of the constitution and the viability of sustained and balanced
national economic development. Wars with China and Pakistan in the 1960s and
1970s and the new pressures from a substantially larger mobilized mass public
and the fast-multiplying breed of unscrupulous and opportunist marauders posed
unprecedented problems for the political system to cope with. Skilfully linking her
political career with the new mobilizational tides and currents of changes (Singh,
1981) and battling with the judiciary, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary oppo-
sition, and non-Congress State governments, she temporarily slipped into the
‘constitutional authoritarianism’ of the Emergency tainted by the ignominy of the
arbitrary suppression of the opposition and the press and the 42nd constitutional
amendment. Partly held at bay by judicial review and finally humbled by an elec-
toral defeat, her party re-emerged as the only viable democratic alternative in the
electoral calculus of 1980. However, following the splits of 1969 and 1978 and the
suspension of organizational elections in the party since 1972, the Congress turned
into a highly personalized pack of political faithful during the persecutions of the
Janata phase, and a personality-oriented mass party since 1980. Indira Gandhi also
sought to dry up corporate financing to parties through a 1969 statute (made legal
by another enactment in 1985), but underhand donations apparently continued not
only to her party but to an extent to opposition parties as well.
The altered organizational style of the Congress—a personalized and centrally
mobilized mass party operating through cooptative ad hoc committees nominated
by higher party echelons, in most cases directly by the Prime Minister (also in
charge of party presidentship)—was in fact a response to Mrs. Gandhi’s deepen-
ing suspicion of powerful State party bosses (from whom the main challenge to
her authority had come in 1969). It was also a function of the very different envi-
ronmental contexts of the 1970s and 1980s marked simultaneously by cumulative
effects of the extra-parliamentary mass mobilization by the opposition, rapid social
mobility and reversal, revolutions of rising expectations and frustrations, and vitia-
tion of the political process by criminal and terrorist elements and money power.
Rajiv Gandhi’s Prime Ministerial succession in October 1984 on Mrs. Gandhi’s
assassination itself has been widely regarded as indicative of the decline of
32 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

institutional procedures in the Congress party. Unlike previous successions in

1964 and 1966 when the then President Dr. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan first admin-
istered the oath of office to the seniormost colleague of the Nehru and the Shastri
cabinets as interim premier, pending the swearing in of the duly elected leaders of
the Congress Parliamentary Party (Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi, respec-
tively), Giani Zail Singh proceeded to induct Rajiv Gandhi without any such for-
mal election. Two members of a truncated Congress Parliamentary Board and a
handful of Chief Ministers in the visitor’s rooms of the separate existence until the
middle of the 1980s, other important splinters of the decade were those led by A.K.
Antony in Kerala and S. Bangarappa in Karnataka, the Rashtriya Sanjay Vichar
Manch formed by Mrs. Gandhi’s estranged daughter-in-law Maneka Gandhi,
Rashtriya Congress floated by Pranab Mukherjee, and the Jan Morcha led by V.P.
Singh that finally merged with Janata Dal in the run-up to the 1989 Lok Sabha elec-
tions. Previously, factionalism was normally more typical of the State Congress
parties with the central leadership playing the role of the mediator/arbitrator. In the
1980s, especially during the Rajiv Gandhi regime, factionalism surfaced even at
the apex of the party. To cite a few instances, the letter of Kamalapati Tripathi, the
working president of the party and the memorandum of Madhavsinh Solanki, the
former Gujarat Chief Minister, to Rajiv Gandhi, the party president, both lament-
ing the state of affairs and the postponement of organizational elections in the party
(organizational elections increase the leverage of the lower-level party leadership
vis-à-vis the higher level leadership); the tussle between Kamalapati Tripathi and
Arjun Singh, the vice-president of the party, both subsequently dispensed with;
the veiled or open rebellions of Pranab Mukherjee, Dr. Jagannath Mishra, A.P.
Sharma, Sripati Mishra, Prakash Mehrotra, Shivaji Ganesan, Arif Mohammad
Khan, V.P. Singh, and Ashok Kurnar Sen—all variously related to factional con-
flicts over denial of legitimate political career opportunities, lack of procedure in
the functioning of the party, retrogressive Muslim personal law legislation piloted
by it, and economic corruption in high places, including defence purchase deals.
Although the sponsored revival of the Youth Congress and later the party organi-
zation to a limited extent in the late 1970s and early 1980s was made with the
calculated purpose of serving as the launching pads for the induction of Sanjay
and subsequently Rajiv, the very frequency of factional conflicts, including those
within the party organization itself, were suggestive of a tendency towards stra-
tarchy in the party, and in extreme cases fragmentation.
The Congress in the 1980s, however, displayed a tendency of becoming essen-
tially a party of parliamentary or legislative presence; its external organizational
and mass movement legacies were largely atrophied. This fact directs attention to
two aspects of the Congress in the decade: (a) the crucial significance of the legisla-
tive wings, and (b) the wider popularity of the Prime Minister compared with the
popularity of the party (Singh, 1990).
Under Mrs. Indira Gandhi and subsequently under Rajiv Gandhi Chief Ministers
generally came to be nominated by the party’s high command, their cabinet for-
mation and expansion were also approved from the top, and their survival hinged
more on central party backing than on the legislative majority of the State congress
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 33

party, although it stands to reason that such central decisions could not fully dis-
regard the factional balance of forces in the State party. Riding roughshod over
a State party might cause stratarchical tension between the State party dissident
leader and the central leadership (e.g. Dr. Jagannath Mishra’s janajagaran (mass
awakening) campaigns in Bihar following his deposition as Chief Minister at cen-
tral leadership’s behest in 1983 despite his enjoying the majority support in the
Congress legislature party) or even open revolt and formation of a non-Congress
government by a dissident State Congress leader (e.g. The Narbahadur Bhandari
episode in Sikkim) where on Centre’s refusal to concede to his demand for granting
of Indian citizenship to Nepalese migrants he proceeded to form a regional party,
Sikkim Sangram Parishad, and led it to victory in 1985.
Since Indira Gandhi put her foot down against the organizational leaders in
1969, her purge of the party’s rightwing faction was so decisive that party organi-
zations at national and State levels could never grow except by her sponsorship.3
This was the case with the rise of Sanjay, with acclaim within the Youth Congress
and limited opposition within the larger party but fierce opposition from the oppo-
sition parties and the press; later this was also true of Rajiv’s induction into politics,
despite his own and his wife Sonia’s reluctance, with wider consensus within the
party and from the masses and the intelligentsia.

The federal dimension in the party

By most accounts, it is probably true that in the State Congress parties and in the
federal arena in general the frequency of central interventions increased is the post-
Nehru era through the instrumentalities of central party functionaries in Congress-
ruled States and Governors in non-Congress States, thus blurring the boundaries
between the governmental and organization wings of Congress and straining fed-
eral consensus. However, it is also worth considering that the Centre’s role in the
pre-Indira Gandhi period in State and local politics has been perhaps underesti-
mated. Brass (1984, p. 10) comments that his earlier impression that State and
district politics were more autonomous from the Centre in the 1950s and 1960s
and the Centre’s role became more intrusive in the subsequent decade was perhaps
exaggerated in some measure. It is also valid, additionally, to argue that the atrophy
of the organizational thermostat has often meant that the internal party conflicts
and mass mobilizational strains in some regions, that would have otherwise been
contained within the Congress, forced into the open leading to the emergence of
non-Congress parties and governments (e.g. the leading role of Congress dissenters
in Janata Party/Dal in 1977 and 1988; and their contributory role in Karnataka in
1983; Andhra Pradesh in 1983; Assam in 1985; and their major role in the forma-
tion of the Sikkim Sangram Parishad in 1985).
A comprehensive look at the Chief Ministerial changes in the Congress States
during the premierships of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi in the 1980s is quite
revealing (Table 2.1). In such changes under Indira Gandhi, 17 were due to dis-
sidence in the State party and 10 due to Assembly elections (not without concomi-
tance of dissidence). The corresponding figures under Rajiv Gandhi were 18 due
34 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

Table 2.1 Social and political background of Congress MPs in the 1980s

Seventh Lok Sabha Eighth Lok Sabha

Age 22.0
25–40 years 24.0 59.0
41–60 years 60.9 19.0
25–40 years 24.0 59.0
41–60 years 60.9 19.0
61 years and above 15.1 400
Total N 350
Education
Primary * 6.8
High School & intermediate * 20.7
Graduate and above * 71.5
No response * 1.0
Total N 400
Occupation
Agriculture * 35.3
Business and Industry * 12.7
Feudal / aristocratic family * 11.3
Professional(s) services * 34.2
Others * 6.5
Total 400
Legislative Experience
Previously MP * 27.5
Previously MP & MLA * 25.5
Previously MLA only * 25.0
Fresh * 22.0
400

Sources: Bhambhari and Verma (1981, pp. 12–16; 1986, p. 20).

Notes: Not comparable with the eighth Lok Sabha figures as different code categories were used for
these variables for the seventh Lok Sabha by the authors.

to dissidence in the party and 24 due to Assembly elections. There was thus an
enormous amount of dissidence and instability in the Congress party in the 1980s.
The unanimous choice of Congress legislature party leaders in practically all cases
is attributable to the active involvement of the party’s high command and their
observers sent to State capitals to oversee the process of selecting the leader and
helping in arriving at a consensus. Factionalism in State Congress parties in 1980
appeared to have far exceeded its magnitudes in the period of Nehru and in the
heyday of Mrs. Gandhi in the 1970s.

Congress chief ministerial changes in the 1980s

Congress chief ministerial changes due to fresh electoral mandate during Indira
Gandhi’s prime ministership

1. Maharashtra: June 1980. A.R. Antulay was sworn in following the Assembly
elections.
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 35

2. Haryana: June 1982. Bhajan Lal was sworn in. Six independents and two defec-
tors among ministers. Given one month by Governor to prove the majority.
Outgoing Chief Minister Devi Lal of Lok Dal-BJP alliance lost the elections.
3. Himachal Pradesh: May 1982. Ram Lal who headed the caretaker govern-
ment after the dissolution of the Assembly sworn in on 24 May 1982. But Vir
Bhadra Singh was subsequently sworn in replacing Ram Lal who quit after
mounting pressure from dissidents in Congress Legislature Party who man-
aged to obtain a nod from the party’s high command.
4. Kerala: May 1982. A UDF ministry headed by K. Karunakaran (Congress) was
sworn in following the Assembly elections. The State was under President’s
rule since March 1982.
5. Rajasthan: June 1980. Jagannath Pahadia sworn in following the 1980
Assembly elections.
6. Rajasthan: March 1985. Heeralal Deopura was sworn in following the 1985
Assembly elections.
7. Nagaland: November 1982. S.C. Jamir sworn in after eight independent legis-
lators joined the Congress Legislature Party to give it a majority in the newly
elected hung Assembly.
8. U.P.: June 1980. V.P. Singh sworn in following the Assembly elections.
9. Assam: February 1983. Hiteshwar Saikia sworn in.
10. Mizoram: April-May 1984. Lal Thanhawla sworn in after dislodging the
People’s Conference.

Congress chief ministerial changes due to reasons other than fresh mandate
during Indira Gandhi’s prime ministership

1. Rajasthan: July 1981. Shiv Charan Mathur sworn in as a result of factional

conflict and central party intervention.
2. Manipur: June 1981. Rishang Keishing was sworn in. The State was under
President’s rule since February 1981.
3. Assam: June 1981. President’s rule.
a. Meghalaya: May 1981. W.A. Sangma sworn in.
4. Assam: January 1982. Keshav Chandra Gogoi sworn in.
5. Maharashtra: January 1982. A.R. Antulay resigned following High Court
stricture. Babasaheb Bhosale sworn in U.P.: June 1980. V.P. Singh was sworn
in following the Assembly elections.
6. Andhra Pradesh: February 1982. T. Anjiah resigned under high command
pressure. Bhavanam Venkataram Reddy sworn in. Fourth Chief Minister in
four and a half years.
7. Maharashtra: January 1982. A.R. Antulay made to resign in the midst of dubi-
ous fund-raising for a trust he set up. He was succeeded by Babasaheb Bhosale
in January 1982.
Maharashtra: February 1983. Babasaheb Bhosale asked to step down to
make room for Vasant Dada Patil in February 1983.
36 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

8. Kerala: March 1982. UDF coalition government led by Congress reduced to a

minority following defections from a front’s constituent, Congress (Mani) (not
Indian National Congress). The State was placed under President’s rule for a
second time in two years.
9. Uttar Pradesh: June 1982. V.P. Singh resigned on his failure to control the
dacoit menace in Kanpur and Mainpuri districts. Sripati Mishra sworn in.
10. Bihar: August 1983. Chandrashekhar Singh sworn in. Dr. Jagannath Mishra
resigned under the high command’s directive. Dissidents in CLP had been
demanding a change in leadership for over two years.
11. Pondicherry: June 1983. DMK-Congress coalition government was dismissed
and President’s rule was proclaimed after the 10-member CLP withdrew sup-
port from the government.
12. Punjab: October 1983. The Congress government in New Delhi proclaimed
President’s rule, advising its own Chief Minister, Darbara Singh, to resign, in
view of the growing extremist violence in the State.
13. Sikkim: 11 May 1984. Narbahadur Bhandari was dismissed as Chief Minister
by the high command of the party and the President of the republic and
replaced by B.B. Gurung.
14. Sikkim: 24 May 1984. Assembly dissolved and President’s rule was
proclaimed after 17 Congress MLAs deserted the party, reducing it to the
minority.
15. Meghalaya: February 1988. Congress-All Party Hill Leaders’ Conference
coalition ministry headed by the Union Minister for Labour Purno Agitok
Sangma, sworn in.
16. Rajasthan: March 1985. Shiv Charan Mathur was sworn in the wake of fac-
tional realignments and central party intervention.
17. Maharashtra: June 1988. Sharad Pawar was sworn in on his return to Congress
and the incumbent Chief Minister, S.B. Chavan shifted to the Centre as a
Union Minister.

Congress chief ministerial changes due to fresh electoral mandate during Rajiv
Gandhi’s prime ministership

1. Maharashtra: June 1985. S.P. Nilangekar-Patil took over Vasant Dada Patil
after the latter resigned protesting against the appointment of Ms. Pratibha Rao
as the Pardesh Congress party’s president by the Central party leadership.
2. Maharashtra: March 1986. S.B. Chavan sworn in after Nilangekar resigned
following a Bombay High Court stricture.
3. Andhra Pradesh: Febraury 1982. B. Venkatarama Reddy replaced T. Anjaiah
due to factional realignments and central party intervention.
4. Andhra Pradesh: September 1982. K.V. Bhaskara Reddy took over from B.V.
Reddy in the wake of factional bickering and central intervention.
5. Arunachal Pradesh: June 1985. Gegong Apang sworn in.
6. Manipur: January 1985. Rishang Keishing sworn in.
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 37

7. Goa, Daman, and Diu: January 1985. Pratap Singh Rane sworn in.
8. Bihar: March 1985. Bindeshwari Dubey, PCC President sworn in. Outgoing
Chief Minister Chandrashekhar Singh.
9. Gujarat: March 1985: Madhavsinh Solanki sworn in.
10. Himachal Pradesh: March 1985. Vir Bhadra Singh sworn in.
11. Madhya Pradesh: March 1985: Arjun Singh sworn in.
12. Madhya Pradesh: 13 March 1985. Motilal Vora was sworn in as the new Chief
Minister, and Arjun Singh appointed Government of Punjab.
13. Orissa: March 1985. Janaki Ballabh Patnaik was sworn in for the second suc-
cessive term. The first Congress Chief Minister in recent years to complete a
term of five years and take the oath of office for a second term.
14. Pondicherry: March 1985. O.H. Farooq was sworn in to head the Congress
minority government after the victory of the Congress-AIADMK alliance in
the elections.
15. Rajasthan: March 1985. Hardeo Joshi was sworn in. At CLP meeting Hiralal
Devpura, who had the shortest tenure of 15 days as Chief Minister, proposed
Joshi’s name.
16. Sikkim: March 1985. Nar Bahadur Bhandari returned to power.
17. Jammu and Kashmir: March 1986. Congress withdrew support from the G.M.
Shah government. Chief Minister G.M. Shah resigned announcing the merger
of his National Congress with Dr. Farooq Abdullah’s National Conference and
urging that the latter be invited to form a government. The Governor instead
dissolved the Assembly and ordered a fresh poll.
Jammu and Kashmir: 1987. Dr. Farooq Abdullah (National Conference)
was sworn in heading a NC-TNC coalition ministry after the front won the
Assembly elections.
18. Nagaland: November 1987. Hokisha Sema was sworn in after Congress won
an absolute majority in Assembly elections.
19. Tripura: February 1988. Sworn in after Congress-Tripura, Upajati, and Tuba
Samiti won the Assembly elections unseating the Left Front.
20. Meghalaya: February 1988. Sworn in heading Congress-All Party Hill
Leaders’ Conference coalition government following the elections.
21. Nagaland: January 1989. S.C. Jamir sworn in after the elections. Earlier in
August 1988. Nagaland was placed under President’s rule following the crisis
resulting from the resignation of 13 Congress MLAs.
22. Mizoram: January 1989. Lal Thanhawla sworn in after the electoral defeat of
MNF at the hands of the Congress. The State was under President’s rule since
September 1988.
23. Goa: November 1989. Stalemate with Congress and Maharashtravadi
Gomantak Party sharing 36 seats each, with two independents in between.
President’s rule is recommended by the Governor. Congress-MGP coalition
government in the previous Assembly on the rocks.
24. Karnataka: December 1989. Virendra Patil sworn in following the displace-
ment of the Janata government by the Congress in the Assembly elections.
38 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

Congress chief ministerial changes due to reasons other than fresh mandate
during Rajiv Gandhi’s prime ministership

1. Gujarat: July 1985. Amarsinh Chaudhury was sworn in after the party’s high
command decided to replace Madhavsinh Solanki as Chief Minister in the
midst of deepening anti-reservation agitation in the State. Solanki was the
third Congress (I) Chief Minister to quit within four months of assuming office
after the last Assembly elections in the state.
2. Haryana: June 1986. Bani Lal assumed the office of the Chief Minister after
the Prime Minister decided to replace Bhajan Lal for taking a rigid position on
the dispute between Haryana and Punjab.
3. Mizoram: August 1986. Congress-Mizo National Front coalition minis-
try headed by MNF President Laldenga with the outgoing Chief Minister
Lalthanhawla of the Congress as his deputy sworn in. Earlier on August 16,
Lalthanhawla resigned as Chief Minister to accommodate Laldenga in the
wake of the Mizo Accord. State Assembly dissolved and the State was put
under President’s rule following the loss of majority by the Laldenga ministry
due to desertion of eight MNF legislators on August 29 who later joined hands
with the 13-member Congress party in the 40-member Assembly.
4. Mizoram: February 1987. Lalthanhawla (Congress) resigned at the behest of
the party’s high command following the Mizoram Peace Accord to make room
for Laldenga (MNF).
5. Kerala: March 1987. UDF led by Congress voted out of power by LDF.
President’s rule was followed by elections in which LDF won.
6. Rajasthan: February 1985. Shiv Charan Mathur was asked to resign by the
party’s high command following the death of an independent candidate in the
ongoing Assembly elections, Raja Man Singh of Deog in police firing.
7. Uttar Pradesh: September 1985. Vir Bahadur Singh replaced N.D. Tiwari as
Chief Minister. Tiwari shifted to New Delhi as a Union Minister.
8. Bihar: March 1989. S.N. Sinha was sworn in after Bhagwat Jha Azad in the midst
of growing dissidence in the CLP under pressure from party’s high command.
9. Uttar Pradesh: June 1988. Narain Dutt Tiwari, former Union Finance Minister,
replaced Vir Bahadur Singh, who resigned following the electoral reverses of
the Congress in recent by-elections.
10. Maharashtra: June 1989. Sharad Pawar was elected by Congress Legislature
Party as the State’s sixth Chief Minister in eight years. Pawar’s name was
proposed by the outgoing Chief Minister S.B. Chavan who was asked by
the AICC to name his successor. Pawar who, had deserted the Congress and
headed the Progressive Democratic Front coalition government, had rejoined
the Congress about a year ago after Rajiv Gandhi’s accession.
11. Manipur: March 1988. R.K. Jaichandra Singh was sworn in following the res-
ignation of Rishang Keishing in the midst of the crisis created by dissidents in
the party.
12. Madhya Pradesh: January 1989. Arjun Singh was replaced as Chief Minister
by Motilal Vobra by the party’s high command. Singh’s tenure of 343 days
was marked by controversies and corruption charges.
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 39

13–17Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan: November–December 1989.

Following the reverses of the Congress party in the Lok Sabha elections (1989)
the party’s high command decided to change Chief Ministers in the four States
even though Vidhan Sabha elections were not simultaneously held in these
States. Dr. Jagannath in Bihar replacing S.N. Singh. In Orissa Hemanand
Biswal, a tribal leader from Western Orissa, replaced J.B. Patnaik. In Madhya
Pradesh S.C. Shukia was chosen in place of Motilal Vora. And in Rajasthan
S.C. Mathur gave way to Haridev Joshi.

Presaged by the elections of 1967 and 1977, the challenge of federalization of

state power in the Indian political system reached a new moment in the 1980s.
The restoration of the Congress in 1980 and the massive renewal of its mandate in
1984 were concomitantly combined with two developments. First, there emerged
powerful movements for greater autonomy for States in a larger part of the country
than ever before. Second, the 1980s also witnessed a steadily growing number
of non-Congress governments in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka (1983), Sikkim,
Punjab, and Assam (1985).
The mass movements led by older regional parties like DMK and Akali Dal as
well as new regional parties like Telugu Desam, Asom Gana Parishad, and Sikkim
Sangram Parishad mounted a powerful assault on the central government for con-
stitutional restructuring and policy changes. Among the older regional parties,
AIADMK had built bridges with the Congress party in power at the Centre. The
National Conference too, after the initial joining of forces after Sheikh, Abdullah’s
death, with the opposition parties in the early 1980s, subsequently joined the Congress
camp and won the 1987 Assembly elections in the State in alliance with Congress
and formed a coalition government. This volte-face on the part of Dr. Farooq
Abdullah came about following a split in National Conference led by the Sheikh’s
son-in-law who briefly formed a government in the State with the Congress’s back-
ing. The anti-Congress regional parties and movements like the Akali Dal and TDP,
at least initially, went to the extent of demanding a radical restructuring of the con-
stitution such that they almost harked back to the failed Articles of Confederation
with stronger States vis-à-vis a weak federal government that preceded the current
American constitution adopted over two centuries back. Punjab and Assam and
subsequently Jammu and Kashmir were increasingly embroiled in conflicts centring
on religious and linguistic identities and even secessionism.
Rajiv Gandhi’s accession created the hope for a federal reconciliation after
Mrs. Gandhi’s drive for centralization and confrontation with regional extremism
and separatism. In a rather quick series, regional accords were signed between
the Centre and Akali Dal leader Harcharan Singh Longowal (1985), Assam agita-
tions (1985), Mizo National Front leader Laldenga (1984), and Tripura National
Volunteer (1988). These accords sought to quell raging fires of agitations, insur-
gency, and secessionism for decades in the border areas of the Northwest and the
Northeast. They involved religious, linguistic, and tribal communities in regions
that had been largely peripheral to the Brahmanical British Raj. Despite their
Vedic and/or epic and Puranic antiquities Punjab as well as Assam had remained
40 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

in relative isolation from the main centres of Brahmanical culture. Both areas also
experienced the spread of Buddhism. Punjab was also the seat of another protestant
sect, Sikhism, since l5 century onwards. Both areas, moreover, were incorporated
into the British rule in India nearly a century later than Bengal, the first major out-
post of British colonial rule: Assam in 1842 and Punjab in 1846.
Punjab and Assam peace accords were addressed to the resolution of the long-
standing and immediate problems affecting the Sikhs and the Assamese. The for-
mer were successful in their bid to convert themselves into the majority community
in the Punjabi Suba but were still fighting for greater autonomy; the latter were
threatened to be reduced into a minority in their own home State by the perennial
influx of migrants, mostly Muslims from Bangladesh and others from neighbour-
ing Indian States and Nepal. In both States sections of the youth were weaned away
by terrorism and separatism often fuelled from across the international border.
The Assam accord fixed 1 January 1966 as the base for the detection of foreign-
ers. The base for expulsion was set on 25 March 1971. Foreigners who came to
Assam prior to 1 January 1966 were to be regularized. Those who came between 1
January 1966 and 25 March 1971 were to be disenfranchised for ten years. Those
who came after 25 March 1971 were to be expelled. It was also agreed that citizen-
ship future would be issued only by the central government. Specific complaints
about irregularities in this matter by the All Assam Students Union and All Assam
Gana Sangram Parishad were to be looked into. The international border was to
be more effectively sealed to prevent future infiltration. Besides, the Centre also
committed to providing constitutional, legislative, and administrative safeguards
‘to protect preserve and promote the cultural, social, linguistic identity and heritage
of the Assamese people’ (clause 6) and to promote economic, administrative, and
technological development of the State (clause 7). Moreover, the Centre and State
governments also agreed to withdraw disciplinary action against employees in the
context of the agitation, relax the upper age limit of recruitment into government
employment in the State, make ex-gratia payments to the family members of those
killed in the agitation, and review the detention cases.
The Punjab accord referred the Anadpur Sàhib resolutions of Shiromani Akali
Dal (1973 and 1978) in the context of the Centre-State relations to the Sarkaria
Commission on Centre-State Relations then actively engaged in its deliberations.
The Dal affirmed that this resolution ‘is entirely within the framework of the Indian
Constitution’ and that ‘it attempts to define the concept of Centre-State relations
in a manner which may bring out the true federal characteristics of our Unitary
Constitution’ and ‘provide greater autonomy to the State with a view to strengthen-
ing the unity and integrity of the country’ (clause 8.1). Besides, Chandigarh was
to be given to Punjab while some Hindi-speaking territories of Punjab were to go
to Haryana on the ‘principle of contiguity and linguistic affinity with a village as a
unit’ determinable by a Commission (clause 7.1 and 2). Moreover, the pattern of
sharing of irrigation water from the RaviVyas system between Punjab, Haryana,
and Rajasthan was to stay put on 1 July 1985 and the claims of the first two States
about the surplus water were to be referred to a judicial tribunal (clause 9.1 and
2). The Sutlej-Yamuna link canal was to be completed by 15 August 1986 (clause
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 41

9.3). In addition, the Government of India was to consider the enactment of an All
India Gurudwara legislation in consultation with the Akali Dal and others con-
cerned (clause 5). The remaining clauses of the accord dealt with compensation to
the sufferers of the agitation, rehabilitation of those deserting and dismissed from
the army, an extension of the jurisdiction of Justice Ranganath Misra Commission
enquiring into anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and Bokaro and Kanpur, disposal of pending
cases relating to those charged with waging war and hi-jacking of planes by regular
instead of special courts, protection of interests of minorities all over India, and
promotion of Punjabi language.
Both Assam and Punjab accords were great steps forward in national reconcili-
ation. The former floundered in its most contentious aspect of territorial claims as
two commissions in succession reported failure to operationalize the criteria of
‘contiguity and linguistic affinity with a village as a unit’ within their terms of
reference. With other problems, parts of the accord remained a dead letter. In the
Assembly elections that followed in these two States close on the heels of the peace
accords the Akali Dal came to power for the first time on its own in Punjab, and in
Assam, the newly formed Asom Gana Parishad incorporating AASU and AAGSP
swept the polls. Both States were previously ruled by Congress.
The Mizo and Tripura peace accords purporting to end the chronic problem of
insurgency in these areas in the Northeast expanded the category of special status
States in Article 371 series (Clauses ) and Articles 244 and 12, though these con-
cessions to ‘asymmetrical federalism’ are less far-reaching than that contained in
Article 370 relating to Jammu and Kashmir. The Union Territory of Mizoram was
granted Statehood under the Constitution. Applicability of the enactments of the
Parliament to Mizoram in respect of religious and social practices of the Mizos,
their customary law and procedure, and ownership and transfer of land was made
contingent on a conforming resolution by the Legislative Assembly of Mizoram.
Nagaland also enjoys a similar status in this regard. Tripura, like Meghalaya, was to
concede legislative power to the autonomous district or regional councils, subject
to the non-repugnancy of such laws and regulations to provisions of a law made
by the State legislature. Besides, the President was empowered to notify would not
apply to an autonomous district of the region. Following the accord, the Congress
Chief Minister in Mizoram made their way to Laldenga’s accession to the office.
The 1980s also witnessed a steadily growing number of non-Congress govern-
ments in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka (1983), Sikkim (1985), and Assam (1985).
Together with West Bengal where a Left Front government had been in power
since 1977, they put up an orchestrated challenge to the Congress and its allies
in legislatures and intergovernmental and wider forums like NDC and National
Integration Council as well as non-Congress conclaves hosted by TDP, Janata,
Left Front, and National Conference State governments. The decade witnessed first
ever walkouts from NDC by some of these Chief Ministers in protest of plans and
policies predominantly formulated by the Congress-controlled Centre. Typical of
the demands made at these forums were the joint statements of six Chief Ministers
of non-Congress-ruled States of West Bengal, Kerala, Tripura, Karnataka, Andhra
Pradesh, and Punjab on 25 April 1987. The Chief Ministers deplored the Congress
42 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

Centre’s tendency of unilateral decisions in vital economic matters adversely

affecting the States, e.g. increasing the administered price of essential commodi-
ties (that augments the Centre’s resource mobilization) instead of adjusting excise
duties which are to be shared with States, making bank deposits more lucrative
than small savings that dwindle the proceeds meted by the States, and revising
dearness allowance and pay scales of central government employees that trigger
inflationary spirals. The Chief Minister demanded a 40 percent share in additional
resources raised through an upward revision in administered prices and adequate
representation for State governments in nationalized banks. They also protested
against Centre’s unilateral decision in licensing large and medium industries and
demanded organizational setup to ensure an effective say of the States in the mat-
ter. Moreover, the Chief Ministers were sore over the centralized programming in
radio and television and urged the Centre to reserve one radio station and one TV
channel for the States.
The phenomenon of this non-congress federalizing thrust could not be exclu-
sively explained in terms of the new agrarian prosperity. Nor had party preferences
been stable enough in States to establish any such correlation. However, this factor
might have accelerated the process of consolidation of non-Congress forces that
initially were associated with linguistic/religious regionalism and leftwing ideo-
logical mobilization. Finally, poorer and economically stagnant States also came
to join the non-Congress Kaleidoscope in combination with perceived threats to
linguistic cultural identity and OBC mobilization.
A significant aspect of regional politics of federal relevance was a more wide-
spread emergence or exacerbation of sub-regional movements in the 1980s, e.g.
GNLF in Darjeeling district of West Bengal, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha in South
Bihar, and Bodoland agitation in Assam. These movements are based on perceived
ethnic/tribal deprivations in backward regions of the States concerned. The move-
ments brought into operation triangular political negotiations between the agita-
tionists; the LF, Janata, and AGP governments in the respective States; and the
Congress Centre. The Centre naturally came to play the role of arbitration/media-
tion between the movement leaders and the State governments. In all three there
was a move afoot to set up regional development boards with some measure of
autonomy to avoid the formation of new States within the Union.
In intergovernmental relations the most persistent question to agitate the State
governments was the power of the President to dismiss a State government in case
of constitutional emergency in a State under Article 356 and to disallow a State
legislation reserved by the Governor for consideration by the Centre under Article
201. The first parliamentary embarrassment to come the way of the newly elected
Congress government of Indira Gandhi was the CPI-sponsored amendment to the
motion of thanks to the President’s address to the joint, bicameral session of the
Parliament carried with opposition support cutting across party lines in the Rajya
Sabha (80: 75) where the ruling party happened to be in a minority. It referred to
the disturbing trend of the Congress to engineer defections in non-Congress parties
and threaten the arbitrary dissolution of State Assemblies contrary to the spirit of the
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 43

Constitution and federalism. The issue also repeatedly cropped up in every conclave
of non-Congress Chief Ministers through the 1980s—in Vijayawada, Bangalore,
Calcutta, and Srinagar. It further deepened with the brutal dismissals of the NT
Rama Rao government in Andhra Pradesh and the Farooq Abdullah government in
Jammu and Kashmir through the 1980s. Both bounced back to power in elections
that followed, the former to the public indictment of the Congress and the latter in a
humiliating alliance with the Congress that pulled out the National Conference from
the non-Congress opposition orbit where Abdullah was playing an honourable role.
Under mounting pressures from the State governments and State autonomy
movements, Indira Gandhi appointed in 1983 the first ever Commission on Centre-
State Relations chaired by Justice R.S. Sarkaria of the Supreme Court and two
additional commissioners. The Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State
Relations submitted its monumental two volumes of recommendations and memo-
randa in 1987–88. It was generally regarded as conservative as it did not recom-
mend a structural change through substantial constitutional amendments. It instead
suggested only piecemeal amendments and activation of some federal instrumen-
talities contemplated in the Constitution but never really implemented. It basically
banked on the growth of healthy federal conventions by emphasizing a new pattern
of elite values and practices respectful of federal norms (Commission on Centre-
State Relations, Part I, 1988, hereafter CCSR).
Almost the only major constitutional amendment of some consequence in the
area of the original structural principles is the one where the Commission sought
to meet the grievances of the States by recommending that proceeds of one of the
Union’s most elastic tax bases, i.e. corporation tax, be made sharable with the
States. Moreover, the Union government was also admonished not to levy a sur-
charge on income tax (which has the effect of denying the States a share in income
tax) except for a specific purpose and limited period (CCSR Part 1, 1988).
To expand and facilitate consultations between the Union and State govern-
ments, the Sarkaria Commission made two major recommendations: the creation
of a modified National Developmental Council renamed as National Economic
Development Council (NEDC) under the Constitution rather than under a Union
government regulation as at present; and the appointment of an Inter-Governmental
Council (IGC) under Article 263 of the Constitution which has so far been practi-
cally dormant. In addition, the Commission that the Finance Commission (pres-
ently constituted by the President every five years under the Constitution) be
strengthened by a permanent tenure and served with a regular secretariat, and the
Planning Commission be put on a constitutional footing under Article 263 instead
of being created under an executive order as at present.
It is a pity that Sarkaria Commission recommendations have not received the
due attention and dispatch either from the governments or the opposition that they
deserve. By creating a series of points of autonomy in the Constitution the report,
if implemented, could precipitate quantum federal lead. Coupled with the factor
of party system transformation from one-party dominance to a multi-partisan con-
figuration the Sarkaria package could mean a major leap forward in federalization.
44 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

The swan song of Rajiv Gandhi’s regime relevant in the federal context was
the 64 constitutional amendment bill introduced in the last session of the 8’ Lok
Sabha. It could not pass due to the strong resistance of the opposition in the Rajya
Sabha. They charged that this ‘power to the people’ legislation of the Congress was
a sham electoral gimmick to malign the opposition. They apprehended that the then
recently convened conferences of the Prime Minister with district collectors cou-
pled with Panchayat reforms unfolded a sinister design of the Centre to bypass the
States in a determined drive towards centralization. They saw in the same perspec-
tive the direct central funds to the Panchayats under the Nehru centenary Jawahar
rojgar yojana (merging the erstwhile three major schemes of rural development and
the Indira) avas yojana (Singh, 1989, p. 43).

Ideological reorientation
The return of Indira Gandhi in 1980 did not spell a sharp reversal of the policies
pursued during the Janata interlude either in the political realm or in the politi-
cal economy. The Janata government had swiftly introduced a series of consti-
tutional amendments to dismantle the authoritarian structures symbolized by the
42nd constitutional amendment. This was replaced by the 44th constitution amend-
ment, which, besides restoring the previous provisions, also took some constitu-
tional safeguards against the recurrence of the authoritarian emergency regime. In
areas of economic and foreign policies, the Janata rulers generally held pro-rural,
pro-business, and anti-communist views. But they were content with only slight
shifts in emphasis in economic and foreign policies. Except for the Bharatiya Jana
Sangh constituent in the Janata Party, all the rest were basically centrist forces.
Even Jana Sangh’s Janata phase was supposed to be a liberalizing experience much
in the same way as for the communists joining Nehru’s Congress. Indira Gandhi
on return, left the Constitution practically untouched. And in economic and for-
eign policies she had no reasons to bring about wholesale policy shifts. The public
sector-led strategy of economic development and nonaligned foreign policy with
a greater understanding of the Soviet Union thus survived the changes in govern-
ments in 1977 and 1980.
However, a cautious move towards economic liberalization in Congress’s
government’s policies on the second coming of Indira Gandhi was unmistakable.
Some such changes already initiated by the Janata government were continued
by her with some modifications. But economic liberalization was always con-
sidered by her on a piecemeal basis under emerging economic compulsions, e.g.
gaps in the balance of payment in international trade and budgetary deficits. Early
on, the industrial policy statement presented to the Parliament by her government
announced a set of ‘pragmatic policies’ aimed at removing constraints on industrial
production, rehabilitating people’s confidence in the public sector, allowing the
private sector to grow in accord with national plans and policies, providing addi-
tional support to the small sector with upwardly redefined upper limits of invest-
ment, promoting industrial dispersal with a view to removing regional disparities,
and offering special assistance for capacity utilization and reduction in pollution.
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 45

It was also proposed to replace the district industries centres scheme of the previ-
ous Janata government with the concept of nucleus plants in each district aimed at
facilitating industrialization of backward areas through ancillary units. The new
policy statement gave a special accent on export and welcomed the establish-
ment of 100 percent export-oriented units and requests for expansion exclusively
for export. Licensing procedure in general was streamlined and a data bank was
set up for monitoring the implementation of licenses granted. Companies with a
track record of R & D were allowed to import technology for innovation. The new
focal point of industrial growth was to be geared toward local materials and man-
power. Industrial sickness was to be detected early. Sick units were encouraged to
merge voluntarily with well-performing ones, and takeover by the government was
exceptionally considered on grounds only of public interest. In such cases of the
takeover, State governments were expected to come forward first.
The import policy liberalization introduced a couple of years ago was contin-
ued. In import policy for 1980–81, the 14 major capital goods industries exposed
to global tendering earlier remained unchanged. The policy selectively liberalized
the import of some raw materials and spares but sought to extend the protection
of indigenous industries by taking out 57 items from the purview of the Open
General License (OGL). Further, the Union Commerce Ministry offered free trade
zone facilities to 100 percent export-oriented industrial units in order to bridge
the increasing deficit in the balance of exports and imports and replenish foreign
exchange reserves. Undeterred by the growing trade deficit, the government further
resorted to the liberalization of imports and promotion of exports in the policy for
1982–83. OGL was expanded to include 100 new items of raw materials and com-
ponents and 85 items of industrial machinery. The policy for the first time included
a chapter on technology imports and considered such an option to make Indian
industries more viable in a highly competitive global market. Moreover, the indus-
trial licensing policy was further liberalized by revising the list of industries that
could be set up by big business houses and FERA (Foreign Exchange Regulation
Act, 19) companies. Besides, industries were allowed a capacity expansion of 33.3
percent over and above the production record of the last five years plus the 25 per-
cent growth allowed earlier. Credit policy was also liberalized to stimulate activity
in a seasonal slump in the industrial sector due to sluggish demand and exports.
These cautious moves towards economic liberalization under economic com-
pulsions apart, Indira Gandhi also gave signals of the continuing relevance of the
economic policies of her previous regime. At the AICC session in New Delhi on
7 December 1980, she exhorted her partymen to involve themselves ‘fully in the
implementation of the 20-point programme and the five-point programme.’ The
economic resolution adopted at the conference confidently assured a five percent
rate of economic growth in 1980–81 and welcomed the ‘massive investment’ of
Rs. 90,000 crores in the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1980–85) and committed itself to
building a ‘vigorous, dynamic and self-reliant economic to eradicate poverty and
injustice.’ The resolution also said the procedures for the import of technology and
capital goods were being streamlined without compromising ‘the basic structure of
industrial policies and the need to arrest the inflationary trends.’ In her broadcast
46 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

to the nation on completing two years in office, Indira Gandhi announced a new
20-point programme pinpointing ‘areas of special thrust which will show immedi-
ate tangible results for various segments’: (1) expansion of irrigation facilities;
(2) increased productivity of pulses and vegetable oilseeds; (3) strengthening and
expansion of IRD and rural employment scheme; (4) implementation of agricul-
tural and land ceiling, and complete compilation of land records; (5) review and
enforcement of minimum wages for agricultural workers; (6) rehabilitation of
bonded labour; (7) acceleration of programme for the development of SCs/STs;
(8) drinking water to all problem villages; (9) allotment of house sites to fami-
lies without them and construction assistance; (10) slum improvement, housing for
economically weaker sections, control of unwarranted increase of land price; (11)
increase in power generation and rural electrification; (12) afforestation, social and
farm forestry, development of biogas, and alternative energy sources; (13) promo-
tion of family planning on a voluntary basis as a people’s movement; (14) universal
primary health care facilities and control of leprosy, T.B., and blindness; (15) wel-
fare of women and children, especially in tribal, hill, and backward areas; (16) uni-
versal elementary education for age group 6–14 with special emphasis on girls and
adult literacy through students and voluntary agencies; (17) expansion of public
distribution system and promotion of strong consumer protection movement; (18)
liberalization of investment procedure, streamlining of industrial policies to ensure
timely completion of projects, and growth and technology updating of handicrafts,
small and village industries; (19) stern action against smugglers, hoarders, and tax-
evaders, and black money; and (20) improvement in the working of the public
sector enterprises with accent on efficiency, capacity utilization, and internal mobi-
lization of resources. It is evident that the new 20-point programme attempted to
blend the concerns of welfare and cautious economic liberalization. Indira Gandhi
cautioned a meeting of the Planning Commission on 28 December 1981 convened
to consider reordering of priorities and reallocation of resources in the Sixth Plan
that cuts in social welfare outlay should not drastically affect ‘our commitments to
the weaker sections.’ Thus Indira Gandhi’s second coming presaged the growing
pressures for marketization over the state-regulated economy that were to become
the hallmarks of the Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao regimes.
This tension between the state and the market was also reflected at the 53rd
annual meeting of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industries
(FICCI) on 8 May 1980 where Union Finance Minister R. Venkataraman advised
businesses to stand without props of subsidies, etc., and the FICCI itself in a reso-
lution urged the government to balance import-substitution measures and export-
promotion and base its import policy on the recognition of the potential of the
domestic economy. The FICCI also demanded the replacement of licensing by
broad guidelines, removal of market-distorting administered prices, encourage-
ment of competition not only within the private sector but also between private
and public sectors, and automatic allowance of 30 percent expansion of production
capacity to private units every five years to avoid industrial sickness.
Indira Gandhi’s post-Janata phase regime was marked by a tougher stance on
law and order and national security and on ensuring the essential supplies and
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 47

services to the consumer. This was evident in her outburst against the ‘epidemic’
of agitations at the New Delhi AICC session in 1980 as well as the series of enact-
ments such, for example, as the National Security Ordinance of 22 September 1980,
arming the government with preventive detention, subsequently replaced by the
National Security Act 1980; another preventive detention Act of February 1980,
this one against hoarders and those hindering the supply of essential commodi-
ties; the ordinance of 26 July 1981, banning strikes in essential services; and the
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act of August 1982, excluding hospitals, educa-
tional, scientific, and training institutions from the coverage of the term ‘industry’
and thus freeing them from trade union bargaining and strikes.
Despite his political noviceness, Rajiv Gandhi’s Congress regime was marked
by vigorous policy initiatives on all fronts, usually with an attempt to formulate
perspective national policy statements. A new educational policy, for instance, was
piloted through the Parliament whose highlights were a national core curriculum
in schools; pace-setting navodaya vidyalayas for talented students in all parts of
the country, especially in the rural areas; vocationalization after the secondary
stage and strengthening of the University Grants Commission, All India Council of
Technical Education, Indian Council of Agricultural Research, and Indian Medical
Council. It continued the 10+2+3 years of schooling introduced in the early 1980s.
The policy also intended to pursue the objective of an Indian Education Service. A
supplemental medical education policy aimed at a national entrance test with the
consent of States and 15 percent admission on an all-India basis. A national hous-
ing policy was also announced in the Parliament and subsequently approved by a
conference of Union and States housing ministers. It proposed the establishment
of a land and housing bank and the declaration of housing to be an ‘industry’ to
entitle it to institutional finance and other facilities. Both public and private sec-
tors were to be involved in the process. Urban land ceiling laws and amendments
to rent control Acts were also envisaged to allow the landlords periodic increases
in rent without unduly exposing the tenants to eviction. A series of national policy
statements related to environmental and technology missions were also initiated.
The policies of economic liberalization initiated by Indira Gandhi were further
expanded by Rajiv Gandhi. Four new trade zones were set up, besides the ear-
lier two, to boost export, in pursuance of the Tandon Commission Report on Free
Trade Zones (1982). The import-export policy (1985–88) put as many as 201 items
of industrial machinery on OGL for import to promote export through technologi-
cal upgradation. In a review of the canalization policy 53 items were decanalized,
shifting 17 to OGL, 20 to the limited permissible list, and 16 to the restricted list. In
a long-term fiscal policy statement, direct tax laws were proposed to be rationalized
and MRTP and FERA companies were allowed the option of delicenced develop-
ment in relatively backward areas.
However, economic liberalization policies were balanced by a commitment to
the public sector and an emphasis on welfare programmes. But the approval of
the Seventh Five-Year Plan by the National Development Council was marked by
the dissent of communist Chief Ministers of West Bengal and Tripura despite the
Prime Minister’s assurance that the dominant role of the public sector and economic
48 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

self-reliance would continue to be the basic thrust of planning. An attempt to com-

bine limited economic liberalization with the tradition of Congress brand of social-
ism was evident in the economic policy resolution adopted at the Madras AICC
meeting on 23–24 April 1988, in the tented ‘Kamarajnagar’:
The central goals of our conception of socialism, originally spelt out by Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru and pursued with energetic perseverance by Smt. Indira Gandhi,
are the elimination of poverty and the creation of an egalitarian society based on a
modern and self-reliant economy. The AICC(I) reaffirms its commitment to plan-
ning in a democratic setup as the principal instrument for building such a national
economy. These goals and strategies shall continue to guide our policies and
actions (Zaidis, eds. EINC, vol. 27, 1994, p. 104).
A more reliable pointer to the direction of economic policies was the White
Paper of the government on the public sector. While reiterating that the public sec-
tor ‘continues to be an article of faith with the Government, both from necessity
and ideological commitment,’ it made it clear that a very restrictive and selective
approach to establishing new units in non-core areas of the industrial economy was
on the anvil. There was a persistent emphasis on reforms and improved perfor-
mance of the existing units.
However, a study of the financing pattern of the first three years of the Seventh
Plan (1985–88) showed a fast depletion of the resource base making sustained
economic development appear problematic. The 1987–88 annual plan, for exam-
ple, was financed in the main by market borrowing, deficit financing, and a grow-
ing reliance on net foreign inflows. The balance from the current revenues was
fast deteriorating for both the Centre and the States. The Comptroller and Auditor
General in his report tabled in the Parliament on 18 July 1989, presented an alarm-
ing debt situation. The total liabilities of the government of India registered a 130
percent increase over the past five years, exceeding in total 67 percent of the gross
national product. A subsidy of Rs. 5,497 crores was given on food, indigenous
fertilizers, export promotion, market development, etc., during 1987–88. Earlier,
the Estimates Committee of Parliament in its 48th Report expressed grave concern
at the ‘alarming magnitude of black money in the economy and citing the findings
of the National Institute of Public Finance estimated its range between Rs. 31,584
crores and Rs. 36,786 crores.’ Almost halfway through his mandate the Rajiv
Gandhi government, as if on the clue of his tirade against rent-seeking neo-feudal
middlemen and brokers in the party and the government at the Congress centennial
AICC session in Bombay in 1985, was rocked by economic scandals involving
alleged administrative lapses and underhand payments in the purchase of defence
supplies from Sweden and Germany for the Indian army. Although the govern-
ment was cleared of the charges by a Joint Parliamentary Committee, other inves-
tigations by intelligence agencies remained inconclusive and a Comptroller and
Auditor General Report revealed serious administrative lapses in the deals. Before
they became symbol of corruption in high places that got murkier and murkier with
an avalanche of revelations in the press in India and abroad with no intelligible
traction in this maze of disinformation. The Opposition paralysed the Parliament’s
proceedings flexing its muscles to take the issue to the hustings.
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 49

Leadership background
Intense and fluid factionalism in the State Congress parties and its growing inci-
dence in the central party may be attributed to many factors, important among
them being the complex social structure, regional diversities, the conflict between
modern and traditional values, and unbridled personal ambition verging on what
Edward Banfield (1958, pp. 305–306) in an Italian context has called ‘amoral
familism.’ But it can also be explained in terms of the traditionally consensual
character of the Congress and the accelerated process of political recruitment in
it. The face of Congress changed beyond recognition in the 1980s. In the 1980
Lok Sabha elections, a very large number of young Congress candidates were
voted to the Parliament, and every fifth new entrant was a Sanjay loyalist. In the
Assembly elections in nine States that followed a few months later over 70 percent
of Congress members of legislative Assemblies (MLAs) were fresh entrants.
In the 1984–85 parliamentary elections Rajiv Gandhi was more cautious and
selective as well as respectful of procedural niceties in recruiting Congress candi-
dates. The party nominated about two-thirds of its sitting members of Parliament
(MPs) and managed to get away with only around 60 to 80 ‘rebel’ candidates
(entering the electoral fray even though the party denied them tickets), roughly half
of them being sitting MPs. The beginners among those elected included a few film
stars, many with backgrounds in corporate business, government, bureaucracy,
and many professionals (lawyers, doctors, chartered accountants, engineers), and
around 25 scions of ex-maharajas and rising entrepreneurs. They are said to ‘form
a compact if elite group within the Congress (I) freshers club’ who now dominate
the government and the party. In the view of two journalists:
One striking feature common to large platoons of Rajiv’s army of beginners is
their economic independence, having been launched into parliamentary politics on
the safe base of either a profession or private business. They are the opposite of the
trademark Indian politician, dhoti-clad, clumsy, and prone to living by his wits.
Nor are they clones of the Sanjay brigade who muscled onto the centre stage of the
seventh Lok Sabha by using hung power and weighty patronage. This new breed
of Congress (I) MPs—either in their smartly-cut kurta-pyjamas or more formally
attired Nehru jackets, manners always impeccable, honed at public schools in many
cases—are a group apart in India’s body politic. (Mitra & Chawla, 1985, p. 79)
A look at the Congress members of the eighth Lok Sabha in comparison with
those of the seventh Lok Sabha showed that the party in the 1980s—in 1989 and
1991 sitting members themselves or their offspring were generally renominated—
were predominantly young and middle-aged, was well-educated, recruited its
leadership heavily from liberal professions and civil services, though business and
industry and feudal and aristocratic backgrounds were also adequately represented
in it (Table 2.2). The contrasts were not so marked between the Congress members
of the seventh Lok Sabha and those of the eighth Lok Sabha (on the variables for
which data are available) as between the congress and opposition parties (these lat-
ter data are not reported in Table 2.1 but are available in the source). For example,
the communist parliamentarians in the eighth Lok Sabha were disproportionately
50 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

Table 2.2 Social and political background of Congress MPs in the 1980s

Seventh Lok Sabha Eighth Lok Sabha

Age 22.0
25–40 years 24.0 59.0
41–60 years 60.9 19.0
25–40 years 24.0 59.0
41–60 years 60.9 19.0
61 years and above 15.1 400
Total N 350
Education
Primary * 6.8
High School & intermediate * 20.7
Graduate and above * 71.5
No response * 1.0
Total N 400
Occupation
Agriculture * 35.3
Business and Industry * 12.7
Feudal / aristocratic family * 11.3
Professional(s) services * 34.2
Others * 6.5
Total 400
Legislative Experience
Previously MP * 27.5
Previously MP & MLA * 25.5
Previously MLA only * 25.0
Fresh * 22.0
400

older (66.7 percent in the modal age group 41–60) than either the Congress (59
percent) or any other party (Janata, BJP, Congress-S, Lok Dal, etc., 56.6 percent;
regional parties, 56.6 percent) in the same age group. With reference to educational
background parliamentary contingents of all parties in the eighth Lok Sabha looked
fairly similar: 71.5 percent Congressmen with graduation and above compares well
with Janata and rightwing parties’ 73.9, communists’ 77.8, and regional parties’
77.3.
Anyone familiar with the Indian Lok Sabha Who’s Who would immediately
suspect the methodological soundness of the occupational categories used by
Bhambhari and Verma. Indian MPs typically report multiple occupations—two,
three, and some even four, e.g. social and political work, agriculturist, business-
man. Bhambhari and Verma have reported a uni-occupational pattern where the
plurality of occupations is the norm in the eighth Lok Sabha, as in any other, with-
out explaining how multiple occupational cases were coded.
Moreover, the category ‘agriculture’ is extremely heterogeneous, as a glance at
the Who’s Who shows that MPs reporting themselves, to be ‘agriculturists’ may
be substantial farmers and peasants and some may even have landless agricultural
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 51

work for their parental background, especially in case of MPs elected from con-
stituencies reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The real contrast
in inter-party variation was reflected in the parliamentarians’ occupational back-
ground: the Congress recruited its MPs overwhelmingly from (a) agriculture, busi-
ness, and industry and (b) liberal professions and services, while the two communist
parties did so mainly from liberal professions and services, and the category ‘oth-
ers’ (48.1 and 37.1 percent, respectively), considerably less from agriculture (14.8
percent) and none from business and industry and feudal and aristocratic families.
Occupationally, the rightwing and regional parties had more similarities with the
Congress than with the communist parties—the rightwing parties recruited 34.8
percent from agriculture, 43.5 percent from professions and services, and 8.7 per-
cent from business and industry; the share of the regional parties was 28.3 percent
from agriculture, 45.3 percent from professions and services, and 15 percent from
business and industry. Given this pattern of political recruitment, a fiercer competi-
tion between the Congress, on the one hand, and the rightwing and regional parties
on the other (as they competed for the same social bases) rather than between the
Congress and the communist parties could be expected. This is actually borne out
by the patterns of inter-party relations and conflicts.

Strategies of mobilization
With the growing complexity of the Indian political system and crystallization of
its new operating norms and procedures, the Congress was faced in the 1980s with
different terrains and challenges, demanding new strategies of political mobiliza-
tion and ideological innovation. Three parallel trends in social and political mobi-
lization complicated the task of the Congress: (a) the persistent challenge from
parties of the leftwing in West Bengal, Kerala, and Tripura, that base their appeal
on class lines; (b) the mobilization of ethnic and linguistic regional identities by
non-Congress and non-BJP nominally national and regional parties all over the
country; and (c) the whipping up of the rightwing Hindutva identity by the BJP
since 1989 mainly in the Hindi heartland with responsive electoral echos in the
non-Hindi rimlands. Class and ethnic articulation, combined with regionalism,
called into question the continuing efficacy of the middle-of-the-road ideological
orientation of the Congress and its image of a multi-class, multi-ethnic, massive
national rally. The continuing relevance of this composite, nationalist strategy pre-
supposes moderate levels of class and ethnic articulation.
In the strategy of political mobilization adopted by the Congress party in the
1980s, one can delineate at least two components (a) the mass electoral and agi-
tational and (b) the federal inter-party. In the States and regions where it was the
ruling party, or at least the major opposition party with a reasonable chance of
coming back to power, the Congress went headlong into the electoral fray alone,
seeking to make a direct appeal to the voter. However, where it does not stand a
fair chance of winning a state on its own, it went in for an electoral and political
understanding or alliance with a regionally powerful party or with a group of par-
ties in the State concerned, keeping in view the federal as well as electoral leverage
52 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

such an arrangement was likely to bring to it. The first strategy may be called the
pluralist, and the second the federalist. The former was the norm, the second excep-
tional. Even in States where seemingly powerful regional parties had emerged, the
first instinct of the Congress was to dislodge them. Thus, although the Congress
government at the Centre had signed accords with Akali Dal (Longowal). Asom
Gana Parishad, Mizo National Front, and Tripura National Volunteers soon after
Rajiv Gandhi’s accession in an effort to check extremist violence, the Congress
did not spare to put up an adversarial electoral and legislative challenge to all of
them. So also with the Left Fronts (in West Bengal, Kerala, and Tripura) and with
Telugu Desam in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtravadi Gomantak Party in Goa,
the Congress adopted a similar strategy of taking them on frontally on its own
electoral resources. The same strategy was applied to the Janata governments in
Karnataka, Bihar, and Orissa, and to the BJP governments in some northern Indian
States.
The strategy we have called federal above was continued or newly forged by the
Congress in the 1980s in the following States: in Tamil Nadu where the AIADMK-
Congress electoral understanding made by Indira Gandhi and M.G. Ramachandran
stood the test of time until at least the early years in power of MGR’s succes-
sor Jayalalitha, in Jammu and Kashmir where the National Conference-Congress
coalition jointly contested the elections and formed a coalition government, in
Pondicherry where the DMK-Congress coalition government was in power, in
Tripura where the Congress and Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti were in a governing
coalition.
The policy options and electoral mobilization strategies of the Congress must
take into account the peculiarities of the Indian social structure and political econ-
omy, some special features of which are caste-class nexus, a vast unorganized sec-
tor, regional segmentation of differentiations, enclaves of the working class and
reservation aristocracies, religious communalism, lingualism, and incomplete
national integration. One typically finds a disjuncture between governmental pol-
icy formulation and the electoral mobilization strategies of parties: the policies are
addressed to the classes of peasants, workers, middle-class professionals, indus-
trialists, traders, minorities, scheduled castes and tribes, Other Backward Classes
(OBC), etc., while electoral calculus mostly operates with caste and communal
vote banks, with only marginal attention to the class vote. Even the presence of
organized working-class movements in various segments of the industrial sector
over the years and the emergence of fairly powerful peasants’ and farmers’ move-
ments in several parts of the country in the 1980s did not make a substantial change
in the electoral calculus and mobilizational trends.
In some States of the Hindi belt, the Congress has been following a mobiliza-
tional strategy which Brass (1984, p. 329), writing about U.P. has characterized
thus:
the Congress has pursued a political strategy of squeezing the middle peasantry
between the former landlords and rich peasants, on the one hand, and the rural
poor, on the other hand. The Congress has increasingly mobilized the support of
the dominant castes of Brahmins, Rajputs, and Bhumihars who continue to be the
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 53

most powerful landed castes in the north Indian countryside, while providing ame-
liorative measures to the rural poor and landless of which the latest in a long series
of measures is the Integrated Rural Development (IRD) program.
The phenomenon of backward caste movements that initially debrahmanized
the Congress party in southern and western India finally made inroads between
the mid-1960s and mid-1970s in much of northern India. The political rise of the
middle peasant castes impeded the class-caste nexus of the top and the bottom
that the Congress had assiduously built in the Ganga valley as an electoral success
proposition. A different mobilizational scenario is sketched by the Rudolphs (1984
and 1987) in which the ‘bullock capitalists’ or the middle peasantry managed to
emerge as a dominant political force in the north during the Janata phase and in the
then Congress-ruled Karnataka. To quote the Rudolphs (1984, p. 228):

there are signs that leaders of several parties in a variety of states have
responded by pursuing downward class, caste and community alliances. In
the 1970s, Karpuri Thakur in Bihar, the late Devraj Urs in Karnataka and
Sharad Pawar in Maharashtra used downward alliances with backward
classes, disadvantaged minorities, poor cultivators and workers to displace
coalitions based on upward alliances of dominant castes (e.g., Bhumihars,
Lingayats and Marathas) and large landowners.

The Rudolphs read into these strategies of mobilization of India’s ‘longer if not
its medium-term future.’ In my opinion they underestimate the regional fragmen-
tation as well as internal caste and community divisions in the class of bullock
capitalists in the same regional as well as in the nation at large. They also seem to
overlook the protean and complex alliance patterns and possibilities and possibili-
ties between the agrarian and urban class formations and structures as also mobili-
zational potentials of wider national issues and problems such as those employed
by Indira Gandhi in 1971 and 1980 (‘garibi hatao’ and ‘government that works’)
and by Rajiv Gandhi in 1984–85 (national unity and integrity). However, this is
not to say that the strategy of lower backward caste/class mobilization is entirely or
universally unworkable; only that caste and class categories should not be treated
as billiard balls in collision in order not to overlook or minimize fluid cross-cut-
ting coalitional possibilities, especially in a country of India’s size, diversity, and
complexity.
The anti-reservation agitation in Gujarat stirred up in the first half of 1985 by
Congress Chief Minister Madhavsinh Solanki’s decision in January to increase
reservations by 18 percent for the OBCs demonstrated both the success and
constraints of ‘downward class, caste and community alliance.’ It showed how
castes, classes, and communities having been displaced from their previous
political dominance by a rival downward coalition may react by way of extra-
parliamentary agitations and force a government to rescind a policy decision in
favour of its clientele for which wider consensus may be lacking. Thus, following
a Gujarat variant of this mobilizational strategy, Solanki and his associates built,
almost from scratch, a powerful Congress (I) unit in the State, overshadowing
54 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

and displacing Congress(O) and Janata parties which had intermittently per-
formed well in the years following the Congress split of 1969. Solanki forged the
strategy which has popularly come to be known as KHAM, a political alliance
of the backward castes/communities foursome—Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis,
and Muslims. The Kshatriyas, themselves a loose federation of middle and
backward Kshatriya subcastes including the sanskritized artisan castes (Barias,
Thakors, Patanwadias, Garasingas, and so on) comprise about 40 percent of the
population in Gujarat (comparable to Marathas in Maharashtra). The politically
dominant Kshatriyas otherwise belong to the SEBCs (socially and educationally
backward castes) under the Baxi Panch formula. Solanki’s assumption of Chief
Ministership symbolized the rise of Kshatriya power (Sheth, 1985, p. 1; see also
Wood, 1984).
The political ascendancy of Kshatriyas at the cost of dominant Patels, who con-
tinue to maintain their social and economic pre-eminence, has not gone unchal-
lenged. The displaced groups are also enraged by the crass electoralism of and lack
of review in reservation policy for possible dereservation and insensivity to the
poor in the upper castes. The State witnessed an unprecedented mass agitation and
caste and communal riots in the mid-1980s eventually forcing Solanki at party’s
high command’s behest to hand over power in 1985 to his lieutenant, Amarsinh
Chaudhary. Chaudhary subsequently entered into an accord with the agitationists,
scrapping the increased reservations until a national consensus on the issue of res-
ervation for the non-Harijan and non-tribal OBCs was reached, in addition to con-
ceding a few other demands.
In Karnataka the mobilizational strategy of a downward alliance that the
Congress had initiated under the state leadership of Devraj Urs subsequently
encountered an even greater reaction culminating in the displacement of the
Congress by the Janata. The policies and programmes of Devraj Urs which aimed
at helping and mobilizing the weaker sections coupled with the political ineptitude
of his successor as Chief Minister, M. Gundu Rao, generated strong resentment
within the dominant castes (Lingayats and Vokkaligas) and vernacular Kannada
interests (piqued by Gundu Rao’s pro-Sanskrit policies). His government finally
succumbed to the combined pressure of a powerful farmers’ movement, a Kannada
movement, and a long-drawn strike of public sector workers in Bangalore (Srinivas
& Panini, 1984, pp. 69–75).
In Andhra Pradesh the downward caste-class-community alliance, strategy has
passed through at least two phases. The Brahman-dominated Congress of the pre-
and early post-independence periods was forced to come to terms with the emer-
gent middle castes of Reddys and Kammas. With the growing identification of
Reddys with the Congress, the Kammas drifted to the leftist partist to begin with,
but by the early 1980s they provided the initial and main thrust in the formation
of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) under the Telugu film action N.T. Rama Rao
of the issue of Telugu pride. Over a decade, the State witnessed the growth of a
tendency towards a two-party system with Congress and TDP providing the poles
for electoral alternation with both parties vying increasingly for backward castes/
classes and Muslim votes. Among the backwards, Kapus especially emerged as
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 55

the balancing factor in electoral politics between the Congress-TDP alternation;

communist parties tried to play a similar role as TDP allies in legislative politics.
In Punjab and Assam the strategy of downward alliance identified the Congress
exceedingly with new bases of support among the majabi (scheduled castes)
Sikhs and peasant and migrant workers from other Indian States, including an
ever-increasing number of Muslim peasants and workers from East Pakistan/
Bangladesh, respectively.

Concluding observations
The 1980s continued the trends of personalization and centralization of power that
characterized the Congress party in the 1970s, though I have tried to argue in this
paper that these trends were not entirely alien even in the Nehru era. The 1970s
had presented the illusion of governability and stability, but this was based on the
paradoxes of centralized power in a modernizing society and acute government-
opposition partition such that stable governments in the Parliament and Assemblies
were under seizure by an extra-parliamentary mass movement led by Jayaprakash
Narayan and others with unprecedented efficacy and spread, especially in the
northern half of the country. The impact of this mass movement on the political
system was, however, limited to removing the authoritarian constitutional amend-
ments erected by an insecure and vulnerable Indira Gandhi during the Emergency
(1975–77); its impact on either the Congress or Janata parties was much less spec-
tacular and durable. The newly formed Janata Party could not institutionalize itself
and collapsed like a house of cards even before it could complete its mandate.
Neither could the Indian National Congress put its acute deinstitutionalization
behind and make good of the opportunity offered by its electoral rehabilitation
in 1980. Instead, it fell prey to ‘amoral familism’ and reckless adventurism of the
enfant terrible of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, Sanjay Gandhi. The reluctant suc-
cessor of the dynasty, Rajiv Gandhi began with an enormous good will and mass
support on Indira Gandhi’s assassination. It was hoped that he would revive the
Nehru legacy in party-building and governance. He did appear tilting at windmills
of political middlemen and brokers at the AICC centenary session in Bombay in
December 1985 and healing the wounds by a series of regional accords with Akalis
and Asom Gana Parishad and others. But party reforms and institutionalization
were kept postponing and finally put off. He was overtaken by the Bofors scandal
and the electoral defeat of 1989.4 He did well, perhaps better, as the leader of the
official opposition in the Parliament, and would have, with experience, proved to
be a better Prime Minister. But his career was cut short by assassination in the
midst of the electoral campaign in 1991. An ‘era’ of great expectations in Indian
politics came to an abrupt and traumatic.

Notes
1. For a liberal interpretation, see Kothari (1983) and Singh (1990); for a Marxist
interpretation, see Kaviraj (1984 and 1986). For an excellent critical review of
56 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s

the wide paradigmatic shifts marked by the Emergency and the 1977 elections,
see Mayer (1984) and Blair (1980).
2. See Morris-Jones (1971) for a review of interpretations heralding a new type
of politics and voting away from manipulative party machinery and his cau-
tionary note against any such premature conclusion. ‘On this view,’ he wrote,
‘it is still too much to announce an issue-oriented electorate and far from
appropriate to declare in large terms that caste and similar loyalties have been
replaced by class sentiment, though patchily this has happened in little meas-
ure.’ See also Blair (1980, pp. 243–245) for a more fundamental paradigmatic
questioning of Indira Gandhi’s populistic rhetoric of reforms in the 1971–1972
elections.
3. Other major theorists of party organization are also divided on this issue.
Duverger (1963) concurs with Michels, while Lipset (1963) and Panebianco
(1988) tend to differ. Duverger (1963, p. 151) writes: ‘The leadership of par-
ties tends naturally to assume oligarchic form. A veritable “ruling class”
comes into being that is more or less closed; it is an “inner circle” into which
it is difficult to penetrate.’ Generalizing from the experience of trade unions,
Lipset (1963, p. 429) observes: ‘the ease with which an oligarchy can control
a large organization varies with the degree to which members are involved
in the organization. The more important membership is considered, and the
more participation in it there is, the more difficult it will be for an oligarchy
to enforce policies and actions which conflict with the values and needs of the
members.’ Panebianco (1988, pp. 23–24), like Lipset, begins with Mechelian
premises and underlines ‘the circular and self-reinforcing character of power
relations.’ But he draws attention to the dialectics of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’
dimensions of competing elites in the party organization such that ‘the greater
the freedom of movement won by the leaders in vertical power games (the
more such freedom is configured as a “carte blanche”) the stronger their trump
card wielded in horizontal power games vis-à-vis the internal opponents. In
other words, the greater their freedom of action, the greater their invulnerabil-
ity to attacks made by internal adversaries.’ Singh (1981) is a very apt Indian
illustration of this theme.
4. ‘Iron law of oligarchy’ and ‘straterchy’ are two contrasting models of author-
ity structure in political parties. The former was formulated in the context
of the West European parties, especially the German Social Democratic
Party, around the early decades of this century in Michaels (1962). It argued
that for organizational and psychological reasons power in political parties
tends to get concentrated in an oligarchy of leaders. The latter, purporting
to describe and explain the situation in American parties in the mid-1950s,
was propounded by Eldersveld (1971). To quote him (p. 9): ‘The general
characteristics of stratarchy are the proliferation of the ruling group and the
diffusion of power throughout the structure, “strata commands” exist which
operate with a varying, but considerable degree of, independence. Such allo-
cation of command and control to specified “layer”, or “echelon”, authori-
ties is a pragmatic necessity. The very heterogeneity of membership, and
 The Indian National Congress in the 1980s 57

the sub-coalitional system, make centralized control not only difficult but
unwise’

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First published in the U.S.A. in 1964.
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Samuel Huntington, A. (1968). Political order in changing societies. Yale University Press.
Sheth, P. (1985, July 14). From Gandhi to Solanki. The Times of India Sunday Review,
Metro.
Singh, M. P. (1981). Split in a predominant party: The Indian National Congress in 1969.
Abhinav.
Singh, M. P. (1989, August). A double-edged sword. Seminar No. 360, 41–43.
Singh, M. P. (1989, October). Down but not out. Seminar No. 362, 14–22.
Singh, M. P. (1990, August). The crisis of the Indian state: From quiet developmentalism to
noisy democracy. Asian Survey, XXX(8), 809–819.
Sission, R. (1982). Party transformation in India: Development and change in the Indian
National Congress. In N. S. Bose (Ed.), India in the eighties. Firma KLM.
Srinivas, M. N., & Panini, M. N. (1984, January 14). Politics and society in Kamataka.
Economy and Political Weekly, 21(2), 69–75.
Weiner, M. (1983). The wounded tiger: Maintaining India’s democratic institutions. In P.
Lyon & J. Manor (Eds.), Transfer and transformation: Political institutions in the new
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Wood, J. R. (1984). Congress restored? The KHAM strategy and congress recruitment in
Gujarat. In his edited volume, State politics in contemporary India: Crisis or continuity.
Westview Press.
3 The Indian National Congress in
the 1990s

The Indian National Congress in the heyday of the nationalist movement

(1920s–1940s) was predominantly a mass movement rather than a political party in
the Conventional sense of the term. Its mass membership in organizations and agi-
tational activities against British rule in India was far more important than its legis-
lative wings. In the mass arena, there was evident, alongside the charismatic appeal
of leaders like Gandhi, Nehru, Subhas Bose, Jayaprakash Narayan, and so on, a
large network of local-level organizations and activities down to every mohalla and
major village. Three sets of changes appear to have characterized Congress in the
post-independence period. First, the Nehru era (1947–1964) witnessed a pattern of
party-building of a more balanced type such that parliamentary/legislative wings
also came to be organized and soon acquired a greater salience as centres of politi-
cal gravity in the new parliamentary-federal system based on universal adult fran-
chise. However, the organizational wings, too, continued to be significant and often
provided organizational bases to those in the party who aspired to share power with
the Prime Minister or the Chief Ministers, especially the latter, or to dislodge them.
Second, during the early phase of the Indira Gandhi era (1966–1977), especially
after the splits in the party in 1969 and 1978, the organizational wings suffered a
precipitous decline vis-à-vis the parliamentary/legislative wings. Indira Gandhi’s
populist policies and charisma substituted well-oiled party organizations for pur-
poses of electoral mobilization. This pattern remained largely unchanged after the
second coming of Indira Gandhi (1980–1989) and her succession by Rajiv Gandhi
(1984–1989). Third, the Congress in the 1990s underwent a sea change in that
it lost its two charismatic leaders in a row in the assassinations of Indira Gandhi
(1984) and Rajiv Gandhi (1991). And, although it went through the motions of
organizational elections in 1992 after a lapse of two decades (the first since 1971),
it again relapsed into its habit of dispensing with internal party democracy in favour
of ad hoc party organizations at various levels nominated from the top down. This
continued until the mid-1990s when the Election Commission forced the parties to
elect their officials as per their constitutions.
We must begin to sketch the recent fortunes of the Congress through five suc-
cessive waves of elections to the Lok Sabha and Vidhan Sabhas. The electoral reha-
bilitation of the Congress under Indira Gandhi in 1980 following the Janata Party
interlude (1977–1980) and its massive mandate under Rajiv Gandhi in 1984 surpass-
ing even the peaks of its electoral performances under Nehru and Indira were both

DOI: 10.4324/9781003254676-3
60 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

far cries from its predominance of the yore. For not only did the party fail to develop
institutionalized structures, its electoral fortunes too proved to be less comprehen-
sive and less durable. Through the 1980s even though the party held the reigns of
power in New Delhi, one State after another began to slip out of its hand—Andhra
and Karnataka in 1983, Assam and Sikkim in 1985, Mizoram in 1986, and Haryana
in 1987. In 1989 it lost power in New Delhi as well as in Uttar Pradesh: this was
followed by the non-Congress deluge in the Assembly elections in 1990 when it lost
Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Meghalaya, Nagaland, Orissa,
and Rajasthan. It lost Andhra Pradesh to Telugu Desam, a makeshift regional party
floated only about a year earlier by the Telugu film actor N.T. Rama Rao; Karnataka
to Janata Dal; Assam to Asom Gana Parishad, a new regional party that emerged
from the anti-foreigners movement in the State that gathered momentum since the
late 1970s; Sikkim to Sikkim Sangram Parishad, a regional party formed by the
Congress rebel Narbahadur Bhandari; Mizoram to Mizo National Front, a regional
secessionist party led by Laldenga that came to power in the wake of an accord with
New Delhi; Haryana to Lok Dal; Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, and Orissa to Janata
Dal; Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, and Rajasthan to BJP; Meghalaya
to MUPP; and Nagaland to Nagaland Peoples Council, both regional parties. It
had wrested Andhra Pradesh a year earlier (1989) from Telugu Desam. The 1993
round of Assembly elections rehabilitated the Congress in Madhya Pradesh and
Himachal, and the Congress-Mizoram Janata Dal coalition government was formed
in Mizoram. But the BJP continued to hold its fort in Rajasthan; and in Uttar
Pradesh, both Congress and Janata Dal were electorally humbled and discomfited
into supporting a coalition government of Mulayam Singh Yadav’s Socialist Party
and Kanshi Ram’s Bahujan Samaj Party, without formally joining it. At various
points in time, the Congress also won back Assam, Haryana, and Punjab in the
subsequent years. It also managed to crawl back to power in Gujarat and Sikkim
through the merger of Janata Dal (Gujarat) led by Chimanbhai Patel/with it and that
of the breakaway faction of Sikkim Sangram Parishad led by Sanchman Limboo in
1994. And, in the 1995 round of Assembly elections, the Congress lost Maharashtra
and Gujarat to BJP but managed to win back Orissa from Janata Dal led by Biju
Patnaik, while the Janata Dal under Laloo Prasad Yadav held its own in Bihar. In
the sphere of electoral and political power or influence of the communist and other
leftist parties, the CPI(M)-led Left Front has continuously held sway in West Bengal
since 1977. However, Kerala and Tripura have alternated between CPI(M)-led Left
Fronts and Congress-led United Fronts and have alternately been AIADMK led by
J. Jayalalitha and DMK. Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab after a decade of mili-
tancy experienced the revival of the democratic processes in 1990s in the wake of
curbing religious fundamentalism and separatism (the dominant regional parties in
these states and the Congress had remained in a state of hibernation).
Two comments are in order on the electoral changes synoptically described
above. First, party fortunes, by and large, have become very fickle, some States
especially being subject to snap party formations and some open to being won and
lost by different parties in quick succession. Second, opposition to the Congress has
emerged from a large assortment of parties spread across the board: from the right
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 61

(Hindu neo-traditionalist BJP), the left (communist parties), the centre (Janata Dal,
Samajvadi Party), Bahujan Samaj Party representing the Scheduled Castes reserva-
tions aristocracy and the Dalits, and a host of new regional parties (Telugu Desam,
Asom Gana Parishad, Sikkim Sangram Parishad, Mizo National Front, Nagaland
Peoples Council, MUPP, etc.). Besides, older regional parties like AIADMK, DMK,
Akali Dais, and National Conference also continue to be in power or as major
contenders.

Ideology and policy reorientation

Ideologically, the Congress in the 1990s continued to be a party of centrist bent
with a penchant for the middle-of-the-road policy options in social and political
spheres. However, in the economic sphere the Congress party in the post-Indira era
rather sharply moved to the right espousing policies of economic liberalization and
even privatization that in some measure harked back to the Swatantra Party’s advo-
cacy of a free enterprise economy plus an added emphasis on globalization and
free international trade. This paradigm shift in economic policies of the Congress
governments of Rajiv Gandhi and P.V. Narasimha Rao came about under dual
pressure, to say nothing of the new economic outlooks of the scions of the Nehru-
Gandhi dynasty, Sanjay and Rajiv. The dual pressures alluded to above refer to
the compulsions of the domestic economy and the policy revolution of the 1980s
and 1990s in the West. The Indian economy experienced a phenomenal expansion
of agricultural productivity mainly within the framework of freeholding peasant
proprietorship but the persistent failure of the state-led strategy of industrializa-
tion in the post-Nehru era mainly due to the non-performing public (state) sector
and populist politics. The world political economy in the same period underwent a
conservative shift away from the postwar welfare state and political liberalism. It
also witnessed the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
The need for loans and economic assistance from the IMF and World Bank for
economic restructuring and adjustment has forced India to open up to international
finance, investment, and technology.
The hallmark of the economic policy shift in the Congress party was a change
with continuity. The necessity for change forced by objective conditions in the
economy of the country and in the world at large when even communist China has
fallen for capitalist modernization was conceded and emphasized. However, the
change did not come naturally to a party still led by a sage father figure nurtured in
the heyday of Congress socialism under Nehru and Indira Gandhi. Moderation was
also dictated by the fact that the Narasimha Rao Government began as a minority
one with the compulsion to carry consensus with communists, Hindu national-
ists with their accent on swadeshi, the ruralists, and the regionalists. However,
the presence in key economic ministries of experts like Manmohan Singh, P.
Chidambaram, Pranab Mukherjee, etc. made a more pragmatic approach possible.
The Prime Minister himself showed a remarkable resilience in policy options.
In defining the task before the party, the All India Congress Committee (AICC)
session in New Delhi (June 1994) stated in a resolution:
62 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

This, in essence, is the political challenge ahead of the Congress. It is to redefine

socialism in the change context of competitiveness and efficiency. It is to reinter-
pret planning in the changed context of market economies and private enterprise.
It is to re-elucidate Non-alignment in the changed context of a unipolar world. It
is to reiterate the Nation’s commitment to solving basic problems like poverty,
unemployment, social discrimination, and regional imbalances in the changed cir-
cumstances of globalization and integration with the world economic. (INC, 1994,
p. 12)
The party was at pains to stress that what was needed in all these areas was not
radical departure but a reorientation consistent with the accomplishment of the past
and the challenges of the present and the future. It asserted that the ‘Congress con-
cept of socialism is neither dogmatic nor based on any imported ideas,’ and citing
Nehru it clarified that ‘socialism is not spreading of poverty’ but the essentially of
‘wealth and production’ (INC, 1992, p. 40). The continued need for planning was
implied in party documents by the emphasis on removal of poverty and regional
imbalances in which context the role of the government was repeatedly mentioned,
while any possible role for the private sector in this endeavour was left unstated
(INC, 1992, 1993, 1994). Besides, a resolution on Panchayati Raj adopted by the
New Delhi session of the AICC in June 1994 said that the rural and urban insti-
tutions of local self-government would be ‘entrusted with a preparation of plans
and the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice,
as listed illustratively in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules of the Constitution’
(INC, 1994, p. 42). The Planning Commission sources suggested the adoption of
some sort of French pattern of indicative planning replacing the previous practice
of a more comprehensive attempt at centralized planning. As for non-alignment as
an original guiding principle for India’s international relations, an AICC resolution
adopted at Surajkund in March 1993 stated:
The Jakarta Summit of the Non-aligned countries has once again established
the relevance of Non-alignment. The end of the cold war increases, rather than
reduces, the imperative of fashioning a world order that will secure the freedom
of all States, the sovereign equality of all, non-interference in the internal affairs
of others, democracy in international relations, peaceful co-existence and oppor-
tunities for the full flowering through mutual cooperation, of the potential of all
member-States and of the human family. (INC, 1993, p. 25)
In pursuit of economic reforms, the Congress party underlined the need for
redefining the respective roles of the state and the market in the Indian economy.
The need to give the market a more vigorous role than previously was recognized.
This entailed reducing bureaucratic control of the economy in the industrial and
financial sectors and lowering subsidies in agricultural and service sectors. These
reforms were linked to the need of promoting competitiveness in the economy; the
imperative of securing multilateral financial assistance, foreign investment, and
high technology; and India’s obligations under the GATT treaty signed in 1995.
‘The public sector has,’ the party argued ‘diversified our industrial structures, but
a major constraint on our economic growth is the inability of our public sector to
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 63

generate adequate resources for further expansion’ (INC, 1992, p. 40). However,
the party did not favour a wholesale strategy of privatization: its preferred course
was partial disinvestment to diversify its ownership and managerial reforms to
ensure autonomy, efficiency, and accountability. The party reiterated: ‘The public
sector will continue to play a very important role in India’s economy’ (INC, 1992,
p. 43).
However, under the new industrial policy announced by the Congress
Government at the Centre on 24 July 1991, limitations on private sector indus-
trial expansion in the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act were relaxed
and industrial licensing for all projects barring in 18 industries was abolished. The
government subsequently also took steps to reduce the list of industries reserved
for the public sector from 17 to 6, to permit the private sector to participate even
in industries in the reserved list, and allowed freer access to foreign technology.
Reforms were followed in trade and exchange rate policies and in the financial
sector, e.g. virtual abolition of import control through licensing, introduction of the
market-determined foreign exchange rate, and dispensing with direct government
control of volume and pricing of issues of private sector companies subject only to
the regulation by an autonomous agency called the Securities and Exchange Board
of India.
Party documents, and especially pronouncements of Congress leaders after the
electoral reverses in the 1990s in Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh at the hands
of the Socialist Party-BSP alliance and Telugu Desam respectively, betrayed a
growing tension between the conflicting needs of pushing forward the policy of
economic liberalization, on the one hand, and projecting a pro-poor image under
electoral compulsions, on the other. As early as in 1992 this contradiction between
economic liberalism and political liberalism was exposed by the difference in thrust
between the party’s economic resolution and Prime Minister Rao’s presidential
address at the Tirupati AICC session. ‘The state should continue,’ the economic
resolution read, ‘to give directions and guidance to the Indian economy in general
and the Indian industry in particular.’ In his presidential address, on the other hand,
Rao said: ‘In matters relating to the economy as a whole … the state’s role should
gradually taper off’ (Keval Varma, The Telegraph, Calcutta, 1992).
Economic reforms have seldom been a highly contentious political issue within
the Congress party. This has also been so in the country at large in comparison
to the more explosive issues of secularism and OBC reservations. Mild protests
against the economic reforms and India’s signing of the GATT treaty had been
more clearly heard at the Tirupati AJCC session in 1992. But in party forums in
subsequent years such protests tended to practically disappear. They seemed more
related to the dissidence in the party principally led by the Union HRD Minister
Arjun Singh until his expulsion from the government and the party in 1995. Only
the communist and other left parties continued to be persistent critics of the eco-
nomic reforms, though even in their case determined agitations by them and their
unions have been few and far between. This state of affairs may be attributed to the
widespread perception about the technicality, inevitability, and irreversibility of
64 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

the reforms, the strategy of the government and opposition’s complicity in avoid-
ing debate, and fragmentation in the ranks of the major interest groups such as
peasants and farmers and trade unions.

Electoral mobilization
The Congress party since the 1989 Lok Sabha elections was caught up in a dilemma
and a double bind. The dilemma related to the predicament of a multi-class, multi-
ethnic, multi-regional centrist party operating in an environment in which such a
strategy of political mobilization was made increasingly problematic due to the
growing efficacy of more narrowly based parties. The double bind referred to the
pincers of BJP’s Hindutva campaign and the ‘social justice’ plank of the National
Front-Left Front alliance respectively. The party system of the 1990s witnessed
the erosion of the centrist predominance of the Congress party, which nonetheless
continued as the largest national party, the emergence of the rightwing Hindu neo-
traditionalist BJP as the second largest party at the national level, and the growing
multiplicity of the centrist Janata Dal and, i.e. leftwing and regional parties organ-
ized loosely in the National Front-Left Front alliance, which first surfaced in the
run-up to the 1989 Lok Sabha elections and later continued for some time as United
Front-Left Front alliance.
These developments put the Congress party in a tight corner where it ideally
kept trying to rehabilitate itself on its own or seeking allies from among the par-
ties in the National Front/United Front-Left Front alliance. But actually, it found
itself spurned by its preferred allies and forced to fall back covertly upon the BJP
most of the time in the parliament arena, though not without occasional support
from National Front/United Front in its bid for a wider consensus. This led to the
paradox of BJP-bashing at Congress forums and campaigns at the same time as
frequently working in unison with it on the parliamentary floor. This was the trend
since the summer of 1991 when the Congress following the mid-term elections
formed a minority Government headed by P.V. Narasimha Rao which gradually
worked its way to a majority in the Lok Sabha (through its majority in the Rajya
Sabha was subsequently lost indirect elections from State Assemblies to that body).
The issue of secularism was a live one in the Congress under Narasimha Rao.
The party employed it as a strategy directed at the minorities’ vote bank. The dissi-
dents, especially Arjun Singh until his expulsion, used it as a ploy to embarrass Rao
for his alleged soft corner for BJP and its cohorts and his failure to project a strong
enough anti-communal image and stance for the party. Party resolutions persis-
tently presented an unequivocal condemnation of communalism in politics, as did
the political resolution adopted at the Tirupati AICC session in 1992: ‘The majority
fundamentalism of the BJP is compounded by minority fundamentalism of cer-
tain elements who believe in obtaining votes through religious edict which only
desecrates the faith it purports to serve’ (INC, 1992, p. 37). However, the Muslim
vote in the 1990s, especially after the demolition of the Babri masjid in Ayodhya
in December 1992 by a frenzied mob of Hindu kar sevaks, remained estranged
from a Congress party, except probably in Kerala. Although the demolition took
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 65

place in the BJP-ruled State of Uttar Pradesh at the time, and although the Congress
government in New Delhi promptly acted in secure resignation or dismissing BJP
Governments in four North Indian States in a row, there seemed to be a widespread
perception among Muslims that Rao gave the U.P. Government a long rope and
acted only belatedly.
The Congress party resolutions also regularly made appeals to the Scheduled
Castes/Tribes and Other Backward Castes (OBCs). However, the bulk of SCs/STs
in 1990 in many States seemed to be moving to the BSP formed in the late 1980s by
Kanshi Ram, which formed a minority coalition government with Mulayam Singh
Yadav’s Samajvadi Party (a JD splinter) until its estrangement with the latter and
the dismissal of Chief Minister Yadav by the Governor in the summer of 1995.
The OBCs likewise predominantly supported the various parties with Janata
Dal antecedence—JD led by V.P. Singh, Samajvadi Party of Mulayam Singh
Yadav, and Samajvadi Janata Party led by Chandra Shekhar. Though the Congress
always had some prominent OBC leaders, the JD led by Ajit Singh merged with the
Congress to give the Rao minority Government a working majority. The Congress
under Indira and Rajiv had shelved the Mandal Commission Report recommend-
ing 27 percent reservations for OBCs, in addition to those for SCs/STs (15 + 7
percent). But once the National Front government led by V.P. Singh revived it by
announcing its implementation but fell before it could see it through court wran-
glings, the Congress Government led by Rao proceeded to implement a revised
Mandal formula instead of withdrawing it.
The Congress party was also at pains to assure the middle classes and the indus-
trial working classes and the farmers, the mainstay of the consumers’ boom of the
1990s, that, despite the opposition parties’ propaganda to the contrary, the eco-
nomic liberalization package and the GATT treaty was going to eventually add to
their prosperity. The economic resolution adopted at the New Delhi AICC session
in June 1994, for example, went on monotonously to list in detail measures taken
by its government to ensure economic recovery, restructuring, and stabilization;
‘safety net’ for retraining and re-employing workers, curbing inflation, strengthen-
ing the Public Distribution System for selected subsidized food items, enhance-
ment in rural development investment, and favourable terms of trade for farmers as
well as export earning for them. This document went on to assert: ‘The AICC does
not find any inherent contradiction between a market economy and effective state
intervention in building up a responsive social infrastructure’ (INC, 1994, p. 26).
This was a distinctly new voice in political mobilization; it steered clear of both
populism and religious communalism. To an extent, it was addressed to a constitu-
ency of the future. Its success hinged on the success of economic reforms. At a time
when the Congress party was fighting with its back to the wall against purveyors
of Hindutva, OBCism, regional populism, Muslim and Sikh fundamentalism, and
aggressive Dalits, the viability of the Congress campaign appeared to be uncertain
and even bleak. However, when others exited from the stage, often prematurely,
leaving behind political instability and economic ruin, the electorate often turned
to the Congress party in desperation and hope. The Congress party itself knew that
by pandering to Hindu communalism or OBCism it was eventually the BJP and
66 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

Sangh Parivar or the Janata Parivar that benefited rather than the Congress. It was
the Congress party’s overtures to the RSS during Indira Gandhi’s last phase and
Rajiv Gandhi’s succession to her that initially seemed to substitute for the erosion
of the traditional Congress vote bank of minorities and SCs/STs. But ultimately the
move backfired and helped the BJP to rise from the ashes of its virtual electoral
extinction of the 1984 Lok Sabha elections.

Organizational tendencies

In organizational terms, the Congress party has through its long existence mostly
operated through a network of notabilities as the nuclei of its mass appeal during
the freedom movement as well as post-independence electoral mobilization. Of the
four types of basic elements of party organization delineated by the French politi-
cal scientist Maurice Duverger (1954: Book I, Ch. 1)—‘caucus,’ ‘branch,’ ‘cell,’
and ‘militia’—the caucus, or rather a varying combination of caucus and branch
has been more typical of the Congress organization. It has a top-heavy organiza-
tional structure, in the parliamentary party as well as the external mass membership
party, with powers converging in the Working Committee and the Parliamentary
Board, both having interlocking memberships internally and externally and headed
by the party President, who was also most often the Prime Minister.
The organization of the Congress party in the 1990s was governed by its consti-
tution (as amended at the Delhi AICC session in 1990) and the rules framed under
Article XIX (f) (i) and other articles of the constitution (as in force from 22 July
1990). The constitution envisaged two categories of dues-paying members:

primary (at least 18 years of age and a permanent resident in the area), and
active (at least 21 years of age, a political activist, and a primary member for
a minimum of two years). Both categories of members were supposed to be
owing allegiance to the basic values of the Indian Constitution and the ide-
als of the Congress. In 1992 there were 2.5 crore primary and 10 lakh active
members of the party.
(India Today, 15 January 1992, p. 25)

The organizational structure of the party is presented in Diagram 1. In the six-

tier party structure, the general body of the party called Committees at various
levels was to elect its own executive committees, except at the top level where
it was partly elected and partly nominated by the President. Every primary unit
of the party at the base was to elect a delegate to the Block Congress Committee.
Each BCC was to elect four members by secret ballot to the District Congress
Committees, which in addition consisted of all former DBB Presidents, Pradesh
Congress Committee members from the district, BCC Presidents, MLAs/MPs from
the district leaders of Congress parties in Zila Parishads and Nagarpalikas, and
members co-opted by the DCC executive in accordance with rules prescribed by
the Congress Working Committee. The PCCs were to consist of a delegate elected
by every BCC, Presidents of DCCs, ex-Presidents of PCCs, AICC members
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 67

resident in the State, members of Congress Legislature Party in the State in propor-
tion to the 5 percent of the PCC membership subject to a maximum of 15, members
co-opted by the PCC executive with a view to giving representation to sections
inadequately represented in pursuance of rules prescribed by the CWC. The AICC
was to consist of one-eighth of PCC members elected from among themselves
by proportional representation with the single transferable vote, the President of
the Congress and the ex-presidents, PCC Presidents, Congress Parliamentary Party
leader and leaders of Congress Legislature Parties in States, 15 members elected by
CPP, and members co-opted by CWC intended to give representation to sections
not adequately represented under the rules prescribed by the CWC.
In terms of organizational structure itself, the general bodies of the party at lower
levels upwards were constituted in such a way as to create a fairly diverse represen-
tational base for both party activists and legislators. However, the CWC enjoyed
overriding powers, subject of course to the large and often unwieldly AICC, over
the party organs at lower levels. It was the ‘highest executive authority’ within
the party with the power ‘to superintend, direct and control’ PCCs/DCCs and all
other subordinate committees in the party (Congress Constitution, Article XIX,
C & f-iii). The CWC and executive committees at Pradesh and lower levels were
also empowered to co-opt a maximum of 15 percent of the total membership of
the AICC and other concerned committees. The co-opted members were debarred
from voting and contesting rights in organization elections.
The CWC consisted of the party President (elected by AICC by more than 50
percent of first preference or transferable second preference votes), leader of the
Congress Party in Parliament, and 19 other members, of whom 10 are elected by
AICC and the remaining 9 appointed by the President. Thus the President’s power
of appointment and election by the AICC was given equal weightage in this body.
The CWC was also ‘the final authority’ in matters pertaining to the interpreta-
tion and application of this constitution (Congress Constitution, Article XIX-C).
However, under this very Article, the CWC was ‘responsible to the AICC.’ The
party constitution was amendable only by a session of the Congress, or provision-
ally by the AICC by two-thirds of members present and voting at a special meeting,
if the CWC so desires, subject to the final ratification by the next session of the
Congress. A special session of the Congress may be convened at the instance of
the AICC or by resolutions of a majority of PCCs. The provision for a requisitioned
meeting of the AICC by a certain percentage of members was apparently deleted
from the amended party constitution.
The Treasurer and one or more General Secretaries of the party were appointed
by the President from among the members of the CWC.
In addition to the CWC, two other top executive bodies of the party were the
Central Parliamentary Board and the Central Election Committee. The CPB, con-
sisting of eight members in all, was chaired by the President of the party and was
set up by the CWC from among its own members. It was required to include the
Leader of the Congress Party in the Parliament. It regulated and coordinated the
activities of the Congress Parliamentary and Legislative parties. This body was first
constituted in 1936 when Congress ministries were first formed in some provinces
68 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

under the Government of India Act of 1935. The CEC consisted of the members of
the CPB and seven other members elected by the AICC. It was the final authority
in the selection of candidates for the Parliamentary and State Legislative elections
and was entrusted with conducting elections. The Pradesh Election Committees
were to include the PCC President, CLP leader, and not more than ten and not less
than four members elected by a two-thirds majority of PCC members present and
voting. Since the lofty days of the nationalist movement against the British rule
in India, the CWC, CPB, and CEC had come to be collectively and endearingly
dubbed as the Congress ‘high command.’
From the organizational point of view, the 1969 split in the Congress party
between the factions led respectively by Indira Gandhi and her more conserva-
tive rightwing old guard colleagues often called the Syndicate may be regarded
as a turning point in the post-independence history of the party. From 1972
onwards organizational elections in the party came to be dispensed with. With
Indira Gandhi’s populist rabble-rousing and political charisma in the ascendance,
an autonomous, democratic party came to be looked upon, in the inimitable words
of W.H. Morris-Jones (1978, p. 188), as a ‘nuisance’ to the leader and ‘inessential’
for electoral success. The practice of ad hoc organizational units at various levels
appoint from the top initiated by Indira Gandhi was continued by her successor
Rajiv as well, despite his intentions and promises to the contrary, most eloquently
at the AICC’s centenary session in 1985 in Bombay where in a fit of idealism he
lambasted the ‘middlemen’ and ‘power-brokers’ in the party. However, he kept
putting off organizational elections in the party indefinitely. Commenting on the
Indira-Rajiv era of Congress politics I have observed elsewhere:
The present style of political recruitment and management at the state and local
levels of the Congress party by its central leadership betrays the blurring of the
boundary between the party and society. It resembles traditional matrimonial nego-
tiations in Bihar—in the absence of any formal membership rolls, influential lead-
ers at lower levels operate with their own informal networks and lists of followers
and, like the elders on the girl’s side, approach the central leaders who, in turn,
do the choosing and authorize the ‘party’ with the most impressive ‘dowry’ to go
ahead with organizing receptions for a barat. Thus apparent populism conceals an
undercurrent of clientelism in the party (M.P. Singh, 1989, p. 15).
There was a sponsored revival of the youth Congress, during Indira Gandhi’s
political wilderness and her last electoral mandate, first under the dubious Sanjay
Brigade and then under the suave but politically naïve Rajiv. The latter was
appointed one of the General Secretaries of the party in February 1983. He initi-
ated a massive computerized data-collection drive in the party from the field and
electoral constituencies. In tandem with party committees, he set up a three-tier
network of paid and trained youth ‘coordinators,’ ‘motivators,’ and ‘rural workers’
for the Indian Youth Congress development centres for party work and implemen-
tation of government’s development programmes. But the party organization did
not really pick up. It was sidelined especially after Rajiv Gandhi’s accession to
Prime Ministership in 1984 following Indira Gandhi’s brutal assassination.
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 69

Rajiv Gandhi’s gruesome assassination on 21 May 1991 in the midst of electoral

campaigns was a major watershed in the recent history of the Congress party. With
Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, Rajiv’s widow, declining with stunned dignity and aloofness
a fairly widespread opinion in the party to draft her as the Congress President,
party hierarchs finally settled for the veteran P.V. Narasimha Rao and persuaded
him to abandon his intention of political retirement and accept the job. And in the
hung Parliament, following the mid-term elections in the wake of the fall in rather
a quick succession of the National Front and Samajvadi Janata Party governments,
Rao was catapulted to Prime Ministership in the Congress minority government.
Skilfully seeking to fabricate consensus in the mutinous party and a highly frag-
mented polity, Rao graduated from being a meek inheritor to a power player. He
managed to get a Congressman elected to the Speakership of the Lok Sabha with
the support of the BJP, and later, when the BJP support was not forthcoming in
the election of the President of the republic, he was able to garner support from
the leftwing. He not only dubiously survived several motions of non-confidence
but also managed within a couple of years to cobble a working majority for the
Congress through splits and mergers among parties in the Parliament involving
mainly some factions in the Janata Parivar.
Other than Lal Bahadur Shastri, Rao was the first Congress Prime Minister (and
the party President, which Shastri never became) to have come from outside the
Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, probably the single most important political factor in the
post-independence politics of the country. Mostly reviled by liberals and Marxists
alike (excepting CPI during the Emergency), especially in the Indira Gandhi phase,
the Dynasty had served to provide an overarching framework of consensus for the
party, at least in the short run. In the long run, indeed, it weakened the party in the
post-Nehru era by postponing the hard option of party building by facing up to
democratic challenges in a country of cumulative inequalities and federal diversi-
ties. With the dynastic element relegated to the background, one noticed what was
called by an observer the ‘Janatafication’ of the Congress.1
Dissidence against Rao in the party mainly came from three major sources. Its
first source was the Rajiv loyalists just as Indira loyalists and the Sanjay Brigade
were the sources of dissidence during Rajiv Gandhi’s leadership of the party. Off
and on they kept Rao under pressure by egging on Sonia Gandhi and charging the
government for its laxity in stepping up the probe against Rajiv’s killers as well as
not proceeding to initiate the process of seeking LTTE’s chief V. Prabhakaran’s
extradition from Sri Lanka (since initiated but never concluded). The second
source of dissidence was a group of fairly senior leaders with some measure of
real or imagined autonomous support base with an eye on Rao’s chair. One might
put in this category leaders like Sharad Pawar (Maharashtra), N.D. Tiwari (U.P.),
and Arjun Singh (M.P.). Pawar, growing larger than his shoes as Union Defence
Minister, was dispatched by the Prime Minister to Bombay as Maharashtra’s Chief
Minister, where he kept . The right side of Rao. The Congress in the State later lost
to BJP (spring 1995). Singh, and subsequently Tiwari, later travelled in their respec-
tive States (both without Congress governments, but M.P. won back in November
70 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

1993) and outside, charging Rao with compromising with religious communalists,
signing the GATT treaty inimical to the interests of Indian farmers, and neglect-
ing Congress party’s interests in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar to keep the Southern
dominance of the party intact under him and appease the Janata parivar Yadava
CMs of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. Both Tiwari and Singh were eventually expelled
from the party. They triggered a split in the party by organizing what they called
a ‘Congress workers’ convention’ in New Delhi on 19 May 1995, claiming to be
the real Congress (Indira) and hence entitled to use the electoral symbol of ‘hand’
used by the party since Indira Gandhi’s second coming in 1980. Tiwari seemed to
evoke a good response in the party’s rank and file in Uttar Pradesh and Arjun Singh
in Madhya Pradesh where his protégé Digvijay Singh was elected Chief Minister
in November 1993 autonomously from the party high command by the Congress
Legislature Party, a rare event, probably a solitary one, in the post-Nehru era in
the party. Arjun Singh’s dismissal from the Union cabinet as the Human Resource
Development Minister received sympathetic comments also from the Union
Minister of Civil Supplies A.K. Antony and created a tremor of support in eastern
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu. In Kerala there followed a deluge
of dissidence against the Congress Chief Minister K. Karunakaran, a close ally of
Rao. Antony soon replaced Karunakaran as Chief Minister and the latter was sub-
sequently inducted as a Union Minister. However, when it came to the crunch most
legislators and AICC members kept away from the rebel Congressmen’s conven-
tion, where the rank and file Congressmen from the Hindi-speaking States, mostly
Tiwari’s and Singh’s home States, proceeded to elect the former as the President
and the latter as the Working President. Sonia Gandhi’s attention and mediation
was sought by Singh and Tiwari as well as by backbenchers in the Rao camp. She
took a low profile and aloof neutral posture, though expressing herself in favour of
moderation and reconciliation. Attempts of a few mediators to bring about a rap-
prochement did not bear any fruit.2
The third source of dissidence in the party was some regional leaders without
any pretensions of national ambition. One might put S. Bangarappa of Karnataka
in this category. Having cultivated some measure of OBC and Dalit support, he had
been an important factional force to reckon with in the State Congress party for dec-
ades. He had also occasionally been out of the Congress, heading an inconsequen-
tial regional party under his thumb. Rao initially gave a long leash to Bangarappa
by containing, through central mediation and arbitration, the recurrence or grow-
ing dissidence against the Chief Minister, who often took stands contradictory to
the central party leadership on issues such as the Karnataka-Tamil Nadu dispute
over Cauvery waters. Party’s central leadership finally allowed the dissidents a
free hand and replaced Bangarappa with another backward caste Congress leader,
Birappa Moiley, as Chief Minister. The former left Congress party in a huff again
floated a regional party under his leadership. In the 1995 round of Assembly elec-
tions, Karnataka was lost to the Janata Dal.
Rao’s greatest contribution to the Congress party’s organization was the attempt
to bring about some degree of internal democracy by holding organizational elec-
tions in the party in 1992 after a lapse of two decades. A combination of idealism
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 71

and pragmatism appeared to have impelled Rao to go ahead with elections in a

party that had become accustomed to an ad hoc organization setup. Rao had been
catapulted to the top when he had practically renounced the political world. He
had been a virtuoso politician with accomplished reconciliatory skills spanning the
Nehru and Indira eras and had also been in some limelight in the brief Rajiv years
in the party. He had been dramatically called to some sort of mission in an hour of
crisis in the party and the polity. A sense of idealism and generativity would not
be entirely unexpected in these circumstances. His pragmatism stood him in good
stead in dealing with the challenges to his position in the party and the country at
the time of his succession of Rajiv Gandhi and immediately thereafter. Having
electorally lost one State after another in the 1980s, the party had also been dis-
lodged in New Delhi in 1989. The electoral revival of the party was imperative.
The recent developments in the country and the party were not entirely bleak. The
National Front and SJP minority governments had collapsed in quick succession.
And Rajiv Gandhi before his tragic assassination was doing much better as an
opposition leader than he had as a novice Prime Minister. The electoral campaign
too, in the midst of which he was bombed, was going well for the Congress. With
charismatic leaders gone, the most practical way to revive the party was through
democratic organization and consensus. Within the party, challenges to Rao were
mainly twofold: the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty in whose surviving likely immediate
successor, Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, the party had reposed trust almost unanimously
following Rajiv’s assassination and the regional-national satraps such as Sharad
Pawar and Arjun Singh. Organizational elections in the party could be a double-
edged sword: it could help legitimize Rao against the dynasty, silence the ‘royal-
ists’ who hardly concealed their contempt for a ‘usurper,’ but it could help the
satraps, to an extent even the ‘royalists,’ to consolidate their power in openly con-
tested organizational elections in the party.
Rao finally took the democratic plunge. Organizational elections in the party
commenced in November 1991 and were supposed to conclude by January end
of the following year. However, the process predictably proved to be fractious,
noisy, and long-drawn-out. Even by the time of the AICC session in Tirupati (in
the make-shift ‘Rajiv Nagar’) in mid-April 1992 the electoral process could not be
completed in all the States. The newly elected AICC met with the following break-
up of delegates by States with some States going without formal representation
due to incomplete or disputed elections. Table 3.1 shows that out of approximately
900 members of the AICC expected at Tirupati, only 227 were duly elected and
declared by the returning officers and the central leadership of the party. They
represented 16 States and six Union Territories. For 213 seats from seven States,
including Bihar and Gujarat, among the centres of political gravity in the Congress
movement/party since the turbulent 1920s, elections were held but the list was
not finalized by the party hierarchs. The list in Uttar Pradesh remained pending
until the last moment. This gave rise to grievance and resentment, particularly in
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, that of late the Southern domination of the party, occa-
sionally in league with Maharashtra, conspired to ‘disenfranchise’ these most
populous Northern States to hamper consolidate their position in the party. In two
72 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

Table 3.1 AICC delegates by States at Tirupati, 1992

States/Union Territories No. of Delegates

Andhra Pradesh 81
Maharashtra 72
Uttar Pradesh 144
Orissa 43
Kerala 36
Assam 21
Manipur 11
Mizoram 7
Sikkim 5
Madhya Pradesh 74
Rajasthan 36
Punjab 21
Arunachal Pradesh 9
Goa 5
Meghalaya 10
Nagaland 9
Tripura 9
Andaman & Nicobar Islands 2
Chandigarh 3
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 2
Pondicherry 3
Daman Diu 2
Lakshadweep 2
Total 227
Election held but the list was disputed and yet to be finalized by central leaders
Bihar 93
Gujarat 35
Haryana 18
Delhi 13
Karnataka 42
Himachal Pradesh 12
Total 213
Elections not held and old AICC members to continue
Tamil Nadu 6
Jammu and Kashmir 13
Total 19
Grand Total (Approximately) 952

Source: The Indian Express (New Delhi), 1 April 1992.

Note: The Indian Express (New Delhi) of the same date as above reported that the forestalled
announcement of the election of PCC Presidents in U.P. and Bihar was perceived by the leaders of these
States as a ploy to prevent them from coalescing and getting four to five members of their choice elected
to the Congress Working Committee. Some credence is lent to the dominance of the South in the party
by the fact that the Congress Parliament Party elected 15 members to the AICC half of whom came from
South Indian States. (See also The Indian Express (New Delhi), 28 March 1992.)
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 73

States—Tamil Nadu and Jammu and Kashmir—organizational elections were not

held and previously or newly nominated members were allowed to continue.
The way the electoral process activated the seemingly defunct mass member-
ship organization of the party down to the Block level seems to suggest that the ad
hoc bodies nominated from the top down in the 1970s–1980s had not entirely dried
up as a channel of political communication. The proportion of change in the party
personnel at various levels was estimated around 10–25 percent by the central
party observers who supervised the points in States. In the biennial organizational
elections in 1994, they surmised, the party could be expected to change beyond
recognition, truly reflecting the changes in the society. This time around Rao’s
intentions about party polls were taken as less seriously as Rajiv’s. Hence party
leaders, excepting perhaps those in Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, and
Andhra Pradesh, mostly ‘worked to rule.’ Yet brisk membership drive, including
enrolment of large-scale bogue members, was reported from almost all the States.
When it came to the election of PCC Chiefs, broadly three patterns in terms
of the process emerged. There were, first, open contests in Kerala, West Bengal,
and Madhya Pradesh. Congress happened to be in power in Kerala at the head
of the United Democratic Front Government headed by K. Karunakaran, a CWC
member and an ally of Prime Minister Rao. In an election marred by a physi-
cal fight and calling in of police, Karunakaran’s protégé Vayalar Ravi defeated
the faction led by the former PCC Chief A.K. Antony by a margin of 18 votes.
The Antony group demanded a party probe into the alleged use of the police in
organizational elections and the irregularities in elections to the DCCs in Trichur,
Kottayam, and Kozhikode, where the main beneficiary was the Chief Minister’s
son. Through Ravi’s initiative and the mediatory role played by some UDF part-
ners—one of whom, the Indian Union Muslim League, threatened to withdraw
from the ruling coalition if the crisis in the Congress was not resolved—a com-
promise was reached. Ravi agreed to withdraw police cases filed against some
supporters of the Antony group and look into alleged electoral irregularities in
some districts. In Left Front-ruled West Bengal, a multiplicity of factions was led
by former Chief Minister Siddhartha Shankar Ray, erstwhile PCC Chief A.B.A.
Ghani Khan Choudhury, Priya Ranjan Das-Munshi, and Youth Congress leader
Mamata Banerjee. Planning Commission Deputy Chairman Pranab Mukherjee first
seemed to be emerging as the consensus candidate. However, in a straight contest
subsequently, Somen Mitra, a protégé of Choudhury, defeated Mamata Banerjee
by 27 votes. She was backed by Ray, Dasmunshi, and Saugata Ray, among others.
In Madhya Pradesh, too, the three major Congress factions, led respectively by
Union HRD Minister Arjun Singh, Union Minister Madhavrao Scindia, and the
CLP leader and former Chief Minister Shyama Charan Shukla, fought it out in a
contest in which Digvijay Singh, a protégé of Arjun Singh, was elected the PCC
President. The State at the time was ruled by BJP but later reverted to Congress
(November 1993 round of Assembly elections), with the ‘Diggi Raja’ becoming
the Chief Minister. Probably the organizational elections were most conflictual in
Tripura where they led to the toppling of the Congress government and its replace-
ment by a rival Congress faction.
74 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

In the second pattern, Maharashtra and Gujarat managed to effect an election by

consensus among State leaders with central observers only mediating, i.e. without
arbitration by the high command. Maharashtra had long been a Congress strong-
hold, while the latter at the time was ruled by Janata Dal (Gujarat), a JD splinter
led by Chimanbhai Patel. The Congress in Maharashtra displayed a multi-factional
configuration, with the Union Defence Minister Sharad Pawar, whose protégé
headed the State government at the time of organizational elections in the party,
having an edge over other factions led by Union Home Minister S.B. Chavan,
former Chief Minister A.R. Antulay, AICC spokesman V.N. Gadgil, Bombay city
Congress chief Murli Deora, and Tirpude. Pawar finally emerged as the dominant
factional leader by consensus, and subsequently, he moved to the State as the Chief
Minister. In Gujarat, a bifactional pattern was in evidence, with the Union Foreign
Minister Madhavsinh Solanki and former Chief Minister Amarsinh Chaudhary
(with Praja Socialist Party antecedents) fighting for dominance, while the JD
(Gujarat) Chief Minister Chimanbhai Patel planning to merge his party with the
Congress. This eventually came to pass with Patel emerging as the major factional
force in the government and the party by consensus. The Congress later lost to BJP
in Gujarat and to the BJP-Shiv Sena alliance in Maharashtra in the 1995 round of
Assembly elections.
The third, and by far the most common, pattern of inducting the PCC Chiefs
was the failure of the State Congress leaders to come to a consensus among
themselves and the authorization to the Prime Minister and party President P.V.
Narasimha Rao to do the final selection. In most States, this authorization followed
a disputed or aborted election. The category included Congress-ruled States like
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Haryana as well as JD-ruled Bihar and Orissa,
SP-BSP-ruled U.P., and BJP-ruled Rajasthan. Besides, multi-factional patterns,
at times grouping into a bi-factional configuration, indiscriminately prevailed in
all States in this category. As many as eight States’ PCCs authorized Rao to
select the Presidents in the wake of observers of the high command reporting
their failure to bring about reconciliation. A procedure common to all States (not
only the ones under review here) was for the central party leadership to dispatch
at least two observers and a Returning Officer and a Deputy Returning Officer.
On their getting stuck and factional leaders agreeing to an arbitration by Rao,
who throughout avoided getting involved in factional feuds in the States, the
central leadership appointed three-member committees to select the party func-
tionaries. The reports of these committees were then referred to a senior min-
ister of the Union cabinet, one appointed for each State, e.g. S.B. Chavan for
U.P., B. Shankaranand for Bihar, Madhavrao Scindia for Haryana, V.C. Shukla
for Karnataka, and Ghulam Nabi Azad for Orissa. The ministers in consultation
with committee members and returning officers reverted to Rao who finally made
the choice of party functionaries. Illustrative of the process is the party organ
in Andhra Pradesh, the Prime Minister’s home-State, confronted with the fac-
tional feud among Chief Minister Janardhan Reddy, PCC Chief V. Hanumantha
Rao, Y.S. Rajashekhar Reddy, and former Chief Ministers J. Bengal Rao and
M. Chenna Reddy; the newly elected PCC appealed to the Prime Minister/party
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 75

President to resolve the tangle. Rao’s choice finally fell on Majji Tulsidas for
the PCC presidentship. His appointment was interpreted as a victory of sorts for
the Chief Minister. The incumbent PCC chief in the State, a Scheduled Caste
Congressman, had been an AICC member only for a year. The new PCC chiefs
selected through this process in U.P. and Bihar were Narayan Dutt Tiwari and
Jagannath Mishra, both enjoying considerable strength in the party in the respec-
tive States.
At the end of the organizational elections in the party, Rao was unanimously
re-elected the President at the AICC session in Tirupati, the fabulous temple town
in his home state, and exempted from the operation ‘one-man-one-post’ principle
under which many Chief Ministers, holding simultaneously the PCC president-
ships as well, were obliged to vacate the latter. At Tirupati the ATCC also elected
10 of the 21 members of the Congress Working Committee, leaving the rest to
be appointed by the Congress President under the party constitution. The elec-
tions aroused a great deal of rank-and-file excitement among the delegates, with as
many as 48 candidates for the 10 seats remaining in the fray despite a considerable
attempt by the leadership to limit the contest. In his concluding extempore address
at Tirupati, Rao lamented the fact that no SCs/STs had made it to the CWC through
the electoral process and that had he been one of the elected members (he was the
elected President by unanimity), he would have resigned. The hint was promptly
taken by Jitendra Prasada, his political secretary, and Abmed Patel at Tirupati
itself. Later, five members, including three Union Ministers (Jakhar, Reddy, and
Azad), resigned from the CWC to facilitate the induction of weaker sections and
women. In the reconstituted body, Rao, among other things, dropped Arjun Singh
and Sharad Pawar from the elected category and accommodated them in the nomi-
nated/appointed category. This brought Singh’s quip that he was ‘doubly blessed’!
(Table 3.2).
The Congress in the 1990s, despite the revival of mass membership organiza-
tion based on a modicum of organizational elections, basically remained a party
with a parliamentary presence and a structure dominated by the government. This
was partly a reflection of the authoritarian style of party-building under Indira and
Rajiv and its continuation with only marginal modifications under Rao, and partly
a manifestation of the structural logic of the parliamentary system that tends to con-
centrate powers in the hands of the parliamentary party leader, especially when he
also happens to be the Prime Minister. However, with the growing federalization
of the party system and the new Panchayati Raj and Nagarpalikas (under the 73rd
and 74th Constitutional amendments), the State and local governments are likely
to become increasingly more important levels of governance. Political parties in all
probability would be forced to delegate more powers in selecting candidates and
formulating policies to the State and local level leaders. This change was already
evident in JD and communist parties whose State units operated with a great deal
of autonomy from the central party units. The Congress party and the BJP were less
open to this trend, though they were not entirely untouched by this development.
The revival of organizational elections in the party by Rao did not set a long-
term trend. For when the biennial party elections fell due at the end of 1993, they
76 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

Table 3.2 Ten CWC members elected by AICC at Tirupati, 1992

Names States Votes Polled

1. Arjun Singh Madhya Pradesh 430
2. A.K. Antony Kerala 426
3. Jitendra Prasad Uttar Pradesh 418
4. Sharad Pawar Maharashtra 404
5. R.K. Dhawan The data is not available from the source 385
6. Ghulam Nabi Azad J&K 332
7. Bairam Jakhar The data is not available from the source 280
8. Rajesh Pilot Rajasthan 258
9. Ahmed Patel Gujarat 247
10. Vijay Bhaskar Reddy Andhra Pradesh 243

Source: Asian Recorder, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 21(20-26 May 1992), pp. 223 06-7.

were initially postponed for a year due to the intervening Assembly elections. No
one in the party talked about them thereafter! Indeed, the alleged pretext for their
putting off could instead be the reason for their urgency. The party cannot become
an effective instrument of electoral mobilization without democratizing itself and
thus reflecting the true aspirations of the people.
Party organizations in the Congress in the post-Nehru era have been at a dis-
count due to at least three main factors. First, both Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi
relied on the charisma of the Dynasty to mobilize the masses and win elections
through their direct appeals without the mediating role of autonomous intermedi-
ary party organizations. The electoral waves thus generated swept the large parts of
the nation, submerging the regional and local issues under the plebiscitary national
issues defined by the central leadership. Second, the post-Nehru Congress leader-
ship was inclined to increasingly rely on the mass media and advertising agen-
cies for leadership image-building and electoral campaigns. Rajiv Gandhi’s 1984
electoral campaign was assigned to Rediffusion, a Bombay ad agency.3 For the
Congress campaign in the 1996 Lok Sabha elections, the party commissioned a
Bombay-based marketing intelligence firm which operated in collaboration with
a reputed U.S. agency. A team of experts and local recruits surveyed and identi-
fied constituencies almost a year in advance in terms of Congress prospects, eth-
nic composition, popular leaders, perceptions of the people, and the course to be
followed to swing public opinion in its favour (The Times of India, New Delhi,
Capital, 10 July 1995, p. 1). Third, the emergence of a variety of social movements
in civil society partly tended to transform the elite-mobilized tenor of the Indian
electorate into a participatory one. These movements fell into the categories of old
social movements (centred around issues of class, State autonomy, religion, region,
OBC reservation, etc.) as well as the new ones centred around quality-of-life issues
(environmental protection, anti-big dams campaigns, gender, etc.). These move-
ments were eroding the bases of established parliamentary parties, especially the
Congress and the communist parties. The main beneficiaries of this trend were the
 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s 77

parties of the extreme right and the extreme left. The new social movements, of
course, tended to shun affiliation or identification with any party.
To come back to the impact of the organizational elections in the party in
1992, it enabled Rao to legitimize his position in the party as well as to consoli-
date it. The graft of anti-Rao campaigns in the party showed a gradual dissipation
from the Tirupati AICC session to the sessions at Surajkund (March 1993) and
at New Delhi (June 1994). But the backstage dissidence never really died out,
and open defiance and criticism by P.R. Kumaramangalam were both trenchant
and persistent. Kumaramangalam went to the extent of proposing cut motions on
the government’s budgetary demands for alleged violation of party resolutions
especially affecting the poor! The N.D. Tiwari-Arjun Singh tirade against Rao in
Uttar Pradesh and elsewhere turned into a torrent, especially after the defeat of the
Congress in Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Gujarat, and its failure to retrieve
Bihar, though a consolation of sorts came in Orissa where it dislodged the JD led
by Biju Patnaik. The whirlwind campaigns of Tiwari and Singh in Uttar Pradesh
and elsewhere culminated in what they called ‘Congress workers’ convention’ in
New Delhi on 19 May 1995. A vindication of the Singh Tiwari critique of Rao on
the issues of anti-minorities and anti-poor consequences of the policies followed
by the Rao Government came from the rethinking of the electoral debacles and
plea for a pro-poor image for the party in Rao’s own ranks. Their frustration with
Rao was also reflected in over 70 MPs led by Rajesh Pilot and Ahmed Patel and
Joined by Pawar faithfuls as also the Madhya Pradesh Chief Minister Digvijay
Singh drove on 17 May 1995 to Sonia Gandhi’s residence to goad her to intervene
to stave off a split in the party. On Sonia’s wondering whether her appeal would
have any effect, they reportedly told her: ‘If he [Rao does not listen to you, then
we won’t listen to him’ (India Today, 15 June 1995, p. 51). Sonia was also under
pressure for her favour by the Congress rebels. While she did not come out of her
cell, her frosty avoidance of Rao after the latter’s failure to respond to her appeal
for compromise was reported in the press. In the split that followed the MPs and
MLAs preferred mostly to stay with Rao, either as loyalists or fence-sitters, but the
rank-and-file support in the convention for the new party claiming to be the real
Congress (Indira) was impressive. The new party faced a double challenge in not
only dislodging the parent Congress but also the new saviours of the minorities
and the poor like Mulayam Singh Yadav, Laloo Prasad Yadav, Kanshi Ram, and
Mayawati. It was an uphill task, to say the least. For the antecedent and the conse-
quent alternatives were still formidably in place, though there was some setback in
the summer of 1995 to the Samajvadi Party-Bahujan Samaj Party Government in
Uttar Pradesh with the BSP withdrawing support from Mulayam Singh and getting
its own minority Government headed by Mayawati installed with the legislative
support of the BJP.
Rao was the first Prime Minister from outside the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty to sur-
vive for a full term. And, it was also a measure of his political success that even sen-
ior non-Congress leaders like Ramakrishna Hegde considered him the best bet for
a likely and desirable national coalition government following the next Lok Sabha
elections due in 1996. He was indeed heading a sort of ‘coalition’ government
78 The Indian National Congress in the 1990s

since June 1991, when he began with a minority government and continued as
such almost halfway through his term. The Congress rebels and the Dynasty were
also political resources in the reserve that the Congress party could fall back on
in any major political realignments that might unfold. In the long run, the success
of economic reforms and restructuring might create a more durable constituency
for the Congress in the bourgeoisie and the middle classes, and the ‘working class
aristocracy’ that are the main beneficiaries of the new economic policy initiated
by Rajiv and stepped up by Rao. In the meantime, the Congress party continued
to be torn between the conflicting demands of economic liberalization and politi-
cal liberalism. The former pulled it to the right of the centre and the latter to the
left of the centre. The most vocal advocates of the latter course in the party led by
Arjun Singh and N.D. Tiwari were shown the door for the moment, but the views
espoused by them continued to surface time and again within the party. For exam-
ple, a meeting of the PCC chiefs and Congress Legislature Party leaders in New
Delhi on 20 June 1995 urged the central leadership to adopt a left-of-the-centre
position on all issues, as the ‘anti-poor’ image of the party was likely to adversely
affects its electoral prospects (The Hindu, New Delhi, 21 June 1995, p. 1). Within
the new, post-1989 party system of polarized pluralism, the Congress party faced
an existential crisis to find a balance among the conflicting poles of the swadeshi
and Hindu neo-traditionalism of the Sangh Parivar, rural-regional populism of the
Janata Parivar and the National/United Front, and the parliamentary socialism and
anti-neo-imperialism of the Left Front. The Congress faced an uphill task, but its
prospects were not as bleak as they might appear.

Notes
1. I n 1990s it would have been perhaps difficult for anyone other than Sonia Gandhi or
her scions to qualify for the top job in the party in terms of widest possible support.
The unseemly replacement of the party president Sitaram Kesri by Sonia herself short-
circuiting the party constitution demonstrated that the top slot was reserved for the
Dynasty.
2. The term in journalist Janardan Thakur’s, quoted from memory.
3. The All-India Indira Congress (Tiwari) contested 321 seats nationally, won four
seats, and forfeited security deposits in 310 constituencies. Of its four seats two came
from Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. Qualifying as a State party under the Election
Commission’s criteria for recognition as such it received recognition as one of the eight
National parties in 1996 (Election Commission of India 1996).
4 The Indian National Congress since
2000

Periodic elections are used in modern democracies to elect representatives. Political

parties are the only organizations through which citizens can select their repre-
sentatives. As a result, they are indispensable institutions in democratic politics.
Parties and party systems, on the other hand, have evolved dramatically over the
last 50 years (Suri, 2007). In Western industrial democracies, mass-based parties
have declined. Parties are frequently challenged in a variety of ways. Among them
are the changing nature of social relations; the availability of alternative sources
of communication and interaction via new technologies such as the Internet and
electronic media; new channels of participation in public affairs via new social
movements, civil society organizations, or single-issue interest groups; and the rise
of the middle class, which is making people less reliant on political parties to pro-
tect their interests. Although we do not see such a drop in public engagement with
developing-country parties, we do find parties all over the world facing new chal-
lenges in the changed international and domestic environments of the 21st century
(Suri, 2007).
The Congress was gradually losing competitiveness in an increasing number
of states and constituencies, as evidenced by its drop to third place or worse. The
larger question is whether a Congress-style, all-encompassing umbrella party, in
this case religious, caste, and regional cleavages in India, can survive the sharp-
ened politicization of social cleavages, because such a party will tend to lose out in
identitarian outbidding to parties based on religious, caste, and regional identities.
According to the social cleavages theory of party systems, social heterogeneity
tends to produce a multi-party system that reflects that heterogeneity regardless of
the electoral system (Farooqui & Sridharan, 2016). According to the classic ver-
sion of the social cleavages theory, parties form around societal cleavages (what
cleavages are salient and why can they vary in time and space) (Lipset & Rokkan,
1967). While Duverger’s law predicts a two-party system, and in the case of mul-
tiple bipolarities, state-level two-party systems leading to a national multi-party
system, it also predicts multi-party systems organized around regions or social
groups such as religion, caste, tribe, class, or language (Farooqui & Sridharan,
2016).
The 2004 Lok Sabha election pitted the NDA, headed by Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, against the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance
(UPA), which was put together under the leadership of Sonia Gandhi. The NDA

DOI: 10.4324/9781003254676-4
80 The Indian National Congress since 2000

administration had performed well in power, but the Gujarat riots and its ‘India
Shining’ campaign did not go over well with voters, and it was defeated in the
elections by its primary rival (Price, 2004). Manmohan Singh was elected Prime
Minister of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA). The leadership was diluted
from a single person to the Manmohan-Sonia-Rahul troika, which functioned
successfully for five years (2004–09) and was able to maintain power by gaining
over 200 seats on its own in the 2009 national elections. The combined leader-
ship of Manmohan Singh, Sonia Gandhi, and Rahul Gandhi, the National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA), the farm loan waiver scheme, pro-
poor policies of the UPA government, confidence in stability, and the victory of
secular forces all contributed to the Congress’s impressive performance (Arora &
Tawa Lama-Rewal, 2009).
However Congress’ impressive performance can also be attributed to India’s
First Past the Post System, as evident from Table 4.1:
The most noticeable trend in the above data shows that the Indian National
Congress could only secure victory in nine states and Union Territories. It could
not form a majority in 16 states and union territories. So how did Congress secure
a majority in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections?
A look at Table 4.2 reflects the strength of Congress Party in forming alliances
and thus securing a majority in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. Once the number
of seats from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 is added we see the alliances helped the
Congress Party in states where it initially lacked a majority with the help of the
state and regional parties. It also reflects on the bigger picture: the Indian National
Congress’ ability to negotiate and accommodate various ideological standpoints
and retain some of its ‘umbrella part characteristics’ (Kothari, 1964) from the
1950s and the 1960s.
The headway made by the Congress in 2009 was squandered in the middle of
the UPA II administration, which was plagued by several scams, high inflation,
and unemployment rates, price increases, and policy gridlock in the country’s last
two years. The general election of 2014 signalled the beginning of the Congress’s
demise, as the nation experienced a ‘wave’ election with a new dimension, with
two currents competing in the country at the same time. The first current was a
significant anti-incumbency tsunami against Congress, which reduced its number
of members to 44, the lowest ever, and reduced its vote share to 20%. The BJP’s
designee for Prime Minister received a second wave of support.
The party now lacks a strong leader and a functional organization, and its ideo-
logical objective of leftist-welfarist measures for the poor has been hijacked by
the BJP, which is skilfully leveraging it to position itself as India’s single most
powerful political party. To fight the BJP’s ascent in the nation, the Congress has
to recast its ideological agenda and open the party’s doors to those with right-wing
beliefs within its wide range of secular politics. The party may resurrect itself by
rebuilding its organization at the grassroots level, repopulating its cadres with foot
soldiers and flag bearers, and setting realistic objectives for a political comeback
in the far future.
 The Indian National Congress since 2000 81

Table 4.1 Congress Performance in 2004 general elections

States Winning Number of seats

Andaman and Nicobar islands 1 1
Andhra Pradesh 29 42
Arunachal Pradesh - 2
Assam 9 14
Bihar 3 40
Chandigarh 1 1
Chhattisgarh 1 1
Dadra and Nagar Haveli - 1
Daman and Diu 1 1
Goa 1 2
Gujarat 12 26
Haryana 9 10
Himachal Pradesh 3 4
Jammu and Kashmir 1 6
Jharkhand 6 14
Karnataka 8 28
Kerala - 20
Lakshadweep - 1
Madhya Pradesh 4 29
Maharashtra 13 48
Manipur 1 2
Meghalaya 1 2
Mizoram - 1
Nagaland - 1
Delhi 6 7
Orissa 2 21
Pondicherry - 1
Punjab 2 13
Rajasthan 2 25
Sikkim - 1
Tamil Nadu 10 39
Tripura - 2
Uttar Pradesh 9 80
Uttaranchal 1 5
West Bengal 6 42
Total 145

Source: Data extracted from Election commission of India website (https://eci​.gov​.in/) and table
collated by the authors.

The Congress follows a schema that is the catch-all party, which maximizes
electoral appeal through a broad aggregation of interests. It is election-focused,
has a shaky party structure, and tenuous ties to civil society (Kirchheimer, 1966).
The People’s Democratic Party of Nigeria, India’s Congress in its first two dec-
ades, Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional (even though it is a stable coalition but not a
single party) (Farooqui & Sridharan, 2016), and India’s Congress in its first two
82 The Indian National Congress since 2000

Table 4.2 UPA alliances performances in 2004 general election

Indian National Congress 146
Rashtriya Janata Dal 24
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 16
Nationalist Congress Party 10
Pattali Makkal Katchi 6
Telangana Rashtra Samithi 5
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 5
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 4
Lok Jan Shakti Party 4
Indian Union Muslim League 1
Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party 1
Kerala Congress 2
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 43
Communist Party of India 10
Revolutionary Socialist Party 3
All India Forward Bloc 3
All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimen 1
Total

Source: Data extracted from the Election Commission of India website

(https://eci​.gov​.in/) and table collated by the authors.

decades are cited as the archetypes of congress parties. According to our position,
the difference between an umbrella party and a catch-all party is that the former is
more inclusive and includes opposing social forces. As a result, the Congress party
in India enjoys support from both wealthy corporations and the underprivileged,
upper castes, and Scheduled Castes, as opposed to a catch-all party, which typically
aims to appeal to voters outside of its core constituency (Farooqui & Sridharan,
2016).

II
The United Progressive Alliance, headed by the Congress Party, was re-elected in
India’s general elections in 2009. With a significant rise in seats in the National
Lok Sabha, accusations of a ‘renationalization’ of the party structure and voting
pattern have surfaced. The evidence from the findings, on the other hand, shows
that the process of fragmentation of the data is, on the contrary, accelerating. The
party system and electorate are continually evolving, with Indian voters opting for
regional and local actors in more significant numbers than ever before. The key
reason for this seeming contradiction is the distorting influence of the majority
election system (‘First Past The Post’) a close look. Despite the repeating debate on
the prevalence of ‘economic voting,’ a glance at the election results indicates the
durability of ‘ethnic voting.’ (Verniers & Jaffrolet, 2009) (Table 4.3).
As reflected in Table 4.2, Congress fared significantly better in 2009 elections
than it did in the 2004 elections winning more than 60 more seats in 2009 elections
 The Indian National Congress since 2000 83

Table 4.3 Congress performance in 2009 general election

States Winning Number of seats

Andaman and Nicobar islands - 1
Andhra Pradesh 33 42
Arunachal Pradesh 2 2
Assam 7 14
Bihar 2 40
Chandigarh 1 1
Chhattisgarh 1 1
Dadra and Nagar Haveli - 1
Daman and Diu - 1
Goa 1 2
Gujarat 11 26
Haryana 9 10
Himachal Pradesh 1 4
Jammu and Kashmir 2 6
Jharkhand 1 14
Karnataka 6 28
Kerala 13 20
Lakshadweep 1 1
Madhya Pradesh 12 29
Maharashtra 17 48
Manipur 2 2
Meghalaya 1 2
Mizoram - 1
Nagaland - 1
Delhi 7 7
Orissa 6 21
Pondicherry 1 1
Punjab 8 13
Rajasthan 20 25
Sikkim - 1
Tamil Nadu 8 39
Tripura - 2
Uttar Pradesh 21 80
Uttarakhand 5 5
West Bengal 6 42
Total 206

Source: Data extracted from Election commission of India website (https://eci​.gov​.in/) and table
collated by the authors.

and forming a majority in 13 states. However, once again in order to form gov-
ernment Congress had some dependence (arguably less so than 2004) on various
regional and State parties as reflected in Table 4.4.
There is no ‘re-nationalization’ of politics in India, according to Jaffrelot and
Verniers, but there is a steady movement towards regionalization. As much as the
advances he accomplished on his own, it was this regionalization of politics that
84 The Indian National Congress since 2000

Table 4.4 UPA alliances performances in 2009 general election

Indian National Congress 206
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 18
Nationalist Congress Party 9
Pattali Makkal Katchi 6
Telangana Rashtra Samithi 5
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 5
Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 4
Indian Union Muslim League 1
Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party 1
Kerala Congress 2
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 43
Communist Party of India 10
Revolutionary Socialist Party 3
All India Forward Bloc 3
All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimen 1
Total

Source: Data extracted from the Election Commission of India website

(https://eci​.gov​.in/) and table collated by the authors.

aided Congress. The party has profited in three ways as a result of this phenomenon
(Jaffrelot & Verniers, 2009).
To begin with, newly formed local or regional parties—a clear sign of India’s
growing fragmentation—have aided the Congress by diluting the votes of its pri-
mary opponents, mainly established regional parties, in several states. In Andhra
Pradesh, the Praja Rajyam Party, founded by film star Chiranjeevi, won an average
of 1,60,000 votes per constituency, denying Chandrababu Naidu’s Telugu Desam
Party roughly 20 seats, which the Congress primarily won. The Congress and its
ally, the Nationalist Congress Party, won all six seats in Mumbai in Maharashtra,
thanks to the 126,000 votes that Raj Thackeray’s Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (a
breakaway faction of the Shiv Sena) received on average in these constituencies;
otherwise, the Shiv Sena and/or its ally, the BJP, would have won at least some
of them. In Tamil Nadu, the advent of a new party, Vijaykant’s Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam (DMK), stopped the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham
(AIADMK) from winning in roughly 15 constituencies where the Congress and
its partner, the DMK, had won the majority of the seats. Second, Congress prof-
ited from its regional partners’ strong performance. The DMK won 18 of the 38
seats available and aided Congress in gaining eight more. The Nationalist Congress
Party (NCP), a branch of the Congress Party, won nine seats in Maharashtra.
The Congress re-established a beneficial partnership with Mamata Banerjee’s
Trinamool National Congress (TNC) 11 in West Bengal, which won 19 seats and
assisted the Congress in winning seven more. Third, the BJP-led coalition (the
National Democratic Alliance, or NDA) lost several key partners in the run-up to
the election (ibid.).
 The Indian National Congress since 2000 85

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) establishes a mini-

mum guaranteed wage (amounting to one hundred days of work hours per year, at
government-fixed rates) for all rural casual workers; the Right to Information Act
requires the bureaucracy to explain its decisions when asked by concerned citizens;
and the implementation of a 27 percent quota for the OBC. These are all examples
of Congress’s best-thought-out policies. All of this pleased a populace that was
also sensitive to the decline in the inflation rate: in India, double-digit inflation can
bring down a government, whereas the growth rate (which has been declining since
mid-2007) does not play such a large role in a country that was accustomed to slow
growth until the 1990s. The 2008 nuclear deal with the United States—in which
Washington agreed to transfer civil nuclear energy technology to India despite the
country’s refusal to sign the TNP—was also appreciated by the urban middle class,
not only for the mark of international recognition it represented but also for its
energy implications.
Most commentators believed that the BJP, not the Congress, had won the elec-
tions in 2004 and that the BJP had lost them by using counterproductive (‘pro-rich)
methods and slogans such as ‘Shining India.’ The Congress seems to have gained
greatly from the collapse of the NDA in 2009: in reality, the exits of the Telugu
Desam Party (TDP), the AIADMK, the TNC, and the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) effec-
tively sealed the BJP’s doom.
The general elections in India in 2009 did not out to be the watershed moment
that many analysts predicted. The victory of Congress did not result in a true
renationalization of the party system or a de-ethnicization of the vote. Certainly,
Congress has fared better in several places where it was pitted against the BJP in
head-to-head contests, but its seat totals do not represent its true popularity. This
optical illusion stems first and foremost from the single-round majoritarian voting
system, which has resulted in the Congress, the most consistent but not dominant
player, benefiting from the growing fragmentation of regional political scenes, par-
ticularly in the case of triangular or quadrangular competitions.

III
The Indian National Congress Party’s (henceforth Congress Party or Congress)
fall reached a nadir in the 2014 Indian general election when it suffered its worst-
ever seat and vote share losses. With a larger majority, the BJP and its allies were
re-elected. Modi’s party won 303 seats, up from 282 seats in 2014 (Palshikar &
Suri, 2014). The National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which includes the BJP
and several allies, won 353 seats in the Lok Sabha, out of a total of 545. Not only
did the NDA keep seats in places like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar
Pradesh that some had predicted would return to opposition parties, but it also
expanded its grip into areas where it previously had little support. In West Bengal,
the BJP and its allies won 17 more seats than in 2014; in Odisha, the BJP and its
allies won 17 more seats than in 2014. It took another seven, and another nine in
Karnataka, in the south. Significant gains were also achieved in Telangana and the
northeast of the nation.
86 The Indian National Congress since 2000

Table 4.5 Congress performance in 2014 general election

States Winning Number of seats

Andaman and Nicobar Islands - 1
Andhra Pradesh 2 42
Arunachal Pradesh 1 2
Assam 3 14
Bihar 2 40
Chandigarh - 1
Chhattisgarh - 1
Dadra and Nagar Haveli - 1
Daman and Diu - 1
Goa - 2
Gujarat - 26
Haryana 1 10
Himachal Pradesh - 4
Jammu and Kashmir - 6
Jharkhand - 14
Karnataka 9 28
Kerala 8 20
Lakshadweep - 1
Madhya Pradesh 2 29
Maharashtra 2 48
Manipur 2 2
Meghalaya 1 2
Mizoram 1 1
Nagaland - 1
Delhi - 7
Orissa - 21
Pondicherry - 1
Punjab 3 13
Rajasthan - 25
Sikkim - 1
Tamil Nadu - 39
Tripura - 2
Uttar Pradesh 2 80
Uttarakhand - 5
West Bengal 4 42
Total 44

Source: Data extracted from Election Commission of India website (https://eci​.gov​.in/) and table
collated by the authors.

Table 4.5 shows the drastic fall of the Indian National Congress where it could
only command a majority in merely two states. Winning less than 10% of Lok
Sabha seats the fault lines of Congress finally created a chasm for its electoral
performance. The Anna Hazare protests created a ground for opposition parties to
take over as they did.
The NDA’s numerous opponents floundered as they tried to make up ground lost
five years ago. The largest opposition party, the historic Indian National Congress
 The Indian National Congress since 2000 87

(INC or Congress), headed by Rahul Gandhi, gained just eight seats more than it
did in 2014, with 52 MPs returning vs 44 in 2014. The party’s victories in Kerala,
where it won seven seats, and Tamil Nadu, where it won eight, were overshadowed
by its resounding defeat in northern India. Other opposition parties fared much
worse, with Mamata Banerjee’s All India Trinamool Congress losing 12 MPs and
obtaining just 22 seats as the BJP made significant gains in West Bengal. Terrorism,
air strikes, and missile launches cast a pall over India’s general election in 2019,
but they had little impact on the result. The BJP clearly outperformed and outspent
its opponents in terms of organization and financial resources. It’s also evident that
Modi’s main opponent, Rahul Gandhi, failed to connect with voters and persuade
them to put their faith in him to fulfil the Congress Party’s lofty promises. Other
problems, such as the Election Commission’s decision not to reprimand others for
using communal language and other alleged violations of the rules, and the Indian
media’s coverage of the election, will be debated for some time. Campaign and the
degree to which India’s media were hesitant to be as openly critical of the Prime
Minister and his party as they should have been.
Above all, the 2019 election was a second referendum on Modi. The first, back
in 2014, was about whether or not to trust a politician with a complicated history
and a recent track record of seeming success to provide quick economic progress
to an ambitious India weary of a sluggish and sometimes corrupt regime (Shastri,
2019). This one was on a unique topic. The BJP-led government’s performance on
employment and growth was spotty, and opinion surveys in the run-up to the elec-
tion reflected this. But it didn’t matter in the end.
As Table 4.6 reflects Congress did succeed in gaining lost ground in Kerala and
Punjab and its overall performance was marginally better than 2014, winning eight
more seats; however, Congress still could not recover to its pre-2014 electoral suc-
cess glory.
Modi had successfully consolidated his image as much more than a simple
politician by his frenzied personal diplomacy over five years and embracing of
foreign policy, as well as his more recent handling of the Balakot issue (ibid.).
He triumphed because his numerous supporters believed he was the emblem and
defender of their New India’s rising national pride, a power to be acknowledged
and reckoned with in the modern world.
Whether an umbrella party like Congress can survive in the long run once the
pre- and post-independence historical momentum that propelled it to dominance
fades, especially in light of the factors that continue to operate, such as the grow-
ing and perhaps entrenched salience of regional identities, as well as varying
state-level caste and religious cleavages. Is it conceivable to rebuild an extended
umbrella party in the face of these schisms? Is it possible that the social cleavage
hypothesis of party systems has triumphed? Or is the electorate moving away from
social cleavages and towards rewarding good administration and economic per-
formance? Will Congress be able to establish a new social coalition around a new
political economy, as it did after 1967 and 1977, and reclaim the social segments it
seems to have lost – the upper and dominating castes, as well as the middle classes
– while maintaining its minority base? Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Castes
88 The Indian National Congress since 2000

Table 4.6 Congress performance in 2019 general election

States Winning Number of seats

Andaman and Nicobar islands - 1
Andhra Pradesh - 25
Arunachal Pradesh - 2
Assam 3 14
Bihar 1 40
Chandigarh - 1
Chhattisgarh - 1
Dadra and Nagar Haveli - 1
Daman and Diu - 1
Goa 1 2
Gujarat - 26
Haryana 1 10
Himachal Pradesh 1 4
Jammu and Kashmir - 6
Jharkhand 14
Karnataka 1 28
Kerala 15 20
Lakshadweep - 1
Madhya Pradesh 1 29
Maharashtra 1 48
Manipur - 2
Meghalaya 1 2
Mizoram - 1
Nagaland - 1
Delhi - 7
Orissa 1 21
Pondicherry - 1
Punjab 8 13
Rajasthan - 25
Sikkim - 1
Tamil Nadu 8 39
Tripura - 2
Uttar Pradesh 1 80
Uttarakhand - 5
West Bengal 2 42
Telengana 3 17
Total 52

Source: Data extracted from Election Commission of India website (https://eci​.gov​.in/) and table
collated by the authors.

and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and the underprivileged? Given the
deterioration of its competitiveness and even presence in a big number of states and
constituencies during the last quarter-century, can it develop a wide enough social
coalition in a large enough number of states to become a national umbrella party?
(Farooqui & Sridharan, 2016).
 The Indian National Congress since 2000 89

The Congress’s feeble rebound in 2004 and 2009, when it fared well among the
higher castes, the urban and rural middle class, and urban seats, seems to imply that
a Congress recovery of lost seats is unlikely. some conditions, social and geographi-
cal turf may be achieved. A wide centrist social alliance based on economic reforms
for growth and targeted social spending within budgetary constraints is a possibility
and seems to be what the Modi administration is aiming to do in order to broaden the
BJP base. Adopting such a policy, however, would need Congress refraining from
portraying itself solely or primarily as a pro-poor party (in an aspirational sense) a
broad-based growth-cum-social justice party that does not upset the fine balance
between growth-oriented policies and redistributive policies that seems to have been
upset in the 2014 campaign (Sridharan, 2014) catering only to its post-2014 remain-
ing base, but a broad-based growth-cum-social justice party that does not upset the
fine balance between growth-oriented policies and redistributive policies that seems
to have been upset in the 2014 campaign (Sridharan, 2014b) and beyond.
Table 4.7: Congress secured the highest number of seats in the 2009 general
election with the highest percentage of seats and percentage of votes and lowest
ever in the 2014 general election with 44 seats and 19.52% of votes.
Table 4.7 reflects the trend of the electoral performance of Congress over the
past four Lok Sabha elections. While Congress did initially maintain its dominance,
in the past decade its electoral performance seems to be on a downward spiral.
In order to regain its electoral ascendency, it will need to address issues of inter-
nal democracy and organizational rebuilding, as well as a new political economy
that balances growth and equity without alienating the growing middle class,
urban, and younger sections of the electorate, whose influence will grow over time.
Reorganizing and reviving the Congress party organization is a challenging endeav-
our, particularly in light of the party’s dismal record. However, it is not impossible
in the Lok Sabha elections and following assembly elections. According to Manor
(2003), it may be simpler to try organizational renewal, particularly at the state
level, while the party is in opposition than when it is in power, since state leaders
must deal with and resolve concerns when they are in power between many groups
aiming for a piece of the power pie. This diminishes the party’s organization while
also encouraging factionalism.

Table 4.7 INC (Congress) performance over the last two decades (2004–2009)

Congress performance from 2004 to 2019

Year Seats contested Seats won Vote percentage (%)
2004 417 145 26.53
2009 440 206 28.55
2014 464 44 19.52
2019 421 52 19.49

Source: Data extracted from Election Commission of India website (https://eci​.gov​.in/) and table
collated by the authors.
90 The Indian National Congress since 2000

To summarize, if the Congress is unable to rebuild an encompassing coalition,

as it arguably did in 2009, and recover as an umbrella party, it faces two options:
disintegration and eventual demise due to further splits and loss of the social base,
or revival as a broad, left-of-centre refrain of the disadvantaged, rather than an
umbrella party, facing a broad, BJP-led, right-of-centre coalition. In the second
scenario, however, it would be a centre-left party rather than an umbrella party,
and the social cleavages theory of party systems would have triumphed (Farooqui
& Sridharan, 2016).
Due to India’s significant political realignment and the federalization of the
party system, Congress’s vote share has been progressively declining. The Green
Revolution’s positive effects on farmers’ and Other Backward Classes/Castes
(OBC) (backward castes other than Scheduled Castes and Tribes) wealth laid the
groundwork for the establishment of democracy. The Congress party’s resistance
to accepting these castes led to the creation of regional parties in a number of
states (Saxena, 2022). This trend towards the broadening of democracy grew more
prominent in the 1990s with the adoption of the Mandal Commission’s recommen-
dations and the rise of caste-based parties. In the 1990s, neo-liberal reforms were
also put into place, which boosted the governments’ economic might (ibid.). This
strengthened the states’ political weight along with the rise of a multi-party system
and the era of coalition governments.
In a comprehensive party typology, where would Congress fall? ‘Congress
parties’ are a distinct category in Gunther and Diamond’s (2001) typology. Five
categories make up this classification: elite, mass-based (ideological/socialist,
ideological/nationalist, religious), ethnicity-based (ethnic parties, congress par-
ties), electoralist parties (catch-all, programmatic, personalist), and movement
parties (left-libertarian, post-industrial extreme right). They classify congress
parties as pluralistic, multi-ethnic coalitions of different ethnic, religious, and
regional groups that reduce conflict through the sharing of power and resources
among ethnic groups, gain support through clientelistic allegiances and appeals
to national integration, and have coalitional or federative organizations based on
local notables and regional elites. All of these are ideal types. The term ‘umbrella
party’ or ‘inclusive party’ can also be used to describe a congress-style party that
crosses class, ethnicity (race, caste, religion, language), region, and political agen-
das, as we do in this chapter (moderate, moderate left) (Farooqui & Sridharan,
2016).
By studying the ideological transformations and organizational limits that drove
the Congress’ demise, a strong case is made for the significance of the Congress
tale in understanding the broader general political revolution occurring in India
(Hasan, 2019). The thesis focuses on the Congress party, but it also has implications
for other centrist and centre-left parties in other countries that also saw declines
after the emergence of populist nationalism and right-wing politics in recent years
(Hasan, 2019). The transformation and polarization processes that supported the
Congress party and other centrist parties throughout the world can be better under-
stood by looking at India’s political development over the past ten years.
 The Indian National Congress since 2000 91

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Hasan, Z. (2019). Ideology and organization in Indian politics. Oxford University Press.
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Conclusion

This monograph analyses the nature and evolution of the Indian party system.
Politically and historically, this party system has its roots in the nationalist move-
ment for independence from colonial rule in British India, the gradual expansion
of the franchise beginning in the early 20th century, and the introduction of the
universal adult franchise under independent India’s Constitution, which has been
in force since 1950. However, if democratization has been the primary independent
variable or factor in producing the party system we currently have, then the peculi-
arities of the Indian social structure—with its regional and social diversities—have
also impacted this party system.
The socio-cultural and regional diversities of India, as well as the federal struc-
ture of the Indian Constitution, are well suited to a multi-party system. Moreover,
the anti-colonial nationalists’ struggle, the early post-independence generation, and
the operation of the universal adult franchise prepared the ground for the formali-
zation of the party system we have today. However, the anti-colonial struggle in the
British Raj and the presence of the movements’ towering charismatic personalities
at both the national and state levels limited the tendency towards the multiplication
of political parties.
The plurality or first-past-the-post representation law was introduced after inde-
pendence. It worked as a barrier to party expansion because it favours larger par-
ties at the expense of smaller ones, as seen by a disproportionate vote-to-seat ratio
(Duverger, 1954; Riker, 1982). The impact of a pluralist election system is, how-
ever, at least in part, lessened in the Indian context due to the diversity of the social
structure. Following are the seven phases of India’s party system’s development:
(i) the Indian National Congress, which was founded in 1885, was a mass move-
ment that fought for national independence during what may be called the ‘move-
ment party system’ (1920–1947); (ii) the ‘Congress system’ as it was portrayed
in Rajni Kothari (1970), which was the time when the Indian National Congress
ruled democratically under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru; (iii) the time of con-
frontation between the parliamentary side of the Indian National Congress, which
finally came to be headed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and the organizational
wing, led by the old guard leaders, which gave rise to the great Congress split in
1969. Then, after eliminating party-level democracy, Jayaprakash Narayan (JP)
led an extra-parliamentary mass movement of protests which clashed with the rul-
ing Congress. This produced the authoritarian internal national emergency under

DOI: 10.4324/9781003254676-5
 Conclusion 93

Article 352 of the Constitution (Singh, 1981). (iv) The 1977 general elections and
the restoration of democracy under the Janata Party government led by Prime
Minister Morarji Desai followed thereafter. (v) The resurgence of the Congress
under Indira Gandhi in 1980, the accession of her elder son Rajiv Gandhi after her
death in 1984, and during the decade, the growing division and difference between
the federal party system and state party systems came to pass. (vi) From the 1990s
to 2014, the tendency towards regionalized multi-party systems with federal minor-
ity coalition governments accelerated. (vii) The next phase was marked by the BJP
winning the general elections in 2019 with a wider margin of victory and becom-
ing, for the first time in 30 years since 1984, the majority party leading the National
Democratic Alliance (NDA) alliance. On both occasions, Narendra Modi served as
the event’s mascot.
Throughout the seven stages of the party system’s growth in India that were
previously covered in this study, the federal tenor and temper of the system fluctu-
ated. With a modest shift towards decentralization in the late 1960s and the late
1970s, the party system, for instance, was characterized mainly by parliamentary
centralism during the time of Congress dominance (1952–1989). On the other
hand, it was considerably federalized and regionalized during the time of federal
coalition governments and minority governments during the multi-party system
(1989–2014). Since 2014, the system has tended towards a more or less medium
ground between parliamentary centralism and federal/regional decentralism under
the BJP-led NDA but ended up in a highly centralized federal dispensation.
No other party had been able to do it since 1989 until the BJP under Modi
emerged as the majority party in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, according to elec-
toral data compiled from the Election Commission of India for the most recent
phase of the Indian party system covering the elections in 2014 and 2019.
Vote shares ranged from 31.34 to 0.03 percent. Two national parties may be
identified if we look at numbers in the double digits: the BJP, which won 282 seats
(51.93 percent of all Lok Sabha seats, with a vote share of 31.34 percent), and
the Indian National Congress, which won 44 seats (seat share 8.10 percent and
vote share 19.52). This was the INC’s worst-ever electoral performance. Even the
second-largest national party fell short of the necessary ten percent in the Lok
Sabha seats to act as the official opposition to the incumbent administration. The
fragmentation of the party system becomes more pronounced when we consider
how State parties did in the more recent elections. The remaining four national
parties—CPI(M), NCP, CPI, and BSP—are de facto State or regional parties if
we adopt more stringent requirements for classifying a national party since the
Commission’s standards are too lenient. (According to the Election Commission,
a ‘National Party’ must meet the following criteria to qualify: winning at least
two percent of the votes cast in any four or more states, along with at least four
Lok Sabha seats, in a previous general election; and being recognized as a ‘State
Party’ in at least four states. A ‘State Party’ must win at least 1 Lok Sabha seat,
or if it wins at least 8 percent of all valid votes cast in the state, for every 25 seats,
or any portion thereof, allocated to that state. Six state parties gained more than
10 seats, including AIADMK (37), AITC (34), BJD (20), Shiv Sena (18), TDP
94 Conclusion

(16), and TRS (11). Their share of the national vote, which fluctuates from slightly
above three to above one, is expected to be small given that they are state par-
ties. However, their share of the overall vote in their respective states is relatively
high: in Tamil Nadu, the AIADMK received 44.92 percent; the DMK received
23.91 percent; in Odisha, 44.74 percent; in West Bengal, 39.79 percent; in Andhra
Pradesh, 29.36 percent; and in Punjab, 26.37 percent. AAP garnered 24.4 percent
of the vote in Delhi, Samajwadi Party received 22.35 percent in Uttar Pradesh,
INLD garnered 24.4 percent in Haryana, RJD garnered 20.46 percent in Bihar,
JDU garnered 16.04 percent in Bihar, PDP garnered 20.72 percent in Jammu &
Kashmir, National Conference garnered 11.22 percent in J & K, JD(S) garnered
11.74 percent in Karnataka, Naga Peoples’ Front received 68.84 and 20.01 percent
in Manipur, 22.84 percent for National Peoples Party in Meghalaya, 53.74 percent
for Sikkim Democratic Front in Sikkim, 14.98 percent for AIUDF in Assam, etc.
The aforementioned information clearly shows two parallel and somewhat
opposing trends in the Indian party system: (i) centralization, as demonstrated by
the BJP’s ascent to great heights and the INC’s dwarfing in comparison; and (ii)
the holding of the forts with an impressive performance by a set of state parties in
regional arenas, which is an indicator of a regionalized or regionalizing political
system. The trend of the election results from 2014 was primarily maintained in
2019, with a few minor alterations. Even though the BJP and the INC were still
the two largest national parties, the remaining five national parties were able to fit
into this group according to the Election Commission’s rather flexible or liberal
definition of national parties. As a result, the votes cast for the two biggest national
parties grew: the BJP gained 303 seats and improved its vote share from 51.93 to
55.9 percent, while the INC gained 44 seats and increased its vote share from 8.10
to 9.59 percent. The BJP continues to have a significant lead over the INC in rela-
tive political influence. Other national parties, such as NCP, CPI(M), and CPI, had
a fall in their totals, except the BSP, which gained from 0 (zero) to 10 seats despite
declining their vote percentage from 4.19 to 3.67. The TMC switched from being a
state party in 2014 to a national party in 2019, and it successfully won 22 seats with
4.11 percent of the votes, which is less than the 34 seats and 3.84 percent it had
attained in the previous election. The party has grown to include more states than
in the past, becoming national despite losing votes and seats in 2019.
Important state parties were, however, still very much present. In reality, with
23 seats and 33.18 percent of the state’s votes, the DMK, which the AIADMK had
wiped out in the Lok Sabha elections in 2014, made a comeback. Regional parties
like the AIADMK and DMK in Tamil Nadu, TRS in Telangana, YSR Congress
in Andhra Pradesh, Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, SAD in Punjab, PDP and National
Conference in Jammu & Kashmir, TMC in West Bengal, BJD in Odisha, JD-U
in Bihar, and several tribal parties in the Northeast continue to be political forces.
Some of them, such as Shiv Sena, JD-U, and SAD, have been BJP allies for an
extended period. Shiv Sena recently defected from the BJP-led NDA following
the November 2019 Maharashtra Assembly elections to form a coalition govern-
ment with the NCP and Congress. The rise of the BJP in the Lok Sabha elections
in 2014 and 2019 must be contrasted with state Assembly elections held since then
 Conclusion 95

to get a complete picture of the party system. Electoral volatility in the state party
systems has accompanied electoral stability in the most recent phase of the national
party system.
In the November–December 2018 Assembly elections in Madhya Pradesh,
Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Telangana, and Mizoram, for example, the ruling BJP
lost to the INC in the first three states, while the incumbent TRS retained power
in Telangana and the MNF defeated the ruling INC. In October 2018, the BJP
ceded sole control of Haryana to the Jananayak Janata Party (JJP), led by Dushyant
Chautala, a scion of the Chaudhary Devi Lal Jat clan and an INLD splinter.
Following the Jharkhand Assembly elections in December 2019, the BJP was
defeated by the JMM, led by Hemant Soren, son of JMM patriarch Shibu Soren.
State-level electoral volatility significantly impacts the national federal balance
of forces. According to the proportional representation system, the federal sec-
ond chamber, Rajya Sabha, is indirectly elected by the elected members of each
State’s Legislative Assembly using a single transferable vote system. As a result,
the Rajya Sabha’s party composition reflects the State party systems. During the
period of Congress dominance, when this party was uniformly dominant at the
National and State levels, there was bicameral concordance in party terms in both
houses of Parliament. Since 1989, this has ended with the transformations of the
national party system and the sharpening of the distinction between the National
and State party systems. No coalition or minority party government has maintained
complete control of the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha since then. The govern-
ment’s majority control of the Lok Sabha has been offset by the opposition’s con-
trol of the Rajya Sabha.
Several analysts have noted that the Congress party has been defeated and then
recovered in the past (Vaishnav, 2014). After all, the Congress party demonstrated
tenacity by evolving from an Independence movement to a successful political
party. Between 1950 and 1967, the Congress party wielded absolute power, which
the late political scientist Rajni Kothari dubbed the ‘Congress System.’ ‘A patron-
age system [within which] traditional institutions of kinship and caste were accom-
modated, and a structure of pressures and compromises was developed,’ he said
(Kothari, 1988, pp. 164–165). Because opposition parties were not legally barred
from competing for power, Congress’s dominance was not a one-party system.
Even though the opposition parties did not share government control with the
dominant party, their exclusion from public policy formation was more formal
than actual. They were, in fact, critical to the Congress system’s operation. These
parties, which frequently had well-developed Left and Right ideologies, were posi-
tioned on either side of the Congress party on major cleavages in Indian politics,
such as land reform and foreign policy. As a result of opposition party pressure,
Congress was pinned to a dynamic equilibrium that resembled a centrist position.
As a result, Congress became the focal point of Indian politics. The Congress lost
control of six State governments and a significant number of Lok Sabha seats
in 1967. Suffering from Jawaharlal Nehru’s death in 1964, a power struggle, a
leadership vacuum, and a weak economy, 1967 is widely regarded as a water-
shed moment in the Congress party’s history. Despite a landslide victory in 1971,
96 Conclusion

Indira Gandhi could not restore the ‘Congress System,’ ushering in a period known
as ‘de-institutionalization.’ Following the 1975–1977 Emergency, the electorate
sought to punish Indira Gandhi for suspending democracy, resulting in India’s first
coalition government and the first time the Congress was removed from power.
Thus we can say that the party went from dominance to decline, yet it remained in
hibernation for some time to rise again in 1980 and 1984.
However, despite a comeback victory in 1980 and an even more dramatic vic-
tory in 1984, the Congress party has been unable to gain a legislative majority since
then. The 16th Lok Sabha elections produced the first clear victor with a clear and
cohesive majority in the lower house of Parliament since 1984. A Congress party
revival on the scale of the 1980 and 1984 elections appears unlikely. Three sig-
nificant impediments prevent Congress from reconvening: leadership, ideas, and
power.
Most analysts and observers agree that Rahul Gandhi has demonstrated no lead-
ership skills, capacity, or even desire to lead. Despite this, no new generation of
leaders has emerged, and party and family loyalists, including senior Congress
party leader Digvijay Singh, continue to look to Rahul Gandhi for direction. The
Congress party will need to reinvent its traditional pro-poor platform regarding
ideas. Congress oversaw the launch of the world’s largest social security scheme,
NREGA—the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act—which guaranteed
rural households one hundred days of paid work per year below the poverty line.
Despite its ambitious scope and goals, the NREGA (later renamed the ‘Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act’ or MGNREGA) did not gar-
ner enough votes for the Congress party among the poor or rural electorate. On the
other hand, BJP appropriated it. Instead of abandoning such poverty-relief initia-
tives, the BJP sought to restructure its foundations on this ground.
One of the first post-election actions was the new BJP-led NDA government’s
announcement of a massive programme to open bank accounts across the coun-
try (the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana) to empower new account holders and
end what they called ‘financial untouchability’ by providing access to credit and
insurance. To reduce waste and corruption, it also proposed that welfare benefits
be paid directly into the beneficiaries’ bank accounts. With Modi at the centre of
attention and his rhetoric, a compelling blend of charisma, performance, and policy
output orientation, the Congress party has struggled to come up with convincing
alternatives.
The most crucial difficulty is basic power arithmetic. Previously, Congress
gained dominance primarily through a gradual expansion of its social base, emerg-
ing from short-term coalitions that led to a political majority—rather than a coher-
ent and organic social base, a cadre-based party with a social mobilization ideology.
In the past, a fragmented opposition could have resulted in a majority of legislative
seats. Instead, Congress has tended to shrink as it loses access to power, political
resources, and opportunities to recoup its losses as part of the fractured opposition.
After the spectacular success of the regional Trinamool Congress in West Bengal
under Mamta Banerjee in 2011, winning all Vidhan Sabha seats in 2011, the INC
became a peripheral party.
 Conclusion 97

Congress is currently dealing with a talent management issue, or the problem

of losing all of its big names. Ghulam Nabi Azad, Jyotiraditya Scindia, Sushmita
Dev, Jiten Prasada, RPN Singh, Kuldeep Bishnoi, and Kapil Sibal were among
those who felt ignored or that Congress had no future for them. In most cases,
such as Azad’s, Congress dismissed the exit as that of a minor figure. In reality,
many of the leaders became key members of the opposing team. For instance, Jitin
Prasada, a second-term BJP minister in Uttar Pradesh, could not accomplish much
in Congress between 2014 and 2021. However, within the BJP, he has emerged
as a strong Brahmin leader, delivering all five districts assigned to him during the
U.P. elections and now being given a second term. Everything comes down to lack
of human resources.
Another example is Anand Sharma, a senior Congress leader, claimed ‘So why
should I continue somewhere where my position has become untenable? How
could I deliver when I’m excluded even in meetings? And by whom? Let these
buffoons who are ruining the party send all of them. Can they fight the BJP there?’
(Choudhary, 2022). Anand Sharma subsequently resigned. However, one thing is
certain: his public outburst tainted the party! Previously, these tantrums were han-
dled quietly behind the scenes to appease those who were upset, but no one appears
to be doing this important job any longer. Haryana Chief Minister Kuldeep Bishnoi
is among those who have recently resigned. He told reporters after resigning that
he was waiting for Rahul Gandhi to call him. It’s worth noting, however, why he
expected Rahul to solve the problem while Sonia Gandhi was in charge. It would
be unthinkable for any other party to regard this as a grey area, but it is. Rahul
Gandhi was President from 2017 to 2019, when he resigned due to poor perfor-
mance in general elections. His mother was asked to come out of retirement, but
her official title was interim Congress president.
However, two events have created a significant shift in the image and leadership
style of Rahul Gandhi, the first being his Bharat Jodo Yatra which to quote Jaffrelot
‘The future will tell whether the Bharat Jodo Yatra has achieved its objectives and
changed India’s political trajectory—but it has already changed the image of Rahul
Gandhi’ (Jaffrelot, 2023). Rahul Gandhi’s march was exceptional among politi-
cal leaders not just for its duration, but also for its completion despite the frigid
weather of North India in December and January. Many commenters emphasized
that he was dressed in merely a t-shirt in the cold. These words, which went viral
on social media, deserve to be noticed because they demonstrate Indian society’s
sensitivity to forms of ‘tapasya’: Politicians who adopt the repertoire of ‘saintly
politics’ gain a special status in India. Mahatma Gandhi is a prime example.
Rahul Gandhi attempted to use this repertoire of appeals. The second aspect was
his recent disqualification from parliament. Following the Yatra that carried him
from Tamil Nadu to Jammu and Kashmir, another one can now take place between
Gujarat and the Northeast, passing through BJP strongholds like Uttar Pradesh.
The Congress can now rely not only on party cadres but also on supporters who see
its leader as an alternative to Modi. Here’s another takeaway from the disqualifica-
tion manoeuvre: Until recently, BJP leaders boasted about having to face Rahul
Gandhi, whom they saw as weaker than Mamata Banerjee or Arvind Kejriwal.
98 Conclusion

Times are changing, not only because of his stamina, which has gifted him with
new charm, but also because of the manner in which the BJP leaders have targeted
him: strangely, the country’s rulers are actively participating in the formation of
their matchup (Jaffrelot, 2023).
They awoke the day before the election, wondering what they could do. It was
too late then, and Ripun Bora had joined another party, the TMC. The Ocotober
2022 organizational elections provided an opportunity to address this issue. By
electing a new president who isn’t a member of the Gandhi family, Congress could
address one of its criticisms for being a Nehru-Gandhi party. Still, it’s unclear
whether such a person will be willing to wear this crown of thorns. For example,
election strategist Prashant Kishor (Choudhary, 2022) told the party that in the
most recent general election, Congress gave tickets to 170 people who had previ-
ously lost elections three times! They were unpopular candidates among voters.
The demographic data and analysis that reveal the party’s voter base are either
not widely available or are not used to inform their decisions. They rely solely
on ‘mahauling,’ or gauging the mood of the party through workers, which is no
longer reliable. That is why all political parties are hiring election strategists, and
Congress must catch up. They’ve made an effort by hiring a strategist named Sunil
Kanugolu, but the question is whether Congress will listen to their advice.
The ability of the Congress party to function as an effective opposition party,
coordinating the efforts of several regional parties represented in Parliament, is a
critical question. No political party was recognized as the official opposition in the
16th Lok Sabha because no party obtained at least ten percent of the seats (a situa-
tion repeated in 2019). The ten percent principle was previously used and derived
from the British parliamentary system, in which the opposition leader must reach
the quorum required to be recognized as the official opposition and, if necessary, to
form an alternative government.
However, it is important to remember that this is not an unusual situation. No
opposition party had the necessary strength between 1952–69 and 1980–89, so no
officially recognized opposition leader existed. The BJP is under attack from all
sides, with several competing parties in the opposition. This is a difficult challenge
to overcome, but it also motivates the party to learn how to deal with the oppos-
ing forces in Indian politics to cultivate, build, and consolidate a moderate and
centrist government. Currently, the economy appears to be regaining momentum
after being ravaged by COVID-19 and no significant intercommunity riots have
occurred. Despite the BJP’s defeats in the Delhi and Punjab elections, anti-BJP
forces’ ability to halt the parliamentary system on critical legislative initiatives
by the government has not fructified. Despite regime change, India’s democracy
appears to be solid and resilient. The 2024 parliamentary election will be an oppor-
tunity to test the long-term viability of the political realignment seen in 2014 and
reinforced in the 2019 parliamentary election.
However, the State Assembly elections held in five states in 2022 shed some
light on the current electoral performance of Congress. The Congress’ rapidly dete-
riorating political fortunes were one of the major takeaways from the Assembly
 Conclusion 99

elections in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand, Goa, and Manipur in 2022.

The grand old party could not retain power in the one poll-bound state where it
was in power, Punjab, or wrest power in the remaining four states. Except for
Uttarakhand, the state’s vote share and seat count have decreased. In response to
the results, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi said he humbly accepts the people’s
verdict. According to Congress spokesperson Randeep Surjewala, the results of the
election fell short of the party’s expectations. Nonetheless, as with previous elec-
toral defeats for the Congress, voices from within the party calling for change are
emerging. ‘We will learn from this and keep working for the interests of the peo-
ple of India’ (accessed from Twitter account@RahulGandhi), he stated. Congress
MP Shashi Tharoor stressed the need to ‘reform our organisational leadership’; he
stated that the only way that Congress can survive is through change while also
mentioning that ‘time to reaffirm the idea of India that the Congress has stood for
and the positive agenda it offers the nation’ (accessed from Twitter account @
ShashiTharoor).
The Indian National Congress will have to address internal democracy and
organisational rebuilding issues, as well as a new political economy that balances
growth and equity without alienating the electorate’s growing middle-class, urban,
and younger segments, the weight of which will grow over time (Farooqui &
Sridharan, 2016). According to Manor (2003), it may be easier to attempt organiza-
tional rejuvenation when the party is in opposition than when it is in power because
state leaders must contend with and resolve issues between different factions vying
for their share of the spoils of power when the party is in power. This further weak-
ens the party.
The INC, the second largest national party after the BJP, is in terminal decline,
but it still has a national reach that can be revived more efficiently than any other
national party. Others are limited to specific regions or states. It can more easily
restore, given a favourable enterprise and opportunity, arrest its severe decline, and
come out of hibernation (Saxena, 2022).
However in 2023, 28 political parties led by the Indian National Congress
(INC), I.N.D.I.A alliance was formed to stand against the National Democratic
Alliance led by the Bhartiya Janta Party in 2024 general elections.
According to INC Chief Mallikarjun Kharge, the aim of the alliance is to protect
democratic values, promote developmentalism and inclusivity, welfare, and pro-
gress, thereby strengthening the ideal of social justice. The proposal for the alliance
was put on the table in the meeting held in Patna, chaired by CM of Bihar, Nitish
Kumar. Initially 16 parties joined the meeting. The second meeting of the alliance
took place in Bengaluru chaired by UPA Chief Sonia Gandhi. The alliance was
renamed the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (I.N.D.I.A) in this
meeting. The third meeting happened in Mumbai hosted by Uddhav Thackeray.
100 Conclusion

The major outcome was the formation of a coordination committee and the passing
of a three-point resolution.
The first meeting of the coordination committee of I.N.D.I.A. alliance was held
on September 13, 2023. The committee released a list of 14 media anchors who will
be boycotted by the representatives of the I.N.D.I.A alliance. The second Bharat
Jodo Yatra from east to west is also under discussion to be held just a few months
before 2024 general elections. The yatra is expected to be joined by the I.N.D.I.A
alliance parties. It is interesting to point out that there seem to be some cleavages
already, for instance, Akhilesh Yadav implied the frail viability of the Alliance
in state-level elections. The ideologically diverse group seems to be sorting out
their seat-sharing and leadership issues. The biggest question remains regarding
the Prime Ministerial Candidate yet to be projected by this alliance.
Finally, it is to be seen whether the Congress is in decline or hibernation or, is
in the process of revival, despite intermittent kinks.
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Books and Journals

Duverger, M. (1963). Political parties: Their organizations and activity in the modern state.
Trans. From the French by Barbara and Robert North with a Foreword by D.W. Brogan.
New York: John Wiley & Sons Science Editions.
Morris-Jones, W. H. (1978). Politics mainly Indian. New Delhi: Orient Longman.
Singh, M. P. (1989, October). Down but not out. Seminar Number 362, 14–18.

Newspapers
The Hindu (New Delhi).
The Indian Express (New Delhi).
The Telegraph (Calcutta).
The Times of India (New Delhi).
106 Bibliography

https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/congress-mulls-bharat-jodo-yatra-20-ahead-of-
2024-lok-sabha-elections/article67307628.ece
https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/uniting-front-the-hindu-editorial-on-the-india-
bloc/article67267015.ece
https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/india-alliance-for-an-inclusive-progressive-
bharat-2684125

Newsmagazines
India Today (New Delhi).

News Digest
Asian Recorder (New Delhi).
Indian Recorder (New Delhi).
Index

Note: Page locators in bold refer to tables and locators followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1971 Lok Sabha elections 7 2019 general election: BJP electoral victory
1972 State Assembly election 28 13; congress performance 87, 88
1980 Lok Sabha election 49
1980s, Congress in: chief ministerial AAGSP 41
changes see chief ministerial changes, Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) 14, 94
1980s: federal dimension in party 33–34; AASU 41
ideological reorientation 44–48; leadership Abdullah, Farooq 8, 37, 43
background 49–51; mobilization strategies Abdullah, Sheikh 39
51–55; organizational crisis and change AIADMK see All India Anna Dravida
29–33; social and political background 33, Munnetra Kazagham (AIADMK)
34; social and political background, MPs AIADMK-Congress 52
49, 50 AICC see All India Congress Committee
1989 Lok Sabha elections 9, 15, 20 (AICC)
1990s, Congress in 59–61; electoral AIUDF 94
mobilization 64–66; ideology and policy Akali Dal 2, 8, 22, 39–41, 52
reorientation 61–64; organizational All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad 40
tendencies 66–78 All Assam Students Union 40
1993 Assembly elections 15 All India Anna Dravida Munnetra
1996 Lok Sabha elections 10; Congress Kazagham (AIADMK) 10, 39, 60, 84,
campaign in 76 85, 94
1998 Lok Sabha polls 10 All India Congress Committee (AICC) 38,
2000, Congress: 2004 general elections 48, 61, 62, 67, 71, 75; CWC members
80, 81, 82; 2009 general election 82, elected by 75, 76; delegates by states at
83, 83, 84; 2014 general election 86, Tirupati, 1992 64, 71, 72; session 45, 47,
86; performance over last two decades 48, 65
(2004–2009) 89, 89 All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 2
2004 general elections: congress All India Gurudwara legislation 40
performance 80, 81; UPA alliances All-India Indira Congress (Tiwari) 78n1
performances 80, 82 All India Trinamool Congress see
2004 Lok Sabha election 11, 79, 80 Trinamool Congress
2005 Right to Information Act 12 American constitution 39
2006 Forest Rights Act 12 amoral familism 49, 55
2009 general election 89; congress Anadpur Sàhib resolutions 40
performance 82, 83; UPA alliances Andhra Pradesh 14, 17, 23, 35, 36, 43, 54,
performances 83, 84 60, 63, 74, 94
2014 general election 89; BJP’s historic Anjaiah, T. 35, 36
performance 13; congress performance anti-authoritarian front 9
86, 86 anti-colonial struggle 92


108 Index

anti-Rao campaigns 77 Biswal, Hemanand 39

Antony, A.K. 32, 70, 73 BJD see Biju Janata Dal (BJD)
Antulay, A.R. 34, 35, 74 BJP see Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Apang, Gegong 36 BJP-Shiv Sena alliance 10, 74
Arab Democratic Spring in 2011 14 BLD 16
Article 12 41 Block Congress Committee (BCC) 66
Article 201 42 BMS 21
Article 244 41 Bolingbroke, Lord 26
Article 263 43 Bora, Ripun 98
Article 352 93 Brahmins 52, 97
Article 356 42 Brass, P. R. 33, 52
Article 370 22, 41 British Raj 1, 2, 39, 92
Article 371 41 British rule 1, 40, 59, 68
Article XIX (f) (i) 66 broom (jhadu) 14
Arunachal Pradesh 36 BSP see Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP)
Asom Gana Parishad 2, 8, 41, 52, 55, 60 bullock capitalists 20, 53
Assam 31, 35, 39–42, 55, 60 Burke, Edmund 26
Assam accord 41
Ayodhya 15, 22, 64 Calcutta Conference 8
Ayodhya Ram Mandir Movement 10 Central Election Committee (CEC) 67, 68
Azad, Ghulam Nabi 74, 97 Central Parliamentary Board (CPB) 67, 68
Centre for the Study of Developing
Babri masjid 64 Societies (CSDS) 13
Babri masjid-Ram janmabhumi 15 Chandigarh 40
Bahuguna, H.N. 8–9 Chandra, Satish 26n1
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) 12, 13, 15, 19, Chandra Shekhar 9, 65
61, 77 Chaudhary, Amarsinh 38, 54, 74
Banerjee, Mamata 73, 84, 87, 96, 98 Chautala, Dushyant 95
Bangarappa, S. 32, 70 Chavan, S.B. 36, 38, 74
Basu, Jyoti 8 Chidambaram, P. 61
BCC see Block Congress Committee chief ministerial changes, 1980s: due to
(BCC) fresh electoral mandate during Indira
Bhambhari 50 Gandhi’s prime ministership 34–35; due
Bhandari, Nar Bahadur 36, 37, 60 to fresh electoral mandate during Rajiv
Bharatiya Jana Sangh 2, 11, 16, 44 Gandhi’s prime ministership 36–37; due
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 9–12, 14–16, to fresh mandate during Indira Gandhi’s
21, 22, 60, 69, 73, 75, 80, 87, 94–96, prime ministership 35–36; due to fresh
98–99; in 2014 general elections 13; mandate during Rajiv Gandhi’s prime
in 2014 Lok Sabha elections 14, 93; in ministership 38–44
2019 general elections 13; Hindutva Chiranjeevi (film star) 84
campaign 64; Hindutva identity by 51; Choudhury, Ghani Khan 73
under Narendra Modi 13, 93; winning civil service reforms 24
general elections in 2019 93 communal polarization 18
Bharatiya Kisan union 20 Communist Party of India 2, 13
Bharat Jodo Yatra 97 Comptroller and Auditor General
Bhojpur Naxalites 22 Report 48
Bhosale, Babasaheb 35 Congress-All Party Hill Leaders’
Bhumihars 52 Conference 37
Bihar 10, 12, 15, 18, 22, 33, 36–39, 53, 60, Congress and Maharashtravadi Gomantak
68, 74, 75, 94 Party 37
Bihar Pradesh Congress 30 Congress campaign 65, 76
Biju Janata Dal (BJD) 85, 94 Congress Centre 42
Bishnoi, Kuldeep 97 Congress dominance 3–5, 93, 95
 Index  109

Congress(I) 9, 10 Duverger, Maurice 2, 66, 56n4

Congress(I) Government 15 Duverger’s law 79
Congress Legislature Party 35, 38, 67, 70
Congress-MGP coalition 37 Eastern Europe 61
Congress-Mizo National Front coalition 38 economic reforms 62, 63, 78
Congress-Mizoram Janata Dal coalition 60 economic voting 82
Congress Parliamentary Party 1, 30, 32, 67 Election Commission 16, 25, 26, 31, 59,
Congress predominance 5, 7, 14, 29 87, 94
Congress Social Party 2 Election Commission of India 4, 93
Congress system 5, 7, 30, 92, 95, 96 electoral mobilization 7, 52, 64–66
Congress workers convention 70, 77 ethnic voting 82
Congress Working Committee 66, 75
Constituent Assembly-cum-provisional Farooq, O.H. 37
Parliament 4 federal premiership style 5
constitutional-legal framework 4 Federation of Indian Chambers of
Constitution and the Representation of the Commerce and Industries (FICCI) 46
People Act 16, 26 FERA see Foreign Exchange Regulation
contemporary party systems 18 Act (FERA)
CPB see Central Parliamentary Board Fernandes, George 15
(CPB) FICCI see Federation of Indian Chambers
CPI 9–11 of Commerce and Industries (FICCI)
CPI(M) 9, 15, 60 financial untouchability 96
credit policy 45 Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA)
CSDS see Centre for the Study of 45, 47
Developing Societies (CSDS)
CWC 67, 68, 73, 75, 76 Gadgil, V.N. 74
Gandhi, Indira 4, 6, 13, 19, 23, 25, 30–33,
Dalit 12, 61, 65, 70 45, 47, 48, 52, 55, 56n2, 65, 66, 70, 75,
Daman and Diu 37 76, 92, 96; chief ministerial changes
Das-Munshi, Priya Ranjan 73 34–36; Congress party under 7; era
DCC see District Congress Committees 28, 59; garibi hatao crusade 24; in
(DCC) 1980, Congress under 33, 93; phase of
Democratic Front in Kerala 10 Congress restoration 8; populist rabble-
Deopura, Heeralal 35 rousing and political charisma
Deora, Murli 74 68; post-Janata phase regime 46;
Desai, Morarji 4, 7, 16, 93 pre-1969 premiership of 5; 20-point
Dev, Sushmita 97 programme 46
Devi Lal, Chaudhary 15, 35, 95 Gandhi, Mahatma 26, 97
Devpura, Hiralal 37 Gandhi, Maneka 9, 32
Devraj Urs 53, 54 Gandhi, Rahul 12, 80, 87, 96–99
Dhanagare, D.N. 20 Gandhi, Rajiv 19, 23, 33, 47, 49, 52, 53,
District Congress Committees (DCC) 55, 61, 65, 66, 71, 75, 78, 93; chief
66, 73 ministerial changes 36–44; gruesome
DMK see Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam assassination 69; in 1980s 33; in
(DMK) 1984, Congress under 13, 24, 59, 68;
DMK-Congress coalition 36, 52 1984 electoral campaign 76; phase of
Dominant Party System 13, 95 Congress restoration 8; Prime Ministerial
double bind 64 succession in October 1984 31; regime
Dravida Kazhagam 2 32, 44, 46
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) 2, Gandhi, Sanjay 22, 32, 55
39, 60, 84, 94 Gandhi, Sonia 12, 33, 69–71, 78n2, 79,
Dubey, Bindeshwari 37 80, 97
Dutt-Bradley thesis 3 Ganesan, Shivaji 32
110 Index

Garam Dal 26n1 Integrated Rural Development (IRD)

GATT treaty 63, 65, 70 program 53
German Social Democratic Party 56n3 Inter-Governmental Council (IGC) 43
GNLF 42 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 61
Goa 10, 37, 99 INTUC 20, 21
Gogoi, Keshav Chandra 35 IRD see Integrated Rural Development
Gopal, Sarvepalli 5, 6 (IRD) program
Goswami, Dinesh 25 Iron law of oligarchy 56n3
Goswami committee report 25 Iyer committee 26
Government of India Act of 1935 68
Gowda, Deve 10 Jaffrelot, C. 83, 97
Green Revolution 90 Jaichandra Singh, R.K. 38
Gujarat 32, 37, 38, 53, 54, 60, 71, 74 Jakarta Summit 62
Gunther and Diamond’s typology 90 Jamir, S.C. 35, 37
Gupta, Indrajit 25 Jammu and Kashmir 22, 37, 39, 41, 43, 52,
Gurung, B.B. 36 60, 73
Jananayak Janata Party (JJP) 95
Habermas, Jürgen 23 Jana Sangh see Bharatiya Jana Sangh
Haryana 14, 35, 38, 40, 60, 74, 94, 95 Janata Dal (JD) 2, 10, 15, 60, 64, 65, 74
Hazare, Anna 14, 86 Janata Dal-led United Front 9
Himachal Pradesh 16, 35, 37, 60 Janata government 16, 24, 44, 45, 52
Hindu Mahasabha 2 Janata Parivar 66, 69, 78
Hindutva campaign 64 Janata Party 2, 8, 9, 15, 16, 55, 59
horizontal power games 56n4 Janata Party government 7, 16
Huntington, Samuel P. 25 Janata State governments 29
Jan Lokpal legislation 14
IGC see Inter-Governmental Council (IGC) Jan Morcha 32
INC see The Indian National Congress (INC) Janvadi Party 9
Indian Constitution 66, 92 Jayalalitha, J. 52, 60
Indian Councils Act of 1861 2 JD(S) 94
Indian economy 61–63 JDU 94
The Indian National Congress (INC) 3, 10, Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 10
11, 55; in 1907 26n1; in 1980s see JJP see Jananayak Janata Party (JJP)
1980s, Congress in; in 1990s see 1990s, Joshi, Hardeo 37
Congress in; in 2000 see 2000, Congress; Joshi, Sharad 20
2024 elections 98, 99; consociational Joshi, Shashi 3
dominance 5; formation 2; by Indira JP Movement 16
Gandhi 6, 7; and Liberal Party 2; under Justice Party of Madras 2, 3
Rajiv Gandhi 13; see also individual
entries Kamaraj, K. 4
Indian People’s Front 10, 18, 22 Kammas 54
Indian politics 2, 4, 23, 24, 30, 39; political Kanshi Ram’s Bahujan Samaj Party 60
corruption in 25; ‘saintly idiom’ in Kanugolu, Sunil 98
27n15; secularization in 18 Kapus 54
Indian Union Muslim League 73 Karnataka 8, 17, 32, 37, 39, 41, 53, 54,
Indian Youth Congress 32, 33, 68, 73 70, 74
Indira Gandhi era 28, 59, 61, 71 Karnataka Rajya Ryet Sangh 20
Indira loyalists 69 Karunakaran, K. 35, 70, 73
Indrajit Gupta Committee 26 Kaviraj, S. 55n1
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act of Keishing, Rishang 35, 36, 38
August 1982 47 Kejriwal, Arvind 14, 98
INLD 94 Kerala 10, 15, 18, 35, 36, 38, 60, 64, 70, 73
inner circle 56n4 Kesri, Sitaram 78n2
 Index  111

KHAM (Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis, MGNREGA see Mahatma Gandhi National

and Muslims) 54 Rural Employment Guarantee Act
Khan, Arif Mohammad 32 (MGNREGA)
Kisan Sabhas/Panchayats 20 Michaels 56n3
Kishor, Prashant 98 micro-parties 27n4
Kochanak, Stanley 19 Mishra, Jagannath 32, 36, 39, 75
Kothari, Rajni 16, 26, 29, 55n1, 92, 95 Mishra, Sripati 32, 36
Krishna Iyer, V.R. 25 Misra, B.B. 2, 26n1
Kshatriyas 54 Mitra, Somen 73
Kumar, Nitish 15 Mizo National Front 8, 52, 60
Kumaramangalam, P.R. 77 Mizo peace accords 41
Mizoram 35, 37, 38, 41, 60
Lal, Bani 38 Mizoram Peace Accord 38
Lal, Bhajan 35, 38 MNF 37, 95
Lal, Ram 35 MNF President Laldenga 38
Laldenga 38, 39, 41, 60 Modi, Narendra 13, 85, 87, 89, 96, 98
Laldenga ministry 38 Moiley, Birappa 70
Lalthanhawla 38 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
LaPalombara, Joseph 1 Act 63
left democratic front 9 Morris-Jones, W. H. 56n2, 68
Left Fronts 10, 15, 41, 52, 78 MP see members of Parliament (MPs)
Legislative Assembly of Mizoram 41 MRTP 47
legislative councils 2 Mukherjee, Pranab 32, 61, 73
Liberal Party 2 multi-partisan configuration 6, 43
Limboo, Sanchman 60 multi-polarization 18
Lipset, S. M. 56n4 Muslim 2, 3, 11, 12, 22, 40, 55, 64, 65
locality-oriented pluralist network model 5 Muslim League 2, 3
Lok Dal 8, 9
Lok Sabha 8, 11, 13, 17, 44, 49, 50, 59, 64, Nagaland 35, 37, 41, 60
69, 93, 95, 96 Naga Peoples’ Front 94
Lok Sabha elections 24, 64, 77 Nagarpalikas 66, 75
Longowal, Harcharan Singh 39 Naidu, Chandrababu 84
Nanjunda Swamy, M.D. 20
Madhya Pradesh 13, 14, 16, 37–39, 60, 70, Naram Dal 26n1
73, 78n1 Narasimha Rao Government 16, 61
Maharashtra 10, 20, 34–36, 38, 53, 71, 74, 84 Narasimha Rao regime 46
Maharashtra Navnirman Sena 84 Narayan, Jayaprakash 7, 24–26, 28, 55, 92
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 8–13,
Employment Guarantee Act 85, 86
(MGNREGA) 12, 96 National Development Council 47
Malaysia’s Barisan Nasional 81 National Economic Development Council
Mandal Commission 90 (NEDC) 43
Mandal Commission Report 15, 65 National Front 8, 9, 15, 65, 69, 71
Mandal mass 15 National Front-Left Front alliance 10,
Manipur 35, 36, 38, 99 15, 64
Manor, J. 89, 99 Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) 84
Mathur, S.C. 35, 36, 38, 39 nationally oriented personalized mass
Mayavati 19 appeal model 7
Meghalaya 35–37, 60 National Peoples Party 94
Mehrotra, Prakash 32 National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
members of Parliament (MP) 51, 77, 87; (NREGA) 85, 96
in Lok Sabha 11; social and political National Security Act 1980 47
background 49, 50 National/United Front 78
112 Index

Naxalites 18, 22 Patnaik, Biju 60, 77

NCP see Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) Patnaik, Janaki Ballabh 37, 39
NDA see National Democratic Alliance Pawar, Sharad 36, 38, 53, 69, 74, 75
(NDA) PCC 66–68, 73–75
NDA regime 11 PDP 94
NDC 41 People’s Democratic Party of Nigeria 81
NEDC see National Economic P.K. Bahri Tribunal 16
Development Council (NEDC) Planning Commission 43, 46, 62
Nehru, Jawaharlal 5, 6, 13, 17, 23, 27n13, plebiscitarian democracy 24
28, 32, 34, 48, 59, 61, 92, 95 plebiscitarian trends, India 25
Nehru democratic government 5 pluralist parliamentary premiership 5, 6
Nehru era 7, 28, 33, 55, 59, 71 political mobilization 51
Nehru-Gandhi dynasty 55, 61, 69, 71, 77 Pondicherry 36, 37, 52
Nehru-Patel drumvirate 5 post-Nehru era 61, 69, 70, 76
Neogy, Sankar 21 Prabhakaran, V. 69
neo-patrimonial premiership style 5 Pradesh Election Committees 68
NES survey 13 Pradesh government 16
New BJP 13 Praja Rajyam Party 84
New Delhi 10, 28, 29, 45, 60–62, 70, 71, 77 Praja Socialist Party 2
New Delhi AICC session 47, 65 Prasada, Jiten 97
NF-LF alliance 15 Prasada, Jitendra 75
Nijalingappa, S. 4 preparty factions 27n4
Nilangekar-Patil, S.P. 36 Public Distribution System 65
NLO 21 Punjab 14, 16, 36, 39–41, 55, 60
non-Congress government 33, 39, 41 Punjab accord 40, 41
non-Congress Kaleidoscope 42 Punjabi Suba 40
non-Congress party 2, 8, 33
NREGA see National Rural Employment Radhakrishnan, Sarvapalli 32
Guarantee Act (NREGA) Rajasthan 16, 35–39, 60
Rajiv Gandhi regime 46, 47
OBCs see Other Backward Castes (OBCs) Rajiv loyalists 69
OGL see Open General License (OGL) Rajputs 52
one-man-one-post principle 75 Rajya Sabha 42, 44, 95
one party dominant system 5, 7 Ram, Kanshi 15, 19, 65
Open General License (OGL) 45, 47 Ramachandran, M.G. 52
Opposition Congress 6 Rama Rao, N.T. 8, 23, 43, 54, 60
Orissa 37, 39, 60, 74, 77 Ram temple 15, 22
Other Backward Castes (OBCs) 15, 54, 65, Rane, Pratap Singh 37
70, 90 Rao, Hanumantha V. 74
Rao, Jagannath 25
Pahadia, Jagannath 35 Rao, J. Bengal 74
Panchayati Raj 62, 75 Rao, M. Gundu 54
Panebianco, A. 56n4 Rao, Pratibha 36
Pardesh Congress party 36 Rao, P.V. Narasimha 9, 10, 17, 61, 63, 64,
party electoral reforms 24 69–71, 73
party system, India: contemporary Rao Congress government 10, 11
dynamics 14–18; evolution 5–14; origins Rashtriya Congress 32
1–5; and pressure groups 18–22; reforms Rashtriya Sanjay Vichar Manch 32
25–26; and social movements 22–25 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 2
Patel, Abmed 75 Ratubhai Adanis Rashtriya Congress 9
Patel, Chimanbhai 60, 74 Ravi, Vayalar 73
Patel, Sardar 3, 5 RaviVyas system 40
Patil, Vasant Dada 35, 36 Ray, Siddhartha Shankar 73
Patil, Virendra 37 Reddy, Bhavanam Venkataram 35, 36
 Index  113

Reddy, Janardhan 74 Sikhs 22, 40, 55

Reddy, K.V. Bhaskara 36 Sikkim 8, 36, 37, 39, 60
Reddy, M. Chenna 74 Sikkim Democratic Front 2, 94
Reddy, Y.S. Rajashekhar 74 Sikkim Sangram Parishad 2, 33, 39, 60
Reddys 54 Singh, Ajit 10, 65
Representation of People Act, 1951 4 Singh, Arjun 32, 37, 38, 63, 64, 69, 70, 73,
RJD 12, 94 75, 77, 78
Roy, A.K. 21 Singh, Chandrashekhar 36, 37
Roy, R. 30 Singh, Charan 16
RSS 16, 66 Singh, Darbara 36
Rudolph, Lloyd 20, 53 Singh, Digvijay 44, 70, 73, 96
Rudolph, Susanne 20, 53 Singh, Giani Zail 32
ruling class 56n4 Singh, Kalyan 27n10
Singh, Manmohan 12, 17, 61, 80
Sadashivan, S.N. 19 Singh, M. P. 27n7, 55n1, 57n4
Saikia, Hiteshwar 35 Singh, Mulayam 77
saintly idiom 27n15 Singh, Raja Man 38
Samajvadi Janata Party 9, 69 Singh, R.P.N. 97
Samajvadi Party Bahujan Samaj Party Singh, S.N. 39
10, 77 Singh, Vir Bahadur 38
Samajwadi Party 15, 19, 65, 94 Singh, Vir Bhadra 35, 37
Samant, Datta 21 Singh, V.P. 9, 15, 32, 35, 36, 65
Samuel Eldersveld, J. 56n3 Sinha, S.N. 38
Sangma, Purno Agitok 36 Sixth Five-Year Plan 45
Sangma, W.A. 35 Sixth Pay Commission salary revision 12
Sanjay Brigade 68, 69 SJP 71
Sanjay Manch 9 social cleavage 79
Sanyukta Socialist Party 2 Socialist Democratic Party 9
Sarkaria, R.S. 43 Solanki, Madhavsinh 32, 37, 38, 53, 54, 74
Sarkaria Commission 40, 43 Soviet Union 3, 44, 61
Sarkaria Commission Report 43 State Assembly elections 8
Sarva Seva Sangh 23 State’s Legislative Assembly 95
Scheduled Caste Congressman 75 straterchy 56n3
Scheduled Castes 11, 51, 61, 87, 88 Surjewala, Randeep 99
Scheduled Castes/Tribes 18, 65, 75 Sutlej-Yamuna link canal 40
Scheduled Tribes 51, 88 Swaraj (self-rule) 14
Scindia, Jyotiraditya 97 Swatantra Party 2, 61
Scindia, Madhavrao 73, 74
Second World War 3 Tamil Nadu 7, 10, 20, 23, 52, 84, 94, 97
Securities and Exchange Board of India 63 Tandon Commission Report 47
Sema, Hokisha 37 Tarkunde, V.M. 25
Sen, Ashok Kurnar 32 Telugu Desam Party (TDP) 2, 54, 55,
Seshan, T.N. 25, 26 84, 85
Shah, G.M. 37 Thackeray, Raj 84
Shankaranand, B. 74 Thakur, Karpuri 53
Sharma, Anand 97 Thanhawla, Lal 35, 37
Sharma, A.P. 32 Tharoor, Shashi 99
Shastri, Lal Bahadur 5, 6, 28, 32, 69 Tikait, Mahendra Singh 20
Shetkari Sangathan 20 Tirupati AICC session 63, 64, 77
Shiromani Akali Dal 40 Tiwari, N.D. 38, 69, 70, 75, 77, 78
Shiv Sena 84, 94 TMC 94, 98
Shukla, Shyama Charan 39, 73 trade union 20, 21, 56
Shukla, V.C. 74 Trinamool Congress 13, 84, 85, 87, 96
Sibal, Kapil 97 Tripathi, Kamalapati 32
114 Index

Tripura 37, 47, 52, 60, 73 Verma 50

Tripura National Volunteers 8, 52 Verniers, G. 83
Tripura peace accords 41 vertical power games 56n4
Tripura Upajati Juba Samiti 52 Vidhan Sabha election 39
TRS 95 Vidhan Sabhas 59, 96
20-point programme 46 Vijayavada conference 8
Vijaykant’s Dravida Munnetra
UDF coalition 36 Kazhagam 84
umbrella party 90 Vishwa Hindu Parishad 16
Union Commerce Ministry 45 Vobra, Motilal 38
Unionist Party in Punjab 3 Vora, Motilal 37
Union Territory Assembly elections 14
Union Territory of Mizoram 41 Washington, George 26
United Front (UF) 8, 10 Weber, Max 24
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 10–13; Weiner, Myron 1, 30
2004 general election, performances West Bengal 10, 15, 18, 41, 60, 85, 95
in 80, 82; 2009 general election, working class aristocracy 77
performances in 83, 84 World Bank 61
UPA-I 12, 13
UPA-II 12 Yadav, Chandrajit 9
Uttar Pradesh (U.P.) 35, 36, 38, 60, 63, 65, Yadav, Laloo Prasad 15, 60
70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 94, 97 Yadav, Mulayam Singh 15, 19, 60, 65
Yadav, Yogendra 11, 12
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 17, 22, 79 Youth Congress see Indian Youth
Venkataraman, R. 46 Congress
Venu, M.K. 12 YSR Congress 94