Media Capture

in Greece:
Entanglement of the fourth estate
Media capture in Greece: Entanglement of the fourth estate

This report was authored by Danai Maragoudaki, a Greek journalist based in Athens. She works for
independent media outlet Solomon and is a member of investigative team The Manifold.
The report is based on publicly available data published in financial statements, reports from media,
journalists, media and democracy watchdogs etc. It was made possible with the interviews of many
colleagues and the comments from the following media experts:

Lambrini Papadopoulou, Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Communication and Media Studies,
National and Kapodistrian University of Athens
Alexandros Minotakis, PhD, University of Athens, Department of Communication and Media Studies
Matina Papachristoudi, Journalist, covering media in Greece, former member of the board of Journalist’s
Union of Athens Daily Newspapers

Editing: Scott Griffen, Oliver Money-Kyrle and Jamie Wiseman

Design and layout: Ana Dokučević

Published by the International Press Institute (IPI)

Spiegelgasse 2/29, 1010 Vienna, Austria
+43 1 5129011 | info@ipi.media | ipi.media

The publication is licensed under the Creative Commons Attibution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0

International License

This report by IPI is part of the Media Freedom Rapid Response, which tracks, monitors and responds
to violations of press and media freedom in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. This project
provides legal and practical support, public advocacy and information to protect journalists and media
workers. The MFRR is organised by a consortium led by the European Centre for Press and Media
Freedom (ECPMF) including ARTICLE 19 Europe, the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), Free Press
Unlimited (FPU), the International Press Institute (IPI) and Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa
(OBCT). The project is co-funded by the European Commission.

part of

This report was produced with the financial support of the European Commission and the Friedrich
Naumann Foundation
Table of Contents

Introduction 4

A History of Media Capture in Greece 6

1 - Private Media: The Biggest Players in the Media Landscape 13

2 - State Funds, Advertising and Banking Loans 23

3 - Independence of the Public Service Media 27

4 - Media Regulator: National Council for Radio and Television 31

Media Freedom in Greece: Wider Backsliding 33

Conclusions 35

Recommendations 39
Introduction

Over the past decade, independent journalism and press freedom across large parts
of Europe have faced increasing pressures from the phenomenon of media capture.
This system for controlling the media involves the capture of once-independent media
houses by vested political or business interests, which collude to control the narrative and
serve their own political and financial ends. In this symbiotic relationship, media tycoons
acquire media assets in order to wield influence and curry favour with the state, while the
government benefits from positive coverage in return for indirect subsidization in the form
of state advertising contracts and lucrative contracts in other sectors. In many countries in
Central and Eastern Europe, this stealth-like takeover of news media by oligarchic owners
working in tandem with state authorities in the last few decades has severely distorted the
free flow of information and eroded media pluralism, with deeply damaging effects on
democracy.

While media capture in Europe takes different forms, the most advanced model of
media capture within the European Union has been developed in Hungary. This model is
characterized by the use of legislative, regulatory and financial powers of the state by the
dominant political force to capture media to advance its political interests. While private
oligarchs act in collusion and benefit from the arrangement, the balance of power lies
with the government. In this model, four key indicators have been highlighted: 1) capture
of private media, 2) capture of public media, 3) capture of the system of funding media,
4) capture of media regulators. Media capture is most entrenched and systemic where all
four indicators are achieved by the ruling party in cooperation with business interests.

In recent years, the International Press Institute (IPI) has been documenting different forms
of media capture across Europe in a series of reports. IPI’s monitoring and reporting have
outlined the expansion of media capture tactics from Hungary to other Central European
states, including Poland. Dedicated reports have been produced on media capture in
the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Slovakia. In this report, the analysis of media capture in
the EU moves for the first time beyond the borders of Central and Eastern Europe to its
southern border: Greece - a country which has often been overlooked in analyses of media
capture in Europe This report will examine media capture in Greece through the four
indicators of media capture outlined above. It will also provide an updated overview of the
current media ownership landscape in the country. After outlining its conclusions about
the current picture for media capture, it presents recommendations for how to protect the
media ecosystem against capture by business and political interests.

In addition to examining the different forms this phenomenon takes, and its damaging
effects on watchdog media, journalistic standards and democratic values, IPI’s work is
aimed at finding international solutions to help stem the tide of media capture. The findings
of this report also underscore the need for the EU to pass a strong and effective European
Media Freedom Act (EMFA) which can help safeguard media pluralism and independent
journalism across the bloc. Amidst wider backsliding on media freedom in Greece in the
last three years, this report concludes that efforts by the government to improve the overall
picture for press freedom in Greece cannot be decoupled from efforts to unwind media
capture. These conclusions and the recommendations are aimed at supporting much
needed democratic reforms to bolster free, independent and pluralistic media in Greece.

4
 POLAND

CZECH REPUBLIC SLOVAKIA

HUNGARY

BULGARIA

GREECE

5
A History of Media Capture in Greece
Media capture is on the rise in Greece, a country whose media landscape has traditionally
been dominated by a few media tycoons who exchanged favors with the economic and
political elite. The story of the Greek media in Greece is characterized by the term “diaploki”.
This “diaploki” - or entanglement - is what happens when the “triangle of interdependence”
of media - state - banks goes unregulated. This entanglement has defined the relationship
between big media and governments in Greece for 20 years (1993-2013). These intertwining
interests have become ever more pronounced during and since the financial crisis
intensified the media’s economic dependence on state support.

The origins of modern media capture in Greece can be traced back to the late 1980s
when the deregulation of the telecommunications industry ushered in increasingly
concentrated ownership across the media sectors. More importantly, the deregulation
of the broadcasting field in Greece took place in the absence of state intervention. The
National Council for Radio and Television (ESR) failed to establish criteria for the legitimate
operation of radio and television stations. The relevant law set “experience in the field of
mass media” as a criterion for media ownership, favoring station ownership by existing
companies in the publishing sector.

In practice, however, new private stations and owners took over frequencies and started
broadcasting without licenses, taking advantage of the institutional vacuum. This
deregulated landscape for private media developed in an uneven and unplanned manner.
As a result the entry of private media into the market went ungoverned by rules. Pluralism
was not protected, rules on cross or horizontal media ownership were not established, and
organized license distribution was highly delayed or disrupted.

This absence of a functioning regulatory framework enabled political actors to exercise

undue control and influence over the newly established but economically vulnerable
media. Media operating without or with only temporary licenses were vulnerable to political
pressure by ruling parties seeking favourable coverage in return of financial and regulatory
guarantees, creating ideal conditions for media capture.

Media capture is in essence a symbiotic system. For their part, media owners in Greece have
historically had their own motives for becoming entangled in this web of conflicting interests. On
the one hand, they sought to exert general influence over ruling parties. On the other, many used
their media to secure privileged treatment such as to obtain public contracts in other business
sectors. Some have used their media assets to pursue political ends, others financial.

The third factor of entanglement (“diaploki”) was the Greek banking system, which has backed
both the financially-troubled media and the political parties, especially from the 1990s onwards.
During the prolonged financial crisis post-2008, banks, now reinforced with resources from
the bailout mechanism, continued to support commercial media, even when it was evident
that the loans could not be repaid. These questionable loans led to defaults and bankruptcies,
while those that survived saw their dependence on the banks deepen.

This mixture of historical and economic factors has significantly influenced the development
of modern journalism in Greece, which is too often subject to the financial interests of
news organization owners and shaped by a culture of political expediency, with political
elites seeking to exert control over content. As a result, too many Greek journalists find
themselves operating within an environment that is heavily influenced by corporate and
political interests.

6
Financial crisis, collapse of the traditional media and the new era

The Greek media sector, already weak, was dealt a hammerblow by the financial crisis of
2008 and subsequent austerity measures. The financial crisis had a detrimental impact
on the quality and independence of media resulted in increased pressures on journalists.
After the economic crash, media organizations faced a collapse in advertising revenue and
consumer spending power, leading to slashed budgets, pay cuts and widespread layoffs
across the industry. Numerous media companies were forced to close, while others were
sold to survive. Legacy media owners and foreign publishers were pushed out of the market,
paving the way for a new generation of Greek business owners to step into the sector.

During this prolonged crisis, the emergence and growth of digital news organizations
became intertwined with the economic and political changes occurring in Greek society.
Commercial media which emerged from the crash tended to support the bailout packages
and austerity policies. Pluralism in news reporting and coverage fell. Spending on
investigative and other forms of watchdog journalism, already scarce, was slashed by the
time of the 2015 referendum, and the new dominant media discourse was accompanied
by the increasing misinformation and fake news.

After the approval of the third package of financial assistance to Greece and the conclusion
of a period of heightened protests and polarization at all levels, commercial media emerged
seriously shaken. Bank loans to media essentially ceased, debts skyrocketed, and major outlets
were left on the verge of collapse. Mega TV aired for the last time on September 14, 2016, with
all employees remaining unpaid for five months.The bank accounts of prominent publisher
Stavros Psycharis were frozen in July 2016 and soon afterwards control of his Lambrakis Press
Group passed to the National Bank of Greece, Piraeus Bank, and Alpha Bank.

7
 According to the Hellenic Statistical Authority, ELSTAT, 2022 saw a 14.1% fall in newspaper
sales from 2021 and an 18.9% drop in sales of magazines.

The collapse in the strength of publishing groups is illustrated by their disappearance

from the Athens Stock Exchange. While a decade ago companies including Teletypos SA,
Tegopoulos, Technikes Ekdoseis, Attikes Ekdoseis SA, Pegasus Publishing, Kathimerini
SA, Naftemporiki, and IMAKO Media Net were all listed, now there are only two: Attikes
Ekdoseis and Livanis SA.

8
Post crisis: A new model of media ownership

In a weakened and splintered media landscape, new entrepreneurs sought opportunities

to dominate the market, acquiring bankrupt media conglomerates such as DOL and
Pegasus Publishing. In this new economic reality, a model of ownership concentration
began to develop combining sports companies, shipping capital and a multitude of media
outlets, from newspapers and websites and now expanding towards television.

The new media owners – precisely because they operate in a context of intense competition,
fragmented audiences, a crisis of legitimacy and weak regulation – aggressively exploit
their media, especially in their battles against each other. The publication of “exposés" to
damage competitors are frequent. Central to the new business model, media owners are
increasingly attached to popular sports clubs, particularly football teams, using sporting
alliances to build cross brand identity with their media. While it was always the norm for
sport press to "glorify" club owners, political newspapers are increasingly drawn into the
realm of tribal sporting rivalry.

Both OT and in.gr belong to Marinakis’s media group Alter Ego. Both stories “AEK
championship winner with 391 million euros in debts and armchair tough guy Melissanidis”
and “"Reaping" response by Vangelis Marinakis to Melissanidis for the inauguration of
the OPAP Arena stadium” are examples of how sport/business rivalry is transferred to the
connected media.

Another example is Dimitris Giannakopoulos’ newsbomb.gr, who also owns Panathinaikos

basketball team “attacks” Halyvourgiki Hellenic Steel Industry which is owned by the
Angelopoulos brothers, who also own Olympiakos basketball team.

9
 Newsbomb title: “Halyvourgiki: The Angelopoulos brothers destroyed it and now they add
insult to injury”.

Businessman Giannis Alafouzos was one of the first to follow this model, by acquiring
Panathinaikos FC and SKAI channel while maintaining ownership of Kathimerini
Publications and Kathimerini newspaper. However, it is the owner of Olympiacos F.C,
Vangelis Marinakis, and his company Alter Ego that best exemplifies the new media
ownership landscape. By restructuring the remains of once-powerful media outlets, a
strong new conglomerate has emerged. Alter Ego, for €22 million, acquired DOL and 22%
of the influential Mega TV in June 2017, and subsequently purchased the film library and
logo of the station. They also acquired the One channels, which have been broadcasting
nationwide since the end of 2019, securing one of the last licenses, while utilizing the
former Alter TV building for their productions. Additionally, Alter Ego owns the only press
distribution agency in Greece, "Argos."

With the elections in 2019, a new element became the strengthening relationships between
media owners and the new government of the New Democracy party, which won an
outright majority for the first time since 2009. According to data from the National Council
for Radio and Television (ESR)1, the party significantly dominates TV news coverage as it
serves as the main source for many issues. In 2020 it received an exceptionally high 61.7% of
television airtime dedicated to political parties, plus a further 13.1% as government officials,
while in the July 2019 elections, it won less than 40% of the vote. In 2021 it also still received
55% as New Democracy and another 13.4% as government officials. The disparity between
the percentage of electoral votes and of television airtime is the largest in the past decade.
Compared to 2019, when Syriza was in government, we see that the analogy between the
election result and the respective airtime is closer but still in favor of the government.

1
Source: National Council for Radio and Television reports for 2019, 2020, 2021.

10
 Time Report by TV station 2020 - 2021
(percentage of total presentation time of political parties in all newscasts)

Time Report
New Golden
by TV station 2019 Government Syriza KKE Potami ANEL
Democracy Dawn
(Jan-Apr)
Elections Result
35.46% 28.29% 6.99% 5.55% 4.09% 3.69%
September 2015

ALPHA 6.80% 37.60% 28.10% 0.50% 2.90% 4.70% 6.70%

ANT1 2.00% 43.40% 31.00% 0.50% 2.80% 3.10% 6.50%

OPEN BEYOND* 1.50% 40.90% 33.00% 0.70% 5.60% 4.10% 2.30%

STAR 4.60% 38.00% 27.80% 1.40% 2.40% 2.30% 12.80%

ERT1 4.00% 55.40% 16.90% 0.40% 2.90% 2.40% 3.60%

ERT2 8.20% 39.10% 20.00% 0.90% 4.00% 5.10% 5.60%

SKAI 1.90% 32.40% 33.10% 0.30% 3.20% 3.00% 6.80%

Average time 4.10% 40.90% 27.10% 0.70% 3.40% 3.50% 6.30%

*Data for OPEN from 1.3.2019 and onwards

Time Report New

Government Syriza KINAL KKE Elliniki Lisi MeRA 25
by TV station 2020 Democracy

Elections Result
39.85% 31.53% 8.10% 5.30% 3.70% 3.44%
July 2019

ALPHA 11.20% 62.60% 15.20% 5.70% 2.50% 2.00% 0.80%

MEGA 11.00% 64.40% 16.30% 3.00% 1.60% 1.20% 0.80%

OPEN BEYOND 8.20% 61.60% 23.10% 4.50% 1.20% 0.70% 0.50%

STAR 18.70% 60.00% 12.40% 3.20% 1.90% 1.30% 1.20%

ERT 16.70% 55.30% 16.70% 4.80% 2.40% 2.00% 1.80%

SKAI 13.00% 66.20% 13.20% 4.10% 1.90% 0.90% 0.60%

Average time 13.10% 61.70% 16.20% 4.20% 1.90% 1.30% 1.00%

11
 Time Report New
Government Syriza KINAL KKE Elliniki Lisi MeRA 25
by TV station 2021 Democracy

Elections Result
39.85% 31.53% 8.10% 5.30% 3.70% 3.44%
July 2019

ALPHA 11.70% 48.20% 21.60% 9.80% 3.50% 3.00% 1.80%

MEGA 11.00% 68.80% 9.20% 8.10% 1.40% 0.30% 0.30%

OPEN BEYOND 7.60% 52.80% 24.30% 12.00% 1.90% 0.60% 0.60%

STAR 13.80% 51.70% 17.60% 7.90% 3.40% 2.50% 2.50%

ERT 20.40% 46.50% 16.70% 7.40% 4.60% 2.10% 1.90%

SKAI 15.70% 62.20% 12.70% 6.30% 2.10% 0.40% 0.50%

Average time 13.40% 55.00% 17.00% 8.60% 2.80% 1.50% 1.30%

As well as the new political situation dominated by New Democracy, the new landscape
has also been shaped by the pandemic. In the initial stages of COVID-19, Greek news
organizations framed it as a global issue, but after the first COVID-19 death in Greece, the
narrative shifted from a global challenge towards that of a national struggle, with public
officials and government officials assigned the role of “leading expert”, while the World
Health Organization was gradually shunned. A process coupled with a “rally-to-the-flag”
reflex reinforced the ties between media owners and political elites.

During the pandemic, journalists who questioned government policy were subjected
to censorship by their editors. Correspondent Richard Pine resigned from the English-
language edition of Kathimerini after he protested that his article criticizing the prime
minister for the environmental impact of projects in Corfu had been blocked. The chief
editor of Vima newspaper also resigned citing intense government pressure after
publishing a critical article on the Covid monitoring system of EODY (National Public
Health Organization). The report published on in.gr, owned by Alter Ego group, was
subsequently deleted from both Vima and in.gr. Renowned columnist Elena Akrita also
resigned from Ta Nea newspaper after 20 years, claiming censorship of her article on
December 12, 2020, where she criticized the government's handling of the pandemic.
In 2022 and after the resignation of the then-director of the newspaper, A. Karakousis,
Dimitra Kroustalli returned to work for Vima newspaper. In 2023 Elena Akrita became an
MP with Syriza.

Overall, the current Greek media landscape can therefore be characterized by a history
of chaotic and deregulated development, a weak economic market battered by multiple
financial crises, combined with the heavy influence and interference of political and
economic interests, resulting in a polarized and fragmented market undermined by
low trust from the public. It is in this economic, political and regulatory climate that the
current system of media capture has developed. The next sections assess the four pillars
of media capture in the Greek context, starting with the private media landscape.

12
 1 - Private Media: The Biggest Players in the Media
Landscape

The ownership of private media by vested interests is the most acute form of media
capture in Greece. The majority of Greek private media are owned by a small number
of wealthy families with a long tradition in the economic and media environment of
the country. The biggest TV channels are owned by the families of Alafouzos, Marinakis,
Vardinoyannis, Kyriakou, and Savvidis. The present generation either inherited the media
groups (Alafouzos, Kyriakou) or inherited the rest of the business activities and then entered
the media (Marinakis, Vardinoyannis). Vardis and Giorgos Vardinoyannis and Ivan Savvidis
are exceptions because they are self-made. This first section of the report maps out these
media owners and their economic and political connections to the Greek state.

Vardinoyannis family

The Vardinogiannis family is one of the strongest families in the shipbuilding world
both in Greece and internationally. The family today operates numerous companies in a
variety of sectors, in Greece and worldwide, from shipping and finance to football teams,
media, hotels and real estate. The most important is Motor Oil and its several subsidiaries2.
According to Forbes, Vardis Vardinoyannis and family have a net worth of $2 billion. The
family is also politically connected.

In the media sector, the Vardinoyannis family first appeared in 1982 with the acquisition
of Mesimvrini newspaper. Despite the family having close relations with socialist Prime
Minister Andreas Papandreou, Mesimvrini remained a newspaper of the centre-right.
They now own Star Channel, Alpha TV, the audiovisual content production company Plus
Production and two radio stations: Talk Radio 98.9 in Athens and Alpha 9.65 in Thessaloniki.
In the past, the family also owned a stake in Teletipos SA that controlled MEGA TV, one of the
biggest channels in Greece. ​​Star and Alpha are two separate entities, since participation in
Alpha is through Motor Oil Hellas subsidiaries and Luxembourg based Primos Media S.a.r.l.
Star is owned by Visbia Media Productions Limited and Paxana Holdings Limited both
controlled by members of the Vardinogiannis family.

Star Channel and its company Nea Tileorasi SA is connected to Alkmaion On Line Media,
Thema SA, European Media Services, Green Pixel Productions SA, Star Investments SA
etc. Star Investments, now called Audiomax Investments SA operates the radio stations
Alpha 98.9, Dromos FM και Diesi 101.3 FM. Recently it acquired a 50.002% stake of Stavros
Theodorakis' Good Stories IKE, which runs pod.gr website.

Notably, Star Channel’s board includes Mirjana Solak along with Dušan Radosavljević.
Mirjana Solak is Dragan Šolak’s sister and Dušan Radosavljević his brother in law. Šolak is
a Serbian businessman and media mogul and through United Group he represents the
latest entree in the Greek media landscape. Since 2021 United Group also owns Greek
telecommunication company and satellite TV provider Nova.

2
Other companies include Motor Oil Renewable Energy, Optima bank, Vegas Oil and Gas (Egypt), NJV
Athens Plaza, AVE Group of Companies (Audio Visual) that controls Allou Fun Park, IGE S.A., Odeon
Entertainment, Kristelcom Group of Companies (Teleunicom SA, Teleunicom Cyprus LTD, Globalsat SA,
Globalsat Cyprus LTD). They are also connected to Air Lift SA, Korinthos Power SA, Tallon Commodities,
Thermoilektriki Komotinis SA, All Sports, Green Pixel Productions SA, Vista Bank Romania SA.

13
 The family’s political affiliations lean traditionally towards the right-wing party of New
Democracy. Even though during the 60’s Pavlos Vardinoyannis was elected with Papandreou,
later he joined Konstantinos Mitsotakis’ government. Another affiliation comes from Eleni
Vardinoyanni (sister of Pavlos and Vardis) who married Yannis Kefaloyannis, a politician and
member of Parliament (1958 - 1964 and 1974 - 2004) with New Democracy. His daughter
Olga Kefaloyanni, also an MP for New Democracy, was appointed Minister of Tourism
together with his nephew Yannis Kefaloyannis, who was appointed Deputy Minister of
National Defense after the 2023 elections.

Vangelis Marinakis

Vangelis Marinakis is the son of Miltiadis Marinakis, a shipowner and right-wing politician.
Since 2010, he has also been the owner of Olympiacos FC and in 2017, he became the
majority owner of the English Premier League football club Nottingham Forest3.

In the media sector, he is the owner of Alter Ego Media S.A. In 2017, Alter Ego bought the
debt-ridden media group Dimosiografikos Organismos Lampraki (DOL) and now it owns
and operates Mega TV, the daily and Sunday newspapers Ta Nea and To Vima, a number of
digital media (one of the largest news websites in.gr, ot.gr, tovima.gr and tanea.gr), and a
portfolio of magazines and a radio station.

In the past Marinakis also acquired a 20% stake of Skai TV from the Alafouzos family,
however their rivalry in Greek football led him to leave. He also runs Wellcomm company
that involves the online shopping platform Shopflix.gr. In addition, he has entered the
catering sector with the company, Foodflix Catering Services.

In 2014 together with the current mayor of Piraeus they founded an electoral alliance called
"Piraeus Winner", which won the consecutive municipal elections of 2014, 2019 and 2023.
Marinakis himself was elected as a member of the City Council in 2014.

Marinakis has a son, whose godmother is Dora Bakoyannis, sister of Prime Minister Kyriakos
Mitsotakis. Bakoyannis is a former mayor of Athens and the mother of the former mayor of
Athens Kostas Bakoyannis. Marinakis was best man when Bakoyannis was remarried in 1998.

A close friend of Marinakis is Yannis Kourtakis, owner of the newspaper Parapolitika,

Parapolitika FM, parapolitika.gr, the financial news website powergame.gr, and shares in
tokarfi.gr. In 2023, he recirculated the newspaper Apogevmatini. Apogevmatini, founded
in 1952, was a Greek newspaper published nationally in Athens that went bankrupt in 2010.

Both his company and Marinakis have shares in Argos, the only Greek press distribution
agency. Argos has come under the scrutiny of the Hellenic Competition Commission
and the EU Commission due to allegedly unfair trading practices against its competitors.
It has been reported that the agency is attempting to unilaterally alter the terms of its
cooperation with rival newspapers. Many newspapers are not included in the bulletin data
of the agency, including Kathimerini, Documento, Proto Thema.

3
He is a shipowner and chairman of the international shipping company Capital Maritime Trading Corp.
In 2018, his Nasdaq-listed Capital Product Partners L.P merged with the tanker operator Diamond S
Shipping, which is affiliated with ex U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in a $1.65 billion deal.

14
These political affiliations are easy to spot one day before the Greek national elections of
2023. Parapolitika - Apogevmatini newspapers

1.“Forward with Kyriakos”, 26/6/23

Source: https://twitter.com/KourtakisJohn/status/1672255748930240512

2.”It couldn’t get worse. A show of misery and mistakes by an obsessive Syriza”
Source: https://www.frontpages.gr/

Alafouzos Group

Alafouzos is an old shipping family from Santorini. Aristeidis Alafouzos (1924-2017) was a
shipowner, civil engineer and publisher with strong ties to the Mitsotakis family. He was
the first Greek shipowner to broaden his activities in the media sector. Nowadays his sons
Yannis and Themis have taken over and advanced his legacy, amongst others with the
shipping company Kyklades Maritime Corporation and hold a majority stake in international
tanker company Okeanis Eco Tankers Corp.

Themis Alafouzos is the chairman of Nees Kathimerines Ekdoseis, one of the most influential
media groups in Greece, which includes the daily newspaper Kathimerini, Kathimerini tis
Kyriakis (Sunday edition), Kathimerini (English edition) and a big portfolio of magazines.
Amongst his other business activities, he is also the CEO of Argonautis EEPN which controls
Sea Shell Enterprises LTD, Sea Pearl Enterprises LTD, Bigal Shipping Corporation, Zenith
Maritime Corporation, Christiana Marine Corporation, Clover Enterprises Corporation. He
is also the chairman and CEO of Anonymos Techniki Etairia Ergon, that owns the property
and the building in Neo Faliro, which houses the newspaper Kathimerini and the other
companies of the Group.

15
 Yannis Alafouzos meanwhile owns a football team and a media group. He is the owner of
one of the oldest Greek teams, Panathinaikos F.C, and the founder and chairman of Skai
Group. Skai group owns five radio stations: SKAI 100.3, Sport-fm 94.6, Menta 88, Pepper
96.6 and 104FM and one of most influential TV channels in Greece, SKAI. He has widely
documented political affiliations with the New Democracy party. Journalists in his channel
are connected with the Mitsotakis family and with New Democracy politicians. In the
past it has been reported that in 1989 his father Aristeidis Alafouzos gave large amounts
of money to finance former Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis (Kyriakos Mitsotakis’
father). In the summer of 2016, during a highly polarized period in Greece, Yiannis Alafouzos
stated that Skai TV "has a clear ideological and political framework and an equivalent front
against Syriza".

Ivan Savvidis

Ivan Savvidis is a Greek-Russian self-made businessman. He is the founder of the food

industry Agrokom Group, whose assets included (until 2018) Russian tobacco firm Donskoy
Tabak. Savvidis is a former member of the Russian parliament and a Vladimir Putin ally.
He also has strong ties to the Patriarch of Russia. Forbes estimates his wealth (2023) at $1.7
billion. He started investing in Greece in 2012 when he bought PAOK, the biggest football
team in Thessaloniki. Savvidis was also president of FC Rostov (2002-2005). In 2013 he
attained a Greek passport and a few years later, in 2017, he purchased a minority stake in the
port company of Thessaloniki. Today, the Savvidis family controls 71.85% of Thessaloniki’s
port and in September 2023, Savvidis bought the port of Volos, the third-largest cargo port
in Greece. Savvidis’s Belterra Investments Ltd (owned by Cyprus based Belterra Holdings
Ltd) carries out business in Greece in a wide range of sectors4.

Recently Savvidis entered the e-commerce sector with open-market.gr (Dimera Group).
Through the group’s companies Dimera Ltd, Dimera Media Investments Ltd, Dimera
Publishing SA and Radioteleoptiki SA. Savvidis operates Ethnos online newspaper,
Ethnos tis Kyriakis (Sunday edition), business news website imerisia.gr and OPEN TV. The
newspapers Ethnos and Imerisia were owned for years by Pegasus Publishing SA. In 2017
they were sold to Dimera Media.

In March 2018, during a PAOK–AEK football match and after PAOK had a goal ruled out for
offside in the 90th minute, Savvidis entered the pitch with his bodyguards and tried to take
the team off. It was later revealed that he had been armed with a handgun at the time. The
Greek Super League was subsequently suspended and Savvidis received a three-year ban
on entering football stadiums by the HFF.

In 2020 it was revealed that Savvidis, who took over PAOK in 2012, had acquired another
team Xanthi in 2018 in violation of a ban on a single investor owning more than one Super
League club. The acquisition was made through a Cypriot offshore company controlled by
a relative of Savvidis. The sports authority ruled that PAOK and Xanthi should be expelled
from the 14-club Greek Super League.

4
They own Porto Karras luxury resort in Halkidiki and it’s companies: Porto Karras SA, Porto Karras
Villa Galini SA, Ktima Porto Karras SA, Porto Karras Golf, Porto Karras Marina SA. Also Makedonia
Pallas SA, the most iconic hotel of Thessaloniki. The Group also owns Northern Wings, a luxurious
helicopters transportation company, Souroti SA, Thessaloniki’s soda water bottler.

16
During the Syriza-ANEL government (2015-2019) Savvidis had good relations with Panos
Kammenos who served as minister of defence. Both the ex-prime minister Kostas
Karamanlis and Panos Kammenos attended Savvidis’s son’s wedding in 2016.

Kyriakou family

Minos Kyriakou (1942 – 2017) was a Greek media and shipping magnate. Originating from
Poros and a shipowner’s family he started his first oil trading companies in 1976: Bacoil
International and Athenian Oil Trading Inc. In 1988 he founded the radio station ANT1 FM
97.2, and one year later he founded the second channel of Greek private television called
ANT1.In 1997 Minos Kyriakou took over the management of the Greek multi-sport club
Panhellenic and contributed to the revival of the international sports meeting Tsikliteria.

Today, Antenna Group, controlled by his son, Theodore Kyriakou, is a media group whose
operations include broadcasting, radio, publishing, digital. In Greece it operates Antenna
TV and since 2019 Macedonia TV. Both are controlled by Media Capital Partners, which in
turn is controlled 70% by Antenna Media and 30% by MBC Initiatives (part of the Saudi
media conglomerate MBC Group). Saudi authorities - ​​ Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman - took a controlling stake in MBC Group in 2018 as they seized assets during an
anti-corruption campaign. It was the first time the Saudi capital entered the Greek media
landscape.

Antenna Group also runs the international networks: ANT1 Satellite (America), ANT1
Pacific (Australia) and ANT1 Europe, ANT1 Cyprus, Kiss TV (Romania), Magic TV (Romania),
Rock TV (Romania). VICE operates in Greece (closed in 2023), Serbia, Romania and other
Southeastern Europe countries in partnership with Antenna Group.

It owns the streaming platform ANT1+, in which recently Fairfax bought a 15% equity stake,
and antenna.gr, ant1news.gr, Heaven Music record label and 314 Records digital record
label, also publisher and digital media company Daphne Communications SA (Fthis.gr,
Bestofyou.gr, Glance.gr). It also runs Ant1 MediaLab for media education.

In 2021 Antenna Group acquired from Sony Pictures Television its entire network portfolio
in Central and Eastern Europe. The deal covered 22 pay-TV channels and two OTT services
in 12 territories (AXN and Viasat legacy brands). In 2022 Antenna acquired multiplex cinema
chain Village Roadshow Operations in Greece that amounts to a 42% market share. Antenna
Music operates the Greek radio stations Easy 97,2 and Rythmos 94,9 and in Romania it
controls the radio group A.G. Radio Holding (Kiss FM, Magic FM, Rock FM, ONE FM). It also
runs the audio aggregator Soundis in Greece, Cyprus, Romania and Moldova.

Minos Kyriakou and his media group had/has good relationships with New Democracy. It
has been reported that Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis has traveled more than once
with Kyriakou’s helicopter in order to visit the mogul’s residence in Porto Heli.

17
Other players

DPG Digital Media Group: Dimitris Giannakopoulos is the chairman and CEO
of the biggest pharmaceutical company in Greece, VIANEX SA. He is also the
owner of Panathinaikos Basketball Team, the owner of 50% of nutritional
supplement company Superfoods SA. and he also owns the DPG Group that
owns DPG Digital Media, GIATRA (Paoshop & PAO BC Academy), Clickhouse, Lab14. The
media group runs Newsbomb.gr, CNN Greece, Gossip-tv.gr, Queen.gr, Akispetretzikis.com,
Astrology.gr, Mothersblog.gr, Ratpack.gr, Onmed.gr, Onsports.gr.

Liquid Media: The owner, businessman Rodolfo Odoni, is a permanent

resident of Cyprus who also owns online sports betting company Novibet,
through Gamart based in Malta. He is also a major shareholder in online
entertainment market company Centric that has activities in the shipping,
F&B, renewable energy and tourism industries. A subsidiary of Centric is PlaySeas which
combines cruise ships with onboard entertainment services. Odoni first entered the
media landscape in 2003 by buying two important sports newspapers “Athletic Echo” and
“Sportime”. Soon after that he launched the sports portal gazzetta.gr and later created
the digital publishing group Liquid Media. Among the brands are gazzetta.gr, insider.gr,
reader.gr, jenny.gr, luben.tv, neopolis.gr.

Attica Publications Group: The owner is Theocharis Filippopoulos,

son of the journalist Alekos Filippopoulos who was the founding
director of Giorgos Bombola's Ethnos. Filippopoulos business activities involve only online
and print media publications. The group involves the weekly financial newspaper, The
Capital, and the relative site capital.gr and 19 magazine titles including the Greek edition of
Forbes: Esquire, Madame Figaro, Shape, Bazaar, Mirror, Teletheatis. Other websites include
TheToc.gr, athinorama.gr, yupiii.gr, missbloom, shape.gr, gr.askmen.com, madamefigaro.
gr, harpersbazaar.gr, esquire.com.gr, womantoc.gr, thememagers.gr. Attica Publications
owns the radio stations Athens DeeJay 95.2, 96.9 ROCK FM, LAMPSI 92.3, Best Radio 92.6,
while the group also has a presence in Bulgaria and Serbia where it publishes a total of
11 magazine titles. Filippopoulos is also the Chairman of the Board of the Association of
Online Publishers in Greece (ENED).

24 MEDIA Group - Dimitris Maris is the founder and chairman of the

Board of Directors of the Group. He is also an investor in a number of
companies such as Change.org, Velocity, Syncbnb, etc. He is the co-
founder of Kaizen Gaming, a GameTech company in Greece, and runs the international
online gaming operator Betano. 24 Media runs sports portal sport24, sports lifestyle
magazine Contra, OneMan, LadyLike, News 24/7, and ow.gr.

18
Big names but new in media

Dimitris Melessanidis - A Greek business shipping and oil magnate, best known for owning
the Greek oil company Aegean Oil and the football team AEK F.C. He is the founder and
former owner of Aegean Marine Petroleum Network Inc., one of the largest fuel suppliers
in the world. In addition to that, for many years he was a major shareholder and investor
in the biggest Greek betting firm OPAP. In 2022 he sold his stake to Allwyn, owned by
Czech billionaire Karel Komarek. Now the Melissanidis family owns oil company Aegean
Oil, shipping and management companies HEC Europe Limited, Aegean Shipping
Management, Aegean Eco Carriers etc. Melissanidis also has very close ties to the Church
of Greece and the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople.

In the media sector, in April 2021 Melissanidis and his son decided to expand their business
activities, acquiring the newspaper Naftemporiki, the website naftemporiki.gr and the
printing press. Naftemporiki is the biggest and only daily financial newspaper in Greece.
The offices of both the printed and online editions of the newspaper moved to Akti
Kondyli in Piraeus, in the building where Aegean Oil is based. In September 2022, they
also launched a new channel, called Naftemporiki TV. It broadcasts online and through
Nova and Cosmote TV (pay television services). Melissanidis also has strong ties with
Yannis Filippakis, another media owner who controls “Espresso” newspaper, “Dimokratia”
newspaper, “Estia” newspaper and their websites.

Bakos, Kaimenakis, Eksarxou - Shipowners and businessmen Dimitris Bakos and Yannis
Kaimenakis are both ex-mariners who in 1997 founded in the UAE the fuel transportation
company Akron Trade & Transport. In 2001 they bought the Asteras Tripolis football club
who then used to play in the regional Arcadian League and managed to move up the team
four divisions, earning the promotion for the Super League Greece. In recent years Bakos
and Kaimenakis also partnered with Alexandros Exarchou, who used to be CEO of Aktor, an
international infrastructure company, and has significant experience in the construction of
public projects in Greece. The trio bought Intrakat (one of the biggest Greek construction
groups) from Sokratis Kokkalis and Pancreta Bank from Michalis Sallas. In the media sector,
in 2022 they acquired TV channel Action24 and through the company Media Time they
bidded for 30% of the broadcasting time of Attica TV. In addition to that, they also bought
the news site flash.gr (former nooz.gr).

Party media

In Greece there is also a long tradition of party-affiliated media. This includes Rizospastis, the
newspaper of the Communist Party of Greece and its website rizospastis.gr. There are also
daily newspapers “Avgi” and “avgi.gr” and “Sto Kokkino 105.5”, radio stations both politically
affiliated to the left wing opposition party Syriza. “Prin” is a leftist weekly newspaper,
published in Athens and circulating nationwide, published by New Left Current, a political
organization of the Greek anti-capitalist left.

19
 Complicated picture of capture in the private media market

As outlined above, the landscape for ownership of private media ownership in Greece
is dominated by a handful of wealthy and politically-connected families with vast cross-
ownership interests in key sectors often reliant on public contracts from the government5.
Shipowners and those with major investments in the industry now represent the dominant
force of media ownership in Greece, although these owners also have a multitude of other
assets in different sectors. Many demonstrate clear personal and even familial links to
political parties, particularly the governing New Democracy party. In other cases, the clear
political affiliations of the media owners are well-documented. The revolving door between
journalism and politics has entrenched these connections further. Connections of media
owners to the banking industry in Greece are also common, while media assets with sports
titles are very often combined with sports club ownership. Disruptive new entrants into a
market in recent years have also purchased media as part of a wider package of assets. The
picture is complicated further by party-controlled media, which have long served as the
media arms of the country’s major political forces.

Unlike in other EU countries, almost no media outlets in Greece in the print, radio or
television market are owned by business interests that have investments solely in the field
of media and publishing. Instead, ownership of media is increasingly entangled with far
more profitable industries such as shipping and finance. While in many Central and Eastern
European countries media capture in the last decade was driven by the exit of foreign
owners from the media market and their acquisition by politically-connected domestic
oligarchs, Greece’s media ownership has always been overwhelmingly dominated by
domestic actors with links to political elites. As outlined above, the development of this
ownership landscape in Greece cannot be separated from the unregulated development
of private media in the 1980s and the repeated financial shocks experienced by the country,
which either saw private media created and then swiftly acquired by powerful families, or
later driven into the hands of shipping magnates after the Greek debt crisis.

The result has been a media landscape distinguished by the concentration of media
ownership under powerful business interests with demonstrable political links. In this
context, major media outlets all too often serve as vehicles for furthering certain narratives
or supporting political parties, rather than platforms for public interest reporting and
holding power to account. While the level of interference by media owners at the different
titles has varied significantly throughout the last few decades, and the situation at some
media is far better than others, pressures on editorial independence and journalistic output
are many and varied. Even at titles where heavy-handed meddling by owners is rare, self
censorship is common among journalists who know the boundaries of investigations and
topics considered off limits. These pressures on free and independent reporting drove
many journalists to break away and form newer media platforms.

5
Recent examples: Melissanidis’ companies Aegean Oil and HEC have public contracts - among
others - with the Ministry of National Defence and national ports, Vardinoyannis’ Coral provides fuel to
municipalities.

20
Emergence of independent media

Since 2010, there has been a steady emergence of media that do not have ties to
governments or wealthy business and shipping interests. These owners also do not have
ties to the banking industry or sports clubs. To preserve their financial independence, most
are instead funded through grants by organizations that support independent journalism
and guarantee that funding will not be made conditional on the exercise of any control or
influence over the editorial process. Some also use subscriptions providing either free or
paid content.

Alterthess - Alterthess was founded in 2010 and is an independent,

collaborative media outlet in Thessaloniki. It runs a journalistic website
but is also involved in video and audio production. Its main stories cover
the environment, refugee and migrant rights, gender based violence and defending
the public space. It is a social cooperative enterprise of eight members, funded through
subscriptions, donations and audiovisual productions.

OmniaTV - Omniatv is a grassroots medium founded in 2011 by eight

citizen-journalists and reporters. The editorial team today includes
journalists, researchers and two of the original founding members, Antonis Dimopoulos and
Loukas Stamellos. Omniatv provides in-depth coverage of under-reported social, political
and human rights related stories. It is a Social Cooperative Enterprise funded mainly by
its readers via open subscriptions. It occasionally receives grants for specific projects on
condition of complete editorial independence.

Press Project was founded in 2010 by journalist Kostas Efimeros and

now managed by Konstantinos Poulis. It is independent and funded by
its subscribers while the content is accessible to all. It has a newsfeed
and analysis as well as online radio and TV shows.

Sto Nisi - Founded in 2019 by a group of journalists, Sto Nisi is a press cooperative
on Lesvos island. The team runs a news website, a radio station “Sto Nisi 99 FM”,
the free press magazine “Plateia” and the sports site “sportlesvos.gr”. It is funded
through advertising.

Typos-i.gr - Founded in 2016 by three Ioannina, NW Greece, based journalists,

Varvara Angeli, Giorgos Patelis, Giorgos Tsantikos. Typos Ioanninon is a
cooperative, independent news portal, managed by a social cooperative
enterprise. Its content is mainly news feed – local and national – as well as investigative
pieces. It is funded by commercial advertising and a subscriber network.

21
The last years has also seen a new ecosystem of small, independent organisations that
focus on in-depth investigating reporting emerge:

Inside Story - Founded in 2016 by Tatiana Karapanagioti and Dimitris Xenakis,

it is an Athens-based independent daily outlet that focuses on in-depth
investigations. It is funded by its subscribers and through grants that support
independent journalism.

Solomon - Founded in 2016 Solomon is a non-profit that produces

public-interest journalism. Solomon’s objective is to hold power to
account, support domestic investigative journalism, as well as facilitate
collaboration among journalists at a cross-border level. It is led by journalists Iliana Papangeli
and Stavros Malichudis. It started in 2016 as an initiative between migrants and media
professionals. Solomon has a hybrid revenue model receiving support from journalistic
grants, philanthropic foundations and readers’ donations.

Manifold - Founded in 2018 by journalists Augustine Zenakos, Mariniki

Alevizopoulou and Yannis Oresits Papadimitriou, the Manifold is a
non-profit, investigative outfit that focuses on in-depth journalism in the public interest.
The Manifold is funded through grants that support independent journalism.

Mediterranean Institute for Investigative Reporting - The Mediterranean Institute

for Investigative Reporting - Based in Greece MIIR is a non profit organisation that
was founded in January 2019 by a diverse team of six journalists. MIIR provides
in-depth investigative journalism and cross-border reporting. Its work is funded
by grants in support of an independent press, participation in cross-border journalism
networks and readers’ donations.

Reporters United - A network of reporters aiming to conduct investigative

journalism in Greece, collaborate on cross-border investigations and
publish stories that would struggle to be published in the Greek press.
Founded in 2019 by Nicholas Leontopoulos and Christoforos Kasdaglis, Reporters United is
a non-profit, funded by donations or voluntary subscriptions, revenue from collaborations
with foreign media, and grants by organisations that support journalistic initiatives,
provided they do not have ties to governments or business interests.

While the emergence of these independent media is a welcome development, which has
resulted in partially filling the vacuum left for public interest and investigative journalism,
these media largely remain on the fringes of the media landscape. Despite the production
of high-quality and award-winning investigative reporting, which has made major
revelations about spyware abuses and illegal pushbacks of refugees and migrants, their
influence remains limited.

22
 2 - State Funds, Advertising and Banking Loans

A central element of media capture involves the financial dependence of media on state
support and advertising, which leaves them vulnerable to editorial interference or self-
censorship. In many EU member states, state advertising is under-regulated and acts as
an indirect form of subsidy in exchange for government-friendly coverage. In Greece, a
pandemic-era scandal shone the spotlight on this issue and led to major reform, although
its effectiveness remains to be seen and other issues regarding state support for media
remain. Greek media have also historically been vulnerable to pressure from corporate
advertisers, as well as the banking industry.

Since the 1980s, the Greek state and the media have enjoyed very close ties. It is common
practice for the state to provide funding to whatever media it chooses without basic
prerequisites such as the circulation of a newspaper or audience measurement. During
the 2000s, successive governments spent millions in advertising. From €36 million in 2004,
the expenditure rose to €65 million in 2007. In 2011, €34 million was allocated to the media
in the form of state advertising campaigns by public bodies and ministries.

Even before the financial crisis, state and corporate advertising has influenced news in
favour of the advertisers. Major media outlets in Greece depended on public contracts and
the banking system, through loans or advertising revenue for their survival6. During the
financial crisis, the dependence of the media on advertising increased considerably. As a
result, the key advertisers, both state and corporate, were able to exert control on the news
content. One of the country’s most influential media owners, Yannis Alafouzos, himself
admitted the problematic situation to Reuters in 2012, saying that some of the media “are
in effect press offices for business groups”. He added: “It’s developed into a completely
unhealthy situation. The purpose of media has been largely to execute specific tasks for
their owners.”

State advertising: The Petsas List example

The issue of non-transparent state advertising to media based on political considerations

was put under the spotlight during the pandemic. During the lockdown the government
allocated €20 million to media to carry “Stay at Home” public health messages. It
outsourced the distribution of these funds to a private company, thereby bypassing its
obligation to make public all transactions conducted by the state, as well as the Online
Media Registry (where online media must register to receive state advertising). After
public pressure, the government finally released the so-called “Petsas list” - named after
government spokesperson Stelios Petsas - listing all media outlets and their allocated
sums. The list confirmed what many suspected: that the funds had been disbursed in a
way that was closely aligned to the government’s agenda.

6
G. Mpompolas is a great example of a businessman owning a construction company (Aktor) taking
for decades public contracts while in the same time owning one of the biggest Greek media groups
(Pegasus Media Group).

23
As mentioned in an alert filed by the International Press Institute (IPI) to the Council of
Europe’s media freedom platform: “An analysis showed that many outlets perceived
as ‘opposition’ media in Greece received disproportionately lower levels of advertising
revenue from the public health campaign compared to more government-friendly media,
regardless of their circulation. The weekly newspaper, Documento, was excluded entirely
with its editor and publisher alleging this was a clear retaliation for its critical coverage
and recent investigations into the leadership of the ruling New Democracy party".

Parliamentary monitoring and transparency watchdog Vouliwatch has campaigned

for three years for effective transparency and accountability of the use of public money
in the case of the Petsas List. In October 2023, after having exhausted all national legal
remedies, the non-profit appealed to the European Court of Human Rights demanding
full transparency and access to all the data and criteria on which the money was allocated.

The Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom (CMPF) report for 2021 allocated a high-
risk score of 67% to Greece for the indicator for “state regulation of resources and support
to the media sector”, mainly “due to the lack of transparency concerning the distribution
of state subsidies to media outlets during the pandemic”. The Media Freedom Rapid
Response (MFRR) wrote to the Greek government about the Petsas list, calling for greater
transparency and objectivity in the distribution of public advertisement funds to media.

In 2020 alone, apart from the first “Petsas list”, there were three more information campaigns
providing indirect support to the media. The total spent on the campaigns was €23.5 million.
According to a statement by the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister Ioannis Bratakos, the
government also allocated €12 million to the media as part of the COVID-19 campaign in
2021, and €25.3 million to TV channels in 2022 in support of the economic distress caused
by the energy crisis due to the war in Ukraine. For 2022, the same CMPF indicator received a
positive low-risk score of 25% due to the government reform initiatives to support the media
in a fair way.

The media also received "emergency" state grants that tend to become permanent
(insurance contributions, employment support programs etc). For example, in March 2020
the government exempted channels from the annual license amounting to €21 million
(for all TV channels of national broadcasting). Again in 2020, the state will pay half of
the "fee" (€1.1 million) for TV channels to use Digea, the network operator that provides
the digital terrestrial television system in Greece. These subsidies have been repeated in
2021, 2022 (Energy saving campaign, 3/10/2022, €7.4 million) and 2023. In October 2023,
the government decided to pay €6.8 million to cover the insurance contributions of all
national TV channels. The scale and criteria used to distribute state funding via government
subsidies is non-transparent and therefore largely unknown to the public.

In recent decades, the General Secretariat for Media and Communication has had access
to this data but does not disclose it, with the exception of cases like the Petsas list where
the public demanded transparency. In addition, since 2012 and the creation of Diavgeia, a
transparency portal where ministries/institutions of the government upload their acts and
decisions, there is access to the state funds given for media purposes but it is done in such
a fragmented way that makes it very difficult to track. In 2017, Syriza created a registry for
online media to receive state advertising and ensure transparency. In December 2022, the
New Democracy government replaced the old registry with another online media registry
and a newspaper registry to further improve transparency.

24
In 2022 the government passed a new media law that aims to establish rules for the
distribution of state advertising in the printed and electronic press. Its effectiveness
remains to be seen. Moreover, the government issued a new Joint Ministerial Decision
that regulated the distribution of direct subsidies. The list with the final beneficiaries was
publicized with no complaints regarding the transparency of the procedures. However, the
two government support measures to contain the crisis in the TV sector provoked criticism
about the allegedly preferential treatment in state funding received by the big TV stations,
while other media were not included in the scheme.

Censorship through revenue: Corporations and banks

It is common knowledge in Greece that advertisers seek to influence news output,

undermining media independence. There are many examples in which advertisers seek to
weaponize their funds to censor criticism, silence truth and leverage public opinion. When
energy companies, banks, telecommunications providers, construction and gambling
companies advertise in the media, readers will very rarely find investigative stories about
those companies.

A recent example was the dispute between the most influential Greek finance website
capital.gr and United Group which owns NOVA, one of the biggest telecommunications
companies in Greece. After a report about the 2022 financial statements of the company,
United Group filed an extrajudicial notice and informed the commercial department of the
media outlet that they would suspend the advertising program in NOVA.

In a survey conducted by the Incubator for Media Education and Development (iMEDd)
80% of Greek journalists said that they self-censor while practicing their job. The survey
assessed that this is the result of a cultivated “culture” that forces journalists to “know”
what they should and shouldn’t write. The banking sector, powerful business owners, and
companies dominating the advertising market are all regarded as off limits at legacy and
major media titles.

Source: Media Education and Development (iMEDd)

25
 The connection between banks and the Greek media is intertwined with political and
vested interests. For decades the Greek banks gave questionable loans that could not be
repaid by big media. When the financial crisis began in 2009, the bubble burst, causing a
huge collapse in the media sector. A parliamentary investigation in 2017 found that Greek
media owed nearly €1.3 billion to banks. Panagiotis Psycharis, a top executive from DOL,
one of the huge outlets that collapsed, told the committee that he secured a €15 million
loan with just his signature as collateral. “Banks would give loans without collateral," Fotis
Bobolas (Pegasos outlet) also admitted.

After 2014, banks stopped giving loans and in 2015, with increasing pressure from the
European Central Bank to recoup loan losses, Greek lenders tightened the screws. That
year saw a major conflict between the Syriza government and broadcasters regarding
TV licenses. As previously outlined, since 1989 all channels had operated with temporary
legality. In the end, the state auctioned six national TV licenses and the owners paid €350
million to acquire them.

After the recapitalization of the Greek banks, the banks were obliged to publish their
advertising expenses to the media (law 4374/16). This decision was reached as a result of
the agreement between Greece and the European lenders aiming to avoid any improper
interconnection between banks, the media and the government.

1/1/2023 -
Banks 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
30/6/2023

PIRAEUS 19.373.000 21.550.310 14.635.630 12.323.410 10.529.888 8.946.650 4.322.130 7.314.560 3.832.030

NATIONAL BANK 6.394.598 6.493.553 8.175.107 6.420.600 8.892.280 8.257.692,18 8.493.683,93 7.363.900,61 3.770.542,75

ALPHA 7.584.736 8.731.258 8.843.778 8.736.705 7.298.697 4.400.536,00 6.903.817 6.776.308 3.461.722

EUROBANK 7.929.726 7.762.527 6.406.178 7.132.129 6.756.085 6.204.130 6.977.509,16 7.282.551,90 4.021.643,58

ΣΎΝΟΛΟ 41.822.060 44.537.648 38.061.693 34.612.844 33.476.950 27.809.008 26.697.140 28.737.321 15.085.939

Source: 2015 - 2019 Typologies and 2020 - 2023 our research through banks’ announcements
and financial statements. *Alpha Bank’s amount for 2020 is for the period 01/01-30/09/2020.

26
3 - Independence of the Public Service Media

A third pillar of media capture across Europe is the capture and control
of public service media by governments. In Greece, the country’s
public media have faced decades of challenges stemming from both
political and economic pressures. Since its creation, Greece’s public broadcaster ERT
(Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation) has been controlled to a greater or lesser extent by
the government of the day. Though efforts have been made to try and professionalize
and depoliticize the broadcaster, ERT has suffered from a chronic lack of editorial and
institutional independence due to the lack of safeguards insulating it from political power.
Some managers or news directors have been more controlling than others. But it has also
been common practice for ERT to be subjected to interference from government officials.
Another perennial problem has been that after a change of government, there is an
equivalent changeover in the state media institutions’ executives.

The level of independence at the broadcaster has varied over time. Until 2010-2012, ERT,
much like private media, was “obliged” to present itself as a versatile organization that hosts
different political opinions and content. That changed after the beginning of a new era of
significant polarization. Even though “traditional” polarization from the 1970s until the end
of the 2000s was between Pasok and New Democracy parties, during the financial crisis the
two parties met ideologically. After 2010 and the rise of Syriza, the new political landscape
was marked by polarization between the right-wing New Democracy and the left-wing
coalition of Syriza. This opened a new chapter in the battle of political control for ERT.

From 2012-2013, the situation deteriorated as government efforts to control political output
grew. However, at the same time, journalists and other employees of ERT also demonstrated
a readiness to resist political interference. For example, one day a journalist reported that the
electricity bills would rise and was immediately asked to meet with management, which
took him off air. The same day, 40 employees of ERT protested and the decision was reversed.

In 2013, amidst the economic crisis, the government of New Democracy and Antonis
Samaras closed down all state-run broadcasts and laid off about 2,500 workers as part of a
cost-cutting drive demanded by the country's international creditors. In a gesture of support
for ERT, Greek private broadcasters pulled live content for six hours that day, declining to
show the evening news. The result was to leave the Greek people without public TV and
dependent on the private media sector.

Two years later, in 2015, the newly elected Syriza government under Prime Minister Alexis
Tsipras restored the operations of ERT. The landscape at the time was highly polarized, not
only at the political political but also inside the broadcaster. Observers say ERT continued
to demonstrate bias in its news reporting. During this period, the government attempted
to promote pro-government stories and later created a political show clearly affiliated with
Syriza. During Syriza's administration, New Democracy accused ERT of biased coverage.

27
After New Democracy came to power in 2019, the first measure Prime Minister Kyriakos
Mitsotakis implemented was to place the General Secretariat of Information and
Communication, the supervising body of ERT, and the Athens News Agency - Macedonian
Press Agency under the supervision of the Greek Prime Minister’s Office. The measure
was justified as stabilizing the broadcaster and reducing political partisanship. The prime
minister appointed Konstantinos Zoulas, the former head of his party’s press office, as
ERT president. Under this new management, ERT started to become much less political.
The most promoted stories centered on everyday life issues, crime and natural disasters.
However, the broadcaster is now criticized for not properly covering public interest stories.

Between 2019-2022, at least 800 people were hired in ERT. All were employed with work
contracts that needed renewal every 6-12 months. Another breakthrough was the creation
in May 2022 of a new channel called ERT News, which broadcasts 24/7. While the situation
at ERT has stabilized in recent years, critics view the process of depoliticization as a subtle
form of control by the current government, although one less aimed at overtly promoting
a political agenda.

An example of this can be seen through ERT’s coverage of the Greek surveillance scandal,
where it was revealed that the Greek intelligence agency (EYP) was spying on journalists,
politicians, and the head of the Greek army, among others. The same citizens and others
were also being simultaneously spied on with Intellexa’s Predator spyware. The scandal was
revealed in April 2022, but ERT did not report on it until March 2023 when a major political
figure was revealed to have been spied on. ERT also failed to report on the European
Parliament's Committee of Inquiry on Pegasus and other spy programs (PEGA) that had
specific conclusions and recommendations for Greece.

Another example is a censorship case regarding Prime Minister Mitsotakis’s trip to the Greek
island Ikaria, during which he allegedly violated the government’s COVID-19 measures
in February 2021. A memo from ERT management was leaked in which instructed the
producers and journalists not to broadcast images of Mitsotakis taken whilst visiting the
house of a fellow New Democracy MP in Ikaria.

During the pandemic, stories about the conditions in hospitals and the complaints of the
medical staff were also underreported or concealed. The first press conference of hospital
doctors was never aired, neither were stories about heads of hospital clinics resigning and
the termination of the contract of the representative of hospital employees. On March 2021,
Syriza turned against the public broadcasting service, claiming that it refused to cover or
present its new policy proposal for the Greek National Health System.

The public media failed to cover the demonstration in Serres of the relatives of the 57 people
who died in the country’s worst train disaster in Tempi. More recently, other media outlets
have sent reporters to Mykonos island where locals have long complained about illicit and
sometimes assertive activity by deep-pocketed developers and the Greek government has
carried out a swift crackdown. ERT has sent none.

While the previous crisis at ERT has subsided and it has benefited from a period of stability, its
oversight by a government body overseen by the PM’s office pose obvious major questions
over its independence. The broadcaster continues to suffer from low levels of public trust
and faces questions over its credibility. Overall, the situation remains an improvement
compared to recent years and the broadcaster’s news and analysis content is no longer
used as an overt media megaphone of the government. However, clear political bias is
clearly visible and sensitive stories which could damage the government are sometimes
ignored, while public interest reporting on certain topics is lacking.

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MEDIA ASSETS

TELEVISION ERT1, ERT2, ERT3, ERT Sports HD, ERT World, ERTNews

RADIO First Programme, Second Programme, Third Programme,

ERA Sport, Kosmos 93.6, Voice of Greece (ERA 5), 102 FM|
(Thessaloniki.), 95.8 FM (Thessaloniki).

WEBSITE ert.gr, ertflix.gr (streaming platform), mousikasynola.ert.gr

(Music Ensembles), ertnews.gr, ertsports.gr.

ERT is also home to three music ensembles: National Symphony Orchestra, Contemporary
Music Orchestra, Hellenic Radio Choir.

ERT is mainly funded by revenues that are generated though the collection of a license fee,
a levy that is paid with the electricity bill. The fee is €3 a month and has to be paid by all
households in Greece. Turnover for 2021 was 198,692,000 euros.

Suffocating control over the Athens News Agency - Macedonian Press

Agency

The challenges facing ERT are similar to those facing the Greek public news agency, the
Athens-Macedonian News Agency (ANA-MPA). However, while the influence of the ERT on
the Greek media ecosystem has been diminished over time, the power of the ANA-MPA in
shaping news content in the country remains high. This central role in the production and
dissemination of news in Greece has made it a more important body for capture or control
by successive governments via politicized appointments.

The ANA-MPA has a board of directors consisting of nine members, the majority of whom
are appointed by the government. In 2021, a ministerial decision was made to increase the
number of board members from seven to nine. The president of the agency announced
that the two extra members appointed by the government will not be sitting on the board
in any official capacity. The ANA-MPA is funded through a combination of a state grant, a
small amount of European Parliament funds and advertising revenues which are not made
public. It has more than 300 employees. Like ERT, the agency was put under direct prime
ministerial control in 2019.

The agency’s content amounts to almost 80% of all news content in the Greek media.
This is due to the fact that almost all Greek media are subscribed to the agency’s services,
receiving and republishing its content. As most media, especially online media, do not have
specialized reporters who cover all ministries and relevant topics, they choose to republish
the content of ANA-MPA. Paradoxically, the agency’s own website cannot compete with
private media, even though its content is widely disseminated. The reach of the agency’s
content therefore increases the importance of its editorial independence. Much like ERT,
after the elections there is an equivalent changeover in the ANA-MPA executives. As a
result, there is a clear preferential coverage for the government.

29
In November 2022, the Journalists’ Union of the Athens Daily Newspapers (ESIEA) issued a
statement criticizing the repeated violation of the journalistic principle of pluralism by the
ANA-MPA. The union said it received regular complaints about how the agency presents
current affairs only through the responses of government officials, without reference to the
news that prompted the response or to statements that complete the picture.

It is also criticized for lack of news critical of the New Democracy government. Examples
of public interest news that was not picked up by the agency include Reporters Without
Borders’ 2023 report which ranked Greece as the worst EU country for press freedom, a
European Parliamentary Committee’s press briefing regarding the Greek spy scandal when
the committee visited Athens, and news on anti-government demonstrations that are
published only after the official announcement of the Greek police. During the pandemic
all reports regarding COVID-19 and the state of the public health system were also defined
by the announcements of Greek Civil Protection Deputy Minister Nikos Hardalias. While
much of the news content sent out via the ANA-MPA is non-political in nature, sensitive
matters of public interest such as these are regularly overlooked.

Through capture of this body via politicized appointments and the oversight of the office
of the prime minister, the current executive wields indirect control over the ANA-MPA, and
in turn, some level of indirect influence over 80% of all news content in the Greek media.
Reports by international media freedom organizations have criticized the overt attempts by
the New Democracy party to ensure “message control” within the Greek media landscape.
This current control over the ANA-MPA is one of the clearest examples of controlling the
message, and of state capture of media, in Greece.

30
4 - Media Regulator: National Council for Radio and
Television
The final element of media capture involves the political control over the system for media
regulation. In many EU states, management of media regulators by politicized individuals
with links to ruling parties have been used to block media licenses, administer fines and
pile pressure on critical and independent media. In Greece, a country which has historically
suffered from the lack of a framework for media regulation, this issue has, overall, not
represented as a major threat to media freedom in recent years. Rather, challenges facing
the regulatory body stems from a lack of finances and capacity. Historical failures to properly
regulate the media market have, however, permitted the high levels of capture of private
media in Greece, with damaging knock-on effects for media pluralism.

The National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV) is the Greek independent
administrative authority which supervises and regulates the broadcasting sector. ​​ The
Council has been assigned to ensure that all broadcasts comply with the provisions of the
law. It has the competence to control the broadcasters’ operation with reference to their
informational, educational, cultural and entertainment responsibilities to the public and to
ensure fundamental benefits such as freedom of expression, political and cultural pluralism
and the broadcasting of reliable, fair and balanced information. The Council also regulates
media companies and is able to impose fines and allocate or revoke broadcast licenses.

TV (National 7, Regional 104) 111

RADIO STATIONS 879

SUBSCRIPTION SERVICE PROVIDERS 12

PUBLISHERS 469

ADVERTISING 263

MEDIA MARKET RESEARCH 13

AUDIOVISUAL PRODUCTION 26

POLLING COMPANIES 63

The NCRTV is composed of nine members, who are nominated by the Conference of the
Presidents, a special body of the Greek parliament in charge of the nomination of the
independent authorities, and in which all political parties are represented. The nominees
have to be elected by 4/5 of the members of the Conference of the Presidents and the
members of the authority are appointed for a period of six years, not renewed.

According to the Euromedia Ownership Monitor, which monitors media ownership

transparency in European countries, one of the factors hampering transparency around this
issue in Greece is that the NCRTV releases reports on major developments in the audiovisual
sector “with apparent delay, displaying distinctive slowness in the execution of its operational
responsibilities”. The European Commision said of NCRTV, “concerns remain with regard to
its financial capacity and human resources” in the 2022 Rule of Law Report on Greece.

31
Until January 2024 the latest available annual report of the NCRTV is the one from 2021,
which was published in December 2022. The Council also has a Department of Transparency
that deals with all ownership changes in TV channels, but their public data are actually not
usable due to the great delays of their publications. As stated by NCRTV’s president and
former prosecutor of the Supreme Court, Evterpi Koutzamani, the regulator employs 34
people while in 2009 there were 81.

After the TV licencing procedure (2016-2018) there were no claims about problematic
licencing decisions against media in Greece. Evidence of strong political meddling in the
regulator and its operations, with an aim of revoking media licences, creating economic
uncertainty, or suppressing independent journalism, is lacking. On balance, the system
for media regulation in Greece, despite historic flaws, cannot be considered as captured.
However, as outlined above, the system of capture in private media in the country can be
traced back to the weak or non-existent media regulation in previous decades. Recently
however, concerns as to the regulator's independence were raised after the changes in the
composition and the election process of the new members of the independent authorities
of Hellenic Authority for Communication Security and Privacy (ADAE) and NCRTV.

32
Media Freedom in Greece: Wider Backsliding
The issue of media capture in Greece must be framed within the wider context of deteriorating
levels of media freedom in the country in the last few years, which has been noted by multiple
international media freedom organizations. Even though freedom of expression and the
right to information are explicitly recognized in the Greek Constitution, these rights are not
always respected in practice. The most recent Democracy Report 2023 from the V-Dem
Institute downgraded Greece from a liberal to an electoral democracy in 2022.

Press freedom in Greece suffered severe setbacks between 2021 and 2023, including a major
wiretapping scandal. Furthermore, SLAPPs (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation)
are common and the 2021 murder of crime reporter Giorgos Karaivaz in Athens has not yet
been solved. The same applies to the case of journalist Sokratis Giolias, who was shot and
killed in front of his house on July 19, 2010. As press freedom groups state, “no authorities
have ever been held to account for their investigative failures amid ongoing impunity in
the case”.

More than two years have now passed since Karaivaz was gunned down outside his Athens
home in broad daylight. The authorities have been criticized for their lack of progress in the
investigation. A European parliamentary delegation visited Greece in March and concluded
that there was no “visible progress in the police investigation” into Karaivaz’s murder, urging
the Greek authorities to seek Europol assistance “without further delay.” A few weeks before
21 May 2023 elections, the police announced the arrests of two suspects in connection with
the 2021 assassination but the investigation is still ongoing.

The 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International reveals that Greece
is “threatened by serious concerns over the roll-back of the rule of law, the independence
of the national transparency authority, and weak guarantees for the protection and safety
of journalists”.

The “Greek Watergate”

After Hungary, Poland and Spain, Greece is the latest EU member state accused of spying
on journalists, opposition politicians and state officials. In 2021, Greek journalist Stavros
Malichoudis found out through a newspaper article that the National Intelligence Service
had been monitoring his work. A few months later it was revealed that another journalist,
Thanasis Koukakis, was also under surveillance from the Intelligence Service (EYP) and
at the same time his phone was hacked through Predator spyware. The Greek prime
minister admitted that the EYP surveillance “was a mistake” – but not an illegal one – and
acknowledged that there were some surveillance operations against Greek citizens.

The use of cyber-surveillance technology to spy on journalists is clearly a major problem in

Greece. According to reports, many journalists have been targeted by Intellexa’s Predator
spyware. The use of spyware by individuals is illegal in Greece. The New Democracy
government has tightened the penalties for the use of such tools by individuals, but at the
same time, in the same law, it has institutionalized the supply of spyware by the state. The
Greek government still denies purchasing or using the Predator spyware.

33
 SLAPPs

Legal threats are a significant problem for media freedom in Greece, including criminal
lawsuits and Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPPs), which mostly target
journalists who report on corruption at government-critical outlets. The limited resources
of Greek journalists and media outlets mean such legal threats can lead to self-censorship.

SLAPP lawsuits by multinational companies and government executives have targeted

independent journalists and outlets in Greece. Abusive lawsuits by the Greek Prime
Minister’s nephew and former secretary general of the prime minister’s office, Grigoris
Dimitriadis, against journalists of two media outlets (EFSYN, Reporters United) and the
journalist Thanasis Koukakis amid the wiretapping scandal. In December 2023 Dimitriadis
unleashed a new round of SLAPPs7. The Journalists’ Union of Athens daily newspapers,
ESIEA, claimed Dimitriadis “unleashed a flurry of new lawsuits against many journalists
and the media and with exorbitant and exterminating claims”, to intimidate journalists and
limit access to information.

The Greek independent media outlet Alterthess and one of its journalists, Stavroula
Poulimeni, were targeted by Efstathios Lialios, an executive of Greek gold mining company
Hellas Gold. Tasos Sarantis from the daily newspaper Efimerida ton Syntakton (EFSYN)
appeared in court on charges of “false publications” related to an article on the construction
of a wind farm in the Peloponnese. Thodoris Chondrogiannis from Reporters United was
targeted by a recycling company after publishing a story that showed how the company,
which has strong ties to the Greek government, has failed to recycle packaging in Greece.

Reporting on migration and protests

Migration policy, human rights violations committed in its implementation including

pushbacks, and the humanitarian crisis that the refugee stream has created are highly
sensitive topics for the government. Reporting on the issue is increasingly difficult, as
journalists face obstructions including arbitrary arrest and detention, restriction of access
to migration hotspots, surveillance, and harassment. Suspension of journalist’s access to
Greek refugee camps is an issue which seriously hinders the right to information and the
work of journalists. Previous cases of detentions of journalists that try to report on migration
is a documented practice that creates a chilling effect and discourages journalists from
carrying on with their stories.

Reporting on protests and demonstrations is another particularly problematic area

for journalists, who face aggression and harassment from law enforcement and from
protesters. Overall, there is a lack of political will to ensure that journalists can safely report
from demonstrations, which translates to a lack of adequate protection at the operational
level. There are many examples of police operations, where officers arrest and detain
journalists and photojournalists despite the fact that they inform the police that they work
for the press. Difficulties in reporting on migration and on protests highlights the lack
of accountability for law enforcement personnel who are aggressive towards journalists.
The lack of adequate disciplinary proceedings and oversight damages the rule of law and
creates a highly insecure context for reporters.

7
Dimitriadis sent lawsuits to the media outlet Efimerida ton Syntakton, EfSyn, the media group Alter
Ego and to journalist Dimitris Terzis, and for a second time to journalists Thanasis Koukakis, Nikolas
Leontopoulos, Thodoris Chondrogiannos and Christoforos Kasdaglis.

34
Conclusions
Legitimation crisis and lack of public trust in media

Media capture has many detrimental impacts on society and democracy, including
negatively affecting media and public trust in news. Countries with higher levels of media
capture – in which citizens perceive their media as serving particular political or economic
interests rather than the public interest – are likely to experience lower levels of trust.

In the annual global study conducted by the Reuters Institute on Media, Greek media
consistently rank among the lowest. In 2016, out of a total of 26 countries, Greece placed
last, with only 20% of respondents confirming that they can trust the media most of the
time. In 2017, among 36 countries, Greece ranked joint last, with a trust rate of 23%. In the
Reuters Institute Digital News Report for 2023 Greece was again one of the lowest countries
with 19%. Trust was again lowest in the country’s television channels, where media capture
is considered to be the most acute in Greece.

Source: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2023/greece

According to a nationwide survey on public trust in journalism conducted in 2022 on behalf

of the Greek non-profit Incubator for Media Education and Development - iMEdD , even
though the public considers journalists to be well qualified (65%), the vast majority (85%)
believe that they “attempt to manipulate people” and also consider them to be “censored by
their superiors” (83.5%). 72% do not trust the public broadcaster and 93% regard journalists
and the media in Greece to be too dependent on governments and/ or political parties.

35
In a recent survey conducted in April 2023 for Eteron Institute specifically targeting young
people of ages 17-34, when asked to what extent they trust the following in order to get
informed they responded:

NEWS SITES
Very much & enough 59.3%
Not that much & not at all 39.9%

SOCIAL MEDIA
Very much & enough 45.9%
Not that much & not at all 53.8%

NEWSPAPERS
Very much & enough 23.5%
Not that much & not at all 72.2%

TV
Very much & enough 13.1%
Not that much & not at all 86.7%

Historical media capture in Greece, along with deep polarization in society, has been a
contributing factor to low levels of trust in the media. This poses knock-on challenges for
elections and democracy more widely. If Greek democracy is to stem its backsliding, efforts
to roll back media capture, safeguard independent journalism and bolster media pluralism
should be considered as part of the solution.

36
Assessing media capture in Greece

The following conclusions can be drawn from this report on the state of media capture and
independent journalism in Greece:

- The toxic interdependence of media, the state and banks is unregulated and
uncontrolled despite the modest attempts to improve the situation in recent years

- The weak or non-existent media regulation in previous decades, combined with

a partial lack of beneficial media ownership ownership, also contributed to media
capture in previous decades

- The use of state funding has historically been used as a weapon from the
government to influence the media; the impact of government reforms here is yet
to be seen

- Private advertising and banking loans create a landscape where financial

dependence on banks and big corporations places editorial independence at high
risk of compromise

- Independent media try to gain the public’s trust through investigative reporting,
despite intense political and economic pressure, but lack visibility and influence

- A small percentage of journalists working in bigger media try to report on

transparency and corruption cases; though self censorship is high overall

- While public broadcaster ERT has stabilized after years of crisis and has become less
partisan in nature, both it and the Athens-Macedonian News Agency remain subject
to varying levels of political control and influence

These overlapping factors combine to create a media ecosystem exhibiting multiple

forms of media capture, yet one in which the levels of capture and control vary. Of the four
elements of media capture assessed in this report, the capture of private media in Greece
is by far the most entrenched. High levels of concentration of legacy media in the hands
of wealthy families and ship owners with varying political connections to political parties,
and the New Democracy party in particular, have contributed significantly to a media
ecosystem in which, although there is a high number of media titles, real media pluralism
is weak and independent journalism which fulfills its watchdog role has been pushed to
the fringes. A new law aimed at enhancing transparency of media ownership is positive, yet
its effectiveness can be improved. The full impact of this law remains to be seen.

At the state level, public advertising was manipulated by the government during the
pandemic to reward media outlets close to the ruling party. This pointed to a wider issue
over the non-transparent allocation of state support to media down political lines. Recent
reforms to improve the transparency of media ownership via new media registries and their
receipt of state advertising campaigns are a positive step. The effectiveness of this reform
remains to be seen. In the Greek context, the amount of money available to media via state
advertising is limited, reducing the threat of this system being distorted to buy favorable
coverage. However, pressure on media by private advertisers remains commonplace, and
the financial crisis deepened the media’s vulnerability to pressure from vested business
interests. While there have been worrying examples of manipulation, systematic capture
of the system for state support to media is not present, as it is in other EU member states.

37
Some level of capture of public service media in Greece is exhibited, particularly at the
national press agency. Compared to previous decades, the level of control by the government
over ERT and the ANA-MPA news agency is less acute and direct interference is lessened.
However, the continued supervision of both media houses by the office of the prime
minister poses serious questions over their independence. Despite positive stabilization
after years of turmoil, public interest reporting at both the ERT and ANA-MPA is lacking
and serious topics go unreported, indicating possible self-censorship and an aversion to
sensitive topics which could damage the government.

The element of media capture least present in Greece is the capture of media regulatory
bodies. While the NCRTV suffers from weak economic capacity and the system of
appointments poses potential questions over the impartiality of its management, its
functional independence has not been questioned. However, the weak or non-existent
media regulation in previous decades played a central role in allowing the current capture
of private media to become entrenched. Far stronger regulation of the media ecosystem to
protect independent journalism and limit media capture is required.

A mixed picture therefore emerges regarding media capture in Greece. While the overall
capture of state organs such as media regulators is not present, the government does wield
undue control over the country's public service media bodies, which negatively affects their
independence. Capture of the system for state advertising to media by political parties
has been prevalent historically, including prominent examples by the current government,
though reforms could ensure better regulation of the system moving forward. In the private
media market, the long-term entanglement of major media owners with political forces and
vested business interests and banks, which was deepened further after the financial crisis,
is highly problematic and has long been having a corrosive effect on Greek democracy.

While this toxic capture of the fourth estate and the symbiotic relationship between media
owners and political elites in Greece is as problematic as in many of the EU’s worst offenders
for media freedom, wider control over state organs such as media regulatory bodies and
the system for state advertising is less severe. However, the lack of overt pressure on media
through a media regulatory body in Greece may simply be down to the fact that capture in
the privately owned media is so advanced that heavy handed measures to silence critical
media or strengthen pro-government media are not required. Due to the dependence
of media owners on the state and the web of personal connections with media owners
and political figures, self censorship is rife and the ruling party already enjoys relatively
favourable media coverage at the national level, particularly in the television market. After
the party’s victory in the 2023 election, more undemocratic tactics for influencing the media
ecosystem may be deemed unnecessary. While critical and hard-hitting journalism is
present in Greece, overall New Democracy is insulated from the effects of serious watchdog
reporting due to the compliance of major television and print media with owners in towing
the government line and limiting prolonged criticism.

Media pluralism is more than stating that Greece has hundreds of media, just as media
freedom means more than saying that there are newspapers that criticize the government.
Media freedom is fundamental for democratic societies. The public rely on the media
for information and to make informed decisions. The media are also an outlet for public
discussion and opinion and serve as a watchdog over government. That is the real criteria
for media freedom: the level of transparency and accountability to which it can hold
governments and corporations. It is hoped the conclusions drawn from this report can help
underscore the need for long-term thinking about the bolstering of free and independent
journalism in Greece as a prerequisite for the flourishing of the country’s democracy.

38
Recommendations

- Ensure full transparency of media ownership, including all forms of beneficial

ownership, in order to better safeguard independence from political connections
and other associated business interests. The NCRTV’s media ownership registry
should be accessible and regularly updated and include all radio/print/online media,
to allow greater scrutiny of ownership changes and practices

- Strengthen the National Council for Radio and Television (NCRTV) that now
malfunctions due to limited resources, and political interference risks. Media
registries should be a responsibility of the NCRTV and not of the government
and the prime minister’s office. Provide full transparency on media registries by
publishing the media and the amount of state funding they were given

- Ensure all forms of state advertising or financial support to all media are distributed
via a transparent and accessible process based on objective criteria, rather than
apparent political affiliation, in line with the provision in the EU’s European Media
Freedom Act (EMFA). Ensure information is updated regularly and easily accessible
to researchers and the public.

- Increase transparency over news media concentration and strengthen legislation

to limit high levels of both vertical and horizontal ownership concentration in
the media landscape in an effort to bolster real media pluralism. Ensure greater
oversight of media acquisitions under competition law and ensure media pluralism
is a key assessment criteria for any future sales.

- In media owned by wealthy and politically-connected commercial interests,

particularly in legacy broadcast and print media, strong internal safeguards and
firewalls should be established and respected to prevent all forms of interference
of owners and other politics and business interests, while also protecting editorial
independence and journalistic freedoms and discouraging self-censorship

- To help safeguard the independence of the ERT and national news agency, review
the need for oversight by the office of the prime minister. Establish a new system
for appointments to supervisory and management boards of the ERT and ANA-MPA
which ends the ability of a government minister to select individuals and replace
this with a more pluralistic system of appointment by civil society organizations.
Strengthen rules about the professional criteria of those able to be appointed to
oversight bodies. Enhance safeguards for firing or replacement of management and
editors at ERT and ANA-MPA to limit political meddling

- Following the example of other EU countries, establish a stronger support fund for
public interest, regional, community and investigative journalism in Greece through
public grants, which is distributed on a tender basis through a third-party body with
representation from journalistic and media experts from across the sector

- Adopt swift amendments to legislation which obliges competent prosecutors to

justify any surveillance against journalists undertaken in the interest of national
security that allows for proper scrutiny of its legality and proportionality. Bring justice
for cases of illegitimate and illegal spying on journalists in an independent and
transparent manner and invite Europol to support investigations

39
- Introduce a strong legal framework against strategic lawsuits against public
participation (SLAPPs) in line with the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive. Repeal Law 1178/81,
which regulates the basic legal framework of lawsuits against journalists and the
media. Implement the call by the Journalists’ Union of Athens Daily Newspapers
for its repeal, which argues that the law has created the legal basis for a lawsuit
industry whose sole purpose is to silence the press and journalists. These lawsuits
obstruct investigative journalism and threaten the financial survival of the media
and journalists. Fully decriminalize defamation.

- Ensure prompt, effective and independent investigations of crimes against journalists

by dedicating additional resources and staff to these cases, recognizing their special
nature and impact on the public sphere. Ensure adequate focus and resources are
provided to addressing cases of impunity for the killing of journalists in Greece

40