NORLINA G. SIBAYAN, Petitioner, v. ELIZABETH O.

ALDA, THROUGH HER

ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, RUBY O. ALDA, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the October 25, 2016 Decision1 and the August 9, 2017 Resolution2 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 137921. The challenged rulings affirmed
the June 9, 2014 and August 26, 2014 Orders3 of the Office of the General Counsel and
Legal Services of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (OGCLS-BSP) denying herein
petitioner Norlina G. Sibayan's (Norlina) resort to modes of discovery in connection with
an administrative case filed against her.

The Facts

The case stemmed from a letter-complaint filed by respondent Elizabeth O. Aida

(Elizabeth), through her daughter and attorney-in-fact, Ruby O. Aida (Ruby), with the
Office of Special Investigation of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (OSI-BSP). Elizabeth
charged Norlina, who was then the Assistant Manager and Marketing Officer of Banco
De Oro Unibank, Inc. (BDO) San Fernando, La Union Branch, with unauthorized
deduction of her BDO Savings Account with Account Number 0970097875, as well as
for failure to post certain check deposits to the said account.4

The complaint alleged that while Elizabeth did not make any withdrawals from her BDO
savings account from 2008-2009, its balance of One Million Seventy One Thousand Five
Hundred Sixty One and 73/100 Pesos (P1,071,561.73) as of July 22, 2008 was reduced
to only Three Hundred Thirty Four and 47/100 Pesos (P334.47) by October 31, 2008.5

Further, Elizabeth claimed that two crossed manager's checks, to wit: 1) United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 0000005197 in the amount of Two Million
Seven Hundred Forty Three Thousand Three Hundred Forty Six Pesos (P2,743,346)
issued to her by Ferdinand Oriente (Ferdinand), and 2) Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) Check No. 0000002688 in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred Thirty Seven
Thousand Three Hundred Forty One and 891100 Pesos (P2,237,341.89) issued to her
by Jovelyn Oriente (Jovelyn) were not posted on her BDO savings account despite the
fact that the said checks were deposited on October 27, 2008.6

As for Norlina's defense, she argued that the charges were only meant to harass her
and BDO as the latter previously filed a criminal case against Elizabeth, Ruby, and their
cohorts, for theft, estafa, and violation of Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as
the Access Devise Regulation Act of 1998.7 The said case proceeded from the acts of
Elizabeth and her co-defendants therein of withdrawing and laundering various amounts
erroneously credited by BDO to Ruby's Visa Electron Fast Card Account (Fastcard) with
Account Number 4559-6872-3866-2036, which Elizabeth opened for and in the name of
Ruby on April 21, 2006.8
According to Norlina, when BDO merged with Equitable PCI Bank in May 2007, the
former acquired all of the latter's accounts, products and services, including the
Fastcard, which functions the same way as a regular Automated Teller Machine (ATM)
card but with an added feature that allows its holders to withdraw local currencies from
ATMs overseas bearing the Visa Plus logo. Thus, using her Fastcard at various ATMs in
Dubai, United Arab Emirates, where she was based, Ruby was able to withdraw the
funds sent to her by Elizabeth, who was then working in Taiwan.9

Sometime in September 2008, BDO, however, discovered that from November 15,
2007 to September 20, 2008, Ruby was able to withdraw the total amount of Sixty Four
Million Two Hundred Twenty Nine Thousand Two Hundred Ninety Seven and 50/100
Pesos (P64,229,297.50) despite Elizabeth only having remitted the amount of One
Million Six Hundred Forty Five Thousand Four Hundred Eighty Six Pesos (P1,645,486).
BDO conducted an investigation and discovered that Ruby learned of the erroneous
crediting of funds as early as November 2007 and utilized BDO's system error to
successfully launder money by transferring funds withdrawn from Ruby's Fastcard
Account to various bank accounts in the Philippines under the names of Elizabeth, Ruby
and their friends and relatives.10

The foregoing facts were allegedly admitted by Ruby, as evidenced by her execution
before the Philippine Consulate in Dubai of certain documents in BDO's favor, to wit:
1. Undertaking with Authorization11 dated October 21, 2008 promising to pay BDO the
total amount of money erroneously credited to her Fastcard account, including all
charges, and authorizing BDO to setoff and apply as payment whatever monies or
properties to her credit or account on the books of BDO or any other entity;

2. Special Power of Attorney12 dated October 22, 2008 authorizing BDO to setoff and
apply any money or other property on the books of BDO and/or other entities, banks,
and financial institutions under her mime or account for the payment of her obligation;
and

3. Deed of Dation in Payment13 dated October 22, 2008 acknowledging her debt to BDO
in the amount of Php62,670,681.60 and conveying to BDO all of her interests, rights
and title in the properties described under the List of Properties14 attached in the said
Deed.
Included in the afore-stated List of Properties purportedly ceded by Ruby to BDO are
the following bank accounts:
Bank/Account Number Account Name

BDO Account No. 0970097875 Elizabeth O. Alda

UCPB Account No. 2351047157 Ferdinand Oriente

BPI Account No. 85890237923 Jovelyn Oriente

Pursuant to the foregoing documents executed by Ruby, BDO debited Elizabeth's
savings account and the proceeds thereof were applied to Ruby's outstanding obligation
to BDO. Thereafter, Ferdinand and Jovelyn, who are relatives of Elizabeth and Ruby,
went to BDO San Fernando, La Union branch and presented to Norlina the above-
mentioned UCPB and BPI manager's checks, the proceeds of which were also
purportedly applied as payment by Ruby to BDO.

After the parties' submission of their respective pleadings, the OSI-BSP issued a
Resolution15 dated June 13, 2012 finding a prima facie case against Norlina for
Conducting Business in an Unsafe or Unsound Manner under Section 56.216 of Republic
Act No. 8791 ("The General Banking Law of 2000"), punishable under Section 37 of
Republic Act No. 7653 ("The New Central Bank Act"). The OGCLS-BSP then directed
Norlina to submit her sworn answer to the formal charge filed by the OSI-BSP.

Meanwhile, on October 19, 2012, Norlina filed a Request to Answer Written

Interrogatories17 addressed to Elizabeth, Jovelyn, and Ferdinand. Norlina also filed a
Motion for Production of Documents18 praying that UCPB and BPI be ordered to produce
and allow the inspection and copying or photographing of the Statements of Account
pertaining to UCPB Account No. 2351047157 and BPI Account No. 85890237923,
respectively, alleging that Ruby is the legal and beneficial owner of both accounts.

Elizabeth, through Ruby, and Ferdinand filed their respective Objections19 to Norlina's
request, while Jovelyn's counsel filed a Manifestation20 stating that the former could not
submit her answer since she is working overseas.

OGCLS-BSP Ruling

In its June 9, 2014 Order,21 the OGCLS-BSP denied Norlina's motions, ruling as follows:
Motion for Production of Bank Documents

xxxx

The respondent also alleged that the examination is exempted from the rule on secrecy
of bank deposit because the money deposited in the subject bank accounts is the
subject matter of litigation. This Office rules otherwise. The present action is an
administrative proceeding aimed at determining respondent's liability, if any, for
violation of banking laws. A deposit account may be examined or looked into if it is the
subject matter of a pending litigation. The phrase "subject matter of the action"
pertains to physical facts, things, real or personal, money, lands, chattels, and the like
by which the suit is prosecuted. It does not refer to the delict or wrong committed by
the defendant.

Hence, the Motion for Production of Bank Documents filed by the respondent is
DENIED.

Request to Answer Written Interrogatories

With respect to respondent's Request to Answer Written Interrogatories addressed to

Mr. Ferdinand Oriente, Ms. Jovelyn Oriente, and Ms. Elizabeth Aida, the same is DENIED
due to the fact that the aforementioned persons are all witnesses for the prosecution.
Respondent will be afforded the right to confront these witnesses during the
presentation of the prosecution's evidence. Moreover, this Office cannot compel
Elizabeth Aida and Jovelyn Oriente to answer the written interrogatories since they are
out of the country as manifested by the prosecution.
SO ORDERED.22
Norlina's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the OGCLS-BSP in its
August 26, 2014 Order.23

Assailing that the OGCLS-BSP committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her
motions, Norlina filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

CA Ruling

In its October 25, 2016 Decision, the CA upheld the OGCLS-BSP's rulings, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is DENIED. The Orders
of Public Respondent dated June 9, 2014 and August 26, 2014 in Administrative Case
No. 2012-047 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24
The CA found that the OGCLS-BSP did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
denied Norlina's motion for the production of bank documents and requests to answer
written interrogatories. It highlighted the fact that the proceedings before the OGCLS-
BSP is summary in nature and to grant Norlina's motions would merely delay the
resolution of the case. The CA ruled that Norlina's persistence to utilize modes of
discovery will be futile since the information she supposedly seeks to elicit are
sufficiently contained in the pleadings and attachments submitted by the parties to aid
the OGCLS-BSP in resolving the case before it.25

Norlina then filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied by the CA in its
August 9, 2017 Resolution.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issue

Norlina anchors her plea for the reversal of the assailed Decision on the following
grounds:26
I.

THERE EXISTS NO SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS FOR THE DENIAL OF PETITIONER

SIBAYAN'S REQUESTS TO ANSWER WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES.

A. REQUESTS. TO ANSWER WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES MAY BE SERVED ON ANY

PERSON, INCLUDING WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION, SUCH AS RESPONDENT
ELIZABETH, FERDINAND AND JOVELYN.

B. PETITIONER SIBAYAN'S REQUESTS FOR WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES ARE

RELEVANT AND MATERIAL TO THE CASE A QUO.

II.

PETITIONER SIBAYAN IS ENTITLED TO THE PRODUCTION OF BANK DOCUMENTS

PURSUANT TO SECTION 1, RULE 27 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
Succinctly put, the pivotal issue to be resolved is whether or not grave abuse of
discretion can be attributed to the OGCLS-BSP in denying Norlina's resort to modes of
discovery.

The Court's Ruling

We find no error in the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly adhered to in

administrative investigations

Throughout the petition, Norlina persistently relies and quotes the provisions of the
Rules of Court27 on modes of discovery and argues her right to utilize the same. To her
eyes, the denial of her requests to answer written interrogatories and motion for
production of bank documents deprived her of availing of the rightful remedies which
shall bring to the fore material and relevant facts for the OGCLS-BSP's
consideration.28 Thus, Norlina postulates that the OGCLS-BSP would now be forced to
resolve the case against her in an arbitrary manner.29

We disagree.

At the outset, it bears stressing that the proceeding involved in the present case is
administrative in nature. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict
enforcement of the rules on evidence, the same does not hold true for administrative
bodies. The Court has consistently held that technical rules applicable to judicial
proceedings are not exact replicas of those in administrative investigations.30 Recourse
to discovery procedures as sanctioned by the Rules of Court is then not mandatory for
the OGCLS-BSP. Hence, We cannot subscribe to Norlina's tenacious insistence for the
OGCLS-BSP to strictly adhere to the Rules of Court so as not to purportedly defeat her
rights.

Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that the nature of the proceedings before the
OGCLS-BSP is summary in nature. Section 3, Rule 1 of the BSP Rules of Procedure on
Administrative Cases,31 states:
Section 3. Nature of Proceedings. - The proceedings under these Rules shall be
summary in nature and shall be conducted without necessarily adhering to the technical
rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial trials. Proceedings under these
Rules shall be confidential and shall not be subject to disclosure to third parties, except
as may be provided under existing laws.
The rationale and purpose of the summary nature of administrative proceedings is to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to
technical rules.32 As such, in proceedings before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies,
like the OGCLS-BSP, decisions may be reached on the basis of position papers or other
documentary evidence only. They are not bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence.33 To require otherwise would negate the summary nature of the proceedings
which could defeat its very purpose.

In this light, OGCLS-BSP did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying Norlina's
request for written interrogatories as the allowance of the same would not practically
hasten, as it would in fact delay, the early disposition of the instant case. We agree
with the CA's discussion on this matter, to wit:
Further to grant the written interrogatories would merely delay the resolution of the
issue brought before [the OGCLS-BSP]. The fraud purportedly executed by [Elizabeth],
along with her daughter, her attorney-in-fact, assuming as true, is plain and clear from
the records of the case, specifically the Undertaking and Authorization allegedly
executed by Ruby admitting the erroneous withdrawal of various amounts from her
peso FAST CARD account, to wit:

xxxx

In Our minds, the defense of fraud[,] is sufficiently contained in the pleadings and
attachments of the parties as to aid the Public Respondent in resolving the case before
it.

We note that at the time of resolution of [Norlina's] motions, Jovelyn Oriente, one of
the persons requested to answer the written interrogatories, was already out of the
country. While her deposition may nevertheless be taken outside of the country, the
same will definitely delay the resolution of an otherwise summary case.34
Additionally, the denial of the motion for production of bank documents pertaining to 1)
UCPB Account No. 2351047157 and 2) BPI Account No. 8589023792335 is justified as
the bank accounts sought to be examined are privileged. Section 2 of Republic Act No.
1405, otherwise known as The Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposit, provides:
Section 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines,
its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an
absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the
depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited
or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Norlina contends, however, that Ruby is the legal and beneficial owner of the foregoing
accounts and that the latter gave her permission to look into the said accounts as
stated in the Undertaking with Authorization,36 Special Power of Attorney,37 and Deed of
Dation in Payment38 executed by her in BDO's favor.

We are not convinced.

Records show that the account holder or depositor of UCPB Account No. 2351047157 is
Ferdinand Oriente while the account holder or depositor of BPI Account No.
85890237923 is Jovelyn Oriente.39 Perforce, the documents executed by Ruby
purportedly granting BDO access to the foregoing accounts do not equate to Ferdinand
and Jovelyn's permissions. Based on this alone, the denial for Norlina to gain access to
these bank accounts is warranted.

Clearly then, the Requests to Answer Written Interrogatories and Motion for Production
of Documents were both unnecessary and improper.

Norlina was not denied due process of law

Norlina bemoans that by suppressing her right to avail of discovery measures, the
OGCLS-BSP violated her right to due process. She maintains that the administrative
character of the proceedings involved is not sufficient to defeat such right.40

Norlina's claims are without merit.

Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case
against him is decided.41 This was further expounded in the recent case of Prudential
Bank v. Rapanot,42viz:
"The essence of due process is to be heard." In administrative proceedings, due process
entails "a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of Administrative due process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a
formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure
are not strictly applied."
As established by the facts, Norlina was afforded the opportunity to be heard and to
explain her side before the OGCLS-BSP. She was allowed to submit her answer and all
documents in support of her defense. In fact, her defense of fraud committed by
Elizabeth and Ruby is sufficiently contained in the pleadings and attachments submitted
by the parties to aid the OGCLS-BSP in resolving the case before it.

Evidently, the information sought to be elicited from the written interrogatories, as well
as the bank documents, are already available in the records of the case. As correctly
pointed out by the CA, the grant of Norlina's motions would merely delay the resolution
of the case. In fine, the OGCLS-BSP's issuance of the assailed orders did not violate
Norlina's right to due process and was in accord with the summary nature of
administrative proceedings before the BSP. The opportunity accorded to Norlina was
enough to comply with the requirements of due process in an administrative case. The
formalities usually attendant in court hearings need not be present in an administrative
investigation, as long as the parties are heard and given the opportunity to adduce their
respective sets of evidence.43

Further, even assuming that the pleadings and attachments on record are not sufficient
for the just resolution of the case against Norlina, the facts, arguments, and defenses
put forward in the pleadings of the parties, as well as the information Norlina seeks to
obtain from Elizabeth, Ruby and other witnesses, may be brought to light in a
clarificatory hearing under Section 7 of the BSP Rules of Procedure on Administrative
Cases,44 to wit:
Section 7. Hearing. - After the submission by the parties of their position papers, the
Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer shall determine whether or not there is a need for a
hearing for the purpose of cross examination of the affiant(s).

If the Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer finds no necessity for conducting a hearing, he
shall issue an Order to that effect.

In cases where the Hearing Panel or Hearing Officer deems it necessary to allow the
parties to conduct cross-examination, the case shall be set for hearing. The affidavits of
the parties and their witnesses shall take the place of their direct testimony.
All told, the denial of Norlina's motions to resort to modes of discovery did not, and will
definitely not, equate to a denial of her right to due process. It must be stressed that
Norlina's fear of being deprived of such right and to put up a proper defense is more
imagined than real. Norlina was properly notified of the charges against her and she
was given a reasonable opportunity to answer the accusations against her. As correctly
ruled by the lower tribunals, Norlina's attempt to resort to modes of discovery is
frivolous and would merely cause unnecessary delay in the speedy disposition of the
case.

Thus, no error or grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed to the OGCLS-BSP in not
granting Norlina's plea for written interrogatories and production of bank documents.
Absent any showing that the OGCLS-BSP had acted without jurisdiction or in excess
thereof or with such grave abuse of discretion as would amount to lack of jurisdiction,
as in the present case, its orders dispensing with the need to resort to modes of
discovery may not be corrected by certiorari.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated October 25, 2016 and the Resolution dated August 9, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 137921 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and EDUARDO Z. ROMUALDEZ, in his capacity as President of
the Philippine National Bank, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
EMILIO A. GANCAYCO and FLORENTINO FLOR, Special Prosecutors of the Dept. of
Justice, defendants-appellees.

REGALA, J.:

The principal question presented in this case is whether a bank can be compelled to disclose the
records of accounts of a depositor who is under investigation for unexplained wealth.

This question arose when defendants Emilio A. Gancayco and Florentino Flor, as special
prosecutors of the Department of Justice, required the plaintiff Philippine National Bank to produce
at a hearing to be held at 10 a.m. on February 20, 1961 the records of the bank deposits of Ernesto
T. Jimenez, former administrator of the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration, who was
then under investigation for unexplained wealth. In declining to reveal its records, the plaintiff bank
invoked Republic Act No. 1405 which provides:

SEC. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political
subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official,
bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of
impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation.

The plaintiff bank also called attention to the penal provision of the law which reads:

SEC. 5. Any violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment
of not more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the
discretion of the court.

On the other hand, the defendants cited the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019) in support of their claim of authority and demanded anew that plaintiff Eduardo Z. Romualdez,
as bank president, produce the records or he would be prosecuted for contempt. The law invoked by
the defendant states:

SEC. 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions of

Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been
found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other
persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and
to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in
the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily
shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.

Because of the threat of prosecution, plaintiffs filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Manila
Court of First Instance. After trial, during which Senator Arturo M. Tolentino, author of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act testified, the court rendered judgment, sustaining the power of the
defendants to compel the disclosure of bank accounts of ACCFA Administrator Jimenez. The court
said that, by enacting section 8 of, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress clearly
intended to provide an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits. Without such
provision, the court added prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the
prosecution of those charged with having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office. 1awphîl.nèt

From that judgment, plaintiffs appealed to this Court. In brief, plaintiffs' position is that section 8 of
the Anti-Graft Law "simply means that such bank deposits may be included or added to the assets of
the Government official or employee for the purpose of computing his unexplained wealth if and
when the same are discovered or revealed in the manner authorized by Section 2 of Republic Act
1405, which are (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon
order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) In
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation."

In support of their position, plaintiffs contend, first, that the Anti-Graft Law (which took effect on
August 17, 1960) is a general law which cannot be deemed to have impliedly repealed section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1405 (which took effect on Sept. 9, 1955), because of the rule that repeals by
implication are not favored. Second, they argue that to construe section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law as
allowing inquiry into bank deposits would be to negate the policy expressed in section 1 of Republic
Act No. 1405 which is "to give encouragement to the people to deposit their money in banking
institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be utilized by banks in
authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country."

Contrary to their claim that their position effects a reconciliation of the provisions of the two laws,
plaintiffs are actually making the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 prevail over those of the Anti-
Graft Law, because even without the latter law the balance standing to the depositor's credit can be
considered provided its disclosure is made in any of the cases provided in Republic Act No. 1405.

The truth is that these laws are so repugnant to each other than no reconciliation is possible. Thus,
while Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely confidential ... and
[therefore] may not be examined, inquired or looked into," except in those cases enumerated therein,
the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in
the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only
conclusion possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of Republic
Act No. 1405 by providing additional exception to the rule against the disclosure of bank deposits.

Indeed, it is said that if the new law is inconsistent with or repugnant to the old law, the presumption
against the intent to repeal by implication is overthrown because the inconsistency or repugnancy
reveals an intent to repeal the existing law. And whether a statute, either in its entirety or in part, has
been repealed by implication is ultimately a matter of legislative intent. (Crawford, The Construction
of Statutes, Secs. 309-310. Cf. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Ass'n v. Feliciano, G.R. No. L-24022,
March 3, 1965).

The recent case of People v. De Venecia, G.R. No. L-20808, July 31, 1965 invites comparison with
this case. There it was held:

The result is that although sec. 54 [Rev. Election Code] prohibits a classified civil service
employee from aiding any candidate, sec. 29 [Civil Service Act of 1959] allows such
classified employee to express his views on current political problems or issues, or to
mention the name of his candidate for public office, even if such expression of views or
mention of names may result in aiding one particular candidate. In other words, the last
paragraph of sec. 29 is an exception to sec. 54; at most, an amendment to sec. 54.
With regard to the claim that disclosure would be contrary to the policy making bank deposits
confidential, it is enough to point out that while section 2 of Republic Act 1405 declares bank
deposits to be "absolutely confidential," it nevertheless allows such disclosure in the following
instances: (1) Upon written permission of the depositor; (2) In cases of impeachment; (3) Upon order
of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; (4) In cases where
the money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Cases of unexplained wealth are similar
to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases
cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be
different from the policy as to the other. This policy express the motion that a public office is a public
trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so
far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

 BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, petitioner,
vs.
HON. FIDEL PURISIMA, etc., and HON. VICENTE ERICTA and JOSE DEL FIERO,
etc., respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The verdict in this special civil action of certiorari turns upon the question of whether or not the "Law on Secrecy of Bank
Deposits" 1 precludes production by subpoena duces tecum of bank records of transactions by or in the names of the wife, children and
friends of a special agent of the Bureau of Customs, accused before the Tanodbayan of having allegedly acquired property manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and other lawful income, in violation of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 2

The Customs special agent involved is Manuel Caturla, and the accusation against him was filed by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue. 3 In the course of the preliminary investigation thereof,
the Tanodbayan issued a subpoena duces tecum to the Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank,
commanding its representative to appear at a specified time at the Office of the Tanodbayan and
furnish the latter with duly certified copies of the records in all its branches and extension offices, of
the loans, savings and time deposits and other banking transactions, dating back to 1969, appearing
in the names of Caturla, his wife, Purita Caturla, their children — Manuel, Jr., Marilyn and Michael —
and/or Pedro Escuyos. 4

Caturla moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum 5 arguing that compliance therewith would result
in a violation of Sections 2 and 3 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits.
Then Tanodbayan Vicente Ericta not only denied the motion for lack of merit, and directed
compliance with the subpoena, 6 but also expanded its scope through a second subpoena duces
tecum,7 this time requiring production by Banco Filipino of the bank records in all its branches and
extension offices, of Siargao Agro-Industrial Corporation, Pedro Escuyos or his wife, Emeterio
Escuyos, Purita Caturla, Lucia Escuyos or her husband, Romeo Escuyos, Emerson Escuyos,
Fraterno Caturla, Amparo Montilla, Cesar Caturla, Manuel Caturla or his children, Manuel Jr.,
Marilyn and Michael, LTD Pub/Restaurant, and Jose Buo or his wife, Evelyn. Two other subpoena of
substantially the same tenor as the second were released by the Tanodbayan's Office. 8 The last
required obedience under sanction of contempt.

The Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank, hereafter referred to simply as BF Bank, took over
from Caturla in the effort to nullify the subpoenae. It filed a complaint for declaratory relief with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, 9 which was assigned by raffle to the sala of respondent Judge
Fidel Purisima. BF Bank prayed for a judicial declaration as to whether its compliance with the
subpoenae duces tecum would constitute an infringement of the provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of
R.A. No. 1405 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. It also asked that pending final resolution of
the question, the Tanodbayan be provisionally restrained from exacting compliance with
the subpoenae.

Respondent Judge Purisima issued an Order denying for lack of merit the application by BF Bank for
a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order. 10

This Order is now impugned in the instant certiorari action instituted by BF Bank before this Court,
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It is the
bank's theory that the order declining to grant that remedy operated as a premature adjudication of
the very issue raised in the declaratory suit, and as judicial sufferance of a transgression of the bank
deposits statute, and so constituted grievous error correctible by certiorari. It further argues
that subpoenae in question are in the nature of "fishing expeditions" or "general warrants" since they
authorize indiscriminate inquiry into bank records; that, assuming that such an inquiry is allowed as
regards public officials under investigation for a violation of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act, it
is constitutionally impermissible with respect to private individuals or public officials not under
investigation on a charge of violating said Act; and that while prosecution of offenses should not, as
a rule, be enjoined, there are recognized exceptions to the principle one of which is here present, i.e.
to avoid multiplicity of suits, similar subpoenae having been directed to other banks as well.

It is difficult to see how the refusal by the Court a quo to issue the temporary restraining order
applied for by the petitioner — in other words, its disagreement with the petitioner's advocated theory
— could be deemed so whimsical, capricious, despotic or oppressive an act as to constitute grave
abuse of discretion. Obviously, the writ of certiorari cannot issue simply on a showing of
disagreement between a party and the court upon some material factual or legal issue. There must
be a reasonable demonstration that a party's contentions are so clearly correct, or the court's ruling
thereon so clearly wrong, to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. No such demonstration exists
in this case. Indeed, for aught that the record shows, the Court's refusal to grant the application for a
restraining order was, in the premises, licit and proper, or its validity, fairly debatable, at the very
least. Be this as it may, on the merits the petitioner cannot succeed. Its declared theory is untenable.

The provisions of R.A. No. 1405 subject of BF's declaratory action, read as follows:

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered
as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a
competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of litigation.

Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to

disclose to any person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any
information concerning said deposits

The other provision involved in the declaratory action is Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019. It reads:

Sec. 8. Dismissal due to unexplained wealth. — If in accordance with the provisions

of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public
official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name
or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out
of proportion to this salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground
for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried
children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition
through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be
taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any
prohibition of law to the contrary.

In our decision in Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco, rendered on September 30, 1966, 11 we
upheld the judgment of the Trial Court "sustaining the power of the defendants (special prosecutors
of the Department of Justice) to compel the disclosure (by PNB) of bank accounts of ACCFA
Administrator Jimenez (then under investigation for unexplained wealth), .. (it being ruled) that, by
enacting section 8 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Congress clearly intended to provide
an additional ground for the examination of bank deposits .. (for) without such provision, the ..
prosecutors would be hampered if not altogether frustrated in the prosection of those charged with
having acquired unexplained wealth while in public office. 12 We ourselves declared in said case
that 13 —

.. while Republic Act No. 1405 provides that bank deposits are "absolutely
confidential .. and [therefore] may not be examined, inquired or looked into," except
in those cases enumerated therein, the Anti-Graft Law directs in mandatory terms
that bank deposits "shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this
section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary." The only conclusion
possible is that section 8 of the Anti-Graft Law is intended to amend section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1405 by providing an additional exception to the rule against the
disclosure of bank desposits.

xxx xxx xxx

... Cases of unexplained wealth 14 are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of

duty 15 and no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted
from the rule making bank deposits confidential. The policy as to one cannot be
different from the policy as to the other. This policy expresses the notion that a public
office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its discharge does so with the
full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public scrutiny.

The inquiry into illegally acquired property — or property NOT "legitimately acquired" — extends to
cases where such property is concealed by being held by or recorded in the name of other persons.
This proposition is made clear by R.A. No. 3019 which quite categorically states that the term,
"legitimately acquired property of a public officer or employee shall not include .. property unlawfully
acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or
held by, respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives or any other persons." 16

To sustain the petitioner's theory, and restrict the inquiry only to property held by or in the name of
the government official or employee, or his spouse and unmarried children is unwarranted in the light
of the provisions of the statutes in question, and would make available to persons in government
who illegally acquire property an easy and fool-proof means of evading investigation and
prosecution; all they would have to do would be to simply place the property in the possession or
name of persons other than their spouse and unmarried children. This is an absurdity that we will not
ascribe to the lawmakers.

The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandcum and subpoenae duces
tecum at the time in question is not disputed, and at any rate does not admit of doubt. 17 The
subpoenae issued by him, will be sustained against the petitioner's impugnation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
 JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated
February 7 and 12, 2003 denying petitioner Joseph Victor G. Ejercito’s Motions to Quash
Subpoenas Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum, and Resolution dated March 11, 2003 denying his
Motion for Reconsideration of the first two resolutions.

The three resolutions were issued in Criminal Case No. 26558, "People of the Philippines v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, et al.," for plunder, defined and penalized in R.A. 7080, "AN ACT DEFINING AND
PENALIZING THE CRIME OF PLUNDER."

In above-stated case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution Panel1 filed on January 20,
2003 before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance
of a subpoena directing the President of Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or
his/her authorized representative to produce the following documents during the hearings scheduled
on January 22 and 27, 2003:

I. For Trust Account No. 858;

1. Account Opening Documents;

2. Trading Order No. 020385 dated January 29, 1999;

3. Confirmation Advice TA 858;

4. Original/Microfilm copies, including the dorsal side, of the following:

a. Bank of Commerce MC # 0256254 in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00;

b. Urban bank Corp. MC # 34181 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount of

P10,875,749.43;

c. Urban Bank MC # 34182 dated November 8, 1999 in the amount of

₱42,716,554.22;

d. Urban Bank Corp. MC # 37661 dated November 23, 1999 in the amount of
₱54,161,496.52;

5. Trust Agreement dated January 1999:

Trustee: Joseph Victor C. Ejercito

Nominee: URBAN BANK-TRUST DEPARTMENT

 Special Private Account No. (SPAN) 858; and

6. Ledger of the SPAN # 858.

II. For Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9

SPAN No. 858

1. Signature Cards; and

2. Statement of Account/Ledger

III. Urban Bank Manager’s Check and their corresponding Urban Bank Manager’s Check Application
Forms, as follows:

1. MC # 039975 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of ₱70,000,000.00;

2. MC # 039976 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00;

3. MC # 039977 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of ₱2,000,000.00;

4. MC # 039978 dated January 18, 2000 in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00;

The Special Prosecution Panel also filed on January 20, 2003, a Request for Issuance of Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum directed to the authorized representative of Equitable-PCI Bank to
produce statements of account pertaining to certain accounts in the name of "Jose Velarde" and to
testify thereon.

The Sandiganbayan granted both requests by Resolution of January 21, 2003 and subpoenas were
accordingly issued.

The Special Prosecution Panel filed still another Request for Issuance of Subpoena Duces
Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 23, 2003 for the President of EIB or his/her authorized
representative to produce the same documents subject of the Subpoena Duces Tecum dated
January 21, 2003 and to testify thereon on the hearings scheduled on January 27 and 29, 2003 and
subsequent dates until completion of the testimony. The request was likewise granted by the
Sandiganbayan. A Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum was accordingly issued on January
24, 2003.

Petitioner, claiming to have learned from the media that the Special Prosecution Panel had
requested for the issuance of subpoenas for the examination of bank accounts belonging to him,
attended the hearing of the case on January 27, 2003 and filed before the Sandiganbayan a letter of
even date expressing his concerns as follows, quoted verbatim:

Your Honors:

It is with much respect that I write this court relative to the concern of subpoenaing the undersigned’s
bank account which I have learned through the media.
I am sure the prosecution is aware of our banking secrecy laws everyone supposed to observe. But,
instead of prosecuting those who may have breached such laws, it seems it is even going to use
supposed evidence which I have reason to believe could only have been illegally obtained.

The prosecution was not content with a general request. It even lists and identifies specific
documents meaning someone else in the bank illegally released confidential information.

If this can be done to me, it can happen to anyone. Not that anything can still shock our family. Nor
that I have anything to hide. Your Honors.

But, I am not a lawyer and need time to consult one on a situation that affects every bank depositor
in the country and should interest the bank itself, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, and maybe the
Ombudsman himself, who may want to investigate, not exploit, the serious breach that can only
harm the economy, a consequence that may have been overlooked. There appears to have been
deplorable connivance.

xxxx

I hope and pray, Your Honors, that I will be given time to retain the services of a lawyer to help me
protect my rights and those of every banking depositor. But the one I have in mind is out of the
country right now.

May I, therefore, ask your Honors, that in the meantime, the issuance of the subpoena be held in
abeyance for at least ten (10) days to enable me to take appropriate legal steps in connection with
the prosecution’s request for the issuance of subpoena concerning my accounts. (Emphasis
supplied)

From the present petition, it is gathered that the "accounts" referred to by petitioner in his above-
quoted letter are Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9.2

In open court, the Special Division of the Sandiganbayan, through Associate Justice Edilberto
Sandoval, advised petitioner that his remedy was to file a motion to quash, for which he was given
up to 12:00 noon the following day, January 28, 2003.

Petitioner, unassisted by counsel, thus filed on January 28, 2003 a Motion to Quash Subpoena
Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoenas previously issued to the President of the
EIB dated January 21 and January 24, 2003 be quashed.3

In his Motion to Quash, petitioner claimed that his bank accounts are covered by R.A. No. 1405 (The
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law) and do not fall under any of the exceptions stated therein. He further
claimed that the specific identification of documents in the questioned subpoenas, including details
on dates and amounts, could only have been made possible by an earlier illegal disclosure thereof
by the EIB and the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) in its capacity as receiver of the
then Urban Bank.

The disclosure being illegal, petitioner concluded, the prosecution in the case may not be allowed to
make use of the information.

Before the Motion to Quash was resolved by the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed another
Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 31, 2003,
again to direct the President of the EIB to produce, on the hearings scheduled on February 3 and 5,
2003, the same documents subject of the January 21 and 24, 2003 subpoenas with the exception of
the Bank of Commerce MC #0256254 in the amount of ₱2,000,000 as Bank of Commerce MC
#0256256 in the amount of ₱200,000,000 was instead requested. Moreover, the request covered the
following additional documents:

IV. For Savings Account No. 1701-00646-1:

1. Account Opening Forms;

2. Specimen Signature Card/s; and

3. Statements of Account.

The prosecution also filed a Request for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum
bearing the same date, January 31, 2003, directed to Aurora C. Baldoz, Vice President-CR-II of the
PDIC for her to produce the following documents on the scheduled hearings on February 3 and 5,
2003:

1. Letter of authority dated November 23, 1999 re: SPAN [Special Private Account
Number] 858;

2. Letter of authority dated January 29, 2000 re: SPAN 858;

3. Letter of authority dated April 24, 2000 re: SPAN 858;

4. Urban Bank check no. 052092 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of P36, 572, 315.43;

5. Urban Bank check no. 052093 dated April 24, 2000 for the amount of P107,191,780.85;
and

6. Signature Card Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9. (Underscoring supplied)

The subpoenas prayed for in both requests were issued by the Sandiganbayan on January 31,
2003.

On February 7, 2003, petitioner, this time assisted by counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum praying that the subpoena dated January 31, 2003
directed to Aurora Baldoz be quashed for the same reasons which he cited in the Motion to
Quash4 he had earlier filed.

On the same day, February 7, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s
Motion to Quash Subpoenae Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated January 28, 2003.

Subsequently or on February 12, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s
Urgent Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum dated February 7, 2003.

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated February 24, 2003 seeking a reconsideration of the
Resolutions of February 7 and 12, 2003 having been denied by Resolution of March 11, 2003,
petitioner filed the present petition.
Raised as issues are:

1. Whether petitioner’s Trust Account No. 858 is covered by the term "deposit" as used in
R.A. 1405;

2. Whether petitioner’s Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 are
excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405; and

3. Whether the "extremely-detailed" information contained in the Special Prosecution Panel’s

requests for subpoena was obtained through a prior illegal disclosure of petitioner’s bank
accounts, in violation of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.

Respondent People posits that Trust Account No. 8585 may be inquired into, not merely because it
falls under the exceptions to the coverage of R.A. 1405, but because it is not even contemplated
therein. For, to respondent People, the law applies only to "deposits" which strictly means the money
delivered to the bank by which a creditor-debtor relationship is created between the depositor and
the bank.

The contention that trust accounts are not covered by the term "deposits," as used in R.A. 1405, by
the mere fact that they do not entail a creditor-debtor relationship between the trustor and the bank,
does not lie. An examination of the law shows that the term "deposits" used therein is to be
understood broadly and not limited only to accounts which give rise to a creditor-debtor relationship
between the depositor and the bank.

The policy behind the law is laid down in Section 1:

SECTION 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the
people to deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the
same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development
of the country. (Underscoring supplied)

If the money deposited under an account may be used by banks for authorized loans to third
persons, then such account, regardless of whether it creates a creditor-debtor relationship between
the depositor and the bank, falls under the category of accounts which the law precisely seeks to
protect for the purpose of boosting the economic development of the country.

Trust Account No. 858 is, without doubt, one such account. The Trust Agreement between petitioner
and Urban Bank provides that the trust account covers "deposit, placement or investment of
funds" by Urban Bank for and in behalf of petitioner.6 The money deposited under Trust Account No.
858, was, therefore, intended not merely to remain with the bank but to be invested by it elsewhere.
To hold that this type of account is not protected by R.A. 1405 would encourage private hoarding of
funds that could otherwise be invested by banks in other ventures, contrary to the policy behind the
law.

Section 2 of the same law in fact even more clearly shows that the term "deposits" was intended to
be understood broadly:

SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines
including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions
and its instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not
be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or
office, except upon written permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of
a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The phrase "of whatever nature" proscribes any restrictive interpretation of "deposits." Moreover, it is
clear from the immediately quoted provision that, generally, the law applies not only to money which
is deposited but also to those which are invested. This further shows that the law was not intended
to apply only to "deposits" in the strict sense of the word. Otherwise, there would have been no need
to add the phrase "or invested."

Clearly, therefore, R.A. 1405 is broad enough to cover Trust Account No. 858.

The protection afforded by the law is, however, not absolute, there being recognized exceptions
thereto, as above-quoted Section 2 provides. In the present case, two exceptions apply, to wit: (1)
the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation.

Petitioner contends that since plunder is neither bribery nor dereliction of duty, his accounts are not
excepted from the protection of R.A. 1405. Philippine National Bank v. Gancayco7 holds otherwise:

Cases of unexplained wealth are similar to cases of bribery or dereliction of duty and no reason is
seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule making bank deposits
confidential. The policy as to one cannot be different from the policy as to the other. This policy
expresses the notion that a public office is a public trust and any person who enters upon its
discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty, is open to public
scrutiny.

Undoubtedly, cases for plunder involve unexplained wealth. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080 states so.

SECTION 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. — Any public officer who, by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof, in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00), shall be guilty of the
crime of plunder and shall be punished by life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification
from holding any public office. Any person who participated with said public officer in the commission
of plunder shall likewise be punished. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stock derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited
in favor of the State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

An examination of the "overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)" of R.A. No. 7080 would
make the similarity between plunder and bribery even more pronounced since bribery is essentially
included among these criminal acts. Thus Section 1(d) states:

d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through
dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and or business associates by any combination or series
of the following means or similar schemes.
 1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on
the public treasury;

2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public officer concerned;

3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National

Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
-controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation including promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;

5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations

and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or

6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, all the above-enumerated overt acts are similar to bribery such that, in each case, it may be
said that "no reason is seen why these two classes of cases cannot be excepted from the rule
making bank deposits confidential."8

The crime of bribery and the overt acts constitutive of plunder are crimes committed by public
officers, and in either case the noble idea that "a public office is a public trust and any person who
enters upon its discharge does so with the full knowledge that his life, so far as relevant to his duty,
is open to public scrutiny" applies with equal force.

Plunder being thus analogous to bribery, the exception to R.A. 1405 applicable in cases of bribery
must also apply to cases of plunder.

Respecting petitioner’s claim that the money in his bank accounts is not the "subject matter of the
litigation," the meaning of the phrase "subject matter of the litigation" as used in R.A. 1405 is
explained in Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,9 thus:

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals confuses the "cause of action" with the "subject of the
action". In Yusingco v. Ong Hing Lian, petitioner points out, this Court distinguished the two
concepts.

x x x "The cause of action is the legal wrong threatened or committed, while the object of the action
is to prevent or redress the wrong by obtaining some legal relief; but the subject of the action is
neither of these since it is not the wrong or the relief demanded, the subject of the action is the
matter or thing with respect to which the controversy has arisen, concerning which the wrong has
been done, and this ordinarily is the property or the contract and its subject matter, or the thing in
dispute."
The argument is well-taken. We note with approval the difference between the ‘subject of the action’
from the ‘cause of action.’ We also find petitioner’s definition of the phrase ‘subject matter of the
action’ is consistent with the term ‘subject matter of the litigation’, as the latter is used in the Bank
Deposits Secrecy Act.

In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Magsino, where the petitioner bank inadvertently caused the transfer of the
amount of US$1,000,000.00 instead of only US$1,000.00, the Court sanctioned the examination of
the bank accounts where part of the money was subsequently caused to be deposited:

‘x x x Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 1405] allows the disclosure of bank deposits in cases where the
money deposited is the subject matter of the litigation. Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 26899 is aimed
at recovering the amount converted by the Javiers for their own benefit, necessarily, an
inquiry into the whereabouts of the illegally acquired amount extends to whatever is
concealed by being held or recorded in the name of persons other than the one responsible
for the illegal acquisition."

Clearly, Mellon Bank involved a case where the money deposited was the subject matter of the
litigation since the money deposited was the very thing in dispute. x x x" (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The plunder case now pending with the Sandiganbayan necessarily involves an inquiry into the
whereabouts of the amount purportedly acquired illegally by former President Joseph Estrada.

In light then of this Court’s pronouncement in Union Bank, the subject matter of the litigation cannot
be limited to bank accounts under the name of President Estrada alone, but must include those
accounts to which the money purportedly acquired illegally or a portion thereof was alleged to have
been transferred. Trust Account No. 858 and Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 in the name of
petitioner fall under this description and must thus be part of the subject matter of the litigation.

In a further attempt to show that the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan are invalid and may
not be enforced, petitioner contends, as earlier stated, that the information found therein, given their
"extremely detailed" character, could only have been obtained by the Special Prosecution Panel
through an illegal disclosure by the bank officials concerned. Petitioner thus claims that, following the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, the subpoenas must be quashed.

Petitioner further contends that even if, as claimed by respondent People, the "extremely-detailed"
information was obtained by the Ombudsman from the bank officials concerned during a previous
investigation of the charges against President Estrada, such inquiry into his bank accounts would
itself be illegal.

Petitioner relies on Marquez v. Desierto10 where the Court held:

We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited
to the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank
personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such
inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case. (Underscoring supplied)

As no plunder case against then President Estrada had yet been filed before a court of competent
jurisdiction at the time the Ombudsman conducted an investigation, petitioner concludes that the
information about his bank accounts were acquired illegally, hence, it may not be lawfully used to
facilitate a subsequent inquiry into the same bank accounts.
Petitioner’s attempt to make the exclusionary rule applicable to the instant case fails. R.A. 1405, it
bears noting, nowhere provides that an unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the
evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible in evidence. Section 5 of R.A. 1405 only states that "[a]ny
violation of this law will subject the offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not more than
five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the court."

The case of U.S. v. Frazin,11 involving the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (RFPA) of the
United States, is instructive.

Because the statute, when properly construed, excludes a suppression remedy, it would not be
appropriate for us to provide one in the exercise of our supervisory powers over the administration of
justice. Where Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive remedies for its
violation, we would "encroach upon the prerogatives" of Congress were we to authorize a remedy
not provided for by statute. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825, 98 S.Ct. 72, 54 L.Ed.2d 83 (1977).

The same principle was reiterated in U.S. v. Thompson:12

x x x When Congress specifically designates a remedy for one of its acts, courts generally presume
that it engaged in the necessary balancing of interests in determining what the appropriate penalty
should be. See Michaelian, 803 F.2d at 1049 (citing cases); Frazin, 780 F.2d at 1466. Absent a
specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to read such a provision
into the act.

Even assuming arguendo, however, that the exclusionary rule applies in principle to cases involving
R.A. 1405, the Court finds no reason to apply the same in this particular case.

Clearly, the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine13 presupposes a violation of law. If there was no
violation of R.A. 1405 in the instant case, then there would be no "poisonous tree" to begin with, and,
thus, no reason to apply the doctrine.

How the Ombudsman conducted his inquiry into the bank accounts of petitioner is recounted by
respondent People of the Philippines, viz:

x x x [A]s early as February 8, 2001, long before the issuance of the Marquez ruling, the Office of
the Ombudsman, acting under the powers granted to it by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, and
acting on information obtained from various sources, including impeachment (of then Pres. Joseph
Estrada) related reports, articles and investigative journals, issued a Subpoena Duces
Tecum addressed to Urban Bank. (Attachment "1-b") It should be noted that the description of the
documents sought to be produced at that time included that of numbered accounts 727, 737, 747,
757, 777 and 858 and included such names as Jose Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez,
Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peachy Osorio, Rowena Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia.
The subpoena did not single out account 858.

xxxx

Thus, on February 13, 2001, PDIC, as receiver of Urban Bank, issued a certification as to the
availability of bank documents relating to A/C 858 and T/A 858 and the non-availability of bank
records as to the other accounts named in the subpoena. (Attachments "2", "2-1" and "2-b)
Based on the certification issued by PDIC, the Office of the Ombudsman on February 16,
2001 again issued a Subpoena Duces Tecum directed to Ms. Corazon dela Paz, as Interim
Receiver, directing the production of documents pertinent to account A/C 858 and T/C 858.
(Attachment "3")

In compliance with the said subpoena dated February 16, 2001, Ms. Dela Paz, as interim receiver,
furnished the Office of the Ombudsman certified copies of documents under cover latter
dated February 21, 2001:

1. Transaction registers dated 7-02-99, 8-16-99, 9-17-99, 10-18-99, 11-22-99, 1-07-00, 04-
03-00 and 04-24-00;

2. Report of Unregularized TAFs & TDs for UR COIN A & B Placements of Various Branches
as of February 29, 2000 and as of December 16, 1999; and

3. Trading Orders Nos. A No. 78102 and A No. 078125.

Trading Order A No. 07125 is filed in two copies – a white copy which showed "set up" information;
and a yellow copy which showed "reversal" information. Both copies have been reproduced and are
enclosed with this letter.

We are continuing our search for other records and documents pertinent to your request and we will
forward to you on Friday, 23 February 2001, such additional records and documents as we might
find until then. (Attachment "4")

The Office of the Ombudsman then requested for the manger’s checks, detailed in the Subpoena
Duces Tecum dated March 7, 2001. (Attachment "5")

PDIC again complied with the said Subpoena Duces Tecum dated March 7, 2001 and provided
copies of the manager’s checks thus requested under cover letter dated March 16,
2001. (Attachment "6")14 (Emphasis in the original)

The Sandiganbayan credited the foregoing account of respondent People.15 The Court finds no
reason to disturb this finding of fact by the Sandiganbayan.

The Marquez ruling notwithstanding, the above-described examination by the Ombudsman of

petitioner’s bank accounts, conducted before a case was filed with a court of competent jurisdiction,
was lawful.

For the Ombudsman issued the subpoenas bearing on the bank accounts of petitioner about four
months before Marquez was promulgated on June 27, 2001.

While judicial interpretations of statutes, such as that made in Marquez with respect to R.A. No.
6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, are deemed part of the statute as of the date it was originally
passed, the rule is not absolute.

Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Court of Appeals16 teaches:

It is consequently clear that a judicial interpretation becomes a part of the law as of the date that law
was originally passed, subject only to the qualification that when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, and more so when there is a reversal thereof, the
new doctrine should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who relied on the
old doctrine and acted in good faith. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
Law in Marquez, that "before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case
before a court of competent jurisdiction", it was, in fact, reversing an earlier doctrine found in Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima17.

Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, then
known as the Tanodbayan,18 in the course of its preliminary investigation of a charge of violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

While the main issue in Banco Filipino was whether R.A. 1405 precluded the Tanodbayan’s
issuance of subpoena duces tecum of bank records in the name of persons other than the one who
was charged, this Court, citing P.D. 1630,19 Section 10, the relevant part of which states:

(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn testimony, or produce
documentary or other evidence the Tanodbayan deems relevant to a matter under his inquiry,

held that "The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and subpoenae
duces tecum at the time in question is not disputed, and at any rate does not admit of
doubt."20

As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a preliminary investigation, in effect
this Court upheld the power of the Tandobayan under P.D. 1630 to issue subpoenas duces tecum
for bank documents prior to the filing of a case before a court of competent jurisdiction.

Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco Filipino despite the fact that the
subpoena power of the Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was essentially the same as that under P.D.
1630. Thus Section 15 of R.A. 6770 empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and
records;

A comparison of this provision with its counterpart in Sec. 10(d) of P.D. 1630 clearly shows that it is
only more explicit in stating that the power of the Ombudsman includes the power to examine and
have access to bank accounts and records which power was recognized with respect to the
Tanodbayan through Banco Filipino.

The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly inspect
bank records in camera thus reversed a prevailing doctrine.21 Hence, it may not be retroactively
applied.

The Ombudsman’s inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing of any case before a
court of competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at the time it was conducted.

Likewise, the Marquez ruling that "the account holder must be notified to be present during the
inspection" may not be applied retroactively to the inquiry of the Ombudsman subject of this case.
This ruling is not a judicial interpretation either of R.A. 6770 or R.A. 1405, but a "judge-made" law
which, as People v. Luvendino22 instructs, can only be given prospective application:
x x x The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal
effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales v.
Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People v. Galit. x x x

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution,
that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions
outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior
to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales. (Emphasis supplied)

In fine, the subpoenas issued by the Ombudsman in this case were legal, hence, invocation of the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is misplaced.

At all events, even if the challenged subpoenas are quashed, the Ombudsman is not barred from
requiring the production of the same documents based solely on information obtained by it from
sources independent of its previous inquiry.

In particular, the Ombudsman, even before its inquiry, had already possessed information giving him
grounds to believe that (1) there are bank accounts bearing the number "858," (2) that such
accounts are in the custody of Urban Bank, and (3) that the same are linked with the bank accounts
of former President Joseph Estrada who was then under investigation for plunder.

Only with such prior independent information could it have been possible for the Ombudsman to
issue the February 8, 2001 subpoena duces tecum addressed to the President and/or Chief
Executive Officer of Urban Bank, which described the documents subject thereof as follows:

(a) bank records and all documents relative thereto pertaining to all bank accounts (Savings,
Current, Time Deposit, Trust, Foreign Currency Deposits, etc…) under the account names of Jose
Velarde, Joseph E. Estrada, Laarni Enriquez, Guia Gomez, Joy Melendrez, Peach Osorio, Rowena
Lopez, Kevin or Kelvin Garcia, 727, 737, 747, 757, 777 and 858. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

The information on the existence of Bank Accounts bearing number "858" was, according to
respondent People of the Philippines, obtained from various sources including the proceedings
during the impeachment of President Estrada, related reports, articles and investigative journals.23 In
the absence of proof to the contrary, this explanation proffered by respondent must be upheld. To
presume that the information was obtained in violation of R.A. 1405 would infringe the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official functions.

Thus, with the filing of the plunder case against former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan,
the Ombudsman, using the above independent information, may now proceed to conduct the same
investigation it earlier conducted, through which it can eventually obtain the same information
previously disclosed to it by the PDIC, for it is an inescapable fact that the bank records of petitioner
are no longer protected by R.A. 1405 for the reasons already explained above. 1âwphi1

Since conducting such an inquiry would, however, only result in the disclosure of the same
documents to the Ombudsman, this Court, in avoidance of what would be a time-wasteful and
circuitous way of administering justice,24 upholds the challenged subpoenas.

Respecting petitioner’s claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his right to due process as he was
neither notified of the requests for the issuance of the subpoenas nor of the grant thereof, suffice it to
state that the defects were cured when petitioner ventilated his arguments against the issuance
thereof through his earlier quoted letter addressed to the Sandiganbayan and when he filed his
motions to quash before the Sandiganbayan.

IN SUM, the Court finds that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the challenged subpoenas for documents pertaining to petitioner’s Trust Account No. 858 and
Savings Account No. 0116-17345-9 for the following reasons:

1. These accounts are no longer protected by the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law, there
being two exceptions to the said law applicable in this case, namely: (1) the examination of
bank accounts is upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, and (2) the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
Exception (1) applies since the plunder case pending against former President Estrada is
analogous to bribery or dereliction of duty, while exception (2) applies because the money
deposited in petitioner’s bank accounts is said to form part of the subject matter of the same
plunder case.

2. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" principle, which states that once the primary source (the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible, does not apply in this case. In the first place, R.A.
1405 does not provide for the application of this rule. Moreover, there is no basis for applying
the same in this case since the primary source for the detailed information regarding
petitioner’s bank accounts – the investigation previously conducted by the Ombudsman –
was lawful.

3. At all events, even if the subpoenas issued by the Sandiganbayan were quashed, the
Ombudsman may conduct on its own the same inquiry into the subject bank accounts that it
earlier conducted last February-March 2001, there being a plunder case already pending
against former President Estrada. To quash the challenged subpoenas would, therefore, be
pointless since the Ombudsman may obtain the same documents by another route.
Upholding the subpoenas avoids an unnecessary delay in the administration of justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated February 7 and
12, 2003 and March 11, 2003 are upheld