Moot Court Respondent Memo
Moot Court Respondent Memo
SATATRANGI SINGH.................................................................APPELLANT
V.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA..................................................RESPONDENT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS...........................................................................................................2
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS....................................................................................................3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....................................................................................................4
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..........................................................................................8
STATEMENT OF FACTS.........................................................................................................9
STATEMENT OF ISSUES......................................................................................................10
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS.............................................................................................11
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..................................................................................................12
PRAYER..................................................................................................................................22
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
SC Supreme Court
HC High Court
Art. Article
Hon’ble Honourable
Id. Ibidem
No. Number
Ors Others
v. Versus
Sec. Section
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
1. Constitution of India
2. Indian Penal Code, 1860
3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
4. Indian Evidence Act, 1872
CASE LAWS
1. State of Maharashtra v. Satarangi Singh, S.C. No. 420 of 2020.
2. Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874.
3. Badri v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 All 189.
4. Jagdish v. State of M.P., AIR 1981 SC 1167.
5. State of Rajasthan v. Kalki & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1390.
6. Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 680.
7. State of Kant. v. Rapanaika AIR 2004 SC 4967.
8. Akhtar & Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 13 SCC 722.
9. State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840.
10. V.C. Shukla & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 1980 SC 1382.
11. Bodh Raj @ Bodha & Ors. v. State of J&K, AIR 2002 SC 3164.
12. Ashok v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 4 SCC 393.
13. Kiriti Pal & Ors. v. State of W.B. & Ors., (2015) 11 SCC 178.
14. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Patranu Dass Raja Ram Beri, AIR 1982 P&H 1.
15. State of Maharashtra v. Meyer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722.
16. Pulichera Nagaraju v. State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 3010.
17. Chahat Khan v. State of Haryana, (1973) Cr LJ 36 (SC).
18. Bhaskar Pandit v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 (2) Bom CR 769.
19. Md. Idrish v. State, (2004) Cr LJ 1724 (Raj).
20. Md. Sharif & Anr. v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 380.
21. Badri, AIR 1953 All 189.
22. Dibia v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 All 373.
23. State of Maharashtra v. Bhairu Sattu Berad, AIR 1956 Bom 609.
24. Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753.
25. Santosh v. State of M.P., 1975 Cr LJ 602 (SC).
BOOKS
1. B.R. SHARMA, FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND TRIAL (6th ed.,
Universals & LexisNexis, 2019).
2. BATUK LAL, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (7th ed., Thomson Reuters, 2017).
3. II, B.B. MITRA, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 (20th ed., Kamal Law House, 2006).
4. Bryan Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, (14th Ed., 2012).
5. D. ORMEROD, SMITH AND HOGAN’S CRIMINAL LAW (9th ed., Oxford Publications, 2009).
6. DR. DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (8th ed.,
Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur 2008).
7. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, PROOF OF GUILT (1st ed., Stevens & Sons, 1955).
8. HALSBURY’S LAWS OF INDIA, (2nd ed., Lexis-Nexis Butterworth Wadhwa, 2007).
9. H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, (4th ed., Universal Law
Publishing, 2010).
10. II, III, IV J K SOONAVALA’S, SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL DIGEST (1950-2015) (6th ed.,
LexisNexis, 2016).
11. KAGZI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 8th ed. 2012.
12. J.W. CECIL TURNER, KENNY’S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW (18th ed., Cambridge University
Press, 2017).
13. K.D. GAUR, TEXTBOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE (6th ed., UNIVERSAL LAW PUBLISHING, 2006).
14. M.P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, (16th ed., Lexis Nexis Butterworth
Wadhwa,2011)
15. N.S. BINDRA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (12th ed., LexisNexis, 2017).
16. P RAMANATHA AIYAR, THE LAW LEXICON (2nd ed., LexisNexis, 2006).
17. P. RAMANATHA AIYAR, THE LAW LEXICON, (3rd ed., LexisNexis, 2012).
18. III, R.A. NELSON, INDIAN PENAL CODE, (11th ed., LexisNexis, 2012).
19. II, III, IV R.A. NELSON, INDIAN PENAL CODE (12th ed., LexisNexis, 2019).
20. R. P. KATHURIA, SUPREME COURT ON INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (9th ed., LexisNexis, 2017).
21. R.V. KELKAR, LECTURES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE (6th ed., Eastern Book Company,
2019).
22. RAM JETHMALANI & D.S CHOPRA, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE (1st ed., Thomson Reuters, 2014).
23. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,1973 (20th ed., Wadhwa And
Company, 2006).
24. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF CRIMES – A COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,
1860, (27th ed., Bharat Law House, 2016).
25. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF CRIMES – A COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE,
1860 (35th ed., LexisNexis, 2016).
26. RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF EVIDENCE (24th ed., LexisNexis, 2016).
27. S. C. SARKAR, LAW OF EVIDENCE (17th ed., Lexisnexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur, 2010).
28. S.N. MISRA, THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,1973 (21ST ed., CENTRAL LAW
PUBLICATIONS, 2019).
29. SURENDRA MALIK, SUPREME COURT ON EVIDENCE ACT (2nd ed., Eastern Book Company,
2015).
30. V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, (Mahendra Pal Singh, 13th ed. 2019).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioner has submitted that, in the instant case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the matter under Art. 136 r/w Art. 142 of the Constitution to hear appeal on
the judgement passed by the Hon’ble High Court of Maharashtra. The Respondent, submits to
this jurisdiction in the instant case and does not contend the maintainability of this Appeal.
Art. 136 of the Constitution- Special Leave to appeal by the Supreme Court
(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant
special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any
cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed
or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed
Forces.
Art. 142 of the Constitution- Enforcement of decrees and orders of the Supreme Court and
orders as to discovery, etc.
(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such
order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it,
and any decree so passed or orders so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory
of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament
and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by
order prescribe.
(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the Supreme Court
shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all and every power to make any
order for the purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or
production of any documents, or the investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. Vadakar, a bachelor aged 21, was a university student. He was residing alone in a room at
the back of Duryodhan Hostel, Ayodhya Park. At around 12:45 PM on 04//08/2021,
Alexis, the complainant of the instant case along with the watchman of Duryodhan hostel,
heard Vadakar shouting loudly from his room. Along with other students, they attempted
to knock on the door to enquire the issue.
2. An individual from inside the room claimed that Vadakar was vomiting blood and
demanded the students to go away. The students continued to knock on the door when the
person (Satarangi Singh) opened the door and attempted to run away. He was caught and
locked in a room in the hostel. Vadakar was found dead and naked inside the room.
3. Alexis filed a complaint at the Mayapuri Police Station and an investigation commenced.
The accused claimed to have hit the deceased with a weapon and alleged that it was
because the deceased removed his clothes and attempted to have unnatural sex with the
accused. It was observed that the deceased died due to a haemorrhage. It was also
observed that certain ornaments of the deceased were stolen. The father of the deceased
identified the stolen ornaments in the instance of the accused.
4. Upon completion of the investigation, the accused was tried before the Hon’ble Court of
Sessions, Pune under S.C. No. 420 of 2020 for offences punishable under Sec. 302 & Sec.
394 of the Indian Penal Code. After the examination of all witnesses, documents and
evidences provided by the Prosecution, the Hon’ble Court of Sessions, Pune convicted the
accused on 31/08/2021 for the offences of murder and voluntarily causing hurt in
committing robbery. The accused was sentenced to imprisonment for life, and liable to
pay a fine of Rs. 20,000.
5. Aggrieved by the judgement, the accused appealed the same before the Hon’ble High
Court of Maharashtra challenging the judgement on the grounds of lack of evidence
provided by the Prosecution, and the accused’s exercise of his right to private defence
under fourthly of Sec. 100. The accused further argued that if the Court believed that the
accused exceeded his right, then the provisions under Sec. 304 Part II was more
applicable than Sec. 302 due to lack of intention.
6. The Hon’ble High Court convicted the accused under Sec. 304 Part II and sentenced him
to imprisonment up to seven years, and made him liable to pay a fine of Rs. 500.
Aggrieved by the judgement passed by the Hon’ble High Court, the Appellant-Accused
has preferred the instant appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I:
ISSUE II:
ISSUE III:
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE ACCUSED WAS JUSTIFIED IN EXERCISING HIS RIGHT
TO PRIVATE DEFENCE?
It is contended that the accused has no right to private defence and the death of Mr. Vadakar
(hereinafter referred to as the deceased), was not an act of private defence due to a grave and
sudden provocation. It is contended by the Respondent before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of
India that the conviction of Mr. Satarangi Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant-
Accused) by the Hon’ble Court of Sessions is proper since the accused is guilty of committing
the offence of murder under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 since actus reus and mens
rea to cause death is established.
ISSUE II: WHETHER THE ACCUSED HAS EXCEEDED HIS RIGHT TO PRIVATE
DEFENCE?
It is submitted by the Respondent before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Appellant-
Accused did not have any right to private defence under Fourthly of Sec. 100 and Exception
II of Sec.
300. In Arguendo, even if such a right did exist, it is submitted that the Appellant-Accused has
exceeded this right by causing the death of the deceased. It is contended that there was no proof
of immediate danger to the accused and there was no necessity to cause injury to the deceased
in order to cause death as it would be disproportionate. The defence of right to private defence
under Fourthly of Sec. 100 is inapplicable as the burden of proof of the same is on the
Appellant- Accused.
ISSUE III: IF YES, WHETHER THE ACCUSED CAN BE HELD LIABLE UNDER
PART II OF SECTION 304?
It is firstly submitted by the Respondent that the Appellant Accused, did not have any right to
private defence as the same right was not proven before the Hon’ble Court of Sessions. It is
secondly submitted that in Arguendo, even if such a right did exist, and the Appellant-Accused
did exercise such a right, he has exceeded his right by disproportionately utilising the same,
thereby causing the death of the deceased. It is therefore submitted that the Appellant-Accused
may then be convicted under Sec. 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as he has still committed
the offence of culpable homicide regardless.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. It is contended by the Respondent before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India that the
conviction of Mr. Satarangi Singh (hereinafter referred to as the Appellant-Accused) by
the Hon’ble Court of Sessions is proper since the accused is guilty of committing the
offence of murder under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 18601 since ‘actus reus’ and
‘mens rea’ to cause death is established.2 It is further contended that the decision provided
the Hon’ble High Court is erroneous to the extent that the Appellant-Accused did indeed
have an intention to commit the heinous offence and had full knowledge of the
consequences of his act, and therefore, submitted that the Appellant-Accused ought to be
convicted under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 over Sec. 304 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860.3
2. It is contended that the accused has no right to private defence and the death of Mr.
Vadakar (hereinafter referred to as the deceased), was not an act of private defence due to
a grave and sudden provocation. The conviction of the accused under Sec. 302 of the
Indian Penal Code, 18604 requires reference to Sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 5
that elucidates the essentials of murder. It is contended that the Appellant-Accused is
liable to be held guilty under Sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 6 as his act of
attacking the deceased with a sword was done with the knowledge and intention of
causing death of the deceased.7
3. The factors to be taken into consideration for the intention to kill are the nature of the
weapon used and the vital part on which the injury was inflicted and the force with which
the weapon was used.8 Proof of intention is enough to establish the offence of murder
unless it falls with any of the exceptions of Sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. 9
Where injuries are inflicted with the intention of killing a person and death ensues as a
result of the injuries, it is a clear case of murder.10
1
PEN. CODE § 302.
2
State of Maharashtra v. Satarangi Singh, S.C. No. 420 of 2020.
3
PEN. CODE § 304.
4
PEN. CODE § 302.
5
PEN. CODE § 300.
6
Id.
7
Case Records, Statement of Facts.
8
K.D. GAUR, TEXTBOOK ON INDIAN PENAL CODE, 448 (6th ed., Universal Law Publishing, 2006).
9
Rajwant Singh v. State of Kerala, AIR 1966 SC 1874.
10
Badri v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 All 189 (hereinafter referred as Badri, AIR 1953 All 189).
4. ‘Actus reus’ is any wrongful act.11 In the case of murder, actus reus is the physical
conduct of the accused that causes death of the victim. 12 It is contended before this
Hon’ble Court that in the instant case the actus reus is established by way of witness
statements, medical evidence, First Information Report and the circumstantial evidence.
5. It is humbly contended that the witness statements do not show inconsistencies in the
manner in which the crime was committed. Direct evidence is the testimony given by a
person as to what he has himself perceived by his own senses and done in regard to the
fact under investigation.13 There are bound to be observations of different witnesses as
observations are very subjective in nature and each witness has seen the incident with a
different perspective,14 there is no legal principle of universal application of how a
witness would react in a given circumstance.15
6. Therefore, the substance provided by each Prosecution witness should be regarded as
conclusive proof of the guilt of the accused. Prosecution Witness and complainant, Alexis
in the instant case provided sufficient information that the Appellant-Accused initially
refused to open the door despite the victim screaming loudly and allegedly vomiting. It is
further on record that a sword was found at the instance of the Appellant-Accused when
he attempted to run away as soon as the door was opened, however, he was caught by the
complainant and other Prosecution Witnesses who were standing outside the door.16
7. It was observed by the Hon’ble Court of Sessions that the post mortem report clearly
opined that the death of the deceased had been caused by a shock due to haemorrhage.17
Where in the post mortem report all the injuries received by the accused were given in
detail and said injuries received by the deceased correspond with the version of
prosecution witnesses there is no reason to disbelieve the post mortem report.18 In the
instant case, the post mortem
11
P. RAMANATHA AIYAR, THE LAW LEXICON, 49 (2nd ed., LexisNexis, 2006).
12
III, R.A. NELSON, INDIAN PENAL CODE, 2100 (11th ed., LexisNexis, 2012).
13
Jagdish v. State of M.P., AIR 1981 SC 1167.
14
State of Rajasthan v. Kalki & Anr., AIR 1981 SC 1390.
15
Rana Pratap v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 680.
16
Case Records, Statement of Facts.
17
State of Maharashtra v. Satarangi Singh, S.C. No. 420 of 2020.
18
State of Kant. v. Rapanaika AIR 2004 SC 4967.
report elaborately discusses the cause of death and type of injuries suffered. It is duly
acknowledged that the cause of death was due to a shock due to haemorrhage and the
same was upheld by the Hon’ble Court of Sessions as well as the Hon’ble High Court.19
8. It is settled position of law that if the genuineness of any document filed by a party is not
disputed by the opposite party it can be read as substantive evidence under Sec. 294(3) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.20 Accordingly, the post mortem report, if its
genuineness is not disputed by the opposite party, the said post mortem report can be read
as substantive evidence to prove the correctness of its contents without the doctor
concerned being examined.21 In the instant case, the defence has not questioned the
genuineness of the post mortem report and therefore, the same can be read as substantive
evidence.
9. It is contended that it is not for the prosecution to disprove every hypothesis suggested by
the accused, howsoever extravagant and fanciful it might be, guilt can be proved by
circumstantial evidence after justification of incriminating facts and circumstances. 22 The
last seen together theory in itself may not be conclusive proof but along with other
circumstances surrounding the incident, like relations between the accused and the
deceased, previous history of hostility, etc may lead to a presumption of guilt.23 The
theory of “last seen alive” comes into play when the time gap between the manner in
which accused and the deceased were last seen together and the deceased was found dead
was so small, the possibility of any other person committing the murder becomes
impossible.24
10. It is firstly submitted that the Appellant-Accused was the last person who was seen inside
the room of the deceased when the deceased was still alive. It is secondly submitted that
the Appellant-Accused refused to open the door and allow for a possibility of medical
intervention when the deceased was vomiting after being hit by the sword. It is thirdly
submitted that a sword was found at the instance of the Appellant-Accused when he
attempted to run away as soon as the door was opened.
19
State of Maharashtra v. Satarangi Singh, S.C. No. 420 of 2020.
20
CODE CRIM. PROC. §294(3).
21
Akhtar & Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal, (2009) 13 SCC 722.
22
State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, AIR 1992 SC 840; V.C. Shukla & Ors. v. State (Delhi
Administration), AIR 1980 SC 1382; Bodh Raj @ Bodha & Ors. v. State of J&K, AIR 2002 SC 3164.
23
Ashok v. State of Maharashtra, (2015) 4 SCC 393.
24
Kiriti Pal & Ors. v. State of W.B. & Ors., (2015) 11 SCC 178.
11. By virtue of Sec. 106, Indian Evidence Act, 187225 the Respondent is exempted to prove
exact happening of the incident as the accused himself would have special knowledge of
the incident and thus, would have burden of proof. It is contended that the circumstantial
evidence in shows that within all human probability, the act must have been done by the
accused and it is not for the prosecution to prove whether the act was done in private
defence.
12. Mens rea is considered as guilty intention, 26 which is proved or inferred from the acts of
the accused.27 In order to prove whether the accused are guilty under Sec. 302 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860,
a) There must have been death of a human being;
b) Such death has been caused by, or in consequence of, the act of the accused;
c) Such act must have been done with the intention of causing death and;
d) accused caused death by doing an act known to him to be so imminently
dangerous that it must in all probability cause death. 28
13. It is contended that where a person causes an injury on the vital part of the body, 29 the
intention to kill can be attributed from that.30 Causing a serious injury on a vital part of the
body of the deceased must necessarily lead to the inference that the accused intended to
cause death or bodily injury sufficient to cause death of the victim, and it answers to Sec.
31
300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and is murder.32 Moreover, the intention to kill is
not required in every case,33 mere knowledge that natural and probable consequences of
an act
25
§ 106, Indian Evidence Act, 1872, No.1, Acts of Parliament, 1872.
26
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Patranu Dass Raja Ram Beri, AIR 1982 P&H 1.
27
State of Maharashtra v. Meyer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722.
28
RATANLAL & DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF CRIMES – A COMMENTARY ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860, 1299 (27th
ed., Bharat Law House, 2016).
29
Pulichera Nagaraju v. State of A.P., AIR 2006 SC 3010.
30
Chahat Khan v. State of Haryana, (1973) Cr LJ 36 (SC); Bhaskar Pandit v. State of Maharashtra, 1984 (2)
Bom CR 769.
31
PEN. CODE § 300.
32
Md. Idrish v. State, (2004) Cr LJ 1724 (Raj); Md. Sharif & Anr. v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 380; Badri, AIR 1953
All 189; Dibia v. State of U.P., AIR 1953 All 373; State of Maharashtra v. Bhairu Sattu Berad, AIR 1956 Bom
609.
33
Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753.
would be death will suffice for a conviction under Sec. 302 of the Indian Penal Code,
1860.34
14. It is contended that when the doer of an act knows that his act would result in death of a
person, he should be deemed to have intent to cause death. 35 To determine the intention of
the accused, the nature of the weapon, part of the body of the victim chosen for the
accused to attack, the number of blows administered, the force used by the assailant, etc.
is to be considered.36 Furthermore, it has also been held that the intention of the accused
to cause death can be inferred from the resultant injuries.37
15. It is submitted that the cause of death was due to a shock due to haemorrhage, and the
weapon used for the same was a sword. It is submitted that the Appellant-Accused had
knowledge that an attack to a vital part of the body of the deceased that may result in a
grievous injury of haemorrhage, which may result in death when he attacked the deceased
with a sword. Furthermore, the accused changed the name plate of the vehicle in which he
arrived to the house of the deceased and the ornaments of the deceased was found in the
instance of the Appellant-Accused. It is therefore submitted that the Appellant-Accused
had the intention and knowledge of causing the death of the deceased.
[C]. The Accused did not have right of private defence under Fourthly of Sec. 100
and Exception 2 of Sec. 300 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
16. It is contended that it is trite that a plea of right of private defence cannot be based on
surmises and speculation. There must be some evidence to establish the circumstances
which necessitated the exercise of such right.38 Burden to prove the plea is on the accused
and it stands discharged by showing preponderance of probabilities in favour of that plea
of the basis of material on record.39
17. The right of private defence preserved by the law for an individual is a very narrow and
circumscribed right and can be taken advantage of only when the circumstances fully
justify the exercise of such a right.40 By virtue of the right to private defence the law
permits taking of the life of another person for prevention and not for punishment, in the
exercise of private
34
Santosh v. State of M.P., 1975 Cr LJ 602 (SC); Sumer Singh v. Surajbhan Singh, 2014 Cr LJ 3246 (SC); State
of Rajasthan v. Manoj Kumar, (2014) 4 SCC 724.
35
Rahman Samail v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Lah 245.
36
Srikantiah BN v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 SC 672; Anda v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1966 SC 148.
37
John Pandian v. State, (2010) 14 SCC 129.
38
Dawaru Patra v. State, (1968) 10 Ori JD 147.
39
Paramananda Mahakud & Anr. v. State, 1970 Cr LJ 931 (Ori) (DB).
40
Buddhi Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) Cr LJ 4420 (Raj) (DB).
defence and not in retribution. It is available only to those who act honestly and in good
faith,41 and in no case can it be applied as a shield to justify aggression.42
18. The accused cannot invoke private defence as a device or pretence for provoking an
attack in order to slay his assailant and then claim exemption on the ground of private
defence.43 A person who provokes his adversary to launch an attack is not entitled to right
of private defence.44Aggressors have no right to private defence.45 It is contended that the
Appellant- Accused was the aggressor and used the sword to cause death of the deceased.
19. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Court of Sessions convicted the accused since there existed no
sufficient evidence to suggest that the deceased wanted to have unnatural sex with the
accused. Therefore, the defence of right to private defence under Fourthly of Sec. 100 is
inapplicable as the burden of proof of the same is on the Appellant-Accused. 46 The
Appellant-Accused claimed to have injuries, however, he was caught while trying to run
away. The Respondent submits that if the Appellant-Accused had the capacity to run
away, then any injury claimed by the accused cannot be considered as a result of the
advancement of the deceased since the Appellant-Accused refused to open the door
initially.47
41
Dharam & Ors v. State of Haryana, AIR 2007 SC 397; Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 2 SCC 333
42
Sikandar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2010) 7 SCC 477.
43
Babulal Bhagwan Khandare v. State of Maharastra, AIR 2005 SC 1460.
44
Raising Mohima v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1962 Guj 203; Chandra Bhan v. State, AIR 1954 All 39; Guru
Charan Singh v. State, AIR 1965 All 543; Ranbaran v. State of Bihar, AIR 1963 Ori 52; Basan Bhowmick v.
State, (1963) 1 Cr LJ 46; Pandharinath Punjaram Lahane v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 Cr LJ (NOC) 79 Bom
(DB).
45
Carlose John v. State of Kerala, AIR 1974 SC 1115.
46
Paramananda Mahakud & Anr. v. State, 1970 Cr LJ 931 (Ori) (DB).
47
State of Maharashtra v. Satarangi Singh, S.C. No. 420 of 2020.
1. It is submitted by the Respondent before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the Appellant-
Accused did not have any right to private defence under Fourthly of Sec. 100 and
Exception II of Sec. 300.
2. In Arguendo, even if such a right did exist, it is submitted that the Appellant-Accused has
exceeded this right by causing the death of the deceased. Sec. 100 of the Indian Penal
Code provides for When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death
wherein if the offence which occasions the exercise of the right be due to An assault with
the intention of gratifying unnatural lust.48 It is essential to analyse Sec. 102 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 which provides that, the right of private defence of the body
commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises from an
attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not have been committed;
and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to the body continues.49 Thus,
there ought to exist reasonable apprehension of danger and the burden of proving the
same is on the defence.50
3. It is to be noted that although the right to private defence is available to the accused, the
Court ought to examine the case with “proper circumspection and caution” since the right
is an exception to the general rule.51 The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that mere
attempt to commit an unnatural offence would not amount to grave provocation although
the commission of an unnatural offence may amount to grave provocation. 52 It is to be
noted that the Appellant-Accused has not alleged that any offence was committed, but a
mere attempt. Therefore, the accused has clearly exceeded the right that may be granted
to him.
4. The right to private defence cannot be exercised against an act which does not reasonably
cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt.53 The right of private defence is
available to only such person who is suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting
danger not of his creation and the necessity must be present, real or apparent. 54 When the
assault on the deceased was exceedingly vindictive and maliciously excessive, and the
force
48
PEN. CODE § 100.
49
PEN. CODE § 102.
50
Paramananda Mahakud & Anr. v. State, 1970 Cr LJ 931 (Ori) (DB).
51
Murali v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2001) 1 SCC 229.
52
Guriya Bucha v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1962 Guj 39.
53
Somiah v. State of Karnataka, (1978) Kant LJ 93; Sheshreddi Gopireddi Changati v. State of Maharashtra,
2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 312 (Bom).
used was out of proportion to the supposed danger which no longer existed, the accused
were not entitled to a right of private defence.55
5. It is to be noted that while the Appellant-Accused claimed to have sustained injuries, the
presence of injuries on the body of the accused in itself is not a reason for sustaining a
plea of private defence as the defence has to further establish that the injuries so caused on
the accused proves beyond reasonable doubt that there was no other reasonable cause of
action than to assume the version of the right of private defence.56 Since the appellant has
failed in establishing that the injury was caused to him while he was exercising his right to
private defence, it is clear that he has exceeded his right by causing the death of the
deceased. Minor or less serious injuries are not sufficient to justify the commission of
murder.57
6. It is contended that there was no proof of immediate danger to the accused and there was
no necessity to cause injury to the deceased in order to cause death as it would be
disproportionate.58 The defence of right to private defence under Fourthly of Sec. 100 is
inapplicable as the burden of proof of the same is on the Appellant-Accused. 59 The
Appellant-Accused claimed to have injuries, however, he was caught while trying to run
away. The Respondent submits that if the Appellant-Accused had the capacity to run
away, then any injury claimed by the accused cannot be considered as a result of the
advancement of the deceased since the Appellant-Accused refused to open the door
initially.60
7. The same is further relevant when read along with the fact that the Appellant-Accused
changed the number plate of the vehicle he used to reach the place of the victim. It is
contended that the same clearly implies malice.
55
Omkarnath Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 1550.
56
Sekar @ Raja Sekharan v. State Rep. By Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, 2002 (4) RCR (Criminal) 477.
57
Devi Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2018 SCC Online Raj 2090.
58
Case Records, Statement of Facts.
59
Paramananda Mahakud & Anr. v. State, 1970 Cr LJ 931 (Ori) (DB).
60
State of Maharashtra v. Satarangi Singh, S.C. No. 420 of 2020.
III. IF YES, WHETHER THE ACCUSED CAN BE HELD LIABLE UNDER PART II
OF SECTION 304?
1. Sec. 304 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 provides for the punishment of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.61 It is submitted that whoever causes death by doing
an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily
injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to
cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.62 Section 300 of the Indian Penal
Code, 1860 provides various exceptions as to when culpable homicide does not amount to
murder.63
2. It is firstly submitted by the Respondent that the Appellant Accused, did not have any
right to private defence as the same right was not proven before the Hon’ble Court of
Sessions.64 It is secondly submitted that in Arguendo, even if such a right did exist, and
the Appellant- Accused did exercise such a right, he has exceeded his right by
disproportionately utilising the same, thereby causing the death of the deceased. It is
therefore submitted that the Appellant-Accused may then be convicted under Sec. 304 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as he has still committed the offence of culpable homicide
regardless.
3. Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender firstly, whilst deprived of the power of
self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave
the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident. 65 It
secondly submitted that culpable homicide is not murder if the offender in the exercise in
good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given
to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right
of defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing more harm than is
necessary for the purpose of such defence.66
4. The right to private defence cannot be exercised against an act which does not reasonably
cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt.67 When the assault on the deceased
was exceedingly vindictive and maliciously excessive, and the force used was out of
proportion to the supposed danger which no longer existed, the accused were not entitled
to a right of private defence.68
61
PEN. CODE § 304.
62
PEN. CODE § 299.
63
PEN. CODE § 300.
64
State of Maharashtra v. Satarangi Singh, S.C. No. 420 of 2020.
65
PEN. CODE § 300.
66
Id.
67
Somiah v. State of Karnataka, (1978) Kant LJ 93; Sheshreddi Gopireddi Changati v. State of Maharashtra,
2013 Cr LJ (NOC) 312 (Bom).
68
Omkarnath Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 1550.
5. It is therefore contended by the Respondent before the Hon’ble Court that, even if the
Appellant-Accused did have the right to private defence, he has used it beyond the scope
of such right. It is contended that the act of hitting the deceased with a sword is in no
reasonable way, a proportional usage of right when the deceased allegedly stripped his
clothes and advanced towards the Appellant-Accused. The Appellant-Accused could have
easily just walked out of the room instead of having to use such drastic measures.
6. In Arguendo, it is submitted that the Appellant-Accused did indeed have an intention and
the knowledge of causing the death of the deceased when he attacked the deceased with
the sword. It is to be noted that the Appellant-Accused refused to open the door when the
complainant and other prosecution witnesses knocked the door. It is also to be noted that
the Appellant-Accused attempted to run as soon as the door was opened, and the
ornaments of the deceased, as well as the sword was found in the instance of the
deceased. Furthermore, the Appellant-Accused had changed the name plate of the vehicle
that was used to reach the place of the deceased thereby indicating a possibility of motive
as well. For the above reasons, the Hon’ble Court of Sessions convicted the accused for
murder.69
69
State of Maharashtra v. Satarangi Singh, S.C. No. 420 of 2020.
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it
is most humbly prayed by the Respondent that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India may
adjudge and declare that:
1. The Appellant-Accused was not justified in exercising the right to private defence.
2. Uphold the judgement of the Hon’ble Court of Sessions and convict the Appellant-
Accused for committing the offence of murder punishable under Sec. 302 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860, thereby quashing the judgement passed by the Hon’ble High Court.
3. Convict the Appellant- Accused for committing the offence of voluntarily causing hurt in
robbery punishable under Sec. 394 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
AND/OR
Pass any order that deems fit in the interest of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience and in
facts and circumstances of the case to sub serve the purpose of justice and ensure protection of
Fundamental Rights,
And for this act of kindness the Respondent shall as duty bound ever humbly pray.
Date:
Place:
sd/-