Report

by the Comptroller
and Auditor General

Ministry of Justice

Efficiency in the
criminal justice system

HC 852 SESSION 2015-16 1 MARCH 2016

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Ministry of Justice

Efficiency in the
criminal justice system

Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General

Ordered by the House of Commons
to be printed on 29 February 2016
This report has been prepared under Section 6 of the
National Audit Act 1983 for presentation to the House of
Commons in accordance with Section 9 of the Act
Sir Amyas Morse KCB
Comptroller and Auditor General
National Audit Office
26 February 2016

HC 852 | £10.00
This report examines what the opportunities are to
improve the efficiency of proceedings in the criminal
justice system in England and Wales.

© National Audit Office 2016

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Contents
Key facts 4
Summary 5
Part One
The criminal justice system 10
Part Two
Inefficiencies in case progression 21
Part Three
Regional variation 28
Part Four
Reform of the system 37
Appendix One
Our audit approach 41
Appendix Two
Our evidence base 43
Appendix Three The National Audit Office study team
Case progression from charge consisted of:
to disposal 45 Lauren Harris, Adam Hughes,
Alex Kaiser, Eleanor Murray,
Annie Murthi and Alison Taylor
under the direction of Oliver Lodge.
This report can be found on the
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4 Key facts Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Key facts

33% £21.5m 34%

percentage of effective trials estimated cost to the Crown increase in the backlog of cases in
in the Crown Court in 2014-15 Prosecution Service for cases the Crown Court since March 2013
(those that go ahead as planned that do not go on to trial, for
on the day they were due to start) example due to late guilty pleas.
It is not possible to calculate the
cost of these trials to other parts
of the system

£2 billion total amount spent per year by central government on the criminal
justice system (excluding police, prisons and other bodies who
prosecute cases)

24,481 reduction in the number of trials heard in the England and Wales
criminal justice system in 2014-15 compared with 2010-11
(11% fewer trials)

£44 million additional costs due to the increasing length of Crown Court trials
(year ending September 2015 over 2010-11)

£36.1 million minimum additional cost of cases that could be heard in either
court going to the Crown Court rather than the magistrates’ court
in 2014-15

£4 million amount the Crown Prosecution Service could save if the level of
‘cracked’ trials (those that collapse on the first day) in the bottom
two quartiles of Local Criminal Justice Board areas reduced to
the level of the top quartile

9,489 more cases heard on time in magistrates’ courts in the year to

September 2015, compared with 4 years earlier
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Summary 5

Summary

1 The criminal justice system (the system) in England and Wales investigates, tries,
punishes and rehabilitates people who are convicted or suspected of committing a crime.
In the year to September 2015, 1.7 million offences were dealt with through the courts.
The system is made up of police forces, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and other
bodies who can bring prosecutions, HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS), alleged
victims, witnesses, victims and witness services, prisons, probation services, the judiciary
and lawyers. Defendants and convicted offenders are key participants.

2 The system has evolved over time, has no single ‘owner’ and has been subject
to regular change and reform. It incorporates a wide range of bodies with different
functions and accountabilities. For it to work as efficiently as possible, each part must
complete its work on time and get it right first time. There are many factors that make
it difficult for the system to work efficiently. These include:

• independence: organisations need a degree of independence from each

other to ensure that the system is just, but each part depends on the others to
allow it to function. There is a national Criminal Justice Board, which oversees the
system as a whole;

• discretion: the defendant and the witnesses can make choices about pleas or
giving evidence, and can change their mind at short notice;

• demand: although overall levels of crime are falling, the number of more complex
court cases (for example, sex offences, complex fraud and terrorism) has
increased; and

• working practices: some parts of the system are still heavily paper-based,
and all parts are operating under reduced budgets.

3 Measuring whether the criminal justice system is achieving its many objectives
is not always straightforward. Some objectives may conflict (for example, possible
tension between punishing and rehabilitating offenders). Even when an objective is
clear, for example ensuring that people who are guilty of an offence are convicted
and innocent people are not, there is no simple way to know whether the system is
achieving it. There are some elements of performance that can be measured more
easily, including whether the different parts of the system are getting it right first time,
whether cases are starting when they are supposed to and whether cases are being
progressed reasonably quickly.
6 Summary Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Scope
4 This report looks at efficiency throughout the criminal justice system in England
and Wales, from the point at which a defendant is charged, to the point at which a court
case concludes. The systems in Scotland and Northern Ireland are devolved and fall
under the remit of the Scottish Parliament and Audit Scotland, and the Northern Ireland
Assembly and the Northern Ireland Audit Office.

5 The report considers the extent and impact of inefficiencies in the system,
including cost, time and the quality of the justice system, and victims and witnesses’
experience. The Committee of Public Accounts reported on the criminal justice system
in May 2014. Our report returns to some of the issues it raised, in particular the extent to
which interdependencies between organisations are understood and good practice is
identified and disseminated.

6 There are a number of initiatives, led by the judiciary, HMCTS and the CPS, to
make the system more efficient. These include changes to working practices, digital
infrastructure and the courts estate. We do not comment on the likely success or
otherwise of these programmes as many of them are still at an early stage.

7 The report is structured as follows:

• Part One covers the overall performance of the system from charge to disposal,
and why it is important for the Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) to lead efforts to
reduce the inefficiencies in the system.

• Part Two examines the main causes of inefficiency.

• Part Three looks in more detail at the differences in reported performance

across the country.

• Part Four outlines the programme of reforms the government has put in place to
tackle inefficiency in the system, and highlights some general risks that will need
to be managed.

Key findings

Performance
8 Delays are getting worse against a backdrop of continuing financial pressure.
Spending on the system has fallen by 26% in real terms since 2010-11 and this is set to
continue. There are slightly fewer cases entering the system, but the complexity of cases
has increased. Backlogs in the Crown Court increased by 34% between March 2013
and September 2015, and waiting time for a Crown Court hearing has increased by
35% (from 99 days to 134) since September 2013 (paragraphs 1.5 to 1.10).
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Summary 7

9 There have been some improvements in the management of cases since

2010-11. The proportion of effective trials (those that go ahead as planned) in the
magistrates’ court has increased from 34% in the year ending September 2011 to
39% in the year ending September 2015. In the Crown Court, although the proportion
of effective trials is relatively stable, the proportion of cases that collapse on the day
of trial (termed ‘cracked’) has fallen from 30% in the year ending September 2011 to
24% in the year to September 2015 (paragraphs 1.12 to 1.16).

10 Two-thirds of cases still do not progress as planned, creating unnecessary

costs. Trials that collapse or are delayed create costs for all the participants, including
the CPS, witnesses and HMCTS. In 2014-15, the CPS spent £21.5 million on preparing
cases that were not heard in court. Of this, £5.5 million related to cases that collapsed
due to ‘prosecution reasons’, including non-attendance of prosecution witnesses and
incomplete case files. The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) funded defence counsel to the tune
of £93.3 million for cases that were not heard in court (paragraphs 1.12, 1.17 to 1.19).

11 Delays and collapsed trials also damage the public’s confidence in the
system. Giving evidence in court as a witness or victim can be a difficult and stressful
process. The uncertainty caused by delays and collapsed trials exacerbates this.
Only 55% of people who have been a witness or victim in court would be prepared
to do so again. Those who have experienced the system as a victim are less likely to
believe it is effective than those who have not (paragraphs 1.20 and 1.21).

Addressing the causes of inefficiency

12 The Ministry and CPS are leading an ambitious reform programme but this
will not address all the causes of inefficiency. The court reform programme’s scope
is far-reaching. It includes rationalising and modernising the estate to enable more
efficient digital working and the roll-out of a single digital case management system
accessible by all parties. Better IT infrastructure and a modernised estate would provide
the tools for a more efficient, less paper-based system, but are not sufficient to address
all the causes of inefficiency in the system (paragraphs 4.2 to 4.10)

13 Inefficiencies are created where individuals and organisations do not get

things right first time, and problems are compounded because mistakes often
occur early in the life of a case and are not corrected. There can be multiple points
of failure as cases progress through the system but these are often not identified until
it is too late. A 2015 inspection found that 18.2% of police charging decisions were
incorrect. Incorrect charging decisions should be picked up by the CPS before court,
but 38.4% of cases were not reviewed before reaching court. The system’s reliance on
paper also builds in inefficiency (paragraphs 2.2 to 2.6, Figures 8 and 9).
8 Summary Efficiency in the criminal justice system

14 The system as a whole is inefficient because its individual parts have strong
incentives to work in ways that create cost elsewhere. As there is no common view
of what success looks like, organisations may not act in the best interests of the whole
system. For example, courts staff seek, under judicial direction, to ensure they are in
use as much as possible by scheduling more trials than can be heard so that there
are back‑ups when one trial cannot proceed. This is both a cause and a result of the
inefficiencies in the system, and leads to costs for other parts of the system, for example
witnesses who spend a day waiting to give evidence for a trial that is not then heard, and
who may then be more likely to disengage from the process (paragraphs 2.7 to 2.13).

15 There is significant regional variation in the performance of the system,

suggesting that there is scope for efficiency gains. A victim of crime in North Wales
has a 7 in 10 chance that the trial will go ahead at Crown Court on the day it is scheduled,
whereas in Greater Manchester the figure is only 2 in 10. The large variation in performance
across the country means that victims and witnesses will experience very different levels
of service. If the performance in those Local Criminal Justice Board areas with the highest
rate of cracked trials was equivalent to the best-performing quartile, 15% more cases would
proceed as planned, saving a minimum of £4 million in CPS costs, as well as those costs
incurred by other organisations (paragraphs 3.2 to 3.5).

16 There are some mechanisms to identify and share good practice, but
awareness and use of these varies. Our case study visits identified a range of innovative
approaches that made a positive impact on the system. These included implementing
an appointment system for the approval of search warrants, which saved a significant
amount of police time, and creating a dedicated videoconferencing court. But there
is varied awareness and use of mechanisms to identify and disseminate learning from
these initiatives (paragraphs 3.6 to 3.18).

Conclusion on value for money

17 Reducing inefficiency in the justice system is essential if the increasing demand and
reducing funding are not to lead to slower, less accessible justice. Although the bodies
involved have improved the management of cases, around two-thirds of criminal trials
still do not proceed as planned on the day they are originally scheduled. Delays and
aborted hearings create extra work, waste scarce resources and undermine confidence
in the system. Notwithstanding the challenges of improving the efficiency of a system
designed to maintain independence of the constituent parts, there are many areas where
improvements must be made. Large parts of the system are paper-based and parties
are not always doing what they are supposed to do in a timely manner. The system is not
currently delivering value for money.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Summary 9

18 The ambitious reforms led by the Ministry, HMCTS, CPS and judiciary are designed
to tackle many of these issues by reducing reliance on paper records and enabling
more flexible digital working. They have the potential to improve value for money but
will not address all of the causes of inefficiency. More also needs to be done to explore
and address the wide regional variations in performance, and to create incentives that
encourage all parties to operate in the best interests of the system as a whole.

Recommendations
19 Improving the efficiency of the criminal justice system is challenging. While the current
reform programme will tackle many areas of inefficiency, it will not remove the underlying
reasons for inefficiency that we explore in this report. Our recommendations aim to create
a shared understanding of effectiveness and improve cross-system working.

a The Criminal Justice Board should agree what ‘good’ looks like for the
system as a whole, and the levels of performance that each part of the
system can commit to deliver to achieve this. It should report publicly on
whether these levels of performance are being met. While it is important that the
different parts of the system are not able to unduly influence individual cases,
this cannot preclude agreement over the level of service that each element of
the system should provide. Whenever possible, these measures should focus on
quality and align with the system’s overarching aims.

b The Criminal Justice Board should regularly review performance at a level

sufficient to identify good practice. Unlike many other areas of government,
there is granular performance data available for many aspects of the system.
Identifying and exploring regional variations in performance will highlight innovative
practice, as well as giving organisations across the system incentives to improve.

c The Criminal Justice Board should establish mechanisms to increase

transparency and encourage feedback through the system. This is particularly
important where one element of the system has a direct but discretionary impact
on another. For example, when magistrates’ courts refer ‘either way’ cases to
Crown Court they should be able to find out how many of these cases were
ultimately sentenced within magistrates’ court powers. This would allow them to
judge whether they are sending the right cases.
10 Part One Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Part One

The criminal justice system

1.1 This part of the report examines why it is important for the government to improve the
efficiency of the criminal justice system (the system). It looks at current performance, and at
the consequences where cases do not progress efficiently.
1.2 The system in England and Wales operates to reduce crime and reoffending; to
punish offenders; to protect the public; to provide victims with reparation; to increase public
confidence, including victims and witnesses; and to ensure the system is fair and just.
1.3 The system is overseen by the national Criminal Justice Board, a cross‑governmental
group chaired by the Justice Secretary. Membership of the board includes ministers and
officials from the Ministry of Justice (the Ministry), its executive agency HM Courts & Tribunals
Service (HMCTS), the Home Office, the Attorney General’s Office and the Crown Prosecution
Service (CPS). It also includes representatives of police forces, police and crime
commissioners and senior members of the judiciary.
1.4 It is important for the effective running of the system that there is a degree of operational
independence between the different parts: the prosecution, defence and judiciary must not
be able to unduly influence each other. Government and Parliament affect the system, for
example in creating new criminal offences and allocating funding, but they cannot interfere
in the progress of an individual case. The judiciary is constitutionally independent of the
executive branches of government.
1.5 Cases enter the system when the defendant is charged with an offence by the police
or the CPS, or by other non-police agencies. They progress according to the nature of
the offence. Cases are allocated a court date through a process called ‘listing’, which is a
judicial function. HMCTS staff assist in this, taking into account the needs of the witnesses,
the parties and court capacity. The most serious (indictable) offences are always tried in the
Crown Court in front of a judge and a jury. Summary offences, which incur lower sanctions,
are always tried in the magistrates’ courts. ‘Either way’ offences fall under both magistrates
and Crown Court sentencing powers. They can be heard in the magistrates’ courts, or
transferred to the Crown Court for all or part of the proceedings at the request of either the
defendant or the magistrate (Figure 1). Crown Court cases are more expensive. They cost
an average of £1,900 per day for staff, judicial and juror costs, compared with £1,150 in a
magistrates’ court. The Sentencing Council issued revised allocation guidance in December
2015, which set out the limited circumstances in which an ‘either way’ case should be
committed to the Crown Court for trial.1

1 The Sentencing Council, Allocation guideline: Determining whether cases should be dealt with by a magistrates’ court or
the Crown Court, December 2015.
Figure 1
Progress of a case through the system
‘Either way’ cases start in the magistrates’ court, and can transfer to the Crown Court for trial or sentencing

Magistrates’ court Crown Court

Guilty plea

Guilty verdict
Appeal

Summary offence Pre-trial Not guilty Trial Sentencing

hearings plea

Not guilty verdict

Pre-trial Trial Guilty Sentencing
Not guilty hearings verdict
plea

‘Either way’ Pre-trial

offence hearings Not guilty Not guilty
plea verdict
Guilty plea

Indictable-only Pre-trial Guilty plea

offence hearings

Notes
1 ‘Either way’ offences to which the defendant pleads guilty can be heard in the magistrates’ court, or can transfer to the Crown Court at the request of the
magistrates or the defendant.
2 ‘Either way’ offences for which the defendant is convicted in a magistrates’ court can transfer to the Crown Court for sentencing if the magistrate considers
their sentencing powers are insufficient.

Source: National Audit Office analysis

Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part One 11
12 Part One Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Changing demand on the system

1.6 The Ministry is under pressure to make financial savings. Central government
spending on the system, excluding police, prisons and other bodies who prosecute
cases, is around £2 billion (Figure 2). This figure has fallen by 26% in real terms since
2010-11, and the Ministry has agreed to reduce its total spending by 15% by 2019-20.
CPS and the police expect their budgets to remain broadly the same over the next
five years. HMCTS resources have fallen by 35% in real terms since 2010-11.

1.7 The number of cases entering the system is reducing, but they are becoming more
complex and resource-intensive. There has been a 6% fall in cases going to the Crown
Court in the last year compared to the previous 12 months, and the number of cases
going to the magistrates’ court has held steady with a 0.3% reduction. However, there has
been a 12% rise in sex offence cases in the Crown Court in the last five years (from 9,178
in 2010-11 to 10,309 in 2014-15) and CPS expects a further rise in 2015-16. This includes
historic sex abuse and child sex abuse cases, involving vulnerable victims and witnesses.
In magistrates’ courts, the number of domestic violence cases is increasing, and these
cases require significant victim support. Prosecutions for other serious offences are
also increasing, including terrorism, organised crime, drugs and fraud. These cases
can involve complex evidence, and trials with multiple defendants. The average length
of a Crown Court trial increased from 11.5 hours in 2010-11 to 14.6 hours in the year to
September 2015 (27%). The increase in trial length means that it would cost £44 million
more to hear the same number of cases in the year to September 2015 as in 2010-11.

Performance in the courts

Timeliness
1.8 The changes described above have affected how quickly cases are progressed.
There will always be cases outstanding in the system as there are minimum timescales
before cases sent to the Crown Court can be heard, but the number of cases
outstanding in Crown Court has increased by 34% since March 2013 (51,117 cases
outstanding as at September 2015). The backlog has fallen since the end of 2014, but
there was a small rise in the most recent quarter (Figure 3 on page 14). Magistrates’
courts have seen an increase of 4%, but the backlog has been falling since mid-2015,
and is now lower than in 2012.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part One 13

Figure 2
Scope of study
From charge to disposal: Central government expenditure across the criminal justice system

Offence/arrest Charge and Trial and hearing Sentencing Post-sentencing

prosecution

Home Office Attorney General’s Ministry of Justice

Office

41 police and crime Crown Prosecution

commissioners Service
£8,613m £508m

43 police forces Serious Fraud Office HM Courts & National Offender

£66m Tribunal Service Management Service
£548m £3,762m

Legal Aid Agency National

Probation Service
£138m £746m

200 magistrates’ 21 Community

courts Rehabilitation
National Crime Companies (CRCs)
Agency
£406m

80 Crown Courts 119 prisons

Primarily out of scope: In scope: From charge to disposal, expenditure of £2bn Out of scope: post-
Pre-charge, expenditure disposal, expenditure
of £9bn of £3.8bn

Stage of the process

Government department
National Agency
Frontline organisation

Notes
1 HMCTS figure of £548 million is minimum direct spend on criminal justice. There is also additional indirect spend on the system that jointly
benefits civil and criminal justice and cannot be easily separated.
2 Other bodies can charge defendants, and these cases are dealt with in the courts. Bodies with charging powers include Department for
Work & Pensions, HM Revenue & Customs and the Driving and Vehicle Licensing Agency.
3 Police expenditure includes some spend related to investigating and prosecuting criminal cases, but this is not separately identifiable.

Source: National Audit Office analysis

14 Part One Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 3
Increase in cases outstanding between 2012 and 2015
There has been a significant increase in cases outstanding at Crown Court, but not at magistrates’ courts

Cumulative percentage change since April 2012

35

30

25

20

15

10

-5

-10

-15
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3

2012 2013 2014 2015

Crown
Magistrates

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Justice data

1.9 In addition to the growing backlogs, Crown Court cases are taking longer overall
to progress through the system, with particular pressure points at the pre-trial stage
(Figure 4). The waiting time for a Crown Court hearing has increased from 99 days in the
year ending September 2013 to 134 days in the year ending September 2015 (35%).
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part One 15

Figure 4
Waiting times (days) from offence to completion, Crown Courts 2011–2015
Crown Court cases are taking longer to progress through the system

Year ending Sep 2015 136 17 5 134 51

Year ending Sep 2014 125 17 8 112 45

Year ending Sep 2013 122 17 24 99 41

Year ending Sep 2012 119 16 31 100 43

Year ending Sep 2011 124 15 33 100 42

0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350

Number of days

Offence to charge
Charge to listing
Listing to magistrates’ court completion
Waiting time for Crown Court hearing
Crown Court hearing to completion

Note
1 This figure includes historical sex offences. This may have a significant impact on the length of time between offence and charge as victims
may not report crimes for some years after they occurred.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Justice data

1.10 The increase in duration of Crown Court cases is likely to be caused in part
by the abolition of committal hearings in May 2013. Committal hearings were purely
administrative hearings in magistrates’ courts, held to send ‘either way’ offences
(paragraph 1.5) to the Crown Court. Before committal hearings were abolished, in the
year to September 2012, cases spent an average of 31 days in magistrates’ courts, and
a further 100 days waiting to be heard in Crown Court. In the year ending September
2015, cases spent just 5 days in the magistrates’ court on average, but then waited a
further 134 days for a Crown Court hearing. While the abolition of committal hearings
has reduced waste in the system by getting rid of a hearing that added little value, it
increased pressure on the Crown Courts as cases now arrive more quickly, adding
to the existing backlog. HMCTS and CPS did not have any additional resource to
accommodate the increase in cases.
16 Part One Efficiency in the criminal justice system

1.11 Although the overall length of magistrates’ court cases has increased slightly,
there have been some improvements at the end of the process (Figure 5). The length
of time spent preparing for magistrates’ court cases increased from 119 to 133 days
(10%) between the year ending September 2011 and the year ending September 2015.
But the amount of time spent in court, including waiting for a court date, reduced from
23 to 22 days. This may be because more effort is being invested up‑front to ensure
cases are ready for court. The result of this is more cases are being resolved on the first
hearing (71% in the year ending September 2015 compared with 62% in the year ending
September 2011) and on average cases are taking slightly fewer hearings to be resolved
(1.8 hearings per case in the year ending September 2011 to 1.6 in the year ending
September 2015).

Figure 5
Waiting time (days) from offence to completion, magistrates’ courts 2011–2015
The total duration of magistrates’ court cases (days) has increased slightly

Year ending Sep 2015 97 36 22

Year ending Sep 2014 93 34 20

Year ending Sep 2013 91 35 21

Year ending Sep 2012 88 36 23

Year ending Sep 2011 86 33 23

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

Number of days

Offence to charge
Charge to listing
Listing to completion

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Justice data

 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part One 17

Effectiveness
1.12 It is difficult to measure the quality of outcomes in the criminal justice system.
The system has a number of objectives, which can be in tension, and it is not possible to
know for certain whether a case has produced the ‘right’ result in terms of convicting all
those who are guilty and no one who is innocent. The Ministry monitors the rate of guilty
pleas, but setting a target rate could discourage prosecution of hard‑to‑prosecute cases
or encourage unreasonable pressure on defendants to plead guilty early.

1.13 The Ministry’s primary measures of the effectiveness of the system are the
proportion of cases that go ahead as scheduled, and the time it takes for cases to
progress through the system.2 There are four possible outcomes for a case that is listed
to go to court:

• Effective. The case goes ahead as planned on the day it was due to start.

• Ineffective. The case is not ready on the day it is due to start, and is relisted for
a later date.

• ‘Cracked’. A trial is withdrawn on the day it is due to start, and it is not relisted.
This is most commonly because the defendant pleads guilty (as in 80% of
‘cracked’ cases).

• Vacated. Before the day it is due to start, it becomes clear that the case is unlikely
to go ahead as scheduled, and it is removed from the list. The further ahead this
happens, the more likely it is that court time will be used productively, and that
effort will not be wasted preparing for a case that does not go ahead.

Crown Courts
1.14 Around a third of trials listed to start in the Crown Court in the year to
September 2015 were effective, meaning they went ahead as planned on the day
they were originally scheduled, and around 10% were ineffective (Figure 6 overleaf).
This level of performance has remained relatively consistent since 2010-11.

1.15 There has, however, been an improvement in the rate of ‘cracked’ trials. In the year
to September 2011 30% of cases cracked and 26% of cases were vacated. Four years
later, 24% of cases cracked and 33% of cases were vacated. This suggests that the
system is getting better at identifying where cases are likely to crack and removing them
from the list before trial. There has been a small decline in this performance since the end
of 2013, at which point the number of vacated trials hit 36% and the number of ‘cracked’
trials was 23%.

2 We have calculated these figures in a different way from the Ministry’s published statistics. The Ministry’s analysis
does not include vacated trials, our analysis does. We have included vacated trials, because this approach provides an
indication of whether the system is getting better at identifying, and removing before the first day of the trial, cases that
will not proceed.
18 Part One Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 6
Effectiveness of Crown Court trials 2010 to 2015
There has been an improvement in the rates for ‘cracked’ and vacated trials since early 2012

Percentage of all cases listed for trial

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Effectiveness
Cracked
Vacated
Ineffective

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Justice data

Magistrates’ courts
1.16 There has been an improvement in the effective trial rate in the magistrates’ court
(Figure 7). Of cases listed in the year ending September 2015, 39% were effective
compared with 34% in 2010-11, representing an additional 9,489 cases heard on time.
The number of ‘cracked’ trials has remained consistent, but the number of vacated trials
has fallen from 23% to 18%. This suggests that some of the improvement in effective
trials is due to better preparation of cases, meaning fewer cases need to be removed
from the schedules. More cases are also now thrown out if the prosecution is not ready
(‘cracked’) rather than being adjourned to a future date (ineffective). In 2014-15, 6% of
‘cracked’ trials were because an adjournment was refused, compared with around 2%
in 2010-11. This creates an incentive for the prosecution to ensure it is properly prepared.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part One 19

Figure 7
Effectiveness of magistrates’ court trials 2010 to 2015
There has been an improvement in effective trial rates at magistrates’ courts since mid-2014

Percentage of all cases listed for trial

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Effective
Cracked
Vacated
Ineffective

Note

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Justice data

Impact of ineffective and ‘cracked’ trials

1.17 Increasing the proportion of effective trials is important because collapsed cases
waste resources. We estimate that in 2014-15 the CPS spent £21.5 million preparing
cases that were not heard in court. The cost of preparing a case varies depending on
the case, but the average direct cost to the CPS associated with progressing a single
case to the point of trial is £975 in the Crown Court. The Legal Aid Agency (LAA) spent
£93.3 million during 2014-15 on defence counsels to represent defendants whose cases
never went to trial, excluding guilty pleas.
20 Part One Efficiency in the criminal justice system

1.18 Cases collapse for a variety of reasons, not all of which are related to the CPS.
Of the estimated £21.5 million spent in 2014-15, around £5.5 million relates to cases
that cracked due to ‘prosecution reasons’, including non-attendance of prosecution
witnesses and incomplete case files. The remaining £16 million relates to cases where
the prosecution was not directly responsible for the case not proceeding as planned,
for example where the defendant changed their plea to guilty either on the same or a
reduced charge. We have not been able to calculate the cost to other agencies as data
were not available. A certain number of cases will always crack on the day of the trial,
as it is neither possible nor desirable to prevent defendants from changing their plea to
guilty at this stage. In addition, some preparatory work may be necessary to persuade
a guilty defendant of the strength of the case against them.

1.19 Delayed trials also increase costs for other parties, although there is limited data to
assess the extent of this. For example, to manage the risk of court rooms sitting empty,
courts’ staff, under judicial direction, have a strong incentive to list more cases than can
be heard, which increases administrative costs for HMCTS. Further costs are incurred
by other parties. For example, in London police officers who spend a day waiting to
give evidence cost £139 per day. If an officer attends every case that cracks this could
amount to £10.6 million in wasted police time. No data are available on how often police
attend court. In addition, expert witnesses may still be paid for their time if a case does
not proceed as planned. The legal aid hourly rates for expert witnesses vary between
£40 and £200.

1.20 The impact of delays and collapsed trials on victims and witnesses can be significant
and undermine confidence in the system. Preparing to give evidence can be a difficult
and stressful process and frequent delays are one of the biggest sources of concern for
victims. Witnesses can wait on average around 2 hours to give evidence in the Crown
Court, and 1 in 5 witnesses wait for 4 hours or more. They may not be able to recover all
the costs they have incurred, such as childcare costs. Extended waits and uncertainty
about whether a case will go ahead can be distressing and create a disincentive for
witnesses to attend court in future. This may affect the likelihood of the trial being effective.
Only 55% of people who have been a witness or victim would be prepared to act as a
witness again, and those who have experienced the system as a victim are less likely to
believe that it is effective (43%) than those who have not (49%).3,4

1.21 Birmingham Crown Court and magistrates’ courts are developing an online video
that shows witnesses the route into the court building, through the building and round the
court, where they should go, what facilities are available and who is available if they need
information. This local initiative will complement the ‘Going to Court’ DVD which is available
nationally in 10 languages. The witness service in all of the courts we visited offer witnesses
a pre-trial visit, including a physical walk‑through of where they will be on the day of trial,
but this is not always compatible with a full-time job and childcare arrangements. An online
option could help witnesses to feel more comfortable with the process, which may
encourage them to attend court and give effective and compelling evidence.

3 Crown Prosecution Service, Victim and Witness Satisfaction Survey, September 2015, appendix, page 80.
This figure is an average of all victims and witnesses consulted by case experience, who stated that they
would be likely to re‑engage.
4 Ministry of Justice, Public Confidence in the Criminal Justice System – findings from the Crime Survey of England and
Wales (2013-14), July 2015, page 5.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Two 21

Part Two

Inefficiencies in case progression

2.1 This part of the report examines the main causes of inefficiency in the criminal
justice system (the system). These include problems that occur as cases flow through
the system, and underlying systemic factors that contribute to inefficient ways of working.

2.2 There can be many points of failure as cases move through the system and
organisations are not always given incentives to prevent these. Inefficiencies in the system
can be created where parties do not discharge their responsibilities to the required
quality standards, or in a timely manner. More detail on the process is in Appendix Three.
Problems occur as cases enter and progress through the system, including at crucial
handover points between organisations, such as where information passes between
police and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). This builds inefficiency into the process
from the start. The impact, however, is not felt until towards the end of the process and
is primarily seen in terms of delayed or cancelled trials. This means that costs are shunted
between different parts of the system, and the organisations and individuals that bear the
cost of inefficiencies may not be the same as those in which the problem first arose.

2.3 Our analysis suggests inefficiencies are caused in three main areas (Figure 8 on
pages 22 and 23):

• incorrect or poorly informed charging decisions;

• inadequate preparation of cases in advance of the trial; and

• inefficiencies which arise when a case comes to court.

22 Part Two Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 8
Examples of inefficiencies across the system
Incorrect or poorly informed charging decisions
Inefficiency Detail
Charging Errors made at charging stage have knock-on effects as cases move through the
decisions are not system. If a defendant is charged with too severe an offence, they may be less
always correct likely to plead guilty, which will extend the case. But if defendants are charged
with too lenient an offence, then justice may not be served. In 2014-15, a Criminal
Justice Joint Inspectorates review found that 9.2% of CPS and 18.2% of police
charging decisions sampled were incorrect.1

Police and CPS Lack of good-quality and timely advice can lead parties to make poor decisions.
do not always This can result in cases either failing to progress or progressing further than they
exchange should. The CPS struggles to provide timely advice to police. The Criminal Justice
good-quality, Joint Inspectorates have found that only 82.5% of cases met the target of 21
timely advice to 28 days to provide advice for the most serious offences.2 A Criminal Justice
Joint Inspectorates report also found that only 68% of the additional information
sections of case files, which includes sensitive areas such as special measures
for victims, were classified as adequate.3

Inadequate preparation of cases before the trial

Inefficiency Detail
Police do not prepare The Committee of Public Accounts’ report in May 2014 highlighted that the quality
a file of evidence to of files received by the CPS from the police had been a longstanding problem.
the required quality It recommended that the Criminal Justice Board develop metrics to monitor
performance and achieve consistent standards.
In their report on the provision of charging decisions, the Criminal Justice Joint
Inspectorates found that around 89.8% of initial police files sampled complied
with the National File Standard,4 and in a November 2015 review, the summary of
evidence submitted by the police was classed as adequate in only 72% of files.5
Evidence guidelines state that the file should be proportionate to the complexity of
the case and the way the defendant is expected to plead. CPS told us that there is
significant regional variation in the quality of police case files, and that poor-quality
files require significant remedial work by CPS staff.

CPS does not always The CPS must produce schedules before a trial to disclose all relevant evidence to
meet requirements to the defence so that they can prepare their case. If not, valuable court time will be
disclose evidence taken up resolving problems that should have been addressed earlier. Her Majesty’s
Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate’s (HMCPSI’s) internal casework information
shows that in 2014-15 the prosecution did not comply adequately with their initial
disclosure obligations in 51% of sampled files.

Parties do not Giving evidence in court can be intimidating and witnesses need to be kept
communicate informed about the process and their role in it. Some witnesses also require
effectively with special measures, such as screens in court. Police are responsible for providing
witnesses the initial information about special measures requirements to the CPS, who
then tell the court about these before the trial. In 2016 HMCPSI found that policy
guidance on the treatment of witnesses, which includes the requirement of the
Victims’ Code to assess whether special measures are required, was fully met in
around half of cases (51%), and there was timely communication with witnesses in
around half of cases sampled (57%).6 In 2015, 2% of Crown Court (800 cases), and
7% of magistrates’ court trials (10,922 cases) collapsed because witnesses did not
come to court, and 3% of Crown Court trials (1,200 cases) were rescheduled for
the same reason.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Two 23

Figure 8 continued
Examples of inefficiencies across the system
Inefficiencies which arise when a case comes to court
Inefficiency Detail
Cases may not be Some cases, known as ‘either way’ cases, may be heard in either the Crown
heard in the most Court or magistrates’ court. Between 2013-14 and 2014-15 the proportion of
appropriate setting these cases allocated to the Crown Courts increased, from 12% to 14%, at a cost
of £5.5 million. If all of the 61,473 ‘either way’ cases heard in the Crown Court in
2014-15 had been held in the magistrates’ court, court running costs would have
reduced by £45.1 million. ‘Either way’ cases can be referred to the Crown Court
for sentencing after the hearing if the sentence falls outside the magistrates’
powers. But there is no mechanism for the Crown Court to return a case to the
magistrates’ court if they feel it should be dealt with there. There is currently no
routine feedback to magistrates to communicate whether the cases they send
to Crown Court eventually receive sentences that could have been issued by the
magistrates’ court.

Defendants may not The Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) has a series of contracts with private providers
appear in court to escort defendants from custody to court. The contractor must meet a target of
90% of prisoners arriving on time. Contractors told us that one reason for delays
is defendants not being ready when they arrived to collect them from prisons.
However, there are no data to confirm how widespread this problem is. In 2014-15,
around 3% of Crown Court cases (1,200 cases) had to be rescheduled because the
defendant was not present.

More cases are listed Judges direct court staff to list more trials than they can hear, because many will
than courts have crack or be ineffective. Getting the balance right is challenging. If more cases are
capacity to hear ready to proceed than anticipated, some will be postponed (ineffective trials). If too
few cases are ready, this could lead to empty court rooms. Court listing was the
single most common reason that a case had to be rescheduled last year, accounting
for 21% of ineffective trials in the Crown Court and 30% in magistrates’ courts.

Technology and Screens or video links are required to communicate with some witnesses or
facilities may not defendants in custody. Such equipment may not always be available in the court or
function as intended may break down, although this happens in only a very small percentage of cases –
in 2014, only 13 cases in the Crown Court and 275 in the magistrates’ court (0.2%)
were postponed because of problems with technology. On one of our case study
visits we witnessed a trial where the police had so little faith in the court’s equipment
that they told us they hired their own at a cost of £500 a day.

Notes
1 Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary,
Joint Inspection of the provision of charging decisions, pages 47 and 51, May 2015.
2 Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary,
Joint Inspection of the provision of charging decisions, page 48, May 2015.
3 Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Witness for the
Prosecution: Identifying victim and witness vulnerability in criminal case files, page 32, table 4, November 2015.
4 Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary,
Joint Inspection of the provision of charging decisions, page 47, May 2015.
5 Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary, Witness for the
Prosecution: Identifying victim and witness vulnerability in criminal case files, page 32, table 4, November 2015.
6 Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, Communicating with victims, pages 14 and 27, January 2016.

Source: National Audit Office analysis

24 Part Two Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Quality assurance and enforcement mechanisms

2.4 There are quality assurance mechanisms built into the system, but these do not
always identify errors, or they pick them up too late in the process (Figure 9). For example,
a CPS review of the case before the first hearing should identify an incorrect charging
decision and stop cases progressing that have no prospect of success. But HMCPSI’s
2015 review found that 38.4% of police‑charged cases sampled had not been reviewed
before getting to court. In other areas, there is no process in place that will identify
problems between the point at which they occur, and the point at which their impact is
felt. For example, where the prosecution does not properly disclose all the evidence to
the defence, this may not be picked up until the day of the trial itself.

2.5 Enforcement mechanisms to encourage parties to comply with procedures, for

example where the defence or prosecution fail to file papers with the court on time, are
limited. In civil courts, cases are routinely thrown out if they are not properly prepared.
Judges in criminal courts are reluctant to take the same approach, as this would result in
potential criminals going unpunished. The system is already operating under constrained
resources so the judges we spoke to felt that fining non-compliant lawyers was unlikely
to improve the situation.

2.6 Some courts, such as Southwark, have introduced ‘compliance courts’ where
advocates will appear before a judge if they have not complied with requirements.
They think this has had a positive impact on overall performance. Similarly, Kingston
Crown Court requires the CPS and defence to return a trial readiness questionnaire one
week before the trial. Court staff told us that while they had had to chase these forms
up when they were first introduced, they are now routinely returned on time, and fewer
cases are postponed as a result. This approach is now being introduced more widely as
part of the Better Case Management initiative.

Barriers to more efficient working

2.7 There have been various attempts to reform the system. Improving efficiency in
the system has been the subject of various reviews, most recently by Sir Brian Leveson
in his January 2015 report Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings. While some
progress has been made, many of the systemic issues identified by these reviews
remain. These create a number of barriers to more efficient working.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Two 25

Figure 9
Problems that occur early in the process are not always identified

Charging Case preparation Trial and sentencing

Charging decision from the CPS Case not reviewed by the CPS Trial ‘cracked’ because the
is not correct before getting to court prosecution withdraws the case
9.2% of CPS charges were incorrect 38.4% of cases sampled were not 16% magistrates/7% Crown Court
(Joint Inspection May 2015) reviewed (HMCPSI 2015) trials in 2014-15

Poor-quality prosecution case files

Charging decision from the
Only 72% of files where the
police is not correct
summary of evidence submitted Trial ‘cracked’ because the
18.2% of police charges were by police was classed as adequate defendant pleads guilty on the day
incorrect (Joint Inspection May 2015) (Joint Inspection 2015)
21% magistrates/28% Crown Court
trials in 2014-15
Prosecution disclosure
Police charge a case that they not adequate
should refer to CPS
51% of files where the prosecution
34% of police-charged cases did not comply adequately with
should have been referred initial disclosure obligations Trial rescheduled because the
(Joint Inspection May 2015) (HMCPSI 2015) parties are not ready
5% magistrates/4% Crown Court
Poor case management by the trials in 2014-15
CPS is slow to provide charging prosecution, eg engage with defence
advice to police In 22% of cases sampled
Anecdotal evidence from interviews prosecution did not progress case
with police (HMCPSI 2015) efficiently (Joint Inspection May 2015)
Trial rescheduled because the
parties are not all in court
Witnesses are not kept informed
Information on witness availability about the progress of the case 7% magistrates/7% Crown Court
is not collected by police trials in 2014-15
Timely communication in only
57.2% of police files failed to meet 57% of cases (HMCPSI 2016)
the National File Standard, 17.5% of
those because of witness availability
information (HMCPSI 2016) Different approaches to listing
of cases Trial rescheduled because the
court is not ready (listing, IT)
Regional disparity in the application
and compliance with Criminal 6% magistrates/4% Crown Court
Procedure Rules and Judicial trials in 2014-15
Orders (Leveson 2015)

Trial is not allocated to the

correct court
57% increase in either way cases
outstanding in the more expensive
Crown Court since year ending
September 2012.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Criminal Justice Joint Inspectorate reports and Ministry of Justice data
26 Part Two Efficiency in the criminal justice system

2.8 The nature of the system presents several barriers that prevent the different
organisations within the system from collaborating:

• The system is adversarial by design, and it is important that parties maintain

a degree of independence from one another.

• Victims and witnesses are central to the process, but many will have had no prior
contact with the system. It may take time to persuade them to engage, which
conflicts with the desire for swift justice.

• Defendants may wish the process to take as long as possible, especially if they
think that delays may increase the likelihood of their case collapsing.

2.9 To improve efficiency, organisations need to work together for the benefit of the
system as a whole. Our March 2013 report Integration across government outlined
four elements for successful integrated working:5

• leadership;

• a shared vision;

• incentives; and

• implementation capability.

Leadership
2.10 Effective leadership is necessary to develop and articulate a clear vision
to all stakeholders, oversee progress and overcome obstacles as they arise.
The Committee of Public Accounts’ 2014 report on the system highlighted that the
Ministry’s ability to persuade local participants to act in the wider interests of the
system as a whole was constrained by the emphasis placed on the independence
and separateness of the other bodies.6 The terms of reference for the Criminal Justice
Board state that it will “protect judicial, prosecutorial and operational independence
of the judiciary, CPS and police; and the constitutional difference of locally elected
and accountable police and crime commissioners”. The need to respect operational
independence may make it more difficult to offer incentives to improve where one part
of the system is causing problems for another.

5 Comptroller and Auditor General, Integration across government, Session 2012‑13, HC 1041, National Audit Office,
March 2013.
6 HC Committee of Public Accounts, The Criminal Justice System, Fifty-ninth Report of Session 2013-14, HC 1115,
May 2014.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Two 27

A shared vision
2.11 Organisations need to be committed to a shared vision for integrated
working. Each participant in the justice system has their own obligations, priorities and
financial constraints, and performance measures are not aligned. Initiatives to improve
efficiency in one area may have unforeseen consequences. For example, abolishing
committal hearings, which reduced pressures in magistrates’ courts, was followed by
a significant increase in delays in the Crown Court, which did not have the resources
to absorb the increase (Part One).

Incentives
2.12 Inadequate incentives for organisations to work together can prevent the
system from achieving wider benefits, such as savings to the public purse.
There are currently no incentives to encourage organisations to take the best course
of action for the whole system. The solution to a particular cause of inefficiency, and the
investment required, may lie with a different organisation to that in which the problem
arises and the costs are incurred. All parts of the system are under pressure to reduce
costs. This creates a strong incentive to reduce work, even if it causes problems for
others. Costs are therefore shunted from one part of the system to another, rather
than being removed from the system altogether. For example, the police may choose
not to request expensive forensic evidence to reduce their costs, but this can make it
harder for the prosecution to prepare a strong case to persuade a defendant to plead
guilty rather than go to court. Incentives could include commitments made by different
parts of the system in discussion at the Criminal Justice Board, or making performance
information more transparent to acknowledge high‑performing areas. The Leveson
Review also highlighted that the structure of legal aid payments could create perverse
incentives for efficiency by encouraging firms to retain cases for as long as possible.

Implementation capability
2.13 Organisations need to be able to work together in an integrated way, and there
are criteria to assess collaborative working. Different organisational structures and
approaches among the main organisations in the system mean it is difficult for them to work
together effectively at a local level. The police and victims services are seeking to devolve
authority to local level. Other parts of the system, such as the CPS, have a more centralised
structure, with national performance measures. In addition, regional boundaries overlap in
some areas. This means there is no common level of the system (local, regional or national)
where parties have autonomy to agree how to tackle inefficiencies.
28 Part Three Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Part Three

Regional variation
3.1 This part of the report explores the regional variations in reported performance of
the criminal justice system (the system).

3.2 There are significant variations in performance across England and Wales.
This means victims, witnesses and defendants may have very different experiences.
The Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) tracks performance for each of the 42 Local Criminal
Justice Board areas that make up the system. In 2014-15 Crown Court trial effectiveness
rates range from around 20% to around 70%, meaning a victim of crime giving evidence at
a trial in the best-performing region (North Wales) has a 7 in 10 chance that their case will
go ahead, but in the worst performing (Greater Manchester), there is only a 2 in 10 chance
that it will (Figure 10). Around 4 out of 10 of cases in the worst-performing areas crack,
compared with less than 1 in 5 in the highest-performing. The variance in Crown Court
effective trial rates has remained relatively consistent over time and some regions are
consistently in the bottom quartile.

3.3 Cases also take much longer to progress through the system in some regions.
In 2014-15, the length of time between the offence and completion of the case ranged
from 243 days in Durham to 418 days in Sussex – a difference of 175 days (Figure 10).

3.4 In the magistrates’ courts, regional variations in performance are smaller, but
becoming wider. In 2014-15, trial effectiveness rates in the magistrates’ courts ranged
from 50% in the best‑performing area to around 24% in the worst. ‘Cracked’ trial rates
ranged from 20% to 40%. The time between the offence and completion of the case
ranged from 111 to 184 days. But the most recent data suggest that the difference
between worst and best performers is increasing, due to worsening performance
in the weaker areas (Figure 11 on page 30).
Figure 10
System performance at Crown Courts by Local Criminal Justice Board area (ordered by trial effectiveness rate)
There is significant variation in the performance of the system at Crown Courts in different Local Criminal Justice Board areas

Percentage of all cases listed for trial Days from offence to completion
70 450

400
60
350
50
300

40 250

30 200

150
20
100
10
50

0 0

Kent

Essex
Surrey
Dorset

Suffolk
Norfolk

Sussex
Durham

Wiltshire
Cumbria

Cheshire

Cleveland
Derbyshire
Lancashire

Merseyside
Lincolnshire
Humberside

North Wales
West Mercia
Northumbria

South Wales
Staffordshire

Bedfordshire

Hertfordshire
Dyfed Powys
Warwickshire
Leicestershire

Thames Valley
West Midlands
West Yorkshire

North Yorkshire
Gloucestershire

Cambridgeshire
South Yorkshire

Nottinghamshire

Northamptonshire
Avon and Somerset
Greater Manchester

Devon and Cornwall

London Crown Courts

Hampshire and Isle of Wight
First quartile Second quartile Third quartile Fourth quartile
Crown Court performance by region

Effective trials rate year ending Q1, 2015

‘Cracked’ trial rate year ending Q1, 2015
Days from offence to completion year ending Q1, 2015

Note
1 Quartile ranking based on the Effective trial rate.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Justice data

Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Three 29
Figure 11
System performance at magistrates’ courts by Local Criminal Justice Board area (ordered by trial effectiveness rate)
There is significant variation in performance at magistrates’ courts in different Local Criminal Justice Board areas

Percentage of all cases listed for trial Days from offence to completion
60 250

50
200

40
150

30
100
20
30 Part Three Efficiency in the criminal justice system

50
10

0 0

Kent
Essex
Surrey

Gwent
Dorset

Suffolk
Norfolk
Sussex

Durham
Wiltshire
Cumbria
Cheshire

Cleveland
Derbyshire

Lancashire
Merseyside
Lincolnshire
Humberside

North Wales
West Mercia
Northumbria

South Wales
Staffordshire
Bedfordshire

Hertfordshire

Dyfed Powys

Warwickshire
Leicestershire
Thames Valley

West Midlands

West Yorkshire
North Yorkshire

Gloucestershire
Greater London

Cambridgeshire
South Yorkshire
Nottinghamshire

Northamptonshire

Avon and Somerset

Greater Manchester
Devon and Cornwall

Hampshire and Isle of Wight

First quartile Second quartile Third quartile Fourth quartile
Magistrates court performance by region

Effectiveness rate year ending Q2, 2015

‘Cracked’ rate year ending Q2, 2015
Days from offence to completion year ending Q2, 2015

Note
1 Quartile ranking based on the Effective trial rate.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of Ministry of Justice data

 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Three 31

3.5 If the bottom two quartiles of all local areas could achieve as few ‘cracked’ cases
as the top quartile, 15% more cases would be heard in court on the day they were
supposed to. This improvement would save the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) alone
£4 million each year, and also free up valuable court time. It is not possible to calculate
savings for other organisations, as data are not available.

Factors affecting performance

3.6 There are many reasons for the variation in system performance but limited sharing
of good practice. We visited a selection of courts throughout the country to explore the
reasons for the variations in performance. We identified a number of factors that both
individually, and in combination, can influence performance. Although some of these
cannot be controlled by individual courts, others can. There are some formal mechanisms
for identifying and sharing good practice across the system as a whole, but awareness
and use of these varies.

Factors outside a court’s control

3.7 The mix of cases being tried in a given area can affect performance, because
some offences typically take longer to prosecute than others, or may be more likely to
crack. Some courts specialise in certain offences: Southwark is the designated court
for fraud and money laundering cases, which are typically complex and long‑running
compared with other types of crime. The geography of an area can affect the mix
of cases, for example areas with ports or airports may see more smuggling and
border offences.

3.8 The mix of cases can also change over time: Birmingham Crown Court, which
is one of the largest urban court centres, has seen a significant increase in fraud, drugs
and complex homicide cases, which can involve lengthy trials and multiple defendants.
The average length of cases at Birmingham Crown Court has nearly doubled from
13.3 hours during April to August 2014 to 24.5 hours for the same period in 2015.

3.9 Court size, age and facilities can have an impact on how cases are managed.
Bigger court centres can make it easier to list multiple cases, or to introduce initiatives
such as holding dedicated courts for particular offences. Birmingham has the largest
Crown Court with 16 courtrooms as well as access to two jury-compatible courts in the
adjacent magistrates’ court. This gives court staff extra flexibility to move cases between
courts if needed, which reduces the risk that cases will need rescheduling because
of a lack of court rooms.
32 Part Three Efficiency in the criminal justice system

3.10 Some areas have newer, more flexible courts, in which it is relatively easy to install
technology, or to provide more suitable facilities for victims and witnesses. In other
areas, staff are constrained by operating in older, sometimes listed buildings. At Kent
magistrates’ court we were told that the introduction of the dedicated videoconferencing
court had given an incentive for Kent police to invest in their own video equipment at
police stations. When the case allows, police officers now give evidence from their police
station, saving travel time but also allowing officers to work in a secure environment
while they wait to give evidence. Expert witnesses based in different parts of the country
are also using the video links to give evidence in Kent courts, saving on travel costs.

3.11 Available capacity in the courts also has an impact on performance. Capacity
does not necessarily correspond with the areas of high demand. In many of the areas
we visited, magistrates’ courts, which tried 10% fewer cases in 2014-15 than in 2010-11,
had spare capacity but Crown Courts did not have enough. When Crown Courts are
full it puts pressure on custody cells and interview rooms and the court operates less
efficiently. There is limited flexibility for the Crown Courts to make use of spare capacity
in the magistrates’ courts, because the courtrooms do not always have facilities for juries
or secure docks.

Factors within the control of courts

3.12 There are areas over which courts have more control, in particular their working
practices, which vary between courts. For example, Swansea magistrates’ court has a
strong focus on improving efficiency. It holds weekly meetings with CPS and the police
to look ahead and identify special requirements for upcoming trials. It also reviews why
parts of the process did not run smoothly. Other courts told us they used to do this but
no longer had the resources.

3.13 We saw one example of a small but impactful change to working practices at
Birmingham Crown Court, where police officers can now request appointments to
obtain search warrants from judges. Previously, officers had to come to court and wait
for an available judge, which could take a long time. Now, police officers phone ahead
for an appointment slot, come into the court and speak directly to the judge. The whole
process takes 10 minutes. The police estimate this will save the equivalent of 2 full-time
police officer positions over a year. The change was easy to implement as court staff
know judges’ availability and needed no additional funding.

3.14 Some courts also make greater use of technology than others, although the
current reform programme should address this (Part Four). In Manchester magistrates’
court, staff told us that they had automated administrative tasks, saving the equivalent of
2 full‑time staff posts.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Three 33

3.15 Courts we visited take different views on what constitutes a ‘good’ result.
Some courts consider that cracking a case is good because it spares the full cost
of a trial and finishes the case. Other courts focus on improving effectiveness and
identifying cases that are likely to crack (for example, because the defendant pleads
guilty or because the charge is withdrawn) before the case gets to trial, resulting
in lower ‘cracked’ rates. There is no agreement across the system about which
approach is better.

3.16 Courts also have different approaches to listing cases, partly as a result
of the constraints they face in terms of capacity and flexibility of the court facilities
(paragraphs 3.7 to 3.11). Listing is carried out by courts’ staff, under judicial direction.
All courts list more cases than can be heard, because a significant proportion will not
go ahead. Cases may be listed with different degrees of certainty. Cases on a ‘fixed list’
are generally expected to go ahead on the specified date. Other cases may be given a
‘floating’ date, where those involved are told the week the case is likely to be heard, but
the exact day is not confirmed until the day before. Cases may be listed as ‘warned’,
meaning those involved should prepare for the case to be heard but there is no guarantee
that it will be. We saw different practice around the country in terms of how fixed the list
is, and how likely it is that cases in the ‘warned’ lists will be heard. Some courts told us
that if a case has been listed as ‘floating’ and is not heard, they will be given a fixed date
on the next occasion. Other courts will list a case as ‘floating’ several times.

3.17 Opinions vary on which is the best approach to take. Some court staff we spoke to
felt that victims and witnesses prefer the certainty of a fixed listing, even if it takes longer
for the case to reach court. Others felt some victims would prefer swifter justice, even at
the risk of rescheduling. Fixed lists give the CPS, police, witnesses and defence lawyers
certainty and make it easier for them to manage their time. This may reduce costs
associated with wasted court time, delays and rework of cases, and travel expenses.
Defence barristers we spoke to singled out this practice as being particularly useful.
Fixed lists are, however, less flexible and increase the risk of empty court rooms, which
is a particular concern given the backlog of cases in the Crown Court.

3.18 There is often a presumption that if cases are listed sooner then they are less likely
to be effective (because there is less time to prepare) but if they are listed later they are
more likely to be effective but would score poorly on timeliness figures. This is not always
the case: some areas with the highest effectiveness rates are also among those with the
shortest delays (Figure 12 overleaf, Figure 13 on page 35 and Figure 14 on page 36).
34 Part Three Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 12
Regional variation – timeliness in the Crown Court
Offence to completion 2014-15

350 days or more

330 days to less than 350 days
310 days to less than 330 days
290 days to less than 310 days
Less than 290 days
No data available

Note
1 Mean timeliness data may be skewed by a small minority of very long cases.

Source: National Audit Office analysis of the published Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Three 35

Figure 13
Regional variation – ‘cracked’ trial rate at the Crown Court
‘Cracked’ trial rate (%), 2014-15

35% or more
30% to less than 35%
25% to less than 30%
20% to less than 25%
Less than 20%
No data available

Source: National Audit Office analysis of the published Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics
36 Part Three Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 14
Regional variation – effective trial rate at the Crown Court
Effective trial rate (%), 2014-15

Less than 25%

25% to less than 30%
30% to less than 35%
35% to less than 40%
40% or more
No data available

Source: National Audit Office analysis of the published Ministry of Justice Criminal Court Statistics
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Four 37

Part Four

Reform of the system

4.1 This part of the report describes the initiatives that the Ministry of Justice
(the Ministry), Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the judiciary have put in place to
tackle inefficiencies and improve the progression of cases through the criminal justice
system (the system). It is too early to assess the likely success of these measures,
however we have identified a number of risks that these bodies must manage if they
are to deliver the intended benefits.

4.2 There have been many attempts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the system: the 1993 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, Lord Justice Auld’s 2001
review of the criminal courts and, more recently, Sir Brian Leveson’s 2015 Review of
Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings. Repeated reviews are necessary, partly because
the system continues to evolve (for example, jurisprudence changes, technology
facilitates different ways of working and changes to the responsibilities of government
departments reconfigure parts of the system) and partly because reforming it is difficult.

4.3 The Ministry, the CPS and the judiciary have instigated a number of different
programmes to reduce costs and improve quality. The Ministry expects to save over
£200 million a year by 2019-20 as a result of improvements (Figure 15 overleaf).

Improving the flow of cases through the system

4.4 There are two initiatives to reduce unnecessary delays and improve case
progression: Transforming Summary Justice was implemented in magistrates’ courts in
2015. Better Case Management is being introduced to Crown Courts in 2016. Both aim
to improve preparation for court so that more hearings will then go ahead successfully.

Improving technology and digitisation of courts

4.5 The Ministry is investing £700 million in modernising the courts, both to reduce
the costs of the estate and to transform the way in which justice is administered using
technology and deliver an improved service at lower cost (courts reform programme).
The CPS and HM Courts & Tribunals Service (HMCTS) are jointly leading an initiative to
introduce a single online case management system (the Common Platform) covering the
entire process from pre‑charge to disposal, with all parties having access to one digital
case file (Figure 15).
38 Part Four Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 15
The reform programmes
Reform programme Lead agency Detail Costs Expected benefits
Transforming HMCTS A joint criminal justice system initiative, aimed Not specified Fewer delays and
Summary Justice and CPS at simplifying the process for summary cases aborted hearings, and
in the magistrates’ courts. Since May 2015, earlier guilty pleas.
organisations across the system are working
towards implementing 10 characteristics
of the Transforming Summary Justice
programme. These fall under three themes –
simplifying cases and streamlining the system;
identifying cases for early guilty pleas and
securing these pleas earlier on; and ensuring
smoother case progression.

Better Case Judiciary The Better Case Management initiative Not specified Improved case
Management aims to improve case management in the progression, which
(Crown Court) Crown Court. It forms part of the response should lead to fewer
to Sir Brian Leveson’s report Efficiency in delayed and aborted
Criminal Proceedings, and is based on the trials, and earlier
overarching principles identified in that review. guilty pleas.
Better Case Management introduces
two case management initiatives – a renewed
emphasis on a uniform national early guilty
plea scheme, and Crown Court disclosure in
document-heavy cases. It will also shorten
timescales, and reduce the number of
interim hearings.

Court reform HMCTS Modernisation of the court estate to £75 million £200 million each year
programme include WiFi in all courts, new equipment each year by 2019-20.
for presenting digital evidence in court for five years
and the roll-out of video link systems. from 2015-16
An online self-service court system that will
allow defendants to enter a plea, complete
forms and pay fines.
Court closure programme aimed at
improving utilisation of court rooms and
reducing the cost of running the estate.

Common Platform CPS and To develop a single case management system £381 million £425 million across
HMCTS for the CPS and HMCTS. The Common 10 years (£318 million
Platform includes an integrated digital case for HMCTS and
file, which will reduce the amount of paper £107 million for CPS).
used in the system, and move as much
as possible of the process online, with the
aim of achieving a fully digital system.
Case file starts when the police gather
evidence, and all parties (CPS, judiciary,
defence and courts) will have access
as needed.

Source: National Audit Office review of Ministry of Justice documents

 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Part Four 39

Risks to delivery
4.6 Transforming Summary Justice was first introduced in some areas in May 2015,
and early signs are that it is beginning to have an impact on performance of the
magistrates’ courts. There has been a slight rise in the number of effective trials, and
a corresponding fall in ineffective trials during the last nine months of 2015 (Part One).
The Better Case Management initiative has not been fully introduced so it is too early
to say whether it is having an impact on reported performance. Staff at the courts we
visited were hopeful that it would lead to improvements; however, courts’ staff and the
judiciary have limited formal powers to influence the behaviour of lawyers who do not
comply, and the schemes do not include any new powers, although more cases are
now being thrown out for not being ready (paragraph 1.16). There are already guidelines
on managing cases, which are not always followed, and these new approaches do not
contain any new formal mechanisms to enforce compliance.

4.7 The Ministry’s reform plans to transform the system depend on introducing new
information technology, and embedding a culture of digital working within different
organisations. This will address one of the long‑standing problems with the system
highlighted by the Committee of Public Accounts in its May 2014 report: that there
had been slow progress in improving IT, and there were still too many disparate
systems, which failed to operate together.7 We have examined many IT-enabled
change projects. Our experience suggests that these are very difficult to deliver well,
and the government does not have a good track record in this area. The Ministry must
learn from the challenges encountered on other programmes if it is to deliver these
change programmes successfully. Some of the risks it will need to overcome include:

• delays to delivering the IT elements;

• failure to understand the needs of users;

• failure to ensure buy‑in among users of the new system; and

• optimism bias in estimating costs and benefits.

4.8 One of the most common challenges in delivering IT-enabled change is to focus all of
the attention on the technology, and not enough on the users. On one of our case study
visits, we were told that the judiciary were keen to support and prepare for digital working,
but that they were unable to secure the necessary training: some members would like to
be able to learn how to touch type, and had identified a course, but were unable to find
funding to pay for it. We cannot say whether this is a widespread concern across the
system, but it is illustrative of the problems that can arise for these types of programmes.

7 HC Committee of Public Accounts, The Criminal Justice System, Fifty-ninth Report of Session 2013-14, HC 1115,
May 2014.
40 Part Four Efficiency in the criminal justice system

4.9 The Ministry is constrained in introducing new technology in some areas by

the nature of the court estate, with particular challenges in adapting historic or listed
buildings. Moving to a predominantly digital way of working represents significant
cultural change for many areas of the system, which are very paper-based and rely on
manual entry onto ageing IT systems. The programme will only work if all parties can be
persuaded of the benefits, so it is important to ensure the participation of other criminal
justice partners such as the defence community.

4.10 As outlined in Part Two, there is currently a lack of effective sanctions where parties
are not following established procedures, and a lack of whole‑system governance and
oversight. The Ministry’s reforms will not be successful unless all parties see the benefit
of the planned changes, and are given incentives to follow the new ways of working.
Without an effective mechanism through which one part of the system can hold another
to account for poor performance, it is not clear what incentives the reforms will provide
for organisations to use the new systems as intended.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Appendix One 41

Appendix One

Our audit approach

1 This study examined what the opportunities are to improve the efficiency of
proceedings in the criminal justice system (the system) in England and Wales. The study
builds on findings of the Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings published by
Sir Brian Leveson in January 2015, to provide an evidence‑based assessment of the
areas of inefficiency and to try to quantify these where possible. We have also looked
across the system as a whole, to understand the effect actions in one area of the
system can have on another. We defined efficiency in terms of whether things could be
done more quickly or for less money, getting things right first time and delivering the
right outcomes.

2 We assessed:

• the overall performance of the system, and the context for improving inefficiency;

• the main causes of inefficiency in the criminal justice system;

• regional variation in the performance of courts across the country; and

• the programme of reforms the government has in place to address inefficiency in

the system, and how the Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) is addressing the main
issues – we did not assess the effectiveness of the Ministry’s planned reforms as
it is too early to do so.

3 The scope of the study is from the charging decision until sentencing. Included in
this scope is the examination of the file prepared by the police, the case prosecuted by
the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the administration, management and organisation
of that case by HM Courts & Tribunals Service, the role of the judiciary and how the
decision-making and overall effectiveness of each of these bodies can impact on the
overall system.

4 Our audit approach is shown in Figure 16 overleaf and evidence base is detailed in
Appendix Two.
42 Appendix One Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 16
Our audit approach
The objective of
government The Ministry of Justice, the Home Office and the Attorney General’s Office all have a collective role, either directly
or indirectly through their executive agencies, in overseeing the effective running of the criminal justice system.
The policy objectives that result from this are to reduce crime, increase efficiency in the processing of justice, to
mitigate the impact on those who pass through the system and to provide a whole-of-system view that individual
executive agencies may not have sight of.

This will
be achieved Among the Ministry’s main activities is the monitoring of the performance of the system through the collection,
analysis and partial publication of criminal court statistics across England and Wales. This publication includes a
large amount of information on the timeliness and effectiveness of different courts, broken down to a regional level.

Our study
Our study examined what the opportunities are to improve the efficiency of proceedings in the system in England
and Wales.

Our evaluative
criteria What are the opportunities to What are the consequences What are the constraints
improve efficiency in criminal of inefficiency in criminal on government’s ability to
court proceedings? court proceedings? improve efficiency in criminal
court proceedings?

Our evidence
We have performed extensive We have obtained information on We have considered the
(see Appendix Two
data analysis on both published the costing of various processes governance arrangements in the
for details)
data sets and internal commonly performed in the system through process mapping
management information. system and used this to price in and a review of the meeting
a minimum (but not complete) minutes of the reconstituted
We have interviewed Criminal Justice Board.
cost of certain inefficiencies.
key stakeholders.
We have also assessed the • Interviews with
We have analysed regional key stakeholders.
non-financial costs of inefficiency
differences in both court
such as the impact on victims,
and CPS performance.
jurors and whether the outcome
• Describing but not analysing
the planned reforms.
is regarded as just.

Our conclusions
Our key findings are shown in paragraphs 8 to 16 and our value-for-money conclusions are shown in paragraphs
17 and 18. Despite improvements in the management of cases, around two-thirds of criminal trials do not proceed
as planned on the day they were originally scheduled. Delays and aborted hearings create extra work, waste scarce
resources and undermine confidence in the system. Notwithstanding the challenges of improving the efficiency of a
system designed to maintain independence of the constituent parts, there are many areas where improvements can
be made. Large parts of the system are paper-based and parties are not always doing what they are supposed to do
in a timely manner. The system is not currently delivering value for money. The ambitious reforms led by the Ministry,
CPS and judiciary are designed to tackle many of these issues, by reducing reliance on paper records and enabling
more flexible digital working. They have the potential to improve value for money but will not address all of the causes
of inefficiency. More also needs to be done to explore and address the wide regional variations in performance, and
to create incentives that encourage all parties to operate in the best interests of the system as a whole.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Appendix Two 43

Appendix Two

Our evidence base

1 We performed an in-depth analysis of the published quarterly criminal court
statistics from the first quarter of 2010 up to the third quarter of 2015. This included
analysing the statistics for effective, ineffective, ‘cracked’ and vacated trial rates at a
national level (Part One), alongside a regional analysis based on the 42 Local Criminal
Justice Board areas (Part Three). We also analysed the links with the timeliness data
produced by each region. We have included vacated trials in our overall calculation
of the percentage of effective trials, as we consider it gives a more complete picture
of activity. The Ministry of Justice (the Ministry) does not include vacated trials when
calculating the effective trial rate, meaning that figures in this report will differ from
published statistics.

2 We obtained internal management information from the Crown Prosecution Service

(CPS) that allowed us to estimate the cost of certain processes that it performs on
various cases in magistrates’ and Crown Courts respectively. It should be noted that
this information is to be treated cautiously as it was made for internal use; however,
it is the best information available and is what the CPS uses to manage its own
business. We therefore consider that it is reasonable to use it to develop estimates.

3 We obtained internal information from the reform unit of HM Courts & Tribunals
Service (HMCTS). This was based on the management accounts produced for internal
use. It allowed us to put a minimum, but not complete, variable cost of a court day in
the Crown Courts and magistrate’ courts respectively. This included staff costs, judicial
costs and juror costs.
44 Appendix Two Efficiency in the criminal justice system

4 We visited courts around the country. These courts were chosen to include a wide
spread of relevant characteristics including geography, size, culture, high- and low‑level
performance and whether they were introducing any novel local projects such as new
digital services. These visits allowed us to engage with many of the local stakeholders
who oversee the implementation of the system on the front line. These included, but were
not limited to, senior HMCTS staff, resident judges, operations managers, listings officers,
defence counsel and victims and witness representatives. The courts we visited were:

• Manchester magistrates’ court.

• Kingston Crown Court.

• Chatham magistrates’ court and Maidstone Crown Court.

• Southwark Crown Court.

• Birmingham magistrates’ court and Crown Court.

• Sunderland magistrates’ court and Newcastle Crown Court.

• Sheffield magistrates’ court and Crown Court.

• Swansea magistrates’ court and Crown Court.

5 We consulted with major stakeholders within the system, including interviewing

Ministry staff; senior members of the judiciary; Sir Brian Leveson, author of the Review
of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (January 2015); the CPS; HM Courts & Tribunals
Service; victims and witness representatives from the Witness Service; and the Ministry
to ensure we collected a wide range of opinions from all those involved.

6 We consulted with our internal experts from the Operational Delivery and Process
Management Community of Practice.
 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Appendix Three 45

Appendix Three

Case progression from charge to disposal

See Figures 17 to 19 on pages 46 to 51.
46 Appendix Three Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 17
Case progression process – charging decisions

Police charging – high-volume minor or routine cases

Not enough evidence
(eg traffic offences)
No involvement from the CPS
Enough evidence, but not
appropriate for court

Enough evidence and

appropriate for court

Police gather evidence and assess

whether there is likely to be enough
evidence to prosecute

Investigation
of offence
Police should consider
evidence and case
management requirements
at this stage Enough evidence
and outside police
charging area Police refer case to the
central CPS Direct phone
line for advice
Duty solicitors (legal aid)
provided to some suspects
when questioned by police
Police should provide
pre-charge reports and
potential disclosure
information at this stage

Enough evidence
and a very serious
charge is likely Police refer case to the
CPS area office for advice
on charge

Process step
Key actions and responsibilities

Source: National Audit Office analysis

 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Appendix Three 47

Police decide to take no

further action

Police decide an appropriate

out-of-court disposal

Police decide the appropriate

charge and the case is
prepared for court

Does not warrant

prosecution
CPSD/CPS area asks for CPS decides to take no
more information (pre-charge further action
action plan)

Charging
Victim can ask for the decision decision made
Insufficient to be reviewed at this stage
information
provided
Warrants prosecution
but not appropriate
CPSD/CPS area assesses for court CPS decides an appropriate
whether a prosecution out-of-court disposal
is warranted

Views of
victims should
be sought and
considered at Warrants prosecution
this stage and appropriate
for court CPS decides on the
appropriate charge and the
case is prepared for court
48 Appendix Three Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 18
Case progression process – preparation for court

Should happen as early

as possible to avoid the
case being listed for
trial unnecessarily

Case discontinued

Does not warrant

prosecution

Prosecution presents The court issues a CPS prosecutor

a written summary summons to defendant reviews case
of the charge to the (and warrant where
court, ie HM Courts & required) and notifies
Charging
Tribunals Service staff the prosecution
decision made

Some defendants Should happen as early

receive legal as possible and always
aid-funded defence before first hearing

Each party should appoint a case progression officer who

is the point of contact for the case and who is responsible
for ensuring compliance with case management, eg sharing
information and responding to queries about the case in a
timely manner

Process step
Key actions and responsibilities

Source: National Audit Office analysis

 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Appendix Three 49

Case file is ‘built’ Initial disclosure and Court lists the case
by police with other communication for a first hearing
guidance from CPS between prosecution
and defence about plea Case
proceeds
to court

The size of the Communication with

file should be the defence should be
proportionate to the timely so the defence
complexity and the can give the best
expected plea advice to client

Police and CPS should continue to communicate with the

victim and witnesses about the progress of the case

Each party should appoint a case progression officer who

is the point of contact for the case and who is responsible
for ensuring compliance with case management, eg sharing
information and responding to queries about the case in a
timely manner
50 Appendix Three Efficiency in the criminal justice system

Figure 19
Case progression process – in court

Not in a courtroom No prosecutor or defence

‘Single justice
Guilty plea
cases’ (identified Plea entered
by prosecutor) in writing

Defendant has the

Prosecution sets out
right to request Not guilty plea
summary of the evidence
a traditional
court hearing Summary
cases, eg
TV licence Guilty plea
Plea entered in
magistrates’ court Guilty plea
Not guilty plea

Initial hearing Subsequent hearings

Less serious cases
in magistrates’ to determine issues
court to hear in dispute
plea and decide
court allocation
First
hearing
Prosecution
makes submission Serious cases
regarding where
the case should
be heard

Must be listed Plea and trial Guilty plea Prosecution sets

A decision on bail in Crown Court preparation out summary of
may be required within 28 days hearing the evidence

Defendants in
Not guilty plea
custody transferred
to court for hearings

Prosecution Case management Further case

and defence to prepare for trial management
should prepare takes place hearing (if needed)
all information
needed for
the hearing
Resolve additional
issues before trial

Process step Key actions and responsibilities

Source: National Audit Office analysis

 Efficiency in the criminal justice system Appendix Three 51

Magistrate can refer to traditional hearing at any point

Magistrate considers case, with Sentenced by

assistance from legal adviser magistrate

Within
magistrates’
powers
Defence sets Pre-sentence report Sentenced by
out mitigation requested (if required) magistrate

Final case files An adjournment

provided to defence Found guilty may be required
before sentencing

Plea and case Trial before Found not guilty Case dismissed
management magistrate begins
by magistrate
hearing

Case
disposed

Outside magistrates’ powers

Sentenced by judge
in Crown Court

Defence sets Pre-sentence

out mitigation report requested
(if required)

Defendants in
custody transferred Found guilty
to court for hearings

Found
Case listed Jury selected Trial before not guilty Case dismissed
for trial judge and jury by judge

Prosecution Special measures for court should be provided

and defence where needed
communicate with
witnesses for trial
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